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BUFFERD v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 91-7804. Argued November 30, 1992 Decided January 25, 1993 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stuart J. Filler, by appointment of the Court, 506 U. S. 809, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Toni Robinson and Mary Ferrari. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Ann B. Durney, and Janet Kay Jones. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Arthur H. Boelter and John J. White, Jr., pro se; and for Charles T. Green et al. by Robert I. White. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. On his 1979 income tax return, petitioner, a shareholder in a Subchapter S corporation, claimed as “pass-through” items portions of a deduction and a tax credit reported on the corporation’s return. The question presented is whether the 3-year period in which the Internal Revenue Service is permitted to assess petitioner’s tax liability runs from the filing date of the individual return or the corporate return. We conclude with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that the relevant date is that on which petitioner’s return was filed. I Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1361-1379, was enacted in 1958 to eliminate tax disadvantages that might dissuade small businesses from adopting the corporate form and to lessen the tax burden on such businesses. The statute accomplishes these goals by means of a pass-through system under which corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits are attributed to individual shareholders in a manner akin to the tax treatment of partnerships. See §§ 1366-1368. In addition, since 1966, “S corporations” have been liable for certain capital gains and other taxes. 80 Stat. 111, 113; 26 U. S. C. §§ 1374, 1378. Petitioner was treasurer and a shareholder of Compo Financial Services, Inc., an S corporation. On February 1, 1980, Compo filed a return for the tax year of December 26, 1978, to November 30, 1979, as required by § 6037(a) of the Code. On that return, Compo reported a loss deduction and an investment tax credit arising from its partnership interest in a venture known as Printers Associates. Petitioner and his wife filed a joint return for 1979 on April 15, 1980. Their return claimed a pro rata share of the deduction and credit reported by Compo pursuant to the pass-through provisions of Subchapter S. Code § 6501(a) establishes a generally applicable statute of limitations providing that the Internal Revenue Service may assess tax deficiencies within a 3-year period from the date a return is filed. That limitations period may be extended by written agreement. § 6501(c)(4). In March 1983, before three years had passed from the time the joint return was filed, petitioner agreed to extend the period in which deficiencies arising from certain claims on the return could be assessed against him. No extension was obtained from Compo with respect to its return for the 1978-1979 tax year. In 1987, the Commissioner determined that the loss deduction and credit reported by Compo were erroneous and sent a notice of deficiency to petitioner based on the loss deduction and credit that he had claimed on his return. In the Tax Court, petitioner contended that the Commissioner’s claim was time barred because the disallowance was based on an error in Compo’s return, for which the 3-year assessment period had lapsed. The Tax Court found for the Commissioner, relying on its decision in Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T. C. 863 (1990), aff’d, 954 F. 2d 653 (CA11 1992). See App. 61. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, where a tax deficiency is assessed against the shareholder, the filing date of the shareholder’s return is the relevant date for purposes of § 6501(a). 952 F. 2d 675 (1992). Because another Court of Appeals has a contrary view, we granted certiorari. 505 U. S. 1203 (1992). II Title 26 U. S. C. § 6501(a) states simply that “the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed . . . The issue before us is whether “the” return is that of petitioner or that of the corporation which was the source of the loss and credit claimed on petitioner’s return. Petitioner’s position is that the Commissioner had three years from the date his return was filed to object to that return in any respect except the loss and credit items passed through to him by the corporation. To disallow those items, petitioner argues, the Commissioner must have acted within three years of the filing of the corporate return. Under this approach, “the” return referred to in § 6501(a) becomes two returns, and petitioner claims that there is adequate statutory basis for his submission. We have no doubt that the courts below properly concluded, as the Commissioner argued, that it is the filing of petitioner’s return that triggers the running of the statutory period. The Commissioner can only determine whether the taxpayer understated his tax obligation and should be assessed a deficiency after examining that taxpayer’s return. Plainly, then, “the” return referred to in § 6501(a) is the return of the taxpayer against whom a deficiency is assessed. Here, the Commissioner sought to assess taxes which petitioner owed under the Code because his return had erroneously reported a loss and credit to which he was not entitled. The fact that the corporation’s return erroneously asserted a loss and credit to be passed through to its shareholders is of no consequence. In this case, the errors on the corporate return did not and could not affect the tax liability of the corporation, and hence the Commissioner could only assess a deficiency against the stockholder-taxpayer whose return claimed the benefit of the errors. Under the plain language of § 6501(a), the Commissioner’s time to make the assessment ran from the filing date of petitioner’s return. By contrast, the S corporation’s return, which petitioner asserts triggers the beginning of the limitations period, is deficient precisely because it does not contain all of the information necessary to compute a shareholder’s taxes. If the Internal Revenue Service were required to rely on that return, it would be forced to conduct its assessment on the basis of incomplete information: “While [the corporate return] may show petitioner’s distributive share of losses, it does not indicate his adjusted basis in his corporate stock, which is information necessary to determine if the loss is deductible. Nor does it show petitioner’s income, losses, deductions, and credits from other sources. Moreover, the information return of the S corporation does not relate to the same taxable period as petitioner’s return . . . .” Fehlhaber, supra, at 869 (citation omitted). As noted in analogous cases, tax returns that “lack the data necessary for the computation and assessment of deficiencies” generally should not be regarded as triggering the period of assessment. Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, 188 (1957) (citing Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U. S. 219 (1944)). Petitioner asserts that § 6501(a) supports a contrary view when read in light of two related Code provisions pertaining to S corporations. Section 6012(a)(2) requires both Sub-chapter C and Subchapter S corporations to file income tax returns. Section 6037(a) specifies the information that each S corporation’s return must provide (including “each shareholder’s pro rata share of each item of the corporation”) and further states that “[a]ny return filed pursuant to this section shall, for purposes of [26 U. S. C. §§6501-6531], be treated as a return filed by the corporation under section 6012.” We do not see that these provisions aid petitioner’s cause. Read together, §§ 6012(a)(2), 6037(a), and 6501(a) establish only that each S corporation must file a tax return containing certain information and that a Commissioner desiring to make an assessment must act within three years of filing. Nothing on the face of these provisions demonstrates that an individual’s income tax return is brought within the compass of § 6037(a)’s reference to “any return” simply because a portion of that return reports income and losses that have passed through from the return of an S corporation. If anything, the phrase “[a]ny return filed pursuant to this section,” coupled with the fact that § 6037(a) is concerned with describing the contents of the corporation’s return, indicates that the provision is not meant to determine when the assessment period for a shareholder’s individual tax return begins. Petitioner argues that this reading of the relevant provisions runs afoul of the fact that, prior to 1966, S corporations were not subject to taxation. According to petitioner, no purpose would have been served by establishing an assessment period that applied to returns reporting corporate income on which no taxes could be assessed but not to the returns of corporate stockholders. This argument fails because even in the period when the S corporation could net be taxed, examination of a corporation’s return was necessary to determine if it could lay valid claim to Subchapter S status. Section 6037(a) thus originally functioned to set the starting date of the 3-year period within which that determination had to be made. See United States v. Adams Building Co., 531 F. 2d 342, 343, n. 2 (CA6 1976); see also 952 F. 2d, at 677 (citing Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 94 T. C. 863 (1990)). Petitioner maintains that such a function would be superfluous because, if the election of S corporation status were found invalid, the corporation’s return would “automatically be subject to the existing rules for C corporations.” Brief for Petitioner 38. But this proposition is hardly self-evident, and petitioner cites no authority to support it. In the absence of § 6037(a), the Internal Revenue Service could claim that a corporation which flies a return containing an erroneous election of Subchapter S status has failed to file any return, which would allow the Service to issue a notice of deficiency with respect to the return “at any time.” See § 6601(c)(3); cf. Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 304, 307 (1940); Mason v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 718, 721 (ND Ga. 1992). The Ninth Circuit’s rejection in Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F. 2d 756 (1989), of the view adopted by the Commissioner was prompted in part by a concern to avoid unfairly burdening shareholders, who might find it difficult to obtain corporate records necessary to defend against a deficiency assessment based on an adjustment made to a corporation’s return years after it was filed. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion by Judge Goldberg in Green v. Commissioner, 963 F. 2d 783 (1992), neatly summarizes the appropriate response to that concern: “First, it is not unfamiliar in the world of tax to have ‘an individual’s income tax return ... dependent on records maintained by another entity.’ Fehlkaber, 954 F. 2d at 658 (citing partnership and trust taxation as examples). Second, the rule generally does not impose an undue burden on the corporation or the shareholder. ... A shareholder can ‘take the necessary steps to ensure that the corporation preserves the relevant records.’ Id. Such protective steps simply do not constitute an overly oppressive task for the shareholder. Bufferd, 952 F. 2d at 678. . . . Finally, we reject any suggestion that we elevate the ‘perceived unfairness to taxpayers’ over our duty to strictly construe in favor of the government a statute of limitation when the petitioner seeks application of the statute so as to bar the rights of the government. Fehlkaber, 954 F. 2d at 658.” Id., at 789. H-( H-( As found by the courts below, the plain language of § 6501(a) supports the Commissioner. The statutory evidence and policy considerations proffered by petitioner offer no basis for questioning this conclusion. We hold that the limitations period within which the Internal Revenue Service must assess the income tax liability of an S corporation shareholder runs from the date on which the shareholder’s return is filed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Subchapter S was substantially amended and recodified by the Sub-chapter S Revision Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1669. The pass-through provisions in effect in the period relevant to this case, see 26 U. S. C. §§ 1373-1374 (1976 ed.), differ in certain respects from the present provisions. These differences do not affect the case. In relevant part, the statute reads: “§ 6037. Return of S corporation “(a) In general “Every S corporation shall make a return for each taxable year, stating specifically the items of its gross income and the deductions allowable by subtitle A [and other information]. Any return filed pursuant to this section shall, for purposes of chapter 66 (relating to limitations), be treated as a return filed by the corporation under section 6012.” Phyllis Bufferd settled separately with the Commissioner and is not a party to this action. The statute reads in part: “§ 6601. Limitations on assessment and collection “(a) General rule “Except as otherwise provided . . . the amount of any tax imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed ... Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F. 2d 766 (CA9 1989), held that the filing date of the corporation’s return controls. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have joined the Second Circuit in declining to follow Kelley. See Green v. Commissioner, 963 F. 2d 783 (CA6 1992); Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F. 2d 653 (CA11 1992). Even if it could credibly be argued that § 6501(a) is ambiguous because it does not expressly indicate how it is to be applied to S corporations and their stockholders, the Commissioner’s construction of the section is a reasonable one to say the least, and we should accept it absent convincing grounds for rejecting it. As noted in Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U. S. 386 (1984), “ ‘limitations statutes barring the collection of taxes otherwise due and unpaid are strictly construed in favor of the Government.’ ” Id., at 392 (quoting Lucia v. United States, 474 F. 2d 565, 570 (CA5 1973)). In these circumstances, the incompleteness of the corporate return provides a reason for doubting petitioner’s understanding of the Code. We do not thereby suggest that, for cases in which a corporate return does supply all of the information necessary to process a shareholder’s return, the mere fact of completeness is sufficient to establish the corporate return as “the” return of § 6501(a). Section 6012(a)(2) reads: “§ 6012. Persons required to make returns of income “(a) General rule “Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the following:... “(2) Every corporation subject to taxation under subtitle A ... .” Since S corporations are now subject to limited taxation, § 6037(a) serves the additional function of determining the assessment period for those taxes. See 962 F. 2d, at 678. Petitioner’s reading of § 6037(a) is sufficiently lacking in textual support to obviate any need to examine legislative history. However, several courts have noted that the history of § 6037 contains evidence in support of the Commissioner’s interpretation. See, e. g., Green v. Commissioner, 963 F. 2d, at 788-790; Fehlhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F. 2d, at 656-657. Section 6037(a) was introduced in the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1606, 1656. The Senate Report explaining the provision states: “Notwithstanding the fact that an electing small-business corporation is not subject to the tax imposed by chapter 1 of the 1954 Code, such corporation must make a return for each taxable year in accordance with new section 6037 .... Such return will be considered as a return filed under section 6012 for purposes of the provisions of chapter 66, relating to limitations. Thus, for example, the period of limitation on assessment and collection of any corporate tax found to be due upon a subsequent determination that the corporation was not entitled to the benefits of subchapter S, will run from the date of filing of the return required under the new section 6037.” S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 226 (1968). Although the passage would seem to support the Commissioner’s view, petitioner, following the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F. 2d 756 (1989), maintains that the phrase “for example” necessarily implies that the Senate also had in mind the present case. This implication is hardly necessary: The phrase just as easily could have been meant to avoid foreclosing other applications of § 6037(a) to corporate returns. Indeed, had “for example” been omitted, the Commissioner could now rely on this passage to argue that the period for assessing capital gains taxes under 26 U. S. C. § 1374 is not controlled by § 6037(a), but is instead governed by the filing date of a shareholder’s return or some other triggering event. Likewise, in the absence of the phrase, it could be argued that, because the legislative history refers exclusively to a case in which taxes are assessed against a corporation that erroneously claims Subchapter S status, the period in which penalties may be assessed against the corporation should not be governed by § 6037(a). The Commissioner claims additional support in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to Subchapter S, which states in relevant part: “Under present law, a taxpayer’s individual tax liability is determined in proceedings between the Internal Revenue Service and the individual whose tax liability is in dispute. Thus, any issues involving the income or deductions of a subchapter S corporation are determined separately in ... proceedings involving the individual shareholder whose tax liability is affected. Statutes of limitations apply at the individual level, based on the returns filed by the individual. The filing by the corporation of its return does not affect the statute of limitations applicable to the shareholders.” S. Rep. No. 97-640, p. 25 (1982). This passage is of little value to either side. While the views of a Congress engaged in the amendment of existing law as to the intent behind that law are “entitled to significant weight,” Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1980), in this instance, the Report’s account of “present law” may have been colored, if not wholly determined, by the Tax Court, which had already adopted the view espoused by the Commissioner. See Leonhart v. Commissioner, 27 TCM 443 (1968), ¶ 68,098 P-H Memo TC, aff’d on other grounds, 414 F. 2d 749 (CA4 1969). Petitioner additionally asserts that the returns of shareholders of a Subchapter C corporation cannot be adjusted after the limitations period has run for assessing the corporation’s return, and that therefore S corporation shareholders are entitled to identical treatment. Brief for Petitioner 11-12, 21-22. However, petitioner has not provided a single authority in support of the premise of this assertion. At oral argument, the Commissioner maintained that the opposite is the case, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-28, relying mainly on Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U. S. 210 (1947), which, without addressing the limitations issue, allowed an adjustment of shareholders’ 1940 taxes based upon the Commissioner’s finding that, at the time of its creation by merger in 1928, the corporation had acquired the accumulated earnings and profits of its predecessor corporations. A recent Tax Court decision also provides indirect support for the Commissioner’s view: “We have held that the relevant return for determining whether, at the time a deficiency notice was issued, the period for assessment had expired under section 6601(a) ‘is that of petitioner against whom respondent has determined a deficiency.’ [Citing Fehlhaber, 94 T. C., at 868.] We have maintained that position consistently, without regard to the nature of the source entity involved. See [cases involving partnerships, trusts, and S corporations].” Lardas v. Commissioner, 99 T. C. 490, 493 (1992). In any event, it is doubtful that petitioner’s conclusion follows from his premise, for the taxation of C corporations and their stockholders is so markedly different from that of S corporations.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CENTRAL TABLET MANUFACTURING CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 73-593. Argued March 25-26, 1974 Decided June 19, 1974 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, BrennaN, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 691. Larry H. Snyder argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, and David English Carmack. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 337 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 337 (a), provides, with stated exceptions, for the nonrecognition of gain or loss from a corporation’s “sale or exchange” of property that takes place during the 12-month period following the corporation’s adoption of a plan of complete liquidation that is effectuated within that period. The issue in this case is whether, when a fire destroys corporate property prior to the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, but the fire insurance proceeds are received after the plan’s adoption, the gain realized is or is not to be recognized to the corporation. I The facts are not contested. Taxpayer, Central Tablet Manufacturing Company, an Ohio corporation, for many years prior to May 14, 1966, was engaged at Columbus, Ohio, in the manufacture and sale of writing tablets, school supplies, art materials, and related items. It filed its federal income tax returns on the accrual basis of accounting and for the fiscal year ended October 31. On August 13, 1965, a majority of the taxpayer’s production and maintenance employees went on strike. As a consequence, production was reduced to about 5% of normal volume. On September 10, during the strike, an accidental fire largely destroyed the taxpayer’s plant, its manufacturing equipment and machinery, and its business offices. The damage was never repaired, the strike was never settled, and the taxpayer never again engaged in manufacturing. At the time of the fire, the taxpayer carried fire and extended coverage insurance on its building, machinery, and inventory. It also carried business interruption insurance. Negotiations relating to the taxpayer’s claim for business interruption loss began about October 8, 1965, and those on its claims for building and personal property losses began about November 1. There was dispute as to the estimated period of loss to be covered by the business interruption insurance; as to the probable duration of the strike had the fire not taken place; as to the applicability of the building policy’s coinsurance clause; as to the extent of the equipment loss due to the fire rather than to rain; as to the value of the building and equipment at the time of the fire; and as to the cost of repair of repairable machinery and equipment. The threshold liability of the insurance carriers, however, despite their not unusual rejection of the initial formal proofs of claim, was never seriously questioned. Eight months after the fire, at a special meeting on May 14, 1966, the shareholders of Central Tablet decided to dissolve the corporation and adopted a plan of dissolution and complete liquidation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.86 (1964). App. 38. About six days later, the taxpayer and the insurers settled the building claim; payment of that claim was received in mid-June. In August, the taxpayer settled its personal property claim and received payment on it in November. On May 3, 1967, all assets remaining after liquidating distributions to the shareholders were conveyed to a Columbus bank in trust for the shareholders pending the payment of taxes and the collection of remaining insurance and other claims. On the same date, the taxpayer filed a certificate of dissolution with the Ohio Secretary of State. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1701.86 (H) and (I) (1964). All this was accomplished within 12 months of the adoption of the plan on May 14,1966. The business interruption claim was settled in August 1967 and payment thereof was received in September of that year. The fire insurance proceeds exceeded the taxpayer’s adjusted income tax basis in the insured property. Gain, therefore, was realized and ordinarily would be recognized and taxed to the corporation. § 1033 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1033 (a) (3); Tobias v. Commissioner, 40 T. C. 84, 95 (1963). The taxpayer, however, resorting to § 337 (a), did not report this gain or any part of the business interruption insurance payment in its income tax returns for fiscal 1965 or for any other year. In January 1968, upon audit, the Internal Revenue Service asserted a deficiency in the taxpayer’s income tax for fiscal 1965. This was attributable to the Service’s inclusion in gross income for that year of (a) capital gain equal to the excess of the fire insurance proceeds over adjusted basis, (b) fiscal 1965’s pro rata share of the business interruption insurance payment, and (c) an amount not at issue here. A deficiency in the taxpayer’s fiscal 1963 tax was also asserted; this was attributable to a decrease in operating loss carryback from fiscal 1966 because of adjustments in the treatment of the insurance proceeds. The taxpayer paid the deficiencies, filed claims for refund, and, in due time, instituted the present action in federal court to recover the amounts so paid. The District Court followed the decision in United States v. Morton, 387 F. 2d 441 (CA8 1968), which concerned a taxpayer on the cash, rather than the accrual, basis, and held that § 337 (a) was available to the taxpayer. 339 F. Supp. 1134 (SD Ohio 1972). Judgment for the taxpayer was entered. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, refusing to follow Morton, reversed and remanded. 481 F. 2d 954 (1973). In view of the indicated conflict in the decisions of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits, we granted certiorari. 414 U. S. 1111 (1973). II The only issue before us is whether § 337 (a) has application in a situation where, as here, the involuntary conversion occasioned by the fire preceded the adoption of the plan of complete liquidation. This depends upon whether the “sale or exchange,” referred to in § 337 (a), took place when the fire occurred or only at some post-plan point, such as the subsequent settlement of the insurance claims, or their payment. Stated simply, it is the position of the Government that the fire was a single destructive event that effected the conversion (and, therefore, the “sale or exchange”) prior to the adoption of the plan of liquidation, thereby rendering § 337 (a) inapplicable. It is the position of the taxpayer, on the other hand, that the fire was not such a single destructive event at all, but was only the initial incident in a series of events — the fire; the preparation and filing of proofs of claim; their preliminary rejection; the negotiations; ultimate dollar agreement by way of settlement; the preparation and submission of final proofs of claim; their formal acceptance; and payment — that stretched over a period of time and came to a meaningful conclusion only after the adoption of the plan, and that, consequently, § 337 (a) ' is applicable. In order to keep this narrow issue in perspective, it is desirable and necessary to examine the background and the history of § 337. A corporation is a taxable entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. Ordinarily, a capital gain realized by the corporation is taxable to it. The shareholders, of course, benefit by that realization of gain and the consequent increase in their corporation’s assets. The value of their shares, in theory, is thereby enhanced. This increment in value, however, is not taxed at that point to the shareholder. His taxable transaction occurs when he disposes of his shares. The capital gain realized by the corporation, and taxed to it, may be said to be subject to a “second” tax later, that is, when the shareholder disposes of his shares. There is nothing unusual about this. It is a reality of tax law, and it is due to the separateness of the corporation and the shareholder as taxable entities. This “double tax” possibility took on technical aspects, however, when the capital gain was realized at about the time of, or in connection with, a corporation’s liquidation. If liquidation was deemed to have taken place subsequent to the sale or exchange, there was a “second” tax to the shareholder in addition to the tax on the gain to the corporation. On the other hand, because a corporation itself realizes no gain for income tax purposes upon the mere liquidation and distribution of its assets to shareholders, § 311 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 311; see General Utilities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200 (1935), if the liquidation was deemed to have preceded the sale or exchange of the asset, there was no “first” tax to the corporation. Thus, the timing of the gain transaction, in relation to the corporation’s liquidation, had important tax consequence's. See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 11-53 (3d ed. 1971). In short, before § 337 came into the Internal Revenue Code, the overall income tax burden for the liquidating corporate taxpayer and its shareholders was less if the corporation clearly made its distribution of assets prior to the sale or exchange of any of them at a gain. All this seemed simple and straightforward. The application of the rule, however, as fact situations varied, engendered profound confusion which was enhanced by two decisions by this Court approximately 25 years ago. In Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945), the Court held that a liquidating corporation could not escape taxation on the gain realized from the sale of its sole asset if the corporation itself had arranged the sale prior to liquidation and distribution of the asset to the shareholders. This was so even though the sale was consummated after the distribution. Subsequently, in United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U. S. 451 (1950), the Court reached exactly the opposite conclusion in a case where the shareholders, rather than the corporation, had negotiated the sale of the distributed assets and, prior to the corporation’s liquidation, had been in touch with the purchaser and had offered to acquire the property and sell it to the purchaser. Mr. Justice Black, who wrote for a unanimous court in both cases, recognized that “the distinction between sales by a corporation as compared with distribution in kind followed by shareholder sales may be particularly shadowy and artificial when the corporation is closely held,” id., at 454-455, but the Court, nonetheless, determined that the distinction was mandated by the Code: “The oddities in tax consequences that emerge from the tax provisions here controlling appear to be inherent in the present tax pattern. For a corporation is taxed if it sells all its physical properties and distributes the cash proceeds as liquidating dividends, yet is not taxed if that property is distributed in kind and is then sold by the shareholders. In both instances the interest of the shareholders in the business has been transferred to the purchaser. . . . Congress having determined that different tax consequences shall flow from different methods by which the shareholders of a closely held corporation may dispose of corporate property, we accept its mandate.” Id., at 455-456. These two cases obviously created a situation where the tax consequences were dependent upon the resolution of often indistinct facts as to whether the negotiations leading to the sale had been conducted by the corporation or by the shareholders. Particularly in the case of a closely held corporation, where there was little, if any, significant difference between management and ownership, this analytical formalism was unsatisfactory and, indeed, was a trap for the unwary. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 49 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., a106 (1954). See Cary, The Effect of Taxation on Selling Out a Corporate Business for Cash, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 423 (1950). It was in direct response to the Court Holding-Cumberland confusion and disparate treatment that Congress produced § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The report of the House Committee on Ways and Means on the bill (H. R. 8300) which became the 1954 Code explained the purpose of § 337: “Your committee’s bill eliminates questions arising as a result of the necessity of determining whether a corporation in process of liquidating made a sale of assets or whether the shareholder receiving the assets made the sale. Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Company (324 U. S. 331), with U. S. v. Cumberland Public Service Company (338 U. S. 451). This last decision indicates that if the distributee actually makes the sale after receipt of the property then there will be no tax on the sale at the corporate level. In order to eliminate questions resulting only from formalities, your committee has provided that if a corporation in process of liquidation sells assets there will be no tax at the corporate level, but any gain realized will be taxed to the dis-tributee-shareholder, as ordinary income or capital gain depending on the character of the asset sold.” H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 38-39 (1954). See also id., at a106-a109, where it was said, at a106: “Your committee intends in section [337] to provide a definitive rule which will eliminate any uncertainty.” See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 48-49, 258-260 (1954). There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that § 337 was enacted in ordér to eliminate “double taxation” as such. Rather, the statute was designed to eliminate the formalistic distinctions recognized and perhaps encouraged by the decisions in Court Holding and Cumberland. See Kovey, When Will Section 337 Shield Fire Loss Proceeds? A Current Look at a Burning Issue, 39 J. Taxation 258, 259 n. 2 (1973); Note, Tax-Free Sales in Liquidation Under Section 337, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (1963). See also West Street-Erie Boulevard Corp. v. United States, 411 F. 2d 738, 740-741 (CA2 1969). The statute was meant to establish a strict but clear rule, with a specified time limitation, upon which planners might rely and which would serve to bring certainty and stability into the corporation liquidation area. The taxpayer here recognizes this statutory purpose. Brief for Petitioner 6-7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 3 — 4. Inasmuch as § 337 was drafted to meet and deal with the Court Holding-Cumberland situation, where there had been a sale, the statute on its face relates only to “the sale or exchange” of property. It is not surprising, therefore, that further confusion resulted when the Internal Revenue Service found itself confronted by liquidating corporate taxpayers who sought § 337 (a) treatment for casualty gains. Following the Court's decision in Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U. S. 247 (1941), the Internal Revenue Service at first refused to consider § 337 as applicable to a casualty situation at all. Rev. Rul. 56-372, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 187. When this was rejected in the courts, the Service reversed its position and treated an involuntary conversion that occurred after adoption of a plan of complete liquidation as a “sale or exchange” with resulting nonrecognition. Rev. Rui. 64-100, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. (Part I) 130. It is at this point that the issue of the instant case emerges and comes into focus. Although it is now settled that an involuntary conversion by fire is a sale or exchange under § 337 (a), the question that is determinative here remains unresolved: When does the involuntary conversion by a preplan fire take place? Since the statute prescribes a strict 12-month postplan period, it is crucial for the taxpayer that the conversion be deemed to have occurred after the plan of liquidation was adopted. Ill Predictably, the taxpayer analogizes the involuntary conversion to a true sale, and it argues that the conversion does not occur until settlement is reached and the insurance obligations are finally determined and paid. This essentially is the reasoning employed in the Morton case. There is nothing to indicate that Congress considered this problem when § 337 (a) was adopted. The fact that attention was invariably focused on an actual sale would indicate that the casualty situation was not legislatively anticipated. Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 123, 129, 180 F. Supp. 373, 376 (1960). Recourse to legislative history, therefore, is somewhat circumstantial in nature. There is, however, one guiding fact, namely, the above-mentioned clear purpose of Congress, in its enactment of § 337 (a), to avoid the Court Holding-Cumberland formalities. The taxpayer’s analogy to the ordinary sale transaction has some superficial appeal. It fails, however, to give sufficient consideration to the underlying purpose of §337 (a). To be sure, under normal circumstances, a true sale is not complete until the mutual obligations (if not the precise terms) are fixed. The Internal Revenue Service has recognized this explicitly in the Regulations by making § 337 (a) available where a sale is negotiated by the corporation prior to the adoption of the plan but is not completed until after the plan is adopted. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (a). This merely acknowledges that the parties are free to avoid an executory sales contract until it is made final. If the transaction is not completed until after the plan of liquidation is adopted, the corporation is rightfully entitled to § 337 (a) treatment. This result is fully consistent with the aim of Congress to avoid the factual determination that led to the Court Hólding-Cumberland dichotomy. The fact that the corporation and its shareholders are given this limited opportunity to plan, preliminary and prior to liquidation, for disposal of assets does not mean that the Congress intended to make this opportunity available in every conceivable fact situation. With a fire loss, the obligation to pay arises upon the fire. Unlike an executory contract to sell, the casualty cannot be rescinded. Details, including even the basic question of liability, may be contested, but the fundamental contractual obligation that precipitates the transformation from tangible property into a chose in action consisting of a claim for insurance proceeds is fixed by the fire. Although the parties remain free to arrive at an acceptable settlement, the obligation itself has come into being, and it is the value of the insured property at that point that governs the claim. In other words, the terms of the obligation cannot be changed unilaterally by the insurer once the fire has occurred. The fact that the ultimate extent of the gain may not be known or final settlement reached until some later time does not prevent the occurrence of a “sale or exchange” even in the context of a normal commercial transaction. See, e. g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404 (1931). The taxpayer’s efforts to draw an analogy to a true sale is therefore of limited utility. See Note, Involuntary Conversions and § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 417, 427-428 (1974). When the casualty occurs during the 12-month period after the plan of liquidation is adopted, § 337 (a)’s applicability follows as a matter of course. The presence of § 337 (a) creates an expectation in the liquidating corporation that it will not be taxed on gains from sales or exchanges of corporate assets during the 12-month period. The taxpayer corporation then need not be concerned with the formalities of sale and disposal in order to avoid tax on capital gains. Put another way, once the plan is adopted, corporate property is colored with the reasonable expectation that if it is sold or exchanged within 12 months, any resulting gain will not be taxed to the corporation. It follows that if, after the plan is adopted, property is destroyed by casualty, with consequent replacement by insurance proceeds, § 337 (a) treatment is available. The property colored by the expectation has been replaced by insurance proceeds. When, however, the casualty occurs prior to the adoption of the plan and the corporation’s commitment to liquidate, none of these considerations attaches. Moreover, there is nothing in the purpose of § 337 which dictates the extension of its benefits to this preplan situation. Before the adoption of the plan the corporation has no expectation of avoiding tax if it disposes of property at a gain. The corporation, of course, is the beneficiary of the insurance, and both at the time the policy is executed and at the time of the fire, the destroyed property is an asset of the corporation. Prior to the adoption of the plan, § 337 (a)’s “expectation” simply is not present. For all practical purposes, the disposal of Central Tablet's insured property occurred at the time of its fire. At that time the taxpayer possessed all incidents of ownership. It had evidenced no intention to liquidate. The fire was irremediable. Regardless of the formalities and negotiations that prefaced the actual insurance settlements, the property was parted with at the time of its destruction. When the casualty occurs prior to the corporation’s committing itself to liquidation, no Court Holding-Cumberland problem is presented. IV This interpretation is fully consistent with the manner in which condemnation, the other principal form of involuntary conversion, is treated under § 337. In condemnation, the legally operative event for purposes of the statute is the passage of title under federal or state law, as the case may be, to the condemning authority. This means that in many jurisdictions the “sale or exchange” under § 337 (a) occurs prior to the determination of the amount of condemnation compensation and, indeed, possibly without advance warning to the corporation owner. Rev. Rui. 59-108, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 72. It has been uniformly recognized that a corporate taxpayer may not avail itself of § 337 (a) where its plan of liquidation is adopted after title has passed by way of condemnation even where no settlement as to condemnation price has been reached or where the corporation had no advance notice of the proposed taking. Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 369 F. 2d 629, 633-635 (CA8 1966); Likins-Foster Honolulu Corp. v. Commissioner, 417 F. 2d 285 (CA10 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 987 (1970); Dwight v. United States, 328 F. 2d 973 (CA2 1964); Wendell v. Commissioner, 326 F. 2d 600 (CA2 1964). The taxpayer’s position here would favor the casualty taxpayer over the condemnation taxpayer. Although perhaps not an exact parallel, the one date in the casualty loss situation analogous to the passage of title in the condemnation context is the date of the casualty. The fire is the event which fixes the legal obligation to pay the insurance proceeds. As with a non-qualifying preplan condemnation, the fire is the single irrevocable event of significance, and it occurs when title and control over the property are in the corporation. The chose in action against the insurer arises at that time. This is unlike the executory sales contract consummated after the adoption of a plan; there, either of the parties is free unilaterally to avoid whatever preliminary agreement had been reached at the preliquidation negotiations. As with condemnation, the involuntary character of the fire distinguishes it from the normal sale, and, as with condemnation, for purposes of § 337 (a), it is irrelevant that the precise dollar amount of the insurer’s obligation remains uncertain. In the casualty situation, the owner of the insured property is deprived of aspects of ownership when the fire occurs in much the same way as the owner of condemned property is deprived at the time title passes. In each case the triggering event is involuntary and irrevocable. Because of the statutorily imposed chronology, the event operates to prevent the corporation’s receiving the favorable treatment of §337 (a). As the Court Holding decision exemplifies, “This may appear a harsh result, but if it is to be corrected Congress must act; the courts have no power to do so.” Dwight v. United States, 328 F. 2d, at 974. y Again, although not precisely parallel and certainly not controlling, concluding that the “sale or exchange” takes place at the time of the fire is consistent with the accepted method for determining the holding period of destroyed property in the ascertainment of its long- or short-term capital gain or loss consequences. Where property is destroyed, the holding period terminates at the moment of destruction. Rose v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 298 (SD Cal. 1964); Steele v. United States, 52-2 U. S. Tax Cas. ¶ 9451 (SD Fla. 1952); see Draper v. Commissioner, 32 T. C. 545, 548-549 (1959). Cf. Comment, Extending Section 337 to Liquidations Triggered by the Involuntary Conversion of Corporate Assets, 62 Geo. L. J. 1203, 1213 n. 55 (1974). Were we to accept the taxpayer’s argument, we would be left with the anomalous situation of having the “sale” take place after the holding period has terminated for capital gain or loss purposes. VI The situation presented by the instant case has been brought to the attention of Congress with the suggestion that the nonrecognition treatment provided by § 337 (a) be extended to preplan involuntary conversions. Congress, however, has not acted on this suggestion. It, of course, has provided some tax relief to the victim of a casualty gain by permitting nonrecognition of the gain if the victim-taxpayer uses the proceeds to replace the destroyed property in a specified manner. § 1033 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1033 (a)(3). But Congress has never disclosed an intention to permit the corporate victim of a casualty with ensuing gain to have the option of liquidating after the casualty occurs and obtaining the benefit of nonrecognition under § 337 (a). If this is desirable policy, it is for the Congress, not the courts, to effectuate. The fact that a tax-oriented and tax-knowledgeable corporation in theory could utilize § 1033 (a) (3) and rebuild with its insurance proceeds without being taxed for the gain, and then adopt a plan of liquidation, surely does not change the result. Tax consequences follow what has taken place, not what might have taken place. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U. S. 134, 148-149 (1974). Had Congress enacted § 337 for the avowed purpose of freeing a corporation from tax on gains whenever it decides to liquidate, the result, here might well be different. Section 337, however, was not designed to accomplish that broad result. As has been noted, § 337 was designed for the limited purpose of avoiding the technical and formalistic determination of control as between the corporation and the shareholders. By the enactment of § 337 (a), the benefit of any existing doubt in that context was given to the corporate taxpayer. But § 337 (a) is narrowly and specifLally drawn. It applies only to a complete liquidation and then only to one fully accomplished in a specified short time. It has no application to a sale or exchange before the adoption of the plan or to one more than 12 months after the adoption. If the statute’s precise conditions are not fulfilled, the tax consequences that normally prevail will ensue. Indeed, the statute is not always beneficial, for it operates to make a loss as well as a gain on the sale or exchange nonrecognizable. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. “§ 337. Gain or loss on sales or exchanges in connection with certain liquidations. “(a) General rule. “If— “(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954, and “(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less 'assets retained to meet claims, “then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.” 26 U. S. C. §337 (a). The deficiencies, including interest, amounted to $70,051.30 for fiscal 1965 and $11,930.30 for fiscal 1963. Kinney v. United States, 73-1 U. S. Tax Cas. ¶ 9140 (ND Cal. 1972), decided before the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in the present case, and now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, also followed Morton. The corporate taxpayer in Kinney was on the accrual basis. Because the District Court ruled that § 337 (a) had application to Central Tablet’s situation, there was no occasion for it to determine in what taxable year the gain to the corporation accrued if it were ultimately decided that § 337 (a) was not applicable. That question remains for resolution upon remand. We intimate no view as to that issue. See generally 2 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 12.65 and p. 236 (Malone rev. 1967). In Flaccus the Court held that fire insurance proceeds did not result in gain from a “sale or exchange” of capital assets within the meaning of § 117 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 715. This result was overcome statutorily by the enactment of § 151 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 846, now carried over into § 1231 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1231 (a). Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 123, 180 F. Supp. 373 (1960); Kent Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 288 F. 2d 812 (CA4 1961). In each of these cases the court relied upon the Flac-cws-inspired statutory amendment, referred to in the preceding footnote, for its conclusion that an involuntary conversion was covered by § 337 (a). In Towanda the Court of Claims permitted § 337 (a) treatment where both the fire and the settlement occurred during the 12-month period following the adoption of .the plan of liquidation. It observed, “It is not conceivable that Congress would have drawn a distinction between a gain from a voluntary conversion and an involuntary one, had the possibility of an involuntary conversion during liquidation come to its attention” (emphasis supplied). 149 Ct. Cl., at 129, 180 F. Supp., at 376. In Kent, the Fourth Circuit disallowed § 337 (a) treatment where both the fire and the settlement took place prior to the adoption of a plan of liquidation. 288 F. 2d, at 816. (It upheld that taxpayer's argument, however, that the casualty gain there sustained was entitled to nonrecognition specially provided under § 392 (b) of the 1954 Code.) Neither case presented the factual sequence of the case before us. The Regulations make the date of the sale dependent “primarily upon the intent of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract and the surrounding circumstances.” § 1.337-2 (a). They provide that an “executory contract to sell is to be distinguished from a contract of sale.” This distinction recognizes the significance of the point in time where the parties can no longer opt out of a transaction. Certainly, a fire insurer has no right to opt out of its coverage and basic liability after the fire takes place; in this respect, the executory contract situation referred to in the Regulations is distinguishable. For tax purposes, the formality of filing a proof of claim usually does not change the substance of this conclusion. In any event, the formalities were observed here. The insurer’s adjuster was in attendance even while the fire was in progress. App. 42. Notice was immediately given the insurance companies and proofs of loss were promptly submitted. Id., at 13-14. Negotiations began within a month. The adjusters, in making the not uncommon rejection of initial proofs of claim, denied the extent, but hardly the fact, of coverage. Id., at 14^15. In 1959 the Advisory Group made the following recommendation to the House Committee on Ways and Means: “The advisory group considers it appropriate and desirable to extend the nonrecognition treatment provided by section 337 (a) to all involuntary conversions. Since an involuntary conversion cannot be foreseen and it is impractical to require adoption of the liquidation plan on or before the day of the conversion, it is proposed, as to such conversions, to relax the strict requirements of the section with respect to the time of adoption of the liquidation plan. Since the time of receipt of the proceeds of an involuntary conversion may depend on factors beyond the control of the corporation and receipt within a 12-month period is often impossible, it is proposed also to relax the distribution requirements with respect to such conversions. Accordingly, it is recommended that an involuntary conversion within the meaning of section 1033 be considered a sale or exchange for purposes of section 337, and that the requirements of paragraph (1) (B) regarding the time of distribution, and the requirement of paragraph (1) that the sale or exchange occur within the 12-month period referred to therein, be considered satisfied if such 12-month period begins not later than 60 days after the disposition of the converted property, as defined in section 1033 (a) (2), and the proceeds of the conversion are distributed within such 12-month period or within 60 days after the receipt thereof by the corporation, whichever is later.” Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K of the Internal Revenue Code before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 532 (1959). It is true that this recommendation was made before the Internal Revenue Service had recognized a casualty as a “sale or exchange,” within the language of § 337 (a), and that the Service has adopted at least part of the recommendation without congressional action. Nonetheless, the Advisory Group clearly recognized that even if the involuntary conversion were a “sale or exchange,” § 337 (a) did not reach the conversion that occurred prior to the adoption of the plan of liquidation, and it proposed “to relax the strict requirements of the section” with respect thereto.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. REORGANIZED CF&I FABRICATORS OF UTAH, INC., et al. No. 95-325. Argued March 25, 1996 Decided June 20, 1996 Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part III, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyek, JJ., joined, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-D, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 229. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Gary D. Gray, and Kenneth W. Rosenberg. Steven J. McCardell argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stephen M. Tumblin and Frank Cummings. James J. Keightley, William G. Beyer, James J. Armbruster, Kenneth J. Cooper, and Charles G. Cole filed a brief for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Richard M. Seltzer, Bernard Kleiman, Carl B. Frankel, Paul Whitehead, and Karin Feldman filed a brief for the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents two questions affecting the priority of an unsecured claim in bankruptcy to collect an exaction under 26 U. S. C. § 4971(a), requiring a payment to the Internal Revenue Service equal to 10 percent of any accumulated funding deficiency of certain pension plans: first, whether the exaction is an “excise tax” for purposes of 11 U. S. C. § 507(a)(7)(E) (1988 ed.), which at the time relevant here gave seventh priority to a claim for such a tax; and, second, whether principles of equitable subordination support a categorical rule placing §4971 claims at a lower priority than unsecured claims generally. We hold that § 4971(a) does not create an excise tax within the meaning of § 507(a)(7)(E), but that categorical subordination of the Government’s claim to those of other unsecured creditors was error. I The CF&I Steel Corporation and its nine subsidiaries (CF&I) sponsored two pension plans, with the consequence that CF&I was obligated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 935, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., to make certain annual minimum funding contributions to the plans based on the value of the benefits earned by its employees. See § 1082; 26 U. S. C. § 412. The annual payments were due each September 15th for the preceding plan year, see 26 CFR § 11.412(c)-12(b) (1995), and on September 15, 1990, CF&I was required to pay a total of some $12.4 million for the year ending December 31, 1989. The day passed without any such payment, and on November 7, 1990, CF&I petitioned the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, in an attempt at financial reorganization prompted in large part by the company’s inability to fund the pension plans. In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 148 B. R. 332, 334 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Utah 1992). In 1991, the IRS filed several proofs of claim for tax liabilities, one of which arose under 26 U. S. C. § 4971(a), imposing a 10 percent “tax” (of $1.24 million here) on any “accumulated funding deficiency” of certain pension plans. The Government sought priority for the claim, either as an “excise tax” within the meaning of 11 U. S. C. § 507(a)(7)(E) (1988 ed.), or as a tax penalty in compensation for pecuniary loss under § 507(a)(7)(G). CF&I disputed each alternative, and by separate adversary complaint asked the Bankruptcy Court to subordinate the §4971 claim to those of general unsecured creditors. The Bankruptcy Court allowed the Government’s claim under § 4971(a) but denied it any priority under § 507(a)(7), finding the liability neither an “excise tax” under § 507(a)(7)(E) nor a tax penalty in compensation for actual pecuniary loss under § 507(a)(7)(G). Instead, the court read §4971 as creating a noncompensatory penalty, 148 B. R., at 340, and by subsequent order subordinated the claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors, on the supposed authority of the Bankruptcy Code’s provision for equitable subordination, 11 U. S. C. § 510(c). The Government appealed to the District Court for the District of Utah, pressing its excise tax theory and objecting to equitable subordination as improper in the absence of Government misconduct. While that appeal was pending, CF&I presented the Bankruptcy Court with a reorganization plan that put the §4971 claim in what the plan called Class 13, a special category giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for nonpecuniary loss penalties; but it also provided that, if the court found subordination behind general unsecured claims to be inappropriate, the §4971 claim would be ranked with them in what the reorganization plan called Class 12 (which would receive some funds). Appel-lees’ App. in No. 94-4034 et al. (CA10), pp. 96-101, 137-141, 197-200. The United States objected, but the Bankruptcy Court affirmed the plan. The Government appealed this order as well, and the District Court affirmed both the denial of excise tax treatment and the subsequent subordination to general unsecured claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-11. The Tenth Circuit likewise affirmed. 53 F. 3d 1155 (1995). We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1005 (1995), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits over whether § 4971(a) claims are excise taxes within the meaning of § 507(a)(7)(E), and whether such claims are categorically subject to equitable subordination under § 510(c). We affirm on the first question but on the second vacate the judgment and remand. II The provisions for priorities among a bankrupt debtor s claimants are found in 11 U. S. C. § 507, subsection (a)(7) of which read, in relevant part, that seventh priority would be accorded to “allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to the extent that such claims are for— “(E) an excise tax on— “(i) a transaction occurring before the date of the filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, under applicable law or under any extension, after three years before the date of the filing of the petition; or “(ii) if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the three years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.” What the Government here claims to be an excise tax obligation arose under 26 U. S. C. § 4971(a), which provides that “[f]or each taxable year of an employer who maintains a [pension] plan . . . there is hereby imposed a tax of 10 percent (5 percent in the case of a multiemployer plan) on the amount of the accumulated funding deficiency under the plan, determined as of the end of the plan year ending with or within such taxable year.” No one denies that Congress could have included a provision in the Bankruptcy Code calling a §4971 exaction an excise tax (thereby affording it the priority claimed by the Government); the only question is whether the exaction ought to be treated as a tax (and, if so, an excise) without some such dispositive direction. A Here and there in the Bankruptcy Code Congress has included specific directions that establish the significance for bankruptcy law of a term used elsewhere in the federal statutes. Some bankruptcy provisions deal specifically with subjects as identified by terms defined outside the Bankruptcy Code; 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(13), for example, addresses “restitution issued under title 18, United States Code,” and § 507(a)(1) refers to “any fees and charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28.” Other bankruptcy provisions directly adopt definitions contained in other statutes; thus §§761(5), (7), and (8) adopt the Commodity Exchange Act’s definitions of “commodity option,” “contract market,” “contract of sale,” and so on. Not surprisingly, there are places where the Bankruptcy Code makes referential use of the Internal Revenue Code, as 11 U. S. C. § 101(41)(C)(i) does in referring to “an employee pension benefit plan that is a governmental plan, as defined in section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code,” and as § 346(g)(1)(C) does in providing for recognition of a gain or loss “to the same extent that such transfer results in the recognition of gain or loss under section 371 of the Internal Revenue Code.” It is significant, therefore, that Congress included no such reference in § 507(a)(7)(E), even though the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no definition of “excise,” “tax,” or “excise tax.” This absence of any explicit connector between §§ 507(a)(7)(E) and 4971 is all the more revealing in light of the following history of interpretive practice in determining whether a “tax” so called in the statute creating it is also a “tax” (as distinct from a debt or penalty) for the purpose of setting the priority of a claim under the bankruptcy laws. B Although § 507(a)(7), giving seventh priority to several different kinds of taxes, was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2590 (1978 Act), a priority provision for taxes was nothing new. Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act), which governed (as frequently amended) until 1978, gave priority to “taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States [or a] State, county, district, or municipality.” 30 Stat. 544, 563. On a number of occasions, this Court considered whether a particular exaction, whether or not called a “tax” in the statute creating it, was a tax for purposes of § 64(a), and in every one of those cases the Court looked behind the label placed on the exaction and rested its answer directly on the operation of the provision using the term in question. The earliest such cases involved state taxes and are exemplified by City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U. S. 283 (1941). In considering whether a New York sales tax was a “tax” entitled to priority under § 64(a), the Court placed no weight on the “tax” label in the New York law, and looked to the state statute only “to ascertain whether its incidents are such as to constitute a tax within the meaning of § 64.” Id., at 285. See also New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 492 (1906); New York v. Jersawit, 263 U. S. 493, 495-496 (1924). The Court later followed the same course when a federal statute created the exaction. In United States v. New York, 315 U. S. 510 (1942), the Court considered whether “‘tax[es]’” so called in two federal statutes, id., at 512, n. 2, were entitled to priority as “taxes” under § 64(a). In each instance the decision turned on the actual effects of the exac-tions, id., at 514-517, with the Court citing Feiring and Anderson as authority for its enquiry. 315 U. S., at 514-516. See also United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304, 309-310 (1924); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U. S. 268, 275 (1978) (“We ... cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the ‘penalty’ language of Internal Revenue Code §6672 is dispositive of the status of respondent’s debt under Bankruptcy Act § 17(a)(1)(e)”). Congress could, of course, have intended a different interpretive method for reading terms used in the Bankruptcy Code it created in 1978. But if it had so intended we would expect some statutory indication, see Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 494, 501 (1986), whereas the most obvious statutory indicator is very much to the contrary: in the specific instances noted before, it would have been redundant for Congress to refer specifically to Internal Revenue Code definitions of given terms if such cross-identity were to be assumed or presumed, as a matter of interpretive course. While the Government does not directly challenge the continuing vitality of the cases in the Feiring line, it seeks to sidestep them by arguing, first, that similarities between the plain texts of §§4971 and 507(a)(7)(E) resolve this case. This approach, however, is inconsistent with New York and Sotelo, in each of which the Court refused to rely on the terminology used in the relevant tax and bankruptcy provisions. The argument is also unavailing on its own terms, for even if we were to accept the proposition that comparable use of similar terms is dispositive, the Government’s plain text argument still would fail. The word “excise” appears nowhere in § 4971 (whereas, by contrast, 26 U. S. C. § 4401 explicitly states that it imposes “an excise tax”). And although there is one reference to “excise taxes” that applies to § 4971 in the heading of the subtitle covering that section (“Subtitle D — Miscellaneous Excise Taxes”), the Government disclaims any reliance on that caption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 17-20; see also 26 U. S. C. § 7806(b) (“No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this title”). Furthermore, though § 4971(a) does explicitly refer to its exaction as a “tax,” the Government disavows any suggestion that this language is dispositive as to whether § 4971(a) is a tax for purposes of § 507(a)(7)(E); while § 4971(b) “impostes] a tax equal to 100 percent of [the] accumulated funding deficiency to the extent not corrected,” the Government says that this explicit language does not answer the question whether § 4971(b) is, in fact, a tax under § 507(a)(7)(E). Reply Brief for United States 13-14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-24. The Government’s positions, then, undermine its suggestion that the statutes’ texts standing together demonstrate that § 4971(a) imposes an excise tax. The Government’s second effort to avoid a New York and Sotelo interpretive enquiry relies on a statement from the legislative history of the 1978 Act, that “[a]ll Federal, State or local taxes generally considered or expressly treated as excises are covered by” § 507(a)(7)(E). 124 Cong. Rec. 32416 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); id., at 34016 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). But even taking this statement as authoritative, it would provide little support for the Government’s position. Although the statement may mean that all exac-tions called “excise taxes” should be covered by § 507(a) (7)(E), § 4971 does not call its exaction an excise tax. And although the section occurs in a subtitle with a heading of “Miscellaneous Excise Taxes,” the Government has disclaimed reliance on the subtitle heading as authority for its position in this case, recognizing the provision of 26 U. S. C. § 7806(b) that no inference of legislative construction should be drawn from the placement of a provision in the Internal Revenue Code. See supra, at 222 and this page; Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. If, on the other hand, the statement in the legislative history is read more literally, its apparent upshot is that, among those exactions that are taxes, the ones that are expressly treated as excises are “excise tax[es]” within the meaning of § 507(a)(7)(E). But that proposition fails, of course, to answer the question whether the exaction is a tax to begin with. In sum, we conclude that the 1978 Act reveals no congressional intent to reject generally the interpretive principle that characterizations in the Internal Revenue Code are not dispositive in the bankruptcy context, and no specific provision that would relieve us from making a functional examination of § 4971(a). We proceed to that examination. C Anderson and New York applied the same test in determining whether an exaction was a tax under § 64(a), or a penalty or debt: “a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the Government.” Anderson, 203 U. S., at 492; New York, 315 U. S., at 515; accord, Feiring, 313 U. S., at 285 (“§ 64 extends to those pecuniary burdens laid upon individuals or their property ... for the purpose of defraying the expenses of government or of undertakings authorized by it”). Or, as the Court noted in a somewhat different context, “[a] tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.” United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572 (1931). We take La Franca’s statement of the distinction to be sufficient for the decision of this case; if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission, and a punishment for an unlawful omission is what this exaction is. Title 29 U. S. C. § 1082 requires a pension plan sponsor to fund potential plan liability according to a complex statutory formula, see also 26 U. S. C. § 412, and 26 U. S. C. § 4971(a) requires employers who maintain a pension plan to pay the Government 10 percent of any accumulated funding deficiency. If the employer fails to correct the deficiency before the earlier of a notice of deficiency under § 4971(a) or an assessment of the § 4971(a) exaction, the employer is obligated to pay an additional “tax” of 100 percent of the accumulated funding deficiency. § 4971(b). The obviously penal character of these exactions is underscored by other provisions, including one giving the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) an entirely independent claim against the employer for “the total amount of the unfunded benefit liabilities,” 29 U. S. C. § 1362(b)(1)(A) (a claim which in this case the PBGC has asserted and which is still pending, see Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 179 B. R. 704 (ND Utah 1994)); see also §§ 1306-1307. We are, indeed, unable to find any provision in the statutory scheme that would cast the “tax” at issue here in anything but this punitive light. D The legislative history reflects the statute’s punitive character: “The bill also provides new and more effective penalties where employers fail to meet the funding standards. In the past, an attempt has been made to enforce the relatively weak funding standards existing under present law by providing for immediate vesting of the employees’ rights, to the extent funded, under plans which do not meet these standards. This procedure, however, has proved to be defective since it does not directly penalize those responsible for the underfunding. For this reason, the bill places the obligation for funding and the penalty for underfunding on the person on whom it belongs — namely, the employer.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, p. 28 (1974). Accord, S. Rep. No. 93-383, p. 24 (1973). The Committee Reports also stated that, “[s]ince the employer remains liable for the contributions necessary to meet the funding standards even after the payment of the excise taxes, it is anticipated that few, if any, employers will willfully violate these standards.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, supra, at 28; S. Rep. No. 93-383, supra, at 24-25. Given the patently punitive function of § 4971, we conclude that §4971 must be treated as imposing a penalty, not authorizing a tax. Accordingly, we hold that the “tax” under § 4971(a) was not entitled to seventh priority as an “excise tax” under § 507(a)(7)(E), but instead is, for bankruptcy purposes, a penalty to be dealt with as an ordinary, unsecured claim. III Hence, the next question: whether the Court of Appeals improperly subordinated the Government’s §4971 claim to those of the other general unsecured creditors. Though we have rejected the argument that the §4971 claim is for an “excise tax” within the meaning of § 507(a)(7)(E), both parties agree that the § 4971 claim is allowable on a nonpriority unsecured basis. CF&I’s reorganization plan did not lump all unsecured claims in one nonpriority class, however, but instead created four classes of unsecured creditors, only the first two of which would receive funds: Class 11 comprised small claims ($1,500 or less) grouped together for administrative convenience, see 11 U. S. C. § 1122(b); Class 12 comprised general unsecured claims (except for those assigned to other classes); Class 13 covered the §4971 claim and some other (much smaller) subordinated penalty claims; and Class 14, claims between the CF&I Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries (all of which were bankrupt), the net value of which was zero. The plan provided, nonetheless, that if a court determined that a Class 13 claim should not be subordinated, or that the Class 13 claims should not be separately classified, the claim or claims would be placed in Class 12. Appel-lees’ App. in No. 94-4034 et al., at 95-101, 137-141, 196-200. When the Government challenged the proposal to subordinate its claim, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the reorganization plan, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-31, and ordered that the §4971 claim be “subordinated to the claims of all other general unsecured creditors of [CF&I] pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 510(c).” Id., at A-21. The District Court subsequently ruled that the §4971 claim “should be equitably subordinated to the claims of the general creditors under Section 510(c).” Id., at A-18. In the Tenth Circuit, the Government again contested subordination under § 510(c), which CF&I defended, even as it sought to sustain the Bankruptcy Court’s result with two new, alternative arguments: first, that 11 U. S. C. § 1122(a), restricting a given class to substantially similar claims, prohibited placement of the § 4971 claim in Class 12, because of its dissimilarity to other unsecured claims; and second, that, because 11 U. S. C. § 1129(a)(7) authorizes creditors with impaired claims (i. e., those getting less than full payment under the plan, like those in Class 12 here) to reject a plan that would give them less than they would get from a Chapter 7 liquidation, courts must have the power to assign a claim the same priority it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation (in which a noncom-pensatory prepetition penalty claim would be subordinated, 11 U. S. C. § 726(a)(4)). The Court of Appeals addressed neither of these arguments, however, relying instead on the broad construction given § 510(c) in In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F. 2d 1246 (CA7 1990) (subordinating a claim otherwise entitled to priority under § 507(a)(7) to those of general unsecured creditors), and holding specifically that “section 510(c)(1) does not require a finding of claimant misconduct to subordinate nonpecuniary loss tax penalty claims.” 53 F. 3d, at 1159. The Court of Appeals took note of the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that “[djeclining to subordinate the IRS’s penalty claim would harm innocent creditors rather than punish the debtor” and concluded that “the bankruptcy court correctly addressed the equities in this case.” Ibid. Nothing in the opinion of the Court of Appeals (or, for that matter, in the rulings of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court) addresses the arguments that the Bankruptcy Court’s result was sustainable without reliance on § 510(c). The court never suggested that either § 1122(a) or the Chapter 7 liquidation provisions were relevant. We thus necessarily review the subordination on the assumption that the Court of Appeals placed no reliance on the possibility that the Bankruptcy Code might permit the subordination on any basis except equitable subordination under § 510(c). So understood, the subordination was error. In United States v. Noland, 517 U. S. 535 (1996), we reversed a judgment said to rely on § 510(c) when the subordination turned on nothing other than the very characteristic that entitled the Government’s claim to priority under §§ 507(a)(1) and 503(b)(1)(C). We held that the subordination fell beyond the scope of a court’s authority under the doctrine of equitable subordination, because categorical subordination at the same level of generality assumed by Congress in establishing relative priorities among creditors was tantamount to a legislative act and therefore was outside the scope of any leeway under § 510(c) for judicial development of the equitable subordination doctrine. See id., at 543. Of course it is true that Noland passed on the subordination from a higher priority class to the residual category of general unsecured creditors at the end of the line, whereas here the subordination was imposed upon a disfavored subgroup within the residual category. But the principle of Noland has nothing to do with transfer between classes, as distinct from ranking within one of them. The principle is simply that categorical reordering of priorities that takes place at the legislative level of consideration is beyond the scope of judicial authority to order equitable subordination under § 510(c). The order in this case was as much a violation of that principle as Noland’s order was. Without passing on the merits of CF&I’s arguments that the § 4971 claim is not similar to the other unsecured claims and that courts dealing with Chapter 11 plans should be guided by Chapter 7 provisions, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia joins all but Part II-D of this opinion. Section 304(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 4132, added a new seventh priority and moved the provision relevant here from seventh (§ 507(a)(7)) to eighth priority (§ 507(a)(8)), without altering any of the language germane to this case. The parties agree that this change from seventh to eighth priority does not affect this case because it arose under the pre-1994 Bankruptcy Code, and we accordingly refer to the provision in question as § 507(a)(7), to reflect its codification at the time in question. The Government also filed a claim under § 4971(b), which imposes an exaction of 100 percent of the accumulated funding deficiency if the deficiency is not corrected before the notice of deficiency under § 4971(a) is mailed or the exaction under § 4971(a) is assessed. For the plan year ending December 31, 1989, the claimed tax liability under § 4971(b) was thus $12.4 million. In addition, the Government filed a claim for an accumulated funding deficiency for the plan year ending December 31, 1990, in the approximate amount of $25.6 million ($12.4 million for 1989 plus an additional deficiency of $13.2 million for 1990); the liability claimed under § 4971(a) for 1990 was therefore $2.56 million, and under § 4971(b) the full $25.6 million. The Bankruptcy Court disallowed all of these additional claims (for reasons not pertinent here), see In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 148 B. R. 332, 341 (Bkrtcy. Ct. CD Utah 1992), and the Government has not sought review of its ruling. Thus, though the Government filed four §4971 claims in the Bankruptcy Court, we focus on the one at issue here, the § 4971(a) claim for the deficiency in the 1989 plan year. Compare In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F. 2d 1055 (CA6 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Krugliak v. United States, 502 U. S. 1092 (1992), with In re Cassidy, 983 F. 2d 161 (CA10 1992); In re C-T of Va., Inc., 977 F. 2d 137 (CA4 1992). This provision was modified slightly between 1898 and 1978, most notably in 1938, when it was moved to § 64(a)(4) (and given fourth priority) and amended to apply to “taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof.” 52 Stat. 874. As the Court stated in a different context: “Although the statute . . . terms the money demanded as ‘a further sum,’ and does not describe it as a penalty, still the use of those words does not change the nature and character of the enactment. Congress may enact that such a provision shall not be considered as a penalty or in the nature of one,. . . and it is the duty of the court to be governed by such statutory direction, but the intrinsic nature of the provision remains, and, in the absence of any declaration by Congress affecting the manner in which the provision shall be treated, courts must decide the matter in accordance with their views of the nature of the act.” Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605, 612-613 (1903). Justice Thomas’s suggestion that no case “has denied bankruptcy priority to a congressionally enacted tax,” post, at 230, is true, but not on point. United States v. New York, 315 U. S., at 514-517, employed the Feiring-Anderson analysis to the exactions at issue there; the Court did not rely on the label that Congress gave. See also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U. S., at 275; United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304, 309-310 (1924). The Court’s conclusion that the exactions functioned as taxes does not change the fact that it employed a functional analysis. Assuming that an exaction would not be “generally considered” an excise tax unless it would be reasonable to consider it such, the possible application of this first prong of the legislators’ statement of intent is answered by the analysis of § 4971, below. It should be noted, though, that such an interpretation may prove too much: the Government suggests that this statement from the legislative history does not affect the rule of construction that courts will look behind the denomination of state and local taxes, Reply Brief for United States 6, n. 4, but it is difficult to read that sentence as applying one rule for federal taxes and another for state and local ones. The Government contends that § 4971(b) is more similar to a penalty than § 4971(a) is, because the Secretary of the Treasury can waive liability under the former but not the latter. The suggestion is that the Secretary can waive the imposition of the 100 percent tax, under ERISA § 3002(b), 88 Stat. 997, or can eliminate a violation by reducing the employer’s funding requirement, see 26 U. S. C. § 412(d); see also 29 U. S. C. § 1083(a). But §§ 412(d) and 1083(a) provide for waiver of the minimum funding requirements, so their application would avoid a violation of either §§ 4971(a) or (b); there simply would be no “accumulated funding deficiency” for purposes of either §§4971(a) or (b). Thus the Government is incorrect in suggesting that the Secretary has the ability to waive the exaction under § 4971(b) but not under § 4971(a). More fundamentally, even if the Secretary could waive only §.4971(b), it is not clear why this would make any difference, as the exaction would still serve to reinforce a federal prohibition. Cf. § 57(j) of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 561 (“Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHRYSLER CORP. v. BROWN, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. No. 77-922. Argued November 8, 1978 Decided April 18, 1979 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 319. Burt A. Braverman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was A. William Rolf. Assistant Attorney General Babcock argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Leonard Schaitman, and Paul Blankenstein. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Paul L. Gomory for the Association for the Advancement of Invention and Innovation; by Joseph A. Keyes, Jr., for the.Association of American Medical Colleges; by Robert L. Ackerly, Thomas L. Patten, Kenneth W. Weinstein, Lawrence B. Kraus, and Stanley T. Kaleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Michael S. Horne, Bruce D. Solder, Stephen R. Mysliwiec, Robert E. Williams, and Douglas S. McDowell for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; and by Leonard J. Theberge and Edward H. Dowd for the Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy et al. Charles E. Hill filed a brief for the Consumer Federation of America et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Thomas L. Pfister for Hughes Aircraft Co.; by Richmond C. Coburn and Thomas E. Douglass for the National Security Industrial Assn.; and by George A. Sears and C. Douglas Floyd for Standard Oil Co. of California. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The expanding range of federal regulatory activity and growth in the Government sector of the economy have increased federal agencies’ demands for information about the activities of private individuals and corporations. These developments have paralleled a related concern about secrecy in Government and abuse of power. The Freedom of Information Act (hereinafter FOIA) was a response to this concern, but it has also had a largely unforeseen tendency to exacerbate the uneasiness of those who comply with governmental demands for information. For under the FOIA third parties have been able to obtain Government files containing information submitted by corporations and individuals who thought that the information would be held in confidence. This case belongs to a class that has been popularly denominated “reverse-FOIA” suits. The Chrysler Corp. (hereinafter Chrysler) seeks to enjoin agency disclosure on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the FOIA and 18 U. S. C. § 1905, a criminal statute with origins in the 19th century that proscribes disclosure of certain classes of business and personal information. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that the FOIA is purely a disclosure statute and affords Chrysler no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure. But we cannot agree with that court’s conclusion that this disclosure is “authorized by law” within the meaning of § 1905. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand so that it can consider whether the documents at issue in this case fall within the terms of § 1905. I As a party to numerous Government contracts, Chrysler is required to comply with Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, which charge the Secretary of Labor with ensuring that corporations that benefit from Government contracts provide equal employment opportunity regardless of race or sex. The United States Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has promulgated regulations which require Government contractors to furnish reports and other information about their affirmative-action programs and the general composition of their work forces. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (formerly the Defense Supply Agency) of the Department of Defense is the designated compliance agency responsible for monitoring Chrysler’s employment practices. OFCCP regulations require that Chrysler make available to this agency written affirmative-action programs (AAP’s) and annually submit Employer Information Reports, known as EEO-1 Reports. The agency may also conduct “compliance reviews” and “complaint investigations,” which culminate in Compliance Review Reports (CRR’s) and Complaint Investigation Reports (CIR’s), respectively. Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor provide for public disclosure of information from records of the OFCCP and its compliance agencies. Those regulations state that notwithstanding exemption from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA, 5 ü. S. C. § 552, “records obtained or generated pursuant to Executive Order 11246 (as amended) . . . shall be made available for inspection and copying ... if it is determined that the requested inspection or copying furthers the public interest and does not impede any of the functions of the OFCC[P] or the Compliance Agencies except in the case of records disclosure of which is prohibited by law.” It is the voluntary disclosure contemplated by this regulation, over and above that mandated by the FOIA, which is the gravamen of Chrysler’s complaint in this case. This controversy began on May 14, 1975, when the DLA informed Chrysler that third parties had made an FOIA request for disclosure of the 1974 AAP for Chrysler’s Newark, Del., assembly plant and an October 1974 CIR for the same facility. Nine days later, Chrysler objected to release of the requested information, relying on OFCCP’s disclosure regulations and on exemptions to the FOIA. Chrysler also requested a copy of the CIR, since it had never seen it. DLA responded the following week that it had determined that the requested material was subject to disclosure under the FOIA and the OFCCP disclosure rules, and that both documents would be released five days later. On the day the documents were to be released, Chrysler filed a complaint in the United States District Court for Delaware seeking to enjoin release of the Newark documents. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order barring disclosure of the Newark documents and requiring that DLA give five days’ notice to Chrysler before releasing any similar documents. Pursuant to this order, Chrysler was informed oil July 1, 1975, that DLA had received a similar request for information about Chrysler’s Hamtramck, Mich., plant. Chrysler amended its complaint and obtained a restraining order with regard to the Hamtramck disclosure as well. Chrysler made three arguments in support of its prayer for an injunction: that disclosure was barred by the FOIA; that it was inconsistent with 18 U. S. C. § 1905, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e), and 44 U. S. C. § 3508, which for ease of reference will be referred to as the “confidentiality statutes”; and finally that disclosure was an abuse of agency discretion insofar as it conflicted with OFCCP rules. The District Court held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 to subject the disclosure decision to review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706. It conducted a trial de novo on all of Chrysler’s claims; both sides presented extensive expert testimony during August 1975. On April 20, 1976, the District Court issued its opinion. It held that certain of the requested information, the “manning” tables, fell within Exemption 4 of the FOIA. The District Court reasoned from this holding that the tables may or must be withheld, depending on applicable agency regulations, and that here a governing regulation required that the information be withheld. Pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 301, the enabling statute which gives federal department heads control over department records, the Secretary of Labor has promulgated a regulation, 29 CFR § 70.21 (a) (1978), stating that no officer or employee of the Department is to violate 18 U. S. C. § 1905. That section imposes criminal sanctions on Government employees who make unauthorized disclosure of certain classes of information submitted to a Government agency, including trade secrets and confidential statistical data. In essence, the District Court read § 1905 as not merely a prohibition of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information by Government employees, but as a restriction on official agency actions taken pursuant to promulgated regulations. Both sides appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F. 2d 1172 (1977). It agreed with the District Court that the FOIA does not compel withholding of information that falls within its nine exemptions. It also, like the District Court, rejected Chrysler’s reliance on the confidentiality statutes, either because there was no implied private right of action to proceed under the statute, or because the statute, by its terms, was not applicable to the information at issue in this case. It agreed with the District Court that analysis must proceed under the APA. But it disagreed with that court’s interpretation of 29 CFR §70.21 (a). By the terms of that regulation, the specified disclosures are only proscribed if “not authorized by law,” the standard of 18 U. S. C. § 1905. In the Court of Appeals’ view, disclosures made pursuant to OFCCP disclosure regulations are “authorized by law” by virtue of those regulations. Therefore, it held that 29 CFR § 70.21 (a) was inapplicable. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the District Court’s view of the scope of review under the APA. It held that the District Court erred in conducting a de novo review; review should have been limited to the agency record. However, the Court of Appeals found that record inadequate in this case and directed that the District Court remand to the agency for supplementation. Because of a conflict in the Circuits and the general importance of these “reverse-FOIA” cases, we granted certiorari, 435 U. S. 914, and now vacate the judgment of the Third Circuit and remand for further proceedings. II We have decided a number of FOIA cases in the last few years. Although we have not had to face squarely the question whether the FOIA ex proprio vigore forbids governmental agencies from disclosing certain classes of information to the public, we have in the course of at least one opinion intimated an answer. We have, moreover, consistently recognized that the basic objective of the Act is disclosure. In contending that the FOIA bars disclosure of the requested equal employment opportunity information, Chrysler relies on the Act’s nine exemptions and argues that they require an agency to withhold exempted material. In this case it relies specifically on Exemption 4: “(b) [FOIA] does not apply to matters that are— “(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential 5U.S.C. §552 (b)(4). Chrysler contends that the nine exemptions in general, and Exemption 4 in particular, reflect a sensitivity to the privacy interests of private individuals and nongovernmental entities. That contention may be conceded without inexorably requiring the conclusion that the exemptions impose affirmative duties on an agency to withhold information sought. In fact, that conclusion is not supported by the language, logic, or history of the Act. The organization of the Act is straightforward. Subsection (a), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a), places a general obligation on the agency to make information available to the public and sets out specific modes of disclosure for certain classes of information. Subsection (b), 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b), which lists the exemptions, simply states that the specified material is not subject to the disclosure obligations set out in subsection (a). By its terms, subsection (b) demarcates the agency’s obligation to disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure. That the FOIA is exclusively a disclosure statute is, perhaps, demonstrated most convincingly by examining its provision for judicial relief. Subsection (a) (4) (B) gives federal district courts “jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (4) (B). That provision does not give the authority to bar disclosure, and thus fortifies our belief that Chrysler, and courts which have shared its view, have incorrectly interpreted the exemption provisions of the FOIA. The Act is an attempt to meet the demand for open government while preserving workable confidentiality in governmental decision-making. Congress appreciated that, with the expanding sphere of governmental regulation and enterprise, much of the information within Government files has been submitted by private entities seeking Government contracts or responding to unconditional reporting obligations imposed by law. There was sentiment that Government agencies should have the latitude, in certain circumstances, to afford the confidentiality desired by these submitters. But the congressional concern was with the agency’s need or preference for confidentiality; the FOIA by itself protects the submitters’ interest in confidentiality only to the extent that this interest is endorsed by the agency collecting the information. Enlarged access to governmental information undoubtedly cuts against the privacy concerns of nongovernmental entities, and as a matter of policy some balancing and accommodation may well be desirable. We simply hold here that Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure. This conclusion is further supported by the legislative history. The FOIA was enacted out of dissatisfaction with § 3 of the APA, which had not resulted in as much disclosure by the agencies as Congress later thought desirable. Statements in both the Senate and House Reports on the effect of the exemptions support the interpretation that the exemptions were only meant to permit the agency to withhold certain information, and were not meant to mandate nondisclosure. For example, the House Report states: “■[The FOIA] sets up workable standards for the categories of records which may be exempt from public disclosure . . . . . There may be legitimate reasons for nondisclosure and [the FOIA] is designed to permit nondisclosure in such cases.” “[The FOIA] lists in a later subsection the specific categories of information which may be exempted from disclosure.” We therefore conclude that Congress did not limit an agency’s discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA. It necessarily follows that the Act does not afford Chrysler any right to enjoin agency disclosure. Ill Chrysler contends, however, that even if its suit for injunc-tive relief cannot be based on the FOIA, such an action can be premised on the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1905. The Act provides: “Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.” There are necessarily two parts to Chrysler’s argument: that § 1905 is applicable to the type of disclosure threatened in this case, and that it affords Chrysler a private right of action to obtain injunctive relief. A The Court of Appeals held that § 1905 was not applicable to the agency disclosure at issue here because such disclosure was “authorized by law” within the meaning of the Act. The court found the source of that authorization to be the OFCCP regulations that DLA relied on in deciding to disclose information on the Hamtramck and Newark plants. Chrysler contends here that these agency regulations are not “law” within the meaning of § 1905. It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have the “force and effect of law.” This doctrine is so well established that agency regulations implementing federal statutes have been held to pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause. It would therefore take a clear showing of contrary legislative intent before the phrase “authorized by law” in § 1905 could be held to have a narrower ambit than the traditional understanding. The origins of the Trade Secrets Act can be traced to Rev. Stat. § 3167, an Act which barred unauthorized disclosure of specified business information by Government revenue officers. There is very little legislative history concerning the original bill, which was passed in 1864. It was re-enacted numerous times, with some modification, and remained part of the revenue laws until 1948. Congressional statements made at the time of these re-enactments indicate that Congress was primarily concerned with unauthorized disclosure of business information by feckless or corrupt revenue agents, for in the early days of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it was the field agents who had substantial contact with confidential financial information. In 1948, Rev. Stat. § 3167 was consolidated with two other statutes — involving the Tariff Commission and the Department of Commerce — to form the Trade Secrets Act. The statute governing the Tariff Commission was very similar to Rev. Stat. § 3167, and it explicitly bound members of the Commission as well as Commission employees. The Commerce Department statute embodied some differences in form. It was a mandate addressed to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and to its Director, but there was no reference to Bureau employees and it contained no criminal sanctions. Unlike the other statutes, it also had no exception for disclosures “authorized by law.” In its effort to “con-solidat[e]” the three statutes, Congress enacted § 1905 and essentially borrowed the form of Rev. Stat. § 3167 and the Tariff Commission statute. We find nothing in the legislative history of § 1905 and its predecessors which lends support to Chrysler’s contention that Congress intended the phrase “authorized by law,” as used in § 1905, to have a special, limited meaning. Nor do we find anything in the legislative history to support the respondents’ suggestion that § 1905 does not address formal agency action — i. e., that it is essentially an “antileak” statute that does not bind the heads of governmental departments or agencies. That would require an expansive and unprecedented holding that any agency action directed or approved by an agency head is “authorized by law,” regardless of the statutory authority for that action. As Attorney General Brownell recognized not long after § 1905 was enacted, such a reading is difficult to reconcile with Congress’ intent to consolidate the Tariff Commission and Commerce Department statutes, both of which explicitly addressed ranking officials, with Rev. Stat. § 3167. It is also inconsistent with a settled understanding — previously shared by the Department of Justice — that has been continually articulated and relied upon in Congress during the legislative efforts in the last three decades to increase public access to Government information. Although the existence of this understanding is not by any means dispositive, it does shed some light on the intent of the enacting Congress. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U. S. 84, 90 (1958). In sum, we conclude that § 1905 does address formal agency action and that the appropriate inquiry is whether OFCCP’s regulations provide the “authorization] by law” required by the statute. In order for a regulation to have the “force and effect of law,” it must have certain substantive characteristics and be the product of certain procedural requisites. The central distinction among agency regulations found in the APA is that between “substantive rules” on the one hand and “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” on the other. A “substantive rule” is not defined in the APA, and other authoritative sources essentially offer definitions by negative inference. But in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199 (1974), we noted a characteristic inherent in the concept of a “substantive rule.” We described a substantive rule — or a “legislative-type rule,” id., at 236 — as one “affecting individual rights and obligations.” Id., at 232. This characteristic is an important touchstone for distinguishing those rules that may be “binding” or have the “force of law.” Id., at 235, 236. That an agency regulation is “substantive,” however, does not by itself give it the “force and effect of law.” The legislative power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes. As this Court noted in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 n. 9 (1977): “Legislative, or substantive, regulations are ‘issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and . . . implement the statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission .... Such rules have the force and effect of law.’ ” Likewise the promulgation of these regulations must conform with any procedural requirements imposed by Congress. Morton v. Ruiz, supra, at 232. For agency discretion is limited not only by substantive, statutory grants of authority, but also by the procedural requirements which “assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application.” NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, 764 (1969). The pertinent procedural limitations in this case are those found in the APA. The regulations relied on by the respondents in this case as providing “authorization] by law” within the meaning of § 1905 certainly affect individual rights and obligations; they govern the public’s right to information in records obtained under Executive Order 11246 and the confidentiality rights of those who submit information to OFCCP and its compliance agencies. It is a much closer question, however, whether they are the product of a congressional grant of legislative authority. In his published memorandum setting forth the disclosure regulations at issue in this case, the Secretary of Labor states that the authority upon which he relies in promulgating the regulations are § 201 of Executive Order 11246, as amended, and 29 CFR § 70.71 (1978), which permits units in the Department of Labor to promulgate supplemental disclosure regulations consistent with 29 CFR pt. 70 and the FOIA. 38 Fed. Reg. 3192-3194 (1973). Since materials that are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA are by virtue of Part II of this opinion outside the ambit of that Act, the Government cannot rely on the FOIA as congressional authorization for disclosure regulations that permit the release of information within the Act’s nine exemptions. Section 201 of Executive Order 11246 directs the Secretary of Labor to “adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as he deems necessary and appropriate to achieve the purposes thereof.” But in order for such regulations to have the “force and effect of law,” it is necessary to establish a nexus between the regulations and some delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress. The origins of the congressional authority for Executive Order 11246 are somewhat obscure and have been roundly debated by commentators and courts. The Order itself as amended establishes a program to eliminate employment discrimination by the Federal Government and by those who benefit from Government contracts. For purposes of this case, it is not necessary to decide whether Executive Order 11246 as amended is authorized by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, or some more general notion that the Executive can impose reasonable contractual require-merits in the exercise of its procurement authority. The pertinent inquiry is whether under any of the arguable statutory grants of authority the OFCCP disclosure regulations relied on by the respondents are reasonably within the contemplation of that grant of authority. We think that it is clear that when it enacted these statutes, Congress was not concerned with public disclosure of trade secrets or confidential business information, and, unless we were to hold that any ■ federal statute that implies some authority to collect information must grant legislative authority to disclose that information to the public, it is simply not possible to find in these statutes a delegation of the disclosure authority asserted by the respondents here. The relationship between any grant of legislative authority and the disclosure regulations becomes more remote when one examines § 201 of the Executive Order. It speaks in terms of rules and regulations “necessary and appropriate” to achieve the purposes of the Executive Order. Those purposes are an end to discrimination in employment by the Federal Government and those who deal with the Federal Government. One cannot readily pull from the logic and purposes of the Executive Order any concern with the public’s access to information in Government files or the importance of protecting trade secrets or confidential business statistics. The “purpose and scope” section of the disclosure regulations indicates two underlying rationales: OFCCP’s general policy “to disclose information to the public,” and its policy “to cooperate with other public agencies as well as private parties seeking to eliminate discrimination in employment.” 41 CFR § 60-40.1 (1978). The respondents argue that “[t]he purpose of the Executive Order is to combat discrimination in employment, and a disclosure policy designed to further this purpose is consistent with the Executive Order and an appropriate subject for regulation under its aegis.” Brief for Respondents 48. Were a grant of legislative authority as a basis for Executive Order 11246 more clearly identifiable, we might agree with the respondents that this “compatibility” gives the disclosure regulations the necessary legislative force. But the thread between these regulations and any grant of authority by the Congress is so strained that it would do violence to established principles of separation of powers to denominate these particular regulations “legislative” and credit them with the “binding effect of law.” This is not to say that any grant of legislative authority to a federal agency by Congress must be specific before regulations promulgated pursuant to it can be binding on courts in a manner akin to statutes. What is important is that the reviewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the regulations issued. Possibly the best illustration remains Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943). There the Court rejected the argument that the Communications Act of 1934 did not give the Federal Communications Commission authority to issue regulations governing chain broadcasting beyond the specification of technical, engineering requirements. Before reaching that conclusion, however, the Court probed the language and logic of the Communications Act and its legislative history. Only after this careful parsing of authority did the Court find that the regulations had the force of law and were binding on the courts unless they were arbitrary or not promulgated pursuant to prescribed procedures. “Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the 'public interest’ will be furthered or retarded by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. The responsibility belongs to the Congress for the grant of valid legislative authority and to the Commission for its exercise.” Id., at 224. The respondents argue, however, that even if these regulations do not have the force of law by virtue of Executive Order 11246, an explicit grant of legislative authority for such regulations can be found in 5 U. S. C. § 301, commonly referred to as the “housekeeping statute.” It provides: “The head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public.” The antecedents of § 301 go back to the beginning of the Republic, when statutes were enacted to give heads of early Government departments authority to govern internal departmental affairs. Those laws were consolidated into one statute in 1874 and the current version of the statute was enacted in 1958. Given this long and relatively uncontroversial history, and the terms of the statute itself, it seems to be simply a grant of authority to the agency to regulate its own affairs. What is clear from the legislative history of the 1958 amendment to § 301 is that this section was not intended to provide authority for limiting the scope of § 1905. The 1958 amendment to § 301 was the product of congressional concern that agencies were invoking § 301 as a source of authority to withhold information from the public. Congressman Moss sponsored an amendment that added the last sentence to § 301, which specifically states that this section “does not authorize withholding information from the public.” The Senate Report accompanying the amendment stated: “Nothing in the legislative history of [§ 301] shows that Congress intended this statute to be a grant of authority to the heads of the executive departments to withhold information from the public or to limit the availability of records to the public.” S. Rep. No. 1621, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958). The logical corollary to this observation is that there is nothing in the legislative history of § 301 to indicate it is a substantive grant of legislative power to promulgate rules authorizing the release of trade secrets or confidential business information. It is indeed a “housekeeping statute,” authorizing what the APA terms “rules of agency organization, procedure or practice” as opposed to “substantive rules.” This would suggest that regulations pursuant to § 301 could not provide the “authorization] by law” required by § 1905. But there is more specific support for this position. During the debates on the 1958 amendment Congressman Moss assured the House that the amendment would “not affect the confidential status of information given to the Government and carefully detailed in title 18, United States Code, section 1905.” 104 Cong. Rec. 6550 (1958). The respondents argue that this last statement is of little significance, because it is only made with reference to the amendment. But that robs Congressman Moss’ statement of any substantive import. If Congressman Moss thought that records within the terms of § 1905 could be released on the authority of a § 301 regulation, why was he (and presumably the House) concerned with whether the amendment affected § 1905? Under the respondents’ interpretation, records released pursuant to § 301 are outside § 1905 by virtue of the first sentence of § 301. The remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history. Congressman Moss’ statement must be considered with the Reports of both Houses and the statements of other Congressmen, all of which refute the respondents’ interpretation of the relationship between § 301 and § 1905. Of greatest significance, however, is the “housekeeping” nature of § 301 itself. On the basis of this evidence of legislative intent, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that “[s]ection 301 does not authorize regulations limiting the scope of section 1905.” Charles River Park “A,” Inc. v. Department of HUD, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 286, 293-294, 519 F. 2d 935, 942-943 (1975). There is also a procedural defect in the OFCCP disclosure regulations which precludes courts from affording them the force and effect of law. That defect is a lack of strict compliance with the APA. Recently we have had occasion to examine the requirements of the APA in the context of “legislative” or “substantive” rulemaking. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), we held that courts could only in “extraordinary circumstances” impose procedural requirements on an agency beyond those specified in the APA. It is within an agency’s discretion to afford parties more procedure, but it is not the province of the courts to do so. In Vermont Yankee, we recognized that the APA is “ ‘a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.’ ” Id., at 547 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 40 (1950)). Courts upset that balance when they override informed choice of procedures and impose obligations not required by the APA. By the same token, courts are charged with maintaining the balance: ensuring that agencies comply with the “outline of minimum essential rights and procedures” set out in the APA. H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1946); see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., supra, at 549 n. 21. Certainly regulations subject to the APA cannot be afforded the “force and effect of law” if not promulgated pursuant to the statutory procedural minimum found in that Act. Section 4 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 553, specifies that an agency shall afford interested persons general notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity to comment before a substantive rule is promulgated “Interpretive rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice” are exempt from these requirements. When the Secretary of Labor published the regulations pertinent in this case, he stated: “As the changes made by this document relate solely to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and to rules of agency procedure and practice, neither notice of proposed rule making nor public participation therein is required by 5 U. S. C. 553. Since the changes made by this document either relieve restrictions or are interpretative rules, no delay in effective date is required by 5 U. S. C. 553 (d). These rules shall therefore be effective immediately. “In accordance with the spirit of the public policy set forth in 5 U. S. C. 553, interested persons may submit written comments, suggestions, data, or arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Contract Compliance . . . .” 38 Fed. Reg. 3193 (1973). Thus, the regulations were essentially treated as interpretative rules and interested parties were not afforded the notice of proposed rulemaking required for substantive rules under 5 U. S. C. § 553 (b). As we observed in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S., at 425 n. 9: “[A] court is not required to give effect to an interpretative regulation. Varying degrees of deference are accorded to administrative interpretations, based on such factors as the timing and consistency of the agency’s position, and the nature of its expertise.” We need not decide whether these regulations are properly characterized as “interpretative rules.” It is enough that such regulations are not properly promulgated as substantive rules, and therefore not the product of procedures which Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to giving a regulation the binding effect of law. An interpretative regulation or general statement of agency policy cannot be the “authorization] by law” required by § 1905. This disposition best comports with both the purposes underlying the APA and sound administrative practice. Here important interests are in conflict: the public’s access to information in the Government’s files and concerns about personal privacy and business confidentiality. The OFCCP’s regulations attempt to strike a balance. In enacting the APA, Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness and informed administrative decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment. With the consideration that is the necessary and intended consequence of such procedures, OFCCP might have decided that a different accommodation was more appropriate. B We reject, however, Chrysler’s contention that the Trade Secrets Act affords a private right of action to enjoin disclosure in violation of the statute. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), we noted that this Court has rarely implied a private right of action under a criminal statute, and where it has done so “there was at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone.” Nothing in § 1905 prompts such an inference. Nor are other pertinent circumstances outlined in Cort present here. As our review of the legislative history of § 1905 — or lack of same — might suggest, there is no indication of legislative intent to create a private right of action. Most importantly, a private right of action under § 1905 is not “necessary to make effective the congressional purpose,” J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1964), for we find that review of DLA’s decision to disclose Chrysler’s employment data is available under the APA. IV While Chrysler may not avail itself of any violations of the provisions of § 1905 in a separate cause of action, any such violations may have a dispositive effect on the outcome of judicial review of agency action pursuant to § 10 of the APA. Section 10 (a) of the APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved- by agency action ... , is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U. S. C. § 702. Two exceptions to this general rule of reviewability are set out in § 10. Review is not available where “statutes preclude judicial review” or where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. §§ 701 (a)(1), (2). In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971), the Court held that the latter exception applies “where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply,’ ” quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945). Were we simply confronted with the authorization in 5 U. S. C. § 301 to prescribe regulations regarding “the custody, use, and preservation of [agency] records, papers, and property,” it would be difficult to derive any standards limiting agency conduct which might constitute “law to apply.” But our discussion in Part III demonstrates that § 1905 and any “authorization] by law” contemplated by that section place substantive limits on agency action. Therefore, we conclude that DLA’s decision to disclose the Chrysler reports is reviewable agency action and Chrysler is a person “adversely affected or aggrieved” within the meaning of § 10 (a). Both Chrysler and the respondents agree that there is APA review of DLA’s decision. They disagree on the proper scope of review. Chrysler argues that there should be de novo review, while the respondents contend that such review is only available in extraordinary cases and this is not such a case. The pertinent provisions of § 10 (e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 706, state that a reviewing court shall “(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; “(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.” For the reasons previously stated, we believe any disclosure that violates § 1905 is “not in accordance with law” within the meaning of 5 TJ. S. C. § 706 (2) (A). De novo review by the District Court is ordinarily not necessary to decide whether a contemplated disclosure runs afoul of § 1905. The District Court in this case concluded that disclosure of some of Chrysler’s documents was barred by § 1905, but the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue. We shall therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion in order that the Court of Appeals may consider whether the contemplated disclosures would violate the prohibition of § 1905. Since the decision regarding this substantive issue — the scope of § 1905 — will necessarily have some effect on the proper form of judicial review pursuant to § 706 (2), we think it unnecessary, and therefore unwise, at the present stage of this case for us to express any additional views on that issue. Vacated and remanded. Executive Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national origin” in federal employment or by Government contractors. Under §202 of this Executive Order, most Government contracts must contain a provision whereby the contractor agrees not to discriminate in such a fashion and to take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity. With promulgation of Executive Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.), in 1967, President Johnson extended the requirements of the 1965 Order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. 41 CFR §§ 60-1.3, 60-1.7 (1978). For convenience all references will be to DLA. 41 CFR §§ 60-1.20, 60-1.24 (1978). The term “alphabet soup” gained currency in the early days of the New Deal as a description of the proliferation of new agencies such as WPA and PWA. The terminology required to describe the present controversy suggests that the “alphabet soup” of the New Deal era was, by comparison, a clear broth. § 60-40.2 (a). The regulations also state that EEO-1 Reports “shall be disclosed,” § 60-40.4, and that AAP’s “must be disclosed” if not within limited exceptions. §§ 60-40.2 (b) (1), 60-40.3. Manning tables are lists of job titles and of the number of people who perform each job. Compare Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F. 2d 1190 (CA4 1976), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 924 (1977), with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F. 2d 1197 (CA7 1978); General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F. 2d 1211 (CA8 1978); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F. 2d 627 (CA5 1976); Charles River Park “A,” Inc. v. Department of HUD, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 286, 519 F. 2d 935 (1975). NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214 (1978); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352 (1976); FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U. S. 255 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U. S. 168 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1 (1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973). “Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions from compelled disclosures. These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (c), and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed.” EPA v. Mink, supra, at 79 (emphasis added). We observed in Department of Air Force v. Rose, supra, at 361, that “disclosure, not secrecj'", is the dominant objective of the Act.” The legislative history is replete with references to Congress’ desire to loosen the agency’s grip on the data underlying governmental decisionmaking. “A democratic societjr requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantitjr and quality of its information varies. . . . “[The FOIA] provides the necessary machinery to assure the availability of Government information necessary to an informed electorate.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1966). “Although the theory of an informed electorate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is nowhere in our present law a statute which affirmatively provides for that information.” S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 10 (emphasis added; footnote omitted): “[Exemption 4] would assure the confidentiality of information obtained by the Government through questionnaires or through material submitted and disclosures made in procedures such as the mediation of labor-management controversies. It exempts such material if it would not customarily be made public by the person from whom it was obtained by the Government. ... It would . . . include information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.” The italicized passage is obviously consistent with Exemption 4’s being an exception to the disclosure mandate of the FOIA and not a limitation on agency discretion. See S. Rep. No. 813, supra, at 3: “It is not an easy task to balance the opposing interests, but it is not an impossible one either. It is not necessary to conclude that to protect one of the interests, the other must, of necessity, either be abrogated or substantially subordinated. Success lies in providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.” Id., at 9; n. 11, supra. It is informative in this regard to compare the FOIA with the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. § 552a. In the latter Act, Congress explicitly requires agencies to withhold records about an individual from most third parties unless the subject gives his permission. Even more telling is 49 U. S. C. § 1357, a section which authorizes the Administrator of the FAA to take antihijacking measures, including research and development of protection devices. “Notwithstanding [the FOIA], the Administrator shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary to prohibit disclosure of any information obtained or developed in the conduct of research and development activities under this subsection if, in the opinion of the Administrator, the disclosure of such information— “(B) would reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information obtained from any person . . . .” § 1357 (d) (2)(B). Section 3 of the original APA provided that an agency should generally publish or make available organizational data, general statements of policy, rules, and final orders. Exception was made for matters “requiring secrecy in the public interest” or “relating solely to the internal management of an agency.” This original version of § 3 was repealed with passage of the FOIA. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973). H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 5, 7 (1966) (emphasis added). See also S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1965). Congressman Moss, the House sponsor of the FOIA, described the exemptions on the House floor as indicating what documents “may be withheld.” 112 Cong. Rec. 13641 (1966). 41 CFR §§ 60.40-1 to 60.40-4 (1978). E. g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 n. 9 (1977); Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 223 (1963); United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431, 437-438 (1960); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Scarlett, 300 U. S. 471, 474 (1937). Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245 (1963); Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663 (1962); Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 355 U. S. 534 (1958). Revenue Act of 1864, § 38, 13 Stat. 238. The last version was codified as 18 U. S. C. § 216 (1940 ed.): “It shall be unlawful for any collector, deputy collector, agent, clerk, or other officer or employee of the United States to divulge or to make known in any manner whatever not provided by law to any person the operations, style of work, or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer visited by him in the discharge of his official duties, or the amount or source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set forth or disclosed in any income return, or to permit any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; and it shall be unlawful for any person to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided by law any income return, or any part thereof or source of income, profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income return; and any offense against the foregoing provision shall be a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court; and if the offender be an officer or employee of the United States he shall be dismissed from office or discharged from employment.” See, e. g., 26 Cong. Rec. 6893 (1894) (Sen. Aldrich) (expressing concern that taxpayer’s confidential information is “to be turned over to the tender mercies of poorly paid revenue agents”); id., at 6924 (Sen. Teller) (exposing records to the “idle curiosity of a revenue officer”). See also Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 2997 (1864) (Rep. Brown) (expressing concern that 1864 revenue provisions would allow “every little petty officer” to investigate the affairs of private citizens). There was virtually no Washington bureaucracy created by the Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, the statute to which the present Internal Revenue Service can be traced. Researchers report that during the Civil War 85% of the operations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue were carried out in the field — “including the assessing and collection of taxes, the handling of appeals, and punishment for frauds” — and this balance of responsibility was not generally upset until the 20th century. L. Schmeckebier & F. Eble, The Bureau of Internal Revenue 8, 40-43 (1923). Agents had the power to enter any home or business establishment to look for taxable property and examine books of accounts. Information was collected and processed in the field. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that congressional comments during this period focused on potential abuses by agents in the field and not on breaches of confidentiality by a Washington-based bureaucracy. See H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A127-A128 (1947). The Tariff Commission statute, last codified as 19 U. S. C. § 1335 (1940 ed.), provided: “It shall be unlawful for any member of the commission, or for any employee, agent, or clerk of the commission, or any other officer or employee of the United States, to divulge, or to make known in any manner whatever not provided for by law, to any person, the trade secrets or processes of any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, or association embraced in any examination or investigation conducted by the commission, or by order of the commission, or by order of any member thereof. Any offense against the provisions of this section shall be a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court, and such offender shall also be dismissed from office or discharged from employment.” 15 U. S. C. § 176a (1940 ed.): “Any statistical information furnished in confidence to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce by individuals, corporations, and firms shall be held to be confidential, and shall be used only for the statistical purposes for which it is supplied. The Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce shall not permit anyone other than the sworn employees of the Bureau to examine such individual reports, nor shall he permit any statistics of domestic commerce to be published in such manner as to reveal the identity of the individual, corporation, or firm furnishing such data.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, supra n. 24, at A127. In a December 1, 1953, opinion, the Attorney General advised the Secretary of the Treasury that he should regard himself as bound by § 1905. The Attorney General noted: “The reviser of the Criminal Code describes the provision as a consolidation of three other sections formerly appearing in the United States Code. Of the three, two expressly operated as prohibitions on the heads of agencies.” 41 Op. Atty. Gen. 166, 167 (footnote omitted). See also id., at 221 (Atty. Gen. Brownell advising Federal Communications-Commission Chairman to regard himself as bound). If we accepted the respondents’ position, 18 U. S. C. § 1905 would simply be irrelevant to the issue of public access to agency information. The FOIA and other such “access” legislation are concerned with formal agency action — to what extent can an agency or department or, put differently, the head of an agency or department withhold information contained within the governmental unit’s files. It is all but inconceivable that a Government employee would withhold information which his superiors had directed him to release; and these Acts are simply not addressed to disclosure by a Government employee that is not sanctioned by the employing agency. This is not to say that the actions of individual employees might not be inconsistent with the access legislation. But such actions are only inconsistent insofar as they are imputed to the agencies themselves. Therefore, if § 1905 is not addressed to formal agency action — i. e., action approved by the agency or department head — there should have been no concern in Congress regarding the interrelationship of § 1905 and the access legislation, for they would then address totally different types of disclosure. In fact, the legislative history of all the significant access legislation of the last 20 years evinces a concern with this relationship and a concomitant universal assumption that § 1905 embraces formal agency action. Congress was assured that the 1958 amendment to 5 U. S. C. § 301, the housekeeping statute that affords department heads custodial responsibility for department records, would not circumscribe the confidentiality mandated by § 1905. The 1958 amendment simply clarified that § 301 itself was not substantive authority to withhold information. See infra, at 310-312. Also in 1958 the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted hearings on the power of the President to withhold information from Congress. As part of the investigative effort, a list was compiled of all statutes restricting disclosure of Government information. Section 1905 was listed among them. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 921, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 986 (1958). Two years later, the House Committee on Government Operations conducted a study on statutory authorities restricting or requiring the release of information under the control of executive departments or independent agencies, and again prominent among the statutes “affecting the availability of information to the public” was 18 U. S. C. § 1905. House Committee on Government Operations, Federal Statutes on the Availability of Information 262 (Comm. Print. 1960) (§ 1905 denominated as statute prohibiting the disclosure of certain information). In FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U. S., at 264-265, we recognized the importance of these lists in Congress’ later deliberations concerning the FOIA, particularly in the consideration of the original Exemption 3. That Exemption excepted from the operation of the FOIA matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” As we noted in Robertson: “When the House Committee on Government Operations focused on Exemption 3, it took note that there are ‘nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records. These would not be modified by the public records provisions of [the FOIA].’ H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). (Emphasis added.)” Id., at 265. In determining that the statute at issue in Robertson, 49 U. S. C. § 1504, was within Exemption 3, we observed that the statute was on these prior lists and that the Civil Aeronautics Board had brought the statute to the attention of both the House and Senate Committees as an exempting statute during the hearings on the FOIA. 422 U. S., at 264, and n. 11. In fact, during those hearings 18 U. S. C. § 1905 was the most frequently cited restriction on agency or department disclosure of information. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on H. R. 5012 et al., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 283 (1965) ’(cited by 28 agencies as authority for withholding information). Among those citing the statute was the Department of Justice. Id., at 386 (“commercial information received or assembled in connection with departmental functions must be withheld pursuant to these requirements”). See also id., at 20 (colloquy between Rep. Moss and Asst. Atty. Gen. Schlei); Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act 31-32 (June 1967) (18 U. S. C. § 1905 among the “nearly 100 statutes” mentioned in the House Report). Most recently, in its Report on the Government in the Sunshine Act, the House Committee on Government Operations observed: “[T]he Trade Secrets Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1905, which relates only to the disclosure of information where disclosure is 'not authorized by law,’ would not permit the withholding of information otherwise required to be disclosed by the Freedom of Information Act, since the disclosure is there authorized by law. Thus, for example, if material did not come within the broad trade secrets exemption contained in the Freedom of Information Act, section 1905 would not justify withholding; on the other hand, if material is within the trade secrets exemption of the Freedom of Information Act and therefore subject to disclosure if the agency determines that disclosure is in the public interest, section 1905 must be considered to ascertain whether the agency is forbidden from disclosing the information.” H. R. Rep. No. 94r-880, pt. 1, p. 23 (1976). 5 U. S. C. §§ 553 (b), (d). Neither the House nor Senate Report attempted to expound on the distinction. In prior cases, we have given some weight to the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), since the Justice Department was heavily involved in the legislative process that resulted in the Act’s enactment in 1946. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 546 (1978); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961) ; United States v. Zucca, 351 U. S. 91, 96 (1956). The Manual refers to substantive rules as rules that “implement” the statute. “Such rules have the force and effect of law.” Manual, supra, at 30 n. 3. In contrast it suggests that “interpretive rules” and “general statements of policy” do not have the force and effect of law. Interpretive rules are “issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers.” Ibid. General statements of policy are “statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” Ibid. See also Final Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure 27 (1941). Quoting Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, supra, at 30 n. 3. See, e. g., Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. 2d 159 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 854 (1971); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Philadelphia Plan and S. 931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 341; Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the Philadelphia Plan, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 84 (1970); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1972); Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 590 (1969). The Executive Order itself merely states that it is promulgated “[u]nder and by virtue of the authority vested in [the] President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States.” 3 CFR 339 (196A-1965 Comp.). 63 Stat. 377, as amended, 40 U. S. C. § 471 et seq. The Act as amended is prefaced with the following declaration of policy: “It is the intent of the Congress in enacting this legislation to provide for the Government an economical and efficient system for (a) the procurement and supply of personal property and nonpersonal services, including related functions such as contracting, inspection, storage, issue, specifications, property identification and classification, transportation and traffic management, establishment of pools or systems for transportation of Government personnel and property by motor vehicle within specific areas, management of public utility services, repairing and converting, establishment of inventory levels, establishment of forms and procedures, and representation before Federal and State regulatory bodies; (b) the utilization of available property; (c) the disposal of surplus property; and (d) records management.” 40 U. S. C. § 471. The Act explicitly authorizes Executive Orders “necessary to effectuate [its] provisions.” § 486 (a). However, nowhere in the Act is there a specific reference to employment discrimination. Lower courts have suggested that § 486 (a) was the authority for predecessors of Executive Order 11246. Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 3 (CA3 1964); Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F. 2d 629 (CA5), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 977 (1967). But as the Third Circuit noted in Contractors Assn, of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, supra, at 167, these suggestions were dicta and made without any analysis of the nexus between the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act and the Executive Orders. It went on to hold, however, that § 486 (a) was authority for at least some aspects of Executive Order 11246 on the ground that “it is in the interest of the United States in all procurement to see that its suppliers are not over the long run increasing its costs and delaying its programs by excluding from the labor pool available minority workmen.” 442 F. 2d, at 170. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000e-17. Significantly, the question has usually been put in terms of whether Executive Order 11246 is inconsistent with these titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e. g., Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, supra, at 171-174. Title YI grants federal agencies that are “empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract,” the authority to promulgate rules “which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.” Such rules must be approved by the President, and their enforcement is subject to congressional review. “In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action.” § 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-1. Executive Order 11246 contains no provision for congressional review, and therefore is not promulgated pursuant to § 602. Cf. Exec. Order No. 11247, 3 CFR 348 (1964-1965 Comp.). Titles VI and VII contain no other express substantive delegation to the President. This is an argument that Congress ratified Executive Order 11246 as amended, when it rejected a series of amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act that were designed to cut back on affirmative-action efforts under the Executive Order. See Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., supra; Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., supra; cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The respondents cite, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 536 (1977), for the proposition that “it has long been acknowledged that administrative regulations consistent with the agencies’ substantive statutes have the force and effect of law.” Brief for Respondents 38, and n. 24. The legislative delegation in that case, however, was quite explicit. The issue was whether state regulation of the labeling of meats and flour was pre-empted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act. The FMIA provides that meat or a meat product is misbranded “(5) if in a package or other container unless it bears a label showing . . . (B) an accurate statement of the quantity of the contents in terms of weight, measure, or numerical count: Provided, That . . . reasonable variations may be permitted, and exemptions as to small packages may be established, by regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” § 1 (n) (5) of the FMIA, 21 U. S. C. § 601 (n) (5). There is a similar provision in the FDCA. See H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1958): “The law has been called an office ‘housekeeping’ statute, enacted to help General Washington get his administration underway by spelling out the authority for executive officials to set up offices and file Government documents. The documents involved are papers pertaining to the day-today business of Government which are not restricted under other specific laws nor classified as military information or secrets of state.” The Secretary of Labor did not cite this statute as authority for the OFCCP disclosure regulations. 38 Fed. Reg. 3192-3193 (1973). This does not mean, of course, that disclosure regulations promulgated on the basis of § 301 are “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” for purposes of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (C). It simply means that disclosure pursuant to them is not “authorized by law” within the meaning of § 1905. The House Committee on Government Operations cited approvingly an observation by legal experts that “[§ 301] merely gives department heads authority to regulate within their departments the way in which requests for information are to be dealt with — for example, by centralizing the authority to deal with such requests in the department head.” H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1958). It noted that the members of its Special Subcommittee on Government Information “unanimously agreed that [§ 301] originally was adopted in 1789 to provide for the day-to-day office housekeeping in the Government departments, but through misuse it has become twisted into a claim of authority to withhold information.” Id., at 12. There are numerous remarks to similar effect in the Senate Report and the floor debates. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1621, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958); 104 Cong. Rec. 6549 (Rep. Moss), 6560 (Rep. Fascell), 15690-15696 (colloquy between Sens. Hruska and Johnston) (1958). Throughout the floor debates references are made to 78 statutes that require the withholding of information, and assurances are consistently given that these statutes are not in any way affected by § 301. E. g., 104 Cong. Rec. 6548 (Rep. Brown), 6549-6550 (Rep. Moss) (1958). It is clear from Congressman Moss’ comments that § 1905 is one of those statutes. 104 Cong. Rec. 6549-6550 (1958). There is also frequent reference to trade secrets as not being disclosable and the confidentiality of that information as not being affected by § 301. H. R. Rep. No. 1461, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958); 104 Cong. Rec. 6558 (Rep. Fascell), 6564 (Rep. Wright) (1958). The following exchange between Congressmen Meader and Moss is also instructive. “Mr. MEADER. Mr. Chairman, I should like the attention of the gentleman from California [Mr. Moss], the sponsor of the measure. I would like to read three paragraphs from the additional views I submitted to the report which appear upon page 62 of the report. I said: "I believe there is unanimous sentiment in the Government Operations Committee on the following points: “1. That departments and agencies of the Government have construed [§ 301] to authorize them to withhold information from the public and to limit the availability of records to the public. “2. That this interpretation is a strained and erroneous interpretation of the intent of Congress in [§ 301] which merely authorized department heads to make regulations governing day-to-day operation of the department — a so-called housekeeping function; and that [§301] was not intended to deal with the authority to release or withhold information or records. “I now yield to the gentleman from California to state whether or not those three points as I have set them forth in my additional views in the report on this measure accurately state what he understands to be the consensus of the judgment of the members of the Government Operations Committee in reporting out this legislation ? “MR. MOSS. That is correct as I interpret it.” Id., at 6562 (emphasis added). See, e. g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199 (1974); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742, 758 (1972). 5 U. S. C. § 553: “(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved — • “(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or “(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. “(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include— “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; “(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and “(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. “Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply— “(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or “(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. “(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection. “(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days before its effective date, except— “(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction; “(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or “(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule. “(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.” The regulations at issue in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., see n. 38, supra, were the product of notice of proposed rulemaking and comment. 32 Fed. Reg. 10729 (1967); 35 Fed. Reg. 15552 (1970). We also note that the respondents’ reliance on FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U. S. 279 (1965), is misplaced. In that case the Court held that a FCC rule — that investigatory proceedings would be public unless a hearing examiner found that “the public interest, the proper dispatch of the business ... , or the ends of justice” would be served by closed sessions— was consistent with the pertinent congressional grant of authority and not arbitrary or unreasonable. This Court held that the District Court imper-missibly invaded the province of the agency when it imposed its own notions of proper procedures. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978). There was no question in the ease regarding the applicability of § 1905. Moreover, the respondents had made a broad request that “all testimony and documents to be elicited from them . . . should be received in camera.” 381 U. S., at 295 (emphasis in original). The Court held that when specific information was requested that might actually injure Schreiber’s firm competitively, “there would be ample opportunity to request that it be received in confidence, and to seek judicial protection if the request were denied.” Id., at 296. 422 U. S., at 79, citing Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191 (1967); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pacific B. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1916). Jurisdiction to review agency action under the APA is found in 28 U. S. C. § 1331. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977). Chrysler does not argue in this Court, as it did below, that private rights of action are available under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e) and 44 U. S. C. § 3508. By regulation, the Secretary of Labor also has imposed the standards of § 1905 on OFCCP and its compliance agencies. 29 CFR § 70.21 (1978). Since the Court of Appeals assumed for purposes of argument that the material in question was within an exemption to the FOIA, that court found it unnecessary expressly to decide that issue and it is open on remand. We, of course, do not here attempt to determine the relative ambits of Exemption 4 and § 1905, or to determine whether § 1905 is an exempting statute within the terms of the amended Exemption 3, 5 U. S. C. §522 (b)(3). Although there is a theoretical possibility that material might be outside Exemption 4 yet within the substantive provisions of § 1905, and that therefore the FOIA might provide the necessary “author-iz[ation] by law” for purposes of § 1905, that possibility is at most of limited practical significance in view of the similarity of language between Exemption 4 and the substantive provisions of § 1905.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FORT STEWART SCHOOLS v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY ET AL. No. 89-65. Argued January 10, 1990 Decided May 29, 1990 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, at p. 657. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Rob erts, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, William Ranter, and Jacob. M. Lewis. William E. Persina argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority was Jill A. Griffin. Richard J. Him and Ronald R. Austin filed a brief for respondent Fort Stewart Association of Educators. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Jeremiah A. Collins, Laurence Gold, Mark D. Roth, Kevin M. Grile, and Lawrence A. Poltrock; and for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O’Duden and Kerry L. Adams. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we review the decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority that petitioner Fort Stewart Schools, a Federal Government employer, is required to bargain with the labor union representing its employees over a proposal -relating to wages and fringe benefits. I Respondent Fort Stewart Association of Educators (Union), is the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of two elementary schools at Fort Stewart, a United States military facility in Georgia. The schools, petitioner here, are owned and operated by the United States Army under authority of 64 Stat. 1107, 20 U. S. C. § 241(a), which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “make such arrangements ... as may be necessary to provide free public education” for children living on federally owned property. The present controversy arose when, during the course of collective-bargaining negotiations, the Union submitted to the schools proposals relating to mileage reimbursement, various types of paid leave, and a salary increase. Petitioner declined to negotiate these matters, claiming that they were not subject to bargaining under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, sometimes referred to as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U. S. C. §7101 et seq. (FSLMRS or Statute). The Union sought the aid of the Federal Labor Relations Authority pursuant to §§ 7105(a)(2)(D) and (E) and the Authority held that the Union’s proposals were negotiable. Fort Stewart Assn. of Educators, 28 F. L. R. A. 547 (1987). Upon a petition for review by petitioner and cross-petitions for enforcement by the Authority and the Union, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Authority’s decision, 860 F. 2d 396 (1988), and we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 807 (1989). II The FSLMRS requires a federal agency to negotiate in good faith with the chosen representative of employees covered by the Statute, 5 U. S. C. § 7114(a)(4), and makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to do so, § 7116(a)(5). The scope of the negotiating obligation is set forth in §7102, which confers upon covered employees the right, through their chosen representative, “to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment.” §7102(2). Section 7103(a)(14) defines “conditions of employment” as follows: “‘conditions of employment’ means personnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions, except that such term does not include policies, practices, and matters — “(A) relating to political activities prohibited under subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title; “(B) relating to the classification of any position; or “(C) to the extent such matters are specifically provided for by Federal statute . . . .” In construing these provisions, and the other provisions of the FSLMRS at issue in this case, the Authority was interpreting the statute that it is charged with implementing, see § 7105. We must therefore review its conclusions under the standard set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If, upon examination of “the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole,” K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988), it is clear that the Authority’s interpretation is incorrect, then we need look no further, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842-843. If, on the other hand, “the statute is silent or ambiguous” on the point at issue, we must decide “whether the agency’s answer is based' on a permissible construction of the statute.” Ibid. The Authority concluded that the Union’s proposals related to “conditions of employment,” following its decision in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1897, 24 F. L. R. A. 377, 379 (1986) (AFGE). 28 F. L. R. A., at 550-551. Petitioner claims that this was error because §7103(a)(14) defines “conditions of employment” as matters affecting “working conditions,” and because the latter term most naturally connotes “the physical conditions under which an employee labors,” Brief for Petitioner 17. The difficulty here, of course, is that the word “conditions” has two common meanings. It can mean matters “established or agreed upon as a requisite to the doing ... of something else”; and it can also mean “attendant circumstances,” or an “existing state of affairs.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 473 (1961). Whereas the term “conditions of employment” in § 7102 seems to us equally susceptible of both meanings, petitioner is correct that the term “working conditions” in the defining provision of § 7103(a)(14) more naturally refers, in isolation, only to the “circumstances” or “state of affairs” attendant to one’s performance of a job. See Department of Defense Dependents Schools v. FLRA, 274 U. S. App. D. C. 299, 301, 863 F. 2d 988, 990 (1988) (“The term ‘working conditions’ ordinarily calls to mind the day-to-day circumstances under which an employee performs his or her job”), rehearing en banc granted, No. 87-1733 (Feb. 6, 1989). Even if, however, it could not reasonably be interpreted to bear the other meaning in isolation, here it is not in isolation, but forms part of a paragraph whose structure, as a whole, lends support to the Authority’s broader reading. As set forth above, § 7103(a)(14) specifically excepts from the definition of “conditions of employment” (and thus suggests are covered by the term “working conditions”) “policies, practices, and matters . . . relating to political activities prohibited under subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title.” The subchapter referred to contains restrictions on partisan political activities of federal employees and protects them from being required or coerced to engage in political activity. It is barely conceivable, but most unlikely, that this provision of § 7103(a)(14) was meant to exclude from collective-bargaining proposals that would somehow infect with politics the “physical conditions” of the workplace; it seems much more plausibly directed at “conditions of employment” in the sense of qualifications demanded of, or obligations imposed upon, employees. And the second exception set forth in § 7103(a)(14), as set forth above, unquestionably assumes that “conditions of employment” (and hence “working conditions”) bears this broader meaning. The exception of “policies, practices, and matters . . . relating to the classification of any position” would be utterly unnecessary if petitioner’s interpretation of “working conditions” were correct. It might reasonably be argued, of course, that these two exceptions are indeed technically unnecessary, and were inserted out of an abundance of caution — a drafting imprecision venerable enough to have left its mark on legal Latin (ex abundanti cautela). But petitioner does not make this argument. Indeed, in its reply brief petitioner claims that it is “a serious distortion of [its] position,” Reply Brief for Petitioner 2, to characterize it, as respondent Union does, as asserting that “negotiations over ‘working conditions’ are limited to the physical conditions under which an employee labors.” Brief for Respondent Union 11. Petitioner asserts that, to the contrary, it “recognize[s] that the phrase ‘conditions of employment’ is no doubt susceptible of diverse interpretations,” including an interpretation whereby it would embrace “any subject which is insisted upon as a prerequisite for continued employment,” Reply Brief for Petitioner 2 (internal quotations omitted); and petitioner even acknowledges, with apparent approval, that the phrase in the present statute “has been extended beyond the purely physical conditions of the workplace,” ibid. The textual argument is thus abandoned. Petitioner seeks to persuade us, not (as respondent Union does) that the term “conditions of employment” (as defined to include only “working conditions”) bears one, rather than the other, of its two possible meanings; but rather to persuade us that it bears some third meaning no one has ever conceived of, so that it includes other insisted-upon prerequisites for continued employment, but does not include the insisted-upon prerequisite par excellence, wages. And this new unheard-of meaning, petitioner contends, is so “unambiguously expressed,” Chevron, supra, at 843, that we must impose it upon the agency initially responsible for interpreting the statute, despite the deference otherwise accorded under Chevron. To describe this position is sufficient to reject it, but we nonetheless examine briefly the elements petitioner sets forth to establish that “conditions of employment” clearly has a meaning here that it bears nowhere else. Petitioner points to the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq., which authorizes bargaining over “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” § 158(d), and to the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. §1201 et seq., which grants postal workers the right to bargain over “wages, hours, and working conditions.” Note following §1201. Because each of these statutes specifically refers to wages, the argument runs, we must infer from the absence of such a reference in the FSLMRS that Congress did not mean to include them. But those other statutes deal with labor-management relations in entirely different fields of employment, and the FSLMRS contains no indication that it is to be read in pari materia with them. The first of those provisions does (perhaps) show that the term “conditions of employment” can be used to refer only to physical circumstances of employment; and the second of them does (perhaps) show that “working conditions” is more naturally used to mean that — but those are points we have already conceded. Petitioner discusses at great length the legislative history of the Statute, from which it has culled a formidable number of statements suggesting that certain members and committees of Congress did not think the duty to bargain would extend to proposals relating to wages and fringe benefits. A Senate Report, for example, states unequivocally that “[t]he bill permits unions to bargain collectively on personnel policies and practices, and other matters affecting working conditions within the authority of agency managers. ... It excludes bargaining on economic matters . . . .” S. Rep. No. 95-969, pp. 12-13 (1978). A House Report recounts that the bill “does not permit . . . bargaining on wages and fringe benefits____” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 12 (1978). To like effect are numerous floor statements by both sponsors and opponents. The trouble with these statements, to the extent they are relevant to our inquiry, is that they may have been wrong. The wages and fringe benefits of the overwhelming majority of Executive Branch employees are fixed by law, in accordance with the General Schedules of the Civil Service Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 5332, and are therefore eliminated from the definition of “conditions of employment” by the third exception in §7103(a)(14) set forth above — which excludes “matters . . . specifically provided for by Federal statute.” 5 U. S. C. § 7103(a)(14)(C). Employees of schools established under §241 are among a miniscule minority of federal employees whose wages are exempted from operation of the General Schedules. Title 20 U. S. C. § 241(a) provides that an agency establishing such a school may fix “the compensation, tenure, leave, hours of work, and other incidents of the employment relationship” of its employees “without regard to the Civil Service Act and rules.” Ibid. See also AFGE, 24 F. L. R. A., at 378. The legislative materials to which petitioner refers display no awareness of this exception. To the contrary, numerous statements, many from the same sources to which petitioner points, display the erroneous belief that the wages and fringe benefits of all Executive Branch em- -- ployees were set by statute. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 12 (1978) (“Federal pay will continue to be set in accordance with the pay provisions of title 5, and fringe benefits, including retirement, insurance, and leave, will continue to be set by Congress”); id., at 44 (“Rates of overtime pay are not bargainable, because they are specifically provided for by statute”). Thus, all of the statements to which petitioner refers may have rested upon the following syllogism: The wages and fringe benefits of all federal employees are specifically provided for by federal statute; “conditions of employment” subject to the duty to bargain do not include “matters . . . specifically provided for by Federal statute”; therefore “conditions of employment” subject to the duty to bargain do not include the wages and fringe benefits of all federal employees. Since the premise of that syllogism is wrong, so may be its expressed conclusion. There is no conceivable persuasive effect in legislative history that may reflect nothing more than the speakers’ incomplete understanding of the world upon which the statute will operate. Cf. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U. S. 820, 824 (1990) (expectation by Members of Congress that all Title VII suits would be tried in federal court, “even if universally shared,” does not establish that the statute requires such suits to be brought in federal court). Ill Petitioner next argues that, even if the Union’s proposals relate to “conditions of employment” subject to bargaining under § 7102, they are exempted from the statutory duty to bargain by § 7106, which provides that “nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency ... to determine the . . . budget ... of the agency . . . .” 5 U. S. C. §7106. The Authority rejected that claim by applying the test established in its decision in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 2 F. L. R. A. 604 (1980), enf’d on other grounds sub nom. Department of Defense v. FLRA, 212 U. S. App. D. C. 256, 659 F. 2d 1140 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 945 (1982): “To establish that a proposal directly interferes with an agency’s right to determine its budget under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute, an agency must make a substantial showing that the proposal requires the inclusion of a particular program or amount in its budget or that the proposal will result in significant and unavoidable increases in cost not affected [sic: offset] by compensating benefits.” 28 F. L. R. A., at 551 (emphasis added). Because petitioner did not contend that the Union’s proposal required “the inclusion of a particular program or amount in its budget,” the only question for the Authority was whether petitioner had made out its case under the underscored standard. The Authority held that it had not, finding that petitioner had shown neither that its costs would be significantly and unavoidably increased were it to accept the proposals offered by the Union, nor that “any increased costs . . . would not be offset by compensating benefits.” Id., at 552. The parties initially dispute which entity is the relevant “agency” for purposes of determining whether the Union’s proposals would “affect the authority of any management official of any agency ... to determine the . . . budget... of the agency. ...” 5 U. S. C. § 7106(a). The Authority concluded only that petitioner had not satisfied § 7106(a) with respect to its own budget, i. e., that of the schools at the Fort Stewart Army base. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority’s decision, but did so by reference to the budget of the Army as a whole, which it noted “includes bases, troops, weapons, vehicles, other equipment, salaries for all other officers, and expenses for its eight other schools.” 860 F. 2d, at 405-406. We cannot, however, uphold the Authority’s decision on that basis, for it is elementary that if an agency’s decision is to be sustained in the courts on any rationale under which the agency’s factual or legal determinations are entitled to deference, it must be upheld on the rationale set forth by the agency itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 93-95 (1943). Because petitioner does not challenge, as a ground for reversing the Authority’s decision, its determination to look only to petitioner’s budget, we assume without deciding that that determination was correct. Petitioner does not take issue with the Authority’s premise that § 7106 does not make a proposal nonnegotiable simply because it “imposes a cost upon the agency which requires the expenditure of appropriated agency funds.” See 28 F. L. R. A., at 607. Rather, petitioner argues that “the application of the FLRA’s rule here — particularly the conclusion that the proposal calling for a 13.5% pay raise would not significantly affect the agency’s budget — is plainly flawed.” Brief for Petitioner 28. Petitioner also claims that “the other aspect of the FLRA’s rule — requiring management to show that a significant increase in costs would not be offset by compensating benefits — is not reasonable or consistent with the statute, because it negates management’s right to set the agency budget.” Ibid. The latter observation has some force if the Authority’s definition of “compensating benefits” is as petitioner describes it. Petitioner claims that, in order to prove that the cost of a given proposal is not outweighed by “compensating benefits,” an agency must disprove'not only monetary benefits, but also nonmonetary “intangible” benefits such as the positive effects that a proposed change might have on employee morale. Although counsel for the Authority agreed with petitioner’s statement of its test at oral argument before this Court, it is not entirely clear from the Authority’s cases that the “benefits” side of the calculus is as all embracing as petitioner suggests. Cf. International Association of Fire Fighters Local F-61, 3 F. L. R. A. 438, 452 (1980) (rejecting agency’s claim of no “compensating benefits” where “the agency has made no substantial demonstration that the increased costs . . . will not be offset by increased employee performance, reduced turnover, fewer grievances and the like”). Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Authority could possibly derive a test measured by nonmonetary benefits from a provision that speaks only to the agency’s “authority ... to determine . . . [its] budget,” a phrase that can only be understood to refer to the allocation of funds within the agency. We need not dwell on this point, however, because the Authority’s first ground for its decision is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner has challenged neither the Authority’s requirement that an agency show a significant and unavoidable increase in its costs, nor the Authority’s finding that petitioner failed to submit any evidence on that point in this case. Rather, it asks us to hold that a proposal calling for a 13.5% salary increase would necessarily result in a “significant and unavoidable” increase in the agency’s overall costs. We cannot do that without knowing even so rudimentary a fact as the percentage of the agency’s budget attributable to teachers’ salaries. Under the Authority’s precedents, petitioner had the burden of proof on this point, but it placed nothing in the record to document its total costs or even its current total teachers’ salaries. The Authority reasonably determined that it could not conclude from an increase in one budget item of indeterminate amount whether petitioner’s costs as a whole would be “significantly] and unavoidably]” increased. IV Petitioner’s final argument rests upon 20 U. S. C. §241, which directs the agency establishing a school thereunder to “ensure that the education provided pursuant to such arrangement is comparable to free public education provided for children in comparable communities in the State,” § 241 (a), and to limit expenditures “[t]o the maximum extent practicable” to “an amount per pupil which will not exceed the per pupil cost of free public education provided for children in comparable communities in the State,” § 241(e). In implementing this provision, the Army has promulgated a regulation stating that education provided under §241 “will be considered comparable to free public education offered by selected communities of the State” when 10 specified factors, including “[s]alary schedules” are, “to the maximum extent practicable, equal.” Army Reg. 352-3, 1 — 7(h) (1980). Petitioner claims — and we assume for purposes of this discussion — that in order to accept the Union’s proposals, it would have to contravene this regulation because the proposed salaries would exceed those of employees of the local school systems. It is a familiar rule of administrative law that an agency must abide by its own regulations. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535, 547 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363, 388 (1957). That says nothing, however, about whether an agency can be compelled to negotiate about a change in its regulations. The latter question is addressed by 5 U. S. C. § 7117(a)(2), which provides, insofar as applicable to the regulation here, that “[t]he duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need (as determined under regulations prescribed by the Authority) exists for the rule or regulation,(Emphasis added.) Section 7117(b) sets out the procedures by which the Authority is to make its “compelling need” determination, see generally FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Department of Army, 485 U. S. 409 (1988), and § 7105(a)(2)(D) instructs the Authority to “prescribe criteria” for that determination. Pursuant to this last provision, the Authority has adopted the following regulation: “A compelling need exists for an agency rule or regulation concerning any condition of employment when the agency demonstrates that the rule or regulation meets any one or more of the following illustrative criteria: “(a) The rule or regulation is essential, as distinguished from helpful or desirable, to the accomplishment of the mission or the execution of functions of the agency ... in a manner which is consistent with the requirements of an effective and efficient government. “(b) The rule or regulation is necessary to insure the maintenance of basic merit principles. “(c) The rule or regulation implements a mandate to the agency . . . under law or other outside authority, which implementation is essentially nondiscretionary in nature.” 5 CFR §2424.11 (1989). Before the Authority, petitioner rested its entire case upon the assertion that the last of these criteria was satisfied by the provision of Army Regulation 352-3 which requires salaries equal to those of local schools, since that provision “implements the mandate” of § 241(a). The Authority disagreed, following its decision in Fort Knox Teachers Assn., 27 F. L. R. A. 203, 215, 216 (1987), which said that no “compelling need” for Army Regulation 352-3 exists because § 241 does not require the agency “to match exactly the conditions of employment of teachers in local school districts” or “to restrict the Agency’s discretion as to the particular employment practices which could be adopted.” Petitioner argues that, although “[sjection 241 does not specifically provide that teachers’ salaries . . . must be set by comparison with those at local public schools,” Brief for Petitioner 32, it does state that “[f]or the purpose of providing such comparable education,” teachers’ salaries and benefits “may be fixed without regard to the [General Schedules set out in the] Civil Service Act,” 20 U. S. C. § 241(a). According to petitioner, “it is a fair reading of [§ 241] to conclude that Congress excepted [wages and fringe benefits] from the civil service laws so that they would be set by comparison with those at public schools.” Brief for Petitioner 33. That is not so. All that can reasonably be deduced from the exclusion of the General Schedules is that Congress expected teachers’ wages and benefits to be one of the elements that the federal agency could adjust in order to render per pupil expenditure comparable to that in local public schools. But to be able to adjust is not to be required to make equal. The statute requires equivalence (“[t]o the maximum extent practicable”) in total per pupil expenditure, not in each separate element of educational cost. An agency may well decide to pay teachers more or less than teachers in local schools, in order that it may expend less or more than local schools for other needs of the educational program. It is thus impossible to say that the requirement of Army Reg. 352-3 that teachers’ salaries be “to the maximum extent practicable, equal” was “essentially nondiscretionary in nature” within the meaning of § 2424.11(c). Petitioner insists, however, that reading §2424.11 this strictly renders that regulation in violation of the Statute, which never requires bargaining over any matter covered by a regulation except “to the extent not inconsistent with Federal law.” See § 7117(a)(2); see also § 7117(a)(1). Thus, to recognize a compelling need for a regulation “only if it implements a statutory mandate that leaves an agency absolutely no room for discretion,” Brief for Petitioner 33, n. 23, is to render the “compelling need” exception of § 7117(a)(2) a nullity, for bargaining over such a regulation would be “inconsistent with Federal law” anyway. We may assume, without deciding, that petitioner is correct that any rule that meets the §2424.11(c) “essentially nondiscretionary” standard as interpreted by the Authority would necessarily be a rule required by law. There is some support for that equivalency in the Authority’s cases. See, e. g., Fort Knox Teachers Assn., 25 F. L. R. A. 1119 (1987). But see National Border Patrol Council, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 23 F. L. R. A. 106 (1986); National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1153, 26 F. L. R. A. 505 (1987). Even so, the Authority’s regulation does not eliminate the “compelling need” exception. Petitioner’s argument ignores the existence of subsections (a) and (b) of § 2424.11, which provide alternative methods of proving “compelling need.” In this case, to be sure, petitioner chose not to assert a claim that Army Regulation 352-3 was either “essential ... to the accomplishment of the mission or the execution of functions of the agency,” 5 CFR §2424.11(a) (1989), or “necessary to insure the maintenance of basic merit principles,” § 2424.11(b). But, those alternatives were available and suffice to give the regulation for which there is a “compelling need” an existence quite independent of the regulation whose elimination would be inconsistent with law. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is Affirmed. See 124 Cong. Rec. 25716, 29182 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall) (“We do not permit bargaining over pay and fringe benefits, but on other issues relating to an employee’s livelihood”) (“There is not really any argument in this bill or in this title about Federal collective bargaining for wages and fifinge benefits and retirement”); id., at 24286, 25720 (remarks of Rep. Clay) (“[E]mployees still. . . cannot bargain over pay”) (“I. . . want to assure my colleagues that there is nothing in this bill which allows Federal employees the right... to negotiate over pay and money-related fringe benefits”); id., at 27549 (remarks of Sen. Sasser) (“[Exclusive representatives of Federal employees may not bargain over pay or fringe benefits”). Statements from the floor are to like effect. See id., at 25721, 25722 (remarks of Rep. Ford) (“[N]o matters that are governed by statute (such as pay, money-related fringe benefits, retirement, and so forth) could be altered by a negotiated agreement") (“It is not the intent of this provision to interfere with the current system of providing the employees in question with retirement benefits, life insurance benefits, health insurance benefits, and workmen’s compensation. Those benefits would not become negotiable and would continue to be paid to those employees exclusively pursuant to the Federal statutes in effect”); id,., at 29182 (remarks of Sen. Udall) (“All these major regulations about wages and hours and retirement and benefits will continue to be established by law through congressional action”); id., at 29174 (remarks of Rep. Collins) (criticizing the bill as too broad because it excluded from the scope of bargaining only “matter[s] relating to discrimination, political activities, and those few specifically prescribed by law — for example, pay and benefits”). Because petitioner loses under the standard set out in the second part of the Authority’s test, and because neither party challenges that standard, we need not reach the question discussed in Justice Marshall’s opinion, viz., whether the Authority’s interpretation of the phrase “to determine the . . . budget” in § 7106 is too generous to the Government.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILMETTE PARK DISTRICT v. CAMPBELL, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 75. Argued November 15-16, 1949. Decided December 12, 1949. Henry J. Brandt argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Gilbert H. Hennessey, Jr. Edward R. Johnston was also of counsel. Lee A. Jackson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack, Helen Goodner and Melva M. Graney. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 1700 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides for the imposition, except as to certain classes of persons under circumstances not important here, of “A tax of 1 cent for each 10 cents or fraction thereof of the amount paid for admission to any place, including admission by season ticket or subscription.” Paragraph (2) of the subsection declares that the tax “shall be paid by the person paying for such admission.” And § 1715 requires that “Every person receiving any payments for admission . . . subject to the tax imposed by section 1700 . . . shall collect the amount thereof from the person making such payments.” This suit, brought to recover penalties paid by petitioner for noncollection of federal admissions tax, presents two questions for determination: Whether § 1700 (a) is applicable to paid admittances to a bathing beach operated without purpose of gain by a local park district of Illinois; and, if the Code provision is to be so interpreted, whether the imposition of admissions tax in connection with such state activity is within the constitutional power of Congress. Petitioner is Wilmette Park' District, a body politic and corporate located within the Village of Wilmette, Cook County, Illinois. Organized and administered pursuant to Illinois statutes, the District includes within its jurisdiction four park areas. The largest, Washington Park, extends for approximately three-fourths of a mile along Lake Michigan and was acquired partly by grant from the State of Illinois, partly by purchase, and partly by exercise of the power of eminent domain. At the north end of Washington Park, petitioner has operated a public bathing beach during the summer months for many years, under authority conferred by the Illinois Legislature. The beach has been used primarily by residents of the District, but also has been open to nonresidents. Among the facilities which the District provided at the beach during the period under review were a bath house, automobile parking area, life-saving equipment, flood lighting, drinking fountains, showers, spectator benches, bicycle racks, first aid, and supplies. The operation and maintenance of the area and its various services were solely by the District, which employed the necessary personnel. Petitioner charged all persons for admittance to the beach. Its charges were of two types: a daily fee of fifty cents on weekdays and one dollar on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, for which no ticket was issued; and a flat rate for a season ticket which could be purchased on an individual or family basis. These charges were made to cover the expense of maintenance and operation of the beach and of some capital improvements. Over the years the charges were intended merely to approximate these costs and not to produce net income or profit to petitioner; during the period 1940-1944 the accounts of the beach, maintained on a cash receipts and disbursements basis, reflected an excess of receipts over expenditures of $42.11. In July 1941 the Collector notified petitioner to collect a tax of 10 per cent on all tickets to the beach sold on or after July 25 of that year. Petitioner had not previously collected such taxes, and it refused to do so after the Collector’s notice. Subsequently the Commissioner under § 1718 of the Code assessed over petitioner’s protest penalties in the amount of the tax which the Commissioner claimed should have been collected under § 1700 (a) from July 25, 1941 through 1945, plus interest and sums due under § 3655 (b) of the Code for failure to pay the tax on demand. These penalties amounted to $6,139.93 and were paid out of petitioner’s general funds raised by property taxes. Petitioner filed timely claims for refund which were rejected, and in 1946 brought this suit against the Collector. The District Court entered judgment for petitioner. 76 F. Supp. 924. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 172 F. 2d 885. Because the questions presented have importance in the administration of the admissions tax sections of the Code, we granted certiorari. 337 U. S. 937. First. The Government raises no issue as to petitioner’s standing to sue for refund. As recovery is here sought of penalties paid from petitioner’s general revenue fund after its failure to collect the tax, we deem petitioner’s financial interest clearly sufficient. Second. Section 1700 (a) is applicable if the charge made by petitioner for admittance to the beach was, within the meaning of the statutory language, an “amount paid for admission to any place.” The words of the provision when taken in their ordinary and familiar meaning reflect a legislative purpose of comprehensive application. By its terms the section embraces every payment made in order to secure admittance to a specific location. And this purpose of broad application is not less certain because of anything in the legislative history of the initial adoption of that language. In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether petitioner’s beach area can be distinguished from a “spectator entertainment,” for we are unable to accept petitioner’s argument that Congress intended in § 1700 (a) to tax only admissions to such events. We think it clear that a beach area may be a “place” in the sense of § 1700 (a) (1). Petitioner’s beach park, including the adjacent shoal waters, was policed and lighted; the land area was defined, and entrance was through gates. A payment was made by patrons of the beach as the condition of admittance to a specific area with definite physical limits. Thus the fee which petitioner charged was “paid for admission” to a “place” as those terms are used in § 1700 (a) (1). We cannot agree with petitioner’s suggestion that Congress intended to exempt from tax admissions to any activity not conducted for gain. Section 1701 of the Code did allow certain exemptions prior to their termination on October 1, 1941 pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1941, § 541 (b). 55 Stat. 687, 710. In § 1701 Congress exempted admissions to certain classes of events and admissions all the proceeds of which inured exclusively to the benefit of designated classes of persons or organizations. But since Congress did not exempt all activities not for profit as it readily might have done, it appears that admissions to such activities are not for that reason outside the admissions tax scheme. Exmoor Country Club v. United States, 119 F. 2d 961 (C. A. 7th Cir., 1941). Nor is there greater force in petitioner’s contention that the admissions tax was not intended to apply in the case of activities conducted by a municipality. In interpreting federal revenue measures expressed in terms of general application, this Court has ordinarily found them operative in the case of state activities even though States were not expressly indicated as subjects of tax. See concurring opinion in New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 584 and n. 3 (1946). And in Allen v. Regents of the Univer sity System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439 (1938), it was decided that the admissions tax law was applicable in connection with activities carried on by an agency of a State, although it does not appear that the issue of legislative purpose was there disputed. However, we are unable to discover that there has been any design to exempt admissions to municipally conducted activities. We regard the interpretative issue as controlled by a long-continued administrative construction, expressly denying such exemption, which has been followed by repeated reenactment of the relevant language without change. Cf. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938). Finally, § 1700 (a) (1) is not rendered inapplicable because beach patrons make use of a beach and its facilities, thus affording characterization of the admission fee as a “use charge.” New if any admissions taxable under § 1700 (a) are not accompanied by a use of the property or equipment to which the admittee’s license extends. Although table accommodations for which a charge is made are usually thought of as objects of a patron’s use, yet Congress in § 1704 of the Code has declared that for purposes of the admissions tax law a charge for their use must be treated as a charge for admission and not as a rental charge. A similar result must obtain when payment is prerequisite, as it was at petitioner’s beach, to both admission to and use of a specific area. Chimney Rock Co. v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 660 (1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 552 (1927); Twin Falls Natatorium v. United States, 22 F. 2d 308 (D. Idaho, 1927). The trial court, in allowing judgment for petitioner in view of the use made of the beach, considered the fee a “use tax.” But if there is no tax exemption for admissions to a municipally conducted activity, then a municipality may not escape tax by claiming that its admission fee is a “use tax” when a similar private business could not advance such claim. Nor does it matter that petitioner’s authority to make any charge to beach patrons is derived from a statute which contemplates a charge for “use.” Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 105, § 8-7d (1947). The application of the federal admissions tax statute is not controlled by the characterization of petitioner’s fee by local law. Cf. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 81 (1940). We conclude that § 1700 (a) is applicable. Third. The constitutionality of admissions tax levied in connection with an activity of a state instrumentality was before this Court in Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439 (1938). We there found no constitutional inhibition against a nondiscriminatory imposition of such tax on admissions to an athletic exhibition conducted in connection with a state educational administration and in the performance of a governmental function. The Allen decision followed soon after Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938), which declared two principles limiting state immunity from federal taxation. Id. at 419. The first of these, invoked in the Allen decision, was dependent upon the nature of the function being performed by the state agency and excluded from immunity such activities as might be thought not essential for the preservation of state government. We need not consider here the applicability of that doctrine, for the petitioner’s assertion of immunity must be rejected on the second restrictive principle reaffirmed in the Gerhardt decision. This “principle, exemplified by those cases where the tax laid upon individuals affects the state only as the burden is passed on to it by the taxpayer, forbids recognition of the immunity when the burden on the state is so speculative and uncertain that if allowed it would restrict the federal taxing power without affording any corresponding tangible protection to the state government.” 304 U. S. at 419-420. According to this principle, the State “is not necessarily protected from a tax which well may be substantially or entirely absorbed by private persons.” Id. at 420. While the Allen decision assumed that the admissions tax there imposed was a direct burden on the State, that assumption was required only for the purpose of considering the first principle of limitation of immunity as formulated in the Gerhardt case. Such an assumption need not be made here. It is true, of course, that unless there is a shift in demand for admissions to petitioner’s beach, imposition of the tax may to an undeterminable extent adversely affect the volume of admissions. Insofar as this occurs, the services of the District will be less widely available and its revenues from beach admissions will be reduced. But admissions tax, which is “paid by the person paying for such admission,” is so imposed as to facilitate absorption by patrons of the beach rather than by the District, and we have no evidence that the District will be forced to absorb the tax in order to maintain the volume of its revenues and the availability of its benefits. Cf. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 526 (1926). “The mere fact that the economic burden of such taxes may be passed on to a state government and thus increase to some extent, here wholly conjectural, the expense of its operation, infringes no constitutional immunity. Such burdens are but normal incidents of the organization within the same territory of two governments, each possessed of the taxing power.” Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra, 304 U. S. at 422. As it follows that there is no constitutional objection to the tax penalties assessed against petitioner, the decision of the Court of Appéals must be Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. A war tax rate of 1 cent for each 5 cents or major fraction thereof has been in effect since April 1, 1944, pursuant to Revenue Act of 1943, § 302 (a). 58 Stat. 21, 61 (1944). The District Court allowed recovery only of payments made since January 1, 1945, when respondent took office as Collector. These payments were based on petitioner’s operations after October 1, 1941, through 1945. Prior to January 1, 1945, petitioner paid $57.20 on the basis of operations from July 25, 1941, to October 1, 1941. See 42 Ill. L. Rev. 818, 819-820 (1948). The Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means relating to the War Revenue Act of 1917 “recommended that this tax be imposed upon all places to which admission is charged, such as motion-picture shows, theaters, circuses, entertainments, cabarets, ball games, athletic games, etc., but not upon admissions all the proceeds of which will go exclusively to the benefit of religious or charitable institutions or for agricultural purposes.” H. R. Rep. No. 45, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1917). See 55 Cong. Rec. 2148 (1917). In the admissions tax provisions of the Code, words restricting the imposition of tax to certain classes of places appear only in subsections other than (a) of § 1700. Section 1700 (b) imposes a tax of 11 per cent on the permanent use or lease of boxes or seats “in an opera house or any place of amusement”; such tax is in lieu of that provided for under § 1700 (a). Section 1700 (c) imposes on the sale outside box offices, of tickets to “theaters, operas, and other places of amusement” a tax of 11 per cent of the price in excess of the box office price; such tax is in addition to the tax imposed by § 1700 (a). Section 1700 (d) imposes a tax of 50 per cent on the amount of sales in excess of regular price by the management of “any opera house, theater, or other place of amusement.” Section 1700 (e) imposes a tax of 5 per cent on amounts paid for admission, refreshment, service, or merchandise, “at any roof garden, cabaret, or other similar place furnishing a public performance for profit”; in such cases no tax may be imposed under § 1700 (a). Compare Exmoor Country Club v. United States, 119 F. 2d 961 (C. A. 7th Cir., 1941); Twin Falls Natatorium v. United States, 22 F. 2d 308 (D. Idaho, 1927); United States v. Roller, 287 F. 418 (W. D. Wash., 1921). Accord: Dashow v. Harrison, 1946 P-H ¶72,405 (N. D. Ill., 1946). Although an exemption was allowed by § 1701 of the Internal Revenue Code prior to October 1, 1941, of “admissions all the proceeds of which inure . . . exclusively to the benefit of . . . societies or organizations conducted for the sole purpose ... of improving any city, town, village, or other municipality,” we need not determine whether the exemption was properly interpreted as inapplicable to activities conducted by a municipal corporation. See Treas. Reg. 43 (1928 ed.) Art. 22; id. (1932 ed.) Art. 22; id. (1940 ed.) § 101.25. The provision became inapplicable prior to the period for which petitioner made payments which could be recovered against the present respondent. See note 2, supra. Petitioner has argued that the specific exemption benefiting municipal improvement societies was intended to afford them the same exemption which Congress thought applied to municipal corporations; thus, it is urged, repeal of the societies’ exemption still would leave the exemption in the case of municipally conducted activities. If Congress assumed that any such municipal corporation exemption existed by implication, it seems likely that it did so because of constitutional considerations which we notice hereafter and not because of a belief or purpose that the tax was not applicable to activities conducted by any public agency. Thus Congress, in adopting 49 Stat. 1757, 1792 (1936) and 55 Stat. 303, 350 (1941), apparently assumed that an express exemption was necessary in order to withdraw admissions to National Parks from the tax statute. Cf. 55 Stat. 687, 710 (1941), terminating such exemptions of park admissions. Treas. Reg. 43 (1919 ed., Part 1) Art. 42; id. (1921 ed., Part 1) Art. 42; id. (1922 ed., Part 1) Art. 26; id. (1924 ed., Part 1) Art. 26; id. (1926 ed., Part 1) Art. 26; id. (1928 ed.) Art. 24; id. (1932 ed.) Art. 24; id. (1940 ed.) § 101.27; id. (1941 ed.) § 101.16. Revenue Act of 1918, § 800, 40 Stat. 1057, 1120; Revenue Act of 1921, § 800, 42 Stat. 227, 289; Revenue Act of 1924, § 500, 43 Stat. 253, 320; Revenue Act of 1926, § 500, 44 Stat. 9, 91; Revenue Act of 1928, § 411, 45 Stat. 791, 863; Revenue Act of 1932, § 711, 47 Stat. 169, 271; Pub. Res. No. 36, June 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 431; I. R. C. §§ 1700, 1701 (1939); Revenue Act of 1941, § 541, 55 Stat. 687, 710. See Huguenot Yacht Club v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 387, 388 (S. D. N. Y., 1940); Lent, The Admissions Tax, 1 Nat. Tax J. 31, 35-36 (1948); 61 Harv. L. Rev. 894 (1948). See Lent, note 10, supra, at 40-42.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OSCAR GRUSS & SON v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 1060. Decided May 8, 1967. Myron S. Isaacs, for appellant. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert W. Ginnane and Jerome Nelson for the United States et al., Hugh B. Cox and Henry P. Sailer for the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. et al., and Joseph Auerbach for Smith et al., appellees. Per Curiam. Appellant is a bondholder of the New York, New Haven &.Hartford Railroad Company (the New Haven), which is now undergoing a reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205. On April 6, 1966, the Interstate Commerce Commission directed inclusion of the New Haven in the merger of the New York Central Railroad Company and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as soon as terms and conditions could be settled, but approved the Penn-Central merger and authorized its consummation prior to such inclusion. Appellant then petitioned the Commission to reconsider this order. The Commission allowed appellant to intervene but denied the petition to reconsider, and appellant then challenged the Commission’s order of April 6 in the District Court, which dismissed the complaint on the ground, among others, that appellant lacked standing to attack the Penn-Central merger. Since that time this Court has reviewed other aspects of the Commission’s order approving the merger ¿nd has directed a remand to the Commission for further proceedings. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, ante, p. 372. Since the order which appellant’s suit attacked is now subject to further consideration by the Commission and since proceedings to achieve inclusion of the New.Haven are also under way before the Commission, it appears inappropriate to review the decision of the District Court at this time. Rather, we vacate the order of the. District Court and remand the case , to that court. Should appellant still be dissatisfied with the ultimate order of the Commission in the merger proceedings, it may attempt a fresh challenge in the District Court.. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, v. CORT. No. 20. Argued October 11, 1961. Decided April 2, 1962. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Victor Rabinowitz. Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Jack Wasserman, David Carliner, Rowland Watts and Lawrence Speiser for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by Milton V. Freeman, Robert E. Herzstein, Horst Kurnik and Charles A. Reich for Angelika Schneider. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 349 (a) (10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provides: “From and after the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by— “(10) departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or during a period declared by the President to be a period of national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States. For the purposes of this paragraph failure to comply with any provision of any compulsory service laws of the United States shall raise the presumption that the departure from or absence from the United States was for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States.” The appellee, Joseph Cort, is a physician and research physiologist. He was born in Massachusetts in 1927. In May of 1951 he registered with his Selective Service Board under the so-called “Doctors’ Draft Act.” A few days later he left the United States for Cambridge, England. In 1953, while still in England, he was repeatedly notified by his draft board to report for a physical examination either in the United States or at an examining facility in Europe. He disregarded these communications, and in September of 1953 his draft board ordered him to report to Brookline, Massachusetts, for induction into the Armed Forces. He failed to report as directed and remained in England. In 1954 an indictment charging him with draft evasion was returned in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Earlier that year, after the British Home Office had refused to renew his residence permit, Cort had gone to Prague, Czechoslovakia. He has been there ever since. In 1959 Cort applied to our Embassy in Prague for a United States passport, his original passport having long since expired. His application was denied by the Passport Office of the Department of State on the ground that he had lost his citizenship under §349 (a) (10) of the 1952 Act by remaining outside the United States for the purpose of avoiding military service. Subsequently, the State Department’s Board of Review on Loss of Nationality affirmed the decision of the Passport Office, on the same ground. Cort then instituted the present action against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. His complaint alleged that he had not remained abroad to evade his military obligations, and that §349 (a) (10) was in any event unconstitutional. A three-judge court was convened. The Secretary of State moved to dismiss the action upon the ground that § 360 (b) and (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provide the exclusive procedure under which Cort could attack the administrative determination that he was not a citizen. The District Court rejected this contention, holding that it had jurisdiction of the action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction. On motions for summary judgment, the court determined that the appellee had remained abroad to avoid service in the Armed Forces. Relying upon Trop v. Dulles, the court held, however, that § 349 (a) (10) was unconstitutional, and that consequently the appellee’s citizenship had not been divested. The court accordingly entered a judgment declaring the appellee to be a citizen of the United States and enjoining the Secretary of State from denying him a passport on the ground that he is not a citizen. Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683. This is a direct appeal from that judgment. The only question we decide today is whether the District Court was correct in holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. If not, we must vacate the judgment and direct the District Court to dismiss the complaint. In support of its jurisdiction the District Court relied upon the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. 187 F. Supp., at 685. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, provides: “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.” Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides: “Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion— “(a) Right of review. — Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. “(b) Form and venue of action. — The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. Agency action shall be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for such review is provided by law.” 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. Section 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides in part: “No subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.” 60 Stat. 244, 5 U. S. C. § 1011. On their face the provisions of these statutes appear clearly to permit an action such as was brought here to review the final administrative determination of the Secretary of State. This view is confirmed by our decisions establishing that an action for a declaratory judgment is available as a remedy to secure a determination of citizenship — decisions rendered both before and after the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325; McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162. Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff is not within the United States has never been thought to bar an action for a declaratory judgment of this nature. Stewart v. Dulles, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 280, 248 F. 2d 602; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445; see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603. It is the appellant’s position, however, that despite these broad provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, Cort could not litigate his claim to citizenship in an action such as the one he brought in the District Court, but is confined instead to the procedures set out in subsections (b) and (c) of § 360 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Section 360 establishes procedures for determining claims to American citizenship by those within and without the country. Subsection (a) covers claimants “within the United States” and authorizes an action for a declaratory judgment against the head of the agency denying the claimant a right or privilege of citizenship — • except that such an action cannot be instituted if the issue of citizenship arises in connection with an exclusion proceeding. Subsections '(b) and (c) deal with citizenship claimants “not within the United States.” The former provides, with limitations, for the issuance abroad of certificates of identity “for the purpose of traveling to a port of entry in the United States and applying for admission.” The latter subsection declares that a person issued such a certificate “may apply for admission to the United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to the United States.” Judicial review of those proceedings is to be by habeas corpus and not otherwise. Thus, the question posed is whether the procedures specified in § 360 (b) and (c) provide the only method of reviewing the Secretary of State’s determination that Cort has forfeited his citizenship. More precisely stated, the question in this case is whether, despite the liberal provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress intended that a native of this country living abroad must travel thousands of miles, be arrested, and go to jail in order to attack an administrative finding that he is not a citizen of the United States. We find nothing in the statutory language, in the legislative history, or in our prior decisions which leads us to believe that Congress had any such purpose. The Administrative Procedure Act confers the right to judicial review of “any agency action.” The procedures of § 360 (b) and (c) would culminate in litigation not against the Secretary of State whose determination is here being attacked, but against the Attorney General. Whether such litigation could properly be considered review of the Secretary of State’s determination presents a not insubstantial question. Putting to one side this conceptual difficulty, it is to be noted that subsections (b) and (c) by their very terms simply provide that a person outside of the United States who wishes to assert his citizenship “may” apply for a certificate of identity and that a holder of a certificate of identity “may” apply for admission to the United States. As the District Court said, “The language of the section shows no intention to provide an exclusive remedy, or any remedy, for persons outside the United States who have not adopted the procedures outlined in subsections (b) and (c). Neither does the section indicate that such persons are to be denied existing remedies.” 187 F. Supp., at 685. The predecessor of § 360 of the 1952 Act was § 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137. That section provided that a claimant whose citizenship was denied by administrative authorities could institute a declaratory judgment suit in the federal courts to determine his right to citizenship, whether he was in the United States or abroad. In addition, the section broadened the venue of such an action by permitting suit to be brought in the “district in which such person claims a permanent residence.” Finally, the section provided a method by which a claimant could enter the United States and prosecute his claim personally. The legislative history of § 503 indicates that Congress understood the provision for a declaratory judgment action to be merely a confirmation of existing law, or at most a clarification of it. What was concededly novel about § 503 was the provision designed to permit a citizenship claimant outside the United States to be admitted to this country upon a certificate of identity in order personally to prosecute his claim to citizenship, subject to the condition of deportation in the event of an adverse decision. At the time of the enactment of this provision some misgivings were expressed that it might be utilized by aliens to gain physical entry into the United States and then to disappear into the general populace. In the ensuing years the abuses which some had anticipated did, indeed, develop, and the legislative history of § 360 of the 1952 Act shows that the predominate concern of Congress was to limit the easy-entry provision of § 503 of the 1940 Act, under which these abuses had occurred. Thus the report of the Senate Committee which studied immigration and nationality problems for two and a half years found that § 503 “has been used, in a considerable number of cases, to gain entry into the United States where no such right existed.” S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 777; see also Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 716, H. R. 2379 and H. R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 108-110, 443-445. In describing the purpose of the legislation which became § 360 of the 1952 Act the Senate Judiciary Committee, stating that “[t]he bill modifies section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940,” explained that it provides: “that any person who has previously been physically present in the United States but who is not within the United States who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any government agency may be issued a certificate of identity for the purpose of traveling to the United States and applying for admission to the United States. The net effect of this provision is to require that the determination of the nationality of such person shall be made in accordance with the normal immigration procedures. These procedures include review by habeas corpus proceedings where the issue of the nationality status of the person can be properly adjudicated.” S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 50. As a matter simply of grammatical construction, it seems obvious that the “such person” referred to in the Committee Report is a person who has chosen to obtain a certificate of identity and to seek admission to the United States in order to prosecute his claim. The appellee in the present case is, of course, not such a person. This legislative history is sufficient, we think, to show that the purpose of § 360 (b) and (c) was to cut off the opportunity which aliens had abused under § 503 of the 1940 Act to gain fraudulent entry to the United States by prosecuting spurious citizenship claims. We are satisfied that Congress did not intend to foreclose lawsuits by claimants, such as Cort, who do not try to gain entry to the United States before prevailing in their claims to citizenship. For these reasons, we hold that a person outside the United States who has been denied a right of citizenship is not confined to the procedures prescribed by § 360 (b) and (c), and that the remedy pursued in the present case was an appropriate one. This view is in accord with previous decisions of this Court concerning the relationship of §§ 10 and 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act to the subsequently enacted Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48; Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U. S. 180. The teaching of those cases is that the Court will not hold that the broadly remedial provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are unavailable to review administrative decisions under the 1952 Act in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that Congress so intended. With respect to the other issues presented by this appeal, the case is set for reargument during the October Term, 1962, to follow No. 19. It is so ordered. 66 Stat. 163, 267-268, 8 U. S. C. § 1481 (a) (10). 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 et seq. Appellee had previously registered as a regular registrant under the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948. 356 U. S. 86. We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction of this appeal until the hearing of the case on the merits. 365 U. S. 808. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, a direct appeal may be taken from a District Court decision holding unconstitutional an Act of Congress in a civil action in which an officer of the United States is a party. Since the District Court held § 349 (a) (10) unconstitutional, this appeal is properly before us under § 1252. An alternative basis for our jurisdiction over this appeal might be found in 28 U. S. C. § 1253, providing for direct appeals from the decisions of three-judge courts convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282, 2284. But since jurisdiction is clearly authorized by 28 U. S. C. § 1252, we need not inquire further into the applicability of 28 U. S. C. § 2282 to this case. In view of the unanimous decision below, the fact that three judges heard the case originally would not affect an otherwise final and reviewable decision of the District Court. See Thompson v. Whittier, 365 U. S. 465; compare Garment Workers v. Donnelly Co., 304 U. S. 243, 251-252. Section 360 (a), 66 Stat. 163, 273, 8 U. S. C. § 1503 (a): “(a) If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person may institute an action under the provisions of section 2201 of title 28, United States Code, against the head of such department or independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States, except that no such action may be instituted in any ease if the issue of such person’s status as a national of the United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with any exclusion proceeding under the provisions of this or any other act, or (2) is in issue in any such exclusion proceeding. An action under this subsection may be instituted only within five years after the final administrative denial of such right or privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or claims a residence, and jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is hereby conferred upon those courts.” Section 360 (b) and (c), 66 Stat. 163, 273-274, 8 U. S. C. § 1503 (b) and (c): “(b) If any person who is not within the United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person may make application to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in the foreign country in which he is residing for a certificate of identity for the purpose of traveling to a port of entry in the United States and applying for admission. Upon proof to the satisfaction of such diplomatic or consular officer that such application is made in good faith and has a substantial basis, he shall issue to such person a certificate of identity. From any denial of an application for such certificate the applicant shall be entitled to an appeal to the Secretary of State, who, if he approves the denial, shall state in writing his reasons for his decision. The Secretary of State shall prescribe rules and regulations for the issuance of certificates of identity as above provided. The provisions of this subsection shall be applicable only to a person who at some time prior to his application for the certificate of identity has been physically present in the United States, or to a person under sixteen years of age who was born abroad of a United States citizen parent. “(c) A person who has been issued a certificate of identity under the provisions of subsection (b), and while in possession thereof, may apply for admission to the United States at any port of entry, and shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act relating to the conduct of proceedings involving aliens seeking admission to the United States. A final determination by the Attorney General that any such person is not entitled to admission to the United States shall be subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise. Any person described in this section who is finally excluded from admission to the United States shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act relating to aliens seeking admission to the United States.” Section 603 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 64 Stat. 1137, 1171— 1172, provided: “If any person who claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States is denied such right or privilege by any Department or agency, or executive official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person, regardless of whether he is within the United States or abroad, may institute an action against the head of such Department or agency in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person claims a permanent residence for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States. If such person is outside the United States and shall have instituted such an action in court, he may, upon submission of a sworn application showing that the claim of nationality presented in such action is made in good faith and has a substantial basis, obtain from a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in the foreign country in which he is residing a certificate of identity stating that his nationality status is pending before the court, and may be admitted to the United States with such certificate upon the condition that he shall be subject to deportation in case it shall be decided by the court that he is not a national of the United States. Such certificate of identity shall not be denied solely on the ground that such person has lost a status previously had or acquired as a national of the United States; and from any denial of an application for such certificate the applicant shall be entitled to an appeal to the Secretary of State, who, if he approves the denial, shall state in writing the reasons for his decision. The Secretary of State, with approval of the Attorney General, shall prescribe rules and regulations for the issuance of certificates of identity as above provided.” For example, one of the managers of the bill in the House explained the declaratory judgment provisions as follows: “We have a rather new situation here, and that is we are cutting off the claim to citizenship of these thousands of persons under this provision in the bill who do not comply with its terms and therefore it was deemed advisable that some chance be given them to have what might be called their day in court. We have safeguarded the situation extremely carefully and feel that so far as possible we have prevented any abuse of it. It was my contention when this measure was up for consideration in the committee that such people did have the right to go into court either on a declaratory judgment or under a writ of habeas corpus, but there was a feeling on the part of others that they may not have that right.” 86 Cong. Rec. 13247. A similar understanding of the measure was indicated during the House Committee Hearings on the bill. “Mr. Flournoy. . . . The question remains, whether while still abroad he would not be able to resort to a petition for declaratory judgment or for a writ of mandamus. “The Chairman. I should think, gentlemen, that we ought to go a little step further ... to say that such person may, upon application, be permitted under certain conditions ... to enter the United States for a short period of time as a temporary person only.” Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 6127, superseded by H. R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 291-292. For instance, a representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service testified at the House Committee hearings that after a citizen claimant had been permitted to enter the United States, “ [I] t would be open to question, in my mind, whether you would ever get him out again.” Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 6127, superseded by H. R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 292; see also, id., at 294, 296.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION v. PENNZOIL PRODUCING CO. et al. No. 77-648. Argued November 28, 1978 Decided January 16, 1979 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Stewart and Powell, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Barnett argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Mc-Cree, Richard A. Allen, and Howard E. Shapiro. Jeron Stevens argued the cause for respondent Pennzoil Producing Co. With him on the briefs were Stephen M. Hackerman and John M. Young. Thomas G. Johnson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Shell Oil Co. Edwin W. Edwards, Governor of Louisiana, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, James R. Patton, Jr., David B. Robinson, and Harry E. Barsh, Jr., filed a brief for respondent State of Louisiana. Lee M. Huber and Donald R. Arnett filed a brief for respondent United Gas Pipe Line Co. Tom P. Hamill, Carroll L. Cilliam, and Philip R. Ehrenkranz filed a memorandum for respondent Mobil Oil Corp. Anthony M. DiLeo filed a brief for Williams, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Dale M. Stucky and Gerrit II. Wormhoudt filed a brief for Lawrence Lightcap et al. as amici curiae. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The major issue in this case involves the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, petitioner herein, to grant or refuse to grant individual producers special relief from applicable area and nationwide rates set by the Commission for the sale of natural gas. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside what it considered to have been the decision of the Commission that under the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq., it did not have authority to grant exceptional relief which would allow producers to pass through to interstate customers increased royalty costs based upon the intrastate price of natural gas. A secondary issue involves a question of abandonment under § 7 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b), and an application of our decision last Term in California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U. S. 519 (1978), rev’g Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F. 2d 1134 (CA5 1976). I Respondent United Gas Pipe Line Co. (United) purchases for resale in the interstate market natural gas produced by respondents Pennzoil Oil Producing Co. and Shell Oil Co. (Producers) from the Gibson field in southern Louisiana. Producers’ prices are subject to Commission regulation and may not exceed the just and reasonable rates established by the Commission in its relevant area and nationwide rate proceedings. Under their lease agreements with the owner of the Gibson field, Producers pay royalties pegged to the “market value” or “market price” of the gas. After commencement of state-court litigation involving the lessor’s contention that these references are to the unregulated price of natural gas in the intrastate market, rather than to the applicable interstate rates set by the Commission, the lessor and Producers reached a settlement agreement whereby royalty payments would be pegged to the higher of 78(4 per 1,000 cubic feet of gas (increasing 1.5(4 per year beginning in 1976) or 150% of the highest applicable interstate rate. In the alternative, Producers would abandon delivery to United of the royalty portion of the gas and deliver it instead as payment in kind to the lessor. However, this settlement would be binding only if the Commission allowed Producers to charge United a rate higher than applicable area and nationwide rates by the amount of the resulting increase in royalty costs, or in the alternative, permitted the desired abandonment. The Commission referred Producers’ subsequent petition for special relief, supported by intervenor United, to an Administrative Law Judge who, after a hearing, denied the petition. Under his view of applicable cases, special relief from the relevant ceiling rates, while not absolutely prohibited, would be available only if Producers demonstrated “that' [their] overall costs incurred in the operation of the particular well or group of wells are higher than the applicable Commission-established area or nationwide ceiling rates, or, even more stringently, that [their] out-of-pocket expenses will exceed revenues.” App. 171. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that neither Producer had satisfied its burden of proof in this respect. Nor had it made a case for abandonment of the royalty portion of the gas. The Commission affirmed but took a somewhat different approach. Acknowledging for the purposes of this case that it had no jurisdiction over royalty rates, the Commission nevertheless noted its authority to regulate the prices charged by Producers for gas sold in interstate commerce and asserted that it would be “inconsistent” with and “contrary” to its mandate to permit royalty costs to be passed on to Producers’ customers if royalties were calculated on any basis other than the just and reasonable rate for the gas involved. Relying in part on our decision in FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380 (1974), the Commission concluded that it was “not free” to allow royalty costs based on the value of the gas in an unregulated market. 55 F. P. C. 400, 404-405 (1976). In an opinion and order denying rehearing, the Commission said that it “does not have the power to base a part of the regulated price on the unregulated market value of intrastate gas.” Price relief was thus denied without accepting or rejecting the findings of the Administrative Law Judge with respect to the relationship between the Producers’ costs and revenues. The Commission also denied the alternative request for abandonment of the royalty portion of the gas. The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s determination that it was without authority to allow producers of natural gas to increase their rates above applicable area and nationwide rates in order “to reflect the increased cost of 'market value’ or 'market price’ royalty obligations.” Pennzoil Producing Co. v. FPC, 553 F. 2d 485, 487 (CA5 1977). Asserting that the Commission “has taken a cost plus profit .approach to gas rate regulation,” the Court of Appeals believed that in seeking to pass through their increased royalty expense, Producers “do not seek to increase their profits but merely to maintain those margins already determined by the Commission to be just and reasonable.” Id., at 488. The Commission had “authority to consider the reasonableness of any costs incurred,” but doing so “necessarily requires consideration of market price,” and the Commission had failed to explain why royalty costs in an unregulated market are different from any other cost of production. Ibid. The court concluded that these considerations and our decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283 (1974), entitled the Producers to a “determination of the merits” of their request for special relief for the applicable area and nationwide rates. 553 F. 2d, at 488. Based on its opinion and judgment in Southland Royalty Co. v. FPC, 543 F. 2d 1134 (CA5 1976), the Court of Appeals also disagreed with the Commission on the abandonment issue. II If the Commission’s opinion is to be read as holding that granting an individual producer a rate increase at variance with the established area or national rate in order to accommodate an increase in royalty costs is forbidden by the Act under any circumstance, the Court of Appeals was surely correct in disagreeing with the Commission. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968), the Commission urged that “nothing in the Constitution or in the Natural Gas Act require[s] the Commission to provide exceptions to the area rates,” at least so long as the Commission permitted abandonment when costs exceed revenues, but it nevertheless pointed out that it had established a procedure whereby individual producers may seek relief from the applicable area rate. Brief for the FPC, O. T. 1967, Nos. 90 et al., p. 64. Similarly, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, supra, the Commission, responding to the possibility of certain producers facing higher royalty payments than the fixed percentage of total costs used by the Commission in setting the area rates, stated — in agreement with the Court of Appeals — that “the issue is hypothetical at this stage and that if it becomes a reality producers may seek special relief from the Commission” Brief for Respondent FPC, O. T. 1973, Nos. 73-437 et al., p. 62. This Court proceeded on a similar assumption, saying that “in any event an affected producer is entitled to seek individualized relief.” 417 U. S., at 328. None of the foregoing is consistent with the proposition that the Commission is totally without power to give special relief to individual producers whose escalating royalty costs place them in an untenable position. In view of the scope of the discretion vested in the Commission to establish just and reasonable rates consistent with the public interest, we could not hold that the Act forbids special relief from area rates to accommodate increased royalty costs regardless of the circumstances. Nor do we understand the Commission in this Court to deny its jurisdiction to extend such relief in proper situations. Indeed, in its brief before this Court the Commission states that “with the approval of the courts, [it] has established the policy that it will not authorize departures from area rates unless a producer can show that its costs exceed its revenues at the area rate. See, e. g., Op. No. 699, 51 F. P. C. 2212, 2279, aff’d, Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 520 F. 2d 1061 (C. A. 5), certiorari denied, 426 U. S. 941.” Brief for Petitioner 34. The Commission does not suggest that this policy is generally inapplicable to eases seeking relief because of escalating royalty costs. Nevertheless, the Commission’s initial opinion and its opinion denying rehearing indicated that it is “not free” and that “it does not have the power” to give individualized relief where escalating royalty costs are a function of, or are otherwise based upon, an unregulated market price for the product the sale of which in the interstate market is regulated by the Commission. Erroneously, we think, the Commission sought support for these conclusions in Texaco, 417 U. S., at 399, where we reminded the Commission that “[i]n subjecting producers to regulation because of anticompetitive conditions in the industry, Congress could not have assumed that ‘just and reasonable’ rates could conclusively be determined by reference to market price.” We did not, however, hold, as suggested by the Commission, that it “has no authority to permit rate increases based on royalty costs tied to the unregulated market for natural gas.” Brief for Petitioner 13; see also id., at 16, 19, 21. Our concern in Texaco was that rates of small producers might be totally exempted from the Act, and we did not indicate that producer or pipeline rates would be per se unjust and unreasonable because related to the unregulated price of natural gas. Texaco did not purport to circumscribe so severely the Commission’s discretion to decide what formulas and methods it will employ to ensure just and reasonable rates. Indeed, the decision underscored the wide discretion vested in the Commission. 387-393. See 417 TI. S., at Ill We are also convinced, however, that the Court of Appeals trenched upon the ratemaking authority vested in the Commission when it strongly suggested that the Commission is required to grant the relief Producers request in this case so long as the increase in royalty costs is not imprudent and the relief, when granted, will merely sustain rather than increase Producers’ profits. Sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c and 7Í7d, mandate the Commission to set just and reasonable rates for the sale of interstate natural gas. In sustaining the Commission’s authority to establish maximum rates on an areawide basis, we noted that “courts are without authority to set aside any rate adopted by the Commission which is within a 'zone of reasonableness,’ ” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra, at 797. Moreover, in arriving at just and reasonable rates “no single method need be followed.” Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U. S. 294, 309 (1963). Specifically, the Commission is not required to adhere “rigidly to a cost-based determination of rates, much less to one that base[s] each producer’s rates on his own costs.” Mobil Oil, 417 U. S., at 308. While recognizing that under an areawide approach, “ 'high cost operators may be more seriously affected . . . than others,’ ” Permian Basin, supra, at 769, quoting Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 518 (1944), we refused to invalidate as inadequate the Commission’s proposal to provide special relief when a producer’s “ 'out of pocket expenses in connection with the operation of a particular well’ exceed [s] its revenue from the well under the applicable area price,” 390 U. S., at 770-771. The Court of Appeals proceeded from the proposition that “[a] cost-based methodology was approved” in Permian Basin, to the implicit conclusion that the Commission is required to allow producers to maintain whatever profit margins they enjoyed under area or national rates, and that therefore it must grant special relief from these rates for all reasonable cost increases, emphasizing that a cost is not unreasonable simply because it is based on an unregulated market price. It must be noted, however, that the methodology employed by the Commission in arriving at the area rates approved in Permian Basin was not a purely cost-plus approach. To the contrary, the Court recognized “deviation [s] from cost-based pricing” which it “found not to be unreasonable and to be consistent with the Commission’s responsibility to consider not merely the interests of the producers . . . but also ‘the relevant public interests’ . . . .” Mobil Oil, supra, at 308-309, quoting Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 792. Furthermore, the notion that the Commission is required to maintain, or even allowed to maintain to the exclusion of other considerations, the profit margin of any particular producer is incompatible not only with the specific area approach to natural gas regulation approved in Permian Basin and Mobil Oil but also with a basic precept of rate regulation. “The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 601 (1944). The Commission is not required by the Act to grant special relief from area or nationwide rates simply because the costs of an individual producer increase and his profits decline. Given the wide discretion of the Commission to refuse exceptional relief, we are somewhat unsure of the meaning of the Court of Appeals’ statement that respondents in this case “were entitled to a determination of the merits of their requests.” 553 F. 2d, at 488. We think that the Court of Appeals read too much into our statement in Mobil Oil that a producer with rising royalty costs “is entitled to seek individualized relief.” 417 U. S., at 328. We did not there suggest that the Commission must be prepared to grant such relief in order to forestall declining profits. Indeed, we rejected the claim that the Commission must “provide automatic adjustments in area rates to compensate for anticipated higher royalty costs.” Ibid. Moreover, in Texaco, decided the same day as Mobil, we faced the issue whether the Commission had acted arbitrarily in failing to provide relief from the bind that pipelines and large producers might be put in if direct regulation of small producers were eliminated, a bind similar to that in which respondent Producers may find themselves if their royalty costs increase. We concluded in Texaco: “ [Requiring pipelines and the large producers to assume the risk in bargaining for reasonable prices from small producers is within the Commission’s discretion in working out the balance of the interests . . . involved.” 417 U. S., at 392. Likewise, the Commission is under no obligation automatically to relieve the bind on producers facing increased royalty costs based on unregulated prices. “All that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory level.” Id., at 391-392. The Commission would not exceed its statutory authority if, in its view of the public interest, it determines to reject requests for special relief presenting no colorable claim that the applicable area or nationwide rate is confiscatory or, what may amount to the same thing, outside the “zone of reasonableness,” Permian Basin, supra, at 797; FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585 (1942). IY Although we hold that the Court of Appeals too narrowly confined the Commission’s functions and judgment on remand, we agree that the case should be returned to the Commission. As we have said, despite the indications to the contrary in its opinions below and despite its failure to address the Administrative Law Judge’s findings with respect to Producers’ proof as to their costs and revenues, the Commission does not seem to take the position here that it is totally without power to grant individual relief from area rates in recognition of increased royalty costs and that the relationship between the individual producer’s costs and revenues in such a proceeding is totally irrelevant. Expressing its adherence to the policy approved in Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F. 2d 1061 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976), the Commission points to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge that Producers in this case failed to make any showing that their costs exceed revenues. See Brief for Petitioner 34-35. At the same time, however, the Commission disaffirms any suggestion that its order be sustained on a ground that it did not itself rely upon. Id., at 34. The agency’s reluctance is understandable, see Texaco, 417 U. S., at 395-397; Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). The upshot is that, given this state of the record, a remand to the Commission is the proper course in order that the Commission in the first instance may clearly enunciate whether and to what extent individual relief from area rates will be granted due to the increased royalty costs that are or may be involved in this case, and, if relief is to be denied, that it may make an adequate explanation of its judgment. Cf. Burlington Truck Lines, supra, at 167-168. If, as the Commission perhaps now suggests, the policy set forth in Shell Oil is the policy to be followed in cases such as this, the Commission should proceed to complete its task of reviewing and sustaining or rejecting the findings of the Administrative Law Judge. V With respect to the issue of abandonment, it is apparent that to the extent that the Court of Appeals relied upon its judgment in the Southland case, it was in error since that judgment was reversed here. It also appears to us, however, that the question of individual rate relief and that of abandonment are not unrelated. If the Commission were to take the position that relief from area rates to accommodate royalty-costs tied to intrastate rates is unavailable regardless of the relationship between costs and revenues, it may be that the issue of abandonment would appear in a different light. Cf. Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 770-771. In any event, it is the better part of wisdom to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand the case to that court with directions to return the entire case to the Commission for further appropriate proceedings. So ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. At the time of the Commission’s decision in this case, the applicable rates were those prescribed by Opinion No. 598, Area Rate Proceeding (,Southern Louisiana Area), 46 F. P. C. 86, enf’d sub nom. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F. 2d 880 (CA5 1973), aff’d sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283 (1974); Opinion No. 699-H, Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Oas, 52 F. P. C. 1604 (1974), aff’d sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F. 2d 1061 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976). The Commission takes the position that construction of such clauses is a question of federal law, and that the “market” referred to is that for interstate gas. See Brief for Petitioner 35-37, and n. 22. Compare Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P. 2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U. S. 876 (1977), petition for rehearing pending, No. 76-1694; and Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349 (WD Tex. 1977), with Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 319-320, 463 F. 2d 256, 265-266 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 976 (1972). Under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351, all wellhead natural gas, including that dedicated to the intrastate market, that is sold after December 1, 1978, will be subject to the Act’s price ceilings. However, there will remain for some time a differential between the rate prescribed for gas previously unregulated and that prescribed for gas dedicated to the interstate market. In separate agreements, United consented to make the additional payments or to release the royalty gas, pursuant to Commission approval. The Commission framed the issue before it as “whether [the Commission] can legally grant any form of rate relief above either an area or nationwide just and reasonable rate solely because the producer selling the gas in interstate commerce may be obligated to make a royalty payment based not upon the regulated price the producer receives for the gas, but rather on the 'market value’ of the gas.” 55 F. P. C. 400, 404 (1976). See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 463 F. 2d 256 (1971), oert. denied, 406 U. S. 976 (1972). The Commission said: “In the instant proceeding, the impetus of the settlement is the market value of the royalties • and no consideration has been given to regulated rates. As such, we cannot permit any incremental royalty costs resulting from this settlement, or resulting from any judgment by a state court regarding royalty payments, to be passed on to the pipeline if these incremental royalty costs are based on any other factors than the regulated just and reasonable rate. On this point, we note the Supreme Court’s warning in FPC v. Texaco . . . that the Commission is not free to equate just and reasonable rates with the prices for gas in the marketplace. Accordingly, we believe that we are not free to allow royalty costs, which are based on market values, to be passed on to the pipelines as just and reasonable rates. A contrary result would not '. . . afford customers a complete, permanent, and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges.’ ” 55 F. P. C., at 405. 55 F. P. C. 901 (1976). The Commission also explained: “In arriving at the national rates costs of production were used and royalties were computed at 16 percent of total costs. ... It is for these reasons that the Commission is not free to allow royalty costs, which are based on market values, to be passed on to the pipelines as just and reasonable rates.” Id., at 902. In separately denying the petition for rehearing filed by another litigant, the Commission observed that in setting area rates, an allowance for royalty costs “would depend on the royalties generally being paid in the area,” but this did not mean that an “individual producer’s rates should be increased because it must pay a higher royalty, particularly one based on market value.” 55 F. P. C. 1377, 1379 (1976). The increasing rates provided for in the tentative settlement between United and Producers in this case, while formally pegged to the higher of the regulated rate or a specific price, are based upon unregulated market prices in that, as the Commission noted, 55 F. P. C., at 405, “the impetus of the settlement is the [unregulated] market value of the royalties.” See Mobil Oil, 417 U. S., at 316; Permian Basin Area Bate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 769-770 (1968).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. STAPF et al., EXECUTORS AND TRUSTEES. No. 54. Argued October 23-24, 1963. —Decided December 2, 1963. Wayne G. Barnett argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer and Robert N. Anderson. W. M. Sutton argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was H. A. Berry. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents brought this suit against the Government in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas for a refund of estate taxes paid pursuant to an asserted deficiency. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that respondents were entitled to certain marital deductions under § 812 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and also to deductions for other payments as “claims against the estate” and “administration expenses” under § 812 (b) (3) and (2) of the 1939 Code. 309 F. 2d 592. We granted certiorari to consider questions of statutory interpretation important to the administration of the federal estate tax laws. 372 U. S. 928. Lowell H. Stapf died testate on July 29,1953, a resident and domiciliary of Texas, a community property jurisdiction. At the time of his death he owned, in addition to his separate estate, a substantial amount of property in community with his wife. His will required that his widow elect either to retain her one-half interest in the community or to take under the will and allow its terms to govern the disposition of her community interest. If Mrs. Stapf were to elect to take under the will, she would be given, after specific bequests to others, one-third of the community property and one-third of her husband’s separate estate. By accepting this bequest she would allow her one-half interest in the community to pass, in accordance with the will, into a trust for the benefit of the children. It was further provided that if she chose to take under the will the executors were to pay “all and not merely one-half” of the community debts and administration expenses. The relevant facts and computations are not in dispute. The decedent’s separate property was valued at $65,100 and the community property at $258,105. The only debts were community debts totalling $32,368. The administration expenses, including attorneys’ fees, were $4,073. If Mrs. Stapf had not elected to take under the will, she would have retained her fully vested one-half interest in the community property ($129,052) which would have been charged with one-half of the community debts ($16,184) and 35% of the administration expenses ($1,426). Thus, as the parties agree, she would have received a net of $111,443. In fact Mrs. Stapf elected to take under the will. She received, after specific bequests to others, one-third of the combined separate and community property, a devise valued at $106,268, which was $5,175 less than she would have received had she retained her community property and refused to take under the will. In computing the net taxable estate, the executors claimed a marital deduction under §812 (e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 for the full value of the one-third of decedent’s separate estate ($22,367) which passed to his wife under the will. The executors also claimed a deduction for the entire $32,368 of community debts as “claims against the estate” under § 812 (b)(3) and for the entire $4,073 of expenses as “administration expenses” under §812 (b)(2). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the marital deduction and the deductions for claims and administration insofar as these represented debts (50%) and expenses (35%) chargeable to the wife’s one-half of the community. Respondents then instituted this suit for a tax refund. The District Court allowed the full marital deduction but disallowed the disputed claims and expenses. 189 F. Supp. 830. On cross-appeals the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting on all issues, held that each of the claimed deductions was allowable in full. 309 F. 2d 592. For reasons stated below, we hold that the Commissioner was correct and that none of the disputed deductions is allowable. I. The Marital Deduction. By electing to take under the will, Mrs. Stapf, in effect, agreed to accept the property devised to her and, in turn, to surrender property of greater value to the trust for the benefit of the children. This raises the question of whether a decedent’s estate is allowed a marital deduction under § 812 (e)(1) (E)(ii) of the 1939 Code where the bequest to the surviving spouse is on the condition that she convey property of equivalent or greater value to her children. The Government contends that, for purposes of a marital deduction, “the value of the interest passing to the wife is the value of the property given her less the value of the property she is required to give another as a condition to receiving it.” On this view, since the widow had no net benefit from the exercise of her election, the estate would be entitled to no marital deduction. Respondents reject this net benefit approach and argue that the plain meaning of the statute makes detriment to the surviving spouse immaterial. Section 812 (e)(1)(A) provides that “in general” the marital deduction is for “the value of any interest in property which passes . . . from the decedent to his surviving spouse.” Subparagraph (E) then deals specifically with the question of valuation: “(E) Valuation Of Interest Passing To Surviving Spouse. — In determining for the purposes of sub-paragraph (A) the value Of any interest in property passing to the surviving spouse for which a deduction is allowed by this subsection— “(ii) where such interest or property is incumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such incum-brance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” The disputed deduction turns upon the interpretation of (1) the introductory phrase “any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest,” and (2) the concluding provision that “such . . . obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” The Court of Appeals, in allowing the claimed marital deduction, reasoned that since the valuation is to be “as if” a gift were being taxed, the legal analysis should be the same as if a husband had made an inter vivos gift to his wife on the condition that she give something to the children. In such a case, it was stated, the husband is taxable in the full amount for his gift. The detriment incurred by the wife would not ordinarily reduce the amount of the gift taxable to the husband, the original donor. The court concluded: “Within gift tax confines the community property of the widow passing under the will of the husband to others may not be ‘netted’ against the devise to the widow, and thus testator, were the transfer inter vivos, would be liable for gift taxes on the full value of the devise.” 309 F. 2d 592, 598. This conclusion, based on the alleged plain meaning of the final gift-amount clause of § 812 (e)(1)(E) (ii), is not supported by a reading of the entire statutory provision. First, § 812 (e) allows a marital deduction only for the decedent’s gifts or bequests which pass “to his surviving spouse.” In the present case the effect of the devise was not to distribute wealth to the surviving spouse, but instead to transmit, through the widow, a gift to the couple’s children. The gift-to-the-surviving-spouse terminology reflects concern with the status of the actual recipient or donee of the gift. What the statute provides is a “marital deduction” — a deduction for gifts to the surviving spouse — not a deduction for gifts to the children or a deduction for gifts to privately selected beneficiaries. The appropriate reference, therefore, is not to the value of the gift moving from the deceased spouse but to the net value of the gift received by the surviving spouse. Second, the introductory phrases of § 812 (e) (1) (E) (ii) provide that the gift-amount determination is to be made “where such interest or property is incumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest . . . .” The Government, drawing upon the broad import of this language, argues: “An undertaking by the wife to convey property to a third person, upon which her receipt of property under the decedent’s will is conditioned, is plainly an 'obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest.’ ” Respondents contend that “incumbrance or obligation” refers only to “a payment to be made out of property passing to the surviving spouse.” Respondents’ narrow construction certainly is not compelled by a literal interpretation of the statutory language. Their construction would embrace only, for example, an obligation on the property passing whereas the statute speaks of an obligation “with respect to the passing” gift. Finally, to arrive at the real value of the gift “such . . . obligation shall be taken into account . . . .” In context we think this relates the gift-amount determination to the net economic interest received by the surviving spouse. This interpretation is supported by authoritative declarations of congressional intent. The Senate Committee on Finance, in explaining the operation of the marital deduction, stated its understanding as follows: “If the decedent bequeaths certain property to his surviving spouse subject, however, to her agreement, or a charge on the property, for payment of $1,000 to X, the value of the bequest (and, accordingly, the value of the interest passing to the surviving spouse) is the value, reduced by $1,000, of such property.” S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, p. 6. (Emphasis added.) The relevant Treasury Regulation is directly based upon, if not literally taken from, such expressions of legislative intent. Treas. Reg. 106, § 81.47c (b) (1949). The Regulation specifically includes an example of the kind of testamentary disposition involved in this case: “A decedent bequeathed certain securities to his wife in lieu of her interest in property held by them as community property under the law of the State of their residence. The wife elected to relinquish her community property interest and to take the bequest. For the purpose of the marital deduction, the value of the bequest is to be reduced by the value of the community property interest relinquished by the wife.” We conclude, therefore, that the governing principle, approved by Congress and embodied in the Treasury Regulation, must be that a marital deduction is allowable only to the extent that the property bequeathed to the surviving spouse exceeds in value the property such spouse is required to relinquish. Our conclusion concerning the congressionally intended result under §812 (e)(1) accords with the general purpose of Congress in creating the marital deduction. The 1948 tax amendments were intended to equalize the effect of the estate taxes in community property and common-law jurisdictions. Under a community property system, such as that in Texas, the spouse receives outright ownership of one-half of the community property and only the other one-half is included in the decedent’s estate. To equalize the incidence of progressively scaled estate taxes and to adhere to the patterns of state law, the marital deduction permits a deceased spouse, subject to certain requirements, to transfer free of taxes one-half of the non-community property to the surviving spouse. Although applicable to separately held property in a community property state, the primary thrust of this is to extend to taxpayers in common-law States the advantages of “estate splitting” otherwise available only in community property States. The purpose, however, is only to permit a married couple’s property to be taxed in two stages and not to allow a tax-exempt transfer of wealth into succeeding generations. Thus the marital deduction is generally restricted to the transfer of property interests that will be includible in the surviving spouse’s gross estate. Respondents’ construction of §812 (e)(1) would, nevertheless, permit one-half of a spouse’s wealth to pass from one generation to another without being subject either to gift or estate taxes. We do not believe that this result, squarely contrary to the concept of the marital deduction, can be justified by the language of § 812 (e) (1). Furthermore, since in a community property jurisdiction one-half of the community normally vests in the wife, approval of the claimed deduction would create an opportunity for tax reduction that, as a practical matter, would be more readily available to couples in community property jurisdictions than to couples in common-law jurisdictions. Such a result, again, would be unnecessarily inconsistent with a basic purpose of the statute. Since in our opinion the plain meaning of § 812 (e)(1) does not require the interpretation advanced by respondents, the statute must be construed to accord with the clearly expressed congressional purposes and the relevant Treasury Regulation. We conclude that, for estate tax purposes, the value of a conditional bequest to a widow should be the value of the property given to her less the value of the property she is required to give to another. In this case the value of the property transferred to Mrs. Stapf ($106,268) must be reduced by the value of the community property she was required to relinquish ($111,443). Since she received no net benefit, the estate is entitled to no marital deduction. II. Claims Against the Estate and Administration Expenses. A. Claims Against the Estate. Section 812 (b)(3) of the 1939 Code provides for the deduction from the gross estate of “Such amounts . . . for claims against the estate ... as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction . . . under which the estate is being administered . . . The community debts in this case total $32,368, consisting largely of taxes due for past income. The decedent’s will directed that his executors pay “all and not merely one-half” of the community debts. Under Texas law, absent this provision, only one-half of the community debts would be charged to the decedent’s half of the community. The issue presented is whether, as a result of the testamentary direction, a deduction may be taken for the entire amount of the community debts as “claims against the estate . . . allowed by” state law. The first question to consider is whether the claim is of the type intended to be deductible. It cannot be denied that where the executors are directed to pay the debts of another party the substance of the direction is to confer a beneficial gift on that party. Respondents’ contentions in effect require that § 812 (b) — designed to allow deductions for “expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes” — be construed to authorize tax-free gifts despite the general policy that wealth not be transmitted tax free at death. The provisions of § 812 (b) demonstrate that it was not intended to allow deductions for voluntary transfers that deplete the estate merely because the testator described the transfers or payments as the settlement of “claims” or “debts.” This intent is evidenced by the treatment of claims or debts founded upon promises or agreements. The section carefully restricts the deductible amount “in the case of clairhs against the estate . . . or any indebtedness . . . , when founded upon a promise or agreement, ... to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth. . . .” Absent such an offset or augmentation of the estate, a testator could disguise transfers as payments in settlement of debts and claims and thus obtain deductions for transmitting gifts. As this requirement suggests, a deduction under § 812 (b) should not be predicated solely on the finding that a promise or claim is legally enforceable under the state laws governing the validity of contracts and wills. The claims referred to by the statute are those “claims against” the property of the deceased -which are allowed by and enforceable under the laws of the administering State and not those claims created by the deceased’s gratuitous assumption of debts attaching to the property of another. The pertinent Treasury Regulation states that the deductible claims are "such only as represent personal obligations of the decedent ...” We cannot agree with respondents’ contention that the debts chargeable to the wife’s community property are “personal obligations” of the decedent within the meaning of the Regulation. It is true, as the Court of Appeals stated, that under Texas law the husband, as manager of the community property, was personally liable for the full amount of community debts. 309 F. 2d 592, 596. His liability for the portion of debts chargeable to his wife’s community property was, however, accompanied by a right over against her half of the community. Ibid. The basic rule of Texas law is that the community is liable for its debts, and, accordingly, half the debts attach to the wife’s community property. Since the will of the decedent cannot be allowed to define what is an "obligation” or a "claim,” where, as in this case, the community is solvent, the debts chargeable to the wife’s property cannot realistically be deemed “personal obligations” of the decedent or “claims against” his estate. The provisions of § 812 (b), like those of § 812 (e) allowing marital deductions, must be analyzed in light of the congressional purpose of equalizing the incidence of taxation upon couples in common-law and community property jurisdictions. If the deductible “claims” were to include all community debts that might be, in a literal sense, “personal obligations” of the husband as surety, then a married couple in a community property State might readily increase their tax-free estate transfers. For example, by borrowing against the value of the community property and then requiring that his executors pay all community debts, the husband could obtain a tax deduction for what would in effect be a testamentary gift to his wife. That gift might or might not qualify for treatment as a marital deduction, but it certainly was not intended to be made deductible by § 812 (b). A contrary interpretation of § 812 (b)(3) would, in our opinion, generally tend to create unwarranted tax advantages for couples in community property States. B. Administration Expenses. The testator’s will provided that administration expenses, as well as community debts, should be paid entirely out of his half of the community property. The administration expenses totalled $4,073. Under Texas law an allocable share of these costs was chargeable to the surviving spouse’s community property. That allocable share was determined to be 35% or $1,426. The issue is whether the executors’ payment of the costs attributable to the wife’s property are deductible “administration expenses . . . allowed by” the law of the State under §812 (b)(2). The interpretation of “administration expenses” under §812 (b)(2) involves substantially the same considerations that determine the interpretation of “claims against the estate” under § 812 (b)(3). In both instances, the testator, by directing that payment be made of debts chargeable to another or to non-estate property, reduces his net estate and in effect confers a gift or bequest upon another. We believe that the provisions of § 812 (b), like those of § 812 (e) providing the marital deduction, must be read in light of the general policies of taxing the transmission of wealth at death and of equalizing the tax treatment of couples in common-law and in community property jurisdictions. We hold, therefore, that a deduction may not be allowed for administration costs chargeable to the surviving spouse’s community property. C. The Payment of Debts and Expenses as a Marital Gift. In our view the payments made as a result of the testator’s assumption of responsibility both for his wife’s share of the community debts and for her share of the administration expenses are more properly characterized as marital gifts rather than as “claims” or “expenses.” Since these gifts were to the surviving spouse, respondents contend that a marital deduction should be allowed. Our interpretation of § 812 (e) disposes of this argument, for under any view of the facts, even if these items are deemed to be gifts to the wife, the will required her to surrender property more valuable than the bequests she received. In the absence of a net benefit passing to the surviving spouse, no marital deduction is allowable. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. It is so ordered. 62 Stat. 117 (1948), now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056 (b) (4) (B). The provisions involved are § 812 (e) (1) (A) and (E) (ii): “(e) Bequests, Etc., to SURVIVING Spouse.— “(1) ALLOWANCE OR MARITAL DEDUCTION. — ■ “(A) In General. — An amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate. “(E) Valuation Of Interest Passing To Surviving Spouse. — In determining for the purposes of subparagraph (A) the value of any interest in property passing to the surviving spouse for which a deduction is allowed by this subsection'— “(ii) where such interest or property is incumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such incum-brance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” 53 Stat. 123 (1939), now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2053 (a). Subsequent references will be to the 1939 Code under which the case arose. The pertinent provisions of § 812 (b) authorize deductions for: “(b) Expenses, Losses, Indebtedness, and Taxes. — Such amounts— “(1) for funeral expenses, “(2) for administration expenses, “(3) for claims against the estate, and “(4) for unpaid mortgages upon, or any indebtedness in respect to, property where the value of decedent’s interest therein, undiminished by such mortgage or indebtedness, is included in the value of the gross estate, “as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United States, under which the estate is being administered, but not including any income taxes upon income received after the death of the decedent, or property taxes not accrued before his death, or any estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance taxes. The deduction herein allowed in the case of claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages, or any indebtedness shall, when founded upon a promise or agreement, be limited to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth . . . .” The figures stated throughout are rounded to the nearer dollar. The apportionment of administration expenses was initially determined by a revenue examiner and was sustained by the District Court. 189 F. Supp. 830, 838. This includes $700 for an automobile specifically bequeathed to Mrs. Stapf. There is some question as to whether Mrs. Stapf should be credited with receiving the full value of the automobile ($1,400) or only a one-half interest ($700). For present purposes the difference is immaterial for it is insufficient to alter the basic fact that the widow did not receive a net benefit by electing to take under the will. We therefore accept the figures used by the courts below and consider Mrs. Stapf as receiving only a one-half interest ($700) in the automobile. The parties agree that the net effect of taking under the will may be computed by another method. As explained by the Court of Appeals, “Computed differently but with the same result, the widow retained a one-third interest out of the one-half of the community owned by her, thereby transferring only a one-sixth interest under the election to take. Under this method of computation she transferred property having a valuation of $27,541.16 and received property being the one-third interest in the separate property of the husband and the one-half interest in the automobile of the aggregate value of the $22,366.66, making a net loss to her of $5,174.50.” 309 F. 2d 592, 594. The Commissioner did in fact allow a marital deduction for $700, representing a one-half interest in the automobile. 309 F. 2d 592, 597, n. 5. That allowance was not challenged by the Government in the District Court. We therefore do not review the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it allows this $700 deduction. See, e. g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303. There the Court stated that under the Revenue Act of 1932 mere detriment to the transferee did not constitute the requisite “consideration in money or money’s worth” to the transferor so as to relieve him of gift tax liability. Respondents’ reliance on this ease ignores that it involved neither a determination of who was to be considered the beneficial donee nor a valuation of the gift received by such donee. The portion of the language relied upon provides that the valuation be “in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47c (b) (3) (1949), now Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-4 (b) (3) (1958). The Regulation provides another relevant illustration “of property interests which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse subject to the imposition of an obligation by the decedent: (1) A decedent devised a residence valued at $25,000 to his wife, with a direction that she pay $5,000 to his sister. For the purpose of the marital deduction, the value of the property interest passing to the wife is only $20,000.” See Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes (1962), § 17.4: “[W]hat the Regulations are driving at seems to be this. If a decedent bequeaths property to his wife in lieu of her interest in community property, which is not part of his estate and which does not pass to her from him, it seems clear that the only thing which the surviving spouse actually receives from the decedent is the excess of the interest bequeathed to her over and above the value of her interest in the community property. Therefore, this should be the only amount which qualifies for the marital deduction . . . .” This Court has frequently “given considerable and in some cases decisive weight to . . . interpretative Regulations of the Treasury and of other bodies that were not of adversary origin.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Although the weight to be given to an interpretative rule varies with its statutory and legislative context, a Treasury Regulation is particularly persuasive when, as in this case, it is supported by declarations of congressional intent. See H. R. Rep. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 24-26; S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 26-29; Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization — The Marital Deduction (1948), 36 Cal. L. Rev. 223, 228-230. The congressional concern with the eventual taxability of marital-deduction property is indicated by the terminable interest rule of § 812 (e) (1) (B). See S. Rep. No. 1013, supra, note 12, p. 28; Warren and Surrey, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation (1961), pp. 759-760. The Court of Appeals recognized the effect of its decision: “Here estate taxes are due now on the property of the husband with the devise to the widow excluded. It is a part of the marital deduction or exclusion on which taxes are deferred to the estate of the widow to be assessed on so much of it as survives on another day. The net of the transfer by the widow became subject to gift taxes at the time of the transfer. The property transferred by the widow will, to the extent of an amount equal to the devise to her, escape both gift and estate taxes.” 309 F. 2d 592, 598. For an illustration of the tax effects of the decision, see the dissent of Judge Wisdom. 309 F. 2d, at 608-609. See 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1671, 1675. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 80-81 (concerning the meaning of “general power of appointment” under a federal revenue act): “State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed. Our duty is to ascertain the meaning of the words used to specify the thing'taxed. If it is found in a given case that an interest or right created by local law was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right by state law.” See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953)., pp. 456-457. See, e. g„ Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit., supra, note 10, §§ 1.2, 2.2. The majority of the Court of Appeals passed over the adequate-consideration provision because “the debts here were in the main for income taxes and ad valorem taxes, debts imposed by law.” 309 F. 2d 592, 596. However, since one-half of the taxes were chargeable to the wife’s community property, the disputed claims were in fact imposed on the estate only by the terms of the will and the widow’s election to take under those terms. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.36 (1942), now Treas. Reg. §20.2053-4 (1958): “Claims against the estate. — The amounts that may be deducted under this heading are such only as represent personal obligations of the decedent existing at the time of his death, whether or not then matured, and interest thereon which had accrued at the time of death. . . . Only claims enforceable against the decedent’s estate may be deducted. . . .” With regard to the disputed deduction for the wife’s share of community debts, it has been suggested that: “because the decedent’s estate is not bound, even under state law, until after the widow elects, allowance of the deduction may be incompatible with the regulation requiring that the claims be in existence at the decedent’s death. This requirement could only be fulfilled by an election which would work retroactively.” 37 Tul. L. Rev. 297, 315. 3 09 F. 2d 592, 604 (Wisdom, J., dissenting): “For example, in the twilight of their years, a couple with community property worth $1,000,000 could borrow an additional $1,000,000 and invest it in securities, using the $2,000,000 as collateral. As a result, the community property would be increased from one million to two million dollars, and would have debts against it of one million dollars. If the husband provided by will that all community debts be paid out of his share of the community property, upon his death his share of the community property would be worth $1,000,000. All of this, however, would be matched by deductible community debts. Thus, under the Court’s holding, the entire 'net’ estate of $1,000,000 would pass, untaxed, to the wife.” See infra, p. 134. See 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1671, 1675. Respondents concede that “even with the benefit of the bequest of 1/3 of the separate property to her and the benefit of the debt and expense assumption provisions, Mrs. Stapf ended up with less than she would have owned had she elected to take against the will.” Her share of the gross community assets was $129,052. The portion of the debts ($16,184) and administration expenses ($1,426) chargeable to her was $17,610. When the assumption of the debts and expenses is viewed as a legacy, the effect of taking under the will may be summarized as follows: Mrs. Stapf, in effect retained one-third of the total community property remaining after certain bequests ($83,902; see note 5, supra) and allowed the balance of her community ($129,052 minus $83,902) to pass into the trust for the children. Thus she gave up property worth $45,151. In return she was given separate property valued at $22,367 (see note 6, supra) and the benefit of the debt and expense assumption, or $17,610, a total transfer of $39,976. Thus, the exchange produced a net loss to Mrs. Stapf of $5,175.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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Francis V. LORENZO, Petitioner v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION No. 17-1077 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued December 3, 2018 Decided March 27, 2019 Robert Heim, New York, NY, for the petitioner. Christopher G. Michel, pro hac vice, for the respondent. Robert G. Heim, Howard S. Meyers, Meyers & Heim LLP, New York, NY, for petitioner. Robert B. Stebbins, General Counsel, Michael A. Conley, Solicitor, Dominick V. Freda, Assistant General Counsel, Martin V. Totaro, Senior Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful: "(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, "(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact ..., or "(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders , 564 U.S. 135, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011), we examined the second of these provisions, Rule 10b-5(b), which forbids the "mak[ing]" of "any untrue statement of a material fact." We held that the "maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it." Id. , at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296 (emphasis added). We said that "[w]ithout control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not 'make' a statement in its own right." Ibid. And we illustrated our holding with an analogy: "[W]hen a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit-or blame-for what is ultimately said." Id., at 143, 131 S.Ct. 2296. On the facts of Janus , this meant that an investment adviser who had merely "participat[ed] in the drafting of a false statement" "made" by another could not be held liable in a private action under subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5. Id., at 145, 131 S.Ct. 2296. In this case, we consider whether those who do not "make" statements (as Janus defined "make"), but who disseminate false or misleading statements to potential investors with the intent to defraud, can be found to have violated the other parts of Rule 10b-5, subsections (a) and (c), as well as related provisions of the securities laws, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84-85, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1). We believe that they can. I A For our purposes, the relevant facts are not in dispute. Francis Lorenzo, the petitioner, was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer in Staten Island, New York. Lorenzo's only investment banking client at the time was Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc., a company developing technology to convert "solid waste" into "clean renewable energy." In a June 2009 public filing, Waste2Energy stated that its total assets were worth about $14 million. This figure included intangible assets, namely, intellectual property, valued at more than $10 million. Lorenzo was skeptical of this valuation, later testifying that the intangibles were a "dead asset" because the technology "didn't really work." During the summer and early fall of 2009, Waste2Energy hired Lorenzo's firm, Charles Vista, to sell to investors $15 million worth of debentures, a form of "debt secured only by the debtor's earning power, not by a lien on any specific asset," Black's Law Dictionary 486 (10th ed. 2014). In early October 2009, Waste2Energy publicly disclosed, and Lorenzo was told, that its intellectual property was worthless, that it had " ' "[w]rit[ten] off ... all [of its] intangible assets," ' " and that its total assets (as of March 31, 2009) amounted to $370,552. Shortly thereafter, on October 14, 2009, Lorenzo sent two e-mails to prospective investors describing the debenture offering. According to later testimony by Lorenzo, he sent the e-mails at the direction of his boss, who supplied the content and "approved" the messages. The e-mails described the investment in Waste2Energy as having "3 layers of protection," including $10 million in "confirmed assets." The e-mails nowhere revealed the fact that Waste2Energy had publicly stated that its assets were in fact worth less than $400,000. Lorenzo signed the e-mails with his own name, he identified himself as "Vice President-Investment Banking," and he invited the recipients to "call with any questions." B In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted proceedings against Lorenzo (along with his boss and Charles Vista). The Commission charged that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b-5, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act. Ultimately, the Commission found that Lorenzo had run afoul of these provisions by sending false and misleading statements to investors with intent to defraud. As a sanction, it fined Lorenzo $15,000, ordered him to cease and desist from violating the securities laws, and barred him from working in the securities industry for life. Lorenzo appealed, arguing primarily that in sending the e-mails he lacked the intent required to establish a violation of Rule 10b-5, § 10(b), and § 17(a)(1), which we have characterized as " 'a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' " Aaron v. SEC , 446 U.S. 680, 686, and n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980). With one judge dissenting, the Court of Appeals panel rejected Lorenzo's lack-of-intent argument. 872 F.3d 578, 583 (C.A.D.C. 2017). Lorenzo does not challenge the panel's scienter finding. Reply Brief 17. Lorenzo also argued that, in light of Janus , he could not be held liable under subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5. 872 F.3d at 586-587. The panel agreed. Because his boss "asked Lorenzo to send the emails, supplied the central content, and approved the messages for distribution," id. , at 588, it was the boss that had "ultimate authority" over the content of the statement "and whether and how to communicate it," Janus , 564 U.S. at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296. (We took this case on the assumption that Lorenzo was not a "maker" under subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5, and do not revisit the court's decision on this point.) The Court of Appeals nonetheless sustained (with one judge dissenting) the Commission's finding that, by knowingly disseminating false information to prospective investors, Lorenzo had violated other parts of Rule 10b-5, subsections (a) and (c), as well as § 10(b) and § 17(a)(1). Lorenzo then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. We granted review to resolve disagreement about whether someone who is not a "maker" of a misstatement under Janus can nevertheless be found to have violated the other subsections of Rule 10b-5 and related provisions of the securities laws, when the only conduct involved concerns a misstatement. Compare e.g., 872 F.3d 578, with WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc. , 655 F.3d 1039, 1057-1058 (C.A.9 2011). II A At the outset, we review the relevant provisions of Rule 10b-5 and of the statutes. See Appendix, infra . As we have said, subsection (a) of the Rule makes it unlawful to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." Subsection (b) makes it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact." And subsection (c) makes it unlawful to "engage in any act, practice, or course of business" that "operates ... as a fraud or deceit." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. There are also two statutes at issue. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to "use or employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of Commission rules and regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). By its authority under that section, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5. The second statutory provision is § 17(a), which, like Rule 10b-5, is organized into three subsections. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). Here, however, we consider only the first subsection, § 17(a)(1), for this is the only subsection that the Commission charged Lorenzo with violating. Like Rule 10b-5(a), (a)(1) makes it unlawful to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." B After examining the relevant language, precedent, and purpose, we conclude that (assuming other here-irrelevant legal requirements are met) dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud can fall within the scope of subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, as well as the relevant statutory provisions. In our view, that is so even if the disseminator did not "make" the statements and consequently falls outside subsection (b) of the Rule. It would seem obvious that the words in these provisions are, as ordinarily used, sufficiently broad to include within their scope the dissemination of false or misleading information with the intent to defraud. By sending emails he understood to contain material untruths, Lorenzo "employ[ed]" a "device," "scheme," and "artifice to defraud" within the meaning of subsection (a) of the Rule, § 10(b), and § 17(a)(1). By the same conduct, he "engage[d] in a[n] act, practice, or course of business" that "operate[d] ... as a fraud or deceit" under subsection (c) of the Rule. Recall that Lorenzo does not challenge the appeals court's scienter finding, so we take for granted that he sent the emails with "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" the recipients. Aaron , 446 U.S. at 686, n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1945. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how his actions could escape the reach of those provisions. Resort to dictionary definitions only strengthens this conclusion. A " 'device,' " we have observed, is simply " '[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design' "; a " 'scheme' " is a " 'project,' " " 'plan[,] or program of something to be done' "; and an " 'artifice' " is " 'an artful stratagem or trick.' " Id. , at 696, n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (quoting Webster's International Dictionary 713, 2234, 157 (2d ed. 1934) (Webster's Second)). By these lights, dissemination of false or misleading material is easily an "artful stratagem" or a "plan," "devised" to defraud an investor under subsection (a). See Rule 10b-5(a) (making it unlawful to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"); § 17(a)(1) (same). The words "act" and "practice" in subsection (c) are similarly expansive. Webster's Second 25 (defining "act" as "a doing" or a "thing done"); id., at 1937 (defining "practice" as an "action" or "deed"); see Rule 10b-5(c) (making it unlawful to "engage in a[n] act, practice, or course of business" that "operates ... as a fraud or deceit"). These provisions capture a wide range of conduct. Applying them may present difficult problems of scope in borderline cases. Purpose, precedent, and circumstance could lead to narrowing their reach in other contexts. But we see nothing borderline about this case, where the relevant conduct (as found by the Commission) consists of disseminating false or misleading information to prospective investors with the intent to defraud. And while one can readily imagine other actors tangentially involved in dissemination-say, a mailroom clerk-for whom liability would typically be inappropriate, the petitioner in this case sent false statements directly to investors, invited them to follow up with questions, and did so in his capacity as vice president of an investment banking company. C Lorenzo argues that, despite the natural meaning of these provisions, they should not reach his conduct. This is so, he says, because the only way to be liable for false statements is through those provisions that refer specifically to false statements. Other provisions, he says, concern "scheme liability claims" and are violated only when conduct other than misstatements is involved. Brief for Petitioner 4-6, 28-30. Thus, only those who "make" untrue statements under subsection (b) can violate Rule 10b-5 in connection with statements. (Similarly, § 17(a)(2) would be the sole route for finding liability for statements under § 17(a).) Holding to the contrary, he and the dissent insist, would render subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 "superfluous." See post , at 1108 - 1109 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The premise of this argument is that each of these provisions should be read as governing different, mutually exclusive, spheres of conduct. But this Court and the Commission have long recognized considerable overlap among the subsections of the Rule and related provisions of the securities laws. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston , 459 U.S. 375, 383, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) ("[I]t is hardly a novel proposition that" different portions of the securities laws "prohibit some of the same conduct" (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have explained, these laws marked the "first experiment in federal regulation of the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. , 375 U.S. 180, 198, 84 S.Ct. 275, 11 L.Ed.2d 237 (1963). It is "understandable, therefore," that "in declaring certain practices unlawful," it was thought prudent "to include both a general proscription against fraudulent and deceptive practices and, out of an abundance of caution, a specific proscription against nondisclosure" even though "a specific proscription against nondisclosure" might in other circumstances be deemed "surplusage." Id., at 198-199, 84 S.Ct. 275. "Each succeeding prohibition" was thus "meant to cover additional kinds of illegalities-not to narrow the reach of the prior sections." United States v. Naftalin , 441 U.S. 768, 774, 99 S.Ct. 2077, 60 L.Ed.2d 624 (1979). We have found " 'no warrant for narrowing alternative provisions ... adopted with the purpose of affording added safeguards.' " Ibid. (quoting United States v. Gilliland , 312 U.S. 86, 93, 61 S.Ct. 518, 85 L.Ed. 598 (1941) ); see Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States , 406 U.S. 128, 152-153, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972) (While "the second subparagraph of [Rule 10b-5] specifies the making of an untrue statement ... [t]he first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted"). And since its earliest days, the Commission has not viewed these provisions as mutually exclusive. See, e.g., In re R. D. Bayly & Co. , 19 S. E. C. 773 (1945) (finding violations of what would become Rules 10b-5(b) and (c) based on the same misrepresentations and omissions); In re Arthur Hays & Co. , 5 S. E. C. 271 (1939) (finding violations of both §§ 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) based on false representations in stock sales). The idea that each subsection of Rule 10b-5 governs a separate type of conduct is also difficult to reconcile with the language of subsections (a) and (c). It should go without saying that at least some conduct amounts to "employ[ing]" a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" under subsection (a) as well as "engag[ing] in a[n] act ... which operates ... as a fraud" under subsection (c). In Affiliated Ute , for instance, we described the "defendants' activities" as falling "within the very language of one or the other of those subparagraphs, a 'course of business' or a 'device, scheme, or artifice' that operated as a fraud." 406 U.S. at 153, 92 S.Ct. 1456. (The dissent, for its part, offers no account of how the superfluity problems that motivate its interpretation can be avoided where subsections (a) and (c) are concerned.) Coupled with the Rule's expansive language, which readily embraces the conduct before us, this considerable overlap suggests we should not hesitate to hold that Lorenzo's conduct ran afoul of subsections (a) and (c), as well as the related statutory provisions. Our conviction is strengthened by the fact that we here confront behavior that, though plainly fraudulent, might otherwise fall outside the scope of the Rule. Lorenzo's view that subsection (b), the making-false-statements provision, exclusively regulates conduct involving false or misleading statements would mean those who disseminate false statements with the intent to cheat investors might escape liability under the Rule altogether. But using false representations to induce the purchase of securities would seem a paradigmatic example of securities fraud. We do not know why Congress or the Commission would have wanted to disarm enforcement in this way. And we cannot easily reconcile Lorenzo's approach with the basic purpose behind these laws: "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry." Capital Gains , 375 U.S. at 186, 84 S.Ct. 275. See also, e.g., SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. , 328 U.S. 293, 299, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946) (the securities laws were designed "to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits"). III Lorenzo and the dissent make a few other important arguments. They contend that applying subsections (a) or (c) of Rule 10b-5 to conduct like his would render our decision in Janus (which we described at the outset, supra, at 1098 - 1099) "a dead letter," post , at 1102. But we do not see how that is so. In Janus , we considered the language in subsection (b), which prohibits the "mak[ing]" of "any untrue statement of a material fact." See 564 U.S. at 141-143, 131 S.Ct. 2296. We held that the "maker" of a "statement" is the "person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement." Id. , at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296. And we found that subsection (b) did not (under the circumstances) cover an investment adviser who helped draft misstatements issued by a different entity that controlled the statements' content. Id., at 146-148, 131 S.Ct. 2296. We said nothing about the Rule's application to the dissemination of false or misleading information. And we can assume that Janus would remain relevant (and preclude liability) where an individual neither makes nor disseminates false information-provided, of course, that the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud. Next, Lorenzo points to the statute's "aiding and abetting" provision. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). This provision, enforceable only by the Commission (and not by private parties), makes it unlawful to "knowingly or recklessly ... provid[e] substantial assistance to another person" who violates the Rule. Ibid. ; see Janus , 564 U.S. at 143, 131 S.Ct. 2296 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A. , 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) ). Lorenzo claims that imposing primary liability upon his conduct would erase or at least weaken what is otherwise a clear distinction between primary and secondary (i.e. , aiding and abetting) liability. He emphasizes that, under today's holding, a disseminator might be a primary offender with respect to subsection (a) of Rule 10b-5 (by employing a "scheme" to "defraud") and also secondarily liable as an aider and abettor with respect to subsection (b) (by providing substantial assistance to one who "makes" a false statement). And he refers to two cases that, in his view, argue in favor of circumscribing primary liability. See Central Bank , 511 U.S. at 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439 ; Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta , Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008). We do not believe, however, that our decision creates a serious anomaly or otherwise weakens the distinction between primary and secondary liability. For one thing, it is hardly unusual for the same conduct to be a primary violation with respect to one offense and aiding and abetting with respect to another. John, for example, might sell Bill an unregistered firearm in order to help Bill rob a bank, under circumstances that make him primarily liable for the gun sale and secondarily liable for the bank robbery. For another, the cases to which Lorenzo refers do not help his cause. Take Central Bank , where we held that Rule 10b-5's private right of action does not permit suits against secondary violators. 511 U.S. at 177, 114 S.Ct. 1439. The holding of Central Bank , we have said, suggests the need for a "clean line" between conduct that constitutes a primary violation of Rule 10b-5 and conduct that amounts to a secondary violation. Janus , 564 U.S. at 143, and n. 6, 131 S.Ct. 2296. Thus, in Janus , we sought an interpretation of "make" that could neatly divide primary violators and actors too far removed from the ultimate decision to communicate a statement. Ibid. (citing Central Bank , 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439 ). The line we adopt today is just as administrable: Those who disseminate false statements with intent to defraud are primarily liable under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), § 10(b), and § 17(a)(1), even if they are secondarily liable under Rule 10b-5(b). Lorenzo suggests that classifying dissemination as a primary violation would inappropriately subject peripheral players in fraud (including him, naturally) to substantial liability. We suspect the investors who received Lorenzo's e-mails would not view the deception so favorably. And as Central Bank itself made clear, even a bit participant in the securities markets "may be liable as a primary violator under [Rule] 10b-5" so long as "all of the requirements for primary liability ... are met." Id., at 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439. Lorenzo's reliance on Stoneridge is even further afield. There, we held that private plaintiffs could not bring suit against certain securities defendants based on undisclosed deceptions upon which the plaintiffs could not have relied. 552 U.S. at 159, 128 S.Ct. 761. But the Commission, unlike private parties, need not show reliance in its enforcement actions. And even supposing reliance were relevant here, Lorenzo's conduct involved the direct transmission of false statements to prospective investors intended to induce reliance-far from the kind of concealed fraud at issue in Stoneridge . As for Lorenzo's suggestion that those like him ought to be held secondarily liable, this offer will, far too often, prove illusory. In instances where a "maker" of a false statement does not violate subsection (b) of the Rule (perhaps because he lacked the necessary intent), a disseminator of those statements, even one knowingly engaged in an egregious fraud, could not be held to have violated the "aiding and abetting" statute. That is because the statute insists that there be a primary violator to whom the secondary violator provided "substantial assistance." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). And the latter can be "deemed to be in violation" of the provision only "to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided." Ibid. In other words, if Acme Corp. could not be held liable under subsection (b) for a statement it made, then a knowing disseminator of those statements could not be held liable for aiding and abetting Acme under subsection (b). And if, as Lorenzo claims, the disseminator has not primarily violated other parts of Rule 10b-5, then such a fraud, whatever its intent or consequences, might escape liability altogether. That is not what Congress intended. Rather, Congress intended to root out all manner of fraud in the securities industry. And it gave to the Commission the tools to accomplish that job. * * * For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. So ordered . Justice KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, "(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, "(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or "(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 78j "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange- * * * "(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 77q "(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud or deceit "It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities (including security-based swaps) or any security-based swap agreement ... by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly- "(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or "(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or "(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 15 U.S.C. § 78t "(e) Prosecution of persons who aid and abet violations "For purposes of any action brought by the Commission ..., any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided. Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice GORSUCH joins, dissenting. In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders , 564 U.S. 135, 131 S.Ct. 2296, 180 L.Ed.2d 166 (2011), we drew a clear line between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases: A person does not "make" a fraudulent misstatement within the meaning of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5(b)-and thus is not primarily liable for the statement-if the person lacks "ultimate authority over the statement." Id., at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296. Such a person could, however, be liable as an aider and abettor under principles of secondary liability. Today, the Court eviscerates this distinction by holding that a person who has not "made" a fraudulent misstatement can nevertheless be primarily liable for it. Because the majority misconstrues the securities laws and flouts our precedent in a way that is likely to have far-reaching consequences, I respectfully dissent. I To appreciate the sweeping nature of the Court's holding, it is helpful to begin with the facts of this case. On October 14, 2009, the owner of the firm at which petitioner Frank Lorenzo worked instructed him to send e-mails to two clients regarding a debenture offering. The owner explained that he wanted the e-mails to come from the firm's investment-banking division, which Lorenzo directed. Lorenzo promptly addressed an e-mail to each client, "cut and pasted" the contents of each e-mail-which he received from the owner-into the body, and "sent [them] out." App. 321. It is undisputed that Lorenzo did not draft the e-mails' contents, though he knew that they contained false or misleading statements regarding the debenture offering. Both e-mails stated that they were sent "[a]t the request of" the owner of the firm. Id., at 403, 405. No other allegedly fraudulent conduct is at issue. In 2013, the SEC brought enforcement proceedings against the owner of the firm, the firm itself, and Lorenzo. Even though Lorenzo sent the e-mails at the owner's request, the SEC did not charge Lorenzo with aiding and abetting fraud committed by the owner. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o(b), 78o(b)(4)(E), 78t(e). Instead, the SEC charged Lorenzo as a primary violator of multiple securities laws, including Rule 10b-5(b), which prohibits "mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018) ; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder , 425 U.S. 185, 212-214, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976) (construing Rule 10b-5(b) to require scienter). The SEC ultimately concluded that, by "knowingly sen[ding] materially misleading language from his own email account to prospective investors," App. to Pet. for Cert. 77, Lorenzo violated Rule 10b-5(b) and several other antifraud provisions of the securities laws. The SEC "barred [him] from serving in the securities industry" for life. Id., at 91. The Court of Appeals unanimously rejected the SEC's determination that Lorenzo violated Rule 10b-5(b). Applying Janus , the court held that Lorenzo did not "make" the false statements at issue because he merely "transmitted statements devised by [his boss] at [his boss'] direction." 872 F.3d 578, 587 (C.A.D.C. 2017). The SEC has not challenged that aspect of the decision below. The panel majority nevertheless upheld the SEC's decision holding Lorenzo primarily liable for the same false statements under other provisions of the securities laws-specifically, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act). Unlike Rule 10b-5(b), none of these provisions pertains specifically to fraudulent misstatements. II Even though Lorenzo undisputedly did not "make" the false statements at issue in this case under Rule 10b-5(b), the Court follows the SEC in holding him primarily liable for those statements under other provisions of the securities laws. As construed by the Court, each of these more general laws completely subsumes Rule 10b-5(b) and § 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act in cases involving fraudulent misstatements, even though these provisions specifically govern false statements. The majority's interpretation of these provisions cannot be reconciled with their text or our precedents. Thus, I am once again compelled to "disagre[e] with the SEC's broad view" of the securities laws. Janus , supra , at 145, n. 8, 131 S.Ct. 2296. A I begin with the text. The Court of Appeals held that Lorenzo violated § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c). In relevant part, § 10(b) makes it unlawful for a person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, "[t]o use or employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of an SEC rule. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under this statutory authority. That Rule makes it unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, "(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, "(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact ..., or "(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit ...." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Court of Appeals also held that Lorenzo violated § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. Similar to Rule 10b-5, § 17(a) of the Act provides that it is unlawful, in connection with the offer or sale of a security, "(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or "(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact ...; or "(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1). We can quickly dispose of Rule 10b-5(a) and § 17(a)(1). The act of knowingly disseminating a false statement at the behest of its maker, without more, does not amount to "employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" within the meaning of those provisions. As the contemporaneous dictionary definitions cited by the majority make clear, each of these words requires some form of planning, designing, devising, or strategizing. See ante, at 1101. We have previously observed that "the terms 'device,' 'scheme,' and 'artifice' all connote knowing or intentional practices ." Aaron v. SEC , 446 U.S. 680, 696, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980) (emphasis added). In other words, they encompass "fraudulent scheme[s]," such as a " 'short selling' scheme," a wash sale, a matched order, price rigging, or similar conduct. United States v. Naftalin , 441 U.S. 768, 770, 778, 99 S.Ct. 2077, 60 L.Ed.2d 624 (1979) (applying § 17(a)(1) ); see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green , 430 U.S. 462, 473, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977) (interpreting the term "manipulative" in § 10(b) ). Here, it is undisputed that Lorenzo did not engage in any conduct involving planning, scheming, designing, or strategizing, as Rule 10b-5(a) and § 17(a)(1) require for a primary violation. He sent two e-mails drafted by a superior, to recipients specified by the superior, pursuant to instructions given by the superior, without collaborating on the substance of the e-mails or otherwise playing an independent role in perpetrating a fraud. That Lorenzo knew the messages contained falsities does not change the essentially administrative nature of his conduct here; he might have assisted in a scheme, but he did not himself plan, scheme, design, or strategize. In my view, the plain text of Rule 10b-5(a) and § 17(a)(1) thus does not encompass Lorenzo's conduct as a matter of primary liability. The remaining provision, Rule 10b-5(c), seems broader at first blush. But the scope of this conduct-based provision-and, for that matter, Rule 10b-5(a) and § 17(a)(1) -must be understood in light of its codification alongside a prohibition specifically addressing primary liability for false statements. Rule 10b-5(b) imposes primary liability on the "make[r]" of a fraudulent misstatement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) ; see Janus , 564 U.S. at 141-142, 131 S.Ct. 2296. And § 17(a)(2) imposes primary liability on a person who "obtain[s] money or property by means of" a false statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2). The conduct-based provisions of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) and § 17(a)(1) must be interpreted in view of the specificity of these false-statement provisions, and therefore cannot be construed to encompass primary liability solely for false statements. This view is consistent with our previous recognition that "each subparagraph of § 17(a) 'proscribes a distinct category of misconduct' " and " 'is meant to cover additional kinds of illegalities.' " Aaron , supra, at 697, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (quoting Naftalin , supra , at 774, 99 S.Ct. 2077 ; emphasis added). The majority disregards these express limitations. Under the Court's rule, a person who has not "made" a fraudulent misstatement within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b) nevertheless could be held primarily liable for facilitating that same statement; the SEC or plaintiff need only relabel the person's involvement as an "act," "device," "scheme," or "artifice" that violates Rule 10b-5(a) or (c). And a person could be held liable for a fraudulent misstatement under § 17(a)(1) even if the person did not obtain money or property by means of the statement. In short, Rule 10b-5(b) and § 17(a)(2) are rendered entirely superfluous in fraud cases under the majority's reading. This approach is in tension with " 'the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute.' " RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U.S. 639, 645, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin , 285 U.S. 204, 208, 52 S.Ct. 322, 76 L.Ed. 704 (1932) ). I would therefore apply the "old and familiar rule " that "the specific governs the general." RadLAX , supra , at 645-646, 132 S.Ct. 2065 (internal quotation marks omitted); see A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 51 (2012) (canon equally applicable to statutes and regulations). This canon of construction applies not only to resolve "contradiction[s]" between general and specific provisions, but also to avoid "the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed by the general one." RadLAX , 566 U.S. at 645, 132 S.Ct. 2065. Here, liability for false statements is " 'specifically dealt with' " in Rule 10b-5(b) and § 17(a)(2). Id., at 646, 132 S.Ct. 2065 (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons , supra , at 208, 52 S.Ct. 322 ). But Rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) also contain general prohibitions that, " 'in [their] most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in' " the more specific provisions. 566 U.S. at 646, 132 S.Ct. 2065. I would hold that the provisions specifically addressing false statements " 'must be operative' " as to false-statement cases, and that the more general provisions should be read to apply " 'only [to] such cases within [their] general language as are not within the' " purview of the specific provisions on false statements. Ibid. Adopting this approach to the statutory text would align with our previous admonitions that the securities laws should not be "[v]iewed in isolation" and stretched to their limits. Hochfelder , 425 U.S. at 212, 96 S.Ct. 1375. In Hochfelder , for example, we concluded that the key words of § 10(b) employed the "terminology of intentional wrongdoing" and thus "strongly suggest[ed]" that it "proscribe[s] knowing or intentional misconduct," even though the statute did not expressly state as much. Id. , at 197, 214, 96 S.Ct. 1375. We took a similar approach to § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. Aaron , 446 U.S. at 695-697, 100 S.Ct. 1945. We have also limited the terms of Rule 10b-5 by recognizing that it was adopted pursuant to § 10(b) and thus "encompasses only conduct already prohibited by § 10(b)." Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta , Inc ., 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) ; see Hochfelder , supra, at 212-214, 96 S.Ct. 1375. Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, this approach does not necessarily require treating each provision of Rule 10b-5 or § 17(a) as "governing different, mutually exclusive, spheres of conduct." Ante, at 1101. Nor does it prevent the securities laws from mutually reinforcing one another or overlapping to some extent. Ante, at 1101 - 1102. It simply contemplates giving full effect to the specific prohibitions on false statements in Rule 10b-5(b) and § 17(a)(2) instead of rendering them superfluous. The majority worries that this approach would allow people who disseminate false statements with the intent to defraud to escape liability under Rule 10b-5. Ante , at 1102. That is not so. If a person's only role is transmitting fraudulent misstatements at the behest of the statements' maker, the person's conduct would be appropriately assessed as a matter of secondary liability pursuant to provisions like 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o(b), 78t(e), and 78o(b)(4)(E). And if a person engages in other acts prohibited by the Rule, such as developing and employing a fraudulent scheme, the person would be primarily liable for that conduct. The majority suggests that secondary liability may often prove illusory. It hypothesizes, for example, a situation in which the "maker" of a false statement does not know that it was false and thus does not violate Rule 10b-5(b), but the disseminator knows that the statement is false. Under that scenario, the majority fears that the person disseminating the statements could be "engaged in an egregious fraud," yet would not be liable as an aider and abettor for lack of a primary violator. Ante, at 1104. This concern is misplaced. As an initial matter, I note that § 17(a)(2) does not require scienter, so the maker of the statement may still be liable under that provision. Aaron , supra , at 695-697, 100 S.Ct. 1945. Moreover, an ongoing, "egregious" fraud is likely to independently constitute a primary violation of the conduct-based securities laws, wholly apart from the laws prohibiting fraudulent misstatements. Here, by contrast, we are concerned with the dissemination of two misstatements at the request of their maker. This type of conduct is appropriately assessed under principles of secondary liability. B The majority's approach contradicts our precedent in two distinct ways. First, the majority's opinion renders Janus a dead letter. In Janus , we held that liability under Rule 10b-5(b) was limited to the "make[r]" of the statement and that "[o]ne who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker" within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b). 564 U.S. at 142, 131 S.Ct. 2296 (emphasis added). It is undisputed here that Lorenzo was not the maker of the fraudulent misstatements. The majority nevertheless finds primary liability under different provisions of Rule 10b-5, without any real effort to reconcile its decision with Janus . Although it "assume[s] that Janus would remain relevant (and preclude liability) where an individual neither makes nor disseminates false information," in the next breath the majority states that this would be true only if "the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud." Ante , at 1103. Given that, under the majority's rule, administrative acts undertaken in connection with a fraudulent misstatement qualify as "other form[s] of fraud," the majority's supposed preservation of Janus is illusory. Second, the majority fails to maintain a clear line between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases. Maintaining this distinction is important because, as the majority notes, there is no private right of action against mere aiders and abettors. Ante , at 1103; see Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A. , 511 U.S. 164, 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). Here, however, the majority does precisely what we declined to do in Janus : impose broad liability for fraudulent misstatements in a way that makes the category of aiders and abettors in these cases "almost nonexistent." 564 U.S. at 143, 131 S.Ct. 2296. If Lorenzo's conduct here qualifies for primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) or (c), then virtually any person who assists with the making of a fraudulent misstatement will be primarily liable and thereby subject not only to SEC enforcement, but private lawsuits. The Court correctly notes that it is not uncommon for the same conduct to be a primary violation with respect to one offense and aiding and abetting with respect to another-as, for example, when someone illegally sells a gun to help another person rob a bank. Ante , at 1103. But this case does not involve two distinct crimes. The majority has interpreted certain provisions of an offense so broadly as to render superfluous the more stringent, on-point requirements of a narrower provision of the same offense. Criminal laws regularly and permissibly overlap with each other in a way that allows the same conduct to constitute different crimes with different punishments. That differs significantly from interpreting provisions in a law to completely eliminate specific limitations in a neighboring provision of that very same law. The majority's overreading of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) and § 17(a)(1) is especially problematic because the heartland of these provisions is conduct-based fraud-"employ[ing] [a] device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or "engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business"-not mere misstatements. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) ; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5(a), (c). The Court attempts to cabin the implications of its holding by highlighting several facts that supposedly would distinguish this case from a case involving a secretary or other person "tangentially involved in disseminat[ing]" fraudulent misstatements. Ante , at 1101. None of these distinctions withstands scrutiny. The fact that Lorenzo "sent false statements directly to investors" in e-mails that "invited [investors] to follow up with questions," ibid ., puts him in precisely the same position as a secretary asked to send an identical message from her e-mail account. And under the unduly capacious interpretation that the majority gives to the securities laws, I do not see why it would matter whether the sender is the "vice president of an investment banking company" or a secretary, ibid. -if the sender knowingly sent false statements, the sender apparently would be primarily liable. To be sure, I agree with the majority that liability would be "inappropriate" for a secretary put in a situation similar to Lorenzo's. Ibid. But I can discern no legal principle in the majority opinion that would preclude the secretary from being pursued for primary violations of the securities laws. * * * Instead of blurring the distinction between primary and secondary liability, I would hold that Lorenzo's conduct did not amount to a primary violation of the securities laws and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. For ease of reference, I use "securities laws" to refer to both statutes and SEC regulations. I recognize that § 17(a)(1) could be deemed narrower than § 17(a)(2) in the sense that it requires scienter, whereas § 17(a)(2) does not. Aaron v. SEC , 446 U.S. 680, 697, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980). But scienter is not disputed in this case, and the specific terms of § 17(a)(2) are otherwise completely subsumed within the more general terms of § 17(a)(1), as interpreted by the majority.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES No. 73-822. Argued November 11, 1974 Decided May 27, 1975 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a separate statement, post, p. 549. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 549. John A. Brown argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Deputy Solicitor General Lafontant argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Hills, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, William L. Patton, and William G. Kanter. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Willard A. Shank, Assistant Attorney General, and Talmadge R. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of California; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, Robert B. Meany, Assistant Attorney General, and James A. Laurenson for the State of Ohio; by John C. Danj'orth, Attorney General, and Gene E. Voigts for the State of Missouri; by Loren E. McMaster for the California State Employees’Assn.; and by Stephen S. Boynton for the Assembly of Governmental Employees. A. L. Zwerdling, Robert H. Chanin, and George Kaujmann filed a brief for the Coalition of American Public Employees as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 authorized the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize wages and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970. By Executive Order, the President created the Pay Board to oversee wage and salary controls imposed under the Act’s authorization. Exec. Order No. 11627, 3 CFR 218 (1971 Comp.), note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I). In implementing the wage stabilization program, the Pay Board issued regulations that limited annual salary increases for covered employees to 5.5% and required prior Board approval for all salary adjustments affecting 5,000 or more employees. The State of Ohio subsequently enacted legislation providing for a 10.6% wage and salary increase, effective January 1, 1972, for almost 65,000 state employees. The State applied to the Pay Board for approval of the increases, and a. public hearing was held. In March 1972, the Board denied the application for an exemption to the extent that it exceeded salary increases of 7% for the 1972 wage year. Petitioners, two state employees, sought a writ of mandamus in state court to compel Ohio officials to pay the full increases provided in the state pay act. The Ohio Supreme Court granted the writ and ordered the increases to be paid. State ex rel. Fry v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St. 2d 252, 298 N. E. 2d 129 (1973). After the State Supreme Court decision, the United States filed this action in the District Court to enjoin Ohio and its officials from paying wage and salary increases in excess of the 7% authorized by the Pay Board. The District Court certified to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals the question of the applicability of federal wage and salary controls to state employees. See §211 (c) of the Economic Stabilization Act, note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I). The Court of Appeals construed the Act as applying to state employees and as thus construed upheld its constitutionality. United States v. Ohio, 487 F. 2d 936 (1973). Relying on the decisions of this Court in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), and United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936), the court concluded that the interference with state affairs incident to the uniform implementation of federal economic controls was of no consequence since Congress had a rational basis upon which to conclude that the state activity substantially affected commerce. The Court of Appeals accordingly enjoined the payment of wage and salary increases in excess of the amount authorized by the Pay Board. We affirm. I At the outset, it is contended that Congress did not intend to include state employees within the reach of the Economic Stabilization Act and that the Pay Board therefore did not have the authority to regulate the compensation due state employees. We disagree. The language and legislative history of the Act leave no doubt that Congress intended that it apply to employees throughout the economy, including those employed by state and local governments. The Act contemplated general stabilization of “prices, rents, wages, salaries, dividends, and interest,” § 202, note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I), and it provided that the controls should “call for generally comparable sacrifices by business and labor as well as other segments of the economy.” § 203 (b)(5). It contained no exceptions for employees of any governmental bodies, even at the federal level. The failure of the Act to make express reference to the States does not warrant the inference that controls could not be extended to their employees. See Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 99 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U. S., at 186. Indeed, in framing the Act, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have exempted employees of state and local governments. 117 Cong. Rec. 43673-43677 (1971). And the Senate Committee Report makes it plain that the Committee considered and rejected a proposed exemption for the same group. S. Rep. No. 92-507, p. 4 (1971). It is clear, then, that Congress intended to reach state and local governmental employees. The only remaining question is whether it could do so consistent with the constitutional limitations on its power. II Petitioners acknowledge that Congress’ power under-the Commerce Clause is very broad. Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 255 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 (1942). There is little difficulty in concluding that such an effect could well result from large wage increases to 65,000 employees in Ohio and similar numbers in other States; e. g., general raises to state employees could inject millions of dollars of purchasing power into the economy and might exert pressure on other segments of the work force to demand comparable increases. Petitioners do not appear to challenge Congress’ conclusion that unrestrained wage increases, even for employees of wholly intrastate operations, could have a significant effect on commerce. Instead, they contend that applying the Economic Stabilization Act to state employees interferes with sovereign state functions and for that reason the Commerce Clause should not be read to permit regulation of all state and local governmental employees. On the facts of this case, this argument is foreclosed by our decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), where we held that the Fair Labor Standards Act could constitutionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by a State. Wirtz reiterated the principle that States are not immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce Clause merely because of their sovereign status. 392 U. S., at 196-197. We noted, moreover, that the statute at issue in Wirtz was quite limited in application. The federal regulation in this case is even less intrusive. Congress enacted the Economic Stabilization Act as an emergency measure' to counter severe inflation that threatened the national economy. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1330, pp. 9-11 (1970). The method it chose, under the Commerce Clause, was to give the President authority to freeze virtually all wages and prices, including the wages of state and local governmental employees. In 1971, when the freeze was activated, state and local governmental employees composed 14% of the Nation’s work force. Brief for United States 20. It seems inescapable that the effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically impaired if wage increases to this sizeable group of employees were left outside the reach of these emergency federal wage controls. We conclude that the Economic Stabilization Act was constitutional as applied to state and local governmental employees. Since the Ohio wage legislation conflicted with the Pay Board’s ruling; under the Supremacy Clause the State must yield to the federal mandate. See Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542-545 (1958); Murphy v. O’Brien, 485 F. 2d 671, 675 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1973). Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas. Less than three months after we granted certiorari, Congress allowed the Economic Stabilization Act to expire on April 30, 1974. There is therefore no continuing impediment to the payment of salary increases of the kind at issue in this case. I would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Title II of the Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I). The Act was extended five times before it expired on April 30, 1974. 6 CFR §§ 101.21, 201.10 (1971). See also 6 CFR §101.28 (1972). Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 143.10 (A) (Supp. 1972). The Act provided for salary increases for employees of the state government, state universities, and county welfare departments. Elected state officials were not included. The Pay Board determined that the implementation of the pay increase from March 1972 to November 1972 would reduce the effective rate to 7% for the wage year November 14, 1971, to November 13, 1972. The payments in issue here therefore represent the wages and salaries that were due from January 1, 1972, when the pay increase was to take effect, to March 16, 1972. The total amount involved is $10.5 million. Petitioners did not raise the statutory issue either in their petition for certiorari or in their brief. Rather than decide a constitutional question when there may be doubt whether there is any statutory basis for it, however, we deal first with the statutory question, which is addressed in the briefs of amici curiae seeking reversal. Congress did provide for the exemption of certain categories of employees, such as members of the working poor, those earning substandard wages, and those entitled to wage increases under the Fair Labor Standards Act. §§ 203 (d) and (f), note following 12 U. S. C. § 1904 (1970 ed., Supp. I). See also §§ 203 (c) (l)-(3), (f)(2), (3), and (g). The various stabilization agencies have uniformly interpreted the Act to include the States within its scope, see 36 Fed. Reg. 21790, 25428 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg. 1240, 24961, 24989-24991 (1972). We have long recognized that the interpretation of a statute by an implementing agency is entitled to great weight. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965). Petitioners have stated their argument, not in terms of the Commerce power, but in terms of the limitations on that power imposed by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a “truism,” stating merely that “all is retained which has not been surrendered,” United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite the extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we are convinced that the wage restriction regulations constituted no such drastic invasion of state sovereignty.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL et al. v. SCANLON No. 84-351. Argued March 25, 1985 Decided June 28, 1985 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 247. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 302. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 304. James E. Ryan, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Thomas E. Warriner, Assistant Attorney General, Anne S. Pressman, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and G. R. Overton, Deputy Attorney General. Marilyn Hollé argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Joseph Lawrence, J. LeVonne Chambers, Eric Schnapper, and Stanley Fleishman. Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper, Charles Fried, Christopher J. Wright, and Walter W. Barnett filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by David L. Shapiro, Burt Neu-bome, Charles S. Sims, Paul L. Hoffman, and Mark D. Rosenbaum; for Senator Cranston et al. by Bonnie Milstein; and for the Disability and Employment Advocacy Project of the Employment Law Center by Joan M. Graff and Robert Barnes. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether States and state agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seeking retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. I — I Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November 1979, he filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hospital and the California Department of Mental Health, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that in 1978 the hospital denied him employment as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent charged that the hospital’s discriminatory refusal to hire him violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and certain state fair employment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc-tive, and declaratory relief. Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal court from entertaining respondent’s claims. Alternatively, petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimination under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance received by the defendants is to provide employment, and that respondent’s case should be dismissed because he did not so allege. In January 1980, the District Court granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 677 F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the question whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respondent’s suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the ground that respondent failed to allege an essential element of a claim under §504, namely, that a primary objective of the federal funds received by the defendants was to provide employment. Id., at 1272. Respondent then sought review by this Court. We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. 1095 (1984), vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 465 U. S. 624 (1984), in which we held that §504’s bar on employment discrimination is not limited to programs that receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing employment. Id., at 632-633. On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It held that “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respondent’s] action because the State, if it has participated in and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. §794.” 735 F. 2d 359, 362 (1984). Although noting that the Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a State’s consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, procedures, and rights against “any recipient of Federal assistance” while implementing regulations expressly defined the class of recipients to include the States. Quoting our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 672 (1974), the court determined that the “‘threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally includes [the] States’ ” was present in this case. 735 F. 2d, at 361. The court’s decision in this case is in conflict with those of the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm’n, 718 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CA8), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 469 U. S. 1032 (1984), and we now reverse. II The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” As we have recognized, the significance of this Amendment “lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. Ill” of the Constitution. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984) (Pennhurst II). Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment do not so provide. There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” that is, by Congress’ power “to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment without the States’ consent. Ibid. But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States, this Court consistently has held that these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to have waived its immunity “only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673, quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). Likewise, in determining whether Congress in exercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required “an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to ‘overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.’” Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 99, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279 (1973). In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has waived its immunity by virtue of Art. Ill, § 5, of the California Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these claims has merit. HH HH J — i Respondent argues that the State of California has waived its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 486 (1883). Respondent relies on Art. Ill, § 5, of the California Constitution, which provides: “Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law.” In respondent’s view, unless the California Legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immunity, the State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as well as state. The test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one. Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just last Term, “a State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued.” Pennhurst II, supra, at 99. Thus, in order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944). In view of these principles, we do not believe that Art. Ill, § 5, of the California Constitution constitutes a waiver of the State’s constitutional immunity. This provision does not specifically indicate the State’s willingness to be sued in federal court. Indeed, the provision appears simply to authorize the legislature to waive the State’s sovereign immunity. In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has waived its constitutional immunity. IV Respondent also contends that in enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress abrogated the States’ constitutional immunity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and inferences from general statutory language. To reach respondent’s conclusion, we would have to temper the requirement, well established in our cases, that Congress unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. Pennhwrst II, supra, at 99; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 342-345. We decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion. Only recently the Court reiterated that “the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system . . . .” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 547 (1985). The “constitutionally mandated balance of power” between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of “our fundamental liberties.” Id., at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of the States against suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment serves to maintain this balance. “Our reluctance to infer that a State’s immunity from suit .in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.” Pennhurst II, supra, at 99. Congress’ power to abrogate a State’s immunity means that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government does not obtain. “Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.” Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this intention in the statutory language ensures such certainty. It is also significant that in determining whether Congress has abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, the courts themselves must decide whether their own jurisdiction has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty of this Court “to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has enhanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) (“The jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . .”). For these reasons, we hold — consistent with Quern, Edel-man, and Pennhurst II — that Congress must express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself. In light of this principle, we must determine whether Congress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to override the Eleventh Amendment. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part: “No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 87 Stat. 394, as amended and as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794. Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794a, describes the available remedies under the Act, including the provisions pertinent to this case: “(a)(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this title. “(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 by “any recipient of Federal assistance.” There is no claim here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically. Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 99, citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits against the States. V Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 735 F. 2d, at 361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on “the extensive provisions [of the Act] under which the states are the express intended recipients of federal assistance.” Id., at 360. It reasoned that “this is a case in which a ‘congressional enactment... by its terms authorized suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defendants which literally included States or state instru-mentalities,’ and ‘the State by its participation in the program authorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that immunity,”’ id., at 361, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that if the State “has participated in and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, [it] has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. §794.” 735 F. 2d, at 362. The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court. Ibid., citing Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S., at 150; Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673. The court erred, however, in concluding that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation Act are addressed to the States, a State necessarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in programs funded under the statute. We have decided today that the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistakable congressional purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Act likewise falls far short of manifesting a clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity. Thus, were we to view this statute as an enactment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, see n. 4, supra, we would hold that there was no indication that the State of California consented to federal jurisdiction. <1 I — I The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in federal court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. It is so ordered. A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974), “[clonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here.” Justice Brennan’s dissent repeatedly asserts that established Eleventh Amendment doctrine is not “grounded on principles essential to the structure of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished constitutional liberties of our people . . . Post, at 247-248; see also post, at 258, 302. We believe, however, that our Eleventh Amendment doctrine is necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers of the Constitution. See n. 3, infra. The Framers believed that the States played a vital role in our system and that strong state governments were essential to serve as a “counterpoise” to the power of the Federal Government. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 17, p. 107 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); The Federalist No. 46, p. 316 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The “new evidence,” discovered by the dissent in The Federalist and in the records of the state ratifying conventions, has been available to historians and Justices of this Court for almost two centuries. Viewed in isolation, some of it is subject to varying interpretations. But none of the Framers questioned that the Constitution created a federal system with some authority expressly granted the Federal Government and the remainder retained by the several States. See, e. g., The Federalist Nos. 39, 45. The Constitution never would have been ratified if the States and their courts were to be stripped of their sovereign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself. The principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the sovereign immunity of the States “is, without question, a reflection of concern for the sovereignty of the States . . . .” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 293 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result). As the Court explained almost 65 years ago: “That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against the State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.” Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (citations omitted). See also cases cited in n. 3, infra. Justice Brennan’s dissent also argues that in the absence of jurisdiction in the federal courts, the States are “exemp[t] . . . from compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in our Nation.” Post, at 248. This claim wholly misconceives our federal system. As Justice Marshall has noted, “the issue is not the general immunity of the States from private suit. . . but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit before federal tribunals.” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, supra, at 293-294 (concurring in result) (emphasis added). It denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493, n. 35 (1976), and post, at 256, n. 8. In a remarkable view of stare decisis, Justice Brennan’s dissent states that our decision today evinces a “lack of respect for precedent.” Post, at 258. Not a single authority is cited for this claim. In fact, adoption of the dissent’s position would require us to overrule numerous decisions of this Court. However one may view the merits of the dissent’s historical argument, the principle of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), that “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. Ill,” Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at 98, has been affirmed time and time again, up to the present day. E. g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell v. Mississippi, 177 U. S. 693 (1900); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 446 (1900); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 34 (1918); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920); Ex parte New York, 256 U. S., at 497; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 (1933); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, n. 13 (1952); Farden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); Employees v. Missouri Public Health and Welfare Dept., 411 U. S., at 280; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 662-663; Pennhurst II, supra. Justice Brennan long has maintained that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, as established in the holdings and reasoning of the above cited cases, is wrong. See, e. g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U. S. 226, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); Pennhurst II, supra, at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, supra, at 298 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is a view, of course, that he is entitled to hold. But the Court has never accepted it, and we see no reason to make a further response to the scholarly, 55-page elaboration of it today. In a dissent expressing his willingness to overrule Edelman v. Jordan, supra, as well as at least 16 other Supreme Court decisions that have followed Hans v. Louisiana, see supra, Justice Stevens would “further unrave[l] the doctrine of stare decisis,” Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 155 (1981), because he views the Court’s decision in Pennhurst II as “repudiat[ing] at least 28 cases. ” Post, at 304, citing Pennhurst II, supra, at 165-166, n. 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). We previously have addressed at length his allegation that the decision in Pennhurst II overruled precedents of this Court, and decline to do so again here. See Pennhurst II, supra, at 109-111, nn. 19, 20, and 21. Justice Stevens would ignore stare decisis in this case because in the view of a minority of the Court two prior decisions of the Court ignored it. This reasoning would indeed “unravel” a doctrine upon which the rule of law depends. Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not represent an exercise of Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we first analyze § 504 in light of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject uncon-senting States to federal court jurisdiction. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). In Part V, infra, at 246, we address the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and conclude that by accepting funds under the Act, the State did not “implicitly consen[t] to be sued . . . .” 735 F. 2d 359, 362 (1984). Although the Court of Appeals seemed to state that the Rehabilitation Act was adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by focusing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged in analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION et al. No. 84-1529. Argued January 15, 1986 Decided June 9, 1986 Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered an opinion in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., concurred in the judgment. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined and in Parts I, II, IV, and V of which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 648. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 665. Rehnquist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Dep uty Solicitor General Wallace, Edwin S. Kneedler, Brian K. Landsberg, and Mark L. Gross. Richard L. Epstein argued the cause for respondents American Hospital Association et al. With him on the brief were Stuart M. Gerson, William G. Kopit, David H. Larry, and Robert W. McCann. Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., argued the cause for respondents American Medical Association et al. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, Vincent F. Prada, Newton N. Minow, Jack R. Bierig, Ann E. Allen, and Joseph A. Keyes, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. by James W. Ellis and Ruth A. Luckasson; for the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities et al. by Thomas K. Gilhool, Frank J. Laski, Michael Churchill, and Timothy M. Cook; for the Associaion for Retarded Citizens of the United States et al. by Martin H. Gerry; for the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Inc., et al. by Barbara M. Milstein; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, Guy 0. Farley, Jr., James J. Knicely, John W. Whitehead, Thomas 0. Kotouc, Wendell R. Bird, and William B. Hollberg; for Carlton Johnson by James Bopp, Jr., and Thomas J. Marzen; and for David G. McLone, M. D., et al. by Dennis J. Horan, Victor G. Rosenblum, Edward R. Grant, and Maura K. Quinlan. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. by Stephan E. Lawton, Jack N. Goodman, and John A. Hodges; for the State University of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Robert Hermann, Solicitor General, Frederick K. Mehlman, Stanley A. Camhi, Paul M. Glickman, Donna Miller, Martha 0. Shoemaker, and Jane Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, and Sanford H. Levine; and for George P. Smith II, pro se. James Bopp, Jr., filed a brief for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. as amici curiae. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell join. This case presents the question whether certain regulations governing the provision of health care to handicapped infants are authorized by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. That section provides, in part: “No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 87 Stat. 394, 29 U. S. C. §794. I The American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, and several other respondents challenge the validity of Final Rules promulgated on January 12, 1984, by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. These Rules establish “Procedures relating to health care for handicapped infants,” and in particular require the posting of informational notices, authorize expedited access to records and expedited compliance actions, and command state child protective services agencies to “prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants.” 45 CFR §84.55 (1985). Although the Final Rules comprise six parts, only the four mandatory components are challenged here. Subsection (b) is entitled “Posting of informational notice” and requires every “recipient health care provider that provides health care services to infants in programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance” — a group to which we refer generically as “hospitals” — to post an informational notice in one of two approved forms. 45 CFR § 84.55(b) (1985). Both forms include a statement that § 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap, and indicate that because of this prohibition “nourishment and medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical judgments) should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments.” 45 CFR §§ 84.55(b)(3), (4) (1985). The notice’s statement of the legal requirement does not distinguish between medical care for which parental consent has been obtained and that for which it has not. The notice must identify the telephone number of the appropriate child protective services agency and, in addition, a toll-free number for the Department that is available 24 hours a day. Ibid. Finally, the notice must state that the “identity of callers will be kept confidential” and that federal law prohibits retaliation “against any person who provides information about possible violations.” Ibid. Subsection (c), which contains the second mandatory requirement, sets forth “Responsibilities of recipient state child protective services agencies.” Subsection (c) does not mention § 504 (or any other federal statute) and does not even use the word “discriminate.” It requires every designated agency to establish and maintain procedures to ensure that “the agency utilizes its full authority pursuant to state law to prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants.” 45 CFR § 84.55(c)(1). Mandated procedures must include (1) “[a] requirement thát health care providers report on a timely basis . . . known or suspected instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants,” §84.55(c)(l)(i); (2) a method by which the state agency can receive timely reports of such cases, § 84.55(c)(1)(h); (3) “immediate” review of those reports, including “on-site investigation,” where appropriate, §84.55(c)(l)(iii); (4) protection of “medically neglected handicapped infants” including, where appropriate, legal action to secure “timely court order[s] to compel the provision of necessary nourishment and medical treatment,” §84.55(c)(l)(iv); and (5) “[tjimely notification” to HHS of every report of “suspected unlawful medical neglect” of handicapped infants. The preamble to the Final Rules makes clear that this subsection applies “where a refusal to provide medically beneficial treatment is a result, not of decisions by a health care provider, but of decisions by parents.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984). The two remaining mandatory regulations authorize “[expedited access to records” and “[expedited action to effect compliance.” 45 CFR §§ 84.55(d), (e) (1985). Subsection (d) provides broadly for immediate access to patient records on a 24-hour basis, with or without parental consent, “when, in the judgment of the responsible Department official, immediate access is necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual.” § 84.55(d). Subsection (e) likewise dispenses with otherwise applicable requirements of notice to the hospital “when, in the judgment of the responsible Department official, immediate action to effect compliance is necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual.” § 84.55(e). The expedited compliance provision is intended to allow “the government [to] see[k] a temporary restraining order to sustain the life of a handicapped infant in imminent danger of death.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1628 (1984). Like the provision affording expedited access to records, it applies without regard to whether parental consent to treatment has been withheld or whether the matter has already been referred to a state child protective services agency. II The Final Rules represent the Secretary’s ultimate response to an April 9, 1982, incident in which the parents of a Bloomington, Indiana, infant with Down’s syndrome and other handicaps refused consent to surgery to remove an esophageal obstruction that prevented oral feeding. On April 10, the hospital initiated judicial proceedings to override the parents’ decision, but an Indiana trial court, after holding a hearing the same evening, denied the requested relief. On April 12 the court asked the local Child Protection Committee to review its decision. After conducting its own hearing, the Committee found no reason to disagree with the court’s ruling. The infant died six days after its birth. Citing “heightened public concern” in the aftermath of the Bloomington Baby Doe incident, on May 18, 1982, the director of the Department’s Office of Civil Rights, in response to a directive from the President, “remind[ed]” health care providers receiving federal financial assistance that newborn infants with handicaps such as Down’s syndrome were protected by § 504. 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982). This notice was followed, on March 7, 1983, by an “Interim Final Rule” contemplating a “vigorous federal role.” 48 Fed. Reg. 9630. The Interim Rule required health care providers receiving federal financial assistance to post “in a conspicuous place in each delivery ward, each maternity ward, each pediatric ward, and each nursery, including each intensive care nursery” a notice advising of the applicability of § 504 and the availability of a telephone “hotline” to report suspected violations of the law to HHS. Id., at 9631. Like the Final Rules, the Interim Rule also provided for expedited compliance actions and expedited access to records and facilities when, “in the judgment of the responsible Department official,” immediate action or access was “necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual.” Id., at 9632. The Interim Rule took effect on March 22. On April 6, 1983, respondents American Hospital Association et al. filed a complaint in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking a declaration that the Interim Final Rule was invalid and an injunction against its enforcement. Little more than a week later, on April 14, in a similar challenge brought by the American Academy of Pediatrics and other medical institutions, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia declared the Interim Final Rule “arbitrary and capricious and promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.” American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 404 (1983). The District Judge in that case “conclude[d] that haste and inexperience ha[d] resulted in agency action based on inadequate consideration” of several relevant concerns and, in the alternative, found that the Secretary had improperly failed to solicit public comment before issuing the Rule. Id., at 399-401. On July 5, 1983, the Department issued new “Proposed Rules” on which it invited comment. Like the Interim Final Rule, the Proposed Rules required hospitals to post informational notices in conspicuous places and authorized expedited access to records to be followed, if necessary, by expedited compliance action. 48 Fed. Reg. 30851. In a departure from the Interim Final Rule, however, the Proposed Rules required federally assisted state child protective services agencies to utilize their “full authority pursuant to State law to prevent instances of medical neglect of handicapped infants.” Ibid. Mandated procedures mirrored those contained in the Final Rules described above. Ibid. The preamble and appendix to the Proposed Rules did not acknowledge that hospitals and physicians lack authority to perform treatment to which parents have not given their consent. After the period for notice and comment had passed, HHS, on December 30, 1983, promulgated the Final Rules and announced that they would take effect on February 13, 1984. On March 12 of that year respondents American Hospital Association et al. amended their complaint and respondents American Medical Association et al. filed suit to declare the new regulations invalid and to enjoin their enforcement. The actions were consolidated in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, which awarded the requested relief on the authority of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. University Hospital, 729 F. 2d 144 (1984). American Hospital Assn. v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984); App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. On appeal, the parties agreed that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in University Hospital, if valid, required a judgment against the Government in this case. In accordance with its earlier decision, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the District Court. 694 F. 2d 676 (1984). Since the judgment here thus rests entirely on the reasoning of University Hospital, it is appropriate to examine that case now. Ill On October 11, 1983, after the Department’s Interim Final Rule had been declared invalid but before it had promulgated the Final Rules challenged here, a child with multiple congenital defects known as “Baby Jane Doe” was born in Long Island, New York, and was promptly transferred to University Hospital for corrective surgery. After consulting with physicians and other advisers, the parents decided to forgo corrective surgery that was likely to prolong the child’s life, but would not improve many of her handicapping conditions. On October 16, 1983, an unrelated attorney named Wash-burn filed suit in the New York Supreme Court, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the infant who would direct the hospital to perform the corrective surgery. The trial court granted that relief on October 20, but was reversed the following day by the Appellate Division which found that the “concededly concerned and loving parents” had “chosen one course of appropriate medical treatment over another” and made an informed decision that was “in the best interest of the infant.” Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 95 App. Div. 2d 587, 589, 467 N. Y. S. 2d 685, 687 (per curiam). On October 28, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, but on the ground that the trial court should not have entertained a petition to initiate child neglect proceedings by a stranger who had not requested the aid of the responsible state agency. Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 60 N. Y. 2d 208, 211-213, 456 N. E. 2d 1186, 1187-1188 (per curiam). While the state proceedings were in progress, on October 19, HHS received a complaint from a “private citizen” that Baby Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied medically indicated treatment. HHS promptly referred this complaint to the New York State Child Protective Service. (The agency investigated the charge of medical neglect and soon thereafter concluded that there was no cause for state intervention.) In the meantime, before the State Child Protective Service could act, HHS on October 22, 1983, made repeated requests of the hospital to make its records available for inspection in order to determine whether the hospital was in compliance with § 504. The hospital refused the requests and advised HHS that the parents had not consented to a release of the records. Subsequently, on November 2, 1983, the Government filed suit in Federal District Court invoking its general authority to enforce §504 and 45 CFR §84.61 (1985), a regulation broadly authorizing access to information necessary to ascertain compliance. The District Court allowed the parents to intervene as defendants, expedited the proceeding, and ruled against the Government. It reasoned that the Government had no right of access to information because the record clearly established that the hospital had not violated the statute. United States v. University Hospital, State Univ. of N. Y. at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607, 614 (EDNY). Since the uncontradicted evidence established that the hospital “ha[d] at all times been willing to perform the surgical procedures in question, if only the parents . . . would consent,” the hospital “failed to perform the surgical procedures in question, not because Baby Jane Doe [wa]s handicapped, but because her parents ha[d] refused to consent.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In an opinion handed down on February 23, 1984, six weeks after promulgation of the Final Rules, it agreed with the District Court that “an agency is not entitled to information sought in an investigation that ‘overreaches the authority Congress has given.’” 729 F. 2d, at 150 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 217 (1946)). It further held that although Baby Jane Doe was a “handicapped individual,” she was not “otherwise qualified” within the meaning of §504 because “where medical treatment is at issue, it is typically the handicap itself that gives rise to, or at least contributes to the need for services”; as a result “the ‘otherwise qualified’ criterion of section 504 cannot be meaningfully applied to a medical treatment decision.” 729 F. 2d, at 156. For the same reason, the Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s argument that Baby Jane Doe had been “subjected to discrimination” under § 504: “Where the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was ‘discriminatory’.” Id., at 157. The difficulty of applying §504 to individual medical treatment decisions confirmed the Court of Appeals in its view that “[CJongress never contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would apply to treatment decisions involving defective newborn infants when the statute was enacted in 1973, when it was amended in 1974, or at any subsequent time.” Id., at 161. It therefore rejected “the far-reaching position advanced by the government in this case” and concluded that until Congress had. spoken, “it would be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to approve the type of investigation that ha[d] precipitated this lawsuit.” Ibid. Judge Winter dissented. He pointed out that §504 was patterned after § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in federally funded programs, and asserted that a refusal to provide medical treatment because of a person’s handicapping condition is as clearly covered by § 504 as a refusal based on a person’s race is covered by § 601: “A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a bona fide medical judgment. So too, a decision not to correct a life threatening digestive problem because an infant has Down’s Syndrome is not a bona fide medical judgment. The issue of parental authority is also quickly disposed of. A denial of medical treatment to an infant because the infant is black is not legitimated by parental consent.” Id., at 162. The Government did not file a certiorari petition in University Hospital. It did, however, seek review of the judgment in this case. We granted certiorari, 472 U.. S. 1016 (1985), and we now affirm. h — I C The Solicitor General is correct that “handicapped individual” as used in § 504 includes an infant who is born with a congenital defect. If such an infant is “otherwise qualified” for benefits under a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, § 504 protects him from discrimination “solely by reason of his handicap.” It follows, under our decision in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 301 (1985), that handicapped infants are entitled to “meaningful access” to medical services provided by hospitals, and that a hospital rule or state policy denying or limiting such access would be subject to challenge under § 504. However, no such rule or policy is challenged, or indeed has been identified, in this case. Nor does this case, in contrast to the University Hospital litigation, involve a claim that any specific individual treatment decision violates § 504. This suit is not an enforcement action, and as a consequence it is not necessary to determine whether § 504 ever applies to individual medical treatment decisions involving handicapped infants. Respondents brought this litigation to challenge the four mandatory components of the Final Rules on their face, and the Court of Appeals’ judgment which we review merely affirmed the judgment of the District Court which “declared invalid and enjoined enforcement of [the final] regulations, purportedly promulgated pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. §794 (1982).” App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. The specific question presented by this case, then, is whether the four mandatory provisions of the Final Rules are authorized by § 504. V It is an axiom of administrative law that an agency’s explanation of the basis for its decision must include “a ‘rational connnection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962)). Agency deference has not come so far that we will uphold regulations whenever it is possible to “conceive a basis” for administrative action. To the contrary, the “presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate” is not equivalent to “the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S., at 43, n. 9. Thus, the mere fact that there is “some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the [regulators],” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938) (footnote omitted), under which they “might have concluded” that the regulation was necessary to discharge their statutorily authorized mission, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487 (1955), will not suffice to validate agency decision-making. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U. S. 607, 639-659 (1980) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 169 (1962). Our recognition of Congress’ need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision, even though we show respect for the agency’s judgment in both. Before examining the Secretary’s reasons for issuing the Final Rules, it is essential to understand the pre-existing state-law framework governing the provision of medical care to handicapped infants. In broad outline, state law vests decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first instance, subject to review in exceptional cases by the State acting as parens patriae. Prior to the regulatory activity culminating in the Final Rules, the Federal Government was not a participant in the process of making treatment decisions for newborn infants. We presume that this general framework was familiar to Congress when it enacted § 504. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979). It therefore provides an appropriate background for evaluating the Secretary’s action in this case. The Secretary has identified two possible categories of violations of §504 as justifications for federal oversight of handicapped infant care. First, he contends that a hospital’s refusal to furnish a handicapped infant with medically beneficial treatment “solely by reason of his handicap” constitutes unlawful discrimination. Second, he maintains that a hospital’s failure to report eases of suspected medical neglect to a state child protective services agency may also violate the statute. We separately consider these two possible bases for the Final Rules. I — l > In the immediate aftermath of the Bloomington Baby Doe incident, the Secretary apparently proceeded on the assumption that a hospital’s statutory duty to provide treatment to handicapped infants was unaffected by the absence of parental consent. See supra, at 617-619. He has since abandoned that view. Thus, the preamble to the Final Rules correctly states that when “a non-treatment decision, no matter how discriminatory, is made by parents, rather than by the hospital, section 504 does not mandate that the hospital unilaterally overrule the parental decision and provide treatment notwithstanding the lack of consent.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984). A hospital’s withholding of treatment when no parental consent has been given cannot violate § 504, for without the consent of the parents or a surrogate decisionmaker the infant is neither “otherwise qualified” for treatment nor has he been denied care “solely by reason of his handicap.” Indeed, it would almost certainly be a tort as a matter of state law to operate on an infant without parental consent. This analysis makes clear that the Government’s heavy reliance on the analogy to race-based refusals which violate § 601 of the Civil Rights Act is misplaced. If, pursuant to its normal practice, a hospital refused to operate on a black child whose parents had withheld their consent to treatment, the hospital’s refusal would not be based on the race of the child even if it were assumed that the parents based their decision entirely on a mistaken assumption that the race of the child made the operation inappropriate. Now that the Secretary has acknowledged that a hospital has no statutory treatment obligation in the absence of parental consent, it has become clear that the Final Rules are not needed to prevent hospitals from denying treatment to handicapped infants. The Solicitor General concedes that the administrative record contains no evidence that hospitals have ever refused treatment authorized either by the infant’s parents or by a court order. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. Even the Secretary never seriously maintained that posted notices, “hotlines,” and emergency on-site investigations were necessary to process complaints against hospitals that might refuse treatment requested by parents. The parental interest in calling such a refusal to the attention of the appropriate authorities adequately vindicates the interest in enforcement of § 504 in such cases, just as that interest obviates the need for a special regulation to deal with refusals to provide treatment on the basis of race which may violate §601 of the Civil Rights Act. The Secretary’s belated recognition of the effect of parental nonconsent is important, because the supposed need for federal monitoring of hospitals’ treatment decisions rests entirely on instances in which parents have refused their consent. Thus, in the Bloomington, Indiana, case that precipitated the Secretary’s enforcement efforts in this area, as well as in the University Hospital case that provided the basis for the summary affirmance in the case now before us, the hospital’s failure to perform the treatment at issue rested on the lack of parental consent. The Secretary’s own summaries of these cases establish beyond doubt that the respective hospitals did not withhold medical care on the basis of handicap and therefore did not violate § 504; as a result, they provide no support for his claim that federal regulation is needed in order to forestall comparable cases in the future. The Secretary’s initial failure to recognize that withholding of consent by parents does not equate with discriminatory denial of treatment by hospitals likewise undermines the Secretary’s findings in the preamble to his proposed rulemaking. In that statement, the Secretary cited four sources in support of the claim that “Section 504 [is] not being uniformly followed.” 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983). None of the cited examples, however, suggests that recipients of federal financial assistance, as opposed to parents, had withheld medical care on the basis of handicap. Notwithstanding the ostensible recognition in the preamble of the effect of parental nonconsent on a hospital’s obligation to provide care, in promulgating the Final Rules the Secretary persisted in relying on instances in which parents had refused consent to support his claim that, regardless of its “magnitude,” there is sufficient evidence of “illegality” to justify “establishing basic mechanisms to allow for effective enforcement of a clearly applicable statute.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1645 (1984). We have already discussed one source of this evidence — “the several specific cases cited in the preamble to the proposed rule.” Ibid. Contrary to the Secretary’s belief, these cases do not “support the proposition that handicapped infants may be subjected to unlawful discrimination.” Ibid. In addition to the evidence relied on in prior notices, the Secretary included a summary of the 49 “Infant Doe cases” that the Department had processed before December 1, 1983. Curiously, however, by the Secretary’s own admission none of the 49 cases had “resulted in a finding of discriminatory withholding of medical care.” Id., at 1649. In fact, in the entire list of 49 cases there is no finding that a hospital failed or refused to provide treatment to a handicapped infant for which parental consent had been given. Notwithstanding this concession, the Secretary “believes three of these cases demonstrate the utility of the procedural mechanisms called for in the final rules.” Ibid. Accord, ibid. (“[T]hese cases provide additional documentation of the need for governmental involvement and the appropriateness of the procedures established by the final rules”). However, these three cases, which supposedly provide the strongest support for federal intervention, fail to disclose any discrimination against handicapped newborns in violation of § 504. For example, in Robinson, Illinois, the Department conducted an on-site investigation when it learned that the “hospital (at the parents’ request) failed to perform necessary surgery.” Id., at 1646 (emphasis added). After “[t]he parents refused consent for surgery,” “the hospital referred the matter to state authorities, who accepted custody of the infant and arranged for surgery and adoption,” all “in compliance with section 504.” Ibid. The Secretary concluded that “the involvement of the state child protective services agency,” at the behest of the hospital, “was the most important element in bringing about corrective surgery for the infant. . . . Had there been no governmental involvement in the case, the outcome might have been much less favorable.” Id., at 1649 (emphasis added). The Secretary’s second example illustrates with even greater force the effective and nondiscriminatory functioning of state mechanisms and the consequent lack of support for federal intervention. In Daytona Beach, Florida, the Department’s hotline received a complaint of medical neglect of a handicapped infant; immediate contact with the hospital and state agency revealed that “the parents did not consent to surgery” for the infant. Id., at 1648. Notwithstanding this information, which was confirmed by both the hospital and the state agency, and despite the fact that the state agency had “obtained a court order to provide surgery” the day before HHS was notified, the Department conducted an on-site investigation. Ibid. In the third case, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the Department intervened so soon after birth that “the decisionmaking process was in progress at the time the OCR [Office of Civil Rights] inquiry began,” and “it is impossible to say the surgery would not have been provided without this involvement.” Id., at 1649. “However,” the Secretary added, “the involvement of OCR and the OCR medical consultant was cooperatively received by the hospital and apparently constructive.” Ibid. In sum, there is nothing in the administrative record to justify the Secretary’s belief that “discriminatory withholding of medical care” in violation of § 504 provides any support for federal regulation: In two of the cases (Robinson, Illinois, and Daytona Beach, Florida), the hospital’s refusal was based on the absence of parental consent, but the parents’ decision was overridden by state authorities and the operation was performed; in the third case (Colorado Springs, Colorado) it is not clear whether the parents would have given their consent or not, but the corrective surgery was in fact performed. VII As a backstop to his manifestly incorrect perception that withholding of treatment in accordance with parental instructions necessitates federal regulation, the Secretary contends that a hospital’s failure to report parents’ refusals to consent to treatment violates §504, and that past breaches of this kind justify federal oversight. By itself, § 504 imposes no duty to report instances of medical neglect — that undertaking derives from state-law reporting obligations or a hospital’s own voluntary practice. Although a hospital’s selective refusal to report medical neglect of handicapped infants might violate §504, the Secretary has failed to point to any specific evidence that this has occurred. The 49 actual investigations summarized in the preamble to the Final Rules do not reveal any case in which a hospital either failed, or was accused of failing, to make an appropriate report to a state agency. Nor can we accept the Solicitor General’s invitation to infer discriminatory nonreporting from the studies cited in the Secretary’s proposed rulemaking. Even assuming that cases in which parents have withheld consent to treatment for handicapped infants have gone unreported, that fact alone would not prove that the hospitals involved had discriminated on the basis of handicap rather than simply failed entirely to discharge their state-law reporting obligations, if any, a matter which lies wholly outside the nondiscrimination mandate of § 504. The particular reporting mechanism chosen by the Secretary — indeed the entire regulatory framework imposed on state child protective services agencies — departs from the nondiscrimination mandate of §504 in a more fundamental way. The mandatory provisions of the Final Rules omit any direct requirement that hospitals make reports when parents refuse consent to recommended procedures. Instead, the Final Rules command state agencies to require such reports, regardless of the state agencies’ own reporting requirements (or lack thereof). 45 CFR §84.55(c)(l)(i) (1985). Far from merely preventing state agencies from remaining calculatedly indifferent to handicapped infants while they tend to the needs of the similarly situated nonhandicapped, the Final Rules command state agencies to utilize their “full authority” to “prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants.” § 84.55(c)(1). The Rules effectively make medical neglect of handicapped newborns a state investigative priority, possibly forcing state agencies to shift scarce resources away from other enforcement activities — perhaps even from programs designed to protect handicapped children outside hospitals. The Rules also order state agencies to “immediately]” review reports from hospitals, §84.55(c)(l)(iii), to conduct “on-site investigation[s],” ibid., and to take legal action “to compel the provision of necessary nourishment and medical treatment,” §84.55(c)(l)(iv) — all without any regard to the procedures followed by state agencies in handling complaints filed on behalf of nonhandicapped infants. These operating procedures were imposed over the objection of several state child protective services agencies that the requirement that they turn over reports to HHS “conflicts with the confidentiality requirements of state child abuse and neglect statutes,” 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984) — thereby requiring under the guise of nondiscrimination a service which state law denies to the nonhandicapped. The complaint-handling process the Secretary would impose on unwilling state agencies is totally foreign to the authority to prevent discrimination conferred on him by § 504. “Section 504 seeks to assure evenhanded treatment,” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S., at 304; “neither the language, purpose, nor history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation” on recipients of federal financial assistance, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 411 (1979). The Solicitor General also recognizes that §504 is concerned with discrimination and with discrimination alone. In his attempt to distinguish the Secretary’s 1976 determination that it “is beyond the authority of section 504” to promulgate regulations “concerning adequate and appropriate psychiatric care or safe and humane living conditions for persons institutionalized because of handicap or concerning payment of fair compensation to patients who perform work,” 41 Fed. Reg. 29548, 29559, the Solicitor General explains: “This conclusion of course was consistent with the fact that, as relevant here, Section 504 is essentially concerned only with discrimination in the relative treatment of handicapped and nonhandicapped persons and does not confer any absolute right to receive particular services or benefits under federally assisted programs.” Brief for Petitioner 40, n. 33. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 30846 (1983) (“Section 504 is in essence an equal treatment, non-discrimination standard”). The Final Rules, however, impose just the sort of absolute obligation on state agencies that the Secretary had previously disavowed. The services state agencies are required to make available to handicapped infants are in no way tied to the level of services provided to similarly situated nonhandicapped infants. Instead, they constitute an “absolute right to receive particular services or benefits” under a federally assisted program. Even if a state agency were scrupulously impartial as between the protection it offered handicapped and nonhandicapped infants, it could still be denied federal funding for failing to carry out the Secretary’s mission with sufficient zeal. It is no answer to state, as does the Secretary, that these regulations are a necessary “ ‘metho[d] ... to give reasonable'assurance’ of compliance.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1627 (1984) (quoting 45 CFR § 80.4(b), which requires state agencies to report on their compliance with Title VI). For while the Secretary can require state agencies to document their own compliance with § 504, nothing in that provision authorizes him to commandeer state agencies to enforce compliance by other recipients of federal funds (in this instance, hospitals). State child protective services agencies are not field offices of the HHS bureaucracy, and they may not be conscripted against their will as the foot soldiers in a federal crusade. As we stated in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S., at 307, “nothing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion of § 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads on the States’ longstanding discretion to choose the proper mix” of services provided by state agencies. VIII Section 504 authorizes any head of an Executive Branch agency — regardless of his agency’s mission or expertise — to promulgate regulations prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped. See S. Rep. No. 93-1297, pp. 39-40 (1974). As a result of this rulemaking authority, the Secretary of HHS has “substantial leeway to explore areas in which discrimination against the handicapped pos[es] particularly significant problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination.” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S., at 304, n. 24. Even according the greatest respect to the Secretary’s action, however, deference cannot fill the lack of an evidentiary foundation on which the Final Rules must rest. The Secretary’s basis for federal intervention is perceived discrimination against handicapped infants in violation of § 504, and yet the Secretary has pointed to no evidence that such discrimination occurs. Neither the fact that regulators generally may rely on generic information in a particular field or comparable experience gained in other fields, nor the fact that regulations may be imposed for preventative or prophylactic reasons, can substitute for evidence supporting the Secretary’s own chosen rationale. For the principle of agency accountability recited earlier means that “an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S., at 50 (citations omitted). The need for a proper evidentiary basis for agency action is especially acute in this case because Congress has failed to indicate, either in the statute or in the legislative history, that it envisioned federal superintendence of treatment decisions traditionally entrusted to state governance. “[W]e must assume that the implications and limitations of our federal system constitute a major premise of all congressional legislation, though not repeatedly recited therein.” United States v. Gambling Devices, 346 U. S. 441, 450 (1953) (opinion of Jackson, J.). Congress therefore “will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance,” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971) — or to have authorized its delegates to do so — “unless otherwise the purpose of the Act would be defeated,” FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351 (1941). Although the nondiscrimination mandate of § 504 is cast in language sufficiently broad to suggest that the question is “not one of authority, but of its appropriate exercise[,] [t]he propriety of the exertion of the authority must be tested by its relation to the purpose of the [statutory] grant and with suitable regard to the principle that whenever the federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification of the exercise of the federal power must clearly appear.” Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 211-212 (1931). Accord, Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U. S. 300, 306 (1958). That is, “it must appear that there are findings, supported by evidence, of the essential facts . . . which would justify [the Secretary’s] conclusion.” Florida v. United States, 282 U. S., at 212. The administrative record does not contain the reasoning and evidence that is necessary to sustain federal intervention into a historically state-administered decisional process that appears — for lack of any evidence to the contrary — to be functioning in full compliance with § 504. The history of these regulations exposes the inappropriateness of the extraordinary deference — virtually a carte blanche — requested by the Government. The Secretary’s present reading of § 504 has evolved only after previous, patently erroneous interpretations had been found wanting. The checkered history of these regulations began in 1982, when the Department notified hospitals that they would violate § 504 if they “allow[ed] an infant” to remain in their care after “the infant’s parents or guardian [had withheld consent to] treatment or nourishment discriminatorily.” 47 Fed. Reg. 26027. By the time the Proposed Rules were announced one year later, the Secretary had abandoned that construction. But the Department substituted the equally untenable view that “the basic provision of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing care” was “not an option for medical judgment” and that “[t]he decision to forego medical treatment of a correctable life-threatening defect because an infant also suffers from a permanent irremediable handicap that is not life-threatening, such as mental retardation, is a violation of Section 504,” insinuating by omission that lack of parental consent did not alter the hospital’s obligation to provide corrective surgery. 48 Fed. Reg. 30852, 30847 (1983). Although the preamble to the Final Rules corrects the prior erroneous signals from the Department that § 504 authorizes it to override parental decisions and to save the lives of handicapped infants, it persists in advocating federal regulation on the basis of treatment denials precipitated by refusals of parental consent and on the ground that its experience with the Baby Doe hotline has demonstrated that “the assumption that handicapped infants will receive medically beneficial treatment is not always justified.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1984). This response, together with its previous remarks, makes irresistible the inference that the Department regards its mission as one principally concerned with the quality of medical care for handicapped infants rather than with the implementation of §504. We could not quarrel with a decision by the Department to concentrate its finite compliance resources on instances of life-threatening discrimination rather than instances in which merely elective care has been withheld. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985). But nothing in the statute authorizes the Secretary to dispense with the law’s focus on discrimination and instead to employ federal resources to save the lives of handicapped newborns, without regard to whether they are victims of discrimination by recipients of federal funds or not. Section 504 does not authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning handicapped children. We may assume that the “qualified professionals” employed by the Secretary may make valuable contributions in particular cases, but neither that assumption nor the sincere conviction that an immediate “on-site investigation” is “necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped individual” can enlarge the statutory powers of the Secretary. The administrative record demonstrates that the Secretary has asserted the authority to conduct on-site investigations, to inspect hospital records, and to participate in the decisional process in emergency cases in which there was no colorable basis for believing that a violation of § 504 had occurred or was about to occur. The District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that these investigative actions were not authorized by the statute and that the regulations which purport to authorize a continuation of them are invalid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Chief Justice Burger concurs in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “Handicapped individual” is defined in § 7(7)(B) of the Act, as amended, as “any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.” 92 Stat. 2985, 29 U. S. C. §706(7)(B). Respondents include the Hospital Association of New York State, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and certain individual physicians. Margaret Heckler occupied the position of Secretary throughout the rulemaking period. On December 13, 1985, after certiorari had been granted, Dr. Otis Bowen assumed that position. Despite the fact that Dr. Bowen was not responsible for promulgation of the Final Rules, for the sake of continuity our references assume that he was. For ease of reference we refer to the Secretary, the Department, and HHS interchangeably. In subsection (a) the Department “encourages each recipient health care provider that provides health care services to infants” to establish an “Infant Care Review Committee (ICRC)” to assist in the development of treatment standards for handicapped infants and to provide assistance in making individual treatment decisions. 45 CFR § 84.55(a) (1985). In subsection (f), the Department describes its version of a model ICRC. Subsection (f) also provides that “[t]he activities of the ICRC will be guided by... [t]he interpretative guidelines of the Department.” 45 CFR §84.55(f)(l)(ii)(A) (1985). These guidelines, which are “illustrative” and “do not independently establish rules of conduct,” pt. 84, Appendix C, ¶ (a), set forth the Department’s interpretation of § 504. Although they do not contain any definition of “discrimination,” they do state that § 504 is not applicable to parents and that the regulation applies to only two categories of activities of hospitals: (1) refusals to provide treatment or nourishment to handicapped infants whose parents have consented to, or requested, such treatment; and (2) the failure or refusal to take action to override a parental decision to withhold consent for medically beneficial treatment or nourishment. With respect to the second category, the guidelines state that the hospital may not “solely on the basis of the infant’s present or anticipated future mental or physical impairments, fail to follow applicable procedures on reporting such incidents to the child protective services agency or to seek judicial review.” 45 CFR pt. 84, Appendix C, 1(a)(4) (1985). With respect to the first category, the guidelines do not state that § 504 categorically prohibits a hospital from withholding requested treatment or nourishment “solely on the basis of present or anticipated physical or mental impairments of an infant.” 45 CFR pt. 84, Appendix C, 1(a)(1). Rather, the substantive guidelines and two of the illustrative examples recognize that the etiology of and prognosis for particular handicapping conditions may justify “a refusal to treat solely on the basis of those handicapping conditions.” 1(a)(2) (§504 does not require “futile treatment”); 1(a)(5)(iii) (§504 does not require treatment of anencephaly because it would “do no more than temporarily prolong the act of dying”); 1 (a)(iv) (same with severely premature and low birth weight infants). In general, the guidelines seem to make a hospital’s liability under § 504 dependent on proof that (1) it refused to provide requested treatment or nourishment solely on the basis of an infant’s handicapping condition, and (2) the treatment or nourishment would have been medically beneficial. See 11 (a)(1) — (S), (5). The guidelines also describe how HHS will respond to “complaints of suspected life threatening noncompliance” with § 504 in this context, progressing from telephone inquiries to the hospital to obtain information about the condition of the infant, to requests for access to records, and finally to on-site investigations and litigation in appropriate eases. ¶ (b). The guidelines do not draw any distinction between cases in which parental consent has been withheld and those in which it has been given. Nor do they draw any distinction between cases in which hospitals have made a report of parental refusal to consent to treatment and those in which no report to a state agency has been made. They do announce that the “Department will also seek to coordinate its investigation with any related investigations by the state child protective services agency so as to minimize potential disruption,” ¶ (b)(4), indicating that the Department’s investigations may continue even in cases that have previously been referred to a state agency. At the instance of the local prosecutor, the Indiana courts on April 13 held another hearing at which the court concluded that “Baby Doe” had not been neglected under Indiana’s Child in Need of Services statute. Additional attempts to seek judicial intervention were rebuffed the same day. On the following day, the Indiana Court of Appeals denied a request for an immediate hearing. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Apr. 12, 1982). The Indiana Supreme Court, by a vote of 3 to 1, rejected a petition for a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S 140 (May 27, 1982). The infant died while a stay was being sought in this Court, and we subsequently denied certiorari. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hospital, 464 U. S. 961 (1983). The notice maintained that hospitals would violate §504 if they “allow[ed] [an] infant” to remain in their care after “the infant’s parents or guardian [had withheld consent to] treatment or nourishment discriminatorily.” 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982). The Secretary no longer subscribes to this reading of the statute. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984). In explaining the need for the Proposed Rules, the preamble, although mentioning “parental rights over their children,” insisted that physicians’ “acquiescence in nontreatment of Down’s children is apparently because of the handicap,” rather than, it must be supposed, lack of parental consent. 48 Fed. Reg. 30848 (1983). The effect of parental nonconsent was not even mentioned in the appendix to the Proposed Rules. That section, which set forth the Department’s view of “the manner in which Section 504 applies to the provision of health care services to handicapped infants,” id., at 30851, declared that §504 mandated “the basic provision of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing care.” Id., at 30852. The provision of sustenance, according to the Department, was “not an option for medical judgment.” Ibid. Thus, “[e]ven if a handicapped infant faces imminent and unavoidable death, no health care provider should take upon itself to cause death by starvation or dehydration.” Ibid. In addition to its unqualified endorsement of nourishment as required by § 504, the appendix announced that “[a]ny decision not to correct intestinal atresia in a Down’s Syndrome child, unless an additional complication medically warrants such decision, must be deemed a denial of services based on the handicap of Down’s Syndrome. The same reasoning applies to a case of Down’s Syndrome [infant] with esophogeal atresia, and the denial of surgery to correct atresia.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The Department did not discuss the relevance of parental nonconsent to the hospital’s treatment obligation under § 504, presumably because it was irrelevant given its understanding of the provision at that time. Indeed, although the Government took an appeal from the District Court’s judgment, it filed a motion for summary disposition after the Court of Appeals denied its motion for initial consideration en banc. Its motion expressly acknowledged that an affirmance was compelled by the decision in University Hospital. As the ease comes to us, we have no reason to review the Court of Appeals’ assumption that the provision of health care to infants in hospitals receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments is a part of a “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U. S. 624, 635-686 (1984). See, e. g., Brief in Opposition for Respondents American Medical Assn, et al. 7-8, n. 8; Record, Doc. No. 4, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 12 (“The Final Regulation which is challenged in this action contains four mandatory provisions” (citations omitted)); id., at 28 (“After University Hospital .. . must fall all of the mandatory obligations imposed by the Final Regulation”). Cf. App. 138-140 (complaint of American Medical Association et al.). It is true that the District Court, in addition to declaring “[t]he Final Regulation. . . invalid and unlawful as exceeding” § 504 and enjoining petitioner from “any further implementation of the Final Regulation,” also declared invalid and enjoined “[a]ny other actions” of the Secretary “to regulate treatment involving impaired newborn infants taken under authority of Section 504, including currently pending investigation and other enforcement actions.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. This language must, however, be given a limited construction. The complaints in this case did not challenge the Department’s authority to regulate all treatment decisions, but more precisely the mandatory provisions of the Final Rules and enforcement activity along those lines but undertaken pursuant to the Department’s “general authority” to enforce § 504, as occurred in the University Hospital litigation and in 41 of the 49 full-scale investigations conducted by the Secretary up to that point in time. See App. 138-139 (complaint of American Medical Association et al.); id., at 145 (same); id., at 159 (complaint of American Hospital Association et al.). See also Record, Doc. No. 4, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 10-11. From these pleadings, the Court of Appeals apparently interpreted the District Court’s use of the word “any” to forbid “[a]ny other actions” resembling the “currently pending investigation and other enforcement actions” specified in the injunction, App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a, rather than all possible regulatory and investigative activity that might involve the provision of health care to handicapped infants. Thus, as will become clear from our analysis of the Final Rules below, the injunction forbids continuation or initiation of regulatory and investigative activity directed at instances in which parents have refused consent to treatment and, if the Secretary were to undertake such action, efforts to seek compliance with affirmative requirements imposed on state child protective services agencies. “Because of the rightly serious view courts have traditionally taken of violations of injunctive orders, and because of the severity of punishment which may be imposed for such violation,” Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 439 (1976); see Longshoremen v. Marine Trade Assn., 389 U. S. 64, 76 (1967); Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383, 389 (1970), the Court of Appeals properly construed the District Court’s judgment as pertaining to the regulations challenged in this litigation (and enforcement activity independent of the Final Rules but paralleling the procedures set forth therein). Cf. Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U. S. 473, 477 (1974) (per curiam) (noting desirability of precise construction of injunction orders to facilitate appellate review). It is, of course, the Court of Appeals’ judgment that we are called on to review, not the District Court’s. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 163 U. S. 564, 593 (1896). Cf. Davis v. Packard, 6 Pet. 41, 49 (1832). Accordingly, we give great weight to the Court of Appeals’ construction of the judgment it affirmed. Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 301-302 (1919). For purposes of comparison, the dissent’s expansive reading of the judgment is supported neither by the Court of Appeals nor by the parties. See Brief for Respondents American Medical Assn. et al. 14, 48, n. 60. Cf. Brief for Respondents American Hospital Assn. et al. 4 (quoting final judgment of the District Court). In view of the fact that we affirm this judgment on reasoning narrower than that employed by the lower courts, it bears repetition that this Court “reviews judgments, not opinions.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). See, e. g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297 (1956); J. E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 55, 59 (1940); Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827); McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 603 (1821). See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87, 105-106 (1983); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 285-286 (1974); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U. S. 233, 249 (1972); FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 393 U. S. 71, 72-73 (1968) (per curiam); Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U. S. 608, 613 (1946). The basic pattern of decisionmaking is well summarized in the 1983 report of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research: “The paucity of directly relevant eases makes characterization of the law in this area somewhat problematic, but certain points stand out. First, there is a presumption, strong but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate decisionmakers for their infants. Traditional law concerning the family, buttressed by the emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects a substantial range of discretion for parents. Second, as persons unable to protect themselves, infants fall under the parens patriae power of the state. In the exercise of this authority, the state not only punishes parents whose conduct has amounted to abuse or neglect of their children but may also supervene parental decisions before they become operative to ensure that the choices made are not so detrimental to a child’s interests as to amount to neglect and abuse. . . [A]s long as parents choose from professionally accepted treatment options the choice is rarely reviewed in court and even less frequently supervened. The courts have exercised their authority to appoint a guardian for a child when the parents are not capable of participating in the decisionmaking or when they have made decisions that evidence substantial lack of concern for the child’s interests. Although societal involvement usually occurs under the auspices of governmental instrumentalities — such as child welfare agencies and courts — the American legal system ordinarily relies upon the private initiative of individuals, rather than continuing governmental supervision, to bring the matter to the attention of legal authorities.” Report, at 212-214 (footnotes omitted). This summary accords with the Secretary’s understanding of the state-law framework, at least in other contexts. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14880 (1986) (final rule implementing Child Abuse Amendments of 1984) (“The decision to provide or withhold medically indicated treatment is, except in highly unusual circumstances, made by the parents or legal guardian”). Rather than address these issues, Justice White’s dissent would remand to the Court of Appeals. See post, at 656. In light of its willingness to address the broader hypothetical question whether § 504 ever authorizes regulation of medical treatment decisions — “even if the judgment below were limited to invalidation of these regulations,” post, at 650, n. 4 — it comes as something of a surprise to read the references to the Solicitor General’s argument that “this claim in its current form is not properly in the case,” post, at 657, n. 9. The procedural objections are plainly without substance. Respondents AMA et al. raised the lack of factual support in their brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. See Brief in Opposition for Respondents American Medical Assn, et al. 20 (“First, the fundamental problem with the Secretary’s position is that it is based on a situation that has not occurred — and will not occur — in real life. . . . Not surprisingly, the Secretary cites no case where [his hypothetical problem] has occurred”); id., at 20-21; id., at 26 (“B. The Secretary Has Shown No Problem With the Historic State Law Framework That Warrants Direct Federal Investigation and Regulation”); id., at 26-29. The Solicitor General, although responding that such evidence exists, see Reply Memorandum for Petitioner 9, did not raise a procedural bar. As a result, the objection is waived. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 815-816 (1985). Although further discussion of this objection is therefore unnecessary, the dissent is also wrong in suggesting that respondents’ complaints did not raise “the lack of a factual basis involving situations in which parents have consented to treatment.” Post, at 657, n. 9. In fact, the complaint of respondents AMA et al. alleged “COUNT II: Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act,” App. 146, and incorporated by reference the allegation that “None of the mandatory provisions of the Final Regulation have a basis in fact or are designed to meet a documented problem,” id., at 140. Accord, id., at 158 (complaint of respondents AHA et al.). The fact that our decision rests on grounds narrower than that relied on by the lower courts is surely not an infirmity. We can only add that the lack of factual support for these regulations was fully briefed in this Court, see especially Brief for Respondents American Medical Assn, et al. 39-41; Brief for Respondents American Hospital Assn, et al. 48-49, and the fact that the Solicitor General responds with so little, so late bespeaks the absence of evidentiary support for the regulations, not an inadequate opportunity to direct us to it. The Solicitor General also contends, for the first time in his reply brief on the merits, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 16, n. 6, that the Final Rules are “interpretative guidelines” which “merely explained the Secretary’s construction of Section 504 in this setting,” ibid. This assertion was rejected the only occasion on which it was tendered, see American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (DC 1983), is belied by the Secretary’s own decision to provide notice and request comment on the regulations, cf. 5 U. S. C. § 553(b), and is patently without merit. To its credit, the dissent does not ultimately rely on either of these arguments. See post, at 657, n. 9. Just as “[t]he failure of the hospital to itself provide the treatment” because of the unavailability of medical equipment or expertise would not be “on the basis of the handicap” but “on the fact that the hospital is incapable of providing the treatment,” according to the Secretary’s regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 1637 (1984), it is equally clear that a refusal to provide care because of the absence of parental consent would not be “solely by reason of [the infant’s] handicap.” The Secretary’s summary of this case makes it clear that the hospital’s failure to perform surgery was based on the parents’ refusal of consent: “Bloomington, Indiana. Investigation into April 1982, death of infant with Down’s syndrome and esophageal atresia from whom surgery was withheld on the instructions of the parents.” Id., at 1646 (emphasis added). As recounted earlier, the hospital initiated judicial review to override the parents’ decision, but its efforts proved unavailing. The Solicitor General now acknowledges that there was no basis for finding a violation of § 504 in this case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. Notwithstanding that the Secretary’s summary of this ease demonstrates both that treatment was withheld because of refusal of parental consent and that state-court proceedings to override the parents’ decision had been instituted before the Department intervened, the Department proceeded with its own investigation anyway: “Long Island, New York. October 19, 1983, complaint, based on newspaper article, that infant with spina bifida not receiving surgery due to refusal of parents to consent; legal proceedings ha[d] been initiated in State court. Inquiry initiated October 19. On October 27, HHS asked Department of Justice to commence legal action to overcome refusal of hospital to permit review of pertinent records.” 49 Fed. Reg. 1649 (1984) (emphasis added). The Secretary first cited a 1973 survey by Raymond Duff and A. G. M. Campbell calculating that 14% of deaths in the special nursery of the Yale-New Haven hospital “were related to withholding treatment.” 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983). The Secretary’s solitary quotation from this study, accurately illustrating the locus of the treatment decisions reviewed by the authors, involved refusal of parental consent: “ ‘An infant with Down’s syndrome and intestinal atresia, like the much publicized one at Johns Hopkins Hospital, was not treated because his parents thought the surgery was wrong for their baby and themselves. He died several days after birth.’” Ibid, (emphasis added) (quoting Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 New Eng. J. Med. 890, 891 (1973)). The Secretary next referred to an incident at Johns Hopkins Hospital which, as the above quotation intimates, also concerned parental refusal of consent. Then followed brief mention of the “Bloomington Baby Doe” incident, in which the parents, as the Secretary now admits, refused consent to treatment despite the hospital’s insistence that it be provided. The Secretary’s fourth and final example involved “a 1979 death of an infant with Down’s syndrome and an intestinal obstruction at the KapiolaniChildren’s Medical Center in Honolulu, Hawaii,” 48 Fed. Reg. 30847 (1983), which again appears to have resulted from “a lack of parental consent,” id., at 30848. Generalizing from these examples, the Secretary reported the results of a survey of physician attitudes. He faulted “[t]heir acquiescence in non-treatment of Down’s children” which he surmised was “apparently because of the handicap represented by Down’s syndrome.” Ibid. See n. 22, infra. The Secretary also reprinted selected quotations from various commenters reporting the existence of “discriminatory” decisions denying sustenance and care to handicapped infants. None of these comments disclosed whether those “discriminatory” decisions were made by parents or by hospitals. The Secretary’s repeated inability to identify a single treatment decision in violation of § 504 lends an aura of unreality to Justice White’s criticism of the Court of Appeals’ decision in University Hospital. In explaining why he believes “the stated basis for the Court of Appeals’ holding in University Hospital was incorrect,” post, at 656; see post, at 655, n. 8, Justice White completely ignores the fact that the case involved a specific treatment decision made by parents. Since Justice White elsewhere agrees that parental decisions are not covered by § 504, post, at 657, n. 10, and that the infant involved in the University Hospital case was therefore not “otherwise qualified” for treatment, post, at 654, n. 7, he implicitly acknowledges that the judgment in University Hospital is correct; only by ignoring the actual facts of that case — as well as the actual facts of the 49 cases that were investigated by the Secretary — and speculating about nonexistent hypothetical cases in which a hospital might refuse to provide treatment requested by parents, does the dissent offer any basis for questioning the decision in University Hospital. Indeed, even the dissent’s criticism of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals’ decision is based on a hypothetical situation that the Court of Appeals did not address. That court was concerned with the treatment of cases in which “the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated,” 729 F. 2d, at 157 (emphasis added); see id., at 147, whereas Justice White has carefully limited his hypothetical discussion to cases in which “the treatment is completely unrelated to the baby’s handicapping condition.” Post, at 655 (emphasis added). Thus, like bishops of opposite colors, the opinions of Justice White and the Court of Appeals do not even touch one another. The preamble repeatedly makes the assumption that evidence showing the need for governmental involvement provides a basis for federal involvement. See, e. g., 49 Fed. Reg. 1649 (1984). Justice White’s dissent suggests that regulation of health care providers can be justified on a theory the Secretary did not advance — a supposed need to curtail discriminatory advice by biased physicians. See post, at 658-661. After observing that at least some handicapped infants have not been treated, the dissent identifies physician attitudes as a likely explanation and concludes that mandated informational notices were presumably designed to “foste[r] an awareness by health care professionals of their responsibility not to act in a discriminatory manner with respect to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants.” Post, at 660. The dissent’s theory finds no support in the text of the regulation, the reasoning of the Secretary, or the briefs filed on his behalf in this Court. The regulations in general — and the informational notices in particular — do not purport to place any constraints on the advice that physicians may give their patients. Moreover, since it is now clear that parental decisionmaking is not covered by § 504, supra, at 630-631, the dissent’s theory rests on the unstated premise that the statute may prevent the giving of advice to do something which § 504 does not itself prohibit. It is hardly obvious that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits physicians from “aiding and abetting” a parental decision which parents admittedly have a right to make. And if Congress did intend this counterintuitive result, one might expect an explanation from the Secretary as to how the hotlines and emergency on-site inspections contemplated by the Final Rules square with the constitutional doctrines on regulation, direct or indirect, of speech in general and of decisionmaking by health professionals in particular. In reality, the Secretary neither found nor implied that physicians’ predispositions against treating handicapped infants had resulted in parental refusals to consent to treatment. Indeed, he principally relied on attitudinal surveys for the converse proposition that regulation is necessary because parents refuse consent to treatment and physicians will “acquiesce in parental refus[als] to treat.” 48 Fed. Reg. 30848 (1983). To the extent any theory may be discerned in the Secretary’s two-column summary of physician surveys, it is that doctors would not correct “bad” parental decisions, not that they were responsible for helping them to make such choices in the first place. Moreover, even if the Secretary had relied on this evidence to insinuate that doctors imposed their own value judgments on parents by lobbying them to refuse consent, he never explains that the parental decisionmaking process is one in which doctors exercise the decisive influence needed to force such results. Compare ibid., with post, at 658-659. The Secretary, in short, has not even adumbrated a theory of “discrimination” remotely resembling the one invented by the dissent, and therefore has not made the essential connection between the evidence of physician attitudes and the regulatory choice made here. Of course, § 504 would be violated only if the hospital failed to report medical neglect of a handicapped infant when it would report such neglect of a similarly situated nonhandicapped infant. Because respondents have challenged the Secretary’s regulations on their face, we have no occasion to address the question whether infants with birth defects are similarly situated with infants in need of blood transfusions (the paradigm case in which hospitals have reported or have sought to override parental decisions, according to the Solicitor General, Brief for Petitioner 28, and n. 16), or whether a hospital could legitimately distinguish between the two situations on the basis of the different risks and benefits inhering in certain operations to correct birth defects, on the one hand, and blood transfusions, on the other hand. To the contrary, the Secretary’s case summaries reveal numerous instances in which hospitals have voluntarily reported instances of suspected medical neglect and have even initiated legal proceedings themselves. In the Bloomington, Indiana, case which prompted these regulations, and in the University Hospital ease which supported the summary affirmance now before us, the parents’ decision was the subject of judicial review in the state courts. In the Robinson, Illinois, case on which the Secretary relies as one of three examples illustrating the need for federal regulation, the hospital reported the parents’ refusal to consent to state authorities who arranged for surgery and adoption. 49 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1984). Most dramatically, in the Daytona Beach, Florida, case HHS received its hotline complaint the day after the state agency had already obtained a court order overriding the parents’ refusal to consent to surgery. Id., at 1648. Notwithstanding the Department’s “immediate contact” with the hospital and the state agency — which surely must have made it clear that the case had already been reported to that agency and that there was no colorable basis for suspecting a violation of § 504 — the Department conducted an on-site investigation. Ibid. In the third case on which the Secretary placed special emphasis, the Department intervened before the parents had decided whether to authorize treatment or not, so that no reporting obligation could have been triggered. Ibid. The interpretative guidelines appended to the Final Rules do impose on hospitals and other health care providers the duty not to discriminate against handicapped infants in reporting instances of parental neglect. We do not address the question whether reporting, either as a hospital practice or as a requirement of state law, constitutes a “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” under §504. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U. S., at 635-636. Cf. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 570-574 (1984). Justice White’s dissent, quoting the Secretary’s explanation for these requirements, concludes that they form, in “substance,” a nondiscrimination requirement. Post, at 663. This assertion is repetitive, not responsive. The rules governing state child protective services agencies operate independently of any provisions of state law; they go further than them in several respects; they flatly contradict them in others (e. g., confidentiality); and they do not accommodate the revision, modification, or repeal of state laws. To say that the Secretary can give detailed marching orders to state agencies upon discovering that both the agencies and HHS are working toward the same general objective — at least when defined with sufficient abstractness — would countenance a novel and serious intrusion on state autonomy. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S., at 410 (language and structure of 1973 Rehabilitation Act recognizes “the distinction between . . . evenhanded treatment. . . and affirmative efforts”). The Secretary notes that “by enacting section 504 Congress intended to eliminate all of the ‘many forms of potential discrimination’ against handicapped people through ‘the establishment of a broad governmental policy.’ S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974).” 49 Fed. Reg. 1636 (1984). But no matter how broad the prohibition contained in § 504 may be, what it prohibits is discrimination. Important principles of federalism are implicated by any “federal program that compels state agencies ... to function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 783 (1982) (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Twenty-seven agencies, including the National Endowment for the Arts, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, have promulgated regulations forbidding discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued a proposed rulemaking. See Jones & Wolfe, Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: A Brief History and Present Status 8-9 (Congressional Research Service, Feb. 28, 1986). There is thus not the same basis for deference predicated on expertise as we found with respect to the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S., at 842-845, and with respect to the Federal Reserve Board’s construction of the Bank Holding Act in Board of Governors, FRS v. Investment Company Inst., 450 U. S. 46, 56, and n. 21 (1981). Accord, American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 539 (1981); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 540 (1947) (“The underlying assumptions of our dual form of government, and the consequent presuppositions of legislative draftsmanship which are expressive of our history and habits, cut across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation”). Cf. Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 409 U. S. 275, 281-282 (1972) (“ ‘[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the Federal-State balance.’” (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 349); Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 152 (1944) (“Where Congress has not clearly indicated a purpose to precipitate conflict [between federal agencies and state authority] we should be reluctant to do so by decision” (footnote omitted)); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U. S. 261, 275 (1943) (“An unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the light of its history, remains ambiguous”); FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U. S., at 354-355 (“The construction of § 5 [of the Federal Trade Commission Act] urged by the Commission would thus give a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law. ... An inroad upon local conditions and local standards of such far-reaching import as is involved here, ought to await a clearer mandate from Congress”); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 513 (1940) (“The maintenance in our federal system of a proper distribution between state and national governments of police authority and of remedies private and public for public wrongs is of far-reaching importance. An intention to disturb the balance is not lightly to be imputed to Congress”); United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d 310, 313-316 (CA7 1971); 3 C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §62.01, p. 64 (4th ed. 1974) (“[T]he rule of strict construction [of statutes in derogation of sovereignty] serves a quasi-constitutional purpose in our federal system of split sovereignty by helping to secure both levels of sovereign power against encroachment by each other” (footnote omitted)). The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act does not support the notion that Congress intended intervention by federal officials into treatment decisions traditionally left by state law to concerned parents and the attending physicians or, in exceptional eases, to state agencies charged with protecting the welfare of the infant. As the Court of Appeals noted, there is nothing in the legislative history that even remotely suggests that Congress contemplated the possibility that “section 504 could or would be applied to treatment decisions, involving defective newborn infants.” 729 F. 2d 144, 159 (1984). “ ‘As far as can be determined, no congressional committee or member of the House or Senate ever even suggested that section 504 would be used to monitor medical treatment of defective newborn infants or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of life. No medical group appeared alert to the intrusion into medical practice which some doctors apprehend from such an undertaking, nor were representatives of parents or spokesmen for religious beliefs that would be affected heard.’” Id., at 158 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp., at 401). The fact that the agency’s interpretation “has been neither consistent nor longstanding . . . substantially diminishes the deference to be given to HEW’s [now HHS’s] present interpretation of the statute.” Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S., at 412, n. 11 (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976)).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION et al. No. 89-333. Argued March 20, 1990 Decided May 21, 1990 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Roderick E. Walston, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, R. H. Connett, Assistant Attorney General, and Clifford T. Lee, Deputy Attorney General. Stephen L. Nightingale argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Jerome M. Feit, Joseph S. Davies, and Raymond E. Hagenlock. Louis Touton and Erwin N. Griswold filed a brief for respondent Rock Creek Limited Partnership. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Idaho et al. by Jim Jones, Attorney General, and Clive J. Strong, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Douglas B. Baily of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Steve Clark of Arkansas, Duane Woodard of Colorado, Clarine Nardi Riddle of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Robert A. Buttenvorth of Florida, Michael J. Boioers of Georgia, Warren Price III of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Frederic J. Cowan of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, James M. Shannon of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Marc Racicot of Montana, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Brian McKay of Nevada, John P. Arnold of New Hampshire, Peter N. Perretti, Jr., of New Jersey, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Robert Abrams of New York, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Nicholas Spaeth of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Robert H. Henry of Oklahoma, Have Frohnmayer of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, James E. O’Neil of Rhode Island, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jim Mattox of Texas, Paul Van Dam of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Teiry of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Roger Tompkins of West Virginia, Donald J. Hanaivay of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; for American Rivers et al. by Steven W. Weston; and for the Council of State Governments et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Richard J. Lazarus. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the City of Klamath Falls, Oregon, by Edward Weinberg and Richmond F. Allan; for the Edison Electric Institute et al. by Jerome C. Muys, Peter Kelsey, Robert L. McCarty, Wallace F. Tillman, and William J. Madden; for the Modesto Irrigation District et al. by Joel S. Moskowitz and Gregory J. Kerivin; for Pacific Gas and Electric Company et al. by Jack F. Fallin, Jr., Howard V. Golub, Thomas H. Nelson, and Jody L. Williams; and for Pacific Northwest Utilities by Jay T. Waldron. Antonio Cosby-Rossmann filed a brief for the County of Inyo et al. as amici curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns overlapping federal and state regulation of a hydroelectric project located near a California stream. California seeks to ensure that the project’s operators maintain water flowing in the stream sufficient, in the State’s judgment, to protect the stream’s fish. The Federal Government claims the exclusive authority to set the minimum stream flows that the federally licensed powerplant must maintain. Each side argues that its position is consistent with the Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §791a et seq. (1982 ed.), and, in particular, with §27 of that Act. We granted certiorari to resolve these competing claims. I The Rock Creek hydroelectric project lies near the confluence of the South Fork American River and one of the river’s tributaries, Rock Creek. Rock Creek runs through federally managed land located within California. The project draws water from Rock Creek to drive its generators and then releases the water near the confluence of the stream and river, slightly less than one mile from where it is drawn. The state and federal requirements at issue govern the “minimum flow rate” of water that must remain in the bypassed section of the stream and that thus remains unavailable to drive the generators. In 1983, pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA or Act), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license authorizing the operation of the Rock Creek project. Keating, 23 FERC ¶ 62,137. Section 4(e) of the FPA empowers FERC to issue licenses for projects “necessary or convenient... for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams . . . over which Congress has jurisdiction.” 16 U. S. C. § 797(e) (1982 ed.). Section 10(a) of the Act also authorizes FERC to issue licenses subject to the conditions that FERC deems best suited for power development and other public uses of the waters. 16 U. S. C. §803(a) (1982 ed.). Congress’ subsequent amendments to those provisions expressly direct that FERC consider a project’s effect on fish and wildlife as well as “power and development purposes.” Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243, 16 U. S. C. §§ 797(e), 803(a)(1). FERC issued the 1983 license and set minimum flow rates after considering the project’s economic feasibility and environmental consequences. In part to protect trout in the stream, the license required that the project maintain interim minimum flow rates of 11 cubic feet per second (cfs) during May through September and 15 cfs during the remainder of the year. 23 FERC ¶ 62,137, at 63,204. The license also required the licensee to submit studies recommending a permanent minimum flow rate, after consulting with federal and state fish and wildlife protection agencies. Ibid. In 1985, the licensee submitted a report recommending that FERC adopt the interim flow rates as permanent rates. The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) recommended that FERC require significantly higher minimum flow rates. The licensee had also applied for state water permits, and in 1984 the State Water Resources Control Board (WRCB) issued a permit that conformed to FERC’s interim minimum flow requirements but reserved the right to set different permanent minimum flow rates. App. 65-67. When the WRCB in 1987 considered a draft order requiring permanent minimum flow rates of 60 cfs from March through June and 30 cfs during the remainder of the year, the licensee petitioned FERC for a declaration that FERC possessed exclusive jurisdiction to determine the project’s minimum flow requirements. Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 38 FERC ¶ 61,240, p. 61,772 (1987). The licensee, by then respondent Rock Creek Limited Partnership, also claimed that the higher minimum flow rates sought by the WRCB would render the project economically infeasible. Ibid. In March 1987, FERC issued an order directing the licensee to comply with the minimum flow requirements of the federal permit. In that order, FERC concluded that the task of setting minimum flows rested within its exclusive jurisdiction. Id., at 61,774. The Commission reasoned that setting minimum flow requirements was integral to its planning and licensing process under FPA § 10(a); giving effect to competing state requirements “would interfere with the Commission’s balancing of competing considerations in licensing” and would vest in States a veto power over federal projects inconsistent with the FPA, as interpreted in First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152 (1946). 38 FERC, at 61,773. FERC also directed an Administrative Law Judge to hold a hearing to determine the appropriate permanent minimum flow rates for the project. Id., at 61,774. After considering proposals and arguments of the licensee, the CDFG, and FERC staff, the Administrative Law Judge set the minimum flow rate for the project at 20 cfs during the entire year. Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC ¶ 63,019 (1987). Four days after FERC’s declaratory order, the WRCB issued an order directing the licensee to comply with the higher minimum flow requirements contained in its draft order. App. 73. The WRCB also intervened to seek a rehearing of FERC’s order. FERC denied the rehearing request, concluded that the State sought to impose conflicting license requirements, and reaffirmed its conclusion that the FPA, as interpreted in First Iowa, provided FERC with exclusive jurisdiction to determine minimum flow rates. Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC ¶ 61,198 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed FERC’s order denying rehearing. California ex rel. State Water Resources Board v. FERC, 877 F. 2d 743 (1989). That court, too, concluded that First Iowa governed the case; that FPA §27 as construed in First Iowa did not preserve California’s right to regulate minimum flow rates; and that the FPA pre-empted WRCB’s minimum flow rate requirements. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 991 (1989), and we now affirm. II In the Federal Power Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 863, Congress clearly intended a broad federal role in the development and licensing of hydroelectric power. That broad delegation of power to the predecessor of FERC, however, hardly determines the extent to which Congress intended to have the Federal Government exercise exclusive powers, or intended to pre-empt concurrent state regulation of matters affecting federally licensed hydroelectric projects. The parties’ dispute regarding the latter issue turns principally on the meaning of § 27 of the FPA, which provides the clearest indication of how Congress intended to allocate the regulatory authority-of the States and the Federal Government. That section provides: “Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.” 16 U. S. C. §821 (1982 ed.). Were this a case of first impression, petitioner’s argument based on the statute’s language could be said to present a close question. As petitioner argues, California’s minimum stream flow requirement might plausibly be thought to “re-latte] to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used . . . for. . . other uses,” namely the generation of power or the protection of fish. This interpretation would accord with the “presumption against finding pre-emption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the States” and “ ‘with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 101 (1989), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); see California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645, 653-663 (1978) (tracing States’ traditional powers over exploitation of water). Just as courts may not find state measures pre-empted in the absence of clear evidence that Congress so intended, so must they give full effect to evidence that Congress considered, and sought to preserve, the States’ coordinate regulatory role in our federal scheme. But the meaning of §27 and the pre-emptive effect of the FPA are not matters of first impression. Forty-four years ago, this Court in First Iowa construed the section and provided the understanding of the FPA that has since guided the allocation of state and federal regulatory authority over hydroelectric projects. The Court interpreted § 27 as follows: “The effect of § 27, in protecting state laws from supersedure, is limited to laws as to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water in irrigation or for municipal or other uses of the same nature. It therefore has primary, if not exclusive, reference to such proprietary rights. The phrase ‘any vested right acquired therein’ further emphasizes the application of the section to property rights. There is nothing in the paragraph to suggest a broader scope unless it be the words ‘other uses.’ Those words, however, are confined to rights of the same nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.” First Iowa, 328 U. S., at 175-176 (emphasis added). The Court interpreted § 27’s reservation of limited powers to the States as part of the congressional scheme to divide state from federal jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects and, “in those fields where rights are not thus ‘saved’ to the States ... to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural course.” Id., at 176. We decline at this late date to revisit and disturb the understanding of §27 set forth in First Iowa. As petitioner prudently concedes, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, First Iowa’s interpretation of § 27 does not encompass the California regulation at issue: California’s minimum stream flow requirements neither reflect nor establish “proprietary rights” or “rights of the same nature as those relating to the use of water in irrigation or for municipal purposes.” First Iowa, supra, at 176; see Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979); accord, California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979). Instead, petitioner requests that we repudiate First Iowa’s interpretation of § 27 and the FPA. This argument misconceives the deference this Court must accord to longstanding and well-entrenched decisions, especially those interpreting statutes that underlie complex regulatory regimes. Adherence to precedent is, in the usual case, a cardinal and guiding principle of adjudication, and “[considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172-173 (1989). There has been no sufficient intervening change in the law, or indication that First Iowa has proved unworkable or has fostered confusion and inconsistency in the law, that warrants our departure from established precedent. Cf. id., at 173. This Court has endorsed and applied First Iowa’s limited reading of §27, see FPC v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435 (1955); cf. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U. S. 239 (1954), and has employed the decision with approval in a range of decisions, both addressing the FPA and in other contexts. See, e. g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331, 338, n. 6 (1982); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U. S. 765, 773 (1984); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U. S. 320, 334 (1958); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm’n, 461 U. S. 190, 223, n. 34 (1983). By directing FERC to consider the recommendations of state wildlife and other regulatory agencies while providing FERC with final authority to establish license conditions (including those with terms inconsistent with the States’ recommendations), Congress has amended the FPA to elaborate and reaffirm First Iowa’s understanding that the FPA establishes a broad and paramount federal regulatory role. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 803(a)(l)-(3) (FERC to issue license on conditions that protect fish and wildlife, after considering recommendations of state agencies), as amended by the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, 16 U. S. C. §§803(j) (1) — (2) (FERC license conditions protecting fish and wildlife to be based on recommendations of federal and state wildlife agencies, with FERC to issue findings if it adopts conditions contrary to recommendations); cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409, 424 (1986) (“We are especially reluctant to reject this presumption [of adherence to precedent] in an area that has seen careful, intense, and sustained congressional attention”). Petitioner asks this Court fundamentally to restructure a highly complex and long-enduring regulatory regime, implicating considerable reliance interests of licensees and other participants in the regulatory process. That departure would be inconsistent with the measured and considered change that marks appropriate adjudication of such statutory issues. See Square D Co., supra, at 424 (for statutory determinations, “‘it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true, even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation,’” quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Petitioner also argues that we should disregard First Iowa’s discussion of § 27 because it was merely dictum. It is true that our immediate concern in First Iowa was the interpretation of § 9(b) of the FPA, which governs submission to the federal licensing agency of evidence of compliance with state law. The Court determined that § 9(b) did not require licensees to obtain a state permit or to demonstrate compliance with the state law prerequisites to obtaining such a permit. First Iowa, 328 U. S., at 163-164, 167, 177. Instead, the Court construed the section merely as authorizing the federal agency to require evidence of actions consistent with the federal permit. Id., at 167-169, 177-179. First Iowa’s limited reading of § 27 was, however, necessary for, and integral to, that conclusion. Like this case, First Iowa involved a state permit requirement that related to the control of water for particular uses but that did not relate to or establish proprietary rights. Iowa had required as one condition of securing a state permit that diverted water be “returned ... at the nearest practicable place without being materially diminished in quantity or polluted or rendered deleterious to fish life,” Iowa Code §7771 (1939), a provision the Court found to conflict with the federal requirements and to “strik[e] at the heart of the present project.” First Iowa, 328 U. S., at 166-167, 170-171. The Court reasoned that, absent an express congressional command, § 9(b) could not be read to require compliance with, and thus to preserve, state laws that conflicted with and were otherwise pre-empted by the federal requirements. See id., at 166-167 (“If a state permit is not required, there is no justification for requiring the petitioner, as a condition of securing its federal permit, to present evidence of the petitioner’s compliance with the requirements of the State Code for a state permit”); id., at 177. Only the Court’s narrow reading of § 27 allowed it to sustain this interpretation of § 9(b). Had § 27 been given the broader meaning that Iowa sought, it would have “saved” the state requirements at issue, made the state permit one that could be issued, and supported the interpretation of § 9(b) as requiring evidence of compliance with those state requirements, rather than compliance only with those requirements consistent with the federal license. The Court’s related, but more general, rationale for its reading of § 9(b) in First Iowa also necessarily rested on its narrow construction of § 27. The Court framed the issue as whether the Act allowed the States to regulate through permit requirements such as Iowa’s “the very requirements of the project that Congress has placed in the discretion of the Federal Power Commission.” Id., at 165 (footnote citing FPA § 10(a) omitted). The Court rejected the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction and interpreted the FPA as mandating divided powers and “a dual system involving the close integration of these powers rather than a dual system of futile duplication of two authorities over the same subject matter.” Id., at 171; see id., at 174 (no “divided authority over any one subject”); id., at 181 (comprehensive federal role “leave[s] no room or need for conflicting state controls”). Section 9 reflected the operation of this exclusive federal authority. See id., at 167-169; id., at 168 (“Where the Federal Government supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that the two agencies both shall have final authority”). In accord with this view, the Court interpreted § 9(b) as requiring compliance only with state measures relevant to federal requirements rather than, as would exist under a system of concurrent jurisdiction, compliance with the state requirements necessary to secure the state permit. Id., at 167-169. Instead, only §27 preserved and defined the States’exclusive regulatory sphere. Id., at 175-178. That is, the Court rejected an interpretation of §9(b) that would have “saved” or accommodated the state permit system and its underlying requirements. To reach its interpretation of § 9(b), however, the Court had to interpret § 27 consistently with the limited state regulatory sphere and in a manner that did not, by “saving” the Iowa requirements, establish “divided authority over any one subject.” Id., at 174. Constricting § 27 to encompass only laws relating to proprietary rights, and thus leaving the permit requirements at issue to the federal sphere, accomplished that goal. The Court’s discussion immediately after its extended discussion of § 27 illustrates the relation between the sections. Before distinguishing §27’s role in saving state law from §9(b)’s role in the sphere of exclusive federal regulation, the Court concluded: “[Section 27] is therefore thoroughly consistent with the integration rather than the duplication of federal and state jurisdictions under the Federal Power Act. It strengthens the argument that, in those fields where rights are not thus “saved” to the States, Congress is willing to let the supersedure of the state laws by federal legislation take its natural course.” Id., at 176. The Court’s interpretation of § 9(b), of course, rested on that supersedure and required that the remaining field “saved” to the States by § 27 be limited correspondingly. Petitioner also argues that our decision in California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645 (1978), construing § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, requires that we abandon First Iowa’s interpretation of § 27 and the FPA. Petitioner reasons that § 8 is similar to, and served as a model for, FPA § 27, that this Court in California v. United States interpreted § 8 in a manner inconsistent with First Iowa’s reading of § 27, and that that reading of § 8, subsequent to First Iowa, in some manner overrules or repudiates First Iowa’s understanding of §27. California v. United States is cast in broad terms and embodies a conception of the States’ regulatory powers in some tension with that set forth in First Iowa, but that decision bears quite indirectly, at best, upon interpretation of the FPA. The Court in California v. United States interpreted the Reclamation Act of 1902; it did not advert to, or purport to interpret, the FPA, and held simply that § 8 requires the Secretary of the Interior to comply with state laws, not inconsistent with congressional directives, governing use of water employed in federal reclamation projects. California v. United States, supra. Also, as in First Iowa, the Court in California v. United States examined the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the entire statute before it and employed those sources to construe the statute’s saving clause. See 438 U. S., at 649-651, 653-670, 674-675. Those sources indicate, of course, that the FPA envisioned a considerably broader and more active federal oversight role in hydropower development than did the Reclamation Act. Compare FPA §§4, 9, 10, as codified, 16 U. S. C. §§797, 802, 803, and First Iowa, 328 U. S., at 164, 167-169, 171-174, 179-181, with Reclamation Act of 1902 §§ 1, 2, 32 Stat. 388, as codified, 43 U. S. C. §§391, 411 (1982 ed.), and California v. United States, supra, at 649-651, 663-670. Even if the two saving clauses were properly viewed in isolation from the remainder of their respective Acts and resulting regulatory schemes, significant differences exist between them. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, after referring to state water laws relating to water used in irrigation and preserved by the Act, contains an explicit direction that “the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such [state] laws.” 43 U. S. C. §383 (1982 ed.). This language has no counterpart in § 27 of the FPA and was crucial to the Court’s interpretation of §8. See California v. United States, supra, at 650, 664-665, 674-675. Although California v. United States and First Iowa accord different effect to laws relating to water uses, this difference stems in part from the different roles assumed by the federal actor in each case, as reflected in § 8’s explicit directive to the Secretary. The Secretary in executing a particular reclamation project is in a position analogous to a licensee under the FPA and need not comply with state laws conflicting with congressional directives respecting particular reclamation projects, see 438 U. S., at 672-674; similarly, a federal licensee under the FPA need not comply with state requirements that conflict with the federal license provisions established pursuant to the FPA’s directives. An additional textual difference is that § 8 refers only to “water used in irrigation” and contains no counterpart to §27’s reference to “other uses,” the provision essential to petitioner’s argument. Laws controlling water used in irrigation relate to proprietary rights, as the First Iowa Court indicated, 328 U. S., at 176, and n. 20, and § 8 does not indicate the appropriate treatment of laws relating to other water uses that do not implicate proprietary rights. Given these differences between the statutes and saving provisions, it should come as no surprise that California v. United States did not refer either to §27 or to First Iowa. Since the Court decided California v. United States, we have continued to cite First Iowa with approval. See, e. g., Escondido Mut. Water Co., 466 U. S., at 773; Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 461 U. S., at 223, n. 34; New England Power Co., 455 U. S., at 338, n. 6. We do not believe that California v. United States requires that we disavow First Iowa in this case. Finally, petitioner argues that §27’s legislative history requires us to abandon First Iowa’s interpretation of that section. Whatever the usefulness of legislative history for statutory interpretation in the usual case, that source provides petitioner with no aid. If a quite natural reading of the statutory language fails to displace an intervening decision providing a contrary interpretation, legislative history supporting that reading and by definition before the Court that has already construed the statute provides little additional reason to overturn the decision. Cf. Patterson, 491 U. S., at 172-174 (reviewing sources most likely to prompt overruling of decision). Indeed, First Iowa expressly considered the legislative history of the FPA and of § 27 in particular and found that source to support its interpretation of both. First Iowa, supra, at 171-174, 176, n. 20, 179. Given the tangential relation of the legislative history to the issue at hand and the interests supporting adherence to First Iowa, we decline to parse again the legislative history to determine whether the Court in First Iowa erred in its understanding of the development, as well as the meaning, of the statute. Adhering to First Iowa’s interpretation of §27, we conclude that the California requirements for minimum in-stream flows cannot be given effect and allowed to supplement the federal flow requirements. A state measure is “pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984) (citations omitted). As Congress directed in FPA § 10(a), FERC set the conditions of the license, including the minimum stream flow, after considering which requirements would best protect wildlife and ensure that the project would be economically feasible, and thus further power development. See Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC ¶ 63,019 (1987); Keating, 23 FERC ¶ 62,137 (1983); see also Rock Creek Limited Partnership, 41 FERC ¶61,198 (1987). Allowing California to impose significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements would disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in that considered federal agency determination. FERC has indicated that the California requirements interfere with its comprehensive planning authority, and we agree that allowing California to impose the challenged requirements would be contrary to congressional intent regarding the Commission’s licensing authority and would “constitute a veto of the project that was approved and licensed by FERC.” 877 F. 2d, at 749; cf. First Iowa, supra, at 164-165. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Affirmed. Section 9(b), 16 U. S. C. §802(a)(2) (formerly 16 U. S. C. §802(b) (1982 ed.)), provides: “(a) Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall submit to the commission— “(2) Satisfactory evidence that the applicant has complied with the requirements of the laws of the State or States within which the proposed project is to be located with respect to bed and banks and to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes and with respect to the right to engage in the business of developing, transmitting and distributing power, and in any other business necessary to effect the purposes of a license under this chapter.” Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, now 43 U. S. C. §§ 372, 383 (1982 ed.), provided in part: “[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof . . .

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

La CROSSE TELEPHONE CORP. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al. NO. 38. Argued November 18-19, 1948. Decided January 17, 1949. Thomas H. Skemp argued the cause for appellant in No. 38. With him on the brief was Quincy H. Hale. Louis Sherman argued the cause for appellant in No. 39. With him on the brief was Philip B. Collins. Beatrice Lampert, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Grover L. Broadfoot, Attorney General, and Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General. John E. Martin, then Attorney General, was on a statement opposing jurisdiction. Solicitor General Perlman, David P. Findling, Ruth Weyand and Mozart G. Ratner filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting appellants. T. McKeen Chidsey, Attorney General, M. Louise Rutherford, Deputy Attorney General, and George L. Reed, Solicitor, Labor Relations Board, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as amicus curiae, in No. 39, urging affirmance. Donald J. Martin filed a brief for the Communication Workers of America, Division 23, supporting appellees. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases, here on appeal from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a), 43 Stat. 937, 45 Stat. 54, present the question whether a certification of a union by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Wis. Stats. 1947, ch. Ill, as the collective bargaining representative of the employees of appellant company, conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. Prior to 1945 the appellant company recognized the appellant union as the collective bargaining representative of its plant and traffic department employees. The company and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which by its terms was to continue from year to year unless terminated by either party on a specified notice. At a time when certain provisions of that agreement were being renegotiated a rival union, the Telephone Guild, filed a petition with the National Board asking that it certify the collective bargaining representative of these employees. Before the National Board acted, the Guild withdrew its petition and filed a petition with the Wisconsin Board seeking the same relief. The Wisconsin Board held a hearing and directed that separate elections be held among the employees in the plant, traffic, and office departments of the company to determine whether they desired to be grouped in a single unit or in departmental units and what representative, if any, they desired to elect. After the election the Wisconsin Board certified that the employees in the plant and traffic departments had elected to combine in a single bargaining unit and had chosen the Guild as their collective bargaining representative, and that the employees in the office department had elected to constitute themselves as a separate unit and had chosen not to have any collective bargaining representative. Each appellant brought an action in the Wisconsin courts to have the certification set aside. The Circuit Court, relying on Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, held that the Wisconsin Board was without jurisdiction to issue the certification. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed. 251 Wis. 583, 30 N. W. 2d 241. First. We are met at the outset with a contention that the certification of the Wisconsin Board which has been sustained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not a “final judgment” within the meaning of § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344. The argument is that under Wisconsin law the certification is no more than a report on the results of an investigation made known to the parties for such use as they may desire, that nothing can be done by any state agency to enforce observance of the certification, that the company cannot be required to bargain with the certified union until and unless an unfair practice charge is lodged against it, and that in such proceeding all the issues involved in the certification proceeding can be relitigated. If that contention is correct, the case is of course not ripe for the intervention of the federal judicial power. See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 130-131 and cases cited. But it has not been shown that the Wisconsin law gives such slight force to the certification. The statute provides that the representative chosen by the employees shall be the exclusive one for purposes of collective bargaining. § 111.05 (1). Provision is made for the board to take a secret ballot of the employees and to certify the results thereof, whenever a question arises concerning the representation of employees in a collective bargaining unit. § 111.05 (3). And the statute contains the following direction: “The board’s certification of the results of any election shall be conclusive as to the findings in-eluded therein unless reviewed in the same manner as provided by subsection (8) of section 111.07 for review of orders of the board.” § 111.05 (3). The certification in these cases has been reviewed and sustained by the highest court of Wisconsin. While that certification is not irrevocable for all time, it fixes a status to which Wisconsin provides a sanction. Eor it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of a majority of the employees. § 111.06 (d). And since § 111.05 (3) makes the certification, subject to judicial review, “conclusive as to the findings included therein,” it would seem that the certification cannot be collaterally attacked in that proceeding or heard de novo. We are pointed to no Wisconsin authority to the effect that it can be. On this phase of the case we are, indeed, referred to only one Wisconsin authority and that is United R. & W. D. S. E. v. Wisconsin Board, 245 Wis. 636, 15 N. W. 2d 844. But that case merely held that an order of the Wisconsin Board that a referendum of employees by secret ballot be held to determine whether an “all union” agreement was desired was not reviewable. It did not deal with a certificate which was in fact reviewed and sustained by the same court as in the present cases. It is true that in the opinion below, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that the “mere fact-finding procedure” of the Wisconsin Board in ascertaining the facts, in ordering an election, and in certifying the result “constitutes action in merely its ministerial capacity.” 251 Wis. at 592, 30 N. W. 2d at 245. But that comment was directed to the lack of discretion which the state statute had left the Wisconsin Board. It had no relevance to the effect of the certification under Wisconsin law. While the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board seems readier than some to reexamine the status of a bargaining representative on the ground that it has lost the support of a majority, it nevertheless appears to be Wisconsin law that a certification is binding upon an employer so long as it stands. We assumed in Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Kelley, 330 U. S. 767, that the certification of a collective bargaining representative, sustained by the highest court of the state, was a final judgment, although it did not of itself command action but like the certification here was enforcible in law only by another proceeding. We think that is the correct view. The fact that Wisconsin’s certification was not in the form of a command is immaterial. See American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, 308 U. S. 401, 408. It was not an abstract determination of status. Nor was it merely an interim adjudication in an uncompleted administrative process. It established legal rights and relationships. It told the employer, subject to judicial review, with whom he could not refuse to negotiate without risk of sanctions. The character of the certification was therefore such as to make it reviewable under the appropriate standards for exercise of the federal judicial power. Second. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the Wisconsin Board could exercise jurisdiction here until and unless the National Board undertook to determine the appropriate bargaining representative or unit of representation of these employees. That view was urged on us in the like cases coming here under a New York statute. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, supra, at 776, we rejected that argument, saying: “The State argues for a rule that would enable it to act until the federal board had acted in the same case. But we do not think that a case by case test of federal supremacy is permissible here.” We went on to point out that the National Board had jurisdiction of the industry in which those particular employers were engaged and had asserted control of their labor relations in general. Both the state and the federal statutes had laid hold of the same relationship and had provided different standards for its regulation. Since the employers in question were subject to regulation by the National Board, we thought the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intrusion of the state agency, even though the National Board had not acted in the particular cases before us. Those considerations control the present cases. This employer is concededly engaged in interstate commerce; and the industry is one over which the National Board has consistently exercised jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Act provides that a majority of employees in a single craft, division, department or plant of an employer may elect to constitute that group a separate bargaining unit. § 111.02 (6). The federal act leaves that matter to the discretion of the board. When under those circumstances the state board puts its imprimatur on a particular group as the collective bargaining agent of employees, it freezes into a pattern that which the federal act has left fluid. In practical effect the true measure of conflict between the state and federal scheme of regulation may not be found only in the collision between the formal orders that the two boards may issue. We know that administrative practice also disposes of cases in which, no order has been entered. Disposition of controversies on an administrative as distinguished from a formal basis will often reflect the attitudes of the National Board which have not been reduced to orders in those specific cases. A certification by a state board under a different or conflicting theory of representation may therefore be as readily disruptive of the practice under the federal act as if the orders of the two boards made a head-on collision. These are the very real potentials of conflict which lead us to allow supremacy to the federal scheme even though it has not yet been applied in any formal way to this particular employer. The problem of employee representation is a sensitive and delicate one in industrial relations. The uncertainty as to which board is master and how long it will remain such can be as disruptive of peace between various industrial factions as actual competition between two boards for supremacy. We are satisfied with the wisdom of the policy underlying the Bethlehem case and adhere to it. The result we have reached is not changed by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. Supp. I, §§ 141 et seq. That Act grants the National Board authority under specified conditions to cede its jurisdiction to a state agency. But it does not appear that there has been any cession of jurisdiction to Wisconsin by the National Board in representation proceedings. Reversed. That review extends to administrative decisions affecting legal rights, duties, and privileges whether affirmative or negative in form, § 227.15, and is allowed any person aggrieved and directly affected by the administrative decision. § 227.16. Section 111.05 (4) provides “The fact that one election has been held shall not prevent the holding of another election among the same group of employes, provided that it appears to the board that sufficient reason therefor exists.” Section 111.06(d) also provides that where an employer files with the board a petition requesting a determination as to majority representation “he shall not be deemed to have refused to bargain until an election has been held and the result thereof has been certified to him by the board.” But we are pointed to no authority holding that where a certification has already been made, a recertification can be demanded. Section 111.05 (3), indeed, makes the certification “conclusive.” See § 111.05 (4), supra, note 2; Rydahl’s Launderers & Cleaners, Wis. E. R. B. Decision No. 677 (1944); UAW-CIO and Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., Wis. E. R. B. Decision No. 687 (1944); cf. AUA and Garton Toy Co., Wis. E. R. B. Decision No. 1238 (1947); Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts 161-62 (1948). See In re United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 2 L. R. R. M. 894 (Wis. County Cir. Ct., 1938); In re Charles Abresch Co., 3 L. R. R. M. 639 (Wis. E. R. B. Decision No. 744, 1938); cf. Wisconsin Board v. Hall Garage Corp., 18 L. R. R. M. 2419 (Wis. County Cir. Ct., 1946). In Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Kelley, supra, suit had been brought in the state court for a declaratory judgment to restrain the state labor board from determining a representative of plaintiff’s supervisory employees to bargain collectively with the plaintiff. Under New York law the labor board had authority to hold elections to determine employee representation and to certify the results. 30 McKinney’s Cons. Laws § 705. Certification in itself, as in the instant case, did not impose a legal penalty. Suit had to be brought in an unfair labor practice proceeding to accomplish such result. 30 Ibid. § 706. Refusal to bargain with the representative of the employees was an unfair labor practice. 30 Ibid. §704 (6). Even though the New York law did not state, as does the Wisconsin law, that certification by the board was conclusive, we considered a decision of the New York court approving the jurisdiction of the state board to conduct a representative proceeding a final judgment ripe for our consideration. See Elyria Telephone Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 402; Newark Telephone Co., 59 N. L. R. B. 1408; People’s Telephone Corp., 69 N. L. R. B. 540; Ohio Telephone Service Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 488. The appellant company operates a telephone business in La Crosse County, Wisconsin. It is a subsidiary of the Central Telephone Co., whose subsidiaries operate telephone businesses in many states. The concession that the company is engaged in interstate commerce is based on the interstate telephone calls which it handles. “The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.” Moreover, the Wisconsin Act excludes from the definition of employee those working in a supervisory capacity. §111.02(3). They were, however, included under the protection of the federal act as then written. Packard Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U. S. 485. The definition of employee under the Wisconsin Act also excludes certain strikers and others who have not been at work for certain periods. §111.02(3). These latter exceptions likewise do not in the main square with the definition of employee contained in § 2 (3) of the federal act. U. S. Const. Art. VI. Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, now provides in part: “the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.” The agreement of August 27, 1948, between the National Board and the Wisconsin Board is restricted to the implementation of § 14 (b) of the federal act. See 22 L. R. R. 268.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AIR POLLUTION VARIANCE BOARD OF COLORADO v. WESTERN ALFALFA CORP. No. 73-690. Argued April 25, 1974 Decided May 20, 1974 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a:unanimous Court. William Tucker, Assistant Attorney General of Colorado,, argued the cause for petitioner. With him- on the brief were John P. Moore, Attorney General, John E: Bush, Deputy Attoméy General, and John Brown, Special.. Assistant Attorney General. Donald D, Cawelti argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George D. Blackwood,'Jr. Edmund W. Kitch argued the cause for the United .States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Qn the- brief were. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Johnson, Harriet S. Shapiro, and Edmund B. Clark Briefs of a7ff,ici curiae urging reversal were filed by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard P. Fahey and John Eufinger, Assistant Attorneys General, for the the State of Ohio; and by the Attorneys General and other officials for'34 States as follows: Evette J.- Younger, Attorney General of California, Robert H. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, and Nicholas C. Yost, C. Foster Knight, and Daniel J. Taaffe, Deputy Attorneys General; Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona; Jim Guy Tucker, Attorney General of Arkansas; Robert K. Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut; Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia; George Pai, Attorney- General of Hawaii; W. Anthony Park, Attorney General of Idaho; William' J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Richard C. Turner, Attorney General of Iowa, and Clifford Peterson, Assistant . Attoijiey General; Vem Miller, Attorney General'of Kansas; Ed W. Hancock, Attorney General of Kentucky; William J. Guste, Jr., ■Attorney General of Louisiana; Jon A. Lund, Attorney General of Maine; Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and Martin A. Ferris III, Special-Assistant Attorney General; Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts.'; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan; Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota;- Clarence A. H. Meyer, Attorney General of Nebraska; Robert List, Attorney General of Nevada; Warren B. Rudman, Attorney General of New Hampshire, and Donald W. Stever, Assistant Attorney General; William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey; David L. Norvell, Attorney General of New Mexico; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York;- Robert Morgan, Attorney General of North Carolina; AUen I.-Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota; Larry Derryberry, Attorney General of Oklahoma.; Lee Johnson,. Attorney Genefal of Oregon; Richard J. Israel, .Attorney General of Rhode Island; Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina; Ker'mit A. Sande, Attorney. General of South Dakota, David M. .Pack, Attorney General of Tennessee; John L. Hill,. Attorney General.of Texas; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia; Robert W. Warren, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Th&ódove L. Priebe-, Assistant Attorney General. ‘ Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. An inspector of a division of the. Colorado Department of Health entered the outdoor premises of respondent without its knowledge or consent. It was daylight and the inspector entered the yard to make a Ringelmann test of plumes of smoke being emitted from' respondent’s chimneys. Since that time Colorado has. adopted a requirement for a seareh warrant for. violations of air quality standards. At the time of the instant inspection the state law required nó warrant and none was sought. Indeed, the. inspector entered no part of respondent’s plant to make the inspection. A federal Act under the administration of the 'Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets certain air quality . standards, 81 Stat. 485, 42 U. S. C. § 1857 et seg. The States have the primary responsibility to assure the maintenance of air. quality standards, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-2 (a). Yet if the EPA has approved'or promulgated “an applicable implementation” plan, a State may not adopt Or enforce a “less stringent” one, 42 U. S. C. §4857d-1. - There is no conflict between a federal standard and state. action, the sole question presented being whether Colorado has violated federal constitutional procedures in making the inspection in the manner described.. Respondent requested a hearing before Colorado’s Air Pollution Variance Board. The Board held a hearing and found that respondent’s, emissions were in violation of the state Act. While the test challenged here was made on June 4, 1969, the Board after noting that Colorado’s Health Department had been in conference with respondent “in regard to its air pollution violations since September, 1967,” after approving the readings made by the field inspector on the day in question, and after holding that tests submitted in rebuttal by respondent were not acceptable, denied a variance and entered a ceasé-and-desist order. Respondent sought review in the District Court for Weld County which set aside the Board’s decision. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, 610 P. 2d 907; and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The petition for certiorari which we granted, 414 U. S. 1166, raised three questions, presenting in differing postures questions under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the . States by the Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643. The main, thrust of the opinion of the Court of Appeals is directed at the Fourth Amendment problem. It held that, under Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, the act of conducting the tests on the premises of respondent without either a warrant or .the cóñsent’of anyone from respondent constituted an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to Camara and See btit we think they are not applicable here. The field inspector' did not enter the plant or offices.- - He was not inspecting stacks, boilers; scrubbers, flues, grates, or furnaces; nor was his inspection related to respondent’s files or papers. He had sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in the sky — plumes of smoke. The Court in Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 59, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, refused to extend the Fourth Amendment to sights seen in “the . open fields.” The field inspector was on respondent’s property but we are not advised that he was on premises from which the public was excluded. Under the Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1234, 42 U. S. C. § 4901 et.seq. (1970 ed., Supp. II), an inspector may enter a railroad right-of-way to determine whether noise standards are being violated. The .invasion of privacy in either that case or the present one, if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical. The EPA regm lation for conducting an opacity test requires the inspector to stand at a distance equivalent to approximately two stack heights away but not more than & quarter of a mile from the base of the stack with the sun to his back from a vantage point perpendicular to the plume; and he must take at least 25 readings, recording the data at 15-to 30-second intervals. Depending upon the layout of the-plant, the inspector may operate within or without the premises but in either case he is well within the “open fields” exception to-the Fourth Amendment'approved.in Hester. The Court of Appeals went on to say that since respondent was not aware that the inspector had been on the premises until the cease-and-desist notice, the hearing it received “lacked the fundamental elements of due process of law-, since.the secret nature of the investigation foreclosed Western from putting on any rebuttal .evidence.” Whether the Court referred to Colorado “due process” or ■ Fourteenth Amendmept “due process” is not clear. If it is the former, the question is a matter of state law beyond our purview. Since we are unsure of the grounds of that ruling we intimate no opinion on that issue. But on our remand we leave open that.and any other, questions that may be lurking' in the case. Reversed and remanded. This test is prescribed by Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-29-5 (Supp. 1967). It requires a'trained inspector to stand _iií a position where he' has an unobstructed view of the smoke plume, observe the smoke, and .rate it according to the opacity scale of the Ringelmann chart..- The person using the- chart matches the color and density of the sinoke • plume with • the numbered example on the chart. The Ringelmann test is generally sanctioned for use in measuring air pollution. See cases collected in Portland v. Fry Roofing Co., 3 Ore. App. 352, 355-358, 472 P. 2d 826, 827-829. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66-29-8 (2) (d) (Supp. 1969). The Air Pollution Variance Board, after the Division of Administration; Colorado Department of Health, had issued a cease- .and-desist order; received a request from respondent for a hearing which was granted and held September 11,1969. EPA studies indicate that tests of stacks are expensive and may . require 300 man-hours of skilled work. 39 Fed. Reg. 9309. And see Schulze; The Economics of Environmental Quality Measurement, 23 J. Air Poll Control Assn. 671. (1973); 40 CFR § 60.85, Method 9. 510 P. 2d, at 909. In the District Court’s opinion it is said that one challenge to the hearing before the Variance Board "was “whether or not due • process of law ánd equal protection of -the law contrary to the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Section 25, Article 2 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado was denied” by the Board. App. 136. See California v. Krivda, 409 U. S. 33; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U. S. 194; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551,

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HATZLACHH SUPPLY CO., INC. v. UNITED STATES No. 78-1175. Argued December 5, 1979 Decided January 21, 1980 Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jamie S. Gorelick and Mark Landesman. Kent L. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Me- Cree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel, Eloise E. Davies, and Frank A. Rosenfeld. Pee Cukiam. We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the United States may be held liable for breach of an implied contract of bailment when goods are lost while held by the United States Customs Service (USCS) following their seizure for customs violations. 441 U. S. 942 (1979). The Court of Claims granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, finding that petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief. 217 Ct. Cl. 423, 579 F. 2d 617 (1978). We vacate the Court of Claims’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Petitioner imported camera supplies and other items which USCS seized upon their arrival in port and declared forfeited for customs violations. On petitioner’s appropriate procedure for relief, USCS agreed to return the forfeited materials upon petitioner’s payment of a $40,000 penalty. When the shipment was returned to petitioner, however, merchandise valued in excess of $165,000 was missing. Petitioner brought suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, for the value of the missing merchandise, alleging breach of an implied contract of bailment. The Court of Claims initially conceded that “the statutes cited by the plaintiff, along with the action of the USCS in agreeing to return the seized goods upon payment of a $40,000 fine by Hatzlaehh, could make a strong case for the existence of an implied-in-fact contract properly to preserve and redeliver all the goods to Hatzlaehh.” 217 Ct. Cl., at 428, 579 F. 2d, at 620. The court noted, however, that 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (c) excepts from the tort liability of the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act any claim “arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs.” Because in its view this provision would bar a tort claim for the loss that occurred in this case, the court thought that it “would certainly be a trespass on congressional prerogatives for this court now to hold that, by seizing subject to forfeiture certain merchandise, the Government assented to, or agreed to be bound by, an implied-in-fact contract to return the merchandise whole.” 217 Ct. Cl., at 430, 579 F. 2d, at 621. The Court of Claims accordingly declined to find an implied-in-fact contract, remarking that it could not “judicially allow by the back door a claim which was, rather clearly and explicitly, legislatively barred at the front.” Ibid. We cannot agree with the Court of Claims that § 2680 (c) is such a major obstacle to awarding judgment against the Government on an implied contract. Section 2680, which is entitled “Exceptions,” declares that “[t]he provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to” certain kinds of claims, which are then described. Among the excepted claims are those specified in § 2680 (c) — claims “arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise” by any customs officer. The section, although excluding certain claims from the statutory waiver Of immunity from tort liability, does not limit or otherwise affect immunity waivers contained in other statutes such as the Tucker Act, which invests the Court of Claims with jurisdiction to render judgment “upon any claim against the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United States.” Neither does its legislative history support the view that § 2680 (c), first passed in 1946 as part of the Federal Tort Claims Act, was intended to declare the immunity of the United States from express or implied contracts with customs officers that would, or might, otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. On the contrary, it appears that in exempting from the Tort Claims Act those claims described in § 2680 (c), Congress did not further intend to disturb other existing statutory remedies. H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1942); H. R. Rep, No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945); S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 38 (1940); Tort Claims: Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 28, 44 (1942). Nothing in these sources, nor anything else called to our attention, indicates that the Tort Claims Act withdrew to any extent existing remedies for the breach of express or implied contracts. Others have read the statute and its legislative history to this effect. See 2 L. Jayson, Personal Injury: Handling Federal Tort Claims § 256 (1979); Gellhom & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 722, 729-730 (1947); Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act—A Statutory Interpretation, 35 Geo. Law J. 1, 45 (1946); Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 344, 360 (1947); Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale L. J. 534, 547-548 (1947). The Court of Claims relied on Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977), where it was held that the United States is not liable under the Tort Claims Act to indemnify a third party for damages paid to a member of the Armed Forces who was injured in military training. Recognizing that the Veterans’ Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-connected injuries, we declined to construe the Tort Claims Act to permit third-party indemnity suits that in effect would expose the Government to greater liability than that contemplated under the statutory compensation scheme. In Stencel, Congress had provided a remedy, which we thought to be exclusive. Here, however, § 2680 (c) denies a tort remedy for certain claims; and we fail to see how the Stencel holding that the existence of an exclusive statutory compensation remedy negates tort liability supports the conclusion that if the Tort Claims Act bars a tort remedy, neither is there a contractual remedy. The absence of Government tort liability has not been thought to bar contractual remedies on implied-in-fact contracts, even in those cases also having elements of a tort. In Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U. S. 381 (1939), the Government argued that because a Government corporation could not be sued for negligence, neither could it be sued for breach of contract of bailment. The Court rejected the argument, holding that even if there was tort immunity, the waiver of immunity with respect to contract claims was not limited to “suits on contract, express or implied, not sounding in tort.” See also Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F. 2d 674, 679 (CA3 1957); New England Helicopter Service, Inc. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 938, 939 (RI 1955). The United States does not now defend the reasoning of the Court of Claims that § 2680 (c) forecloses a remedy on an implied-in-fact contract of bailment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. It does support the judgment on a ground concededly not urged in the Court of Claims: that the contractual remedy should be rejected because individual customs officers are subject to tort liability and because 28 U. S. C. § 2006 provides that judgments against customs officers for negligent loss of goods, where seizure was made with probable cause, shall be paid by the United States. The existence of this private recourse, it is urged, counsels against recognizing a contractual remedy under the Tucker Act. We find the argument unpersuasive. There is no inconsistency between a contractual remedy against the Government and a tort remedy against customs officers. Cf. Keifer & Keifer, supra. Without more, neither the existence of a tort remedy nor the lack of one is relevant to determining whether there is an implied-in-fact contract of bailment upon which the United States is liable in the Court of Claims pursuant to its waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Tucker Act. Because the Court of Claims’ judgment rested heavily on a mistaken view of the legal significance of § 2680 (c) and because the Court of Claims should first address the question of an implied-in-fact contract without regard to that section, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Claims and remand the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Petitioner also sought damages, no longer in issue, for loss of “face and good will.” As a second cause of action, petitioner alleged a capricious and arbitrary seizure, “unreasonable detainer” of property, and “deprivation without due process.” Petitioner does not challenge the dismissal of this cause of action. We proceed in the text on the assumption, but without deciding, that the Court of Claims was correct in holding that the loss alleged in this case was a claim arising from the detention of goods by a customs officer and hence within the exception carved out by §2680 (e). Petitioner disputes this holding, claiming that the section is limited to wrongful detentions and does not deal with losses and that the courts are divided on the interpretation of the section. A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F. 2d 849 (CA9 1978), and Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (CA2 1958), it is said, permit recovery under the Tort Claims Act for the loss of goods detained by customs officers; whereas this case, United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL844SAY, 501 F. 2d 1327 (CA5 1974), and S. Schonfeld Co. v. S. S. Akra Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220 (SC 1973), construe §2680 (c) to except such losses from the Tort Claims Act. We need not resolve the conflict. If petitioner is correct in its interpretation, § 2680 (c) would itself present no barrier to either contractual or tort liability. Nor would the existence of a Tort Claims Act remedy in this case be preclusive of pre-existing contractual remedies under the Tucker Act, at least absent some reasonably clear evidence that Congress intended to foreclose contractual remedies in the circumstances obtaining here. When Congress first considered the exception in 1940, Judge Alexander Holtzoff, then a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering the bill. As the then Mr. Holtzoff described the intended effect of the various exemptions, certain of them, such as the loss or miscarriage of postal matter and certain intentional torts, were included because they related to activities for which, as a policy matter, the Government should be free from tort claims. Other exemptions, such as the assessment or collection of taxes or customs duties, the detention of goods by customs officers, and admiralty or maritime torts, were included because various other laws provided the machinery for recovery on these claims and “[t]here was no purpose in interfering with that machinery.” Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 38-39 (1940). The purpose was to avoid duplication; there was no indication that existing remedies, if’any, were withdrawn. The Tucker Act itself is only a jurisdictional statute, of course, an# does not create a substantive'right to money damages. United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398 (1976). The enforceable claim in this case must arise from the alleged contract. Moreover, the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction with respect to contracts extends only to actual contracts, either express or implied in fact; it does not reach claims on contracts implied in law. Alabama v. United States, 282 U. S. 502, 507 (1931); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 287, 292-293 (1928); United States v. Minnesota Mutual Investment Co., 271 U. S. 212, 217 (1926); Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593, 598 (1893). We indicate no view, one way or the other, as to whether an implied-in-fact contract could be found on the record in this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HEALY et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. NO. 76. Argued December 12, 1952. Decided April 6, 1953. James H. Heffern argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 76. Assistant Attorney General Lyon argued the cause for petitioner in No. 138 and respondent in No. 76. With him on the briefs were Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson and Melva M. Graney. Solicitor General Cummings was also on the brief in No. 76. Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, and Philip Elman were also on the brief in No. 138. Sol Goodman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 138. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. The income tax liability of three individual taxpayers for a given year is here before the Court. Only a single question, common to all the cases, is involved. The Tax Court held a view favorable to the taxpayers. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought review before the appropriate Courts of Appeals. . As to two of the taxpayers, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, while the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took a contrary view of the law. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. All controlling facts in the three situations are similar. Each taxpayer reports his income on the cash receipts and disbursements method. Each, in the respective years involved, received a salary from a closely held corporation in which he was both an officer and a stockholder. The full amount of salary so received was reported as income for the year received. Subsequently, after audit of the corporate returns, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction by the corporations of parts of the salaries as exceeding reasonable compensation. As a result, deficiencies in income taxes were determined against the corporations. The Commissioner also determined that the officers were liable as transferees under § 311 of the Internal Revenue Code for the corporate deficiencies. The receipt of excessive salary was the transfer upon which the transferee liability was predicated. As a result of either litigation or negotiation, various amounts became established as deficiencies of the corporations and as transferee liabilities of each of the three officers. In each case, the entire process of determining these amounts — from the start of the audit by agents of the Commissioner to the final establishment of the liabilities — occurred after the end of the year in which the salary was received and reported. The question before the Court is whether part of the salary should be excluded from taxable income in the year of receipt since part was excessive salary and led to transferee liability for the unpaid taxes of the corporations. The taxpayers contend that an adjustment should be made in the year of original receipt of the salary; the Government that an adjustment should be made in the year of payment of the transferee liability. One of the basic aspects of the federal income tax is that there be an annual accounting of income. Each item of income must be reported in the year in which it is properly reportable and in no other. For a cash basis taxpayer, as these three are, the correct year is the year in which received. Not infrequently, an adverse claimant will contest the right of the recipient to retain money or property, either in the year of receipt or subsequently. In North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417 (1932), we considered whether such uncertainty would result in an amount otherwise includible in income being deferred as reportable income beyond the annual period in which received. That decision established the claim of right doctrine “now deeply rooted in the federal tax system.” The usual statement of the rule is that by Mr. Justice Brandéis in the North American Oil opinion: “If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.” 286 U. S., at 424. The phrase “claim of right” is a term known of old to lawyers. Its typical use has been in real property law in dealing with title by adverse possession, where the rule has been that title can be acquired by adverse possession only if the occupant claims that he has a right to be in possession as owner. The use of the term in the field of income taxation is analogous. There is a claim of right when funds are received and treated by a taxpayer as belonging to him. The fact that subsequently the claim is found to be invalid by a court does not change the fact that the claim did exist. A mistaken claim is nonetheless a claim, United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590 (1951). However, we are told that the salaries were not received as belonging to the taxpayers, but rather they were received by the taxpayers as “constructive trustees” for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation. Admittedly, receipts by a trustee expressly for the benefit of another are not income to the trustee in his individual capacity, for he “has received nothing ... for his separate use and benefit,” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 211 (1920). We do not believe that these taxpayers were trustees in the sense that the salaries were not received for their separate use and benefit. Under the equitable doctrine that the funds of a corporation are a trust fund for the benefit of creditors, a stockholder receiving funds without adequate consideration from an insolvent corporation may be held, in some jurisdictions, to hold the funds as a constructive trustee. So it was that these taxpayers were declared constructive trustees and were liable as transferees in equity. A constructive trust is a fiction imposed as an equitable device for achieving justice. It lacks the attributes of a true trust, and is not based on any intention of the parties. Even though it has a retroactive existence in legal fiction, fiction cannot change the “readily realizable economic value” and practical “use and benefit” which these taxpayers enjoyed during a prior annual accounting period, antecedent to the declaration of the constructive trust. . We think it clear that the salaries were received under a claim of individual right — not under a claim- of right as a trustee. Indeed one of the parties concedes, as is manifestly so, that the reporting of the salary on the income tax returns indicated that the income was held under a claim of individual right. The taxpayers argue that the salary was subject to a restriction on its use. Since all the facts which ultimately gave rise to the trans--feree liability were in existence at the end of the taxable year, we are told those facts were a legal restriction on the use of the salary. Actually it could not have been said at the end of each of the years involved that the transferee liability would materialize. The Commissioner might not have audited one or all of these particular returns; the Commissioner might not have gone through the correct procedure or have produced enough admissible evidence to meet his burden of proving transferee liability; or, through subsequent profitable operations, the corporations might have been able to have paid their taxes obviating the necessity of resort to the transferees. There is no need to attempt to list hypothetical situations not before us which put such restrictions on use as to prevent the receipt under claim of right from giving rise to taxable income. But a potential or dormant restriction, such as here involved, which depends upon the future application of rules of law to present facts, is not a “restriction on use” within the meaning of North American Oil v. Burnet, supra. The inequities of treating an amount as income which eventually turns out not to be income are urged upon us. The Government concedes that each of these taxpayers is entitled to a deduction for a loss in the year of repayment of the amount earlier included in income. In some cases, this treatment will benefit the taxpayer; in others it will not. Factors such as the tax rates in the years involved and the brackets in which the income of the taxpayer falls will be controlling. A rule which required that the adjustment be made in the earlier year of receipt instead of the later year of repayment would generally be unfavorable to taxpayers, for the statute of limitations would frequently bar any adjustment of the tax liability for the earlier year. Congress has enacted an annual accounting system under which income is counted up at the end of each year. It would be disruptive of an orderly collection of the revenue to rule that the accounting must be done over again to reflect events occurring after the year for which the accounting is made, and would violate the spirit of the annual accounting system. This basic principle cannot be changed simply because it is of - advantage to a taxpayer or to the Government in a particular case that a different rule be followed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in No. 76, being consistent with this opinion, is affirmed, while the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in No. 138 is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. Gordon W. Hartfield and Edwin E. Healy, 16 T. C. 200 (1951) (consolidated proceedings); Hall C. Smith, 11 T. C. 174 (1948). Commissioner v. Hartfield, 194 F. 2d 662 (1952). Commissioner v. Smith, 194 F. 2d 536 (1952). 344 U. S. 811, 813 (1952). Charles E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F. 2d 1011 (1950). Reo Motors v. Commissioner, 338 U. S. 442 (1950); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U. S. 271 (1938); Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931). See I. R. C., § 41. I. R. C., § 42 (a). Other permissive methods of accounting for tax purposes are the accrual basis, I. R. C., §§ 41 and 42, and the installment basis, I. R. C., § 44. United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590, 592 (1951). 4 Tiffany, Real Property, § 1147. 15A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, §§ 7369-7389. 3 Scott on Trusts, § 462.1; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 471. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130, 137 (1952). Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 211 (1920). The rule announced in North American Oil v. Burnet, supra, requires a receipt without “restriction on use” as well as under a claim of right. I. R. C., § 1119 imposes upon the Commissioner the burden of proving transferee liability. This may be contrasted to the rule that normally the burden of proof is on the taxpayer contesting the determination of the Commissioner. I. R. C., § 1111; Rule 32, Tax Court of United States. Transferee liability is secondary to the primary liability of the transferor. To sustain transferee liability the Commissioner must prove that he is unable to collect the deficiency from the transferor. 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 53.29. G. C. M. 16730, XV-1 Cum. Bull. 179 (1936). I. R. C., § 322 (b). See also I. R. C., §§ 275 and 311 (b).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GUARDIANS ASSOCIATION et al. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK et al. No. 81-431. Argued November 1, 1982 — Decided July 1, 1983 Christopher Crowley argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Kenneth Kimerling. Leonard Koerner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Arthur N. Eisen-berg and E. Richard Larson for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Vilma S. Martinez, Morris J. Bailer, and Roger L. Waldman for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Thomas I. Atkins and Michael H. Sussman filed a brief for the NAACP as amicus curiae. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in Parts I, III, IV, and V of which Justice Rehnquist joined. The threshold issue before the Court is whether the private plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq., and administrative implementing regulations promulgated thereunder. I conclude, as do four other Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory intent. However, I conclude that the judgment below should be affirmed on other grounds, because, in the absence of proof of discriminatory animus, compensatory relief should not be awarded to private Title VI plaintiffs; unless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory and limited injunctive relief should be the only available private remedies for Title VI violations. There being four other Justices who would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that judgment is accordingly affirmed. This class action involves a challenge by black and Hispanic police officers, petitioners here, to several written examinations administered by New York City between 1968 and 1970 that were used to make entry-level appointments to the city’s Police Department (Department) through October 1974. The District Court found that the challenged examinations had a discriminatory impact on the scores and pass-rates of blacks and Hispanics and were not job-related. These findings were not disturbed in the Court of Appeals. Each member of the plaintiff class seeking relief from discrimination achieved a passing score on one of the challenged examinations and was hired as a police officer. Since appointments were made in order of test scores, however, the examinations caused the class members to be hired later than similarly situated whites, which lessened the petitioners’ seniority and related benefits. Accordingly, when the Department laid off police officers in June 1975 on a “last-hired, first-fired” basis, those officers who had achieved the lowest scores on the examinations were laid off first, and the plaintiff black and Hispanic officers were disproportionately affected by the layoffs. On April 30, 1976, petitioners filed the present suit against the Department and other New York City officials and entities, the respondents here. Petitioners’ amended complaint alleged that the June 1975 layoffs violated their rights under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq., and § 2000e et seq., under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and under various other state and federal laws. The primary allegation of the complaint was that but for the discriminatory impact of the challenged examinations upon minorities, petitioners would have been hired earlier and therefore would have accumulated sufficient seniority to withstand the layoffs. After a hearing, the District Court held that, although petitioners had failed to prove that the respondents had acted with discriminatory intent, the use of the examinations violated Title VII, because the tests had a disparate impact upon minorities and were not proved by respondents to be job-related. The court therefore granted petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the Department from firing or recalling any police officers until seniority lists were reordered to accord petitioners the seniority they would have had but for respondents’ discriminatory practices. 431 P. Supp. 526 (SDNY 1977). In light of its holding under Title VII, the District Court deemed it unnecessary to decide the merits of petitioners’ claims under Title VI. Id., at 530, n. 2. On respondents’ appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our holding in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), in which we ruled that a bona fide seniority system that merely perpetuates the effects of pre-Title VII discrimination is protected by § 703(h) of that statute, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h). 562 F. 2d 38 (1977). On remand, the District Court found that Teamsters had rendered its previous holding untenable to the extent that it granted relief with respect to discrimination occurring prior to March 24, 1972, the date on which Title VII became applicable to municipalities. See Pub. L. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103. This meant that, under Title VII, class members hired prior to the effective date were not entitled to any relief, and that the remaining members of the class were only entitled to back seniority awards that did not take into account time periods prior to that date. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (SDNY 1979). The court then turned to Title VI, which has been applicable to municipalities since its enactment in 1964, to see if it would provide relief for the time periods prior to March 24, 1972. After considering Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), and the various opinions in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978), the District Court concluded that an implied private right of action exists under Title VI. 466 F. Supp., at 1281-1285. Then, citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974), and Title VI administrative interpretative regulations adopted by several federal agencies, the court reasoned that proof of discriminatory effect is enough to establish a violation of Title VI in a private action, thereby rejecting respondents’ contention that only proof of discriminatory intent could suffice. 466 F. Supp., at 1285-1287. Finally, turning to the question of relief, the court held that the same remedies available under Title VII should be available under Title VI, unless they would conflict with some purpose peculiar to Title VI. “In the instant case, back seniority, approved as a Title VII remedy in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 . . . (1976), is just as necessary to make discriminatees ‘whole’ under Title VI.” Id., at 1287. Accordingly, relief was granted to the entire class pursuant to Title VI. In a subsequent order, the court set forth a detailed plan for the determination of the constructive seniority to which each individual member of the class would be entitled, and the corresponding monetary and nonmonetary entitlements that would be derived therefrom. The court also ordered respondents to meet and consult with petitioners on the preparation and use of future examinations. App. A99-A107. Respondents appealed once again to the Second Circuit, which affirmed the relief under Title VII but reversed as to Title VI. 633 F. 2d 232 (1980). All three members of the panel agreed that the award of Title VI relief could not be sustained, but the panel divided on the rationale for this conclusion. Two judges held that the trial court erred by concluding that Title VI does not require proof of discriminatory intent. They believed that this Court’s decision in Lau v. Nichols, supra, which held that proof of discriminatory impact could suffice to establish a Title VI violation, had been implicitly overruled by the judgment and supporting opinions in Bakke, supra. 633 F. 2d, at 270 (Kelleher, J.); id., at 274-275 (Coffrin, J.). The third member of the panel, Judge Meskill, declined to reach the question whether Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. Instead, he concluded that the “compensatory remedies sought by and awarded to plaintiffs in the case at bar are not available to private litigants under Title VI.” Id., at 255. Nothing in the legislative history, Judge Meskill observed, indicated that Title VI was intended to compensate individuals excluded from the benefits of a program receiving federal assistance, and in his view a compensatory private remedy would work at cross-purposes with the administrative enforcement mechanism expressly provided by §602 of Title VI, 42 U. S. C. §2000d-l, and with the objectives of the federal assistance statutes. 633 F. 2d, at 255-262. After the Second Circuit denied petitions for rehearing from both sides, 633 F. 2d 232 (1980), we granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari, 454 U. S. 1140, which claimed error solely on the basis that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a Title VI violation. r-H HH The Court squarely held m Lau v. Nichols, supra, that Title VI forbids the use of federal funds not only in programs that intentionally discriminate on racial grounds but also in those endeavors that have a disparate impact on racial minorities. The Court of Appeals recognized this but was of the view, as are respondents, that University of California Regents v. Bakke, supra, had confined the reach of Title VI to those programs that are operated in an intentionally discriminatory manner. For two reasons, I disagree with this reading of Bakke. A First, I recognize that in Bakke five Justices, including myself, declared that Title VI on its own bottom reaches no further than the Constitution, which suggests that, in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), Title VI does not of its own force proscribe unintentional racial discrimination. The Court of Appeals thought these declarations were inconsistent with Lau’s holding that Title VI contains its own prohibition of disparate-impact racial discrimination. The issue in Bakke, however, was whether Title VI forbids intentional discrimination in the form of affirmative action intended to remedy past discrimination, even though such affirmative action is permitted by the Constitution. Holding that Title VI does not bar such affirmative action if the Constitution does not is plainly not determinative of whether Title VI proscribes unintentional discrimination in addition to the intentional discrimination that the Constitution forbids. It is sensible to construe Title VI, a statute intended to protect racial minorities, as not forbidding those intentional, but benign, racial classifications that are permitted by the Constitution, yet as proscribing burdensome, nonbenign discriminations of a kind not contrary to the Constitution. Although some of the language in the Bakke opinions has a broader sweep, the holdings in Bakke and Lau are entirely consistent. Absent some more telling indication in the Bakke opinions that Lau was being overruled, I would not so hold. B Even if I am wrong in concluding that Bakke did not overrule Lau, as so many of my colleagues believe, there is another reason for holding that disproportionate-impact discrimination is subject to the Title VI regime. In Lau, the Court was unanimous in affirming a holding that the school district there involved was forbidden by Title VI to practice unintentional as well as intentional discrimination against racial minorities. Five Justices were of the view that Title VI itself forbade impact discrimination. Lau, 414 U. S., at 566-569. Justice Stewart, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, concurred in the result. The concurrence stated that it was not at all clear that Title VI, standing alone, would prohibit unintentional discrimination, but that the Title VI implementing regulations, which explicitly forbade impact discrimination, were valid because not inconsistent with the purposes of Title VI. Id., at 569-571. Even if Bakke must be taken as overruling Lau’s holding that the statute itself does not reach disparate impact, none of the five Justices whose opinions arguably compel this result considered whether the statute would permit regulations that clearly reached such discrimination. And no Justice in Bakke took issue with the view of the three concurring Justices in Lau, who concluded that even if Title VI itself did not proscribe unintentional racial discrimination, it nevertheless permitted federal agencies to promulgate valid regulations with such effect. The upshot of Justice Stewart’s opinion was that those charged with enforcing Title VI had sufficient discretion to enforce the statute by forbidding unintentional as well as intentional discrimination. Nothing that was said in Bakke is to the contrary. Of course, this leaves the question whether The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, and Justice Blackmun were correct in their reading of the statute. I am convinced that they were. The language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the word “discrimination” is inherently so. It is surely subject to the construction given the antidiscrimination proscription of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), at least to the extent of permitting, if not requiring, regulations that reach disparate-impact discrimination. As Justice Stewart pointed out, the federal agency given enforcement authority had consistently construed Title VI in that manner. Lau, supra, at 570 (opinion concurring in result). Moreover, soon after the passage of Title VI, the Department of Justice, which had helped draft the legislation, assisted seven agencies in the preparation of regulations incorporating the disparate-impact standard of discrimination. These regulations were early interpretations of the statute by the agencies charged with its enforcement, and we should not reject them absent clear inconsistency with the face or structure of the statute, or with the unmistakable mandate of the legislative history. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). I discern nothing in the legislative history of Title VI, and nothing has been presented by respondents, that is at odds with the administrative construction of the statutory terms. The Title, furthermore, has been consistently administered in this manner for almost two decades without interference by Congress. Under these circumstances, it must be concluded that Title VI reaches unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination as well as deliberate racial discrimination. I — I I — I Although the Court of Appeals erred in construing Title VI, it does not necessarily follow that its judgment should be reversed. As an alternative ground for affirmance, respondents defend the judgment on the basis that there is no private right of action available under Title VI that will afford petitioners the relief that they seek. I agree that the relief denied petitioners under Title VII is unavailable to them under Title VI, at least where no intentional discrimination has been proved, as is the case here. A I deal first with the matter of a private cause of action under Title VI. In Lau v. Nichols, non-English-speaking Chinese students sought relief against the San Francisco School District, claiming that they should be taught the English language, that instruction should proceed in Chinese, or that some other way should be provided to afford them equal educational opportunity. This Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, gave relief under Title VI. The existence of a private cause of action under that Title, however, was not disputed in that case. Four years later, the Court decided University of California Regents v. Bakke, which also involved a private suit seeking relief under Title VI against state educational authorities. Four Justices assumed, but did not decide, that a private action was available under Title VI. A fifth Justice was of the view that no private cause of action could be implied under the Title. The four remaining Justices concluded that a private action was available. Still later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), the Court, applying the factors specified in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), held that private parties could sue to enforce the prohibitions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., against gender-based discrimination in any educational program supported by federal funds. A major part of the analysis was that Title IX had been derived from Title VI, that Congress understood that private remedies were available under Title VI, and that Congress intended similar remedies to be available under Title IX. 441 U. S., at 694-703. Furthermore, it was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon Court’s opinion that the congressional view was correct as to the availability of private actions to enforce Title VI. Id., set 710-716. Two Justices, in dissent, were of the view that private remedies under Title VI itself were not available and that the same was true under Title IX. Those Justices, however, asserted that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 was available to enforce the proscriptions of Title VI and Title IX where the alleged discriminatory practices were being carried on under the color of state law. Id., at 717-730 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). Thus at least eight Justices in Cannon were of the view that Title VI and Title IX could be enforced in a private action against a state or local agency receiving federal funds, such as the respondent Department. See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980). B Petitioners, however, are not entitled to a “make whole” remedy for respondents’ Title VI violations. Whether a litigant has a cause of action “is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive.” Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 239 (1979). The usual rule is that where legal rights have been invaded and a cause of action is available, a federal court may use any available remedy to afford full relief. Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946). The general rule nevertheless yields where necessary to carry out the intent of Congress or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the statute involved. For example, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), the Court found that a private right of action for only limited relief could be implied under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80b-l et seq., which prohibits certain practices in connection with investment advisory contracts. Section 215 of the Act declared that contracts whose formation or performance would violate the Act were void, and the Court concluded that Congress intended “that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract.” 444 U. S., at 19. But the Court refused to allow recovery of monetary relief in a private suit alleging violations of the Act, stating that, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent, “where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.” Ibid. We have also indicated that “make whole” remedies are not ordinarily appropriate in private actions seeking relief for violations of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to its “power under the Spending Clause to place conditions on the grant of federal funds.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 15 (1981). This is because the receipt of federal funds under typical Spending Clause legislation is a consensual matter: the State or other grantee weighs the benefits and burdens before accepting the funds and agreeing to comply with the conditions attached to their receipt. Typically, before funds are advanced, the appropriate federal official will determine whether the grantee’s plan, proposal, or program will satisfy the conditions of the grant or other extension of federal funds, and the grantee will have in mind what its obligations will be. When in a later private suit brought by those for whose benefit the federal money was intended to be used it is determined, contrary to the State’s position, that the conditions attached to the fluids are not being complied with, it may be that the recipient would rather terminate its receipt of federal money than assume the unanticipated burdens. Thus, the Court has more than once announced that in fashioning remedies for violations of Spending Clause statutes by recipients of federal funds, the courts must recognize that the recipient has “alternative choices of assuming the additional costs” of complying with what a court has announced is necessary to conform to federal law or of “not using federal funds” and withdrawing from the federal program entirely. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420-421 (1970). Although a court may identify the violation and enjoin its continuance or order recipients of federal funds prospectively to perform their duties incident to the receipt of federal money, the recipient has the option of withdrawing and hence terminating the prospective force of the injunction. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, supra, reiterated the Rosado approach: Remedies to enforce spending power statutes must respect the privilege of the recipient of federal funds to withdraw and terminate its receipt of federal money rather than assume the further obligations and duties that a court has declared are necessary for compliance. 451 U. S., at 29-30, 30, n. 23; id., at 53-55 (White, J., dissenting in part). The Court noted that “in no [Spending Clause] case . . . have we required a State to provide money to plaintiffs, much less required” a State to assume more burdensome obligations. Id., at 29. > HH Since the private cause of action under Title VI is one implied by the judiciary rather than expressly created by Congress, we should respect the foregoing considerations applicable in Spending Clause cases and take care in defining the limits of this cause of action and the remedies available thereunder. Because it was found that there was no proof of intentional discrimination by respondents, I put aside for present purposes those situations involving a private plaintiff who is entitled to the benefits of a federal program but who has been intentionally discriminated against by the administrators of the program. In cases where intentional discrimination has been shown, there can be no question as to what the recipient’s obligation under the program was and no question that the recipient was aware of that obligation. In such situations, it may be that the victim of the intentional discrimination should be entitled to a compensatory award, as well as to prospective relief in the event the State continues with the program. However that may be, the Court of Appeals in this case did not disturb the District Court’s finding that there was no intentional discrimination on racial grounds. The discrimination was unintentional and resulted from the disproportionate impact of the entry-level tests on racial minorities. In this and similar situations, it is not immediately obvious what the grantee’s obligations under the federal program were and it is surely not obvious that the grantee was aware that it was administering the program in violation of the statute or regulations. In such cases, proof of discriminatory impact does not end the matter. If the grantee can bear the burden of proving some “business necessity” for practices that have discriminatory impact, it has a complete affirmative defense to claims of violation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S., at 431. In the typical case where deliberate discrimination on racial grounds is not shown, the recipient will have at least colorable defenses to charges of illegal disparate-impact discrimination, and it often will be the case that, prior to judgment, the grantee will not have known or have had compelling reason to know that it had been violating the federal standards. Hence, absent clear congressional intent or guidance to the contrary, the relief in private actions should be limited to declaratory and injunctive relief ordering future compliance with the declared statutory and regulatory obligations. Additional relief in the form of money or otherwise based on past unintentional violations should be withheld. The foregoing considerations control decision in this case. I note first that Title VI is spending-power legislation: “It is not a regulatory measure, but an exercise of the unquestioned power of the Federal Government to ‘fix the terms on which Federal funds shall be disbursed.’ Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U. S. 127, 143 (1947). No recipient is required to accept Federal aid. If he does so voluntarily, he must take it on the conditions on which it is offered.” 110 Cong. Rec. 6546 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey). Accord, id., at 1527 (memorandum by Rep. Celler) (validity of Title VI “rests on the power of Congress to fix the terms on which Federal funds will be made available”); id., at 6562 (Sen. Kuchel); id., at 7063 (Sen. Pastore). Title VI rests on the principle that “taxpayers’ money, which is collected without discrimination, shall be spent without discrimination.” Id., at 7064 (Sen. Ribicoff). Accord, id., at 7054-7055, 7062 (Sen. Pastore); id., at 7102 (Sen. Javits); id., at 6566 (memorandum by the Republican Members of the House Committee on the Judiciary). The mandate of Title VI is “[v]ery simple. Stop the discrimination, get the money; continue the discrimination, do not get the money.” Id., at 1542 (Rep. Lindsay). Title VI imposes no obligations but simply “ ‘extends an option’” that potential recipients are free to accept or reject. Id., at 1527 (memorandum by Rep. Celler) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 480 (1923)). This legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended Title VI to be a typical “contractual” spending-power provision. Since Title VI is Spending Clause legislation, it is presumed that private litigants seeking to enforce compliance with its terms are entitled to no more than the limited remedy deemed available to the plaintiffs in Pennhurst. The inquiry is not at this point complete, however, because, like all rules of statutory construction, the Pennhurst presumption must “yield ... to persuasive evidence of contrary legislative intent.” Transamerica, 444 U. S., at 20. As in Trans-america, however, the relevant legislative history of Title VI reveals that “what evidence of intent exists in this case, circumstantial though it may be, weighs against the implication of a private right of action for a monetary award in a case such as this,” ibid., at least absent proof of intentional discrimination. Title VI does not explicitly allow for any form of a private right of action. This fact did not go unnoticed by Senators Keating and Ribicoff, who unsuccessfully proposed an amendment adding to Title VI a provision expressly allowing the institution of “a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, . . . by the person aggrieved.” 109 Cong. Rec. 15375 (1963). Senator Keating explained that, under this proposal, if someone violated Title VI, funds could be denied or “a suit for specific performance of the nondiscrimination requirement could be brought... by the victim of the discrimination.” Id., at 15376. The relevant language of the proposed amendment was identical to that of § 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3(a), the provision creating a private right of action to enforce Title II of the Act, which deals with discrimination in public accommodations. Suits under § 204(a) are “private in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general/ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 401-402 (1968). Senator Keating thought that elementary fairness required that victims of Title VI-proscribed discrimination be accorded the same private right of action as allowed in the “proposed education and public accommodations titles of the [Civil Rights] bill.” The Keating-Ribicoff proposal was not included in Title VI, but the important point for present purposes is that even the most ardent advocates of private enforcement of Title VI contemplated that private plaintiffs would only be awarded “preventive relief.” Like the drafters of Title II, they did not intend to allow private plaintiffs to recover monetary awards. Although the expressed intent of Senators Keating and Ribicoff is alone not determinative of whether a compensatory remedy may be obtained in a private action to enforce Title VI, “it is one more piece of evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause, of action for anything beyond limited equitable relief.” Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, supra, at 22. Surely, it did not intend to do so where intentional discrimination is not shown. The remaining indications of congressional intent are also circumstantial, but they all militate in favor of the conclusion that only prospective relief ordering compliance with the terms of the grant is appropriate as a private remedy for Title VI violations in cases such as this. The “greatest possible emphasis” was given to the fact that the “real objective” of Title VI was “the elimination of discrimination in the use and receipt of Federal funds.” 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey). See also id., at 7062 (Sen. Pastore). The remedy of termination of assistance was regarded as “a last resort, to be used only if all else fails,” because “cutoffs of Federal funds would defeat important objectives of Federal legislation, without commensurate gains in eliminating racial discrimination or segregation.” Id., at 6544, 6546 (Sen. Humphrey). To ensure that this intent would be respected, Congress included an explicit provision in § 602 of Title VI that requires that any administrative enforcement action be “consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.” 42 U. S. C. §2000d-l. Although an award of damages would not be as drastic a remedy as a cutoff of funds, the possibility of large monetary liability for unintended discrimination might well dissuade potential nondiscriminating recipients from participating in federal programs, thereby hindering the objectives of the funding statutes. See 633 F. 2d, at 261-262 (opinion of Meskill, J.). In summary, there is no legislative history that in any way rebuts the Pennhurst presumption that only limited injunc-tive relief should be granted as a remedy for unintended violations of statutes passed pursuant to the spending power. What little evidence there is evinces an intent not to allow any greater relief. I conclude that compensatory relief, or other relief based on past violations of the conditions attached to the use of federal funds, is not available as a private remedy for Title VI violations not involving intentional discrimination. V If the relief unavailable under Title VII and ordered under Title VI is the kind of relief that should be withheld in enforcing a Spending Clause statute, the Court should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals without more. Only if all or some of this relief is the kind of declaratory or prospective relief that private enforcement of Title VI properly contemplates should the Court of Appeals be reversed in whole or in part. To resolve this matter, I now consider the items of relief ordered by the District Court to determine if any element is a permissible injunctive remedy. Although the Eleventh Amendment cases are not dispos-itive here, in holding that only prospective relief is available to remedy violations of federal law by state officials, the Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667 (1974), observed that the difference between permissible and impermissible relief “will not in many instances be that between day and night.” It seems as patent here as in the Eleventh Amendment context that the relief cannot include a monetary award for past wrongs, even if the award is in the form of “equitable restitution” instead of damages. See id., at 665-667. However, prospective relief need not be “totally without effect on the [defendant’s] revenues”; injunctive relief is permissible even if it means that the defendants, in order to shape their conduct to the mandate of the court’s decree, will have to spend more money “than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct.” Id., at 667-668. The key question for present purposes is whether the decree requires the payment of funds or grants other relief, “not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of compensation” or other relief based on or flowing from violations at a prior time when the defendant “was under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard.” Id., at 668. The District Court in the present case granted a number of relatively discrete items of relief. First, each class member was awarded constructive seniority, which included the right to: (1) “all monetary entitlements which [the class members] would have received had they been appointed on their constructive seniority date,” including backpay and back medical and insurance benefits; and (2) all other entitlements relative to the award of constructive seniority, including salary, benefits, and pension rights. Also, respondents were directed to give a sergeant’s examination to those class members whose constructive seniority would have entitled them to take the last such examination. Finally, in an effort to insure that future hiring practices would be nondiscriminatory, respondents were ordered to consult with petitioners on the preparation and use of future police officer examinations for the next two years, and to provide petitioners with race and ethnicity information regarding the scores of the next scheduled examination. App. A99-A107. On the one hand, it is obvious that the award of backpay and back benefits constitutes relief based upon past conduct no longer permissible; it therefore should not stand. On the other hand, it is without doubt that the portion of the order requiring consultation to insure that future examinations will not have discriminatory effects constitutes permissible injunc-tive relief aimed at conforming respondents’ future conduct to the declared law. This leaves the award of constructive seniority for purposes of future entitlements: the right to take the special sergeant’s examination ordered by the District Court and the right to an increase of salary and benefits to the level warranted by the constructive seniority. Because such an award affects only the future conduct of a defendant, it arguably could be categorized as permissible prospective relief. I conclude, however, that an award of constructive seniority, for any purpose whatsoever, must be deemed impermissible retroactive relief. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 766-767 (1976), we identified two types of seniority — “benefit” and “competitive status.” The first of these, “which determines pension rights, length of vacations, size of insurance coverage and unemployment benefits, and the like, is analogous to backpay. . . . Benefit-type seniority, like backpay, serves to work complete equity by penalizing the wrongdoer economically at the same time that it tends to make whole the one who was wronged.” Id., at 786-787 (Powell, J.). A general bar to the award of retroactive seniority “reduces the restitution required of an employer at such time as he is called upon to account for his discriminatory actions perpetrated in violation of the law.” Id., at 767, n. 27 (opinion of the Court). Since constructive benefit-type seniority in this case is obviously restitutionary and remedial in nature, it is “a form of compensation” to those whose rights were violated at a time when the respondents were “under no court-imposed obligation to conform to a different standard. ” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 668. It is therefore not an appropriate remedy for the Title VI violations alleged here. An award of “competitive status” seniority, although prospective in form, nevertheless constitutes a form of compensation or relief based on past conduct now deemed violative of the Act. In no respect can such an award be said to be “a necessary consequence,” ibid., of future Title VI compliance by the employer. It therefore must also be considered an inappropriate Title VI remedy. I also note that competitive-type seniority “determines an employee’s preferential rights to various economic advantages at the expense of .other employees. These normally include the order of layoff and recall of employees, job and trip assignments, and consideration for promotion.” Franks, supra, at 787 (Powell, J.). Although an award of constructive seniority of this nature does not result in any increased costs to the wrongdoing employer, it “directly implicate[s] the rights and expectations of perfectly innocent employees,” 424 U. S., at 788, and it can only be viewed as compensation for a past wrong. Accordingly, I conclude that neither “benefit” nor “competitive status” constructive seniority may be obtained as a private remedy for Title VI violations, at least in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent to me that the only proper Title VI relief granted by the District Court is the order directing the respondents to take actions and make disclosures intended to insure that future hiring practices will be nondiscriminatory and valid. However, this relief is wholly sustainable under the District Court’s findings and conclusions with respect to petitioners’ Title VII claim, and all members of the class will fully benefit from it. There is thus no need to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I — I > In conclusion, for the reasons expressed above, I am convinced that discriminatory intent is not an essential element of a Title VI violation, but that a private plaintiff should recover only injunctive, noncompensatory relief for a defendant’s unintentional violations of Title VI. Such relief should not include an award of constructive seniority. Albeit on different grounds, the judgment below is Affirmed,. Section 601 of the Act, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The five of us reach the conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred by different routes. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun, reasons that, although Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent, the administrative regulations incorporating a disparate-impact standard are valid. Post, at 642-645. Justice Marshall would hold that, under Title VI itself, proof of disparate-impact discrimination is all that is necessary. Post, at 623. I agree with Justice Marshall that discriminatory animus is not an essential element of a violation of Title VI. I also believe that the regulations are valid, even assuming, arguendo, that Title VI, in and of itself, does not proscribe disparate-impact discrimination. Part II, infra. The class representatives are The Guardians Association of the New York City Police Department, Inc., The Hispanic Society of the New York City Police Department, Inc., Oswaldo Perez, and Felix E. Santos. Petitioners also alleged that the Department’s 5' 7" minimum height requirement discriminated against Hispanics. The disposition of this issue in the lower courts is not now before us. This was petitioners’ second judicial attack on the Department’s use of the examinations. Petitioners first filed suit in 1972, but the District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the making of appointments from the ranked eligibility lists generated by the challenged examinations, on the basis that the eligibility lists would soon be fully exhausted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Guardians Assn. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 490 F. 2d 400 (CA2 1973). Petitioners unsuccessfully sought to revive the earlier case before filing the present suit. See 633 F. 2d 232, 235 (CA2 1980). Among these was a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, which the District Court twice rejected because petitioners failed to prove discriminatory intent, which the court found to be a necessary element of a § 1981 cause of action. 431 F. Supp. 526, 534 (SDNY 1977); 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1276, n. 4 (SDNY 1979). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 633 F. 2d, at 263-268. Petitioners raised this § 1981 issue in their petition for certiorari, but they abandoned it after our decision last Term in General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375 (1982), resolved the issue adversely to them. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 1, n. The District Court correctly relied on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), and its progeny, as the framework for its Title VII disparate-impact analysis. 431 F. Supp., at 538-539. The panel majority disagreed with Judge Meskill’s views, reading our decisions in Bakke and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), as allowing a private right of action under Title VI irrespective of the compensatory effect of the relief sought or granted. Also, fearing that part of the noncompensatory relief in the District Court’s order might not be available to the entire class under Title VII, the court could not agree with Judge Meskill’s conclusion that his rationale made it unnecessary to decide whether Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. 633 F. 2d, at 274. Respondents also filed a petition for certiorari, in which they seek review of the Court of Appeals’ determination that the plaintiff class is entitled to relief under Title VII. Civil Service Comm’n of the City of New York v. Guardians Assn., No. 81-432. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 287 (Powell, J.); id., at 328 (opinion of BRennan, White, MARSHALL, and Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Stevens correctly states that “when the Court unequivocally rejects one reading of a statute, its action should be respected in future litigation. ... If a statute is to be amended after it has been authoritatively construed by this Court, that task should almost always be performed by Congress.” Post, at 641. However, Justice Stevens appears to ignore his own admonition by disregarding the square holding of Lau v. Nichols, the only case that directly addressed the present issue. In Lau, we “unequivocally rejected]” the notion that Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent. Since Congress has chosen not to modify Title VI after it was “authoritatively construed” in Lau, we should be especially slow to adopt a new construction of the statute at this late date. Section 602 of Title VI, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d-l, empowers agencies providing federal financial assistance to issue “rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance . . . .” Justice Stewart explained that the regulations therefore should be upheld as valid, because they were “ ‘ “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.’”” Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S., at 571 (opinion concurring in result) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356, 369 (1973), in turn quoting Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U. S. 268, 280-281 (1969)). See 29 Fed. Reg. 16274-16305 (1964). As Justice Marshall notes, post, at 619, shortly after these initial regulations were promulgated, every Cabinet department and about 40 federal agencies adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination. Justice Marshall details, post, at 620, how Congress has rebuffed efforts to overturn the Title VI disparate-impact regulations, and how Congress, with full awareness of how the agencies were interpreting Title VI, has modeled later statutes on § 601 of Title VI, thus indicating approval of the administrative definition. Cf. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 291-300 (1981) (agency interpretation of a statute may be confirmed or ratified by congressional inaction). See Brief for Respondents 8-9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 281-284 (Powell, J.); id., at 328 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Id., at 379 (White, J.). This Justice, however, was of the view that where the alleged discriminatory conduct constitutes state action, a cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is available. Id., at 419-421, 420, n. 28 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). One Justice disagreed with the Court’s holding that a private right of action could be implied under Title IX itself, without expressing a view as to whether Title IX could be privately enforced via § 1983. 441 U. S., at 730-749 (Powell, J., dissenting). It is not uncommon in the law for the extent of a defendant’s liability to turn on the extent of his knowledge or culpability. Thus, it has been said that, under principles of contract law, a contracting party cannot be held liable for extraordinary harm due to special circumstances unless, at the time the contract was made, he knew or had reason to know the circumstances that made such extraordinary injury probable “so as to have the opportunity of judging for himself as to the degree of this probability.” 5 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1014 (1964). See also id., §§ 1006-1019; 11W. Jae-ger, Williston on Contracts § 1344A (3d ed. 1968). And in tort law, usually only persons who have intentionally or recklessly violated another’s rights are liable for punitive damages. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30 (1983); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 9-10 (4th ed. 1971). Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 335 (1963) (Sen. Keating). See also, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1520 (1964) (Rep. Celler); id., at 7068 (Sen. Pastore); id., at 7065 (Sen. Ribicoff). The lower courts are generally in agreement that it is not appropriate to award monetary damages for Title VI violations. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F. 2d 1185 (CA7 1981) (Title IX case), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 937 (1982); Drayden v. Needville Independent School District, 642 F. 2d 129, 133 (CA5 1981); Nabke v. HUD, 520 F. Supp. 5, 10-11 (WD Mich. 1981); Concerned Tenants Assn. v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 526-527 (ND Ill. 1980); Rendon v. Utah State Dept. of Employment Security Job Service, 454 F. Supp. 534 (Utah 1978). See also C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Acts § 317 (1980); 2 N. Dorsen, P. Bender, B. Neuborne, & S. Law, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 608 (4th ed. 1979). But cf. Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969, 977-979 (CA8 1982) (holding that damages may be recovered under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was considered to be “closely analogous” to Title VI); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842 (Neb.) (dicta), aff’d without mention of remedies, 524 F. 2d 1013 (CA8 1975); Quiroz v. City of Santa Ana, 18 FEP Cases 1138 (CD Cal. 1978) (dicta); Flanagan v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (DC 1976) (dicta). Justice Stevens argues, post, at 638, that even if Title VI authorizes only a limited remedy, full relief is available in this case because the petitioners “sought relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,” and § 1983 “provides a damages remedy.” Damages indeed are usually available in a § 1983 action, but such is not the case when the plaintiff alleges only a deprivation of rights secured by a Spending Clause statute. Thus, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27-29 (1981), the Court indicated that, even if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under § 1983 for defendants’ alleged violations of certain Spending Clause legislation, the defendants would not be required “to provide money to [the] plaintiffs.” Justice Marshall erroneously contends, post, at 632, that my view “would allow recipients to violate the conditions of their contracts until a court identifies the violation and either enjoins its continuance or orders the recipient to begin performing its duties incident to the receipt of federal money.” This is not so, because the Federal Government can always sue any recipient who fails to comply with the terms of the grant agreement and force the violator to repay misspent funds. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 794 (1983) (White, J., concurring). But it is an entirely different matter to subject the recipient to open-ended liability to private plaintiffs. Justice Marshall’s third-party beneficiary analogy, post, at 632-633, is appealing, but he ignores the possibility that Congress may have felt that the salutary deterrent effect of a compensatory remedy was outweighed by the possibility that such a remedy would dissuade potential recipients from participating in important federal programs. Of course, not every contract that benefits third persons accords enforceable rights in such persons; it is a question of intent. See 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 777 (1951). Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) states that a party who contracts with a government agency to do an act or render a service to the public is generally not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from performance or failure to perform. The only exceptions to this rule involve situations where the terms of the contract provide for such liability, or where the governmental entity would be subject to liability to the injured member of the public. Ibid. Neither of these exceptions is applicable in the present context. As permitted by 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k) and 42 U. S. C. § 1988, the District Court also awarded attorney’s fees to petitioners. App. A107. Under Title VII, this type of relief can be granted unconditionally. Under Title VI, the defendants should be given the option of complying or terminating participation in the federal program. See Parts IV and V, supra. Despite the numerous opinions, the views of at least five Justices on two issues are identifiable. The dissenters, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, join with me to form a majority for upholding the validity of the regulations incorporating a disparate-impact standard. See n. 2, supra. A different majority, however, would not allow compensatory relief in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent. Justice Rehnquist and I reach this conclusion directly. See Parts III and IV, supra; post, at 612 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Powell, joined by The Chief Justice, post, at 608-610, believes that no private relief should ever be granted under Title VI under any circumstances. Justice O’Connor, post, at 615, would hold that all relief should be denied unless discriminatory intent is proved. It follows from the views of these three latter Justices that no compensatory relief should be awarded if discriminatory animus is not shown.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GRIFFIN v. WISCONSIN No. 86-5324. Argued April 20, 1987 Decided June 26, 1987 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, in Parts I-B and I-C of which Brennan, J., joined, and in Part I-C of which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 881. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 890. Alan G. Habermehl, by appointment of the Court, 479 U. S. 1053, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Barry M. Levenson, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General. Arthur Eisenberg filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Richard G. Taranto, and Kathleen A. Felton filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Ronald E. Niver and Stan M. Helfman, Deputy Attorneys General; and for the State of New York et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, Lawrence S. Kahn, Deputy Solicitor General, Judith T. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John J. Kelly, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, James T. Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, E. Cary Edwards, Attorney General of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, and T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his home searched by probation officers acting without a warrant. The officers found a gun that later served as the basis of Griffin’s conviction of a state-law weapons offense. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1005 (1986), to consider whether this search violated the Fourth Amendment. I On September 4, 1980, Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in Wisconsin state court of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and obstructing an officer. He was placed on probation. Wisconsin law puts probationers in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social Services and renders them “subject . . . to . . . conditions set by the court and rules and regulations established by the department.” Wis. Stat. § 973.10(1) (1985-1986). One of the Department’s regulations permits any probation officer to search a probationer’s home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe the presence of contraband — including any item that the probationer cannot possess under the probation conditions. Wis. Admin. Code HSS §§ 328.21(4), 328.16(1) (1981). The rule provides that an officer should consider a variety of factors in determining whether “reasonable grounds” exist, among which are information provided by an informant, the reliability and specificity of that information, the reliability of the informant (including whether the informant has any incentive to supply inaccurate information), the officer’s own experience with the probationer, and the “need to verify compliance with rules of supervision and state and federal law.” HSS §328.21(7). Another regulation makes it a violation of the terms of probation to refuse to consent to a home search. HSS § 328.04(3)(k). And still another forbids a probationer to possess a firearm without advance approval from a probation officer. HSS § 328.04(3)(j). On April 5, 1983, while Griffin was still on probation, Michael Lew, the supervisor of Griffin’s probation officer, received information from a detective on the Beloit Police Department that there were or might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. Unable to secure the assistance of Griffin’s own probation officer, Lew, accompanied by another probation officer and three plainclothes policemen, went to the apartment. When Griffin answered the door, Lew told him who they were and informed him that they were going to search his home. During the subsequent search — carried out entirely by the probation officers under the authority of Wisconsin’s probation regulation — they found a handgun. Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, which is itself a felony. Wis. Stat. §941.29(2) (1985-1986). He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that no warrant was necessary and that the search was reasonable. A jury convicted Griffin of the firearms violation, and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 126 Wis. 2d 183, 376 N. W. 2d 62 (1985). On further appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court also affirmed. It found denial of the suppression motion proper because probation diminishes a probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy — so that a probation officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, search a probationer’s home without a warrant, and with only “reasonable grounds” (not probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. It held that the “reasonable grounds” standard of Wisconsin’s search regulation satisfied this “reasonable grounds” standard of the Federal Constitution, and that the detective’s tip established “reasonable grounds” within the meaning of the regulation, since it came from someone who had no reason to supply inaccurate information, specifically identified Griffin, and suggested a need to verify Griffin’s compliance with state law. 131 Wis. 2d 41, 52-64, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 539-544 (1986). II We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it unnecessary to embrace a new principle of law, as the Wisconsin court evidently did, that any search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer satisfies the Fourth Amendment as long as the information possessed by the officer satisfies a federal “reasonable grounds” standard. As his sentence for the commission of a crime, Griffin was committed to the legal custody of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and Social Services, and thereby made subject to that Department’s rules and regulations. The search of Griffin’s home satisfied the demands of the Fourth Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement under well-established principles. A A probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be “reasonable.” Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution says warrants must be), see, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980), we have permitted exceptions when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, we have held that government employers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices without probable cause, O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987), and that school officials may conduct warrantless searches of some student property, also without probable cause, New Jersey v. T. L. O., swpra. We have also held, for similar reasons, that in certain circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements as long as their searches meet “reasonable legislative or administrative standards.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967). See New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 702-703 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 602 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 XJ. S. 311, 316 (1972). A State’s operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements. Probation, like incarceration, is “a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.” G. Killinger, H. Kerper, & P. Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System 14 (1976); see also 18 U. S. C. § 3651 (1982 ed. and Supp. III) (probation imposed instead of imprisonment); Wis. Stat. § 973.09 (1985-1986) (same). Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. A number of different options lie between those extremes, including confinement in a medium- or minimum-security facility, work-release programs, “halfway houses,” and probation — which can itself be more or less confining depending upon the number and severity of restrictions imposed. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §3563 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (effective Nov. 1, 1987) (probation conditions authorized in federal system include requiring probationers to avoid commission of other crimes; to pursue employment; to avoid certain occupations, places, and people; to spend evenings or weekends in prison; and to avoid narcotics or excessive use of alcohol). To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972). These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large. See State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 652-653, 247 N. W. 2d 696, 700 (1976). These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed. Recent research suggests that more intensive supervision can reduce recidivism, see Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 49 Fed. Probation 9 (June 1985), and the importance of supervision has grown as probation has become an increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes, see id., at 4. Supervision, then, is a “special need” of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large. That permissible degree is not unlimited, however, so we next turn to whether it has been exceeded here. B In determining whether the “special needs” of its probation system justify Wisconsin’s search regulation, we must take that regulation as it has been interpreted by state corrections officials and state courts. As already noted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court — the ultimate authority on issues of Wisconsin law — has held that a tip from a police detective that Griffin “had” or “may have had” an illegal weapon at his home constituted the requisite “reasonable grounds.” See 131 Wis. 2d, at 64, 388 N. W. 2d, at 544. Whether or not we would choose to interpret a similarly worded federal regulation in that fashion, we are bound by the state court’s interpretation, which is relevant to our constitutional analysis only insofar as it fixes the meaning of the regulation. We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin’s probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by “reasonable grounds,” as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct, see New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 340, and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create, see New York v. Burger, 482 U. S., at 710; United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316. By way of analogy, one might contemplate how parental custodial authority would be impaired by requiring judicial approval for search of a minor child’s room. And on the other side of the equation — the effect of dispensing with a warrant upon the probationer: Although a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen. He is an employee of the State Department of Health and Social Services who, while assuredly charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer (who in the regulations is called a “client,” HSS § 328.03(5)). The applicable regulations require him, for example, to “[p]rovid[e] individualized counseling designed to foster growth and development of the client as necessary,” HSS § 328.04(2)(i), and “[m]onito[r] the client’s progress where services are provided by another agency and evaluate] the need for continuation of the services,” HSS §328.04(2)(o). In such a setting, we think it reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement. Justice Blackmun’s dissent would retain a judicial warrant requirement, though agreeing with our subsequent conclusion that reasonableness of the search does not require probable cause. This, however, is a combination that neither the text of the Constitution nor any of our prior decisions permits. While it is possible to say that Fourth Amendment reasonableness demands probable cause without a judicial warrant, the reverse runs up against the constitutional provision that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Arndt. 4. The Constitution prescribes, in other words, that where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also of such a nature as to require probable cause. Although we have arguably come to permit an exception to that prescription for administrative search warrants, which may but do not necessarily have to be issued by courts, we have never done so for constitutionally mandated judicial warrants. There it remains true that “[i]f a search warrant be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions for its issue.” Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 373 (1959). Justice Blackmun neither gives a justification for departure from that principle nor considers its implications for the body of Fourth Amendment law. We think that the probation regime would also be unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause. To take the facts of the present case, it is most unlikely that the unauthenticated tip of a police officer — bearing, as far as the record shows, no indication whether its basis was firsthand knowledge or, if not, whether the firsthand source was reliable, and merely stating that Griffin “had or might have” guns in his residence, not that he certainly had them — would meet the ordinary requirement of probable cause. But this is different from the ordinary case in two related respects: First, even more than the requirement of a warrant, a probable-cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement. The probationer would be assured that so long as his illegal (and perhaps socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently concealed as to give rise to no more than reasonable suspicion, they would go undetected and uncorrected. The second difference is well reflected in the regulation specifying what is to be considered “[i]n deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to believe ... a client’s living quarters or property contain contraband,” HSS §328.21(7). The factors include not only the usual elements that a police officer or magistrate would consider, such as the detail and consistency of the information suggesting the presence of contraband and the reliability and motivation to dissemble of the informant, HSS §§328.21(7) (c), (d), but also “[ijnformation provided by the client which is relevant to whether the client possesses contraband,” and “[t]he experience of a staff member with that client or in a similar circumstance.” HSS §§ 328.21(7)(f), (g). As was true, then, in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987), and New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325 (1985), we deal with a situation in which there is an ongoing supervisory relationship —and one that is not, or at least not entirely, adversarial— between the object of the search and the decisionmaker. In such circumstances it is both unrealistic and destructive of the whole object of the continuing probation relationship to insist upon the same degree of demonstrable reliability of particular items of supporting data, and upon the same degree of certainty of violation, as is required in other contexts. In some cases — especially those involving drugs or illegal weapons — the probation agency must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society. The agency, moreover, must be able to proceed on the basis of its entire experience with the probationer, and to assess probabilities in the light of its knowledge of his life, character, and circumstances. To allow adequate play for such factors, we think it reasonable to permit information provided by a police officer, whether or not on the basis of firsthand knowledge, to support a probationer search. The same conclusion is suggested by the fact that the police máy be unwilling to disclose their confidential sources to probation personnel. For the same reason, and also because it is the very assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law, we think it enough if the information provided indicates, as it did here, only the likelihood (“had or might have guns”) of facts justifying the search. The search of Griffin’s residence was “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider whether, as the court below held and the State urges, any search of a probationer’s home by a probation officer is lawful when there are “reasonable grounds” to believe contraband is present. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is Affirmed. HSS § 328 was promulgated in December 1981 and became effective on January 1, 1982. Effective May 1, 1986, HSS § 328.21 was repealed and repromulgated with somewhat different numbering and without relevant substantive changes. See 131 Wis. 2d 41, 60, n. 7, 388 N. W. 2d 535, 542, n. 7 (1986). This opinion will cite the old version of § 328.21, which was in effect at the time of the search. We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly infringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are “ ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U. S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 89 (1987)). We have no occasion in this case to decide whether, as a general matter, that test applies to probation regulations as well. If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty — e. g., a restriction on his movements — the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatural an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to provide adequate notice. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358 (1983); Lambert v. California, 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957). That is not an issue here since, even though the petitioner would be in violation of his probation conditions (and subject to the penalties that entails) if he failed to consent to any search that the regulation authorized, see HSS §328.04(3)(k), nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be advised, at the time of the request for search, what the probation officer’s “reasonable grounds” were, any more than the ordinary citizen has to be notified of the grounds for “probable cause” or “exigent circumstances” searches before they may be undertaken. In the administrative search context, we formally require that administrative warrants be supported by “probable cause,” because in that context we use that term as referring not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement of reasonableness. See, e. g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 320 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). In other contexts, however, we use “probable cause” to refer to a quantum of evidence for the belief justifying the search, to be distinguished from a lesser quantum such as “reasonable suspicion.” See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 724 (1987) (plurality); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 341-342 (1985). It is plainly in this sense that the dissent uses the term. See, e. g., post, at 881-883 (less than probable cause means “a reduced level of suspicion”). 5 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 307 (“We hold that. . . the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent”). The “neutral magistrate,” Camara, supra, at 532, or “neutral officer,” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 323, envisioned by our administrative search cases is not necessarily the “neutral judge,” post, at 887, envisioned by the dissent. It is irrelevant whether the probation authorities relied upon any peculiar knowledge which they possessed of petitioner in deciding to conduct the present search. Our discussion pertains to the reasons generally supporting the proposition that the search decision should be left to the expertise of probation authorities rather than a magistrate, and should be supportable by a lesser quantum of concrete evidence justifying suspicion than would be required to establish probable cause. That those reasons may not obtain in a particular case is of no consequence. We may note, nonetheless, that the dissenters are in error to assert as a fact that the probation authorities made no use of special knowledge in the present case, post, at 890. All we know for certain is that the petitioner’s probation officer could not be reached; whether any material contained in petitioner’s probation file was used does not appear. The dissenters speculate that the information might not have come from the police at all, “but from someone impersonating an officer.” Post, at 888. The trial court, however, found as a matter of fact that Lew received the tip on which he relied from a police officer. See 131 Wis. 2d, at 62, 388 N. W. 2d, at 543. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed that finding, ibid., and neither the petitioner nor the dissenters assert that it is clearly erroneous. The dissenters assert that the search did not comport with all the governing Wisconsin regulations. There are reasonable grounds on which the Wisconsin court could find that it did. But we need not belabor those here, since the only regulation upon which we rely for our constitutional decision is that which permits a warrantless search on “reasonable grounds.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the requirement of “reasonable grounds” to have been met on the facts of this case and, as discussed earlier, we hold that such a requirement, so interpreted, meets constitutional minimum standards as well. That the procedures followed, although establishing “reasonable grounds” under Wisconsin law, and adequate under federal constitutional standards, may have violated Wisconsin state regulations, is irrelevant to the ease before us.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY CO. et al. v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. et al. No. 8. Argued April 19, 1967. Decided May 29, 1967 Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for appellants in No. 8. With him on the briefs were William H. Allen, Nuel D. Belnap, Richard M. Freeman, Bryce L. Hamilton, Raymond K. Merrill and Nye F. Morehouse. Arthur J. Cerra argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 23. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert B. Hummel, Jerry Z. Pruzansky and Robert W. Ginnane. Howard J. Trienens argued the cause for appellees Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al. With him on the brief were Douglas F. Smith, George L. Saunders, Jr., and Gary L. Cowan. George L. Saunders, Jr., argued the cause for appellees Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. et al. With him on the brief was John E. McCullough. Calvin L. Rampton argued the cause for appellees Arizona Corporation Commission et al. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton and Richard W. Sabin. Cyril M. Saroyan argued the cause for appel-lees the State of California et al. With him on the brief were Mary Moran Pajalich and J. Thomason Phelps. Walter R. McDonald filed a brief for the Southern Governors’ Conference et al., as amici curiae, in No. 23. Together with No. 23, United States et al. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al., also on appeal from the same court. Me. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion the Court. This is a controversy between the Mountain-Pacific railroads and certain Midwestern railroads, involving the proper division between them of joint rates from through freight service in which they both participate. Dissatisfied with their share of existing divisions, the Midwestern carriers called upon the Interstate Commerce Commission’s statutory authority to determine that joint rate divisions “are or will be unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly preferential,” and to prescribe “just, reasonable, and equitable divisions” in their place. The Commission found that the existing divisions were unlawful, and established new divisions which, on the average, gave the Midwestern carriers a greater share of the joint rates. The District Court set aside the Commission’s order on the ground that certain of its findings were deficient. We noted probable jurisdiction, 383 U. S. 964, to consider important questions regarding the Commission’s powers and procedures raised by the District Court’s decision. I. There were originally three groups of railroads involved in the proceedings before the Commission: the Eastern, Midwestern, and Mountain-Pacific carriers. The Eastern railroads operate in the northeastern area of the United States extending south to the Ohio River and parts of Virginia and west to central Illinois. Midwestern Territory lies between Eastern Territory and the Rocky Mountains, and the rest of the United States to the west constitutes Mountain-Pacific Territory. The latter is subdivided into Transcontinental Territory — comprising the States bordering the Pacific, Nevada, Arizona, and parts of Idaho, Utah, and New Mexico — and Inter-mountain Territory. The railroads operating in Southern Territory, which includes the southeastern United. States, were not involved in the proceedings before the Commission. Railroads customarily establish joint through rates for interterritorial freight service, and the divisions of these rates, fixed by the Commission or by agreement, determine what share of the joint tariffs each of the several participating carriers receives. See St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136, 139-140, n. 2. In 1954 the Eastern carriers filed a complaint with the Commission seeking a greater share of the joint tariff on freight traffic east and west between Eastern Territory and Transcontinental Territory. Shortly thereafter, the Midwestern carriers also filed a complaint, requesting higher divisions on (1) their intermediate service on Eastern-Transcontinental traffic, (2) their service on freight traffic east and west between Midwestern Territory and Transcontinental Territory. Some of the Midwestern lines had long believed that the Mountain-Pacific carriers enjoyed an unduly high share of the joint tariffs for these categories of traffic. When joint rates for traffic to the western United States were first established in the 1870’s, rates were divided on the basis of the miles of carriage rendered by the participating railroads, but the Mountain-Pacific carriers enjoyed a 50% inflation in their mileage factor. In 1925, after the Commission had begun, but not yet completed, an investigation of the existing divisions, the Mountain-Pacific carriers agreed to modest increases in the Midwestern railroads' share of joint rates. The divisions between Mountain-Pacific and Midwestern carriers have remained unchanged since that time. In the proceedings before the Commission, which consolidated the Eastern and the Midwestern complaints, the Mountain-Pacific railroads not only defended the existing divisions, but sought a 10% increase in their share. Regulatory commissions of States in Mountain-Pacific Territory also intervened. The consolidated proceedings involved rate divisions affecting about 300 railroads, which voluntarily aligned themselves into three groups— Eastern, Midwestern, and Mountain-Pacific — and submitted evidence and tried the case on this group basis. A great deal of time was consumed in compiling and introducing massive amounts of evidence — more than 800 exhibits and over 11,200 pages of testimony. The Hearing Examiners made a recommended report in 1960. After considering written briefs and oral arguments from the various groups of parties, the Commission issued its original report in March of 1963. The Commission found the existing divisions to be unlawful, and prescribed increased divisions for the Midwestern and Eastern carriers, effective July 1, 1963. When exercising its statutory authority to establish “just and reasonable” divisions under § 15 (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission is required to: “[G]ive due consideration, among other things, to the efficiency with which the carriers concerned are operated, the amount of revenue required to pay their respective operating expenses, taxes, and a fair return on their railway property held for and used in the service of transportation, and the importance to the public of the transportation services of such carriers; and also whether any particular participating carrier is an originating, intermediate, or delivering line, and any other fact or circumstance which would ordinarily, without regard to the mileage haul, entitle one carrier to a greater or less proportion than another carrier of the joint rate, fare or charge.” After reviewing the nature of the traffic involved and considering the special claims of the various groups, the Commission found that “none of the contending groups is more or less efficiently operated than another,” and that “there are no differences in the importance to the public attributable to the three contending groups of carriers.” Its decision thus turned on more direct financial considerations, to which the Commission devoted a substantial part of its lengthy report. Under Commission practice, these financial considerations are divided into “cost of service” and “revenue needs.” The former consists of the out-of-pocket expenses directly associated with a particular service, including operating costs, taxes, and a four percent return on the property involved. “Revenue needs” refers to broader requirements for funds in excess of out-of-pocket expenses, including funds for new investment. In determining cost of service, the Commission relied upon a cost study prepared by the Mountain-Pacific railroads, but introduced certain modifications that produced different results. The Commission found that existing divisions on Eastern-Transcontinental traffic gave the Mountain-Pacific carriers revenues that exceeded their costs by 57%, while the Midwestern and Eastern railroads received only 43% and 22% more, respectively, than their costs for the service they contributed. On Midwestern-Transcontinental traffic, the Commission found that the divisions gave the Mountain-Pacific carriers revenues 71% above cost, while the Midwestern lines received only 39% above cost; on this traffic the Midwestern railroads bore 31.5% of the total cost but received only 27.1% of the total revenue. In assessing comparative revenue needs, the Commission found, that the average rate of return for 1946-1958, based on net railway operating income from all services as a percentage of the value of invested property, was 3.40% for the Eastern roads, 3.49% for the Midwestern group, and 4.64% for the Mountain-Pacific carriers. The Commission also found that the Mountain-Pacific railroads had the most favorable record and trend in both freight volume and freight revenues, and the Eastern railroads the least favorable, with the Midwestern roads occupying an intermediate position. In response to the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ complaint that their net operating income from all services had not increased as fast as net investment in recent years, the Commission noted that this was primarily due to disproportionate passenger deficits that offset favorable income from freight services. The Commission also discounted the contention that the Mountain-Pacific carriers were entitled to greater revenues to provide funds for new investment, finding that the needs of the various carrier groups for such funds were not appreciably different. The claim of the Midwestern carriers that they had the most pressing need for revenues was also rejected by the Commission. From all this evidence, the Commission concluded “that there should be increases in [the Eastern carriers’] divisions reflecting revenue need as well as cost.” While the very poor financial position and high revenue needs of the Eastern carriers were thus important elements in prescribing increases in their divisions, the Commission went on to find cost considerations the controlling factor with regard to the Midwestern divisions: “As between the [Mountain-Pacific railroads] and the [Midwestern] railroads the differences in earning power are less marked, but our consideration of the evidence bearing on cost of service previously discussed convinces us that the primary midwestern divisions as a whole are too low.” In establishing higher divisions for the Eastern carriers, the Commission relied upon the existing percentages governing divisions of the various rates between well-defined subareas in Eastern Territory and points in Transcontinental Territory. The Commission simply increased the percentages that the Eastern carriers formerly received on this traffic. However, the Commission concluded that it could not follow this procedure with respect to Midwestern divisions on Eastern-Transcontinental and Midwestern-Transcontinental traffic. It found that Midwestern-Transcontinental subgroupings were not well-defined and were in some cases not properly related to distance. Thus it was not feasible to assemble rates from various Midwestern points to Transcontinental points into common groups and apply fixed percentage divisions to each group in order to determine the respective shares of the Midwestern and Mountain-Pacific carriers. Instead, the Commission resorted to a weighted mileage basis of apportionment, determined through the use of divisional scales. The Commission has frequently used such scales in the past, and their use in this case was suggested by both the Midwestern and Mountain-Pacific carriers. Under the system adopted, the mileage contributed by each carrier to the joint service is broken down into 50-mile blocks. The scale chosen assigns each block a number. A large number is assigned the first block, and a smaller number to successive 50-mile increments; this is designed to reflect terminal and standby costs incurred regardless of the length of carriage contributed. Each carrier then receives a share of the joint revenue in proportion to the sum of scale numbers corresponding to its mileage contribution. To determine the divisions between the Midwest-ern and Mountain-Pacific carriers, the Commission used a 29886 scale — so named because it was developed in another interterritorial divisions case bearing that docket number. This scale assigns a factor of 65 to the first 50-mile block of carriage and a factor of 12 to each successive 50-mile increment. The Commission decided that the Midwestern carriers’ shares would be determined by an unadjusted 29886 scale, but that the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ shares should be based on the same scale with the mileage factors inflated by 10% to reflect certain greater costs of carriage in the mountainous West. Thus, for their carriage, the Mountain-Pacific carriers would enjoy a factor of 72 for the first 50-mile block, and a factor of 13 for successive 50-mile increments. For any joint carriage, the Midwestern and Mountain-Pacific carriers would translate their mileage contributions into scale numbers, and divide the proceeds in proportion to the numbers so obtained. The divisions thus essentially reflect a mileage basis, with disproportionate weight assigned the first 50 miles of carriage and an overall inflation factor favoring the Mountain-Pacific carriers. The Commission found that the net effect of its revised scale would be to “produce moderate increases in some of the most important midwestern divisions.” After entertaining petitions for reconsideration, the Commission adopted a supplemental report in late 1963. For the first time, a few carriers abandoned the three-group basis on which all the prior proceedings had been conducted. Requests for special treatment were made on behalf of one Mountain-Pacific road, the Denver & Rio Grande, and two Midwestern carriers, the Missouri-Kansas-Texas (Katy) and the St. Louis-San Francisco (Frisco), on the ground that the divisions prescribed by the Commission had an unduly harsh effect on them. The Commission considered and largely rejected these and other criticisms of its original decision, and issued a supplemental order substantially reaffirming its original order after making minor technical modifications. Eleven of the Mountain-Pacific carriers brought an action in the District Court to enjoin and set aside the Commission’s orders and succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctions. Other Mountain-Pacific carriers, the western state regulatory commissions, and the Katy and the Frisco intervened as plaintiffs, while the Eastern carriers and a group of Midwestern railroads intervened on the side of the Government and the Commission as defendants. In January 1965 the District Court handed down the decision setting aside the Commission’s orders. The court held that the findings made by the Commission with regard to the revenue need, cost of service, public importance, etc., of the Eastern, Midwestern, and Mountain-Pacific carriers were insufficient because they were made on a group basis. In the view of the District Court, the Interstate Commerce Act required the Commission to make such findings with respect to each of the 300 railroads involved, on an individual basis. The District Court further held that in a divisions case the Commission is obliged to determine, in precise dollar amount, the revenue needs of each individual railroad, and also the revenue effect on each individual railroad, again in precise dollar amount, of the new divisions that the Commission establishes. The District Court in conclusion stated: "[T]hat to comply with . . . the Interstate Commerce and the Administrative Procedure Acts . . . the Commission is required to make affirmative findings which disclose that the requirements of Section 15 (6) have been met and the factors therein required have been determined and considered, not only as to the groups of roads involved but with respect to each carrier affected in said groups; that findings must be made as to the amount of revenue, in terms of dollars, required by the respective carriers affected in any new divisions prescribed, the financial effect of the Commission’s orders in terms of dollars as to the carriers and the extent to which the new divisions prescribed will produce the revenue found to be required . . . ." The Eastern carriers, the Midwestern defendants, and the Government and the Commission all appealed the decision of the District Court. Thereafter, all of the Eastern and some of the Midwestern carriers reached settlement agreements with the Mountain-Pacific carriers covering the rate divisions affecting them. We accordingly vacated the judgment of the District Court with respect to the divisions of the Eastern and the settling Midwestern railroads, and remanded the relevant portions of the appeals to the District Court with instructions to dismiss as moot. 383 U. S. 832, 384 U. S. 888. Thus, the principal dispute remaining concerns the divisions between the Mountain-Pacific carriers and the eight principal Midwestern roads that are appellants in No. 8. II. None of the appellees now defends the position, espoused by the District Court, that the Commission was required to make separate individual findings for each of the 300 railroads involved in the proceedings before it. But the error in that position, which rejects over 40 years of consistent administrative practice, requires comment. In its first decision involving rate divisions under § 15 (6), the New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, the Court upheld the authority of the Commission to take evidence and make findings on a group basis. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Brandéis noted that the “actual necessities of procedure and administration” required procedures on a group basis in ratemaking cases, and that a similar practice was appropriate in divisions cases. The complexity of the subject matter and the multiplicity of carriers typically involved in divisions cases were such that a wooden requirement of individual findings would make effective regulation all but impossible. The Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act permits the Commission to proceed on a group basis and to rely on “evidence which the Commission assumed was typical in character, and ample in quantity” to justify its findings, reasoning that: “Obviously, Congress intended that a method should be pursued by which the task, which it imposed upon the Commission, could be performed. ... To require specific evidence, and separate adjudication, in respect to each division of each rate of each carrier, would be tantamount to denying the possibility of granting relief. We must assume that Congress knew this . . . .” 261 U. S., at 196-197. Both the Court and the Commission have consistently adhered to this construction of the Act’s requirements, and its rejection by the District Court in this case was error. The pragmatic justifications for the Commission’s group procedures are obvious. Even on a group basis, the Commission proceedings in this case required a voluminous record and were not completed until nearly 10 years after the complaints were filed. To demand individual evidence and findings for each of the 300 carriers in the Commission proceedings would so inflate the record and prolong administrative adjudication that the Commission’s regulatory authority would be paralyzed. Nor do considerations of fairness require disregard of administrative necessities. The premise of group proceedings, as the New England Divisions Case explicitly recognized, is that evidence pertaining to a group is typical of its individual members. 261 U. S., at 196-199. See also Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74, 82-83. It has always been accepted that an individual carrier may challenge this premise and, on proper showing, receive independent consideration if its individual situation is so atypical that its inclusion in group consideration would be inappropriate. It is the Commission’s practice to accord independent treatment to an individual carrier when a proper request for special consideration is made. But no such requests were made during the hearings and presentation of evidence in this case. Instead, the individual carriers voluntarily aligned themselves into groups, presented evidence and tried the case on a group basis, and asked the Commission to prescribe new divisions on a group basis. In this situation, the Commission was not obliged on its own motion to demand evidence and make findings on an individual basis. Departure from the practicalities of group procedure is justified only when there is a real need for separate treatment of a given carrier; the individual carriers themselves, which have the closest understanding of their own situation and interests, are normally the appropriate parties to show that such need exists. The Denver & Rio Grande, the Katy, and the Frisco did request independent consideration in petitions for reconsideration of the Commission’s original decision. Their claims will be discussed below in Part VI of this opinion, but it should be noted that at no point during the administrative hearings or the presentation of evidence did they raise any claim for separate treatment. Moreover, their contention basically is not that the group evidence or findings were unrepresentative, but rather that the divisions prescribed by the Commission have an unduly harsh impact on them. Even if it were assumed that the Commission’s- disposition of this contention was erroneous, that would be no ground for requiring the Commission to make individual findings for the rest of the 300 carriers involved. III. Among the errors that the District Court found in the Commission’s decision was its failure to state the revenue needs of each individual carrier in terms of precise dollar amount. While not defending the requirement of individual findings, the appellees do contend that the Commission was required to determine the revenue needs of the various carrier groups in precise dollar amount, and they also urge other errors in the Commission’s treatment of revenue needs. We believe, however, that in the case’s present posture these criticisms are largely misdirected. In increasing the shares of the Eastern railroads the Commission did rely on revenue needs as well as costs, but it found costs alone the controlling factor in raising the divisions of the Midwestern carriers. In the conclusions in its original report, the Commission stated that there should be increases in the Eastern divisions “reflecting revenue need as well as cost,” but in the very next sentence it went on to say that as between the Midwestern and Mountain-Pacific roads, “differences in earning power are less marked, but our consideration of the evidence bearing on cost of service previously discussed convinces us that the primary midwestern divisions as a whole are too low.” Its reliance on costs alone in increasing the Midwestern shares is confirmed by the Commission’s supplemental report, in which it again rejected a request of the Midwestern carriers for even higher divisions based on their claim of pressing revenue needs: “It was our stated view that [increases in the Midwestern divisions] were supported by the evidence concerning cost of service, but that the proposal of the midwestern lines gave undue weight to their claimed revenue need.” Since revenue needs were important factors only with regard to the Eastern divisions, and those divisions are no longer in issue because the Eastern roads have settled with the Mountain-Pacific carriers, any errors committed by the Commission in its treatment of revenue needs are no longer relevant. But even assuming that the Commission did attach some limited significance to revenue needs in raising the Midwestern divisions, we cannot conclude that its treatment of revenue needs was legally inadequate. The Commission devoted over 25 pages of its reports to revenue needs. It discussed at length the proper basis for computing rates of return and found the rates of return for the various carrier groups; it also examined the record and trends in net railway operating income from all services, and from freight and passenger services considered separately. The Commission placed considerable emphasis on rates of return in its discussion of comparative revenue needs. Following its established practice, it found that a value basis, rather than book cost, as urged by the Mountain-Pacific roads, was the proper method for calculating the investment base. The evidence disclosed that the Mountain-Pacific fines had enjoyed a 4.64% return, as opposed to 3.40% for the Eastern fines, and 3.49% for the Midwestern fines. The suggestion that these findings in terms of rate of return were insufficient because they did not express revenue needs in terms of absolute dollar amount is totally novel and unreasonable. This suggestion seems to stem from a misconception of the Commission’s function in divisions cases. Its task is not to transfer lump sums of cash from one carrier to another, but to “make divisions that colloquially may be said to be fair.” B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 357. The relative financial strength of the carriers involved is a key factor in this task, see the New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 189 — 192, and the use of comparative rates of return is an obviously appropriate basis for the exercise of administrative judgment. Rates of return are a familiar tool of analysis in the financial community. The Commission has long relied on this form of analysis in divisions cases, and in passing on the Commission’s performance in such cases, this Court has never suggested that ultimate findings of revenue need in terms of absolute dollar amount were required. Appellees are unable to suggest any clear regulatory purpose that would be served by such findings. We decline now to impose upon the Commission a rigid mechanical requirement that is without foundation in precedent, practice, or policy. Appellees, especially the regulatory commissions, vigorously contend that reliance on rates of return showing the Mountain-Pacific carriers in a heavily favorable position was inappropriate because the Commission overlooked the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ disproportionate need for funds for new investment. It might be questioned whether forcing carriers in other parts of the country to accept divisions lower than those to which they would otherwise be entitled is a sensible means of raising funds for new investment in the Far West. But the Commission did not reach this issue because it found that the Mountain-Pacific carriers did not in fact have a greater need for investment funds than railroads elsewhere: “We are unable to agree with the [Mountain-Pacific carriers] and [the regulatory commissions] that the public interest warrants increases in the divisions of the mountain-Pacific railroads in order to provide a source of investment funds required for enlarged facilities commensurate with industrial development in that region. The railroads in all sections of the country are faced with the continuing necessity of raising funds for additions and betterments and new equipment, and we cannot recognize any difference in the degree of this urgency among the territorial groups.” The appellees have sought to convince us that this finding is factually incorrect, but we decline to invade the administrative province and second-guess the Commission on matters within its expert judgment. B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 359; Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. United States, 340 U. S. 216, 227-228. The appellees also contend that the Commission erred in its treatment of passenger deficits. In discussing revenue needs, the Commission pointed out that since 1950-1952 the Mountain-Pacific carriers had enjoyed substantial increases in operating revenue from freight services, while the freight revenue of the Eastern carriers had declined. It also noted that the Midwestern carriers’ freight revenues had remained relatively constant, and concluded that these comparative trends were likely to continue. The Mountain-Pacific carriers, however, complained that, despite their favorable trend in freight revenues and large amounts of new investment that they had recently made, their rate of return from all services had declined. In reply, the Commission observed that the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ passenger deficits had increased substantially since 1950-1952 and had offset their impressive performance in freight revenues. The Mountain-Pacific roads now argue that the Commission’s decision to increase the Midwestern divisions was based almost exclusively on its treatment of Mountain-Pacific passenger deficits. They further contend that this treatment was invalid on the grounds that it constituted unfair procedural surprise, that the statute does not permit the Commission to differentiate railroads’ performance as freight carriers and passenger carriers when it assesses revenue needs in a freight rate divisions case, and that the Commission erred in assuming that, because their statistical passenger deficits had increased, the Mountain-Pacific carriers were capable of making a real improvement in their overall performance by reducing passenger service. We regard the assumption that the Commission attached great importance to Mountain-Pacific passenger deficits in raising the Midwestern divisions as fanciful. As we have already noted, those increases were based exclusively or almost entirely on cost considerations. To the extent the Commission may have relied on comparative revenue needs, passenger deficits were not a significant factor. The discussion of passenger deficits in the Commission’s original report occurred primarily in the context of comparing the revenue needs of the Mountain-Pacific carriers with those of the Eastern roads, when the Commission emphasized that the Eastern railroads had been much more successful in curbing losses on passenger service than the Mountain-Pacific carriers. Any error in the Commission’s treatment of passenger deficits prejudiced the Midwestern as well as the Mountain-Pacific carriers, for in rejecting a Midwestern revenue needs argument in its supplemental report, the Commission noted that the Midwestern carriers had also done a much poorer job than the Eastern carriers in halting the swell of passenger deficits. Furthermore, the Commission did not ignore the overall financial strength of the various groups of carriers, but found that the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ rate of return from all services was substantially higher than that of either the Midwestern or Eastern carriers. The claim of unfair surprise is strained in light of the fact that the Commission has frequently differentiated passenger and freight revenues in freight rate division cases. While passenger deficits did not become an important issue in this case until the report of the Hearing Examiners was handed down, the Commission relied upon statistics which were matters of public record, and the Mountain-Pacific carriers had ample opportunity to debate the issue in their exceptions to the Hearing Examiners’ report and their petitions for reconsideration of the Commission’s original decision. And while the Commission has sometimes acted to offset passenger deficits in freight rate cases, the issues are quite different when, in a divisions case, it is argued that carriers in one part of the country should subsidize the passenger operations of carriers elsewhere. If the Commission were to give controlling weight to passenger deficits in a divisions case, it might be appropriate to take more evidence on the issue and discuss it in greater depth than the Commission did here. But in light of the fact that, in this case, passenger deficits were of negligible relevance to the Commission’s decision to increase the Midwestern divisions, we find no errors in the Commission’s findings and procedure on this point that would justify setting aside its order. IV. Rejection of the appellees’ attacks on the Commission’s treatment of revenue needs does not exhaust their arsenal. For they argue that the Commission’s findings on costs, which were the basis of its decision to raise the Midwestern divisions, were also infected with serious error. All are agreed that the relevant costs are those of the Eastern-Transcontinental and Midwestern-Transcontinental freight traffic to which the divisions apply. But throughout the proceedings there has been sharp dispute as to the proper method of ascertaining these costs. At the beginning of the administrative hearings, the Midwestern and Eastern carriers relied principally on the Commission’s standard Rail Form A, a formulation based on average freight data which, as the Commission noted, “has been widely used as an acceptable means of comparing relative transportation costs.” The Mountain-Pacific carriers took the position that Rail Form A, based on averages of all freight service, was not a proper yardstick for measuring the costs of the particular traffic involved in the contested divisions, which, they maintained, had certain distinctive characteristics. The Mountain-Pacific roads prepared their own cost system, based upon a study of this traffic. The Midwestern and Eastern lines responded with other material, and the Midwestern carriers conducted their own special study of line-haul services. Disputes over the applicability of Rail Form A and the various approaches urged by the parties occupied a large part of the administrative proceedings. As the Commission observed: “The evidence pertaining to the cost studies of the [Mountain-Pacific carriers] and the midwestern lines was extensive. In addition to the detailed testimony of the cost analysts who planned the studies and supervised their compilation, evidence was presented by many other witnesses concerned with operating, statistical, engineering, and mathematical aspects of the projects. In criticism of the studies the [Eastern carriers] and the midwestern lines also introduced detailed evidence of the same general nature and considerable bulk.” After carefully considering this evidence, the Commission decided to base its cost findings on the special cost study and analysis prepared by the Mountain-Pacific carriers. However, it made certain adjustments in the Mountain-Pacific analysis which, in the judgment of the Commission, more accurately reflected the true costs of the traffic involved. The Commission substituted its own ratio for empty-car returns, derived from Rail Form A, for that devised by the Mountain-Pacific carriers. It summarized its reasons for this choice in its supplemental report: “It is difficult to ascribe the empty movement of a car to a particular commodity or class of traffic because of the variety of the lading, and the fact that cars used occasionally for hauling transcontinental traffic may at other times serve widely different uses, including local movements within each territory .... The defendants urge that insufficient consideration was given to special cars .... They would be included in [Rail Form A] tending to increase the empty-return ratios in all territories. Here they accounted for only about 4 percent of the total movement .... “Many special studies of empty-return movement were undertaken in these proceedings, each showing a different result. The deficiencies in the [Mountain-Pacific carriers’] studies of general-purpose boxcar empty return . . . are so serious in our opinion as to render them without value. We adhere to our prior finding that the 7-day studies made under an order of the Commission and based on uniform instructions to all the railroads as to how the studies were to be made, afford a more reliable basis of comparison among territories. Moreover, on the basis of the evidence in this record, the 7-day studies provide appropriate comparative ratios to the traffic in issue.” The Commission also disagreed with the Mountain-Pacific study’s treatment of the “constant cost” element of road costs — that which is unrelated to volume of traffic. It found the accounting methods used to distribute these costs in Rail Form A to be more accurate. The Mountain-Pacific roads claimed that this method unduly favored the Midwestern lines by improperly ascribing the maintenance costs of branch and light-density main lines to the cost of their transcontinental traffic. The Commission, however, found that the evidence showed: “[T]hat the proportion of branch line mileage for each group is almost the same and the amount of traffic on branch lines is so small that some other factors cause the lower unit cost in mountain-Pacific territory. The principal factor is clearly the high density of traffic, 76 percent higher than the Midwest. “Although the cost per mile may be somewhat higher in mountainous territory, this higher cost is shared by so many more tons of traffic that the cost per ton-mile is lower. “It is the light density on the main lines in the Midwest which causes [their] higher costs. These lines are used by bridge traffic, and it is, therefore, quite correct to charge this bridge traffic with its proportionate share of maintaining the lines over which it moves.” The Commission made certain adjustment in the basis for determining locomotive costs; the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ objections to this adjustment were directed at the Commission’s reliance on differences it found between engine districts in Eastern Territory and those elsewhere. Any error in this adjustment is thus relevant only to the Eastern divisions, which are no longer in issue. The Commission also substituted Rail Form A treatment of car service costs, after finding that the Mountain-Pacific study ignored actual territorial differences in this item. Again, this issue related only to the Eastern divisions. In ascertaining the cost attributable to equipment used in the service at issue, the Commission chose a 4% rate of return on investment, a figure traditionally employed by it for this purpose, rather than the 6% figure urged by the Mountain-Pacific carriers. And, in harmony with its treatment of revenue needs, the Commission chose its standard value basis to measure the investment involved, rather than the book cost used by the Mountain-Pacific study. From the Mountain-Pacific cost study, as adjusted in these particulars, the Commission found that the Mountain-Pacific carriers enjoyed a much higher margin of revenue over costs than did the Midwestern carriers, and for this reason prescribed increases in the Midwestern divisions. In the proceedings before the District Court, the Mountain-Paeific carriers generally attacked the adjustments made by the Commission in their cost study, claiming that their approach more accurately reflected the costs involved. They particularly maintained that the Commission should have forced the Eastern and Midwestern carriers to produce evidence on empty-car return ratios on the same basis that the Mountain-Pacific carriers had used in their cost study. The Midwestern carriers, however, had come forward with specific empty-return data, and the Commission also observed that: “In the prehearing conference in the instant cases the advisability of instituting an overall general investigation was discussed but the [Mountain-Pacific carriers] opposed the suggestion, and the matter was dropped. . . . Nor do we see in the record any basis for assuming that the eastern and midwestern complainants withheld vital evidence merely because they had different conceptions of the nature and extent of facts to be developed.” The Mountain-Pacific carriers also contended that certain factual premises on which the Commission based its allocation of road maintenance costs were erroneous, and that there was no foundation for the Commission’s choice of a value basis for investment rather than book cost. The District Court did not directly deal with these contentions, stating rather cryptically that in light of its conclusions on the revenue needs issues, “it is unnecessary to discuss [the cost issues]. However, no inference is to be drawn that the court is of the opinion that the [cost issues], or any other numbered issues not discussed in this opinion, are of the nature it would be required to decide should they be raised at some future time.” The appellees argue that since the District Court failed to pass on the cost issues, we are precluded from doing so. It is true that we have occasionally stated that it is not our general practice “to review an administrative record in the first instance.” United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U. S. 562, 578; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 382 U. S. 154, 157. But we think that policy is not applicable on the facts of this case. The presentation and discussion of evidence on cost issues constituted a dominant part of the lengthy administrative hearings, and the issues were thoroughly explored and contested before the Commission. Its factual findings and treatment of accounting problems concerned matters relating entirely to the special and complex peculiarities of the railroad industry. Our previous description of the Commission’s disposition of these matters is sufficient to show that its conclusions had reasoned foundation and were within the area of its expert judgment. B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 359; New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 328, 335, 349. Thirteen years have elapsed since the complaints in this case were first filed. The appellees’ attacks on the legal validity of the Commission’s findings on cost are so insubstantial that no useful purpose would be served by further proceedings in the District Court. We conclude that there was no legal infirmity in the Commission’s cost findings. Y. The Commission devised a special divisional scale, adapted to the particular circumstances of this case and designed to produce the moderate overall increases in the Midwestern divisions that it found justified by the evidence relating to cost of service. Appellees contend that the Commission did not sufficiently explain its choice of new divisions, that the divisions are not justified by the evidence relating to cost, and that the Commission was required to find the exact revenue effect of the new divisions in precise dollar amount. None of these contentions has sufficient merit to warrant setting aside the Commission’s order. In discussing its choice of the modified 29886 divisional scale, the Commission stated: “Although broad groups are now employed in connection with the divisions of rates between mid-western and transcontinental territories, they are less well defined than those on which the [Eastern-Transcontinental] divisions are based, and in a number of instances they appear not to be properly related to distance. The midwestern lines urge that in lieu of prescribing new [Midwestern-Transcontinental] divisions on a group basis we should formulate scales of divisional factors and authorize the two groups of carriers to apply these to groups agreed upon by them. The defendants apparently are not opposed to that course. In our opinion divisional scales afford an appropriate means of readjusting the [Midwestern-Transcontinental] divisions, and the possibility of such use was discussed extensively in the record.” The Commission then rejected certain divisional scales urged by the Mountain-Pacific lines on the ground that they were not justified by the evidence on cost of service. However, it found that the 29886 scale, which had been discussed by a witness for the Mountain-Pacific carriers, and which the Commission had employed previously, could be adapted for use in this case after adjustments were made to reflect certain Mountain-Pacific costs: “Consistency with our action in prescribing intra-territorial class rates for mountain-Pacific territory higher than those in the rest of the country . . . makes it logical to provide a higher scale of divisional factors for that territory here, but a difference of more than 10 percent would not be justified in our opinion. The scales shown in appendix C reflect that difference. They would produce moderate increases in some of the most important midwestern divisions.” Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, relied upon by the appellees, is thus inapposite. In that case the Court stressed that there were “no findings and no analysis” to justify the Commission’s choice of remedy, “no indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion.” 371 U. S., at 167. See also Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 115, 129-131. Here the Commission explained why it had resorted to divisional scales and why it modified the familiar 29886 scale; it found that the modified scale would produce divisions appropriate to its cost findings. The Commission’s “expert discretion” has a considerable role to play in so technical a matter as railroad rate divisions, and there was sufficient explanation of its exercise in this case. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. United States, 340 U. S. 216, 227-228; Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 548. Appellees claim that if the changes in divisions were based on costs, the Commission was required to start from scratch and construct the new divisional scale directly from cost data. In their view, a scale like that used by the Commission in this case, constructed on a weighted mileage basis and adjusted to reflect comparative costs, is per se invalid. We cannot impose such mechanical restrictions on the range of remedies from which the Commission may choose. It is true that in a more recent territorial divisions case, involving Eastern and Southern Territories, the Commission did establish a divisional scale constructed directly from costs. But the two methods of constructing divisional scales are merely alternative mechanisms for dividing rates in conformity with the evidence. What is appropriate in one case may be inappropriate in another, and the fact that the Commission may, in the light of accumulating experience, devise new remedial techniques does not make the ones that it formerly employed unlawful. It is also true that the changes produced by the new scale were not the same for every existing division. Some of the particular Midwestern divisions were increased more than others, and a few were actually reduced. But that is only to be expected when a uniform scale is substituted for divisions produced by negotiation between the several carriers, and especially when, as the Commission found, the existing divisions were based on subgroupings that were not well-defined. Cf. Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74, 86-88. The Commission’s cost findings dictated moderate overall increases in the Midwestern divisions; the remedy it chose was appropriately calculated to achieve that result. The District Court held that the Commission was required to find the exact effect, in precise dollar amount, of the new divisions on the revenues of each of the 300 carriers involved in the Commission proceedings. The appellees also contend that the Commission was obliged to make such findings, at least with respect to the various carrier groups involved. These views stem from the same misconception of the Commission’s decision that we have already dealt with in the discussion concerning revenue needs. The Commission did not undertake to transfer lump sums of money from the Mountain-Pacific carriers to the Midwestern roads in order to meet certain defined revenue needs of the latter carriers. If it had, there might be more substance to these contentions. But, even in such a case, all the details of the divisions’ actual operation might be difficult to foresee, and precise calculation impossible. It is also dubious whether any useful regulatory purpose would be served by such a rigid requirement, which this Court has never imposed in the past. In any event, the Commission’s action in this case was based not on revenue needs, but cost of service, and it found that the divisions which it established would produce moderate overall increases in the shares of the Midwestern group, in accord with its cost findings. None of the figures, charts, or tables concocted by the appellees convinces us that this determination was not based upon substantial evidence. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. United States, 340 U. S. 216, 227-228. Finally, the Mountain-Pacific carriers quarrel with the Commission’s prescription of a minimum division of 15%. They contend that the evidence pertaining to terminal costs and standby costs that a participating railroad must incur regardless of the length of its carriage does not justify so high a minimum division. But the Commission found that: “Both in many divisional bases voluntarily established in the past and as well in our decisions it has been common practice to accord minimum divisions for carriers having relatively short hauls, sometimes as high as 20 or 25 percent but more usually 15 percent. The increasingly burdensome terminal costs in recent years are persuasive that a 15-percent minimum is justified.” We cannot find that the Commission exceeded its proper role in weighing and interpreting the evidence when it made this finding. B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, 359. For similar reasons, we also reject the Mountain-Pacific carriers’ criticism of the weight assigned to the first 50 miles of carriage in the Commission’s divisional scales. YI. The appellees finally contend that the Commission erred in its treatment of a single Mountain-Pacific carrier, the Denver & Rio Grande, and two Midwestern carriers, the Katy and the Frisco. It is argued that the situation of these three carriers was dissimilar to that of the groups with whom they were considered, that the typical evidence rule of the New England Divisions Case was inapplicable, and that the Commission was therefore required to make separate findings concerning these carriers. The appellants point out that these carriers voluntarily aligned themselves with their respective groups, presented evidence and argued the case on that basis, and never suggested that they should receive separate treatment until after the Commission’s original decision. They argue that the Commission should not be required, on its own motion, to guess which of 300 carriers may require individual treatment when none of them even requests it. Cf. United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U. S. 33, 37. The District Court resolved these contentions by stating that “there has been no intentional relinquishment of a known right on the part of any of these roads.” This language is more appropriate to a criminal trial than an administrative proceeding. Reconciling the need for efficient regulatory adjudication with fairness to the parties and due concern for the public interest is a different, and difficult, problem. But we need not undertake to resolve this problem in all its broad ramifications. The contentions made on behalf of the three individual carriers are basically quite limited. It is not argued that the Commission erred in generally treating them on a group basis and not making individual findings on their costs and revenue needs. The basic claim is that the divisions prescribed by the Commission have an unfair and unduly harsh impact on these individual carriers. The Katy and the Frisco claim that the new divisions will result in a net decrease in their revenue shares; while many of their divisions were increased under the Commission’s order, some highly profitable divisions that they had negotiated with respect to lumber carriage were reduced. The Commission found that this situation “was fully disclosed in the evidence of the midwestern lines and foreshadowed in the examiners’ recommended report. The petitioners are therefore not in a position to claim that the effect of our decision was a surprise.” But more than procedural grounds justify rejecting the tardy claims of the Frisco and the Katy for separate treatment. The Act does not give any carrier a vested right to divisions that it may have negotiated. It does not recognize prescriptive privileges, but requires the Commission to establish “just, reasonable, and equitable divisions.” The mere fact that the new divisions may have caused a net reduction in the revenues of two Midwestern carriers while raising those of other Midwestern carriers does not establish the invalidity of the new divisions. For the high divisions on lumber previously negotiated by these two roads may have been far in excess of their cost of service. The Katy and the Frisco have not shown that the new divisions do not fairly reflect their cost of service. The Commission was justified in stating that “[w]e see no reason for making a special exception from our findings” for them. Moreover, the losses claimed by the Frisco and the Katy were based primarily on the new divisions’ effect in apportioning revenues between themselves and the Mountain-Pacific carriers. But this aspect of the case is no longer in issue, because the Katy and the Frisco have settled with the Mountain-Pacific carriers and agreed on negotiated divisions. Thus, the Commission’s divisions affect the Katy and the Frisco only insofar as they must divide revenues with other Midwestern carriers on service in which they jointly participate. The Katy and the Frisco are silent as to the effect on their revenues of the new divisions operating in this much more limited respect. We may assume that the losses produced, if any, are small. The Denver & Rio Grande also complains of reductions in its revenues caused by the new divisions. Since it is one of the Mountain-Pacific carriers, whose existing divisions the Commission found too high in terms of cost of service, some reduction was of course to be expected. But the Denver & Rio Grande states that its competitive and geographical situation is such that it must bear a disproportionate share of the reductions in the Mountain-Pacific divisions, with allegedly disastrous effects on its net income. The Rio Grande participates in transcontinental service between Utah gateways (Ogden and Salt Lake City) and Denver and Pueblo, Colorado, on the border of Mountain-Pacific Territory. There it interchanges with Midwestern carriers who provide service to the Missouri River and beyond. The Union Pacific operates entirely by itself a competitive route between Utah and Missouri River gateways. Both the Union Pacific and the Rio Grande accept traffic at the Utah gateways from the Western Pacific and the Southern Pacific. The Commission’s divisions break at the border of Mountain-Pacific territory, at the Colorado junctions, but do not provide for any subdivisions in Mountain-Pacific territory. The Rio Grande complains that, as a result, it must bear the whole reduction in the Mountain-Pacific divisions. Its competitor, the Union Pacific, is unaffected by the new divisions because it operates in both Mountain-Pacific and Midwestern territory and does not, insofar as relevant here, interchange with Midwestern carriers. The Rio Grande contends that the Southern Pacific and Western Pacific will not accept divisions from it lower than they obtain from the Union Pacific, and thus it will be squeezed. It alleges that it will lose $8,500,000 as a result, and that its net income is only $10,500,000. Divisions over these competing Utah-Missouri River routes were equalized under the existing system. In the Commission proceedings, the Midwestern carriers urged that these routes also be equalized under the new divisions. However, this would require the Commission to establish subdivisions in Mountain-Pacific territory east and west of the Utah gateways, and the Mountain-Pacific carriers, including the Rio Grande, resisted this proposal on the ground that it was outside the issues raised by the pleadings. If the Rio Grande’s description of its competitive situation is accurate it was obvious, from at least the time of the examiners’ recommended report, that it would bear most or all of the reductions in the Mountain-Pacific divisions unless the Commission prescribed subdivisions within Mountain-Pacific territory. Nevertheless, it joined the other Mountain-Pacific lines in stating to the Commission that: “The Midwestern lines ask that the Commission fix divisions over Utah gateways, not served by any Midwestern line, in the interest of equalizing competing routes. ... In dealing with this contention, two considerations must be sharply differentiated. The first is the general desirability of equalizing divisions; the Mountain-Pacific lines agree that the parties should be free to equalize divisions over competitive routes .... But a very different question is raised when the Midwestern lines ask the Commission to prescribe divisions over gateways 500 miles inside Mountain-Pacific territory and served only by Mountain-Pacific lines. Such a prescription is beyond the issues of the complaints before the Commission in this proceeding.” In rejecting the belated claims made by the Mountain-Pacific carriers on behalf of the Rio Grande, the Commission was justified in concluding that: “The midwest-ern complainants are correct in stating that the ‘problem is left precisely where the transcontinental defendants insisted that it be left.’ We therefore see no reason for the modification of our findings sought by the defendants.” Of course, the Commission could not simply rest on such notions of estoppel to justify infliction of substantial injury upon an important railroad serving the public. But it was not at all clear at the time of the Commission’s decision, and it is still not clear, that the new divisions will have the disastrous or unfair effects alleged by the Rio Grande. The revenue effect on the Rio Grande hinges, in important part, on the subdivisions it is able to negotiate with the other Mountain-Pacific carriers. The Mountain-Pacific carriers, including the Rio Grande, urged the Commission to permit such voluntary negotiation in the first instance before taking action itself. The Commission acceded to this request by specifically providing in its orders that the carriers involved were free to negotiate divisions to equalize competitive routes between gateways. Thus at the time of the Commission’s decisions, the impact of the new divisions on the Rio Grande’s revenues was speculative and uncertain, and voluntary negotiation of subdivisions was available. It could be assumed that the actual reduction in the Rio Grande’s revenues might turn out to be no greater than that of the other Mountain-Pacific carriers. In these circumstances, the Commission was not required to rearrange the foundations of a decision that had been reached after long years of proceedings and affected 300 carriers, nor was it required to embark on new hearings to deal with the Rio Grande’s claims. It now appears that the impact of the new divisions may in fact be much less severe than the Rio Grande feared. The Midwestern appellants have cited evidence tending to show that the reduction in its revenue is more like $850,000 than $8,500,000. We, of course, do not resolve this issue. But we do think that the Commission was justified in refusing plenary consideration of the Rio Grande’s claims in 1963. If the Commission’s new divisions, in connection with the subdivisions that the Rio Grande is able to negotiate with its fellow Mountain-Pacific carriers, do have an impact on the Rio Grande that is unfairly disproportionate or so severe that the Rio Grande’s ability to provide service is jeopardized, the Rio Grande may apply to the Commission for relief. There is no reason to suppose that relief will not be promptly forthcoming if the Rio Grande’s claim is meritorious. We conclude as did the Court in the New England Divisions Case: “To consider the weight of the evidence, or the wisdom of the order entered, is beyond our province. . . . But the way is still open to any carrier to apply to the Commission for modification of the order, if it is believed to operate unjustly in any respect.” 261 U. S., at 204. VII. We hold that the Commission’s original and supplemental orders are valid, and that the District Court erred in setting them aside. When it entered interlocutory injunctions against these orders, the District Court imposed certain protective conditions. They provided that if the Commission’s orders were eventually upheld, they would be deemed effective as of July 1, 1963, and March 30, 1964, respectively, and the various carriers would be required to resettle the interim revenues they received in accordance with the divisions established in the orders. Pending appeal of its final decision to this Court, the District Court stayed execution of its judgment permanently setting aside the Commission’s order and remanding the case to the Commission; with the consent of the parties, it also provided that these protective conditions should be continued in effect. The Commission has required the carriers involved to adopt certain accounting procedures designed to facilitate the eventual implementation of these protective conditions. Since we now uphold the validity of the Commission’s orders, it will be necessary for the District Court, with such assistance from the Commission as seems appropriate, to supervise resettlement of revenues in accordance with its protective conditions. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Interstate Commerce Act, §15 (6), 41 Stat. 486, 49 U. S. C. § 15 (6). See also § 1 (4) of the Act, 54 Stat. 900, 49 U. S. C. §1 (4), which provides, in pertinent part, that: “It shall be the duty of every . . . common carrier establishing through routes . . . in case of joint rates, fares, or charges, to establish just, reasonable, and equitable divisions thereof, which shall not unduly prefer or prejudice any of such participating carriers.” 3211. C. C. 17, 322 I. C. C. 491. 238 F. Supp. 528. Certain Southern carriers did participate in some of the proceedings before the Commission in relation to service they perform in Eastern Territory. And the Southern Governors’ Conference and the Southeastern Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, parties in pending litigation involving divisions between Southern and Eastern Territory, filed an amicus brief here. Assume a carriage of 1,000 miles by a Mountain-Pacific road and 500 miles by Midwestern carrier. On a straight mileage basis of dividing the joint rate fare, the Mountain-Pacific carrier would receive two-thirds of the fare and the Midwestern road one-third. Under the system described in the text, the Mountain-Pacific carrier would be credited with 1,500 miles of carriage and the Midwestern line 500. They would accordingly divide the joint fare on a three-fourths-one-fourth basis. In 1929, the Commission undertook another investigation of the Midwestern-Transcontinental divisions. In 1934, on the basis of a record it termed “most unsatisfactory,” the Commission concluded that “we are unable to find that the divisions of the transcontinental rates are unlawful.” Divisions of Freight Rates, 203 I. C. C. 299, 335. In the present proceeding, the Commission stated that the weight to be ascribed its 1934 decision was a question “of little moment ... in view of changes which have occurred in the intervening years.” 321 I. C. C. 17, 72. Interstate Commerce Act, §15(6), 41 Stat. 486, 49 U. S. C. §15 (6). The value of the investment base was determined for this purpose by the valuations of railroad property made by the Commission’s Bureau of Valuation. Thus, for carriage between the Buffalo-Pittsburgh area to points on or near the Pacific coast, with interchange at Chicago, the Commission provided that the Eastern carrier should receive 22% of the joint fare, leaving the remaining 78% to be divided between carriers providing service west of Chicago. Official-Southwestern Divisions, 287 I. C. C. 553. A few of the 50-mile increments enjoy a factor of 13. See table, n. 13, infra. Some of the 50-mile increments enjoy factors of 14 or 15. See table, n. 13, infra. The scale prescribed by the Commission is as follows: Scales op Divisional Factors. Miles One Two Three Miles One Two Three 50 65 72 1.100 318 292 350 100 77 85 1,150 330 304 363 150 89 98 1,200 342 316 376 200 101 75 111 1,250 354 328 389 250 113 87 124 1,300 367 341 404 300 125 99 138 1,350 379 353 417 350 137 111 151 1,400 391 365 430 400 149 123 164 1,450 403 443 450 161 135 177 1,500 415 457 500 174 148 191 1,550 427 470 550 186 160 205 1,600 439 483 600 198 172 218 1,650 451 496 650 210 184 231 1,700 463 509 700 222 196 244 1,750 475 523 750 234 208 257 1,800 487 536 800 246 220 271 1,850 499 549 850 258 232 284 1,900 511 562 900 270 244 297 1,950 523 575 950 282 256 310 2,000 535 589 1,000 294 268 323 2,050 547 602 1,050 306 280 337 2.100 559 615 Definitions. Column Three provides the factor for the Mountain-Pacific haul. Column One provides the Midwestern factor on Midwestern-Transcontinental traffic, and Column Two the Midwestern factor for Eastern-Transcontinental traffic. Column Two also applies to subdivisions of carriage in Midwestern Territory. To illustrate the operation of the scale, assume a carriage of 1,000 miles in Midwestern Territory by a Midwestern railroad and an additional carriage by a Mountain-Pacific road of another 1,000 miles in Mountain-Pacific Territory. Column One gives the Midwestern carrier a factor of 294, and Column Three assigns the Mountain-Pacific railroad a factor of 323. The sum of the factors is 617. The Midwestern carrier would receive 294/617, or 48% of the joint rate, and the Mountain-Pacific carrier 323/617, or 52% of the rate. Certain individual contentions were also made by the Wabash Railroad on petition for reconsideration before the Commission, but they are no longer part of the issues in these cases (hereafter referred to as this case). The nonsettling Midwestern railroads include the eight appellants in No. 8, the Chicago & North Western, the Chicago Great Western, the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific, the Green Bay and Western, the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio, the Illinois Central, the Missouri Pacific, and the Soo Line, and 45 of their short-line connections. Also involved are subdivisions in Midwestern Territory between the Midwestern appellants and the settling Midwestern roads. Furthermore, five of the Midwestern appellants operate in a small part of Eastern Territory, comprising southeastern Illinois and a few areas in Indiana. The Eastern divisions are applicable to some of these operations, but the only active issue between the appellants and the Mountain-Pacific roads relating to these divisions is a 15% minimum division prescribed by the Commission and discussed in Part V of this opinion. 238 F. Supp., at 539. Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74; B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349; Boston & Maine R. Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 26, affirming 208 F. Supp. 661. E. g., Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I. C. C. 135; Divisions of Rates, Official and Southern Territories, 234 I. C. C. 175; Official Western Trunk Line Divisions, 269 I. C. C. 765; Official- Southern Divisions, 287 I. C. C. 497; Official-Southwestern Divisions, 287 I. C. C. 553, 289 I. C. C. 11; Official-Southern Divisions, 325 I. C. C. 1. We cannot accept the notion that the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U. S. C. §§ 551-559 (1964 ed. Supp. II), overruled these established precedents and imposed a requirement of individual findings upon the Commission. For example, in Official-Southern Divisions, 325 I. C. C. 1, 449, the Commission undertook separate consideration and prescribed special divisions for the Norfolk Southern Railroad after that carrier had disassociated itself from its geographical group and presented evidence on an individual basis. That the Commission based its increase of the Midwestern divisions on costs is further indicated by its rejection, in its original report, of divisional scales proposed by the Mountain-Pacific carriers on the ground that they were based on studies which “understate the costs of the midwestern lines.” The Eastern divisions do apply to some service by five of the Midwestern appellants in a small part of Eastern Territory, but the only active issue with regard to these divisions is whether the Commission’s minimum 15% divisions are justified by the evidence on cost. See n. 17, supra. See n. 8, supra. As the Court observed in ICC v. Hoboken R. Co., 320 U. S. 368, 381, “The prescription of divisions where carriers are unable to agree is not a mere partition of property. It is one aspect of the general rate policy which Congress has directed the Commission to establish and administer in the public interest.” See also the New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 195. E. g., New England Divisions, 66 I. C. C. 196, 202; Alabama & Mississippi R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 95 I. C. C. 385, 402-403; Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I. C. C. 457, 476; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Arcade & A. R. Co., 194 I. C. C. 729, 752-755, 198 I. C. C. 375, 382-384; Divisions of Freight Rates, 203 I. C. C. 299, 328, 342; Southwestern-Official Divisions, 216 I. C. C. 687, 701-702, 739; Southwestern-Official Divisions, 234 I. C. C. 135, 146, 148; Official-Southern Divisions, 287 I. C. C. 497, 503-504; Official-Southwestern Divisions, 287 I. C. C. 553, 564, 289 I. C. C. 11, 12. Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74; B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349; Boston & Maine R. Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 26, affirming 208 F. Supp. 661. Cf. New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 329, 347-349. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U. S. 300, relied upon by the appellees, is not apposite. There the Court upheld the District Court in setting aside an order of the Commission made under § 13 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 383, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4). The Commission had ordered increases in fares on an intrastate passenger run made by the Milwaukee Road, on the ground that existing fares did not cover operating and indirect costs and thus constituted an “undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination” against the Milwaukee Road’s interstate operations. The Court held that the Commission erred in comparing the costs and revenues of the particular intrastate service involved instead of all the Milwaukee Road’s intrastate operations in Illinois taken together. In a footnote, the Court also stated that it agreed with the District Court’s holding that the Commission had not satisfactorily explained how it derived the figure of $77,000 as the commuter service’s proper share of indirect costs. 355 U. S., at 309-310, n. 8. It did not hold that in any consideration of revenue need the Commission must make findings in precise dollar amount, but that when it does make precise dollar findings as the basis for raising intrastate fares, it must explain how they were derived. Moreover, different issues are involved in an intrastate fare case and a rate divisions case, and in the former context this Court has noted that the Commission’s exercise of its § 13 (4) power must be scrutinized “with suitable regard to the principle that whenever the federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification of the exercise of the federal power must clearly appear.” Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 211-212. See also Pub. Service Comm’n v. United States, 356 U. S. 421, 425-426. Divisions of Freight Rates, 148 I. C. C. 457, 474-475; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Arcade & A. R. Co., 194 I. C. C. 729, 753, 755; Southwestern-Official Divisions, 216 I. C. C. 687, 698, 708; Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 235 I. C. C. 211, 236-237; Official Western Trunk Line Divisions, 269 I. C. C. 765, 772; Gardner v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 272 I. C. C. 529, 573-577. E. g., Increased Freight Rates, 1948, 276 I. C. C. 9, 35. See also King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254, 263-264. Also, when as little as 50% of the traffic on a branch lino was in some way related to interterritorial service, the Mountain-Pacific study charged 100% of the expenses of the branch to the cost of the latter service. The Commission’s rejection of this technique was not challenged in the District Court. 238 F. Supp., at 540. Official-Southern Divisions, 325 I. C. C. 1, 449. The parties in that case specifically requested a cost-constructed scale. See Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 36 F. 2d 789, 799. This Court has never suggested that there was legal infirmity in divisional scales constructed on a basis similar to that employed by the Commission in this ease. Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 74; B. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349; Boston & Maine R. Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 26, affirming 208 F. Supp. 661. Georgia Comm’n v. United States, 283 U. S. 765, 775. See also Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 665-666. See nn. 26 and 27, supra, and accompanying text. 238 F. Supp., at 539. After the examiners’ recommended report, the Mountain-Pacific carriers told the Commission that: “Any legitimate concern the Midwestern lines may have in any threat to the equalization of divisions over Utah gateways is premature. If any problems arise as to equalization of divisions over those gateways on a fair and equitable basis, they can be considered in the negotiations contemplated in the Recommended Report.” In Official-Southern Divisions, 325 I. C. C. 449, 450, the Commission stated: “To avoid serious injustice to any carrier, our procedures permit any railroad to be excepted from a group order, in whole or in part, on a proper showing of differing circumstances. Where it is demonstrated by competent and reliable evidence that a carrier’s financial or revenue needs situation requires the preservation of its share of the joint rates on the same level as presently existing or at a level different than that to be maintained for the group as a whole, we may provide special individual treatment in order to maintain such carrier as part of the Nation’s transportation system without regard to its costs of rendering the service.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHOMBERG v. UNITED STATES. No. 48. Argued March 1, 1955. Decided April 4, 1955. Alan Y. Cole argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Max Schultz. Gray Thoron argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, L. Paul Winings and Lorraine Wall Hurney. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The precise issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner, who filed his petition for naturalization two days before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., may compel a final hearing on the same before the determination of deportation proceedings instituted after the effective date of the Act and based solely on grounds initiated by that Act. The “priority provision”' of the Act, § 318, states “no petition for naturalization shall be finally heard ... if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding.” 66 Stat. 244, 8 U. S. C. § 1429. But petitioner claims that the savings clause of the Act, § 405, 66 Stat. 280, 8 U. S. C. § 1101, note, which we considered in United States v. Menasche, ante, p. 528, preserves his eligibility for citizenship under prior law, and that final hearing thereon cannot be delayed by reason of the pendency of the subsequently instituted deportation action. Both the trial court, 115 F. Supp. 336, and the Court of Appeals, 210 F. 2d 82, decided against the petitioner. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 811, in order to determine the relationship between § 318 and § 405 of the 1952 Act. On October 1, 1952, petitioner submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service a preliminary application to file a petition for naturalization, Form N-400. Following a preliminary examination, he filed his petition for naturalization on December 22, 1952, two days before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The prenaturalization investigation disclosed that petitioner had a criminal record; he had been convicted of grand larceny in 1913 and of manslaughter in 1915. Section 241 (a) of the 1952 Act subjects aliens to deportation if they are convicted “at any time after entry ... of two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (4). On June 22, 1953, a warrant of arrest was issued against petitioner, based on his 1913 and 1915 convictions, charging as grounds for deportation petitioner’s presence in the country in violation of § 241 (a)(4). The deportation proceedings were in progress when on July 28, 1953, petitioner, through an order to show cause filed in this case, moved to compel a final hearing on his petition for naturalization, and, in the interim, to stay the deportation proceedings. Relying on § 318, supra, the district judge denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner’s main argument is that under § 405 (a) nothing contained in the new Act, “unless otherwise specifically provided therein, shall be construed to affect . . . any status, condition, right in process of acquisition . . . done or existing, at the time this Act shall take effect.” Petitioner was eligible for citizenship under the prior law and remains eligible under the new Act. But under the prior law petitioner was not deportable. Petitioner argues that the deportation proceeding, based solely on § 241 (a) of the new Act, is adversely affecting a right protected by § 405 (a), to wit, his inchoate right to citizenship. This, he claims, is in direct contravention of the terms of § 405 (a) unless some other section in the Act “otherwise specifically provide [s].” Section 318, advanced as just such an exception, says “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b) . . . ,” and makes no mention of § 405 (a). Thus, petitioner concludes, § 318 is not a specific exception to the protection afforded his rights by § 405 (a), and if he is to vindicate his rights under that section he must prevail in the present proceedings. We agree with petitioner that, absent a specific provision to the contrary, he has rights protected by § 405 (a). These stem from the filing of his Form N-400, from his petition for naturalization, and, perhaps, from his fulfillment of the five-year residence requirement. United States v. Menasche, supra. But we hold that § 318 specifically excepts rights under the prior law from the protection of § 405 when these rights stem from a petition for naturalization or from some other step in the naturalization process. The practice previous to the enactment of a priority provision in the immigration and nationality laws was for both the deportation and naturalization processes to proceed along together until either petitioner’s deportation or naturalization ipso jacto terminated the possibility of the other occurring. See United States v. Waskowski, 158 F. 2d 962. And in the few instances where deportations were stayed in order to permit aliens to obtain a hearing under a recently enacted naturalization provision, the remedy was by habeas corpus after the termination of the deportation proceedings and after a stay had been denied in those proceedings. United States ex rel. Walther v. District Director of Immigration and Naturalization, 175 F. 2d 693; Petition of Kavadias, 177 F. 2d 497. But as a general rule stays were not utilized, cf. Klig v. Watkins, 84 F. Supp. 486, and there ensued a race between the alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport him. If the alien was successful in forcing a final hearing and the granting of his naturalization petition, the deportation proceedings were completely nullified. To remedy this situation, the Congress incorporated § 27 in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1015, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 729 (c). This section prohibited naturalization or the holding of final hearings on naturalization petitions where deportation proceedings were instituted “under the provisions of this or any other Act.” The 1950 Act took effect immediately and contained no savings clause, although it introduced new grounds for deportation which were to be retroactively applied. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522. And in United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F. 2d 580, the priority provision— § 27 — was held to apply to naturalization petitions filed before the effective date of the Act, even though the deportation proceedings were commenced, as here, under the new statute. Section 318 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 re-enacted § 27 in substantially the same form, retaining the language of its predecessor in suspending final hearings on naturalization where deportation proceedings were instituted under this or any other Act. But petitioner contends that this plain language does not apply to his case because Congress did not specifically exempt §318 from the operation of the.savings clause embodied in § 405 (a), under which his inchoate right to citizenship is preserved. It is true that § 318 begins with the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b),” which at first glance might indicate that it was intended not to apply to § 405 (a). But further analysis renders this position untenable. The same priority section had been inserted as an emergency provision in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, and had been given immediate prospective and retroactive effect. It was carried forward almost verbatim as § 318 in the 1952 Act. And to make certain that it would apply to rights existing under petitions for naturalization, the Congress added to § 318 the phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b),” referring to the only part of the savings clause which deals explicitly with the law applicable to naturalization petitions. The congressional purpose must have been to have § 318 supersede rights stemming from such petitions, for under any other interpretation its previous approach under the 1950 law is unexplainedly reversed and the “notwithstanding” clause is rendered meaningless. It may be that the draftsmen could have been more exact in their language, since §405 (a), as well as §405 (b), embraces rights under pending petitions, see United States v. Menasche, supra. But we think their intent is plain enough. Petitioner contends that this application of § 318 will have the result of affording more protection to pre-petition rights of the Menasche-type than to inchoate rights under a petition for naturalization itself, since the former are not embraced within §405 (b). But we do not believe § 318 differentiates between these steps in the process of naturalization. Each is but part of the whole process leading to citizenship and each is subject to the provisions of § 318. Nor can we accept petitioner’s argument that Congress intended § 318 to apply only to deportation proceedings based on grounds existing under the prior law. In making this contention, petitioner gives away nothing and gains nothing. If the grounds for deportation are the same under the prior law as under the new Act, then nothing in the new Act affects petitioner; it is clear that rights under the savings clause have not been infringed even if there is no specific exception. Only where something in the new law introduces a change, thereby affecting one’s status under the old law, is the savings clause called into play. Only then is a specific exception to § 405 required. Thus, if petitioner's construction were to prevail, the “notwithstanding” language in § 318 would be as meaningless as under the interpretation previously advanced and rejected. The “notwithstanding” clause takes on meaning only when we assume that the new Act has made some change in the law to which the “notwithstanding” statement is noting a specific exception. That is this case. The role thus played by § 405 (b) is in substantial accord with the operation of its predecessor, § 347 (b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1168, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 747. It was pointed out in Menasche, supra, that § 347 (b), with its two-year limitation, was considered to be a special limitation on the rights preserved by subsection (a) of that savings clause. The two-year period has been deleted in § 405 (b), but the subsection remains a special limitation on the broad savings provision, bringing to bear the specific exceptions found in § 318 and other provisions of the new Act whenever the protection of § 405 (a) is sought for rights connected with the naturalization process. In our view, § 405 (b) is the vehicle for applying each of these exceptions to the rights and liabilities emerging from naturalization proceedings under prior law and otherwise preserved by §405 (a). In using the “notwithstanding” language in these sections, Congress clearly manifested its intent that certain policies should override the otherwise broad and pervasive principle of the savings clause. In United States v. Menasche, supra, we recognized the wide scope to be given the savings clause. We would be lax in our duty.if we did not give recognition also to the congressional purpose to override the savings clause when other considerations were thought more compelling than the preservation of the status quo. If we are not to nullify this clear legislative purpose and render meaningless the “notwithstanding” language of § 318 and the other sections, we must find for the Government and hold that § 318 bars petitioner’s attempt to compel a hearing on his naturalization petition while the deportation proceeding is pending. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The text of this provision, in material part, is as follows: “Sec. 318. . . . Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b), and except as provided in sections 327 and 328 no person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final finding of de-portability pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other Act; and no petition for naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this or any other Act: . . . It is assumed for the purposes of this proceeding that petitioner is deportable under § 241 (a). See note 3, infra. This is not to say that petitioner cannot challenge the authority of the Attorney General to deport him under § 241 (a) of the 1952 Act. We express no opinion as to whether such a challenge, grounded on the savings clause or otherwise, might succeed if made in the deportation proceedings. Whether the question of deportability could be raised in a naturalization proceeding was expressly waived by the petitioner. See Petitioner’s Brief, p. 7. Petitioner’s further argument, that a change in the punctuation of § 318 resulted in the application of the “notwithstanding” clause to final findings of deportability but not to pending proceedings, must be rejected. When viewed against the purpose of the clause, the circumstances surrounding the controverted change, and the usual rules of proper punctuation, the contention is shown to be without substance. Section 311 provides that the right to naturalization shall not be abridged because of race, sex or marriage, and, “ [n] otwithstanding section 405 (b), this section shall apply to any person whose petition for naturalization shall hereafter be filed, or shall have been pending on the effective date of this Act.” 66 Stat. 239, 8 U. S. C. § 1422. Section 313 (a) states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b), no person shall hereafter be naturalized” who engages in specified subversive activities or who is a member of described subversive organizations. 66 Stat. 240, 8 U. S. C. § 1424 (a). Section 315 (a) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b),” one who claims or has claimed his alienage and “is or was” thereby relieved of service in the armed forces, “shall be permanently ineligible to become a citizen.” 66 Stat. 242, 8 U. S. C. § 1426 (a). Section 331 (d) provides for the ending of enemy alien status and states: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 405 (b), this subsection shall also apply to the case of any such alien whose petition for naturalization was filed prior to the effective date of this Act and which is still pending on that date.” 66 Stat. 252, 8 U. S. C. § 1442 (d).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. FLORES et al. No. 91-905. Argued October 13, 1992 Decided March 23, 1993 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 315. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 320. Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Ronald J. Mann, Michael Jay Singer, and John C. Hoyle. Carlos Holguin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Peter A. Schey, Paul Hoffman, Mark Rosenbaum, James Morales, Alice Bussiere, Lucas Gutten-tag, and John A. Powell. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bar Association by Talbot D’Alemberte, Andrew S. Krulwich, and Christopher D. Cerf; for Amnesty International U. S. A. by Clara A. Pope; for the Child Welfare League of America et al. by J. Michael Klise, Clifton S. Elgarten, and John R. Heisse II; for the Southwest Refugee Rights Project et al. by Antonia Hernandez, Richard Larson, Susan M. Lydon, and Bill Ong Hing; and for the United States Catholic Conference et al. by William F. Abrams. Justice Sc alia delivered the opinion of the Court. Over the past decade, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service) has arrested increasing numbers of alien juveniles who are not accompanied by their parents or other related adults. Respondents, a class of alien juveniles so arrested and held in INS custody pending their deportation hearings, contend that the Constitution and immigration laws require them to be released into the custody of “responsible adults.” I Congress has given the Attorney General broad discretion to determine whether, and on what terms, an alien arrested on suspicion of being deportable should be released pending the deportation hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals has stated that “[a]n alien generally . . . should not be detained or required to post bond except on a finding that he is a threat to the national security ... or that he is a poor bail risk.” Matter of Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (1976); cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. (NCIR), 502 U. S. 183 (1991) (upholding INS regulation imposing conditions upon release). In the case of arrested alien juveniles, however, the INS cannot simply send them off into the night on bond or recognizance. The parties to the present suit agree that the Service must assure itself that someone will care for those minors pending resolution of their deportation proceedings. That is easily done when the juvenile’s parents have also been detained and the family can be released together; it becomes complicated when the juvenile is arrested alone, i. e., unaccompanied by a parent, guardian, or other related adult. This problem is a serious one, since the INS arrests thousands of alien juveniles each year (more than 8,500 in 1990 alone) — as many as 70% of them unaccompanied. Brief for Petitioners 8. Most of these minors are boys in their midteens, but perhaps 15% are girls and the same percentage 14 years of age or younger. See id., at 9, n. 12; App. to Pet. for Cert. 177a. For a number of years the problem was apparently dealt with on a regional and ad hoc basis, with some INS offices releasing unaccompanied alien juveniles not only to their parents but also to a range of other adults and organizations. In 1984, responding to the increased flow of unaccompanied juvenile aliens into California, the INS Western Regional Office adopted a policy of limiting the release of detained minors to “‘a parent or lawful guardian/” except in “‘unusual and extraordinary cases/ ” when the juvenile could be released to “ ‘a responsible individual who agrees to provide care and be responsible for the welfare and well being of the child.’” See Flores v. Meese, 934 F. 2d 991, 994 (CA9 1990) (quoting policy), vacated, 942 F. 2d 1352 (CA9 1991) (en banc). In July of the following year, the four respondents filed an action in the District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of a class, later certified by the court, consisting of all aliens under the age of 18 who are detained by the INS Western Region because “a parent or legal guardian fails to personally appear to take custody of them.” App. 29. The complaint raised seven claims, the first two challenging the Western Region release policy (on constitutional, statutory, and international law grounds), and the final five challenging the conditions of the juveniles’ detention. The District Court granted the INS partial summary judgment on the statutory and international law challenges to the release policy, and in late 1987 approved a consent decree that settled all claims regarding the detention conditions. The court then turned to the constitutional challenges to the release policy, and granted respondents partial summary judgment on their equal protection claim that the INS had no rational basis for treating alien minors in deportation proceedings differently from alien minors in exclusion proceedings (whom INS regulations permitted to be parolqd, in some circumstances, to persons other than parents and legal guardians, including other relatives and “friends,” see 8 CFR § 212.5(a)(2)(ii) (1987)). This prompted the INS to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking “to codify Service policy regarding detention and release of juvenile aliens and to provide a single policy for juveniles in both deportation and exclusion proceedings.” 52 Fed. Reg. 38245 (1987). The District Court agreed to defer consideration of respondents’ due process claims until the regulation was promulgated. The uniform deportation-exclusion rule finally adopted, published on May 17, 1988, see Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449 (codified as to deportation at 8 CFR § 242.24 (1992)), expanded the possibilities for release somewhat beyond the Western Region policy, but not as far as many commenters had suggested. It provides that alien juveniles “shall be released, in order of preference, to: (i) a parent; (ii) a legal guardian; or (iii) an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are [sic] not presently in INS detention,” unless the INS determines that “the detention of such juvenile is required to secure his timely appearance before the Service or the immigration court or to ensure the juvenile’s safety or that of others.” 8 CFR § 242.24(b)(1) (1992). If the only listed individuals are in INS detention, the Service will consider simultaneous release of the juvenile and custodian “on a discretionary case-by-ease basis.” § 242.24(b)(2). A parent or legal guardian who is in INS custody or outside the United States may also, by sworn affidavit, designate another person as capable and willing to care for the child, provided that person “execute[s] an agreement to care for the juvenile and to ensure the juvenile’s presence at all future proceedings.” § 242.24(b)(3). Finally, in “unusual and compelling circumstances and in the discretion of the [INS] district director or chief patrol agent,” juveniles may be released to other adults who execute a care and attendance agreement. § 242.24(b)(4). If the juvenile is not released under the foregoing provision, the regulation requires a designated INS official, the “Juvenile Coordinator,” to locate “suitable placement . . . in a facility designated for the occupancy of juveniles.” § 242.24(c). The Service may briefly hold the minor in an “INS detention facility having separate accommodations for juveniles,” § 242.24(d), but under the terms of the consent decree resolving respondents’ conditions-of-detention claims, the INS must within 72 hours of arrest place alien juveniles in a facility that meets or exceeds the standards established by the Alien Minors Care Program of the Community Relations Service (CRS), Department of Justice, 52 Fed. Reg. 15569 (1987). See Memorandum of Understanding Re Compromise of Class Action: Conditions of Detention, Flores v. Meese, No. 85-4544-RJK (Px) (CD Cal., Nov. 30, 1987) (incorporating the CRS notice and program description), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 148a-205a (hereinafter Juvenile Care Agreement). Juveniles placed in these facilities are deemed to be in INS detention “because of issues of payment and authorization of medical care.” 53 Fed. Reg., at 17449. “Legal custody” rather than “detention” more accurately describes the reality of the arrangement, however, since' these are not correctional institutions but facilities that meet “state licensing requirements for the provision of shelter care, foster care, group care, and related services to dependent children,” Juvenile Care Agreement 176a, and are operated “in an open type of setting without a need for extraordinary security measures,” id., at 173a. The facilities must provide, in accordance with “applicable state child welfare statutes and generally accepted child welfare standards, practices, principles and procedures,” id., at 157a, an extensive list of services, including physical care and maintenance, individual and group counseling, education, recreation and leisure-time activities, family reunification services, and access to religious services, visitors, and legal assistance, id., at 159a, 178a-185a. Although the regulation replaced the Western Region release policy that had been the focus of respondents’ constitutional claims, respondents decided to maintain the litigation as a challenge to the new rule. Just a week after the regulation took effect, in a brief, unpublished order that referred only to unspecified “due process grounds,” the District Court granted summary judgment to respondents and invalidated the regulatory scheme in three important respects. Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-4544-RJK (Px) (CD Cal., May 25,1988), App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a. First, the court ordered the INS to release “any minor otherwise eligible for release ... to his parents, guardian, custodian, conservator, or other responsible adult party.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Second, the order dispensed with the regulation’s requirement that unrelated custodians formally agree to care for the juvenile, 8 CFR §§ 242.24(b)(3) and (4) (1992), in addition to ensuring his attendance at future proceedings. Finally, the District Court rewrote the related INS regulations that provide for an initial determination of prima facie deportability and release conditions before an INS examiner, see § 287.3, with review by an immigration judge upon the alien’s request, see § 242.2(d). It decreed instead that an immigration-judge hearing on probable cause and release restrictions should be provided “forthwith” after arrest, whether or not the juvenile requests it. App. to Pet. for Cert. 146a. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. Flores v. Meese, 934 F. 2d 991 (CA9 1990). The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case and selected an 11-judge en banc court. See Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3. That court vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court order “in all respects.” Flores v. Meese, 942 F. 2d 1352, 1365 (1991). One judge dissented in part, see id., at 1372-1377 (opinion of Rymer, J.), and four in toto, see id., at 1377-1385 (opinion of Wallace, C. J.). We granted certiorari. 503 U. S. 905 (1992). II Respondents make three principal attacks upon INS regulation 242.24. First, they assert that alien juveniles suspected of being deportable have a “fundamental” right to “freedom from physical restraint,” Brief for Respondents 16, and it is therefore a denial of “substantive due process” to detain them, since the Service cannot prove that it is pursuing an important governmental interest in a manner narrowly tailored to minimize the restraint on liberty. Second, respondents argue that the regulation violates “procedural due process,” because it does not require the Service to determine, with regard to each individual detained juvenile who lacks an approved custodian, whether his best interests lie in remaining in INS custody or in release to some other “responsible adult.” Finally, respondents contend that even if the INS regulation infringes no constitutional rights, it exceeds the Attorney General’s authority under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). We find it economic to discuss the objections in that order, though we of course reach the constitutional issues only because we conclude that the respondents’ statutory argument fails. Before proceeding further, however, we make two important observations. First, this is a facial challenge to INS regulation 242.24. Respondents do not challenge its application in a particular instance; it had not yet been applied in a particular instance — because it was not yet in existence— when their suit was brought (directed at the 1984 Western Region release policy), and it had been in effect only a week when the District Court issued the judgment invalidating it. We have before us no findings of fact, indeed no record, concerning the INS’s interpretation of the regulation or the history of its enforcement. We have only the regulation itself and the statement of basis and purpose that accompanied its promulgation. To prevail in such a facial challenge, respondents “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). That is true as to both the constitutional challenges, see Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 268, n. 18 (1984), and the statutory challenge, see NCIR, 502 U. S., at 188. The second point is related. Respondents spend much time, and their amici even more, condemning the conditions under which some alien juveniles are held, alleging that the conditions are so severe as to belie the Service’s stated reasons for retaining custody — leading, presumably, to the conclusion that the retention of custody is an unconstitutional infliction of punishment without trial. See Salerno, supra, at 746-748; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 237 (1896). But whatever those conditions might have been when this litigation began, they are now (at least in the Western Region, where all members of the respondents’ class are held) presumably in compliance with the extensive requirements set forth in the Juvenile Care Agreement that settled respondents’ claims regarding detention conditions, see supra, at 298. The settlement agreement entitles respondents to enforce compliance with those requirements in the District Court, see Juvenile Care Agreement 148a-149a, which they acknowledge they have not done, Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. We will disregard the effort to reopen those settled claims by alleging, for purposes of the challenges to the regulation, that the detention conditions are other than what the consent decree says they must be. HH 1 — 1 1 — I Respondents substantive due process claim relies upon our line of cases which interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantee of “due process of law” to include a substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e. g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992); Salerno, supra, at 746; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 191 (1986). “Substantive due process” analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right, for “[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.” Collins, supra, at 125; see Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, at 194-195. The “freedom from physical restraint” invoked by respondents is not at issue in this case. Surely not in the sense of shackles, chains, or barred cells, given the Juvenile Care Agreement. Nor even in the sense of a right to come and go at will, since, as we have said elsewhere, “juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody,” Schall, 467 U. S., at 265, and where the custody of the parent or legal guardian fails, the government may (indeed, we have said must) either exercise custody itself or appoint someone else to do so. Ibid. Nor is the right asserted the right of a child to be released from all other custody into the custody of its parents, legal guardian, or even close relatives: The challenged regulation requires such release when it is sought. Rather, the right at issue is the alleged right of a child who has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, and for whom the government is responsible, to be placed in the custody of a willing-and-able private custodian rather than of a government-operated or government-selected child-care institution. If there exists a fundamental right to be released into what respondents inaccurately call a “non-custodial setting,” Brief for Respondents 18, we see no reason why it would apply only in the context of government custody incidentally acquired in the course of law enforcement. It would presumably apply to state custody over orphans and abandoned children as well, giving federal law and federal courts a major new role in the management of state orphanages and other child-care institutions. Cf. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S. 689, 703-704 (1992). We are unaware, however, that any court — aside from the courts below — has ever held that a child has a constitutional right not to be placed in a decent and humane custodial institution if there is available a responsible person unwilling to become the child’s legal guardian but willing to undertake temporary legal custody. The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that “substantive due process” sustains it; the alleged right certainly cannot be considered “ ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” Salerno, supra, at 751 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934)). Where a juvenile has no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian, where the government does not intend to punish the child, and where the conditions of governmental custody are decent and humane, such custody surely does not violate the Constitution. It is rationally connected to a governmental interest in “preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 766 (1982), and is not punitive since it is not excessive in relation to that valid purpose. See Schall, supra, at 269. Although respondents generally argue for the categorical right of private placement discussed above, at some points they assert a somewhat more limited constitutional right: the right to an individualized hearing on whether private placement would be in the child’s “best interests” — followed by private placement if the answer is in the affirmative. It seems to us, however, that if institutional custody (despite the availability of responsible private custodians) is not unconstitutional in itself, it does not become so simply because it is shown to be less desirable than some other arrangement for the particular child. “The best interests of the child,” a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody. But it is not traditionally the sole criterion — much less the sole constitutional criterion — for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others. Even if it were shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best provide for the child’s welfare, the child would nonetheless not be removed from the custody of its parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978). Similarly, “the best interests of the child” is not the legal standard that governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves. See, e. g., R. C. N. v. State, 141 Ga. App. 490, 491, 233 S. E. 2d 866, 867 (1977). “The best interests of the child” is likewise not an absolute and exclusive constitutional criterion for the government’s exercise of the custodial responsibilities that it undertakes, which must be reconciled with many other responsibilities. Thus, child-care institutions operated by the State in the exercise of its parens patriae authority, see Schall, supra, at 265, are not constitutionally required to be funded at such a level as to provide the best schooling or the best health care available; nor does the Constitution require them to substitute, wherever possible, private nonadoptive custody for institutional care. And the same principle applies, we think, to the governmental responsibility at issue here, that of retaining or transferring custody over a child who has come within the Federal Government’s control, when the parents or guardians of that child are nonexistent or unavailable. Minimum standards must be met, and the child’s fundamental rights must not be impaired; but the decision to go beyond those requirements — to give one or another of the child’s additional interests priority over other concerns that compete for public funds and administrative attention — is a policy judgment rather than a constitutional imperative. Respondents’ “best interests” argument is, in essence, a demand that the INS program be narrowly tailored to minimize the denial of release into private custody. But narrow tailoring is required only when fundamental rights are involved. The impairment of a lesser interest (here, the alleged interest in being released into the custody of strangers) demands no more than a “reasonable fit” between governmental purpose (here, protecting the welfare of the juveniles who have come into the Government’s custody) and the means chosen to advance that purpose. This leaves ample room for an agency to decide, as the INS has, that administrative factors such as lack of child-placement expertise favor using one means rather than another. There is, in short, no constitutional need for a hearing to determine whether private placement would be better, so long as institutional custody is (as we readily find it to be, assuming compliance with the requirements of the consent decree) good enough. If we harbored any doubts as to the constitutionality of institutional custody over unaccompanied juveniles, they would surely be eliminated as to those juveniles (concededly the overwhelming majority of all involved here) who are aliens. “For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 81 (1976). “ ‘[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete.’” Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909)). Thus, “in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, ‘Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.’” 430 U. S., at 792 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 79-80). Respondents do not dispute that Congress has the authority to detain aliens suspected of entering the country illegally pending their deportation hearings, see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 538 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S., at 235. And in enacting the precursor to 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a), Congress eliminated any presumption of release pending deportation, committing that determination to the discretion of the Attorney General. See Carlson v. Landon, supra, at 538-540. Of course, the INS regulation must still meet the (unexacting) standard of rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose — which it does, as we shall discuss later in connection with the statutory challenge. Respondents also argue, in a footnote, that the INS release policy violates the “equal protection guarantee” of the Fifth Amendment because of the disparate treatment evident in (1) releasing alien juveniles with close relatives or legal guardians but detaining those without, and (2) releasing to unrelated adults juveniles detained pending federal delinquency proceedings, see 18 U. S. C. § 5034, but detaining unaccompanied alien juveniles pending deportation proceedings. The tradition of reposing custody in close relatives and legal guardians is in our view sufficient to support the former distinction; and the difference between citizens and aliens is adequate to support the latter. IV We turn now from the claim that the INS cannot deprive respondents of their asserted liberty interest at all, to the “procedural due process” claim that the Service cannot do so on the basis of the procedures it provides. It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1903). To determine whether these alien juveniles have received it here, we must first review in some detail the procedures the INS has employed. Though a procedure for obtaining warrants to arrest named individuals is available, see 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1); 8 CFR § 242.2(c)(1) (1992), the deportation process ordinarily begins with a warrantless arrest by an INS officer who has reason to believe that the arrestee “is in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained,” 8 U. S. C. § 1357(a)(2). Arrested aliens are almost always offered the choice of departing the country voluntarily, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b) (1988 ed., Supp. III); 8 CFR §242.5 (1992), and as many as 98% of them take that course. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1044 (1984). Before the Service seeks execution of a voluntary departure form by a juvenile, however, the juvenile “must in fact communicate with either a parent, adult relative, friend, or with an organization found on the free legal services list.” 8 CFR § 242.24(g) (1992). If the juvenile does not seek voluntary departure, he must be brought before an INS examining officer within 24 hours of his arrest. § 287.3; see 8 U. S. C. § 1357(a)(2). The examining officer is a member of the Service’s enforcement staff, but must be someone other than the arresting officer (unless no other qualified examiner is readily available). 8 CFR §287.3 (1992). If the examiner determines that “there is prima facie evidence establishing that the arrested alien is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws,” ibid., a formal deportation proceeding is initiated through the issuance of an order to show cause, §242.1, and within 24 hours the decision is made whether to continue the alien juvenile in custody or release him, § 287.3. The INS notifies the alien of the commencement of a deportation proceeding and of the decision as to custody by serving him with a Form 1-22IS (reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioners 7a-8a) which, pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U. S. C. § 1252b(a)(3)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. III), must be in English and Spanish. The front of this form notifies the alien of the allegations against him and the date of his deportation hearing. The back contains a section entitled “NOTICE OF CUSTODY DETERMINATION,” in which the INS officer checks a box indicating whether the alien will be detained in the custody of the Service, released on recognizance, or released under bond. Beneath these boxes, the form states: “You may request the Immigration Judge to redetermine this decision.” See 8 CFR § 242.2(c)(2) (1992). (The immigration judge is a quasi-judicial officer in the Executive Office for Immigration Review, a division separated from the Service’s enforcement staff. §3.10.) The alien must check either a box stating “I do” or a box stating “[I] do not request a redetermination by an Immigration Judge of the custody decision,” and must then sign and date this section of the form. If the alien requests a hearing and is dissatisfied with the outcome, he may obtain further review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, § 242.2(d); § 3.1(b)(7), and by the federal courts, see, e. g., Carlson v. Landon, supra, at 529, 531. Respondents contend that this procedural system is unconstitutional because it does not require the Service to determine in the case of each individual alien juvenile that detention in INS custody would better serve his interests than release to some other “responsible adult.” This is just the “substantive due process” argument recast in “procedural due process” terms, and we reject it for the same reasons. The District Court and the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the INS procedures are faulty because they do not provide for automatic review by an immigration judge of the initial deportability and custody determinations. See 942 F. 2d, at 1364. We disagree. At least insofar as this facial challenge is concerned, due process is satisfied by giving the detained alien juveniles the right to a hearing before an immigration judge. It has not been shown that all of them are too young or too ignorant to exercise that right when the form asking them to assert or waive it is presented. Most are 16 or 17 years old and will have been in telephone contact with a responsible adult outside the INS — sometimes a legal services attorney. The waiver, moreover, is revocable: The alien may request a judicial redetermination at any time later in the deportation process. See 8 CFR § 242.2(d) (1992); Matter of Uluocha, Interim Dec. 3124 (BIA 1989). We have held that juveniles are capable of “knowingly and intelligently” waiving their right against self-incrimination in criminal cases. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 724-727 (1979); see also United States v. Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F. 2d 832, 835 (CA5 1988) (applying Fare to alien juvenile). The alleged right to redetermination of prehear-ing custody status in deportation cases is surely no more significant. Respondents point out that the regulations do not set a time period within which the immigration-judge hearing, if requested, must be held. But we will not assume, on this facial challenge, that an excessive delay will invariably ensue — particularly since there is no evidence of such delay, even in isolated instances. Cf. Matter of Chirinos, 16 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1977). V Respondents contend that the regulation goes beyond the scope of the Attorney General’s discretion to continue custody over arrested aliens under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). That contention must be rejected if the regulation has a “ ‘reasonable foundation,’ ” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S., at 541, that is, if it rationally pursues a purpose that it is lawful for the INS to seek. See also NCIR, 502 U. S., at 194. We think that it does. The statement of basis and purpose accompanying promulgation of regulation 242.24, in addressing the question “as to whose custody the juvenile should be released,” began with the dual propositions that “concern for the welfare of the juvenile will not permit release to just any adult” and that “the Service has neither the expertise nor the resources to conduct home studies for placement of each juvenile released.” Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449 (1988). The INS decided to “strik[e] a balance” by defining a list of presumptively appropriate custodians while maintaining the discretion of local INS directors to release detained minors to other custodians in “unusual and compelling circumstances.” Ibid. The list begins with parents, whom our society and this Court’s jurisprudence have always presumed to be the preferred and primary custodians of their minor children. See Parham v. J R., 442 U. S. 584, 602-603 (1979). The list extends to other close blood relatives, whose protective relationship with children our society has also traditionally respected. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974). And finally, the list includes persons given legal guardianship by the States, which we have said possess “special proficiency” in the field of domestic relations, including child custody. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U. S., at 704. When neither parent, close relative, or state-appointed guardian is immediately available, the INS will normally keep legal custody of the juvenile, place him in a government-supervised and state-licensed shelter-care facility, and continue searching for a relative or guardian, although release to others is possible in unusual cases. Respondents object that this scheme is motivated purely by “administrative convenience,” a charge echoed by the dissent, see, e. g., post, at 320. This fails to grasp the distinction between administrative convenience (or, to speak less pejoratively, administrative efficiency) as the purpose of a policy — for example, a policy of not considering late-filed objections — and administrative efficiency as the reason for selecting one means of achieving a purpose over another. Only the latter is at issue here. The requisite statement of basis and purpose published by the INS upon promulgation of regulation 242.24 declares that the purpose of the rule is to protect “the welfare of the juvenile,” 53 Fed. Reg. 17449 (1988), and there is no basis for calling that false. (Respondents’ contention that the real purpose was to save money imputes not merely mendacity but irrationality, since respondents point out that detention in shelter-care facilities is more expensive than release.) Because the regulation involves no deprivation of a “fundamental” right, the Service was not compelled to ignore the costs and difficulty of alternative means of advancing its declared goal. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656-657 (1972). It is impossible to contradict the Service’s assessment that it lacks the “expertise,” and is not “qualified,” to do individualized child-placement studies, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449 (1988), and the right alleged here provides no basis for this Court to impose upon what is essentially a law enforcement agency the obligation to expend its limited resources in developing such expertise and qualification. That reordering of priorities is for Congress — which has shown, we may say, no inclination to shrink from the task. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. § 1154(c) (requiring INS to determine if applicants for immigration are involved in “sham” marriages). We do not hold, as the dissent contends, that “minimizing administrative costs” is adequate justification for the Service’s detention of juveniles, post, at 320; but we do hold that a detention program justified by the need to protect the welfare of juveniles is not constitutionally required to give custody to strangers if that entails the expenditure of administrative effort and resources that the Service is unwilling to commit. Respondents also contend that the INS regulation violates the statute because it relies upon a “blanket” presumption of the unsuitability of custodians other than parents, close relatives, and guardians. We have stated that, at least in certain contexts, the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion under § 1252(a)(1) requires “some level of individualized determination.” NCIR, 502 U. S., at 194; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S., at 538. But as NCIR itself demonstrates, this does not mean that the Service must forswear use of reasonable presumptions and generic rules. See 502 U. S., at 196, n. 11; cf. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 467 (1983). In the case of each detained alien juvenile, the INS makes those determinations that are specific to the individual and necessary to accurate application of the regulation: Is there reason to believe the alien deportable? Is the alien under 18 years of age? Does the alien have an available adult relative or legal guardian? Is the alien’s case so exceptional as to require consideration of release to someone else? The particularization and individuation need go no further than this. Finally, respondents claim that the regulation is an abuse of discretion because it permits the INS, once having determined that an alien juvenile lacks an available relative or legal guardian, to hold the juvenile in detention indefinitely. That is not so. The period of custody is inherently limited by the pending deportation hearing, which must be concluded with “reasonable dispatch” to avoid habeas corpus. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S., at 747 (noting time limits placed on pretrial detention by the Speedy Trial Act). It is expected that alien juveniles will remain in INS custody an average of only 30 days. See Juvenile Care Agreement 178a. There is no evidence that alien juveniles are being held for undue periods pursuant to regulation 242.24, or that habeas corpus is insufficient to remedy particular abuses. And the reasonableness of the Service’s negative assessment of putative custodians who fail to obtain legal guardianship would seem, if anything, to increase as time goes by. * * * We think the INS policy now in place is a reasonable response to the difficult problems presented when the Service arrests unaccompanied alien juveniles. It may well be that other policies would be even better, but “we are [not] a legislature charged with formulating public policy.” Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at 281. On its face, INS regulation 242.24 accords with both the Constitution and the relevant statute. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(1), 66 Stat. 208, as amended, provides: “[A]ny such alien taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending such final determination of deportability, (A) be continued in custody; or (B) be released under bond . . . containing such conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (C) be released on conditional parole. But such bond or parole . . . may be revoked at any time by the Attorney General, in his discretion ....” The Attorney General’s discretion to release aliens convicted of aggravated felonies is narrower. See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2) (1988 ed., Supp. III). Exclusion proceedings, which are not at issue in the present case, involve aliens apprehended before “entering” the United States, as that term is used in the immigration laws. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 187 (1958). The District Court and all three judges on the Court of Appeals panel held in favor of the INS on this statutory claim, see Flores v. Meese, 934 F. 2d 991, 995, 997-1002 (CA9 1991); id, at 1015 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); the en banc court (curiously) did not address the claim, proceeding immediately to find the rule unconstitutional. Although respondents did not cross-petition for certiorari on the statutory issue, they may legitimately defend their judgment on any ground properly raised below. See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 476, n. 20 (1979). The INS does not object to our considering the issue, and we do so in order to avoid deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 854 (1985). Alien juveniles from Canada and Mexico must be offered the opportunity to make a telephone call but need not in fact do so, see 8 CFR § 242.24(g) (1992); the United States has treaty obligations to notify diplomatic or consular officers of those countries whenever their nationals are detained, see § 242.2(g). The regulation also provides for release to any person designated by a juvenile’s parent or guardian as “capable and willing to care for the juvenile’s well-being.” 8 CFR §242.24(b)(3) (1992). “[To] ensurfe] that the INS is actually receiving the wishes of the parent or guardian,” 53 Fed. Reg. 17450 (1988), the designation must be in the form of a sworn affidavit executed before an immigration or consular officer. The dissent maintains that, in making custody decisions, the INS cannot rely on “[c]ategorical distinctions between cousins and uncles, or between relatives and godparents or other responsible persons,” because “[d]ue process demands more, far more.” Post, at 343. Acceptance of such a proposition would revolutionize much of our family law. Categorical distinctions between relatives and nonrelatives, and between relatives of varying degree of affinity, have always played a predominant role in determining child custody and in innumerable other aspects of domestic relations. The dissent asserts, however, that it would prohibit such distinctions only for the purpose of “prefer[ring] detention [by which it means institutional detention] to release,” and accuses us of “mischaracteriz[ing] the issue” in suggesting otherwise. Post, at 343, n. 29. It seems to us that the dissent mischaracterizes the issue. The INS uses the categorical distinction between relatives and nonrelatives not to deny release, but to determine which potential custodians will be accepted without the safeguard of state-decreed guardianship. By referring unrelated persons seeking custody to state guardianship procedures, the INS is essentially drawing upon resources and expertise that are already in place. Respondents’ objection to this is puzzling, in light of their assertion that the States generally view unrelated adults as appropriate custodians. See post, at 325-326, n. 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting state statutes). If that is so, one wonders why the individuals and organizations respondents allege are eager to accept custody do not rush to state court, have themselves appointed legal guardians (temporary or permanent, the States have procedures for both), and then obtain the juveniles’ release under the terms of the regulation. Respondents and their amici do maintain that becoming a guardian can be difficult, but the problems they identify — delays in processing, the need to ensure that existing parental rights are not infringed, the “bureaucratic gauntlet”— would be no less significant were the INS to duplicate existing state procedures. We certainly agree with the dissent that this case must be decided in accordance with “indications of congressional policy,” post, at 334. The most pertinent indication, however, is not, as the dissent believes, the federal statute governing detention of juveniles pending delinquency proceedings, 18 U. S. C. § 5034, but the statute under which the Attorney General is here acting, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). That grants the Attorney General discretion to determine when temporary detention pending deportation proceedings is appropriate, and makes his exercise of that discretion “presumptively correct and unassailable except for abuse.” Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 540 (1952). We assuredly cannot say that the decision to rely on universally accepted presumptions as to the custodial competence of parents and close relatives, and to defer to the expertise of the States regarding the capabilities of other potential custodians, is an abuse of this broad discretion simply because it does not track policies applicable outside the immigration field. See NCIR, 502 U. S. 183, 193-194 (1991). Moreover, reliance upon the States to determine guardianship is quite in accord with what Congress has directed in other immigration contexts. See 8 U. S. C. § 1154(d) (INS may not approve immigration petition for an alien-juvenile orphan being adopted unless “a valid home-study has been favorably recommended by an agency of the State of the child’s proposed residence, or by an agency authorized by that State to conduct such a study”); § 1522(d)(2)(B)(ii) (for refugee children unaccompanied by parents or close relatives, INS shall “attempt to arrange . . . placement under the laws of the States”); see also 45 CFR §400.113 (1992) (providing support payments under § 1522 until the refugee juvenile is placed with a parent or with another adult “to whom legal custody and/or guardianship is granted under State law”). The dissent would mandate fully individualized custody determinations for two reasons. First, because it reads Carlson v. Landon, supra, as holding that the Attorney General may not employ “mere presumptions” in exercising his discretion. Post, at 337. But it was only the dissenters in Carlson who took such a restrictive view. See 342 U. S., at 558-559, 563-564, 568 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Second, because it believes that § 1252(a) must be interpreted to require individualized hearings in order to avoid ‘“constitutional doubts.’” Post, at 334 (quoting United States v. Witkovich, 353 U. S. 194, 199 (1957)); see post, at 339-340. The “constitutional doubts” argument has been the last refuge of many an interpretive lost cause. Statutes should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional doubts, Witkovich, supra, at 202, not to eliminate all possible contentions that the statute might be unconstitutional. We entertain no serious doubt that the Constitution does not require any more individuation than the regulation provides, see supra, at 303-305, 309, and thus find no need to supplement the text of § 1252(a). The dissent’s citation of a single deposition from 1986, post, at 323, and n. 6, is hardly proof that “excessive delay” will result in the “typical” case, post, at 324, under regulation 242.24, which was not promulgated until mid-1988.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER AND PAUL HOME, Petitioner v. PENNSYLVANIA, et al.; Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Petitioners v. Pennsylvania, et al. Nos. 19-431 19-454 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued May 6, 2020 Decided July 8, 2020 Paul D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, Andrew C. Lawrence, Mariel A. Brookins, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, Mark L. Rienzi, Eric C. Rassbach, Lori H. Windham, Diana M. Verm, Chris Pagliarella, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for petitioner Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home. Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Deputy Solicitor General, Hashim M. Mooppan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Christopher G. Michel, Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistants to the Solicitor General, Sharon Swingle, Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Karen Schoen, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioners Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Glenn J. Moramarco, Assistant Attorney General, Elspeth Hans, Eric L. Apar, Deputy Attorneys General, Office of Attorney General, Trenton, NJ, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Michael J. Fischer, Counsel of Record, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Aimee D. Thomson, Jacob B. Boyer, Deputy Attorneys General, Office of Attorney General, Philadelphia, PA, for Respondents. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. In these consolidated cases, we decide whether the Government created lawful exemptions from a regulatory requirement implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), 124 Stat. 119. The requirement at issue obligates certain employers to provide contraceptive coverage to their employees through their group health plans. Though contraceptive coverage is not required by (or even mentioned in) the ACA provision at issue, the Government mandated such coverage by promulgating interim final rules (IFRs) shortly after the ACA's passage. This requirement is known as the contraceptive mandate. After six years of protracted litigation, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury (Departments)-which jointly administer the relevant ACA provision -exempted certain employers who have religious and conscientious objections from this agency-created mandate. The Third Circuit concluded that the Departments lacked statutory authority to promulgate these exemptions and affirmed the District Court's nationwide preliminary injunction. This decision was erroneous. We hold that the Departments had the authority to provide exemptions from the regulatory contraceptive requirements for employers with religious and conscientious objections. We accordingly reverse the Third Circuit's judgment and remand with instructions to dissolve the nationwide preliminary injunction. I The ACA's contraceptive mandate-a product of agency regulation-has existed for approximately nine years. Litigation surrounding that requirement has lasted nearly as long. In light of this extensive history, we begin by summarizing the relevant background. A The ACA requires covered employers to offer "a group health plan or group health insurance coverage" that provides certain "minimum essential coverage." 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) ; §§ 4980H(a), (c)(2). Employers who do not comply face hefty penalties, including potential fines of $100 per day for each affected employee. §§ 4980D(a)-(b); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 696-697, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014). These cases concern regulations promulgated under a provision of the ACA that requires covered employers to provide women with "preventive care and screenings" without "any cost sharing requirements." 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). The statute does not define "preventive care and screenings," nor does it include an exhaustive or illustrative list of such services. Thus, the statute itself does not explicitly require coverage for any specific form of "preventive care." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 697, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Instead, Congress stated that coverage must include "such additional preventive care and screenings ... as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration" (HRSA), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). § 300gg-13(a)(4). At the time of the ACA's enactment, these guidelines were not yet written. As a result, no specific forms of preventive care or screenings were (or could be) referred to or incorporated by reference. Soon after the ACA's passage, the Departments began promulgating rules related to § 300gg-13(a)(4). But in doing so, the Departments did not proceed through the notice and comment rulemaking process, which the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) often requires before an agency's regulation can "have the force and effect of law." Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn. , 575 U.S. 92, 96, 135 S.Ct. 1199,191 L.Ed.2d 186 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553. Instead, the Departments invoked the APA's good cause exception, which permits an agency to dispense with notice and comment and promulgate an IFR that carries immediate legal force. § 553(b)(3)(B). The first relevant IFR, promulgated in July 2010, primarily focused on implementing other aspects of § 300gg-13. 75 Fed. Reg. 41728. The IFR indicated that HRSA planned to develop its Preventive Care Guidelines (Guidelines) by August 2011. Ibid. However, it did not mention religious exemptions or accommodations of any kind. As anticipated, HRSA released its first set of Guidelines in August 2011. The Guidelines were based on recommendations compiled by the Institute of Medicine (now called the National Academy of Medicine), "a nonprofit group of volunteer advisers." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 697, 134 S.Ct. 2751. The Guidelines included the contraceptive mandate, which required health plans to provide coverage for all contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures approved by the Food and Drug Administration as well as related education and counseling. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (2012). The same day the Guidelines were issued, the Departments amended the 2010 IFR. 76 Fed. Reg. 46621 (2011). When the 2010 IFR was originally published, the Departments began receiving comments from numerous religious employers expressing concern that the Guidelines would "impinge upon their religious freedom" if they included contraception. Id. , at 46623. As just stated, the Guidelines ultimately did contain contraceptive coverage, thus making the potential impact on religious freedom a reality. In the amended IFR, the Departments determined that "it [was] appropriate that HRSA ... tak[e] into account the [mandate's] effect on certain religious employers" and concluded that HRSA had the discretion to do so through the creation of an exemption. Ibid. The Departments then determined that the exemption should cover religious employers, and they set out a four-part test to identify which employers qualified. The last criterion required the entity to be a church, an integrated auxiliary, a convention or association of churches, or "the exclusively religious activities of any religious order." Ibid. HRSA created an exemption for these employers the same day. 78 Fed. Reg. 39871 (2013). Because of the narrow focus on churches, this first exemption is known as the church exemption. The Guidelines were scheduled to go into effect for plan years beginning on August 1, 2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-8726. But in February 2012, before the Guidelines took effect, the Departments promulgated a final rule that temporarily prevented the Guidelines from applying to certain religious nonprofits. Specifically, the Departments stated their intent to promulgate additional rules to "accommodat[e] non-exempted, non-profit organizations' religious objections to covering contraceptive services." Id. , at 8727. Until that rulemaking occurred, the 2012 rule also provided a temporary safe harbor to protect such employers. Ibid. The safe harbor covered nonprofits "whose plans have consistently not covered all or the same subset of contraceptive services for religious reasons." Thus, the nonprofits who availed themselves of this safe harbor were not subject to the contraceptive mandate when it first became effective. The Departments promulgated another final rule in 2013 that is relevant to these cases in two ways. First, after reiterating that § 300gg-13(a)(4) authorizes HRSA "to issue guidelines in a manner that exempts group health plans established or maintained by religious employers," the Departments "simplif[ied]" and "clarif[ied]" the definition of a religious employer. 78 Fed. Reg. 39873. Second, pursuant to that same authority, the Departments provided the anticipated accommodation for eligible religious organizations, which the regulation defined as organizations that "(1) [o]ppos[e] providing coverage for some or all of the contraceptive services ... on account of religious objections; (2) [are] organized and operat[e] as ... nonprofit entit[ies]; (3) hol[d] [themselves] out as ... religious organization[s]; and (4) self-certif[y] that [they] satisf[y] the first three criteria." Id. , at 39874. The accommodation required an eligible organization to provide a copy of the self-certification form to its health insurance issuer, which in turn would exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health plan and provide payments to beneficiaries for contraceptive services separate from the health plan. Id. , at 39878. The Departments stated that the accommodation aimed to "protec[t]" religious organizations "from having to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for [contraceptive] coverage" in a way that was consistent with and did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 78 Fed. Reg. 39871, 39886-39887. This accommodation is referred to as the self-certification accommodation. B Shortly after the Departments promulgated the 2013 final rule, two religious nonprofits run by the Little Sisters of the Poor (Little Sisters) challenged the self-certification accommodation. The Little Sisters "are an international congregation of Roman Catholic women religious" who have operated homes for the elderly poor in the United States since 1868. See Mission Statement: Little Sisters of the Poor, http://www.littlesistersofthepoor.org/mission-statement. They feel called by their faith to care for their elderly residents regardless of "faith, finances, or frailty." Brief for Residents and Families of Residents at Homes of the Little Sisters of the Poor as Amici Curiae 14. The Little Sisters endeavor to treat all residents "as if they were Jesus [Christ] himself, cared for as family, and treated with dignity until God calls them to his home." Complaint ¶14 in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged , Denver, Colo. v. Sebelius , 6 F.Supp.3d 1225 (D Colo.2013), p. 5 (Complaint). Consistent with their Catholic faith, the Little Sisters hold the religious conviction "that deliberately avoiding reproduction through medical means is immoral." Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell , 794 F.3d 1151, 1167 (CA10 2015). They challenged the self-certification accommodation, claiming that completing the certification form would force them to violate their religious beliefs by "tak[ing] actions that directly cause others to provide contraception or appear to participate in the Departments' delivery scheme." Id. , at 1168. As a result, they alleged that the self-certification accommodation violated RFRA. Under RFRA, a law that substantially burdens the exercise of religion must serve "a compelling governmental interest" and be "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b). The Court of Appeals disagreed that the self-certification accommodation substantially burdened the Little Sisters' free exercise rights and thus rejected their RFRA claim. Little Sisters , 794 F.3d at 1160. The Little Sisters were far from alone in raising RFRA challenges to the self-certification accommodation. Religious nonprofit organizations and educational institutions across the country filed a spate of similar lawsuits, most resulting in rulings that the accommodation did not violate RFRA. See, e.g. , East Texas Baptist Univ. v. Burwell , 793 F.3d 449 (CA5 2015) ; Geneva College v. Secretary, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 778 F.3d 422 (CA3 2015) ; Priests for Life v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 772 F.3d 229 (CADC 2014) ; Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell , 755 F.3d 372 (CA6 2014) ; University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius , 743 F.3d 547 (CA7 2014) ; but see Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 801 F.3d 927 (CA8 2015) ; Dordt College v. Burwell , 801 F.3d 946 (CA8 2015). We granted certiorari in cases from four Courts of Appeals to decide the RFRA question. Zubik v. Burwell , 578 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1557, 1560, 194 L.Ed.2d 696 (2016) (per curiam ). Ultimately, however, we opted to remand the cases without deciding that question. In supplemental briefing, the Government had "confirm[ed]" that " 'contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners' employees, through petitioners' insurance companies, without any ... notice from petitioners.' " Id. , at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1560. Petitioners, for their part, had agreed that such an approach would not violate their free exercise rights. Ibid. Accordingly, because all parties had accepted that an alternative approach was "feasible," ibid. , we directed the Government to "accommodat[e] petitioners' religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners' health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage," id. , at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1560 (internal quotation marks omitted). C Zubik was not the only relevant ruling from this Court about the contraceptive mandate. As the Little Sisters and numerous others mounted their challenges to the self-certification accommodation, a host of other entities challenged the contraceptive mandate itself as a violation of RFRA. See, e.g. , Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius , 723 F.3d 1114 (CA10 2013) (en banc); Korte v. Sebelius , 735 F.3d 654 (CA7 2013) ; Gilardi v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 733 F.3d 1208 (CADC 2013) ; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 724 F.3d 377 (CA3 2013) ; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius , 730 F.3d 618 (CA6 2013). This Court granted certiorari in two cases involving three closely held corporations to decide whether the mandate violated RFRA. Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. 682, 134 S.Ct. 2751. The individual respondents in Hobby Lobby opposed four methods of contraception covered by the mandate. They sincerely believed that human life begins at conception and that, because the challenged methods of contraception risked causing the death of a human embryo, providing those methods of contraception to employees would make the employers complicit in abortion. Id. , at 691, 720, 134 S.Ct. 2751. We held that the mandate substantially burdened respondents' free exercise, explaining that "[if] the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy price." Id. , at 691, 134 S.Ct. 2751. "If these consequences do not amount to a substantial burden," we stated, "it is hard to see what would." Ibid. We also held that the mandate did not utilize the least restrictive means, citing the self-certification accommodation as a less burdensome alternative. Id. , at 730-731, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Thus, as the Departments began the task of reformulating rules related to the contraceptive mandate, they did so not only under Zubik 's direction to accommodate religious exercise, but also against the backdrop of Hobby Lobby 's pronouncement that the mandate, standing alone, violated RFRA as applied to religious entities with complicity-based objections. D In 2016, the Departments attempted to strike the proper balance a third time, publishing a request for information on ways to comply with Zubik . 81 Fed. Reg. 47741. This attempt proved futile, as the Departments ultimately concluded that "no feasible approach" had been identified. Dept. of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36, p. 4 (2017). The Departments maintained their position that the self-certification accommodation was consistent with RFRA because it did not impose a substantial burden and, even if it did, it utilized the least restrictive means of achieving the Government's interests. Id. , at 4-5. In 2017, the Departments tried yet again to comply with Zubik , this time by promulgating the two IFRs that served as the impetus for this litigation. The first IFR significantly broadened the definition of an exempt religious employer to encompass an employer that "objects ... based on its sincerely held religious beliefs," "to its establishing, maintaining, providing, offering, or arranging [for] coverage or payments for some or all contraceptive services." 82 Fed. Reg. 47812 (2017). Among other things, this definition included for-profit and publicly traded entities. Because they were exempt, these employers did not need to participate in the accommodation process, which nevertheless remained available under the IFR. Id. , at 47806. As with their previous regulations, the Departments once again invoked § 300gg-13(a)(4) as authority to promulgate this "religious exemption," stating that it "include[d] the ability to exempt entities from coverage requirements announced in HRSA's Guidelines." Id. , at 47794. Additionally, the Departments announced for the first time that RFRA compelled the creation of, or at least provided the discretion to create, the religious exemption. Id. , at 47800-47806. As the Departments explained: "We know from Hobby Lobby that, in the absence of any accommodation, the contraceptive-coverage requirement imposes a substantial burden on certain objecting employers. We know from other lawsuits and public comments that many religious entities have objections to complying with the [self-certification] accommodation based on their sincerely held religious beliefs." Id. , at 47806. The Departments "believe[d] that the Court's analysis in Hobby Lobby extends, for the purposes of analyzing a substantial burden, to the burdens that an entity faces when it religiously opposes participating in the [self-certification] accommodation process." Id. , at 47800. They thus "conclude[d] that it [was] appropriate to expand the exemption to other ... organizations with sincerely held religious beliefs opposed to contraceptive coverage." Id. , at 47802 ; see also id. , at 47810-47811. The second IFR created a similar "moral exemption" for employers-including nonprofits and for-profits with no publicly traded components-with "sincerely held moral" objections to providing some or all forms of contraceptive coverage. Id. , at 47850, 47861-47862. Citing congressional enactments, precedents from this Court, agency practice, and state laws that provided for conscience protections, id. , at 47844-47847, the Departments invoked their authority under the ACA to create this exemption, id. , at 47844. The Departments requested post-promulgation comments on both IFRs. Id. , at 47813, 47854. E Within a week of the 2017 IFRs' promulgation, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Among other claims, it alleged that the IFRs were procedurally and substantively invalid under the APA. The District Court held that the Commonwealth was likely to succeed on both claims and granted a preliminary nationwide injunction against the IFRs. The Federal Government appealed. While that appeal was pending, the Departments issued rules finalizing the 2017 IFRs. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57536 (2018) ; 83 Fed. Reg. 57592, codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147 (2018). Though the final rules left the exemptions largely intact, they also responded to post-promulgation comments, explaining their reasons for neither narrowing nor expanding the exemptions beyond what was provided for in the IFRs. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57542-57545, 57598-57603. The final rule creating the religious exemption also contained a lengthy analysis of the Departments' changed position regarding whether the self-certification process violated RFRA. Id. , at 57544-57549. And the Departments explained that, in the wake of the numerous lawsuits challenging the self-certification accommodation and the failed attempt to identify alternative accommodations after the 2016 request for information, "an expanded exemption rather than the existing accommodation is the most appropriate administrative response to the substantial burden identified by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby ." Id. , at 57544-57545. After the final rules were promulgated, the State of New Jersey joined Pennsylvania's suit and, together, they filed an amended complaint. As relevant, the States-respondents here-once again challenged the rules as substantively and procedurally invalid under the APA. They alleged that the rules were substantively unlawful because the Departments lacked statutory authority under either the ACA or RFRA to promulgate the exemptions. Respondents also asserted that the IFRs were not adequately justified by good cause, meaning that the Departments impermissibly used the IFR procedure to bypass the APA's notice and comment procedures. Finally, respondents argued that the purported procedural defects of the IFRs likewise infected the final rules. The District Court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against the implementation of the final rules the same day the rules were scheduled to take effect. The Federal Government appealed, as did one of the homes operated by the Little Sisters, which had in the meantime intervened in the suit to defend the religious exemption. The appeals were consolidated with the previous appeal, which had been stayed. The Third Circuit affirmed. In its view, the Departments lacked authority to craft the exemptions under either statute. The Third Circuit read 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) as empowering HRSA to determine which services should be included as preventive care and screenings, but not to carve out exemptions from those requirements. It also concluded that RFRA did not compel or permit the religious exemption because, under Third Circuit precedent that was vacated and remanded in Zubik , the Third Circuit had concluded that the self-certification accommodation did not impose a substantial burden on free exercise. As for respondents' procedural claim, the court held that the Departments lacked good cause to bypass notice and comment when promulgating the 2017 IFRs. In addition, the court determined that, because the IFRs and final rules were "virtually identical," "[t]he notice and comment exercise surrounding the Final Rules [did] not reflect any real open-mindedness." Pennsylvania v. President of United States , 930 F.3d 543, 568-569 (2019). Though it rebuked the Departments for their purported attitudinal deficiencies, the Third Circuit did not identify any specific public comments to which the agency did not appropriately respond. Id. , at 569, n. 24. We granted certiorari. 589 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 918, 205 L.Ed.2d 519 (2020). II Respondents contend that the 2018 final rules providing religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate are both substantively and procedurally invalid. We begin with their substantive argument that the Departments lacked statutory authority to promulgate the rules. A The Departments invoke 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) as legal authority for both exemptions. This provision of the ACA states that, "with respect to women," "[a] group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide ... such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA]." The Departments maintain, as they have since 2011, that the phrase "as provided for" allows HRSA both to identify what preventive care and screenings must be covered and to exempt or accommodate certain employers' religious objections. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57540-57541 ; see also post , at 2397 - 2398 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment). They also argue that, as with the church exemption, their role as the administering agencies permits them to guide HRSA in its discretion by "defining the scope of permissible exemptions and accommodations for such guidelines." 82 Fed. Reg. 47794. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that § 300gg-13(a)(4) permits HRSA to only list the preventive care and screenings that health plans "shall ... provide," not to exempt entities from covering those identified services. Because that asserted limitation is found nowhere in the statute, we agree with the Departments. "Our analysis begins and ends with the text." Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. , 572 U.S. 545, 553, 134 S.Ct. 1749, 188 L.Ed.2d 816 (2014). Here, the pivotal phrase is "as provided for." To "provide" means to supply, furnish, or make available. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1827 (2002) (Webster's Third); American Heritage Dictionary 1411 (4th ed. 2000); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 713 (2d ed. 1989). And, as the Departments explained, the word "as" functions as an adverb modifying "provided," indicating "the manner in which" something is done. 83 Fed. Reg. 57540. See also Webster's Third 125; 1 Oxford English Dictionary, at 673; American Heritage Dictionary 102 (5th ed. 2011). On its face, then, the provision grants sweeping authority to HRSA to craft a set of standards defining the preventive care that applicable health plans must cover. But the statute is completely silent as to what those "comprehensive guidelines" must contain, or how HRSA must go about creating them. The statute does not, as Congress has done in other statutes, provide an exhaustive or illustrative list of the preventive care and screenings that must be included. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). It does not, as Congress did elsewhere in the same section of the ACA, set forth any criteria or standards to guide HRSA's selections. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(3) (requiring "evidence-informed preventive care and screenings" (emphasis added)); § 300gg-13(a)(1) ("evidence-based items or services"). It does not, as Congress has done in other contexts, require that HRSA consult with or refrain from consulting with any party in the formulation of the Guidelines. See, e.g. , 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) ; 23 U.S.C. § 138. This means that HRSA has virtually unbridled discretion to decide what counts as preventive care and screenings. But the same capacious grant of authority that empowers HRSA to make these determinations leaves its discretion equally unchecked in other areas, including the ability to identify and create exemptions from its own Guidelines. Congress could have limited HRSA's discretion in any number of ways, but it chose not to do so. See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons , 552 U.S. 214, 227, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008) ; see also Rotkiske v. Klemm , 589 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 355, 361, 205 L.Ed.2d 291 (2019) ; Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute , 584 U. S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 1833, 1845-1846, 201 L.Ed.2d 141 (2018). Instead, it enacted " 'expansive language offer[ing] no indication whatever' " that the statute limits what HRSA can designate as preventive care and screenings or who must provide that coverage. Ali , 552 U.S. at 219-220, 128 S.Ct. 831 (quoting Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 446 U.S. 578, 589, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980) ). "It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that 'absent provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.' " Rotkiske , 589 U. S., at ----, 140 S.Ct., at 360-361 (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012)); Nichols v. United States , 578 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1113, 1118, 194 L.Ed.2d 324 (2016). This principle applies not only to adding terms not found in the statute, but also to imposing limits on an agency's discretion that are not supported by the text. See Watt v. Energy Action Ed. Foundation , 454 U.S. 151, 168, 102 S.Ct. 205, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981). By introducing a limitation not found in the statute, respondents ask us to alter, rather than to interpret, the ACA. See Nichols , 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1118. By its terms, the ACA leaves the Guidelines' content to the exclusive discretion of HRSA. Under a plain reading of the statute, then, we conclude that the ACA gives HRSA broad discretion to define preventive care and screenings and to create the religious and moral exemptions. The dissent resists this conclusion, asserting that the Departments' interpretation thwarts Congress' intent to provide contraceptive coverage to the women who are interested in receiving such coverage. See post , at 2400, 2411 - 2412 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). It also argues that the exemptions will make it significantly harder for interested women to obtain seamless access to contraception without cost sharing, post , at 2394 - 2396, which we have previously "assume[d]" is a compelling governmental interest, Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 728, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; but see post , at 2391 - 2393 (ALITO, J., concurring). The Departments dispute that women will be adversely impacted by the 2018 exemptions. 82 Fed. Reg. 47805. Though we express no view on this disagreement, it bears noting that such a policy concern cannot justify supplanting the text's plain meaning. See Gitlitz v. Commissioner , 531 U.S. 206, 220, 121 S.Ct. 701, 148 L.Ed.2d 613 (2001). "It is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we think Congress really intended." Lewis v. Chicago , 560 U.S. 205, 215, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010). Moreover, even assuming that the dissent is correct as an empirical matter, its concerns are more properly directed at the regulatory mechanism that Congress put in place to protect this assumed governmental interest. As even the dissent recognizes, contraceptive coverage is mentioned nowhere in § 300gg-13(a)(4), and no language in the statute itself even hints that Congress intended that contraception should or must be covered. See post , at 2401 - 2402 (citing legislative history and amicus briefs). Thus, contrary to the dissent's protestations, it was Congress, not the Departments, that declined to expressly require contraceptive coverage in the ACA itself. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57540. And, it was Congress' deliberate choice to issue an extraordinarily "broad general directiv[e]" to HRSA to craft the Guidelines, without any qualifications as to the substance of the Guidelines or whether exemptions were permissible. Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). Thus, it is Congress, not the Departments, that has failed to provide the protection for contraceptive coverage that the dissent seeks. No party has pressed a constitutional challenge to the breadth of the delegation involved here. Cf. Gundy v. United States , 588 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019). The only question we face today is what the plain language of the statute authorizes. And the plain language of the statute clearly allows the Departments to create the preventive care standards as well as the religious and moral exemptions. B The Departments also contend, consistent with the reasoning in the 2017 IFR and the 2018 final rule establishing the religious exemption, that RFRA independently compelled the Departments' solution or that it at least authorized it. In light of our holding that the ACA provided a basis for both exemptions, we need not reach these arguments. We do, however, address respondents' argument that the Departments could not even consider RFRA as they formulated the religious exemption from the contraceptive mandate. Particularly in the context of these cases, it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA. As we have explained, RFRA "provide[s] very broad protection for religious liberty." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 693, 134 S.Ct. 2751. In RFRA's congressional findings, Congress stated that "governments should not substantially burden religious exercise," a right described by RFRA as "unalienable." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(1), (3). To protect this right, Congress provided that the "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability" unless "it demonstrates that application of the burden ... is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and ... is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b). Placing Congress' intent beyond dispute, RFRA specifies that it "applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise." § 2000bb-3(a). RFRA also permits Congress to exclude statutes from RFRA's protections. § 2000bb-3(b). It is clear from the face of the statute that the contraceptive mandate is capable of violating RFRA. The ACA does not explicitly exempt RFRA, and the regulations implementing the contraceptive mandate qualify as "Federal law" or "the implementation of [Federal] law." § 2000bb-3(a) ; cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown , 441 U.S. 281, 297-298, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). Additionally, we expressly stated in Hobby Lobby that the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA as applied to entities with complicity-based objections. 573 U.S. at 736, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Thus, the potential for conflict between the contraceptive mandate and RFRA is well settled. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that RFRA would feature prominently in the Departments' discussion of exemptions that would not pose similar legal problems. Moreover, our decisions all but instructed the Departments to consider RFRA going forward. For instance, though we held that the mandate violated RFRA in Hobby Lobby , we left it to the Federal Government to develop and implement a solution. At the same time, we made it abundantly clear that, under RFRA, the Departments must accept the sincerely held complicity-based objections of religious entities. That is, they could not "tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed" because, in the Departments' view, "the connection between what the objecting parties must do ... and the end that they find to be morally wrong ... is simply too attenuated." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 723-724, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Likewise, though we did not decide whether the self-certification accommodation ran afoul of RFRA in Zubik , we directed the parties on remand to "accommodat[e]" the free exercise rights of those with complicity-based objections to the self-certification accommodation. 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1560. It is hard to see how the Departments could promulgate rules consistent with these decisions if they did not overtly consider these entities' rights under RFRA. This is especially true in light of the basic requirements of the rulemaking process. Our precedents require final rules to "articulate a satisfactory explanation for [the] action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement allows courts to assess whether the agency has promulgated an arbitrary and capricious rule by "entirely fail[ing] to consider an important aspect of the problem [or] offer[ing] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before [it]." Ibid. ; see also Department of Commerce v. New York , 588 U. S. ----, ---- - ----, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2585-2586, 204 L.Ed.2d 978 (2019) (BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Genuine Parts Co. v. EPA , 890 F.3d 304, 307 (CADC 2018) ; Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Assns. v. United States Bur. of Reclamation , 426 F.3d 1082, 1094 (CA9 2005). Here, the Departments were aware that Hobby Lobby held the mandate unlawful as applied to religious entities with complicity-based objections. 82 Fed. Reg. 47799 ; 83 Fed. Reg. 57544-57545. They were also aware of Zubik 's instructions. 82 Fed. Reg. 47799. And, aside from our own decisions, the Departments were mindful of the RFRA concerns raised in "public comments and ... court filings in dozens of cases-encompassing hundreds of organizations." Id. , at 47802 ; see also id. , at 47806. If the Departments did not look to RFRA's requirements or discuss RFRA at all when formulating their solution, they would certainly be susceptible to claims that the rules were arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider an important aspect of the problem. Thus, respondents' argument that the Departments erred by looking to RFRA as a guide when framing the religious exemption is without merit. III Because we hold that the Departments had authority to promulgate the exemptions, we must next decide whether the 2018 final rules are procedurally invalid. Respondents present two arguments on this score. Neither is persuasive. A Unless a statutory exception applies, the APA requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register before promulgating a rule that has legal force. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Respondents point to the fact that the 2018 final rules were preceded by a document entitled "Interim Final Rules with Request for Comments," not a document entitled "General Notice of Proposed Rulemaking." They claim that since this was insufficient to satisfy § 553(b) 's requirement, the final rules were procedurally invalid. Respondents are incorrect. Formal labels aside, the rules contained all of the elements of a notice of proposed rulemaking as required by the APA. The APA requires that the notice of proposed rulemaking contain "reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed" and "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved." §§ 553(b)(2)-(3). The request for comments in the 2017 IFRs readily satisfies these requirements. That request detailed the Departments' view that they had legal authority under the ACA to promulgate both exemptions, 82 Fed. Reg. 47794, 47844, as well as authority under RFRA to promulgate the religious exemption, id. , at 47800-47806. And respondents do not-and cannot-argue that the IFRs failed to air the relevant issues with sufficient detail for respondents to understand the Departments' position. See supra , at 2377 - 2378. Thus, the APA notice requirements were satisfied. Even assuming that the APA requires an agency to publish a document entitled "notice of proposed rulemaking" when the agency moves from an IFR to a final rule, there was no "prejudicial error" here. § 706. We have previously noted that the rule of prejudicial error is treated as an "administrative law ... harmless error rule," National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife , 551 U.S. 644, 659-660, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Departments issued an IFR that explained its position in fulsome detail and "provide[d] the public with an opportunity to comment on whether [the] regulations ... should be made permanent or subject to modification." 82 Fed. Reg. 47815 ; see also id. , at 47852, 47855. Respondents thus do not come close to demonstrating that they experienced any harm from the title of the document, let alone that they have satisfied this harmless error rule. "The object [of notice and comment], in short, is one of fair notice," Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke , 551 U.S. 158, 174, 127 S.Ct. 2339, 168 L.Ed.2d 54 (2007), and respondents certainly had such notice here. Because the IFR complied with the APA's requirements, this claim fails. B Next, respondents contend that the 2018 final rules are procedurally invalid because "nothing in the record signal[s]" that the Departments "maintained an open mind throughout the [post-promulgation] process." Brief for Respondents 27. As evidence for this claim, respondents point to the fact that the final rules made only minor alterations to the IFRs, leaving their substance unchanged. The Third Circuit applied this "open-mindedness" test, concluding that because the final rules were "virtually identical" to the IFRs, the Departments lacked the requisite "flexible and open-minded attitude" when they promulgated the final rules. 930 F.3d at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted). We decline to evaluate the final rules under the open-mindedness test. We have repeatedly stated that the text of the APA provides the " 'maximum procedural requirements' " that an agency must follow in order to promulgate a rule. Perez , 575 U.S. at 100, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 435 U.S. 519, 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) ). Because the APA "sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness," FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. , 556 U.S. 502, 513, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009), we have repeatedly rejected courts' attempts to impose "judge-made procedur[es]" in addition to the APA's mandates, Perez , 575 U.S. at 102, 135 S.Ct. 1199 ; see also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp. , 496 U.S. 633, 654-655, 110 S.Ct. 2668, 110 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990) ; Vermont Yankee , 435 U.S. at 549, 98 S.Ct. 1197. And like the procedures that we have held invalid, the open-mindedness test violates the "general proposition that courts are not free to impose upon agencies specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the APA." LTV Corp. , 496 U.S. at 654, 110 S.Ct. 2668. Rather than adopting this test, we focus our inquiry on whether the Departments satisfied the APA's objective criteria, just as we have in previous cases. We conclude that they did. Section 553(b) obligated the Departments to provide adequate notice before promulgating a rule that has legal force. As explained supra , at 2384 - 2385, the IFRs provided sufficient notice. Aside from these notice requirements, the APA mandates that agencies "give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments," § 553(c) ; states that the final rules must include "a concise general statement of their basis and purpose," ibid. ; and requires that final rules must be published 30 days before they become effective, § 553(d). The Departments complied with each of these statutory procedures. They "request[ed] and encourag[ed] public comments on all matters addressed" in the rules-i.e. , the basis for the Departments' legal authority, the rationales for the exemptions, and the detailed discussion of the exemptions' scope. 82 Fed. Reg. 47813, 47854. They also gave interested parties 60 days to submit comments. Id. , at 47792, 47838. The final rules included a concise statement of their basis and purpose, explaining that the rules were "necessary to protect sincerely held" moral and religious objections and summarizing the legal analysis supporting the exemptions. 83 Fed. Reg. 57592 ; see also id. , at 57537-57538. Lastly, the final rules were published on November 15, 2018, but did not become effective until January 14, 2019-more than 30 days after being published. Id. , at 57536, 57592. In sum, the rules fully complied with " 'the maximum procedural requirements [that] Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.' " Perez , 575 U.S. at 102, 135 S.Ct. 1199 (quoting Vermont Yankee , 435 U.S. at 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197 ). Accordingly, respondents' second procedural challenge also fails. * * * For over 150 years, the Little Sisters have engaged in faithful service and sacrifice, motivated by a religious calling to surrender all for the sake of their brother. "[T]hey commit to constantly living out a witness that proclaims the unique, inviolable dignity of every person, particularly those whom others regard as weak or worthless." Complaint ¶14. But for the past seven years, they-like many other religious objectors who have participated in the litigation and rulemakings leading up to today's decision-have had to fight for the ability to continue in their noble work without violating their sincerely held religious beliefs. After two decisions from this Court and multiple failed regulatory attempts, the Federal Government has arrived at a solution that exempts the Little Sisters from the source of their complicity-based concerns-the administratively imposed contraceptive mandate. We hold today that the Departments had the statutory authority to craft that exemption, as well as the contemporaneously issued moral exemption. We further hold that the rules promulgating these exemptions are free from procedural defects. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered . Justice ALITO, with whom Justice GORSUCH joins, concurring. In these cases, the Court of Appeals held, among other things, (1) that the Little Sisters of the Poor lacked standing to appeal, (2) that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) does not permit any exemptions from the so-called contraceptive mandate, (3) that the Departments responsible for issuing the challenged rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by failing to provide notice of proposed rulemaking, and (4) that the final rule creating the current exemptions is invalid because the Departments did not have an open mind when they considered comments to the rule. Based on this analysis, the Court of Appeals affirmed the nationwide injunction issued by the District Court. This Court now concludes that all the holdings listed above were erroneous, and I join the opinion of the Court in full. We now send these cases back to the lower courts, where the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey are all but certain to pursue their argument that the current rule is flawed on yet another ground, namely, that it is arbitrary and capricious and thus violates the APA. This will prolong the legal battle in which the Little Sisters have now been engaged for seven years-even though during all this time no employee of the Little Sisters has come forward with an objection to the Little Sisters' conduct. I understand the Court's desire to decide no more than is strictly necessary, but under the circumstances here, I would decide one additional question: whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4, does not compel the religious exemption granted by the current rule. If RFRA requires this exemption, the Departments did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in granting it. And in my judgment, RFRA compels an exemption for the Little Sisters and any other employer with a similar objection to what has been called the accommodation to the contraceptive mandate. I Because the contraceptive mandate has been repeatedly modified, a brief recapitulation of this history may be helpful. The ACA itself did not require that insurance plans include coverage for contraceptives. Instead, the Act provided that plans must cover those preventive services found to be appropriate by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). In 2011, HRSA recommended that plans be required to cover " '[a]ll ... contraceptive methods' " approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (2012). (I will use the term "contraceptive mandate" or simply "mandate" to refer to the obligation to provide coverage for contraceptives under any of the various regimes that have existed since the promulgation of this original rule.) At the direction of the relevant Departments, HRSA simultaneously created an exemption from the mandate for "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches," as well as "the exclusively religious activities of any religious order." 76 Fed. Reg. 46623 (2011) ; see 77 Fed. Reg. 8726. (I will call this the "church exemption.") This narrow exemption was met with strong objections on the ground that it furnished insufficient protection for religious groups opposed to the use of some or all of the listed contraceptives. The Departments responded by issuing a new regulation that created an accommodation for certain religious non-profit employers. See 78 Fed. Reg. 39892-39898 (2013). (I will call this the "accommodation.") Under this accommodation, a covered employer could certify its objection to its insurer (or, if its plan was self-funded, to its third-party plan administrator), and the insurer or third-party administrator would then proceed to provide contraceptive coverage to the objecting entity's employees. Unlike the earlier church exemption, the accommodation did not exempt these religious employers from the contraceptive mandate, but the Departments construed invocation of the accommodation as compliance with the mandate. Meanwhile, the contraceptive mandate was challenged by various employers who had religious objections to providing coverage for at least some of the listed contraceptives but were not covered by the church exemption or the accommodation. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014), we held that RFRA prohibited the application of the regulation to closely held, for-profit corporations that fell into this category. The Departments responded by issuing a new regulation that attempted to codify our holding by allowing closely-held corporations to utilize the accommodation. See 80 Fed. Reg. 41343-41347 (2015). Although this modification solved one RFRA problem, the contraceptive mandate was still objectionable to some religious employers, including the Little Sisters. We considered those objections in Zubik v. Burwell , 578 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1557, 194 L.Ed.2d 696 (2016) (per curiam ), but instead of resolving the legal dispute, we vacated the decisions below and remanded, instructing the parties to attempt to come to an agreement. Unfortunately, after strenuous efforts, the outgoing administration reported on January 9, 2017, that no reconciliation could be reached. The Little Sisters and other employers objected to engaging in any conduct that had the effect of making contraceptives available to their employees under their insurance plans, and no way of providing such coverage to their employees without using their plans could be found. In 2017, the new administration took up the task of attempting to find a solution. After receiving more than 56,000 comments, it issued the rule now before us, which made the church exemption available to non-governmental employers who object to the provision of some or all contraceptive services based on sincerely held religious beliefs. 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2019) ; see 83 Fed. Reg. 57540, 57590. (The "religious exemption.") The Court of Appeals, as noted, held that RFRA did not require this new rule. II A RFRA broadly prohibits the Federal Government from violating religious liberty. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). It applies to every "branch, department, agency, [and] instrumentality" of the Federal Government, as well as any "person acting under the color of" federal law. § 2000bb-2(1). And this prohibition applies to the "implementation" of federal law. § 2000bb-3(a). Thus, unless the ACA or some other subsequently enacted statute made RFRA inapplicable to the contraceptive mandate, the Departments responsible for administering that mandate are obligated to do so in a manner that complies with RFRA. No provision of the ACA abrogates RFRA, and our decision in Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 736, 134 S.Ct. 2751, established that application of the contraceptive mandate must conform to RFRA's demands. Thus, it was incumbent on the Departments to ensure that the rules implementing the mandate were consistent with RFRA, as interpreted in our decision. B Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not "substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless it "demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." §§ 2000bb-1(a) - (b). Applying RFRA to the contraceptive mandate thus presents three questions. First, would the mandate substantially burden an employer's exercise of religion? Second, if the mandate would impose such a burden, would it nevertheless serve a "compelling interest"? And third, if it serves such an interest, would it represent "the least restrictive means of furthering" that interest? Substantial burden . Under our decision in Hobby Lobby , requiring the Little Sisters or any other employer with a similar religious objection to comply with the mandate would impose a substantial burden. Our analysis of this question in Hobby Lobby can be separated into two parts. First, would non-compliance have substantial adverse practical consequences? 573 U.S. at 720-723, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Second, would compliance cause the objecting party to violate its religious beliefs, as it sincerely understands them ? Id. , at 723-726. The answer to the first question is indisputable. If a covered employer does not comply with the mandate (by providing contraceptive coverage or invoking the accommodation), it faces penalties of $100 per day for each of its employees. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1). "And if the employer decides to stop providing health insurance altogether and at least one full-time employee enrolls in a health plan and qualifies for a subsidy on one of the government-run ACA exchanges, the employer must pay $2,000 per year for each of its full-time employees. §§ 4980H(a), (c)(1)." 573 U.S. at 697, 134 S.Ct. 2751. In Hobby Lobby , we found these "severe" financial consequences sufficient to show that the practical effect of non-compliance would be "substantial." Id. , at 720, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Our answer to the second question was also perfectly clear. If an employer has a religious objection to the use of a covered contraceptive, and if the employer has a sincere religious belief that compliance with the mandate makes it complicit in that conduct, then RFRA requires that the belief be honored. Id. , at 724-725. We noted that the objection raised by the employers in Hobby Lobby "implicate[d] a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another." Id. , at 724. We noted that different individuals have different beliefs on this question, but we were clear that "federal courts have no business addressing ... whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable." Ibid. Instead, the "function" of a court is " 'narrow' ": " 'to determine' whether the line drawn reflects 'an honest conviction.' " Id. , at 725 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div. , 450 U.S. 707, 716, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) ). Applying this holding to the Little Sisters yields an obvious answer. It is undisputed that the Little Sisters have a sincere religious objection to the use of contraceptives and that they also have a sincere religious belief that utilizing the accommodation would make them complicit in this conduct. As in Hobby Lobby , "it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial." 573 U.S. at 725, 134 S.Ct. 2751. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of a prior Third Circuit decision holding that " 'the submission of the self-certification form' " required by the mandate would not " 'trigger or facilitate the provision of contraceptive coverage' " and would not make the Little Sisters " ' "complicit" in the provision' " of objected-to services. 930 F.3d 543, 573 (2019) (quoting Geneva College v. Secretary of U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 778 F.3d 422, 437-438 (CA3 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik , 578 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1557 ). The position taken by the Third Circuit was similar to that of the Government when Zubik was before us. Opposing the position taken by the Little Sisters and others, the Government argued that what the accommodation required was not materially different from simply asking that an objecting party opt out of providing contraceptive coverage with the knowledge that by doing so it would cause a third party to provide that coverage. According to the Government, everything that occurred following the opt-out was a result of governmental action. Petitioners disagreed. Their concern was not with notifying the Government that they wished to be exempted from complying with the mandate per se , but they objected to two requirements that they sincerely believe would make them complicit in conduct they find immoral. First, they took strong exception to the requirement that they maintain and pay for a plan under which coverage for contraceptives would be provided. As they explained, if they "were willing to incur ruinous penalties by dropping their health plans, their insurance companies would have no authority or obligation to provide or procure the objectionable coverage for [their] plan beneficiaries." Second, they also objected to submission of the self-certification form required by the accommodation because without that certification their plan could not be used to provide contraceptive coverage. At bottom, then, the Government and the religious objectors disagreed about the relationship between what the accommodation demanded and the provision of contraceptive coverage. Our remand in Zubik put these two conflicting interpretations to the test. In response to our request for supplemental briefing, petitioners explained their position in the following terms. "[T]heir religious exercise" would not be "infringed" if they did not have to do anything " 'more than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all forms of contraception,' even if their employees receive[d] cost-free contraceptive coverage from the same insurance company." 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1560. At the time, the Government thought that it might be possible to achieve this result under the ACA, ibid ., but subsequent attempts to find a way to do this failed. After great effort, the Government was forced to conclude that it was "not aware of the authority, or of a practical mechanism," for providing contraceptive coverage "specifically to persons covered by an objecting employer, other than by using the employer's plan, issuer, or third party administrator." 83 Fed. Reg. 57545-57546. The inescapable bottom line is that the accommodation demanded that parties like the Little Sisters engage in conduct that was a necessary cause of the ultimate conduct to which they had strong religious objections. Their situation was the same as that of the conscientious objector in Thomas , 450 U.S. at 715, 101 S.Ct. 1425, who refused to participate in the manufacture of tanks but did not object to assisting in the production of steel used to make the tanks. Where to draw the line in a chain of causation that leads to objectionable conduct is a difficult moral question, and our cases have made it clear that courts cannot override the sincere religious beliefs of an objecting party on that question. See Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 723-726, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; Thomas , 450 U.S. at 715-716, 101 S.Ct. 1425. For these reasons, the contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial burden on any employer who, like the Little Sisters, has a sincere religious objection to the use of a listed contraceptive and a sincere religious belief that compliance with the mandate (through the accommodation or otherwise) makes it complicit in the provision to the employer's workers of a contraceptive to which the employer has a religious objection. Compelling interest . In Hobby Lobby , the Government asserted and we assumed for the sake of argument that the Government had a compelling interest in "ensuring that all women have access to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing." 573 U.S. at 727, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Now, the Government concedes that it lacks a compelling interest in providing such access, Reply Brief in No. 19-454, p. 10, and this time, the Government is correct. In order to show that it has a "compelling interest" within the meaning of RFRA, the Government must clear a high bar. In Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), the decision that provides the foundation for the rule codified in RFRA, we said that " '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest' " could " 'give occasion for [a] permissible limitation' " on the free exercise of religion. Id. , at 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790. Thus, in order to establish that it has a "compelling interest" in providing free contraceptives to all women, the Government would have to show that it would commit one of "the gravest abuses" of its responsibilities if it did not furnish free contraceptives to all women. If we were required to exercise our own judgment on the question whether the Government has an obligation to provide free contraceptives to all women, we would have to take sides in the great national debate about whether the Government should provide free and comprehensive medical care for all. Entering that policy debate would be inconsistent with our proper role, and RFRA does not call on us to express a view on that issue. We can answer the compelling interest question simply by asking whether Congress has treated the provision of free contraceptives to all women as a compelling interest. " '[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest "of the highest order" ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.' " Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520, 547, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). Thus, in considering whether Congress has manifested the view that it has a compelling interest in providing free contraceptives to all women, we must take into account "exceptions" to this asserted " 'rule of general applicability.' " Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal , 546 U.S. 418, 436, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (quoting § 2000bb-1(a) ). And here, there are exceptions aplenty. The ACA-which fails to ensure that millions of women have access to free contraceptives-unmistakably shows that Congress, at least to date, has not regarded this interest as compelling. First, the ACA does not provide contraceptive coverage for women who do not work outside the home. If Congress thought that there was a compelling need to make free contraceptives available for all women, why did it make no provision for women who do not receive a paycheck? Some of these women may have a greater need for free contraceptives than do women in the work force. Second, if Congress thought that there was a compelling need to provide cost-free contraceptives for all working women, why didn't Congress mandate that coverage in the ACA itself? Why did it leave it to HRSA to decide whether to require such coverage at all ? Third, the ACA's very incomplete coverage speaks volumes. The ACA "exempts a great many employers from most of its coverage requirements." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 699, 134 S.Ct. 2751. "[E]mployers with fewer than 50 employees are not required to provide" any form of health insurance, and a number of large employers with " 'grandfathered' " plans need not comply with the contraceptive mandate. Ibid. ; see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) ; 42 U.S.C. § 18011. According to a recent survey, 13% of the 153 million Americans with employer-sponsored health insurance are enrolled in a grandfathered plan, while only 56% of small firms provide health insurance. Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2019 Annual Survey 7, 44, 209 (2019). In Hobby Lobby , we wrote that "the contraceptive mandate 'presently does not apply to tens of millions of people,' " 573 U.S. at 700, 134 S.Ct. 2751, and it appears that this is still true apart from the religious exemption. Fourth, the Court's recognition in today's decision that the ACA authorizes the creation of exemptions that go beyond anything required by the Constitution provides further evidence that Congress did not regard the provision of cost-free contraceptives to all women as a compelling interest. Moreover, the regulatory exemptions created by the Departments and HRSA undermine any claim that the agencies themselves viewed the provision of contraceptive coverage as sufficiently compelling. From the outset, the church exemption has applied to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and associations. 76 Fed. Reg. 46623. And because of the way the accommodation operates under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Departments treated a number of self-insured non-profit organizations established by churches or associations of churches, including religious universities and hospitals, as "effectively exempted" from the contraceptive mandate as well. Brief for Petitioners in No. 19-454, p. 4. The result was a complex and sometimes irrational pattern of exemptions. The dissent frames the allegedly compelling interest served by the mandate in different terms-as an interest in providing "seamless" cost-free coverage, post , at 2400, 2407, 2411 - 2412 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.)-but this is an even weaker argument. What "seamless" coverage apparently means is coverage under the insurance plan furnished by a woman's employer. So as applied to the Little Sisters, the dissent thinks that it would be a grave abuse if an employee wishing to obtain contraceptives had to take any step that would not be necessary if she wanted to obtain any other medical service. See post , at 2408 - 2409. Apparently, it would not be enough if the Government sent her a special card that could be presented at a pharmacy to fill a prescription for contraceptives without any out-of-pocket expense. Nor would it be enough if she were informed that she could obtain free contraceptives by going to a conveniently located government clinic. Neither of those alternatives would provide "seamless coverage," and thus, according to the dissent, both would be insufficient. Nothing short of capitulation on the part of the Little Sisters would suffice. This argument is inconsistent with any reasonable understanding of the concept of a "compelling interest." It is undoubtedly convenient for employees to obtain all types of medical care and all pharmaceuticals under their general health insurance plans, and perhaps there are women whose personal situation is such that taking any additional steps to secure contraceptives would be a notable burden. But can it be said that all women or all working women have a compelling need for this convenience? The ACA does not provide "seamless" coverage for all forms of medical care. Take the example of dental care. Although lack of dental care can cause great pain and may lead to serious health problems, the ACA does not require that a plan cover dental services. Millions of employees must secure separate dental insurance or pay dentist bills out of their own pockets. In short, it is undoubtedly true that the contraceptive mandate provides a benefit that many women may find highly desirable, but Congress's enactments show that it has not regarded the provision of free contraceptives or the furnishing of "seamless" coverage as "compelling." Least restrictive means . Even if the mandate served a compelling interest, the accommodation still would not satisfy the "exceptionally demanding" least-restrictive-means standard. Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 728, 134 S.Ct. 2751. To meet this standard, the Government must "sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion." Ibid. ; see also Holt v. Hobbs , 574 U.S. 352, 365, 135 S.Ct. 853, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015) (" '[I]f a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it' "). In Hobby Lobby , we observed that the Government has "other means" of providing cost-free contraceptives to women "without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties." 573 U.S. at 728, 134 S.Ct. 2751. "The most straightforward way," we noted, "would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the ... contraceptives ... to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies." Ibid. In the context of federal funding for health insurance, the cost of such a program would be "minor." Id. , at 729, 134 S.Ct. 2751. The Government argued that we should not take this option into account because it lacked statutory authority to create such a program, see ibid. , but we rejected that argument, id. , at 729-730, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Certainly, Congress could create such a program if it thought that providing cost-free contraceptives to all women was a matter of "paramount" concern. As the Government now points out, Congress has taken steps in this direction. "[E]xisting federal, state, and local programs," including Medicaid, Title X, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, already "provide free or subsidized contraceptives to low-income women." Brief for Petitioners in No. 19-454, at 27; see also 83 Fed. Reg. 57548, 57551 (discussing programs). And many women who work for employers who have religious objections to the contraceptive mandate may be able to receive contraceptive coverage through a family member's health insurance plan. In sum, the Departments were right to conclude that applying the accommodation to sincere religious objectors violates RFRA. See id. , at 57546. All three prongs of the RFRA analysis-substantial burden, compelling interest, and least restrictive means-necessitate this answer. III Once it was apparent that the accommodation ran afoul of RFRA, the Government was required to eliminate the violation. RFRA does not specify the precise manner in which a violation must be remedied; it simply instructs the Government to avoid "substantially burden[ing]" the "exercise of religion"-i.e. , to eliminate the violation. § 2000bb-1(a) ; see also § 2000bb-1(c) (providing for "appropriate relief" in judicial suit). Thus, in Hobby Lobby , once we held that application of the mandate to the objecting parties violated RFRA, we left it to the Departments to decide how best to rectify this problem. See 573 U.S. at 736, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; 79 Fed. Reg. 51118 (2014) (proposing to modify the accommodation to extend it to closely held corporations in light of Hobby Lobby ); 80 Fed. Reg. 41324 (final rule explaining that "[t]he Departments believe that the definition adopted in these regulations complies with and goes beyond what is required by RFRA and Hobby Lobby "). The same principle applies here. Once it is recognized that the prior accommodation violated RFRA in some of its applications, it was incumbent on the Departments to eliminate those violations, and they had discretion in crafting what they regarded as the best solution. The solution they devised cures the problem, and it is not clear that any narrower exemption would have been sufficient with respect to parties with religious objections to the accommodation. As noted, after great effort, the Government concluded that it was not possible to solve the problem without using an "employer's plan, issuer, or third party administrator." 83 Fed. Reg. 57546. As a result, the Departments turned to the current rule, under which an objecting party must certify that it "objects, based on its sincerely held religious beliefs, to its establishing, maintaining, providing, offering, or arranging for (as applicable)" either "[c]overage or payments for some or all contraceptive services" or "[a] plan, issuer, or third party administrator that provides or arranges such coverage or payments." 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.132(a)(2)(i)-(ii). The States take exception to the new religious rule on several grounds. First, they complain that it grants an exemption to some employers who were satisfied with the prior accommodation, but there is little basis for this argument. An employer who is satisfied with the accommodation may continue to operate under that regime. See §§ 147.131(c) - (d) ; 83 Fed. Reg. 57569-57571. And unless an employer has a religious objection to the accommodation, it is unclear why an employer would give it up. The accommodation does not impose any cost on an employer, and it provides an added benefit for the employer's work force. The States also object to the new rule because it makes exemptions available to publicly traded corporations, but the Government is "not aware" of any publicly traded corporations that object to compliance with the mandate. Id. , at 57562. For all practical purposes, therefore, it is not clear that the new rule's provisions concerning entities that object to the mandate on religious grounds go any further than necessary to bring the mandate into compliance with RFRA. In any event, while RFRA requires the Government to employ the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest that burdens religious belief, it does not require the converse-that an accommodation of religious belief be narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest. The latter approach, which is advocated by the States, gets RFRA entirely backwards. See Brief for Respondents 45 ("RFRA could require the religious exemption only if it was the least restrictive means of furthering [the Government's compelling interest]"). Nothing in RFRA requires that a violation be remedied by the narrowest permissible corrective. Needless to say, the remedy for a RFRA problem cannot violate the Constitution, but the new rule does not have that effect. The Court has held that there is a constitutional right to purchase and use contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut , 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) ; Carey v. Population Services Int'l , 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). But the Court has never held that there is a constitutional right to free contraceptives. The dissent and the court below suggest that the new rule is improper because it imposes burdens on the employees of entities that the rule exempts, see post , at 2407 - 2409; 930 F.3d at 573-574, but the rule imposes no such burden. A woman who does not have the benefit of contraceptive coverage under her employer's plan is not the victim of a burden imposed by the rule or her employer. She is simply not the beneficiary of something that federal law does not provide. She is in the same position as a woman who does not work outside the home or a woman whose health insurance is provided by a grandfathered plan that does not pay for contraceptives or a woman who works for a small business that may not provide any health insurance at all. * * * I would hold not only that it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA, but also that the Departments were required by RFRA to create the religious exemption (or something very close to it). I would bring the Little Sisters' legal odyssey to an end. Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice BREYER joins, concurring in the judgment. I would uphold HRSA's statutory authority to exempt certain employers from the contraceptive-coverage mandate, but for different reasons than the Court gives. I also write separately because I question whether the exemptions can survive administrative law's demand for reasoned decisionmaking. That issue remains open for the lower courts to address. The majority and dissent dispute the breadth of the delegation in the Women's Health Amendment to the ACA. The Amendment states that a health plan or insurer must offer coverage for "preventive care and screenings ... as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA] for purposes of this paragraph." 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). The disputed question is just what HRSA can "provide for." Both the majority and the dissent agree that HRSA's guidelines can differentiate among preventive services, mandating coverage of some but not others. The opinions disagree about whether those guidelines can also differentiate among health plans, exempting some but not others from the contraceptive-coverage requirement. On that question, all the two opinions have in common is equal certainty they are right. Compare ante, at 2380 - 2381 (majority opinion) (Congress "enacted expansive language offer[ing] no indication whatever that the statute limits what HRSA can designate as preventive care and screenings or who must provide that coverage" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with post, at 2904 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in [the statute] accord[s] HRSA authority" to decide "who must provide coverage" (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)). Try as I might, I do not find that kind of clarity in the statute. Sometimes when I squint, I read the law as giving HRSA discretion over all coverage issues: The agency gets to decide who needs to provide what services to women. At other times, I see the statute as putting the agency in charge of only the "what" question, and not the "who." If I had to, I would of course decide which is the marginally better reading. But Chevron deference was built for cases like these. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ; see also Arlington v. FCC , 569 U.S. 290, 301, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013) (holding that Chevron applies to questions about the scope of an agency's statutory authority). Chevron instructs that a court facing statutory ambiguity should accede to a reasonable interpretation by the implementing agency. The court should do so because the agency is the more politically accountable actor. See 467 U.S. at 865-866, 104 S.Ct. 2778. And it should do so because the agency's expertise often enables a sounder assessment of which reading best fits the statutory scheme. See id., at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Here, the Departments have adopted the majority's reading of the statutory delegation ever since its enactment. Over the course of two administrations, the Departments have shifted positions on many questions involving the Women's Health Amendment and the ACA more broadly. But not on whether the Amendment gives HRSA the ability to create exemptions to the contraceptive-coverage mandate. HRSA adopted the original church exemption on the same capacious understanding of its statutory authority as the Departments endorse today. See 76 Fed. Reg. 46623 (2011) ("In the Departments' view, it is appropriate that HRSA, in issuing these Guidelines, takes into account the effect on the religious beliefs of certain religious employers if coverage of contraceptive services were required"). While the exemption itself has expanded, the Departments' reading of the statutory delegation-that the law gives HRSA discretion over the "who" question-has remained the same. I would defer to that longstanding and reasonable interpretation. But that does not mean the Departments should prevail when these cases return to the lower courts. The States challenged the exemptions not only as outside HRSA's statutory authority, but also as "arbitrary [and] capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Because the courts below found for the States on the first question, they declined to reach the second. That issue is now ready for resolution, unaffected by today's decision. An agency acting within its sphere of delegated authority can of course flunk the test of "reasoned decisionmaking." Michigan v. EPA , 576 U. S. 743, 750, 135 S.Ct. 2699, 192 L.Ed.2d 674 (2015). The agency does so when it has not given "a satisfactory explanation for its action"-when it has failed to draw a "rational connection" between the problem it has identified and the solution it has chosen, or when its thought process reveals "a clear error of judgment." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. , 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Assessed against that standard of reasonableness, the exemptions HRSA and the Departments issued give every appearance of coming up short. Most striking is a mismatch between the scope of the religious exemption and the problem the agencies set out to address. In the Departments' view, the exemption was "necessary to expand the protections" for "certain entities and individuals" with "religious objections" to contraception. 83 Fed. Reg. 57537 (2018). Recall that under the old system, an employer objecting to the contraceptive mandate for religious reasons could avail itself of the "self-certification accommodation." Ante, at 2376. Upon making the certification, the employer no longer had "to contract, arrange, [or] pay" for contraceptive coverage; instead, its insurer would bear the services' cost. 78 Fed. Reg. 39874 (2013). That device dispelled some employers' objections-but not all. The Little Sisters, among others, maintained that the accommodation itself made them complicit in providing contraception. The measure thus failed to "assuage[ ]" their "sincere religious objections." 82 Fed. Reg. 47799 (2017). Given that fact, the Departments might have chosen to exempt the Little Sisters and other still-objecting groups from the mandate. But the Departments went further still. Their rule exempted all employers with objections to the mandate, even if the accommodation met their religious needs. In other words, the Departments exempted employers who had no religious objection to the status quo (because they did not share the Little Sisters' views about complicity). The rule thus went beyond what the Departments' justification supported-raising doubts about whether the solution lacks a "rational connection" to the problem described. State Farm , 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856. And the rule's overbreadth causes serious harm, by the Departments' own lights. In issuing the rule, the Departments chose to retain the contraceptive mandate itself. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57537. Rather than dispute HRSA's prior finding that the mandate is "necessary for women's health and well-being," the Departments left that determination in place. HRSA, Women's Preventive Services Guidelines (Dec. 2019), www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines-2019; see 83 Fed. Reg. 57537. The Departments thus committed themselves to minimizing the impact on contraceptive coverage, even as they sought to protect employers with continuing religious objections. But they failed to fulfill that commitment to women. Remember that the accommodation preserves employees' access to cost-free contraceptive coverage, while the exemption does not. See ante, at 2374 - 2375. So the Departments (again, according to their own priorities) should have exempted only employers who had religious objections to the accommodation-not those who viewed it as a religiously acceptable device for complying with the mandate. The Departments' contrary decision to extend the exemption to those without any religious need for it yielded all costs and no benefits. Once again, that outcome is hard to see as consistent with reasoned judgment. See State Farm , 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Other aspects of the Departments' handiwork may also prove arbitrary and capricious. For example, the Departments allow even publicly traded corporations to claim a religious exemption. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57562-57563. That option is unusual enough to raise a serious question about whether the Departments adequately supported their choice. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 717, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) (noting the oddity of "a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights"). Similarly, the Departments offer an exemption to employers who have moral, rather than religious, objections to the contraceptive mandate. Perhaps there are sufficient reasons for that decision-for example, a desire to stay neutral between religion and non-religion. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57603-57604. But RFRA cast a long shadow over the Departments' rulemaking, see ante, at 2382 - 2384, and that statute does not apply to those with only moral scruples. So a careful agency would have weighed anew, in this different context, the benefits of exempting more employers from the mandate against the harms of depriving more women of contraceptive coverage. In the absence of such a reassessment, it seems a close call whether the moral exemption can survive. None of this is to say that the Departments could not issue a valid rule expanding exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. As noted earlier, I would defer to the Departments' view of the scope of Congress's delegation. See supra, at 2397 - 2398. That means the Departments (assuming they act hand-in-hand with HRSA) have wide latitude over exemptions, so long as they satisfy the requirements of reasoned decisionmaking. But that "so long as" is hardly nothing. Even in an area of broad statutory authority-maybe especially there-agencies must rationally account for their judgments. Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR joins, dissenting. In accommodating claims of religious freedom, this Court has taken a balanced approach, one that does not allow the religious beliefs of some to overwhelm the rights and interests of others who do not share those beliefs. See, e.g. , Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. , 472 U.S. 703, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557, 708-710 (1985) ; United States v. Lee , 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127, 258-260 (1982). Today, for the first time, the Court casts totally aside countervailing rights and interests in its zeal to secure religious rights to the nth degree. Specifically, in the Women's Health Amendment to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 124 Stat. 119; 155 Cong. Rec. 28841 (2009), Congress undertook to afford gainfully employed women comprehensive, seamless, no-cost insurance coverage for preventive care protective of their health and well-being. Congress delegated to a particular agency, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), authority to designate the preventive care insurance should cover. HRSA included in its designation all contraceptives approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Destructive of the Women's Health Amendment, this Court leaves women workers to fend for themselves, to seek contraceptive coverage from sources other than their employer's insurer, and, absent another available source of funding, to pay for contraceptive services out of their own pockets. The Constitution's Free Exercise Clause, all agree, does not call for that imbalanced result. Nor does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. , condone harm to third parties occasioned by entire disregard of their needs. I therefore dissent from the Court's judgment, under which, as the Government estimates, between 70,500 and 126,400 women would immediately lose access to no-cost contraceptive services. On the merits, I would affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. I A Under the ACA, an employer-sponsored "group health plan" must cover specified "preventive health services" without "cost sharing," 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13, i.e. , without such out-of-pocket costs as copays or deductibles. Those enumerated services did not, in the original draft bill, include preventive care specific to women. "To correct this oversight, Senator Barbara Mikulski introduced the Women's Health Amendment," now codified at § 300gg-13(a)(4). Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675, 741 (2014) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); see also 155 Cong. Rec. 28841. This provision was designed "to promote equality in women's access to health care," countering gender-based discrimination and disparities in such access. Brief for 186 Members of the United States Congress as Amici Curiae 6 (hereinafter Brief for 186 Members of Congress). Its proponents noted, inter alia , that "[w]omen paid significantly more than men for preventive care," and that "cost barriers operated to block many women from obtaining needed care at all." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 742, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); see, e.g. , 155 Cong. Rec. 28844 (statement of Sen. Hagan) ("When ... women had to choose between feeding their children, paying the rent, and meeting other financial obligations, they skipped important preventive screenings and took a chance with their personal health."). Due to the Women's Health Amendment, the preventive health services that group health plans must cover include, "with respect to women," "preventive care and screenings ... provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA]." § 300gg-13(a)(4). Pursuant to this instruction, HRSA undertook, after consulting the Institute of Medicine, to state "what preventive services are necessary for women's health and well-being and therefore should be considered in the development of comprehensive guidelines for preventive services for women." The resulting "Women's Preventive Services Guidelines" issued in August 2011. Under these guidelines, millions of women who previously had no, or poor quality, health insurance gained cost-free access, not only to contraceptive services but as well to, inter alia, annual checkups and screenings for breast cancer, cervical cancer, postpartum depression, and gestational diabetes. As to contraceptive services, HRSA directed that, to implement § 300gg-13(a)(4), women's preventive services encompass "all [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity." Ready access to contraceptives and other preventive measures for which Congress set the stage in § 300gg-13(a)(4) both safeguards women's health and enables women to chart their own life's course. Effective contraception, it bears particular emphasis, "improves health outcomes for women and [their] children," as "women with unintended pregnancies are more likely to receive delayed or no prenatal care" than women with planned pregnancies. Brief for 186 Members of Congress 5 (internal quotation marks omitted); Brief for American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 10 (hereinafter ACOG Brief) (similar). Contraception is also "critical for individuals with underlying medical conditions that would be further complicated by pregnancy," "has ... health benefits unrelated to preventing pregnancy," (e.g. , it can reduce the risk of endometrial and ovarian cancer ), Brief for National Women's Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 23-24, 26 (hereinafter NWLC Brief), and "improves women's social and economic status," by "allow[ing] [them] to invest in higher education and a career with far less risk of an unplanned pregnancy," Brief for 186 Members of Congress 5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted). B For six years, the Government took care to protect women employees' access to critical preventive health services while accommodating the diversity of religious opinion on contraception. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) crafted a narrow exemption relieving houses of worship, "their integrated auxiliaries," "conventions or associations of churches," and "religious order[s]" from the contraceptive-coverage requirement. 76 Fed. Reg. 46623 (2011). For other nonprofit and closely held for-profit organizations opposed to contraception on religious grounds, the agencies made available an accommodation rather than an exemption. See 78 Fed. Reg. 39874 (2013) ; Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 730-731, 134 S.Ct. 2751. "Under th[e] accommodation, [an employer] can self-certify that it opposes providing coverage for particular contraceptive services. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.131(b)(4), (c)(1) [ (2013) ]; 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.9815-2713A(a)(4), (b). If [an employer] makes such a certification, the [employer's] insurance issuer or third-party administrator must '[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan' and '[p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered' without imposing 'any cost-sharing requirements ... on the [employer], the group health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.' 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2) ; 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(c)(2)." Id. , at 731, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (some alterations in original). The self-certification accommodation, the Court observed in Hobby Lobby , "does not impinge on [an employer's] belief that providing insurance coverage for ... contraceptives ... violates [its] religion." Ibid . It serves "a Government interest of the highest order," i.e. , providing women employees "with cost-free access to all FDA-approved methods of contraception." Id. , at 729, 134 S.Ct. 2751. And "it serves [that] stated interes[t] ... well." Id. , at 731, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; see id., at 693, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (Government properly accommodated employer's religion-based objection to covering contraceptives under employer's health insurance plan when the harm to women of doing so "would be precisely zero"). Since the ACA's passage, "[gainfully employed] [w]omen, particularly in lower-income groups, have reported greater affordability of coverage, access to health care, and receipt of preventive services." Brief for 186 Members of Congress 21. C Religious employers, including petitioner Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home (Little Sisters), nonetheless urge that the self-certification accommodation renders them "complicit in providing [contraceptive] coverage to which they sincerely object." Brief for Little Sisters 35. In 2017, responsive to the pleas of such employers, the Government abandoned its effort to both end discrimination against employed women in access to preventive services and accommodate religious exercise. Under new rules drafted not by HRSA, but by the IRS, EBSA, and CMS, any "non-governmental employer"-even a publicly traded for-profit company-can avail itself of the religious exemption previously reserved for houses of worship. 82 Fed. Reg. 47792 (2017) (interim final rule); 45 C.F.R. § 147.132(a)(1)(i)(E) (2018). More than 2.9 million Americans-including approximately 580,000 women of childbearing age-receive insurance through organizations newly eligible for this blanket exemption. 83 Fed. Reg. 57577-57578 (2018). Of cardinal significance, the exemption contains no alternative mechanism to ensure affected women's continued access to contraceptive coverage. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.132. Pennsylvania and New Jersey, respondents here, sued to enjoin the exemption. Their lawsuit posed this core question: May the Government jettison an arrangement that promotes women workers' well-being while accommodating employers' religious tenets and, instead, defer entirely to employers' religious beliefs, although that course harms women who do not share those beliefs? The District Court answered "no," and preliminarily enjoined the blanket exemption nationwide. 281 F.Supp.3d 553, 585 (ED Pa. 2017). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 930 F.3d 543, 576 (CA3 2019). The same question is now presented for ultimate decision by this Court. II Despite Congress' endeavor, in the Women's Health Amendment to the ACA, to redress discrimination against women in the provision of healthcare, the exemption the Court today approves would leave many employed women just where they were before insurance issuers were obliged to cover preventive services for them, cost free. The Government urges that the ACA itself authorizes this result, by delegating to HRSA authority to exempt employers from the contraceptive-coverage requirement. This argument gains the Court's approbation. It should not. A I begin with the statute's text. But see ante , at 2381 (opinion of the Court) (overlooking my starting place). The ACA's preventive-care provision, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a), reads in full: "A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for- "(1) evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of 'A' or 'B' in the current recommendations of the United States Preventive Services Task Force; "(2) immunizations that have in effect a recommendation from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with respect to the individual involved; ... "(3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care and screenings provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA; and] "(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by [HRSA] for purposes of this paragraph." At the start of this provision, Congress instructed who is to "provide coverage for" the specified preventive health services: "group health plan[s]" and "health insurance issuer[s]." § 300gg-13(a). As the Court of Appeals explained, paragraph (a)(4), added by the Women's Health Amendment, granted HRSA "authority to issue 'comprehensive guidelines' concern[ing] the type of services" group health plans and health insurance issuers must cover with respect to women. 930 F.3d at 570 (emphasis added). Nothing in paragraph (a)(4) accorded HRSA "authority to undermine Congress's [initial] directive," stated in subsection (a), "concerning who must provide coverage for these services." Ibid. (emphasis added). The Government argues otherwise, asserting that "[t]he sweeping authorization for HRSA to 'provide[ ] for' and 'support[ ]' guidelines 'for purposes of' the women's preventive-services mandate clearly grants HRSA the power not just to specify what services should be covered, but also to provide appropriate exemptions." Brief for HHS et al. 15. This terse statement-the entirety of the Government's textual case-slights the language Congress employed. Most visibly, the Government does not endeavor to explain how any language in paragraph (a)(4) counteracts Congress' opening instruction in § 300gg-13(a) that group health plans "shall ... provide" specified services. See supra , at 2404 - 2405. The Court embraces, and the opinion concurring in the judgment adopts, the Government's argument. The Court correctly acknowledges that HRSA has broad discretion to determine what preventive services insurers should provide for women. Ante , at 2380. But it restates that HRSA's "discretion [is] equally unchecked in other areas, including the ability to identify and create exemptions from its own Guidelines." Ante , at 2380. See also ante , at 2397 - 2398 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing with this interpretation). Like the Government, the Court and the opinion concurring in the judgment shut from sight § 300gg-13(a) 's overarching direction that group health plans and health insurance issuers "shall" cover the specified services. See supra , at 2404 - 2405. That " 'absent provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts,' " ante , at 2381 (quoting Rotkiske v. Klemm , 589 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 355, 361, 205 L.Ed.2d 291 (2019)), militates against the Court's conclusion, not in favor of it. Where Congress wanted to exempt certain employers from the ACA's requirements, it said so expressly. See, e.g. , supra, at 2401, n. 2. Section 300gg-13(a)(4) includes no such exemption. See supra , at 2404 - 2405. B The position advocated by the Government and endorsed by the Court and the opinion concurring in the judgment encounters further obstacles. Most saliently, the language in § 300gg-13(a)(4) mirrors that in § 300gg-13(a)(3), the provision addressing children's preventive health services. Not contesting here that HRSA lacks authority to exempt group health plans from the children's preventive-care guidelines, the Government attempts to distinguish paragraph (a)(3) from paragraph (a)(4). Brief for HHS et al. 16-17. The attempt does not withstand inspection. The Government first observes that (a)(4), unlike (a)(3), contemplates guidelines created "for purposes of this paragraph ." (Emphasis added.) This language does not speak to the scope of the guidelines HRSA is charged to create. Moreover, the Government itself accounts for this textual difference: The children's preventive-care guidelines described in paragraph (a)(3) were "preexisting guidelines ... developed for purposes unrelated to the ACA." Brief for HHS et al. 16. The guidelines on women's preventive care, by contrast, did not exist before the ACA; they had to be created "for purposes of" the preventive-care mandate. § 300gg-13(a)(4). The Government next points to the modifier "evidence-informed" placed in (a)(3), but absent in (a)(4). This omission, however it may bear on the kind of preventive services for women HRSA can require group health insurance to cover, does not touch or concern who is required to cover those services. HRSA's role within HHS also tugs against the Government's, the Court's, and the opinion concurring in the judgment's construction of § 300gg-13(a)(4). That agency was a logical choice to determine what women's preventive services should be covered, as its mission is to "improve health care access" and "eliminate health disparities." First and foremost, § 300gg-13(a)(4) is directed at eradicating gender-based disparities in access to preventive care. See supra , at 2401. Overlooked by the Court, see ante, at 2379 - 2382, and the opinion concurring in the judgment, see ante , at 2397 - 2398 (opinion of KAGAN, J.), HRSA's expertise does not include any proficiency in delineating religious and moral exemptions. One would not, therefore, expect Congress to delegate to HRSA the task of crafting such exemptions. See King v. Burwell , 576 U. S. 473, 486, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015) ("It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to [an agency] which has no expertise in ... policy of this sort."). In fact, HRSA did not craft the blanket exemption. As earlier observed, see supra , at 2403 - 2404, that task was undertaken by the IRS, EBSA, and CMS. See also 45 C.F.R. § 147.132(a)(1), 147.133(a)(1) (direction by the IRS, EBSA, and CMS that HRSA's guidelines "must not provide for" contraceptive coverage in the circumstances described in the blanket exemption (emphasis added)). Nowhere in 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) are those agencies named, as earlier observed, see supra, at 2404 - 2405, an absence the Government, the Court, and the opinion concurring in the judgment do not deign to acknowledge. See Brief for HHS et al. 15-20; ante , at 2379 - 2382 (opinion of the Court); ante , at 2397 - 2398 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). C If the ACA does not authorize the blanket exemption, the Government urges, then the exemption granted to houses of worship in 2011 must also be invalid. Brief for HHS et al. 19-20. As the Court of Appeals explained, however, see 930 F.3d at 570, n. 26, the latter exemption is not attributable to the ACA's text; it was justified on First Amendment grounds. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC , 565 U.S. 171, 188, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012) (the First Amendment's "ministerial exception" protects "the internal governance of [a] church"); 80 Fed. Reg. 41325 (2015) (the exemption "recogni[zes] [the] particular sphere of autonomy [afforded to] houses of worship ... consistent with their special status under longstanding tradition in our society"). Even if the house-of-worship exemption extends beyond what the First Amendment would require, see ante , at 2397 - 2398, n. 1 (opinion of KAGAN, J.), that extension, as just explained, cannot be extracted from the ACA's text. III Because I conclude that the blanket exemption gains no aid from the ACA, I turn to the Government's alternative argument. The religious exemption, if not the moral exemption, the Government urges, is necessary to protect religious freedom. The Government does not press a free exercise argument, see supra , at 2400 - 2401, and n. 1, instead invoking RFRA. Brief for HHS et al. 20-31. That statute instructs that the "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability," unless doing so "is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b). A 1 The parties here agree that federal agencies may craft accommodations and exemptions to cure violations of RFRA. See, e.g ., Brief for Respondents 36. But that authority is not unbounded. Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 720, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) (construing Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, the Court cautioned that "adequate account" must be taken of "the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries" of the Act); Caldor , 472 U.S. at 708-710, 105 S.Ct. 2914 (invalidating state statute requiring employers to accommodate an employee's religious observance for failure to take into account the burden such an accommodation would impose on the employer and other employees). "[O]ne person's right to free exercise must be kept in harmony with the rights of her fellow citizens." Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 765, n. 25, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). See also id. , at 746, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ("[Y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the other man's nose begins." (quoting Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 932, 957 (1919) )). In this light, the Court has repeatedly assumed that any religious accommodation to the contraceptive-coverage requirement would preserve women's continued access to seamless, no-cost contraceptive coverage. See Zubik v. Burwell , 578 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1557, 1560, 194 L.Ed.2d 696 (2016) (per curiam ) ("[T]he parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach ... that accommodates petitioners' religious exercise while ... ensuring that women covered by petitioners' health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wheaton College v. Burwell , 573 U.S. 958, 959, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 189 L.Ed.2d 856 (2014) ("Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of applicant's employees and students to obtain, without cost, the full range of [FDA] approved contraceptives."); Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 692, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ("There are other ways in which Congress or HHS could equally ensure that every woman has cost-free access to ... all [FDA]-approved contraceptives. In fact, HHS has already devised and implemented a system that seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as employees of [other] companies."). The assumption made in the above-cited cases rests on the basic principle just stated, one on which this dissent relies: While the Government may "accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements," Cutter , 544 U.S. at 713, 125 S.Ct. 2113, when it does so, it may not benefit religious adherents at the expense of the rights of third parties. See, e.g. , id. , at 722, 125 S.Ct. 2113 ("[A]n accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests."); Caldor , 472 U.S. at 710, 105 S.Ct. 2914 (religious exemption was invalid for its "unyielding weighting in favor of" interests of religious adherents "over all other interests"). Holding otherwise would endorse "the regulatory equivalent of taxing non-adherents to support the faithful." Brief for Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae 3. 2 The expansive religious exemption at issue here imposes significant burdens on women employees. Between 70,500 and 126,400 women of childbearing age, the Government estimates, will experience the disappearance of the contraceptive coverage formerly available to them, 83 Fed. Reg. 57578-57580 ; indeed, the numbers may be even higher. Lacking any alternative insurance coverage mechanism, see supra , at 2403 - 2404, the exemption leaves women two options, neither satisfactory. The first option-the one suggested by the Government in its most recent rulemaking, 82 Fed. Reg. 47803 -is for women to seek contraceptive care from existing government-funded programs. Such programs, serving primarily low-income individuals, are not designed to handle an influx of tens of thousands of previously insured women. Moreover, as the Government has acknowledged, requiring women "to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new health benefit" imposes "additional barriers," "mak[ing] that coverage accessible to fewer women." 78 Fed. Reg. 39888. Finally, obtaining care from a government-funded program instead of one's regular care provider creates a continuity-of-care problem, "forc[ing those] who lose coverage away from trusted providers who know their medical histories." NWLC Brief 18. The second option for women losing insurance coverage for contraceptives is to pay for contraceptive counseling and devices out of their own pockets. Notably, however, "the most effective contraception is also the most expensive." ACOG Brief 14-15. "[T]he cost of an IUD [intrauterine device ]," for example, "is nearly equivalent to a month's full-time pay for workers earning the minimum wage." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 762, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Faced with high out-of-pocket costs, many women will forgo contraception, Brief for 186 Members of Congress 11, or resort to less effective contraceptive methods, 930 F.3d at 563. As the foregoing indicates, the religious exemption "reintroduce[s] the very health inequities and barriers to care that Congress intended to eliminate when it enacted the women's preventive services provision of the ACA." NWLC Brief 5. "No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based exemption when [it] would be harmful to others-here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed to protect." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 764, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). I would therefore hold the religious exemption neither required nor permitted by RFRA. B Pennsylvania and New Jersey advance an additional argument: The exemption is not authorized by RFRA, they maintain, because the self-certification accommodation it replaced was sufficient to alleviate any substantial burden on religious exercise. Brief for Respondents 36-42. That accommodation, I agree, further indicates the religious exemption's flaws. 1 For years, religious organizations have challenged the self-certification accommodation as insufficiently protective of their religious rights. See, e.g. , Zubik , 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1560. While I do not doubt the sincerity of these organizations' opposition to that accommodation, Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 758-759, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG. J., dissenting), I agree with Pennsylvania and New Jersey that the accommodation does not substantially burden objectors' religious exercise. As Senator Hatch observed, "[RFRA] does not require the Government to justify every action that has some effect on religious exercise." 139 Cong. Rec. 26180 (1993). Bowen v. Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), is instructive in this regard. There, a Native American father asserted a sincere religious belief that his daughter's spirit would be harmed by the Government's use of her social security number. Id. , at 697, 106 S.Ct. 2147. The Court, while casting no doubt on the sincerity of this religious belief, explained: "Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens." Id ., at 699, 106 S.Ct. 2147. Roy signals a critical distinction in the Court's religious exercise jurisprudence: A religious adherent may be entitled to religious accommodation with regard to her own conduct, but she is not entitled to "insist that ...others must conform their conduct to [her] own religious necessities.' " Caldor , 472 U.S. at 710, 105 S.Ct. 2914 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. , 205 F.2d 58, 61 (CA2 1953) ) (Hand, J.); (emphasis added). Counsel for the Little Sisters acknowledged as much when he conceded that religious "employers could [not] object at all" to a "government obligation" to provide contraceptive coverage "imposed directly on the insurers." Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. But that is precisely what the self-certification accommodation does. As the Court recognized in Hobby Lobby : "When a group-health-insurance issuer receives notice that [an employer opposes coverage for some or all contraceptive services for religious reasons], the issuer must then exclude [that] coverage from the employer's plan and provide separate payments for contraceptive services for plan participants." 573 U.S. at 698-699, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; see also id., at 738, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The accommodation works by requiring insurance companies to cover ... contraceptive coverage for female employees who wish it." (emphasis added)). Under the self-certification accommodation, then, the objecting employer is absolved of any obligation to provide the contraceptive coverage to which it objects; that obligation is transferred to the insurer. This arrangement "furthers the Government's interest [in women's health] but does not impinge on the [employer's] religious beliefs." Ibid . ; see supra , at 2409 - 2410. 2 The Little Sisters, adopting the arguments made by religious organizations in Zubik , resist this conclusion in two ways. First, they urge that contraceptive coverage provided by an insurer under the self-certification accommodation forms "part of the same plan as the coverage provided by the employer." Brief for Little Sisters 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 29 (Little Sisters object "to having their plan hijacked"); ante , at 2391 (ALITO, J., concurring) (Little Sisters object to "maintain[ing] and pay[ing] for a plan under which coverage for contraceptives would be provided"). This contention is contradicted by the plain terms of the regulation establishing that accommodation: To repeat, an insurance issuer "must ...[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan." 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(2)(i)(A) (2013) (emphasis added); see supra, at 2402 - 2403. Second, the Little Sisters assert that "tak[ing] affirmative steps to execute paperwork ... necessary for the provision of 'seamless' contraceptive coverage to their employees" implicates them in providing contraceptive services to women in violation of their religious beliefs. Little Sisters Reply Brief 7. At the same time, however, they have been adamant that they do not oppose merely "register[ing] their objections" to the contraceptive-coverage requirement. Ibid. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, 42-43 (Little Sisters have "no objection to objecting"); ante , at 2390 - 2391 (ALITO, J., concurring) (Little Sisters' "concern was not with notifying the Government that they wished to be exempted from complying with the mandate per se "). These statements, taken together, reveal that the Little Sisters do not object to what the self-certification accommodation asks of them , namely, attesting to their religious objection to contraception. See supra , at 2402 - 2403. They object, instead, to the particular use insurance issuers make of that attestation. See supra , at 2409 - 2410. But that use originated from the ACA and its once-implementing regulation, not from religious employers' self-certification or alternative notice. * * * The blanket exemption for religious and moral objectors to contraception formulated by the IRS, EBSA, and CMS is inconsistent with the text of, and Congress' intent for, both the ACA and RFRA. Neither law authorizes it. The original administrative regulation accommodating religious objections to contraception appropriately implemented the ACA and RFRA consistent with Congress' staunch determination to afford women employees equal access to preventive services, thereby advancing public health and welfare and women's well-being. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-92 ; 29 U.S.C. § 1191c ; 26 U.S.C. § 9833. The ACA exempts "grandfathered" plans from 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) -i.e. , "those [plans] that existed prior to March 23, 2010, and that have not made specified changes after that date." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 699, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014). See §§ 18011(a), (e); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251 (2019). As of 2018, an estimated 16 percent of employees "with employer-sponsored coverage were enrolled in a grandfathered group health plan." 84 Fed. Reg. 5971 (2019). Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers, Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers With Respect to the Requirement To Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section 9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, p. 2 (2013). The Departments took this action to prevent an unduly narrow interpretation of the church exemption, in which "an otherwise exempt plan [was] disqualified because the employer's purposes extend[ed] beyond the inculcation of religious values or because the employer ... serve[d] people of different religious faiths." 78 Fed. Reg. 39874. But see post , at 2406 - 2407 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (arguing that the church exemption only covered houses of worship). The Little Sisters moved to intervene in the District Court to defend the 2017 religious-exemption IFR, but the District Court denied that motion. The Third Circuit reversed. After that reversal, the Little Sisters appealed the District Court's preliminary injunction of the 2017 IFRs, and that appeal was consolidated with the Federal Government's appeal. The Third Circuit also determined suasponte that the Little Sisters lacked appellate standing to intervene because a District Court in Colorado had permanently enjoined the contraceptive mandate as applied to plans in which the Little Sisters participate. This was error. Under our precedents, at least one party must demonstrate Article III standing for each claim for relief. An intervenor of right must independently demonstrate Article III standing if it pursues relief that is broader than or different from the party invoking a court's jurisdiction. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc. , 581 U. S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1651, 198 L.Ed.2d 64 (2017). Here, the Federal Government clearly had standing to invoke the Third Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, and both the Federal Government and the Little Sisters asked the court to dissolve the injunction against the religious exemption. The Third Circuit accordingly erred by inquiring into the Little Sisters' independent Article III standing. Though not necessary for this analysis, our decisions in Zubik v. Burwell , 578 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1557, 194 L.Ed.2d 696 (2016) (per curiam ), and Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. 682, 134 S.Ct. 2751, implicitly support the conclusion that § 300gg-13(a)(4) empowered HRSA to create the exemptions. As respondents acknowledged at oral argument, accepting their interpretation of the ACA would require us to conclude that the Departments had no authority under the ACA to promulgate the initial church exemption, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 69-71, 91, which by extension would mean that the Departments lacked authority for the 2013 self-certification accommodation. That reading of the ACA would create serious tension with Hobby Lobby , which pointed to the self-certification accommodation as an example of a less restrictive means available to the Government, 573 U.S. at 730-731, 134 S.Ct. 2751, and Zubik , which expressly directed the Departments to "accommodat[e]" petitioners' religious exercise, 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1560. It would be passing strange for this Court to direct the Departments to make such an accommodation if it thought the ACA did not authorize one. In addition, we are not aware of, and the dissent does not point to, a single case predating Hobby Lobby or Zubik in which the Departments took the position that they could not adopt a different approach because they lacked the statutory authority under the ACA to do so. HRSA has altered its Guidelines multiple times since 2011, always proceeding without notice and comment. See 82 Fed. Reg. 47813-47814 ; 83 Fed. Reg. 8487 ; 85 Fed. Reg. 722-723 (2020). Accordingly, if HRSA chose to exercise that discretion to remove contraception coverage from the next iteration of its Guidelines, it would arguably nullify the contraceptive mandate altogether without proceeding through notice and comment. The combination of the agency practice of proceeding without notice and comment and HRSA's discretion to alter the Guidelines, though not necessary for our analysis, provides yet another indication of Congress' failure to provide strong protections for contraceptive coverage. The dissent does not attempt to argue that the self-certification accommodation can coexist with its interpretation of the ACA. As for the church exemption, the dissent claims that it is rooted in the First Amendment's respect for church autonomy. See post , at 2406 - 2407. But the dissent points to no case, brief, or rule in the nine years since the church exemption's implementation in which the Departments defended its validity on that ground. The most the dissent can point to is a stray comment in the rule that expanded the self-certification accommodation to closely held corporations in the wake of Hobby Lobby . See post , at 2406 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. 41325 (2015) ). The dissent claims that "all agree" that the exemption is not supported by the Free Exercise Clause. Post , at 2400 - 2401. A constitutional claim is not presented in these cases, and we express no view on the merits of that question. The dissent appears to agree that the Departments had authority under RFRA to "cure" any RFRA violations caused by its regulations. See post , at 2407, n. 16 (disclaiming the view that agencies must wait for courts to determine a RFRA violation); see also supra , at 2374 - 2375 (explaining that the safe harbor and commitment to developing an accommodation occurred prior to the Guidelines going into effect). The dissent also does not-as it cannot-dispute our directive in Zubik . Here, too, the Departments have consistently taken the position that their rules had to account for RFRA in response to comments that the rules would violate that statute. See Dept. of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36, pp. 4-5 (2017) (2016 Request for Information); 78 Fed. Reg. 39886-39887 (2013 rule) ; 77 Fed. Reg. 8729 (2012 final rule). As the 2017 IFR explained, the Departments simply reached a different conclusion on whether the accommodation satisfied RFRA. See 82 Fed. Reg. 47800-40806 (summarizing the previous ways in which the Departments accounted for RFRA and providing a lengthy explanation for the changed position). We note as well that the Departments promulgated many other IFRs in addition to the three related to the contraceptive mandate. See, e.g. , 75 Fed. Reg. 27122 (dependent coverage); id. , at 34538 (grandfathered health plans); id. , at 37188 (pre-existing conditions). Because we conclude that the IFRs' request for comment satisfies the APA's rulemaking requirements, we need not reach respondents' additional argument that the Departments lacked good cause to promulgate the 2017 IFRs. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a division of the Department of Health and Human Services, creates the "comprehensive guidelines" on "coverage" for "additional preventive care and screenings" for women, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4), but the statute is jointly administered and enforced by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury (collectively Departments), see § 300gg-92 ; 29 U.S.C. § 1191c ; 26 U.S.C. § 9833. The Departments promulgated the exemptions at issue here, which were subsequently incorporated into the guidelines by HRSA. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57536 (2018) ; id. , at 57592. In the regulation, the Departments also responded to our holding in Wheaton College v. Burwell , 573 U.S. 958, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 189 L.Ed.2d 856 (2014), by allowing employers who invoked the accommodation to notify the Government of their objection, rather than filing the objection with their insurer or third-party administrator. See 80 Fed. Reg. 41337. Dept. of Labor, FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-36.pdf. A similar exemption was provided for employers with moral objections. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.33. This is one of the differences between these cases and Bowen v. Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986). See post , at 2409 - 2410 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.) (relying on Bowen to conclude that accommodation was unnecessary). In Bowen , the objecting individuals were not faced with penalties or "coerced by the Governmen[t] into violating their religious beliefs." Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. , 485 U.S. 439, 449, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). See Brief for Respondents in Zubik v. Burwell , O. T. 2015, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191, pp. 35-41. See Brief for Petitioners in Zubik v. Burwell , O. T. 2015, Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191, p. 45. Brief for Petitioners in Zubik v. Burwell , O. T. 2015, Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, p. 49. Brief for Petitioners in Zubik , O. T. 2015, Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191, at 44. In contrast, the Departments estimated that plans covering 727,000 people would take advantage of the religious exemption, and thus that between 70,500 and 126,400 women of childbearing age would be affected by the religious exemption. 83 Fed. Reg. 57578, 57581. In 2019, the Government is estimated to have spent $737 billion subsidizing health insurance for individuals under the age of 65; $287 billion of that went to employment-related coverage. CBO, Federal Subsidies for Health Insurance for People Under Age 65: 2019 to 2029, pp. 15-16 (2019). While the cost of contraceptive methods varies, even assuming the most expensive options, which range around $1,000 a year, the cost of providing this coverage to the 126,400 women who are estimated to be impacted by the religious exemption would be $126.4 million. See Kosova, National Women's Health Network, How Much Do Different Kinds of Birth Control Cost Without Insrance? (Nov. 17, 2017), http://nwhn.org/much-different-kinds-birth-control-cost-without-insurance/ (discussing contraceptive methods ranging from $240 to $1,000 per year); 83 Fed. Reg. 57581 (estimating that up to 126,400 women will be affected by the religious exemption). The Government recently amended the definitions for Title X's family planning program to help facilitate access to contraceptives for women who work for an employer invoking the religious and moral exemptions. See 84 Fed. Reg. 7734 (2019). These definitions now provide that "for the purpose of considering payment for contraceptive services only," a "low income family" "includes members of families whose annual income" would otherwise exceed the threshold "where a woman has health insurance coverage through an employer ... [with] a sincerely held religious or moral objection to providing such [contraceptive] coverage." 42 C.F.R. § 59.2(2). Both the dissent and the court below refer to the statement in Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 720, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005), that "courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries," but that statement was made in response to the argument that RFRA's twin, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. , violated the Establishment Clause. The only case cited by Cutter in connection with this statement, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. , 472 U.S. 703, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985), involved a religious accommodation that the Court held violated the Establishment Clause. Before this Court, the States do not argue-and there is no basis for an argument-that the new rule violates that Clause. The First Amendment cannot have separately justified the church exemption, as the dissent suggests. See post , at 2406 - 2407(opinion of GINSBURG, J.). That exemption enables a religious institution to decline to provide contraceptive coverage to all its employees, from a minister to a building custodian. By contrast, the so-called ministerial exception of the First Amendment (which the dissent cites, see post , at 2406 - 2407) extends only to select employees, having ministerial status. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru , 591 U. S. ----, ----, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2061-63, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020) ; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC , 565 U.S. 171, 190, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012). (Too, this Court has applied the ministerial exception only to protect religious institutions from employment discrimination suits, expressly reserving whether the exception excuses their non-compliance with other laws. See id. , at 196, 132 S.Ct. 694.) And there is no general constitutional immunity, over and above the ministerial exception, that can protect a religious institution from the law's operation. I speak here only of the substantive validity of the exemptions. I agree with the Court that the final rules issuing the exemptions were procedurally valid. At oral argument, the Solicitor General argued that the rule's overinclusion is harmless because the accommodation remains available to all employers who qualify for the exemption. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-23. But in their final rule, the Departments themselves acknowledged the prospect that some employers without a religious objection to the accommodation would switch to the exemption. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57576-57577 ("Of course, some of the[ ] religious" institutions that "do not conscientiously oppose participating" in the accommodation "may opt for the expanded exemption[,] but others might not"); id., at 57561 ("[I]t is not clear to the Departments" how many of the religious employers who had used the accommodation without objection "will choose to use the expanded exemption instead"). And the Solicitor General, when pressed at argument, could offer no evidence that, since the rule took effect, employers without the Little Sisters' complicity beliefs had declined to avail themselves of the new exemption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. In a brief passage in the interim final rule, the Departments suggested that an exemption is "more workable" than the accommodation in addressing religious objections to the mandate. 82 Fed. Reg. 47806. But the Departments continue to provide the accommodation to any religious employers who request that option, thus maintaining a two-track system. See ante, at 2377 - 2378; n. 3, supra . So ease of administration cannot support, at least without more explanation, the Departments' decision to offer the exemption more broadly than needed. In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Court explained that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." Id., at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). The requirement that insurers cover FDA-approved methods of contraception "applies generally, ... trains on women's well-being, not on the exercise of religion, and any effect it has on such exercise is incidental." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 573 U.S. 682, 745, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Smith forecloses "[a]ny First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim [one] might assert" in opposition to that requirement. 573 U.S. at 744, 134 S.Ct. 2751. This requirement does not apply to employers with fewer than 50 employees, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2), or "grandfathered health plans"-plans in existence on March 23, 2010 that have not thereafter made specified changes in coverage, 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a), (e) ; 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g) (2018). "Federal statutes often include exemptions for small employers, and such provisions have never been held to undermine the interests served by these statutes." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 763, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). "[T]he grandfathering provision," "far from ranking as a categorical exemption, ... is temporary, intended to be a means for gradually transitioning employers into mandatory coverage." Id. , at 764, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The [Institute of Medicine] is an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, an organization Congress established for the explicit purpose of furnishing advice to the Government." Id ., at 742, n. 3, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (internal quotation marks omitted). HRSA, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (HHS), Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (2012). HRSA, HHS, Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, supra . 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Proponents of the Women's Health Amendment specifically anticipated that HRSA would require coverage of family planning services. See, e.g. , 155 Cong. Rec. 28841 (2009) (statement of Sen. Boxer); id. , at 28843 (statement of Sen. Gillibrand); id. , at 28844 (statement of Sen. Mikulski); id. , at 28869 (statement of Sen. Franken); id ., at 28876 (statement of Sen. Cardin); ibid . (statement of Sen. Feinstein); id. , at 29307 (statement of Sen. Murray). This opinion refers to the contraceptive-coverage accommodation made in 2013 as the "self-certification accommodation." See ante , at 2375 (opinion of the Court). Although this arrangement "requires the issuer to bear the cost of [contraceptive] services, HHS has determined that th[e] obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers because its cost will be less than or equal to the cost savings resulting from th[ose] services." Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 698-699, 134 S.Ct. 2751. Nonprofit and closely held for-profit organizations with "sincerely held moral convictions" against contraception also qualify for the exemption. 45 C.F.R. § 147.133(a)(1)(i), (a)(2). Unless otherwise noted, this opinion refers to the religious and moral exemptions together as "the exemption" or "the blanket exemption." This opinion uses "Brief for HHS et al." to refer to the Brief for Petitioners in No. 19-454, filed on behalf of the Departments of HHS, Treasury, and Labor, the Secretaries of those Departments, and the President. The only language to which the Court points in support of its contrary conclusion is the phrase "as provided for." See ante , at 2380. This phrase modifies "additional preventive care and screenings." § 300gg-13(a)(4). It therefore speaks to what services shall be provided, not who must provide them. The Court does not say whether, in its view, the exemption authority it claims for women's preventive care exists as well for HRSA's children's preventive-care guidelines. HRSA, HHS, Organization, www.hrsa.gov/about/organization/index.html. A more logical choice would have been HHS's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which "enforces ... conscience and religious freedom laws" with respect to HHS programs. HHS, OCR, About Us, www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html. Indeed, when the Senate introduced an amendment to the ACA similar in character to the blanket exemption, a measure that failed to pass, the Senate instructed that OCR administer the exemption. 158 Cong. Rec. 1415 (2012) (proposed amendment); id ., at 2634 (vote tabling amendment). On the broad scope the Court today attributes to the "ministerial exception," see Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru , 591 U. S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 2049, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2020 WL 3808420 (2020). The Government does not argue that my view of the limited compass of § 300gg-13(a)(4) imperils the self-certification accommodation. Brief for HHS et al. 19-20. But see ante , at 2382, n. 9 (opinion of the Court). That accommodation aligns with the Court's decisions under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). See infra , at 2407 - 2408. It strikes a balance between women's health and religious opposition to contraception, preserving women's access to seamless, no-cost contraceptive coverage, but imposing the obligation to provide such coverage directly on insurers, rather than on the objecting employer. See supra , at 2402 - 2403; infra , at 2409 - 2411. The blanket exemption, in contrast, entirely disregards women employees' preventive care needs. But see, e.g. , Brief for Professors of Criminal Law et al. as Amici Curiae 8-11 (RFRA does not grant agencies independent rulemaking authority; instead, laws allegedly violating RFRA must be challenged in court). No party argues that agencies can act to cure violations of RFRA only after a court has found a RFRA violation, and this opinion does not adopt any such view. The Government notes that 2.9 million people were covered by the 209 plans that previously utilized the self-certification accommodation. 83 Fed. Reg. 57577. One hundred nine of those plans covering 727,000 people, the Government estimates, will use the religious exemption, while 100 plans covering more than 2.1 million people will continue to use the self-certification accommodation. Id. , at 57578. If more plans, or plans covering more people, use the new exemption, more women than the Government estimates will be affected. Title X "is the only federal grant program dedicated solely to providing individuals with comprehensive family planning and related preventive health services." HHS, About Title X Grants, www.hhs.gov/opa/title-x-family-planning/about-title-x-grants/index.html. A recent rule makes women who lose contraceptive coverage due to the religious exemption eligible for Title X services. See 84 Fed. Reg. 7734 (2019). Expanding eligibility , however, "does nothing to ensure Title X providers actually have capacity to meet the expanded client population." Brief for National Women's Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 22. Moreover, that same rule forced 1,041 health providers, serving more than 41% of Title X patients, out of the Title X provider network due to their affiliation with abortion providers. 84 Fed. Reg. 7714 ; Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al. as Amici Curiae 18-19. Remarkably, Justice ALITO maintains that stripping women of insurance coverage for contraceptive services imposes no burden. See ante , at 2395 - 2396 (concurring opinion). He reaches this conclusion because, in his view, federal law does not require the contraceptive coverage denied to women under the exemption. Ibid . Congress, however, called upon HRSA to specify contraceptive and other preventive services for women in order to ensure equality in women employees' access to healthcare, thus safeguarding their health and well-being. See supra, at 2400 - 2402. As above stated, the Government does not defend the moral exemption under RFRA. See supra , at 2406 - 2407. Justice ALITO disputes the relevance of Roy , asserting that the religious adherent in that case faced no penalty for noncompliance with the legal requirement under consideration. See ante , at 2390, n. 5. As Justice ALITO acknowledges, however, the critical inquiry has two parts. See ante , at 2389 - 2390. It is not enough to ask whether noncompliance entails "substantial adverse practical consequences." One must also ask whether compliance substantially burdens religious exercise. Like Roy , my dissent homes in on the latter question. Even if RFRA sweeps more broadly than the Court's pre- Smith jurisprudence in some respects, see Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 695, n. 3, 134 S.Ct. 2751 ; but see id. , at 749-750, 134 S.Ct. 2751 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting), there is no cause to believe that Congress jettisoned this fundamental distinction. Justice ALITO ignores the distinction between (1) a request for an accommodation with regard to one's own conduct, and (2) an attempt to require others to conform their conduct to one's own religious beliefs. This distinction is fatal to Justice ALITO's argument that the self-certification accommodation violates RFRA. See ante , at 2389 - 2392. Religious organizations have observed that, under the self-certification accommodation, insurers need not, and do not, provide contraceptive coverage under a separate policy number. Supp. Brief for Petitioners in Zubik v. Burwell , O. T. 2015, No. 14-1418, p. 1. This objection does not relate to a religious employer's own conduct; instead, it concerns the insurer's conduct. See supra , at 2402 - 2403. Justice ALITO asserts that the Little Sisters' "situation [is] the same as that of the conscientious objector in Thomas [v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div. , 450 U.S. 707, 715, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) ]." Ante , at 2391. I disagree. In Thomas , a Jehovah's Witness objected to "work[ing] on weapons," 450 U.S. at 710, 101 S.Ct. 1425, which is what his employer required of him. As above stated, however, the Little Sisters have no objection to objecting, the only other action the self-certification accommodation requires of them. Given this conclusion, I need not address whether the exemption is procedurally invalid. See ante , at 2384 - 2386 (opinion of the Court). Although the Court does not reach the issue, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction. The Administrative Procedure Act contemplates nationwide relief from invalid agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (empowering courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action"). Moreover, the nationwide reach of the injunction "was 'necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.' " Trump v. Hawaii , 585 U. S. ----, ----, n. 13, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2446 n. 13, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. , 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) ). Harm to Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the Court of Appeals explained, occurs because women who lose benefits under the exemption "will turn to state-funded services for their contraceptive needs and for the unintended pregnancies that may result from the loss of coverage." 930 F.3d at 562. This harm is not bounded by state lines. The Court of Appeals noted, for example, that some 800,000 residents of Pennsylvania and New Jersey work-and thus receive their health insurance-out of State. Id. , at 576. Similarly, many students who attend colleges and universities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey receive their health insurance from their parents' out-of-state health plans. Ibid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INC. v. VIRGINIA. No. 163. Argued January 5, 1954. Decided April 5, 1954. Thomas B. Gay argued the cause for. appellant. With him on the brief were J. H. Mooers, W. H. Waldrop, Jr. and H. Merrill Pasco. Frederick T. Gray, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Jackson, announced by Mr. Justice Reed. This appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia presents another variation in the seemingly endless problems raised by efforts of the several states to tax commerce as it moves among them. In the 1920’s the railroads of the country took over the express business theretofore separately handled. Their instrumentality was this appellant, a Delaware corporation, chartered for interstate and intrastate operation throughout the Union and actually so operating in every state except Virginia. It sought to do a general express business there, but that State has a constitutional provision which forbids a foreign corporation to exercise any public-service powers or functions therein. This prohibition was invoked by the State Corporation Commission to deny appellant authority to do any intrastate business. This exclusion was sustained by Virginia’s highest court and by this Court. As a consequence of the State’s own policy, this appellant does no business in Virginia which the State has power to prohibit but does only such as it can conduct under protection of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. To handle such intrastate express as falls within the power of the State to control, a separate Virginia subsidiary necessarily was organized. That local company annually has been assessed and has paid the type of tax here in controversy, based upon its total gross receipts. Those payments are not before us. Virginia provides by statute a separate and detailed system of taxation for express companies. It allocates to state taxation, free of all local levies, two kinds of property, viz., intangible personal property and money. It sets off real estate and tangible personal property for local levies at the same rates as other similar properties. These, taxable at different rates, are all included in the statute under the rubric “Taxes on property of express companies.” Then follows a section headed “Annual license tax” providing that “for the privilege of doing business in this State” express companies shall pay “in addition to . . . the property tax as herein provided” an “annual license tax” upon gross receipts earned in the State “on business passing through, into or out of this State.” Appellant has protested the gross-receipts tax, and for some years the protesting company and the state authorities appear to have come together on a compromise formula, as to the portion of receipts attributable to Virginia, the details of which need not concern us, since it does not affect the issue of power now adequately raised, passed upon by the State Corporation Commission and the Supreme Court of Appeals and duly brought before us. Since admittedly the State did not gr,ant any privilege but on the contrary denied every privilege in its power to withhold, and since it concedes that appellant does nothing within the State except interstate commerce, appellant contends that the assessment is invalid for contravention of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The State counters with the contention that we should regard this, not as a privilege tax, even though it was labeled as such by the statute imposing it, but, instead, as a property tax measured by gross income and laid on the intangible value of good-will or going-concern status. The Corporation Commission said that the physical properties were assessed at dead value or bare-bones value for local taxation, while here the “live, or going concern value” is being separately taxed by the State “for the protection and services rendered by it.” The State’s highest court approved. While great respect is due these conclusions, it has long been held that in a case involving the line between permissible state taxation of property at its full value, including going-concern value, and prohibited taxation of gross receipts from interstate commerce, “neither the state courts nor the legislatures, by giving the tax a particular name or by the use of some form of words, can take away our duty to consider its nature and effect,” Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227, in which inquiry “we are concerned only with its practical operation.” Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U. S. 276, 280. See Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 443-444. We start with the taxing statute, in which the Legislature gave a trinity of characterizations to the tax. It was declared to be in addition to the “property tax,” not an additional property tax; it was named “an annual license tax,” and it was laid “for the privilege of doing business in this State.” It is not an easy conclusion that the Legislature did not know the actual character of the tax it was laying or that it misconceived what it was taxing. If the tax was in purpose and effect one on property, tangible or intangible, no reason is apparent for casting it in the mold of a privilege tax. Indeed, as the Corporation Commission finally said, the opposite is true, and some other basis for the tax must be found if it is to be saved as valid. This both the Commission and the court below sought to do. The Virginia court, in this and earlier cases, considered that gross earnings measure the value of a good-will or going-concern element which is a separate intangible property of the company. Of course, we have held, and it is but common sense to hold, that a physical asset may fluctuate in value according to the income it can be made to produce. A live horse is worth more than a dead one, though the physical object may be the same, and a smooth-going automobile is worth more than an unassem-bled collection of all its parts. The physical facilities used in carrying on a prosperous business are worth more than the same assets in bankruptcy liquidation or on sale by the sheriff. No one denies the right of the State, when assessing tangible property, to use any fair formula which will give effect to the intangible factors which influence real values. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185. But Virginia has not done this. Instead, the practical effect of the tax conforms to its statutory description as one whose impact is squarely upon gross receipts without consideration of their effect on the value of any of the classes of property recognized elsewhere in the statute. A summary of appellant’s total taxation for 1951 will illustrate this point. It reported money on deposit in Virginia of $109,906.38, on which it paid a tax of $219.81 at the rate of twenty cents per $100. We may drop this item from consideration of additional going-concern value, for money is money and is a medium of exchange which does not deflate or inflate according to the owner’s use of it. A dollar to an express company is worth as much as and no more than a dollar to one of its employees. But this company had real property and tangible personal property, items no doubt possessing a going-concern as well as an intrinsic value. These properties were assessed at $129,279, on which it paid taxes of $3,389.65 at local rates, probably varied but averaging 2.6 per centum. Appellant’s tax, under the questioned portion of the statute, amounted to $66,454.71, so that its tax on a gross-receipts basis was over fifty percent of the total value of its real and tangible personal property. It is this tax which Virginia says is really a tax on the intangible value of this tangible property. Neither the state court nor the Commission has seen fit to state any amount which it considers to be the going-concern valuation. We know the amount of the tax, and we know the rates of taxation, and from that can compute a possible valuation base. If this going-concern value be treated as separable “intangible property,” the statutory rate is fifty cents per $100, at which rate tangible property worth only $129,279 must be deemed to have an intangible going-concern value of $13,290,942. In other words, every dollar invested in the tangible property of an express business is deemed worth over $100 for tax purposes. This may not overtax the express company, but it does overtax our credulity, and neither the court nor the Commission, while treating this as an intangible, expressly treated it as entitled to the intangible property rate or classification. But the $66,454.71 of tax and the statutory gross-earnings tax rate of 2 3/20 per centum produce a base of $3,090,916.55, which is exactly the amount of gross revenues reported by appellant. To ascribe a going-concern value of over three million dollars to tangible property of $129,279 is on its face an extreme attribution. To base the value on appellant’s gross revenues is to assume that every dollar of annual intake adds a dollar of intangible value to the company’s assets regardless of how much it cost in labor, interest and other expense, including other taxes, to produce it. On the other hand, as a forthright tax on gross receipts, the tax involves no irrational or impractical assumption. We have sustained and would now sustain the power of a state to tax, without discrimination, all property within its jurisdiction and to include in its assessment, or to assess separately, the value added by the property’s assemblage into a going business, even if that business be solely interstate commerce. Cf. Meyer v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298; Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185. The impact of the tax is thus upon the proportionate total worth of the property. But the tax in dispute here does not depend on owning any physical property, nor upon the value thereof, but would be levied on gross revenues even if the company found some way to dispense with all local, physical property. The fact that its measure is gross revenue is consistent with a tax on the privilege of doing a volume of business which would yield that revenue, just as the Legislature indicated. But we have declined to regard mere gross receipts as a sound measure of going-concern value in a practical world of commerce, where values depend on profitableness of a business, not merely its volume. Cf. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328-329. Here the State excises every receipt from movement of express in interstate commerce. It takes a portion of gross revenue from “all receipts earned in this State on business passing through, into or out of this State.” It contends that this obvious burden on interstate commerce is validated by state protection of a localized incident in the course of the business. The three incidents are originating the interstate movement, which requires local pickup of the parcels; terminating the movement, which requires delivery, and movement through the State. If each of these incidents is sufficient warrant for taxing gross revenues from wholly interstate commerce, a concern doing a nationwide business is vulnerable to a gross-revenue tax in every one of the forty-eight states. But it is argued that this is permissible, provided the states formulate their burden so as each to burden it proportionately, not encroaching on the other’s right to burden. It is enough to say that we recently have ruled that local incidents such as gathering up or putting down interstate commodities as an integral part of their interstate movement are not adequate grounds for a state license, privilege or occupation tax. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602; Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U. S. 389; Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157; New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338. The Supreme Court of Appeals placed reliance upon our dismissal of the appeals in Baltimore Steam Packet Co. v. Virginia, 343 U. S. 923, and Norfolk, Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Virginia, 343 U. S. 923, and may well have been misled, since we assigned no reasons and cited no authority. In those cases, the Virginia court held an almost identical tax to be a property tax. Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 193 Va. 55, 68 S. E. 2d 137. But a vital distinction, so far as our jurisdiction is concerned, will account for dismissal of the appeals. One of those appellants was a Virginia corporation and derived its privilege to exist from that State. Both were engaged in intrastate as well as interstate commerce and were therefore subject to some privilege tax from the State. For our purposes, it mattered not whether the right to tax was based on those companies’ privileges or on their property, since they were taxable on either basis. This fact distinguishes those dismissed cases from the one at bar and from Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, supra. Those appeals did not question the fairness of apportionment of revenues between the interstate and intrastate business so as to require such consideration as we gave in Central Greyhound Lines v. Medley, 334 U. S. 653. It was therefore a mistake to assume that this Court, by dismissal of the appeals, approved the holding of the Virginia court that this statute imposes what in reality is a property tax though otherwise named and shaped. We think we can only regard this tax as being in fact and effect just what the Legislature said it was — a privilege tax, and one that cannot be applied to an exclusively interstate business. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for any further proceeding not inconsistent herewith. Reversed and remanded. Va. Const., Art. XII, § 163. Case No. 3900, Virginia Corporation Commission Report (1929), p. 252. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Corporation Comm’n, 153 Va. 498, 150 S. E. 419. 282 U. S. 440. The tax in question is laid under Va. Code, 1950, § 58-547. This section and the section immediately preceding it read as follows: “§ 58-546. Taxes on property of express companies. — Each and every one of the express companies doing business in this State shall, on or before the first day of October of each and every year, pay to the State and to the several counties, cities and towns of the State wherein they may have taxable properties located, the taxes levied on such property as follows: “(1) The State tax on the intangible personal property (other than shares of stock, and bonds issued by counties, cities and towns or other political subdivisions of this State) owned by every such company shall be at the rate of fifty cents on every one hundred dollars of the assessed value thereof; “(2) The State tax on the money of every such company shall be twenty cents on every one hundred dollars of the assessed value thereof; “(3) There shall be no local levies assessed on such intangible personal property or money; “(4) On the real estate and tangible personal property of every such company there shall be local levies at the same rate or rates as are assessed upon other real, estate and tangible personal property located in such localities, the proceeds of which local levies shall be applied as is provided by law. “The provisions of this section shall apply to the assessment for the tax year nineteen hundred forty-nine and annually thereafter, unless otherwise provided by law. “§ 58-547. Annual license tax. — Every such company, for the privilege of doing business in this State, in addition to the annual regis- (¡ration fee and the property tax as herein provided, shall pay an annual license tax as follows: “The tax shall be equal to two and three-twentieths per centum upon the gross receipts from operations of such companies and each of them within this State. When such companies are operating partly within and partly without this State, the gross receipts within this State shall be deemed to be all receipts on business beginning and ending within this State and all receipts earned in this State on business passing through, into or out of this State; provided, unless otherwise clearly shown, such last-mentioned receipts shall be deemed to be that portion of the total receipts from such business which the entire mileage over which such business is done bears to the mileage operated within this State. “The provisions of this section shall apply to the assessment for the tax year nineteen hundred forty-nine and annually thereafter, unless otherwise provided by law.” Cases Nos. 10,629 and 10,767, Virginia Corporation Commission Report (1952). The Commission was quoting from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 193 Va. 55, 70, 68 S. E. 2d 137, 147. The figures discussed in the text are summarized in the following chart for the year 1951. The Corporation Commission commented on the Baltimore Steam Packet case in this manner: “So, when the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the license taxes on steamship and express companies were property taxes, all danger of an adverse decision in the Supreme Court of the United States was averted, and that court dismissed the appeal without comment, presumably on the ground that no federal question worth discussing was involved.” Cases Nos. 10,629 and 10,767, Virginia Corporation Commission Report (1952).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. v. JEWS FOR JESUS, INC., et al. No. 86-104. Argued March 3, 1987 Decided June 15, 1987 O’ConnoR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, 'post, p. 577. James R. Kapel argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was James H. Pearson. Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause pro hac vice for respondents. With him on the brief were Andrew J. Ekono-mou, Barry A. Fisher, and Wendell R. Bird. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the city of St. Louis, Missouri, by James J. Wilson and Edward J. Hanlon; and for the Airport Operators Council International by Arthur P. Berg, Anne M. Tan-nenbaum, and Arnold D. Kolikoff. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Michael J. Woodruff, Samuel E. Ericsson, Kimberlee W. Colby, and Forest D. Montgomery; for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Boothby, James M. Parker, Robert W. Nixon, and Rolland Truman; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, Ira W. Still III, Wendell R. Bird, Thomas W. Strahan, James J. Knicely, and Alfred J. Lindh; and for the Jesus People U. S. A. Full Gospel Ministries by Robert L. Graham. A brief of amicus curiae was filed for the International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc., by David M. Liberman. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented in this case , is whether a resolution banning all “First Amendment activities” at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment. I On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners (Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in pertinent part: “NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity; “BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport; and “BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual or entity engages in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commissioners . . . App. 4a-5a. Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc., is a nonprofit religious corporation. On July 6,1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minister of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a Department of Airports peace officer while distributing free religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central Terminal Area at LAX. The officer showed Snyder a copy of the resolution, explained that Snyder’s activities violated the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The officer warned Snyder that the city would take legal action against him if he refused to leave as requested. Id., at 19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left the airport terminal. Id., at 20a. Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the resolution under both the California and Federal Constitutions. First, respondents contended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under Art. I, §2, of the California Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it bans all speech in a public forum. Second, they alleged that the resolution had been applied to Jews for Jesus in a discriminatory manner. Finally, respondents urged that the resolution was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. When the case came before the District Court for trial, the parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under the United States Constitution. The District Court declined to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and Kuszynski v. Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973), the Court of Appeals concluded that “an airport complex is a traditional public forum,” 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Federal Constitution. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 812 (1986), and now affirm, but on different grounds. II In balancing the government’s interest in limiting the use of its property against the interests of those who wish to use the property for expressive activity, the Court has identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The proper First Amendment analysis differs depending on whether the area in question falls in one category rather than another. In a traditional public forum or a public forum by government designation, we have held that First Amendment protections are subject to heightened scrutiny: “In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. . . . The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id., at 45. We have further held, however, that access to a nonpublic forum may be restricted by government regulation as long as the regulation “is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Id., at 46. The petitioners contend that LAX is neither a traditional public forum nor a public forum by government designation, and accordingly argue that the latter standard governing access to a nonpublic forum is appropriate. The respondents, in turn, argue that LAX is a public forum subject only to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. Moreover, at least one commentator contends that Perry does not control a case such as this in which the respondents already have access to the airport, and therefore concludes that this ease is analogous to Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969). See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1986). Because we conclude that the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine regardless of the proper standard, we need not decide whether LAX is indeed a public forum, or whether the Perry standard is applicable when access to a nonpublic forum is not restricted. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a statute on its face “because it also threatens others not before the court — those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid.” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 503 (1985). A statute may be invalidated on its face, however, only if the over-breadth is “substantial.” Houston v. Hill, ante, at 458-459; New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973). The requirement that the overbreadth be substantial arose from our recognition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is, “manifestly, strong medicine,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, at 613, and that “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.” City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984). On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting all protected expression, purports to create a virtual “First Amendment Free Zone” at LAX. The resolution does not merely ■'regulate expressive activity in the Central Terminal Area that might create problems such as congestion or the disruption of the activities of those who use LAX. Instead, the resolution expansively states that LAX “is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity,” and that “any individual and/or entity [who] seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area. . . shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners.” App. , 4a-5a. The resolution therefore does not merely reach the activity of respondents at LAX; it prohibits even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing. Under such a sweeping ban, virtually every individual who enters LAX may be found to violate the resolution by engaging in some “First Amendment activit[y].” We think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech. Additionally, we find no apparent saving construction of the resolution. The resolution expressly applies to all “First Amendment activities,” and the words of the resolution simply leave no room for a narrowing construction. In the past the Court sometimes has used either abstention or certification when, as here, the state courts have not had the opportunity to give the statute under challenge a definite construction. See, e. g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289 (1979). Neither option, however, is appropriate in this case because California has no certification procedure, and the resolution is not “fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question.” Harmon v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 535 (1965). The difficulties in adopting a limiting construction of the resolution are not unlike those found in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964). At issue in Baggett was the constitutionality of several statutes requiring loyalty oaths. The Baggett Court concluded that abstention would serve no purpose given the lack of any limiting construction, and held the statutes unconstitutional on their face under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. We observed that the challenged loyalty oath was not “open to one or a few interpretations, but to an indefinite number,” and concluded that “[i]t is fictional to believe that anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact of a variety of factual situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty.” Id., at 378. Here too, it is difficult, to imagine that the resolution could be limited by anything less than a series of adjudications, and the chilling effect of the resolution on protected speech in the meantime would make such a case-by-case adjudication intolerable. The petitioners suggest that the resolution is not substantially overbroad because it is intended to reach only expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes. Such a limiting construction, however, is of little assistance in substantially reducing the overbreadth of the resolution. Much nondisruptive speech — such as the wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a political message — may not be “airport related,” but is still protected speech even in a nonpublic forum. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). Moreover, the vagueness of this suggested construction itself presents serious constitutional difficulty. The line between airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech is, at best, murky. The petitioners, for example, suggest that an individual who reads a newspaper or converses with a neighbor at LAX is engaged in permitted “airport-related” activity because reading or conversing permits the traveling public to “pass the time.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 12. We presume, however, that petitioners would not so categorize the activities of a member of a religious or political organization who decides to “pass the time” by distributing leaflets to fellow travelers. In essence, the result of this vague limiting construction would be to give LAX officials alone the power to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is airport related. Such a law that “confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation” of the resolution is unconstitutional because “[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident.” Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 135-136 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Houston v. Hill, ante, at 465; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 358 (1983). We conclude that the resolution is substantially overbroad, and is not fairly subject to a limiting construction. Accordingly, we hold that the resolution violates the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HUGHES v. ROWE et al. No. 79-6000. Decided November 10, 1980 Per Curiam. Petitioner, an inmate of the Illinois State Penitentiary, asks us to review an order dismissing his civil rights action against the respondent corrections officers and directing him to pay counsel fees of $400 for services rendered by the Attorney General of Illinois in representing the respondents in that action. After granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a constitutional violation, the District Court ordered petitioner to show cause why fees of $400 should not be taxed against him under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Because he did not respond to that order, the fee award was entered. A motion to reconsider was later denied on the ground that petitioner’s suit was “meritless.” The Court of Appeals disposed of the novel question presented by petitioner by affirming the fee award in an unpublished order. We now grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I On September 20, 1977, petitioner was charged with a violation of prison regulations and placed in segregation. At a disciplinary hearing two days later, petitioner admitted that he and two other inmates had consumed a homemade alcoholic beverage; his punishment was confinement to segregation for 10 days, demotion to C-grade, and loss of 30 days’ statutory good time. Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies and then filed a complaint under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on the form used by prisoners who are not represented by counsel. The facts stated on the form raised two federal questions of arguable merit: (1) the decision to place petitioner in a segregation cell on September 20, 1977, was not preceded by a hearing and was not justified by any emergency or other necessity; (2) two of the officers who conducted the disciplinary hearing after petitioner had been in segregation for two days were biased against him. Respondents, represented by the State Attorney General’s Office, moved to dismiss the complaint, but filed no affidavits denying or explaining the facts alleged by petitioner. After allowing petitioner to file various amendments and additional papers, the District Court dismissed the complaint without taking any evidence. Thereafter the fee award was made. In its order affirming the action of the District Court, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords a prisoner certain minimum procedural safeguards before disciplinary action may be taken against him. Because the record did not reveal a violation of those safeguards at the hearing on September 22, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint had been properly dismissed. However, the Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked the fact, clearly stated in petitioner's brief on appeal, that the disciplinary hearing did not take place until two days after petitioner was placed in segregation on September 20. Nothing in the papers filed on behalf of the respondents purports to justify or explain the segregation of petitioner for two days in advance of the disciplinary hearing. II Petitioner's complaint, like most prisoner complaints filed in the Northern District of Illinois, was not prepared by counsel. It is settled law that the allegations of such a complaint, “however inartfully pleaded'' are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ....'' Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F. 2d 83, 86 (CA7 1980); French v. Heyne, 547 F. 2d 994, 996 (CA7 1976). Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines, supra, at 520-521. And, of course, the allegations of the complaint are generally taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 322 (1972). Applying these principles to petitioner’s amended complaint, we conclude that all but one of its allegations were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. Petitioner’s allegations of bias and procedural irregularities in the September 22 hearing, unequal treatment, and cruel and unusual punishment, even when liberally construed, were insufficient to require any further proceedings in the District Court. We therefore affirm the dismissal of these claims. Petitioner’s allegation that he had been confined unnecessarily to segregation is of a different character. It can be construed as a contention that his confinement to segregation violated due process because it took place without a prior hearing. It is clear from the facts alleged in the amended complaint that petitioner was confined in segregation for two days before a hearing was held. Indeed, petitioner expressly stated this claim in procedural due process terms in his response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Segregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due process if the postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F. 2d 625, 633 (CA7), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 959 (1977). The amended complaint alleged that segregation was unnecessary in petitioner’s case because his offense did not involve violence and he did not present a “clear and present danger.” There is no suggestion in the record that immediate segregation was necessitated by emergency conditions. Defendants did make the unsworn assertion that petitioner was placed in segregation on “temporary investigative status,” but the significance of this designation is unclear and it does not, without more, dispose of petitioner’s procedural due process claim. The District Court, in dismissing the amended complaint, merely concluded that temporary segregation pending investigation was not actionable. The court cited an Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Regulation which authorized segregation of prisoners pending investigation of disciplinary matters, where required “in the interest of institutional security and safety.” In the absence of any showing that concern for institutional security and safety was the basis for immediate segregation of petitioner without a prior hearing, this regulation does not justify dismissal of petitioner’s suit for failure to state a claim. Our discussion of this claim is not intended to express any view on its merits. We conclude merely that the amended complaint was adequate at least to require some response from the defendants, by way of affidavit or otherwise, to petitioner’s claim that he was unjustifiably placed in segregation without a prior hearing. Although petitioner’s pleadings are prolix and lacking in stylistic precision, this is not a case like Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), in which a pro se litigant’s detailed recitation of the facts reveals on its face the insufficiency of the complaint. We cannot say with assurance that petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S., at 521. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have reversed the dismissal of this claim and remanded for further proceedings. Ill The award of attorney’s fees entered against petitioner must be vacated. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), we held that the defendant in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may recover attorney’s fees from the plaintiff only if the District Court finds “that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id., at 421. Although arguably a different standard might be applied in a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, we can perceive no reason for applying a less stringent standard. The plaintiff’s action must be meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation. The fact that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of fees. As we stated in Christiansburg: “To take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” 434 U. S., at 422. No such finding supported the fee award in this case. These limitations apply with special force in actions initiated by uncounseled prisoners. Faithful adherence to the principles of Haines v. Kerner dictates that attorney’s fees should rarely be awarded against such plaintiffs. The fact that a prisoner’s complaint, even when liberally construed, cannot survive a motion to dismiss does not, without more, entitle the defendant to attorney’s fees. An unrepresented litigant should not be punished for his failure to recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in his claims. As the Court noted in Christiansburg, even if the law or the facts are somewhat questionable or unfavorable at the outset of litigation, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. 434 U. S., at 422. Despite the lower court’s conclusion to the contrary, the allegations of petitioner’s amended complaint are definitely not meritless in the Christiansburg sense. Even those allegations that were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim deserved and received the careful consideration of both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Allegations that, upon careful examination, prove legally insufficient to require a trial are not, for that reason alone, “groundless” or “without foundation” as required by Christiansburg. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It %s so ordered. The Chief Justice would grant the petition and set the case for oral argument. Justice Stewakt would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint. He substantially agrees, however, with what is said in Part III of the Court’s per curiam opinion, and for those reasons would reverse the judgment insofar as it affirmed the award of attorney’s fees entered against the petitioner. The order entered by District Judge McMillen on October 18, 1978, reads as follows: “On August 7, 1978, we ordered plaintiff to show cause within twenty (20) days thereof why defendants’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $400 should not be taxed against plaintiff under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Because plaintiff has not complied with or otherwise responded to that order, we hereby tax defendants’ fees in the amount of $400 against him pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988.” On December 5, 1978, Judge McMillen entered the following order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration: “On October 18, 1978, we ordered that the defendants’ attorneys fees in the amount of $400 should be taxed against the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider said action. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider is denied and attorneys fees in the amount of $400 will be taxed against the plaintiff, as the suit was meritless.” Rule 35 (c)(1) of the Circuit Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit identifies those decisions warranting publication: “A published opinion will be filed when the decision “(i) establishes a new, or changes an existing, rule of law; “(ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest; “(in) criticizes or questions existing law; “(iv) constitutes a significant and nonduplieative contribution to legal literature “(A) by a historical review of law, “(B) by describing legislative history, or “(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law; “(v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has published an opinion supporting the judgment or order; or “(vi) is pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court and is not rendered merely in ministerial obedienee to specific directions of that Court.” When a decision does not satisfy these criteria, it is to be filed as an unpublished order. Circuit Rule 35 (e)(2). Unpublished orders may not be cited as precedent in any federal court within the Seventh Circuit. Circuit Rule 35 (b) (2) (iv). Although petitioner’s appeal was decided in an unpublished order purportedly having no precedential significance, three members of the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Fairchild and Judges Swygert and Bauer, nonetheless voted to rehear the case en banc. Judge Swygert filed a written dissent from the order denying the petition for rehearing en banc. It is unclear from the record whether this sentence included the two days petitioner spent in segregation prior to the disciplinary hearing, or whether he was sentenced to 10 days’ segregation in addition to the time already served. There apparently is also some confusion with respect to the exact sentence imposed on petitioner at the hearing. The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint indicates that petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in segregation. The Court of Appeals’ order, on the other hand, states that he was sentenced to 10 days in segregation. The petition for writ of certiorari and respondents’ brief in opposition filed in this Court are similarly inconsistent on this point. The record seems to indicate that petitioner was sentenced to 10 days in segregation. The uncertainty with respect to petitioner’s posthearing segregation is not, however, material to our decision in this case. Petitioner also alleged that respondents violated their own procedural regulations, and that it was a denial of equal protection of the laws and cruel and unusual punishment to impose a more severe sentence on him than on the other two inmates involved in the incident, since he had confessed to drinking and they had not. As the Court of Appeals noted: “The Supreme Court has delineated the standard to be applied in determining whether a prisoner has been afforded his minimum due process rights. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 . . . (1974). The prisoner is entitled to (1) advance written notice of the charges against him or her; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided that to do so will not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals, before a sufficiently impartial hearing board; (3) a written statement by the fact finder of ‘the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action taken.’ ” The Court reaffirmed the principles of Haines in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976): “As the Court unanimously held in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded/ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” ’ Id., at 520-521, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957).” In a document entitled, “Response to: Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment/& Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment,” petitioner alleged: “Placement in Segregation: Plaintiff was placed in Segregation on September 20, 1977, with no hearing what-so-ever. No reasons provided him as to why it was necessary to place him in segregation. No Resident Information Report issued him, stating he was being placed in segregation, under investigation status.” Response, at 2 (emphasis in original). Petitioner thereafter asserted that “[classification to segregation must comply with procedural due process.” Id., at 4, 7. Petitioner went on to assert that his placement in segregation on September 20 was “completely unnecessary, because plaintiff posed no immediate threat to the safety and security of the institution. . . .” Id., at 8. Later in the response, petitioner discussed his due process claim in detail. Id., at 15-16. In their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, respondents asserted: “Plaintiff's placement in segregation cellhouse on September 20, 1977 on temporary investigative status pending hearing of the resident information reports on September 22, 1977 does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. No disciplinary sanctions constituting a grievous loss were imposed prior to a disciplinary hearing. The transfer of a resident from one cell to another does not trigger due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 .. . (1976).” The District Court’s order dismissing petitioner’s complaint stated: “Plaintiff complains that his placement in segregation between the evening of September 20 and his hearing on September 22 was ‘unnecessary’ because no violence was involved in the incident. We find that his temporary placement in segregation pending the hearing, which was brought within the required 72 hour period, is not actionable. See A. R. 804 (G), effective December 1, 1976.” This regulation, Administrative Regulation § 804 (II) (G), provides, in pertinent part: “It is recognized that incidents occur which, in the interest of institutional security and safety, require that a resident be removed from the general population and placed in a holding unit pending the completion of an investigation. As the holding unit functions in the same manner as a segregation unit (except that single celling is not required in the holding unit), a resident must be provided with the same procedural safeguards and services as are required by this regulation relative to placements, conditions and services in a segregation unit.” The dissenting opinion rests on the alternative and somewhat inconsistent grounds that prehearing solitary confinement was (a) proper punishment for an offense that was already adequately proved, (b) necessary in order to forestall the development of a contrived defense, and (c) harmless because petitioner subsequently received a fair hearing. The record reveals that these grounds are not sufficient to justify the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. On the basis of petitioner’s admission that he had been drinking, plus unsworn allegations in the reports of the corrections officers, the dissent concludes that petitioner was intoxicated on September 20 and that he posed a threat to prison security and safety sufficiently serious to warrant immediate segregation. There is little doubt that some intoxicated prisoners may pose a threat to prison security justifying segregation without a hearing. The problem in this case is that the record does not establish, and the District Court did not find, that petitioner was in fact intoxicated or that his condition presented a threat to institutional security. Indeed, at no point in this litigation have the respondents asserted, by affidavit or otherwise, that petitioner was placed in segregation on September 20 because of such security concerns. The dissent also speculates that inmates suspected of violations of prison regulations, if allowed to remain in the general prison population pending disciplinary proceedings, will fabricate alibi defenses and intimidate potential witnesses. Post, at 22. This danger would apparently justify automatic investigative segregation of all inmate suspects. Ironically, however, even the Administrative Regulation cited by the District Court, see n. 11, supra, does not purport to justify such blanket segregation. Moreover, automatic investigative segregation is particularly inappropriate for an inmate, like petitioner, who has already admitted guilt; fabrication of alibis or intimidation of witnesses seems unlikely in such a case. While investigative concerns might, in particular cases, justify prehearing segregation, nothing in the present record suggests that these concerns were at work in this case. Either the institutional security or the investigative justification postulated by the dissent might well be dispositive had the District Court made appropriate findings. The respondents did not, however, present these justifications to the District Court and the District Court accordingly made no such findings. The record is entirely consistent with the possibility that an inmate who admittedly had been drinking posed no threat at all to prison security and had no intent to deny the facts, but did want an opportunity to establish mitigating circumstances before being placed in solitary confinement. The dissent’s emphasis upon petitioner’s admission confuses the distinction, previously recognized by this Court, between the question of guilt and the question of appropriate punishment. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 483-484 (1972). Finally, even if the subsequent hearing accorded petitioner minimized or eliminated any compensable harm resulting from the initial denial of procedural safeguards, his constitutional claim is nonetheless actionable. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266-267 (1978). “Because the right to procedural due process is 'absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed . . . the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.” Id., at 266 (footnote omitted). As Judge Swygert noted in his dissent from the order denying rehearing en banc, see n. 3, supra, the District Court dismissed petitioner’s claims only after detailed consideration resulting in a seven-page opinion. According to Judge Swygert: “It is quite evident from the detailed treatment given by the district court to the issues raised by plaintiff’s complaint that the suit was not groundless or meritless. That fact is corroborated by this court’s treatment of the same issues on appeal.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DOLAN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE et al. No. 04-848. Argued November 7, 2005 Decided February 22, 2006 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 492. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. James R. Radmore argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Michael T Kirkpatrick. Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Robert D. Kamenshine, Mary Anne Gibbons, Lori J. Dym, and Stephan J. Boardman. Harold Krent, Daniel J Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Each day, according to the Government’s submissions here, the United States Postal Service delivers some 660 million pieces of mail to as many as 142 million delivery points. This case involves one such delivery point — petitioner Barbara Dolan’s porch — where mail left by postal employees allegedly caused her to trip and fall. Claiming injuries as a result, Dolan filed a claim for administrative relief from the Postal Service. When her claim was denied, she and her husband (whose claim for loss of consortium the Dolans later conceded was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting that the Postal Service’s negligent placement of mail at their home subjected the Government to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The District Court dismissed Dolan’s suit, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, 377 F. 3d 285 (2004). Both courts concluded that, although the FTCA generally waives sovereign immunity as to federal employees’ torts, Dolan’s claims were barred by an exception to that waiver, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b). We disagree and hold that Dolan’s suit may proceed. I Under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., the Postal Service is “an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States,” §201. Holding a monopoly over carriage of letters, the Postal Service has “significant governmental powers,” including the power of eminent domain, the authority to make searches and seizures in the enforcement of laws protecting the mails, the authority to promulgate postal regulations, and, subject to the Secretary of State’s supervision, the power to enter international postal agreéments. See Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 U. S. 736, 741 (2004) (discussing 39 U. S. C. §§ 101, 401, 407, 601-606). Consistent with this status, the Postal Service enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver. See ibid.; cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit”). Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally “waives the immunity of the Postal Service from suit by giving it the power ‘to sue and be sued in its official name/ ” Flamingo Industries, supra, at 741 (quoting 39 U. S. C. §401(1)), the statute also provides that the FTCA “shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal Service,” § 409(c). The FTCA, in turn, waives sovereign immunity in two different sections of the United States Code. The first confers federal-court jurisdiction in a defined category of cases involving negligence committed by federal employees in the course of their employment. This jurisdictional grant covers: “claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b)(1). As to claims falling within this jurisdictional grant, the FTCA, in a second provision, makes the United States liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” though not “for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” § 2674; see generally United States v. Olson, ante, at 44. The FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for certain categories of claims (13 in all). If one of the exceptions applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains. The 13 categories of exempted claims are set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 2680, and the relevant subsection for our purposes, pertaining to postal operations, is § 2680(b). It states: “The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to ... [a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” As a consequence, the United States may be liable if postal employees commit torts under local law, but not for claims defined by this exception. This was the provision relied upon by the District Court and Court of Appeals to dismiss Dolan’s suit. The Court of Appeals’ decision created a conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Raila v. United States, 355 F. 3d 118, 121 (2004). We granted certiorari. 544 U. S. 998 (2005). II We assume that under the applicable state law a person injured by tripping over a package or bundle of papers negligently left on the porch of a residence by a private party would have a cause of action for damages. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The question is whether, when mail left by the Postal Service causes the slip and fall, the § 2680(b) exception for “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter” preserves sovereign immunity despite the FTCA’s more general statements of waiver. If considered in isolation, the phrase “negligent transmission” could embrace a wide range of negligent acts committed by the Postal Service in the course of delivering mail, including creation of slip-and-fall hazards from leaving packets and parcels on the porch of a residence. After all, in ordinary meaning and usage, transmission of the mail is not complete until it arrives at the destination. See, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2429 (1971) (defining “transmission” as “an act, process, or instance of transmitting” and “transmit” as “to cause to go or be conveyed to another person or place”). In large part this inference— transmission includes delivery — led the District Court and Court of Appeals to rule for the Government. See 377 F. 3d, at 288; App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-6a. The definition of words in isolation, however, is not necessarily controlling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis. Here, we conclude both context and precedent require a narrower reading, so that “negligent transmission” does not go beyond negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address. See Raila, supra, at 121 (holding the postal exception covers “damages and delay of the postal material itself and consequential damages therefrom”). The phrase does not comprehend all negligence occurring in the course of mail delivery. Starting with context, the words “negligent transmission” in §2680(b) follow two other terms, “loss” and “miscarriage.” Those terms, we think, limit the reach of “transmission.” “[A] word is known by the company it keeps” — a rule that “is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961); see also Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36 (1990) (“[Wjords grouped in a list should be given related meaning” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, as both parties acknowledge, mail is “lost” if it is destroyed or misplaced and “miscarried” if it goes to the wrong address. Since both those terms refer to failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address, it would be odd if “negligent transmission” swept far more broadly to include injuries like those alleged here— injuries that happen to be caused by postal employees but involve neither failure to transmit mail nor damage to its contents. Our interpretation would be less secure were it not for a precedent we deem to have decisive weight here. We refer to Kosak v. United States, 466 U. S. 848 (1984). In Kosak, an art collector alleged in an FTCA suit that artworks he owned were damaged when the United States Customs Service seized and detained them. Id., at 849-850. The question was whether the Government retained immunity based on § 2680(c), a provision that has since been amended but at the time covered: “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.” Id., at 852, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). In its opinion concluding the exception did apply and thus that the United States retained sovereign immunity, the Court gave specific consideration to the postal exception. In a part of the opinion central to its holding, the Court contrasted what it called the “generality of § 2680(c)” with the “specificity of § 2680(b),” id., at 855. The Court observed: “One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at fault. In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibility — namely, ‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter’ — thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). In the present case neither party suggests Kosak’s conclusion regarding negligent operation of postal motor vehicles should be ignored as dictum. In light of Kosak’s discussion, we cannot interpret the phrase “negligent transmission” in § 2680(b) to cover all negligence in the course of mail delivery. Although postal trucks may well be delivering — and thus transmitting — mail when they collide with other vehicles, Kosak indicates the United States, nonetheless, retains no immunity. Séeking to distinguish postal auto accidents from Dolan’s fall, the Government argues that negligent driving relates only circumstantially to the mail, whereas Dolan’s accident was caused by the mail itself. Nothing in the statutory text supports this distinction. Quite the contrary, if placing mail so as to create a slip-and-fall risk constitutes “negligent transmission,” the same should be true of driving postal trucks in a manner that endangers others on the road. In both cases the postal employee acts negligently while transmitting mail. In addition, as the Second Circuit recognized and as the Government acknowledged at oral argument, focusing on whether the mail itself caused the injury would yield anomalies, perhaps making liability turn on whether a mail sack causing a slip-and-fall was empty or full, or whether a pedestrian sideswiped by a passing truck was hit by the side-view mirror or a dangling parcel. See Raila, 355 P. 3d, at 122-123. We think it more likely that Congress intendedrto retain immunity, as a general rule, only for injuries arising, directly or consequentially, because mail either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in damaged condition, or at the wrong address. Illustrative instances of the exception’s operation, then, would be personal or financial harms arising from nondelivery or late delivery of sensitive materials or information (e. g., medicines or a mortgage foreclosure notice) or from negligent handling of a mailed parcel (e. g., shattering of shipped china). Such harms, after all, are the sort primarily identified with the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail throughout the United States. Resisting this conclusion, the Government emphasizes the Postal Service’s vast operations — the 660 million daily mailings and 142 million delivery points mentioned at the outset. See Brief for Respondents 36. As delivery to mailboxes and doorsteps is essential to this nationwide undertaking, Congress must have intended, the Government asserts, to insulate delivery-related torts from liability. If, however, doorstep delivery is essential to the postal enterprise, then driving postal trucks is no less so. And in any event, while it is true “[t]he § 2680 exceptions are designed to protect certain important governmental functions and prerogatives from disruption,” Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 311 (1992), the specificity of § 2680(b), see Kosak, supra, at 855, indicates that Congress did not intend to immunize all postal activities. Other FTCA exceptions paint with a far broader brush. They cover, for example: “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system,” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(i); “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war,” §2680(j); “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country,” §2680(k); “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority,” §2680(Z), or “the Panama Canal Company,” §2680(m); and “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives,” § 2680(n). Had Congress intended to preserve immunity for all torts related to postal delivery— torts including hazardous mail placement at customer homes — it could have used similarly sweeping language in § 2680(b). By instead “carefully delineat[ing]” just three types’ of harm (loss, miscarriage, and negligent transmission), see Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855, Congress expressed the intent to immunize only a subset of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in the course of mail delivery. Further supporting our interpretation, losses of the type for which immunity is retained under § 2680(b) are at least to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal registration and insurance. See United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards, Domestic Mail Manual 609.1.1 (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/ 609.htm (as visited Jan. 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s ease file) (allowing indemnity claims for loss or damage of “insured, collect on delivery (COD), registered with postal insurance, or Express Mail”); 39 CFR § 111.1 (2005) (incorporating by reference the Domestic Mail Manual). The same was true when Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946. See 39 U. S. C. §245 (1940 ed. and Supp. V) (setting rates and conditions for mail insurance); §381 (1946 ed.) (“For the greater security of valuable mail matter the Postmaster General may establish a uniform system of registration, and as a part of such system he may provide rules under which the senders or owners of any registered matter shall be indemnified for loss, rifling, or damage thereof in the mails . . . ”). As Kosak explains, one purpose of the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available,” 465 U. S., at 858 — an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to claims of mail damage or delay covered by postal registration and insurance. While the Government suggests other injuries falling outside the FTCA'are also subject to administrative relief, even assuming that is true, the provision the Government cites permits only discretionary relief, not an automatic remedy like postal insurance. See 39 U. S. C. § 2603 (indicating the Postal Service “may adjust and settle” personal-injury and property-damage claims “not cognizable” under the FTCA’s administrative relief provision); see also 31 U. S. C. §224c (1940 ed.) (indicating that “[w]hen any damage is done to person or property by or through the operation of the Post Office Department .. . the Postmaster General is invested with power to adjust and settle any claim for such damage when his award for such damage in any case does not exceed $500”); Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 424(a), 60 Stat. 846-847 (repealing §224c as to negligence claims cognizable under the FTCA). The Government raises the specter of frivolous slip-and-fall claims inundating the Postal Service. It is true that, in addition to other considerations we have identified, Kosak describes “avoiding exposure of the United States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims” as a principal aim of the FTCA exceptions, 465 U. S., at 858. Slip-and-fall liability, however, to the extent state tort law imposes it, is a risk shared by any business that makes home deliveries. Given that “negligent transmission,” viewed in context and in light of Kosak, cannot sweep as broadly as the Government claims, ordinary protections against frivolous litigation must suffice here, just as they do in the case of motor vehicle collisions. Finally, it should be noted that this case does not implicate the general rule that “a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity .will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996). As Kosak explains, this principle is “unhelpful” in the FTCA context, where “unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute,” 465 U. S., at 853, n. 9, which “waives the Government’s immunity from suit in sweeping language,” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 547 (1951); see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992) (observing “[w]e have on occasion narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity where that was consistent with Congress’ clear intent, as in the context of the ‘sweeping language’ of the [FTCA]” (quoting Yellow Cab Co., supra, at 547)). Hence, “the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to identify ‘those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception’ — no less and no more.” Kosak, supra, at 853, n. 9 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). Having made that inquiry here, we conclude Dolan’s claims fall outside § 2680(b). * * * The postal exception is inapplicable, and Dolan’s claim falls within the FTCÁ’s general waiver of federal sovereign immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UTAH et al. v. EVANS, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, et al. No. 01-714. Argued March 27, 2002 Decided June 20, 2002 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which O’Connor, J., joined as to Parts I and II. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 479. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 488. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 510. Thomas R. Lee argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, Michael S. Lee, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, Raymond A. Hintze, Chief Civil Deputy Attorney General, and J. Mark Ward, Assistant Attorney General. Walter Dellinger argued the cause for appellees North Carolina et al. With him on the brief were Jonathan D. Hacker, Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, and James Peeler Smith and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the federal appellees. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Malcolm L. Stewart, Mark B. Stern, and Jonathan H. Levy Valle Simms Dutcher and L. Lynn Hogue filed a brief for the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Nancy Northup and Deborah Goldberg filed a brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether the Census Bureau’s use in the year 2000 census of a methodology called “hot-deck imputation” either (1) violates a statutory provision forbidding use of “the statistical method known as ‘sampling’ ” or (2) is inconsistent with the Constitution’s statement that an “actual Enumeration” be made. 13 U. S. C. § 195; U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. We conclude that use of “hot-deck imputation” violates neither the statute nor the Constitution. I A "Hot-deck imputation refers to the way in which the Census Bureau, when conducting the year 2000 census, filled in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. The Bureau derives most census information through reference to what is, in effect, a nationwide list of addresses. It sends forms by mail to each of those addresses. If no one writes back or if the information supplied is confusing, contradictory, or incomplete, it follows up with several personal visits by Bureau employees (who may also obtain information on addresses not listed). Occasionally, despite the visits, the Bureau will find that it still lacks adequate information or that information provided by those in the field has somehow not been integrated into the master list. The Bureau may have conflicting indications, for example, about whether an address on the list (or a newly generated address) represents a housing unit, an office building, or a vacant lot; about whether a residential building is vacant or occupied; or about the number of persons an occupied unit contains. These conflicts and uncertainties may arise because no one wrote back, because agents in the field produced confused responses, or because those who processed the responses made mistakes. There may be too little time left for further personal visits. And the Bureau may then decide “imputation” represents the most practical way to resolve remaining informational uncertainties. The Bureau refers to different kinds of “imputation” depending upon the nature of the missing or confusing information. Where, for example, the missing or confused information concerns the existence of a housing unit, the Bureau speaks of “status imputation” Where the missing or confused information concerns whether a unit is vacant or occupied, the Bureau speaks of “occupancy imputation.” And where the missing or confused information concerns the number of people living in a unit, the Bureau refers to “household size imputation.” In each case, however, the Bureau proceeds in a somewhat similar way: It imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of a “nearby sample or ‘donor’ ” address or unit — e. g., its “geographically closest neighbor of the same type (i. e., apartment or single-family dwelling) that did not return a census questionnaire” by mail. Brief for Appellants 7-8, 11. Because the Bureau derives its information about the known address or unit from the current 2000 census rather than from prior censuses, it refers to its imputation as “hot-deck,” rather than “cold-deck,” imputation. These three forms of imputation increased the final year 2000 count by about 1.2 million people, representing 0.4% of the total population. But because this small percentage was spread unevenly across the country, it makes a difference in the next apportionment of congressional Representatives. In particular, imputation increased North Carolina’s population by 0.4% while increasing Utah’s population by only 0.2%. And the parties agree that that difference means that North Carolina will receive one more Representative, and Utah will receive one less Representative, than if the Bureau had not used imputation but instead had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. B After analyzing the census figures, Utah brought this lawsuit against the Secretary of Commerce and the Acting Director of the Census Bureau, the officials to whom the statutes delegate authority to conduct the census. 28 U. S. C. §2284. Utah claimed that the Bureau’s use of “hot-deck imputation” violates the statutory prohibition against use of “the statistical method known as ‘sampling,’ ” 13 U. S. C. § 195, and is inconsistent with the Constitution’s statement that an “actual Enumeration” be made, Art. I, §2, cl. 3. Utah sought an injunction compelling the census officials to change the official census results. North Carolina intervened. The District Court found in the Census Bureau’s favor. 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (Utah 2001). Utah appealed. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. And we postponed consideration of jurisdiction pending hearing , the case on the merits. 534 U. S. 1112 (2002). II North Carolina argues at the outset that the federal courts lack the constitutional power to hear this case. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the “judicial Power” of the United States to actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” A lawsuit does not fall within this grant of judicial authority unless, among other things, courts have the power to “redress” the “injury” that the defendant allegedly “caused” the plaintiff. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). And, in North Carolina’s view, the courts cannot “redress” the injury that Utah claims to have suffered here. Hence Utah does not have the “standing” that the Constitution demands. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), this Court considered, and rejected, a similar claim. A private plaintiff had sued the Secretary of Commerce, challenging the legality of a 1990 census counting method as “arbitrary and capricious” and contrary to certain specific statutes. Id., at 790-791. That plaintiff sought to require the Secretary to recalculate the numbers and recertify the official results. The plaintiff hoped that would ultimately lead to a reapportionment that would assign an additional Representative to his own State. Eight Members of the Court found that the plaintiff had standing. Four Justices considered only whether the law permitted courts to review Census Bureau decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act. They concluded that it did. And they saw no further standing obstacle. Id., at 807 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Four other Justices went further. They found that the controversy between the plaintiff and the Secretary was concrete and adversary. They said: “The Secretary certainly has an interest in defending her policy determinations concerning the census; even though she cannot herself change the reapportionment, she has an interest in litigating its accuracy.” Id., at 803 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). They also found that, as a practical matter, redress seemed likely. They said: “[A]s the Solicitor General has not contended to the contrary, we may assume it is substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision . . . even though they would not be directly bound by such a determination.” Ibid. They saw no further potential obstacle to standing. Ibid. We can find no significant difference between the plaintiff in Franklin and the plaintiff (Utah) here. Both brought their lawsuits after the census was complete. Both claimed that the Census Bureau followed legally improper counting methods. Both sought an injunction ordering the Secretary of Commerce to recalculate the numbers and recertify the official result. Both reasonably believed that the Secretary’s recertification, as a practical matter, would likely lead to a new, more favorable, apportionment of Representatives. Given these similarities, North Carolina must convince us that we should reconsider Franklin. It has not done so. North Carolina does not deny that the courts can order the Secretary of Commerce to recalculate the numbers and to recertify the official census result. Rather it points out that Utah suffers, not simply from the lack of a proper census “report” (a document), but more importantly from the lack of the additional congressional Representative to which North Carolina believes itself entitled as a consequence of the filing of that document. Whatever we may have said in Franklin, North Carolina argues, court-ordered relief simply cannot reach beyond the “report” and, here, a proper “report” cannot help bring about that ultimate “redress.” The reason North Carolina believes that court-ordered relief, i. e., the new document, cannot help is that, in its view, the statutes that set forth the census process make ultimate redress legally impossible. Those statutes specify that the Secretary of Commerce must “take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April” 2000, 13 U. S. C. § 141(a); he must report the results to the President by January 1,2001, § 141(b); the President must transmit to Congress by January 12,2001, a statement showing the “whole number of persons in each State ... and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled,” 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a); and, within 15 days of receiving that statement, the Clerk of the House of Representatives must “send to the executive of each State a certificate of the number of Representatives to which such State is entitled,” §2a(b). The statutes also say that, once all that is done, each State “shall be entitled” to the number of Representatives that the “certificate” specifies “until the taking effect of a reapportionment under this section or subsequent statute.” Ibid. North Carolina points out that all of this was done by January 16,2001. And North Carolina concludes that it is “entitled” to the number of Representatives that the “certificate” specifies (i. e., one more than Utah would like) — come what may. We disagree with North Carolina because we do not read these statutes so absolutely — as if they barred a certificate’s revision in all cases no matter what. The statutes themselves do not expressly say what is to occur should the “report” or the “statement” upon which the Clerk’s “certificate” rests turn out to contain, or to reflect, a serious mistake. The language is open to a more flexible reading that would permit correction of a certificate found to rest upon a serious error — say, a clerical, a mathematical, or a calculation error, in census data or in its transposition. And if that error is uncovered before new Representatives are actually selected, and its correction translates mechanically into a new apportionment of Representatives without further need for exercise of policy judgment, such mechanical revision makes good sense. In such cases, the “certificate” previously sent would have turned out not to have been a proper or valid certificate, it being understood that these statutes do not bar the substitution of a newer, more accurate version. Guided by Franklin, which found standing despite the presence of this statute, we read the statute as permitting “certificate” revision in such cases of error, and we include among them cases of court-determined legal error leading to a court-required revision of the underlying Secretarial “report.” So read, the statute poses no legal bar to “redress.” North Carolina adds that another statute, enacted after Franklin, nonetheless bars our consideration of this case. That statute authorizes “[a]ny person aggrieved by the use of any [unlawful] statistical method” to bring “a civil action” for declaratory or injunctive “relief against the use of such method.” Pub. L. 105-119, Title II, § 209(b), 111 Stat. 2481. North Carolina argues that this statute, by directly authorizing a lawsuit prior to conclusion of the census, implicitly forbids a lawsuit after its conclusion. And it supports this reading by pointing to a legislative finding that it would “be impracticable” to provide relief “after” that time. Id., § 209(a)(8). This statute, however, does not say that it bars postcensus lawsuits. It does not explain why Congress would have wished to deprive of its day in court a State that did not learn about a counting method’s representational consequences until after the census is complete — and hence had little, if any, incentive to bring a precensus action. Nor (as we have just explained), if a lawsuit is brought soon enough after completion of the census and heard quickly enough, is relief necessarily “impracticable.” We read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988); see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986). But see National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 (1974) (special circumstances warrant reading statute as limiting the persons authorized to bring suit). We do not normally read into a statute an unexpressed congressional intent to bar jurisdiction that we have previously exercised. Franklin; Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442 (1992). And we shall not do so here. Neither statute posing an absolute legal barrier to relief, we believe it likely that Utah’s victory here would bring about the ultimate relief that Utah seeks. Victory would mean a declaration leading, or an injunction requiring, the Secretary to substitute a new “report” for the old one. Should the new report contain a different conclusion about the relative populations of North Carolina and Utah, the relevant calculations and consequent apportionment-related steps would be purely mechanical; and several months would remain prior to the first post-2000 census congressional election. Under these circumstances, it would seem, as in Franklin, “substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision . . . 505 U. S., at 803 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Moreover, in terms of our “standing” precedent, the courts would have ordered a change in a legal status (that of the “report”), and the practical consequence of that change would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered. We have found standing in similar circumstances. See, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 25 (1998) (standing to obtain court determination that the organization was a “political committee” where that determination would make agency more likely to require reporting, despite agency’s power not to order reporting regardless); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 169-171 (1997) (similar in respect to determination of the lawfulness of an agency’s biological report); Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 264-265 (1991) (similar in respect to determination that transfer of airport control to local agency is unlawful). And related cases in which we have denied standing involved a significantly more speculative likelihood of obtaining ultimate relief. See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 564-565, n. 2 (obtaining ultimate relief “speculative”); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 42 (1976) (same). We consequently conclude that Utah has standing here, and we have jurisdiction. III Utah rests its statutory claim on a federal sampling statute which reads as follows: “Except for the determination of population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he considers it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as ‘sampling’...13 U. S. C. § 195. We have previously read this language as forbidding apportionment-related use of “the statistical method known as ‘sampling.’ ” Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U. S. 316, 343 (1999). Utah claims that imputation, as practiced by the Census Bureau, is a form of that forbidden “sampling” method. The Government argues that imputation is not “sampling.” And it has used a simplified example to help explain why this is so. Imagine a librarian who wishes to determine the total number of books in a library. If the librarian finds a statistically sound way to select a sample (e. g., the books contained on every 10th shelf) and if the librarian then uses a statistically sound method of extrapolating from the part to the whole (e. g., multiplying by 10), then the librarian has determined the total number of books by using the statistical method known as “sampling.” If, however, the librarian simply tries to count every book one by one, the librarian has not used sampling. Nor does the latter process suddenly become “sampling” simply because the librarian, finding empty shelf spaces, “imputes” to that empty shelf space the number of books (currently in use) that likely filled them — not even if the librarian goes about the imputation process in a rather technical way, say, by measuring the size of nearby books and dividing the length of each empty shelf space by a number representing the average size of nearby books on the same shelf. This example is relevant here both in the similarities and in the differences that.it suggests between sampling and imputation. In both, “ ‘information on a portion of a population is used to infer information on the population as a whole.’ ” Brief for Appellants 18. And in Utah’s view, and that of Justice O’Connor, see post, at 482-483 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), that similarity brings the Census Bureau imputation process within the relevant statutory phrase. On the other hand, the two processes differ in several critical respects: (1) In respect to the nature of the enterprise, the librarian’s sampling represents an overall approach to the counting problem that from the beginning relies on data that will be collected from only a part of the total population, Declaration of Howard Hogan ¶ ¶ 19-28, App. 257-259 (hereinafter Hogan); (2) in respect to methodology, the librarian’s sampling focuses on using statistically valid sample-selection techniques to determine what data to collect, ¶¶ 29-30, id., at 261-262; Declaration of Joseph Waksberg ¶¶6, 10, id,., at 290-294 (hereinafter Waksberg); and (3) in respect to the immediate objective, the librarian’s sampling seeks immediately to extrapolate the sample’s relevant population characteristics to the whole population, Hogan ¶30, id., at 262; Declaration of David W. Peterson ¶8, id., at 352 (hereinafter Peterson). By way of contrast, the librarian’s imputation (1) does not represent an overall approach to the counting problem that will rely on data collected from only a subset of the total population, since it is a method of processing data (giving a value to missing data), not its collection, ¶¶21, 29, id., at 257-258, 261-262; it (2) does not rely upon the same statistical methodology generally used for sample selection, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Decennial Statistical Studies Division, Census 2000 Procedures and Operations, Memorandum Series B-17, Feb. 28, 2001, id., at 194-196; Waksberg ¶¶ 6, 10, id., at 290, 293-294; and it (3) has as its immediate objective determining the characteristics of missing individual books, not extrapolating characteristics from the sample to the entire book population, Hogan ¶ 17, id., at 256-257; Peterson ¶ 9, id., at 352. These same differences distinguish Bureau imputation in the year 2000 census from “the statistical method known as ‘sampling.’” 13 U. S. C. § 195. The nature of the Bureau’s enterprise was not the extrapolation of the features of a large population from a small one, but the filling in of missing data as part of an effort to count individuals one by one. But cf. post, at 482-483 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting the contrary). The Bureau’s methodology was not that typically used by statisticians seeking to find a subset that will resemble a whole through the use of artificial, random selection processes; but that used to assure that an individual unit (not a “subset”), chosen nonrandomly, will resemble other individuals (not a “whole”) selected by the fortuitous unavailability of data. L. Kish, Survey Sampling 26 (1965) (“In statistical literature [sampling] is generally synonymous with random sampling”). And the Bureau’s immediate objective was the filling in of missing data; not extrapolating the characteristics of the “donor” units to an entire population. These differences, whether of degree or of kind, are important enough to place imputation outside the scope of the statute’s phrase “the statistical method known as ‘sampling.’” For one thing, that statutory phrase — using the words “known as” and the quotation marks that surround “sampling” — suggests a term of art with a technical meaning. And the technical literature, which we have consequently examined, see Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 201 (1974), contains definitions that focus upon differences of the sort discussed above. One text, for example, says that “[sjurvey sampling, or population sampling, deals with methods for selecting and observing a part (sample) of the population in order to make inferences about the whole population.” Kish, supra, at 18. Another says that “sample, as it is Used in the [statistics] literature . . . means a subset of the population that is used to gain information about the entire population,” G. Henry, Practical Sampling 11 (1990), or, in other words, “a model of the population,” ibid. Yet another says that a “sampling method is a method of selecting a fraction of the population in a way that the selected sample represents the population.” P. Sukhatme, Sampling Theory of Surveys with Applications 1 (1954). A 1953 treatise, to which Utah refers, says that a broader definition of “sample” is imprecise, adding that the term “should be reserved for a set of units . . . which has been selected in the belief that it will be representative of the whole aggregate.” F. Yates, Sampling Methods for Censuses and Surveys § 1.1, p. 2 (2d rev. ed. 1953) (hereinafter Yates). And Census Bureau documents state that “professional statisticians” reserve the term “‘sample’ ... for instances when the selection of the smaller population is based on the methodology of their science.” Report to Congress — The Plan for Census 2000, p. 23 (revised and reissued Aug. 1997) (hereinafter Report to Congress). These definitions apply easily and naturally to what we called “sampling” in the librarian example, given its nature, methods, and immediate objectives. These definitions do not apply to the librarian’s or to the Bureau’s imputation process — at least not without considerable linguistic squeezing. For another thing, Bureau statisticians testified in the District Court that, in their expert opinion, Bureau imputation was not “sampling” as that term is used in the field of statistics. Hogan ¶¶ 18-30, App. 257-262; Waksberg ¶¶6-10, id., at 290-294 (former Bureau statistician). Their reasons parallel those to which we have referred. Ibid. Although Utah presented other experts who testified to the contrary, Utah has not relied upon their testimony or expert knowledge here. Insofar as the parties now rely on expert opinion, that opinion uniformly favors the Government. Further, the history of the sampling statute suggests that Congress did not have imputation in mind in 1958 when it wrote that law. At that time, the Bureau already was engaged in what it called “sampling,” a practice that then involved asking a small subset of the population subsidiary census questions about, say, automobiles, telephones, or dishwashers, and extrapolating the responses to produce national figures about, say, automobile ownership. See M. Anderson, The American Census: A Social History 199 (1988) (discussing “long form” survey, sent in 1950 to about 20% of population). The Secretary of Commerce asked Congress to enact a law that would make clear the Bureau had legal authority to engage in this “practice.” Amendment of Title 13, United States Code, Relating to Census: Hearing on H. R. 7911 before the House Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957) (Statement of Purpose and Need) (Secretary of Commerce, describing Bureau’s ability to obtain “some . . . information . . . efficiently through a sample survey . . . rather than a complete enumeration basis”). The Secretary did not object to a legislative restriction that would, in effect, deny the Bureau sampling authority in the area of apportionment. And Congress, in part to help achieve cost savings, responded with the present statute which provides that limited authority. See S. Rep. No. 698, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1957) (“[Pjroper use of sampling methods can result in substantial economies in census taking”); S. Rep. No. 94-1256, p. 5 (1976) (“use of sampling procedures and surveys . . . urged for the sake of economy and reducing respondent burden”). This background suggests that the “sampling” to which the statute refers is the practice that the Secretary called “sampling” at the time — for that is what Congress considered. And it suggests that the statutory word does not apply to imputation — for that is a matter that Congress did not consider. Indeed, had the Secretary believed that Congress intended to restrict the Bureau’s authority to engage in apportionment-related imputation, he would likely have expressed an objection, for the Bureau had used such imputation in the past and intended to use it in the future. Hogan ¶ 39, App. 266-267. Moreover, the Bureau’s rationale for using sampling was quite different from its rationale for using imputation. An advance plan to sample a subset saves money, for it restricts a survey’s potential scope. Bureau imputation does not save money, for the Bureau turns to imputation only after ordinary questionnaires and interviews have failed. Rather, imputation reflects a Bureau decision to spend at least a small amount of additional money in order to avoid placing the figure “zero” next to a listed address when it is possible to do better. See ¶ 34, id., at 264 (“The goal in Census 2000 was to conduct a census that was both numerically and distributively accurate”). Finally, Utah provides no satisfactory alternative account of the meaning of the phrase “the statistical method known as ‘sampling.’” Its arguments suggest that the phrase should apply to any use of statistics that would help the Bureau extrapolate from items about which the Bureau knows to other items, the characteristics of which it does not know. Brief for Appellants 9. But that definitional view would include within the statutory phrase matters that could not possibly belong there — for example, the use of statistics to determine whether it is better to ask a postal worker or a neighbor about whether an apparently empty house is occupied. And it would come close to forbidding the use of all statistics, not simply one statistical method (“sampling”). Utah’s express definitional statement — that “sampling” occurs whenever “information on a portion of a population is used to infer information on the population as a whole”— suffers from a similar defect. Indeed, it is even broader, coming close to a description of the mental process of inference itself. While the Census Bureau and at least one treatise have used somewhat similar language to define “sampling,” they have immediately added the qualification that such is the “layman’s” view, while professional statisticians, when speaking technically, speak more narrowly and more precisely. Report to Congress 23; Yates 1-2. Utah makes several additional arguments. It says that in House of Representatives, the Court found that two methods, virtually identical to imputation, constituted “sampling.” It says that the Bureau, if authorized to engage in imputation, might engage in wide-scale substitution of imputation for person-by-person counting. And it says that, in any event, the Bureau’s methods for imputing status and occupancy, see supra, at 458, are inaccurate. In our view, however, House of Representatives is distinguishable. The two instances of Bureau methodology at issue there satisfied the technical criteria for “sampling” in ways that the imputation here at issue does not. In both instances, the Bureau planned at the outset to produce a statistically sound sample from which it extrapolated characteristics of an entire population. In the first instance it did so by selecting census blocks randomly from which to extrapolate global census figures in order to compare (and adjust) the accuracy of figures obtained in traditional ways with figures obtained through statistical sampling. 525 U. S., at 325-826. In the second instance it used a sample drawn from questionnaire nonrespondents in particular census tracts in order to obtain the population figure for the entire tract. The “sampling” in the second instance more closely resembles the present effort to fill in missing data, for the “sample” of nonrespondents was large (about 20% of the tract) compared to the total nonresponding population (about 30% of the entire tract). Id., at 324-325. Nonetheless, we believe that the Bureau’s view of the enterprise as sampling, the deliberate decision taken in advance to find an appropriate sample, the sampling methods used to do so, the immediate objective of determining through extrapolation the size of the entire nonresponding population, and the quantitative figures at issue (10% of the tract there; 0.4% here), all taken together, distinguish it — in degree if not in kind — from the imputation here at issue. Nor are Utah’s other two arguments convincing. As to the first, Utah has not claimed that the Bureau has used imputation to manipulate results. It has not explained how census-taking that fills in ultimate blanks through imputation is more susceptible to manipulation than census-taking that fills in ultimate blanks with a zero. And given the advance uncertainties as to which States imputation might favor, manipulation would seem difficult to arrange. If Justice O’Connor’s speculation comes to pass — that the Bureau would decide, having litigated this case and utilized imputation in a subsequent census, to forgo the benefits of that process because of its results — the Court can address the problem at that time. As to the second, Utah’s claim concerns the nature of the imputation method, not its accuracy as applied — though we add that neither the record, see infra, at 477, nor Justice O’Connor’s opinion, see post, at 487-488, gives us any reason to doubt that accuracy here. We note one further legal hurdle that Utah has failed to overcome — the Bureau’s own interpretation of the statute. The Bureau, which recommended this statute to Congress, has consistently, and for many years, interpreted the statute as permitting imputation. Hogan ¶¶39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 52,. App. 266-273. Congress, aware of this interpretation, has enacted related legislation without changing the statute. See, e.g., Census Address List Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-430, 108 Stat. 4393; Foreign Direct Investment and International Financial Data Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-533, 104 Stat. 2344; Act of Oct. 14,1986, Pub. L. 99-467, 100 Stat. 1192. (Indeed, the Bureau told Congress of its planned use of imputation in the year 2000 census without meeting objection.) And the statute itself delegates to the Secretary the authority to conduct the decennial census “in such form and content as he may determine.” 13 U. S. C. § 141(a). Although we do not rely on it here, under these circumstances we would grant legal deference to the Bureau’s own legal conclusion were that deference to make the difference. Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). In sum, imputation differs from sampling in respect to the nature of the enterprise, the methodology used, and the immediate objective sought. And as we have explained, these differences are of both kind and degree. That the differences may be of degree does not lessen their significance where we are charged with interpreting statutory language and we are faced with arguments that suggest that it covers even the most ordinary of inferences. Since that cannot be so, we have found the keys to understanding the operative phrase in its history: the fact that the Bureau itself believed imputation to stand outside the prohibition it requested Congress pass, the fact that the Bureau has consistently used imputation, and the fact that Congress, on notice of that use, has not suggested otherwise. For these reasons, we conclude that the statutory phrase “the statistical method known as ‘sampling’” does not cover the Bureau’s use of imputation. IV Utah’s constitutional claim rests upon the words “actual Enumeration” as those words appear in the Constitution’s Census Clause. That Clause, as changed after the Civil War (in ways that do not matter here), reads as follows: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers ... counting the whole number of persons in each State. . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, ... in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.” Art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also Arndt. 14, § 2. Utah argues that the words “actual Enumeration” require the Census Bureau to seek out each individual. In doing so, the Bureau may rely upon documentary evidence that an individual exists, say, a postal return, or upon eyewitness evidence, say, by a census taker. It can fill in missing data through the use of testimonial reports, including secondhand or thirdhand reports, made by a family member, neighbor, or friend. But it may not rely upon imputation, which fills in data by assuming, for example, that an unknown house has the same population characteristics as those of the closest similar house nearby. We do not believe the Constitution makes the distinction that Utah seeks to draw. The Constitution’s text does not specify any such limitation. Rather, the text uses a general word, “enumeration,” that refers to a counting process without describing the count’s methodological details. The textual word “actual” refers in context to the enumeration that will be used for apportioning the Third Congress, succinctly clarifying the fact that the constitutionally described basis for apportionment will not apply to the First and Second Congresses. The final part of the sentence says that the “actual Enumeration” shall take place “in such Manner as” Congress itself “shall by Law direct,” thereby suggesting the breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than its limitation. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U. S. 1, 19 (1996). The history of the constitutional phrase supports our understanding of the text. The Convention sent to its Committee of Detail a draft stating that Congress was to “regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, . . . which number shall ... be taken in such manner as ... [Congress] shall direct.” 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 178,182-183 (rev. ed. 1966) (hereinafter Farrand). Aft,er making minor, here irrelevant, changes, the Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, in revising the language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Id., at 590, 591. Although not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter the meaning” of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 538-539 (1969); see 2 Farrand 553; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U. S. 224, 231 (1993). Hence, the Framers would have intended the current phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be made ... in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the substantive equivalent of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants] shall ... be taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.” 2 Farrand 188. And the Committee of Style’s phrase offers no linguistic temptation to limit census methodology in the manner that Utah proposes. Moreover, both phrases served to distinguish the census from the process of apportionment for the first Congress. Read in conjunction with the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, the text of Article I makes clear that the original allocation of seats in the House was based on a kind of “eonjectur[e],” 1 id., at 578-579, in contrast to the deliberately taken count that was ordered for the future. U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 3; 1 Farrand 602; 2 id., at 106; 2 The Founders’ Constitution 135-136,139 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) (hereinafter Kurland & Lerner); see also Department of Commerce, 503 U. S., at 448, and n. 15; post, at 498-500 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing colonial estimates). What was important was that contrast — rather than the particular phrase used to describe the new process. Contemporaneous general usage of the word “enumeration” adds further support. Late-18th-century dictionaries define the word simply as an “act of numbering or counting over,” without reference to counting methodology. 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 658 (4th rev. ed. 1773); N. Bailey, An Etymological English Dictionary (26th ed. 1789) (“numbering or summing up”); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 759 (1961 ed.) (“the act of counting,” “a count of something (as a population)”). Utah’s strongest evidence, a letter from George Washington contrasting a population “estimate” with a “census” or “enumeration,” does not demonstrate the contrary, for one can indeed contrast, say, a rough estimate with an enumeration, without intending to encompass in the former anything like the Bureau’s use of imputation to fill gaps or clarify confused information about individuals. 31 Writings of George Washington 329 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1931); see 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 236 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903) (comparing the “actual returns” with “conjectures”); 1 Far-rand 602; 2 id,., at 106; Kurland & Lerner 135-136. And the evidence Justice Thomas sets forth, post, at 498-500 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), demonstrates the same. The kinds of estimates to which his sources refer are those based on “the number of taxable polls, or the number of the militia.” Post, at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such sources show nothing other than that “enumeration” may be “incompatible (or at least arguably incompatible .. .) with gross statistical estimates,” House of Representatives, 525 U. S., at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part), but such “gross statistical estimates” are not at stake here. Contemporaneous legal documents do not use the term “enumeration” in any specialized way. The Constitution itself, in a later article, refers to the words “actual Enumeration” as meaning “Census or Enumeration,” Art. I, § 9, cl. 4, thereby indicating that it did not intend the term “actual Enumeration” as a term of art requiring, say, contact (directly or through third parties) between a census taker and each enumerated individual. The First Census Act uses the term “enumeration” almost interchangeably with the phrase “cause the number of the inhabitants ... to be taken.” And the marshals who implemented that Act did not try to contact each individual personally, as they were required only to report the names of all heads of households. Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 1,1 Stat. 102. Cf. House of Representatives, supra, at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (noting that the Census Acts of 1810 through 1950 required census workers to “visit each home in person”); see also post, at 504 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Of course, this last limitation suggests that the Framers expected census enumerators to seek to reach each individual household. And insofar as statistical methods substitute for any such effort, it may be argued that the Framers did not believe that the Constitution authorized their use. See House of Representatives, supra, at 346-349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). But we need not decide this matter here, for we do not deal with the substitution of statistical methods for efforts to reach households and enumerate each individual. Here the Census Bureau’s method is used sparingly only after it has exhausted its efforts to reach each individual, and it does not differ in principle from other efforts used since 1800 to determine the number of missing persons. Census takers have long asked heads of households, “neighbors, landlords, postal workers, or other proxies” about the number of inhabitants in a particular place, Hogan ¶ 11, App. 253. Such reliance on hearsay need be no more accurate, is no less inferential, and rests upon no more of an individualized effort for its inferences than the Bureau’s method of imputation. Nor can Utah draw support from a consideration of the basic purposes of the Census Clause. That Clause reflects several important constitutional determinations: that comparative state political power in the House would reflect comparative population, not comparative wealth; that comparative power would shift every 10 years to reflect population changes; that federal tax authority would rest upon the same base; and that Congress, not the States, would determine the manner of conducting the census. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 9-14, and n. 34 (1964); 1 Farrand 35-36, 196-201, 540-542, 559-560, 571, 578-588, 591-597, 603; 2 id., at 2-3, 106; Kurland & Lerner 86-144; see The Federalist No. 54, pp. 336-341 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); id., No. 55, at 341-350 (J. Madison); id., No. 58, at 356-361 (J. Madison); 31 Writings of George Washington, supra, at 329. These basic determinations reflect the fundamental nature of the Framers’ concerns. Insofar as Justice Thomas proves that the Framers chose to use population, rather than wealth or a combination of the two, as the basis for representation, post, at 500-503, we agree with him. What he does not show, however, is that, in order to avoid bias or for other reasons, they prescribed, or meant to prescribe, the precise method by which Congress was to determine the population. And he cannot show the latter because, for the most part, the choice to base representation on population, like the other fundamental choices the Framers made, are matters of general principle that do not directly help determine the issue of detailed methodology before us. Declaration of Jack N. Rakove in Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, O. T. 1998, No. 98-404, p. 387 (“What was at issue . . . were fundamental principles of representation itself ... not the secondary matter of exactly how census data was [sic] to be compiled”). Nonetheless, certain basic constitutional choices may prove relevant. The decisions, for example, to use population rather than wealth, to tie taxes and representation together, to insist upon periodic recounts, and to take from the States the power to determine methodology all suggest a strong constitutional interest in accuracy. And an interest in accuracy here favors the Bureau. That is because, as we have said, the Bureau uses imputation only as a last resort— after other methods have failed. In such instances, the Bureau’s only choice is to disregard the information it has, using a figure of zero, or to use imputation in an effort to achieve greater accuracy. And Bureau information provided in the District Court suggests that those efforts have succeeded. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin., Census 2000 Informational Memorandum No. 110, App. 445-448 (concluding that postcensus research confirms that imputation appropriately included individuals in the census who would otherwise have been excluded). Of course, the Framers did not consider the imputation process. At the time they wrote the Constitution “statis-tieks” referred to “ ‘a statement or view of the civil condition of a people,’ ” not the complex mathematical discipline it has become. P. Cohen, A Calculating People 150-151 (1982). Yet, however unaware the Framers might have been of specific future census needs, say, of automobiles for transport or of computers for calculation, they fully understood that those future needs might differ dramatically from those of their own times. And they, were optimists who might not have been surprised to learn that a year 2000 census of the Nation that they founded required “processed data for over 120 million households, including over 147 million paper questionnaires and 1.5 billion pages of printed material.” Hogan ¶ 8, App. 251. Consequently, they did not write detailed census methodology into the Constitution. As we have said, we need not decide here the precise methodological limits foreseen by the Census Clause. We need say only that in this instance, where all efforts have been made to reach every household, where the methods used consist not of statistical sampling but of inference, where that inference involves a tiny percent of the population, where the alternative is to make a far less accurate assessment of the population, and where consequently manipulation of the method is highly unlikely, those limits are not exceeded. For these reasons the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HCSC-LAUNDRY v. UNITED STATES No. 80-338. Decided February 23, 1981 Per Curiam. Petitioner HCSC-Laundry is a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation. It was organized in 1967 under the law of that Commonwealth “[t]o operate and maintain a hospital laundry and linen supply program for those public hospitals and non-profit hospitals or related health facilities organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes that contract with [it].” Petitioner provides laundry and linen service to 15 nonprofit hospitals and to an ambulance service. All these are located in eastern Pennsylvania. Each organization served possesses a certificate of exemption from federal income taxation under § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 501 (c)(3). Each participating hospital pays petitioner annual membership dues based upon bed capacity. The ambulance service pays no dues. Petitioner’s only other income is derived from (a) a charge for laundry and linen service based upon budgeted costs and (b) a charge of 1% cents per pound of laundry. Budgeted costs include operating expenses, debt retirement, and linen replacement. The amounts charged in excess of costs have been placed in a fund for equipment acquisition and replacement. No part of petitioner’s net earnings inures to the benefit of any individual. Petitioner was formed after the Lehigh Valley Health Planning Council determined that a shared, nonprofit, off-premises laundry would best accommodate the requirements of the member hospitals with respect to both quality of service and economies of scale. The Council had investigated various alternatives. It had rejected a joint service concept because no member hospital had sufficient laundry facilities to serve more than itself. A commercial laundry had declined an offer for the laundry business of all the hospitals, and most of the other available commercial laundries were not capable of managing the heavy total volume. Petitioner’s laundry plant was built and equipped at a cost of about $2 million. This was financed through loans from local banks, with 15-year contracts from 10 of the hospitals used as collateral. Petitioner employs approximately 125 persons. In 1976, petitioner applied for exemption under § 501 (c) (3) from federal income taxation. The Internal Revenue Service denied the exemption application on the grounds that § 501 (e) of the Code was the exclusive provision under which a cooperative hospital service organization could qualify as “an organization organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes” and therefore exempt. Because subsection (e)(1) (A) does not mention laundry, the Service reasoned that petitioner was not entitled to tax exemption. Petitioner duly filed its federal corporate income tax return for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. That return showed taxable income of $123,521 and a tax of $10,395. The tax was paid. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a claim for refund of that tax and, when the Internal Revenue Service took no action on the claim within six months, see 26 U. S. C. § 6532 (a)(1), petitioner commenced this refund suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On stipulated facts and cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that it was entitled to exemption as an organization described in § 501 (c) (3). 473 F. Supp. 250 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reversed. It held that § 501 (e) was the exclusive provision under which a cooperative hospital service organization could obtain an income tax exemption, and that the omission of laundry services from § 501 (e)(l)(A)’s specific list of activities demonstrated that Congress intended to deny exempt status to cooperative hospital service laundries. 624 F. 2d 428 (1980). Because the ruling of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with decisions elsewhere, we grant certiorari, and we now affirm. This Court has said: “The starting point in the determination of the scope of 'gross income’ is the cardinal principle that Congress in creating the income tax intended 'to use the full measure of its taxing power.’ ” Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U. S. 77, 82 (1977), quoting from Helvering v. Cliford, 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940). See § 61 (a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 61 (a). Under our system of federal income taxation, therefore, every element of gross income of a person, corporate or individual, is subject to tax unless there is a statute or some rule of law that exempts that person or element. Sections 501 (a) and (c) (3) provide such an exemption, and a complete one, for a corporation fitting the description set forth in subsection (c) (3) and fulfilling the subsection’s requirements. But subsection (e) is also a part of § 501. And it expressly concerns the tax status of a cooperative hospital service organization. It provides that such an organization is exempt if, among other things, its activities consist of “data processing, purchasing, warehousing, billing and collection, food, clinical, industrial engineering, laboratory, printing, communications, record center, and personnel (including selection, testing, training, and education of personnel) services.” Laundry and linen service, so essential to a hospital’s operation, is not included in that list and, indeed, is noticeable for its absence. The issue, thus, is whether that omission prohibits petitioner from qualifying under § 501 as an organization exempt from taxation. The Government’s position is that subsection (e) is controlling and exclusive, and because petitioner does not qualify under it, exemption is not available. Petitioner takes the opposing position that § 501 (c) (3) clearly entitles it to the claimed exemption. Without reference to the legislative history, the Government would appear to have the benefit of this skirmish, for it is a basic principle of statutory construction that a specific statute, here subsection (e), controls over a general provision such as subsection (c)(3), particularly when the two are interrelated and closely positioned, both in fact being parts of § 501 relating to exemption of organizations from tax. See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 761 (1961). Additionally, however, the legislative history provides strong and conclusive support for the Government’s position. It persuades us that Congress intended subsection (e) to be exclusive and controlling for cooperative hospital service organizations. Prior to the enactment of subsection (e) in 1968, the law as to the tax status of shared hospital service organizations was uncertain. The Internal Revenue Service took the position that if two or more tax-exempt hospitals created an entity to perform commercial services for them, that entity was not entitled to exemption. See Rev. Rul. 54-305, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 127. See also § 502, as amended, of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 502. This position, however, was rejected by the Court of Claims in Hospital Bureau of Standards and Supplies, Inc. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 91, 158 F. Supp. 560 (1958). After expressly noting the uncertainty in the law, Congress enacted subsection (e). See Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-364, § 109 (a), 82 Stat. 269. In considering the provisions of the tax adjustment bill of 1968 that ultimately became subsection (e), the Senate sought to include laundry in the list of services that a cooperative hospital service organization could provide and still maintain its tax-exempt status. The Treasury Department supported the Senate amendment. See 114 Cong. Rec. 7516, 8111-8112 (1968). At the urging of commercial interests, however (see Hearings on Certain Committee Amendments to H. R. 10612 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 608 (1976)), the Conference Committee would accept only a limited version of the Senate amendment. In recommending the adoption of subsection (e), the managers on the part of the House emphasized that shared hospital service organizations performing laundry services were not entitled to tax-exempt status under the new provision. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 43 (1968); Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Ways and Means, Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Explanation of the Bill H. R. 15414, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 20 (Comm. Print 1968). Later, in 1976, at the urging of the American Hospital Association, the Senate Committee on Finance proposed an amendment that would have added laundry to the list of services specified in subsection (e)(1)(A). Hearings on H. R. 10612 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 2765-2772 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. 2, pp. 76-77 (1976). The amendment, however, was defeated on the floor of the Senate. 122 Cong. Rec. 25915 (1976). In view of all this, it seems to us beyond dispute that subsection (e)(1)(A) of § 501, despite the seemingly broad general language of subsection (c)(3), specifies the types of hospital service organizations that are encompassed within the scope of § 501 as charitable organizations. Inasmuch as laundry service was deliberately omitted from the statutory list and, indeed, specifically was refused inclusion in that list, it inevitably follows that petitioner is' not entitled to tax-exempt status. The Congress easily can change the statute whenever it is so inclined. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice White dissents and would set the case for plenary consideration. The quoted language is from petitioner’s articles of incorporation, as amended May 29, 1970. The articles further state that petitioner’s corporate purposes are to be accomplished “in a manner consistent with the provisions of Section 501 (c) (3) of the- Internal Revenue Code of 1954.” See 624 F. 2d 428, 429, n. 1 (CA3 1980). Subsections (a) and (c) of §501, to the extent pertinent here, read: “(a) Exemption from taxation “An organization described' in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401 (a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503. “(c) List of exempt organizations “The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a): “(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.” Section 501 (e) reads: “(e) Cooperative hospital service organizations “For purposes of this title, an organization shall be treated as an organization organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, if— “(1) such organization is organized and operated solely— “(A) to perform, on a centralized basis, one or more of the following services which, if performed on its own behalf by a hospital which is an organization described in subsection • (c) (3) arid exempt from taxation under subsection (a), would constitute activities in exercising or performing the purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption: data processing, purchasing, warehousing, bitting and collection, food, clinical, industrial engineering, laboratory, printing, communications, record center, and personnel (including selection, testing, training, and education of personnel) services; and “(B) to perform such services solely for two or more hospitals each of which is— “(i) an organization described in subsection (c) (3) which is exempt from taxation under subsection (a), “(ii) a constituent part of an organization described in subsection (c) (3) which is exempt from taxation under subsection (a) and which, if organized and operated as a separate entity, would constitute an organization described in subsection (c)(3), or “(iii) owned and operated by the United States, a State, the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States, or a political subdivision or an agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.” Among the eases in conflict with the Third Circuit’s ruling are Northern California Central Services, Inc. v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 60, 591 F. 2d 620 (1979), and United Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 776 (SD Ind. 1974). See also Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (DC 1979) (appeals pending, Nos. 80-1138 and 80-1139 (CADC)). Decisions in accord with the ruling of the Third Circuit include Hospital Central Services Assn. v. United States, 623 F. 2d 611 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, post, p. 911, and Metropolitan Detroit Area Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States, 634 F. 2d 330 (CA6 1980). See also Associated Hospital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T. C. 213, 231 (1980) (reviewed by the court, with four dissents; appeal pending, No. 80-3596 (CA5)). Since the enactment of subsection (e), the Internal Revenue Service has adhered to its view that laundry service provided by a cooperative hospital service organization is not entitled to exemption under § 501. See Rev. Rul. 69-160, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 147; Rev. Rul. 69-633, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 121. See S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 200-201 (1967); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 73 (1967); 114 Cong. Rec. 7516, 8111-8112 (1968). We do not agree with the suggestion made by the Court of Claims in Northern California Central Services, Inc. v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl., at 67, 591 F. 2d, at 624, that Congress “may have wished not to encourage cooperative hospital laundries by new tax exemptions, to which commercial laundries made vehement objections, yet to leave such laundries free to obtain from the courts the exemptions that existing law might afford them.” The extended hearings, the Committee considerations, and the floor debates all reveal that Congress was well informed on the issue and made a deliberate decision. We necessarily recognize that congressional choice. The Commissioner never expressly announced a nonacquiescence in this decision. However, in an apparent response to the Hospital Bureau case, the feeder regulation, § 1.502-1 (b), was amended in several respects in 1963. See T. D. 6662, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 214, 215-216. See also Associated Hospital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, at 219.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GAINESVILLE UTILITIES DEPARTMENT et al. v. FLORIDA POWER CORP. No. 464. Argued February 24, 1971 Decided May 24, 1971 BeeNNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except Blackmun, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. George Spiegel argued the cause for petitioners in No. 464. With him on the briefs was Melvin Richter. Gordon Gooch argued the cause for petitioner in No. 469. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Samuel Huntington, Peter H. Schiff, and Leonard D. Eesley. Richard W. Emory argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Robert A. Shelton and S. A. Brandimore. Northcutt Ely filed a brief for the American Public Power Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. Thomas M. Debevoise filed a brief for the American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Together with No. 469, Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power Corp., also on certiorari to the same court. Me. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Federal Power Act, an order of the Federal Power Commission that directs one electric utility “to establish physical connection of its transmission facilities with the facilities of” another utility “may prescribe the terms and conditions of the arrangement to be made . . . including the apportionment of cost between them and the compensation or reimbursement reasonably due to any of them.” Federal Power Act §202 (b), 49 Stat. 848, 16 U. S. C. § 824a (b). The Commission order which directed respondent Florida Power Corp. to interconnect its electric system with that of petitioner Gaines-ville Utilities Department did not contain a term or condition sought by respondent requiring petitioner to pay an annual standby charge of approximately $150,000 for the emergency or backup service provided by the interconnection, 40 F. P. C. 1227 (1968); 41 F. P. C. 4 (1969). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, because of the omission of such a term or condition, “the terms of the interconnection do not adequately satisfy the statutory requirements because they do not provide Florida Power with the ‘reimbursement reasonably due’ it. . . . Thus we deny enforcement of this order insofar as no provision for the reasonable compensation of Florida Power is made.” 425 F. 2d 1196, 1203 (1970) (footnote omitted). We granted the petition for certiorari of Gainesville Utilities Department in No. 464, and of the Federal Power Commission in No. 469, 400 U. S. 877 (1970). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied enforcement of the Commission’s order and remand for the entry of a new judgment enforcing the Commission’s order in its entirety. I The demand upon an electric utility for electric power fluctuates significantly from hour to hour,' day to day, and season to season. For this reason, generating facilities cannot be maintained on the basis of a constant demand. Rather, the utility’s generating capability must be geared to the utility’s peak load of demand, and also take into account the fact that generating equipment must occasionally be out of service for overhaul, or because of breakdowns. In consequence, the utility builds certain “reserves” of generating capacity in excess of peak load requirements into its system. The practice of a utility that relies completely on its own generating resources (an “isolated” system in industry jargon) is to maintain equipment capable of producing its peak load requirements plus equipment that produces a “reserve” capacity equal to the capacity of its largest generating unit. The major importance of an interconnection is that it reduces the need for the “isolated” utility to build and maintain “reserve” generating capacity. An interconnection is simply a transmission line connecting two utilities. Electric power may move freely through the line up to the line’s capacity. Ordinarily, however, the energy generated by each system is sufficient to supply the requirements of the system’s customers and no substantial amount of power flows through the interconnection. It is only at the times when one of the connected utilities is unable for some reason to produce sufficient power to meet its customers’ needs that the deficiency may be supplied by power that automatically flows through the interconnection from the other utility. To the extent that the utility may rely upon the interconnection to supply this deficiency, the utility is freed of the necessity of constructing and maintaining its own equipment for the purpose. The Gainesville Utilities Department is a municipally owned and operated electric utility serving approximately 17,000 customers in a 22-square-mile area covering the city of Gainesville and adjacent portions of Alachua County, Florida. In 1965, Gainesville's “isolated” system had a total generating capability of 108.4 megawatts (mw) while its peak load was 51.1 mw. Gainesville’s generating capacity in 1965 consisted of five steam electric generating units ranging from five to 50 mw. Thus Gainesville’s generating capacity of 108.4 mw gave it a reserve capacity of 57.3 mw over its annual peak load of 51.1 mw — a reserve adequate to cover the shutdown of the system’s largest generating unit of 50 mw. Gaines-ville’s peak load was projected to be doubled to 102 mw by 1970. Its 1970 capacity, however, was projected to increase to only 138.4 mw through the addition in 1968 of two 15-mw gas-turbine generators. Thus an interconnection was necessary if Gainesville was to avoid having to make a still greater investment in generating equipment. Florida Power Corporation operates a major electric generation, transmission, and distribution system serving 370,000 retail customers in a 20,600-square-mile system serving 32 counties in central and northwest Florida, including Alachua County. It also supplies power at wholesale to 12 municipal distribution systems and 9 REA cooperatives. In 1966, Florida Power had an aggregate generating capability of 1595 mw and experienced a peak load of 1232 mw. At the time of the hearing before the Commission, Florida Power was building a 525-mw generating unit to begin service in December 1969, and anticipated a 1970 generating capability of 2114 mw and a 1970 peak load of 1826 mw. Thus the anticipated excess of capacity over peak load, 288 mw, is less than the size of its largest generating unit, 525 mw. However, the deficiency is provided for by interconnections which Florida Power has with four other Florida utilities. See n. 3, supra. All five of these utilities constitute the Florida Operating Committee, which, though informal in nature, serves as a medium through which the technical operations of its members are coordinated. As a result of the sharing of reserves made possible by the interconnection of the Committee’s members, each utility is able to reduce the reserve generating capacity that would be required if it were electrically isolated. Specifically, each of the Florida Operating Committee members maintains generating capacity equal to 115% of its annual peak load. For several years prior to 1965, Gainesville sought to negotiate an “interconnection” with Florida Power and with another member of the Florida Operating Committee, Florida Power & Light. When those efforts failed, Gainesville, in 1965, filed an application with the Commission seeking an order under § 202 (b) directing Florida Power to interconnect with Gainesville. II Section 202 (b) authorizes the Federal Power Commission to order a utility to interconnect with another, and to “prescribe the terms and conditions of the arrangement . . . ,” if the Commission “finds such action necessary or appropriate in the public interest,” and “if the Commission finds that no undue burden will be placed upon such public utility thereby.” The proviso to the section makes explicit that the Commission has no authority in ordering an interconnection “to compel the enlargement of generating facilities . . . [or] to compel such public utility to sell or exchange energy when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service to its customers.” 16 U. S. C. § 824a (b). Following extensive hearings, an examiner made findings that the proposed interconnection would be in the public interest and that it would not place an undue burden on Florida Power. The Commission affirmed the findings and further found that the interconnection would neither compel Florida Power to enlarge its generating facilities nor impair its ability to serve its customers. The Commission ordered the interconnection but on conditions (1) that Gainesville pay the entire $3 million cost of the interconnection, and (2) that Gainesville maintain generating capacity resources at least equal to 115% of its peak load — the requirement imposed by the Florida Operating Committee on all its members. The order also fixed the rates of compensation to be paid for actual energy transfers across the interconnection. Respondent, Florida Power, does not challenge the Commission's order except in its omission of a term or condition that Gainesville pay approximately $150,000 annually as “compensation or reimbursement reasonably due” respondent for the backup service effected by the interconnection. Respondent contended that this charge, computed on the basis of Gainesville’s largest generator, was justified because only Gainesville could gain from the interconnection since the reserve made available to respondent from Gainesville was too small to be of any realistic value to respondent’s massive power system. The Commission rejected the contention. It noted that respondent had not included a comparable charge in any of the contracts for interconnection voluntarily negotiated with members of the Florida Operating Committee. The Commission also emphasized that “the apportionment of cost” factor had been satisfied by requiring Gainesville to bear the full cost of making the interconnection. Primarily, however, the Commission rested its rejection upon two grounds. First, the Commission stated its view that, in applying the statutory provision, the appropriate analysis should focus not upon the respective gains to be realized by the parties from the interconnection but upon the sharing of responsibilities by the interconnected operations: “[T]hat sharing must be based upon, and follow the proportionate burdens each system places upon the interconnected system networks, not the benefits each expects to receive. Benefits received in any given situation may approximate these responsibilities or they may not. In the course of negotiation of voluntary pooling arrangements, benefits received may, on occasion, serve to offset burdens imposed in determining the appropriate charge for particular services rendered or facilities supplied. But where, as here, the cost of providing such services and facilities and the appropriate charges therefor have equitably been determined after a careful analysis and apportionment of the burdens and responsibilities of each party, there is no basis for any further consideration of relative benefits . . . .” 40 F. P. C., at 1237. Second, the Commission found that even if the interconnection were evaluated on the basis of relative benefits, “this record shows that the proposed intertie will afford both parties opportunities to take advantage of substantial and important benefits: electrical operating benefits, and corporate financial savings.” Id., at 1238. In its original opinion and in its opinion denying rehearing, the Commission specified the benefits that it found Florida Power would gain from the interconnection, as set out in the margin. On the basis of these findings, the Commission concluded that no standby charge should be imposed on either party to the interconnection. Thus, under the terms of the Commission's final order, each party pays only for the power actually received from the other, and each party is obligated to deliver power only on an “as available” basis. 40 F. P. C., at 1236 n. 4, 1246. The Court of Appeals’ denial of enforcement of the Commission’s order insofar as no provision was made “for the reasonable compensation of Florida Power” rested on the court’s conclusion that the Commission’s “proportionate burden” analysis was “largely illusory:” “The Commission’s policy of proportionate utility responsibility really works only one way. The small system receives high benefits and, because of its size, no real obligations. The large system, however, receives no benefit but does incur real, substantial responsibilities. Such imaginary equity is not reasonable compensation.” 425 F. 2d, at 1203. The validity of this conclusion, however, depends upon whether the court correctly read the record as showing that Florida Power “receives no benefit” and that Gaines-ville incurs “no real obligations.” The Commission’s findings are squarely contrary. Although the Commission did argue that the benefits to be derived from the interconnection by each party were irrelevant to the proper decision of the case, nonetheless, in view of respondent’s strenuous protest, the Commission went on to bring its expertise and judgment to bear upon the benefits and burdens and made findings identifying several specific benefits that would accrue to Florida Power from the interconnection. See n. 5, supra. Merely because the Commission argued that on its view of the legal question involved, findings of benefits were unnecessary to its decision does not render them any the less findings on the question of benefits. A reviewing court should hardly complain because an agency provides more analysis than it feels is absolutely necessary. Section 313 (b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 8251 (b), provides that “[t]he finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). Among the specific benefits the Commission found would accrue to Florida Power were increased reliability of Florida Power’s service to customers in the Gainesville area, the availability of 60 to 100 mw of reserve capacity during certain periods of the year, and savings from coordinated planning to achieve use at all times of the most efficient generating equipment in both systems. The Commission’s findings were aided by specific studies, made by the Commission’s staff, and placed in the record. Insofar as the Court of Appeals’ opinion implies that there was not substantial evidence to support a finding of some benefits, it is clearly wrong. And insofar as the court’s opinion implies that the responsibilities assumed by Gainesville in combination with the benefits found to accrue to Florida Power were insufficient to constitute “compensation . . . reasonably due,” the Court of Appeals overstepped the role of the judiciary. Congress ordained that that determination should be made, in the first instance, by the Commission, and on the record made in this case, the Court of Appeals erred in not deferring to the Commission’s expert judgment. Florida Power’s emphasis on Gainesville’s small size occurs only when discussing Gainesville’s ability to provide Florida Power with energy. But Gainesville’s small size has relevance in terms of the amount of power it may, even in emergencies, require from Florida Power. What Florida Power chooses to emphasize is that the availability of a certain amount of power flowing from it to Gainesville is relatively more valuable to Gainesville’s small system than the availability of the same amount of power flowing from Gainesville to Florida Power. It is certainly true that the same service or commodity may be more valuable to some customers than to others, in terms of the price they are willing to pay for it. An airplane seat may bring greater profit to a passenger flying to California to close a million-dollar business deal than to one flying west for a vacation; as a consequence, the former might be willing to pay more for his seat than the latter. But focus on the willingness or ability of the purchaser to pay for a service is the concern of the monopolist, not of a governmental agency charged both with assuring the industry a fair return and with assuring the public reliable and efficient service, at a reasonable price. Our guidepost here is the Act’s explicit commitment of the judgment as to what compensation is reasonably due, in this highly technical field, to the Commission. Cf. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 767 (1968). In the exercise of this judgment, the Commission’s order placed on Gainesville the entire $3 million cost of constructing the interconnection. Thus the benefits that the Commission found that Florida Power will receive from the interconnection will come without any capital investment on its part. In addition, the Commission required Gainesville to maintain generating capacity equal to at least 115% of its annual peak load and to maintain operating reserves in accordance with the procedures established by the Florida Operating Committee. In light of these circumstances, the Commission concluded on the basis of its proportionate-burden analysis that Gainesville should not pay a standby charge for the availability of emergency service, which is provided only on an “as available” basis. It simply required Gainesville to pay for energy actually received. On this record, we cannot say that the Commission has failed to discharge either its responsibility to assure Florida Power of “reasonable compensation” or its responsibility to the public to assure reliable efficient electric service. Since we conclude that substantial evidence supports the findings of the Commission that benefits will accrue to Florida Power from the interconnection, we have no occasion to decide whether the Commission in ordering the interconnection of two electric power companies, may properly condition the interconnection, when one party receives no benefits, upon compensation terms based on the relative burdens that each places on the interconnected network. Decision of that question must await a case which presents it. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of these cases. Section 202 (b) of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 848, 16 U. S. C. § 824a (b), provides: “(b) Whenever the Commission, upon application of any State commission or of any person engaged in the transmission or sale of electric energy, and after notice to each State commission and public utility affected and after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or appropriate in the public interest it may by order direct a public utility (if the Commission finds that no undue burden will be placed upon such public utility thereby) to establish physical connection of its transmission facilities with the facilities of one or more other persons engaged in the transmission or sale of electric energy, to sell energy to or exchange energy with such persons: Provided, That the Commission shall have no authority to compel the enlargement of generating facilities for such purposes, nor to compel such public utility to sell or exchange energy when to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service to its customers. The Commission may prescribe the terms and conditions of the arrangement to be made between the persons affected by any such order, including the apportionment of cost between them and the compensation or reimbursement reasonably due to any of them.” The industry distinguishes between various types of “reserve” requirements. Since time is required to start up equipment that is not operating, a certain amount of equipment must be maintained in such a state that it can begin generating power immediately. The industry calls these instantaneous or “spinning” reserves, and they must be available to meet load variations and breakdowns of equipment as they occur. A utility must always maintain “spinning” reserves equal to the size of the largest generator currently in service producing power, in order to protect against a breakdown of that unit. As “spinning” reserves are called upon a utility must start up more equipment in order to maintain “spinning” reserves at an adequate level. These reserves are called “quick-start” or "ready” reserves and must be available on short notice — usually 10 minutes or less. Both spinning and quick-start reserves are collectively referred to as “operating” reserves, in contrast to “installed” reserves. Installed reserves refers to the remaining generating capacity of a utility, those generators that are not ready to be operated, or in operation. Accordingly, the expense associated with “reserve” requirements includes both capital expense — building the necessary “installed” reserve generating capacity — and operating expense — running the necessary “spinning” reserves and maintaining the readiness of “quick-start” reserves. In general, this opinion will not differentiate between the different reserve requirements. The reason that interconnections lower reserve requirements is well illustrated by a hypothetical discussed in the Commission’s brief, at 15-16. “Assume that four electric systems operate in isolation and that each has an annual peak load of 500 mw served by several generating units the largest of which is 200 mw. At a minimum, each system would have to provide 700 mw of installed generating capacity (500 mw to cover the annual peak load plus 200 mw of installed reserves equal to the largest unit). If we assume further that each system operates its 200 mw unit near capacity throughout the year, spinning reserves equal to the output of that unit would constantly be required. If the four systems are to be interconnected pursuant to the Florida Operating Committee formula, total generating capacity need not exceed 2300 mw (total annual peak load — if all peaks occur during the same period — plus operating reserves of 300 mw, i.e., 1% times the largest generating unit). This 2300 mw capacity requirement would be met by requiring each system to maintain generating capacity equal to 115 percent of its annual peak load. Each system would thus have to maintain only 575 mw of generating capacity — 125 mw less than would be required if operating in isolation. The interconnected system as a whole would require the constant maintenance of 200 mw of spinning reserves and 100 mw of quick-start reserves; each system’s pro rata share of operating reserves would amount to only 75 mw. Thus, interconnection of the four systems would result in substantial capital savings by reducing installed generating capacity requirements and substantial operating savings by reducing operating reserve requirements.” (Footnote omitted.) At the same time, Gainesville also filed a complaint with the Commission charging Florida Power with unlawful discrimination under §§ 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. §§ 824d, 824e, for failure to agree to an interconnection. The Commission dismissed this complaint as moot when the interconnection was ordered. “For the Company, the interconnection will add an additional energy source to its network in a geographic area where the Company has a substantial load (customer demands), but does not have generating plants of its own. Because of that, the expected benefit to Florida Power may be very substantial since the [Gainesville] governors have a faster rate of response setting than Florida Power’s. Also of great importance to Florida Power is the improved system reliability which the Company will gain through the proposed inter-tie. That is shown in studies submitted by staff from engineering analyses of loss of load probabilities. They establish that the interconnection will have the effect of improving the reliability of Florida Power’s system.” 40 F. P. C., at 1238. “[Throughout its application [for rehearing], the Corporation emphasizes the contention that Gainesville will not be able to render any service of significant value to Florida Power. Upon consideration of this argument we find that Florida Power has greatly underestimated Gainesville’s capacity to be of service to the Corporation. Because of its electrical isolation, Gainesville has maintained a very large reserve capacity in relationship to its peak load. In 1965 its peak load was 51.1 mw, and its reserve capacity was 57.3 mw or 112,1 percent of peak demand. Although the purpose of this interconnection proceeding is to enable Gainesville to lessen its need for self-reliance, Gainesville’s reserve capacity will continue to be large even after interconnection. The staff’s witness has testified that during the ten year period 1970-1979, Gainesville’s average minimum reserves at the time of Florida Power’s annual peak hour demand will be 43 percent. According to staff’s computations, Gainesville will be able to deliver, if there will be sufficient interconnection transmission facilities, anywhere from 60 mw to 100 mw to Florida Power during certain periods in January, April, and September 1970. This prediction that Gainesville will be able to furnish capacity of this magnitude to Florida Power plainly refutes Florida Power’s assertion that the interconnection will prove to be a one-way street with all the benefits flowing from the Corporation to the City. The Commission is satisfied that the interconnection will permit a reciprocal exchange of benefits to the mutual advantage of both systems. “Staff’s studies of Gainesville’s future reserve capacity also serve to refute Florida Power’s allegation that there is ‘no scintilla of evidence’ to support the Commission’s finding that Gainesville will become an additional interchange power source on Florida Power’s network after the interconnection is consummated. Similarly, staff’s studies rebut the Corporation’s assertions regarding the insignificance of Gainesville’s anticipated capacity contributions.” 41 F. P. C., at 5-6 (opinion denying rehearing). “Florida Power asserts that the Commission erred in finding that the interconnection will add an additional energy source in an area where Florida [Power] has no generating plant. The Corporation states that it now has three energy sources to supply its load in the Gainesville area and that it does not need a fourth. Florida Power’s Form 12 for 1965 shows that the Corporation’s Suwanee Plant is the closest generating source to its Gainesville load center. This plant is more than 75 transmission line miles away from this load center. The next closest plant is the Inglis Station which is more than 80 transmission line miles away. Florida Power’s three energy sources are connected to the Gainesville load area by 69 kv transmission lines. According to staff, two of these lines serve other loads and could be vulnerable to outages. We agree with staff’s position that the connection with Gainesville’s generating resources would upgrade service reliability to the Corporation’s customers in the Gainesville area.” 41 F. P. C., at 7. Respondent Florida Power concedes that the Commission's proportionate-burden analysis is appropriate when the interconnected systems are approximately equal in size and when the interconnection does benefit both parties to an interconnection. Brief for Florida Power Corp. 21. We, therefore, reject the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that, because they were stated in the alternative, these were “not fact-findings protected by the umbrella of the substantial evidence test.” 425 F. 2d, at 1203 n. 20. This is not a ease where the Commission did not follow a procedure that it might have followed, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943), or failed to make findings or evaluate considerations relevant to its determination, see Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U. S. 83 (1957).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS et al. v. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO. No. 94. Argued February 21, 1963. Decided April 29, 1963. Harold C. Heiss argued the cause for petitioners. With him" on the briefs were Chas. I. Dawson, Russell B. Day, Harold N. McLaughlin, Wayland K. Sullivan and V. C. Shuttleworth. John P. Sandidge argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were H. G. Breetz, W. L. Grubbs, M. D. Jones and Joseph L. Lenihan. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The" respondent railroad company dismissed an employee named Humphries on the ground that he had assaulted two fellow employees. His union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, protested the discharge. The customary grievance procedures on the property were invoked, but to no avail. To .enforce its demand that Humphries be reinstated, the union threatened to call a strike. Before a strike was actually Called, the respondent submitted the dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, pursuant to § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act. The Adjustment Board sustained the employee’s claim for reinstatement in the following brief order: “Claim sustained with pay for time lost as the rule is construed on the property.” . The respondent reinstated Humphries, and, for the purpose of computing his pay for lost time, it asked him to submit a record of the outside income he had earned during the period which followed his dismissal. Hum-phries and his union resisted this demand for information, claiming that the Adjustment Board’s award entitled him to full pay for the time lost, without deduction for outside income. Several conferences were called to discuss this dispute. When the respondent refused to accede to the union’s interpretation of the award’s lost-time provision, the union again threatened to call a strike. To forestall "the impending work stoppage, the respondent twice petitioned the Adjustment Board to resolve the dispute as to the amount due Humphries under the award, asking the Board first for a clarification-of its earlier order and then submitting the disputed issue for resolution in a separate de novo proceeding. The Adjustment Board refused to entertain either petition, stating in its second order that “The matter must be ■ judged res judicata” in light of the original Adjustment Board decision dealing with the Humphries controversy. After the respondent had submitted the dispute for the second time to the Adjustment Board, the union set a definite strike deadline. The respondent then brought the present lawsuit in a Federal District Court, requesting injunctive relief against the threatened strike. After the Adjustment Board proceedings were completed, the court issued the injunction, holding that under the Railway Labor Act the union could not legally strike for the purpose of enforcing its interpretation of the Board’s money award, but must instead utilize the judicial enforcement procedure provided by § 3 First (p) of the Act. 190 F. Supp. 829. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 297 F. 2d 608, and we' granted certiorari to consider an obviously substantial question affecting the administration of the Railway Labor Act. 370 U. S. 908. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issues presented, and we accordingly affirm the judgment before us. The statute governing the central issue in this case is § 3 First of the Railway Labor Act, covering so-called “minor disputes.” The present provisions of § 3 First were added to the Act in 1934. The historical background of these provisions has been described at length .in previous opinions of this Court. See Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711; Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601. As explained in detail in those opinions, the 1934 amendments were enacted because the scheme of voluntary arbitration contained in the original Railway Labor Act had proved incapable of achieving peaceful settlements of grievance disputes. To arrive at a more efficacious solution, Congress, at the behest of the several interests ■ involved, settled upon a new detailed' and comprehensive statutory grievance procedure. Subsections (a) to (h) of § 3 First create the National Railroad Adjustment Board and define its composition and duties. Subsection (i) provides that it shall be the duty of both the carrier and the union to negotiate on the property concerning all minor disputes which arise; failing adjustment by this means, “the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board . ...” Subsection (l) directs the appointment of a neutral referee to sit on the Adjustment Board in the event its regular members are evenly divided. Subsection (m) makes awards of the Adjustment Board “final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as' they shall contain a money award.” It further directs the Adjustment Board to entertain a petition for clarification of its award if a dispute should arise over its meaning. And finally, subsections (o) and (p) describe the manner in which Adjustment Board awards may be enforced, providing for the issuance of an order by the Board itself and for judicial action to enforce such orders. The several decisions of this Court interpreting § 3 First have made it clear that this statutory grievance procedure is a mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive system for resolving grievance disputes. The right of one party to place the disputed issue before the Adjustment Board, with or without the consent of the other, has been firmly established. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S., at 34. And the-other party may not defeat this right by resorting to some other forum. Thus, in Order of Conductors v. Southern R. Co., 339 U. S. 255, the Court held that a state'court could not take jurisdiction over an employer’s declaratory judgment action concerning an employee grievance subject to § 3 First, because, “if a carrier or a union could choose a court instead of the Board, the other party would be deprived.of the privilege conferred by § 3 First (i) '. . . which provides that after negotiations have failed, 'either party’ may refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board.” Id., at 256-257. See Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239. Similarly, an employee is barred from choosing another forum in which to litigate claims arising under the collective agreement. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day, 360 U. S. 548, 552-553. A corollary of this view has been the principle that the process of decision through the Adjustment Board cannot be challenged collaterally by methods of review not provided for in the statute. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601, the Court held that an employee could not resort to a. common law action for wrongful discharge after the same claim had been rejected on the merits in a proceeding before the Adjustment Board. The decision in that case was based upon the conclusion that, when invoked, the remedies provided for in § 3 First were intended by Congress to be the complete and final means for settling minor disputes. 360 U. S., at 616-617. See also, Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 124 F. 2d 235 (per. Rutledge, J.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 319 U. S. 732. Of even more particularized relevance to the issue now before us is this Court’s decision in Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., supra. There the railroad had submitted several common grievances.to the Adjustment Board pursuant to'§ 3 First (i). The union had resisted the submission, and called a strike to énforce its grievance demands. The Court held that the strike violated those provisions of the Act making the minor dispute procedures compulsory on both parties. In an opinion which reviewed at length the legislative history of the 1934 amendments, the Court concluded that this history • entirely supported the plain import of the statutory language — that Congress had intended the grievance procedures of § 3 First to be a compulsory substitute for economic self-help, not merely a voluntary alternative to it. For this reason, the Court concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115, was not a bar to injunctive relief against strikes called in support of grievance disputes which had been submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. It is against this pattern of decisions that we must evaluate the petitioners’ claim that the District Court in the. present ease was wrong in enjoining the threaténed strike. The claim, simply stated, is that the power to issue injunctions recognized by the Chicago River decision is limited to those situations in which a strike is called during the'proceedings before the Adjustment Board. Once a favorable award has been rendered, say the petitioners, .the union becomes free to enforce the award as it will— by invoking the judicial enforcement procedures of § 3 First (p),'or by resorting to economic force. The right to strike, it is argued, is necessary to achieve “the congressional policy of requiring carriers and their employees to settle grievances by the collective bargaining process.” The broad premise of the petitioners’ argument — that Congress intended to permit the settlement of minor disputes through the interplay of economic force — is squarely in conflict with the basic teaching of Chicago River. After a detailed analysis of the historic background of the 1934 Act, the Court there determined that “there was general understanding between both the supporters and the opponents of the 1934 amendment that the provisions dealing with the • Adjustment Board. were to be considered as-compulsory arbitration in this limited field.” 353 U. S., at 39. The petitioners’ narrower argument — that, at the' least, strikes may be permitted after the Adjustment Board makes an award — is likewise untenable under the circumstances of this case. We do not deal here with non-money awards, which áre made “final and binding” by. § 3 First (m).. The- only' portion of the award which presently remains unsettled is the dispute concerning the computation of Humphries’ “time lost” award, an issue wholly separable from the merits of i the wrongful discharge issue. This, then, is clearly a controversy concerning a “money award,” as to which decisions of the Adjustment Board are not final and binding. Instead, the Act' provides a further step in the settlement process. If the carrier does not comply with the award, or with the employee’s or union’s interpretation, of it, § 3 First (p) authorizes the employee to bring an action in a Federal District Court to enforce the award. The lawsuit is to “proceed in all respects as other civil suits,” but the findings and order of the Adjustment Board are to be regarded as “prima facie evidence” of the facts stated in thé complaint. The employee, is excused from the costs of suit, and, in addition, is awarded attorney’s fees if he prevails. The total effect of these detailed provisions is to provide .a carefully designed procedure for reviewing money • awards, one which will achieve the reviewing function without any significant expense to the employee or his union. See Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, supra. ■ The express provision for this special form of judicial review for money awards, both in subsection (m) and again in subsection (p), makes it clear that Congress regarded this procedure as an integral part of the Act’s grievance machinery. Congress-has, in effect, decreed a two-step grievance procedure, for money awards, with the first step, the Adjustment Board order and findings, serving, as the foundation for the second. Money awards against carriers cannot be made final by any other means. To allow one of the parties to resort to economic self-help at this point in the process would violate this direct statu - tory. command. It would permit'that party to withdraw at will from the process of settlement which Congress has expressly required both parties to follow. ■ In addition, it would obviously render the earlier parts of the grievance procedure totally meaningless. A strike in these circumstances would therefore be no less disruptive of the explicit statutory grievance procedure than was the strike enjoined in the Chicago River case. Consequently, the reasons which, in'that case, required accommodating the more generalized provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act' apply with equal force to the present case. We hold that the District Court was not in error in issuing the injunction. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black dissents. "(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including .cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the. disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of .the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.” 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i). “(p) If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the time limit in such order, the petitioner, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may. file in the District Court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through' which the carrier operates, a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the- Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of'the Adjustment Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, unless they accrue upon his appeal, and such costs shall be paid out of the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of the United States. If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit. The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order- and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus of otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.” 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (p). There can be no doubt that the controversy over the amount of the “time lost” award is a minor dispute, because it involves “the interpretation or application” of the collective agreement between the railroad and the union. See note 1, supra. See also, Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711; Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30. 48 Stat. 1185, 1189 (1934). 44 Stat. 577, 578 (1926). 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (a)-(h). See note 1, supra. 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (1). "(m) The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards' shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award, the division of the Board upon request of either' party shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute.” 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (m). “(o) In case of an award by any division of-the Adjustment Board in favor of petitioned, the division of the Board shall make an order, directed to the carrier, to make the award effective and, if the' award-includes a.requirement for the payment of money, to pay to' the employee the sum to which he is entitled under the award on or be'fore a day named.” 45 U. S. C. §153 First (o). The language of § 3 First (p).is set out in note 2, supra. “[The Norris-LaGuardia Afct was designed primarily] to prevent the injunctions of the federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the competing economic forces of labor and capital. Rep. LaGuardia . . .. recognized that the machinery of the Railway Labor Act channeled these economic forces, in matters dealing with railway. labor, into special -processes intended to compromise them. Such controversies, therefore, are not the same as those- in which the injunction strips labor of its primary weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative.” 353 U. S., at 40-41. Cf. Manion v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 353 U. S. 927, which held that injune-tive relief is not available if the processes of the Railway Labor Act Jiave not actually been invoked. Compare Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195, 210-212. See note 9, supra. See note 9, supra. See note 2, supra. See note 11; supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LYTLE v. HOUSEHOLD MANUFACTURING, INC., dba SCHWITZER TURBOCHARGERS No. 88-334. Argued January 8, 1990 Decided March 20, 1990 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O’Con-nor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 556. Judith Reed argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Julius LeVonne Chambers, Charles Stephen Ralston, Ronald L. Ellis, Eric Schnapper, and Penda D. Hair. H. Lane Dennard, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was A. Bmce Clarke. Robert W. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Garen E. Dodge filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322 (1979), we held that a court’s determinations of issues in an equitable action could collaterally estop relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent legal action without violating a litigant’s right to a jury trial. Id., at 333. In this case, petitioner brought both equitable and legal claims in the same action, but the District Court erroneously dismissed the legal claims. We must determine whether the District Court’s resolution of the issues raised by petitioner’s equitable claims bars re-litigation of the same issues before a jury in the context of his legal claims. We hold that collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation of those issues in these circumstances. I John Lytle, an Afro-American, worked as a machinist for Schwitzer Turbochargers, a subsidiary of Household Manufacturing, Inc. On August 11, 1983, Lytle asked his supervisor if he could take a vacation day on Friday, August 12, so that he could see a doctor. Although his supervisor approved that request, the supervisor later told Lytle that he was required to work on Saturday, August 13. Lytle objected because he would be too ill to work on Saturday. He did not report for work on either day, and the parties dispute whether he informed his employer of his intention to be absent both days. Schwitzer classified Lytle’s absences as “unexcused.” Under the company’s discharge policy, more than eight hours of unexcused absences within a 12-month period provides grounds for dismissal. On that basis, Schwitzer fired Lytle. Lytle filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been treated differently from white workers who had missed work. At the same time, Lytle applied for jobs with other employers, several of whom sought references from Schwitzer. Lytle alleges that his job search was unsuccessful because Schwitzer provided prospective employers only with Lytle’s dates of employment and his job title. After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Lytle filed this action seeking monetary and injunctive relief under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1982 ed.), and 16 Stat. 144, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (1982 ed.). He alleged that Schwitzer had discharged him because of his race and had retaliated against him for filing a charge with the EEOC by providing inadequate references to prospective employers. In his complaint, Lytle requested a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury. At the beginning of the trial, the District Court dismissed Lytle’s § 1981 claims, concluding that Title VII provided the exclusive remedy for Lytle’s alleged injuries. The District Court then conducted a bench trial on the Title VII claims. At the close of Lytle’s case in chief, the court granted Schwitzer’s motion to dismiss the claim of discriminatory discharge pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (“After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence”). After both parties had presented all their evidence, the judge entered a judgment in favor of Schwitzer on the retaliation claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 831 F. 2d 1057 (CA4 1987) (judgment order), but noted that the dismissal of the § 1981 claims was “apparently erroneous” because “Title VII and §1981 remedies [are] separate, independent and distinct.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a, n. 2. Nevertheless, it ruled that the District Court’s findings with respect to the Title VII claims collaterally estopped Lytle from litigating his § 1981 claims because the elements of a cause of action under § 1981 are identical to those under Title VII. The Court of Appeals rejected Lytle’s claim that the Seventh Amendment precluded according collateral-estoppel effect to the District Court’s findings, reasoning that the judicial interest in economy of resources overrode Lytle’s interest in relitigating the issues before a jury. We granted certiorari, 492 U. S. 917 (1989), and now reverse. II The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in “Suits at common law.” Respondent does not dispute that, had the District Court not dismissed Lytle’s § 1981 claims, Lytle would have been entitled to a jury trial on those claims. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 211-212, 216 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). When legal and equitable claims are joined in the same action, “the right to jury trial on the legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 196, n. 11 (1974). Further, had the § 1981 claims remained in the suit, a jury would have been required to resolve those claims before the court considered the Title VII claims, because “only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims.” Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 510-511 (1959) (footnote omitted). Accord, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 473 (1962). The Court in Beacon Theatres emphasized the importance of the order in which legal and equitable claims joined in one suit would be resolved because it “thought that if an issue common to both legal and equitable claims was first determined by a judge, relitigation of the issue before a jury might be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral estoppel.” Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U. S., at 334. In Parklane Hosiery Co., this Court held that “an equitable determination can have collateral-estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action and that this estoppel does not violate the Seventh Amendment.” Id., at 335 (emphasis added). In that case, a judgment had already been issued by a District Court and affirmed on appeal in a suit in which a jury trial was not constitutionally required. This Court held that the District Court’s resolution of issues in that case collaterally estopped relitigation of the same issues in a second, separate action, even though the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial in the second action. Respondent argues that this case is governed by Parklane Hosiery Co., rather than by Beacon Theatres, because the District Court made its findings when no legal claims were pending before it. In respondent’s view, if an appellate court finds that a trial court’s dismissal of legal claims was erroneous and remands the legal claims to the trial court, that case would in effect constitute a separate action and therefore be subject to collateral estoppel under Parklane Hosiery Co. We are not persuaded. Only the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of the § 1981 claims enabled that court to resolve issues common to both claims, issues that otherwise would have been resolved by a jury. But for that erroneous ruling, this case would be indistinguishable from Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen. It would be anomalous to hold that a district court may not deprive a litigant of his right to a jury trial by resolving an equitable claim before a jury hears a legal claim raising common issues, but that a court may accomplish the same result by erroneously dismissing the legal claim. Such a holding would be particularly unfair here because Lytle was required to join his legal and equitable claims to avoid the bar of res judicata. See Harnett v. Billman, 800 F. 2d 1308, 1315 (CA4 1986) (holding that prior adjudication barred a claim that arose out of the same transactions and that could have been raised in prior suit). Our conclusion is consistent with this Court’s approach in cases involving a wrongful denial of a petitioner’s right to a jury trial on legal issues. In such cases, we have never accorded collateral-estoppel effect to the trial court’s factual determinations. Instead, we have reversed and remanded each case in its entirety for a trial before a jury. See Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Corp., 375 U. S. 160 (1963) (per curiam) (reversing trial court’s decision to try equitable claims first and thereby to bar jury trial on legal claims that relied on the same facts); Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412 (1987) (reversing and remanding claims for monetary penalties and injunctive relief because trial court improperly denied plaintiff a jury trial on the claims for monetary penalties); Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33 (1989) (reversing and remanding Bankruptcy Court’s judgment because petitioners were denied a jury trial and according no weight to trial judge’s factual findings). Furthermore, the purposes served by collateral estoppel do not justify applying the doctrine in this case. Collateral estoppel protects parties from multiple lawsuits and the possibility of inconsistent decisions, and it conserves judicial resources. Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 153-154 (1979). Application of collateral estoppel is unnecessary here to prevent multiple lawsuits because this case involves one suit in which the plaintiff properly joined his legal and equitable claims. Moreover, our refusal to apply collateral estoppel does not dissipate judicial resources in “needless litigation” over previously resolved issues, Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U. S., at 326. Although our holding requires a new trial in this case, we view such litigation as essential to vindicating Lytle’s Seventh Amendment rights. The relitigation of factual issues before a jury is no more “needless” in this context than in cases in which a trial court erroneously concludes that a claim is equitable rather than legal, see, e. g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469 (1962), or that resolution of an equitable claim can precede resolution of a legal claim, see, e. g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500 (1959). In all of these circumstances, relitigation is the only mechanism that can completely correct the error of the court below. Thus, concern about judicial economy, to the extent that it supports respondent’s position, remains an insufficient basis for departing from our longstanding commitment to preserving a litigant’s right to a jury trial. Ill Respondent argues that notwithstanding our resolution of the collateral-estoppel issue, we should affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment because the record indicates that the District Court would have directed a verdict in favor of respondent on the § 1981 claims even if those claims had been litigated before a jury. This argument is not compelling with respect to either the discriminatory discharge claim or the retaliation claim. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), the District Court dismissed the Title VII claim relating to allegations of discriminatory discharge. After making several factual findings on the basis of evidence adduced by Lytle, Tr. 258, the court concluded that he had not established a prima facie case. Id., at 259. Respondent contends that this ruling establishes that the court would also have directed a verdict against Lytle on his similar § 1981 claim because that claim required proof of the same prima facie case. Respondent’s reasoning ignores the important distinction between a dismissal under Rule 41(b) and a directed verdict under Rule 50(a). Rule 41(b) allows the court “as trier of the facts” to determine the facts and the law “and render judgment against the plaintiff or . . . decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.” In contrast, in considering a motion for a directed verdict, the court does not weigh the evidence, but draws all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge .... The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor”). Thus, although a court might, after reviewing the evidence, decide in favor of the party moving for a dismissal under Rule 41(b), that court might not take the same case away from the jury because it might believe that the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. The District Court’s observation that Lytle’s interpretation of the evidence supporting his discriminatory discharge claims was “reasonable,” Tr. 253, supports our conclusion that that court would not necessarily have granted a directed verdict on Lytle’s similar § 1981 claim. Respondent’s argument with respect to Lytle’s allegations of retaliation is even further off base. The District Court declined to dismiss the retaliation claim, finding that Lytle had adduced some evidence of disparate treatment, Tr. 256, 257, and required respondent to present evidence on that issue. After both parties presented closing statements, the court found no evidence of discrimination on the part of respondent, id., at 301, and then entered a judgment in respondent’s favor. Nothing in the record indicates that the court reached the only reasonable conclusions or that a jury could not have found the facts differently and entered a different verdict. As we have long recognized, a jury and a judge can draw different conclusions from the same evidence. See, e. g., Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 664 (1874). Thus, we are not convinced that the District Court would have granted a motion for a directed verdict on Lytle’s § 1981 claim concerning retaliation. IV We decline to extend Parklane Hosiery Co., supra, and to accord collateral-estoppel effect to a district court’s determinations of issues common to equitable and legal claims where the court resolved the equitable claims first solely because it erroneously dismissed the legal claims. To hold otherwise would seriously undermine a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, vacate the decision of the District Court with respect to Lytle’s Title VII claims, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion but write separately to note what the Court acknowledges in the last sentence of a footnote, see ante, at 551-552, n. 3: that the question whether petitioner has stated a valid claim under § 1981 remains open. In the District Court, petitioner claimed that respondent had fired him because of his race and retaliated against him for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Ante, at 548. As Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989), was decided after the Court of Appeals issued its decision, the applicability of § 1981 to these claims was not specifically addressed. This Court’s usual practice is to decline to address questions raised for the first time here. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-552, n. 5 (1980); Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 234 (1976). The Court adheres to this practice, noting that arguments based on Patterson neither were “presented to either court below” nor are to be found “in the record.” Ante, at 552, n. 3. The Court correctly concludes that there is “therefore . . . nothing in the record to justify affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment” at this juncture. Ibid. On remand, therefore, the parties will have ample opportunity to present arguments, and the lower courts will have the first opportunity to consider whether either of petitioner’s charges relates to the formation or enforcement of a contract, the two types of claims actionable under § 1981, Patterson, 491 U. S., at 176-178, or relates only to “postformation conduct unrelated to an employee’s right to enforce [his] contract.” Id., at 180. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff does not have a right to a jury trial on a Title VII claim. See Keller v. Prince George’s County, 827 F. 2d 952, 955 (1987). This Court has not ruled on the question whether a plaintiff seeking relief under Title VII has a right to a jury trial. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers v. Tetry, post, at 572. Because Lytle does not argue that he was entitled to a jury trial on his Title VII claims, we express no opinion on that issue here. Instead, we assume for purposes of this opinion that he has no such right. The Fourth Circuit’s decision to apply collateral estoppel in this situation directly conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hussein v. Oshkosh Motor Truck Co., 816 F. 2d 348 (1987). Respondent argues that dismissal of Lytle’s § 1981 claims was not erroneous because Lytle’s allegations do not state § 1981 claims in light of this Court’s decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989). Under our Rules, “[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.” This Court’s Rule 14.1(a). The question of Patterson’s effect on Lytle’s claims is not even remotely related to the question on which we granted certiorari. See Pet. for Cert, i (“Did the Fourth Circuit correctly hold that district court violations of the Seventh Amendment are unreviewable by the appellate courts if the trial judge, after violating the Amendment by refusing to empanel a jury, compounds that constitutional infraction by deciding himself the very factual issue which should have been presented to and decided by a jury?”). Respondent nonetheless contends that, whether or not the Patterson issue is fairly included in the question presented, the Court can consider its argument because, as the prevailing party below, it may “defend its judgment on any ground properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected, or even considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals.” Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 476, n. 20 (1979). The argument that the allegations of discriminatory discharge and retaliation did not concern conduct within the scope of § 1981 as defined by Patterson, however, was not presented to either court below, nor is it supported by arguments in the record. We therefore find nothing in the record to justify affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment on the ground that Lytle has not stated a cause of action under § 1981. Respondent also argues that because Patterson was decided after Lytle filed his petition for a writ of certiorari but before we granted the petition, the Court can consider that decision’s effect on Lytle’s § 1981 claims. In other words, respondent claims that the intervening decision is an extraordinary circumstance that justifies departing from our Rules. We are not persuaded that an exception is warranted in this case. Applying our analysis in Patterson to the facts of a particular case without the benefit of a full record or lower court determinations is not a sensible exercise of this Court’s discretion. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320, n. 6 (1971); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 896, n. 7 (1984). Cf. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548 (1971) (dismissing a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because both parties agreed that an intervening state-court judgment rendered any decision by this Court meaningless). On remand, the Fourth Circuit should consider the impact of Patterson on Lytle’s § 1981 claims. Vacating the District Court’s determination regarding Lytle’s Title VII claims is required to afford Lytle complete and consistent relief. Had his § 1981 claims not been dismissed, the jury’s determination of legal and factual issues could not have been disregarded when the District Court considered his equitable claims. Moreover, vacating the District Court’s judgment avoids the possibility of inconsistent determinations. See Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 154 (1979) (noting that inconsistent decisions pose threat of diminishing reliance on the judiciary).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THOR POWER TOOL CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 77-920. Argued November 1, 1978 Decided January 16, 1979 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Mark H. Berens argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Lee N. Abrams and Douglas A. Poe. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, and Ann Belanger Durney. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Donald E. Egan, Francis X. Orossi, Jr., Robert S. Connors, Laurence B. Kraus, and Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Jr., for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and by Crane C. Hauser, Arthur I. Gould, Richard D. Godown, and John Lucas for the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States. Eric Neisser filed a brief for the Taxation With Representation Fund et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, as it comes to us, presents two federal income tax issues. One has to do with inventory accounting. The other relates to a bad-debt reserve. The Inventory Issue. In 1964, petitioner Thor Power Tool Co. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the taxpayer), in accord with “generally accepted accounting principles,” wrote down what it regarded as excess inventory to Thor’s own estimate of the net realizable value of the excess goods. Despite this write-down, Thor continued to hold the goods for sale at original prices. It offset the write-down against 1964 sales and thereby produced a net operating loss for that year; it then asserted that loss as a carryback to 1963 under § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 172. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, maintaining that the write-down did not serve to reflect income clearly for tax purposes, disallowed the offset and the carryback. The Bad-Debt Issue. In 1965, the taxpayer added to its reserve for bad debts and asserted as a deduction, under § 166 (c) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 166 (c), a sum that presupposed a substantially higher charge-off rate than Thor had experienced in immediately preceding years. The Commissioner ruled that the addition was excessive, and determined, pursuant to a formula based on the taxpayer’s past experience, what he regarded as a lesser but “reasonable” amount to be added to Thor’s reserve. On the taxpayer’s petition for redetermination, the Tax Court, in an unreviewed decision by Judge Goffe, upheld the Commissioner’s exercise of discretion in both respects. 64 T. C. 154 (1975). As a consequence, and also because of other adjustments not at issue here, the court redetermined, App. 264, the following deficiencies in Thor’s federal income tax: calendar year 1963 — $494,055.99 calendar year 1965 — $59,287.48 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 563 F. 2d 861 (1977). We granted certiorari, 435 U. S. 914 (1978), to consider these important and recurring income tax accounting issues. I The Inventory Issue A Taxpayer is a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Illinois. It manufactures hand-held power tools, parts and accessories, and rubber products. At its various plants and service branches, Thor maintains inventories of raw materials, work-in-process, finished parts and accessories, and completed tools. At all times relevant, Thor has used, both for financial accounting and for income tax purposes, the “lower of cost or market” method of valuing inventories. App. 23-24. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2 (c), 26 CFR § 1.471-2 (c) (1978). Thor’s tools typically contain from 50 to 200 parts, each of which taxpayer stocks to meet demand for replacements. Because of the difficulty, at the time of manufacture, of predicting the future demand for various parts, taxpayer produced liberal quantities of each part to avoid subsequent production runs. Additional runs entail costly retooling and result in delays in filling orders. App. 54-55. In 1960, Thor instituted a procedure for writing down the inventory value of replacement parts and accessories for tool models it no longer produced. It created an inventory contra-account and credited that account with 10% of each part’s cost for each year since production of the parent model had ceased. 64 T. 0., at 156-157; App. 24. The effect of the procedure was to amortize the cost of these parts over a 10-year period. For the first nine months of 1964, this produced a write-down of $22,090. 64 T. C., at 157; App. 24. In late 1964, new management took control and promptly concluded that Thor’s inventory in general was overvalued. After “a physical inventory taken at all locations” of the tool and rubber divisions, id., at 52, management wrote off approximately $2.75 million of obsolete parts, damaged or defective tools, demonstration or sales samples, and similar items. Id., at 52-53. The Commissioner allowed this writeoff because Thor scrapped most of the articles shortly after their removal from the 1964 closing inventory. Management also wrote down $245,000 of parts stocked for three unsuccessful products.- Id., at 56. The Commissioner allowed this write-down, too, since Thor sold these items at reduced prices shortly after the close of 1964. Id., at 62. This left some 44,000 assorted items, the status of which is the inventory issue here. Management concluded that many of these articles, mostly spare parts, were “excess” inventory, that is, that they were held in excess of any reasonably foreseeable future demand. It was decided that this inventory should be written down to its “net realizable value,” which, in most cases, was scrap value. 64 T. C., at 160-161; Brief for Petitioner 9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. Two methods were used to ascertain the quantity of excess inventory. Where accurate data were available, Thor forecast future demand for each item on the basis of actual 1964 usage, that is, actual sales for tools and service parts, and actual usage for raw materials, work-in-process, and production parts. Management assumed that future demand for each item would be the same as it was in 1964. Thor then applied the following aging schedule: the quantity of each item corresponding to less than one year’s estimated demand was kept at cost; the quantity of each item in excess of two years’ estimated demand was written off entirely; and the quantity of each item corresponding to from one to two years’ estimated demand was written down by 50% or 75%. App. 26. Thor presented no statistical evidence to rationalize these percentages or this time frame. In the Tax Court, Thor’s president justified the formula by citing general business experience, and opined that it was “somewhat in between” possible alternative solutions. This first method yielded a total write-down of $744,030. 64 T. C., at 160. At two plants where 1964 data were inadequate to permit forecasts of future demand, Thor used its second method for valuing inventories. At these plants, the company employed flat percentage write-downs of 5%, 10%, and 50%. for various types of inventory. Thor presented no sales or other data to support these percentages. Its president observed that “this is not a precise way of doing it,” but said that the company “felt some adjustment of this nature was in order, and these figures represented our best estimate of what was required to reduce the inventory to net realizable value.” App. 67. This second method yielded a total write-down of $160,832. 64 T. C., at 160. Although Thor wrote down all its “excess” inventory at once, it did not immediately scrap the articles or sell them at reduced prices, as it had done with the $3 million of obsolete and damaged inventory, the write-down of which the Commissioner permitted. Rather, Thor retained the “excess” items physically in inventory and continued to sell them at original prices. Id., at 160-161. The company found that, owing to the peculiar nature of the articles involved, price reductions were of no avail in moving this “excess” inventory. As time went on, however, Thor gradually disposed of some of these items as scrap; the record is unclear as to when these dispositions took place. Thor's total write-down of “excess” inventory in 1964 therefore was: Ten-year amortization of parts for discontinued tools $22,090 First method (aging formula based on 1964 usage) 744,030 Second method (flat percentage write-downs) 160,832 Total $926,952 Thor credited this sum to its inventory contra-account, thereby decreasing closing inventory, increasing cost of goods sold, and decreasing taxable income for the year by that amount. The company contended that, by writing down excess inventory to scrap value, and by thus carrying all inventory at “net realizable value,” it had reduced its inventory to “market” in accord with its “lower of cost or market” method of accounting. On audit, the Commissioner disallowed the write-down in its entirety, asserting that it did not serve clearly to reflect Thor’s 1964 income for tax purposes. The Tax Court, in upholding the Commissioner’s determination, found as a fact that Thor’s write-down of excess inventory did conform to “generally accepted accounting principles” ; indeed, the court was “thoroughly convinced . . . that such was the case.” Id., at 165. The court found that if Thor had failed to write down its inventory on some reasonable basis, its accountants would have been unable to give its financial statements the desired certification. Id., at 161-162. The court held, however, that conformance with “generally accepted accounting principles” is not enough; § 446 (b), and § 471 as well, of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 446 (b) and 471, prescribe, as an independent requirement, that inventory accounting methods must “clearly reflect income.” The Tax Court rejected Thor’s argument that its write-down of “excess” inventory was authorized by Treasury Regulations, 64 T. C., at 167-171, and held that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion in determining that the write-down failed to reflect 1964 income clearly. B Inventory accounting is governed by §§ 446 and 471 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 446 and 471. Section 446 (a) states the general rule for methods of accounting: “Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.” Section 446 (b) provides, however, that if the method used by the taxpayer “does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the [Commissioner], does clearly reflect income.” Regulations promulgated under § 446, and in effect for the taxable year 1964, state that “no method of accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clearly reflects income.” Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a)(2), 26 CPR § 1.446-1 (a)(2) (1964). Section 471 prescribes the general rule for inventories. It states: “Whenever in the opinion of the [Commissioner] the use of inventories is necessary in order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventory shall be taken by such taxpayer on such basis as the [Commissioner] may prescribe as conforming as nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the income.” As the Regulations point out, § 471 obviously establishes two distinct tests to which an inventory must conform. First, it must conform “as nearly as may be” to the “best accounting practice,” a phrase that is synonymous with “generally accepted accounting principles.” Second, it “must clearly reflect the income.” Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2 (a) (2), 26 CFR § 1.471-2 (a)(2) (1964). It is obvious that on their face, §§ 446 and 471, with their accompanying Regulations, vest the Commissioner with wide discretion in determining whether a particular method of inventory accounting should be disallowed as not clearly reflective of income. This Court’s cases confirm the breadth of this discretion. In construing § 446 and its predecessors, the Court has held that “[t]he Commissioner has broad powers in determining whether accounting methods used by a taxpayer clearly reflect income.” Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U. S. 446, 467 (1959). Since the Commissioner has “[m]uch latitude for discretion,” his interpretation of the statute’s clear-reflection standard “should not be interfered with unless clearly unlawful.” Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 449 (1930). To the same effect are United States v. Caito, 384 U. S. 102, 114 (1966); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U. S. 128, 133-134 (1963); American Automobile Assn. v. United States, 367 U. S. 687, 697-698 (1961); Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, 189-190 (1957); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 203 (1934). In construing § 203 of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1060, a predecessor of § 471, the Court held that the taxpayer bears a “heavy burden of [proof],” and that the Commissioner’s dis-allowance of an inventory accounting method is not to be set aside unless shown to be “plainly arbitrary.” Lucas v. Structural Steel Co., 281 U. S. 264, 271 (1930). As has been noted, the Tax Court found as a fact in this case that Thor’s write-down of “excess” inventory conformed to “generally accepted accounting principles” and was “within' the term, ‘best accounting practice/ as that term is used in section 471 of the Code and the regulations promulgated under that section.” 64 T. C., at 161,165. Since the Commissioner has not challenged this finding, there is no dispute that Thor satisfied the first part of § 471’s two-pronged test. The only question, then, is whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in determining that the write-down did not satisfy the test’s second prong in that it failed to reflect Thor’s 1964 income clearly. Although the Commissioner’s discretion is not unbridled and may not be arbitrary, we sustain his exercise of discretion here, for in this case the write-down was plainly inconsistent with the governing Regulations which the taxpayer, on its part, has not challenged. It has been noted above that Thor at all pertinent times used the “lower of cost or market” method of inventory accounting. The rules governing this method are set out in Treas. Reg. | 1.471-4, 26 CFR § 1.471-4 (1964). That Regulation defines “market” tornean, ordinarily, “the current bid price prevailing at the date of the inventory for the particular merchandise in the volume in which usually purchased by the taxpayer.” §1.471-4 (a). The courts have uniformly interpreted “bid price” to mean replacement cost, that is, the price the taxpayer would have to pay on the open market to purchase or reproduce the inventory items. Where no open market exists, the Regulations require the taxpayer to ascertain “bid price” by using “such evidence of a fair market price at the date or dates nearest the inventory as may be available, such as specific purchases or sales by the taxpayer or others in reasonable volume and made in good faith, or compensation paid for cancellation of contracts for purchase commitments.” § 1.471-4 (b). The Regulations specify two situations in which a taxpayer is permitted to value inventory below “market” as so defined. The first is where the taxpayer in the normal course of business has actually offered merchandise for sale at prices lower than replacement cost. Inventories of such merchandise may be valued at those prices less direct cost of disposition, “and the correctness of such prices will be determined by reference to the actual sales of the taxpayer for a reasonable period before and after the date of the inventory.” Ibid. The Regulations warn that prices “which vary materially from the actual prices so ascertained will not be accepted as reflecting the market.” Ibid. The second situation in which a taxpayer may value inventory below replacement cost is where the merchandise itself is defective. If goods are “unsalable at normal prices or unusable in the normal way because of damage, imperfections, shop wear, changes of style, odd or broken lots, or other similar causes,” the taxpayer is permitted to value the goods “at bona fide selling prices less direct cost of disposition.” § 1.471-2 (c). The-Regulations define “bona fide selling price” to mean an “actual offering of goods during a period ending not later than 30 days after inventory date.” Ibid. The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that “such exceptional goods as are valued upon such selling basis come within the classifications indicated,” and is required to “maintain such records of the disposition of the goods as will enable a verification of the inventory to be made.” Ibid. From this language, the regulatory scheme is clear. The taxpayer must value inventory for tax purposes at cost unless the “market” is lower. “Market” is defined as “replacement cost,” and the taxpayer is permitted to depart from replacement cost only in specified situations. When it makes any such departure, the taxpayer must substantiate its lower inventory valuation by providing evidence of actual offerings, actual sales, or actual contract cancellations. In the absence of objective evidence of this kind, a taxpayer’s assertions as to the “market value” of its inventory are not cognizable in computing its income tax. It is clear to us that Thor’s procedures for writing down the value of its “excess” inventory were inconsistent with this regulatory scheme. Although Thor conceded that “an active market prevailed” on the inventory date, see 64 T. C., at 169,' it “made no effort to determine the purchase or reproduction cost” of its “excess” inventory. Id., at 162. Thor thus failed to ascertain “market” in accord with the general rule of the Regulations. In seeking to depart from replacement cost, Thor failed to bring itself within either of the authorized exceptions. Thor is not able to take advantage of § 1.471-4 (b) since, as the Tax Court found, the company failed to sell its excess inventory or offer it for sale at prices below replacement cost. 64 T. Cl, at 160-161. Indeed, Thor concedes that it continued to sell its “excess” inventory at original prices. Thor also is not able to take advantage of § 1.471-2 (c) since, as the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals both held, it failed to bear the burden of proving that its excess inventory came within the specified classifications. 64 T. C., at 171; 563 F. 2d, at 867. Actually, Thor's “excess” inventory was normal and unexceptional, and was indistinguishable from and intermingled with the inventory that was not written down. More importantly, Thor failed to provide any objective evidence whatever that the “excess” inventory had the “market value” management ascribed to it. The Regulations demand hard evidence of actual sales and further demand that records of actual dispositions be kept. The Tax Court found, however, that Thor made no sales and kept no records. 64 T. C., at 171. Thor’s management simply wrote down its closing inventory on the basis of a well-educated guess that some of it would never be sold. The formulae governing this write-down were derived from management’s collective “business experience”; the percentages contained in those formulae seemingly were chosen for no reason other than that they were multiples of five and embodied some kind of anagogical symmetry. The Regulations do not permit this kind of evidence. If a taxpayer could write down its inventories on the basis of management’s subjective estimates of the goods’ ultimate salability, the taxpayer would be able, as the Tax Court observed, id., at 170, “to determine how much tax it wanted to pay for a given year.” For these reasons, we agree with the Tax Court and with the Seventh Circuit that the Commissioner acted within his discretion in deciding that Thor’s write-down of “excess” inventory failed to reflect income clearly. In the light of the well-known potential for tax avoidance that is inherent in inventory accounting, the Commissioner in his discretion may insist on a high evidentiary standard before allowing write-downs of inventory to “market.” Because Thor provided no objective evidence of the reduced market value of its “excess” inventory, its write-down was plainly inconsistent with the Regulations, and the Commissioner properly disallowed it. C The taxpayer's major argument against this conclusion is based on the Tax Court’s clear finding that the write-down conformed to “generally accepted accounting principles.” Thor points to language in Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a)(2), 26 CFR § 1.446-1 (a)(2) (1964), to the effect that “[a] method of accounting which reflects the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles . . will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income” (emphasis added). Section 1.471-2 (b), 26 CFR § 1.471-2 (b) (1964), of the Regulations likewise stated that an inventory taken in conformity with best accounting practice “can, as a general rule, be regarded as clearly reflecting . . . income” (emphasis added). These provisions, Thor contends, created a presumption that an inventory practice conformable to “generally accepted accounting principles” is valid for income tax purposes. Once a taxpayer has established this conformity, the argument runs, the burden shifts to the Commissioner affirmatively to demonstrate that the taxpayer’s method does not reflect income clearly. Unless the Commissioner can show that a generally accepted method “demonstrably distorts income,” Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae 3, or that the taxpayer’s adoption of such method was “motivated by tax avoidance,” Brief for Petitioner 25, the presumption in the taxpayer’s favor will carry the day. The Commissioner, Thor concludes, failed to rebut that presumption here. If the Code and Regulations did embody the presumption petitioner postulates, it would be of little use to the taxpayer in this case. As we have noted, Thor’s write-down of “excess” inventory was inconsistent with the Regulations; any general presumption obviously must yield in the face of such particular inconsistency. We believe, however, that no such presumption is present. Its existence is insupportable in light of the statute, the Court’s past decisions, and the differing objectives of tax and financial accounting. First, as has been stated above, the Code and Regulations establish two distinct tests to which an inventory must conform. The Code and Regulations, moreover, leave little doubt as to which test is paramount. While § 471 of the Code requires only that an accounting practice conform “as nearly as may be” to best accounting practice, § 1.446-1 (a) (2) of the Regulations states categorically that “no method of accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clearly reflects income” (emphasis added). Most importantly, the Code and Regulations give the Commissioner broad discretion to set aside the taxpayer’s method if, “in [his] opinion,” it does not reflect income clearly. This language is completely at odds with the notion of a “presumption” in the taxpayer’s favor. The Regulations embody no presumption; they say merely that, in most cases, generally accepted accounting practices will pass muster for tax purposes. And in most cases they will. But if the Commissioner, in the exercise of his discretion, determines that they do not, he may prescribe a different practice without having to rebut any presumption running against the Treasury. Second, the presumption petitioner postulates finds no support in this Court’s prior decisions. It was early noted that the general rule specifying use of the taxpayer’s method of accounting “is expressly limited to cases where the Commissioner believes that the accounts clearly reflect the net income.” Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S., at 449. More recently, it was held in American Automobile Assn. v. United States that a taxpayer must recognize prepaid income when received, even though this would mismatch expenses and revenues in contravention of “generally accepted commercial accounting principles.” 367 U. S., at 690. “[T]o say that in performing the function of business accounting the method employed by the Association ‘is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles and practices,’ ” the Court concluded, “is not to hold that for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects income as to be binding on the Treasury.” Id., at 693. “[W]e are mindful that the characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on the one hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be the same.” Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561, 577 (1978). See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U. S. 1, 15 (1974). Indeed, the Court’s cases demonstrate that divergence between tax and financial accounting is especially common when a taxpayer seeks a current deduction for estimated future expenses or losses. E. g., Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U. S. 446 (1959) (reserve to cover contingent liability in event of nonperformance of guarantee); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193 (1934) (reserve to cover expected liability for unearned commissions on anticipated insurance policy cancellations); Lucas v. American Code Co., supra (reserve to cover expected liability on contested lawsuit). The rationale of these cases amply encompasses Thor’s aim. By its president’s concession, the company’s write-down of “excess” inventory was founded on the belief that many of the articles inevitably would become useless due to breakage, technological change, fluctuations in market demand, and the like. Thor, in other words, sought a current “deduction” for an estimated future loss. Under the decided cases, a taxpayer so circumstanced finds no shelter beneath an accountancy presumption. Third, the presumption petitioner postulates is insupportable in light of the vastly different objectives that financial and tax accounting have. The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to management, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility of the accountant is to protect these parties from being misled. The primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of revenue; the major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc. Consistently with its goals and responsibilities, financial accounting has as its foundation the principle of conservatism, with its corollary that “possible errors in measurement [should] be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net income and net assets.” In view of the Treasury's markedly different goals and responsibilities, understatement of income is not destined to be its guiding light. Given this diversity, even contrariety, of objectives, any presumptive equivalency between tax and financial accounting would be unacceptable. This difference in objectives is mirrored in numerous differences of treatment. Where the tax law requires that a deduction be deferred until “all the events” have occurred that will make it fixed and certain, United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422, 441 (1926), accounting principles typically require that a liability be accrued as soon as it can reasonably be estimated. Conversely, where the tax law requires that income be recognised currently under “claim of right,” “ability to pay,” and “control” rationales, accounting principles may defer accrual until a later year so that revenues and expenses may be better matched. Financial accounting, in short, is hospitable to estimates, probabilities, and reasonable certainties; the tax law, with its mandate to preserve the revenue, can give no quarter to uncertainty. This is as it should be. Reasonable estimates may be useful, even essential, in giving shareholders and creditors an accurate picture of a firm’s overall financial health; but the accountant’s conservatism cannot bind the Commissioner in his efforts to collect taxes. “Only a few reserves voluntarily established as a matter of conservative accounting,” Mr. Justice Brandéis wrote for the Court, “are authorized by the Revenue Acts.” Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S., at 201-202. Finally, a presumptive equivalency between tax and financial accounting would create insurmountable difficulties of tax administration. Accountants long have recognized that “generally accepted accounting principles” are far from being a canonical set of rules that will ensure identical accounting treatment of identical transactions. “Generally accepted accounting principles,” rather, tolerate a range of “reasonable” treatments, leaving the choice among alternatives to management. Such, indeed, is precisely the case here. Variances of this sort may be tolerable in financial reporting, but they are questionable in a tax system designed to ensure as far as possible that similarly situated taxpayers pay the same tax. If management’s election among “acceptable” options were dispositive for tax purposes, a firm, indeed, could decide unilaterally — within limits dictated only by its accountants — the tax it wished to pay. Such unilateral decisions would not just make the Code inequitable; they would make it unenforceable. D Thor complains that a decision adverse to it poses a dilemma. According to the taxpayer, it would be virtually impossible for it to offer objective evidence of its “excess” inventory's lower value, since the goods cannot be sold at reduced prices; even if they could be sold, says Thor, their reduced-price sale would just “pull the rug out” from under the identical “non-excess” inventory Thor is trying to sell simultaneously. The only way Thor could establish the inventory’s value by a “closed transaction” would be to scrap the articles at once. Yet immediate scrapping would be undesirable, for demand for the parts ultimately might prove greater than anticipated. The taxpayer thus sees itself presented with “an unattractive Hobson’s choice: either the unsalable inventory must be carried for years at its cost instead of net realizable value, thereby overstating taxable income by such overvaluation until it is scrapped, or the excess inventory must be scrapped prematurely to the detriment of the manufacturer and its customers.” Brief for Petitioner 25. If this is indeed the dilemma that confronts Thor, it is in reality the same choice that every taxpayer who has a paper loss must face. It can realize its loss now and garner its tax benefit, or it can defer realization, and its deduction, hoping for better luck later. Thor, quite simply, has suffered no present loss. It deliberately manufactured its “excess” spare parts because it judged that the marginal cost of unsalable inventory would be lower than the cost of retooling machinery should demand surpass expectations. This was a rational business judgment and, not unpredictably, Thor now has inventory it believes it cannot sell. Thor, of course, is not so confident of its prediction as to be willing to scrap the “excess” parts now; it wants to keep them on hand, just in case. This, too, is a rational judgment, but there is no reason why the Treasury should subsidize Thor’s hedging of its bets. There is also no reason why Thor should be entitled, for tax purposes, to have its cake and to eat it too. i — I The Bad-Debt Issue A Deductions for bad debts are covered by § 166 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 166. Section 166 (a)(1) sets forth the general rule that a deduction is allowed for “any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.” Alternatively, the Code permits an accrual-basis taxpayer to account for bad debts by the reserve method. This is implemented by § 166 (c), which states that “[i]n lieu of any deduction under subsection (a), there shall be allowed (in the discretion of the [Commissioner]) a deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts.” A “reasonable” addition is the amount necessary to bring the reserve balance up to the level that can be expected to cover losses properly anticipated on debts outstanding at the end of the tax year. At all times pertinent, Thor has used the reserve method. Its reserve at the beginning of 1965 was approximately $93,000. See 64 T. C., at 162. During 1965, Thor’s new management undertook a stringent review of accounts receivable. In the company’s rubber division, credit personnel studied all accounts; a 100% reserve was set up for two accounts deemed wholly uncollectible, and a 1% reserve was established for all other receivables. Ibid. In the tool division, credit clerks analyzed all accounts more than 90 days past due with balances over $100; a 100% reserve was established for accounts judged wholly uncollectible, and an identical collectibility ratio was applied to accounts under $100 of the same age. A flat 2% reserve was set up for accounts more than 30 days past due, and a 1 % reserve for all other accounts. Id., at 162-163. These judgments, approved by three levels of management, indicated that $136,150 should be added to the bad-debt reserve, bringing its balance at year-end to a figure slightly below $229,000. Id., at 162. Thor claimed this $136,150 as a deduction under § 166 (c). The Commissioner ruled that the deduction was excessive. He computed what he believed to be a “reasonable” addition to Thor’s reserve by using the “six-year moving average” formula derived from the decision in Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A. 300 (1940), aff’d on other grounds, 125 F. 2d 977 (CA6 1942). This formula seeks to ascertain a “reasonable” addition to a bad-debt reserve in light of the taxpayer’s recent chargeoff history. In this case, the formula indicated that, for the years 1960-1965, Thor’s annual charge-offs of bad debts amounted, on the average, to 3.128% of its year-end receivables. 64 T. C., at 163. Applying that percentage to Thor’s 1965 year-end receivables, the Commissioner determined that $154,156.80 of accounts receivable could reasonably be expected to default. The amount required to bring Thor’s reserve up to this level was $61,359.20, and the Commissioner decided that this was a “reasonable” addition. Accordingly, he disallowed the remaining $74,790.80 of Thor’s claimed § 166 (c) deduction. Both the Tax Court, 64 T. C., at 174-175, and the Seventh Circuit, 563 F. 2d, at 870, held that the Commissioner had not abused his discretion in so ruling. B Section 166 (c) states that a deduction for an addition to a bad-debt reserve is to be allowed “in the discretion” of the Commissioner. Consistently with this statutory language, the courts uniformly have held that the Commissioner’s determination of a “reasonable” (and hence deductible) addition must be sustained unless the taxpayer proves that the Commissioner abused his discretion. The taxpayer is said to bear a “heavy burden” in this respect. He must show not only that his own computation is reasonable but also that the Commissioner’s computation is unreasonable and arbitrary. Since it first received the approval of the Tax Court in 1940, the Black Motor bad-debt formula has enjoyed the favor of all three branches of the Federal Government. The formula has been employed consistently by the Commissioner, approved by the courts, and collaterally recognized by the Congress. Thor faults the Black Motor formula because of its retrospectivity: By ascertaining current additions to a reserve by reference to past chargeoff experience, the formula assertedly penalizes taxpayers who have delayed in making writeoffs in the past, or whose receivables have just recently begun to deteriorate. Petitioner’s objection is not altogether irrational, but it falls short of rendering the formula arbitrary. Common sense suggests that a firm’s recent credit experience offers a reasonable index of the credit problems it may suffer currently. And the formula possesses the not inconsiderable advantage of enhancing certainty and predictability in an area peculiarly susceptible of taxpayer abuse. In any event, after its 40 years of near-universal acceptance, we are not inclined to disturb the Black Motor formula now. Granting that Black Motor in principle is valid, then, the only question is whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in invoking the formula in this case. Of course, there will be cases — indeed, the Commissioner has acknowledged that there are cases, see Rev. Rul. 76-362, 1976-2 Cum. Bull. 45, 46 — in which the formula will generate an arbitrary result. If a taxpayer’s most recent bad-debt experience is unrepresentative for some reason, a formula using that experience as data cannot be expected to produce a “reasonable” addition for the current year. If the taxpayer suffers an extraordinary credit reversal (the bankruptcy of a major customer, for example), the “six-year moving average” formula will fail. In such a case, where the taxpayer can point to conditions that will cause future debt collections to be less likely than in the past, the taxpayer is entitled to — and the Commissioner is prepared to allow — an addition larger than Black Motor would call for. See Rev. Rul. 76-362, supra. In this case, however, as the Tax Court found, Thor “did not show that conditions at the end of 1965 would cause collection of accounts receivable to be less likely than in prior years.” 64 T. C., at 175. Indeed, the Tax Court “infer [red] from the entire record that collectibility was probably more likely at the end of 1965 than it was [previously] because new management had been infused into petitioner” (emphasis added). Thor cited no changes in the conditions of business generally or of its customers specifically that would render the Black Motor formula unreliable; new management just came in and second-guessed its predecessor, taking a “tougher” approach. Management’s pessimism may not have been unreasonable, but the Commissioner had the discretion to take a more sanguine view. For these reasons, we agree with the Tax Court and with the Court of Appeals that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in recomputing a “reasonable” addition to Thor’s bad-debt reserve according to the Black Motor formula. Thor failed to carry its “heavy burden” of showing why the application of that formula would have been arbitrary in this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Tn August 1964, Stewart-Warner Corp., Thor’s principal shareholder (owning approximately 20% of petitioner’s outstanding common shares), agreed with Thor to purchase substantially all of Thor’s assets. Its ensuing examination and audit led Stewart-Warner to conclude that petitioner’s assets were substantially overstated and its liabilities understated. The purchase agreement then was rescinded and Stewart-Warner agreed, instead, to provide management assistance to Thor. Both in. his brief, Brief for Respondent 6, 17, 30-31, and at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 24r-25, the Commissioner has maintained that the reason for the allowance of Thor’s $2.75 million writeoff was that the items were scrapped soon after they were written off. The Court of Appeals accepted this explanation. 563 F. 2d 861, 864 (1977). Thor challenges its factual predicate, and asserts that 40% of the obsolete parts in fact remained unscrapped as late as the end of 1967. Reply Brief for Petitioner 8. The record does not enable us to resolve this factual dispute; in any event, we must accept the Commissioner’s explanation at face value. The inventory items broke down as follows: Raw materials 4,297 Work-in-prooess 1,781 Finished parts and accessories 33,670 Finished tools 4,344 Total number of inventory items 44,092 64 T. C., at 158. The operation of Thor’s aging formula is well illustrated by a chart set forth in the opinion of the Tax Court. Id., at 159. The chart assumes that 100 units of each of five hypothetical items were on hand at the end of 1964, but that the number of units sold or used in that year varied from 20-100: ANticipated Demand units on units sold Rand at or used Item 12-31-64 in 1964 0-12 Months 13-18 Months 19-24 Months + 24 Months Percent of •write-down [ A XXX XX XX X ]% 0 10 50% 5 10 75% 7.5 60 100% 60 :72.5 B 100 40 40 0% 0 20 50% 10 20 75% 15 20 100% 20 = 45.0 100 60 60 0% 0 30 50% 15 10 75% 7.5 0 100% 0 = 22.5 D 100 80 80 0% 0 20 50% 10 0 75% 0 0 100% 0 = 10.0 E 100 100 100 0% 0 0 60% 0 0 75% 0 0 100% 0 = 0.0 “So here is where I fell back on my experience of 20 years in manufacturing of trying to determine a reasonable basis for evaluating this inventory. In my previous association, we had generally written off inventory that was in excess of one year. In this case, we felt that that would be overly conservative, and it might understate the value of the inventory. On the other hand, we felt that two years . . . would be too optimistic and that we would overvalue the inventory [in view of] the factors which affect inventory, such as technological change, market changes, and the like, that two years, in our opinion, was too long a period of time. “So what we did is we came up with a formula which was somewhat in between . . . writing off, say, everything over one year as compared to writing everything [off] over two years, and we came up with this formula that has been referred to in this Court today.” App. 57. This write-down was formulated as follows: Write-down Amount Write-down Type of Inventory Percentage $26,341 (1) tool parts and motor parts at plant A (2) raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods at plants A and B 10 ai of 05 (3) hardware items at plant A 50 DCO ^ CO $160,832 64 T. C., at 159-160; App. 209. The Tax Court found that the finished tools were too specialized to attract bargain hunters; that no one would buy spare parts, regardless of price, unless they were needed to fix broken tools; that work-in-process had no value except as scrap; and that other manufacturers would not buy raw materials in the secondary market. 64 T. C., at 160-161. It appears that 78% of the "excess” inventory at two of Thor’s plants was scrapped between 1965-1971. Id., at 161; App. 218. For a manufacturing concern like Thor, Gross Profit basically -equals Sales minus Cost of Goods Sold. Cost of Goods Sold equals Opening Inventory, plus Cost of Inventory Acquired, minus Closing Inventory. A reduction of Closing Inventory, therefore, increases Cost of Goods Sold and decreases Gross Profit accordingly. The Regulations define “method of accounting” to include “not only the over-all method of accounting of the taxpayer but also the accounting treatment of any item.” Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a)(1), 26 CFR § 1.446-1 (a)(1) (1964). See 64 T. C., at 166; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-19. Even if Thor had made a timely challenge to the Regulations, it is well established, of course, that they still “ ‘must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes/ and ‘should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.’” Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U. S. 741, 750 (1969), quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U. S. 496, 501 (1948). As an alternative to his argument that Thor’s write-down was inconsistent with the Regulations, the Commissioner argues that he was justified in disallowing the write-down in any event because it constituted a “change of accounting method” for which Thor failed to obtain the Commissioner’s prior consent, as required by §446 (e), 26 U. S. C. §446 (e). The Regulations define a change of accounting method to include “a change in the treatment of a material item.” Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (e)(2)(i), 26 CFR § 1.446-1 (e) (2) (i) (1964). In view of our disposition of the case, we need not reach this alternative contention. E. g., D. Loveman & Son Export Oorp. v. Commissioner, 34 T. C. 776, 796 (1960), aff’d, 296 F. 2d 732 (CA6 1961), cert. denied, 369 U. S. 860 (1962). See Sehnelwar & Jurgensen, The New Inventory Regulations in Operation and Other Inventory Valuation Considerations, 33 N. Y. U. Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1077, 1093-1094 (1975); AICPA Accounting Principles Board, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, ch. 4, Statement 6 (1953), reprinted in 2 APB Accounting Principles 6016 (1973). Judge Raum emphasized in D. Loveman & Son that “market” ordinarily means the price the taxpayer must pay to replace the inventory; “it does not mean the price at which such merchandise is resold or offered for resale.” 34 T. C., at 796. Thor seeks to justify its write-down by citing Space Controls, Inc. v. Commissioner, 322 F. 2d 144 (CA5 1963), and similar cases. In Space Controls, the taxpayer manufactured trailers under a fixed-price contract with the Government; it was stipulated that the trailers were suitable only for military use and had no value apart from the contract. The taxpayer experienced cost overruns and sought to write down its inventory by the amount by which its cost exceeded the contract sales price. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, held that the write-down was authorized by Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4 (b), reasoning that the taxpayer in effect had offered the trailers for sale by way of the fixed-price contract. 322 F. 2d, at 151. While not necessarily approving the Fifth Circuit’s decision to dispense with the “actual sale” rule of § 1.471-4 (b), we note that that case is distinguishable from this one. In Space Controls, the fixed-price contract offered objective evidence of reduced inventory value; the taxpayer in the present case provided no objective evidence of reduced inventory value at all. Petitioner’s reliance at oral argument on United States Cartridge Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 511 (1932), is, we think, similarly misplaced. The taxpayer in that case manufactured ammunition for the Government during World War I. In 1918 the taxpayer was instructed to stop production immediately, with a provision that settlement of its claims for unfinished and undelivered ammunition would be negotiated later. At the end of its taxable calendar year 1918, the ammunition was unsalable at normal prices and settlement negotiations had not yet begun; the taxpayer, accordingly, wrote down its 1918 closing inventory to “market,” which was agreed to be $232,000. Id., at 519. The question was whether the taxpayer, in computing its 1918 taxable income, should value its inventory at that figure, or at $732,000, the sum it ultimately realized upon settlement of its claims with the Army in 19201-1922. This Court held that, in accordance with the annual accounting principle, market value controlled, noting that the taxpayer at the end of 1918 “had no assurance as to what settlements finally would be made or that it ever would receive more than the then market value of the inventories.” Id., at 520. This case, we think, may be said to support, rather than to conflict with, the result we reach here. Just as Thor cannot write down its inventory, in the absence of objective evidence of lower value, because of an anticipated future loss, so the taxpayer in United States Cartridge could not be required to write up its inventory, in the absence of objective evidence of higher value, because of an anticipated future gain. In this respect, at least, tax accounting travels a two-way street. See, e. g., H. R. Doc. No. 140, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1961) (the President’s tax message); B. Bittker & L. Stone, Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxation 843 (4th ed. 1972); Skinner, Inventory Valuation Problems, 50 Taxes 748-749 (1972); Schwaigart, Increasing IRS Emphasis on Inventories Stresses Need for Proper Practices, 19 J. Tax. 66,69 (1963). The Commissioner also contends that Thor’s write-down of “excess” inventory was prohibited by Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2 (f), 26 CFR § 1.471-2 (f) (1964). That section states: “The following methods ... are not in accord with the regulations in this part: “(1) Deducting from the inventory ... an estimated depreciation in the value thereof. “(2) Taking work in process, or other parts of the inventory, at a nominal price or at less than its proper value. “(3) Omitting portions of the stock on hand.” See Rev. Rul. 77-364, 1977-2 Cum. Bull. 183 (percentage write-down of “slow” and “doubtful” inventory violates § 1.471-2 (f) (1)); Rev. Rul. 77-228, 1977-2 Cum. Bull. 182 (deduction from closing inventory of “excess” items still retained for sale violates § 1.471-2 (f) (3)). The Court of Appeals and the Tax Court did not consider these contentions. In view of our disposition, we need not consider them either. Until 1973, § 1.471-2 (b) of the applicable Regulations provided in pertinent part: “In order clearly to reflect income, the inventory practice of' a taxpayer should be consistent from year to year, and greater weight is to be given to consistency than to any particular method of inventorying or basis of valuation so long as the method or basis used is substantially in accord with §§ 1.471-1 to 1.471-9. An inventory that can be used under the best accounting practice in a balance sheet showing the financial position of the taxpayer can, as a general rule, be regarded as clearly reflecting his income.” The inventory Regulations were amended in 1973 to require most taxpayers engaged in manufacturing to use the “full absorption method of inventory costing,” currently set forth in § 1.471-11. T. D. 7285, 1973-2 Cum. Bull. 163, 164; 26 CFR § 1.471-11 (1978). As part of these amendments, the final sentence of § 1.471-2 (b) — containing the “as a general rule” language — was deleted; further, the requirement that inventory practices be “substantially in accord with §§ 1.471-1 to 1479-9” was revised to require that such methods be “in accord with §§ 1.471-1 through 1471-11.” 26 CFR § 1.471-2 (b) (1978) (emphasis added). The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals both determined that the 1973 amendments to § 1.471-2 (b) were inapplicable to this case. 64 T. C., at 167; 563 F. 2d, at 866 n. 11. We agree. “I think it is pretty obvious that [inventory representing a 10-year supply] has inherently less value [than inventory representing a 1-year supply] because of the things that can happen to the inventory. Some of it will be lost. Some of it may become damaged. Some of it will become obsolete because of the technological change. Some won’t be sold because of the fact that you have market changes. So we were confronted with the problem, as anybody in the manufacturing field [would be], of trying to develop a relationship between inventory quantity and anticipated usage.” App. 56-57 (testimony of Thor’s president). AICPA Accounting Principles Board, Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises ¶ 171 (1970), reprinted in 2 APB Accounting Principles 9089 (1973). See Sterling, Conservatism: The Fundamental Principle of Valuation in Traditional Accounting, 3 Abacus 109-113 (1967). Accord, Raby & Richter, Conformity of Tax and Financial Accounting, 139 J. Accountancy 42, 44, 48 (Mar. 1975); Arnett, Taxable Income vs. Financial Income: How Much Uniformity Can We Stand?, 44 Accounting Rev. 482, 485-487, 492-493 (July 1969); Cannon, Tax Pressures on Accounting Principles and Accountants’ Independence, 27 Accounting Rev. 419, 419-422 (1952). See, e. g., McClure, Diverse Tax Interpretations of Accounting Concepts, 142 J. Accountancy 67, 68-69 (Oct. 1976); Kupfer, The Financial Accounting Disclosure of Tax Matters; Conflicts With Tax Accounting Technical Requirements, 33 N. Y. U. Inst, on Fed. Tax. 1121, 1122 (1975); Healy, Narrowing the Gap Between Tax and Financial Accounting, 22 Tulane Tax Inst. 407, 417 (1973); A Challenge: Can the Accounting Profession Lead the Tax System?, 126 J. Accountancy 66, 68-69 (Sept. 1968). E. g., Raby & Richter, supra, at 44; Arnett, supra, at 486; 126 J. Accountancy, supra, at 68. Arnett, supra, at 492 (noting that there are “many and diverse ‘acceptable’ practices in valuing inventories, depreciating assets, amortizing or not amortizing goodwill,” and the like); 126 J. Accountancy, supra, at 69 (noting that “methods of determining inventory costs vary widely and various methods, if consistently applied,'will be acceptable for accounting purposes”); Eaton, Financial Reporting in a Changing Society, 104 J. Accountancy 25, 26 (Aug. 1957); Cox, Conflicting Concepts of Income for Managerial and Federal Income Tax Purposes, 33 Accounting Rev. 242 (1958); Cannon, supra, at 421 (suggesting that accountants “are quite prone to define 'generally accepted’ as ‘somebody tried it’ ”). Thor’s experts did not testify that the company’s write-down procedures were the only “generally accepted accounting practice.” They testified merely that Thor’s inventory needed to be written down, and that the formulae Thor used constituted a “reasonable” way of doing this. App. 166, 184, 196. The details of the calculation are set out in Black Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A., at 302. See 2 CCH 1978 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 1624.0992; Whitman, Gilbert, & Picotte, The Black Motor Bad Debt Formula: Why It Doesn’t Work and How to Adjust It, 35 J. Tax. 366 (1971). Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. United States, 568 F. 2d 474, 477 (CA6 1978); Business Dev. Corp. of N. C. v. United States, 428 F. 2d 451, 453 (CA4), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 957 (1970); United States v. Haskel Engineering & Supply Co., 380 F. 2d 786, 789 (CA9 1967); Patterson v. Pizitz, Inc., 353 F. 2d 267, 270 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 910 (1966); Ehlen v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 35, 42, 323 F. 2d 535, 539 (1963); James A. Messer Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T. C. 848, 864r-865 (1972). Atlantic Discount Co. v. United States, 473 F. 2d 412, 414-415 (CA5 1973) (citing cases); Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F. 2d 829, 834 (CA7 1963). E. g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. United States, 568 F. 2d, at 477; First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner, 546 F. 2d 759, 761 (CA7 1976), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 915 (1977). See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 76-362, 1976-2 Cum. Bull. 45, 46 (“[A]s a general rule, the Black Motor formula may be used to determine a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts” under § 166 (e)). E. g., Atlantic Discount Co. v. United States, 473 F. 2d, at 413, 415; Ehlen v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl., at 45, 323 F. 2d, at 540-541; James A. Messer Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T. C., at 857, 865-866. See § 585 (b) (3) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 585 (b) (3) (using “six-year moving average” formula as alternative method of computing reasonable addition to bad-debt reserve for banks); §586 (b)(1) (using “six-year moving average” formula to compute reasonable addition to bad-debt reserve for small business investment companies). E. g., Westchester Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T. C. 198, 212 (1974), acq., 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 2 (Commissioner abused discretion in invoking Black Motor where taxpayer’s recent bad-debt experience was “wholly unrepresentative” given its “comparatively brief operational history”). E. g., Calavo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 304 F. 2d 650, 651-652, 654 n. 4, 655 (CA9 1962) (extraordinary addition to reserve to cover losses on accounts due from debtor who recently became insolvent). Indeed, as has been noted, a significant portion of Thor’s addition to its reserve reflected blanket aging of accounts. Both the Treasury, Rev. Rul. 76-362, 1976-2 Cum. Bull. 45, 46, and the courts, United. States v. Haskel Engineering & Supply Co., 380 F. 2d, at 787, 789; James A. Messer Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T. C., at 857, 866, have held that such mechanical formulae are inadequate to overcome the Commissioner’s discretionary invocation of Black Motor under § 166 (c).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHWEIKER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. HOGAN et al. No. 81-213. Argued March 24, 1982 Decided June 21, 1982 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. George W. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, William Kanter, Bruce G. Forrest, Lynne K. Zusman, and Robert P. Jaye. William H. Simon, by appointment of the Court, 454 U. S. 1051, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Mark Coven, Gill Deford, and Gary Bellow. Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Mitchell J. Sikora, Jr., and Paul W. Johnson, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as amicus curiae urging reversal. Bruce K. Miller and Dennis Caraher filed a brief for the Massachusetts Association of Older Americans as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case are the meaning and validity of § 1903(f) of the Social Security Act, 81 Stat. 898, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(f). As applied in Massachusetts, that provision results in a distribution of Medicaid benefits to recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) — a class of aged, blind, or disabled persons who lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs — that is more generous than the distribution of such benefits to persons who are self-supporting. Appellees are members of the latter class. Because they must incur medical expenses — for which they are never reimbursed — before they become eligible for Medicaid, they have less income available for their nonmedical needs than the recipients of SSI. The District Court concluded that this discrimination was irrational and held that § 1903(f) was unconstitutional. Hogan v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 1129 (Mass. 1980). We disagree and reverse. The statutory provisions governing the Medicaid program are complex. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). We first consider the history of the specific provisions at issue in this case, then relate the circumstances that gave rise to the present controversy, and finally address the two legal issues that are presented. I Section 1903(f) of the Social Security Act (Act) was enacted in 1968. To understand the present controversy, however, it is necessary to consider amendments to the Act made in 1965, 1967, and 1972. A The Medicaid program was established in 1965 in Title XIX of the Act “for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons;” Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 301. Section 1902(a)(10) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10), sets forth the basic scope of the program, which has not changed significantly from its enactment in 1965. See 79 Stat. 345. Participating States are required to provide Medicaid coverage to certain individuals — now described as the “categorically needy”; at their option States also may provide coverage (and receive partial federal reimbursement) to other individuals — described as the “medically needy.” See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 37. These classes are defined by reference to other federal assistance programs. In 1965, federal assistance programs existed for the aged, the blind, the disabled, and families with dependent children. At that time, each of these programs was administered by the States, which established both the “standard of need” and the “level of benefits.” See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397. In establishing the Medicaid program, Congress required participating States to provide medical assistance to individuals who received cash payments under one of these assistance programs. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a) (10)(A). The House Report explained: “These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for medical care costs to be met, first, for these people.” They are the “categorically needy.” Congress also provided that a participating State could offer Medicaid benefits to individuals who. fell within one of the categories for which federal assistance was available but whose income made them ineligible for aid under those programs. These individuals were deemed “less needy” and could receive assistance only if their income and resources were insufficient “to meet the costs of necessary medical or remedial care and services.” 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C). In 1965, no limit was placed on the extent to which federal reimbursement was available for optional coverage that States elected to provide to these persons who might become “medically needy.” Since States established the income limits for the categorical assistance programs, they also established the income limits for the “categorically needy” under the Medicaid program. In addition, participating States established the eligibility standards for the optional coverage provided to the “medically needy.” In § 1902(a)(17) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a)(17), however, Congress set forth certain requirements governing state standards for determining eligibility. In particular, Congress required States to “provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law.” 79 Stat. 346; see 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17). Most States promptly elected to participate in the Medicaid program. Many of these States also chose to provide Medicaid coverage to the “medically needy.” Within a year, Congress recognized that it was fiscally improvident to rely exclusively on the States to set income limits for both aspects of the Medicaid program. See H. R. Rep. No. 2224, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1966). It cautioned States “to avoid unrealistic levels of income and resources for title XIX eligibility purposes.” Id., at 3. B In 1967, Congress placed a limit on federal participation in the Medicaid program. Representative Mills introduced a bill, sponsored by the Johnson administration, that would have made significant changes in both the Medicaid program and the categorical assistance programs. H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Under §220 of H. R. 5710, a State participating in the Medicaid program would have been entitled to receive federal financial assistance for providing Medicaid benefits only to those persons whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than 150% of the highest of the State’s categorical assistance standards of need. Section 202 of the bill would have required States to revise annually the standards of need under each of the categorical assistance programs to reflect changes in the costs of living and, in some circumstances, to pay 100% of the standard of need established under the programs. In support of this provision, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare explained that “33 States provide less support for needy children [under the AFDC program] than the standards the States themselves have set as necessary to meet basic human needs.” After extensive consideration, the House Ways and Means Committee reported out a substantially revised bill. H. R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Committee Report described its primary proposed limitation on federal participation: “Your committee is proposing . . . that Federal sharing will not be available for families whose income exceeds 133 Vs percent of the highest amount ordinarily paid to a family of the same size (without any income and resources) in the form of money payments under the AFDC program. (AFDC income limits are, generally speaking, the lowest that are used in the categorical assistance programs).” 1967 House Report, at 119. As noted, see n. 10, supra, the amount of benefits paid in many States was less than the qualifying standard of need. The Committee Report explained the reasons for the move to limit federal participation in the Medicaid program. After noting that a few States had provided benefits beyond that anticipated by Congress, it stated: “Your committee expected that the State plans submitted under title XIX would afford better medical care and services to persons unable to pay for adequate care. It neither expected nor intended that such care would supplant health insurance presently carried or presently provided under collective bargaining agreements for individuals and families in or close to an average income range. Your committee is also concerned that the operation of some State plans may greatly reduce the incentives for persons aged 65 or over to participate in the supplementary medical insurance program [Medicare] of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, which was also established by the Social Security Amendments of 1965. The provisions of the bill are directed toward eliminating, insofar as Federal sharing is concerned, these clearly unintended and, in your committee’s judgment, undesirable actual and potential effects of the legislation.” Id., at 118. In States that paid less than 75% of the AFDC standard of need, the House provision would have provided Medicaid benefits only to persons whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than the AFDC standard of need. The Committee proposal was severely criticized on the House floor. It nevertheless was passed by the House and sent to the Senate. The Senate returned a substantially different bill and the matter was referred to conference. The Conference Committee adopted the House 13873% AFDC payment standard. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (1967). It added, however, an express exception for the categorically needy. Ibid. Opposition to the Conference proposal was voiced in both the House and the Senate. The 133 Vs% AFDC payment standard nevertheless was approved by Congress and enacted into law as § 1903(f) of the Social Security Act. See 81 Stat. 898, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1396b(f). c In 1972, Congress replaced three of the four state-administered categorical assistance programs with a new federal program entitled Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The SSI program establishes a federally guaranteed minimum income for the aged, blind, and disabled. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 223. Under the program, however, the States may (and in some cases must) raise that minimum standard and supplement the benefits provided by the Federal Government. See 42 U. S. C. § 1382e (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Moreover, if supplemental payments are made to persons who would be eligible for SSI benefits except for the amount of their income, the State also may provide Medicaid benefits to those persons. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii). H hH The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program and to provide benefits— to the extent that federal financial assistance is available — to the “medically needy.” The State also has elected to make supplementary payments to individuals who are eligible for SSI benefits or who would be eligible except for their income. Finally, the State has chosen to provide Medicaid benefits to those persons who receive supplemental payments. In Massachusetts, 13373% of the appropriate state AFDC payment amount is less in some cases than the combined federal SSI and state supplementary payment level. Appellees filed this suit in 1980 in federal court, contending that § 1903(f) of the Act — as applied in Massachusetts — violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Each of the appellees is either aged, blind, or disabled, but they are not categorically needy. For each ap-pellee or his spouse was employed at one time and paid “Social Security” taxes. Each appellee (or his spouse) currently receives Social Security benefits (Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, 42 U. S. C. §401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)) in an amount that renders him ineligible for either SSI benefits or state supplementary payments. Appellees challenged the fact that, since 13373% of the Massachusetts AFDC payment level is for them lower than the SSI payment level, they are ineligible for Medicaid until their income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, is less than that of SSI payment recipients. By reason of the Social Security benefits that they receive, appellees thus have less income available for nonmedical expenses than individuals who — possibly because they never worked and receive no Social Security benefits — are dependent upon public assistance for support. The District Court granted appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment. It ruled that the Massachusetts Medicaid program was unconstitutional insofar as it forced Social Security recipients to incur medical expenses that reduced their remaining income to an amount below SSI payment levels. The court later declared explicitly that § 1903(f) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(f), is unconstitutional as applied in Massachusetts. App. to Juris. Statement 25a. We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 891. III In this Court, for the first time, appellees contend that the Social Security Act itself compels the conclusion that, if Medicaid services are provided to the “medically needy,” those persons may not be forced to incur medical expenses that would reduce their remaining income below the applicable public assistance standard. Although appellees did not advance this argument in the District Court, they are not precluded from asserting it as a basis on which to affirm that court’s judgment. “Where a party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the constitutional issue.” Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 137. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 306-307. Appellees contend that a “fundamental Congressional purpose in the creation of the medically needy feature of Title XIX was to achieve equity between public assistance recipients and others similarly situated.” Brief for Appellees 12. In support of this contention, appellees cite the requirement first imposed in 1965 that States “include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all groups) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan . . . ,” 79 Stat. 346 (emphasis added), as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17), and note the statements in the legislative history that a State could not require an individual to use, for medical expenses, income “which would bring the individual below the test of eligibility under the State plan.” See n. 7, supra. Moreover, appellees contend that this “comparability requirement” was not changed by the enactment of § 1903(f) in 1968. Appellees argue that the separate bills passed in both the House and the Senate would have affected both the categorically and the medically needy. Only when the Conference Committee accepted the House provision and added an exception for the categorically needy, appellees argue, did the 1968 modification potentially change the comparability requirement between the two groups. Appellees assert that such a change was not intended; rather, they argue that the exception for the categorically needy was added only to ensure that they would not be adversely affected by § 1908(f). Appellees assert that the medically needy were not similarly excepted from the 13373% rule in those States in which that figure was less than the applicable standard of need because, in 1967, those States did not have medically needy programs. Thus, appellees urge that we construe § 1903(f) to require the medically needy to incur medical expenses until their income is 133V3% of the AFDC payment amount or — to maintain comparability — 100% of the combined SSI-state supplementary payment level if that figure is higher. Appellees argue that the legislative history of the 1965 and 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act justifies a departure from the literal language of § 1903(f) and the Secretary’s interpretation of that provision. We cannot agree. Congress explicitly stated in § 1903(f) that federal reimbursement for benefits provided to the medically needy was available only if the income of those persons, after the deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than 13373% of the state AFDC payment level. In specifically excepting the categorically needy from this rule, Congress recognized that this amount could be lower than categorical assistance eligibility levels. There is no basis in either the statute or the legislative history for appellees’ argument that Congress implicitly “assumed” that those States in which 13373% of the AFDC payment level was less than the applicable standard of need simply would not provide assistance to the medically needy. Even if this were true in 1967, the Medicaid program then was less than two years old; Congress was aware that many States were in the process of adopting Medicaid programs. To assume that Congress was unaware that § 1903(f) — which applied only to the medically needy — could operate in those States — which Congress knew existed — in which 13373% of the AFDC payment amount was less than the applicable standard of need is to demean the intelligence of the Congress. We are not prepared to interpret a statute on the basis of an unsupported assumption that Congress had little idea of what it was doing. The literal and clear language of § 1903(f) does not conflict with any other provision of the Act. In both § 1902(a)(10) and §1902(a)(17), see 79 Stat. 345-346, Congress required comparability among the various “categories” for which federal assistance was available, but these provisions did not require that the medically needy be treated comparably to the categorically needy in all respects. See n. 6, supra. Indeed, such a broad comparability requirement would be inconsistent with the fact that Congress provided in 1965 that the medically needy could be excluded entirely from the Medicaid program. Moreover, § 1903(f) is not inconsistent with the congressional intent, see n. 7, supra, that medical expenses be considered in determining, where appropriate, an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid. In § 1903(f) Congress determined that federal assistance would not be available for payments made to individuals whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was greater than 13373% of applicable state AFDC payments. Congress determined that, so long as an individual retained that level of income to meet basic needs, he need not receive reimbursement for medical expenses. That income level might appear unreasonably low, but it is the level that Congress chose. We find no inconsistency between § 1903(f) and § 1902(a)(17). In sum, we see no reason to ignore the literal language of § 1903(f). Moreover, this analysis is consistent with the Secretary’s interpretation of that statutory provision. “We have often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference.” Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 141. We hold that the discrimination challenged in this case is required by the Social Security Act. IV Appellees also contend — and the District Court held — that § 1903(f), as applied in Massachusetts, irrationally discriminates between the categorically and the medically needy. The unfairness of the statute stems from the fact that appel-lees receive less medical assistance, and have less income remaining for their nonmedical needs, than do SSI recipients. The unfairness is accentuated by the fact that the disfavored class consists largely of persons who worked and paid taxes to provide for their retirement while the favored class includes persons who may never have done so. Powerful equities unquestionably support the appellees’ claim of unfair treatment. A belief that an Act of Congress may be inequitable or unwise is of course an insufficient basis on which to conclude that it is unconstitutional. Moreover, the validity of a broad legislative classification is not properly judged by focusing solely on the portion of the disfavored class that is affected most harshly by its terms. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47. In this case, Congress has differentiated between the categorically needy — a class of aged, blind, disabled, or dependent persons who have very little income — and other persons with similar characteristics who are self-supporting. Members of the former class are automatically entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter class are not eligible unless a State elects to provide benefits to the medically needy and unless their income, after consideration of medical expenses, is below state standards of eligibility. According to the congressional scheme, then, the medically needy may be excluded entirely from the Medicaid program. Before considering the constitutional constraints that may exist if a State chooses to provide benefits to that class, it is appropriate to confront the more basic question whether the optional character of the program for the medically needy is itself constitutionally permissible. In establishing public assistance programs, Congress often has determined that the Federal Government cannot finance a program that provides meaningful benefits in equal measure to everyone. Both federal and state funds available for such assistance are limited. In structuring the Medicaid program, Congress chose to direct those limited funds to persons who were most impoverished and who — because of their physical characteristics — were often least able to overcome the effects of poverty. The legislative history of the 1965 Amendments makes clear that this group was not chosen for administrative convenience. “These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for medical care costs to be met, first, for these people.” A decision to allocate medical assistance benefits only to the poor does not itself violate constitutional principles of equality; in terms of their ability to provide for essential medical services, the wealthy and the poor are not similarly situated and need not be treated the same. It is rational to distribute public assistance benefits on the basis of the income and resources available to potential recipients. In choosing to require coverage only for the categorically needy, Congress permitted States to exclude from the program many persons who — by reason of large medical expenses — often were just as much in need of medical assistance as the categorically needy. Yet Congress found these persons “less needy.” 1965 House Report, at 66. By reason of the greater income available to them, as a class these persons generally are better able to provide for their medical needs. In the legislative history of the 1967 Amendments, see supra, at 577-580, and n. 14, Congress noted that these persons often are able to prepare for future medical expenses through private insurance or through participation in the Medicare program. In Fullington v. Shea, 404 U. S. 963, this Court affirmed a decision of a three-judge District Court holding that it was constitutional for the State of Colorado to provide benefits to the categorically needy but not to the medically needy. We decided Fullington summarily. It is clear that a decision to allocate scarce assistance benefits on the basis of an assumption that persons with greater incomes generally are better able to prepare for future medical needs is not inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal treatment. In other words, it is rational to define need on the basis of income, even though some persons with greater income — who have been unable or unwilling to save enough of their earnings to prepare for future medical needs — may actually be in greater need of assistance than those with less gross income. Although some “medically needy” persons have less income available for nonmedical expenses than those who receive categorical assistance, the broad legislative classification does not involve the type of arbitrariness that is constitutionally offensive. Appellees do not challenge the decision in Fullington. They do not contend that it is irrational to deny benefits entirely to the medically needy. Thus, they do not challenge the line drawn by Congress to separate the class that receives favored treatment from the class that does not. Ap-pellees attack only the manner in which one of the separate classes is affected by the program. They argue that if medical benefits are made available to a class of persons who are not categorically needy, it is constitutionally impermissible to deny them benefits if their income, after the deduction of incurred medical expenses, is lower than that of an individual who receives public assistance. In view of the unchallenged decision in Fullington, appel-lees’ constitutional argument is self-defeating. The injury that they regard as inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal treatment could be avoided by denying them all Medicaid benefits, thus placing them in a worse position financially than they are in now. No interest in “equality” could be furthered by such a result. If a State may deny all benefits to the medically needy — while providing benefits to the categorically needy and rendering some persons who are on public assistance better off than others who are not — a State surely may narrow the gap between the two classes by providing partial benefits to the medically needy, even though certain members of that class may remain in a position less fortunate than those on public assistance. The validity of the distinction between the categorically needy and the medically needy is not undermined by § 1903(f), because the impact of that provision falls entirely on persons who are not within the categorically needy class. See n. 30, supra. The function of the 13373% AFDC payment rule is to place a limit on the availability of reimbursement for potential members of the “medically needy” class. That rule prevents some persons (although not the appellees) from qualifying as medically needy; it also determines the extent to which the medically needy are reimbursed for their medical expenses. Yet appellees do not challenge the fact that, among persons who do not receive public assistance, some are treated differently from others. In other words, they do not complain of any discrimination within the class (all persons who are not categorically needy) in which the rule performs its entire function. Nor do they argue that Congress chose an eligibility level that is unrelated to ability to provide for medical needs. The fact that Massachusetts, unlike the State of Colorado in Fullington, has provided Medicaid benefits to the medically needy — and in doing so has defined eligibility for persons who are not categorically needy on the basis of incurred medical expenses — does not force it to make immediate medical need the sole standard in its entire Medicaid program. Massachusetts in essence has determined that those individuals whose gross income is greater than public assistance levels are ineligible for Medicaid, unless medical expenses in any computation period reduce available income to ISSfflo of the state AFDC payment level. By adding the qualifying clause, which the State of Colorado did not, Massachusetts did not offend any constitutional interest in equality. Accordingly, without endorsing the wisdom of the particular standard that Congress selected — a matter that is not for us to consider — we conclude that it violates no constitutional command. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. But see n. 18, infra. These programs were entitled: Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. (1970 ed.); Aid to the Blind, § 1201 et seq.; Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, § 1351 et seq.; and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), § 601 et seq. See also 42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970 ed.). These programs are of course fundamentally different from Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI or Social Security), 42 U. S. C. §401 et seq. In many States, the “level of benefits” did not raise an individual’s income to the “standard of need.” The standard of need determined eligibility for some benefits; often the benefits provided, however, were merely a fraction of the difference between the individual’s income and the defined standard of need. See Jefferson v. Hackney. The standards of need also typically varied from program to program. H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 66 (1965) (1965 House Report). Ibid. See also S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 77 (1965) (1965 Senate Report). The 1965 Act contained certain requirements governing the comparative treatment of different beneficiaries under the Act. It provided that the medical assistance afforded to an individual who qualified under any categorical assistance program could not be different from that afforded to an individual who qualified under any other program. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i). In other words, the amount, duration, and scope of medical assistance provided to an individual who qualified to receive assistance for the aged could not be different from the amount, duration, and scope of benefits provided to an individual who qualified to receive assistance for the blind. “This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy under the federally aided categories of assistance and will eliminate some of the unevenness which has been apparent in the treatment of the medical needs of various groups of the needy.” 1965 House Report, at 66. See also 1965 Senate Report, at 77. A similar “comparability” requirement among the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent applied to the optional distribution of benefits to the “medically needy.” If a State elected to provide benefits to one group, it was obligated to provide benefits to the others, and “the determination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recipients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance programs.” 1965 House Report, at 67; see also 1965 Senate Report, at 77. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i). In addition, the benefits provided to each categorical group of the medically needy were required to be equal in amount, duration, and scope. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii). In its provision for “comparability among the various categorical groups of needy people,” 1965 House Report, at 67, the Act required comparability in the criteria used to determine eligibility for each group. 79 Stat. 346, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17). See also 1965 House Report, at 67; 1965 Senate Report, at 77 (“Although States may set a limitation on income and resources which individuals may hold and be eligible for aid, they must do so by maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy people”). Finally, the Act provided that the assistance provided to the “medically needy” could not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than the assistance provided to the “categorically needy.” 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(ii). “This was included in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no less comprehensive care than those who are not as needy.” 1965 House Report, at 67; see also 1965 Senate Report, at 77. In its discussion of this portion of the statute, the 1965 House Report, at 68, explains: “The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted programs which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the individual’s income may be small when compared with the cost of the medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual’s income, your committee bill requires that the States standards for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the cost — whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise — incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both the State’s allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the medical care he requires.” See also 1965 Senate Report, at 78-79. To this extent, the House Report mirrors the statutory language. In further describing this provision, however, the 1965 House Report, at 68, immediately continues: “The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount. In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources which would bring the individual below the test of eligibility under the State plan. If the test of eligibility should be $2,000 a year, an individual with income in excess of that amount shall not be required to use his income to the extent he has remaining less than $2,000. This action would reduce the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for his maintenance.” See also 1965 Senate Report, at 79. This additional comment has no direct foundation in the statutory language of § 1902(a)(17). See 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17). See H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 117 (1967) (1967 House Report). This provision, of course, would have had no effect on the “categorically needy,” since their income was necessarily less than 150% of the highest categorical assistance standard of need. President’s Proposals for Revision in the Social Security System: Hearings on H. R. 5710 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 118 (1967). In January 1965, there were 21 States that paid less than 75% of the standard of need established for a family of four under the State’s AFDC program. Id., at 119. The proposed bill also provided another limit on federal participation. It included a provision that set “a figure of 133V;! percent of the average per capita income of a State as the upper limit on Federal sharing when applied to a family of four under the title XIX program.” 1967 House Report, at 119. It is noteworthy that these proposals were not an insignificant part of what was — admittedly—a complex bill. In setting forth at the outset the “principal purposes of the bill,” the House Report provides: “Fifth, to modify the program of medical assistance to establish certain limits on Federal participation in the program and to add flexibility in administration, the bill would— “(a) Impose a limitation on Federal matching at an income level related to payments for families receiving aid to families with dependent children or to the per capita-income of the State, if lower.”' Id., at 5. If the House bill applied to both the categorically needy and the medically needy, it could have resulted in the denial of Medicaid benefits to certain categorically needy individuals who — although eligible for assistance under the State’s standard of need — had an income that was higher than 133 V8% of the amount the State actually paid to a qualifying individual with no income. The House bill did not, however, alter § 1902(a)(10) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10), which required participating States to provide Medicaid benefits to all of the categorically needy. See 113 Cong. Rec. 23065 (1967) (remarks of Rep. King); id., at 23077 (remarks of Rep. Burke); id., at 23082 (remarks of Rep. Vanik); id., at 23084 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id., at 23087 (remarks of Rep. Halpem); id., at 23093 (remarks of Rep. Ryan); id., at 23104 (remarks of Rep. Bing-ham); id., at 23125 (remarks of Rep. Boland); id., at 23128 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). In particular, see id., at 23131 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein); id.., at 23083 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert); id., at 23092 (remarks of Rep. Burton). Representative Mills defended the bill against criticism that its treatment of those with income above the categorical assistance limit was unfair. He noted that it was “only because of what we walked into with this program that the committee has seen fit to put limits on it,” id., at 23093, and added: “I do not think it is fair to tax people through the general funds of the Treasury to pay for the medical costs of those who undoubtedly have the means to buy insurance and to defray their own medical costs.” Ibid. See also id., at 23061-23062 (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); id., at 23084-23085 (remarks of Rep. Hanley); id., at 23090 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); id., at 23090, 23091 (remarks of Rep. McCarthy); id., at 23105 (remarks of Rep. Taft); id., at 22783 (remarks of Rep. Quillen). In hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, an HEW official recommended that the administration’s proposal be adopted. He criticized the House bill and noted that, in States such as Indiana and Texas, 133% of the AFDC payment amount was less than the AFDC standard of need. Social Security Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 280 (1967). He pointed out that such a standard could result in exclusion of some of the categorically needy, which he suggested probably had not been intended. Ibid. Senator Robert Kennedy also criticized the House proposal, noting that medically needy individuals would not be eligible for Medicaid in some States until their income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than the standards of need established for the categorically needy. Id., at 784. The Finance Committee subsequently proposed a bill that provided participating States with federal assistance for Medicaid expenditures made on behalf of any person whose income after the deduction of medical expenses was less than 150% of the OAA standard, which generally was the highest of the cash assistance standards. See S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 177 (1967). The Senate bill also introduced a new formula for computing the amount of federal reimbursement under the Medicaid program that was designed to reduce federal matching funds for payments to the medically needy. Id., at 176-177. The proposals encountered resistance on the Senate floor. Senator Jav-its, speaking in support of an amendment offered by Senator Kuchel that would have substituted the proposals of the administration, criticized the Finance Committee bill on the ground that it discriminated against the medically needy. See 113 Cong. Rec. 33168, 33169 (1967). In response, Senator Long acknowledged that the bill discriminated against the medically needy, but explained that it “encourages the State to concentrate its medical assistance for those who are most in need, those who qualify for public welfare assistance.” Id., at 33169, 33171. The Senate rejected the Kuchel amendment and adopted the Finance Committee bill. See id., at 36380 (remarks of Rep. Burton); id., at 36381 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert); id., at 36385 (remarks of Rep. Reid); id., at 36387 (remarks of Rep. Ryan); id., at 36389 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein). In the Senate, Robert Kennedy complained that in Mississippi the 133'A% limitation amounted to an income level, after medical expenses had been incurred, of $80 per month for a family of four. Id., at 36784. Senator Mondale quoted the testimony in the Senate Hearings, see n. 15, supra, that in some States the 133'A% AFDC payment amount was less than the standard of need established under even the AFDC program. 113 Cong. Rec. 36819 (1967). Title 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(f) provides: “(f) Limitation on Federal participation in medical assistance “(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (4), payment under the preceding provisions of this section shall not be made with respect to any amount expended as medical assistance in a calendar quarter, in any State, for any member of a family the annual income of which exceeds the applicable income limitation determined under this paragraph. “(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii) of this subparagraph, the applicable income limitation with respect to any family is the amount determined, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, to be equivalent to 133V¡ percent of the highest amount which would ordinarily be paid to a family of the same size without any income or resources, in the form of money payments, under the plan of the State approved under Part A of subchapter IV of this chapter. “(2) In computing a family’s income for purposes of paragraph (1), there shall be excluded any costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred by such family for medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under State law. “(4) The limitations on payment imposed by the preceding provisions of this subsection shall not apply with respect to any amount expended by a State as medical assistance for any individual— “(A) who is receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X, XIV or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are being paid under subchapter XVI of this chapter, or “(B) who is not receiving such aid or assistance, and with respect to whom such benefits are not being paid, but (i) is eligible to receive such aid or assistance, or to have such benefits paid with respect to him, or (ii) would be eligible to receive such aid or assistance, or to have such benefits paid with respect to him if he were not in a medical institution, or “(C) with respect to whom there is being paid, or who is eligible, or would be eligible if he were not in a medical institution, to have paid with respect to him, a State supplementary payment and is eligible for medical assistance equal in amount, duration, and scope to the medical assistance made available to individuals described in section 1396a(a)(10)(A) of this title, but only if the income of such individual (as determined under section 1382a of this title, but without regard to subsection (b) thereof) does not exceed 300 percent of the supplemental security income benefit rate established by section 1382(b)(1) of this title, at the time of the provision of the medical assistance giving rise to such expenditure.” The SSI program is funded and administered by the Federal Government. As its name indicates, it replaced the categorical assistance programs for the aged, the blind, and the disabled. The AFDC program continues to be administered by the States and is only partially funded by the Federal Government. In some States the number of individuals eligible for SSI was significantly greater than the number of persons who had been eligible under the state-administered categorical assistance programs. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 38. Since recipients of categorical welfare assistance are also entitled to Medicaid benefits, the expansion of general welfare accomplished by the SSI program increased Medicaid obligations for some States. To guarantee that States would not, for that reason, withdraw from the Medicaid program, Congress offered what has become known as the “§ 209(b) option.” Under it, States may elect to provide Medicaid assistance only to those individuals who would have been eligible under the state Medicaid plan in effect on January 1, 1972. See id., at 38-39. Thus, in some States, Medicaid is not automatically available for all of the “categorically needy.” Massachusetts is not a § 209(b) State. There is a limit on federal participation in this aspect of the program. A State is entitled to federal financial assistance for providing Medicaid benefits to a state supplementary payment recipient only if his gross income is less than 300% of the applicable SSI income limitation. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(f)(4)(C); n. 17, supra. There is no statutory requirement that state AFDC payment amounts be comparable to state supplemental benefits. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499. Appellees also contended that certain state statutory provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellees alleged that federal and state provisions require an individual to apply for and to accept all Social Security benefits for which he is eligible as a condition of application for SSI and Medicaid benefits. See 42 U. S. C. § 1382(e)(2). Appellees’ grievances are best illustrated by the situation of appellee Hunter. The District Court found that Hunter had worked for 41 years and had paid Social Security taxes during that period. As a result, he received at the time of trial $534 per month in Social Security benefits, $20 of which apparently was disregarded in computing eligibility for SSI and state supplementary payments. As a result of his income, Hunter was ineligible for either SSI or state supplemental payments; the “standard of need” under those programs was $513 per month. If he had qualified, he of course would also have been eligible for Medicaid. Since the applicable AFDC payment amount in Massachusetts was $300, Hunter was ineligible for Medicaid until his income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was no higher than $400. Hunter regularly incurred over $200 each month in medical expenses; thus, by reason of his Social Security benefits, he had less income available for nonmedical needs ($400 per month) than he would have had on public assistance ($513 per month). In his case, a Social Security payment of $1 less each month ($534 less $20 less $1) would apparently have rendered him fully eligible for Medicaid. See Hogan v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (Mass. 1980). In other words, if his gross income were reduced by $1, he would receive over $100 in additional medical benefits and have that additional amount of income available for nonmedical needs. The District Court certified a class “consisting of all (i) present and future Social Security recipients; (ii) who reside or will reside in Massachusetts; (iii) who are or will be disabled or 65 years old or older; (iv) who are or will be ineligible because of the amount of their incomes for Massachusetts Supplemental Security Income payments; and (v) who have or will have, as determined in accordance with the applicable Massachusetts Medicaid regulations, medical expenses not subject to payment by a third party which exceed the difference between their countable incomes under the Massachusetts Medicaid regulations and the applicable Massachusetts Supplemental Security Income standard.” App. to Juris. Statement 23a-24a. “It is well accepted . . . that without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below.” Blum. v. Bacon, ante, at 137, n. 5. The statutory argument raised by the appellees, although not presented in the District Court, may be decided on the basis of the record developed in that court. See n. 12, supra. Since the limitation in the Senate bill was set at 150% of the O AA assistance standard, by definition it would not likely have affected the categorically needy. In any event, appellees contend that both bills were consistent with a comparability requirement. See 1967 House Report, at 117-118. Moreover, appellees’ “congressional ignorance” argument rests on another unsupportable premise. Appellees assume that the House bill— which they admit was vigorously debated — had a “comparable” effect on the categorically and the medically needy. That bill, however, did not propose an amendment to §1902(a)(10) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a)(10), which required that Medicaid coverage be provided to all the categorically needy. It is much more likely — in light of § 1902(a)(10) — that the House assumed that its proposed limits on federal participation in the Medicaid program would affect only the medically needy. See Hearings on H. R. 12080, supra n. 15, at 280 (describing the possibility that the House bill would affect the categorically needy as a “drafting error”). This assumption was made explicit by the Conference Committee, which chose the House standard but added — with little discussion — a direct exception for the categorically needy. Relying on 42 U. S; C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) and 1396a(a)(17), courts have concluded that certain treatment of the medically needy must be comparable to that afforded to the categorically needy. See Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F. 2d 491 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 909; Fabula v. Buck, 598 F. 2d 869 (CA4 1979); Greklek v. Toia, 565 F. 2d 1259 (CA2 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Blum v. Toomey, 436 U. S. 962; Aitchison v. Berger, 404 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1975), aff'd, 538 F. 2d 307 (CA2 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 890. Whatever the scope of the requirement of comparability between the categorically and the medically needy, it is clear that the Act does not require the income of medically needy persons — after the deduction of incurred medical expenses — to be at least comparable to that of the categorically needy. The discriminatory impact challenged in this case arises solely from the fact that Massachusetts has chosen to supplement SSI payments to an extent that exceeds 133V3% of state AFDC payment levels. It is not disputed that 133'/.¡% of the Massachusetts AFDC payment level is higher than federal SSI benefit levels. See 45 Fed. Reg. 31782 (1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 27076 (1981). Although the arguments in this case have focused on two classes, in fact there are three: (1) the categorically needy; and (2) all others, (a) some of whom have medical expenses that reduce their remaining income to a level that qualifies them as medically needy, and (b) some of whom are neither categorically needy nor medically needy. 1965 House Report, at 66. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 238 (“This Court has granted a ‘strong presumption of constitutionality’ to 1f>' islation conferring monetary benefits, Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S., at 185, because it believes that Congress should have discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources”). The fact that the recipient of a governmental benefit— such as an indigent defendant who is represented by a public defender— may in some cases be better off after receiving the benefit than a wealthier person who did not qualify to receive it does not undermine the validity of the basis for determining eligibility. The fact that the amount of benefits payable to persons within the medically needy class is determined on the basis of income remaining after medical expenses have been incurred does not impeach the rationality of defining the basic distinction between the categorically needy and all others on the basis of income before medical expenses are considered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. RUZICKA et al., trading as SEELEY DAIRY. No. 54. Argued November 20, 21, 1946. Decided December 16, 1946. Acting Solicitor General Washington argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Berge, Robert L. Stern, J. Stephen Doyle, Jr. and W. Carroll Hunter. William Parker Ward argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. We brought this case here, 327 U. S. 776, because it raises questions of importance in the administration of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. 50 Stat. 246, 7 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. The general scheme of the Act and its operation have been before us in a series of cases. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288. Our immediate concern is with the provisions of the Act that distribute enforcing authority between the courts and the Secretary of Agriculture. These become relevant to the enforcement of Milk Order No. 41, an “Order Regulating the Handling of Milk in the Chicago, Illinois, Marketing Area,” and more particularly the portion of that elaborate Order which defines the rights and obligations of ’“handlers” of milk. Section 941.1 (5). The Order was issued under the powers delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Section 8c of the Act. Order No. 41 classifies milk received into the Chicago area according to its uses. To milk in each of the four classes the market administrator assigns a uniform “use value.” All handlers are required to report to the market administrator the quantity of milk purchased and put to its classified uses. On the basis of these reports, the administrator, taking into account the total quantity of milk produced and the amount devoted to each classification, as well as the balance in the- Producer-settlement Fund, and making authorized adjustments, announces monthly a uniform minimum price to be paid by handlers to producers. Since a handler’s receipts from the re-sale of milk, or the sale of milk products, vary with the amount of the milk distributed in each class, the uniform price paid by handlers will create inequities unless adjustment is made, based on the comparative use value of the milk distributed by a particular handler. The mechanism for adj ustment is the Producer-settlement Fund. Handlers are required to contribute to this Fund whenever the use value of the milk handled by them during the month is greater than the norm on which the uniform price is based. Conversely, handlers whose milk distribution is of low use value and whose fixed minimum costs are therefore out of line with their receipts, are recompensed from this Fund. Effective enforcement of such a marketing scheme rests on proper accounting, reliable reports and alert inspection. At best, however, errors are inevitable, which may call for payments by handlers into the Fund. The reliance of the industry upon that Fund makes prompt payments into it imperative. An order for payment into the Fund and its resistance led to this litigation. The Ruzickas, handlers of milk, filed with the market administrator required reports and received from him a transcript of their account with the Fund for the period in controversy. Deficiencies were disclosed which the Ruzickas refused to pay, in disregard of § 941.8 (e) and (g) of Order 41 requiring a handler to pay within five days “the amount so billed.” Under § 8 (6) of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act this suit was begun in the Northern District of Illinois for enforcement. The Government prayed for a mandatory injunction commanding compliance with Order 41 by payment of the sums alleged to be due to the Fund. If it be relevant, it was not alleged that there was danger of irreparable loss because of insolvency of the Fund. By their answer the Ruzickas justified their failure to pay, chiefly on the ground that the demand was based upon faulty inspection of their accounts and improper tests of their milk and milk products. The District Court ruled that “the defendants having failed to avail themselves of the administrative remedy provided by said Act, may not raise such issues of fact before this court.” On the issue in the suit thus limited, the District Court granted the Government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the District Court, ruling that the validity of the demand by the Secretary of Agriculture may be contested in an enforcement proceeding under § 8a (6). 152 F. 2d 167. Thus the question before us is whether a handler may resist a claim against him by the Secretary of Agriculture, made according to the procedure defined in the Act, without previously having sought to challenge the claim in a proceeding, also defined in the Act, before the Secretary of Agriculture. The answer is found on a fair reading of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act in the context of its purposes and of the scheme designed by Congress for their realization. The sections of the statute directly relevant to our problem are set out in the margin. Briefly, the district courts of the United States are “vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce” orders issued pursuant to the Act. The Act authorizes a handler to challenge before the Secretary of Agriculture his order “or any obligation imposed in connection therewith” as “not in accordance with law,” and to ask to have it modified or to be exempted from it. When the order is so challenged, the determination of the Secretary of Agriculture, after hearing, is final but only “if in accordance with law.” Section 8c (15) (A). To test whether such ruling is “in accordance with law,” the handler may bring the Secretary’s action for review before the appropriate district court. Section 8c (15) (B). But the very subsection, (15), which gives the handler access to the Secretary of Agriculture for administrative relief and opportunity for judicial review of his determination, provides that the pendency of the procedings before the Secretary, or in the district court to review the Secretary’s ruling, “shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief” under § 8a (6). It is only when “a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15)” that proceedings brought for enforcement under § 8a (6) “shall abate.” Section 8c (15) (B). To be sure, Congress did not say in words that, in a proceeding under § 8a (6) to enforce an order, a handler may not question an obligation which flows from it. But meaning, though not explicitly stated in words, may be imbedded in a coherent scheme. And such we find to be the provisions taken in their entirety, as a means for attaining the purposes of the Act while at the same time protecting adequately the interests of individual handlers. The procedure devised by Congress explicitly gave to an aggrieved handler an appropriate opportunity for the correction of errors or abuses by the agency charged with the intricate business of milk control. In addition, if the Secretary fails to make amends called for by law the handler may challenge the legality of the Secretary’s ruling in court. Handlers are thus assured opportunity to establish claims of grievances while steps for the protection of the industry as a whole may go forward. Sections 8a (6) and 8c (15) thus form a complementary procedural scheme. Contrariwise, it would make for disharmony to extrapolate from these provisions of the statute the right to consider independently, in a proceeding by the Government for the enforcement of the Secretary’s order, questions for which Congress explicitly furnished the handler an expert forum for contest with ultimate review by a district court. The situation before us indicates how disruptive it would be to allow issues that may properly come before a district court in a proceeding under § 8c (15) to be open for independent adjudication in a suit for enforcement under § 8a (6). After a presumably careful study by those technically equipped, a program was devised for the dairy farmers in one of the large areas of the country. The success of the operation of such Congressionally authorized milk control must depend on the efficiency of its administration. Promptness of compliance by those subject to the scheme is the presupposition of Order No. 41. Thus, definite monthly deadlines are fixed by the Order for every step in the program. In large measure, the success of this scheme revolves around a “producers” fund which is solvent and to which all contribute in accordance with a formula equitably determined and of uniform applicability. Failure by handlers to meet their obligations promptly would threaten the whole scheme. Even temporary defaults by some handlers may work unfairness to others, encourage wider non-compliance, and engender those subtle forces of doubt and distrust which so readily dislocate delicate economic arrangements. To make the vitality of the whole arrangement depend on the contingencies and inevitable delays of litigation, no matter how alertly pursued, is not a result to be attributed to Congress unless support for it is much more manifest than we here find. That Congress avoided such hazards for its policy is persuasively indicated by the procedure it devised for the careful administrative and judicial consideration of a handler’s grievance. It thereby safeguarded individual as well as collective interests. In the case before us, administrative proceedings were instituted before the Secretary of Agriculture and, apparently, are awaiting his action. Presumably the Secretary of Agriculture will give the respondents the rights to which Congress said they were entitled. If they are dissatisfied with his ruling, they may question it in a district court. The interests of the entire industry need not be disturbed in order to do justice to an individual case. It is suggested that Congress did not authorize a district court to enforce an order not “in accordance with law.” The short answer to this rather dialectic point is that whether such an order is or is not in accordance with law is not a question that brings its own immediate answer, or even an answer which it is the familiar, everyday business of courts to find. Congress has provided a special procedure for ascertaining whether such an order is or is not in accordance with law. The questions are not, or may not be, abstract questions of law. Even when they are formulated in constitutional terms, they are questions of law arising out of, or entwined with, factors that call for understanding of the milk industry. And so Congress has provided that the remedy in the first instance must be sought from the Secretary of Agriculture. It is on the basis of his ruling, and of the elucidation which he would presumably give to his ruling, that resort may be had to the courts. Congress seems to have emphasized the different functions in the enforcement of the Act that § 8a and § 8c serve by explicitly directing that the proceedings for relief instituted by a handler under § 8c shall not “impede, hinder, or delay” enforcement proceedings by the United States under § 8a. We are dealing here solely with the rights of handlers. This is not Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288. In that case it was concluded that since Congress had provided no administrative remedy for a producer to review the legality of an order against him, presumably the courts were not closed to him. But by § 8c (15) Congress has made precisely such provisions for handlers. As to them the procedural scheme is complete. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is one of many enactments by which Congress in regulating economic enterprise has divided the duty of enforcement between courts and administrative agencies. But there is the greatest variety in the manner in which Congress has distributed this responsibility. Those who are entitled to speak tell us that the development of the natural sciences has often suffered from premature generalization. Certainly the recent growth of administrative law counsels against generalizations regarding what is compendiously called judicial review of administrative action. And so we deem it desirable, in a case like this, to hug the shore of the precise problem before us in relation to the provisions of the particular Act immediately relevant. One general observation may, however, be permitted. Both courts and administrative bodies are law-enforcing agencies, utilized by Congress as such. In construing the enforcement provisions of legislation like the Marketing Act, it is important to remember that courts and administrative agencies are collaborative “instrumentalities of justice,” and not business rivals. See United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 191; Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 141 et seq. And so we are not called upon to decide what powers inhere in a court of equity, exercising due judicial discretion, even in a suit such as was here brought by the United States for the enforcement of an order under § 8a. We say this because it appears that at a stage in the proceedings in the District Court a motion for a stay, pending disposition of the petition by the Ruzickas before the Secretary of Agriculture, was made by the respondents. With the court’s leave, this motion was subsequently withdrawn. The power of the District Court to have acted on it is therefore not before us. Compare Scripps-Howard Radio v. Comm’n, 316 U. S. 4; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321. Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. “8a (6) The several district courts of the United States are hereby vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person .from violating any order, regulation, or agreement, heretofore or hereafter made or issued pursuant to this title, in any proceeding now pending or hereafter brought in said courts. “8c (15) (A) Any handler subject to an order may file a written petition with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that any such order or any provision of any such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in accordance with law and praying for a modification thereof or to be exempted therefrom. He shall thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if in accordance with law. “8c (15) (B) The District Courts of the United States (including the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) in any district in which such handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, are hereby vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had upon the Secretary by delivering to him a copy of the bill of complaint. If the court determines that such ruling is not in accordance with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the Secretary with directions either (1) to make such ruling as the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. The pendency of proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief pursuant to section 8a (6) of this title. Any proceedings brought pursuant to section 8a (6) of this title (except where brought by way of counterclaim in proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15)) shall abate whenever a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15).” Section 8a (8) is also invoked by petitioner. But that section adds to the Government’s remedies. It implies no judicial review in favor of handlers. “During the period while any such petition is pending before the Secretary and until notice of the Secretary’s ruling is given to the petitioner, the penalties imposed by the act for violation of an order cannot be imposed upon the petitioner if the court finds that the petition was filed in good faith and not for delay. The Secretary may, nevertheless, during this period proceed to obtain an injunction against the petitioner pursuant to section 8a (6) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. ... It is believed that these provisions establish an equitable and expeditious procedure for testing the validity of orders, without hampering the Government’s power to enforce compliance with their terms.” S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.,

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Andre Martello BARTON, Petitioner v. William P. BARR, Attorney General No. 18-725 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued November 4, 2019 Decided April 23, 2020 Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General., Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor, General, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, Patrick J. Glen, Timothy G. Hayes, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. H. Glenn Fogle, Jr., The Fogle Law Firm, LLC, Atlanta, GA, Adam G. Unikowsky, Lauren J. Hartz, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Justice KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the immigration laws, a noncitizen who is authorized to live permanently in the United States is a lawful permanent resident-also commonly known as a green-card holder. But unlike a U.S. citizen, a lawful permanent resident who commits a serious crime may be removed from the United States. Andre Barton is a Jamaican national and a longtime lawful permanent resident of the United States. During his time in the United States, Barton has been convicted of state crimes on three separate occasions spanning 12 years. The crimes include a firearms offense, drug offenses, and aggravated assault offenses. By law, the firearms offense and the drug offenses each independently rendered Barton eligible for removal from the United States. In September 2016, the U.S. Government sought to remove Barton, and a U.S. Immigration Judge determined that Barton was removable. Barton applied for cancellation of removal, a form of relief that allows a noncitizen to remain in the United States despite being found removable. The immigration laws authorize an immigration judge to cancel removal, but Congress has established strict eligibility requirements. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a), (d)(1)(B). For a lawful permanent resident such as Barton, the applicant for cancellation of removal (1) must have been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years; (2) must have continuously resided in the United States for at least seven years after lawful admission; (3) must not have been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in the immigration laws; and (4) during the initial seven years of continuous residence, must not have committed certain other offenses listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). If a lawful permanent resident meets those eligibility requirements, the immigration judge has discretion to (but is not required to) cancel removal and allow the lawful permanent resident to remain in the United States. Under the cancellation-of-removal statute, the immigration judge examines the applicant's prior crimes, as well as the offense that triggered his removal. If a lawful permanent resident has ever been convicted of an aggravated felony, or has committed an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) during the initial seven years of residence, that criminal record will preclude cancellation of removal. In that way, the statute operates like traditional criminal recidivist laws, which ordinarily authorize or impose greater sanctions on offenders who have committed prior crimes. In this case, after finding Barton removable based on his state firearms and drug offenses, the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that Barton was not eligible for cancellation of removal. Barton had committed offenses listed in § 1182(a)(2) during his initial seven years of residence-namely, his state aggravated assault offenses in 1996. Barton's 1996 aggravated assault offenses were not the offenses that triggered his removal. But according to the BIA, and contrary to Barton's argument, the offense that precludes cancellation of removal need not be one of the offenses of removal. In re Jurado-Delgado , 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 31 (BIA 2006). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the BIA's reading of the statute and concluded that Barton was not eligible for cancellation of removal. The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have similarly construed the statute; only the Ninth Circuit has disagreed. Barton argues that the BIA and the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted the statute. He contends that the § 1182(a)(2) offense that precludes cancellation of removal must be one of the offenses of removal. We disagree with Barton, and we affirm the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. I Federal immigration law governs the admission of noncitizens to the United States and the deportation of noncitizens previously admitted. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a), 1229a. The umbrella statutory term for being inadmissible or deportable is "removable." § 1229a(e)(2). A noncitizen who is authorized to live permanently in the United States is a lawful permanent resident, often known as a green-card holder. When a lawful permanent resident commits a crime and is determined by an immigration judge to be removable because of that crime, the Attorney General (usually acting through an immigration judge) may cancel removal. § 1229b(a). But the comprehensive immigration law that Congress passed and President Clinton signed in 1996 tightly cabins eligibility for cancellation of removal. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note. For a lawful permanent resident, the cancellation-of-removal statute provides that an immigration judge "may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien-(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." § 1229b(a). The statute imposes one other requirement known as the "stop-time rule." As relevant here, the statute provides that a lawful permanent resident, during the initial seven years of residence, also cannot have committed "an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title." § 1229b(d)(1)(B). Andre Barton is a Jamaican national and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In 1996, he was convicted in a Georgia court of a firearms offense stemming from an incident where Barton and a friend shot up the house of Barton's ex-girlfriend. In separate proceedings in 2007 and 2008, he was convicted in Georgia courts of state drug offenses. One case involved methamphetamine, and the other involved cocaine and marijuana. In 2016, the U.S. Government charged Barton with deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) based on the 1996 firearms offense and the 2007 and 2008 drug crimes. See §§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), (C). Barton conceded that he was removable based on his criminal convictions for the firearms offense and drug offenses, and an Immigration Judge found him removable. Barton applied for cancellation of removal. All agree that Barton meets two of the eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. He has been a lawful permanent resident for more than five years. And he has not been convicted of an "aggravated felony," as defined by the immigration laws. The Immigration Judge concluded, however, that Barton had committed an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) during his initial seven years of residence. In 1996, 6½ years after his admission to this country, Barton committed aggravated assault offenses for which he was later convicted in a Georgia court. The Immigration Judge concluded that those aggravated assault offenses were covered by § 1182(a)(2) and that Barton was therefore not eligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit likewise concluded that Barton was not eligible for cancellation of removal. Barton v. United States Atty. Gen. , 904 F.3d 1294, 1302 (2018). The key question was whether the offense that precludes cancellation of removal (here, Barton's 1996 aggravated assault offenses) must also be one of the offenses of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals has long interpreted the statute to mean that "an alien need not actually be charged and found inadmissible or removable on the applicable ground in order for the criminal conduct in question to terminate continuous residence in this country" and preclude cancellation of removal. Jurado-Delgado , 24 I. & N. Dec., at 31. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit likewise indicated that the § 1182(a)(2) offense that precludes cancellation of removal need not be one of the offenses of removal. 904 F.3d at 1299-1300. And the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have similarly construed the statute. See Heredia v. Sessions , 865 F.3d 60, 68 (C.A.2 2017) ; Ardon v. Attorney General of United States , 449 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (C.A.3 2011) ; Calix v. Lynch , 784 F.3d 1000, 1011 (C.A.5 2015). But in 2018, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with those courts and with the BIA. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a lawful permanent resident's commission of an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) makes the noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal only if that offense was one of the offenses of removal. Nguyen v. Sessions , 901 F.3d 1093, 1097 (2018). Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, Barton would have been eligible for cancellation of removal because his § 1182(a)(2) offenses (his 1996 aggravated assault offenses) were not among the offenses of removal (his 1996 firearms offense and his 2007 and 2008 drug crimes). In light of the division in the Courts of Appeals over how to interpret this statute, we granted certiorari. 587 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 1615, 203 L.Ed.2d 755 (2019). II A Under the immigration laws, when a noncitizen has committed a serious crime, the U.S. Government may seek to remove that noncitizen by initiating removal proceedings before an immigration judge. If the immigration judge determines that the noncitizen is removable, the immigration judge nonetheless has discretion to cancel removal. But the immigration laws impose strict eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. To reiterate, a lawful permanent resident such as Barton who has been found removable because of criminal activity is eligible for cancellation of removal "if the alien-(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony." § 1229b(a). To be eligible for cancellation of removal, the lawful permanent resident, during the initial seven years of residence after admission, also must not have committed "an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title." § 1229b(d)(1)(B). The law therefore fashions two distinct ways in which a lawful permanent resident's prior crimes may preclude cancellation of removal. The law precludes cancellation of removal if the lawful permanent resident has been convicted of an "aggravated felony" at any time . The statutory list of aggravated felonies is long: murder, rape, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, obstruction of justice, treason, gambling, human trafficking, and tax evasion, among many other crimes. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U). In addition, the law precludes cancellation of removal if the lawful permanent resident committed certain other serious crimes during the initial seven years of residence . The law defines those offenses by cross-referencing § 1182(a)(2), which specifies the offenses that can render a noncitizen "inadmissible" to the United States. Section 1182(a)(2) includes "crime[s] involving moral turpitude," which is a general category that covers a wide variety of crimes. Section 1182(a)(2) also expressly encompasses various violations of drug laws, prostitution, money laundering, and certain DUIs involving personal injury, among other crimes. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), (C), (D), (E), (I) ; see § 1101(h). In specifying when cancellation of removal would be precluded because of prior criminal activity, Congress struck a balance that considers both the nature of the prior crime and the length of time that the noncitizen has resided in the United States. If a lawful permanent resident has been convicted at any time of certain crimes (what the immigration laws refer to as an "aggravated felony"), then the noncitizen is not eligible for cancellation of removal. If during the initial 7-year period of residence, a lawful permanent resident committed certain other offenses referred to in § 1182(a)(2), then the noncitizen likewise is not eligible for cancellation of removal. In providing that a noncitizen's prior crimes (in addition to the offense of removal) can render him ineligible for cancellation of removal, the cancellation-of-removal statute functions like a traditional recidivist sentencing statute. In an ordinary criminal case, a defendant may be convicted of a particular criminal offense. And at sentencing, the defendant's other criminal offenses may be relevant. So too in the immigration removal context. A noncitizen may be found removable based on a certain criminal offense. In applying for cancellation of removal, the noncitizen must detail his entire criminal record on Form EOIR-42A. An immigration judge then must determine whether the noncitizen has been convicted of an aggravated felony at any time or has committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence. It is entirely ordinary to look beyond the offense of conviction at criminal sentencing, and it is likewise entirely ordinary to look beyond the offense of removal at the cancellation-of-removal stage in immigration cases. It is not surprising, moreover, that Congress required immigration judges considering cancellation of removal to look in part at whether the noncitizen has committed any offenses listed in § 1182(a)(2). The offenses listed in § 1182(a)(2) help determine whether a noncitizen should be admitted to the United States. Under the cancellation-of-removal statute, immigration judges must look at that same category of offenses to determine whether, after a previously admitted noncitizen has been determined to be deportable, the noncitizen should nonetheless be allowed to remain in the United States. If a crime is serious enough to deny admission to a noncitizen, the crime can also be serious enough to preclude cancellation of removal, at least if committed during the initial seven years of residence. Importantly, the text of the cancellation-of-removal statute does not simply say that cancellation of removal is precluded when, during the initial seven years of residence, the noncitizen was convicted of an offense referred to in § 1182(a)(2). Rather, the text says that cancellation of removal is precluded when, during the initial seven years of residence, the noncitizen "committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) ... that renders the alien inadmissible." § 1229b(d)(1)(B). That language clarifies two points of relevance here. First , cancellation of removal is precluded if a noncitizen committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence, even if (as in Barton's case) the conviction occurred after the seven years elapsed. In other words, as Congress specified in the statute and as the BIA and the Courts of Appeals have recognized, the date of commission of the offense is the key date for purposes of calculating whether the noncitizen committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence. See In re Perez , 22 I. & N. Dec. 689, 693-694 (BIA 1999) (date of commission is controlling date); see also Heredia , 865 F.3d at 70-71 ("the date of the commission of the offense governs the computation of a lawful permanent resident's continuous residency in the United States"); Calix , 784 F.3d at 1012 ("Once he was convicted of the offense" referred to in § 1182(a)(2), "he was rendered inadmissible to the United States. His accrual of continuous residence was halted as of the date he committed that offense"). Second , the text of the law requires that the noncitizen be rendered "inadmissible" as a result of the offense. For crimes involving moral turpitude, which is the relevant category of § 1182(a)(2) offenses here, § 1182(a)(2) provides that a noncitizen is rendered "inadmissible" when he is convicted of or admits the offense. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). As the Eleventh Circuit explained, "while only commission is required at step one, conviction (or admission) is required at step two." 904 F.3d at 1301. In this case, Barton's 1996 state aggravated assault offenses were crimes involving moral turpitude and therefore "referred to in section 1182(a)(2)." Barton committed those offenses during his initial seven years of residence. He was later convicted of the offenses in a Georgia court and thereby rendered "inadmissible." Therefore, Barton was ineligible for cancellation of removal. As a matter of statutory text and structure, that analysis is straightforward. The Board of Immigration Appeals has long interpreted the statute that way. See Jurado-Delgado , 24 I. & N. Dec., at 31. And except for the Ninth Circuit, all of the Courts of Appeals to consider the question have interpreted the statute that way. B Barton pushes back on that straightforward statutory interpretation and the longstanding position of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Barton says that he may not be denied cancellation of removal based on his 1996 aggravated assault offenses because those offenses were not among the offenses of removal found by the Immigration Judge in Barton's removal proceeding. Rather, his 1996 firearms offense and his 2007 and 2008 drug offenses were the offenses of removal. To succinctly summarize the parties' different positions (with the difference highlighted in italics below): The Government would preclude cancellation of removal under this provision if the lawful permanent resident committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence. Barton would preclude cancellation of removal under this provision if the lawful permanent resident committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence and if that § 1182(a)(2) offense was one of the offenses of removal in the noncitizen's removal proceeding . To support his "offense of removal" approach, Barton advances three different arguments. A caution to the reader: These arguments are not easy to unpack. First , according to Barton, the statute's overall structure with respect to removal proceedings demonstrates that a § 1182(a)(2) offense may preclude cancellation of removal only if that § 1182(a)(2) offense was one of the offenses of removal. We disagree. In removal proceedings, a lawful permanent resident (such as Barton) may be found "deportable" based on deportability offenses listed in § 1227(a)(2). A noncitizen who has not previously been admitted may be found "inadmissible" based on inadmissibility offenses listed in § 1182(a)(2). See §§ 1182(a), 1227(a), 1229a(e)(2). Importantly, then, § 1227(a)(2) offenses-not § 1182(a)(2) offenses-are typically the basis for removal of lawful permanent residents. Because the offense of removal for lawful permanent residents is ordinarily a § 1227(a)(2) offense, Barton's structural argument falls apart. If Barton were correct that this aspect of the cancellation-of-removal statute focused only on the offense of removal, the statute presumably would specify offenses "referred to in section 1182(a)(2) or section 1227(a)(2) ." So why does the statute identify only offenses "referred to in section 1182(a)(2)"? Barton has no good answer. At oral argument, when directly asked that question, Barton's able counsel forthrightly acknowledged: "It's a little hard to explain." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. This point is the Achilles' heel of Barton's structural argument. As we see it, Barton cannot explain the omission of § 1227(a)(2) offenses in the "referred to" clause for a simple reason: Barton's interpretation of the statute is incorrect. Properly read, this is not simply an "offense of removal" statute that looks only at whether the offense of removal was committed during the initial seven years of residence. Rather, this is a recidivist statute that uses § 1182(a)(2) offenses as a shorthand cross-reference for a category of offenses that will preclude cancellation of removal if committed during the initial seven years of residence. By contrast to this cancellation-of-removal provision, some other provisions of the immigration laws do focus only on the offense of removal-for example, provisions governing mandatory detention and jurisdiction. See §§ 1226(a), (c)(1)(A), (B), 1252(a)(2)(C). But the statutory text and context of those provisions support that limitation. Those provisions use the phrase "inadmissible by reason of " a § 1182(a)(2) offense, "deportable by reason of " a § 1227(a)(2) offense, or "removable by reason of " a § 1182(a)(2) or § 1227(a)(2) offense. And the provisions make contextual sense only if the offense justifying detention or denying jurisdiction is one of the offenses of removal. The cancellation-of-removal statute does not employ similar language. Second , moving from overall structure to precise text, Barton seizes on the statutory phrase "committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) ... that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) ." § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). According to Barton, conviction of an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) -for example, conviction in state court of a crime involving moral turpitude-does not itself render the noncitizen "inadmissible." He argues that a noncitizen is not rendered "inadmissible" unless and until the noncitizen is actually adjudicated as inadmissible and denied admission to the United States. And he further contends that a lawfully admitted noncitizen usually cannot be removed from the United States on the basis of inadmissibility. As Barton puts it (and the dissent echoes the point), how can a lawfully admitted noncitizen be found inadmissible when he has already been lawfully admitted? As a matter of common parlance alone, that argument would of course carry some force. But the argument fails because it disregards the statutory text, which employs the term "inadmissibility" as a status that can result from, for example, a noncitizen's (including a lawfully admitted noncitizen's) commission of certain offenses listed in § 1182(a)(2). For example, as relevant here, § 1182(a)(2) flatly says that a noncitizen such as Barton who commits a crime involving moral turpitude and is convicted of that offense "is inadmissible." § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Full stop. Similarly, a noncitizen who has two or more convictions, together resulting in aggregate sentences of at least five years, "is inadmissible." § 1182(a)(2)(B). A noncitizen who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is a drug trafficker "is inadmissible." § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i). A noncitizen who receives the proceeds of prostitution within 10 years of applying for admission "is inadmissible." § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii). The list goes on. See, e.g., §§ 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii)-(E), (G)-(I). Those provisions do not say that a noncitizen will become inadmissible if the noncitizen is found inadmissible in a subsequent immigration removal proceeding. Instead, those provisions say that the noncitizen "is inadmissible ." Congress has in turn made that status-inadmissibility because of conviction or other proof of commission of § 1182(a)(2) offenses-relevant in several statutory contexts that apply to lawfully admitted noncitizens such as Barton. Those contexts include adjustment to permanent resident status; protection from removal because of temporary protected status; termination of temporary resident status; and here cancellation of removal. See, e.g., §§ 1160(a)(1)(C), (a)(3)(B)(ii), 1254a(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A)(iii), 1255(a), (l )(2). In those contexts, the noncitizen faces immigration consequences from being convicted of a § 1182(a)(2) offense even though the noncitizen is lawfully admitted and is not necessarily removable solely because of that offense. Consider how those other proceedings work. A lawfully admitted noncitizen who is convicted of an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) is typically not removable from the United States on that basis (recall that a lawfully admitted noncitizen is ordinarily removable only for commission of a § 1227(a)(2) offense). But the noncitizen is "inadmissible" because of the § 1182(a)(2) offense and for that reason may not be able to obtain adjustment to permanent resident status. §§ 1255(a), (l )(2). So too, a lawfully admitted noncitizen who is convicted of an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) is "inadmissible" and for that reason may not be able to obtain temporary protected status. §§ 1254a(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A)(iii). A lawfully admitted noncitizen who is a temporary resident and is convicted of a § 1182(a)(2) offense is "inadmissible" and for that reason may lose temporary resident status. §§ 1160(a)(1)(C), (a)(3)(B)(ii). Those statutory examples pose a major hurdle for Barton's textual argument. The examples demonstrate that Congress has employed the concept of "inadmissibility" as a status in a variety of statutes similar to the cancellation-of-removal statute, including for lawfully admitted noncitizens. Barton has no persuasive answer to those examples. Barton tries to say that some of those other statutes involve a noncitizen who, although already admitted to the United States, is nonetheless seeking "constructive admission." Reply Brief 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. But that ginned-up label does not avoid the problem. Put simply, those other statutes show that lawfully admitted noncitizens who are, for example, convicted of § 1182(a)(2) crimes are "inadmissible" and in turn may suffer certain immigration consequences, even though those lawfully admitted noncitizens cannot necessarily be removed solely because of those § 1182(a)(2) offenses. The same is true here. A lawfully admitted noncitizen who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude during his initial seven years of residence is "inadmissible" and for that reason is ineligible for cancellation of removal. In advancing his structural and textual arguments, Barton insists that his interpretation of the statute reflects congressional intent regarding cancellation of removal. But if Congress intended that only the offense of removal would preclude cancellation of removal under the 7-year residence provision, it is unlikely that Congress would have employed such a convoluted way to express that intent. Barton cannot explain why, if his view of Congress' intent is correct, the statute does not simply say something like: "The alien is not eligible for cancellation of removal if the offense of removal was committed during the alien's initial seven years of residence." Third , on a different textual tack, Barton argues that the Government's interpretation cannot be correct because the Government would treat as surplusage the phrase "or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title." Recall that the statute, as relevant here, provides that a lawful permanent resident is not eligible for cancellation of removal if, during the initial seven years of residence, he committed "an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title ." § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). To begin with, all agree that under either side's interpretation, the reference to § 1227(a)(4) -as distinct from § 1227(a)(2) -is redundant surplusage. See § 1229b(c)(4) ; Brief for Petitioner 32-33 & n. 7. Under the Government's interpretation, it is true that the reference to § 1227(a)(2) also appears to be redundant surplusage. Any offense that is both referred to in § 1182(a)(2) and an offense that would render the noncitizen deportable under § 1227(a)(2) would also render the noncitizen inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2). But redundancies are common in statutory drafting-sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes simply because of the shortcomings of human communication. The Court has often recognized: "Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy." Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. , 586 U.S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 873, 881, 203 L.Ed.2d 180 (2019) ; see Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States , 585 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 2067, 2073, 201 L.Ed.2d 490 (2018) ; Marx v. General Revenue Corp. , 568 U.S. 371, 385, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013) ; Lamie v. United States Trustee , 540 U.S. 526, 536, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). So it is here. Most importantly for present purposes, we do not see why the redundant statutory reference to § 1227(a)(2) should cause us to entirely rewrite § 1229b so that a noncitizen's commission of an offense referred to in § 1182(a)(2) would preclude cancellation of removal only if it is also the offense of removal. Redundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text, as Barton would have us do. One final point: Barton argues in the alternative that even if inadmissibility is a status, and even if the offense that precludes cancellation of removal need not be one of the offenses of removal, the noncitizen must at least have been capable of being charged with a § 1182(a)(2) inadmissibility offense as the basis for removal. The dissent seizes on this argument as well. But as we have explained, this cancellation-of-removal statute is a recidivist statute that precludes cancellation of removal if the noncitizen has committed an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) during the initial seven years of residence. Whether the offense that precludes cancellation of removal was charged or could have been charged as one of the offenses of removal is irrelevant to that analysis. * * * Removal of a lawful permanent resident from the United States is a wrenching process, especially in light of the consequences for family members. Removal is particularly difficult when it involves someone such as Barton who has spent most of his life in the United States. Congress made a choice, however, to authorize removal of noncitizens-even lawful permanent residents-who have committed certain serious crimes. And Congress also made a choice to categorically preclude cancellation of removal for noncitizens who have substantial criminal records. Congress may of course amend the law at any time. In the meantime, the Court is constrained to apply the law as enacted by Congress. Here, as the BIA explained in its 2006 Jurado-Delgado decision, and as the Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have indicated, the immigration laws enacted by Congress do not allow cancellation of removal when a lawful permanent resident has amassed a criminal record of this kind. We affirm the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It is so ordered. Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting. The stop-time rule ends a noncitizen's period of continuous residence, making him or her ineligible for certain relief from removal. But to trigger the rule, it takes more than commission of a specified criminal offense: The offense must also render a noncitizen either "inadmissible" or "deportable." In applying these important limitations, the rule directly references the two-track nature of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a statute that has long distinguished between noncitizens seeking admission and those already admitted. Inadmissibility, of course, pertains to noncitizens seeking admission; deportability relates to noncitizens already admitted but removable. The majority errs by conflating these two terms. It concludes that the term "inadmissible," for the purposes of the stop-time rule, refers to a status that a noncitizen could acquire even if he or she is not seeking admission. Under this logic, petitioner Andre Barton is inadmissible yet, at the same time, lawfully admitted. Neither the express language of the statute nor any interpretative canons support this paradox; Barton cannot and should not be considered inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule because he has already been admitted to the country. Thus, for the stop-time rule to render Barton ineligible for relief from removal, the Government must show that he committed an offense that made him deportable. Because the Government cannot meet that burden, Barton should prevail. I respectfully dissent. I A Cancellation of removal is a form of immigration relief available to lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and other noncitizens, including those who have never been lawfully admitted. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. To obtain this relief, both groups must continuously reside in the United States for a certain amount of time. § 1229b(a)(2) (seven years for LPRs); § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (10 years for non-LPR noncitizens). The stop-time rule ends a noncitizen's period of continuous residence (1) when the noncitizen "has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title" that either (2) "renders" the noncitizen "inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title" or (3) renders the noncitizen "removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title." § 1229b(d)(1). The second clause directly invokes grounds of inadmissibility; the third clause, although using the term "removable," directly invokes grounds of deportability. See § 1227(a) (specifying "[c]lasses of deportable aliens"). Both the second and the third clauses are cabined by the first: In addition to rendering a noncitizen either inadmissible or deportable, the offense must also be one "referred to" in § 1182(a)(2). That provision includes some-but not all-of the grounds of deportability in § 1227. This distinction between "inadmissible" and "deportable" matters. Indeed, both are terms of art, so it is critical to understand their histories and their attached meaning over time. See INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 312 n. 35, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (noting that " '[w]here Congress borrows terms of art,' " with settled meaning, it " 'presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word' " (quoting Morissette v. United States , 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) )). Until Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), noncitizens seeking physical entry were placed in " 'exclusion proceeding[s],' " while those already physically present were placed in " 'deportation proceeding[s].' " Judulang v. Holder , 565 U.S. 42, 45, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011). Although the grounds for exclusion and deportation-and the procedures applying to each-evolved over time, the immigration laws retained a two-track system; different procedures and processes applied to noncitizens who were deportable and noncitizens who were excludable. Brief for Immigration Law Professors as Amici Curiae 3-8. IIRIRA changed the proceedings and some of the language. All noncitizens are now channeled into " 'removal proceeding[s],' " and noncitizens previously labeled "excludable" are now labeled " 'inadmissible.' " Judulang, 565 U.S. at 46, 132 S.Ct. 476. IIRIRA also altered when a noncitizen faces grounds of inadmissibility, formerly exclusion: Rather than focusing on whether a noncitizen had physically entered the country, the statute now asks whether the noncitizen had been lawfully admitted, in any status, to the country. See §§ 1101(a)(13)(A), 1182(a). Still, the immigration laws have retained their two-track structure. Inadmissibility and deportability remain separate concepts, triggered by different grounds. With few exceptions, the grounds for inadmissibility are broader than those for deportability. Compare § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) with § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (reflecting different treatment for crimes involving moral turpitude). Further, while a noncitizen charged with inadmissibility bears the ultimate burden to show that he is admissible, the Government bears the burden of demonstrating that a noncitizen is deportable. §§ 1229a(c)(2), (c)(3). Whether a noncitizen is charged with inadmissibility or deportability also affects what the noncitizen or the Government must show to carry their respective burdens. A criminal ground for inadmissibility can be made out by showing either that the noncitizen admitted to conduct meeting the elements of a crime or that she was actually convicted of an offense. See, e.g. , Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe , 292 F.3d 1209, 1213-1215 (C.A.9 2002) (noncitizen inadmissible because he admitted to health officer that he smoked marijuana in his youth); see also § 1182(a)(2)(A). By contrast, most criminal grounds for deportability can be established only through convictions. See §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(v), (a)(2)(B)(i). Finally, the substantive standards for cancellation of removal are also less stringent for a subset of deportable noncitizens: LPRs like Barton. Among other things, while an otherwise-eligible LPR must merely demonstrate that he or she deserves the relief as a matter of discretion, see In re C-V-T- , 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10-11 (BIA 1998), non-LPRs must demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to an LPR or citizen parent, spouse, or child, § 1229b(b)(1)(D). These separate categories and procedures-treating deportable noncitizens more generously than inadmissible noncitizens, and treating one group of deportable noncitizens (LPRs) the most generously of all-stem from one animating principle. All noncitizens in this country are entitled to certain rights and protections, but the protections afforded to previously admitted noncitizens and LPRs are particularly strong. See Demore v. Kim , 538 U.S. 510, 543-544, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, "[t]he immigration laws give LPRs the opportunity to establish a life permanently in this country by developing economic, familial, and social ties indistinguishable from those of a citizen." Id. , at 544, 123 S.Ct. 1708. Because those already admitted, like Barton, are often presumed to have greater connections to the country, the immigration laws use separate terms and create separate procedures for noncitizens seeking admission to the country on the one hand, and those who were previously admitted on the other. The stop-time rule carries that distinction forward. The rule specifies how a period of continuous residence ends for noncitizens who are seeking admission and thus are inadmissible, as well as noncitizens who are already admitted and thus are deportable. By using separate terms and grounds for two groups of people, the stop-time rule thus reflects the two-track dichotomy for inadmissible or deportable noncitizens that pervades the INA. B Barton is a longtime lawfully admitted resident of the United States. He and his mother moved to the United States from Jamaica when he was about 10 years old. They both entered legally and, through Barton's stepfather, soon adjusted their status to LPRs. When Barton was placed in removal proceedings, all of his immediate family-his mother, his children, his fiancee-were living in the United States. He had not returned to Jamaica in 25 years. Barton was first arrested in 1996, when he was 17 or 18, after a friend shot at his ex-girlfriend's house while he was present. Both he and his friend were convicted of, among other things, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm. Barton later testified before an immigration judge that he was unaware that his friend had a gun or was planning to shoot it. After attending a boot camp and obtaining his GED, Barton led a law-abiding life for several years. But in the mid-2000s, Barton developed a drug problem and was convicted twice on possession charges. After attending two drug rehabilitation programs, Barton was never arrested again. He graduated from college, began running an automobile repair shop, and became a father to four young children. Just a few years ago-nearly 10 years after his last arrest-the Government detained Barton and placed him in removal proceedings. Because he had been lawfully admitted to the country, the Government could not charge him with any grounds of inadmissibility. Rather, the Government charged, and Barton conceded, that he was deportable based on prior firearms and drug convictions. (All agree that Barton's aggravated-assault offense did not qualify as a deportable offense under § 1227.) Barton then sought cancellation of removal. Perhaps recognizing that Barton had a strong case for cancellation of removal on the merits, see C-V-T- , 22 I. & N. Dec., at 11 (factors such as "family ties within the United States, residence of long duration in this country (particularly when the inception of residence occurred at a young age)," and "business ties" all favor a noncitizen seeking cancellation), the Government contended that Barton was categorically ineligible for that relief. It reasoned that Barton's prior offenses triggered the stop-time rule and that Barton therefore could not meet the continuous-residence requirement. The problem (for the Government) was finding a prior offense that actually triggered the stop-time rule. None of the offenses that had made Barton deportable-his firearms and drug convictions-satisfied the stop-time rule's first clause because § 1182(a)(2) does not "refe[r] to" those offenses. The Government therefore could not argue that Barton's firearms and drug offenses ended Barton's period of continuous residence under the stop-time rule. As for Barton's aggravated-assault offense, it was not a ground for deportability under § 1227(a) and therefore did not render him deportable under the third clause of the stop-time rule. So the Government took a different tack: It argued that, even though Barton had already been admitted (and was not seeking readmission), his aggravated-assault offense "render[ed him] inadmissible" under the second clause of the stop-time rule. That is, although the Government could not charge Barton with inadmissibility, it relied upon a ground of inadmissibility to assert that Barton was not entitled to relief from removal. The Immigration Judge agreed with the Government. The judge made clear, however, that she would have granted Barton's cancellation application had he satisfied the continuous-residence requirement. The judge cited, among other things, Barton's strong family ties, including his four young children who were all U.S. citizens. The judge concluded that because "his last arrest was over 10 years ago," Barton "is clearly rehabilitated." The judge also concluded that Barton's family "relies on him and would suffer hardship if he were to be deported to Jamaica." App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. II Barton makes two arguments to this Court. The Court focuses on the first-that the stop-time rule will "rende[r]" a noncitizen inadmissible only if the person is actually adjudicated inadmissible based on the given offense. But whether Barton is right on that score is irrelevant because Barton's second argument-which the Court fails to grapple with meaningfully-is surely correct: At the very least, an offense cannot "rende[r]" someone inadmissible unless the Government can legally charge that noncitizen with a ground of inadmissibility. That is, the stop-time rule is consistent with basic immigration law: A noncitizen who has already been admitted, and is not seeking readmission, cannot be charged with any ground of inadmissibility and thus cannot be deemed inadmissible. Because the stop-time rule uses the terms "removable" (i.e. , deportable) and "inadmissible" in the disjunctive, the Court must analyze the rule against the INA's historic two-track backdrop. That context confirms that the term "inadmissible" cannot refer to a noncitizen who, like Barton, has already been admitted and is not seeking readmission. Indeed, the terms "inadmissible" and "deportable" are mutually exclusive in removal proceedings: A noncitizen can be deemed either inadmissible or deportable, not both. § 1229a(e) (for the purposes of removal statute and § 1229b-governing cancellation of removal-a noncitizen is "inadmissible under section 1182" if "not admitted to the United States," and "deportable under section 1227" if "admitted to the United States"). For the purposes of the stop-time rule, a person is not "inadmissible" unless that person actually seeks admission, and thus is subject to charges of inadmissibility. After all, if the provision applied to those who could hypothetically be rendered inadmissible, it could have said so. For example, the statute would have said that it applied when "the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title" that either (2) "could render the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title" or (3) could render the noncitizen "removable [i.e. , deportable] from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title." The Government's reading-that a noncitizen can be inadmissible under the stop-time rule without seeking admission at all-flouts basic statutory-interpretation principles. Among "the most basic interpretative canons" is "that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant." Corley v. United States , 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Were the stop-time rule agnostic to whether the noncitizen actually seeks admission, then the rule's third clause-regarding deportability-would be meaningless. When a noncitizen is "removable"-i.e. , deportable-under § 1227 for an offense "referred to" in § 1182(a)(2), he or she is also "inadmissible" for an offense "referred to" in § 1182(a)(2). The third clause has meaning only if inadmissibility and deportability apply, as they always have, to separate groups of noncitizens-noncitizens seeking admission on the one hand, and noncitizens already admitted on the other. To be sure, there are limited exceptions to the general rule that questions of admissibility apply only to noncitizens seeking formal admission. Noncitizens applying for adjustment of status must establish admissibility. §§ 1255(a), (l )(2). But that is because adjustment of status is an express proxy for admission: "Congress created the [process] to enable an alien physically present in the United States to become an LPR without incurring the expense and inconvenience of traveling abroad to obtain an immigrant visa" and then presumably demonstrating admissibility on return. DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. A, ch. 1 (2020), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. Far from a "ginned-up label," ante , at 1452 - 1453, the term "constructive admission" expresses precisely how the INA conceives of adjustment of status: an admissions process that occurs inside the United States as opposed to outside of it. Alternatively, the Government also relies on two narrow provisions of the INA applicable to "[s]pecial agricultural workers," 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(3)(B)(ii), and "certain entrants before January 1, 1982," § 1255a(b)(2)(B). These provisions, it argues, demonstrate that throughout the INA, inadmissibility is a status untethered to admission. But these provisions, too, refer to noncitizens seeking adjustment of status. § 1160(a)(1) (setting procedures for adjustment of status of certain noncitizens); § 1255a(a) (same). Even if the Government were correct that these statutes deem a noncitizen inadmissible outside of an application for admission, its argument would rise and fall on a few provisions within the expansive INA. In any event, neither of these provisions is similar in structure and purpose to the stop-time rule. Neither refers to grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability in tandem. What is more, neither appears to confer or deny relief exclusively in removal proceedings-where the dichotomy between inadmissibility and deportability is most important. By contrast, the Government concedes that the term "inadmissible" in the mandatory-detention statute-a provision structurally similar to the stop-time rule-applies only to noncitizens capable of being charged with inadmissibility. Brief for Respondent 30. That provision specifies, in relevant part, that the Government "shall take into custody any alien who-(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2)" or "(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) ... on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year." § 1226(c)(1) (footnote omitted). Although the term "inadmissible" in this context does not refer to an actual adjudication of inadmissibility, see Demore , 538 U.S. at 513, 531, 123 S.Ct. 1708, the Government accepts that it must at least refer to a possible charge on a noncitizen seeking admission. Brief for Respondent 30. Otherwise, the statute would subject already-admitted noncitizens-even those who are not deportable for any criminal offense-to mandatory detention, simply because they occupy the "status" of inadmissibility. This provision's structure is virtually the same as the stop-time rule: It refers to grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability separately and applies to a noncitizen in removal proceedings. Given the similar structure, the stop-time rule should be read the same as the mandatory-detention provision: to refer to adjudications that are possible rather than impossible. If a noncitizen seeking admission has committed a crime under § 1182(a)(2) and is convicted of or admits to the offense, that offense "renders" the noncitizen "inadmissible" because the noncitizen can be charged and found inadmissible based on that crime. But such an offense does not render a noncitizen inadmissible if, like Barton, he or she was admitted years earlier and does not seek readmission. For a noncitizen who has already been admitted, Congress carved out a separate category of offenses in both the stop-time rule and the mandatory-detention provision: here, those referred to in § 1182(a)(2) that render a noncitizen deportable under §§ 1227(a)(2) and (a)(4). III The Court reaches a different result only by contorting the statutory language and by breezily waving away applicable canons of construction. At various points the Court seems to ignore the rule's second and third clauses entirely-clauses that, as mentioned above, distinguish between grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability. The Court insists that the statute "operates like traditional criminal recidivist laws" because it precludes cancellation of removal for a noncitizen who "has committed an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) during the initial seven years of residence." Ante , at 1445; see also ante , at 1448, 1449, n. 5, 1453 - 1454. Had Congress intended for commission of a crime in § 1182(a)(2) alone to trigger the stop-time rule, it would have said so. In fact, it would have stopped at the rule's first clause, which (without more) states the Court's rule: that the time of continuous residence stops whenever a noncitizen "has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title." § 1229b(d)(1). But that reading ignores the rest of what Congress wrote. Congress specified that it is not enough for a noncitizen to commit a crime listed in § 1182(a)(2) ; that crime must also "rende[r] the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title" or "removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title." § 1229b(d)(1). Those words have meaning-invoking the two-track structure of the INA and the distinction between grounds of inadmissibility and grounds of deportability-and the Court cannot simply will them out of existence. Even when the Court finally discusses the second clause, "renders the alien inadmissible," the Court raises more questions than it answers-and answers questions that it need not address at all. First, the Court claims, the clause makes clear that "cancellation of removal is precluded if an alien committed a § 1182(a)(2) offense during the initial seven years of residence, even if (as in Barton's case) the conviction occurred after the seven years elapsed." Ante , at 1444. Despite the emphasis the Court lays on this point, it is irrelevant to this case: Barton does not dispute that the stop-time rule is triggered by the date of commission of a crime rather than a later date of conviction. Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 4. The question in this case is whether certain offenses can possibly render Barton inadmissible when he does not seek admission and has already been admitted-regardless of whether one looks to the date of commission or the date of conviction of those offenses. Even if this question mattered and were properly before us, Congress could have made the same point-that the stop-time rule is triggered by commission of a crime-by omitting the second and third clauses entirely. It again could have written what the Court, at various points, seems to wish it had written: The stop-time rule is triggered whenever a noncitizen "has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title." The second and third clauses-which refer to later events, when a noncitizen is actually "render[ed]" inadmissible or deportable-make the Court's aside less plausible, not more. The Court next insists that the second clause makes clear that the crime must "rende[r]" the noncitizen "inadmissible"-which, in the Court's view, requires only that a noncitizen admit the crime or be convicted of it. Ante, at 1459. But given the INA's historic two-track structure, a noncitizen is not "render[ed]" inadmissible when convicted of an offense that cannot serve as a ground of removal at all. The Court also fails to clarify why, if conviction or admission alone renders any noncitizen inadmissible regardless of admission status, Congress chose to add a third clause referring to grounds of deportability. Indeed, what does the Court do about the canon against surplusage? The Court does not dispute that its reading makes the entire third clause of the stop-time rule meaningless. It offers only two rejoinders: (1) that the reference to subsection (a)(4) in the third clause is superfluous under either party's reading, and (2) that a bit of surplusage makes no difference in any event. Ante, at 1452 - 1453. To be sure, "[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy." Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc. , 586 U.S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 873, 881, 203 L.Ed.2d 180 (2019). But the Court relies on more than just "some redundancy." It dismisses out of hand one of only three clauses in the stop-time rule-without regard for the clause's pedigree or the core difference between deportability and inadmissibility. It remains this Court's " 'duty "to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." ' " Duncan v. Walker , 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (quoting United States v. Menasche , 348 U.S. 528, 538-539, 75 S.Ct. 513, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) ). It must therefore be " 'reluctan[t] to treat statutory terms as surplusage' in any setting," 533 U.S. at 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 698, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 132 L.Ed.2d 597 (1995) )-especially in this context, where each word could dictate categorical ineligibility for relief from removal. It also does not matter that, as the Government points out, § 1227(a)(4) did not initially refer to any crimes cross-referenced in § 1182(a)(2). Brief for Respondent 32-33. Congress' decision to make a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation based on a to-be-determined class of crimes is far different from excising and giving no meaning to an entire clause. * * * At bottom, the Court's interpretation is at odds with the express words of the statute, with the statute's overall structure, and with pertinent canons of statutory construction. It is also at odds with common sense. With virtually every other provision of the INA, Congress granted preferential treatment to lawfully admitted noncitizens-and most of all to LPRs like Barton. But because of the Court's opinion today, noncitizens who were already admitted to the country are treated, for the purposes of the stop-time rule, identically to those who were not-despite Congress' express references to inadmissibility and deportability. The result is that, under the Court's interpretation, an immigration judge may not even consider whether Barton is entitled to cancellation of removal-because of an offense that Congress deemed too trivial to allow for Barton's removal in the first instance. Because the Court's opinion does no justice to the INA, let alone to longtime LPRs like Barton, I respectfully dissent. As the statute makes clear, and as we discuss below, committing a § 1182(a)(2) offense precludes cancellation of removal only if the offense also "renders" the noncitizen inadmissible. See infra , at 1450. Section 1182(a)(2) specifies what that means for each of its enumerated offenses. For the offense at issue in this case, the noncitizen must also have been convicted of or admitted the offense. This opinion uses the term "noncitizen" as equivalent to the statutory term "alien." See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). The immigration laws impose a similar but even stricter set of eligibility requirements for noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents. § 1229b(b). The term "offense of removal" describes the offense that was the ground on which the immigration judge, at the removal proceeding, found the noncitizen removable. If the offense of removal itself was an aggravated felony or was an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) that was committed during the initial seven years of residence, then the offense of removal alone precludes cancellation of removal, regardless of whether the noncitizen has an additional record of prior crimes. Because the third clause refers to grounds of deportability, the Government appears to agree that the terms "removable" and "deportable" are interchangeable. See Brief for Respondent 21-22. The Court seems to suggest that the stop-time rule's tense simply mirrors § 1182(a)(2). See ante , at ---- - ----. It is true that § 1182(a)(2) speaks in the present tense, stating that a noncitizen "is inadmissible" if she has been "convicted of " or "admits having committed" certain offenses. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). But the Court's argument does not follow. Section 1182, by its terms, applies only to "[c]lasses of aliens ineligible for visas or admission." § 1182(a). Because the provision applies only to noncitizens seeking admission, it is only natural that the clause uses the present tense to describe when such a noncitizen "is inadmissible." By contrast, the stop-time rule, under the Government's and Court's reading, purports to apply to noncitizens not seeking admission at all-and who therefore could not possibly be adjudicated inadmissible. Indeed, one of the provisions suggests that, outside the context in which a noncitizen seeks adjustment of status (and thus seeks constructive admission), a noncitizen's status can be terminated "only upon a determination ... that the alien is deportable." § 1160(a)(3)(A). The Government also notes that a noncitizen would be deportable were she inadmissible at entry (or during adjustment of status) but erroneously admitted (or allowed to adjust status). Brief for Respondent 18-19 (citing § 1227(a)(1)(A) ). But this provision directly undermines the Government's reading of the statute. Were inadmissibility a status untethered to admission, a noncitizen inadmissible at the time of entry would always be inadmissible. But because a noncitizen who was already admitted cannot be adjudicated inadmissible, Congress made erroneous admission a ground of deportability, not inadmissibility. Courts have split over what event triggers the stop-time rule-commission of the offense or a second, later point at which the offense "render[s]" the noncitizen inadmissible. Brief for Momodoulamin Jobe et al. as Amici Curiae 12-13. Because this point about the trigger date is neither disputed here nor briefed by either party, the Court's opinion should not be read to resolve a Circuit split that is not before this Court. Barton acknowledges that, even now, the reference to § 1227(a)(4) "does little or no work" for a separate reason: Noncitizens who are deportable under that subsection are ineligible for cancellation of removal. Brief for Petitioner 33, n. 7. But, according to Barton, there are scenarios in which the reference to § 1227(a)(4) nevertheless " 'may ... not be a redundancy,' " ibid. , and perhaps for this reason, the Government does not focus on this argument in its brief.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 81-1008. Argued November 3, 1982 Decided December 13, 1982 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. R. Eden Martin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Howard J. Trienens and Thormund A. Miller. Elliott Schulder argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, John Broadley, Kathleen M. Dollar, Robert S. Burk, and Timm L. Abendroth. William L. Slover argued the cause for respondents City of San Antonio et al. With him on the brief for respondent San Antonio was C. Michael Loftus. Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, First Assistant Attorney General, Richard E. Gray III, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and James R. Myers and Stuart Fryer, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for respondent State of Texas. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to clarify the allocation of authority, as between the federal courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission, to set and review rates for movements of coal by rail. I This case arose as a result of a 1972 decision of San Antonio, Tex., acting through its City Public Service Board, to substitute coal-generated electricity for natural gas. Toward that end, in 1974, San Antonio entered into long-term contracts to purchase coal from two suppliers in Campbell County, Wyo.; began to construct two coal-fired generating units; and initiated negotiations with Burlington Northern Inc. and Southern Pacific Transportation Co. for contracts to transport coal from Wyoming to the new plants. Although the railroads originally quoted San Antonio a rate of $7.90 per ton for moving coal from Campbell County to San Antonio, economic conditions, which were characterized by rapid inflation, required the railroads to raise the rate to $11.90 per ton. In May 1975, San Antonio filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission seeking prescription of a just and reasonable tariff. In October 1976, the Commission rendered a decision, San Antonio v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 3551. C. C. 405 (1976) (San Antonio I), establishing a rate of $10.93 per ton for the San Antonio movement. The Commission emphasized that the prescription was temporary by noting: “The public interest requires that, in view of the parties’ inability to reach an agreement, a rate be prescribed at this time so that the movement may commence. As actual experience is gained, the parties may petition for modification of the prescription if circumstances warrant.” Id., at 417-418. The order was to “continue in full force and effect until the further order of the Commission.” Ibid. The railroads sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming, inter alia, that the Commission had erred in not considering the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (4-R Act), which became effective before San Antonio I was announced. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission, reasoning that since the rate was temporary and expressly subject to modification, the parties could return to the Commission when guidelines for implementing the 4-R Act were promulgated, Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 555 F. 2d 637, 648 (1977). In June 1977, after six months of operation at the San Antonio I rates, the railroads petitioned the Commission for a modification of the rate. In October 1977, the Commission reopened the San Antonio proceeding, and one year later, issued a new order, San Antonio v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 359 I. C. C. 1 (1978) (San Antonio II), finding that when compared to other similar movements, the San Antonio I $10.93 rate was “below a maximum reasonable rate and that modification of that rate [was] warranted.” 359 I. C. C., at 7. After making extensive new cost findings and applying the ratemaking guidelines of the 4-R Act, the Commission set the maximum rate level at $16.12 per ton. Both San Antonio and the railroads were dissatisfied with this rate and petitioned for reconsideration. In June 1979, a third order was issued, San Antonio v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 3611. C. C. 482 (1979) (San Antonio III), which made certain modifications in the San Antonio II analysis that resulted in a new maximum rate of $17.23 per ton for the San Antonio movement. The railroads then filed tariffs at the $17.23 rate. Petitions for review of the San Antonio II and San Antonio III prescriptions were filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by all the parties. Without expressing an opinion as to whether the rate was too high, as San Antonio claimed, or too low, as the railroads urged, in June 1980, the Court of Appeals decided that aspects of both the San Antonio II and the San Antonio III rate orders were “arbitrary and capricious” and without “defensible rationale.” San Antonio v. United States, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 249, 269, 631 F. 2d 831, 851. The Commission’s orders were vacated, and the case was remanded to the Commission. It is at this point that the present controversy arose, for the parties sharply disagreed about the effect of the Court of Appeals’ decision on the filed tariffs pending the Commission’s decision on remand. Construing the decision as vacating only the Commission’s orders in San Antonio II and III but not the rates that were filed, the railroads continued to treat the $17.23 rate as the one which San Antonio was required to pay pursuant to 49 U. S. C. §10761 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). San Antonio, on the other hand, interpreted the Court of Appeals’ decision as vacating the $17.23 rate and reviving the rate set by San Antonio I. Accordingly, the shipper unilaterally reduced its payments to the $10.93-per-ton rate set in 1976. Although we might have thought otherwise, it was not clear to the railroads what legal action should be taken to force San Antonio to pay the filed $17.23 tariff. Several maneuvers were attempted: in its first effort to reestablish San Antonio III as the rate applicable to this period, the carriers filed a new tariff in early November 1980. That tariff, which would have required San Antonio to prepay at the $17.23 rate before coal service would be provided, was suspended by a division of the Commission which agreed with San Antonio that the Court of Appeals’ decision precluded any rate except $10.93. The railroads asked the Court of Appeals for clarification of its decision. Pending review, however, the parties carried on their controversy in other forums. The railroads again attempted to file a tariff in conformity with San Antonio III. Although this time the tariff was not suspended or rejected by the Commission, San Antonio continued to pay at the San Antonio I rate even after the new tariff’s December 1980 effective date; in addition, it filed a complaint to enforce the San Antonio I rate in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Before the District Court could rule, the railroads countered by filing a petition asking the Commission to clarify its refusal to suspend or reject the new tariff by declaring that this action amounted to a modification of San Antonio I. In addition, the carriers filed a second prepayment tariff — which was also accepted by the Commission. Before the Commission could react to the railroads’ request for clarification, however, the Texas District Court ruled in San Antonio’s favor on an application to preliminarily enjoin the railroads from conditioning service on prepayment of rates that did not conform with San Antonio I. The railroads appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In April 1981, while the railroads’ appeal was pending in the Fifth Circuit, the Commission finally took the step necessary to end the controversy over what rate applied from the time of the June 1980 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the context of considering the railroads’ request for clarification, the Commission formally vacated its San Antonio I prescription. The order stated that in a later proceeding, the Commission would determine “what the maximum reasonable rate should have been ... for the period during which the vacated maximum rate prescriptions in San Antonio II and III were in effect.” San Antonio v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 364 I. C. C. 887, 894 (1981) (San Antonio IV). Pursuant to 49 U. S. C. § 10327(h) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), this order became effective 30 days later, in May 1981. It was at this point that the Fifth Circuit decided the railroads’ appeal of the Texas District Court decision. In its holding, that court vacated the preliminary injunction on the ground that only the Commission had jurisdiction to enjoin railroads from collecting their filed tariff rate. In addition, that court denied an application by San Antonio for a stay of the Commission’s San Antonio IV decision, San Antonio v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 650 F. 2d 49, clarified, 652 F. 2d 422 (1981). Thus, when the Commission’s San Antonio IV decision became effective in May 1981, San Antonio finally began to pay for the shipment of its coal at the carriers’ tariff rate of $17.23 per ton. One month later, on June 30, 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued the clarification of its 1980 holding. 211 U. S. App. D. C. 111, 655 F. 2d 1341. It is this clarification that is under review here. Citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. National Assn. of Recycling Industries, Inc., 449 U. S. 609 (1981) (per curiam), and Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U. S. 800 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that since it was without authority to determine interim policy pending remand proceedings in the Commission, the effect of the court’s 1980 decision was necessarily to reinstate San Antonio I, which was “revived” by the vacation of San Antonio 11 and 111. 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 114, 655 F. 2d, at 1344. Tariffs set in excess of the San Antonio I rate were therefore declared “unlawful” for the period after the court vacated San Antonio II and III but before the Commission formally vacated San Antonio I. 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 113, 655 F. 2d, at 1343. We granted certiorari. 455 U. S. 988 (1982). We agree that Consolidated Rail and Wichita Board of Trade control this case, but these holdings require federal courts to defer to the Commission on questions concerning the applicable rates; accordingly, we reverse. II In recent years, we have had four occasions to consider federal courts’ authority to alter rail rates regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act. In the first of these, Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658 (1963), a railroad faced with declining revenues had attempted to lower its rates, and the issue before us was whether a Federal District Court had the power to enjoin this reduction at the request of competitors of the railroad and those who shipped by rail. Affirming the District Court’s denial of an injunction, we held that Congress, in the Interstate Commerce Act, meant to “vest in the Commission the sole and exclusive power to suspend” the rates. Id., at 667. We noted several reasons for this rule. First, a review of the legislative history of the 1910 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act demonstrated that Congress was dissatisfied with the nonuniformity in rates and inequities that resulted from the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act’s failure to give the Commission power to grant injunctive relief. We noted that the authority to suspend rates granted the Commission by the 1910 amendments would not cure the problem unless the suspension power was exclusive. Id., at 664. Second, we held that court-ordered injunctive relief would interfere with the careful way in which the Commission’s suspension power takes into account the need of the carrier to receive a reasonable rate of return, and the desire of the shipper to pay only what is lawful. Unlike an injunction, a suspension order is limited to seven months’ duration. Id., at 665-666. The shippers, on the other hand, are fully protected by the reparation provision which requires carriers to reimburse shippers if the Commission later determines that the filed tariff was unreasonable. Id., at 666. Finally, we emphasized that court-ordered injunctions were inconsistent with the congressional intent to vest rate-making decisions in the Commission, stating: “Congress meant to foreclose a judicial power to interfere with the timing of rate changes which would be out of harmony with the uniformity of rate levels fostered by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” Id., at 668. (Emphasis in original.) Ten years later, we again considered a federal court’s power to enjoin rail rates in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 (1973). There we reversed a three-judge District Court that had enjoined the Commission from permitting surcharges on shipments of recycled goods. We rejected the argument that injunctive relief could be granted under authority conferred by the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U. S. C. §4331 et seq., stating that “to grant an injunction in the present context, even though not based upon a substan tive consideration of the rates, would directly interfere with the Commission’s decision as to when the rates were to go into effect, and would ignore our conclusion in Arrow. . . .” 412 U. S., at 697. (First emphasis added; other in original.) A third case, Wichita Board of Trade, supra, stated our position in even stronger terms. There the Commission had approved certain rate increases but failed, in the District Court’s view, to explain its reasoning adequately. In addition to vacating the order and remanding the case for reconsideration by the Commission, the District Court enjoined the railroads from charging the rates that had been approved in the order. Although we affirmed the remand to the Commission, we nevertheless reversed as to the injunction, reiterating the views we expressed in Arrow that a federal court has no jurisdiction to enter an order that operates to fix rates. “The only consequence of suspending [an] order is that the railroads may not rely, in some subsequent proceeding, on a Commission finding that the proposed rates were just and reasonable. . . . “Carriers may put into effect any rate that the Commission has not declared unreasonable. . . . Suspension of the Commission’s order thus does not in itself preclude the carriers from implementing a new rate.” 412 U. S., at 818-819. (Emphasis added.) Again we noted that Congress channeled all rate decisions to the Commission in the first instance, id., at 820; that court-ordered relief interferes with the delicate balance the Act strikes between the competing interests of shipper and carrier, ibid.; and that the equities favor allowing the railroads to charge more than the Commission may ultimately find reasonable because the Act gives the shippers a right to reparations while no such protection is given to the carriers, id., at 823. We now turn to our recent holding in Consolidated Rail, supra, which both parties appear to concede states the controlling law. There the Commission fixed rates for recycled materials. On review, the Court of Appeals revoked the rate increases, remanded to the Commission to determine a rate structure incorporating the standards set forth in the 4-R Act, and enjoined new rates until after the Commission’s reconsideration. In reversing this holding summarily, we held: “The authority to determine when any particular rate should be implemented is a matter which Congress has placed squarely in the hands of the Commission. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 662-672 (1963). . . . [T]here is no basis in our prior decisions for the revocation order or for the injunction against further increases. Tf a reviewing court cannot discern [the Commission’s] policies, it may remand the case to the agency for clarification and further justification. . . . When a case is remanded on the ground that the agency’s policies are unclear, an injunction ordinarily interferes with the primary jurisdiction of the Commission.’ Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 822 (1973)_” 449 U. S., at 612. (Emphasis added.) To recapitulate, our cases stand for three propositions: (1) under the Interstate Commerce Act, primary jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates lies with the Commission, see also Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. &S.F.R. Co., 284 U. S. 370, 384 (1932); (2) federal-court authority to reject Commission rate orders for whatever reason extends to the orders alone, and not to the rates themselves, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2349(a) (“The court of appeals . . . has exclusive jurisdiction to make. . . a judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining;. . . the order of the agency”) (emphasis added); (3) where there is a dispute about the appropriate rate, the equities favor allowing the carrier’s rate to control pending decision by the Commission, since under the Act, the shipper may receive reparations for overpayment while the carrier can never be made whole after underpayment. 49 U. S. C. § 11705(b)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U. S. 301 (1935). HH J — I We can discern no basis to distinguish this case from Arrow, SCRAP, Wichita Board of Trade, and Consolidated Rail, supra. By entering an order declaring that the San Antonio 1 rate order was “revived” for the period June 1980-May 1981, the Court of Appeals did that which we have said a federal court may not do: i. e., freeze the rate that railroads charge shippers prior to a decision by the Commission as to what a reasonable rate should be. That approach undermines the Commission’s ability to exercise the primary jurisdiction delegated to it by Congress to insure equitable and uniform rates. More important, the determination requires the railroads to accept a return that was considered temporary when it was approved in 1976, and “below a maximum reasonable rate” when it was modified in 1978. This result would be inequitable in the best of times, but the impact is particularly acute in a period of high inflation and changing regulatory standards. Because the reparations provisions do not apply to both shippers and carriers, losses suffered by the carriers cannot be recovered. Carriers are not adequately protected by their authority under §§ 10761 and 10762 to file a new rate or their right under § 10327(g) to petition the Commission to modify its “revived” rate order, as San Antonio urges. It is arguable — and in other proceedings, San Antonio has so claimed, see Brief for Petitioners 38-39 — that before either action can take effect, the party adversely affected may ask for a hearing pursuant to Arizona Grocery, supra. A plenary hearing necessarily causes delay, and even if it did not, action by the Commission usually will not be effective until 30 days have elapsed after its order is served, § 10327(h). The claim is made that the Court of Appeals was powerless to achieve a different result because, under § 10704(a)(1), the only rate the railroads could legally charge was the rate prescribed by the Commission. Since the Commission prescribed a rate in San Antonio I, the argument is that this is the rate the railroads must charge. We disagree. San Antonio I was by its terms limited to “continue in full force and effect until . . . further order of the Commission,” 355 I. C. C., at 418. Absent a contrary indication from the Commission, San Antonio II terminated the vitality of San Antonio I. Moreover, if the court was unsure about the continued vitality of San Antonio I, the more appropriate course would have been to remand to the Commission for explanation rather than to undertake itself to construe the order, and in so doing to interfere with the Commission’s primary jurisdiction, contrary to important congressional policies. The existence of a 1976 rate prescription does not require a result different from the result reached in Consolidated Rail. San Antonio II and III each in turn vacated the prescription which preceded it. In striking the orders in San Antonio II and III, the court’s action operated to leave in effect the rates filed under the Commission’s authority pending the Commission’s redetermination of a reasonable rate and subject always to reparations to protect the shipper should the Commission find that these rates were too high. The June 30, 1981, judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The 4-R Act changed the regulatory atmosphere in several key respects. Especially relevant here is § 205, which, as codified at 49 U. S. C. § 10704(a)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), instructs the Commission to "make an adequate and continuing effort to assist. . . carriers in attaining revenue levels” that are “adequate, under honest, economical and efficient management, to cover total operating expenses . . . plus a reasonable and economic profit or return (or both) on capital employed in the business.” For convenience, we continue to refer to the rates as “San Antonio I,” “San Antonio II," and “San Antonio III." In actual fact, general rate increases, which are not in issue here, have taken effect significantly raising each of these rates. See Brief for Petitioners 9, n. 3. Initially, the Commission took the position adopted by the panel, namely that the Court of Appeals’ decision required the railroads to charge at San Antonio I rates. While the petition for clarification was pending, however, our decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. National Assn. of Recycling Industries, Inc., 449 U. S. 609 (1981) (per curiam), was handed down. At about this time, the Commission revised its view to espouse the railroads’ position. The Federal Government has thus joined the railroads in asking us to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals. In the period in dispute, from June 1980, when the Court of Appeals vacated the San Antonio II and III orders, to May 1981, when the Commission formally vacated the San Antonio I prescription, San Antonio’s failure to pay the tariff rate resulted in a savings to it — and a loss to the railroads — of over $19 million. See Brief for Federal Respondents 6. San Antonio argues that the railroads’ failure to petition for certiorari within 90 days after rehearing was denied on the June 1980 judgment deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Because the June 1981 decision “resolve[d] a genuine ambiguity in a judgment previously rendered” and dealt with a question which was not “plainly and properly settled with finality,” FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U. S. 206, 211-212 (1952) (footnote omitted), we plainly have jurisdiction. Under § 207(d)(2) of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1907, 49 U. S. C. § 10707(d)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the carrier can also receive reparations. This right is limited, however, to underpayments resulting from the Commission’s suspension of a tariff; it does not apply where, as here, a court has prevented the carrier from collecting a higher tariff. See, e. g., 4-R Act, discussed in n. 1, supra; Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, supra. Both statutes are directly relevant in the determination of a reasonable rate for the San Antonio coal movement; neither was considered in San Antonio I.. San Antonio makes much of the dictionary definitions of “modify” and “vacate.” While ordinary meanings are not insignificant in statutory construction, San Antonio has not cited a single case under the Interstate Commerce Act making this distinction. Another way in which the Court of Appeals might have minimized interference with congressional objectives would have been to construe its own opinion as vacating only the Commission’s new rate calculations and not the Commission’s conclusion that the San Antonio I rate was too low. See 28 U. S. C. § 2349(a), allowing the court to enjoin or set aside “in whole or part, the order of the agency.” Cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 822 (1973). Because we find that Consolidated Rail mandates this result, we need not reach the railroads’ claim that the decision oí the Court oí Appeals is inconsistent with the filed rate doctrine.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. SERYETTE, INC. No. 111. Argued February 19, 1964. Decided April 20, 1964. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Philip B, Heymann, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come. Stanley E. Tobin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Carl M. Gould. Duane B. Beeson filed a brief for the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Servette, Inc., is a wholesale distributor of specialty merchandise stocked by retail food chains in Los Angeles, California. In 1960, during a strike which Local 848 of the Wholesale Delivery Drivers and Salesmen’s Union was conducting against Servette, the Local’s representatives sought to support the strike by asking managers of supermarkets of the food chains to discontinue handling merchandise supplied by Servette. In most instances the representatives warned that handbills asking the public not to buy named items distributed by Servette would be passed out in front of stores which refused to cooperate, and in a few cases handbills were in fact passed out. A complaint was issued on charges by Servette that this conduct violated subsections (i) and (ii) of § 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which, in relevant part, provide that it is an unfair labor practice for a union “(i) ... to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person ... to engage in ... a refusal in the course of his employment to . . . handle . . . commodities or to perform any services; or” “(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . . where in either case an object thereof is— “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . . Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer . . . .” The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the complaint. The Board adopted the finding of the Trial Examiner that “the managers of McDaniels Markets were authorized to decide as they best could whether to continue doing business with Servette in the face of threatened or actual handbilling. This, a policy decision, was one for them to make. The evidence is persuasive that the same authority was vested in the managers of Kory.” 133 N. L. R. B. 1506. The Board held that on these facts the Local’s efforts to enlist the cooperation of the supermarket managers did not constitute inducement of an “individual” within the meaning of that term in subsection (i); the Board held further that the handbilling, even if constituting conduct which “threaten [s], coerce [s], or restraints] any person” under subsection (ii), was protected by the quoted proviso to amended § 8 (b) (4). 133 N. L. R. B. 1501. The Court of Appeals set aside the Board’s order, holding that the term “individual” in subsection (i) was to be read literally, thus including the supermarket managers, and that the distributed products were not “produced” by Servette within the meaning of the proviso, thus rendering its protection unavailable. 310 F. 2d 659. We granted certiorari, 374 U. S. 805. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals correctly read the term “individual” in subsection (i) as including the supermarket managers, but it erred in holding that the Local’s attempts to enlist the aid of the managers constituted inducement of the managers in violation of the subsection. The 1959 statute amended §8 (b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, which made it unlawful to induce or encourage “the employees of any employer” to strike or engage in a “concerted” refusal to work. We defined the central thrust of that statute to be to forbid “a union to induce employees to strike against or to refuse to handle goods for their employer when an object is to force him or another person to cease doing business with some third party.” Local 1976, Carpenters’ Union v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93, 98. In the instant case, however, the Local, in asking the managers not to handle Servette items, was not attempting to induce or encourage them to cease performing their managerial duties in order to force their employers to cease doing business with Servette. Rather, the managers were asked to make a managerial decision which the Board found was within their authority to make. Such an appeal would not have been a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) before 1959, and we think that the legislative history of the 1959 amendments makes it clear that the amendments were not meant to render such an appeal an unfair labor practice. The 1959 amendments were designed to close certain loopholes in the application of § 8 (b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions. Thus, it had been held that the term “the employees of any employer” limited the application of the statute to those within the statutory definitions of “employees” and “employer.” Section 2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act defines “employer” to exclude the federal and state governments and their agencies or subdivisions, nonprofit hospitals, and employers subject to the Railway Labor Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2). The definition of “employee” in § 2 (3) excludes agricultural laborers, supervisors, and employees of an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3). Furthermore, since the section proscribed only inducement to engage in a strike or “concerted” refusal to perform services, it had been held that it was violated only if the inducement was directed at two or more employees. To close these loopholes, subsection (i) substituted the phrase “any individual employed by any person” for “the employees of any employer,” and deleted the word “concerted.” The first change was designed to make the provision applicable to refusals by employees who were not technically “employees” within the statutory definitions, and the second change was intended to make clear that inducement directed to only one individual was proscribed. But these changes did not expand the type of conduct which §8 (b)(4) (A) condemned, that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their employer to cease dealing with the primary employer. Moreover, the division of § 8 (b)(4) into subsections (i) and (ii) by the 1959 amendments has direct relevance to the issue presented by this case. It had been held that § 8 (b) (4) (A) did not reach threats of labor trouble made to the secondary employer himself. Congress decided that such conduct should be made unlawful, but only when it amounted to conduct which “threaten [s], coerce[s] or restraints] any person”; hence the addition of subsection (ii). The careful creation of separate standards differentiating the treatment of appeals to the employees of the secondary employer not to perform their employment services, from appeals for other ends which are attended by threats, coercion or restraint, argues conclusively against the interpretation of subsection (i) as reaching the Local's appeals to the supermarket managers in this case. If subsection (i), in addition to prohibiting inducement of employees to withhold employment services, also reaches an appeal that the managers exercise their delegated authority by making a business judgment to cease dealing with the primary employer, subsection (ii) would be almost superfluous. Harmony between (i) and (ii) is best achieved by construing subsection (i) to prohibit inducement of the managers to withhold their services from their employer, and subsection (ii) to condemn an attempt to induce the exercise of discretion only if the inducement would “threaten, coerce, or restrain” that exercise. We turn finally to the question whether the proviso to amended §8 (b)(4) protected the Local’s handbilling. The Court of Appeals, following its decision in Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. Labor Board, 310 F. 2d 591 (C. A. 9th Cir.), held that the proviso did not protect the Local’s conduct because, as a distributor, Servette was not directly involved in the physical process of creating the products, and thus “does not produce any products.” The Board on the other hand followed its ruling in Lohman Sales Co., 132 N. L. R. B. 901, that products “produced by an employer” included products distributed, as here, by a wholesaler with whom the primary dispute exists. We agree with the Board. The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions’ freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded. We elaborated the history of the proviso in Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, post, p. 58, decided today. It would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose if the proviso applied only in situations where the union’s labor dispute is with the manufacturer or processor. Moreover, a primary target of the 1959 amendments was the secondary boycotts conducted by the Teamsters Union, which ordinarily represents employees not of manufacturers, but of motor carriers. There is nothing in the legislative history which suggests that the protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower in coverage than the prohibition to which it is an exception, and we see no basis for attributing such an incongruous purpose to Congress. The term “produced” in other labor laws was not unfamiliar to Congress. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the term is defined as “produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on . . . ,” 29 U. S. C. § 203 (j), and has always been held to apply to the wholesale distribution of goods. The term “production” in the War Labor Disputes Act has been similarly applied to a general retail department and mail-order business. The Court of Appeals’ restrictive reading of “producer” was prompted in part by the language of § 8 (b)(4)(B), which names as a proscribed object of the conduct defined in subsections (i) and (ii) “forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer.” (Italics supplied.) In its decision in Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, the Court of Appeals reasoned that since a “processor” and a “manufacturer” are engaged in the physical creation of goods, the word “producer” must be read as limited to one who performs similar functions. On the contrary, we think that “producer” must be given a broader reach, else it is rendered virtually superfluous. Finally, the warnings that handbills would be distributed in front of noncooperating stores are not prohibited as “threats” within subsection (ii). The statutory protection for the distribution of handbills would be undermined if a threat to engage in protected conduct were not itself protected. Reversed. The supermarket chains principally involved were Kory’s Markets, Inc., and McDaniels Markets. The testimony mentioned only one other chain, Daylight Markets, one of whose store managers made an unsworn statement that he was interviewed on one occasion, and that although he refused to cooperate, the Local did not handbill at his store. Servette’s products are primarily candy, liquor, holiday supplies and specialty articles. The handbill was as follows: “To the Patrons of This Store “Wholesale Delivery Drivers & Salesmen’s Local No. 848 urgently requests that you do not buy the following products distributed by Servette, Inc.: “Brach’s Candy “Servette Candy “Good Season Salad Dressing “Old London Products “The Servette Company which distributes these products refuses to negotiate with the Union that represents its drivers. The Company is attempting to force the drivers to sign individual ‘'Yellow Dog’ contracts. “These contracts will destroy the wages and working conditions that the drivers now enjoy, and will set them back 20 years in their struggle for decent wages and working conditions. “The drivers of Servette appreciate your cooperation in this fight.” As amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704 (a), 73 Stat. 542-543, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV, 1963) §158 (b)(4). The Board reached a contrary conclusion on the authority of its decision in Carolina Lumber Co., 130 N. L. R. B. 1438, 1443, which viewed the statute as distinguishing “low level” supervisors from “high level” supervisors, holding that inducement of “low level” supervisors is impermissible but inducement of “high level” supervisors is permitted. We hold today that this is not the distinction drawn by the statute; rather, the question of the applicability of subsection (i) turns upon whether the union’s appeal is to cease performing employment services, or is an appeal for the exercise of managerial discretion. Section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4), read as follows: “Sec. 8 (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.” In view of these definitions, it was permissible for a union to induce work stoppages by minor supervisors, and farm, railway or public employees. See Ferro-Co Corp., 102 N. L. R. B. 1660 (supervisors) ; Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 N. L. R. B. 255 (supervisors); Conway’s Express, 87 N. L. R. B. 972, 980, aff’d, 195 F. 2d 906, 911 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (supervisors); Great Northern R. Co., 122 N. L. R. B. 1403, enforcement denied, 272 F. 2d 741 (C. A. 9th Cir.), and supplemental Board decision, 126 N. L. R. B. 57 (railroad employees); Smith Lumber Co., 116 N. L. R. B. 1756, enforcement denied, 246 F. 2d 129, 132 (C. A. 5th Cir.) (railroad employees); Paper Makers Importing Co., Inc., 116 N. L. R. B. 267 (municipal employees). Compare Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 87 N. L. R. B. 720, 721, enforced, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 191 F. 2d 642, cert. denied, 342 U. S. 869 (agricultural labor organization). See Joliet Contractors Assn. v. Labor Board, 202 F. 2d 606, 612 (C. A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 824; cf. Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 671. The changes made in § 8 (b) (4) (A) by subsection (i) first appeared in the Administration bill, which was introduced by Senator Goldwater. See § 503 (a) of S. 748,1 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 142. The Secretary of Labor testified that the change would cure the situation whereby unions could “avoid the existing provisions by inducing individual employees, or workers not defined as employees by the act such as railroad and agricultural workers — to refuse to handle the products of the person with whom they want the employer to cease doing business,” Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 505, etc., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 265. The Lan-drum-Griffin bill introduced in the House contained a subsection (i) similar to that of the Administration bill. Section 705 (a) of H. R. 8400,1 Leg. Hist. 680. An analysis submitted by its sponsors explained the purpose of the amendment as had the Secretary of Labor, and added that the omission of the word “concerted” was to prevent the unions from inducing employees one at a time to engage in secondary boycotts. 105 Cong. Rec. 14347, II Leg. Hist. 1522-1523. See also 105 Cong. Rec. 15531-15532 (Congressman Griffin), II Leg. Hist. 1568.- Thus, the following colloquy occurred between Secretary of Labor Mitchell and Senator Kennedy with respect to the provision of the Administration bill analogous to § 8 (b) (4) (ii): “Senator Kennedy. Mr. Secretary . . . “I would like to ask you a question regarding section 503 (a) of your bill: There is a manufacturer of clothing ‘A.’ He begins to purchase the products of a plant which is under the domination of racketeers .... Would it be a violation of section 503 of your bill if the business agent of the Clothing Workers Union at company A spoke to the plant manager and requested him not to order materials— nonunion materials — from the racketeer plant in Pennsylvania? “Secretary Mitchell. We don’t think it would be, Senator. “Senator Kennedy. Now, supposing the plant in Pennsylvania was a nonunion plant, would it be a violation under your bill for union leaders in another company to go to his plant manager and ask him not to buy goods from the nonunion plant? “Secretary Mitchell. Request him not to buy? No. “Senator Kennedy. Now, if the representative of the union at plant A told the manufacturer that the members of the union would not continue to work on goods which were secured from the racketeer’s shop? “Secretary Mitchell. In that case, it is my interpretation of our proposal that that would be coercion. And our proposal prohibits coercion for the purpose of bringing pressure on an employer not to buy merchandise from a neutral third party.” Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 505, etc., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 304^305. See Sealright Pacific, Ltd., 82 N. L. R. B. 271, 272, n. 4; Rabouin v. Labor Board, 195 F. 2d 906, 911-912 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. International Union of Brewery Workers, 272 F. 2d 817, 819 (C. A. 10th Cir.). Accord, Labor Board v. Local 294, Teamsters, 298 F. 2d 105 (C. A. 2d Cir.); and see Alpert v. Local 379, Teamsters, 184 F. Supp. 558 (D. C. D. Mass.). The Conference Committee in adopting subsection (ii) understood that the subsection would reach only threats, restraints or coercion of the secondary employer and not a mere request to him for voluntary cooperation. Senator Dirksen, one of the conferees, stated that the new amendment “makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to try to coerce or threaten an employer directly (but not to persuade or ask him) in order — • ... To get him to stop doing business with another firm or handling its goods.” 105 Cong. Rec. 19849, II Leg. Hist. 1823. (Italics supplied.) See, e. g., 105 Cong. Rec. 1730, II Leg. Hist. 993-994; 105 Cong. Rec. 6105, II Leg. Hist. 1028; 105 Cong. Rec. 6669, II Leg. Hist. 1196; 105 Cong. Rec. 3926-3927, II Leg. Hist. 1469-1470; 105 Cong. Rec. 15544, II Leg. Hist. 1580. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Pidcock, 299 F. 2d 281 (C. A. 5th Cir.); McComb v. Wyandotte Furniture Co., 169 F. 2d 766 (C. A. 8th Cir.); McComb v. Blue Star Auto Stores, 164 F. 2d 329 (C. A. 7th Cir.) ; Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food Co., 141 F. 2d 331, 340 (C. A. 8th Cir.). United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F. 2d 369 (C. A. 7th Cir.). We attach no significance to the fact that another version of the proviso read: “Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed ... to prohibit publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an establishment is operated, or goods are produced or distributed, by an employer engaged in a labor dispute . . . .” 105 Cong. Ree. 17333, II Leg. Hist. 1383. This version was in a request by the Senate conferees for instructions but was not made the subject of debate or vote because Senate and House conferees reached agreement on the proviso.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED GAS IMPROVEMENT CO. et al. v. CALLERY PROPERTIES, INC., et al. No. 21. Argued October 18-19, 1965. Decided December 7, 1965 Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell and Josephine H. Klein. William T. Coleman, Jr., argued the cause for United Gas Improvement Co. et al., petitioners in No. 21 and respondents in No. 26. With him on the briefs were Samuel Graff Miller, Richardson Dilworth, Harold E. Kohn, Bertram D. Moll and Vincent P. McDevitt. Kent H. Brown argued the cause for Public Service Commission of New York, petitioner in No. 22 and respondent in No. 26. With him on the briefs was Morton L. Simons. J. Evans Attwell argued the cause for Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., petitioner in No. 26 and respondent in Nos. 21, 22 and 32. With him on the briefs were W. H. Drushel, Jr., J. A. O’Connor, Jr., and H. Y. Rowe. Herbert W. Varner argued the cause for Superior Oil Co. et al., respondents in Nos. 21, 22 and 32. With him on the brief was H. H. Hillyer, Jr. Richard F. Generelly argued the cause and filed a brief for Callery Properties, Inc., respondent in Nos. 21, 22 and 32. Paul W. Hicks argued the cause for Placid Oil Co. et al., respondents in Nos. 21, 22 and 26. With him on the brief were Robert W. Henderson and Thomas G. Crouch. H. H. Hillyer, Jr., filed a brief for J. R. Frankel et al., respondents in Nos. 21, 22 and 32. Together with No. 22, Public Service Commission of New York v. Cattery Properties, Inc., et al., No. 26, Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al., and No. 32, Federal Power Commission v. Cattery Properties, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Power Commission in 1958-1959 granted unconditional certificates of public convenience and necessity to numerous producers of gas in south Louisiana, the sales contracts of the producers calling for initial prices ranging from 21.4 cents to 23.8 cents per Mcf. After deliveries commenced under those contracts, consumer interests challenged the orders in various courts of appeals. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sustained the Commission’s action (United Gas Improvement Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 269 F. 2d 865) but we vacated the judgment (Public Service Comm’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 361 U. S. 195) for reconsideration in light of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n (CATCO), 360 U. S. 378; and the other courts of appeals did likewise. The Commission thereupon instituted an area rate proceeding for south Louisiana and consolidated the remanded cases with that proceeding. 25 F. P. C. 942. It advised the producers of their potential obligation to refund any amounts eventually found to be inconsistent “with the requirements of the public interest and necessity” under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717f. 27 F. P. C. 15. Later the Commission in the interest of expedition severed the present group of applications and set them for a hearing in a consolidated proceeding under § 7. 27 F. P. C. 482. At the end, the Commission imposed two conditions on the certificates granted in these cases. First, it provided that the producers commence service at 18.5 cents per Mcf., plus 1.5 cents tax reimbursement where applicable, a price that it found to be “in line” with prices for Commission-certificated sales of gas from the southern Louisiana production area under generally contemporaneous contracts, 30 F. P. C. 283, 288-289. Second, it provided that until just and reasonable area rates are determined for south Louisiana, or until July 1, 1967, whichever is earlier, the producers shall not file any increased rates above 23.55 cents, the level at which rate filings might trigger increased rates by other producers under the escalation provisions of their contracts with the pipeline companies here involved. 30 F. P. C. 283, 298. In addition, the Commission ordered the producers to refund to their customers the amounts in excess of the proper initial price which they had already collected under the original certificate. 30 F. P. C. 283, 290. On review the Court of Appeals held that the Commission erred in limiting producers to an initial “in-line” price without first canvassing evidence bearing on the question of what would be a just and reasonable price for the gas. It further held that the Commission had no power to place an upper limit on future rates that a producer might file. Finally, the Court of Appeals, while upholding the power of the Commission to order refunds, held that the measure of such refunds was not to be the difference between the “in-line” price and the original contract price, but between the latter and the just and reasonable price subsequently to be fixed. 335 F. 2d 1004. We granted certiorari, 380 U. S. 931. We reverse the Court of Appeals. We think the Commission acted lawfully and responsibly, in line with our decision in the CATCO case where we held that it need not permit gas to be sold in the interstate market at the producer’s contract price, pending determination of just and reasonable rates under § 5, 52 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 717d. 360 U. S. 378, 388-391. Rather, we held that there is ample power under § 7 (e), to attach appropriate protective conditions. And see Federal Power Comm’n v. Hunt, 376 U. S. 515, 524-527. The fixing of an initial “in-line” price establishes a firm price at which a producer may operate, pending determination of a just and reasonable rate, without any contingent obligation to make refunds should a just and reasonable rate turn out to be lower than the “in-line” price. Consumer protection is afforded by keeping the “in-line” price at the level where substantial amounts of gas have been certificated to enter the market under other contemporaneous certificates, no longer subject to judicial review or in any way “suspect.” We believe the Commission can properly conclude under § 7 that adequate protection to the public interest requires as an interim measure that gas not enter the interstate market at prices higher than existing levels. To consider in this § 7 proceeding the mass of evidence relevant to the fixing of just and reasonable rates under § 5 might in practical effect render nugatory any effort to fix initial prices. We said in CATCO that § 7 procedures are designed “to hold the line awaiting adjudication of a just and reasonable rate” (360 U. S., at 392), and that “the inordinate delay” in § 5 proceedings (360 U. S., at 391) should not cripple them. The second condition, which temporarily bars rate increases beyond 23.55 cents per Mcf., was likewise aimed at keeping the general price level relatively constant pending determination of the just and reasonable rate. We noted in Federal Power Comm’n v. Hunt, supra, at 524, that “a triggering of price rises often results from the out-of-line initial pricing of certificated gas” and that the possibility of refund does not afford sufficient protection. And see Federal Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 42-43. We think, contrary to the Court of Appeals, that there was ample power under § 7 (e) for the Commission to attach these conditions for consumer protection during this interim period though the certificate was not a temporary one, as in Hunt, but a permanent one, as in CATCO and Federal Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., supra. The “in-line” price of 18.5 cents is supported by the contract prices in the south Louisiana area that were not “suspect,” and the selection of 23.55 cents beyond which a price increase might trigger escalation reflects the Commission’s expertise. We also conclude that the Commission’s refund order was allowable. We reject, as did the Court of Appeals below, the suggestion that the Commission lacked authority to order any refund. While the Commission “has no power to make reparation orders,” Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 618, its power to fix rates under § 5 being prospective only, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 389, it is not so restricted where its order, which never became final, has been overturned by a reviewing court. Here the original certificate orders were subject to judicial review; and judicial review at times results in the return of benefits received under the upset administrative order. See Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 200-201. An agency, like a court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of its order. Under these circumstances, the Commission could properly conclude that the public interest required the producers to make refunds for the period in which they sold their gas at prices exceeding those properly determined to be in the public interest. We think that the Commission could properly measure the refund by the difference between the rates charged and the “in-line” rates to which the original certificates should have been conditioned. The Court of Appeals would delay the payment of the refund until the “just and reasonable” rate could be determined. We have said elsewhere that it is the duty of the Commission, “where refunds are found due, to direct their payment at the earliest possible moment consistent with due process.” Federal Power Comm’n v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U. S. 145, 155. These excessive rates have been collected since 1958; under the circumstances, the Commission was not required to delay this refund further. And the imposition of interest on refunds is not an inappropriate means of preventing unjust enrichment. See Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 290 F. 2d 149, 157; Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 331 F. 2d 720, 729-731. Reversed. Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 283 F. 2d 817; Public Service Comm’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 292, 287 F. 2d 146; United Gas Improvement Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 287 F. 2d 159; United Gas Improvement Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 290 F. 2d 133; and United Gas Improvement Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 290 F. 2d 147. Section 7 (e) provides in part: “The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.” In the early post-CATCO cases, the Commission apparently proceeded on a case-by-case basis, considering whatever evidence might have been presented. See, e. g., Continental Oil Co., 27 F. P. C. 96, 102-108. Experience convinced it that the minimal utility derived from cost and economic trend evidence was outweighed by the administrative burdens and delays its consideration inevitably produced. See Skelly Oil Co., 28 F. P. C. 401, 410-412. The Commission properly and constructively exercised its discretion in declining to consider this large quantity of evidence. To have done so would have required a considerable expenditure of manpower, cf. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm’n, 373 U. S. 294, 313. We have previously encouraged the Commission to devise reasonable means of streamlining its procedures, see Federal Power Comm’n v. Hunt, supra, at 527, and we regard the Commission’s decision here as an appropriate step in that direction. Cf. Federal Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 44. The problem of refunds for amounts collected above the “in-line” price is not affected here by any filing under § 4 for increases within the limits of the triggering moratorium. 52 Stat. 822, 15 U. S. C. § 717c. Under §4 (d), a 30-day notice to the Commission and to the public is required for all rate increases, the Commission having authority under § 4 (e) to suspend the new rate for five months and thereafter to act only “after full hearings.” If the Commission has not acted at the expiration of the period of suspension, the new rates become effective. The Commission may require the producer to furnish a bond, and thereafter may compel refund of “the portion of such increased rates or charges by its decision found not justified.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RED BALL MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., et al. v. SHANNON et al., doing business as E. & R. SHANNON. No. 406. Argued April 28, 1964. Decided June 1, 1964 Amos M. Matheivs argued the cause for appellants in No. 406. With him on the briefs were Phillip Robinson, Charles D. Mathews, Roland Rice and John S. Fessenden. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 421. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Lionel Kestenbaum, Elliott Moyer and Fritz R. Kahn. Walter C. Wolff, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Robert E. Redding for the Transportation Association of America, by James E. Wilson for the Common Carrier Conference — -Irregular Route of the American Trucking Associations, Inc., and by Joseph E. Keller and William H. Borghesani, Jr. for the Private Carrier Conference, Inc. Together with No. 421, United States et al. v. Shannon et al., doing business as E. & R. Shannon, also on appeal from the same court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Act provides that it is unlawful for any person engaged in a business other than transportation to “transport property by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce for business purposes unless such transportation is within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise (other than transportation) of such person.” §203 (c), 49 U. S. C. § 303 (c). Appellees deal in livestock and commodities from a place of business in San Antonio, Texas. They make deliveries in their own trucks to customers in Louisiana, and buy sugar at Supreme, Louisiana, which they backhaul 525 miles for resale to customers in San Antonio. The Interstate Commerce Commission held that this backhaul was not exempt under § 203 (c) as “transportation . . . within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise . . of appellees, but was “conducted with the purpose of profiting from the transportation performed, and, as such, constitutes for-hire carriage for which operating authority from this Commission is required.” 81 M. C. C. 33/, 347. A three-judge court in the District Court for the Western District of Texas set aside the ICC order. 219 F. Supp. 781. We noted probable jurisdiction. 375 U. S. 901. We affirm. Section 203 (c) was designed explicitly to authorize the ICC to eliminate transportation which, though carried on in the guise of private carriage, was in effect for-hire carriage, and thus might lawfully be carried on only by an authorized common or contract carrier. Before the enactment of § 203 (c) the ICC was able to reach such abuses by interpreting § 203 (a) (17), 49 U. S. C. § 303 (a) (17), so as to exclude such “pseudo-private” carriage from its definition of a “private carrier of property by motor vehicle” as a person, not a “common” or “contract” carrier, who transports property of which he “is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such transportation is for the purpose of sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or in furtherance of any commercial enterprise.” Many of the cases involved nonauthorized carriers in the transportation business who resorted to transparent “buy-and-sell” devices to evade ICC regulation. A typical buy-and-sell arrangement is one under which the carrier “buys” property at a shipping point, transports it to a delivery point and there “sells” it to the real purchaser, the “profit” to the carrier amounting to the price of the transportation between the two points. Similar evasions through the use of spurious buy-and-sell agreements were found in cases where property was transported in trucks regularly used by noncarrier businesses to make pickups and deliveries. The ICC was faced with the necessity of determining on the facts of each case whether the transportation constituted private carriage beyond the scope of ICC economic regulation, or for-hire transportation subject to all relevant provisions of the Act. In other words, here, as in United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 374, in which we dealt with another aspect of the “pseudo-private” carriage problem, the ICC has also “had to decide whether a particular arrangement gives rise to that ‘for-hire’ carriage which is subject to economic regulation in the public interest, or whether it is, in fact, private carriage as to which Congress determined that the [noncarrier’s] interest . . . should prevail.” In the course of discriminating between this pseudo-private carriage and that transportation which was in fact in furtherance of a noncarrier business, the ICC developed the so-called “primary business” test. This test was first enunciated by the full Commission in Lenoir Chair Co., 51 M. C. C. 65, ail’d, sub nom. Brooks Transportation Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 517, aff’d, 340 U. S. 925. A chair manufacturer delivered some of its products in its own trucks. Whenever possible, it also used the vehicles to backhaul manufacturing materials for use and processing in its own plant. The ICC concluded, 51 M. C. C., at 76, that the delivery of goods and the backhaul were lawful private carriage because undertaken “as a bona fide incident to and in furtherance of [its] primary business . . . The governing standard was stated as follows, id., at 75: “If the facts establish that the primary business of an operator is the supplying of transportation for compensation then the carrier’s status is established though the operator may be the owner, at the time, of the goods transported and may be transporting them for the purpose of sale. ... If, on the other hand, the primary business of an operator is found to be manufacturing or some other noncarrier commercial enterprise, then it must be determined whether the motor operations are in bona fide furtherance of the primary business or whether they are conducted as a related or secondary enterprise with the purpose of profiting from the transportation performed. In our opinion, they cannot be both.” The ICC believed, however, that § 203 (a) (17) was not sufficiently explicit, particularly since decisions of some lower courts after Brooks raised doubts whether a truck operator could be found to be an unauthorized “for-hire” carrier in the absence of some affirmative showing that his operations brought him within the definitions of common or contract carriage. Consequently the Commission sought additional legislation. The original ICC bill in this area would have amended the definition of “private carrier” in § 203 (a) (17) to prohibit the buy-and-sell device employed by pseudo-private carriers as a subterfuge to avoid regulation. See S. 1677, H. R. 5825, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. This was withdrawn, however, in favor of a more broadly phrased provision, sponsored by the Transportation Association of America, which encompassed not only buy-and-sell devices, but also similar subterfuges which might be employed to engage in unauthorized for-hire transportation. The second clause of § 203 (c) is substantially the TAA proposal. The 1958 amendment appears on its face to codify the primary business test as the standard for determining whether a particular carrier is engaged in a private or for-hire operation. The appellants argue, however, that the amendment was intended to impose a broader limitation in the case of backhaul operations of the kind engaged in by appellees. The United States urges in its brief that Congress in 1958 was particularly concerned with the diversion of traffic from regulated carriers by backhauling operations, and that one object of the 1958 amendment was “to make plain that the purchase and sale of goods solely to take advantage of available backhaul capacity cannot qualify as a 'primary business enterprise (other than transportation).’ ” We understand this argument to be that Congress in effect enacted a per se test outlawing trucking operations limited to backhaul capacity without inquiry into whether that operation was undertaken pursuant to a bona fide noncarrier business enterprise. We find no support in either the words of the amendment or its legislative history for putting that gloss upon the amendment. On the contrary, we are persuaded that Congress meant only to codify the primary business test which, as applied by the ICC, requires an analysis of the backhaul operation in the factual setting of .each case. The legislative history fully supports this view. The ICC Chairman, speaking in support of the TAA amendment, expressly stated that, in his view, its effect would be to “incorporate the primary business test into the statute.” Similarly, the President of TAA, speaking directly to the backhaul problem, said that “Our proposal . . . would affect . . . the carrier who delivers his own goods in one direction, as a legal private carrier, but then resorts to the buy-and-sell practice to get a return load.” The Senate and House Reports, while less crystal clear, nevertheless reveal no purpose beyond codification of the Brooks test. Thus the Senate Report states that the amendment “accurately reflects the holding in the Brooks case.” Although the House Report includes a discussion of the backhaul problem in language which tracks the statement in the ICC 1953 Annual Report — where the Commission first directed the attention' of Congress to the problem of buy-and-sell arrangements — the House Report concludes: “There is no intention on the part of this Committee in any way to jeopardize or interfere with bona fide private carriage, as recognized in the Brooks case.” Moreover, the managers of the bills in both Senate and House gave assurances that the object of the amendment was to incorporate the primary business test into positive law. No application of the primary business test by the ICC or the courts gave conclusive effect to backhauling. The critical determination made in each case was between spurious buy-and-sell arrangements, whether or not as part of a backhaul, and a true wholesaling operation utilizing the operator’s own trucks. Backhauls were treated as merely one aspect of the buy-and-sell problem, since the presence of backhaul capacity presents a special temptation to indulge in pseudo-private carriage. We therefore conclude that § 203 (c) merely codifies the primary business test, and embodies no outright prohibition of backhauling practices. The statutory scheme recognizes that mere availability and use of backhaul capacity may in particular cases be completely consistent with the bona fide conduct of a noncarrier business. Thus the question in this case is a narrow one: whether, applying the standards developed under the primary business test, appellees’ backhauling of sugar was within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary, noncarrier business. In developing and applying the primary business standard, the ICC has elaborated criteria characteristic of the spurious buy-and-sell device. Among these are the large investment of assets or payroll in transportation operations; negotiating the sale of goods transported in advance of dispatching a truck to pick them up; direct delivery of the transported goods from the truck to the ultimate buyer, rather than from warehoused stocks; solicitation of the order by the supplier rather than the truck owner; and inclusion in the sales price of an amount to cover transportation costs. We are not persuaded from our examination of the record that there is sufficient evidence to support the ICC’s conclusion that the appellees’ sugar operation was for-hire transportation and not transportation within the scope, and in furtherance, of appellees’ noncarrier business enterprise. The ICC found that appellees “have long been buying and selling certain commodities and in connection therewith transporting them to purchasers, in bona fide furtherance of their primary business, as a dealer in those commodities.” 81 M. C. C., at 345. The ICC found further that “The more usual arrangement under which [appellees] operate . . . appears to be one in which the [appellees] have no preexisting sugar order, but buy with the intention of selling later either en route or after the transportation is accomplished. This procedure is ordinarily coordinated with a backhaul, and the purpose of their sugar dealings is the generation of sugar shipments which they can transport as return lading for their trucks which are moving in the opposite direction.” 81 M. C. C., at 346. But these findings, on this record, are consistent with an operation “within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise.” Appel-lees began their business in 1934 as dealers in livestock. They gradually added a feed mill and the buying and selling of corn, oats, wheat, bran, molasses, salt and fertilizer. They added sugar in 1954. Moreover, in addition to the absence of the element — usually found in spurious buy-and-sell arrangements — of obtaining orders for a commodity (in this case sugar) before purchasing it, other indicia are absent. Appellees’ assets are not in large part composed of transportation facilities, nor is transportation a major item of expense; appellees bear the full risk of damage in transit and, since they sell at market price, also of loss in value due to price changes; they buy the sugar on credit with a discount for payment in 10 days, and sell on the same terms; their sugar accounts receivable at the date of hearing exceeded $10,000, and amounted to $20,000 or $30,000 during the previous year. It is true that they warehoused only a small stock of sugar and that generally the trucks delivered the sugar directly to buyers upon, or within a day or two after, arrival in San Antonio. Appellees offered an entirely reasonable explanation for this, however: sugar is a perishable commodity, the preservation of which apparently requires air conditioning facilities with which their warehouse is not equipped; the ICC offered nothing to the contrary. And the ICC offered no evidence that other sugar dealers in San Antonio conducted their businesses differently from appellees. It is also true that since the motor carrier rate for transporting sugar from Supreme is 69 cents, and the rail rate $1.09 per hundred pounds, appellees could not have conducted the sugar business but for the availability of the backhaul capacity of their trucks. This shows no more than that appellees were able to make efficient use of their equipment; on these facts it does not prove, as the ICC found, that the “transportation ... is, with respect to their primary business of buying and selling livestock and certain other commodities, a related or secondary enterprise conducted with the purpose of profiting from the transportation performed . . . 81 M. C. C., at 347. We agree with the District Court that, rather, “The record clearly indicates that [appellees] are in a general mercantile business buying and selling many items, including sugar.” 219 F. Supp., at 782. As such, on the facts shown, their purchase of sugar at Supreme to provide a backhaul in connection with outbound movements of livestock and other commodities from San Antonio is within the scope, and in furtherance, of their primary general mercantile business enterprise. Affirmed. Section 203 (c), as added in 1957, 71 Stat. 411, provided in pertinent part: . .no person shall engage in any for-hire transportation business by motor vehicle, in interstate or foreign commerce . . . unless there is in force with.respect to such person a certificate or a permit issued by the Commission authorizing such transportation.” In 1958, 72 Stat. 574, the section was amended to add the provision here involved providing, “nor shall any person engaged in any other business enterprise transport property by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce for business purposes unless such transportation is within the scope, and in furtherance, of a primary business enterprise (other than transportation) of such person.” The 1957 version of § 203 (c) was enacted after the examiner submitted his report but as amended in 1958 was part of the Interstate Commerce Act when Division 1 of the Commission served its report. Appellees’ action was brought pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 1398. The statutory three-judge court was convened under 28 U. S. C. § 2325. See, e. g., Lyle H. Carpenter, 2 M. C. C. 85; B. E. Farnsworth, 4 M. C. C. 164; Thomas Stanley Redding, 7 M. C. C. 608; ICC v. Tank Car Oil Corp., 151 F. 2d 834 (C. A. 5th Cir.). See, e. g., T. J. McBroom, 1 M. C. C. 425; Triangle Motor Co., 2 M. C. C. 485. Cf. Congoleum-Naim, Inc., 2 M. C. C. 237. See, e. g., ICC v. Woodall Food Prods. Co., 207 F. 2d 517 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Taylor v. ICC, 209 F. 2d 353 (C. A. 9th Cir.). See the discussion of Taylor in the Commission’s Sixty-eighth Annual Report (1954), p. 82. The Commission pressed for amendments in its Annual Reports from 1953 through 1957: 1953 Report, p. 55; 1954 Report, p. 5; 1955 Report, p. 99; 1956 Report, p. 2; 1957 Report, pp. 137-138. In amending §203 (c) rather than the definitional sections, the TAA proposal also met the protests of private carriers who opposed ICC’s proposal on the ground that it might be construed to throw doubt on the Brooks test, and unduly restrict the scope of private carriage. See Remarks of Frazor T. Edmondson, Private Truck Council of America, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1384, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 163 (1957); Remarks of R. J. Van Liew, Private Carrier Conference, American Trucking Associations, id., at 275. See Remarks of Chairman Clarke, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1384, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 13, 19 (1957). See Statement of Mr. Baker, President, Transportation Association of America, id., at 244, 246. S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1958). In its 1953 Annual Report the Commission said (p. 55): “Merchandising by motortruck, whether actual or pretended, over long distances is increasing to such an extent that it is becoming a major factor in the transportation of freight between distant points. Manufacturers and mercantile establishments, which deliver in their own trucks articles which they manufacture or sell, are increasingly purchasing merchandise at or near their point of delivery and transporting such articles to their own terminal for sale to others. Such transportation is performed for the purpose of receiving compensation for the otherwise empty return of their trucks. Sometimes the purchase and sale is a bona fide merchandising venture. In other cases, arrangements are made with the consignee of such merchandise for the 'buy-and-sell' arrangement in order that the consignee may receive transportation at a reduced cost.” Compare H. R. Rep. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958). See id., at 19. See 104 Cong. Rec. 12535-12536 (1958) (House); 104 Cong. Rec. 10818 (1958) (Senate). See Virgil P. Stutzman, 81 M. C. C. 223, 226; Joseph V. Hofer, 84 M. C. C. 527, 540. See Lyle H. Carpenter, 2 M. C. C. 85, 86; Thomas Stanley Redding, 7 M. C. C. 608, 609; Jay Cee Transport Co., 68 M. C. C. 758, 759; Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co., 82 M. C. C. 457, 459, aff'd, sub nom. Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 508 (D. C. W. D. La.). See L. A. Woitishek, 42 M. C. C. 193; Jay Cee Transport Co., supra; William Stewart, 89 M. C. C. 281, 286. See Subler Transfer, Inc., 79 M. C. C. 561, 565; Riggs Dairy Express, Inc., 78 M. C. C. 574, 575-576; Donald L. Wilson, 82 M. C. C. 651, 661. See Riggs Dairy Express, Inc., supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PARKER et al. v. FLEMING, TEMPORARY CONTROLS ADMINISTRATOR. No. 80. Argued December 18,1946. Decided January 20, 1947. Alexander Pfeiffer argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Carl A. Auerbach argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, John R. Benney, Richard H. Field, Harry H. Schneider and Bernard A. Stol. Louis L. Tetelman, Gertrude Tetelman, Sylvia U. Siegel and Harry Carroll filed a brief for the landlords, as amici curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners are tenants of a New York apartment house. Their landlords applied for a certificate from the New York Area Rent Director authorizing eviction proceedings in the State courts. Section 6 of the Rent Regulations for New York City, issued by the Price Administrator under authority of § 2 of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. V, § 902, prohibits landlords from instituting such proceedings except under certain specific conditions not here relevant, or when a special certificate authorizing eviction is issued by the Area Rent Director upon his finding, for example, that failure to authorize eviction would impose “substantial hardship” upon the landlords. In this case the Area Rent Director refused to issue the requested certificate after extensive hearings at which both the landlords and the tenants presented evidence. Denial was based on a finding that the landlords had wholly failed to meet the regulation’s conditions; that their request was part of a concerted plan to evade the Price Control Act; and that a fraud had been perpetrated against the OPA. The Regional Rent Director affirmed this ruling. On protest by the landlords, the Price Administrator reversed the ruling of the Area Director and ordered that the certificate be issued. Petitioners thereupon filed a protest of their own with the Administrator. When the Administrator dismissed this protest, they sought relief in the Emergency Court of Appeals, complaining that the Administrator’s order was “not in accordance with law” and was “arbitrary and capricious.” On motion of the Administrator, that action was dismissed on the ground that petitioners were not “subject to” the Administrator’s order and therefore had no right to protest or have judicial review of the dismissal of their protest. Parker v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 830. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue raised. 328 U. S. 828. Section 204 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act provides that “Any person who is aggrieved by the denial ... of his protest” against an order of the Price Administrator issued under § 2 of the Act may, upon complaint to the Emergency Court of Appeals, secure a judicial review of the Administrator’s denial of such “protest.” Under § 204 (b) that Court can enjoin or set aside the protested “order” in whole or in part only if it is satisfied that the order “is not in accordance with law, or is arbitrary or capricious.” But § 203 (a) denies the right to make a “protest” upon which review may be had to all but persons who are “subject to any provision of such . . . order.” The Emergency Court of Appeals did not question that the petitioners were “aggrieved” within the meaning of § 204 (b) by the Administrator’s special order authorizing their landlord to institute legal proceedings to evict them from their apartments. See Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 476, 477. Review was denied solely on the ground that they were not “subject to” that order within the meaning of § 203 (a). In deciding a case concerning review of the Administrator’s order granting a special exception to one of his general regulations, we are mindful that the legislative history of the Price Control Act strongly indicates that judicial review of the Administrator’s general regulations and orders was intended by Congress to be limited to relatively few of the millions of people who would be more or less affected by them. Congress did not provide for protest and judicial review of general price orders by the great mass of consumers because of an apprehension that this might cause delay and difficulty in administering the Price Control Act with the efficiency and expedition deemed necessary to accomplish its broad purpose. Only a few categories of persons whom the Act affected and whose protests, if reviewed, would not have these consequences, were specifically permitted by the Act to protest and have general price orders affecting them judicially reviewed. The Administrator and the courts have adhered to this congressional policy. See e. g. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503. Procedural Regulation No. 1 of the Office of Price Administration, 7 Fed. Reg. 971, defined a person as “subject to” a general price regulation or order, and therefore entitled to protest and obtain judicial review of it, only wheat such regulation or order “prohibits or requires action by him.” The Emergency Court of Appeals sustained the regulation which contained this definition. Buka Coal Co. v. Brown, 133 F. 2d 949, 952. But in other special situations not directly involving general price-fixing orders the words “subject to” have beeia construed more broadly by the Administrator and the Emergency Court of Appeals. Revised Procedural Regulation No. 1, 7 F. R. 8961, promulgated by the Administrator, provides that agricultural producers may protest an order which denies them a subsidy granted by Congress as one of the mechanisms of the price control program, the regulation stating that such a producer “shall be considered to be subject to a maximum price regulation.” And in Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, 151 F. 2d 337, the Emergency Court of Appeals held that meat packers, denied such a subsidy under regulations of the Defense Supplies Corporation promulgated under the same authority on which Office of Price Administration orders were based, were subject to and could protest against such regulations. The court there said that: “If anybody could be ‘subject to’ a provision of the subsidy regulation, complainant certainly would meet this requirement, since it claims to be excluded from the subsidy by a discriminatory and unlawful condition inserted in the subsidy regulation by Amendment No. 2. Since section 204 (d) confers upon this court 'jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order issued under section 2,’ and since Amendment No. 2 is such a regulation or order, it is inadmissible to put upon the phrase 'any person subject to any provision’ of a regulation under section 2 an interpretation which would make it impossible for anyone to invoke our jurisdiction in this type of case, especially one who, like complainant, is most immediately and directly prejudiced by the challenged provision of the subsidy regulation.” Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, supra, at 338-339. Thus it appears that the Administrator and the Emergency Court of Appeals have determined that the question of whether a person is “subject to” an order is dependent to some extent upon whether the order immediately, substantially and adversely affects him, as well as whether the order requires or prohibits action by him. Under these standards we think the tenants here were “subject to” the order. Whether the regulations gave the tenants a “vested right” to remain in possession is not decisive of their right to protest or obtain judicial review. However that may be, general regulations prohibited these landlords from evicting the tenants unless the Administrator granted a certificate. The Emergency Price Control Act was intended in part to prevent excessive rents in the public interest, and the very anti-eviction regulations under which the Administrator granted the eviction certificate here were specifically designed to prevent manipulative renting practices which would result in excessive rents. Those regulations have been held valid by the Emergency Court of Appeals, Taylor v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 654, 662-663, and their validity is not here challenged. If these tenants cannot “protest” this order issued under these regulations, no one can; and if they cannot challenge it in the Emergency Court of Appeals, they cannot effectively challenge it at all. We cannot say that tenants who are about to be evicted from their apartments on account of the order are not “subject to” it. We are persuaded that these tenants would be required to act by the issuance of the certificate. They would either have to move themselves and their possessions to another abode, which might be difficult or impossible to obtain, or undertake defense of eviction proceedings in the State courts, which proceedings, but for the certificate, would have been barred by the regulation promulgated under the Act. For the same reason, it seems apparent that they would be immediately, substantially, and adversely affected by the order. This situation is altogether different, in terms of administrative complications and the impact of the order on the individual, from one in which a consumer member of the public wishes to attack a general price-fixing regulation which will require him to pay higher prices, or even a tenant to pay higher rent. For this reason, the legislative history relied on by the Administrator, thought to indicate a purpose not to make such general price-fixing orders open to widespread challenge, has no relevancy here. While the scope of judicial review authorized by the Act is a limited one, Illinois Packing Co. v. Snyder, supra at 339, we think that these tenants were entitled to have their protest considered by the Administrator and that the Emergency Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of their complaint. Reversed. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Burton dissent. The landlords here claimed to be purchasers of stock in a co-operative apartment corporation which stock holding entitled each of them to possession of an apartment under a proprietary lease. Section 6 (a) of the Rent Regulations for New York City Defense Area, 8 Fed. Reg. 13914, as amended, provides that “no tenant shall be removed from any housing accommodations, by action to evict . . . unless:” (1) The tenant has refused to renew his lease; (2) The tenant has unreasonably refused the landlord access to the premises; (3) The tenant has violated an obligation of tenancy or is committing a nuisance; (4) Subtenants occupy the premises at the time of the expiration of the prime tenant’s lease; (5) The landlord “has an immediate compelling necessity to recover possession ... for use and occupancy as a dwelling for himself.” Section 6 (b) (3) “applies to the issuance of a certificate for occupancy of housing accommodations in a structure or premises owned or leased by a cooperative corporation . . . by a purchaser of stock . . . in such cooperative who is entitled by reason of ownership of such stock to possession of such housing accommodations by virtue of a proprietary lease or otherwise.” The part of § 6 (b) (3) ii pertinent here provides that where the co-operative was organized after February 17, 1945, or the effective date of the regulation, “no certificate shall be issued, unless on such date the cooperative was in the process of organization and the Administrator finds that substantial hardship would result from the failure to issue a certificate . . .” The original respondent here was Paul A. Porter, Price Administrator. The functions of his office have been assumed by Philip B. Fleming, Temporary Controls Administrator, who has been substituted as respondent. The congressional purpose in this regard has been summarized in our previous decisions in Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 423, 431-433, 439, 441 and Bowles v. Willingham., 321 U. S. 503, 513, 520-521. Section 4 (a) of the Act lists the classes of persons to be punished for disobedience of the provisions of a regulation or order and therefore ipso facto "subject to” it as sellers of commodities, buyers of commodities in the course of business and landlords. Among other provisions showing that such was the purpose of the Act, § 2 (d) provides in part that the Administrator may promulgate regulations or orders to “prohibit speculative or manipulative practices ... or renting or leasing practices (including practices relating to recovery of the possession) . . . which in his judgment are equivalent to or are likely to result in price or rent increases . . .” 58 Stat. 634. The landlords here claimed to be recent purchasers of stock in a cooperative ownership arrangement. Regulation 6 (b), here involved, was promulgated, according to the Administrator, for the following, among other, stated reasons: “In recent months the problem of evictions and potential evictions in connection with the sale of stock in cooperative housing corporations has reached serious proportions. Apartment houses and other multiple-unit premises are being sold to cooperative corporations. These corporations in turn sell stock in the corporation which entitles the purchaser to a ‘proprietary lease’ of a dwelling unit in the structure. In selling stock in the cooperative, tenants usually are first approached. They are under heavy pressure to purchase stock because the alternative is likely to be eviction in favor of the ultimate purchaser of the stock. If the stock is not purchased by a tenant, it is then sold to another person who obtains a proprietary lease of the tenant’s dwelling unit and seeks possession of that unit for personal occupancy. “In the past cooperative housing corporations were virtually unknown in most defense-rental areas. Since rent control there has been a tendency to make more frequent use of the device and there is every indication that this will accelerate. “. . . During recent months, as the housing shortage has become more acute, the cooperative corporations or other owners of this stock have begun to sell it to purchasers who become entitled to proprietary leases.” Statement of Reasons Accompanying Amendment 17 to the Rent Regulation for Housing for the New York City Defense-Rental Area.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KAUFMAN et al. v. SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE POUR PARTICIPATIONS INDUSTRIELLES ET COMMERCIALES, S. A., et al. No. 172. Argued January 2, 1952. Decided April 7, 1952. Irving Moskovitz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were William Radner, Henry G. Fischer, Seymour Graubard, Odell Kominers, Peter N. Schiller and Beryl Harold Levy. David Schwartz argued the cause for McGrath, Attorney General, et al., respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baynton, James D. Hill, George B. Searls and Sidney B. Jacoby. John J. Wilson argued the cause for the Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commer-ciales, S. A., respondent. With him on the brief was Roger J. Whiteford. William P. MacCracken, Jr., Urban A. Lavery and William W. Barron submitted on brief for Remington Rand, Inc., respondent. Me. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Acting under § 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Alien Property Custodian vested in himself the American assets of Interhandel, a Swiss corporation. In-terhandel sued in the District Court to recover the assets. The Custodian answered alleging that the Swiss corporation was dominated and controlled by officers, agents, and stockholders who were engaged in a conspiracy with German nationals and with the German Government to operate the company’s business in their interests while we were at war with Germany. Petitioners, United States citizens who own stock in Interhandel, filed a motion to intervene. They admitted the Custodian’s charge that Interhandel was dominated by officers and stockholders who had been engaged in such a conspiracy. They also admitted the right of the Custodian to retain an interest in the seized assets proportional to the stock ownership of enemy stockholders. But petitioners contended that they and other nonenemy stockholders had claims in the corporate assets which it was the corporation’s duty to protect. Alleging that the dominant enemy group which had charge of the suit would not press the corporate claim in a manner that would adequately protect the claims of innocent shareholders, petitioners asserted a right to intervene under Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court denied the motion to intervene, 90 F. Supp. 1011, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 296, 188 F. 2d 1017. Underlying the claimed right of petitioners to intervene is an important question of the power of the Alien Property Custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Act, namely: What part of the assets of a corporation organized under the laws of a neutral country may the Custodian retain where part of the corporate stock is owned by enemies, part by American citizens, and part by nonenemy aliens? This question was reserved in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U. S. 480, 489-490. To consider it we granted certiorari in this case. 342 U. S. 847. First. Interhandel is a neutral corporation organized in Switzerland. Prior to 1941, even ownership of its stock and domination by enemy nationals would not have justified seizure of its assets. In order to reach the enemy interests in such neutral corporations, Congress amended the controlling Act in 1941. The background, scope and consequences of that amendment were discussed in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., supra. We there held that the 1941 amendment authorized the Custodian to seize and vest in himself all property of any foreign country or national, even that of friendly or neutral nations. At the same time we refused to hold that the 1941 amendment deprived friendly or neutral nations or nationals of a right to have their assets returned -if they could prove that they were free of any open or concealed enemy taint. The purpose of the amendment, we found, was “not to appropriate friendly or neutral assets but to reach enemy interests which masqueraded under those innocent fronts.” Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., supra, at 485. Thus, under the 1941 amendment the nonenemy character of a foreign corporation because it was organized in a friendly or neutral nation no longer conclusively determines that all interests in the corporation must be treated as friendly or neutral. The corporate veil can now be pierced. Enemy taint can be found if there are enemy officers or stockholders; even the presence of some nonenemy stockholders does not prevent seizure of all the corporate assets. But such a governmental seizure requires consideration of the plight of innocent stockholders. For as stated in the Uebersee case, the amendment does not contemplate appropriation of friendly or neutral assets. While Congress has clearly provided for forfeiture of enemy assets, it has used no language requiring us to hold that innocent interests must be confiscated because of the guilt of other stockholders. Nor does any legislative history pointed out persuade us that Congress intended to inflict such harsh consequences upon the innocent. We decline to read such a congressional purpose into the Act. Our holding is that when the Government seizes assets of a corporation organized under the laws of a neutral country, the rights of innocent stockholders to an interest in the assets proportionate to their stock holdings must be fully protected. This holding is not based on any technical concept of derivative rights appropriate to the law of corporations. It is based on the Act which enables one not an enemy as defined in § 2 to recover any interest, right or title which he has in the property vested. The innocent stockholder may not have title to corporate assets, but he does have an interest which Congress has indicated should not be confiscated merely because some others who have like interests are enemies. Second. Section 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act authorizes Interhandel to maintain this action for the recovery of all its assets because it has alleged that it is not enemy dominated. Alleging that they and others are nonenemy stockholders, petitioners charge that it is Interhandel’s corporate duty to assert a claim for the return of their proportionate interests in the assets even though other stockholders who dominate the corporation are found to be enemies. Petitioners further allege that the corporate management refuses to assert such a claim, but continues to claim only a return of all assets on the theory that whatever return is obtained must be divided among enemy and nonenemy shareholders in proportion to their stock holdings. This position is taken, petitioners charge, because the suit is being controlled by the very stockholders on whose account the Custodian seized the property and whose interests will be worthless if they are found to be enemies. Petitioners allege that this enemy corporate management, fearing confiscation of its enemy-tainted interests, is about to settle the corporate claim with the Custodian for an amount less than the value of the nonenemy part of the assets. Should this be done, it is said the enemy management contemplates dividing the proceeds proportionately among enemy and nonenemy stockholders, thus violating the Act in two ways: (1) by depriving nonenemy stockholders of part of their property, and (2) by returning assets to foreign enemy stockholders. A mere narration of the allegations shows that petitioners’ fears are by no means fanciful. Indeed, the Government agrees with the dominant corporate management that the interests of enemy and nonenemy stockholders should be treated alike. The United States wishes to sell the entire assets of Interhandel. And it is argued that if nonenemy stockholders are to be given a chance in court (which right is challenged), they should be limited to individual suits for money judgments against the Custodian. Petitioners claim a proportional right or interest in the specific assets of Interhandel and that they may not be driven to accept their share of whatever price the Government may happen to get from a sale of these valuable assets. In order to play safe, petitioners have filed a separate suit in a Federal District Court. But we think the questions involved in disputes like this can be more appropriately resolved in the corporate actions authorized by § 9 (a) than by resort to a multiplicity of separate actions. In such suits the nonenemy stockholder in his own right may assert his nonenemy character in order to protect his own interest from the enemy taint caused by other stockholders. Courts trying such corporate actions have adequate equitable power and procedural flexibility to protect all interests, even when the corporate recovery is not for the benefit of all stockholders but only for those who are nonenemies. In view of our holding that Congress has recognized that nonenemy stockholders of nonenemy foreign corporations have a severable interest in corporate assets seized by the Custodian, it follows that the allegations of these petitioners entitle them to intervene. These allegations, if true, show that petitioners’ interests may be inadequately represented and that they may be bound by a judgment in this corporate action. This brings the claim of intervention squarely within Rule 24 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Reversed. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 40 Stat. 411, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1, as amended by the First War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839, 50 U. S. C. App. § 5 (b). Although the corporation is commonly called “Interhandel,” its full legal name is Societe Internationale Pour Participations In-dustrielles et Commerciales S. A., etc. The American assets consisted of bank accounts and over 90% of the capital stock in the General Aniline & Film Corporation of Delaware, all of the assets apparently being valued at more than $100,000,000. In 1946, the Attorney General succeeded to the powers and duties of the Alien Property Custodian. Exec. Order No. 9788, 11 Fed. Reg. 11981. “Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when the representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; . . . .” See Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 19.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE-PEET CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 47. Argued November 17, 1949. Decided December 5, 1949. Ricardo J. Hecht argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Philip S. Ehrlich and Bartley C. Crum. Ruth Weyand argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert N. Denham, David P. Findling, Marcel Mallet-Prevost and Bernard Dunau. Mathew O. Tobriner filed a brief for the International Chemical Workers Union, A. F. of L., respondent. Mr. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question we have here is whether a closed-shop contract, entered into and performed in good faith, and valid in the state where made, protects an employer from a charge of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act. Petitioner was found by the National Labor Relations Board to have violated §§ 8 (1) and 8 (3) of the Act. On petition for review and cross-petition of the Board for enforcement of its order, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered a decree enforcing the Board’s order. We granted certiorari limited to the question of the construction of § 8 (3) of the Act in relation to this case, i. e., to examine the applicability of the so-called Rutland Court doctrine, here applied by the Board. The doctrine has been approved in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, but disapproved in the Seventh Circuit. At the period of time in question in 1945, petitioner company was engaged in producing glycerin for war purposes. Petitioner has no record of antiunion or anti-organizational activities. Its employees were first organized and represented in 1936 by a union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. In 1938 the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, became the representative of petitioner’s employees. On July 9, 1941, the C. I. O. entered into a collective bargaining contract with petitioner which contained a closed-shop provision in these words: “Section 3. The Employer agrees that when new employees are to be hired to do any work covered by Section One (1), they shall be hired thru the offices of the Union, provided that the Union shall be able to furnish competent workers for work required. In the event the union is unable to furnish competent workers, the Employer may hire from outside sources, provided that employees so hired shall make application for membership in the Union within fifteen (15) days of their employment. The employees covered by this agreement shall be members in good standing of the Union and the Employer shall employ no workers other than members of the Union subject to conditions herein above prescribed. In the hiring of new help (for the warehouses), they shall be hired through the offices of the Warehouse Union, Local 1-6, I. L. W. U.” This contract was entered into in good faith by the parties and served as a foundation for amicable labor relations for over four years. It was of indefinite duration. On July 24, 1945, the C. I. O. and petitioner entered into a supplemental agreement that their contract of July 9, 1941, “shall remain in full force and effect” pending approval of certain agreed-upon items, other than the closed-shop provision, by the War Labor Board. In the instant proceedings, the closed-shop contract, as extended by the supplemental agreement, was found by the National Labor Relations Board to have been made in compliance with the proviso of § 8 (3) of the Act. On July 26, 1945, shortly after the making of the supplemental agreement, open agitation for a change of bargaining representative began. On July 31 an unauthorized strike occurred which was participated in by a substantial majority of the employees and lasted two and one-half days, although the C. I. O. had pledged its membership not to strike during wartime. A group of employees formed an independent organization which later sought to affiliate with the A. F. of L. There was much propagandizing among the employees and warnings were issued by the C. I. O. that its members would be disciplined for rival union activity, and would if disciplined be discharged from their jobs under the closed-shop contract with petitioner. Altogether some 37 employees were suspended and expelled by the C. I. O. for their activities in behalf of the A. F. of L. union during the fight between the two unions for control, and because of their participation in the strike contrary to C. I. O. policy. These suspended and expelled employees were discharged by petitioner, with the advice of counsel, upon demand by the C. I. O. The ground of the demand was that they were no longer “members in good standing” of the C. I. O. as required by the closed-shop contract. Petitioner knew, as the Board found, that the discharge of these employees was demanded by the C. I. O. because of their rival union activity. On October 16 the C. I. O. won an election held by the Board to determine the bargaining representative of petitioner’s employees, and the open hostilities were substantially concluded. Petitioner was charged with violation of § 8 (1) and § 8 (3) of the Act and found guilty thereof by the Board for having carried out the terms of the closed-shop contract at the request of the bargaining representative. The Board ordered petitioner to restore the employees discharged at the request of the C. I. O. to their former positions without loss of seniority and pay. It is this order which the Court of Appeals decreed should be enforced and that is here for review. There is no question but that the discharges had the effect of interfering with the employees’ right, given by § 7 of the Act, to self-organization and to collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. Nor is there any question but that the discharges had the effect of discriminating, contrary to the prohibition of § 8 (3), in the tenure of the employees. It is petitioner’s contention that such interference and discrimination are taken out of the category of unfair labor practices where the employees are discharged in good faith, pursuant to an employer’s obligations under a valid closed-shop contract entered into in good faith with the authorized representative of the employees, as permitted by the proviso contained in § 8 (3) of the Act. The Board admits that petitioner’s contention is supported by the proviso in § 8 (3) but says that a contract of indefinite duration such as the one in the instant case is subject to the doctrine of Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 587, 46 N. L. R. B. 1040. In the Rutland Court case the Board determined that an employer is not permitted to discharge employees pursuant to a closed-shop contract, even though the contract is valid under the proviso to § 8 (3), when, to the employer’s knowledge, the discharge is requested by the union for the purpose of eliminating employees who have sought to change bargaining representatives at a period when it is appropriate for the employees to seek a redetermination of representatives. The reason for this holding by the Board will be presently discussed. The doctrine as applied to the facts in this case is stated in the Board’s brief as follows: “The Board found the closed-shop agreement to have been validly entered into in conformity with the proviso to Section 8 (3) of the Act. The Board concluded, however, that, by virtue of the indefinite term of the contract, which had run for more than four years, the employees undertook to oust the C. I. O. as their bargaining representative at a period during which it was appropriate to seek a redetermination of representatives.” The Board contends that therefore the contract no longer protected petitioner. We take it from this conclusion of the Board that there is no dispute as to the validity of the closed-shop contract as far as the Act is concerned. In Algoma P. & V. Co. v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 336 U. S. 301, it was held that nothing in the Act precludes a state from prohibiting closed-shop contracts in whole or in part. We therefore also look to the law of the state where the closed-shop contract was made, here California, to determine its validity. We think it is clear, and do not understand the Board to contend otherwise, that the closed-shop contract was valid under California law. Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union Local 1172, 16 Cal. 2d 379, 106 P. 2d 403; Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc., Local 848, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P. 2d 891; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329. In the Marinship case, supra, at 736, the California Supreme Court explicitly recognized that a union may expel persons who “have interests inimical to the union” because of “the right of the union to reject or expel persons who refuse to abide by any reasonable regulation or lawful policy adopted by the union.” See also Davis v. Int. Alliance of Stage Employees, 60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 715, 141 P. 2d 486, 487-488, where it is stated that under California law, “An organization has the natural right of self preservation, and may with propriety expel members who show their disloyalty by joining a rival organization.” The contract was valid under the Act and under state law. The claimed impotency of the contract as a defense here rests not upon any provision of the Act of Congress or of state law or the terms of the contract, but upon a policy declared by the Board. That policy has for its avowed purpose the solution of what the Board conceives to be an anomalous situation, in that § 7 guarantees employees the right to select freely their representative for collective bargaining, while the proviso to § 8 (3) permits a closed-shop contract with inherent possibilities for invasion of the right guaranteed by § 7. The solution arrived at in the Rutland Court case, and urged here, is that the Board may not give full effect to the proviso of § 8 (3) because to do so would permit circumvention of § 7. We turn to this contention. One of the oldest techniques in the art of collective bargaining is the closed shop. It protects the integrity of the union and provides stability to labor relations. To achieve stability of labor relations was the primary objective of Congress in enacting the National Labor Relations Act. Congress knew that a closed shop would interfere with freedom of employees to organize in another union and would, if used, lead inevitably to discrimination in tenure of employment. Nevertheless, with full realization that there was a limitation by the proviso of § 8 (3) upon the freedom of § 7, Congress inserted the proviso of § 8 (3). It is not necessary for us to justify the policy of Congress. It is enough that we find it in the statute. That policy cannot be defeated by the Board’s policy, which would make an unfair labor practice out of that which is authorized by the Act. The Board cannot ignore the plain provisions of a valid contract made in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the statute and reform it to conform to the Board’s idea of correct policy. To sustain the Board’s contention would be to permit the Board under the guise of administration to put limitations in the statute not placed there by Congress. In reality whatever interference or discrimination was present here came not from the employer, but from fellow-employees of the dischargees. Shorn of embellishment, the Board’s policy makes interference and discrimination by fellow-employees an unfair labor practice of the employer. Yet the legislative history conclusively shows that Congress, by rejecting the proposed Tydings amendment to the Act, refused to word § 7 so as to hamper coercion of employees by fellow-employees. The emasculation of the contract pressed for by the Board in order to achieve that which Congress refused to enact into law cannot be sustained. It must be remembered that this is a contest primarily between labor unions for control. It is quite reasonable to suppose that Congress thought it conducive to stability of labor relations that parties be required to live up to a valid closed-shop contract made voluntarily with the recognized bargaining representative, regardless of internal disruptions growing out of agitation for a change in bargaining representative. In the instant case the employees exercised their right to choose their bargaining representative. The representative bound them to a valid contract. The contract was lived under for four years and was subsisting at the period of time in question. It was made and carried out in good faith by petitioner, who cannot be held guilty of an unfair labor practice by administrative amendment of the statute. We reject the application of the so-called Rutland Court doctrine. Nothing that this Court said in Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248, supports the Board’s position here. In that case this Court said: “It was as much a deprivation of the rights of these minority employees for the company discriminatorily to discharge them in collaboration with Independent as it would have been had the company done it alone. To permit it to do so by indirection, through the medium of a 'union’ of its own creation, would be to sanction a readily contrived mechanism for evasion of the Act.” 323 U. S. at 256. There the independent union was found to be a company-supported union, and the employer was found guilty of an unfair labor practice for supporting it. While the proviso to § 8 (3) permits a closed-shop contract, it does not permit one made with a union “established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice.” So the Court concluded in the Wallace Corp. case that: “The Board therefore is authorized by the Act to order disestablishment of such unions and to order an employer to renounce such contracts.” 323 U. S. at 251. Thus the Wallace Corp. case does not deal with the scope of protection afforded an employer by a valid closed-shop contract, because there was not and could not have been a valid closed-shop contract in that case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, with directions to the Board to dismiss the complaint. Reversed. 49 Stat. 449 et seq., 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. Matter of Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company, 70 N. L. R. B. 1202. 171 F. 2d 956. 337 U. S. 913. Matter of Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 587, 46 N. L. R. B. 1040. Labor Board v. Geraldine Novelty Co., 173 F. 2d 14; Colonie Fibre Co. v. Labor Board, 163 F. 2d 65; Labor Board v. American White Cross Laboratories, 160 F. 2d 75. Labor Board v. Public Service Transport Co., 177 F. 2d 119. Labor Board v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 171 F. 2d 956; Local 2880 v. Labor Board, 158 F. 2d 365, certiorari granted, 331 U. S. 798, certiorari dismissed on motion of petitioner, 332 U. S. 845. Aluminum Co. v. Labor Board, 159 F. 2d 523; Lewis Meier & Co. v. Labor Board, 21 L. R. R. M. 2093 (Nov. 1947). “Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— . . . . . “(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, ... or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.” 49 Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3). This election was thereafter set aside by the Board, upon objections filed by the A. F. of L., on the ground that the employer’s discharge of employees at the request of the C. I. O. prevented the result of the election from being truly representative of the employees’ wishes. Supra, n. 10. See Peterson, American Labor Unions, p. 1 (1945). Rev. Jerome L. Toner in The Closed Shop in the American Labor Movement, published under auspices of The Catholic University of America, Studies in Economics, vol. 5, 1941, traces the principle of the closed shop to the English guild system, the forerunner of the American union movement, p. 16 et seq. In America the desire of workers for closed-shop conditions antedates the American Revolution and even unionism. Id. at 22, 58 et seq. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151; S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935); H. R. Rep. Nos. 969, 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935). See statement of Senator Wagner: Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 195, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1935); Statement of Mr. Millis, id. at 179-180; and the Senate and House Reports accompanying the bill: S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1935). During consideration of the bill on the Senate floor, Senator Tydings proposed to amend it by adding to § 7 the words, “free from coercion or intimidation from any source.” In the debate which followed it became clear that the amendment would deal with employee-against-employee relations, while the bill was designed to deal only with employee-employer relations, and the amendment was defeated. See 79 Cong. Rec. 7653-7658, 7675.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. KOPPERS COMPANY, INC. NO. 29. Argued November 10, 1954. Decided January 31, 1955. Hilbert P. Zarky argued the causes for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack and Harry Baum. Ralph S. Spritzer was also with them on the brief in No. 41. David W. Richmond argued the cause for respondent in No. 29. With him on the brief were Robert N. Miller, Frederick O. Graves, John M. Crimmins, E. S. Ruffin, Jr. and C. M. Crick. William A. Sutherland argued the cause for petitioner in No. 41. With him on the brief were Eugene M. Locke, Harold B. Pressley, Jr. and Mac Asbill, Jr. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in these cases is whether, for the years 1940 through 1945, abatements of federal excess profits taxes, through application of I. R. C., § 722, are retroactive. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that they are not and that they relieve taxpayers from the payment of interest on deficiencies in such taxes from the time of the abatements, rather than from the original due dates of the taxes abated. In No. 29, United States v. Koppers Co., the taxpayer, respondent therein, reported and paid excess profits taxes of $6,512.76 for 1940, and $1,781,288.14 for 1941. In computing these taxes, it used excess profits credits based upon invested capital. In 1943 and 1945, it applied under § 722 for relief from all or part of these taxes, claiming that they were “excessive and discriminatory.” In accordance with the usual administrative practice, the Commissioner determined the amount of the excess profits taxes due without regard to the application for relief under § 722. In doing so, he found it necessary to proceed under I. R. C., § 713, using excess profits credits based upon the taxpayer’s income, rather than upon its invested capital. As a result he found that the above taxes, as returned and paid by the taxpayer without reference to § 722, had been understated and that the following deficiencies existed as of their original due dates, March 15, 1941, and 1942: Excess profits tax under §§ 710 (a) and 19Jfi 1941 713 . $466,921.67 $2,208,019.09 Payments. 6,512.76 1,781,288.14 Deficiencies . 460,408.91 426,730.95 The Commissioner computed interest, at 6%, on the above deficiencies, amounting to $217,376.07 for 1940, and $230,504.86 for 1941. After extended investigations and negotiations conducted under authority of § 722, the Commissioner and the taxpayer agreed upon a “constructive average base period net income” which fixed the excess profits credits for the years in question and, as a result, the relief available under § 722. After this agreement was approved by the Excess Profits Tax Council of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner determined that the above-stated deficiencies, with the benefit of § 722, should be reduced to $260,554.39 for 1940, and to $95,749.33 for 1941. The taxpayer consented to the assessment of these deficiencies, with interest as provided by law. Whereupon, the Commissioner issued a formal determination of them and assessed them against the taxpayer. He also assessed the above-stated interest charges, based upon the full amount of the original deficiencies. The taxpayer paid the deficiencies and interest so assessed but claimed refunds of $94,358.71 for 1940, and $178,784.48 for 1941. Those sums represented the interest on the abatements in its excess profits taxes made under § 722. When the Commissioner disallowed the claims, the taxpayer sued in the Court of Claims to recover their amounts. With one judge dissenting, that court deducted a setoff and rendered judgment in favor of the taxpayer for $270,216.34. 126 Ct. Cl. 847, 117 F. Supp. 181. To resolve the resulting conflict with United States v. Premier Oil Co., 209 F. 2d 692, we granted certiorari, 347 U. S. 965. In No. 41, Premier Oil Co. v. United States, the taxpayer, petitioner therein, paid the excess profits taxes shown on its original returns in the following amounts: for 1943, $564,167.70 (adjusted to $560,484.84); for 1944, $353,292.15 (adjusted to $313,639.13); and for 1945, $45,679.67. Thereafter, several deductions which the taxpayer had made from its income were disallowed, resulting, in 1948, in the following deficiencies in its payment of its excess profits and income taxes as of their original due dates: Deficiencies Without the Application of § 722. • Deficiencies in excess profits 1943 1944 1945 tax, under §§ 710 (a) and 713. $78,359.80 $55,529.92 $190,785.32 Deficiencies in income tax... 9,060.07 9,178.01 (90.00) Total deficiencies. 87,419.87 64,707.93 190,695.32 The Commissioner computed interest, at 6%, on the above excess profits tax deficiencies as follows: For 1943 — on $78,359.80, March 15, 1944, to June 23, 1948 . $20,084.79 For 1944 — on $55,529.92, March 15, 1945, to June 23, 1948 . 10,901.36 For 1945 — on $190,785.32, March 15, 1946, to June 19, 1948 . 25,869.26 Total . 56,855.41 In the meantime, the taxpayer had applied for relief under § 722, seeking acceptance of a “constructive average base period net income” of $357,000 for each of the years at issue. The Excess Profits Tax Council approved that figure as a credit in lieu of $93,150.36 for each of the years 1943 and 1944, and of $116,437.95 for 1945. This credit so far reduced the taxpayer’s taxable excess profits as to abate its excess profits tax deficiencies for 1943 and 1944 entirely, and that for 1945 to $366.52. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s assessment of the remainder of the taxpayer’s deficiencies in excess profits taxes was for only $366.52. However, as in the Koppers case, supra, he assessed against the taxpayer the full amount of the interest charges based upon the original deficiencies. The taxpayer paid the deficiency and interest so assessed but claimed refunds totaling $56,855.41. That sum represented the interest on the abatements in its excess profits taxes made under § 722. When the Commissioner disallowed those claims, the taxpayer brought the instant action to recover their amounts, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, under 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(1). That court rendered judgment for the taxpayer. 107 F. Supp. 837. The Court of Appeals reversed. 209 F. 2d 692. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict with United States v. Koppers Co., supra. 347 U. S. 987. As the underlying issue is the same in each case and for each year, we shall discuss it in relation to the 1940 taxes in the Koppers case. There, the taxpayer, under the usual procedure, computed and paid the excess profits tax of $6,512.76 shown on its return for 1940. In due course the Commissioner, without the application of § 722, determined that the payment should have been $466,921.67, and, therefore, that a deficiency of $460,408.91 was due the United States, with interest from March 15, 1941. I. R. C., §§53 (a), 56 (a). If the taxpayer had made no application for relief under § 722, there is no doubt that such interest would have remained due the United States until paid and that, when paid, it would not have been refundable. The same would have been true if the taxpayer’s application for relief under § 722 had been finally denied. The taxpayer contends, however, that, because the Commissioner has abated the taxpayer’s deficiency from $460,408.91 to $260,554.39 under § 722, such reduction is necessarily retroactive to March 15, 1941, and that the taxpayer, accordingly, is entitled to a refund of the interest on the sum abated. The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that the determination under § 722 is not retroactive but is a current abatement effective when made. Congress could have prescribed either treatment but did not expressly specify either. Our answer is determined from our consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole, the related provisions of the statute, the legislative history of § 722 and the administrative interpretation that has been given the statute. 1. The statutory scheme as a whole. The excess profits tax was a device initiated by Congress, late in 1940, in great part for the quick collection of large sums needed by the Government in a national emergency. Congress sought to obtain those funds from abnormally high corporate profits while such profits were available. To that end, it prescribed computations of unusual profits and required prompt payment of the taxes on them. From the beginning, the statute also provided, in § 722, a means of subsequent adjustment of the tax in special instances where the normal computation of the tax was found to result in inequity. The adjustment could be made only after administrative action and, pending its consideration, it did not eliminate the tax return or the tax payment otherwise required. Until 1942, it did not permit even the postponement of the payment of any part of the standard tax. Indeed, the full payment of that tax soon was made an express condition of the application for adjustment. I. R. C., § 722 (d). In 1943, Congress stated that if overpayments for either of the taxable years 1940 or 1941 were found to be attributable to § 722, no interest on such overpayments was to be paid the taxpayer. At least to that extent, Congress expressly recognized that the funds paid as excess profits taxes, when due and without the benefit of § 722, were funds owed to and usable by the Government. The significance of this statutory scheme further appears when it is applied to the instant case. If the instant taxpayer had paid its required tax in 1941, the Government would have received an additional $460,408.91 at that time. Accordingly, it would have had the use of that money, without charge, during the crucial war years. Correspondingly, the taxpayer would have been without that money during the same period. Instead, the taxpayer, in fact, retained the funds for its own use and now contends that it need not compensate the Government for such use of a substantial part of it. While in the instant case the taxpayer did not underpay any amount actually shown on its return, as contemplated by I. R. C., § 294 (a), it understated its tax and thus withheld the amount in question. The detriment to the Government and benefit to the taxpayer was the same — the use of $460,408.91 for eight years. The above distinction, emphasized by the taxpayer, may have helped it in initiating its application for relief under § 722 (d) because it could establish that, at least, it had paid “the tax shown on its return.” The distinction, however, supplies no ground for different results once the deficiencies have been determined. We find no implication that a self-serving error in the understatement of its tax on its tax return entitles the taxpayer to a greater ultimate tax advantage than does a self-serving error of the same size in the underpayment of the same tax. A fortiori we find nothing to justify a greater tax advantage to any taxpayer that underpays its correct tax, over one that pays such tax in full when due. 2. The interest here in controversy is attributable to I. R. C., § m (a). The interest here in controversy was due under § 292 (a) from March 15, 1941, until paid. Accordingly, to obtain a refund of it, the taxpayer must sustain the proposition that the tax relief granted under § 722 is necessarily retroactive, extinguishing the deficiency as of the original due date of the tax and thus eliminating the interest charges for the corresponding period. To that end, the taxpayer emphasizes the statement in § 722 (a) that, as a condition of securing the application of § 722, a taxpayer must establish that the usual procedure “re-suits in an excessive and discriminatory tax” and also must establish “what would be a fair and just amount representing normal earnings to be used as a constructive average base period net income.” Once the taxpayer has done that, “the tax shall be determined by using such constructive average base period net income in lieu of the average base period net income otherwise determined under this subchapter.” Standing alone, this directive language is elastic. It can be read consistently either with the interpretation that the new computation replaces and abates the old one currently, when the new one is determined and assessed, or that it retroactively replaces the old tax from its original due date. It leaves the issue open for disposition by the effect of other clauses relating more specifically to the issue. For the reasons hereafter stated, we read it as looking forward, rather than backward. 3. I. R. C., §710 (a)(5), ■permits a taxpayer, seeking relief under § 782, to defer a part of its existing excess profits taxes where its adjusted excess profits net income exceeds 50% of its normal tax net income. In 1942, Congress added §710 (a)(5), conditionally authorizing partial deferment of the tax in cases where a taxpayer claimed benefits under § 722. The condition was that the taxpayer’s “adjusted excess profits net income (computed without reference to section 722)” must exceed 50% of the taxpayer’s normal tax net income for the year. Even then, deferment was limited to 33% of the benefit claimed under § 722. If a taxpayer, without this amendment, could have successfully deferred payment and avoided interest charges by following the course taken in the instant cases, it could, by understatement of its tax, have deferred, without incurring interest charges, the payment of a corresponding part of its tax pending relief. If so, there would have been little need for § 710 (a)(5). The 1942 amendment, by its restrictions, fairly meant that, under all other circumstances, the existing taxes were to be paid when due, or be subjected to interest during their delinquency under § 292 (a). 4. The denial of interest on refunds is prescribed by I.R. C., § 3771 (g). Although § 3771 (g) was not enacted until 1943, it was then made applicable to taxable years before, as well as after, January 1, 1942. It denied all interest on refunds attributable to § 722 where the refunds related to the taxable years 1940 or 1941. It also denied interest on refunds relating to taxable years beginning after January 1, 1942, but limited such denials to the first year after the filing of an application for relief under § 722, or to periods prior to September 16, 1945 (two years after the effective date of the amendment), whichever was the later. In cases where the Government has authorized refunds of excess profits taxes overpaid to it by reason of the abatement of taxes attributable to § 722, § 3771 (g) expressly precludes the payment of interest by the Government upon the amounts abated. This treats the Government as entitled to the use of the abated amounts between the time of their overpayment and that of their abatement. Equity demands a comparable result in the case of underpayments. Where unpaid taxes are abated by reason of § 722, the taxpayer then receives a release from its existing obligation to pay the amount abated. However, the Government having been entitled, up to that time, to collect and use the sum abated, the Government should receive interest, on the abated sum, for the period during which the Government was entitled to have its use. This is the natural counterpart of the Government’s freedom from paying interest on refunded overpayments. 5. The legislative history of § 722. The excess profits tax was initiated in 1940. 54 Stat. 975 et seg. It provided for prompt payment of large taxes computed on income reflecting unusual profits. Computation of the tax on the basis of the taxpayer’s prior income or invested capital was prescribed in §§713 and 714. A standardized treatment of abnormalities was provided in § 721. In addition, § 722 authorized the Commissioner “to make such adjustments as may be necessary to adjust abnormalities affecting income or capital.” 54 Stat. 986. The procedure under § 722 was formalized by the Excess Profits Tax Amendments of 1941, 55 Stat. 23-25, and put in its final form by the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 914-917, as amended, 57 Stat. 601-602. The technical and discretionary nature of the adjustment was emphasized by the provision that the determination of most computations under § 722 was reviewable only by a special division of the Tax Court constituted for the occasion and by no other court or agency. 55 Stat. 26, as amended, 56 Stat. 917, 59 Stat. 295, 673, 26 U. S. C. § 732. A taxpayer never was permitted to file a return of its own under § 722. S. Rep. No. 75, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 13; H. R. Rep. No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 13. The statute has been interpreted as authorizing a procedure that is in the nature of a claim for a refund preceded by long investigations of complicated special circumstances, and followed by extended negotiations between the Commissioner and taxpayer to develop a mutually satisfactory “constructive average base period net income.” This interpretation leaves the usual procedure under § 710 et seq. complete in itself but subject, upon application, to ultimate adjustment in instances accepted by the Commissioner under § 722. We find no statement of a purpose that § 722 shall relieve taxpayers from penalties or interest charges due either to their defaults in paying, or their errors in computing, their taxes. On the contrary, it has been suggested that Congress considered relief under § 722 to be in the nature of a favor and as not relieving the taxpayer of its duty to pay the original tax when due. The regulations do not deal specifically with the issue before us but, from their beginning, in Treasury Regulations 109, they have been consistent with the interpretation given the Act by the Government. See § 30.722-5, as added by T. D. 5264, 1943 Cum. Bull. 761, as amended, T. D. 5393, 1944 Cum. Bull. 415. In addition to the practice of the Commissioner in the instant cases, there is in the record of the Premier Oil Co. case an .undisputed affidavit by a Treasury Department reviewer to the effect that the policy followed was the administrative policy of the Bureau: “It is the policy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in those cases where all or any part of a tax deficiency has been extinguished by application of the relief provisions of Section 722 of the Internal Revenue Code not to assess the extinguished portion of such deficiency. However, interest has been computed and assessed on the extinguished portion of the deficiency from the due date of the return to the thirtieth day after the agreement, Form 874, is filed or date of assessment, whichever is the earlier.” (Emphasis supplied.) While Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U. S. 561, relates to the carry-back provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, it is thoroughly consistent in principle with the above discussion. There the Court upheld the collection of interest on a deficiency which later was extinguished by carrying back a loss which occurred in a subsequent year. It treated the carry-back as a current adjustment of the tax previously determined, characterizing it as an “abatement” at 565. It recognized I. R. C., § 3771 (e), as a help to the interpretation of the statute, much as we recognize I. R. C., § 3771 (g), as a help here. See 567-568. The Court also there announced that “In the absence of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the question of who properly should possess the right of use of the money owed the Government for the period it is owed must be answered in favor of the Government.” Id., at 566. While the deficiency for 1940 in the amount of $460,408.91 was properly determined without reference to § 722 and treated as a deficiency for that year by the Commissioner, it was not separately assessed as such. This was not necessary because, at the time of its determination and before its assessment, it was abated to $260,-554.39. The latter sum, with interest in the amount of $217,376.07 computed on the whole deficiency of $460,-408.91, was correctly and adequately assessed and paid. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Government, in each case, is entitled to retain the interest now in controversy. Therefore, in No. 29, the judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and, in No. 41, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. No. 29 — Reversed. No. ¿¡.1 — Affirmed. Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent. “SEC. 722. GENERAL RELIEF — CONSTRUCTIVE AVERAGE BASE PERIOD NET INCOME. “(a) GENERAL Rule. — In any case in which the taxpayer establishes that the tax computed under this subchapter [as to excess profits tax, § 710 et seg.] (without the benefit of this section) results in an excessive and discriminatory tax and establishes what would be a fair and just amount representing normal earnings to be used as a constructive average base period net income for the purposes of an excess profits tax based upon a comparison of normal earnings and earnings during an excess profits tax period, the tax shall be determined by using such constructive average base period net income in lieu of the average base period net income otherwise determined under this subchapter. . . . “(d) ApplicatioN for Relief Under This Section. — The taxpayer shall compute its tax, file its return, and pay the tax shown on its return under this subchapter without the application of this section, except as provided in section 710 [a) (6). The benefits of this section shall not be allowed unless the taxpayer within the period of time prescribed by section 322 and subject to the limitation as to amount of credit or refund prescribed in such section makes application therefor in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary. If a constructive average base period net income has been determined under the provisions of this section for any taxable year, the Commissioner may, by regulations approved by the Secretary, prescribe the extent to which the limitations prescribed by this subsection may be waived for the purpose of determining the tax under this subchapter for a subsequent taxable year.1’ (Emphasis supplied.) 56 Stat. 914-915, as amended, 57 Stat. 601-602, 26 U. S. C. § 722 (a) (d). The above provisions of § 722 (d) apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1939. 57 Stat. 602. Koppers Company, Inc., is, in fact, the successor to Koppers United Company and its subsidiaries, which filed consolidated excess profits tax returns for the years in question. For convenience, all of such corporations are referred to as the taxpayer. This tax was computed and paid pursuant to the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 975, as amended. See I. R. C., § 710 et seq. On November 8, 1945, these provisions became inapplicable to any calendar- year beginning after 1945. 59 Stat. 568. Two methods of computation of the excess profits credit were authorized: the invested capital method under L R. C., § 714, or the base period income method under I, R. C., § 713. By timely consents, the Commissioner and the taxpayer agreed that the amount of any income, excess profits, or war profits tax due for 1940 and 1941 could be assessed at any time on or before June 30, 1951. The interest on the 1940 tax ran from March 15,1941, to January 28, 1949, which was treated as the date of its payment'; that on the 1941 tax ran from March 15, 1942, to March 16, 1951, which was 30 days after the filing of a waiver consenting to the assessment and collection of the deficiencies finally determined. See I. R. C., §292 (a), infra, note 12. ABATEMENT OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX DEFICIENCIES UNDER § 722. Deficiencies without ap- 1943 1944 1945 plication of § 722. $78,359.80 $55,529.92 $190,785.32 (Decreases) under § 722. (175,307.78) (175,174.49) (190,418.80) Resulting (credits) and deficiency . (96,947.98) (119,644.57) 366.52 By reducing that part of the taxpayer’s income that was subject to excess profits taxes, this application of § 722 automatically left more of the taxpayer’s income subject to the normal tax and surtax. Those increases in the taxpayer’s income taxes and their consequences are not before us. The original judgment for $56,855.41 was modified to $52,292.40 to reflect several adjustments, including the deduction of $49.72, representing interest on the unabated deficiency of $366.52 upon which the taxpayer conceded that interest was chargeable. The grant was limited to the following question stated in the petition: “Where a deficiency in excess profits tax, based on the income and credits as shown in the taxpayer’s return, would have existed except for the subsequent application of Section 722 of the Internal Revenue Code, is the taxpayer liable for interest on the amount of such deficiency (hereinafter called the 'potential deficiency’) which would have existed had it not been extinguished by the application of Section 722?” 347 U. S., at 988. I. R. C., § 713 — on the basis of income, or I. R. C., § 714 — on the basis of invested capital. I. R. C., § 721, authorized standard allowances for specified abnormalities. No return by the taxpayer under I. R. C., § 722, was permissible. I. R. C., §3771 (g), infra, note 15, discussed at 266-267, infra. “SEC. 292. INTEREST ON DEFICIENCIES. “(a) General Rule. — Interest upon the amount determined as a deficiency shall be assessed at the same time as the deficiency, shall be paid upon notice and demand from the collector, and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax (or, if the tax is paid in installments, from the date prescribed for the payment of the first installment) to the date the deficiency is assessed, or, in the case of a waiver under section 272 (d), to the thirtieth day after the filing of such waiver or to the date the deficiency is assessed .whichever is the earlier.” 53 Stat. 88, as amended, 57 Stat. 602, 26 U. S. C. § 292 (a). Section 722 (d) looks forward when it provides that if a constructive base period net income has been determined under § 722 for any taxable year, the Commissioner may, by regulations approved by the Secretary, permit waivers of the section’s limitations for the purpose of determining excess profits taxes for a subsequent taxable year. Even this effect is not automatic, whereas it might have been expected to be so if the adjustment were a retroactive correction of the standard excess profits credit. “SEC. 710. IMPOSITION OF TAX. “(a) . . . “(5) DEFERMENT OF PAYMENT IN CASE OF ABNORMALITY. — If the adjusted excess profits net income (computed without reference to section 722) for the taxable year of a taxpayer which claims on its return, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, the benefits of section 722, is in excess of 50 per centum of its normal tax net income for such year, computed without the credit provided in section 26 (e) (relating to adjusted excess profits net income), the amount of tax payable at the time prescribed for payment may be reduced by an amount equal to 33 per centum of the amount of the reduction in the tax so claimed. For the purposes of section 271, if the tax payable is the tax so reduced, the tax so reduced shall be considered the amount shown on the return.” 54 Stat. 975, as amended, 56 Stat. 917, but see also, later amendment indicated by 26 U. S. C. §710 (a)(5). The Senate Committee on Finance Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, stated: “Although it is believed advisable to require a taxpayer seeking relief under section 722 to compute and pay its tax without the benefit of such section, there are some eases in which it would be inequitable to compel the taxpayer to pay the entire amount of such tax. Section 710 (a) is therefore amended to provide . . . [as above quoted].” S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 205. “SEC. 3771. INTEREST ON OVERPAYMENTS. “(g) Claims Based Upon Relief Under Section 722'. — If any part of an overpayment for a taxable year beginning prior to January 1, 1942, is determined by the Commissioner to be attributable to the final determination of an application for relief or benefit under section 722 for any taxable year, no interest shall be allowed or paid with respect to such part of the overpayment. If any part of an overpayment for a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941, is determined by the Commissioner to be attributable to the final determination of an application for relief or benefit under section 722 for any taxable year, no interest shall be allowed or paid with respect to such part of the overpayment for any period prior to one year after the filing of such application, or September 16, 1945, whichever is the later.” 53 Stat. 465, as amended, 57 Stat. 602, 26 U. S. C. § 3771 (g). The same Act added I. R. C., § 292 (b), containing comparable provisions prohibiting the assessment of interest upon deficiencies attributable to the final determination of an application for relief under § 722. 53 Stat. 88, as amended, 57 Stat. 602, 26 U. S. C. § 292 (b). This applied, for example, to deficiencies in the payment of ordinary income taxes resulting from an abatement under § 722 of excess profits taxes. Such an abatement automatically would leave a larger portion of a corporation’s taxable income subject to the normal income tax and surtax. This increase, however, was not made retroactive any more than the decrease in the excess profits tax which caused it was made retroactive. Congress thus appropriately charged no interest on the resulting deficiency just as it had allowed none on the related overpayment. When Congress, in a later Act, authorized deferment of payments of comparable taxes pending determinations of applications for relief, it did so unequivocally. The relief provisions in the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1137, adding I. R. C., §§ 430-472, prescribed formulas for determining a substitute average base period net income, §§ 442-446, and permitted the taxpayer to adjust its base period net income at the time the return was filed, § 447 (e). See S. Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 17-21, discussing the general relationship between these provisions and the experience gained under § 722 now before us. See legislative history outlined in American Coast Line v. Commissioner, 159 F. 2d 665, and Pohatcong Hosiery Mills v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 146. “. . . there is no doubt a difference between a tax, conceded to be due in the corporation’s own return, and a tax assessed against it in invitum. This argument might perhaps be persuasive, if the denial of 'benefits’ under § 722 were regarded as a constituent factor of the tax itself, as for example are the conditions detailed in § 721. We do not so regard § 722; on the contrary it was a favor; it presupposed that, even after taking into account the ameliatory conditions of §721, the tax was due unless ex gratia the blow was softened; it was a tempering of the wind to the shorn lamb.” Circuit Judge Learned Hand, for the court, 159 F. 2d, at 668. See also, Ideal Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 346, 349; Uni-Term Stevedoring Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 917, 918. “In each instance the section [722] provided that a hypothetical base period earnings credit be ‘tailor made’ for the particular taxpayer and that certain assumptions be made in connection with the case. Each case was a problem in research, and the legal or tax result generally was intertwined with complicated accounting and economic problems. Almost every factor which had any influence on the particular business was pertinent to the case and the time and expense involved in reconstructing the average base period earnings credit were tremendous.” S. Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 17. See also, Standard Roofing & Material Co. v. United States, 199 F. 2d 607; Rodgers v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 779, 108 F. Supp. 727; Cumberland Portland Cement Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 677. aff’d. 202 F. 2d 152. See Rodgers v. United States, supra; Cumberland Portland Cement Co. v. United States, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BREEN v. SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BOARD NO. 16 et al. No. 65. Argued November 19, 1969 Decided January 26, 1970 Emanuel Margolis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Lawrence P. Weisman and Melvin L. Wulf. Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Attorney General Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Morton Hollander, and Ralph A. Fine. George Soli and Joseph B. Robison filed a brief for the American Jewish Congress as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion the Court. This case raises a question concerning the right of a young man ordered to report for induction into the Armed Forces to challenge the legality of that order prior to reporting for duty. Petitioner Breen, while enrolled in the Berklee School of Music in Boston, Massachusetts, was given a II-S student classification by his local draft board, and deferred from military service pursuant to the provisions of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 100, 50 U. S. C. App. § 451 et seq. (1964 ed. and Supp. IV). According to an agreed stipulation of facts, in November 1967 he surrendered his draft registration card to a minister at a public gathering “for the sole purpose of protesting United States involvement in the war in Vietnam.” Shortly thereafter his local draft board declared he was “delinquent” for failing to have his draft card in his possession and at the same time reclassified him I-A— available for military service. He appealed this reclassification to the appropriate Selective Service Appeal Board, and while that appeal was pending filed this suit in the United States District Court in February 1968, seeking an injunction against any possible induction into the Armed Forces on the ground that his delinquency reclassification was invalid. The respondent local board moved to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction, relying on § 10 (b) (3) of the Act which provides that: “No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction . . . ,” 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (b)(3) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and Breen appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, we rendered our decision in Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233 (1968), holding that §10 (b)(3) did not bar pre-induction judicial review in the circumstances presented in that case. Although Breen argued that Oestereich controlled his own case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the suit, with one judge dissenting, holding that Oestereich did not cover this case and § 10 (b) (3) therefore required dismissal of the suit. 406 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1969). We granted a petition for certiorari, 394 U. S. 997 (1969), and, because we conclude that Oestereich does control this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In Oestereich a student preparing for the ministry surrendered his draft registration card in protest against the war in Vietnam and was reclassified as a “delinquent.” He then filed suit seeking to enjoin his induction, claiming that he was being inducted contrary to the clear statutory requirement that students preparing for the ministry “shall be exempt from training and service” under the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (g). We held in that case that since Congress had unambiguously said that students preparing for the ministry were not to be drafted and, since there was no indication in the statute that such exemptions could be denied for “delinquency,” Oestereich’s induction was unlawful and in such a case § 10 (b) (3) would not be interpreted to bar pre-induction judicial review and thereby force the registrant to submit to an illegal induction or risk the possibility of a criminal prosecution to regain his exempt status. In the present case petitioner Breen argues that he, like Oestereich, should not be inducted and he relies on § 6 (h)(1) of the Act, which provides that: “Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the President shall, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, provide for the deferment from training and service in the Armed Forces of persons satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college, university, or similar institution of learning and who request such deferment.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). In his complaint Breen alleged that he was a 20-year-old student and argued that he was clearly qualified for a student deferment. The Government has never contested Breen's factual allegations concerning his student status, nor has it argued that he is not qualified for such a deferment for any reason except the alleged “delinquency.'' As in Oestereich, we do not find any indication that Congress intended to allow the draft boards to deprive otherwise qualified students of their deferments for the reasons relied upon in this case. In concluding that Oestereich did not control this case, the Court of Appeals felt that the reference in § 6 (h)(1) to “such rules and regulations as [the President] may prescribe” was an indication that Congress authorized revocation of student deferments for violations of the delinquency regulations. 406 F. 2d, at 638. That conclusion must be rejected for several reasons. The explicit language of the Act provides that the President “shall” provide for the deferment of undergraduate students except as otherwise provided by the terms of the Act itself, and Congress then set forth the specific conditions that a student must meet to qualify for such a deferment. The reference to “rules and regulations” is clearly intended only to authorize such additional administrative procedures as the President may find necessary to insure that all qualified students are given the deferment that Congress provided in § 6. There is nothing in the language of the Act itself that indicates a congressional desire to allow the President to add to or subtract from the factors specified in the statute for determining when students would be deferred. The legislative history of §6 (h)(1) clearly indicates that Congress intended that only the conditions specified in that section need be met to warrant a student deferment. Prior to the 1967 Act the draft law stated that student deferments were provided only according to presidential regulation and in practice such deferments were subject to the discretion of the local draft boards. The committee reports and floor debates on the 1967 Act show that a primary purpose of the amendments was to eliminate this local option and provide clear, uniform standards for undergraduate student deferments. When Congress thus acted to replace discretionary standards with explicit requirements for student deferments, it did not specifically provide or in any way indicate that such deferred status could be denied because the registrant failed to possess his registration certificate. Finally, any contention that “delinquency” induction is proper in this case must be rejected for the reasons set forth in our decision in Gutknecht v. United States, ante, p. 295, holding that induction pursuant to the delinquency regulations has not been authorized by Congress. The Attorney General advances another argument for distinguishing this case from Oestereich, supra. He points out that Oestereich met the requirements for a statutory “exemption” from military service, while Breen is at best qualified only for a statutory “deferment.” On the basis of this observation he urges that the provisions of § 10 (b) (3) preclude pre-induction judicial review in all cases of deferments and that Oestereich provides an exception only in certain cases where an exemption is claimed. We fail to see any relevant practical or legal differences between exemptions and deferments. The effect of either type of classification is that the registrant cannot be inducted as long as he remains so classified. Congress has specifically said that the only persons who may be inducted into the Armed Forces are those “who are liable for such training and service and who at the time of selection are registered and classified, but not deferred or exempted.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 455 (a)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.) Thus it is clear that the crucial distinction in draft classifications is between individuals presently subject to induction and those who are not so subject, either because of deferment or exemption. The Attorney General also argues that a rational distinction exists in the statutory scheme between deferments which merely postpone the time when a registrant will serve and exemptions which place the registrant “outside the manpower pool.” Brief for the Respondents 20-21. A careful reading of the entire Act indicates that no such consistent distinction is preserved. Congress has provided that “[n]o . . . exemption or deferment . . . shall continue after the cause therefor ceases to exist.” 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (k). Many of the “exemptions” are not absolute, as the Attorney General implies, but conditioned on certain factors. Thus an exempt ministerial student like Oestereich will lose that exempt status if he withdraws from study in preparation for the ministry. Similarly exempt veterans can be inducted into the Armed Forces if Congress declares a war or national emergency. 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (b). On the other hand there is absolutely no assurance that an individual who is simply deferred will only have his military obligation postponed. So long as a registrant remains in a deferred classification he cannot be inducted, and deferment past the maximum age of draft liability would effectively exempt the registrant from compulsory military service. Although a registrant like Breen cannot be deferred as an undergraduate student past his 24th birthday, he may continue to be deferred on the basis of extreme hardship to dependents or employment in the national interest. 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). There is thus no statutory scheme to permanently exempt certain individuals while only deferring service for others. Both deferments and exemptions accomplish the same congressional purpose, that of not inducting certain registrants at a particular time. We are consequently unable to distinguish this case from Oestereich. In both situations a draft registrant who was required by the -relevant law not to be inducted was in fact ordered to report for military service. In both cases the order for induction involved a “clear departure by the Board from its statutory mandate,” Oestereich, supra, at 238, and in both cases § 10 (b) (3) of the Act should not have been construed to require the registrants to submit to induction or risk criminal prosecution to test the legality of the induction order. The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. This reclassification was undertaken pursuant to 32 CFR § 1642.12. Although this provision would appear to preclude judicial review by habeas corpus after the registrant submitted to induction, we have already construed the statute to allow such review. Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U. S. 233, 235, 238 (1968). During the pendency of that appeal the Appeal Board upheld the reclassification and the local board then ordered Breen to report for induction. The induction order has been stayed pending decision in this case. The Act also provides that student deferment status may be lost under certain conditions. “A deferment granted to any person under [this provision] shall continue until such person completes the requirements for his baccalaureate degree, fails to pursue satisfactorily a full-time course of instruction, or attains the twenty-fourth anniversary of the date of his birth, whichever first occurs.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (h) (1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). There is no contention raised here that Breen has lost his deferred status for any of these statutory reasons. The Act does allow the President to restrict student deferments on a finding that the needs of the Armed Forces require such action, 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (h)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), but he has not made any such finding at this time. See Selective Service Act of 1948, §6(h), 62 Stat. 611, as amended. The regulations promulgated pursuant to this authority permitted student deferments in the discretion of the local boards with certain suggested guidelines. See 32 CFR, §§ 1622.25, 1622.25a (1967 ed.). H. R. Rep. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 25-26 (1967); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 346, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1352, 1356-1359 (1967); 113 Cong. Rec. 14093, 14095, 16434 (1967). The suggestion that the fleeting reference to “delinquents” in § 6 (h) (1) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (h) (1) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes delinquency inductions must be rejected for the reasons set forth in Oestereich, supra, at 236-237, and in Gutknecht v. United States, ante, at 302. This statutory directive is implemented by 32 CFR § 1631.7. See n. 4, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. WOKO, INC. No. 65. Argued November 22, 1946. Decided December 9, 1946. Harry M. Plotkin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath, Stanley M. Silverberg, Benedict P. Cottone and Max Goldman. William J. Dempsey argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William C. Koplovitz. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. WOKO, Incorporated, for some years has operated a radio station at Albany, New York, and appears to have rendered public service of acceptable quality and to be able to continue. The Federal Communications Commission refused to renew its license because of misrepresentations made to the Commission and its predecessor as to the ownership of the applicant’s capital stock. Two hundred and forty shares, being twenty-four per cent of its outstanding capital stock, was owned by one Pickard and his family. For some twelve years they received all dividends paid on the stock and Pickard took an active interest in the Company’s affairs. He also was a vice-president of the Columbia Broadcasting Company and had obtained the stock on the assurance that he would help to secure Columbia affiliation for Station WOKO, would furnish, without charge, Columbia engineers to construct the station at Albany, and would supply a grand piano and certain newspaper publicity. The company, however, in reporting to the Federal Radio Commission and to the Federal Communications Commission the names of its stockholders as it was required to do for many years and in many applications, concealed the fact that the Pickards held this stock interest and represented that the shares were held by others. Its general manager appeared on behalf of the applicant at various hearings and furnished false testimony to both Commissions regarding the identity of the corporation stockholders and the shares held by each so as to conceal the Pickard holdings. The purpose of the concealment was to prevent the facts from becoming known to Pickard’s Columbia colleagues. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the Commission’s decision denying renewal of the license, a majority for the various reasons that we will consider. The dissenting Chief Justice noted that he did “very heartily agree with the view that this is a hard case. The Commission’s drastic order, terminating the life of the station, punishes the innocent equally with the guilty, and in its results is contrary to the Commission’s action in several other comparable cases. But that the making of the order was within the discretion of the Commission, I think is reasonably clear.” 153 F. 2d 623, 633. We granted certiorari' because of the importance of the issue to the administration of the Act. We come to a consideration of the reasons which led the Court of Appeals to reverse the order of the Commission under the admonition that “review by the court shall be limited to questions of law and that findings of fact by the Commission, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are arbitrary or capricious.” 48 Stat. 1094,47 U. S. C. § 402 (e). The Act provides as to applications such as WOKO filed that “All such applications shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the applicant to operate the station; the ownership and location of the proposed station . . . and such other information as it may require.” It requires such statements to be under oath or affirmation. 48 Stat. 1085, 47 U. S. C. § 308 (b). It provides, too, that any station license may be revoked for false statements in the application. 48 Stat. 1086,47 U. S. C. § 312 (a). It is said that in this case the Commission failed to find that the concealment was of material facts or had influenced. the Commission in making any decision, or that it would have acted differently had it known that the Pick-ards were the beneficial owners of the stock. We think this is beside the point. The fact of concealment may be more significant than the facts concealed. The willingness to deceive a regulatory body may be disclosed by immaterial and useless deceptions as well as by material and persuasive ones. We do not think it is an answer to say that the deception was unnecessary and served no purpose. If the applicant had forthrightly refused to supply the information on the ground that it was not material, we should expect the Commission would have rejected the application and would have been sustained in so doing. If we would hold it not unlawful, arbitrary or capricious to require the information before granting a renewal, it seems difficult to say that it is unlawful, arbitrary or capricious to refuse a renewal where true information is withheld and false information is substituted. We are told that stockholders owning slightly more than 50 per cent of the stock are not found to have had any part in or knowledge of the concealment or deception of the Commission. This may be a very proper consideration for the Commission in determining just and appropriate action. But as matter of law, the fact that there are innocent stockholders can not immunize the corporation from the consequences of such deception. If officers of the corporation by such mismanagement waste its assets, presumably the State law affords adequate remedies against the wrongdoers. But in this as in other matters, stockholders entrust their interests to their chosen officers and often suffer for their dereliction. Consequences of such acts cannot be escaped by a corporation merely because not all of its stockholders participated. Respondent complains that the present case constitutes a departure from the course which the Commission has taken in dealing with misstatements and applications in other cases. Much is made in argument of the fact that deceptions of this character have not been uncommon and it is claimed that they have not been dealt with so severely as in this case. Cf. Navarro Broadcasting Association, 8 F. C. C. 198. But the very fact that temporizing and compromising with deception seemed not to discourage it, may have led the Commission to the drastic measures here taken to preserve the integrity of its own system of reports. The mild measures to others and the apparently unannounced change of policy are considerations appropriate for the Commission in determining whether its action in this case is too drastic, but we cannot say that the Commission is bound by anything that appears before us to deal with all cases at all times as it has dealt with some that seem comparable. It also is contended that this order inflicts a penalty, that the motive is punishment and that since the Commission is given no powers to penalize persons, its order must fall. We think it unnecessary to indulge in the exposition of what a penalty is. It is enough to decide this case to know what a penalty is not. A denial of an application for a license because of the insufficiency or deliberate falsity of the information lawfully required to be furnished is not a penal measure. It may hurt and it may cause loss, but it is not made illegal, arbitrary or capricious by that fact. Lastly, and more importantly, the Court of Appeals suggested that in order to justify refusal to renew, the Commission should have made findings with respect to the quality of the station’s service in the past and its equipment for good service in the future. Evidence of the station’s adequate service was introduced at the hearing. The Commission on the other hand insists that in administering the Act it must rely upon the reports of licensees. It points out that this concealment was not caused by slight inadvertence nor was it an isolated instance, but that the Station carried on the course of deception for approximately twelve years. It says that in deciding whether the proposed operations would serve public interest, convenience or necessity, consideration must be given to the character, background and training of all parties having an interest in the proposed license, and that it cannot be required to exercise the discretion vested in it to entrust the responsibilities of a licensee to an applicant guilty of a systematic course of deception. We cannot say that the Commission is required as a matter of law to grant a license on a deliberately false application even if the falsity were not of this duration and character, nor can we say that refusal to renew the license is arbitrary and capricious under such circumstances. It may very well be that this Station has established such a standard of public service that the Commission would be justified in considering that its deception was not a matter that affected its qualifications to serve the public. But it is the Commission, not the courts, which must be satisfied that the public interest will be served by renewing the license. And the fact that we might not have made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a substitution of judicial for administrative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to the latter. We agree that this is a hard case, but we cannot agree that it should be allowed to make bad law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to that court with direction to remand to the Commission. Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL et al. v. HALDERMAN et al. No. 81-2101. Argued February 22, 1983 Reargued October 3, 1983 Decided January 23, 1984 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 125. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 126. H. Bartow Farr III and Allen C. Warshaw reargued the cause for petitioners. With them on the briefs were Thomas M. Kittredge, Joel I. Klein, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Robert B. Hoffman, Debra K. Wallet, Alan J. Davis, and Mark A. Aronchick. David Ferleger reargued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Halderman et al. Thomas K. Gilhool reargued the cause for respondents Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens et al. With him on the brief were Frank J. Laski and Michael Churchill. Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Cooper and Wilkinson, Brian K. Landsberg, and Frank Allen filed a brief for the United States. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, and Carl Volvo, William L. Pardee, and Judith S. Yogman, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Charles A. Grad-dick of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona (by Anthony Ching, Solicitor General), J. D. MacFarlane of Colorado, CarlR. Ajello of Connecticut, Richard S. Gebelein of Delaware, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Tyrone C. Fahner of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Steven L. Beshear of Kentucky, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Richard H. Bryan of Nevada, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert 0. Wefald of North Dakota, Hector Reichard of Puerto Rico, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, Steven Freudenthal of Wyoming, and Aviata F. Fa’Aleveo of American Samoa. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law. I — t This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally retarded. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation’s history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10, it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that history. This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC); and the United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding Penn-hurst. Respondents’ amended complaint charged that conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members’ rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 29 U. S. C. § 794; the Developmental^ Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 89 Stat. 496, 42 U. S. C. §6001 et seqand the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1983-1984). Both damages and injunctive relief were sought. In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295. As noted in our prior opinion, the court’s findings were undisputed: “Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the ‘habilitation’ of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst.” 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident’s right to “minimally adequate habilitation” under the Due Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at 1314-1318, 1322-1323; “freedom from harm” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321; and “nondiscriminatory habilitation” under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at 1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that “due process demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting consistent with that individual’s habilitative needs.” Id., at 1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered that “immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded residents from Pennhurst.” Id., at 1325. Petitioners were ordered “to provide suitable community living arrangements” for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master “with the power and duty to plan, organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation of this and any further Orders of the Court.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most of the District Court’s judgment. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en banc). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this right solely on the “bill of rights” provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court’s holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting. On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed except as to the District Court’s order that Pennhurst be closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by respondents precluded institutionalization. Id., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for “individual determinations by the [District Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each such patient,” guided by “a presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements].” Ibid. On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is subject to review by the Special Master. A second master, called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings, upon request by the resident, his parents, or his advocate, on the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident’s plan. The Hearing Master then determines where the patient should reside, subject to possible review by the District Court. See App. 123a-134a (Order of Apr. 24, 1980). This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive rights. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5) (1976 ed., Supp. V)). On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en banc). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had “spoken definitively” in holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the “least restrictive environment” approach for the care of the mentally retarded. Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected petitioners’ argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim. The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, also involved state officials, “there cannot be ... an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule.” 673 F. 2d, at 658. Finally, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law claim under principles of comity, see id,., at 659-660, and refused to consider petitioners’ objections to the District Court’s use of a Special Master, see id., at 651, and n. 10. Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles of federalism and comity the establishment of a. Special Master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of that order would be meaningless). We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand. II Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and (iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two Masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues, for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive. A Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that the federal judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State.” Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The decision “created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted.” Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” The Amendment’s language overruled the particular result in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of Art. Ill, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States “was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.” Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi, supra, at 322-323. In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. Ill: “That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.” Ex parte State of New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). A sovereign’s immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State’s consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to “overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not override States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State’s immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system. A State’s constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued. As Justice Marshall well has noted, “[b]e-cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this.” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (concurring in result). Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by “[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978). B This Court’s decisions thus establish that “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.” Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however, whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) (“Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State”). When the suit is brought only against state officials, a question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when “the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 720-723, 727-728 (1883). Thus, “[t]he general rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam). And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85, 91 (1982). The Court has recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action is not one against the State. This was the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is “void” and therefore does not “impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id., at 160. Since the State could not authorize the action, the officer was “stripped of his official or representative character and [was] subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.” Ibid. While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary to “the supreme authority of the United States” has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id., at 666-667. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the official’s future conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief. Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority. N evertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. HH HH I — I With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of the judgment below. First, they contend that under the doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against the State because the courts below ordered only prospective injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S., at 193. A We first address the contention that respondents’ state-law claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edel-man and Young even though the prospective financial burden was substantial and ongoing. See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman. As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is “stripped of his official or representative character,” Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This rationale, of course, created the “well-recognized irony” that an official’s unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment. Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of Stevens, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to “the supreme authority of the United States.” Young, supra, at 160. As Justice Brennan has observed, “Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S., at 337; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952). The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young “has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect.” 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief “will not in many instances be that between day and night,” 415 U. S., at 667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily “ ‘fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.”’ Id., at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 P. 2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman’s distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States. This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal court’s grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law. B The contrary view of Justice Stevens’ dissent rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. Under his view, an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to override the State’s protection under that Amendment. The theory is that such conduct is contrary to the official’s “instructions,” and thus ultra vires his authority. Accordingly, official action based on a reasonable interpretation of any statute might, if the interpretation turned out to be erroneous, provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors in their official capacities. In this case, where officials of a major state department, clearly acting within the scope of their authority, were found not to have improved conditions in a state institution adequately under state law, the dissent’s result would be that the State itself has forfeited its constitutionally provided immunity. The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does not dispute that the general criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief sought. See supra, at 101; post, at 146, n. 29. According to the dissent, the relief sought and ordered here — which in effect was that a major state institution be closed and smaller state institutions be created and expansively funded — did not operate against the State. This view would make the law a pretense. No other court or judge in the 10-year history of this litigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent’s underlying view that the named defendants here were acting beyond and contrary to their authority cannot be reconciled with reality — or with the record. The District Court in this case held that the individual defendants “acted in the utmost good faith . . . within the sphere of their official responsibilities,” and therefore were entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F. Supp., at 1324 (emphasis added). The named defendants had nothing to gain personally from their conduct; they were not found to have acted willfully or even negligently. See ibid. The court expressly noted that the individual defendants “apparently took every means available to them to reduce the incidents of abuse and injury, but were constantly faced with staff shortages.” Ibid. It also found “that the individual defendants are dedicated professionals in the field of retardation who were given very little with which to accomplish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst.” Ibid. As a result, all the relief ordered by the courts below was institutional and official in character. To the extent there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises. The dissent bases its view on numerous cases from the turn of the century and earlier. These cases do not provide the support the dissent claims to find. Many are simply miscited. For example, with perhaps one exception, none of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief could be ordered against state officials for failing to carry out their duties under state statutes. And the federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on for analogy, while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not be predicated on violations of state statutes that command purely discretionary duties. Since it cannot be doubted that the statutes at issue here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, see n. 11, supra; see also 446 F. Supp., at 1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be ultra vires even under the standards of the dissent’s cases. Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this theory had never been pressed as far as Justice Stevens would do in this case. And when the expansive approach of the dissent was advanced, this Court plainly and explicitly rejected it. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), the Court was faced with the argument that an allegation that a Government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a suit for an injunction to remedy the injury would not be against the sovereign. The Court rejected the argument, noting that it would make the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous. A plaintiff would need only to “claim an invasion of his legal rights” in order to override sovereign immunity. Id., at 693. In the Court’s view, the argument “confuse[d] the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action.” Id., at 692-693. The dissent’s theory suffers a like confusion. Under the dissent’s view, a plaintiff would need only to claim a denial of rights protected or provided by statute in order to override sovereign immunity. Except in rare cases it would make the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity. The crucial element of the dissent’s theory was also the plaintiff’s central contention in Larson. It is that “[a] sovereign, like any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to violate the law,” so that when the agent does so he cannot be acting for the sovereign. Post, at 153; see also post, at 142, 148-149, 158; cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 (“It is argued .. . that the commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign. . . . It is on this contention that the respondent’s position fundamentally rests . . .”). It is a view of agency law that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected. Larson thus made clear that, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is against it. 337 U. S., at 690, 695. Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was “outweigh[ed] ” by “the necessity of permitting the Government to carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention.” Id., at 704. If anything, this public need is even greater when questions of federalism are involved. See supra, at 99-100. The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by Justice Stevens’ dissent today, and asserted that many of the same cases were being overruled or ignored. See 337 U. S., at 723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those arguments were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in 1949, no opinion by any Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all. Those that have been so cited have been relied upon only for propositions with which no one today quarrels. The plain fact is that the dissent’s broad theory, if it ever was accepted to the full extent to which it is now pressed, has not been the law for at least a generation. The reason is obvious. Under the dissent’s view of the ultra vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have force only in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or where he cannot produce some state statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity “ ‘undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State.’” Post, at 164, n. 48 (quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). This argument has not been adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, supra, at 51 (“Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution”); Larson, 337 U. S., at 704 (“The Government, as representative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks . . .”). Moreover, the argument substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As Justice Marshall has observed, the Eleventh Amendment’s restriction on the federal judicial power is based in large part on “the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other.” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S., at 294 (concurring in result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment’s basis in federalism. C The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when — as here — the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment. This Court long has held generally that when a federal court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, 213 U. S., at 192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at 193; Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter”). But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment. As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim. Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials’ argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action, regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional. See 244 U. S., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court’s jurisdiction extended “to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all.” Id., at 508. The case then was decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. “[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). We therefore view the question as an open one. As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. “The Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation of the judicial power of the United States.” Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims against States that otherwise would be within the scope of Art. Ill’s grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well. As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general Art. Ill language conferring power to hear all “cases” arising under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S., at 725. See also Hagans v. Lavine, supra, at 545 (terming pendent jurisdiction “a doctrine of discretion”). The Eleventh Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at 97-100, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. Ill power: “the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given,” Ex parte State of New York, 256 U. S., at 497. If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan makes clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that “the District Court was correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs’] statutory claim,” 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the basis of that pendent claim. Id., at 678. In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. A federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court’s jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 106. We now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. D Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect on litigation against state officials. They argue that the “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants” that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause litigants to split causes of action between state and federal courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court. It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based on federal or state law, must be brought in state court. Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of state law commonly are split off and referred to the state courts. In any case, the answer to respondents’ assertions is that such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 (“Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment’s] restriction”). That a litigant’s choice of forum is reduced “has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism.” Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S., at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring in result). IV Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded. Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, it is clear that without the injunction against the state institutions and officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1983-1984), and the costs of the Masters have been borne by the State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re Schmidt, 494 Pa., at 95-96, 429 A. 2d, at 635-636. In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. V The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania’s MH/MR Act. We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 93. On remand the Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the judgment may be sustained on these bases. The court also may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§6011, 6063 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted in good faith and therefore were immune from the damages claims. 446 F. Supp., at 1324. In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association’s motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en banc). The Association subsequently was granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court. On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters’ expenses for the fiscal year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363. Three Justices dissented from the Court’s construction of the Act, but concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the “far-reaching remedy” of appointing “a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst . . . .” 451 U. S., at 54 (White J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part). The Court of Appeals also noted that “the United States is an intervening plaintiff . . . against which even the state itself cannot successfully plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction,” and that “the counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages may be awarded.” 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted). As Justice Brennan notes in his dissent, post, at 126, Judge Gibbons has expanded on his views of the Eleventh Amendment in a recent law review article. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983). Judge Gibbons was the author of both the first and second opinions by the Court of Appeals in this case. The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982. See App. 220a (Order of Aug. 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains in operation. See Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 291-292 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (The Eleventh Amendment “clarified] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power” and “restore[d] the original understanding” that States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id., at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. “The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment. . . even though urged for the first time in this Court.” Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 467 (1945). For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State’s waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). “[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts. ... [A] clear declaration of the state’s intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found.” Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944). See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were “vitally interested” in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is “a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism” and is “sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit constitutional dimension”); id., at 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions”). “The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if ‘the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,’ or if the effect of the judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.’ ” Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted). Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the State in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest, however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the State for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts “without any authority whatever.” Treasure Salvors, 458 U. S., at 697 (opinion of Stevens, J.); accord, id., at 716 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no “colorable basis for the exercise of authority by state officials”). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra vires claim rests on “the officer’s lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.” Larson, supra, at 690. Petitioners’ actions in operating this mental health institution plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. The MH/MR Act gave them broad discretion to provide “adequate” mental health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The essence of respondents’ claim is that petitioners have not provided such services adequately. In his dissent, Justice Stevens advances a far broader — and unprecedented — version of the ultra vires doctrine, which we discuss infra, at 106-117. We reject respondents’ additional contention that Pennsylvania has waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court: “Federal courts. — Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980). We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States’ presence in the case for any purpose does not eliminate the State’s immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to assert the state-law claims of third parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents’ state-law claim is unaffected by the United States’ participation in the case. We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law, but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. “Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the ‘special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.’” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 120 (1951)). We are prompted to respond at some length to Justice Stevens’ 41-page dissent in part by his broad charge that “the Court repudiates at least 28 cases,” post, at 127. The decisions the dissent relies upon simply do not support this sweeping characterization. See nn. 19, 20, and 21, infra. In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding that state law required habilitation in the least restrictive environment on dicta in In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981). That decision was not issued until seven years after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended. This part of the court’s findings and judgment was not appealed. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F. 2d 84, 90, n. 4 (1979). See also 446 F. Supp., at 1303 (“On the whole, the staff at ' Pennhurst appears to be dedicated and trying hard to cope with the inadequacies of the institution”). The parties defendant in this suit were not all individuals. They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a state institution. The dissent apparently is arguing that the defendants as a group — including both the state institutions, and state and county officials — were acting ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said to have violated the law through the individual defendants, the District Court’s findings, never since questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all the defendants from the dissent’s claim that they acted beyond the scope of their authority. A truth of which the dissent’s theoretical argument seems unaware is the plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. As the District Court in this case found: “History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded.” Id., at 1299. Accord, Message from President Kennedy Relative to Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, H. R. Doc. No. 58, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1963) (“We as a Nation have long neglected the mentally ill and the mentally retarded”). It is common knowledge that “insane asylums,” as they were known until the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It is not easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions, particularly well-trained professionals. Physical facilities, due to consistent underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate — especially in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of the mentally ill. See generally id., at 2, 4; The President’s Committee on Mental Retardation, MR 68: The Edge of Change 11-13 (1968); President’s Committee on Mental Retardation, Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded 1-57 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger eds. 1969); R. Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation 240-243 (1983). Only recently have States commenced to move to correct widespread deplorable conditions. The responsibility, as the District Court recognized after a protracted trial, has rested on the State itself. The dissent appears to be confused about our argument here. See post, at 138-139. It is of course true, as the dissent says, that the finding below that petitioners acted in good faith and therefore were immune from damages does not affect whether an injunction might be issued against them by a court possessed of jurisdiction. The point is that the courts below did not have jurisdiction because the relief ordered so plainly ran against the State. No one questions that the petitioners in operating Pennhurst were acting in their official capacity. Nor can it be questioned that the judgments under review commanded action that could be taken by petitioners only in their official capacity — and, of course, only if the State provided the necessary funding. It is evident that the dissent would vest in federal courts authority, acting solely under state law, to ignore the sovereignty of the States that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted to protect. Article III confers no jurisdiction on this Court to strip an explicit Amendment of the Constitution of its substantive meaning. Contrary to the dissent’s view, see post, at 150, an injunction based on federal law stands on very different footing, particularly in light of the Civil War Amendments. As we have explained, in such cases this Court is vested with the constitutional duty to vindicate “the supreme authority of the United States,” Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 160 (1908). There is no corresponding mandate to enforce state law. See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887). In Rolston, however, the state officials were ordered to comply with “a plain ministerial duty,” see Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S., at 51, a far cry from this case, see n. 20, infra. The cases are collected in n. 50 of the dissent, post, at 165-166. Several of the cases do not rest on an Eleventh Amendment holding at all. For example, federal jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1918), because of lack of diversity. A fair reading of South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895), and the cases it cites, makes clear that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point that the party pressing the appeal was not a party to the proceeding. In two other eases the allegation was that a state officer or agency had acted unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state law. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911). In Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money damages against the individual officer. See n. 21, infra. None of these cases can be said to be overruled by our holding today. As noted infra, at 118, the Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim. Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), and Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants had committed common-law torts, not, as here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute. See Tindal, supra, at 221 (distinguishing suits brought “to enforce the” discharge by the defendants of any specific duty enjoined by the State”); Tr. of Record in Tindal v. Wesley, O. T. 1896, No. 231, p. 3 (complaint alleged that defendants had “wrongfully entered into said premises and ousted the plaintiff... to the damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars”); Scully, supra, at 483 (allegation was that defendant had “injuriously affect[ed] the reputation and sale of [plaintiff’s] products”). Tort cases suph as these were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). See infra, at 111-114. See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) (“The complainant did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of the Secretary of War, but challenged his authority to do the things of which complaint was made”); Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197, 198-199 (1922) (same); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845) (“[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake”); Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1893); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted where officer commits a tort that is “contrary to a plain official duty requiring no exercise of discretion”); Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 338 (1918); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S., at 695 (suit challenging “incorrect decision as to law or fact” is barred “if the officer making the decision was empowered to do so”); id., at 715 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that cases involve orders to comply with nondiscretionary duties). The opinions make clear that the question of discretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to the court’s mandamus powers generally. See, e. g., Philadelphia Co., supra, at 618-620. The rationale appears to be that discretionary duties have a greater impact on the sovereign because they “brin[g] the operation of governmental machinery into play.” Larson, supra, at 715 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases, see n. 19, supra, the dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity cases it cites post, at 166, n. 50, are today overruled. Many of them were actions for damages in tort against the individual officer. Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1852); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896). In Belknap the Court drew a careful distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would run more directly against the State. Id., at 18. The Court disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this basis. Id., at 23-25. Contrary to the view of the dissent, post, at 135, n. 10, nothing in our opinion touches these cases. The Court in Larson similarly distinguished between cases seeking money damages against the individual officer in tort, and those seeking in-junctive relief against the officer in his official capacity. It held that the latter sought relief against the sovereign, while the former might not. 337 U. S., at 687-688, and nn. 7, 8. There is language in other cases that suggests they were actions alleging torts, not statutory violations. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, supra, at 623; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 568 (1922); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 736 (1947). The remainder clearly distinguish eases (like the present one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties. See n. 20, supra. In any case, the Court in Larson explicitly limited the precedential value of all of these cases. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, and n. 6 (1962). In fact, as the dissent itself states, the argument in Larson that an allegation of tortious activity overrides sovereign immunity is essentially the same as the dissent’s argument that an allegation of conduct contrary to statute overrides sovereign immunity. See post, at 158. The result in each case — as the Court in Larson recognized — turns on whether the defendant state official was empowered to do what he did, i. e., whether, even if he acted erroneously, it was action within the scope of his authority. See Larson, 337 U. S., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether officer had interpreted Government contract correctly); id., at 695; id., at 716-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in cases alleging a tort, the “official seeks to screen himself behind the sovereign”); id., at 721-722. What the dissent fails to note is that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected the view that the dissent here also advances, which is “that an officer given the power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions.” Id., at 695. The Court in Larson made crystal clear that an officer might make errors and still be acting within the scope of his authority. Ibid. (There can be no question that the defendants here were “given the power to make decisions” about the operation of Pennhurst. See n. 11, supra.) The dissent’s view that state officers “have no discretion to commit a tort,” post, at 132, n. 7, cannot be reconciled with the plain holding of Larson. “It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of agency law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission of a tort by his agent. But that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of saying that an agent’s liability for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal.” 337 U. S., at 694 (footnote omitted). The Larson Court noted that a similar argument “was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate liability for torts, but was decisively rejected.” Ibid. See 10 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4877, p. 350 (rev. ed. 1978) (a corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within the scope of his authority even though the “act was contrary to or in violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the offending agent”); id., §4959 (same as to crimes). The dissent’s strained interpretation of Larson, post, at 153-155, simply ignores the language that the dissent itself quotes: “It is important to note that in [ultra vires] cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer’s lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.” 337 U. S., at 689-690. As we have discussed supra, at 102-103, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), also shows that the broad ultra vires theory enunciated in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded. In Edelman, although the state officers were alleged to be acting contrary to law, and therefore should have been “stripped of their authority” under the theory of the dissent, we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on the ground that the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not run only against the agent. Post, at 146, n. 29. To say that injunctive relief against state officials acting in their official capacity does not run against the State is to resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent’s theories. Unlike the English sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through its officials. It is true that the Court in Edelman recognized that retroactive relief often, or at least sometimes, has a greater impact on the state treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415 U. S., at 666, n. 11, but there was no suggestion that damages alone were thought to run against the State while injunctive relief did not. We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction that has been narrowly construed. In this light, it may well be wondered what principled basis there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth in Larson and Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982). That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers acting in their official capacities but without any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction of the Young opinion. The dissent’s method is merely to take this fiction to its extreme. While the dissent’s result may be logical, in the sense that it is difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its view would virtually eliminate the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result from which the Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today. For present purposes, however, we do no more than question the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the analysis of this opinion, it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit only under the standards set forth in n. 11, supra. The dissent appears to believe that Larson is consistent with all prior law. See post, at 153. This view ignores the fact that the Larson Court itself understood that it was required to “resolve [a] conflict in doctrine.” 337 U. S., at 701. The Court since has recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law of sovereign immunity. In Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643 (1962), Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court observed that “to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task.” Id., at 646. His opinion continued: “The Court’s 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was called upon to ‘resolve the conflict in doctrine’ . . . , thoroughly reviewed the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents.” Ibid. The Court included many of the cases upon which the dissent relies in its list of cases that were rejected by Larson. See 369 U. S., at 646, n. 6. E. g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887) (never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918) (never cited); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration is a suit against the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that State cannot be sued without its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1885) (unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against State); Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., supra, Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length, 458 U. S., at 685-688, but noted that the rule of Tindal “was clarified in Larson." 458 U. S., at 688; see also id., at 715, n. 13 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). As noted, n. 26, supra, some of these cases were also cited — and rejected — in Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at 646, n. 6. The ease was argued in the same way. The Eleventh Amendment argument in the briefs is confined to the federal constitutional claims. See, e. g., Brief for Louisville & Nashville R. Co., O. T. 1916, Nos. 778, 779, pp. 15-38 (jurisdiction over federal claims); id., at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state claims). Indeed the State’s brief somewhat curiously closes with a concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. Brief for State Board and Officers, O. T. 1916, Nos. 778, 779, p. 189; see Reply Brief, O. T. 1916, Nos. 778, 779, p. 2 (pointing out concession). Thus, while the State’s position on the Court’s jurisdiction over the federal claims is somewhat unclear, the State never argued that there might not be jurisdiction over the local-law claims if the Court found jurisdiction over the federal question in the case. Nor do any of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited in Justice Stevens’ dissent, post, at 166, n. 52, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claims. Moreover, since Larson was decided in 1949, making clear that mere violations of state law would not override the Eleventh Amendment, these cases have been cited only for the proposition that, as a general matter, a federal court should decide a case on state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. Nothing in our decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the Siler principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 671 (“Having now had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our holding today”). See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S., at 322 (“[Although a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens”); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933). See Missouri v. Fiske, supra, at 27 (“This is not less a suit against the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental”). Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of “judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants,” Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded. For example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal court’s construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing oversight of a state program' that may extend over years, as in this ease, the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) (“Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this double [1 e., federal-state] system of review”). This case is an example. Here, the federal courts effectively have been undertaking to operate a major state institution based on inferences drawn from dicta in a state-court opinion not decided until four years after the suit was begun. The state court has had no opportunity to review the federal courts’ construction of its opinion, or their choice of remedies. The only sure escape from an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather cumbersome route of legislation. Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which often is called for when state law is unclear, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378-379 (1964) (“abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time”) (citations omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs, supra, at 726; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933). Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although “considerations of judicial economy” would be served by permitting pendent-party jurisdiction, “the addition of a completely new party would run counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress”). We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to “counties and similar municipal corporations.” Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment to bar relief against county officials “in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself.” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234 (CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281, 287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d 218, 220 (CA10 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State, it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State. Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1978) (holding that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for backpay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue in light of our disposition above. On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. WODEHOUSE. No. 84. Argued December 10, 13, 1948. Decided June 13, 1949. . 'Melva M. Graney argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney ■ General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack and Lee A. Jackson. Watson Washburn argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion, of the Court. . The question before us is whether certain sums received in 1938 and 1941, by the. respondent, as a nonresident alien author not engaged in trade or business within, the United States and not having an office or place of business therein, were required by the Revenue Acts of the United States to be included in his gross income for federal tax purposes. Each of these sums had been paid to him in advance and respectively for an exclusive serial or book right throughout the United States in relation to a specified original story written by him and ready to be copyrighted. The answer turns upon the meaning of “gross income from sources within the United States” as that term was used, limited and defined in §§ 212 (a), 211 and 119 of the Revenue Act of 1938, and the Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1940 and 1941. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that these sums eách came within those kinds of gross income from sources within the United States that were referred to in those Acts as “rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States . . . copyrights, . . . and other like property,” and that, accordingly, each of these sums was taxable under one or the other of those Acts. The respondent, Pelham G. Wodehouse, at the times material to this case, was a British subject residing in France. He was a nonresident alien of the United States not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein during either the taxable year 1938 or 1941. He was a writer of serials, plays, short stories and other literary works published in the United States in the Saturday Evening Post, Cosmopolitan Magazine and other periodicals. February 22, 1938, the Curtis Publishing Company (here called Curtis) accepted for publication in the Saturday Evening Post the respondent’s unpublished novel “The Silver Cow.” The story had been submitted to Curtis by the respondent’s literary agent, the Reynolds Agency, and, on that date, Curtis paid the agency $40,000 under an agreement reserving to Curtis the American serial rights in the story, including in such rights those in ■the United States, Canada and South America. The memorandum quoted in Appendix B, infra, p. 398, constituted the agreement. Also in 1938, the respondent received $5,000 from Doubleday, Doran & Company for the book rights in this story. The story was published serially in the Saturday Evening Post, July 9 to September 3, 1939. Pursuant to a like agreement, the respondent received $40,000 from Curtis, December 13, 1938, for serial rights in and to his story “Uncle Fred in the Springtime.” It was published serially in the Saturday Evening Post, April 22 to May 27, 1939. July 23, 1941, Hearst’s International Cosmopolitan Magazine, through the respondent’s same agent, paid the respondent $2,000 for “all American and Canadian serial rights (which include all American and Canadian magazine, digest, periodical and newspaper publishing rights)” to the respondent’s article entitled “My Years Behind Barbed Wire.” The agreement appears in Appendix C, infra, p. 400. Apparently this story was published shortly thereafter. August 12, 1941, Curtis, tnrough the same-agent, paid the respondent $40,000 for the “North American (including Canadian) serial rights” to respondent’s novel entitled “Money in the Bank.” The agreement was in the form used by Curtis in 1938. The evidence does not state that this story was published but it shows that Curtis, pursuant to its agreements, took out a United Statés copyright on each of the respective stories named in the foregoing agreements. After each story’s serial publication, Curtis reassigned to the respondent, on the latter’s demand, all rights in and to the story excepting those rights which the respondent expressly had agreed that Curtis was to retain. The respective sums were thus paid to the respondent, in advance and in full, for the serial or book rights which he had made available. Eor United States income tax purposes, the respondent’s literary agent, or some other withholding agent, withheld from the respondent, or from his wife as his assignee, a part of each payment. In 1944 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner herein, gave the respondent notice of tax deficiencies assessed against him for the taxable years 1923, 1924, 1938, 1940 and 1941. In these assessments, among other items, the Commissioner claimed deficiencies in the respondent’s income tax payments based upon his above-described 1938 and 1941 receipts. The respondent, in a petition to the Tax Court for a. redetermination of such deficiencies, not only contested the additional taxes assessed against him, which were based upon the full amounts of those receipts, but he asked also for the refund to him of the amounts which had been withheld, for income tax purposes, from each such payment. The Tax Court entered judgment against him for additional taxes for 1938, 1940 and 1941, in the respective amounts of $11,806.71, $8,080.83 and $1,854.85. In speaking of the taxes for 1940 and 1941, the Tax Court said: “The first issue, found also in the year 1938,- presents the question of the taxability of lump sum payments for serial rights to literáry works. Counsel for the petitioner [Wodehouse, the respondent here] .concedes that substantially the same issue was raised and decided in Sax Rohmer, 5 T. ,C. 183; aff'd., 153 Fed. (2d) 61; certiorari denied, 328 U. S. 862. “In Sax Rohmer, supra, we held that the lump sum payments for serial rights were royalties and, as such, were taxable to the recipient. The arguinents advanced in the cases at bar follow the same pattern as those appearing in the Sax Rohmer case, as presented to this Court and. to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The petitioner’s contentions were rejected in both courts and for the same reasons stated ;n the opinions therein, they are rejected here.” 8' T. C. 637, 653. As the respondent’s taxes for 1938 and 1941 had been paid to the Collector of Internal Revenue at Baltimore, Maryland, his petition for review of the Tax Court’s judgment for those years was filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.. The judgment against him was there reversed, 166 F. 2d 986, one judge dissenting on the authority and reasoning of Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 61 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Because of the resulting conflict between the Circuits and also because comparable issues as to this respondent’s taxes for 1940 were pending before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we granted certiorari. 335 U. S. 807. ’ ' The petitioner contends that receipts of the type before us long have been recognized as rentals or royalties paid for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States, patents, copyrights and other like property. Keeping in mind that, before 1936, such receipts were expressly subject to withholding as part of the taxable-income of nonresident alien individuals, he contends that those receipts remained taxable and subject to withholding in 1938 and 1941, after the standards for taxation of such aliens had been made expressly coterminous with the standards for subjecting this part of their income to withholding procedures. In opposition, the respondent argues, first, that each sum he received was a payment made to him in return for his sale of a property interest in a copyright and not a payment to him of a royalty for rights granted by him under the protection of his copyright. Being the proceeds of a sale by him of such a property interest, he concludes that those proceeds were not required to be included in his taxable gross income because the controlling Revenue Acts did not attempt to tax nonresident alien individuals, like himself, upon income from sales of property. Secondly, the respondent argues that, even if his receipts were to be treated as royalties, yet each was received in a single lump sum and not “annually” or “periodically,” and that, therefore, they did not come within his taxable gross income. The petitioner replies that, in this case, we do not properly reach the fine questions of title, or of sales or copyright law, thus raised by the respondent as to the divisibility of a copyright or as to the sale of some interest in a copyright. The petitioner states that the issue here is one of statutory interpretation. It is confined primarily to the taxability of the respondent’s receipts within the broad, rather than narrow, language of certain Revenue Acts. Attention must be focused on those Revenue Acts. If their terms made these receipts taxable because of the general nature of the transactions out of which the receipts arise, namely, payments for the use of or for the privilege of using copyrights, then it is those statutory definitions,- properly read in the light of their context and of their legislative history, that must determine the taxability of the receipts. He argues that the language of the Revenue Acts does not condition the right of the United States to its revenue upon any fine point of property law but covers these receipts in any event. Treating the respondent's receipts simply as representing payments for the use of .or the privilege of using copyrights the petitioner argues that they constituted income that was subject both to withholding and to taxation in 1938 and 1941. He claims finally that the respondent cannot escape taxation of such receipts merely by showing that each payment was received by him -in a lump sum in advance for certain uses of a copyright, instead of in several payments to be made at intermediate dates during the life of the copyright. I. Sums received by a nonresident alien individual for the use of a copyright in the United States constituted gross income taxable to him under the Revenue Act of 1988 and the Internal Revenue Code. Under the income tax laws of the United States, sums received by a nonresident alien author not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein long have been required to be included in his gross income for our federal tax purposes. Such receipts have been an appropriate and readily collectible, subject of taxation. A review of the statutes, regulations, administrative practices and court decisions discloses this policy and, at least from a revenue standpoint, no reason has appeared for changing it. Since the early days of our income tax levies, rentals and royalties paid for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States, patents, copyrights and other like, property have been taxed to nonresident aliens and for many years at least a part of the tax has been withheld at the source of the income. To exempt this type of income from taxation in 1938 or 1941, in the face of this long record of its taxation, would require a clearness and positiveness of legislative determination to change the established procedure that, is entirely absent here. The policy of this Court in this general field of statutory interpretation was stated in 1934 in a case which dealt with the taxation of a somewhat comparable form of income of a foreign corporation. In Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, the question presented was that of the proper interpretation to be given to § 217 (a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 30 (analogous to § 119 (a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 503, now before us). Certain sums had been received by a foreign corporation from the United States Government in the form of interest upon a refund of an overpayment by that corporation of its income taxes. This Court held that such interest, in turn, constituted taxable gross income derived by the foreign corporation from a source within the United States, because it amounted to interest upon an interest-bearing obligation of a resident of the United States within the meaning of the Act. This interpretation was adopted in opposition to the foreign corporation’s argument that the payment should be exempted because it amounted to interest on one of the “obligations of the United States” and that interest on such an obligation was expressly exempted from taxation by § 213 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (analogous to § 22 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1938). This Court distinguished between the meaning of the word “obligations” in the context of the different sections of the Act and stated the applicable general principles of statutory construction as follows: “The general object of this act is to put money into the federal treasury; and there is manifest in the reach of its many provisions an intention on the part of Congress to bring about a generous attainment of that object by imposing a tax upon pretty much every sort of income subject to the federal power. Plainly, the payment in question constitutes income derived from a source within the United States; and the natural aim of Congress would be to' reach it. In Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 166, this court, rejecting the contention that certain payments there involved did not constitute income, said: ‘If these payments properly may be called income by the common understanding of that word and the statute has failed to hit them it has missed so much of the general purpose that it expresses at the start. Congress intended to use its power to the full extent. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 203.’ Although Congress intended, as the court held in the Viscose case, supra [56 F. 2d 1033 (C. A. 3d Cir.)], to include interest on a. tax refund made to a domestic corporation, we are asked to deny such intention in respect of a competing foreign corporation.' But . we see nothing in the relationship of a foreign corporation to the United States, or in any other circumstance called to our attention, which fairly shows that such a discrimination was within the contemplation of Congress. On the.contrary, the natural conclusion is that if any discrimination had been intended it would have been made in favor of, and not against, the domestic corporation, which contributes in a much more substantial degree to the support of the people and government of the United States.” Id. at pp. 89-90. And further: “In the foregoing discussion, we have not been unmindful of the rule, frequently stated by this court, that taxing acts ‘are not to be extended by implica-, tion beyond the clear import of the language used/ and that doubts are to be resolved against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. The rule is a salutary one, but it does not apply here. The intention of the lawmaker controls in the construction of taxing acts as it does in the construction of other statutes, and that intention is to be ascertained, not by taking the word or clause in question from its setting and viewing it apart, but by considering it in connection with the context, the general purposés of the statute in which it is found,, the occasion and circumstances of its use, and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the legislative will. Compare Rein v. Lane, L. R. 2 Q. B. Cases 144, 151. The intention being thus disclosed, it is enough that the word or clause is reasonably susceptible of a meaning consonant therewith, whatever might be its meaning in another and different connection. We are not at liberty to reject the meaning so established and adopt another lying outside the intention of the legislature, simply because the latter would release the taxpayer or bear less heavily against him. To do so would be not to resolve a doubt in his favor, but to say that the statute does not mean what it means.” Id. at pp. 93-94. A. These receipts unquestionably would have been taxed to a nonresident alien individual if received by him under the Revenue Act of 1934.' The background and development of the particular provisions before us emphasize the congressional purpose to tax this type of income. They disclose the full familiarity of Congress with this general type of transaction. Throughout the history of our federal income taxes since the Sixteenth Amendment to our Constitution, the Revenue Acts have expressly subjected to taxation the income received by nonresident alien individuals from' sources within the United States. For example, there is no doubt that the receipts here in question would have been taxable to the respondent if they had been received by him under the Revenue Act of 1934, c. -277, 48 Stat. 680, et seq., and the present issue resolves itself largely into a determination of whether $uch receipts were re-, lieved from taxation by the Revenue Act of 1936, c. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, et seq.,- through certain changes in the income tax laws that were made by that Act and which were still in effect in 1938 and 1941. Under the Revenue Act of 1934, the income of a nonresident alien individual Was taxed at the same rates as was the income of a resident citizen.(§§ 11 and 12) but his taxable gross income was limited wholly to that which he had received “from sources within the United States,” §211 (a). Such sources were described in § 119 of that Act, and the material portions of that Section have remained unchanged ever since. They ^ive their own definition of rentals and royalties. ' These have been quoted from above and they are set forth in full in Appendix A, infra, p. 397. The Act of 1934 thus sought to include as taxable gross income any income which a nonresident alien individual received as royalties for the privilege of using any copyrights in the United States and also sought to tax his income from the sale of any personal property which he had produced (in whole or in part) outside the United States but had sold within the United States. § 119 (a) (4) and (éj (2). As a mechanism of collection, the Act also sought to withhold from nonresident alien individuals, at the source of payment, the entire normal tax of 4% computed upon numerous classifications of their income named in § 143 (b). This language is important in this case. It expressly included certain forms of interest and also "rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remuneratipns, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, of any nonresident alien individual, . . . (Emphasis added.) While royalties were not mentioned specifically in this statutory withholding clause, they had been expressly listed in the Regulations, since long before 1934, so that there was no doubt that they were tó be subject to withholding as a matter of interpretation. It was equálly clear that income derived from a sale in the United States, of either real or personal property, was not included, either expressly or by implication or interpretation, in the income subject to a withholding of the tax on it at the' source of the income. The Regulations, since the Act of 1924 (U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 362 (1924)) to the present time, have contained decisive statements on these points. • Such, Regulations have been substantially identical with the following which appeared in Treasury Regulations 86, Article 143-2 (1934): “Only fixed or determinable annual or periodical income is subject to withholding. The Act specifically includes in such income, interest, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, and emoluments. But other kinds of income are included, as, for instance, royalties. ". . . The income, derived from the sale in the United States of property, whether real or personal, is not fixed or determinable annual or periodical income.” (Emphasis added.) Apart from these provisions requiring the withholding of taxes at the source of the income, the Revenue Acts have contained other provisions, in similar language, calling for the reporting to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of material information as to certain income which might be taxable. This language has received an interpretation which is related to and consistent with that here given to the provisions as to withholding taxes. These statutes and Regulations show that, under the Act of 1934, Congress sought to tax (and withhold all or part of the tax on) the income of a nonresident alien individual insofar as it was derived from payments for the use of or for the privilege of using copyrights'in the United States. It also sought to tax (although it could not generally withhold the tax on) any gain which the taxpayer derived from the sale of personal property produced by him without the United States but sold within the United States. Accordingly, if the receipts now before us had been received by the respondent under the Act of 1934, they would have been taxable whether they were treated as payments in the nature of royalties for the use of the copyrights under § 119 (a) or were treated as payments of a sale’s price for certain interests in copyrights under § 119 (e). The Regulations helpfully carried this analysis further. They showed that, while both forms of income were taxable, yet it was only the royalty payments (and not the sales’ proceeds) that were subject to the withholding procedure. A Treasury Decision made in 1933, under the Revenue Acts extending from 1921 to 1928, and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made in 1938, under the Revenue Act of 1928, c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, sustain the above conclusions. The latter case was that of Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 753 (C. A. 2d Cir.), later discussed and approved in Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 61, 63 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Incidentally, these opinions declared not only that the taxes in question were imposed upon the receipts as royalties but that it made no difference whether such royalties were each received in lump sums in full payment in advance, to cover the use of the respective copyrights throughout their statutory lives, or whether the royalties were received from time to time and in lesser sums. B. The Revenue Act of 1936 preserved the taxability of the several kinds of income of nonresident alien individuals which had been the subject of withholding at their respective sources, including receipts in the nature of, royalties for the use of copyrights in the , United States. .The Revenue Act of 1936 did not change materially the statutory definition of gross income from sources within the United States under § 119. It did, however, amend § 211 (a) materially ih its description of the taxable income of nonresident alien individuals. These, amendments (1) substituted a special flat rate of 10% for the general normal tax and surtax rates, (2). required this entire special tax, in the usual case, to be withheld at the source of the taxable income, (3) limited the taxability of the income of each nonresident alien individual to those kinds of income to which the withholding provisions also applied, and (4) (except for the addition of dividends) inserted verbatim, as a new statement of the types of taxable income of -a nonresident alien individual (not engaged in trade or business within the United States' and not having an office or place of business. therein), the language that previously had been used to state the specific types of income to which the withholding procedure was to apply. See its § 143 (b) paralleling its amended § 211 (a). By thus restricting the income tax to those specific types of income to which the withholding procedure had previously applied, Congress automatically relieved nonresident alien individuals from the taxation of their income from certain sales of real Or personal property, previously taxed. This Amendment, on the other hand' retained and in-ereased the tax on the very kind of income that is before us. It also increased the portion of such income to be withheld at its source to meet the new and higher flat rate of tax. The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1936 confirms the special meaning thus apparent on its face. It emphasizes the policy which expressly marked the enactment of this Act, including particularly these Amendments. The practical situation was that it had beén difficult for United States tax officials to ascertain the taxable income (in the nature of capital gains) which had been derived from sales of property at a profit by nonresident alien individuals, or by foreign corporations, when the respective taxpayers were not engaged in trade or business within the United States and did not have an office or place of business therein. This difficulty was in contrast to the easej of computing and collecting a tax from certain other kinds of income, including payments for -the use of patents and copyrights, from which the United States income taxes were being, wholly or partially, withheld at the source. The Congressional Committee Reports expressed a. purpose of Congress to limit future taxes on nonresident alien individuals to those readily collectible. With a view eyidently to securing substantially as much revenue as before, Congress thereupon applied a new flat rate of 10% to nonresident alien individuals and of 15% to foreign corporations, the entire amount of this flat rate of tax to be withheld and collected at the source of the income. The reports referred also to increases in stock transfer taxes which might result from thus removing the income tax from profits of nonresident alien individuals on their stock sales. ' Congress recognized a value and a convenience in thus turning to the accessible, fixed and determinable income of nonresident aliens. There is no dqubt that these steps sought to increase or at least to maintain the existing volume of revenue. No suggestion appears that Congress intended or wished to relieve from taxation the readily accessible and long-established source of revenue to be found in the payments made to nonresident, aliens for the usé of patents or copyrights in the United States. Much less was any suggestion made that lump sum advance payments of rentals or royalties should be exempted from taxation while at the same time smaller repeated payments of rentals or royalties would be taxed and collected at the source of the income. To have exempted these nonresident aliens from these readily collectible taxes derived from sources within the United States would have discriminated in their favor against résident citizens of the United States who would be required to pay their regular income tax on such income, if treated as royalties within the meaning of our gross income provisions, or at least to pay a tax upon them as capital gains, if treated as income from sales of capital within the meaning of our capital gains provisions. No such purpose to discriminate can be implied. Accordingly, at the time in 1936 when these Amendments were being enacted into § 211 (a), the provisions for taxing the gross income of nonresident alien individuals under the Revenue Act of 1934 already had been long and officially interpreted as covering receipts from royalties as expressly and broadly defined in § 119 (a) and subjected to withholding at the- source of income under § 143 (b). The legislative history of the 1936 Amendments is, therefore, a refutation of any claim that Con-, gress, at that time, was seeking to exempt such taxpayers from those appropriate and readily collectible items. On the other hand, that .history shoyvs that Congress was seeking to continue to tax, and even to increase the tax upon, those kinds of income which had been found to be readily withholdable at their respective sources. Accordingly, whát Congress did was to incorporate the very language of the withholding provisions of § 143 (b) into the languáge of the taxing § 211 (a). The Regulations under § 143 (b), quoted above substantially as being in effect since 1924, had already settled that roy alties were included in § ll$'(b). The Treasury Bulletin also, showed that lump sum payments made in advance for limited rights under copyrights were included in the “royalties” thus subject to withholding and taxation. The type of transactions and the kind of payments were thus identified. The broad language there used is entitled to be interpreted in accordance with its plain mean- and established usage. Therefore," after the 1936 Amendments,.# became equally clear that these receipts in the nature of royalties which were previously withheld at their source were included in the sources of income specified in § 211 (a), but that profits from, sales of property were not included' in the sources of income specified in %-211 (a) any more than they had been under § 11$ (a). The decisions of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in Sabatini v. Commissioner; supra, in 1938, in relation to the Revenue Act of 1928, and in Rohmer v. Commissioner,-supra, in 1946, in relation to the Internal Revenue Code/ as amended in 1940, reflected the same point of view. None of these provisions of the Act of 1936 were changed by the Revenue Act of 1938, the Internal Revenue Code, or the 1940 or 1941 Amendments to that Code, except in relation to the size of the tax rates. The principal changes even in those rates were to provide higher taxes in the higher brackets, rather than to reduce the taxes on nonresident aliens. II. The receipt of the respective amounts by the respondent in single lump sums as payments in full, in advance, for certain rights under the respective copyrights did not exempt those receipts from taxation. Once it has been determined that the receipts of the respondent woüld have been required to be included in his gross income for federal income tax purposes if they had been received in annual payments, or from time to time, during the life of the respective copyrights, it becomes equally clear tha' . the receipt of those same sums by. him in single lump sums as payments in full, in advance, for the same rights to be enjoyed throughout the entire life of the respective copyrights cannot, solely by reason of the consolidation of the payment into one sum, render it tax exempt. No Revenue Act cam be interpreted to reach such a result in the absence of inescapably clear provisions to that effect. There are none such here. The argument for the exemption was suggested by the presence in §§211 (a) and 143 (b) of the words “annual” and “periodical:” If reád apart from their text and legislative history and supplemented by the gratuitous insertion after them of the word “payments,” they might support the limiting effect here argued for them. However, when taken in their context, and particularly in the light of the legislative history of those Acts, and the interpretation placed upon them by the Treasury Department and the lower courts, they have, no such meaning. Those words are merely generally descriptive of the character of the gains, profits and income which arise out of such relationships as those which produce readily with-holdable interest, rents, royalties and salaries, consisting wholly of income, ¿specially in contrast to gains, profits and income in the nature of capital gains from profitable sales of real or personal property. In the instant case, each copyright which was to be obtained had its full, original life of 28 years to run after the advance payment was received by the author covering the use of or the privilege of using, certain rights under it. Fixed and determinable income, from a tax standpoint, may be received either in annual or other payments without altering in the least the need or the reasons for taxing such income or for withholding a part of it at its source. One advance payment to cover the entire 28-year period of a copyright comes within the reason and reach of the Revenue Acts as well as> or even better than, two or more partial payments of the same sum. Article 143-2 of Treasury Regulations 101, issued under the Revenue Act of 1938, provided: “The income need not be paid annually if it is paid periodically; that is to say, from time to time, whether or not at regular intervals. That the length of time during which the payments are to be made may be increased or diminished in accordance with someone’s will or with the happening of an event does not make the payments any the less determinable or periodical.” Substantially this liberal language in the Regulations has been used in this connection since 1918. (U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 362 (1918).) Single lump sum payments of royalties were held to be taxable under the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926 and 1928, I. T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. Bull. 131 (1933); under the Revenue Act of 1928, Sabatini v. Commissioner, supra; and under the Internal Revenue Code, as amended in 1940, Rohmer v. Commissioner, supra. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the receipts in question were required to be included in the gross income of the respondent for federal income tax purposes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. L D , ¿ _ , , Reversed and remanded. Me. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson, see post, p. 401.] Appendix A. Material provisions of §§ 212 (a), 211 and 119 of the Revenue Act of 1938 and the Internal Revenue Code: “SEC. 212. GROSS INCOME. “(a) General Rule. — In the case of a nonresident alien individual gross income includes only the gross income from sources within the United States.” (Emphasis added.) 52 Stat. 528, and 53 Stat. 76,26 U. S. C. § 212 (a). “SEC. 211. TAX ON NONRESIDENT ALIEN INDIVIDUALS. “ (a) No United States Business or Office.— “(1) General rule. — There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by sections 11 and 12 [normal tax and surtax imposed generally upon individuals and applicable in the instant case, under paragraphs (a) (2) and (c), because the respondent’s gross income for each taxable year exceeded the allowable maximum there specified], upon the amount received, by every nonresident alien individual not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having, an office or place of business therein, from sources within the United States as interest (except' interest on deposits with persons carrying on the.banking business), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, a tax of 10 per centum of such amount, .... “(2) Aggregate ■ more than $21,600. — The tax imposed by paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual if the aggregate amount received during the taxable year from the soúrces therein spécified is more than $21,600. “(c) No United States Business or Office and Gross Income of More Than $21,600. — A nonresident alien individual not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein who has a gross income for any taxable year "of more than $21,600 from the sources specified in subsection (a) (Í), shall be taxable-without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) (1), except that— . “(1) The gross income shall include only income from the sources specified in subsection (a) (1); .“(2) The deductions (other than the so-called ‘charitable deduction’. provided in section 213 (c)) shall be allowed only if and to the extent that they are properly allocable to the gross income from the sources specified in subsection (a) (|) ; “(3) The aggregate of the normal tax and surtax under sections 11 and 12 shall, in no case, be less íhan 1Ó per centum of the gross income from the sources specified in subsection (a) (1); and ...."' (Emphasis added.) 62 Stat. 527-528. The above provisions of §§ 212 and 211 were reenacted in the Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. 76, 75-76. The tax rates were changed by the Revenue Act of 1940, c. 419, 54 Stat..516-517 as follows: the surtaxes were increased generally in § 12 (b); the flat rates were increased from 10% to 15% and the allowable maximum income subject to the flat rates was raised from $21,600 to $24,000 in. §211 (a,) and (c), 54 Stat. 518. The Revenue Act of 1941,.c. 412, 55 Stat. 687, 688, again increased the surtaxes in § 12 (b), increased the flat rates from, 15% to 27%% and decreased the allowable maximum income, subject to the flat rates from $24,000 to $23,000 .in §211 (a) and (c), 55 Stat. 694. Since then, the normal tax and surtax rates have been increased still further, the flat rate applicable Jo nonresident alien individuals has been increased from 27%% to, 30% and th*' allowable maximum income to which tlie flat rates ’ -jspply has beeii reduced to*$15,400: 26 U. S. C. § 211 (a)- and (c). “SEC. 119. INCOME FROM. SOURCES WITHIN UNITED STATES. “(a) Gross Income From Sources in United States. — The following items of gross income shall be treated as income from sources within the United States: • • “(1) Interest.— ... “(2) Dividends.— ... “(3) Personal services.— “(4) Rentals and royalties. — Rentals or royalties from property located in the United States or from any interest in such property, including rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using in the United States, patents, copyrights, secret processes dnd formulas,' good will, trade-marks, trade brands, franchises, and other like property.; and- “(5) Sale of real property. — Gains; profits, and income from the sale of real property locáted in the United States. “(6) Sale of personal property. — For gains, profits, and income from the sale of personal property, see subsection (e). “(b) Net Income From Sources in United States. — From the items of gross income specified in subsection (a) of this section there shall be deducted .the expenses, losses, and other deductions properly apportioned or allocated thereto and a ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other deductions which can not definitely be allocated to some item or class of gross income. The remainder, if any, shall be. included in full as net income from sources within the United States. “(c) Gross Income From Sources Without United States.— The following items of gross income shall be treated as income from sources without the United States: “(1) Interest other, than that derived from sources within the United States as. provided in subsection (a) (1) of this section; “(2) Dividends other than those derived from sources within the United States as provided in subsection' (a) (2) .of this section; “(3) .Compensation for labor or personal services performed without the United States;- “(4) Rentals or royalties from property located without the United States or .from any interest in such property,-including. rentals or royalties for the use of or for the privilege of using without the United States, patents; copyrights; secret-processes and formulas, good will, trade-marksf trade brands, franchises, and other like properties; and . ... . “(5) Gains, profits^ and income from the sale of real property located without the United States. “(d) Net Income From Sources Without United States.— . . . “(e) Income From Sources Partly Within and Partly Without- United States.— . . .- Gains, profits, and income from— “(1) transportation or other services rendered partly within and partly without the United States, or “(2) from the sale of personal property produced (in whole or in part) by the taxpayer within and sold without the United States, or produced {in whole or in part) by the taxpayer without and sold within the United States, shall be treated as derived partly from sources within and partly from sources without the United States. Gains, profits and income derived from the purchase of personal property within and its sale without the United States or from the purchase of personal property without and its sale within the United States, shall be .treated as derived entirely from éources within the country in which sold, .... “(f) Definitions.— . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 52 Stat; 503-506,53 Stat. 53-55,26 U. S. C. § 119. Appendix B.- “THE CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY Independence Square Philadelphia February 22, 1938 “Paul R. Reynolds,-' & Son 599 Fifth Avenue . New York City We inclose herewith our check Forty. Thousand Dollars in payment for Serial: The Silver Cow By P. G. Wodehouse $40,000.00 “Important “This check is offered and-accepted with the understanding that The Curtis Publishing Company buys all rights in and of all stories and-.-special articles appearing in its publications and with the further, understanding that every number of these publications in which any" portion thereof shall appear shall be copyrighted at its expense. After publication in a Curtis periodical is completed it agrees to reassign to the author on demand all rights, except American (including Canadian and South American) serial rights. “Motion Picture Rights “Please note that our reservation of serial rights (which includes publication in one installment) includes new story versions based on motion-picture or dramatic scenarios of short stories and serials that have appeared in Curtis publications, and that we permit the use of such versions only under the following conditions: Such synopsis, scenario, or new story version shall not exceed fifteen hundred (1500) words in length when based on a short story appearing complete in one issue, or five thousand (5000) words when based on a serial appearing in two or more issues, or a series of not less than three connected short stories from which a single picture is to be made. Such synopsis shall appear only in circular matter, press books, press notices, trade journals and in magazines devoted exclusively to dramatic or motion-picture matter, and shall in no event appear as having been written by the author. When selling motion-picture or dramatic rights of matter, .you must notify the producer to this effect, so that there may be no misunderstanding on his part and no infringement of our rights “THE CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY” Respondent’s’ exhibit containing the foregoing memorandum agreefftent also included the statement rendered and the checks issued by the agent to the respondent and to the respondent’s wife for $17,100 each, including the following: “March 3, 1938 “P. G. Wodehouse in account with Paul R. Reynolds & Son “Received from Saturday Evening Post for All American, Canadian & South American serial rights to The Silver Cow $40,000. Commission 5% 2,000. $38,000. U. S. Income Tax 10% 3,800. $34,200. Ethel Wodehouse share % 17,100. Draft herewith $17,100.” (Emphasis added.) No issue is before us relating to the computation of the amount withheld or the division of the payments between the respondent and his wife. In the statements rendered by the agent as to the payments received for serial rights to “Uncle Fred in the Springtime,” the initial amount withheld was. 10% of the full payment without deduction of the'agent’s commission. Appendix C. “HEARST’S INTERNATIONAL COSMOPOLITAN Hearst Magazine Building Fifty-seventh Street and Eighth Avenue New York City July 23, 1941 Jul 24 1941 “Mr. Paul R. Reynolds, Sr. 599 Fifth Avenue New York City “Dear .Mr. Reynolds: “This will' confirm our purchase of the article entitled My Year Behind Barbed Wire by P. G. Wodehouse for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00). We are buying all American and Canadian serial rights (which include all American and Canadian magazine, digest, periodical and newspaper publishing rights). “It is understood and agreed that the author, and you as his agent, will not use or permit the use of this article or any part or parts thereof (1) in any manner or for any purpose until thirty (30) days after magazine publication and (2) in connection with or as the basis for any motion and/or talking picture(s), radio broadcast (s), television, dramatic production (s) or public performance (s) throughout the world’unless the words 'Based on (or taken from) literary material originally published in Cosmopolitan’ immediately precede or' follow or otherwise accompany the title of any and all such motion and/or talking pictures, radio broadcasts, telecasts, dramatic productions or public performances. “Your signature hereon will constitute an. agreement between us. “Sincerely yours, “FRANCES WHITING Frances Whiting “Accepted: Date:...................... “I am accepting the above letter on the condition that publication of this article can be released in England simultaneously with publication in Cosmopolitan Magazine (despite the wording of (1) in the second paragraph); with the further understanding that Cosmopolitan will permit no digest or newspaper publication of this article without the consent of the author or his agent in writing; and with the further condition that we receive payment not later than September 1, 1941.” (Emphasis added.) The material provisions were identical in the Revenue Act of 1938, enacted May 28, 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. 447, et seq., and in the Internal Revenue Code, enacted February 10, 1939, 53 Stat. 1, et seq. Amendments to these provisions in 1940 and 1941 changed only the rates of the taxes. For text of the material provisions, see Appendix A, infra, pp. 395, 397, following this opinion. § 119 (a) (4), 52 Stat. 504, 53 Stat. 54, 26 U. S. C. § 119 (a) (4). For full text of the material provisions of § 119, see Appendix A, infra, p. 397. See Appendix B, infra, p. 398. As the court below held that the respondent’s 1938 and 1941 receipts were not subject to taxation, it did not reach the subsidiary issues which had been raised as to the proper amount of those taxes if they were sustained. Similarly, the court below did not pass Upon the claim that certain of the assessments were subject to the three-year statute of limitations rather than the five-year statute here applied. See §275 (a) and (c), 52 Stat. 539, 53 Stat. 86, 26 U. S. C. §275 (a) and (c). This claim turned upon the recognition to be given to certain assignments made by the respondent to his wife. Those assignments, if fully recognized, might have reduced the tax to be assessed against the respondent to an amount less than 25% of the amount originally stated by him in his return and thus rendered the five-year statute inapplicable. However, 'the effect of those assignments was not passed upon by the court below. “Supplement H — Nonresident Alien Individuals “SEC. 211. GROSS INCOME. “ (a) General Rule. — In the case of a nonresident alien individual gross income includes only the gross incomé from sources within the United States.” §211 (a), 48 Stat. 735. “SEC. 143. WITHHOLDING OF TAX AT SOURCE. “(a) Tax-Free Covenant Bonds.— ... “(b) Nonresident. Aliens. — All persons, in whatever capacity acting, including lessees or mortgagors of real or personal property, fiduciaries, employers, and all. officers and employees of the United States, having the control, receipt, custody, disposal," or payment of interest (except interest on deposits with persons carrying on the banking business paid to persons not engaged in business in the United States and not having an office or place of business therein), rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, of any nonresident alien individual, or of any partnership, not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having any office, or place of business therein and composed in whole or in part of nonresident aliens, . . . deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits, and income .a tax'equal to 4 per centum thereof: . . . (Emphasis added.) 48 Stat. 723-724. “SEC. 147. INFORMATION AT SOURCE. “(a)- Payments op $1,000 or More. — All persons, in whatever capacity acting, including lessees or mortgagors of real or personal property, fiduciaries, and employers, making payment to another person, of interest, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income ... of $1,000 or more in any taxable year, ... shall render a true and accurate return to the Commissioner, under such regulations and in' such form and manner and to such extent as may be prescribed by him with the approval of the Secretary, . . .(Emphasis added.) 48 Stat. 726. Treasury ■ Regulation 86, under the Act of 1934, showed among other things, that.this Section applied generally to fixed or determinable income, that royalties were included as fixed and determinable income and that information as to them was not required when such royalties did not exceed the taxpayer’s exemptions. Also, such information at the source was not required, where the income had been" withheld, at the source, from a nonresident alien individual and a report had been made to that effect. See, for example :• “Art. 147-1. . . . Although to make necessary a return of information the income must be fixed or determinable, it need not be annual or periodical. —v.” “Art. 147-3. Cases where no return of information required.— Payments of the following character, although over $1,000, need not be reported in returns of information . . . :. “{h) Payments of salaries, rents, royalties, interest (except bond interest required to be reported on ownership certificates), and other fixed or deterrmnable income aggregating less than $2,500 made to a married individual; . : . .” “Art. 147-5. Return of information as to payments to other than citizens or residents. — -In the case of payments of fixed or determinable annual or periodical income to nonresident aliens (individual or fiduciary), . . . the returns filed by withholding agents on Form 1042 [required by Art. 143-8] shall constitute and be treated as returns of information. (See sections 143 and 144.)” (Emphasis added.) This opinion was rendered in response to a request to the Treasury for advice as to whether certain payments received during the years 1921 to 1928 by the taxpayer, a nonresident alien author, were taxable as income from sources within the United States. The payments were received pursuant to contracts granting certain volume, serial and motion picture rights in consideration of stipulated royalties payable in various ways. . Sóme contracts prescribed a royalty on each copy sold, others a total stipulated sum, and, in at least one case, this sum was payable in several parts. The opinion reviewed the practice of many , years and gave a positive answer to guide future practice. The answer was that all these receipts were taxable insofar as they came from sources within the United States. The opinion contained the following significant statements which indicate the administrative practice which had been applied and thereafter was to apply to these Sections: “The fact that a payment in the. nature of a. rent or royalty is in a lump sum rather than so much per annum, per unit of property, per performance, per book sold, or a certain percentage of the receipts or profits, does not alter the character of the payment as rent or royalty. (O. D. 1028, C. B. 5, 83; Appeal of J. M. & M. S. Browning Co., 6 B. T. A., 914, acquiescence C. B. VII-1, 5.) Nor is it material whether the royalty is paid in advance. (Appeal of Bloedel’s Jewelry, Inc., 2 B. T. A., 611.) It is accordingly the. opinion of this office that the payments in question are ‘rentals or royalties from . . . [or] for the use of or for the privilege of using . . . copyrights . . . and other like property.’ Since the grant by the taxpayer in each instance is so clearly the grant of a particular right in all the rights constituting the taxpayer’s literary property and copyright, the conclusion is .obvious that the grant is a license and not a sale. “The applicable Revenue Acts regard royalties from American copyrights (or for the use of or for the ■ privilege of using in the United States copyrights and other like property) as income from, sources within the United States, and royalties from foreign copyrights (or for the. use of or for the privilege of using without the. United States copyrights and other like property) as income from sources without the United States. Substantially all the income here in question constitutes royalties from, or for the use of, or for the privilege of using American copyrights.” I. T. 2735,' XII-2 Cum. Bull. 131 (1933). “The fact that' one lump sum was received for.the privilege of using the property of the author instead of a series of payments does not alter the real character of what the taxpayer received. It was payment for the use of Rife literary property for the purpose named and in so far as it was in payment for use in the United States was taxable as a royalty paid in advance and received for the granting of that privilege. While there seems to be no direct authority for this'view of the meaning of the statute, we believe it correct in principle and the order of the Board in this respect is reversed.” Id. at p. 755. This decision effectively supplements the Treasury Bulletin of 1933 and emphasizes the. general language of the statute in taxing proceeds of the type of transaction that is before us. It reversed an intermediate holding made by the Board of Tax Appeals in 1935 in Sabatini v. Commissioner, 32 B. T. A. 705. . That intermediate decision, accordingly, was in the process of review when the Revenue Act of 1936 was enacted and, therefore, it cannot be argued that Congress carried its interpretation into the, Revenue Act of 1936. If anything, the contrary might be argued as to Sabatini v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 753 (C. A. 2d Cir.), which was .decided before the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code, “SEC. 211. TAX ON NONRESIDENT ALIEN INDIVIDUALS.- “(a) No United States Business or Office. — There shall be levied, collected, and paid for each’ taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by sections 11 and 12, upon the amount received, by every nonresident, alien individual not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business the'rein, from sources within the United States as interest (except interest on deposits with persons carrying on the banking business), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, a tax of 10 per centum of such amount, . . . .” (Emphasis' added.) 49 Stat. 1714. “SEC. 143. WITHHOLDING OF TAX AT SOURCE. “(b) Nonresident Aliens — All persons, in whatever capacity acting, including lessees or mortgagors of real or personal property, fiduciaries, employers, and all officers and employees of the United States, having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of interest (except interest on deposits with persons carrying on the banking business paid to persons not engaged in business in the United States and not having an office or place of business therein), dividends, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income (but only to the extent that any of the above items constitutes gross income from sources within the United States), of any nonresident alien individual, or of any partnership not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having any office or place of business therein and composed in Whole or in'part'.of nonresident aliens, shall . . . deduct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits, and income a tax equal to 10 plfr centum thereof, . . . (Emphasis added.) 49 Stat. 1700-1^01. • “nonresident aliens and foreign corporations “It has also been necessary to recommend substantial changes in our present system of taxing nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. .... In section 211, it is proposed that the tax on a nonresident alien not engaged in a trade or business in- the United States and not having, an office or place of business therein, shall be at the rate of 10 percent on his gross income from interest, dividends, rents, wages, and salaries and other fixed and determinable income. This tax (in the usual case) is collected at the source by withholding as provided for in section 11)8. Such a nonresident viill not be subject to the tax on capital gains, including gains from hedging transactions, as at present, it having been found impossible to effectually collect this latter tax.' It is believed that this exemption from tax will result in ádditional revenue from the transfer taxes and from the income tax in the case of persons carrying on the brokerage business. ... s “. . . In the case of a foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the United States and not having an office or place of business therein, it is proposed to levy a flat rate of tax of 15 percent on the gross income of such corporation from interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, and other fixed and determinable income - (not including capital gains). This tax is to be collected in the usual case by withholding at the source. ... “It is believed that the proposed revision of our system of taxing nonresident aliens and foreign corporations will be productive of substantial amounts of additional revenue, since it replaces a theoretical system impractical of administration in a great number of cases.” (Emphasis added.) H. R. Rep. No. 2475, 74th Cong., 2d SesS.9-10 (1936). ' To the same effect, see S. Rep. No. 2156, 74th Cong.,-2d Sess. 21,23 (1936). On the floor of the House, Representative Hill of Washington, of the Committee on Ways and Means, supporting these Amendments, said: “We have placed a flat tax of 10 percent on nonresident aliens, that is, people not citizens of the United States and not residing in the United States, and this 10-percent tax is withheld at the source. We expect to get considerably more revenue out of both nonresident aliens and foreign corporations having no'place of ^business or not engaged in trade or business in this country, than we have been getting under the present plan, because we are going .to withhold it at the source, and not take a chance on their making a report of it, or having to send our representatives to some foreign country to find What their net income is, and seek to* induce them to pay their tax.” 80 Cong. Rec. 6005 (1936). ’ On the floor of the Senate, Senator King of Utah, a member of the Finance' Committee and in charge of the bill, said, in supporting these Amendments: “The House bill changes the method of taxing nonresident- aliens and foreign corporations. A nonresident alien not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, of not having an office or place of business therein, is taxed at a flat rate of 10 percent on his income from, interest, dividends, rents, wages, salaries, and other fixed or determinable income, which are collected at the source. . . . These nonresident' aliens are exempted under the House bill from the tax. ■on capital gains, including hedging transactions, it being found admin-' istrativély almost impossible to collect thé capital-gains tax in'such cases. This exemption will result in increased revenue from transfer, taxes or. from- the income tax in the case of persons carrying on the brokerage business.” 80 Cong. Rec. 8650 (1936). Particularly in the Revenue Act of 1938, §211 was amended to provide that, if the aggregate amount of a taxpayer’s income of the types included from sources within the United States was more than $21,600 during a taxable year, then the regular rate of tax imposed by §§ 11 and 12 became applicable, subject, to the proviso that in no case it be less than 10% of the gross income subject to the tax. §211 (a) and (c), 52 Stat. 527-528, and see Appendix A, infra, p. 395. “. . . While payment ordinarily. is at a certain rate for each article or certain per cent of the gross sale, that in itself is not determinative. The purpose for which the payment is made and not the manner thereof is the determining factor.” Commissioner v. Affiliated Enterprises, 123 F. 2d 665, 668 (C. A. 10th Cir.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MORRISON-KNUDSEN CONSTRUCTION CO. et al. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al. No. 81-1891. Argued March 21, 1983 Decided May 24, 1983 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 638. Arthur Larson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Walter A. Smith, Jr., and Richard W. Galiher, Jr. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the federal respondent in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., Karen I. Ward, Mary-HelenMautner, and Charles I. Hadden. Geo. S. Leonard argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Hilyer. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Dennis Lindsay and Robert E. Babcock for the Alliance of American Insurers et al.; by John C. Duncan III and William P. Dale for the American Insurance Association; by Thomas D. Wilcox for the National Association of Stevedores; by Thomas E. Cinnamond, H. Thomas Howell, and Rudolph L. Rose for the National Council of Self-Insurers; and by Jed L. Bobbin for the Shipbuilders Council of America. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether employer contributions to union trust funds for health and welfare, pensions, and training are “wages” for the purpose of computing compensation benefits under § 2(13) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1425, 33 U. S. C. § 902(13) (Compensation Act). I James Hilyer, an employee of petitioner Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co., was fatally injured while working on the construction of the District of Columbia Metrorail System. At the time of his death, Hilyer was covered by the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, D. C. Code §36-501 (1973), which incorporates the provisions of the Compensation Act. He was also a beneficiary of a collective-bargaining agreement between Morrison-Knudsen and his union, Local 456 of the Laborers’ District Council of Washington, D. C., and Vicinity (AFL-CIO). Immediately upon Hilyer’s death, petitioner began to pay 662/3% of Hilyer’s “average weekly wage” in death benefits to his wife and two minor children pursuant to 33 U. S. C. § 909(b). Respondent Hilyer disputed the amount of benefits paid, claiming, among other things, that her husband’s average weekly wage included not only his take-home pay, as petitioner contended, but also the 680 per hour in contributions the employer was required to make to union trust funds under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. The Administrative Law Judge rejected Mrs. Hilyer’s contention and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Board reasoned that only values that are readily identifiable and calculable may be included in the determination of wages. Hilyer’s rights in his union trust funds were speculative. It was not clear from the record whether his pension rights had vested, and even if they had, the value of his interest in the Pension and Disability Fund depended on his continued employment with petitioner, while the value of his interest in the health, welfare, and training funds was contingent on his need for these benefits. The Board also rejected the notion that the values could be computed from the amounts contributed by the employer, noting that the family in all likelihood would not have been able to purchase similar protection at the same cost. Mrs. Hilyer sought review of the Benefits Review Board’s decision in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reiterating her contention that her husband’s wages included the contributions that his employer made to the union trust funds. The Court of Appeals reversed. It agreed with the Board that the term “wages” includes only values that are readily identifiable and calculable, but held that the benefits at issue here met that definition. The court reasoned that since the contributions were intended for the benefit of the workers, the trustees could be viewed as “no more than a channel; ... a means by which the company provides life insurance, health insurance, retirement benefits, and career training for its employees.” Hilyer v. Morrison-Knudsen Construction Co., 216 U. S. App. D. C. 50, 53, 670 F. 2d 208, 211 (1981). Although the court conceded that the family would not be able to use the employer’s contribution to purchase benefits of equivalent value, it relied on United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U. S. 210 (1957), for the proposition that the employer’s contributions were a reasonable measurement of the value of the benefits to the employees. We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 820 (1982), and we reverse. II This case involves the meaning of 33 U. S. C. §902(13), a definitional section that was part of the Compensation Act in 1927, when it became law, and that has remained unchanged through 10 revisions of the Act. The section provides: “ Wages’ means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advantage received from the employer, and gratuities received in the course of employment from others than the employer.” A We begin with the plain language of the Compensation Act. Since it is undisputed that the employers’ contributions are not “money . . . recompensed” or “gratuities received . . . from others,” the narrow question is whether these contributions are a “similar advantage” to “board, rent, housing, [or] lodging.” We hold that they are not. Board, rent, housing, or lodging are benefits with a present value that can be readily converted into a cash equivalent on the basis of their market values. The present value of these trust funds is not, however, so easily converted into a cash equivalent. Respondent Hilyer urges us to calculate the value by reference to the employer’s cost of maintaining these funds or to the value of the employee’s expectation interests in them, but we do not believe that either approach is workable. The employer’s cost is irrelevant in this context; it measures neither the employee’s benefit nor his compensation. It does not measure the benefit to the employee because his family could not take the 680 per hour earned by Mr. Hilyer to the open market to purchase private policies offering similar benefits to the group policies administered by the union’s trustees. It does not measure compensation because the collective-bargaining agreement does not tie petitioner’s costs to its workers’ labors. To the contrary, the employee enjoys full advantage of the Training and Health and Welfare Funds as soon as he becomes a beneficiary of the collective-bargaining agreement. App. 37-38 and 40. He derives benefit from the Pension and Disability Fund according to the “pension credits” he earns. These pension credits are not correlated to the amount of the employer’s contribution; the employer pays benefits for every hour the employee works, while the employee earns credits only for the first 1,600 hours of work in a given year. Furthermore, although the employer is never refunded money that has been contributed, the employee can lose credit if he works less than 200 hours in a year or fails to earn credit for four years. Significantly, the employee loses all advantage if he leaves his employment before he attains age 40 and accumulates 10 credits. Id., at 49-68. Nor can the value of the funds be measured by the employee’s expectation interest in them, for that interest is at best speculative. Employees have no voice in the administration of these plans and thus have no control over the level of funding or the benefits provided. Furthermore, the value of each fund depends on factors that are unpredictable. The value to the Hilyer family of the Health and Welfare Fund depends on its need for the services the Fund provides; the value of the Pension and Disability Fund depends on whether Hilyer’s interest vested, see n. 7, supra. And the value of the Training Fund, which was established to insure “adequate trained manpower,” see n. 3, supra, and not for the benefit of the individual workers, is even more amorphous. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, supra, is not to the contrary. That case concerned a claim under the Miller Act, 40 U. S. C. §270a et seq., which requires a contractor working for the United States to furnish a surety bond to insure the payment of “sums justly due” employees. When the employer failed to contribute to the union trust funds as required by the employees’ collective-bargaining agreement, the union trustees sued the surety on the bond. The Court allowed the trustees to maintain their action, reasoning that “contributions were a part of the compensation for the work to be done by [the] employees.” 353 U. S., at 217-218. The Court did not, however, base its conclusion on the notion these contributions were included in wages. Indeed the Court specifically noted that the Miller Act “does not limit recovery on the statutory bond to ‘wages.’” Id., at 217. A far different situation obtains here, where the Compensation Act specifically limits benefits to the worker’s “wages.” See also United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U. S. 29, 35 (1959). B We are aided in our interpretation of § 902(13) by the legislative history of the Compensation Act, its structure, and the consistent policies of the agency charged with its enforcement. That history provides abundant indication that Congress did not intend to include employer contributions to benefit plans within the concept of “wages.” In 1927, when the Act was enacted, employer-funded fringe benefits were virtually unknown, see United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Beneficial Activities of American Trade-Unions, Bull. No. 465, pp. 3-4 (Sept. 1928); cf. S. Rep. No. 963, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1964). Although the Act was amended several times in the ensuing years, including substantial revision in 1972, there is no evidence in the legislative history indicating that Congress seriously considered the possibility that fringe benefits should be taken into account in determining compensation under the Act. In comparison, over these same years, Congress has acted on several occasions to include fringe benefits in other statutory schemes, see, e. g., the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U. S. C. § 276a et seq., which was amended in 1964 to bring the United States’ wage practices “into conformity with modern wage payment practices.” S. Rep. No. 963, supra, at l. From this evidence that Congress was aware of the significant changes in compensation practices, its willingness to amend and enact legislation in view of these changes, and its failure to amend the Compensation Act in the same manner, we can only conclude that Congress did not intend this expanded definition of “wages.” The structure of the Act lends further support for our conclusion; it uses the concept of wages in several ways: to determine disability and survivors’ actual benefits, 33 U. S. C. §§ 908 and 909, and to calculate the minimum and maximum level of benefits, § 909(e) (survivors’ benefits), § 906(b) (disability benefits). In the latter sense, the reference is to the “national average weekly wage. ” Since we have of ten stated that a word is presumed to have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute, see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 826 (1980), we would expect the term “wages” to maintain the same meaning throughout the Compensation Act. Accordingly, were we to accept respondent Hilyer’s argument, we would also have to conclude that in determining the national average weekly wage, the Secretary of Labor is required to evaluate the benefit provisions of collective-bargaining agreements throughout the Nation. Any attempt to make this determination on a national basis would involve deciding which benefits to include, a subject on which different branches of the Government differ, see Chen, The Growth of Fringe Benefits: Implications for Social Security, 104 Monthly Labor Review 3, 9, n. 6 (Nov. 1981). It would also require deciding how the benefits should be evaluated. Evaluating benefits is not simple in “defined contribution” plans such as the one involved in this case; in “defined benefit” plans, where the employer’s costs are actuarially determined to provide a certain level of services, the calculation is infinitely harder. See, e. g., the collective-bargaining agreement between General Motors Corp. and the United Auto Workers, cited in App. F to Brief for National Council of Self-Insurers as Amicus Curiae 16a. Without clear indication from Congress that this approach with its attendant problems is required, we decline to adopt it. Finally, we note that, with the exception of the instant case, the Director of Workers’ Compensation has consistently taken the position that fringe benefits are not includible in wages, see Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, OWCP, 686 F. 2d 1336 (CA9 1982), and letters filed by the Department of Labor in Levis v. Farmers Export Co., appeal pending, No. 81-4258 (CA5), and Waters v. Farmers Export Co., No. 81-4273 (same). See also U. S. Dept. of Labor, LS/HW Program Memorandum No. 32, June 17, 1968, reprinted in App. to Brief for American Insurance Association as Amicus Curiae 1a-4a. Prior to the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case, the Benefits Review Board had uniformly rejected the argument pressed by respondent Hilyer. See, e. g., Waters v. Farmers Export Co., 14 BRBS 102 (1981); Freer v. Duncanson-Harrelson Co., 9 BRBS 888 (1979), rev’d in pertinent part and remanded sub nom. Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, OWCP, supra; Lawson v. Atlantic & Gulf Grain Stevedores Co., 6 BRBS 770 (1977); Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 5 BRBS 334 (1977). Although not controlling, the consistent practice of the agencies charged with the enforcement and interpretation of the Act are entitled to deference. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U. S. 170, 189-190 (1981); E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U. S. 46, 54-55 (1977). We discern nothing to suggest that Congress intended the phrase “wages” as used in § 902(13) to include employer contributions to fringe benefit plans. III Respondent Hilyer argues that, despite these clear indications to the contrary, the remedial policies underlying the Act authorize the agency and require us to expand the meaning of the term to reflect modern employment practices. It is argued that fringe benefits are advantageous to both the worker, who receives tax-free benefits that he otherwise would have to buy with after-tax dollars, and to the employer, who reduces payroll costs by providing his workers with services that they could not on their own purchase with equivalent dollars. Respondent Hilyer contends that the incentive to trade salary for benefits should not be diluted by failing to consider the value of the benefits in determining survivorship and disability rights. There is force to this argument, but a comprehensive statute such as this Act is not to be judicially expanded because of “recent trends.” Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U. S. 268, 279 (1980). There we recognized that the Act was not a simple remedial statute intended for the benefit of the workers. Rather, it was designed to strike a balance between the concerns of the longshoremen and harbor workers on the one hand, and their employers on the other. Employers relinquished their defenses to tort actions in exchange for limited and predictable liability. Employees accept the limited recovery because they receive prompt relief without the expense, uncertainty, and delay that tort actions entail. Id., at 282, and n. 24; H. R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1927); cf. S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 5 (1972). Against this background, reinterpretation of the term “wages” would significantly alter the balance achieved by Congress. As noted above, employer-funded benefits were virtually unknown in 1927; as a result, employers have long calculated their compensation costs on the basis of their cash payroll. Since 1927, however, the proportion of costs attributable to fringe benefits has increased significantly. In 1950, these benefits constituted only 5% of compensation costs; their value increased to 10% by 1970 and is over 15% presently. Chen, supra, at 5. According to some projections, they could easily constitute more than one-third of labor costs by the middle of the next century, ibid. This shift in the relative value of take-home pay versus fringe benefits dramatically alters the cost factors upon which employers and their insurers have relied in ordering their affairs. If these reasonable expectations are to be altered, that is a task for Congress, J. W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel. Board of Trustees, 434 U. S. 586, 593 (1978). An expanded definition of wages would also undermine the goal of providing prompt compensation to injured workers and their survivors. Under the Act as presently interpreted, more.than 95% of all lost-time injuries are immediately compensated without recourse to the administrative process. In all but 0.1% of the cases, delays averaged less than 10 months. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Needs Amending 31, 41 (Apr. 1982). This situation could well change drastically if every worker could challenge the manner in which his own wages were calculated or the basis used by the Secretary to determine the national average weekly wage. The language of this statute, Congress’ failure to include other benefits that were common in 1972, when the statute was amended, the longstanding administrative interpretation of the Act, and the policies underlying it, all combine to support our conclusion that Congress did not intend to include employer contributions to union trust funds in the Act’s term “wages.” Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Morrison-Rnudsen’s insurer, the Argonaut Insurance Co., is also a petitioner here. Both parties are referred to collectively as “petitioner.” Section 909(b) requires the employer to pay a surviving husband or wife 50% of the deceased spouse’s average weekly wages and each minor child (in excess of one) 16%% of the deceased parent’s wages. In no event, however, is the amount payable to exceed 66%% of such wages. The statute also establishes a minimum level of death benefits by providing that “the average weekly wages of the deceased shall be considered to have been not less than the applicable national average weekly wage” as determined by the Secretary of Labor, § 909(e), so long as benefits do not exceed the deceased’s average weekly wage. In relevant part, that agreement provides: “Section 5. The parties hereto agree to continue to operate the Health and Welfare Fund known as Laborers’ District Council Trust Fund No. 3 for the benefit of the employees covered by this collective bargaining agreement. The Employers agree to pay to such fund an amount equal to twenty-eight cents ($.28) per hour ... for all hours worked by employees who are covered by this Agreement.... “. . . The trustees shall use the payments to the Fund for the benefit of the Subway and Rapid Transit Laborers, their families and dependents, for medical, dental, and/or hospital care, compensation for injuries, and/ or illness resulting from occupational activity, or for unemployment benefits, or for the purchase of insurance covering life and accidental death, accident disability benefits, hospitalization, surgical, medical and sickness benefits. . . . “Section 6. Parties hereto agree to continue to operate the Pension and Disability. . . Fund known as Laborers’ District Council Trust Fund No. 3 .... The employers shall pay such fund . . . thirty-five cents ($.35) per hour for all hours worked by employees .... “. . . The trustees shall use the payments to the Fund for Subway and Rapid Transit Laborers, and their families and shall cover all disability and pension benefits as may in the discretion of the trustees be agreed upon “Section 9. The parties hereto agree to establish and operate a Training Fund for the purpose of insuring adequate trained manpower to perform the work covered by this collective bargaining agreement. The employers agree to pay to such fund ... an amount equal to five cents ($0.05) per hour for all hours worked by employees . . . .” App. 37-40. The Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs joined Mrs. Hilyer in her petition for review of the Benefits Review Board’s decision. That Office has, however, since readopted its prior understanding that the term “wages” does not include employer contributions to union trust funds. See, e. g., Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Director, OWCP, 686 F. 2d 1336, 1343 (CA9 1982). Accordingly, before this Court, the federal respondent has taken a position in support of the petitioner. Mrs. Hilyer also disputed the manner in which the employer had accounted for the fact that Hilyer had worked for Morrison-Knudsen for only part of the year and had worked for substantially lower wages for the remainder of the year. The employer contended that the average weekly wages should be calculated on the basis of Hilyer’s actual wages; Mrs. Hilyer claimed that under 33 U. S. C. § 910(b), his wages should be determined by reference to the wages of a fellow employee “of the same class” who had worked “substantially the whole” of the preceding year. The Benefits Review Board upheld a determination by the Administrative Law Judge in Mrs. Hilyer’s favor but modified the amount of attorney’s fees awarded under 33 U. S. C. § 928. The employer’s and insurer’s cross-appeal from that determination was consolidated by the Court of Appeals with Mrs. Hilyer’s appeal of the Board’s adverse determination on the definition of wages. The court affirmed the decision of the Board to modify the attorney’s fees award but did not address the § 910(b) issue. Petitioner did not seek review of the determination on either the attorney’s fees issue or the § 910(b) issue. Accordingly, neither determination is before us. The statute was amended in 1934, 1938, 1948, 1956, 1960, 1961, and 1969 to revise or increase benefits. It was amended in 1958 to require employers to maintain a reasonably safe workplace. In 1959, it was amended to allow certain third-party actions. In 1972, the Act was comprehensively revised. See S. Rep. No. 97-498, p. 20 (1982). Since Hilyer worked for Morrison-Knudsen for less than a year, it is probable that his rights in the Pension and Disability Fund did not vest. It is not insignificant that the Senate Report accompanying the 1972 Amendments, which raised the maximum benefit from a specific sum to a multiple of the national average weekly wage, stated: “Today the average weekly wage for private, non-agriculture employees in the United States is $135 a week.” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 4 (1972). This figure apparently comes from earnings Statistics provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, see United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1978, p. 321 (1979) (listing data from 1972). The Bureau determines “earnings” by “dividing payrolls by hours. . . . The earnings ... do not measure the level of total labor costs . . . since the following are excluded: . . . payment of various welfare benefits . . . Id., at 4. (Emphasis added.) See also, e. g., 46 U. S. C. § 814 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V); 39 U. S. C. §1004 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); 38 U. S. C. § 2003A (1976 ed., Supp. V); 45 U. S. C. § 836; 38 U. S. C. § 4114; 41 U. S. C. § 351 et seq. Recent consideration of this issue by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources is also suggestive. The Committee, which was charged with reviewing administration of the Act to, inter alia, “reduce incentives for fraud and abuse [and] to assure immediate compensation,” S. Rep. No. 97-498, p. 1 (1982), recommended changing the Act’s definition of wages “to confirm past practice and congressional intent and to reaffirm the previously settled rule that fringe benefits are excluded from the definition of ‘wages.’ ” Id., at 41. The Committee would have the definition amended to read: “The term ‘wages’ means the money rate at which the service rendered by an employee is compensated .... The term wages does not include fringe benefits, including but not limited to employer payments for or contributions to a retirement, pension, health and welfare, . . . fund or trust for the employee’s or dependent’s benefit . . . .” Id., at 3. (Emphasis added.) Mrs. Hilyer asked only for the inclusion in wages of Morrison-Knudsen’s contributions to union trust funds. Her argument appears to imply, however, that every benefit of her husband's employment should be evaluated to determine his wages. This would seem to require the Secretary of Labor to include in his determination of the national average weekly wage such diverse elements as employer contributions to Social Security, administrative costs of maintaining savings and thrift plans, and the costs of Christmas parties, company outings, or gold watches. See also Handbook of Labor Statistics, supra n. 8, at 388-393. The Chen figures are based on data obtained from the United States Department of Commerce. The figures in the Handbook are not identical to Chen’s because, as discussed above, the Departments of Commerce and Labor take different views on what benefits are to be included in the calculation of compensation. The report states that in the 5% of eases that are referred to an administrative law judge, delays average 4-4.5 months, Report by the Comptroller General, at 41. The 1% of cases that are appealed to the Benefits Review Board, id., at 5, are resolved on the average in 10 months, id., at 41. Only 0.1% of all lost-time injuries reach the Courts of Appeals, id., at 5. It is argued that the standard of living of the injured worker’s family will decrease if employer contributions are not included in wages because the family will be required to use a portion of their compensation benefits to purchase health, disability, training, and pension benefits for themselves. This argument is not well taken in the context of survivor benefits; upon the death of the worker, disability, pension, and training benefits have no relevance. Furthermore, under respondent Hilyer’s interpretation of the statute, she would be entitled to a death benefit (had her husband’s interest in his pension plan vested) as well as the funds necessary to purchase the benefit she has just received. We do not think Congress could have intended to provide this double “recovery.” While it is true that once the worker’s employment ends, his survivors will be forced to provide for their own health insurance, we do not believe that a statute as complex as this one should be interpreted in light of this single factor.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. WARD, dba L. O. WARD OIL & GAS OPERATIONS No. 79-394. Argued February 26, 1980 Decided June 27, 1980 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, and Powell, JJ., joined. Black-MUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 255. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 257. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Jacques B. Gelin, and Michael A. McCord. Stephen Jones argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was David C. Butler. James G. Watt filed a brief for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States seeks review of a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that a proceeding for the assessment of a “civil penalty” under § 311 (b) (6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) is a “criminal case” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 939, and now reverse. I At the time this case arose, § 311 (b) (3) of the FWPCA prohibited the discharge into navigable waters or onto adjoining shorelines of oil or hazardous substances in quantities determined by the President to be “harmful.” Section 311 (b) (5) of the Act imposed a duty upon “any person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore facility” to report any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance into navigable waters to the “appropriate agency” of the United States Government. Should that person fail to supply such notification, he or she was liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year. Section 311 (b)(5) also provided for a form of “use immunity,” specifying that “[notification received pursuant to this paragraph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement.” 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (b)(5). Section 311 (b) (6) provided for the imposition of a “civil penalty” against “[a]ny owner or operator of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation” of the Act. In 1975, that subsection called for a penalty of up to $5,000 for each violation of the Act. In assessing penalties, the Secretary of the appropriate agency was to take into account “the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business or of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the owner or operator’s ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the violation. . . .” 33 TJ. S. C. § 1321 (b)(6). According to § 311 (k) of the Act, funds collected from the assessment of penalties under § 311 (b) (6) were to be paid into a “revolving fund” together with “other funds received . . . under this section” and any money appropriated to the revolving fund by Congress. See 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (k). Money contained in this fund was to be used to finance the removal, containment, or dispersal of oil and hazardous substances discharged into navigable waters and to defray the costs of administering the Act. 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (?). Another section of the Act allowed the United States Government to collect the costs of removal, containment, or dispersal of a discharge from the person or corporation responsible for that discharge in cases where that person or corporation had been identified. 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (f). On or about March 23, 1975, oil escaped from an oil retention pit at a drilling facility located near Enid, Okla., and eventually found its way into Boggie Creek, a tributary of the Arkansas River system. At the time of the discharge, the premises were being leased by respondent L. 0. Ward, who was doing business as L. 0. Ward Oil & Gas Operations. On April 2, 1975, respondent Ward notified the regional office of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that a discharge of oil had taken place. Ward later submitted a more complete written report of the discharge, which was in turn forwarded to the Coast Guard, the agency responsible for assessing civil penalties under §311 (b)(6). After notice and opportunity for hearing, the Coast Guard assessed a civil penalty against respondent in the amount of $500. Respondent filed an administrative appeal from this ruling, contending, inter alia, that the reporting requirements of § 311 (b)(5) of the Act violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The administrative appeal was denied. On April 13, 1976, Ward filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Transportation, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Administrator of EPA from enforcing §§ 311 (b)(5) and (6) and from collecting the penalty of $500. On June 4, 1976, the United States filed a separate suit in the same court to collect the unpaid penalty. The District Court eventually ordered the two suits consolidated for trial. Prior to trial, the District Court rejected Ward’s contention that the reporting requirements of §311 (b)(5), as used to support ¿ civil penalty under § 311 (b)(6), violated his right against compulsory self-incrimination. The case was tried to a jury, which found that Ward’s facility did, in fact, spill oil into Boggie Creek. The District Court, however, reduced Ward’s penalty to $250 because of the amount of oil that had spilled and because of its belief that Ward had been diligent in his attempts to clean up the discharge after it had been discovered. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F. 2d 1187 (1979). Although admitting that Congress had labeled the penalty provided for in § 311 (b)(6) as civil and that the use of funds collected under that section to finance the administration of the Act indicated a “remedial” purpose for the provision, the Court of Appeals tested the statutory scheme against the standards set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963), and held that §311 (b)(6) was sufficiently punitive to intrude upon the Fifth Amendment’s protections against compulsory self-incrimination. It therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings in the collection suit. II The distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional import. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, for example, is expressly limited to “any criminal case.” Similarly, the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are available only in “criminal prosecutions.” Other constitutional protections, while not explicitly limited to one context or the other, have been so limited by decision of this Court. See, e. g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938) (Double Jeopardy Clause protects only against two criminal punishments); United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, 47-48 (1914) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt required only in criminal cases). This Court has often stated that the question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. See, e. g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232, 237 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 399. Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally proceeded on two levels. First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra, at 236-237. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 617-621 (1960). In regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted that “only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground.” Id., at 617. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra, at 237; Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 154 (1956). As for our first inquiry in the present case, we believe it quite clear that Congress intended to impose a civil penalty upon persons in Ward’s position. Initially, and importantly, Congress labeled the sanction authorized in §311 (b)(6) a “civil penalty,” a label that takes on added significance given its juxtaposition with the criminal penalties set forth in the immediately preceding subparagraph, § 311 (b) (5). Thus, we have no doubt that Congress intended to allow imposition of penalties under § 311 (b) (6) without regard to the procedural protections and restrictions available in criminal prosecutions. We turn then to consider whether Congress, despite its manifest intention to establish a civil, remedial mechanism, nevertheless provided for sanctions so punitive as to “trans-for[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, supra, at 154. In making this determination, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found it useful to refer to the seven considerations listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at 168-169. This list of considerations, while certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, has proved helpful in our own consideration of similar questions, see, e. g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 537-538 (1979), and provides some guidance in the present case. Without setting forth here our assessment of each of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, we think only one, the fifth, aids respondent. That is a consideration of whether “the behavior to which [the penalty] applies is already a crime.” 372 U. S., at 168-169. In this regard, respondent contends that § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. § 407, makes criminal the precise conduct penalized in the present case. Moreover, respondent points out that at least one federal court has held that § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act defines a “strict liability crime,” for which the Government need prove no scienter. See United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F. 2d 619 (CA1 1974). According to respondent, this confirms the lower court’s conclusion that this fifth factor “falls clearly in favor of a finding that [§ 311 (b)(6)] is criminal in nature.” 598 F. 2d, at 1193. While we agree that this consideration seems to point toward a finding that § 311 (b)(6) is criminal in nature, that indication is not as strong as it seems at first blush. We have noted on a number of occasions that “Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission.” Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 399; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra, at 235. Moreover, in Helvering, where we held a 50% penalty for tax fraud to be civil, we found it quite significant that “the Revenue Act of 1928 contains two separate and distinct provisions imposing sanctions,” and that “these appear in different parts of the statute. . . .” 303 U. S., at 404. See also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, supra, at 236-237. To the extent that we found significant the separation of civil and criminal penalties within the same statute, we believe that the placement of criminal penalties in one statute and the placement of civil penalties in another statute enacted 70 years later tends to dilute the force of the fifth Mendoza-Martinez criterion in this case. In sum, we believe that the factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez, while neither exhaustive nor conclusive on the issue, are in no way sufficient to render unconstitutional the congres-sionai classification of the penalty established in § 311 (b)(6) as civil. Nor are we persuaded by any of respondent's other arguments that he has offered the “clearest proof” that the penalty here in question is punitive in either purpose or effect. Ill Our conclusion that § 311 (b) (6) does not trigger all the protections afforded by the Constitution to a criminal defendant does not completely dispose of this case. Respondent asserts that, even if the penalty imposed upon him was not sufficiently criminal in nature to trigger other guarantees, it was “quasi-criminal,” and therefore sufficient to implicate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compulsory self-in-erimination. He relies primarily in this regard upon Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), and later cases quoting its language. In Boyd, appellants had been indicted under § 12 of an “Act to amend the customs revenue laws and to repeal moieties,” for fraudulently attempting to deprive the United States of lawful customs duties payable on certain imported merchandise. According to the statute in quéstion, a person found in violation of its provisions was to be “fined in any sum not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both; and, in addition to such fine, such merchandise shall be forfeited.” 116 U. S., at 617. Despite the pending indictment, appellants filed a claim for the goods held by the United States. In response, the prosecutor obtained an order of the District Court requiring appellants to produce the invoice covering the goods at issue. Appellants objected that such an order violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by subjecting them to an unreasonable search and seizure and by requiring them to act as witnesses against themselves. This Court found the Fifth Amendment applicable, even though the action in question was one contesting the forfeiture of certain goods. According to the Court: “We are . . . clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal.” Id., at 633-634. While at this point in its opinion, the Court seemed to limit its holding to proceedings involving the forfeiture of property, shortly after the quoted passage it broadened its reasoning in a manner that might seem to apply to the present case: “As, therefore, suits for 'penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . Id., at 634 (emphasis added). Seven years later, this Court relied primarily upon Boyd in holding that a proceeding resulting in a “forfeit and penalty” of $1,000 for violation of an Act prohibiting the employment of' aliens was sufficiently criminal to trigger the protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476 (1893). More recently, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693 (1965), and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U. S. 715 (1971), this Court applied Boyd to proceedings involving the forfeiture of property for alleged criminal activity. Plymouth Sedan dealt with the applicability of the so-called exclusionary rule to a proceeding brought by the State of Pennsylvania to secure the forfeiture of a car allegedly involved in the illegal transportation of liquor. Coin & Currency involved the applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in a proceeding brought by the United States to secure forfeiture of $8,674 found in the possession of a gambler at the time of his arrest. Read broadly, Boyd might control the present case. This Court has declined, however, to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta in Boyd, noting on at least one occasion that “[s]everal of Boyd’s express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 407 (1976). In United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37 (1914), for example, we declined to apply Boyd’s classification of penalties and forfeitures as criminal in a case where a defendant assessed with a $1,000 penalty for violation of the Alien Immigration Act claimed that he was entitled to have the Government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Boyd and Lees, according to Regan, were limited in scope to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination, which “is of broader scope than are the guarantees in Art. III and the Sixth Amendment governing trials and criminal prosecutions.” 232 U. S., at 50. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S., at 400, n. 3. Similarly, in Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103 (1909), this Court upheld the entry of a directed verdict against the appellant under a statute similar to that examined in Lees. According to Hepner, “the Lees and Boyd cases do not modify or disturb but recognize the general rule that penalties may be recovered by civil actions, although such actions may be so far criminal in their nature that the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself in such actions in respect to any matters involving, or that may involve, his being guilty of a criminal offense.” Id., at 112. The question before us, then, is whether the penalty imposed in this case, although clearly not “criminal” enough to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the other procedural guarantees normally associated with criminal prosecutions, is nevertheless “so far criminal in [its] nature” as to trigger the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Initially, we note that the penalty and proceeding considered in Boyd were quite different from those considered in this case. Boyd dealt- with forfeiture of property, a penalty that had absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law. See also Lees v. United States, supra (fixed monetary penalty) ; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, supra (forfeiture) ; United States v. United States Coin & Currency, supra (forfeiture). Here the penalty is much more analogous to traditional civil damages. Moreover, the statute under scrutiny in Boyd listed forfeiture along with fine and imprisonment as one possible punishment for customs fraud, a fact of some significance to the Boyd Court. See 116 U. S., at 634. Here, as previously stated, the civil remedy and the criminal remedy are contained in separate statutes enacted 70 years apart. The proceedings in Boyd also posed a danger that the appellants would prejudice themselves in respect to later criminal proceedings. See Hepner v. United States, supra, at 112. Here, respondent is protected by § 311 (b) (5), which expressly provides that “[notification received pursuant to this paragraph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case, except [for] prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement.” 33 U. S. C. § 1321 (b)(5). More importantly, however, we believe that in the light of what we have found to be overwhelming evidence that Congress intended to create a penalty civil in all respects and quite weak evidence of any countervailing punitive purpose or effect it would be quite anomalous to hold that § 311 (b) (6) created a criminal penalty for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause but a civil penalty for all other purposes. We do not read Boyd as requiring a contrary conclusion. IV We conclude that the penalty imposed by Congress was civil, and that the proceeding in which it was imposed was not “quasi-criminal” as that term is used in Boyd v. United States, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed. Section 311 was amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, 91 .Stat. 1566, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468. Except as noted, those amendments have no bearing on the present case.' See nn. 2 and 4, infra. Section 311 (b) (3) was amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468, to prohibit the discharge of oil and hazardous substances “in such quantities as may be harmful” (emphasis added), as determined by the President. At the time in question, § 311 (b) (5) read in full: “Any person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility in violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection, immediately notify the appropriate agency of the United States Government of such discharge. Any such person who fails to notify immediately such agency of such discharge shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. Notification received pursuant to this paragraph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement.” Section 311 (b) (6) was amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2468, to authorize civil penalties of up to $50,000 per offense, or up to $250,000 per offense in cases where the discharge was the result of willful negligence or misconduct. At the time of the discharge in this case, § 311 (b)(6), as set forth in 33 U. S. C. §1321 (b)(6), read: “Any owner or operator of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating of not more than $5,000 for each offense. No penalty shall be assessed unless the owner or operator charged shall have been given notice and opportunity for a hearing on such charge. Each violation is a separate offense. Any such civil penalty may be compromised by such Secretary. In determining the amount of the penalty, or the amount agreed upon in compromise, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the owner or operator’s ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the violation, shall be considered by such Secretary. The Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold at the request of such Secretary the clearance required by section 91 of Title 46 of any vessel the owner or operator of which is subject to the foregoing penalty. Clearance may be granted in such cases upon the filing of a bond or other surety satisfactory to such Secretary.” All parties concede that Boggie Creek is a “navigable water” within the meaning of 33 U. S. C. § 1362 (7). The standards set forth were “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment— retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. . . .” 372 U. S., at 168-169 (footnotes omitted).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS No. 94-395. Argued February 22, 1995 Decided April 25, 1995 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 541. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 541. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, William S. Estabrook, and Kevin M. Brown. Philip Garrett Panitz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Gregory Ross Gose. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether respondent Lori Williams, who paid a tax under protest to remove a lien on her property, has standing to bring a refund action under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1), even though the tax she paid was assessed against a third party. We hold that respondent has standing to sue for a refund. Respondent’s suit falls within the broad language of § 1346(a)(1), which gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear “[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,” and only a strained reading of other relevant provisions would bar her suit. She had no realistic alternative to payment of a tax she did not owe, and we do not believe Congress intended to leave parties in respondent’s position without a remedy. I Before this litigation commenced, respondent Lori Williams and her then-husband Jerrold Rabin jointly owned their home. As part owner of a restaurant, Rabin personally incurred certain tax liabilities, which he failed to satisfy. In June 1987 and March 1988, the Government assessed Rabin close to $15,000 for these liabilities, and thereby placed a lien in the assessed amount on all his property, including his interest in the house. See 26 U. S. C. § 6321 (“If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.”). The Government has not alleged that Williams is personally liable for these or any subsequent assessments. Meanwhile, Rabin and Williams divided their marital property in contemplation of divorce. Williams did not have notice of the lien when Rabin deeded his interest in the house to her on October 25, 1988, for the Government did not file its tax lien until November 10, 1988. As consideration for the house, Williams assumed three liabilities for Rabin (none of them tax liabilities) totaling almost $650,000. App. 7-8 (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts presented by attorneys for United States). In the ensuing months, the Government made further assessments on Rabin in excess of $26,000, but did not file notice of them until June 22,1989. Williams entered a contract on May 9, 1989, to sell the house, and agreed to a closing date of July 3. Id., at 8. One week before the closing, the Government gave actual notice to Williams and the purchaser of over $41,000 in tax liens which, it claimed, were valid against the property or proceeds of the sale. The purchaser threatened to sue Williams if the sale did not go through on schedule. Believing she had no realistic alternative — none having been suggested by the Government — Williams, under protest, authorized disbursement of $41,937 from the sale proceeds directly to the Internal Revenue Service so that she could convey clear title. After the Government denied Williams’ claim for an administrative refund, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, claiming she had taken the property free of the Government’s lien under 26 U. S. C. § 6323(a) (absent proper notice, tax lien not valid against purchaser). To enforce her rights, she invoked 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1), which waives the Government’s sovereign immunity from suit by authorizing federal courts to adjudicate “[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” In a trial on stipulated facts, the Government maintained that it was irrelevant whether the Government had a right to Williams’ money; her plea could not be entertained, the Government insisted, because she lacked standing to seek a refund under § 1346(a)(1). According to the Government, that provision authorizes actions only by the assessed party, i. e., Rabin. The District Court accepted this jurisdictional argument, relying on precedent set in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 24 F. 3d 1143, 1145 (1994), guided by Fourth Circuit precedent. To resolve this conflict among the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari, 513 U. S. 959 (1994), and now affirm. II The question before us is whether the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1346(a)(1) authorizes a refund suit by a party who, though not assessed a tax, paid the tax under protest to remove a federal tax lien from her property. In resolving this question, we may not enlarge the waiver beyond the purview of the statutory language. Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U. S. 607, 614-616 (1992). Our task is to discern the “unequivocally expressed” intent of Congress, construing ambiguities in favor of immunity. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). To fathom the congressional instruction, we turn first to the language of § 1346(a). This provision does not say that only the person assessed may sue. Instead, the statute uses broad language: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of: “(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a) (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (emphasis added). Williams’ plea to recover a tax “erroneously . . . collected” falls squarely within this language. The broad language of § 1346(a)(1) mirrors the broad common-law remedy the statute displaced: actions of assumpsit for money had and received, once brought against the tax collector personally rather than against the United States. See Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Controversies, 48 Iowa L. Rev. 312, 327 (1963). Assumpsit afforded a remedy to those who, like Williams, had paid money they did not owe — typically as a result of fraud, duress, or mistake. See H. Ballantine, Shipman on Common-Law Pleading 163-164 (3d ed. 1923). Assumpsit refund actions were unavailable to volunteers, a limit that would not have barred Williams because she paid under protest. See Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wall. 720, 731-732 (1867) (“Where the party voluntarily pays the money, he is without remedy; but if he pays it by compulsion of law, or under protest, or with notice that he intends to bring suit to test the validity of the claim, he may recover it back ....”). Ill Acknowledging the evident breadth of § 1346(a)(1), the Government relies on the interaction of three other provisions to narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Government argues: Under 26 U. S. C. § 7422, a party may not bring a refund action without first exhausting administrative remedies; under 26 U. S. C. § 6511, only a “taxpayer” may exhaust; under 26 U. S. C. § 7701(a)(14), Williams is not a taxpayer. It is undisputed that §7422 requires administrative exhaustion. If Williams is eligible to exhaust, she did so by filing an administrative claim. But to show that Williams is not eligible to exhaust, the Government relies first on 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a), which provides in part: “(a) Period of limitation on filing claim “Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.” (Emphasis added.) From the statute’s use of the term “taxpayer,” rather than “person who paid the tax,” the Government concludes that only a “taxpayer” may file for administrative relief under §7422, and thereafter pursue a refund action under 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1). Then, to show that Williams is not a “taxpayer,” the Government relies on 26 U. S. C. § 7701 (a)(14), which defines “taxpayer” as “any person subject to any internal revenue tax.” According to the Government, a party who pays a tax is not “subject to” it unless she is the one assessed. The Government’s argument fails at both statutory junctures. First, the word “taxpayer” in §6511(a) — the provision governing administrative claims — cannot bear the weight the Government puts on it. This provision’s plain terms provide only a deadline for filing for administrative relief, not a limit on who may file. To read the term “taxpayer” as implicitly limiting administrative relief to the party assessed is inconsistent with other provisions of the refund scheme, which expressly contemplate refunds to parties other than the one assessed. Thus, in authorizing the Secretary to award a credit or refund “[i]n the case of any overpayment,” 26 U. S. C. § 6402(a) describes the recipient not as the “taxpayer,” but as “the person who made the overpayment.” Similarly, in providing for credits and refunds for sales taxes and taxes on tobacco and alcohol, 26 U. S. C. § 6416(a) and 26 U. S. C. § 6419(a) describe the recipient as “the person who paid the tax.” Further, even if, as the Government contends, only “taxpayers” could seek administrative relief under §6511, the Government’s claim that Williams is not at this point a “taxpayer” is unpersuasive. Section 7701(a)(14), defining “taxpayer,” informs us that “[w]hen used in [the Internal Revenue Code], where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, . . . [t]he term ‘taxpayer’ means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.” That definition does not exclude Williams. The Government reads the definition as if it said “any person who is assessed any internal revenue tax,” but these are not Congress’ words. The general phrase “subject to” is broader than the specific phrase “assessed” and, in the tax collection context before us, we think it is broad enough to include Williams. In placing a lien on her home and then accepting her tax payment under protest, the Government surely subjected Williams to a tax, even though she was not the assessed party. In support of its reading of “taxpayer,” the Government cites our observation in Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Bedford, 310 U. S. 41, 52 (1940), that “[t]he taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself.” The Government takes this language out of context. We were not interpreting the term “taxpayer” in the Internal Revenue Code, but deciding whether a state tax scheme was consistent with federal law. In particular, we were determining whether Colorado had imposed its service tax on a bank’s customers (which was consistent with federal law) or on the bank itself (which was not). Though the bank collected and paid the tax, its incidence fell on the customers. Favoring substance over form, we said: “The person liable for the tax [the bank], primarily, cannot always be said to be the real taxpayer. The taxpayer is the person ultimately liable for the tax itself.” Ibid. As a result, we determined that the tax had been imposed on the customers rather than the bank. If Colorado Nat. Bank is relevant at all, it shows our preference for commonsense inquiries over formalism — a preference that works against the Government’s technical argument in this case. IV As we have just developed, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(1) clearly allows one from whom taxes are erroneously or illegally collected to sue for a refund of those taxes. And 26 U. S. C. § 6402(a), with similar clarity, authorizes the Secretary to pay out a refund to “the person who made the overpayment.” The Government's strained reading of § 1346(a)(1), we note, would leave people in Williams’ position without a remedy. See supra, at 529, n. 1. This consequence reinforces our conclusion that Congress did not intend refund actions under § 1346(a)(1) to be unavailable to persons situated as Lori Williams is. Though the Government points to three other remedies, none was realistically open to Williams. Nor would any of the vaunted remedies be available to others in her situation. See, e. g., Martin v. United States, 895 F. 2d 992 (CA4 1990); Barris v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 696 (WD Pa. 1994); Brodey v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 44 (Mass. 1991) (all ordering refunds of amounts erroneously collected to the people who paid those amounts). If the Government has not levied on property — as it has not levied on Williams’ home — the owner cannot challenge such a levy under 26 U. S. C. § 7426. Nor would an action under 28 U. S. C. § 2410(a)(1) to quiet title afford meaningful relief to someone in Williams’ position. The first lien on her property, for nearly $15,000, was filed just six months before the closing; and liens in larger sum — over $26,000, out of $41,937 — were filed only 11 days before the closing. (Williams did not receive actual notice of any of the liens until barely a week before the closing.) She simply did not have time to bring a quiet title action. She urgently sought to sell the property, but a sale would have been difficult before a final judgment in such litigation, which could have been protracted. In contrast, a refund suit would allow her to sell the property and simultaneously pay off the lien, leaving her free to litigate with the Government without tying up her real property, whose worth far exceeded the value of the Government’s liens. Nor may Williams and persons similarly situated rely on § 6325(b)(3) for such an arrangement. This provision permits the Government to discharge a lien on property if the owner sets aside a fund that becomes subject to a new lien; the parties then can litigate the propriety of the new lien after the property is sold. However, § 6325(b)(3) and its implementing regulation render this remedy doubtful indeed, for it is available only at the Government’s discretion. See § 6325(b)(3) (“[T]he Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge [of a federal tax lien] of any part of the property subject to the lien if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to an agreement with the Secretary, the proceeds of such sale are to be held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as such liens and claims had with respect to the discharged property.”) (emphasis added); 26 CFR § 301.6325-1(b)(3) (1994) (“A district director [of the Internal Revenue Service] may, in his discretion, issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to a [tax lien] if such part of the property is sold and, pursuant to a written agreement with the district director, the proceeds of the sale are held, as a fund subject to the liens and claims of the United States, in the same manner and with the same priority as the lien or claim had with respect to the discharged property.”) (emphasis added). So far as the record shows, the Government did not afford Williams an opportunity to substitute a fund pursuant to § 6325(b)(3). This omission is not surprising, for on the Government’s theory of who may sue under § 1346(a)(1), the Government had scant incentive to agree to such an arrangement with people caught in Williams’ bind. Under § 6325(b)(3), the Government does not receive cash, but another lien (albeit one on a fund). In contrast, if the Government resists a § 6325(b)(3) agreement, it is likely to get cash immediately: property owners eager to remove a tax lien will have to pay, as did Williams. If they may not sue under § 1346(a)(1), their payment is nonrefundable. An agreement pursuant to § 6325(b)(3) thus dependent on the district director’s grace cannot sensibly be described as available to Williams. We do not agree with the Government that, if § 1346(a)(1) authorizes some third-party suits, the levy, quiet title, and separate-fund remedies become superfluous. Section 1346(a)(1) is a postdeprivation remedy, available only if the taxpayer has paid the Government in full. Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145 (1960). The other remedies offer predeprivation relief. The levy provision in 26 U. S. C. § 7426(a)(1) is available “without regard to whether such property has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary.” Likewise, 28 U. S. C. § 2410 allows a property owner to have a lien discharged without ever paying the tax. Under 26 U. S. C. § 6325(b)(3), the lien on the property is removed in exchange for a new lien, rather than a cash payment. V Finally, the Government urges that allowing Williams to sue will violate the principle that parties may not challenge the tax liabilities of others. According to the Government, undermining this principle will lead to widespread abuse: In particular, parties will volunteer to pay the tax liabilities of others, only to seek a refund once the Government has ceased collecting from the real taxpayer. Although parties generally may not challenge the tax liabilities of others, this rule is not unyielding. A taxpayer’s fiduciary may litigate the taxpayer’s liability, even though the fiduciary is not herself liable. See 26 CFR §301.6903-1(a) (1994) (the fiduciary must “assume the powers, rights, duties, and privileges of the taxpayer with respect to the taxes imposed by the Code”); ibid. (“The amount of the tax or liability is ordinarily not collectible from the personal estate of the fiduciary but is collectible from the estate of the taxpayer....”); 15 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 58.08 (1994) (refund claims for decedents filed by executor, administrator, or other fiduciary of estate). Similarly, certain transferees may litigate the tax liabilities of the transferor; if the transfer qualifies as a fraudulent conveyance under state law, the Code treats the transferee as the taxpayer, see 26 U. S. C. § 6901(a)(1)(A); 5 J. Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 73.10, pp. 73-82 to 73-87 (1992), so the transferee may contest the transferor’s liability either in tax court, see 14 Mertens, supra, § 53.50, or in a refund suit under § 1346(a)(1). See id., §53.55. Furthermore, the Court has allowed a refund action by parties who were not assessed, albeit under a different statute. See Stahmann v. Vidal, 305 U. S. 61 (1938) (cotton producers could bring a refund action for a federal cotton ginning tax if they had paid the tax, even though the tax was assessed against ginners rather than producers). The burden on the principle that a party may not challenge the tax liability of another is mitigated, moreover, because Williams’ main challenge is to the existence of a lien against her property, rather than to the underlying assessment on her husband. That is, her primary claim is not that her husband never owed the tax — a matter that, had she not paid these taxes herself under the duress of a lien, would not normally be her concern. Rather, she asserts that the Government has attached a lien on the wrong property, because the house belongs to her rather than to him — a scenario which leaves her “subject to” the tax in a meaningful and immediate way. We do not find disarming the Government’s forecast that allowing Williams to sue will lead to rampant abuse. The Government’s posited scenario seems implausible; it is not clear what incentive a volunteer has to pay someone else’s taxes as a way to help that person evade them. Nor does the Government report that such schemes are commonplace among the millions of taxpayers in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, Circuits that permit persons in Williams’ position to bring refund suits. Furthermore, our holding does not authorize the host of third-party challenges the Government fears. Williams paid under protest, solely to gain release of the Government’s lien on her property — a lien she attacked as erroneously maintained. We do not decide the circumstances, if any, under which a party who volunteers to pay a tax assessed against someone else may seek a refund under § 1346(a). * * * The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Affirmed. Peeking summary disposition in the District Court, the Government did not contend otherwise or question the District Court’s understanding that “the plaintiff here is left without a remedy.” App. 22. The dissent, perhaps finding unappealing the Government’s defense of unjustified taking, tenders factual inferences, post, at 545-546, both unfavorable to Williams and beyond the parties’ stipulation of uncontroverted facts. The sole issue in this case, however, is whether one in Williams’ situation has standing to sue for a refund, and to that issue the strength of Williams’ case on the merits is not relevant. See Snodgrass v. United States, 834 F. 2d 537, 540 (CA5 1987); Busse v. United States, 542 F. 2d 421, 425 (CA7 1976). See Martin v. United States, 895 F. 2d 992 (1990). Section 7422(a) provides in relevant part: “No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” Title 26 U. S. C. § 6532(a)(1), governing the time to file a refund suit in court, reads in part: “No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or proceeding relates.” As a statute of limitations, § 6511(a) does narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1346(a)(1) by barring the tardy. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 602 (1990) (“Read together, the import of these sections [§§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), 6511(a)] is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund, regardless of whether the tax is alleged to have been ‘erroneously,’ ‘illegally,’ or ‘wrongfully collected,’ §§ 1346(a)(1), 7422(a), may not be maintained in any court.”). The Treasury’s regulation, 26 CFR § 301.7701-16 (1994), adds nothing to the statute; in particular, the regulation does not ascribe any special or limiting meaning to the statute’s “subject to” terminology. The dissent asserts, regarding § 6325(b)(3), that Williams cannot complain in court without exhausting her administrative remedy. Post, at 547-548. But § 6325(b)(3) presents no question of administrative exhaustion as a prelude to judicial review, for that “remedy” lies entirely within the Government’s discretion. On motion for summary judgment in District Court, Williams did challenge her husband’s liability as well. See Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 13. However, counsel retreated from this claim at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36 (“We’re not arguing that she’s going to go into court and litigate the liability of her ex-husband.”); id., at 37 (“[W]e’re not saying that she wa[nts] [to] go into court and litigate his tax liability. That’s his problem, not hers.”). Moreover, to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, we can rely solely on Williams’ standing to challenge the lien, regardless of whether she has standing to challenge the underlying assessment on her husband. Accordingly, we need not resolve whether Williams is still asserting her challenge to the underlying assessment, let alone whether she has standing to do so.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIRECTOR OF REVENUE OF MISSOURI v. COBANK ACB, as successor to the NATIONAL BANK FOR COOPERATIVES No. 99-1792. Argued November 28, 2000 Decided February 20, 2001 ' Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James R. .Layton, State Solicitor of Missouri, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, and Gail Vas-terling and David Lieber, Assistant Attorneys General. David C. Frederick argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Junghans, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David English Carmack, and Donald B. Tobin. Richard A. Hanson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Theodore R. Bots Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, and Robert C. Maier, Assistant Solicitor, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Karen M. Freeman-Wilson of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Philip T McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Eliot Spitser of New York, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; for the American Bankers Association by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, and Mark R. Baran; and for the Multistate Tax Commission by Pauli Mines and Frank D. Katz, Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are asked to decide whether the National Bank for Cooperatives, which Congress has designated as a federally chartered instrumentality of the United States, is exempt from state income taxation. We hold that it is not. I In the Farm Credit Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 257, as amended, 12 U. S. seq., institutions within the Farm Credit System to meet the specific credit needs of farmers. Among these institutions were banks for cooperatives, one in each of 12 farm credit districts, and a Central Bank for Cooperatives. These banks were designed to make loans to cooperative associations engaged in marketing farm products, purchasing farm supplies, or furnishing farm services. Today, the Farm Credit System includes banks for cooperatives, production credit associations, farm credit banks, and federal land bank associations. § 2002(a). By statute, each of these institutions is designated as a “federally chartered instrumentalit[y] of the United States.” §2121 (banks for cooperatives and Central Bank for Cooperatives); §2141 (National Bank for Cooperatives); §§ 2071(a) and (b)(7) (production credit associations); § 2011(a) (farm credit banks); §§ 2091(a) and (b)(4) (federal land bank associations). The Farm Credit Act also addresses the taxation of these institutions. The provision applicable to a bank for cooperatives, the institution at issue in this case, states: “Each bank for cooperatives and its obligations are instrumentalities of the United States and as such any and all notes, debentures, and other obligations issued by such bank shall be exempt, both as to principal and interest from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States or any State, territorial, or local taxing authority, except that interest on such obligations shall be subject to Federal income taxation in the hands of the holder.” § 2134. Respondent CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives, which had been formed in 1989 through the consolidation of 10 district banks for cooperatives and the Central Bank for Cooperatives. The National Bank for Cooperatives filed Missouri corporate income tax returns for the years 1991 through 1994 and paid the taxes shown on those returns. In March 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of the National Bank for Cooperatives, requesting an exemption from all state income taxes and refunds on the taxes paid — erroneously, it alleged — for 1991 through 1994. Relying on the doctrine of implied tax immunity that originated in McCul-loch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity. CoBank argued that, because the current version of the Farm Credit Act does not expressly waive this immunity, banks for cooperatives are exempt from Missouri’s corporate income tax. The ' Director of Revenue of Missouri denied the request. On appeal, the Administrative Hearing Commission upheld' the Director of Revenue’s assessment of corporate income tax, because the National Bank for Cooperatives had not established that it was a federal instrumentality statutorily exempt from state taxation of its income. The commission determined that Congress did not provide expressly that banks for cooperatives, in contrast to farm credit banks and federal land bank associations, would have immunity from state income taxation. The commission reasoned that had Congress intended to confer upon banks for cooperatives the same immunity that was provided to farm credit banks and federal land bank associations, it would have done so expressly. For jurisdictional reasons, the commission did not decide CoBank’s constitutional claim. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the commission’s decision and held that banks for cooperatives are exempt from state income taxation. Production Credit Assn. of Southeastern Mo. v. Director of Revenue, 10 S. W. 3d 142, 143 (2000). The Missouri Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity. According to the Missouri Supreme Court, because the current version of the Farm Credit Act is silent as to such institutions’ immunity from state taxation, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the institutions are exempt from state income taxes. The Missouri,Supreme Court noted that other courts that had addressed the issue of state taxation of member institutions of the Farm Credit System also had concluded that the States could not tax such institutions. Id., at 143-144 (citing Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., PCA v. Arkansas, 76 F. 3d 961, 964 (CA8 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U. S. 821 (1997); State v. Farm Credit Servs. of Central Ark., 338 Ark. 322, 327, 994 S. W. 2d 453, 456 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U. S. 1036 (2000); Northwest La. Production Credit Assn. v. State, 98-1995 (La. App. 11/5/99), 746 So. 2d 280). The New Mexico Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court have reached the opposite conclusion with respect to state taxation of production credit associations. See Production Credit Assn. of Eastern N. M. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept., 2000 NMCA-021 ¶26, 999 P. 2d 1031, 1038, cert. denied, 128 N. M. 688, 997 P. 2d 820 (2000); Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 734 N. E. 2d 551, 560 (Ind. 2000). Since the statutory history and provisions regarding the taxation of production credit associations and banks for cooperatives are virtually identical, compare 12 U. S. C. §2077 with §2134; compare Farm Credit Act of 1971, §2.17, 85 Stat. 602, with §3.13, 85 Stat. 608; compare Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, § 205(d)(16), 99 Stat. 1705, with §205(e)(10), 99 Stat. 1705, we granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 530 U. S. 1260 (2000). II Congress has expressly designated banks for cooperatives as “instrumentalities of the United States.” 12 U. S. C. §2121. We have held, in addressing state taxation of contractors conducting business with the United States, that an instrumentality is entitled to implied tax immunity only when it is “so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities.” United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720, 735 (1982). Relying on New Mexico, the Director of Revenue argues that banks for cooperatives are not “so closely connected” to the United States as to be indistinguishable from the United States, and that banks for cooperatives thus are not entitled to immunity from state taxation. CoBank disagrees with this characterization and asks us to conclude that banks for cooperatives are indeed virtual arms of the United States, worthy of implied tax immunity under McCulloch. We need not, however, reach this implied immunity question. Implied immunity becomes an issue only when Congress has failed to indicate whether an instrumentality is subject to state taxation. In this case, Congress has provided that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation. To be sure, Congress did not include an express statement in the current version of §2134. However, nothing in the statute indicates a repeal of the previous express approval of state taxation, and the structure of the Farm Credit Act indicates by negative implication that banks for cooperatives are not entitled to immunity. A Upon their creation in 1933, banks for cooperatives were subject to state income taxation except during periods when the United States held stock in the banks. Farm Credit Act of 1933, § 63, 48 Stat. 267 (“Such banks,... and their income, shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States or by any State, Territorial, or local taxing authority .... The exemption provided herein shall not apply . .. with respect to .. . any . .. Bank for Cooperatives, or its property or income after the stock held in it by the United States has been retired”). Under this statute, as soon as governmental investment in a bank for cooperatives was repaid (as it was for all such banks by 1968), the bank had to pay state income taxes because the exemption from such taxation no longer applied. When Congress amended the Farm Credit Act in 1971, it did not change the rule that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation unless the United States holds stock in the banks. Farm Credit Act of 1971, §3.13, 85 Stat. 608. Although all banks for cooperatives were at the time privately owned, Congress provided that the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration had the authority on behalf of the United States to purchase stock in banks for cooperatives “as a temporary investment in the stock of the institution to help one or several of the banks... to meet emergency credit needs of borrowers.” §4.0, 85 Stat. 609. The 1971 version of § 2134 therefore provided, in relevant part: “Such banks . . . and their income shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States or by any State, territorial, or local taxing authority .... The exemption provided in the preceding sentence shall apply only for any year or part thereof in which stock in the bank for cooperatives is held by the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration.” §3.13, 85 Stat. 608-609. In 1985, Congress enacted various amendments to the Act. Among other things, these amendments eliminated the position of Governor of the Farm Credit Administration, discontinued the Farm Credit Administration’s authority to own stock in banks for cooperatives, and included numerous “Technical and Conforming Amendments.” Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1986, §201, 99 Stat. 1688; § 101, 99 Stat. 1678; § 205, 99 Stat. 1703-1707. One of these technical and conforming amendments was the deletion of the two sentences within §2134 that, first, exempted a bank for cooperatives from state taxation and, second, limited that exemption to periods when the Governor held stock in the bank. § 205(e)(10), 99 Stat. 1705, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §2134. CoBank argues that the deletion of these two sentences altered the States’ ability to tax the income of banks for cooperatives. According to CoBank, because the deletion eliminated the express statutory authorization for such taxation, Congress intended banks for cooperatives to be immune from state taxation under McCulloch’s implied immunity doctrine. We do not share CoBank’s interpretation as to the effect of this amendment, because there is no indication that Congress intended to change the taxation of banks for cooperatives with the 1985 amendments. Since 1933, the States could collect revenue from banks for cooperatives. Nothing in the 1985 amendments expressly changes this. And, it would be surprising, indeed, if Congress had eliminated this important fact sub silentio. CoBank’s interpretation would mean that Congress made a radical — but entirely implicit — change in the taxation of banks for cooperatives with the 1985 amendment to §2134. The amendment to § 2134 was merely one of numerous "technical and conforming amendments” to the Farm Credit Act. Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, § 205, 99 Stat. 1703-1707 (section entitled “Technical and Conforming Amendments”). In fact, the deletion of the sentence within § 2134 referring to the Governor was one of more than 30 deletions of references to the Governor, a position eliminated by the 1985 amendments to the Act. Ibid. . The more logical interpretation of this amendment to §2134 is that Congress merely deleted language that had become superfluous once the United States no longer owned, and no longer could own, stock in banks for cooperatives. This explanation accords with the more than 50-year history of the Farm Credit Act, permitting the States to tax banks for cooperatives except when there was governmental investment in the banks. Had Congress simply deleted the final sentence of § 2134 that limited the exemption while retaining the sentence granting the exemption, we would have no trouble concluding that Congress had eliminated the States’ ability to tax banks for cooperatives. Short of this act, however, we find Congress’ silence insufficient to disrupt the 50-year history of state taxation of banks for cooperatives. B In addition, the structure of the Farm Credit Act confirms that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation. With respect to each lending institution in the Farm Credit System, the Act contains a taxation provision that specifically delineates the immunity from taxation enjoyed by that entity. For example, farm credit banks and federal land bank associations receive the type of immunity from state taxation that the Missouri Supreme Court held to be implied here for banks for cooperatives. See 12 U. S. C. § 2023 (“The Farm Credit Banks and the capital, reserves, and surplus thereof, and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation . . § 2098 (“Each Federal land bank association and the capital, reserves, and surplus thereof, and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation .. .”). By contrast, since their creation in 1933, banks for cooperatives have been granted only limited exemptions from taxation. Had Congress intended to confer upon banks for cooperatives the more comprehensive exemption from taxation that it had provided to farm credit banks and federal land bank associations, it would have done so expressly as it had done elsewhere in the Farm Credit Act. Thus, in light of the structure of the Farm Credit Act — and the explicit grant of immunity to other institutions within the Farm Credit System — Congress’ silence with respect to banks for cooperatives indicates that banks for cooperatives are subject to state taxation. * * * The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. CoBank is an “agricultural credit bank,” which the Farm Credit Administration recognizes as having the combined authority of a bank for cooperatives and a farm credit bank. See 12 CFR §§ 618.8005(c), 619.9020 (2000). In this consolidated appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court also addressed the taxation of production credit associations and held that such institutions are exempt from state taxation. See also Farm Credit Act of 1933, § 63, 48 Stat. 267.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Anthony W. PERRY, Petitioner v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD. No. 16-399. Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 17, 2017. Decided June 23, 2017. Christopher Landau, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Brian H. Fletcher for Respondent. Christopher Landau, P.C., Devin S. Anderson, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Jeffrey B. Wall, Acting Solicitor General, Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Marleigh D. Dover, Stephanie R. Marcus, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Michael Foreman, Joseph V. Kaplan, Andrew J. Perlmutter, Erik D. Snyder, Rosa Koppel, and Alan R. Kabat, for Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the proper forum for judicial review when a federal employee complains of a serious adverse employment action taken against him, one falling within the compass of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., and attributes the action, in whole or in part, to bias based on race, gender, age, or disability, in violation of federal antidiscrimination laws. We refer to complaints of that order, descriptively, as "mixed cases." In the CSRA, Congress created the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) to review certain serious personnel actions against federal employees. If an employee asserts rights under the CSRA only, MSPB decisions, all agree, are subject to judicial review exclusively in the Federal Circuit. § 7703(b)(1). If the employee asserts no civil-service rights, invoking only federal antidiscrimination law, the proper forum for judicial review, again all agree, is a federal district court, see Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 46, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012) ; the Federal Circuit, while empowered to review MSPB decisions on civil-service claims, § 7703(b)(1)(A), lacks authority over claims arising under antidiscrimination laws, see § 7703(c). When a complaint presents a mixed case, and the MSPB dismisses it, must the employee resort to the Federal Circuit for review of any civil-service issue, reserving claims under federal antidiscrimination law for discrete district court adjudication? If the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on the merits, the parties agree, review authority lies in district court, not in the Federal Circuit. In Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596, we held, the proper review forum is also the district court when the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on procedural grounds, in Kloeckner itself, failure to meet a deadline for Board review set by the MSPB. We hold today that the review route remains the same when the MSPB types its dismissal of a mixed case as "jurisdictional." As in Kloeckner, we are mindful that review rights should be read not to protract proceedings, increase costs, and stymie employees, but to secure expeditious resolution of the claims employees present. See Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 15, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (emphasizing need for "clear guidance about the proper forum for [an] employee's [CSRA] claims"). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. l. I A The CSRA "establishes a framework for evaluating personnel actions taken against federal employees." Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 44, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012). For "particularly serious" actions, "for example, a removal from employment or a reduction in grade or pay," "the affected employee has a right to appeal the agency's decision to the MSPB." Ibid. (citing §§ 1204, 7512, 7701 ). Such an appeal may present a civil-service claim only. Typically, the employee may allege that "the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA." Id., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596. An appeal to the MSPB, however, may also complain of adverse action taken, in whole or in part, because of discrimination prohibited by another federal statute, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1) ; Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596. In Kloeckner, we explained, "[w]hen an employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB and alleges that the action was based on discrimination, she is said (by pertinent regulation) to have brought a 'mixed case.' " Ibid. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302 (2012) ). See also § 1614.302(a)(2) (2016) (defining "mixed case appeal" as one in which an employee "alleges that an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in part, because of discrimination"). For mixed cases, "[t]he CSRA and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) set out special procedures ... different from those used when the employee either challenges a serious personnel action under the CSRA alone or attacks a less serious action as discriminatory." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 44-45, 133 S.Ct. 596. As Kloeckner detailed, the CSRA provides diverse procedural routes for an employee's pursuit of a mixed case. The employee "may first file a discrimination complaint with the agency itself," in the agency's equal employment opportunity (EEO) office, "much as an employee challenging a personnel practice not appealable to the MSPB could do." Id., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a) (2012) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) (2012) ); see § 7702(a)(2). "If the agency [EEO office] decides against her, the employee may then either take the matter to the MSPB or bypass further administrative review by suing the agency in district court." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(d)(1)(i) ); see § 7702(a)(2). "Alternatively, the employee may initiate the process by bringing her case directly to the MSPB, forgoing the agency's own system for evaluating discrimination charges." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) ); see § 7702(a)(1). Section 7702 prescribes appellate proceedings in actions involving discrimination. Defining the MSPB's jurisdiction in mixed-case appeals that bypass an agency's EEO office, § 7702(a)(1) states in relevant part: "[I]n the case of any employee ... who- "(A) has been affected by an action which the employee ... may appeal to the [MSPB], and "(B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by [specified antidiscrimination statutes], ... "the Board shall, within 120 days of the filing of the appeal, decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in accordance with the Board's appellate procedures...." Section 7702(a)(2) similarly authorizes a mixed-case appeal to the MSPB from an agency EEO office's decision. Then, "[i]f the MSPB upholds the personnel action (whether in the first instance or after the agency has done so), the employee again has a choice: She may request additional administrative process, this time with the EEOC, or else she may seek judicial review." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 45, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing § 7702(a)(3), (b) ; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.161 ; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.303 ). Section 7703(b) designates the proper forum for judicial review of MSPB decisions. Section 7703(b)(1)(A) provides the general rule: "[A] petition to review a ... final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." Section 7703(b)(2) states the exception here relevant, governing "[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§ ]7702." See Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 46, 133 S.Ct. 596 ("The 'cases of discrimination' in § 7703(b)(2)'s exception ... are mixed cases, in which an employee challenges as discriminatory a personnel action appealable to the MSPB."). Such cases "shall be filed under [the enforcement sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ], as applicable." § 7703(b)(2). Those enforcement provisions "all authorize suit in federal district court." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 46, 133 S.Ct. 596 (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16(c), 2000e-5(f) ; 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) ; § 216(b)). Thus, if the MSPB decides against the employee on the merits of a mixed case, the statute instructs her to seek review in federal district court under the enforcement provision of the relevant antidiscrimination laws. § 7703(b)(2) ; see Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596. Federal district court is also the proper forum for judicial review, we held in Kloeckner, when the MSPB dismisses a mixed case on procedural grounds. Id ., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596. We rested that conclusion on this syllogism: "Under § 7703(b)(2), 'cases of discrimination subject to [ § 7702 ]' shall be filed in district court." Id., at 50, 133 S.Ct. 596 (alteration in original). Further, "[u]nder § 7702(a)(1), [mixed cases qualify as] 'cases of discrimination subject to [ § 7702 ].' " Ibid. (third alteration in original). Thus, "mixed cases shall be filed in district court." Ibid. That syllogism, we held, holds true whether the dismissal rests on procedural grounds or on the merits, for "nowhere in the [CSRA's] provisions on judicial review" is a distinction drawn between MSPB merits decisions and procedural rulings. Id., at 51, 133 S.Ct. 596. The instant case presents this question: Where does an employee seek judicial review when the MSPB dismisses her civil-service case alleging discrimination neither on the merits nor on a procedural ground, but for lack of jurisdiction? B Anthony Perry worked at the U.S. Census Bureau until 2012. 829 F.3d 760, 762 (C.A.D.C.2016). In 2011, Perry received notice that he would be terminated because of spotty attendance. Ibid. Later that year, Perry and the Bureau reached a settlement in which Perry agreed to a 30-day suspension and early retirement. Ibid. The agreement required Perry to dismiss discrimination claims he had separately filed with the EEOC. Ibid. After retiring, Perry appealed his suspension and retirement to the MSPB. Ibid. He alleged discrimination on grounds of race, age, and disability, as well as retaliation by the Bureau for his prior discrimination complaints. Ibid. The settlement, he maintained, did not stand in the way, because the Bureau coerced him into signing it. Ibid. An MSPB administrative law judge (ALJ) eventually determined that Perry had failed to prove that the settlement was coerced. Perry v. Department of Commerce, No. DC-0752-12-0486-B-1 etc. (Dec. 23, 2013) (initial decision), App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a, 47a. Presuming Perry's retirement to be voluntary, the ALJ dismissed his case. Id., at 33a, 47a. Voluntary actions are not appealable to the MSPB, the ALJ observed, hence, the ALJ concluded, the Board lacked jurisdiction to entertain Perry's claims. Id., at 51a. The MSPB affirmed the ALJ's decision. See Perry v. Department of Commerce, 2014 WL 5358308, *1 (Aug. 6, 2014) (final order). The settlement agreement, the Board recounted, provided that Perry would waive his Board appeal rights with respect to his suspension and retirement. Ibid. Because Perry did not prove that the agreement was involuntary, the Board determined (in accord with the ALJ) that his separation should be deemed voluntary, hence not an adverse action subject to the Board's jurisdiction under § 7702(a)(1). Id., at *3-*4. If dissatisfied with the MSPB's ruling, the Board stated in its decision, Perry could seek judicial review in the Federal Circuit. Id., at *4. Perry instead filed a pro se petition for review in the D.C. Circuit. 829 F.3d, at 763. The court ordered jurisdictional briefing and appointed counsel to argue for Perry. Ibid. By the time the court heard argument, the parties had agreed that the D.C. Circuit lacked jurisdiction, but disagreed on whether the proper forum for judicial review was the Federal Circuit, as the Government contended, or federal district court, as Perry maintained. Ibid. The D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over Perry's petition and transferred his case to that court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 829 F.3d, at 763. The court's disposition was precedent-bound: In a prior decision, Powell v. Department of Defense, 158 F.3d 597, 598 (1998), the D.C. Circuit had held that the Federal Circuit is the proper forum for judicial review of MSPB decisions dismissing mixed cases "on procedural or threshold grounds." See 829 F.3d, at 764, 767-768. Notably, Powell ranked as a "procedural or threshold matter" "the Board's view of its jurisdiction." 158 F.3d, at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted). The D.C. Circuit rejected Perry's argument that Powell was undermined by this Court's intervening decision in Kloeckner, which held MSPB procedural dispositions of mixed cases reviewable in district court. 829 F.3d, at 764-768. Kloeckner, the D.C. Circuit observed, repeatedly tied its decision to dismissals on "procedural grounds," 568 U.S., at 44, 46, 49, 52, 54, 55, 133 S.Ct. 596. See 829 F.3d, at 765. Jurisdictional dismissals differ from procedural dismissals, the D.C. Circuit concluded, given the CSRA's reference to mixed cases as those "which the employee ... may appeal to the [MSPB]." Id., at 766-767 (quoting § 7702(a)(1)(A) ; emphasis added). A jurisdictional dismissal, the court said, rests on the Board's determination that the employee may not appeal his case to the MSPB. Id ., at 766-767. In contrast, a dismissal on procedural grounds, e.g., untimely resort to the MSPB, leaves the employee still "affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the MSPB." Ibid. (quoting § 7702(a)(1)(A) ; alteration in original). We granted certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit's decision, 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 811, 196 L.Ed.2d 596 (2017), which accords with the Federal Circuit's decision in Conforto v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 713 F.3d 1111 (2013). II Federal employees, the Government acknowledges, have a right to pursue claims of discrimination in violation of federal law in federal district court. Nor is there any doubt that the Federal Circuit lacks authority to adjudicate such claims. See § 7703(c) (preserving "right to have the facts subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court" in any "case of discrimination" brought under § 7703(b)(2) ). The sole question here disputed: What procedural route may an employee in Perry's situation take to gain judicial review of the MSPB's jurisdictional disposition of a complaint that alleges adverse action taken under the CSRA in whole or in part due to discrimination proscribed by federal law? The Government argues, and the dissent agrees, that employees, situated as Perry is, must split their claims, appealing MSPB nonappealability rulings to the Federal Circuit while repairing to the district court for adjudication of their discrimination claims. As Perry sees it, one stop is all he need make. Exclusively competent to adjudicate "[c]ases of discrimination," § 7703(b)(2), the district court alone can resolve his entire complaint, Perry urges; the CSRA, he maintains, forces no bifurcation of his case. Section 7702(a)(1), the Government contends, marks a case as mixed only if the employee "has been affected by an action which the employee ... may appeal to the [MSPB]." Brief for Respondent 15, 17-19, 21. An MSPB finding of nonappealability removes a case from that category, the Government asserts, and hence, from the purview of "[c]ases of discrimination" described in § 7703(b)(2). Id ., at 21. Only this reading of the CSRA's provisions on judicial review-one ordering Federal Circuit review of any and all MSPB appealability determinations-the Government maintains, can ensure nationwide uniformity in answering questions arising under the CSRA. Id., at 26-32. Perry emphasizes in response that § 7702(a)(1)(A)'s language, delineating cases in which an employee "has been affected by an action which the employee ... may appeal to the [MSPB]," is not confined to cases an employee may successfully appeal to the Board. Brief for Petitioner 19. The MSPB's adverse ruling on the merits of his claim that the settlement was coerced, Perry argues, "did not retroactively divest the MSPB of jurisdiction to render that decision."Id., at 21. The key consideration, according to Perry, is not what the MSPB determined about appealability; it is instead the nature of an employee's claim that he had been "affected by an action [appealable] to the [MSPB]" (here, suspension for more than 14 days and involuntary removal, see § 7512(1), (2) ). See id ., at 11, 23-24. Perry draws support for this argument from our recognition that "a party [may] establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements," Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 537, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). See Brief for Petitioner 21-22. Perry, we hold, advances the more sensible reading of the statutory prescriptions. The Government's procedure-jurisdiction distinction, we conclude, is no more tenable than "the merits-procedure distinction" we rejected in Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 51, 133 S.Ct. 596. A As just noted, a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction generally suffices to establish jurisdiction upon initiation of a case. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S., at 537, 115 S.Ct. 1043. See also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (To invoke federal-question jurisdiction, allegations in a complaint must simply be more than "insubstantial or frivolous," and "[i]f the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction."). So too here: whether an employee "has been affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the [MSPB]," § 7702(a)(1)(A), turns on her well-pleaded allegations. Kloeckner, EEOC regulations, and Courts of Appeals' decisions are corroborative. We announced a clear rule in Kloeckner : "[M]ixed cases shall be filed in district court." 568 U.S., at 50, 133 S.Ct. 596. An employee brings a mixed case, we explained, when she "complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB," e.g., suspension for more than 14 days, § 7512(2), "and alleges that the action was based on discrimination." Id., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596 (emphasis deleted). The key to district court review, we said, was the employee's "clai[m] that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in § 7702(a)(1)." Id., at 56, 133 S.Ct. 596 (emphasis added). EEOC regulations, see supra, at 1980, are in accord: The defining feature of a "mixed case appeal," those regulations instruct, is the employee's "alleg [ation] that an appealable agency action was effected, in whole or in part, because of discrimination." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(2) (2016) (emphasis added). Several Courts of Appeals have similarly described mixed-case appeals as those alleging an adverse action subject to MSPB jurisdiction taken, in whole or in part, because of unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Downey v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 139, 143 (C.A.2 1998) ("Mixed appeals to the MSPB are those appeals alleging an appealable action affected in whole or in part by prohibited discrimination." (emphasis added)); Powell, 158 F.3d, at 597 (defining mixed-case appeal as "an appeal alleging both a Board-jurisdictional agency action and a claim of unlawful discrimination" (emphasis added)). See also Conforto, 713 F.3d, at 1126-1127, n. 5 (Dyk, J., dissenting). Because Perry "complain[ed] of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to the MSPB" (in his case, a 30-day suspension and involuntary removal, see supra, at 1982; § 7512(1), (2) ) and "allege[d] that the [personnel] action was based on discrimination," he brought a mixed case. Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596. Judicial review of such a case lies in district court. Id., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596. B The Government rests heavily on a distinction between MSPB merits and procedural decisions, on the one hand, and the Board's jurisdictional rulings, on the other. The distinction has multiple infirmities. "If Congress had wanted to [bifurcate judicial review,] send[ing] merits decisions to district court and procedural dismissals to the Federal Circuit," we observed in Kloeckner, "it could just have said so." Id., at 52, 133 S.Ct. 596. The same observation could be made about bifurcating judicial review here, sending the MSPB's merits and procedural decisions to district court, but its jurisdictional dismissals to the Federal Circuit. The Government's attempt to separate jurisdictional dismissals from procedural dismissals is newly devised. In Kloeckner, the Government agreed with the employee that there was "no basis" for a procedure-jurisdiction distinction. Brief for Respondent, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, p. 25, n. 3; see Reply to Brief in Opposition, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, pp. 1-2 (stating employee's agreement with the Government that procedural and jurisdictional dismissals should travel together). Issues of both kinds, the Government there urged, should go to the Federal Circuit. Drawing such a distinction, the Government observed, would be "difficult and unpredictable." Brief in Opposition in Kloeckner, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, p. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Now, in light of our holding in Kloeckner that procedural dismissals should go to district court, the Government has changed course, contending that MSPB procedural and jurisdictional dismissals should travel different paths. A procedure-jurisdiction distinction for purposes of determining the court in which judicial review lies, as both parties recognized in Kloeckner, would be perplexing and elusive. If a 30-day suspension followed by termination becomes nonappealable to the MSPB when the Board credits a release signed by the employee, one may ask why a determination that the employee complained of such adverse actions (suspension and termination) too late, i.e., after a Board-set deadline, does not similarly render the complaint nonappealable. In both situations, the Board disassociates itself from the case upon making a threshold determination. This Court, like others, we note, has sometimes wrestled over the proper characterization of timeliness questions. Compare Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-211, 215, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (timely filing of notice of appeal in civil cases is "jurisdictional"), with id., at 217-219, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (Souter, J., dissenting) (timeliness of notice of appeal is a procedural issue). Just as the proper characterization of a question as jurisdictional rather than procedural can be slippery, the distinction between jurisdictional and merits issues is not inevitably sharp, for the two inquiries may overlap. See Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 260 F.3d 1336, 1341 (C.A.Fed. 2001) ("recogniz[ing] that the MSPB's jurisdiction and the merits of an alleged involuntary separation are inextricably intertwined" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This case fits that bill. The MSPB determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Perry's civil-service claims on the ground that he voluntarily released those claims by entering into a valid settlement with his employing agency, the Census Bureau. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. But the validity of the settlement is at the heart of the dispute on the merits of Perry's complaint. In essence, the MSPB ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because Perry's claims fail on the merits. See Shoaf, 260 F.3d, at 1341 (If it is established that an employee's "resignation or retirement was involuntary and thus tantamount to forced removal," then "not only [does the Board] ha[ve] jurisdiction, but also the employee wins on the merits and is entitled to reinstatement." (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Conforto, 713 F.3d, at 1126 (Dyk, J., dissenting) ("[I]t cannot be that [the Federal Circuit] lack[s] jurisdiction to review the 'merits' of mixed cases but nevertheless may review 'jurisdictional' issues that are identical to the merits...."). Distinguishing between MSPB jurisdictional rulings and the Board's procedural or substantive rulings for purposes of allocating judicial review authority between district court and the Federal Circuit is problematic for a further reason: In practice, the distinction may be unworkable. The MSPB sometimes rules on alternate grounds, one typed "jurisdictional," another either procedural or substantive. See, e.g., Davenport v. Postal Service, 97 M.S.P.R. 417 (2004) (dismissing "for lack of jurisdiction and as untimely filed" (emphasis added)). To which court does appeal lie? Or, suppose that the Board addresses a complaint that encompasses multiple claims, dismissing some for want of jurisdiction, others on procedural or substantive grounds. See, e.g., Donahue v. Postal Service, 2006 WL 859448, *1, *3 (E.D.Pa., Mar. 31, 2006). Tellingly, the Government is silent on the proper channeling of appeals in such cases. Desirable as national uniformity may be, it should not override the expense, delay, and inconvenience of requiring employees to sever inextricably related claims, resorting to two discrete appellate forums, in order to safeguard their rights. Perry's comprehension of the complex statutory text, we are persuaded, best serves "[t]he CSRA's objective of creating an integrated scheme of review[, which] would be seriously undermined" by "parallel litigation regarding the same agency action." Elgin, 567 U.S., at 14, 132 S.Ct. 2126. See also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444-445, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). Perry asks us not to "tweak" the statute, see post, at 1988, but to read it sensibly, i.e., to refrain from reading into it the appeal-splitting bifurcation sought by the Government. Accordingly, we hold: (1) the Federal Circuit is the proper review forum when the MSPB disposes of complaints arising solely under the CSRA; and (2) in mixed cases, such as Perry's, in which the employee (or former employee) complains of serious adverse action prompted, in whole or in part, by the employing agency's violation of federal antidiscrimination laws, the district court is the proper forum for judicial review. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting. Anthony Perry asks us to tweak a congressional statute-just a little-so that it might (he says) work a bit more efficiently. No doubt his invitation is well meaning. But it's one we should decline all the same. Not only is the business of enacting statutory fixes one that belongs to Congress and not this Court, but taking up Mr. Perry's invitation also seems sure to spell trouble. Look no further than the lower court decisions that have already ventured where Mr. Perry says we should follow. For every statutory "fix" they have offered, more problems have emerged, problems that have only led to more "fixes" still. New challenges come up just as fast as the old ones can be gaveled down. Respectfully, I would decline Mr. Perry's invitation and would instead just follow the words of the statute as written. Our case concerns the right of federal employees to pursue their employment grievances under the Civil Service Reform Act. Really, it concerns but a small aspect of that right. Everyone agrees that employees may contest certain adverse employment actions-generally serious ones like dismissals-before the Merit Systems Protection Board. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701 - 7702, 7512 - 7513. Everyone agrees, too, that employees are generally entitled to seek judicial review of the Board's decisions. See § 7703. The only question we face today is where. And on that question, the Act provides clear directions. First, the rule. The Act says that an employee's appeal usually "shall be filed in ... the Federal Circuit," § 7703(b)(1)(A), which then applies a deferential, APA-style standard of review familiar to administrative law, § 7703(c). No doubt this makes sense, too, for Congress established the Federal Circuit in no small part to ensure a uniform case law governs Executive Branch personnel actions and guarantees the equal treatment of civil servants without regard to geography. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). Second, the exception. Congress recognized that sometimes agencies taking adverse employment actions against employees violate not just federal civil service laws, but also federal antidiscrimination laws. Usually, of course, employees who wish to pursue discrimination claims in federal district court must first exhaust those claims in proceedings before their employing agency. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). But the Act provides another option. Employees affected by adverse employment actions that trigger the Act's jurisdiction may (but need not) elect to exhaust their discrimination claims before the Board. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a). They also may ask the Board to review discrimination claims already exhausted before their employing agencies, and in this way obtain an additional layer of administrative review. See ibid . In § 7702 of the Act, Congress proceeded to set forth the rules the Board must apply in reviewing these cases of discrimination. And it then said that "[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702" are exempt from the default rule of Federal Circuit review and instead "shall be filed" in district court "under" specified antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII or the ADEA. § 7703(b)(2). At that point, district courts are instructed to engage in de novo factfinding, § 7703(c), not APA-style judicial review, just as they would in any other discrimination lawsuit. Putting these directions together, the statutory scheme is plain. Disputes arising under the civil service laws head to the Federal Circuit for deferential review; discrimination cases go to district court for de novo review. Congress allowed employees an elective option to bring their discrimination claims to the Board, but didn't allow this option to destroy the framework it established for the resolution of civil service questions. These rules provide straightforward direction to courts and guidance to federal employees who often proceed pro se . These rules also tell us all we need to know to resolve our case. Construing his pro se filings liberally, Mr. Perry pursued civil service and discrimination claims before the Board without first exhausting his discrimination claim before his own agency. The Board held that it couldn't hear Mr. Perry's claims because he hadn't suffered an adverse employment action sufficient to trigger its jurisdiction under the Act. Mr. Perry now seeks to contest the Board's assessment of its jurisdiction and win a review there that so far he's been denied. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 24. No doubt, too, he wants the chance to proceed on the merits before the Board for good reason: A victory there is largely unappealable by the government. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7703(d) ; see also Brief for Respondent 34. And because the scope of the Board's jurisdiction is a question of civil service law, Mr. Perry must go to the Federal Circuit for his answer. If that court agrees with Mr. Perry about the scope of the Board's authority, he can return to the Board and argue the merits of his two claims. If instead the court agrees with the Board's assessment of its powers, then Mr. Perry still hasn't lost his chance to pursue his remaining discrimination claim, for he may seek to exhaust that claim in the normal agency channels and proceed to district court. Mr. Perry, though, invites us to adopt a very different regime, one that would have the district court review the Board's ruling on the scope of its jurisdiction. Having to contest Board rulings on civil service and discrimination issues in different courts, he says, is a hassle. So, he submits, we should fix the problem by allowing civil service law questions to proceed to district court whenever an employee pursues a case of discrimination before the Board. In support of his proposal, he points us to a line of lower court cases associated with Williams v. Department of Army . And there, indeed, the Federal Circuit adopted a fix much like what Mr. Perry now proposes: allowing civil service claims to tag along to district court with discrimination claims because, in its judgment, "[f]rom the standpoint of judicial economy, consideration of all issues by a single tribunal is clearly preferable." 715 F.2d 1485, 1490 (1983) (en banc). Mr. Perry's is an invitation I would run from fast. If a statute needs repair, there's a constitutionally prescribed way to do it. It's called legislation. To be sure, the demands of bicameralism and presentment are real and the process can be protracted. But the difficulty of making new laws isn't some bug in the constitutional design: it's the point of the design, the better to preserve liberty. Besides, the law of unintended consequences being what it is, judicial tinkering with legislation is sure only to invite trouble. Just consider the line of lower court authority Mr. Perry asks us to begin replicating now in the U.S. Reports. Having said that district courts should sometimes adjudicate civil service disputes, these courts have quickly and necessarily faced questions about how and when they should do so. And without any guidance from Congress on these subjects, the lower courts' solutions have only wound up departing further and further from statutory text-and invited yet more and more questions still. A sort of rolling, case-by-case process of legislative amendment. Take this one. Recall that the statute says that de novo standard of review applies to cases filed in district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). But everyone agrees that standard is poorly adapted to the review of administrative civil service decisions. So what's to be done with civil service disputes that tag along to district court? Rather than see the problem as a clue things have gone awry, lower courts following Williams have suggested that maybe civil service claims should be assessed under deferential standards of review the Act prescribes only for (yes) Federal Circuit cases. And today Mr. Perry encourages us to follow suit too. See Brief for Petitioner 17, n.; Sher v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 488 F.3d 489, 499 (C.A.1 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1309, 128 S.Ct. 1924, 170 L.Ed.2d 743 (2008). But that's just the beginning. The statute allows only cases "filed under" certain specified federal antidiscrimination statutes to proceed to district court. Those laws (of course) prescribe remedies to vindicate harms associated with discrimination, including equitable relief and damages. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c). But what remedies can or should a district court afford a plaintiff in a run-of-the-mill civil service dispute that lands there? Might a plaintiff be forced to litigate in the district court only to be told at the end that no remedial authority exists? May a district court fashion some remedy in the absence of a statutory mandate to do so? Should it only adopt APA-style remedies prescribed by the Act for (again) the Federal Circuit ? Who knows. Answer all those questions and still more arise. What happens if the Board fully remedies an employee's discrimination claim, but rejects his simultaneously litigated civil service dispute? Should the employee go to district court with a stand-alone civil service complaint, to be nominally "filed" and adjudicated "under" a federal antidiscrimination statute? Or has by this point the case somehow transformed into one that should be sent to the Federal Circuit? Williams itself anticipated these particular problems but (notably) declined to take any stab at answering them. See 715 F.2d, at 1491. Still more and even curiouser questions follow. In some cases a district court will find the employee's discrimination claim meritless. When that happens, what should the district court do with a tag along civil service claim? Some lower courts after Williams have suggested that cases like these should be transferred back to the Federal Circuit in the "interests of judicial economy." Nater v. Riley, 114 F.Supp.2d 17, 29 (D.P.R.2000). But isn't it more than a little strange that an employee (often proceeding pro se, no less) should be sent to district court only to be bounced back to the Federal Circuit-with each trip undertaken in the name of "judicial economy"? And speaking of judicial economy, you might wonder what happened to the (no doubt efficient) policy Congress itself articulated when it declared that civil service issues should be decided by the Federal Circuit so they might be subject to a uniform body of appellate case law. See Fausto, 484 U.S., at 449, 108 S.Ct. 668 ; see also Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 13-14, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012). In an effort to achieve a simulacrum of that statutory command, one Federal Circuit judge has suggested that the regional circuits hearing tag along civil service issues should defer to Federal Circuit interpretations of civil service laws, much as federal courts defer to state courts on matters of state law when sitting in diversity. See Williams, supra, at 1492-1493 (Nichols, J., concurring). Call it a sort of Erie doctrine for the Federal Circuit-if, of course, one lacking any basis in federalism, not to mention the statutory text. By this point, you might wonder too if accepting Mr. Perry's invitation will even wind up saving him (or those like him) any hassle at all. Not only because of all the complications that arise from accepting his invitation. But also because, regardless which court hears his case, Mr. Perry should wind up in the same place anyway. If the reviewing court (whichever court that may be) finds that the Board was wrong and it actually possessed jurisdiction over his civil service and discrimination claims, presumably the court will seek to send Mr. Perry back to the Board to adjudicate those claims. See Reply Brief 18 (agreeing with this point). Meanwhile, if the reviewing court concludes that the Board was right and it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Perry's claims, presumably the court will require him to exhaust his remaining discrimination claim in normal agency channels before litigating it in court. So even if we take up Mr. Perry's ambitious invitation to overhaul the statute, is it even clear that we would save him and those like him any hassle at all? Or might future courts respond to this development with a yet further statutory rewrite, suggesting next that claimants should be allowed to proceed in district court on the merits of both their civil service and discrimination claims? Even where (as here) the discrimination claim remains unexhausted before any agency and the civil service claim isn't one even the Board could hear? Mr. Perry's proposal for us may be seriously atextual and practically unattractive, but perhaps it has one thing going for it, he says. While we of course owe no fealty to Williams or other lower court opinions, and are free to learn from, rather than repeat, their misadventures, Mr. Perry suggests our decision in Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012), requires us to rule for him. Whatever we think about the statute's plain terms, he says, we are bound by precedent to send him to district court all the same. But I just don't see in Kloeckner what Mr. Perry would have us find there. This Court was not asked to decide-and did not decide-whether issues arising under the civil service laws go to district court. Rather, we were asked to answer the much more prosaic question where an employee seeking to pursue only a discrimination claim should proceed. See Pet. for Cert. in Kloeckner v. Solis, O.T. 2012, No. 11-184, p. i ("If the [Board] decides a mixed case without determining the merits of the discrimination claim, is the court with jurisdiction over that claim the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a district court?" (emphasis added)). And this Court simply (and quite rightly) responded to that question by holding that "[a] federal employee who claims that an agency action appealable to the [Board] violates an antidiscrimination statute ... should seek judicial review in district court, not in the Federal Circuit ... whether the [Board] decided her case on procedural grounds or instead on the merits." Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 56, 133 S.Ct. 596 (emphasis added). Nothing about the question presented or holding suggests that a claimant wishing to challenge a Board ruling under the civil service laws may also proceed in district court. Mr. Perry replies that Kloeckner endorsed the idea that something called "mixed cases" should go to district court. But that term does not mean what he thinks it means. The phrase "mixed case" appears nowhere in the statute. Instead, it is but "lingo [from] the applicable regulations." Id., at 50, 133 S.Ct. 596. And even those regulations don't say that civil service questions may go to district court. Instead, the regulations use the term "mixed cases" to describe administrative challenges where the employee both "complains of a personnel action serious enough to appeal to [the Board] and alleges that the action was based on discrimination. " Id., at 44, 133 S.Ct. 596 (second emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(2) (2016). The regulations thus simply acknowledge that some administrative matters are both sufficient to trigger the Board's authority and raise questions addressed by federal antidiscrimination statutes. They say nothing about what goes to district court. Neither did Kloeckner redefine the term "mixed case" in some novel way. After discussing the regulatory definition of "mixed cases," the decision proceeds to say just this: "Under § 7703(b)(2), 'cases of discrimination subject to [ § 7702 ]' shall be filed in district court. Under § 7702(a)(1), the 'cases of discrimination subject to [ § 7702 ]' are mixed cases -those appealable to the [Board] and alleging discrimination. Ergo, mixed cases shall be filed in district court." 568 U.S., at 50, 133 S.Ct. 596 (some brackets in original; emphasis added). In context, it seems clear that this passage only seeks to restate the statute, using the term "mixed cases" as shorthand for cases that go to district court under § 7703(b)(2). And from that statute we know that only "cases of discrimination ... filed under" certain specified federal antidiscrimination statutes go to district court-no more, no less. Nothing in this passage suggests the Court meant to rewrite a regulatory term as a tool to undo a statute. Now, admittedly, a footnote in Kloeckner did seem to go a step farther and assume Williams ' view that civil service claims may tag along with discrimination claims to district court. Kloeckner, 568 U.S., at 55-56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596. But even by its terms such an assumption wouldn't help Mr. Perry, for he isn't seeking to pursue a discrimination claim in district court. By his own telling, he is seeking to overturn the Board's holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his administrative appeal so he might seek relief there in the first instance. And that, of course, raises only a question of civil service law. What's more, the footnote's discussion about Williams is no more than dicta. The footnote addressed only a policy argument from the government and said that argument failed both under Williams and for other reasons "[i]n any event." 568 U.S., at 56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596. As near as I can tell, then, Mr. Perry would have us upend a carefully crafted statutory scheme on the strength of a comment in one sentence of one footnote offered in reply to a policy argument that failed for other reasons anyway. Full respect for stare decisis does not demand so much from us. To the contrary, this Court has long made clear that where, as here, we have not "squarely addressed [an] issue, and have at most assumed [one side of it to be correct], we are free to address the issue on the merits." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ; see also Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537, 121 S.Ct. 1043, 149 L.Ed.2d 63 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Judicial decisions do not stand as binding 'precedent' for points that were not raised, not argued, and hence not analyzed"). Notably, even the Court today doesn't read Kloeckner as holding that all civil service claims and issues must proceed to district court after a discrimination claim is presented to the Board. Instead, the Court says that result is justified in large measure because it will "best serv[e]" the statute's " 'objective of creating an integrated scheme of review[, which] would be seriously undermined' by 'parallel litigation.' " Ante at 1987 (quoting Elgin, 567 U.S., at 14, 132 S.Ct. 2126 ). Yet, the very case the Court quotes for its account about the statute's purpose (Elgin which, in turn, quotes Fausto ) speaks of Congress' desire to provide an " 'integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review' " for civil service disputes that "would be seriously undermined" if "employees [had] the right to challenge employing agency actions in district court across the country," and regional district and circuit courts could pass on such matters. Elgin, supra, at 13-14, 132 S.Ct. 2126 (quoting Fausto, 484 U.S., at 445, 108 S.Ct. 668 ). And, respectfully, the result Elgin and Fausto warned against is exactly the result the Court's opinion seems sure to guarantee. Rather than pursue the congressional policy discussed in those cases, the Court seems more nearly headed in the opposite direction. Beyond its claim about the statute's purpose, the Court offers little in the way of a traditional statutory interpretation. It does not explain how the result it reaches squares with the statute's text and structure, or grapple with the arguments presented here on those counts. The Court does not explain, for example, how exactly a civil service dispute might be said to be "filed under" a federal antidiscrimination statute, what the standard of review might apply in such a matter (nowhere discussed in the statute), or what the remedial powers of the district court could be in these circumstances. And it remains far from obvious whether the Court's eventual answers to questions like these will wind up yielding a regime better for employees, or instead one just different or even a good deal worse. Indeed, the only answer the Court supplies to any of the questions raised above lies in a footnote and seems telling. There, the Court instructs that Mr. Perry will not be able to pursue his discrimination claim if the district court agrees with the Board that it lacked jurisdiction over his claim. Ante, at 1987, n. 10. But this will surely come as a surprise to Mr. Perry, who tells us he wants to pursue a federal discrimination claim even if it isn't one the Board has jurisdiction to hear. And it comes as a surprise to me too, for as I've described and the government concedes, nothing in the statute would prevent Mr. Perry from trying to bring a discrimination claim in district court after seeking to exhaust it before his employing agency. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 11, 16-17, 28; Brief for Respondent 25; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. At the end of a long day, I just cannot find anything preventing us from applying the statute as written-or heard any good reason for deviating from its terms. Indeed, it's not even clear how overhauling the statute as Mr. Perry wishes would advance the efficiency rationale he touts. The only thing that seems sure to follow from accepting his invitation is all the time and money litigants will spend, and all the ink courts will spill, as they work their way to a wholly remodeled statutory regime. Respectfully, Congress already wrote a perfectly good law. I would follow it. Many CSRA claimants proceed pro se. See MSPB, Congressional Budget Justification FY 2017, p. 14 (2016) ("Generally, at least half or more of the appeals filed with the [MSPB] are from pro se appellants...."). If the MSPB fails to render a "judicially reviewable action" within 120 days, an employee may, "at any time after ... the 120th day," "file a civil action [in district court] to the same extent and in the same manner as provided in" the federal antidiscrimination laws invoked by the employee. § 7702(e)(1). Our decision in Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012), did not merely assume that the civil-service component of mixed cases travels to district court. See id., at 56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596 ("If the MSPB rejects on the merits a complaint alleging that an agency violated the CSRA as well as an antidiscrimination law, the suit will come to district court for a decision on both questions." (emphasis added)). But see post, at 1992 - 1993. Characteristic of "mixed cases," the employee in Kloeckner complained of adverse action taken, at least in part, because of discrimination. See 568 U.S., at 47, 133 S.Ct. 596. The Board dismissed that case, not for any flaw under antidiscrimination law, but because the employee missed a deadline set by the MSPB. See id., at 47-48, 133 S.Ct. 596. Our interpretation is also consistent with another CSRA provision, § 7513(d), which provides that "[a]n employee against whom an action is taken under this section is entitled to appeal to the ... Board." Because the "entitle[ment] to appeal" conferred in § 7513(d) must be determined before an appeal is filed, such a right cannot depend on the outcome of the appeal. If, as the dissent and the Government argue, see post, at 1992 - 1993; Brief for Respondent 19-26, 33-35, Perry's case is not "mixed," one can only wonder what kind of case it is, surely not one asserting rights under the CSRA only, or one invoking only antidiscrimination law. See supra, at 1979 - 1980. This is, of course, a paradigm mixed case: Perry alleges serious personnel actions (suspension and forced retirement) caused in whole or in part by prohibited discrimination. So did the employee in Kloeckner. She alleged that her firing (a serious personnel action) was based on discrimination. See 568 U.S., at 47, 133 S.Ct. 596. Thus Perry, like Kloeckner, well understood what the term "mixed case" means. Notably, the dissent ventures no support for the principal argument made by the Government, i.e., that MSPB jurisdictional dispositions belong in the Federal Circuit, procedural and merits dispositions, in district court. As Judge Dyk, dissenting in Conforto v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 713 F.3d 1111 (C.A.Fed.2013), pointed out: "[W]here Congress intended to distinguish between different types of Board decisions, it did so expressly." Id., at 1124, n. 1 (citing § 3330b(b) ("An election under this section may not be made ... after the [MSPB] has issued a judicially reviewable decision on the merits of the appeal." (emphasis added)); § 7703(a)(2) ("The Board shall be named respondent in any proceeding brought pursuant to this subsection, unless the employee ... seeks review of a final order or decision on the merits...." (emphasis added))). This is not the first time the Government has changed its position. Before the Federal Circuit in Ballentine v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 738 F.2d 1244 (1984), the Government moved to transfer to district court an appeal challenging a jurisdictional dismissal by the MSPB. See id., at 1245. The Government argued that "even a question of the Board's jurisdiction to hear an attempted mixed case appeal must be addressed by a district court." Id., at 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rejecting the Government's position, the Federal Circuit concluded that it could review MSPB decisions on "procedural or threshold matters, not related to the merits of a discrimination claim." Ibid. In Kloeckner, we disapproved the Federal Circuit's holding with respect to MSPB procedural dismissals. 568 U.S., at 50, 56, 133 S.Ct. 596. Today we disapprove Ballentine 's holding with respect to jurisdictional dismissals, thereby adopting precisely the position advanced by the Government in that case. In civil litigation, a release is an affirmative defense to a plaintiff's claim for relief, not something the plaintiff must anticipate and negate in her pleading. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1) (listing among affirmative defenses "release" and "waiver"); Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 391, 107 S.Ct. 1187, 94 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987). In that light, the MSPB's jurisdiction should be determined by the adverse actions Perry asserts, suspension and forced retirement; the settlement releasing Perry's claims would figure as a defense to his complaint, it would not enter into the determination whether the Board has jurisdiction over his claims. If a reviewing court "agree[d] with the Board's assessment," then Perry would indeed have "lost his chance to pursue his ... discrimination claim[s]," post, at 1989, for those claims would have been defeated had he voluntarily submitted to the agency's action. In Kloeckner, we rejected the Government's national uniformity argument. See 568 U.S., at 55-56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596. "When Congress passed the CSRA, the Federal Circuit did not exist," we observed, so uniformity did not then figure in Congress' calculus. Id., at 56, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596. Moreover, even under the Government's reading, "many cases involving federal employment issues [would be resolved] in district court. If the MSPB rejects on the merits a complaint alleging that an agency violated the CSRA as well as an antidiscrimination law, the suit will come to district court for a decision on both questions." Ibid. In both Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012), and United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988), we rejected employees' attempts to divide particular issues or claims among review forums. In Elgin, a federal employee opted not to seek review of an MSPB ALJ's decision, either before the full Board or in the Federal Circuit; he instead brought in District Court, in the first instance, a constitutional challenge to an agency personnel action. 567 U.S., at 7-8, 132 S.Ct. 2126. We concluded that an employee with civil-service claims must follow the CSRA's procedures and may not bring a standalone constitutional challenge in district court. Id., at 8, 132 S.Ct. 2126. In Fausto, a federal employee with CSRA claims filed an action in the United States Claims Court under the Back Pay Act of 1966. 484 U.S., at 443, 108 S.Ct. 668. We determined that the employee could not bring his action under the Back Pay Act because the CSRA provided "the comprehensive and integrated review scheme." See id., at 454, 108 S.Ct. 668. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at 1993, neither case indicated that the Federal Circuit, as opposed to district court, is the preferred forum for judicial review of all CSRA claims. Rather, both decisions emphasized the benefits of an integrated review scheme and the problems associated with bifurcating consideration of a single matter in different forums. See 567 U.S., at 13-14, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 484 U.S., at 444-445, 108 S.Ct. 668. It is the dissent's insistence on bifurcated review, therefore, that "Elgin and Fausto warned against," post, at 1993. * * *

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al. No. 79-816. Argued October 8, 1980 Decided December 15, 1980 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 284. Richard W. Turner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen A. Trimble. Elinor Hadley Stillman argued the cause for the federal respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Laurie M. Streeter, and Lois G. Williams. Leslie Scherr argued the cause for respondent Cross. With him on the brief was William F. Krebs. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 38 U. S. C. §§ 901-950 (1976 ed. and Supp. III), compensation for a permanent partial disability must be determined in one of two ways. First, if the injury is of a kind specifically identified in the schedule set forth in §§8(c)(1)-(20) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 908 (c)(1)-(20), the injured employee is entitled to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages for a specific number of weeks, regardless of whether his earning capacity has actually been impaired. Second, in all other cases, § 8 (c)(21), 33 U. S. C. § 908 (c)(21), authorizes compensation equal to two-thirds of the difference between the employee’s preinjury average weekly wages and his postinjury wage-earning capacity, during the period of his disability. The question, in this case is whether a permanently partially disabled employee, entitled to compensation under the statutory schedule, may elect to receive a larger recovery under § 8(c) (21) measured by the actual impairment of wage-earning capacity caused by his injury. Although Congress could surely authorize such an election, it has not yet done so. We therefore hold that respondent Cross’ recovery must be limited by the statutory schedule. Cross is employed by Potomac Electric Power Co. (Pepeo) as a cable splicer — a job that requires strength and agility. In 1974, he earned a total of $21,959.38, including overtime pay of $8,543.30. In December of that year, he injured his left knee in the course of his employment, thereby suffering a permanent partial loss of the use of his leg. The physical impairment is described as a 5 to 20% loss of the use of one leg, but the resulting impairment of his earning capacity is apparently in excess of 40%. Although Cross has retained his job, he has not been able to perform all of the strenuous duties required of a cable splicer and therefore he has received no overtime and has not qualified for certain pay increases. Because he worked in the District of Columbia, respondent Cross is entitled to compensation under the LHWCA. It is undisputed that the injury to his leg is a “permanent partial disability” within the meaning of § 8 (c) of the Act; he therefore has an unquestioned right to a compensation award measured by a fraction of his earnings for 288 weeks. His claim, however, is for the larger amount measured by two-thirds of the difference between his average weekly earnings before the injury and his present wage-earning capacity, multiplied by the number of weeks that his disability continues. The Administrative Law Judge allowed the larger recovery. He held that an injured employee is not required to accept the specific amount authorized by §§ 8 (c) (2) and (19) for the partial loss of the use of a leg, but instead may recover an amount based on the formula set forth in § 8(c) (21) for “all other cases.” Using that formula, the Administrative Law Judge found that respondent Cross’ permanent loss of earning capacity amounted to approximately $130 per week, and ordered Pepeo to pay him two-thirds of that amount each week for the remainder of his working life. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. Cross v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 7 BRBS 10 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also affirmed. 196 U. S. App. D. C. 417, 606 F. 2d 1324 (1979). Recognizing that the Act “must be construed in light of its humanitarian objectives,” and noting a “recent trend in workmen’s compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits,” the court concluded that the “all other cases” language in § 8 (c)(21) provided a “remedial alternative” measure of compensation for cases in which “the scheduled benefits fail adequately to compensate for a diminution in [wage-earning] capabilities.” While expressing sympathy for the result reached by the majority, one judge dissented. I The language of the Act plainly supports the view that the character of the disability determines the method of compensation. Section 8 identifies four different categories of disability and separately prescribes the method of compensation for each. In the permanent partial disability category, § 8 (c) provides a compensation schedule which covers 20 different specific injuries. It then adds an additional sub-paragraph, § 8(c) (21), that applies to any injury not included within the list of specific injuries. There is no language in that additional subparagraph indicating that it was intended to provide an alternative method of compensation for the cases described in the preceding subparagraphs; quite the contrary, by its terms, subparagraph (21) is applicable “In all other cases.” It is also noteworthy that the statutory direction that precedes the schedule of specifically described partial disabilities mandates that the compensation prescribed by the schedule “shall be paid to the employee, as follows.” We are not free to read this language as though it granted the employee an election. Nor are we free to read the subsequent words “all other cases” as though they described “all of the foregoing” as well; the use of the word “other” forecloses that reading. In sum, we find nothing in the statute itself to support the view that the reference to “all other cases” in § 8 (c)(21) was intended to authorize an alternative method for computation of disability benefits in certain cases of permanent partial disability already provided for in the schedule. II The legislative history of the Act is entirely consistent with the conclusion that it was intended to mean what it says. Although that history contains no specific consideration of the precise question before us, one aspect of the Act’s history is somewhat enlightening. The relevant language was enacted in 1927. It was patterned after a similar “scheduled benefits” provision in the New York Workmen’s Compensation Law enacted in 1922. A few years after enactment of the LHWCA, the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with the same question of construction under the New York statute that is now presented to us under the federal statute. The New York Court of Appeals apparently considered the statutory language so clear on its face that little discussion of this issue was necessary: “Obviously, the phrase 'in all other cases’ signifies that the provisions of the paragraph shall apply only in cases where the injuries received are not confined to a specific member or specific members.” Sokolowski v. Bank of America, 261 N. Y. 57, 62, 184 N. E. 492, 494 (1933). Nothing in the original legislative history of the federal Act or in the legislative history of subsequent amendments indicates that Congress did not intend the plain language of the federal statute to receive the same construction as the substantially identical language of its New York ancestor. Ill The weight of judicial authority also supports a literal reading of the Act. During the first half century of administration of the LHWCA, federal tribunals consistently construed the schedule benefits provision as exclusive. Although the exclusivity question did not explicitly arise until 1964, prior to that time evidence of loss of wages or wage-earning capacity was considered irrelevant in cases of permanent partial disability falling within the schedule provisions. In 1964, in Williams v. Donovan, 234 F. Supp. 135 (ED La.), aff’d, 367 F. 2d 825 (CA5 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 977 (1967), the first federal court to address the exclusivity issue found that “the form and language of the Act” indicated that compensation under § 8 (c)(21) for loss of wage-earning capacity was not available in cases covered by the schedule. 234 F. Supp., at 139. This construction of the Act went unchallenged for the next decade. It was not until 1975 that the Benefits Review Board announced its dissatisfaction with the Williams construction of the statute and concluded that claimants suffering from a permanent partial disability may elect to proceed under either the schedule or § 8 (c)(21). The Board has since applied its construction of the Act in a series of decisions of which the instant case is a member. The divided opinion of the Court of Appeals is apparently the first and only federal court de-cisión accepting that construction. The notion that the plain language of the LHWCA might not mean what it says is thus a relatively recent development surfacing for the first time almost 50 years after its enactment. The relevant judicial authority prior to 1975, although not abundant, indicates that the schedule benefits were considered exclusive. While the federal decisional authority on this question is scarce, state-law authority apparently is not. The lower court cited, and the respondents rely upon, the “recent trend in workmen’s compensation law away from the idea of exclusivity of scheduled benefits.” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328. Although this “trend” unquestionably exists, it is neither uniform nor based entirely on cases presenting issues comparable to the precise issue before us. More importantly, a proper understanding of the judicial role in this case reveals that the recent trend actually supports a literal reading of the federal statute. Our task is to ascertain the congressional intent underlying the schedule benefit provisions enacted in 1927; we are not free to incorporate into those provisions subsequent state-law developments that we may consider sound as a matter of policy. In attempting to ascertain the legislative intent underlying a statute enacted over 50 years ago, the view that once “dominate [d] the field” is more enlightening than a recent state-law trend that has not motivated subsequent Congresses to amend the federal statute. The once dominant view is entirely consistent with a literal reading of the Act. IV Respondents suggest two reasons why this settled construction is erroneous. They submit that it does not fulfill the fundamental remedial purpose of the Act and that it may produce anomalous results that Congress probably did not intend. The first submission is not entirely accurate; the second, though theoretically correct, has insufficient force to overcome the plain language of the statute itself. Respondents correctly observe that prior decisions of this Court require that the LHWCA be liberally construed in order to effectuate its remedial purposes. Respondents accordingly argue that the Act should be interpreted in a manner which provides a complete and adequate remedy to an injured employee. Implicit in this argument, however, is the assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to provide disabled workers with a complete remedy for their industrial injuries. The inaccuracy of this implicit assumption undercuts the validity of respondents’ argument. The LHWCA, like other workmen’s compensation legislation, is indeed remedial in that it was intended to provide a certain recovery for employees who are injured on the job. It imposes liability without fault and precludes the assertion of various common-law defenses that had frequently resulted in the denial of any recovery for disabled laborers. While providing employees with the benefit of a more certain recovery for work-related harms, statutes of this kind do not purport to provide complete compensation for the wage earner’s economic loss. On the contrary, they provide employers with definite and lower limits on potential liability than would have been applicable in common-law tort actions for damages. None of the categories of disability covered by the LHWCA authorizes recovery measured by the full loss of an injured employee’s earnings; even those in the most favored categories may recover only two-thirds of the actual loss of earnings. It therefore is not correct to interpret the Act as guaranteeing a completely adequate remedy for all covered disabilities. Rather, like most workmen’s compensation legislation, the LHWCA represents a compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and their employers. The use of a schedule of fixed benefits as an exclusive remedy in certain cases is consistent with the employees’ interest in receiving a prompt and certain recovery for their industrial injuries as well as with the employers’ interest in having their contingent liabilities identified as precisely and as early as possible. It is true, however, that requiring resort to the schedule may produce certain incongruous results. Unless an injury results in a scheduled disability, the employee’s compensation is dependent upon proving a loss of wage-earning capacity; in contrast, even though a scheduled injury may have no actual effect on an employee’s capacity to perform a particular job or to maintain a prior level of income, compensation in the schedule amount must be paid. Conversely, the schedule may seriously undercompensate some employees like respondent Cross. The result seems particularly unfair when his case is compared with an employee who suffers an unscheduled disability resulting in an equivalent impairment of earning capacity. Indeed, it is possible that the award for a serious .temporary partial disability could exceed the amount scheduled for a permanent disability of like character. As this Court has observed in the past, it is not to be lightly assumed that Congress intended that the LHWCA produce incongruous results. Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 412-413 (1932). But if “compelling language” produces incongruities, the federal courts may not avoid them by rewriting or ignoring that language. Id., at 413. Such compelling statutory language is present in this case. See Part I, supra. The fact that it leads to seemingly unjust results in particular cases does not give judges a license to disregard it. If anomalies actually do occur with any frequency in the day-to-day administration of the Act, they provide a persuasive justification for a legislative review of the statutory compensation schedule. It would obviously be sound policy for Congress t<5 re-examine the schedule of permanent partial disability benefits more frequently than every half century. In such a re-examination the extent and importance of hypothetical cases such as those described by respondents could be fairly evaluated. In this judical proceeding, however, concern with such hypothetical cases is less compelling than sympathy for the actual plight of the individual litigant in the case before us. Nonetheless, that sympathy is an insufficient basis for approving a recovery that Congress has not authorized. The judgment is Reversed. Section 8, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 908, provides, in part, as follows: "Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows: “(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 66% per centum of the average weekly wages, which shall be in addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) or subdivision (e) of this section, respectively, and shall be paid to the employee, as follows: “(1) Arm lost, three hundred and twelve weeks’ compensation. “(2) Leg lost, two hundred and eighty-eight weeks’ compensation. “(3) Hand lost, two hundred and forty-four weeks’ compensation. “(4) Foot lost, two hundred and five weeks’ compensation. “(5) Eye lost, one hundred and sixty weeks’ compensation. “(18) Total loss of use: Compensation for permanent total loss of use of a member shall be the same as for loss of the member. “(19) Partial loss or partial loss of use: Compensation for permanent partial loss or loss of use of a member may be for proportionate loss or loss of use of the member. “(20) Disfigurement: Proper and equitable compensation not to exceed $3,500 shall be awarded for serious disfigurement of the face, head, or neck or of other normally exposed areas likely to handicap the employee in securing or maintaining employment. “(21) Other cases: In all other cases in this class of disability the compensation shafi be 66% per centum of the difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the deputy commissioner on his own motion or upon application of any party in interest.” Cross’ 1975 earnings amounted to $12,086.48, in contrast to 1974 earnings of $21,959.38. The District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, D. C. Code §§ 36-501 to 36-504 (1973 and Supp. V-1978), adopts the LHWCA as the workmen’s compensation law for the District of Columbia. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 471 (1947). Section 1 of the Act, D. C. Code §36-501 (1973), provides: “The provisions of chapter 18 of title 33, U. S. Code, including all amendments that may hereafter be made thereto, shall apply in respect to the injury or death of an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, irrespective of the place where the injury or death occurs; except that in applying such provisions the term ‘employer’ shall be held to mean every person carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia, and the term ‘employee’ shall be held to mean every employee of any such person.” Under §§8 (e)(2) and (18), an employee suffering a total loss of the use of one leg is entitled to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages for a period of 288 weeks. If an injury results in a partial loss of the use of a scheduled member, as in this case, § 8 (c) (19) provides that compensation is to be calculated as a proportionate loss of the use of that member. Under the schedule, Cross is therefore entitled to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages for whatever fraction of 288 weeks represents the proportionate loss of the use of his leg caused by the knee injury. Because this case was decided under § 8 (c) (21), rather than the schedule, it was not necessary for the Administrative Law Judge to determine the precise extent of respondent Cross’ disability. The medical testimony indicates that he suffered a 5 to 20% loss of the use of his leg. This computation is derived from § 8(c) (21), 33 U. S. C. § 908 (c) (21), quoted in n. 1, supra. It should be noted that “wage-earning capacity” under § 8 (c) (21) is not necessarily measured by an injured employee’s actual postinjury earnings. Section 8 (h) of the Act, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. §908 (h), provides: “The wage-earning capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability under subdivision (c) (21) of this section or under subdivision (e) of this section shall be determined by his actual earnings if such actual earnings fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity: Pro vided, however, That if the employee has no actual earnings or his actual earnings do not fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity, the deputy commissioner may, in the interest of justice, fix such wage-earning capacity as shall be reasonable, having due regard to the nature of his injury, the degree of physical impairment, his usual employment, and any other factors or circumstances in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 420-421, 606 F. 2d, at 1327-1328. Before analyzing the statute and its history in detail, Judge MacKinnon wrote: “Nothing in section 8 permits an employee whose injury is unquestionably confined to one of those set out in the schedule to circumvent Congress' conclusive presumptions with a showing of lost earning capacity in excess of the specified benefit. The majority holds otherwise, and does so despite the fact that during the fifty-two year old regime of an essentially unaltered statutory scheme no federal court has ever read section 8 in that manner while a number of federal courts have adopted a contrary approach. I am not unsympathetic to the result the majority’s holding achieves, but I submit that it is within the province of the legislative branch to weigh and decide whether this result ought to obtain.” Id., at 422-423, 606 F. 2d, at 1329-1330. In addition to permanent partial disability, the Act provides for permanent total, temporary total, and temporary partial disability. The remedies for permanent and temporary total disability — essentially two-thirds of the employee’s average weekly wages during the period of the disability — are set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of § 8, 33 U. S. C. §§ 908 (a) and (b). The remedy for temporary partial disability — two-thirds of the difference between the employee’s preinjury average weekly wages and his postinjury wage-earning capacity during the period of disability, up to a maximum of five years — is set forth in § 8 (e), 33 U. S. C. §908 (e). Indeed, it should be noted that the words “other cases” appear twice in subparagraph (21). See n. 1, supra. 33 U. S. C. § 908 (c) (emphasis supplied). See n. 1, supra. Judge MacKinnon’s dissenting opinion reviewed the legislative history in detail; although he discovered no clear answer to the exclusivity question, see 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 425, 606 F. 2d, at 1332, he found that, to the extent any conclusions could be drawn, the legislative history supported the view that the schedule and “all other cases” categories were intended to be mutually exclusive. Id., at 425-429, 606 F. 2d, at 1332-1336. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. 1922 N. Y. Laws, ch. 615, § 15 (3). The 1922 Act was an extensive revision of the Workmen’s Compensation Law of 1914, 1914 N. Y. Laws, ch. 41. A schedule covering particular cases of permanent partial disability initially appeared in the 1914 Act. See 1914 N. Y. Laws, ch. 41, § 15 (3). This schedule was retained, in a slightly revised form, in the 1922 Act. The schedule adopted by Congress in the LHWCA was substantially identical to the New York schedule of 1922. Congress selected the New York statute as the model for the LHWCA because that statute was considered one of the best workmen’s compensation laws of its time. See H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1926). In 1972, Congress considered and failed to pass an amendment to § 8 (c) that would have permitted an employee suffering from a permanent partial disability caused by a scheduled injury to recover both the schedule benefits and two-thirds of his lost wage-earning capacity after expiration of the schedule period. See S. 2318, § 7, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1972); H. R. 12006, §7, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and H. R. 15023, §7, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act: Hearings before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 27, 38 (1972). Although Pepeo relies heavily upon Congress’ rejection of this proposed amendment as support for its position that schedule benefits are exclusive, this action is of marginal relevance in this case because the amendment would have authorized cumulative, not alternative, remedies. Pepco’s reliance upon 1949 and 1966 amendments to the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U. S. C. §8101 et seq., is similarly misplaced. These amendments, authorizing cumulative remedies under the FECA, shed little light upon Congress’ intention with respect to alternative remedies under the LHWCA. See Act of Oct. 14, 1949, ch. 691, § 104, 63 Stat. 855; Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 536. See, e. g., Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F. 2d 137, 143-144 (CA2), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 913 (1955). It should be noted, however, that this principle was announced in response to employer attempts to defeat an injured employee’s claim for schedule benefits on the ground that the employee had suffered no actual loss of wages or wage-earning capacity. Prior to 1964, the federal courts apparently had not been confronted with an employee, entitled to compensation under the schedule, who attempted to secure a greater recovery by establishing an actual loss of wages or wage-earning capacity in excess of the schedule benefit. Although the question arose in a significantly different context, another 1964 decision, Flamm v. Hughes, 329 F. 2d 378, 380, suggests that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the schedule and “other cases” provisions mutually exclusive. Mason v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 1 BRBS 357, 363-365 (1975). In Mason, the Board rejected Williams in favor of American Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 269, 426 F. 2d 1263 (1970), a decision upon which the court below also relied. See 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328. The opinion in Jones, however, does not address the exclusivity issue presented in this case. Rather, Jones held merely that a scheduled injury can give rise to an award for permanent total disability under § 8 (a) where the facts establish that the injury prevents the employee from engaging in the only employment for which he is qualified. 138 U. S. App. D. C., at 271-272, 426 F. 2d, at 1265-1266. This conclusion is entirely consistent with the statute which, in § 8 (a), directs that “permanent total disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts.” 33 U. S. C. §908 (a). Indeed, since the §8(c) schedule applies only in cases of permanent partial disability, once it is determined that an employee is totally disabled the schedule becomes irrelevant. The question presented in Mason and in this case is the very different question of whether § 8 (c) permits an employee suffering from a disability determined to be partial in character to choose between recovery under the schedule and recovery under § 8 (c) (21). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently recognized this distinction when it noted that Williams and Jones are in no way inconsistent, because the former concerns partial disability while the latter concerns total disability. See Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Dugger, 587 F. 2d 197, 198 (1979). See Collins v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 9 BRBS 1015 (1979); Brandt v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 8 BRBS 698 (1978); Dugger v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 8 BRBS 552 (1978); Richardson v. Perna & Cantrell, Inc., 6 BRBS 588 (1977); Longo v. Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp., 2 BRBS 357 (1975). It should be noted that two of these decisions, Dugger and Longo, involved permanent total, not permanent partial, disability; therefore, comments in those decisions pertaining to the exclusivity issue are dicta. See n. 17, supra. It should also be noted that the Benefits Review Board is not a policymaking agency; its interpretation of the LHWCA thus is not entitled to any special deference from the courts. See Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 202 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 94, 628 F. 2d 85, 94 (1980) cert. denied, post, p. 905; Tri-State Terminals, Inc. v. Jesse, 596 F. 2d 752, 757, n. 5 (CA7 1979). In the Board’s most recent examination of the exclusivity issue, Collins v. Todd Shipyards, supra, Chairman Smith vigorously dissented from the majority’s conclusion that § 8 (c) (21) benefits are available for scheduled injuries. 9 BRBS, at 1027-1036. Chairman Smith acknowledged that the contrary construction could produce inequitable results, but concluded that the statutory language would support no other construction: “The statute is not ambiguous or indefinite. It needs no strained interpretation or construction. The statutory language contained in Section 8 (c) clearly indicates that the schedule awards and the Section 8 (c) (21) awards are mutually exclusive. Sections 8 (c)(1) through (20) set forth the provisions and conditions for making schedule awards. Section 8 (e) (21) represents a clear line of demarcation from the schedule in that it applies to 'all other cases’ in the permanent partial class of disability.” Id., at 1027. The majority quoted the following passage from a leading treatise on workmen’s compensation law: “ 'Although it is difficult to speak in terms of a majority rule on this point, because of significant differences in statutory background, it can be said that at one time the doctrine of exclusiveness of schedule allowances did dominate the field. But in recent years there has developed such a strong trend in the opposite direction that one might now, with equal justification, say that the field is dominated by the view that schedule allowances should not be deemed exclusive, whether the issue is treatment of a smaller member as a percentage loss of a larger, or treatment of any scheduled loss as a partial or total disability of the body as a whole.’ ” 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 214-215, 606 F. 2d, at 1328-1329, quoting 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 58.20, pp. 10-212 to 10-214 (1976) (footnotes omitted). The trend away from exclusivity identified by Professor Larson has developed, at least in part, in eases involving scheduled injuries which result in either total disability or permanent partial disability extending in effect to other parts of the body. See id., § 58.20, pp. 10-196 to 10-206, 10-214 to 10-220. We are concerned here solely with a case in which a scheduled injury, limited in effect to the injured part of the body, results in a permanent partial disability. With respect to the limited question before us, it appears that, despite the recent trend to the contrary, a significant number of jurisdictions continue to view schedule benefits as exclusive in cases of permanent partial disability. See, e. g., E. Blair, Reference Guide to Workmen’s Compensation Law §11:07, p. 11-24 (1974); 11 W. Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation §2322 (a), pp. 562-565 (Perm. ed. 1957). Indeed, Professor Larson’s treatise indicates that exclusivity, although perhaps no longer the majority view, nonetheless represents the view of “many jurisdictions.” See 2 A. Larson, supra, § 58.00, p. 10-164; § 58.20, pp. 10-206 to 10-212; see also id., § 58.13, p. 10-174. As Professor Larson noted in the passage quoted by the court below, “at one time the doctrine of exclusiveness of schedule allowances did dominate the field.” Id., § 58.20, p. 10-212, quoted in 196 U. S. App. D. C., at 421, 606 F. 2d, at 1328. See n. 19, supra. See, e. g., Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U. S. 410, 415 (1963); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 333 (1953); Baltimore & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 414 (1932). The LHWCA clearly does not attempt to compensate injured employees for their entire loss. In all four classes of disability covered by the Act, see n. 8, swpra, the maximum compensation available is expressly designated to be less than an employee’s actual economic loss. In this respect, the LHWCA is typical of most workmen’s compensation statutes. See 1 A. Larson, supra n. 19, § 2.50, p. 11; Small, The General Structure of Law Applicable to Employee Injury and Death, 16 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1027-1028 (1963). The compromise nature of workmen’s compensation legislation is well recognized: “Workmen’s compensation acts are in the nature of a compromise or quid pro quo between employer and employee. Employers relinquish certain legal rights which the law affords to them and so, in tum, do the employees. Employers give up the common-law defenses of the fellow servant rule and assumption of risk. Employees are assured hospital and medical care and subsistence during the convalescence period. In return for a fixed schedule of payments and a fixed amount in the event of the worker’s death, employers are made certain that irrespective of their fault, liability to an injured workman is limited under workmen’s compensation. Employees, on the other hand, ordinarily give up the right of suit for damages for personal injuries against employers in return for the certainty of compensation payments as recompense for those injuries.” 1 M. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries § 55, p. 102 (3d ed. 1975). See also E. Blair, supra n. 20, §1:00, pp. 1-1 to 1-2; W. Prosser, Law of Torts 531-532 (4th ed. 1971). This Court has previously recognized that the concept of compromise is central to the LHWCA, as adopted by the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act: “A prime purpose of the Act is to provide residents of the District of Columbia with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to place on District of Columbia employers a limited and determinate liability.” Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S., at 476. Under the schedule, Cross is entitled to an award of approximately $3,200 to $12,800, depending upon the ultimate conclusion with respect to the degree of his disability. See n. 4, supra. Under §8(c)(21), in contrast, Cross was awarded $86.76 per week for the remainder of his working life, which, according to counsel in this case, could amount to well over $100,000. Brief for Petitioner 9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, 31, 34, 36. This dramatic disparity may be partially attributable to the fact that Cross received an exceptional amount of overtime compensation in the year preceding his injury. It is possible that, had Cross’ disability been temporary in duration, he might have been entitled to a larger recovery than is available under the schedule for his permanent disability. On the basis of the evidence presented below, the maximum award available to Cross under the schedule is approximately $12,800. Because compensation for temporary partial disability under § 8 (e) is based upon lost wage-earning capacity rather than a schedule, Cross could have received approximately $22,400 for a temporary partial disability, assuming that the loss of wage-earning capacity demonstrate^ in this case was found to continue for the 5-year maximum temporary partial disability period. See 33 U. S. C. § 908 (e). As The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, stated in another case in which plain statutory language led to a seemingly incongruous result: “Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978). Compensation for permanent partial disability apparently presents particularly complex and troublesome problems in the workmen’s compensation field. See generally Burton, Permanent Partial Disabilities and Workers’ Compensation, 53 J. Urb. L. 853 (1976). Such problems are appropriately solved by legislative, not judicial, action. Although § 8 (e) has been amended in minor respects since its enactment, the present schedule is substantially identical to the schedule included in the Act in 1927.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. v. UNITED STATES. No. 451. Argued May 17, 1960. Decided June 13, 1960. Hugh B. Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was William F. Zearfaus. Assistant Attorney General Doub argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Alan S. Rosenthal. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the power of District Courts to review Interstate Commerce Commission orders determining the reasonableness of rates. In 1941 and 1942 the United States made 75 shipments of iron and steel over the Pennsylvania Railroad intended for export from the port of New York to Great Britain. War conditions prevented exportation from New York. This caused a dispute about applicable transportation charges since the Pennsylvania had in effect tariffs for “domestic rates” that were higher than “export rates.” Since the goods were not exported as planned the Railroad billed the United States for the higher domestic rates which the Government paid because required to do so by § 322 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 955, 49 U. S. C. § 66. Later, under authority of the same section, the General Accounting Office deducted from other bills due the Railroad the difference between the higher and lower rates, claiming that the higher domestic rates were inapplicable, unreasonable and unlawful. The Railroad then brought this action in the Court of Claims to recover the amount deducted. Properly relying on our holding in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 62-70, the Court of Claims suspended proceedings to enable the parties to have the Interstate Commerce Commission pass on the reasonableness of the rates. After hearings the Commission found and reported that the domestic rates were “unjust and unreasonable” as to 62 of the shipments but “just and reasonable” as to 13. 305 I. C. C. 259, 265. The Railroad then took two steps to challenge that part of the order adverse to it: (1) it invoked the jurisdiction of a United States District Court in Pennsylvania under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 1398, and 49 U. S. C. § 17 (9) to enjoin and set aside the order; and (2) it moved that the Court of Claims stay its proceedings until the District Court could pass upon the validity of the order. The United States objected to further stay in the Court of Claims and asked for dismissal of the case or judgment in its favor. It urged in support of dismissal that the Railroad had deprived the Court of Claims of jurisdiction when it filed the .District Court action to enjoin the Commission. order because 28 U. S. C. § 1500 declares that “The Court of Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States . . . The Court of Claims rejected this contention and its action in this respect is not challenged here. The United States argued in support of its motion for judgment that the order of the Commission did not require anything to be done or not done, that it was therefore an advisory opinion only, and consequently not the kind of “order” subject to review by 28 U. S. C. § 1336, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (9), or any other provision of law. The contention of the United States was that although the Court of Claims was compelled to submit the question of the reasonableness of the rates to the Commission, neither that court nor any other court had power to review the Commission’s determination. The Court of Claims agreed with this contention of the United States, accordingly refused to stay the case for the District Court to pass on the validity of the order, and entered judgment for the Railroad for only $1,663.39, which the Commission had held to be recoverable, instead of the $7,237.87 which the Railroad claimed. The result is that the Railroad has been held bound by the Commission’s order although completely denied any judicial review of that order. We granted certiorari to consider this denial. 361 U. S. 922. The Railroad contends that it was error for the Court of Claims to refuse to stay its proceedings while the District Court reviewed the Commission’s order. The Solicitor General concedes here that this was error. We reach the same conclusion on the basis of our independent consideration of the record. We decided some years ago that while a mere “abstract declaration” on some issue by the Commission may not be judicially reviewable, an order that determines a “right or obligation” so that “legal consequences” will flow from it is reviewable. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 131, 132, 143. The record shows that the Commission order here meets this standard. The Commission found that the Railroad’s domestic rates were “unreasonable” as to 62 shipments. This order is by no means a mere “advisory opinion,” its “legal consequences” are obvious, for if valid it forecloses the “right” of the Railroad to recover its domestic rates on those shipments. We have held that judicial review is equally available whether a Commission order-relates to past or future rates, or whether its proceeding follows referral by a court or originates with the Commission. El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U. S. 12. For these reasons we conclude that the Railroad was entitled to have this Commission order judicially reviewed. We have already determined, however, that the power to review such an order cannot be exercised by the Court of Claims. United States v. Jones, 336 U. S. 641, 651-653, 670-671. That jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the District Courts. 28 U. S. C. § 1336, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (9). See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U. S. 118, 122. Moreover, this order is properly reviewable by a one-judge rather than a three-judge District Court because it is essentially one “for the payment of money” within the terms of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2321 and 2325, which exempt such orders from the three-judge procedure of 28 U. S. C. § 2284. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U. S. 426, 441, 443. It necessarily follows, of course, that since the Railroad had a right to have the Commission’s order reviewed, and only the District Court had the jurisdiction to review it, the Court of Claims was under a duty to stay its proceedings pending this review. Other questions argued by the Government are not properly presented by this record. It was error for the Court of Claims to render judgment on the basis of the Commission's order without suspending its proceedings to await determination of the validity of that order by the Pennsylvania District Court. Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALLIED CHEMICAL & ALKALI WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO. 1 v. PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS CO., CHEMICAL DIVISION, et al. No. 70-32. Argued October 20, 1971 Decided December 8, 1971 Mortimer Riemer argued the cause for petitioner in No. 70-32. With him on the brief was Lawrence M. Oberdank. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner in No. 70-39. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Richard B. Stone, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, and Nancy M. Sherman. Guy Farmer argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief was Nicholas R. Criss, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, Thomas E. Harris, and Stephen I. Schlossberg for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., and by Harold Edgar, David H. Marlin, and Robert J. Mozer for the National Council of Senior Citizens. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Milton A. Smith, Lawrence M. Cohen, and Gerard C. Smetana for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Lambert H. Miller and Richard D. Godown for the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States; and by William C. Treanor and John W. Whittlesey for Union Carbide Corp. Together with No. 70-39, National Labor Relations Board v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Division, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include pension and insurance benefits for active employees, and an employer’s mid-term unilateral modification of such benefits constitutes an unfair labor practice. This cause presents the question whether a mid-term unilateral modification that concerns, not the benefits of active employees, but the benefits of already retired employees also constitutes an unfair labor practice. The National Labor Relations Board, one member dissenting, held that changes in retired employees' retirement benefits are embraced by the bargaining obligation and that an employer’s unilateral modification of them constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. 177 N. L. R. B. 911 (1969). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed and refused to enforce the Board’s cease-and-desist order, 427 P. 2d 936 (1970). We granted certiorari, 401 U. S. 907 (1971). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Since 1949, Local 1, Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers of America, has been the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees “working” on hourly rates of pay at the Barberton, Ohio, facilities of respondent Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. In 1950, the Union and the Company negotiated an employee group health insurance plan, in which, it was orally agreed, retired employees could participate by contributing the required premiums, to be deducted from their pension benefits. This program continued unchanged until 1962, except for an improvement unilaterally instituted by the Company in 1954 and another improvement negotiated in 1959. In 1962 the Company agreed to contribute two dollars per month toward the cost of insurance premiums of employees who retired in the future and elected to participate in the medical plan. The parties also agreed at this time to make 65 the mandatory retirement age. In 1964 insurance benefits were again negotiated, and the Company agreed to increase its monthly contribution from two to four dollars, applicable to employees retiring after that date and also to pensioners who had retired since the effective date of the 1962 contract. It was agreed, however, that the Company might discontinue paying the two-dollar increase if Congress enacted a national health program. In November 1965, Medicare, a national health program, was enacted, 79 Stat. 291, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. The 1964 contract was still in effect, and the Union sought mid-term bargaining to renegotiate insurance benefits for retired employees. The Company responded in March 1966 that, in its view, Medicare rendered the health insurance program useless because of a non-duplication-of-benefits provision in the Company’s insurance policy, and stated, without negotiating any change, that it was planning to (a) reclaim the additional two-dollar monthly contribution as of the effective date of Medicare; (b) cancel the program for retirees; and (c) substitute the payment of the three-dollar monthly subscription fee for supplemental Medicare coverage for each retired employee. The Union acknowledged that the Company had the contractual right to reduce its monthly contribution, but challenged its proposal unilaterally to substitute supplemental Medicare coverage for the negotiated health plan. The Company, as it had done during the 1959 negotiations without pressing the point, disputed the Union’s right to bargain in behalf of retired employees, but advised the Union that upon further consideration it had decided not to terminate the health plan for pensioners. The Company stated instead that it would write each retired employee, offering to pay the supplemental Medicare premium if the employee would withdraw from the negotiated plan. Despite the Union’s objections the Company did circulate its proposal to the retired employees, and 15 of 190 retirees elected to accept it. The Union thereupon filed unfair labor practice charges. The Board held that although the Company was not required to engage in mid-term negotiations, the benefits of already retired employees could not be regarded as other than a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Board reasoned that “retired employees are 'employees’ within the meaning of the statute for the purposes of bargaining about changes in their retirement benefits . . . .” 177 N. L. R. B., at 912. Moreover, “retirement status is a substantial connection to the bargaining unit, for it is the culmination and the product of years of employment.” Id., at 914. Alternatively, the Board considered “bargaining about changes in retirement benefits for retired employees” as “within the contemplation of the statute because of the interest which active employees have in this subject . . . .” Id., at 912. Apparently in support of both theories, the Board noted that “[bargaining on benefits for workers already retired is an established aspect of current labor-management relations.” Id., at 916. The Board also held that the Company's “establishment of a fixed, additional option in and of itself changed the negotiated plan of benefits” contrary to §§ 8 (d) and 8 (a)(5) of the Act. Id., at 918. Accordingly, the Company was ordered to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively about retirement benefits and from making unilateral adjustments in health insurance plans for retired employees without first negotiating in good faith with the Union. The Company was also required to rescind, at the Union’s request, any adjustment it had unilaterally instituted and to mail and post appropriate notices. II Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act declares the policy of the United States to protect commerce “by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment. . . .” 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151. To effectuate this policy, § 8 (a) (5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section” 9 (a). 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(5). Section 8(d), in turn, defines “to bargain collectively” as “the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment...61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. 1158(d). Finally, § 9 (a) declares: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . . .” 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). Together, these provisions establish the obligation of the employer to bargain collectively, “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” with “the representatives of his employees” designated or selected by the majority “in a unit appropriate for such purposes.” This obligation extends only to the “terms and conditions of employment” of the employer’s “employees” in the “unit appropriate for such purposes” that the union represents. See, e. g., Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 666 (1965); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958); Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485 (1947); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 192 (1941) (dictum); Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941). The Board found that benefits of already retired employees fell within these constraints on alternative theories. First, it held that pensioners are themselves “employees” and members of the bargaining unit, so that their benefits are a “term and condition” of their employment. The Court of Appeals, in contrast, held “that retirees are not ‘employees’ within the meaning of section 8 (a) (5) and . . . the Company was under no constraint to collectively bargain improvements in their benefits with the Union.” 427 F. 2d, at 942. The court reasoned, first, “[Retirement with this Company, as with most other companies, is a complete and final severance of employment. Upon retirement, employees are completely removed from the payroll and seniority lists, and thereafter they perform no services for the employer, are paid no wages, are under no restrictions as to other employment or activities, and have no rights or expectations of reemployment,” id., at 944; and, second, “[i]t has repeatedly been held that the scope of the bargaining unit controls the extent of the bargaining obligation .... [And] the unit certified by the Board as appropriate was composed . . . only of presumably active employees . . . .” Id., at 945. For the reasons that follow we agree with the Court of Appeals. First. Section 2 (3) of the Act provides: “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . .” 49 Stat. 450, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3). We have repeatedly affirmed that the task of determining the contours of the term “employee” “has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act.” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 130 (1944). See also Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701, 706 (1963); NLRB v. Atkins & Co., 331 U. S. 398 (1947). But we have never immunized Board judgments from judicial review in this respect. “[T]he Board’s determination that specified persons are ‘employees’ under this Act is to be accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, supra, at 131. In this cause we hold that the Board’s decision is not supported by the law. The Act, after all, as § 1 makes clear, is concerned with the disruption to commerce that arises from interference with the organization and collective-bargaining rights of “workers” — not those who have retired from the work force. The inequality of bargaining power that Congress sought to remedy was that of the “working” man, and the labor disputes that it ordered to be subjected to collective bargaining were those of employers and their active employees. Nowhere in the history of the National Labor Relations Act is there any evidence that retired workers are to be considered as within the ambit of the collective-bargaining obligations of the statute. To the contrary, the legislative history of § 2 (3) itself indicates that the term “employee” is not to be stretched beyond its plain meaning embracing only those who work for another for hire. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, supra, we sustained the Board’s finding that newsboys were “employees” rather than independent contractors. We said that “the broad language of the Act’s definitions, which in terms reject conventional limitations on such conceptions as ‘employee,’ . . . leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifications.” The term “employee” “must be understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and the facts involved in the economic relationship.” 322 U. S., at 129. Congress reacted by specifically excluding from the definition of “employee” “any individual having the status of an independent contractor.” The House, which proposed the amendment, explained: “An ‘employee,’ according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, . . . means someone who works for another for hire. But in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. . . . , the Board . . . held independent merchants who bought newspapers from the publisher and hired people to sell them to be 'employees.' The people the merchants hired to sell the papers were ‘employees’ of the merchants, but holding the merchants to be ‘employees’ of the publisher of the papers was most far reaching. It must be presumed that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it intended words it used to have the meanings that they had when Congress passed the act, not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor Board might think up. In the law, there always has been a difference, and a big difference, between ‘employees’ and ‘independent contractors.’ ‘Employees’ work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. ... It is inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to give to every word in the act whatever meaning it wished. On the contrary, Congress intended then, and it intends now, that the Board give to words not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947) (emphasis added). See also 93 Cong. Rec. 6441-6442; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33 (1947). The 1947 Taft-Hartley revision made clear that general agency principles could not be ignored in distinguishing “employees” from independent contractors. NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U. S. 254, 256 (1968). Although Hearst Publications was thus repudiated, we do not think its approach has been totally discredited. In doubtful cases resort must still be had to economic and policy considerations to infuse § 2 (3) with meaning. But, as the House comments quoted above demonstrate, this is not a doubtful case. The ordinary meaning of “employee” does not include retired workers; retired employees have ceased to work for another for hire. The decisions on which the Board relied in construing § 2 (3) to the contrary are wide of the mark. The Board enumerated “unfair labor practice situations where the statute has been applied to persons who have not been initially hired by an employer or whose employment has terminated. Illustrative are cases in which the Board has held that applicants for employment and registrants at hiring halls — who have never been hired in the first place — as well as persons who have quit or whose employers have gone out of business are 'employees’ embraced by the policies of the Act.” 177 N. L. R. B., at 913 (citations omitted). Yet all of these cases involved people who, unlike the pensioners here, were members of the active work force available for hire and at least in that sense could be identified as “employees.” No decision under the Act is cited, and none to our knowledge exists, in which an individual who has ceased work without expectation of further employment has been held to be an “employee.” The Board also found support for its position in decisions arising under § 302 (c) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5). Section 302 prohibits, inter alia, any payment by an employer to any representative of any of his employees. Subsection (c) (5) provides an exemption for payments to an employee trust fund established "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer" and administered by equal numbers of representatives of the employer and employees. The word "employee," as used in that provision, has been construed to include "current employees and persons who were . . . current employees but are now retired." Blassie v. Kroger Co., 345 F. 2d 58, 70 (CA8 1965). The Board considered that it would be anomalous to hold "that retired employees are not `employees' whose ongoing benefits are fit subjects of bargaining under Section 8 (a) (5), while under [§ 302 (c)] they are `employees' for the purpose of administering the same health insurance benefits. It would create the further anomaly that a union would not be entitled to act as the representative of retired employees under Section 8 (a) (5), while subject to an explicit statutory duty to act as their representative under [§ 302 (c)]." 177 N. L. R. B., at 915. Yet the rationale of Blassie is not at all in point. The question there was simply whether under § 302 (c) (5) retirees remain eligible for benefits of trust funds established during their active employment. The conclusion that they do was compelled by the fact that the contrary reading of the statute would have made illegal contributions to pension plans, which the statute expressly contemplates in subsections (A) and (C). No comparable situation exists in this case. Furthermore, there is no anomaly in the conclusion that retired workers are “employees” within § 302 (c) (5) entitled to the benefits negotiated while they were active employees, but are not “employees” whose ongoing benefits are embraced by the bargaining obligation of § 8 (a)(5). Contrary to the Board’s assertion, the union’s role in the administration of the fund is of a far different order from its duties as collective-bargaining agent. To accept the Board’s reasoning that the union’s § 302 (c) (5) responsibilities dictate the scope of the § 8 (a) (5) collective-bargaining obligation would be to allow the tail to wag the dog. Second. Section 9 (a) of the Labor Relations Act accords representative status only to the labor organization selected or designated by the majority of employees in a "unit appropriate" "for the purposes of collective bargaining." Section 9 (b) goes on to direct the Labor Board to "decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . ." 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (b). We have always recognized that, in making these determinations, the Board is accorded broad discretion. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S., at 132-135; Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146 (1941). Moreover, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. National Labor Relations Act, § 10 (e), 49 Stat. 454, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). But the Board's powers in respect of unit determinations are not without limits, and if its decision "oversteps the law," Packard Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S., at 491, it must be reversed. In this cause, in addition to holding that pensioners are not “employees” within the meaning of the collective-bargaining obligations of the Act, we hold that they were not and could not be “employees” included in the bargaining unit. The unit determined by the Board to be appropriate was composed of “employees of the Employer’s plant . . . working on hourly rates, including group leaders who work on hourly rates of pay . . . Apart from whether retirees could be considered “employees” within this language, they obviously were not employees “working” or “who work” on hourly rates of pay. Although those terms may include persons on temporary or limited absence from work, such as employees on military duty, it would utterly destroy the function of language to read them as embracing those whose work has ceased with no expectation of return. In any event, retirees could not properly be joined with the active employees in the unit that the Union represents. “As a standard, the Board must comply . . . with the requirement that the unit selected must be one to effectuate the policy of the act, the policy of efficient collective bargaining.” Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 165. The Board must also exercise care that the rights of employees under § 7 of the Act “to self-organization . . . [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing” are duly respected. In line with these standards, the Board regards as its primary concern in resolving unit issues “to group together only employees who have substantial mutual interests in wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.” 15 NLRB Ann. Rep. 39 (1950). Such a mutuality of interest serves to assure the coherence among employees necessary for efficient collective bargaining and at the same time to prevent a functionally distinct minority group of employees from being submerged in an overly large unit. See Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N. L. R. B. 134, 137 (1962). Here, even if, as the Board found, active and retired employees have a common concern in assuring that the latter’s benefits remain adequate, they plainly do not share a community of interests broad enough to justify inclusion of the retirees in the bargaining unit. Pensioners’ interests extend only to retirement benefits, to the exclusion of wage rates, hours, working conditions, and all other terms of active employment. Incorporation of such a limited-purpose constituency in the bargaining unit would create the potential for severe internal conflicts that would impair the unit’s ability to function and would disrupt the processes of collective bargaining. Moreover, the risk cannot be overlooked that union representatives on occasion might see fit to bargain for improved wages or other conditions favoring active employees at the expense of retirees’ benefits. But we need not rely on our own assessment of the probable consequences of including retirees in the bargaining unit to conclude that the resulting unit would be inappropriate. The Board itself has previously recognized that retirees do not have a sufficient interest to warrant participation in the election of a collective-bargaining agent. In Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, 72 N. L. R. B. 224, 229-230 (1947), for example, the Board stated: “We have considerable doubt as to whether or not pensioners are employees within the meaning of Section 2 (3) of the Act, since they no longer perform any work for the Employers, and have little expectancy of resuming their former employment. In any event, even if pensioners were to be considered as employees, we believe that they lack a substantial community of interest with the employees who are presently in the active service of the Employers. Accordingly, we find that pensioners are ineligible to vote in the election.” The Board argues, however, that the pensioners’ ineligibility to vote is not dispositive of their right to membership in the bargaining unit, since the franchise and the right to membership depend upon different levels of interest in the unit. Yet in W. D. Byron & Sons of Maryland, Inc., 55 N. L. R. B. 172, 174-175 (1944), which the Board found controlling in Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, see 72 N. L. R. B., at 230 n. 10, the Board not merely held ineligible to vote, but expressly excluded from the bargaining unit pensioners who had little expectation of further employment. In any event, it would be clearly inconsistent with the majority rule principle of the Act to deny a member of the unit at the time of an election a voice in the selection of his bargaining representative. The Board’s own holdings thus compel the conclusion that a unit composed of active and retired workers would be inappropriate. Third. The Board found that bargaining over pensioners’ rights has become an established industrial practice. But industrial practice cannot alter the conclusions that retirees are neither “employees” nor bargaining unit members. The parties dispute whether a practice of bargaining over pensioners’ benefits exists and, if so, whether it reflects the views of labor and management that the subject is not merely a convenient but a mandatory topic of negotiation. But even if industry commonly regards retirees’ benefits as a statutory subject of bargaining, that would at most, as we suggested in Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 211 (1964), reflect the interests of employers and employees in the subject matter as well as its amenability to the collective-bargaining process; it would not be determinative. Common practice cannot change the law and make into bargaining unit “employees” those who are not. III Even if pensioners are not bargaining unit “employees,” are their benefits, nonetheless, a mandatory subject of collective bargaining as “terms and conditions of employment” of the active employees who remain in the unit? The Board held, alternatively, that they are, on the ground that they “vitally” affect the “terms and conditions of employment” of active employees principally by influencing the value of both their current and future benefits. 177 N. L. R. B., at 915. The Board explained: “It is not uncommon to group active and retired employees under a single health insurance contract with the result that ... it is the size and experience of the entire group which may determine insurance rates.” Ibid. Consequently, active employees may “benefit from the membership of retired employees in the group whose participation enlarges its size and might thereby lower costs per participant.” Ibid. Furthermore, the actual value of future benefits depends upon contingencies, such as inflation and changes in public law, which the parties cannot adequately anticipate and over which they have little or no control. By establishing a practice of representing retired employees in resolving those contingencies as they arise, active workers can insure that their own retirement benefits will survive the passage of time. This, in turn, the Board contends, facilitates the peaceful settlement of disputes over active employees’ pension plans. The Board’s arguments are not insubstantial, but they do not withstand careful scrutiny. Section 8 (d) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for mandatory bargaining. See, e. g., Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 220-221 (STEWART, J., concurring); Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 97 U. S. App. D. C. 383, 389-390, 231 F. 2d 717, 723-724 (1956). But it does establish a limitation against which proposed topics must be measured. In general terms, the limitation includes only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees. See, e. g., NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958). Although normally matters involving individuals outside the employment relationship do not fall within that category, they are not wholly excluded. In Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959), for example, an agreement had been negotiated in the trucking industry, establishing a minimum rental that carriers would pay to truck owners who drove their own vehicles in the carriers' service in place of the latter's employees. Without determining whether the owner-drivers were themselves "employees," we held that the minimum rental was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and hence immune from state antitrust laws, because the term "was integral to the establishment of a stable wage structure for clearly covered employee-drivers." United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 382-383, n. 26 (1962). Similarly, in Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 215, we held that "the type of `contracting out' involved in this case—the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment—is a statutory subject of collective bargaining . . . ." As we said there, id., at 213, "the work of the employees in the bargaining unit was let out piecemeal in Oliver, whereas here the work of the entire unit has been contracted out.” The Board urges that Oliver and Fibreboard provide the principle governing this cause. The Company, on the other hand, would distinguish those decisions on the ground that the unions there sought to protect employees from outside threats, not to represent the interests of third parties. We agree with the Board that the principle of Oliver and Fibreboard is relevant here; in each case the question is not whether the third-party concern is antagonistic to or compatible with the interests of bargaining-unit employees, but whether it vitally affects the “terms and conditions” of their employment. But we disagree with the Board’s assessment of the significance of a change in retirees’ benefits to the “terms and conditions of employment” of active employees. The benefits that active workers may reap by including retired employees under the same health insurance contract are speculative and insubstantial at best. As the Board itself acknowledges in its brief, the relationship between the inclusion of retirees and the overall insurance rate is uncertain. Adding individuals increases the group experience and thereby generally tends to lower the rate, but including pensioners, who are likely to have higher medical expenses, may more than offset that effect. In any event, the impact one way or the other on the “terms and conditions of employment” of active employees is hardly comparable to the loss of jobs threatened in Oliver and Fibreboard. In Fibreboard, after holding that “the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment” is a mandatory subject of bargaining, we noted that our decision did “not encompass other forms of 'contracting out' or ‘subcontracting’ which arise daily in our complex economy.” 379 U. S., at 215. The inclusion of retirees in the same insurance contract surely has even less impact on the “terms and conditions of employment” of active employees than some of the contracting activities that we excepted from our holding in Fibreboard. The mitigation of future uncertainty and the facilitation of agreement on active employees’ retirement plans, that the Board said would follow from the union’s representation of pensioners, are equally problematical. To be sure, the future retirement benefits of active workers are part and parcel of their overall compensation and hence a well-established statutory subject of bargaining. Moreover, provisions of those plans to guard against future contingencies are equally subsumed under the collective-bargaining obligation. Under the Board’s theory, active employees undertake to represent pensioners in order to protect their own retirement benefits, just as if they were bargaining for, say, a cost-of-living escalation clause. But there is a crucial difference. Having once found it advantageous to bargain for improvements in pensioners’ benefits, active workers are not forever thereafter bound to that view or obliged to negotiate in behalf of retirees again. To the contrary, they are free to decide, for example, that current income is preferable to greater certainty in their own retirement benefits or, indeed, to their retirement benefits altogether. By advancing pensioners’ interests now, active employees, therefore, have no assurance that they will be the beneficiaries of similar representation when they retire. The insurance against future contingencies that they may buy in negotiating benefits for retirees is thus a hazardous and, therefore, improbable investment, far different from a cost-of-living escalation clause that they could contractually enforce in court. See n. 20, supra,. We find, accordingly, that the effect that the Board asserts bargaining in behalf of pensioners would have on the negotiation of active employees’ retirement plans is too speculative a foundation on which to base an obligation to bargain. Nor does the Board’s citation of industrial practice provide any ground for concluding otherwise. The Board states in its brief that “[n] either the bargaining representative nor the active employees . . . can help but recognize that the active employees of today are the retirees of tomorrow — indeed, such a realization undoubtedly underlies the widespread industrial practice of bargaining about benefits of those who have already retired . . . and explains the vigorous interest which the Union has taken in this case.” But accepting the Board’s finding that the industrial practice exists, we find nowhere a particle of evidence cited showing that the explanation for this lies in the concern of active workers for their own future retirement benefits. We recognize that “classification of bargaining subjects as ‘terms [and] conditions of employment’ is a matter concerning which the Board has special expertise.” Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U. S. 676, 685-686 (1965). The Board’s holding in this cause, however, depends on the application of law to facts, and the legal standard to be applied is ultimately for the courts to decide and enforce. We think that in holding the “terms and conditions of employment” of active employees to be vitally affected by pensioners’ benefits, the Board here simply neglected to give the adverb its ordinary meaning. Cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 292 (1965). IV The question remains whether the Company committed an unfair labor practice by offering retirees an exchange for their withdrawal from the already negotiated health insurance plan. After defining “to bargain collectively” as meeting and conferring “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” § 8 (d) of the Act goes on to provide in relevant part that “where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract” except upon (1) timely notice to the other party, (2) an offer to meet and confer “for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications,” (3) timely notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and comparable state or territorial agencies of the existence of a “dispute,” and (4) continuation “in full force and effect [of] ... all the terms and conditions of the existing contract . . . until [its] expiration date . . . .” The Board's trial examiner ruled that the Company’s action in offering retirees a change in their health plan did not amount to a “modification” of the collective-bargaining agreement in violation of § 8 (d), since the pensioners had merely been given an additional option that they were free to accept or decline as they saw fit. The Board rejected that conclusion on the ground that there were several possible ways of adjusting the negotiated plan to the Medicare provisions and the Company “modified” the contract by unilaterally choosing one of them. The Company now urges, in effect, that we adopt the views of the trial examiner. We need not resolve, however, whether there was a “modification” within the meaning of § 8 (d), because we hold that even if there was, a “modification” is a prohibited unfair labor practice only when it changes a term that is a mandatory rather than a permissive subject of bargaining. Paragraph (4) of § 8 (d), of course, requires that a party proposing a modification continue “in full force and effect ... all the terms and conditions of the existing contract” until its expiration. Viewed in isolation from the rest of the provision, that language would preclude any distinction between contract obligations that are “terms and conditions of employment” and those that are not. But in construing § 8 (d), “ ‘we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ ” Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122). See also NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282, 288 (1957). Seen in that light, § 8 (d) embraces only mandatory topics of bargaining. The provision begins by defining “to bargain collectively” as meeting and conferring “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” It then goes on to state that “the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean” that mid-term unilateral modifications and terminations are prohibited. Although this part of the section is introduced by a “proviso” clause, see n. 21, supra, it quite plainly is to be construed in pari materia with the preceding definition. Accordingly, just as § 8 (d) defines the obligation to bargain to be with respect to mandatory terms alone, so it prescribes the duty to maintain only mandatory terms without unilateral modification for the duration of the collective-bargaining agreement. The relevant purpose of § 8 (d) that emerges from the legislative history of the Act together with the text of the provision confirms this understanding. The section stems from the 1947 revision of the Act, an important theme of which was to stabilize collective-bargaining agreements. The Senate bill, in particular, contained provisions in §§ 8 (d) and 301 (a) to prohibit unilateral mid-term modifications and terminations and to confer federal jurisdiction over suits for contract violations. See S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 8 (d), 301(a). The bill also included provisions to make it an unfair labor practice for an employer or labor organization "to violate the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id., §§ 8 (a)(6), 8(b)(5). In conference the Senate’s proposed §§ 8 (d) and 301 (a) were adopted with relatively few changes. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, supra, at 34-35, 65-66. The provisions to make contract violations an unfair labor practice, on the other hand, were rejected with the explanation that “[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board.” Id., at 42. The purpose of the proscription of unilateral mid-term modifications and terminations in § 8 (d) cannot be, therefore, simply to assure adherence to contract terms. As far as unfair-labor-practice remedies are concerned, that goal was to be achieved through other unfair-labor-practice provisions that were rejected in favor of customary judicial procedures. See Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 510-513 (1962). The structure and language of § 8 (d) point to a more specialized purpose than merely promoting general contract compliance. The conditions for a modification or termination set out in paragraphs (1) through (4) plainly are designed to regulate modifications and terminations so as to facilitate agreement in place of economic warfare. Thus, the party desiring to make a modification or termination is required to serve a written notice on the other party, offer to meet and confer, notify mediation and conciliation agencies if necessary, and meanwhile maintain contract relations. Accordingly, we think we accurately described the relevant aim of § 8 (d) when we said in Mastro Plastics Cory. v. NLRB, supra, at 284, that the provision “seeks to bring about the termination and modification of collective-bargaining agreements without interrupting the flow of commerce or the production of goods . . . .” If that is correct, the distinction that we draw between mandatory and permissive terms of bargaining fits the statutory purpose. By once bargaining and agreeing on a permissive subject, the parties, naturally, do not make the subject a mandatory topic of future bargaining. When a proposed modification is to a permissive term, therefore, the purpose of facilitating accord on the proposal is not at all in point, since the parties are not required under the statute to bargain with respect to it. The irrelevance of the purpose is demonstrated by the irrelevance of the procedures themselves of §8 (d). Paragraph (2), for example, requires an offer “to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications.” But such an offer is meaningless if a party is statutorily free to refuse to negotiate on the proposed change to the permissive term. The notification to mediation and conciliation services referred to in paragraph (3) would be equally meaningless, if required at all. We think it would be no less beside the point to read paragraph (4) of § 8 (d) as requiring continued adherence to permissive as well as mandatory terms. The remedy for a unilateral mid-term modification to a permissive term lies in an action for breach of contract, see n. 20, supra, not in an unfair-labor-practice proceeding. As a unilateral mid-term modification of a permissive term such as retirees’ benefits does not, therefore, violate § 8 (d), the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. See, e. g., NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F. 2d 523 (CA6 1954) (dictum): NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 179 F. 2d 221 (CA2 1950); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F. 2d 875 (CA1 1949); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F. 2d 247 (CA7 1948). See, e. g., NLRB v. Scam Instrument Corp., 394 F. 2d 884 (CA7 1968). Cf., e. g., NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F. 2d 964 (CA8 1967); C & S Industries, Inc., 158 N. L. R. B. 454 (1966). See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 (1962). The Board has since adhered to its decision in: Union Carbide Corp.-Linde Div., 76 L. R. R. M. 1585 (1971); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 76 L. R. R. M. 1451 (1971); Union Carbide Corp., 75 L. R. R. M. 1548 (1970); and Hooker Chemical Corp., 75 L. R. R. M. 1357 (1970). The Labor Board’s direction of election described the bargaining unit as: “all employees of the Employer’s plant and limestone mine at Barberton, Ohio, working on hourly rates, including group leaders who work on hourly rates of pay, but excluding salaried employees and supervisors . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The Union was re-certified in 1970, after the Board’s decision in this cause, with the same unit description embracing only employees working on hourly rates. Hospital benefits under Medicare are provided automatically to any social security annuitant 65 or over. Medical benefits are optional and, at the relevant time period, required a monthly three-dollar payment per person. The Board found that the Company had violated not only § 8 (a) (5) but § 8 (a) (1), and the Board framed its cease-and-desist order accordingly. Section 8 (a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in” § 7, which include “the right to self-organization . . . [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing . . . .” 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1), 157. However, the §8 (a) (1) violation derives from the alleged § 8 (a) (5) misconduct and, therefore, presents no separate issues. The Court of Appeals below seems to have read the Board’s decision as holding that retirees might be considered “employees" under the Act, but not as finding that the retirees in this case were. See 427 F. 2d, at 944 n. 14. We do not read the Board’s decision that way. The Board said: “For the reasons stated above, the ‘underlying economic facts’ of this case persuade us that Congress intended to confer employee status on retired employees with respect to health insurance plans affecting them.” 177 N. L. R. B. 911, 914. See also Garvison v. Jensen, 355 F. 2d 487 (CA9 1966); Local No. 688, Int'l Bro. of Teamsters v. Townsend, 345 F. 2d 77 (CA8 1965). Section 501 (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that the term "employee" as used in that legislation has the same meaning as when used in the National Labor Relations Act. 61 Stat. 161, 29 U. S. C. § 142 (3). Although the Board referred to § 302 (b) rather than § 302 (c), it is clear from the context of the Board's discussion that the latter citation was the one intended. Section 302 (c)(5) provides an exemption: “with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such [employee] representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents . . . : Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying ... for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; . . . and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The express reference to pensions in subsections (A) and (C) requires that the phrase “for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer” in the introductory clause to § 302 (c) (5) be read to include retirees. The Board adds an argument in its brief for construing “employee” in §§ 302 (c) (5) and 8 (a) (5) in -pari materia. Not to read the term that way, the Board contends, “would frequently interject into welfare plan negotiations the troublesome threshold question whether particular proposals involved the administration of the written agreement, in which case the union would be entitled to represent retired employees, or its renegotiation, in which case . . . it would not.” However, nothing we hold today precludes permissive bargaining over the benefits of already retired employees. Moreover, to the extent that “the troublesome threshold question” posited by the Board may arise, it is no different from the task of distinguishing the distinct functions of contract application and contract negotiation which employers and labor organizations are already accustomed to addressing. The Board argues in its brief that retirees will be at a greater disadvantage if they are required to bargain individually with the employer than if they are represented by the union. The argument assumes that collective bargaining over the benefits of already retired employees would be a one-way street in their favor. The assumption, however, is not free from doubt, as the Board itself recognized in its opinion, see 177 N. L. R. B., at 917, in declining to take a position on the question. Compare Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711 (1945), adhered to on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661 (1946), with §9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act. In any event, in representing retirees in the negotiation of retirement benefits, the union would be bound to balance the interests of all its constituents, with the result that the interests of active employees might at times be preferred to those of retirees. See Recent Developments, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 766-767, 772-773 (1970). See also J. S. Young Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1174 (1944). The Board indicates in its brief that it adheres to these decisions. Indeed, we are informed by the Company that the Board excluded retirees from the representation election that it conducted following its decision in this case. See n. 4, supra. The Board on that theory at one time withheld the right to vote from certain employees who were, nonetheless, acknowledged unit members. See, e. g., H. P. Wasson & Co., 105 N. L. R. B. 373 (1953). However, that policy was subsequently abandoned. See Post Houses, Inc., 161 N. L. R. B. 1159, 1160 n. 1, 1172 (1966). Section 7 of the Act declares that “[ejmployees shall have the right ... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing . . . .” Section 9 (a), in turn, provides that “[Representatives designated or selected ... by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit . . . .” The majority rule principle that the Act thus establishes was adopted after considerable public controversy. Both the House and the Senate committees that reported out the Wagner bill were at pains to explain that the principle not only was necessary for the effective functioning of collective bargaining but was sanctioned by the philosophy of democratic institutions. Moreover, they carefully reviewed the provisions that the Act establishes to protect minority groups within the bargaining unit, such as the prohibition on discrimination in favor of union members. See H. R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 18-20 (1935); S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 13-14 (1935). The language of §§ 7 and 9 (a), coupled with this legislative history, makes plain that all unit members are enfranchised. This is not to say that the Board is without power to develop reasonable regulations governing who may vote in Board-conducted elections. The House committee expressly indicated that the Board may “make and publish appropriate rules governing the conduct of elections and determining who may participate therein.” H. R. Rep. No. 972, supra, at 20. Thus, the Board may, for example, withhold the ballot from employees hired after the election eligibility date. As Member Zagoria explained in his dissent from the Board’s decision below, that rule “provides an administrative cutoff date for convenience in conducting elections, and to prevent payroll padding and other possible abuses.” 177 N. L. R. B., at 919. The Company also contends that the record is barren of any evidence to support the Board’s findings on industry experience. Even if that is the case, the evidence cited by the Board may have properly been officially noticed. But we need not decide that question in view of our conclusion that the industrial practice that the Board found to exist does not validate its holdings. The additional interests that the Board found active employees have in pensioners' benefits were properly dealt with by the Court of Appeals below and do not need extended consideration here. The Board stated that "the Union and current employees have a legitimate interest in assuring that negotiated retirement benefits are in fact paid and administered in accordance with the terms and intent of their contracts . . . ." 177 N. L. R. B., at 915. That interest is undeniable. But Congress has specifically established a remedy for breaches of collective-bargaining agreements in § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185. See, e. g., Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F. 2d 427 (CA6 1967). Similarly, Congress has expressly provided for employee representation in the administration of trust funds under § 302 (c) (5) of that Act. In any event, the question presented is not whether retirement rights are enforceable, but whether they are subject to compulsory bargaining. The Board also noted "that changes in retirement benefits for retired employees affect the availability of employer funds for active employees.” 177 N. L. R. B., at 915. That, again, is quite true. But countless other employer expenditures that concededly are not subjects of mandatory bargaining, such as supervisors’ salaries and dividends, have a similar impact. The principle that underlies the Board’s argument sweeps with far too broad a brush. The Board does suggest in its brief that pensioners’ benefits are different from other employer expenses because they are normally regarded as part of labor costs. The employer’s method of accounting, however, hardly provides a suitable basis for distinction. In any ease, the impact on active employees’ compensation from changes in pensioners’ benefits is, like the effect discussed in the text of including retirees under the same health insurance plan as active employees, too insubstantial to bring those changes within the collective-bargaining obligation. Specifically, we noted in Oliver, 358 U. S., at 294: “[The collective-bargaining agreement constitutes] ... a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the . . . contract. The inadequacy of a rental which means that the owner makes up his excess costs from his driver’s wages not only clearly bears a close relation to labor’s efforts to improve working conditions but is in fact of vital concern to the carrier’s employed drivers; an inadequate rental might mean the progressive curtailment of jobs through withdrawal of more and more carrier-owned vehicles from service.” This is not to say that application of Oliver and Fibreboard turns only on the impact of the third-party matter on employee interests. Other considerations, such as the effect on the employer’s freedom to conduct his business, may be equally important. See Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 217 (Stewart, J., concurring). But we have no occasion in this case to consider what, if any, those considerations may be. Since retirees are not members of the bargaining unit, the bargaining agent is under no statutory duty to represent them in negotiations with the employer. Nothing in Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 (1952), is to the contrary. In Howard we held that a union may not use the powers accorded it under law for the purposes of racial discrimination even against workers who are not members of the bargaining unit represented by the union. The reach and rationale of Howard are a matter of some conjecture. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 151, 157-159 (1957). But whatever its theory, the case obviously does not require a union affirmatively to represent nonbargaining unit members or to take into account their interests in making bona fide economic decisions in behalf of those whom it does represent. This does not mean that when a union bargains for retirees — which nothing in this opinion precludes if the employer agrees — the retirees are without protection. Under established contract principles, vested retirement rights may not be altered without the pensioner’s consent. See generally Note, 70 Col. L. Rev. 909, 916-920 (1970). The retiree, moreover, would have a federal remedy under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act for breach of contract if his benefits were unilaterally changed. See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195, 200-201 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459, 470 (1960). Section 8 (d) reads in full: “For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the malting of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification— “(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; “(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; “(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and "(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later: “The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2) — (4) of this subsection shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this title, and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 158 to 160 of this title, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer.” 29 U. S. C. §158 (d). In coming to a contrary conclusion, the trial examiner mistakenly relied on Brotherhood of Painters, Local Union No. 1S85, 143 N. L. R. B. 678 (1963), where the Board held that a union violated § 8 (d) by refusing to execute a written contract containing a permissive term to which it had previously agreed. “The parties did discuss the provision,” the Board reasoned, “and for us to hold that the Employers in this case may not insist on the inclusion of this provision in their contract would upset, if not undo, the stabilizing effects of the agreement which was reached after several negotiation meetings.” Id., at 680. The union was required to sign the contract at the employers’ request, not because § 8 (d) reaches permissive terms, but because the union’s refusal obstructed execution of an agreement on mandatory terms. Cf. NLRB v. Katz, supra, n. 2. The notification required by paragraph (3) is “of the existence of a dispute.” Section 2 (9) of the Act defines “labor dispute” to include “any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment 49 Stat. 450, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §152(9). Since controversies over permissive terms are excluded from the definition, a paragraph (3) notice might not be required in the case of a proposed modification to such a term even if § 8 (d) applied. It does not appear whether the collective-bargaining agreement involved in this cause provided for arbitration that would have been applicable to this dispute. We express no opinion, therefore, on the relevance of such a provision to the question before us.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. UNITED INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA et al. No. 178. Argued January 23-24, 1968. Decided March 6, 1968. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, petitioner in No. 178 and respondent in No. 179. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman and Norton J. Come. Isaac N. Groner argued the cause and filed a brief for the Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, petitioner in No. 179 and respondent in No. 178. Bernard G. Segal argued the cause for the United Insurance Co. of America, respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Samuel D. Slade and Herbert G. Keene, Jr. Shayle P. Fox filed a brief for the American Retail Federation, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Together with No. 179, Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. In its insurance operations respondent United Insurance Company uses “debit agents” whose primary functions are collecting premiums from policyholders, preventing the lapsing of policies, and selling such new insurance as time allows. The Insurance Workers International Union, having won a certification election, seeks to represent the debit agents, and the question before us is whether these agents are “employees” who are protected by the National Labor Relations Act or “independent contractors” who are expressly exempted from the Act. Respondent company refused to recognize the Union, claiming that its debit agents were independent contractors rather than employees. In the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding the National Labor Relations Board held that these agents were employees and ordered the company to bargain collectively with the Union. 154 N. L. R. B. 38. On appeal the Court of Appeals found that the debit agents were independent contractors and refused to enforce the Board’s order. 371 F. 2d 316 (C. A. 7th Cir.). The importance of the question in the context involved to the administration of the National Labor Relations Act prompted us to grant the petitions of the Board and the Union for certiorari. 389 U. S. 815. At the outset the critical issue is what standard or standards should be applied in differentiating “employee” from “independent contractor” as those terms are used in the Act. Initially this Court held in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, that “Whether . . . the term ‘employee’ includes [particular] workers . . . must be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation.” 322 U. S., at 124. Thus the standard was one of economic and policy considerations within the labor field. Congressional reaction to this construction of the Act was adverse and Congress passed an amendment specifically excluding “any individual having the status of an independent contractor” from the definition of “employee” contained in § 2 (3) of the Act. The obvious purpose of this amendment was to have the Board and the courts apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors under the Act. And both petitioners and respondents agree that the proper standard here is the law of agency. Thus there is no doubt that we should apply the common-law agency test here in distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. Since agency principles are to be applied, some factual background showing the relationship between the debit agents and respondent company is necessary. These basic facts are stated in the Board’s opinion and will be very briefly summarized here. Respondent has district offices in most States which are run by a manager who, usually has several assistant managers under him. Each assistant manager has a staff of four or five debit agents, and the total number of such agents connected with respondent company is approximately 3,300. New agents are hired by district managers, after interviews; they need have no prior experience and are assigned to a district office under the supervision of an assistant district manager. Once he is hired, a debit agent is issued a debit book which contains the names and addresses of the company’s existing policyholders in a relatively concentrated geographic area. This book is company property and must be returned to the company upon termination of the agent’s service. The main job of the debit agents is to collect premiums from the policyholders listed in this book. They also try to prevent the lapsing of policies and sell new insurance when time allows. The company compensates the agents as agreed to in the “Agent’s Commission Plan” under which the agent retains 20% of his weekly premium collections on* industrial insurance and 10% from holders of ordinary life, and 50% of the first year’s premiums on new ordinary life insurance sold by him. The company plan also provides for bonuses and other fringe benefits for the debit agents, including a vacation-with-pay plan and participation in a group insurance and profit-sharing plan. At the beginning of an agent’s service an assistant district manager accompanies the new agent on his rounds to acquaint him with his customers and show him the approved collection and selling techniques. The agent is also supplied with a company “Rate Book,” which the agent is expected to follow, containing detailed instructions on how to perform many of his duties. An agent must turn in his collected premiums to the district office once a week and also file a weekly report. At this time the agent usually attends staff meetings for the discussion of the latest company sales techniques, company directives, etc. Complaints against an agent are investigated by the manager or assistant manager, and, if well founded, the manager talks with the agent to “set him straight.” Agents who have poor production records, or who fail to maintain their accounts properly or to follow company rules, are “cautioned.” The district manager submits a weekly report to the home office, specifying, among other things, the agents whose records are below average; the amounts of their debits; their collection percentages, arrears, and production; and what action the district manager has taken to remedy the production “letdown.” If improvement does not follow, the company asks such agents to “resign,” or exercises its rights under the “Agent’s Commission Plan” to fire them “at any time.” There are innumerable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor, and these cases present such a situation. On the one hand these debit agents perform their work primarily away from the company’s offices and fix their own hours of work and work days; and clearly they are not as obviously employees as are production workers in a factory. On the other hand, however, they do not have the independence, nor are they allowed the initiative and decision-making authority, normally associated with an independent contractor. In such a situation as this there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, but all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive. What is important is that the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent common-law agency principles. When this is done, the decisive factors in these cases become the following: the agents do not operate their own independent businesses, but perform functions that are an essential part of the company’s normal operations; they need not have any prior training or experience, but are trained by company supervisory personnel; they do business in the company’s name with considerable assistance and guidance from the company and its managerial personnel and ordinarily sell only the company’s policies; the “Agent’s Commission Plan” that contains the terms and conditions under which they operate is promulgated and changed unilaterally by the company; the agents account to the company for the funds they collect under an elaborate and regular reporting procedure; the agents receive the benefits of the company’s vacation plan and group insurance and pension fund; and the agents have a permanent working arrangement with the company under which they may continue as long as their performance is satisfactory. Probably the best summation of what these factors mean in the reality of the actual working relationship was given by the chairman of the board of respondent company in a letter to debit agents about the time this unfair labor practice proceeding arose: “if any agent believes he has the power to make his own rules and plan of handling the company’s business, then that agent should hand in his resignation at once, and if we learn that said agent is not going to operate in accordance with the company’s plan, then the company will be forced to make the agents final [sic]. “The company is going to have its business managed in your district the same as all other company districts in the many states where said offices are located. The other company officials and I have managed the United Insurance Company of America’s operations for over 45 years very successfully, and we are going to continue the same successful plan of operation, and we will not allow anyone to interfere with us and our successful plan.” The Board examined all of these facts and found that they showed the debit agents to be employees. This was not a purely factual finding by the Board, but involved the application of law to facts — what do the facts establish under the common law of agency: employee or independent contractor? It should also be pointed out that such a determination of pure agency law involved no special administrative expertise that a court does not possess. On the other hand, the Board’s determination was a judgment made after a hearing with witnesses and oral argument had been held and on the basis of written briefs. Such a determination should not be set aside just because a court would, as an original matter, decide the case the other way. As we said in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, “Nor does it [the requirement for canvassing the whole record] mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” 340 U. S., at 488. Here the least that can be said for the Board’s decision is that it made a choice between two fairly conflicting views, and under these circumstances the Court of Appeals should have enforced the Board’s order. It was error to refuse to do so. Reversed. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.), protects an “employee” only and specifically excludes “any individual having the status of an independent contractor.” (§2(3).) See 93 Cong. Rec. 6441-6442, 2 Leg. Hist. of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 1537. See also H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 1 Leg. Hist., 1947, p. 309; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33, 1 Leg. Hist., 1947, pp. 536-537. See annotated cases in 55 A. L. R. 289 et seq. and 61 A. L. R. 218 et seq.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MONSANTO CO. et al. v. GEERTSON SEED FARMS et al. No. 09-475. Argued April 27, 2010 Decided June 21, 2010 Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 166. Breyer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease. Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Maureen E. Mahoney, Richard R Bress, Philip J. Perry, J. Scott Ballenger, Drew C. Ensign, and B. Andrew Brown. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the federal respondents in support of petitioners. On the briefs were Solicitor General Kagan, Assistant Attorney General Moreno, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Sarah E. Harrington, Andrew C. Mergen, Ellen J. Durkee, and Anna T. Katselas. Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for respondents Geertson Seed Farms et al. With him on the brief were Donald J. Russell, Alan E. Untereiner, Eva A. Temkin, George A. Kimbrell, Kevin S. Golden, and Richard J. Lazarus. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Dan Himmelfarb and Jay C. Johnson; for the American Sugarbeet Growers Association et al. by Jerrold J. Ganzfried, John F. Bruce, Gilbert S. Keteltas, Christopher H. Marraro, and John F. Stanton; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by F. William Brownell, Ryan A. Shores, Robin S. Conrad, Amar D. Sarwal, Harry M. Ng, Stacy R. Linden, Thomas Ward, and Douglas Nelson; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper and Damien M. Schiff; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Cory L. Andrews, and Kevin T. Haroff. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Arkansas Rice Growers Association et al. by Richard Drury; for CROPP Cooperative et al. by Stephanie Tai and Dennis M. Grzezinski; for the Union of Concerned Scientists et al. by Deborah A Sivas; and for Dinah Bear et al. by Hope M. Babcock. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California ex rel. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., et al. by Mr. Brown, Attorney General, pro se, Matt Rodriquez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gordon Burns, Deputy State Solicitor General, Ken Alex, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sally Magnani, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Susan S. Fie-ring, Deputy Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts by Martha Coakley, Attorney General, and Seth Schofield, Assistant Attorney General, and for the State of Oregon by John R. Kroger, Attorney General; for the Defenders of Wildlife et al. by Eric R. Glitzenstein and Howard M. Crystal; and for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al. by Allison M. LaPlante and Nathaniel S. W. Lawrence. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises out of a decision by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to deregulate a variety of genetically engineered alfalfa. The District Court held that APHIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq., by issuing its deregulation decision without first completing a detailed assessment of the environmental consequences of its proposed course of action. To remedy that violation, the District Court vacated the agency’s decision completely deregulating the alfalfa variety in question; ordered APHIS not to act on the deregulation petition in whole or in part until it had completed a detailed environmental review; and enjoined almost all future planting of the genetically engineered alfalfa pending the completion of that review. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s entry of permanent injunctive relief. The main issue now in dispute concerns the breadth of that relief. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I A The Plant Protection Act (PPA), 114 Stat. 438, 7 U. S. C. §7701 et seq., provides that the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (USDA) may issue regulations “to prevent the introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United States.” § 7711(a). The Secretary has delegated that authority to APHIS, a division of the USDA. 7 CFR §§ 2.22(a), 2.80(a)(36) (2010). Acting pursuant to that delegation, APHIS has promulgated regulations governing “the introduction of organisms and products altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant pests.” See § 340.0(a)(2), and n. 1. Under those regulations, certain genetically engineered plants are presumed to be “plant pests” — and thus “regulated articles” under the PPA — until APHIS determines otherwise. See ibid.; §§340.1, 340.2, 340.6; see also App. 183. However, any person may petition APHIS for a determination that a regulated article does not present a plant pest risk and therefore should not be subject to the applicable regulations. 7 U. S. C. § 7711(c)(2); 7 CFR § 340.6. APHIS may grant such a petition in whole or in part. § 340.6(d)(3). In deciding whether to grant nonregulated status to a genetically engineered plant variety, APHIS must comply with NEPA, which requires federal agencies “to the fullest extent possible” to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C). The statutory text “speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 20 (1976). An agency need not complete an EIS for a particular proposal if it finds, on the basis of a shorter “environmental assessment” (EA), that the proposed action will not have a significant impact on the environment. 40 CFR §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2009). Even if a particular agency proposal requires an EIS, applicable regulations allow the agency to take at least some action in furtherance of that proposal while the EIS is being prepared. See § 1506.1(a) (“[N]o action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would: (1) Have an adverse environmental impact; or (2) Limit the choice of reasonable alternatives”); § 1506.1(c) (“While work on a required program environmental impact statement is in progress and the action is not covered by an existing program statement, agencies shall not undertake in the interim any major Federal action covered by the program which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment unless such action” satisfies certain requirements). B This case involves Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA), a kind of alfalfa crop that has been genetically engineered to be tolerant of glyphosate, the active ingredient of the herbicide Roundup. Petitioner Monsanto Company (Monsanto) owns the intellectual property rights to RRA. Monsanto licenses those rights to co-petitioner Forage Genetics International (FGI), which is the exclusive developer of RRA seed. APHIS initially classified RRA as a regulated article, but in 2004 petitioners sought nonregulated status for two strains of RRA. In response, APHIS prepared a draft EA assessing the likely environmental impact of the requested deregulation. It then published a notice in the Federal Register advising the public of the deregulation petition and soliciting public comments on its draft EA. After considering the hundreds of public comments that it received, APHIS issued a “Finding of No Significant Impact” and decided to deregulate RRA unconditionally and without preparing an EIS. Prior to this decision, APHIS had authorized almost 300 field trials of RRA conducted over a period of eight years. App. 348. Approximately eight months after APHIS granted RRA nonregulated status, respondents (two conventional alfalfa seed farms and environmental groups concerned with food safety) filed this action against the Secretary of Agriculture and certain other officials in Federal District Court, challenging APHIS's decision to completely deregulate RRA. Their complaint alleged violations of NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., and the PPA. Respondents did not seek preliminary injunctive relief pending resolution of those claims. Hence, RRA enjoyed nonregulated status for approximately two years. During that period, more than 3,000 farmers in 48 States planted an estimated 220,000 acres of RRA. App. 350. In resolving respondents’ NEPA claim, the District Court accepted APHIS’s determination that RRA does not have any harmful health effects on humans or livestock. App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a; accord, id., at 45a. Nevertheless, the District Court held that APHIS violated NEPA by deregulating RRA without first preparing an EIS. In particular, the court found that APHIS’s EA failed to answer substantial questions concerning two broad consequences of its proposed action: first, the extent to which complete deregulation would lead to the transmission of the gene conferring glyphosate tolerance from RRA to organic and conventional alfalfa; and, second, the extent to which the introduction of RRA would contribute to the development of Roundup-resistant weeds. Id., at 52a. In light of its determination that the deregulation decision ran afoul of NEPA, the District Court dismissed without prejudice respondents’ claims under the ESA and PPA. After these rulings, the District Court granted petitioners permission to intervene in the remedial phase of the lawsuit. The court then asked the parties to submit proposed judgments embodying their preferred means of remedying the NEPA violation. APHIS’s proposed judgment would have ordered the agency to prepare an EIS, vacated the agency’s deregulation decision, and replaced that decision with the terms of the judgment itself. Id., at 184a (proposed judgment providing that “[the federal] defendants’ [June 14,] 2005 Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate is hereby vacated and replaced by the terms of this judgment” (emphasis added)). The terms of the proposed judgment, in turn, would have permitted the continued planting of RRA pending completion of the EIS, subject to six restrictions. Those restrictions included, among other things, mandatory isolation distances between RRA and non-genetically-engineered alfalfa fields in order to mitigate the risk of gene flow; mandatory harvesting conditions; a requirement that planting and harvesting equipment that had been in contact with RRA be cleaned prior to any use with conventional or organic alfalfa; identification and handling requirements for RRA seed; and a requirement that all RRA seed producers and hay growers be under contract with either Monsanto or FGI and that their contracts require compliance with the other limitations set out in the proposed judgment. The District Court rejected APHIS’s proposed judgment. In its preliminary injunction, the District Court prohibited almost all future planting of RRA pending APHIS’s completion of the required EIS. But in order to minimize the harm to farmers who had relied on APHIS’s deregulation decision, the court expressly allowed those who had already purchased RRA to plant their seeds until March 30, 2007. Id., at 58a. In its subsequently entered permanent injunction and judgment, the court (1) vacated APHIS’s deregulation decision; (2) ordered APHIS to prepare an EIS before it made any decision on Monsanto’s deregulation petition; (3) enjoined the planting of any RRA in the United States after March 30, 2007, pending APHIS’s completion of the required EIS; and (4) imposed certain conditions (suggested by APHIS) on the handling and identification of already-planted RRA. Id., at 79a, 109a. The District Court deified petitioners’ request for an evidentiary hearing. The Government, Monsanto, and FGI appealed, challenging the scope of the relief granted but not disputing the existence of a NEPA violation. See Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F. 3d 1130, 1136 (2009). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Based on its review of the record, the panel first concluded that the District Court had “recognized that an injunction does not ‘automatically issue’ when a NEPA violation is found” and had instead based its issuance of injunctive relief on the four-factor test traditionally used for that purpose. Id., at 1137. The panel held that the District Court had not committed clear error in making any of the subsidiary factual findings on which its assessment of the four relevant factors was based. And the panel rejected the claim that the District Court had not given sufficient deference to APHIS’s expertise concerning the likely effects of allowing continued planting of RRA on a limited basis. In the panel’s view, APHIS’s proposed interim measures would have perpetuated a system that had been found by the District Court to have caused environmental harm in the past. Id., at 1139. Hence, the panel concluded that the District Court had not abused its discretion “in choosing to reject APHIS’s proposed mitigation measures in favor of a broader injunction to prevent more irreparable harm from occurring.” Ibid. The panel majority also rejected petitioners’ alternative argument that the District Court had erred in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing before entering its permanent injunction. Writing in dissent, Judge N. Randy Smith disagreed with that conclusion. In his view, the District Court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before issuing a permanent injunction unless the facts were undisputed or the adverse party expressly waived its right to such a hearing. Neither of those two exceptions, he found, applied here. We granted certiorari. 558 U. S. 1142 (2010). II A At the threshold, respondents contend that petitioners lack standing to seek our review of the lower court rulings at issue here. We disagree. Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling. Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S. 433, 445 (2009). Petitioners here satisfy all three criteria. Petitioners are injured by their inability to sell or license RRA to prospective customers until such time as APHIS completes the required EIS. Because that injury is caused by the very remedial order that petitioners challenge on appeal, it would be redressed by a favorable ruling from this Court. Respondents do not dispute that petitioners would have standing to contest the District Court’s permanent injunction order if they had pursued a different litigation strategy. Instead, respondents argue that the injury of which petitioners complain is independently caused by a part of the District Court’s order that petitioners failed to challenge, namely, the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision. The practical consequence of the vacatur, respondents contend, was to restore RRA to the status of a regulated article; and, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, federal regulations ban the growth and sale of regulated articles. Because petitioners did not specifically challenge the District Court’s vacatur, respondents reason, they lack standing to challenge a part of the District Court’s order (i. e., the injunction) that does not cause petitioners any injury not also caused by the vacatur. See Brief for Respondents 19-20. Respondents’ argument fails for two independent reasons. First, although petitioners did not challenge the vacatur directly, they adequately preserved their objection that the vacated deregulation decision should have been replaced by APHIS’s proposed injunction. Throughout the remedial phase of this litigation, one of the main disputes between the parties has been whether the District Court was required to adopt APHIS’s proposed judgment. See, e. g., IntervenorAppellants’ Opening Brief in No. 07-16458 etc. (CA9), p. 59 (urging the Court of Appeals to “vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case to the district court with instructions to enter APHIS’s proposed relief”); Opening Brief of Federal Defendants-Appellants in No. 07-16458 etc. (CA9), pp. 21, 46 (“The blanket injunction should be narrowed in accordance with APHIS’s proposal”); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 25-27, 53-54. That judgment would have replaced the vacated deregulation decision with an order' expressly allowing continued planting of RRA subject to certain limited conditions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a (proposed judgment providing that “[the federal] defendants’ 14 June 2005 Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate is hereby vacated and replaced by the terms of this judgment” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, if the District Court had adopted the agency’s suggested remedy, there would still be authority for the continued planting of RRA, because there would, in effect, be a new deregulation decision. Second, petitioners in any case have standing to challenge the part of the District Court’s order enjoining partial deregulation. Respondents focus their standing argument on the part of the judgment enjoining the planting of RRA, but the judgment also states that “[b]efore granting Monsanto’s deregulation petition, even in part, the federal defendants shall prepare an environmental impact statement.” Id., at 108a (emphasis added); see also id., at 79a (“The Court will enter a final judgment... ordering the government to prepare an EIS before it makes a decision on Monsanto’s deregulation petition”). As respondents concede, that part of the judgment goes beyond the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37, 46. At oral argument, respondents contended that the restriction on APHIS’s ability to effect a partial deregulation of RRA does not cause petitioners “an actual or an imminent harm.” Id., at 39-40. In order for a partial deregulation to occur, respondents argued, the case would have to be remanded to the agency, and APHIS would have to prepare an EA “that may or may not come out in favor of a partial deregulation.” Id., at 40. Because petitioners cannot prove that those two events would happen, respondents contended, the asserted harm caused by the District Court’s partial deregulation ban is too speculative to satisfy the actual or imminent injury requirement. We reject this argument. If the injunction were lifted, we do not see why the District Court would have to remand the matter to the agency in order for APHIS to effect a partial deregulation. And even if a remand were required, we perceive no basis on which the District Court could decline to remand the matter to the agency so that it could determine whether to pursue a partial deregulation during the pendency of the EIS process. Nor is any doubt as to whether APHIS would issue a new EA in favor of a partial deregulation sufficient to defeat petitioners’ standing. It is undisputed that petitioners have submitted a deregulation petition and that a partial deregulation of the kind embodied in the agency’s proposed judgment would afford petitioners much of the relief that they seek; it is also undisputed that, absent the District Court’s order, APHIS could attempt to effect such a partial deregulation pending its completion of the EIS. See id., at 7-8, 25-27,38. For purposes of resolving the particular standing question before us, we need not decide whether or to what extent a party challenging an injunction that bars an agency from granting certain relief must show that the agency would be likely to afford such relief if it were free to do so. In this case, as is clear from APHIS’s proposed judgment and from its briefing throughout the remedial phase of this litigation, the agency takes the view that a partial deregulation reflecting its proposed limitations is in the public interest. Thus, there is more than a strong likelihood that APHIS would partially deregulate RRA were it not for the District Court’s injunction. The District Court’s elimination of that likelihood is plainly sufficient to establish a constitutionally cognizable injury. Moreover, as respondents essentially conceded at oral argument, that injury would be redressed by a favorable decision here, since “vacating the current injunction . . . will allow [petitioners] to go back to the agency, [to] seek a partial deregulation,” even if the District Court’s vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision is left intact. Id., at 39. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to seek this Court’s review. B We next consider petitioners’ contention that respondents lack standing to seek injunctive relief. See Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 352 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Petitioners argue that respondents have failed to show that any of the named respondents is likely to suffer a constitutionally cognizable injury absent injunctive relief. See Brief for Petitioners 40. We disagree. Respondents include conventional alfalfa farmers. Emphasizing “the undisputed concentration of alfalfa seed farms,” the District Court found that those farmers had “established a ‘reasonable probability’ that their organic and conventional alfalfa crops will be infected with the engineered gene” if RRA is completely deregulated. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a. A substantial risk of gene flow injures respondents in several ways. For example, respondents represent that, in order to continue marketing their product to consumers who wish to buy non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, respondents would have to conduct testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been contaminated. See, e. g., Record, Doc. 62, p. 5 (Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment) (Geertson Declaration) (“Due to the high potential for contamination, I will need to test my crops for the presence of genetically engineered alfalfa seed. This testing will be a new cost to my seed business and we will have to raise our seed prices to cover these costs, making our prices less competitive”); id., Doc. 57, p. 4 (Declaration of Patrick Trask in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment) (“To ensure that my seeds are pure, I will need to test my crops and obtain certification that my seeds are free of genetically engineered alfalfa”); see also id., Doc. 55, p. 2 (“[T]here is zero tolerance for contaminated seed in the organic market”). Respondents also allege that the risk of gene flow will cause them to take certain measures to minimize the likelihood of potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of non-genetically-engineered alfalfa. See, e. g., Geertson Declaration 3 (noting the “increased cost of alfalfa breeding due to potential for genetic contamination”); id., at 6 (“Due to the threat of contamination, I have begun contracting with growers outside of the United States to ensure that I can supply genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed. Finding new growers has already resulted in increased administrative costs at my seed business”). Such harms, which respondents will suffer even if their crops are not actually infected with the Roundup Ready gene, are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional standing analysis. Those harms are readily attributable to APHIS’s deregulation decision, which, as the District Court found, gives rise to a significant risk of gene flow to non-genetically-engineered varieties of alfalfa. Finally, a judicial order prohibiting the growth and sale of all or some genetically engineered alfalfa would remedy respondents’ injuries by eliminating or minimizing the risk of gene flow to conventional and organic alfalfa crops. We therefore conclude that respondents have constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief from the complete deregulation order at issue here. Petitioners appear to suggest that respondents fail to satisfy the “zone of interests” test we have previously articulated as a prudential standing requirement in cases challenging agency compliance with particular statutes. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 (arguing that protection against the risk of commercial harm “is not an interest that NEPA was enacted to address”); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 162-163 (1997). That argument is unpersuasive because, as the District Court found, respondents’ injury has an environmental as well as an economic component. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. In its ruling on the merits of respondents’ NEPA claim, the District Court held that the risk that the RRA gene conferring glyphosate resistance will infect conventional and organic alfalfa is a significant environmental effect within the meaning of NEPA. Petitioners did not appeal that part of the court’s ruling, and we have no occasion to revisit it here. Respondents now seek injunctive relief in order to avert the risk of gene flow to their crops — the very-same effect that the District Court determined to be a significant environmental concern for purposes of NEPA. The mere fact that respondents also seek to avoid certain economic harms that are tied to the risk of gene flow does not strip them of prudential standing. In short, respondents have standing to seek injunctive relief, and petitioners have standing to seek this Court’s review of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment affirming the entry of such relief. We therefore proceed to the merits of the case. Ill A The District Court sought to remedy APHIS’s NEPA violation in three ways: First, it vacated the agency’s decision completely deregulating RRA; second, it enjoined APHIS from deregulating RRA, in whole or in part, pending completion of the mandated EIS; and third, it entered a nationwide injunction prohibiting almost all future planting of RRA. Id., at 108a-110a. Because petitioners and the Government do not argue otherwise, we assume without deciding that the District Court acted lawfully in vacating the deregulation decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (“[T]he district court could have vacated the order in its entirety and sent it back to the agency”); accord, id., at 15-16. We therefore address only the latter two aspects of the District Court’s judgment. Before doing so, however, we provide a brief overview of the standard governing the entry of injunctive relief. B “[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remediés available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. 388, 391 (2006). The traditional four-factor test applies when a plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction to remedy a NEPA violation. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 31-33 (2008). Petitioners argue that the lower courts in this case proceeded on the erroneous assumption that an injunction is generally the appropriate remedy for a NEPA violation. In particular, petitioners note that the District Court cited preWinter Ninth Circuit precedent for the proposition that, in “'the run of the mill NEPA case,’” an injunction delaying the contemplated government project is proper '"until the NEPA violation is cured.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a (quoting Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn, 307 F. 3d 815, 833 (CA9 2002)); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a (quoting same language in preliminary injunction order). In addition, petitioners observe, the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case both stated that, “in unusual circumstances, an injunction may be withheld, or, more likely, limited in scope” in NEPA eases. Id., at 66a (quoting National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Babbitt, 241 F. 3d 722, 737, n. 18 (CA9 2001); internal quotation marks omitted); 570 F. 3d, at 1137. Insofar as the statements quoted above are intended to guide the determination whether to grant injunctive relief, they invert the proper mode of analysis. An injunction should issue only if the traditional four-factor test is satisfied. See Winter, supra, at 31-33. In contrast, the statements quoted above appear to presume that an injunction is the proper remedy for a NEPA violation except in unusual circumstances. No such thumb on the scales is warranted. Nor, contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, could any such error be cured by a court’s perfunctory recognition that “an injunction does not automatically issue” in NEPA cases. See 570 F. 3d, at 1137 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue; rather, a court must determine that an injunction should issue under the traditional four-factor test set out above. Notwithstanding the lower cpurts’ apparent reliance on the incorrect standard set out in the pre-Winter Circuit precedents quoted above, respondents argue that the lower courts in fact applied the traditional four-factor test. In their view, the statements that injunctive relief is proper in the “run-of-the-mill” NEPA case, and that such injunctions are granted except in “unusual circumstances,” are descriptive rather than prescriptive. See Brief for Respondents 28, n. 14. We need not decide whether respondents’ characterization of the lower court opinions in this case is sound. Even if it is, the injunctive relief granted here cannot stand. C We first consider whether the District Court erred in enjoining APHIS from partially deregulating RRA during the pendency of the EIS process. The relevant part of the District Court’s judgment states that, “[bjefore granting Monsanto’s deregulation petition, even in part, the federal defendants shall prepare an environmental impact statement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a (emphasis added); see also id., at 79a (“The Court will enter a final judgment. . . ordering the government to prepare an EIS before it makes a decision on Monsanto’s deregulation petition”). The plain text of the order prohibits any partial deregulation, not just the particular partial deregulation embodied in APHIS’s proposed judgment. We think it is quite clear that the District Court meant just what it said. The related injunction against planting states that “no [RRA]... may be planted” “[u]ntil the federal defendants prepare the EIS and decide the deregulation petition.” Id., at 108a (emphasis added). That injunction, which appears in the very same judgment and directly follows the injunction against granting Monsanto’s petition “even in part,” does not carve out an exception for planting subsequently authorized by a valid partial deregulation decision. In our view, none of the traditional four factors governing the entry of permanent injunctive relief supports the District Court’s injunction prohibiting partial deregulation. To see why that is so, it is helpful to understand how the injunction prohibiting a partial deregulation fits into the broader dispute between the parties. Respondents in this case brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge a particular agency order: APHIS’s decision to completely deregulate RRA. The District Court held that the order in question was procedurally defective, and APHIS decided not to appeal that determination. At that point, it was for the agency to decide whether and to what extent it would pursue a partial deregulation. If the agency found, on the basis of a new EA, that a limited and temporary deregulation satisfied applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, it could proceed with such a deregulation even if it had not yet finished the onerous EIS required for complete deregulation. If and when the agency were to issue a partial deregulation order, any party aggrieved by that order could bring a separate suit under the APA to challenge the particular deregulation attempted. See 5 U. S. C. § 702. In this ease, APHIS apparently sought to “streamline” the proceedings by asking the District Court to craft a remedy that, in effect, would have partially deregulated RRA until such time as the agency had finalized the EIS needed for a complete deregulation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, 23-24; App. to Pet. for Cert. 69a. To justify that disposition, APHIS and petitioners submitted voluminous documentary submissions in which they purported to show that the risk of gene flow would be insignificant if the District Court allowed limited planting and harvesting subject to APHIS’s proposed conditions. Respondents, in turn, submitted considerable evidence of their own that seemed to cut the other way. This put the District Court in an unenviable position. “The parties’ experts disagreed over virtually every factual issue relating to possible environmental harm, including the likelihood of genetic contamination and why some contamination had already occurred.” 570 F. 3d, at 1135. The District Court may well have acted within its discretion in refusing to craft a judicial remedy that would have authorized the continued planting and harvesting of RRA while the EIS is being prepared. It does not follow, however, that the District Court was within its rights in enjoining APHIS from allowing such planting and harvesting pursuant to the authority vested in the agency by law. When the District Court entered its permanent injunction, APHIS had not yet exercised its authority to partially deregulate RRA. Until APHIS actually seeks to effect a partial deregulation, any judicial review of such a decision is premature. Nor can the District Court’s injunction be justified as a prophylactic measure needed to guard against the possibility that the agency would seek to effect on its own the particular partial deregulation scheme embodied in the terms of APHIS’s proposed judgment. Even if the District Court was not required to adopt that judgment, there was no need to stop the agency from effecting a partial deregulation in accordance with the procedures established by law. Moreover, the terms of the District Court’s injunction do not just enjoin the particular partial deregulation embodied in APHIS’s proposed judgment. Instead, the District Court barred the agency from pursuing any deregulation — no matter how limited the geographic area in which planting of RRA would be allowed, how great the isolation distances mandated between RRA fields and fields for growing non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, how stringent the regulations governing harvesting and distribution, how robust the enforcement mechanisms available at the time of the decision, and — consequently—no matter how small the risk that the planting authorized under such conditions would adversely affect the environment in general and respondents in particular. The order enjoining any partial deregulation was also inconsistent with other aspects of the very same judgment. In fashioning its remedy for the NEPA violation, the District Court steered a “middle course” between more extreme options on either end. See id., at 1136. On the one hand, the District Court rejected APHIS’s proposal (supported by petitioners) to allow continued planting and harvesting of RRA subject to the agency’s proposed limitations. On the other hand, the District Court did not bar continued planting of RRA as a regulated article under permit from APHIS, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a, and it expressly allowed farmers to harvest and sell RRA planted before March 30, 2007, id., at 76a-79a. If the District Court was right to conclude that any partial deregulation, no matter how limited, required the preparation of an EIS, it is hard to see why the limited planting and harvesting that the District Court allowed did not also require the preparation of an EIS. Conversely, if the District Court was right to conclude that the limited planting and harvesting it allowed did not require the preparation of an EIS, then an appropriately limited partial deregulation should likewise have been possible. Based on the analysis set forth above, it is clear that the order enjoining any deregulation whatsoever does not satisfy the traditional four-factor test for granting permanent injunctive relief. Most importantly, respondents cannot show that they will suffer irreparable injury if APHIS is allowed to proceed with any partial deregulation, for at least two independent reasons. First, if and when APHIS pursues a partial deregulation that arguably runs afoul of NEPA, respondents may file a new suit challenging such action and seeking appropriate preliminary relief. See 5 U. S. C. §§702, 705. Accordingly, a permanent injunction is not now needed to guard against any present or imminent risk of likely irreparable harm. Second, a partial deregulation need not cause respondents any injury at all, much less irreparable injury; if the scope of the partial deregulation is sufficiently limited, the risk of gene flow to their crops could be virtually nonexistent. For example, suppose that APHIS deregulates RRA only in a remote part of the country in which respondents neither grow nor intend to grow non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, and in which no conventional alfalfa farms are currently located. Suppose further that APHIS issues an accompanying administrative order mandating isolation distances so great as to eliminate any appreciable risk of gene flow to the crops of conventional farmers who might someday choose to plant in the surrounding area. See, e. g., Brief in Opposition 9, n. 6 (quoting study concluding “ ‘that in order for there to be zero tolerance of any gene flow between [an RRA] seed field and a conventional seed field, those fields would have to have a five-mile isolation distance between them’ ”); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16 (representation from the Solicitor General that APHIS may impose conditions on the deregulation of RRA via issuance of an administrative order). Finally,suppose that APHIS concludes in a new EA that its limited deregulation would not pose a significant risk of gene flow or harmful weed development, and that the agency adopts a plan to police vigorously compliance with its administrative order in the limited geographic area in question. It is hard to see how respondents could show that such a limited deregulation would cause them likely irreparable injury. (Respondents in this case do not represent a class, so they could not seek to enjoin such an order on the ground that it might cause harm to other parties.) In any case, the District Court’s order prohibiting any partial deregulation improperly relieves respondents of their burden to make the requisite evidentiary showing. Of course, APHIS might ultimately choose not to partially deregulate RRA during the pendency of the EIS, or else to pursue the kind of partiál deregulation embodied in its proposed judgment rather than the very limited deregulation envisioned in the above hypothetical. Until such time as the agency decides whether and how to exercise its regulatory authority, however, the courts have no cause to intervene. Indeed, the broad injunction entered here essentially preempts the very procedure by which the agency could determine, independently of the pending EIS process for assessing the effects of a complete deregulation, that a limited deregulation would not pose any appreciable risk of environmental harm. See 40 CFR §§ 1501.4, 1508.9(a) (2009). In sum, we do not know whether and to what extent APHIS would seek to effect a limited deregulation during the pendency of the EIS process if it were free to do so; we do know that the vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision means that virtually no RRA can be grown or sold until such time as a new deregulation decision is in place, and we also know that any party aggrieved by a hypothetical future deregulation decision will have ample opportunity to challenge it, and to seek appropriate preliminary relief, if and when such a decision is made. In light of these particular circumstances, we hold that the District Court did not properly exercise its discretion in enjoining a partial deregulation of any kind pending APHIS’s preparation of an EIS. It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that aspect of the District Court’s judgment. D We now turn to petitioners’ claim that the District Court erred in entering a nationwide injunction against planting RRA. Petitioners argue that the District Court did not apply the right test for determining whether to enter permanent injunctive relief; that, even if the District Court identified the operative legal standard, it erred as a matter of law in applying that standard to the facts of this case; and that the District Court was required to grant petitioners an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested issues of fact germane to the remedial dispute between the parties. We agree that the District Court’s injunction against planting went too far, but we come to that conclusion for two independent reasons. First, the impropriety of the District Court’s broad injunction against planting flows from the impropriety of its injunction against partial deregulation. If APHIS may partially deregulate RRA before preparing a full-blown EIS — a question that we need not and do not decide here — farmers should be able to grow and sell RRA in accordance with that agency determination. Because it was inappropriate for the District Court to foreclose even the possibility of a partial and temporary deregulation, it necessarily follows that it was likewise inappropriate to enjoin any and all parties from acting in accordance with the terms of such a deregulation decision. Second, respondents have represented to this Court that the District Court’s injunction against planting does not have any meaningful practical effect independent of its vacatur. See Brief for Respondents 24; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 (“[T]he mistake that was made [by the District Court] was in not appreciating ... that the vacatur did have [the] effect” of independently prohibiting the growth and sale of almost all RRA). An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a matter of course. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 311-312 (1982). If a less drastic remedy (such as partial or complete vacatur of APHIS’s deregulation decision) was sufficient to redress respondents’ injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary relief of an injunction was warranted. See ibid.; see also Winter, 555 U. S., at 31-33. E In sum, the District Court abused its discretion in enjoining APHIS from effecting a partial deregulation and in prohibiting the possibility of planting in accordance with the terms of such a deregulation. Given those errors, this Court need not express any view on whether injunctive relief of some kind was available to respondents on the record before us. Nor does the Court address the question whether the District Court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before entering the relief at issue here. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. We need not decide whether the District Court had the authority to replace the vacated agency order with an injunction of its own making. The question whether petitioners are entitled to the relief that they seek goes to the merits, not to standing. We do not rest “the primary basis for our jurisdiction on the premise that the District Court enjoined APHIS from partially deregulating RRA in any sense.” Post, at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even if the District Court’s order prohibiting a partial deregulation applies only to “the particular partial deregulation order proposed to the court by APHIS,” post, at 173, petitioners would still have standing to challenge that aspect of the order. At least one of the respondents in this case specifically alleges that he owns an alfalfa farm in a prominent seed-growing region and faces a significant risk of contamination from RRA. See Record, Doe. 62, pp. 1-2; id., ¶ 10, at 3-4 (Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment) (“Since alfalfa is pollinated by honey, bumble and leafeutter bees, the genetic • contamination of the Roundup Ready seed will rapidly spread through the seed growing regions. Bees have a range of at least two to ten miles, and the alfalfa seed farms are much more concentrated”). Other declarations in the record provide further support for the District Court’s conclusion that the deregulation of RRA poses a significant risk of contamination to respondents’ crops. See, e. g., id., Doc. 53, ¶ 9, p. 2 (Declaration of Jim Munsch) (alleging risk of “significant contamination . . . due to the compact geographic area of the prime alfalfa seed producing areas and the fact that pollen is distributed by bees that have large natural range of activity”); App. ¶ 8, p. 401 (Declaration of Mare Asumendi) (“Roundup alfalfa seed fields are currently being planted in all the major alfalfa seed production areas with little regard to contamination to non-GMO seed production fields”). Petitioners focus their challenge on the part of the District Court’s order prohibiting the planting of RRA. As we explain below, however, the broad injunction against planting cannot be valid if the injunction against partial deregulation is improper. See infra, at 165; see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a (District Court order recognizing that APHIS’s proposed remedy “seek[s], in effect, a partial deregulation that permits the continued expansion of the [RRA] market subject to certain conditions” (emphasis added)). The validity of the injunction prohibiting partial deregulation is therefore properly before us. Like the District Court, we use the term “partial deregulation” to refer to any limited or conditional deregulation. See id,., at 64a, 69a. NEPA provides that an EIS must be “inelude[d] in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added); see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 406 (1976) (“A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and . . . determine a point during the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared” (first emphasis added)). When a particular agency proposal exists and requires the preparation of an EIS, NEPA regulations allow the agency to take at least some action pertaining to that proposal during the pendency of the EIS process. See 40 CFR §§ 1506.1(a), (c) (2009). We do not express any view on the Government’s contention that a limited deregulation of the kind embodied in its proposed judgment would not require the prior preparation of an EIS. See Brief for Federal Respondents 21-22 (citing § 1506.1(a)); Tr. of Oral Arg. 20 (“[W]hat we were proposing for the interim, that is allowing continued planting subject to various protective measures, was fundamentally different from the action on which the EIS was being prepared”). Because APHIS has not yet invoked the procedures necessary to attempt a limited deregulation, any judicial consideration of such issues is not warranted at this time. The District Court itself appears to-have recognized that its broad injunction may not have been necessary to avert any injury to respondents. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a (“It does complicate it to try to fine-tune a particular remedy. So the simpler the remedy, the more attractive it is from the Court’s point of view, because it appears to me enforcement is easier. Understanding it is easier, and it may be, while a blunt instrument, it may actually, for the short term, achieve its result, achieve its purpose, even maybe it overachieves it. . . . Maybe a lot of it is not necessary. I don’t know” (emphasis added)); see also ibid. (“I don’t say you have to be greater than 1.6 miles, you have to be away from the bees, you have to be dah dah dah. That’s the farm business. I’m not even in it”); id., at 192a (“I am not going to get into the isolation distances”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION No. 76-99. Argued April 20, 1977 Decided June 20, 1977 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, White, Marshall, Blackmtw, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. RehNquist, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 373. Dennis H. Vaughn argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Leonard S. Janofsky and Howard C. Hay. Thomas S. Martin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, Abner W. Sibal, Joseph T. Eddins, and Beatrice Rosenberg. Wayne S. Bishop and John J. Gallagher filed a brief for the Texas Association of Business as amicus curiae urging reversal. Robert T. Thompson, Lawrence Kraus, and Richard P. O’Brecht filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1972 Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so as to empower the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bring suit in a federal district court against a private employer alleged to have violated the Act. The sole question presented by this case is what time limitation, if any, is imposed on the EEOC’s power to bring such a suit. I On December 27, 1970, an employee of the petitioner Occidental Life Insurance Co. filed a charge with the EEOC claiming that the company had discriminated against her because of her sex. After a fruitless referral to the appropriate state agency, the charge was formally filed with the EEOC on March 9, 1971, and subsequently served on the company. After investigation, the EEOC served proposed findings of fact on the company on February 25, 1972, to which the company in due course filed exceptions. Conciliation discussions between the EEOC and the company began in the summer of 1972. These discussions continued sporadically into 1973, but on September 13 of that year the EEOC determined that conciliation efforts had failed and so notified the company and the original complainant. The latter requested that the case be referred to the General Counsel of the EEOC to bring an enforcement action. On February 22, 1974, approximately three years and two months after the complainant first communicated with the EEOC and five months after conciliation efforts had failed, the EEOC brought this enforcement action in a Federal District Court. The District Court granted the company’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the law requires that an enforcement action be brought within 180 days of the filing of a charge with the EEOC. Alternatively, the court held that the action was subject to the most appropriate state limitations statute and was therefore barred by the one-year limitation provision of Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. § 340 (3) (West Supp. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the federal law does not impose-a 180-day limitation on the EEOC’s authority to sue and that the action is not governed by any state statute of limitations. 535 F. 2d 533. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1022, to consider an important and recurring question regarding Title VII. II As enacted in 1964, Title VII limited the EEOC’s function to investigation of employment discrimination charges and informal methods of conciliation and persuasion. The failure of conciliation efforts terminated the involvement of the EEOC. Enforcement could then be achieved, if at all, only if the charging party, or other person aggrieved by the allegedly unlawful practice, initiated a private suit within 30 days after EEOC notification that conciliation had not been successful. In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 Congress established an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure culminating in the EEOC's authority to bring a civil action in a federal court. That procedure begins when a charge is filed with the EEOC alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of the allegedly unlawful practice, and the EEOC is directed to serve notice of the charge on the employer within 10 days of filing. The EEOC is then required to investigate the charge and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it is true. This determination is to be made “as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge.” If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause it “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” When “the Commission [is] unable to secure ... a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.” The 1972 Act expressly imposes only one temporal restriction on the EEOC's authority to embark upon the final stage of enforcement — the bringing of a civil suit in a federal district court: Under § 706 (f)(1), the EEOC may not invoke the judicial power to compel compliance with Title VII until at least 30 days after a charge has been filed. But neither § 706 (f) nor any other section of the Act explicitly requires the EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts and bring an enforcement suit within any maximum period of time. The language of the Act upon which the District Court relied in finding a limitation that bars the bringing of a lawsuit by the EEOC more than 180 days after a timely charge has been filed with it is found in § 706 (f)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V), which provides in relevant part: “If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference [from a state agency], whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section ... , or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.” On its face, § 706 (f)(1) provides little support for the argument that the 180-day provision is such a statute of limitations. Rather than limiting action by the EEOC, the provision seems clearly addressed to an alternative enforcement procedure: If a complainant is dissatisfied with the progress the EEOC is making on his or her charge of employment discrimination, he or she may elect to circumvent the EEOC procedures and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a district court. The 180-day limitation provides only that this private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed. Nothing in § 706 (f)(1) indicates that EEOC enforcement powers cease if the complainant decides to leave the case in the hands of the EEOC rather than to pursue a private action. In short, the literal language of § 706 (f)(1) simply cannot support a determination that it imposes a 180-day time limitation on EEOC enforcement suits. On the contrary, a natural reading of § 706 (f)(1) can lead only to the conclusion that it simply provides that a complainant whose charge is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the EEOC may himself bring a lawsuit, but that he must wait 180 days before doing so. After waiting for that period, the complainant may either file a private action within 90 days after EEOC notification or continue to leave the ultimate resolution of his charge to the efforts of the EEOC. Only if the legislative history of § 706 (f) (1) provided firm evidence that the subsection cannot mean what it so clearly seems to say would there be any justification for construing it in any other way. But no such evidence is to be found. The dominant Title VII battle in the 92d Congress was over what kind of additional enforcement powers should be granted to the EEOC. Proponents of increased EEOC power constituted a substantial majority in both Houses of Congress, but they were divided between those Members who favored giving the EEOC power to issue cease-and-desist orders and those who advocated authorizing it to bring suits in the federal district courts. The supporters of cease-and-desist authority won the first victory when Committees in both Houses favorably reported bills providing for that enforcement technique. The bill reported by the House Committee contained a section entitled “Civil Actions by Persons Aggrieved,” embodying the provisions that eventually became that part of § 706 (f)(1) at issue in the present case. The Committee Report clearly explained that the purpose of this provision was to afford an aggrieved person the option of withdrawing his case from the EEOC if he was dissatisfied with the rate at which his charge was being processed: “In the case of the Commission, the burgeoning workload, accompanied by insufficient funds and a shortage of staff, has, in many instances, forced a party to wait 2 to 3 years before final conciliation procedures can be instituted. This situation leads the committee to believe that the private right of action, both under the present Act and in the bill, provides the aggrieved party a means by which he may be able to escape from the administrative quagmire which occasionally surrounds a case caught in an overloaded administrative process.” Opponents of cease-and-desist authority carried their cause to the floor of the House, where Congressmen Erlenborn and Mazzoli introduced a substitute bill, which authorized the EEOC when conciliation failed to file federal-court actions rather than conduct its own hearings and issue cease-and-desist orders. The Erlenborn-Mazzoli substitute contained a private action provision substantially the same as that of the Committee bill. There was no suggestion in the House debates that that section in the substitute bill was intended to be a statute of limitations on EEOC enforcement action, or that the purpose of the provision differed in any way from that expressed in the Committee Report. The Erlenborn-Mazzoli substitute was adopted by the House. Senate action on amendments to Title VII was essentially parallel to that of the House, beginning with the introduction of a bill giving the EEOC cease-and-desist power, and ending with the substitution of a bill authorizing it instead to file suits in the federal courts. As in the House, both the original and substitute Senate bills authorized complainants dissatisfied with the pace of EEOC proceedings to bring individual lawsuits after 180 days. And, as in the House, the Senate Committee explained that such a provision was necessary because the heavy caseload of the EEOC could result in delays unacceptable to aggrieved persons: “As it indicated in testimony, [the EEOC’s] caseload has increased at a rate.which surpasses its own projections. The result has been increasing backlogs in making determinations, and the possibility of occasional hasty decisions, made under the press of time, which have unfairly prejudiced complaints. Accordingly, where the Commission is not able to pursue a complaint with satisfactory speed, or enters into an agreement which is not acceptable to the aggrieved party, the bill provides that the individual shall have an opportunity to seek his own remedy, even though he may have originally submitted his charge to the Commission.” The Senate Committee further noted that the “primary concern should be to protect the aggrieved person’s option to seek a prompt remedy,” and that the purpose of the 180-day provision was to preserve “the private right of action by an aggrieved person.” Senator Dominick led the opposition to the Committee bill on the floor of the Senate. His substitute bill did not give the EEOC power to issue cease-and-desist orders but authorized it instead to bring enforcement suits in federal courts. The substitute bill also contained a provision authorizing private lawsuits almost identical to that contained in the Committee bill. There ensued a month-long Senate debate, at the conclusion of which the substitute bill was adopted by the Senate. During the course of that debate there were only a few isolated and ambiguous references to the provision in the substitute bill authorizing federal suits by complainants dissatisfied with EEOC delay. But a section-by-section analysis of the substitute bill made available before the final vote in the Senate clearly explained the purpose of the 180-day provision: “In providing this provision, it is intended that . . . the person aggrieved should [not] have to endure lengthy delays if the agency does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provisions . . . would allow the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy in the courts where agency action does not prove satisfactory.” After the final Senate vote the House and Senate bills were sent to a Conference Committee. An analysis presented to the Senate with the Conference Report provides the final and conclusive confirmation of the meaning of § 706 (f) (1): “The retention of the private right of action, as amended, ... is designed to make sure that the person aggrieved does not have to endure lengthy delays if the Commission . . . does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the provisions . . . allow the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy under this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution. “It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the EEOC. . . . However, as the individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief.” The legislative history of §706 (f)(1) thus demonstrates that the provision was intended to mean exactly what it seems to say: An aggrieved person unwilling to await the conclusion of extended EEOC proceedings may institute a private lawsuit 180 days after a charge has been filed. The subsection imposes no limitation upon the power of the EEOC to file suit in a federal court. Ill The company argues that if the Act contains no limitation on the time during which an EEOC enforcement suit may be brought, then the most analogous state statute of limitations should be applied. Relying on a long line of cases in this Court holding state limitations periods applicable to actions brought under federal statutes, the company contends that California law barred the EEOC from bringing this lawsuit. When Congress has created a cause of action and has not specified the period of time within which it may be asserted, the Court has frequently inferred that Congress intended that a local time limitation should apply. E. g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 179-182 (Civil Rights Act of 1866); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696 (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318 (Civil Rights Act of 1871); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (Sherman Antitrust Act); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (Patent Act). This “implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of . . . federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395. But the Court has not mechanically applied a state statute of limitations simply because a limitations period is absent from the federal statute. State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies. “Although state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive guide.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, 465. State limitations periods will not be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal statute. Ibid.; Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., supra, at 701; Board of County Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 352. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the company’s argument in this case. When Congress first enacted Title VII in 1964 it selected “[cooperation and voluntary compliance ... as the preferred means for achieving” the goal of equality of employment opportunities. Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44. To this end, Congress created the EEOC and established an administrative procedure whereby the EEOC “would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.” Ibid. Although the 1972 amendments provided the EEOC with the additional enforcement power of instituting civil actions in federal courts, Congress preserved the EEOC’s administrative functions in § 706 of the amended Act. Thus, under the procedural structure created by the 1972 amendments, the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of employment discrimination and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion. Unlike the typical litigant against whom a statute of limitations might appropriately run, the EEOC is required by law to refrain from commencing a civil action until it has discharged its administrative duties. In view of the federal policy requiring employment discrimination claims to be investigated by the EEOC and, whenever possible, administratively resolved before suit is brought in a federal court, it is hardly appropriate to rely on the “State’s wisdom in setting a limit ... on the prosecution . . . .” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 464. For the “State’s wisdom” in establishing a general limitation period could not have taken into.account the decision of Congress to delay judicial action while the EEOC performs its administrative responsibilities. See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342, 348; Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461, 464; Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, 98. Indeed, the one-year statute of limitations applied by the District Court in this case could under some circumstances directly conflict with the timetable for administrative action expressly established in the 1972 Act. But even in cases involving no inevitable and direct conflict with the express time periods provided in the Act, absorption of state limitations would be inconsistent with the congressional intent underlying the enactment of the 1972 amendments. Throughout the congressional debates many Members of both Houses demonstrated an acute awareness of the enormous backlog of cases before the EEOC and the consequent delays of 18 to 24 months encountered by aggrieved persons awaiting administrative action on their complaints. Nevertheless, Congress substantially increased the workload of the EEOC by extending the coverage of Title VII to state employers, private employers with as few as 15 employees, and nonreligious educational institutions; by transferring the authority to bring pattern-or-practice suits from the Attorney General to the Commission; and by authorizing the Commission to bring civil actions in the federal courts. It would hardly be reasonable to suppose that a Congress aware of the severe time problems already facing the EEOC would grant that agency substantial additional enforcement responsibilities and at the same time consign its federal lawsuits to the vagaries of diverse state limitations statutes, some as short as one year. Congress did express concern for the need of time limitations in the fair operation of the Act, but that concern was directed entirely to the initial filing of a charge with the EEOC and prompt notification thereafter to the alleged violator. The bills passed in both the House and the Senate contained short time periods within which charges were to be filed with the EEOC and notice given to the employer. And the debates and reports in both Houses made evident that the statute of limitations problem was perceived in terms of these provisions, rather than in terms of a later limitation on the EEOC’s power to sue. That perception was reflected in the final version of the 1972 Act, which requires that a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation of Title VII, and that the alleged violator must be notified “of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) . . . within ten days” thereafter. The fact that the only statute of limitations discussions in Congress were directed to the period preceding the filing of an initial charge is wholly consistent with the Act’s overall enforcement structure — a sequential series of steps beginning with the filing of a charge with the EEOC. Within this procedural framework, the benchmark, for purposes of a statute of limitations, is not the last phase of the multistage scheme, but the commencement of the proceeding before the administrative body. IV The absence of inflexible time limitations on the bringing of lawsuits will not, as the company asserts, deprive defendants in Title VII civil actions of fundamental fairness or subject them to the surprise and prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale claims. Unlike the litigant in a private action who may first learn of the cause against him upon service of the complaint, the Title VII defendant is alerted to the possibility of an enforcement suit within 10 days after a charge has been filed. This prompt notice serves, as Congress intended, to give him an opportunity to gather and preserve evidence in anticipation of a court action. Moreover, during the pendency of EEOC administrative proceedings, a potential defendant is kept informed of the progress of the action. Regulations promulgated by the EEOC require that the charged party be promptly notified when a determination of reasonable cause has been made, 29 CFR § 1601.19b (b) (1976), and when the EEOC has terminated its efforts to conciliate a dispute, §§ 1601.23, 1601.26. It is, of course, possible that despite these procedural protections a defendant in a Title VII enforcement action might still be significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the action after exhausting its conciliation efforts. If such cases arise the federal courts do not lack the power to provide relief. This Court has said that when a Title VII defendant is in fact prejudiced by a private plaintiff’s unexcused conduct of a particular case, the trial court may restrict or even deny backpay relief. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 424-425. The same discretionary power “to locate ‘a just result’ in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case,” ibid., can also be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. The charge specified that the most recent act of discrimination was on October 1, 1970. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§706 (b), (d), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (b), (d); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522. The 1972 amendments to Title VII were made applicable “with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment.” § 14, 86 Stat. 113. The District Court also held that EEOC enforcement suits, such as this one, based on charges within the coverage of § 14 must be brought within 180 days of March 24, 1972, the effective date of the amendments. The District Court’s decision is reported in 12 FEP Cases 1298. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706 (a), 78 Stat. 259, 42 Ü. S. C. § 2000&-5 (a). § 706 (e), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253. All subsequent citations to Title VII in this opinion are to the 1964 Act as amended. § 706 (©), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). If a charge has been initially filed with or referred to a state or local agency, it must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the practice occurred or within 30 days after notice that the state or local agency has terminated its proceeding, whichever is earlier. Ibid. § 706 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Ibid. § 706 (f) (1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). In the case of a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, the EEOC is required, upon failure of conciliation, to refer the case to the Attorney General who may then bring a civil action. Ibid. The section in the House Committee bill provided, in relevant part: “If (1) the Commission determines that there is no reasonable cause to believe the charge is true and dismisses the charge . . . , (2) finds no probable jurisdiction and dismisses the charge, or (3) within one hundred and eighty days after a charge is filed with the Commission . . . , the Commission has not either (i) issued a complaint . . . , (ii) determined that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true and dismissed the charge, ... or (iii) entered into a conciliation agreement . . ., the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and within sixty days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved .... Upon timely application, the court may, in its. discretion, permit the Commission to intervene in such civil action if it certifies that the case is of general public importance. Upon the commencement of such civil action, the Commission shall be divested of jurisdiction over the proceeding and shall take no further action with respect thereof [sic] . . . .” H. R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 8 (j) (1971), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, pp. 54r-55 (1971). Id., at 12. H. R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §3 (c) (1971). S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (a) (1971); S. 2617, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §3 (c) (1971). S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 23 (1971). Id., at 24, 40. At one point in the debates Senator Javits, a sponsor of the Committee bill, sought to amend the substitute bill to clarify the relationship between EEOC and private lawsuits, by providing that “if within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission . . . the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall bring a civil action .. . .” Senator Dominick objected to the substitution of the word “shall” for “may” and suggested that “in the interest of flexibility in the Commission’s schedule, and in the interest of flexibility in working something out through voluntary compliance, it would be far better to put in the word 'may.’ ” In the exchange that followed, both Senators manifested their understanding that the 180-day provision in the Dominick amendment served the same purpose as the analogous provision in the Committee bill. 118 Cong. Rec. 1068-1069 (1972). Senator Javits later agreed to the use of the word “may,” and Senator Dominick responded as follows: “I think this change is very meritorious, as I pointed out in my first statement. I do not think the Commission should be mandated on what date an agency should bring suit when we are trying to work out matters the best we can by conciliation.” Id., at 1069. Id., at 4942. Id., at 7168; see id., at 7565. In addition to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the present case, six other Courts of Appeals have reached this conclusion. EEOC v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 516 F. 2d 1297 (CA3); EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F. 2d 153 (CA4); EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 505 F. 2d 610 (CA5); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F. 2d 1352 (CA6); EEOC v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 521 F. 2d 1364 (CA8); EEOC v. Duval Corp., 528 F. 2d 945 (CA10). The two Courts of Appeals that have considered this question have reached differing conclusions. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., supra, at 1359-1360 (state limitations not applicable); EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F. 2d 456 (CA5) (state limitations applicable to backpay suits only). Since California has created a state agency with authority to provide a remedy for employment discrimination, Cal. Labor Code Ann. §§ 1410-1433 (West 1971), an aggrieved party in that State may file a charge with the EEOC as long as 300 days after the allegedly unlawful act. See n. 8, supra. Under § 706 (b) the EEOC may then take at least 120 days to investigate the charge and make its determination of reasonable cause. Thus, even if the aggrieved party and the EEOC act within the 420-day period expressly authorized by the Act, the California limitations period applied by the District Court would expire before the EEOC had an opportunity to begin any conciliation efforts, let alone bring a lawsuit. In his testimony before the House Committee, William Brown III, Chairman of the EEOC, stated that as of February 20, 1971, there was a backlog of 25,195 pending charges. Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Procedures, Hearings on H. R. 1746 before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 81 (1971). By the time Chairman Brown testified before the Senate Committee, the backlog had increased to nearly 32,000 cases and further increases were expected. Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Act of 1971, Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617, H. R. 1746, before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1971). See, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 31959 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Martin); id., at 31972 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn); 118 Cong. Rec. 594^595 (1972) (remarles of Sen. Dominick); id., at 699-700 (remarks of Sen. Fannin) ; id., at 944 (remarks of Sens. Talmadge and Chiles); id., at 2386 (remarks of Sen. Allen); id., at 3136-3137 (remarks of Sens. Gurney and Allen); id., at 3969-3973 (remarks of Sens. Javits, Cooper, Dominick, Williams, and Allen). The company contends that the numerous references in the debates to the EEOC’s backlog and delays demonstrate that by adopting the court enforcement plan Congress intended to restrict the time allowed for investigation and conciliation of a charge. Nearly all of the references, however, were in the context of discussions of whether enforcement after conciliation efforts had failed could be accomplished more expeditiously through an administrative process or through lawsuits in the federal courts. The concern, therefore, was with the additional delays that complainants would suffer if the EEOC were given the task of conducting its own hearings and issuing cease-and-desist orders. Congressional concern over delays during the investigation and conciliation process was resolved by providing complainants with the continuing opportunity to withdraw their cases from the EEOC and bring private suits. See Part II, swpra. §§ 701 (a), (b), 702, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e (a), (b), 2000e-l (1970 ed., Supp. V). The number of state and local governmental employees who would be brought under the jurisdiction of the EEOC was estimated to be more than 10 million. 117 Cong. Rec. 31961 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Perkins); 118 Cong. Rec. 699 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Fannin). The elimination of the exemption for nonreligious educational institutions added an 'estimated 4.3 million employees. Id., at 4931 (remarks of Sen. Cranston). § 707 (c), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-6 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). § 706 (f) (1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The House bill provided that the EEOC serve notice of the charge on the alleged violator within five days; the Senate bill required notice within 10 days. Both bills included a 180-day limitation on an aggrieved party’s filing of a charge. S. Rep. No. 92-681, pp. 16-17 (1972). Because the bill reported by the House Committee did not require notice of a charge within any specific time, the dissenters from the Committee Report urged that the 180-day filing limitation be amended to require the EEOC to give notice within five days, or some other reasonable time, after a charge had been filed. H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 66 (1971). On the floor of the House, Congressman Erlenbom explained that the amendment was for the purpose of “giving notice to the party charged [so] that he would have the opportunity to gather and preserve the evidence with which to sustain himself when formal charges are filed and subsequent enforcement proceedings are instituted.” 117 Cong. Rec. 31972 (1971). The requirement of reasonable notice quickly received the support of proponents of the Committee bill. Id., at 31783-31784 (remarks of Rep. Dent); id., at 31961 (remarks of Rep. Perkins). In the Senate a 10-day-notice provision was included in the bill reported out of Committee in order “to protect fully the rights of the person or persons against whom the charge is filed.” S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 25 (1971). §§ 706 (b), (e), 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (b), (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Prompt notice of a reasonable-cause determination also serves to cure any deficiencies in the 10-day notice that may result from EEOC amendment of the claimed violation after investigation. See EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532 F. 2d 359, 366 (CA4); EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F. 2d 453, 455 (CA5); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F. 2d, at 1363. See also NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U. S. 301; National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 367-369.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. NEW ENGLAND ELECTRIC SYSTEM et al. No. 305. Argued January 18, 1968.— Decided March 5, 1968. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Robert S. Rifkind, Philip A. Loomis, Jr., David Ferber, Roger S. Foster and Richard E. Nathan. John R. Quarles argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Richard B. Dunn, Richard W. Southgate and John J. Glessner III. George Spiegel filed a brief for the Municipal Electric Association of Massachusetts, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent New England Electric System (NEES), a holding company registered under § 5 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, controls both an integrated electric utility system and an integrated gas utility system. Section 11 (b) of the Act requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to limit the operations of a holding company system to a single integrated public utility system, except the Commission may permit the holding company to continue control of any additional integrated utility system that the Commission determines, among other things, “cannot be operated as an independent system without the loss of substantial economies which can be secured by the retention of control by such holding company of such system . ...” In 1957 the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted proceedings to determine whether NEES should be permitted to retain control of both the electric and gas systems. The Commission initially found that the electric companies constituted a single integrated electric utility system, 38 S. E. C. 193 (1958), and NEES elected to retain those companies as its principal system. NEES urged, however, that it should also be permitted to retain the gas system. After extensive hearings, the Commission refused respondent permission to do so, and ordered the gas system divested. 41 S. E. C. 888 (1964). In reaching its conclusion the Commission construed the statutory phrase “loss of substantial economies” in Clause A of § 11 (b)(1) to require a showing that the “additional system cannot be operated under separate ownership without the loss of economies so important as to cause a serious impairment of that system.” In its first review of the Commission’s order, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Commission had erroneously construed the statute; in the court’s view, “loss of substantial economies” merely “called for a business judgment of what would be a significant loss . . . .” The court therefore set aside the Commission’s order and remanded for reconsideration in light of that test. 346 F. 2d 399, 406. We reversed, approving the Commission’s construction, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for review of the challenged order in light of the proper meaning of the statutory term. SEC v. New England Electric System, 384 U. S. 176 (NEES I). On remand, the Court of Appeals again set aside the Commission’s order. 376 F. 2d 107. That court, “after a fresh review of all the evidence,” concluded “that the Commission’s opinion does not reveal that application of both reason and experience to facts which merits endorsement as the responsible exercise of expertise.” Id., at 111. We granted certiorari. 389 U. S. 816. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals with direction to enter a judgment affirming the Commission’s order. The question for our decision is whether the Court of Appeals properly held that, on the record, the Commission erred in finding that NEES failed to prove a case for retention of the integrated gas utility system. We address that question against the background of a congressional objective to protect consumer interests through the “elimination of 'restraint of free and independent competition.’ . . . One of the evils that had resulted from control of utilities by holding companies was the retention in one system of both gas and electric properties and the favoring of one of these competing forms of energy over the other.” NEES I, 384 U. S., at 183. Congress therefore ordained separate ownership — and divestiture where necessary to reduce holdings to one system — as the “ 'very heart’ of the Act.” Id., at 180. Although Congress was aware that some economic loss might be suffered by the parent holding company or the separated integrated utility, Congress relented only to the extent of authorizing the Commission to permit retention of an additional integrated utility if that permission might be granted under the narrow exception provided by § 11 (b)(1). But “retention of an 'additional’ integrated system is decidely the exception,” and the burden is on the holding company to satisfy the “stringent test” set by the statute. Id., at 180, 182; cf. United States v. First City Nat. Bank, 386 U. S. 361, 366. Congress committed to the Commission the task of determining whether a holding company has met the burden of showing that its situation falls within the narrow exception under § 11 (b)(1). The Clause A determination whether separation entails a loss of economies likely to cause a serious impairment of the system involves an element of prediction which necessarily calls for difficult and expert judgment. That judgment requires the assessment of many subtle and often intangible factors not easily expressed in precise or quantifiable terms. This is the very nature of economic forecasting. The task calls for expertise and is not simply “an exercise in counting commonplaces.” United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 384; see NEES I, 384 U. S., at 184 — 185. Judicial review of that expert judgment is necessarily a limited one. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 412-413; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 131; Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U. S. 357, 367-368; United States v. Drum, supra, at 375-376. Congress expressly provided that “[t]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 15 U. S. C. § 79x (a); see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474; cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236. In our view, the Court of Appeals in this case indulged in an unwarranted incursion into the administrative domain. The Commission’s order has adequate support in the record and should have been affirmed. As of 1958, the test year selected for purposes of these proceedings, NEES’ eight gas subsidiaries provided retail service to some 237,000 customers in a relatively compact 660-square-mile franchise area in Massachusetts. NEES’ electric companies also served 75% of this area and about 78% of the gas customers were also electric customers. NEES’ gross investment in gas plant and equipment was about $56,300,000 and gross gas revenues for 1958 were about $22,700,000. The eight gas companies were organized administratively as a Gas Division with centralized management, marketing and supply, operations, and merchandising departments. The chief executive of the Gas Division was also president of each gas company and ultimately responsible to NEES’ vice president in charge of management; in short, top management rested with executives having joint control over both electric and gas operations. The Commission had before it a “severance study,” a cost analysis and projection prepared for NEES by a professional public utilities management consulting firm, Ebasco Services, Inc. This study projected a loss of economies of approximately $1,100,000 annually for the gas system as the result of its separation from NEES. The Commission dealt with this study in alternative ways. It analyzed the study and concluded that “[t]he Ebasco estimate is inadequately supported in a number of important aspects and leaves considerable doubts which [NEES has] not satisfactorily overcome in the record.” Then it went on to find that even if the estimated $1,100,000 in loss of economies were accepted as accurate “it would not lead us to conclude that such a loss is so substantial, when compared with the loss of economies involved in prior divestment cases and viewed in light of the objectives of the Act, as to warrant retention of the gas properties . . . .” 41 S. E. C., at 895, 897. Because we conclude that the record supports the Commission’s decision on the latter ground, we have no occasion to consider whether the Commission’s strictures on the reliability of the Ebasco study are well founded. The Commission’s ultimate finding that the projected $1,100,000 loss of economies annually did not constitute a loss of “substantial” economies within Clause A of § 11 (b)(1) was reached primarily upon the basis of its subsidiary findings upon three matters: (1) That NEES’ estimated losses were not significantly out of line with those found insubstantial in previous cases; (2) that other nonaffiliated Massachusetts gas companies, all but one of them smaller than the NEES gas system, are apparently able to operate successfully without electric utility affiliations; (3) that NEES did not establish that independent management devoted solely to promoting gas sales would not result in benefits to offset some of the projected losses. The Court of Appeals held that none of the three subsidiary findings was supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. I. The Commission, consistent with its practice in prior cases, weighed NEES’ estimated $1,100,000 losses in relative rather than absolute terms, calculating the losses as a percentage of NEES’ 1958 revenues, expenses, and income. It found these loss ratios to be “lower or not significantly higher than corresponding ratios of gas systems whose divestment we have required on the ground that the estimated loss of economies was not substantial within the meaning of clause A.” 41 S. E. C., at 898. The cases with which these particular comparisons were made involved companies outside Massachusetts. The Court of Appeals held that the comparisons with the loss ratios of companies involved in prior cases were “largely irrelevant” because “. . . these ratios are significant only as they affect the investment structure of the companies in the particular case, and different companies may be compared only on the assumption that both operate at the same level.” 376 F. 2d, at 113, 115. The court’s ultimate conclusion was that only close analysis of NEES’ own “particular circumstances” was relevant to the Commission’s inquiry. It is significant, however, that the Court of Appeals’ criticism of the Commission’s use of ratios relied heavily on the court’s reading of the statistical data in evidence as showing that the projected loss of economies “would decrease [NEES’] rate of return from 6.4 per cent in 1959 to 4.1 per cent on the projected basis,” or some 30% below, “an average rate of 5.9 per cent for the non-affiliated Massachusetts gas companies . . . .” 376 F. 2d, at 114. But, as the Commission has noted, the court’s computation that the separated companies would realize a return of only 4.1%. contained a serious error, for it overlooked the allowance to be made for income tax deductions generated by the projected losses. The actual rate of return taking such deductions into account would be a significantly higher 5.2%. In any event, we may agree that the ratios of losses of revenues, expenses, and income are necessarily affected by differences in capital structure, management, market position, and other factors. But it by no means follows that the Commission’s comparisons are for that reason irrelevant to the determination whether a projected loss of economies is so important as to cause a serious impairment of the separated system. It was well within the' range of the Commission’s administrative discretion to use the loss ratios, as it did, “as a guide in adjudicating the pending case.” Philadelphia Co., 28 S. E. C. 36, 50, n. 24. The Commission in its expert judgment may so employ evaluative factors it considers relevant. Indeed, NEES apparently recognized that its burden to establish that its situation comes within Clause A included the burden of showing that the projected loss of economies would be more serious for its separated system than the comparable level of losses in the other cases already decided by the Commission. Respondent attempted to prove that the gas system’s distance from sources of supply gives it only a very narrow competitive advantage over oil as a fuel, and, further, that the system’s growth potential is more limited by a lack of new housing expansion in the area serviced by the gas companies. As we shall see below, the Commission found that NEES had not made a case in either respect insofar as those matters bore on whether the projected loss of economies threatened serious impairment of the separated system. II. The Commission’s resort to data concerning the operations of the nonaffiliated Massachusetts gas companies was a response to NEES’ argument, supported by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, that the projected loss of economies from separation of the gas system would require the gas companies to seek rate increases which might seriously impair or destroy any hope of a successful operation. Natural gas in 1959 enjoyed in New England the smallest price advantage over oil of any section of the country. The annual differential was $7 over oil for a typical New England house compared with $27 to $118 in favor of gas in the rest of the country. NEES contended that the predicted rate increase would substantially or entirely eliminate the gas system’s already narrow price advantage over oil competitors. The Commission’s answer was to inquire about the economic health of the already nonaffiliated Massachusetts gas companies. The Commission found that these companies were apparently able to earn a fair return although not enjoying the supposed advantages of affiliation with electric utilities; and it could find no evidence that they did not face the same competitive conditions as NEES. The Commission found further that, despite NEES’ insistence that its market conditions differed from the nonaffiliated companies because of relatively stagnant franchise areas offering less sales growth, there was no evidence that this would prevent the separated gas system — which would emerge as the second largest independent in the State — from competing as effectively as the smaller independents who had long held their own. Finally, the Commission noted that after severance the gas system’s operating ratio would be more favorable or only slightly higher than the ratios of nine independents and therefore concluded that it “would be entering the realm of speculation at this time to assume that rate increases would ensue from severance.” 41 S. E. C., at 899. The Court of Appeals rejected the comparison of these operating ratios, again on the ground that such ratios fail to take account of special characteristics of individual companies. The court observed that since all New England gas companies operated on a “small cushion . . . [t]he significance of this is not negated by observing that non-NEES companies in Massachusetts seem to be surviving, for the focus must be on the specific characteristics of the NEES companies, the only ones affected by the Commission’s order.” 376 F. 2d, at 113. The court further held “irrelevant the comparison of operating ratios, since a business may operate relatively efficiently, yet at a level too low to attract investors.” 376 F. 2d, at 114, n. 6. For the reasons already stated for our disagreement with the Court of Appeals’ view of the Commission’s use of other ratios, we disagree that this comparison was either irrelevant or outside the limits of the Commission’s administrative discretion. The dissection and evaluation of an economic projection is a function Congress committed to the Commission, not the courts. A court may believe it would have done the job differently and better; but judicial inquiry must be addressed to whether what the Commission did is fatal to its ultimate conclusion that the holding company failed to carry its burden of showing a loss of “substantial” economies within the meaning of Clause A. In assessing NEES’ forecast of the need for rate increases because of the projected loss of economies, it was proper for the Commission to consider the performance of other Massachusetts gas companies which were already operating independently. NEES was afforded every opportunity to sustain its burden of showing that the separated gas system would wither into critical health despite the contrary inferences suggested by the comparison made by the Commission. It cannot be a basis for finding error that the Commission found the attempt unpersuasive, given the gas system’s size, and the prognosis of efficiencies comparable to those achieved by the independents. III. The Commission conceived that the projected loss of economies would in some measure be offset by advantages realized by the separated system under the direction of “a management solely interested in and devoted to the gas operations . . . .” 41 S. E. C., at 901. NEES, again supported by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, took the position that its operation of the companies had already achieved all possible benefits of interservice competition. The Commission found the argument unpersuasive, relying again on a comparison with the nonaffiliated Massachusetts gas companies. This was a comparison of the sales performance of the gas companies under NEES management with the sales performances of the independents. All seven of the comparable independents showed substantially higher gas sales and revenues per customer and lower costs to customers. The Commission found unpersuasive NEES’ explanation that this was accounted for by the greater residential growth potential of the areas serviced by the independents. The Court of Appeals held that the test of “serious impairment” under Clause A already took account of offsetting benefits to be realized from separation and therefore “that done, the general judgment has no independent significance in an individual case.” 376 F. 2d, at 115-116. Whatever the merit of the general premise, see NEES I, 384 U. S., at 184-185, we understand the Commission’s finding to have been simply that the projected $1,100,000 loss of economies did not in fact take into account any offsetting benefits on the assumption that joint operation had already achieved the advantages of independence. See 41 S. E. C., at 900-901. The Commission’s conclusion that NEES’ assumption was not proved has support in the record and the Court of Appeals was not justified in rejecting it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to enter a judgment affirming the Commission’s order. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 49 Stat. 812, 15 U. S. C. § 79e. At the time of this proceeding, the integrated electric utility system consisted of seven electric utility companies serving parts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The integrated gas utility system consisted of eight Massachusetts gas companies. NEES also controlled a service company which provided services for the whole NEES operation. Section 11 (b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b), provides in pertinent part: “It shall be the duty of the Commission, as soon as practicable after January 1, 1938: “(1) To require by order, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that each registered holding company, and each subsidiary company thereof, shall take such action as the Commission shall find necessary to limit the operations of the holding-company system of which such company is a part to a single integrated public-utility system . . . : Provided, however, That the Commission shall permit a registered holding company to continue to control one or more additional integrated public-utility systems, if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, it finds that— “(A) Each of such additional systems cannot be operated as an independent system without the loss of substantial economies which can be secured by the retention of control by such holding company of such system . . . .” On remand, the Court of Appeals interpreted the “serious impairment” standard as requiring proof only of “a condition allowing survival but not on a sound or 'healthful continuing’ basis,” rather than proof that severance "will result in imminent bankruptcy . . . .” 376 F. 2d, at 109. The Commission has not contested this interpretation in this Court. “By fostering competition between gas and electric utility companies, the Act promotes what has been described as ‘variegated competition.’” NEES I, 384 U. S., at 184, n. 15. The following passage is from the court’s opinion on remand: “Even without the burden of proving likely demise, [NEES’] burden is, as the Court said, to meet 'a much more stringent test’ than that of a probable significant loss. But, if the standard to be applied to [NEES] is stringent, so is the level of analysis and expertise to be exercised by the Commission. We have, only after a fresh review of all the evidence in the light of this most stringent practical standard, concluded that the Commission’s opinion does not reveal that application of both reason and experience to facts which merits endorsement as the responsible exercise of expertise.” 376 F. 2d, at 111. This was the latest year for which audited financial statements were available at the time of the hearing before the Commission. 41 S. E. C., at 889, n. 3. All but one of the eight companies are located within 48 miles of the division headquarters; one is 80 miles away. “Nonaffiliated” or “independent” refers to gas companies not having any electric affiliations and gas companies not jointly operated with electric companies serving the same franchise area. E. g., Philadelphia Co., 28 S. E. C. 35, 50-52 (1948); General Pub. Util. Corp., 32 S. E. C. 807, 837 (1951). The losses would amount to: 4.8% of operating revenues; 6.0% of operating revenue deductions (excluding federal income taxes); 23.3% of gross income (before federal income taxes); 29.9% of net income (before taxes). See Engineers Pub. Service Co., 12 S. E. C. 41, 55-61, 78-81 (1942); North Amer. Co., 18 S. E. C. 611 (1945); Philadelphia Co., 28 S. E. C. 35, 45-53 (1948); General Pub. Util. Corp., 32 S. E. C. 807, 814-815, 823-839 (1951); Middle So. Util., Inc., 35 S. E. C. 1 (1953), 36 S. E. C. 383 (1955). The relevant financial data for each case are summarized in an appendix to the Commission’s opinion. 41 S. E. C., at 905. Rate of retum is the percentage of net operating income to the rate base, which is fixed by a formula tied generally to the value of capital assets. The source of the 4.1% figure appears to have been the Court of Appeals. The 4.1% was apparently derived as follows: (a) $ 3,050,988 (1959 net oper. income after taxes) $47,723,162 (rate base) =6.4% rate of retum (b) $ 3,050,988 1,098,600 (projected losses) $ 1,952,388 (est. net oper. income) (c) $ 1,952,388 $47,723,162 =4-1% mte °f retum However, the $1,100,000 projected loss would generate income tax deductions of roughly 50%, increasing the numerator of fraction (c) from $1,952,388 to $2,501,688, and the rate of retum to 5.2%. The NEES brief relies on the 4.1% figure, but NEES has not challenged the Commission’s recalculation. The 1959 rates of retum for the comparable nonaffiliated Massachusetts companies were as follows: Percent Berkshire Gas . 5.2 Brockton-Taunton Gas . 6.1 Fall River Gas. 6.2 Haverhill Gas . 6.8 Lowell Gas . 7.9 Springfield Gas . 6.4 Worcester Gas . 4.5 (Resp. Ex. 117; R. 1436.) Although the parties are in dispute as to the validity of some of the data drawn from the previous cases, we do not consider it necessary to become involved in that controversy. Suffice it to say that we do not think the Commission in looking to the data for guidance exceeded the bounds of reason or administrative discretion. Gas to New England was piped all the way from Texas, whereas oil was shipped in by tanker. NEES estimated the average home heating cost to be $166 for gas, $173 for oil; and it was in residential space heating that NEES found its chief market. NEES calculated the composite rate of return for its gas system at 6.6% for 1958 and 6.4% for 1959. (Resp. Ex. 114; R. 1431.) The average for seven comparable independents was 6.3% in 1958 and 5.9% in 1959. (Resp. Ex. 117; R. 1436.) NEES cites as prime evidence in this regard the testimony of Robert Cahal, an Ebasco marketing consultant who had to some extent analyzed the marketing conditions NEES faced. The substance of his testimony was that (a) gas and oil are highly competitive in the State, with oil being well entrenched in many areas so that the major source of growth has to be in new residence construction; (b) in Massachusetts growth is in the suburbs with towns proper being relatively stagnant; (c) gas companies are limited by their franchise area, prisoners of the characteristics of their particular communities; (d) the independents are not necessarily comparable with NEES because they may be in areas of higher growth; (e) independents having such areas are Haverhill, Lowell, Springfield, Worcester, Brockton-Taunton; all of them having growth greater (but unspecified as to degree) than any NEES gas company except Norwood. The Commission noted, without comment, that the population increase in NEES’ franchise areas between 1950 and 1960 was only 11% as compared with 18% in the areas of seven independents. 41 S. E. C., at 899, n. 23. The operating ratio is “the percentage of total operating revenue deductions (other than depreciation, amortization of conversion costs, and Federal income taxes) to total operating revenues.” 41 S. E. C., at 899, n. 25. The ratio “affords a measure for determining the efficiency with which the enterprise is conducted and while its value is greater in comparing the year to year trend it has a limited use in comparing very similar enterprises.” Moody’s Public Utility Manual ix (1967). NEES’ ratio was fixed at 76.41% and compared with the composite ratio of nine independents of 79.14%, as well as their median and mean ratios of 74.87% and 76.35% respectively. Individual ratios are cited at 41 S. E. C., at 899, n. 26. The Commission may properly regard size of operation to be a relevant factor. One of Congress’ concerns in providing the exception involved here was to protect small companies likely to fail if separated from the parent holding company. Cf. NEES I, 384 U. S., at 181; North Amer. Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686, 697. See also H. R. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 68-71; S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 72-A, at 831, 835. And size, especially given its relatively compact franchise area, indication of its competitive position. NEES’ is some See n. 18, supra, and accompanying text. The breakdown was as follows: 1958— NEES Indep. Sales, mcf/cust. 44.2 78.8 Revenues, cust. $95.44 $135.19 Cost to customers, mcf. $2.16 $1.72 1959- Sales, mcf/cust. 51.5 83.7 Revenues, cust. $104.49 $142.10 Cost to customers, mcf. $2.03 $1.70 Equivalent data for the Norwood Gas Company, the NEES subsidiary asserted to have growth potential comparable to the independents, see n. 17, supra, were as follows (1958 and 1959 figures): Sales — 51.8 and 60.4 mcf/customer; Revenues — $112.59 and $125.66/customer; Cost to customers — $2.17 and $2.08/mcf. 41 S. E. C., at 901, nn. 29-30. See R. 1446-1447, 1449-1450. “[N]o specific demonstration of the existence or extent of such a causal relation was presented.” 41 S. E. C., at 901. See also n. 21, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LUJAN, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE et al. No. 90-1424. Argued December 3, 1991 Decided June 12, 1992 Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Kennedy, Soutek, and Thomas, 33., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 579. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 581. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 689. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Hartman, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert L. Klarquist, David C. Shilton, Thomas L. Sansonetti, and Michael Young. Brian B. O’Neill argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Steven C. Schroer and Richard A. Duncan Terence P. Ross, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the City of Austin et al. by William A Butler, Angus E. Crane, Michael J. Bean, Kenneth Oden, James M. McCormack, and Wm. Robert Irvin; for the American Association of Zoological Parks & Aquariums et al. by Ronald J. Greene and W. Hardy Callcott; for the American Institute of Biological Sciences by Richard J. Wertheimer and Charles M. Chambers; and for the Ecotrop-ica Foundation of Brazil et al. by Durwood J. Zaelke. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Texas et al. by Patrick J. Mahoney, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, and Nancy N. Lynch, Mary Ruth Holder, and Shannon J. Kilgore, Assistant Attorneys General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, and Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Victor A Kovner, Leonard J. Koerner, Neal M. Janey, and Louise H. Renne. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IY, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Thomas join. This case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting § 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 892, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1586, in such fashion as to render it applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The preliminary issue, and the only one we reach, is whether respondents here, plaintiffs below, have standing to seek judicial review of the rule. I The ESA, 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., seeks to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. See generally TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978). The ESA instructs the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate by regulation a list of those species which are either endangered or threatened under enumerated criteria, and to define the critical habitat of these species. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1533, 1536. Section 7(a)(2) of the Act then provides, in pertinent part: “Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica- . tion of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Commerce respectively, promulgated a joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by § 7(a)(2) extend to actions taken in foreign nations. 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978). The next year, however, the Interior Department began to reexamine its position. Letter from Leo Kuliz, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Aug. 8, 1979. A revised joint regulation, reinterpreting § 7(a)(2) to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high seas, was proposed in 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 29990, and promulgated in 1986, 61 Fed. Reg. 19926; 50 CFR 402.01 (1991). Shortly thereafter, respondents, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes, filed this action against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation is in error as to the geographic scope of § 7(a)(2) and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring the initial interpretation. The District Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (Minn. 1987). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed by a divided vote. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F. 2d 1035 (1988). On remand, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on the standing issue, and respondents moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court denied the Secretary’s motion, on the ground that the Eighth Circuit had already determined the standing question in this case; it granted respondents’ merits motion, and ordered the Secretary to publish a revised regulation. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (Minn. 1989). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 911 F. 2d 117 (1990). We granted certiorari, 500 U. S. 915 (1991). II While the Constitution of the United States divides all power conferred upon the Federal Government into “legislative Powers,” Art. I, § 1, “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, § 1, and “[t]he judicial Power,” Art. Ill, § 1, it does not attempt to define those terms. To be sure, it limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” but an executive inquiry can bear the name “case” (the Hoffa case) and a legislative dispute can bear the name “controversy” (the Smoot-Hawley controversy). Obviously, then, the Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts. In The Federalist No. 48, Madison expressed the view that “[i]t is not infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere,” whereas “the executive power [is] restrained within a narrower compass and . . . more simple in its nature,” and “the judiciary [is] described by landmarks still less uncertain.” The Federalist No. 48, p. 256 (Carey and McClellan eds. 1990). One of those landmarks, setting apart the “Cases” and “Controversies” that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III — “serving] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) — is the doctrine of standing. Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See, e. g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see id., at 756; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972); and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” Whitmore, supra, at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not. .. th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id., at 38, 43. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth, supra, at 508. Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883-889 (1990); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 114-115, and n. 31 (1979); Simon, supra, at 45, n. 25; Warth, supra, at 527, and n. 6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we “presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” National Wildlife Federation, supra, at 889. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such “mere allegations,” but must “set forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be “supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.” Gladstone, supra, at 115, n. 31. When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction — and perhaps on the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing “depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,” ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 615 (1989) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Simon, supra, at 41-42; and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury. E. g., Warth, supra, at 505. Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily “substantially more difficult” to establish. Allen, supra, at 758; Simon, supra, at 44-45; Warth, supra, at 505. Ill We think the Court of Appeals failed to apply the foregoing principles in denying the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. Respondents had not made the requisite demonstration of (at least) injury and redressability. A Respondents’ claim to injury is that the lack of consultation with respect to certain funded activities abroad “increases] the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species.” Complaint ¶ 5, App. 13. Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing. See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 734. “But the ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.” Id., at 734-735. To survive the Secretary’s summary judgment motion, respondents had to submit affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but also that one or more of respondents’ members would thereby be “directly” affected apart from their “ ‘special interest’ in th[e] subject.” Id., at 735, 739. See generally Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977). With respect to this aspect of the case, the Court of Appeals focused on the affidavits of two Defenders’ members— Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred. Ms. Kelly stated that she traveled to Egypt in 1986 and “observed the traditional habitat of the endangered nile crocodile there and intend[s] to do so again, and hope[s] to observe the crocodile directly,” and that she “will suffer harm in fact as the result of [the] American ... role ... in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile . . . and [in] developing] . . . Egypt’s . . . Master Water Plan.” App. 101. Ms. Skilbred averred that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and “observed th[e] habitat” of “endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard” at what is now the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development (AID), although she “was unable to see any of the endangered species”; “this development project,” she continued, “will seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and endemic species habitat including areas that I visited . . . [, which] may severely shorten the future of these species”; that threat, she concluded, harmed her because she “intend[s] to return to Sri Lanka in the future and hope[s] to be more fortunate in spotting at least the endangered elephant and leopard.” Id., at 145-146. When Ms. Skilbred was asked at a subsequent deposition if and when she had any plans to return to Sri Lanka, she reiterated that “I intend to go back to Sri Lanka,” but confessed that she had no current plans: “I don’t know [when]. There is a civil war going on right now. I don’t know. Not next year, I will say. In the future.” Id., at 318. We shall assume for the sake of argument that these affidavits contain facts showing that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed species — though that is questionable. They plainly contain no facts, however, showing how damage to the species will produce “imminent” injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred. That the women “had visited” the areas of the projects before the projects commenced proves nothing. As we have said in a related context, “‘Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.’ ” Lyons, 461 U. S., at 102 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 495-496 (1974)). And the affiants’ profession of an “inten[t]” to return to the places they had visited before — where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species — is simply not enough. Such “some day” intentions — without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the “actual or imminent” injury that our cases require. See supra, at 560. Besides relying upon the Kelly and Skilbred affidavits, respondents propose a series of novel standing theories. The first, inelegantly styled “ecosystem nexus,” proposes that any person who uses any part of a “contiguous ecosystem” adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away. This approach, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, is inconsistent with our opinion in National Wildlife Federation, which held that a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly “in the vicinity” of it. 497 U. S., at 887-889; see also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 735. It makes no difference that the general-purpose section of the ESA states that the Act was intended in part “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,” 16 U. S. C. § 1531(b). To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action in persons who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in question. Respondents’ other theories are called, alas, the “animal nexus” approach, whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the “vocational nexus” approach, under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue. Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the Agency for International Development (AID) did not consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason. Standing is not “an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,” United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but as we have said requires, at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of perceptible harm. It is clear that the person who observes or works with a particular animal threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since the very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is even plausible — though it goes to the outermost limit of plausibility — to think that a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a federal decision is facing such harm, since some animals that might have been the subject of his interest will no longer exist, see Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U. S. 221, 281, n. 4 (1986). It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which he has no more specific connection. B Besides failing to show injury, respondents failed to demonstrate redressability. Instead of attacking the separate decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them harm, respondents chose to challenge a more generalized level of Government action (rules regarding consultation), the invalidation of which would affect all overseas projects. This programmatic approach has obvious practical advantages, but also obvious difficulties insofar as proof of causation or redressability is concerned. As we have said in another context, “suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations . . . [are], even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law,... rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.” Allen, 468 U. S., at 759-760. The most obvious problem in the present case is redress-ability. Since the agencies funding the projects were not parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only against the Secretary: He could be ordered to revise his regulation to require consultation for foreign projects. But this would not remedy respondents’ alleged injury unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary’s regulation, which is very much an open question. Whereas in other contexts the ESA is quite explicit as to the Secretary’s controlling authority, see, e. g., 16 U. S. C. § 1533(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall” promulgate regulations determining endangered species); § 1535(d)(1) (“The Secretary is authorized to provide financial assistance to any State”), with respect to consultation the initiative, and hence arguably the initial responsibility for determining statutory necessity, lies with the agencies, see § 1536(a)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any” funded action is not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species) (emphasis added). When the Secretary promulgated the regulation at issue here, he thought it was binding on the agencies, see 51 Fed. Reg. 19928 (1986). The Solicitor General, however, has repudiated that position here, and the agencies themselves apparently deny the Secretary’s authority. (During the period when the Secretary took the view that § 7(a)(2) did apply abroad, AID and FWS engaged in a running controversy over whether consultation was required with respect to the Mahaweli project, AID insisting that consultation applied only to domestic actions.) Respondents assert that this legal uncertainty did not affect redressability (and hence standing) because the District Court itself could resolve the issue of the Secretary’s authority as a necessary part of its standing inquiry. Assuming that it is appropriate to resolve an issue of law such as this in connection with a threshold standing inquiry, resolution by the District Court would not have remedied respondents’ alleged injury anyway, because it would not have been binding upon the agencies. They were not parties to the suit, and there is no reason they should be obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit produced. The Court of Appeals tried to finesse this problem by simply proclaiming that “[w]e are satisfied that an injunction requiring the Secretary to publish [respondents’ desired] regulatio[n] . . . would result in consultation.” Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F. 2d, at 1042, 1043-1044. We do not know what would justify that confidence, particularly when the Justice Department (presumably after consultation with the agencies) has taken the position that the regulation is not binding. The short of the matter is that redress of the only injury in fact respondents complain of requires action (termination of funding until consultation) by the individual funding agencies; and any relief the District Court could have provided in this suit against the Secretary was not likely to produce that action. A further impediment to redressability is the fact that the agencies generally supply only a fraction of the funding for a foreign project. AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli project. Respondents have produced nothing to indicate that the projects they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to listed species, if that fraction is eliminated. As in Simon, 426 U. S., at 43-44, it is entirely conjectural whether the non-agency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve. There is no standing. IV The Court of Appeals found that respondents had standing for an additional reason: because they had suffered a “procedural injury.” The so-called “citizen-suit” provision of the ESA provides, in pertinent part, that “any person may com-menee a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.” 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g). The court held that, because § 7(a)(2) requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision creates a “procedural righ[t]” to consultation in all “persons” — so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the Secretary’s (or presumably any other official’s) failure to follow the assertedly correct consultative procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury flowing from that failure. 911 F. 2d, at 121-122. To understand the remarkable nature of this holding one must be clear about what it does not rest upon: This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs (e. g., the procedural requirement for a hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement before a federal facility is constructed next door to them). Nor is it simply a case where concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations. Nor, finally, is it the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government’s benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff. Rather, the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental “right” to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law. We reject this view. We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government — claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large — does not state an Article III case or controversy. For example, in Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129-130 (1922), we dismissed a suit challenging the propriety of the process by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. Justice Brandéis wrote for the Court: “[This is] not a case within the meaning of . . . Article III ... . Plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit. . . .” Ibid. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), we dismissed for lack of Article III standing a taxpayer suit challenging the propriety of certain federal expenditures. We said: “The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.... Here the parties plaintiff have no such case.... [T]heir complaint... is merely that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.” Id., at 488-489. In Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937), we dismissed a suit contending that Justice Black’s appointment to this Court violated the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2. “It is an established principle,” we said, “that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.” 302 U. S., at 634. See also Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 433-434 (1952) (dismissing taxpayer action on the basis of Mellon). More recent cases are to the same effect. In United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), we dismissed for lack of standing a taxpayer suit challenging the Government’s failure to disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency, in alleged violation of the constitutional requirement, Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” We held that such a suit rested upon an impermissible “generalized grievance,” and was inconsistent with “the framework of Article III” because “the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the public.’ ” Richardson, supra, at 171, 176-177. And in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), we dismissed for the same reasons a citizen-taxpayer suit contending that it was a violation of the Incompatibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2, for Members of Congress to hold commissions in the military Reserves. We said that the challenged action, “standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance . . . . We reaffirm Lévitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of th[is] kind . . . .” Schlesinger, supra, at 217, 220. Since Schlesinger we have on two occasions held that an injury amounting only to the alleged violation of a right to have, the Government act in accordance with law was not judicially cognizable because “‘assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. Ill without draining those requirements of meaning.’” Allen, 468 U. S., at 754; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 483 (1982). And only two Terms ago, we rejected the notion that Article III permits a citizen suit to prevent a condemned criminal’s execution on the basis of “ ‘the public interest protections of the Eighth Amendment’ once again, “[t]his allegation raise[d] only the ‘generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance’... and [was] an inadequate basis on which to grant... standing.” Whitmore, 495 U. S., at 160. To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch — one of the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and “Controversies” that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches. “The province of the court,” as Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803), “is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.” Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies’ observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, “to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department,” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S., at 489, and to become “ ‘virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.’” Allen, supra, at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 15 (1972)). We have always rejected that vision of our role: “When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers.... This is very far from assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of the people. Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents. . . . But under Article III, Congress established courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power.” Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309-310 (1944) (footnote omitted). “Individual rights,” within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively-pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public. See also Sierra Club, 405 U. S., at 740-741, n. 16. Nothing in this contradicts the principle that “[t]he . . . injury required by Art. Ill may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’ ” Warth, 422 U. S., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973)). Both of the cases used by Linda R. S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress’ elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, defacto injuries that were previously inadequate in law (namely, injury to an individual’s personal interest in living in a racially integrated community, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 208-212 (1972), and injury to a company’s interest in marketing its product free from competition, see Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 6 (1968)). As we said in Sierra Club, “[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.” 405 U. S., at 738. Whether or not the principle set forth in Warth can be extended beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain. * * * We hold that respondents lack standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. By particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. The dissent acknowledges the settled requirement that the injury complained of be, if not actual, then at least imminent, but it contends that respondents could get past summary judgment because “a reasonable finder of fact could conclude ... that... Kelly or Skilbred will soon return to the project sites.” Post, at 691. This analysis suffers either from a factual or from a legal defect, depending on what the “soon” is supposed to mean. If “soon” refers to the standard mandated by our precedents— that the injury be “imminent,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990) — we are at a loss to see how, as a factual matter, the standard can be met by respondents’ mere profession of an intent, some day, to return. But if, as we suspect, “soon” means nothing more than “in this lifetime,” then the dissent has undertaken quite a departure from our precedents. Although “imminence” is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes — that the injury is “ ‘ “certainly impending,” ’ ” id, at 168 (emphasis added). It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control. In such circumstances we have insisted that the injury proceed with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all. See, e. g., id,., at 156-160; Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102-106 (1983). There is no substance to the dissent’s suggestion that imminence is demanded only when the alleged harm depends upon “the affirmative actions of third parties beyond a plaintiff’s control,” post, at 592. Our cases mention third-party-caused contingency, naturally enough; but they also mention the plaintiff’s failure to show that he will soon expose himself to the injury, see, e. g., Lyons, supra, at 105-106; O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 497 (1974); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173, n. 2 (1977) (per curiam). And there is certainly no reason in principle to demand evidence that third persons will take the action exposing the plaintiff to harm, while presuming that the plaintiff himself will do so. Our insistence upon these established requirements of standing does not mean that we would, as the dissent contends, “demand . . . detailed descriptions” of damages, such as a “nightly schedule of attempted activities” from plaintiffs alleging loss of consortium. Post, at 593. That case and the others posited by the dissent all involve actual harm; the existence of standing is clear, though the precise extent of harm remains to be determined at trial. Where there is no actual harm, however, its imminence (though not its precise extent) must be established. The dissent embraces each of respondents’ “nexus” theories, rejecting this portion of our analysis because it is “unable to see how the distant location of the destruction necessarily (for purposes of ruling at summary judgment) mitigates the harm” to the plaintiff. Post, at 694-595. But summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986). Respondents had to adduce facts, therefore, on the basis of which it could reasonably be found that concrete injury to their members was, as our cases require, “certainly impending.” The dissent may be correct that the geographic remoteness of those members (here in the United States) from Sri Lanka and Aswan does not “necessarily” prevent such a finding — but it assuredly does so when no further facts have been brought forward (and respondents have produced none) showing that the impact upon animals in those distant places will in some fashion be reflected here. The dissent’s position to the contrary reduces to the notion that distance never prevents harm, a proposition we categorically reject. It cannot be that a person with an interest in an animal automatically has standing to enjoin federal threats to that species of animal, anywhere in the world. Were that the case, the plaintiff in Sierra Club, for example, could have avoided the necessity of establishing anyone’s use of Mineral King by merely identifying one of its members interested in an endangered species of flora or fauna at that location. Justice Blackmun’s accusation that a special rule is being crafted for “environmental claims,” post, at 595, is correct, but he is the craftsman. Justice Stevens, by contrast, would allow standing on an apparent “animal nexus” theory to all plaintiffs whose interest in the animals is “genuine.” Such plaintiffs, we are told, do not have to visit the animals because the animals are analogous to family members. Post, at 583-584, and n. 2. We decliné to join Justice Stevens in this Linnaean leap. It is unclear to us what constitutes a “genuine” interest; how it differs from a “nongenuine” interest (which nonetheless prompted a plaintiff to file suit); and why such an interest in animals should be different from such an interest in anything else that is the subject of a lawsuit. We need not linger over the dissent’s facially impracticable suggestion, post, at 595-596, that one agency of the Government can acquire the power to direct other agencies by simply claiming that power in its own regulations and in litigation to which the other agencies are not parties. As for the contention that the other agencies will be “collaterally estopped” to challenge our judgment that they are bound by the Secretary of the Interior’s views, because of their participation in this suit, post, at 596-597: Whether or not that is true now, it was assuredly not true when this suit was filed, naming the Secretary alone. “The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 830 (1989) (emphasis added). It cannot be that, by later participating in the suit, the State Department and AID retroactively created a redressability (and hence a jurisdiction) that did not exist at the outset. The dissent’s rejoinder that redressability was clear at the outset because the Secretary thought the regulation binding on the agencies, post, at 598-599, n. 4, continues to miss the point: The agencies did not agree with the Secretary, nor would they be bound by a district court holding (as to this issue) in the Secretary’s favor. There is no support for the dissent’s novel contention, ibid., that Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing joinder of indispensable parties, somehow alters our longstanding rule that jurisdiction is to be assessed under the facts existing when the complaint is filed. The redressability element of the Article III standing requirement and the “complete relief” referred to by Rule 19 are not identical. Finally, we reach the dissent’s contention, post, at 599, n. 4, that by refusing to waive our settled rule for purposes of this case we have made “federal subject-matter jurisdiction ... a one-way street running the Executive Branch’s way.” That is so, we are told, because the Executive can dispel jurisdiction where it previously existed (by either conceding the merits or by pointing out that nonparty agencies would not be bound by a ruling), whereas a plaintiff cannot retroactively create jurisdiction based on postcomplaint litigation conduct. But any defendant, not just the Government, can dispel jurisdiction by conceding the merits (and presumably thereby suffering a judgment) or by demonstrating standing defects. And permitting a defendant to point out a preexisting standing defect late in the day is not remotely comparable to permitting a plaintiff to establish standing on the basis of the defendant’s litigation conduct occurring after standing is erroneously determined. Seizing on the fortuity that the case has made its way to this Court, Justice Stevens protests that no agency would ignore “an authoritative construction of the [ESA] by this Court.” Post, at 585. In that he is probably correct; in concluding from it that plaintiffs have demonstrated redressability, he is not. Since, as we have pointed out above, standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit; since at that point it could certainly not be known that the suit would reach this Court; and since it is not likely that an agency would feel compelled to accede to the legal view of a district court expressed in a case to which it was not a party; redressability clearly did not exist. The dissent criticizes us for “overlooking]” memoranda indicating that the Sri Lankan Government solicited and required AID’s assistance to mitigate the effects of the Mahaweli project on endangered species, and that the Bureau of Reclamation was advising the Aswan project. Post, at 600-601. The memoranda, however, contain no indication whatever that the projects will cease or be less harmful to listed species in the absence of AID funding. In fact, the Sri Lanka memorandum suggests just the opposite: It states that AID’s role will be to mitigate the “ ‘negative impacts to the wildlife,’ ” post, at 600, which means that the termination of AID funding would exacerbate respondents’ claimed injury. There is this much truth to the assertion that “procedural rights” are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many years. (That is why we do not rely, in the present case, upon the Government’s argument that, even if the other agencies were obliged to consult with the Secretary, they might not have followed his advice.) What respondents’ “procedural rights” argument seeks, however, is quite different from this: standing for persons who have no concrete interests affected — persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the country from the dam. The dissent’s discussion of this aspect of the case, post, at 601-606, distorts our opinion. We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing. The dissent, however, asserts that there exist “classes of procedural duties ... so enmeshed with the prevention of a substantive, concrete harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural duty.” Post, at 605. If we understand this correctly, it means that the Government’s violation of a certain (undescribed) class of procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself, without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest in having the procedure observed). We cannot agree. The dissent is unable to cite a single case in which we actually found standing solely on the basis of a “procedural right” unconnected to the plaintiff’s own concrete harm. Its suggestion that we did so in Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U. S. 221 (1986), and Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332 (1989), post, at 602-603, 605, is not supported by the facts. In the former case, we found that the environmental organizations had standing because the “whale watching and studying of their members w[ould] be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting,” see 478 U. S., at 230-231, n. 4; and in the latter we did not so much as mention standing, for the very good reason that the plaintiff was a citizens’ council for the area in which the challenged construction was to occur, so that its members would obviously be concretely affected, see Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F. 2d 810, 812-813 (CA9 1987).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HEIKKINEN v. UNITED STATES. No. 89. Argued December 10, 1957. Decided January 6, 1958. David Rein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Joseph Forer and M. Michael Essin. J. F. Bishop argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney and Beatrice Rosenberg. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the legality of convictions of petitioner, an alien previously ordered deported, for (1) willful failure to depart from the United States, and (2) willful failure to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure, within six months from the date of the final order of deportation. Section 20 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 890, as amended, 57 Stat. 553, 64 Stat. 1012, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. IV) § 156 (c), provided, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny alien against whom an order of deportation is outstanding . . . who shall willfully fail or refuse to depart from the United States within a period of six months from the date of such order of deportation, or from the date of the enactment of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, whichever is the later, or shall willfully fail or refuse to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure, . . . shall upon conviction be guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned not more than ten years . . . .” It is the above-quoted provisions of § 20 (c) that are involved here. Petitioner, a native of Finland, went to Canada in 1910 and later acquired Canadian citizenship. He entered the United States in 1916 and, except for several foreign trips, has since resided here. A final order of deportation was entered against him on April 9, 1952, under the Act of October 16,1918, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended, 41 Stat. 1008, 54 Stat. 673, 64 Stat. 1006, 1008, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. IV) § 137, by reason of his membership in the Communist Party of the United States from 1923 to 1930. On November 10, 1953, petitioner was indicted, in two counts, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The first count charged him with willful failure to depart from the United States within six months from the date of the deportation order. The second count charged him with willful failure to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure from the United States within six months from the date of the deportation order. Upon a trial before a jury he was convicted on both counts. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years on Count T, and imposition of sentence on Count 2 was suspended until completion of service of the sentence on Count 1. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 240 F. 2d 94. We granted certiorari. 353 U. S. 935. Petitioner challenges the judgments of conviction on a number of grounds, but in the view we take of the case it is necessary to consider only the first ground, namely, that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict on either count. This is a criminal case. It is therefore necessary that the prosecution adduce evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is no less true when the defendant is an alien. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 586. The crucial element of the crime charged in the first count is that petitioner "did willfully fail to depart from the United States” within six months from the deportation order of April 9, 1952. (Emphasis supplied.) A thorough review of the record discloses no evidence that any country was willing, in that period, to receive petitioner. There can be no willful failure to depart until “the country willing to receive the alien is identified.” United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 171. It therefore cannot be said that there was any evidence to support the jury’s finding that petitioner “did willfully fail to depart from the United States” within six months from the deportation order. The evidence on Count 1 is thus insufficient to support the verdict, and the judgment of conviction thereon must fall. The Government argues that petitioner willfully failed to make timely application to Finland, or to some other country, to receive him, and that if he had done so he might have been able to identify, within the time prescribed, a country to which he could go. While this argument has some relation to Count 1, it mainly involves, and therefore brings us to a consideration of, the adequacy of the evidence to support the verdict on Count 2. On April 18, 1952, nine days after entry of the order of deportation, the officer in charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Duluth, Minnesota, at the request of the District Director of Immigration at Chicago, sent Inspector Maki to interview petitioner and obtain “personal data, usually called passport data.” Maki admitted at the trial that, in that interview, he “told [petitioner] that [he] had been instructed to get this personal history; that [he] was going to prepare this on the Passport Data form, and that it would [be sent to Chicago where it] would be considered by [the] Service down there with a view towards [the] Service obtaining some travel document or other in [petitioner’s] case,” and that this was common procedure in such cases. Petitioner furnished the information requested, and it was forwarded by Maki, on April 21, 1952, to the District Director at Chicago. On April 30, 1952, petitioner received a letter from the officer in charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Office in Duluth, which, after reciting that an order directing petitioner’s deportation from the United States had been entered on April 25, 1952, said: “Arrangements to effect your deportation pursuant to such order are being made and when completed you will be notified when and where to present yourself for deportation.” The letter continued, summarizing pertinent provisions of §'20 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, and concluded: “Therefore, you will recognize the importance of making every effort in good faith to obtain passport or other travel documents so that you may effect your departure pursuant to the said order of deportation within the time prescribed by the quotation above from the [Immigration Act of 1917, as amended].” On February 12, 1953, an investigator of the Service interviewed and took a written and signed statement from petitioner, which was put in evidence by the Government at the trial. In that statement petitioner corroborated Maki’s statement to him of April 9, 1952, acknowledged receipt of the letter of April 30, 1952, and stated, in substance, that he had not applied for travel documents because, relying on Maki’s statement and the letter mentioned, he had “been waiting for instructions from the immigration authorities” or “from Mr. Maki as to when [he] should start to make application for a passport, in case the Service had failed to get a visa or a passport.” Petitioner’s statement further recited that he had never received any request from the Service “to execute any passport application” and that he had not willfully refused to depart from the United States nor to apply in good faith for travel documents, but wanted “to cooperate [with the Attorney General to get] a passport to Finland . . . .” Is this evidence sufficient to support the jury’s finding that petitioner “did willfully fail to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure from the United States”? We believe that it is not. There can be no willful failure by a deportee, in the sense of § 20 (c), to apply to, and identify, a country willing to receive him in the absence of evidence, or an inference permissible under the statute, of a “bad purpose” or “[non-]justifiable excuse,” or the like. Cf. United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394; Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497, 498. Inspector Maki had informed petitioner that his purpose, in procuring the “passport data” on April 9, 1952, was to send it to the District Director at Chicago, where it “would be considered . . . with a view towards . . . obtaining some travel document or other in his case.” Moreover, the letter of April 30, 1952, from the officer in charge of the Duluth office, told petitioner, in the plainest language, that the Service was making the arrangements to effect his deportation and, when completed, he would be notified when and where to present himself for deportation. Surely petitioner was justified in relying upon the plain meaning of those simple words, and it cannot be said that he acted “willfully” — i. e., with a “bad purpose” or without “justifiable excuse”- — in doing so, until, at least, they were in some way countermanded, which was never done within the prescribed period. It is true that the last paragraph of that letter drew attention to the importance of making good-faith efforts to obtain the documents necessary to effect departure within the time prescribed, but that language did not in terms negate, and cannot fairly be said implicitly to have negated, the earlier paragraph of the letter, because, as stated, that paragraph of the letter plainly told petitioner that the Service was itself making the necessary arrangements for his deportation and, when completed, he would be notified when and where to present himself for deportation. In this factual setting we believe there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that petitioner acted willfully in failing to apply for documents necessary to his departure within the time prescribed. The evidence on Count 2 is thus insufficient to support the verdict, and the judgment of conviction on that count must also fall. Reversed. That Act provided, in pertinent part: “[Sec. 1] That any alien who is a member of any one of the following classes shall be excluded from admission into the United States: “ (2) Aliens who, at any time, shall be or shall have been members of any of the following classes: “(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist Party of the United States . . . .” (64 Stat. 1006.) “Sec. 4. (a) Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter, ... a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 (2) of this Act, shall upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the classes of aliens mentioned in this Act, irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States.” (64 Stat. 1008.) He was asked at the deportation hearing to specify the country to which he would prefer to go, if deported from the United States, and he answered: “To my native country, Finland.” Deportees are authorized to designate the country of their first choice by § 20 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended. There was evidence that after expiration of the period of six months from the issue of the deportation order on April 9, 1952, petitioner obtained a passport to Canada. But this evidence was irrelevant to the issue whether Canada was willing to receive petitioner ' during the period covered by the indictment, 'and, in fact, counsel for the Government objected to this evidence upon the ground that the Canadian passport did not show Canada’s willingness to accept petitioner “within the six months’ period [after April 9, 1952], which is the . . . period that we are concerned with in this indictment.” This was, in fact, not the date of the deportation order, which was April 9, 1952, but, rather, was the date of the warrant of deportation ordering petitioner deported to Finland. That summary read as follows: “In this connection you are reminded that [§ 20 (e) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended] . . . declares that any such alien 'who shall willfully fail or refuse to depart from the United States within a period of six months from the date of such order of deportation, ... or shall willfully fail or refuse to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure, or who shall connive or conspire, or take any other action, designed to prevent or hamper or with the purpose of preventing or hampering his departure pursuant to such order of deportation, or who shall willfully fail or refuse to present himself for deportation at the time and place required by the Attorney General pursuant to such order of deportation, shall upon conviction be guilty of a felony. . .

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENNSYLVANIA v. RITCHIE No. 85-1347. Argued December 3, 1986 Decided February 24, 1987 Powell, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 61. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 66. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 72. Edward Marcus Clark argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert L. Eberhardt. John H. Corbett, Jr., by invitation of the Court, 478 U. S. 1019, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief was Lester G. Nauhaus Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold Overoye, Assistant Attorney General, Joel Carey, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Karen Ziskind, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Duane Woodard of Colorado, Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Corinne Watanabe, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, David Armstrong of. Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Edwin L. Pittman of Mississippi, Michael Greely oí Montana, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina,- Mike Turpén of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Mike Cody of Tennessee, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, William A. Broadus of Virginia, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, Charlie Brown of West Virginia, and Archie G. McClintock of Wyoming; for the County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, on behalf of Allegheny County Children and Youth Services by George M. Janocsko and Robert L. Mc-Tieman; for the Appellate Committee of the District Attorneys Association of California by Ira Reiner, Harry B. Sondheim, and Arnold T. Guminski; for the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape et al. by Nancy D. Wasser; and for the Sunny von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, Inc., et al. by Frank Gamble Carrington, Jr., David Crump, and Ann M. Haralambie. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice O’Connor join. The question presented in this case is whether and to what extent a State’s interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover favorable evidence. I As part of its efforts to combat child abuse, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has established Children and Youth Services (CYS), a protective service" agency charged with investigating cases of suspected mistreatment and neglect. In 1979, respondent George Ritchie was charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, and corruption of a minor. The victim of the alleged attacks was his 13-year-old daughter, who claimed that she had been assaulted by Ritchie two or three times per week during the previous four years. The girl reported the incidents to the police, and the matter then was referred to the CYS. During pretrial discovery, Ritchie served CYS with a subpoena, seeking access to the records concerning the daughter. Ritchie requested disclosure of the file related to the immediate charges, as well as certain records that he claimed were compiled in 1978, when CYS investigated a separate report by an unidentified source that Ritchie’s children were being abused. CYS refused to comply with the subpoena, claiming that the records were privileged under Pennsylvania law. The relevant statute provides that all reports and other information obtained in the course of a CYS investigation must be kept confidential, subject to 11 specific exceptions. One of those exceptions is that the agency may disclose the reports to a “court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, §2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986). Ritchie moved to have CYS sanctioned for failing to honor the subpoena, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion in chambers. Ritchie argued that he was entitled to the information because the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other, unspecified exculpatory evidence. He also requested disclosure of a medical report that he believed was compiled during the 1978 CYS investigation. Although the trial judge acknowledged that he had not examined the entire CYS file, he accepted a CYS representative’s assertion that there was no medical report in the record. The judge then denied the motion and refused to order CYS to disclose the files. See App. 72a. At trial, the main witness against Ritchie was his daughter. In an attempt to rebut her testimony, defense counsel cross-examined the girl at length, questioning her on all aspects of the alleged attacks and her reasons for not reporting the incidents sooner. Except for routine evidentiary rulings, the trial judge placed no limitation on the scope of cross-examination. At the close of trial Ritchie was convicted by a jury on all counts, and the judge sentenced him to 3 to 10 years in prison. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Ritchie claimed, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the contents of the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court agreed that there had been a constitutional violation, and accordingly vacated the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A. 2d 220 (1984). The Superior Court ruled, however, that the right of confrontation did not entitle Ritchie to the full disclosure that he sought. It held that on remand, the trial judge first was to examine the confidential material in camera, and release only the verbatim statements made by the daughter to the CYS counselor. But the full record then was to be made available to Ritchie’s lawyer, for the limited purpose of allowing him to argue the relevance of the statements.. The court stated that the prosecutor also should be allowed to argue that the failure to disclose the statements was harmless error. If the trial judge determined that the lack of information was prejudicial, Ritchie would be entitled to a new trial. Id., at 567-568, 472 A. 2d, at 226. On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed that the conviction must be vacated and the case remanded to determine if a new trial is necessary. 509 Pa. 357, 502 A. 2d 148 (1985). But the court did not agree that the search for material evidence must be limited to the daughter’s verbatim statements. Rather, it concluded that Ritchie, through his lawyer, is entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence. It stated: “When materials gathered become an arrow of inculpation, the person inculpated has a fundamental constitutional right to examine the provenance of the arrow and he who aims it.” Id., at 367, 502 A. 2d, at 153. The Pennsylvania Court concluded that by denying access to the file, the trial court order had violated both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. The court was unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument that the trial judge already had examined the file and determined that it contained no relevant information. It ruled that the constitutional infirmity in the trial court’s order was that Ritchie was unlawfully denied the opportunity to have the records reviewed by “the eyes and the perspective of an advocate,” who may see relevance in places that a neutral judge would not. Ibid. In light of the substantial and conflicting interests held by the Commonwealth and Ritchie, we granted certiorari. 476 U. S. 1139 (1986). We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. J-H HH Before turning to the constitutional questions, we first must address Ritchie’s claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, because the decision below is not a “final judgment or decree.” See 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3); Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of California, 324 U. S. 548, 551 (1945). Normally the finality doctrine contained in § 1257(3) is not satisfied if the state courts still must conduct further substantive proceedings before the rights of the parties as to the federal issues are resolved. Ibid.; Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-127 (1945). Ritchie argues that under this standard the case is not final, because there are several more proceedings scheduled in the Pennsylvania courts: at a minimum there will be an in camera review of the file, and the parties will present arguments on whether the lack of disclosure was prejudicial; after that, there could be a new trial on the merits. Ritchie claims that because the Sixth Amendment issue may become moot at either of these stages, we should decline review until these further proceedings are completed. Although it is true that this Court is without jurisdiction to review an interlocutory judgment, it also is true that the principles of finality have not been construed rigidly. As we recognized in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), there are at least four categories of cases in which jurisdiction is proper even when there are further proceedings anticipated in the state court. One of these exceptions states that the Court may consider cases: “[WJhere the federal claim has been finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case. . . . [I]n these cases, if the party seeking interim review ultimately prevails on the merits, the federal issue will be mooted; if he were to lose on the merits, however, the governing state law would not permit him again to present his federal claims for review.” Id., at 481. We find that the case before us satisfies this standard because the Sixth Amendment issue will not survive for this Court to review, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings on remand. If the trial court decides that the CYS files do not contain relevant information, or that the nondisclosure was harmless, the Commonwealth will have prevailed and will have no basis to seek review. In this situation Ritchie’s conviction will be reinstated, and the issue of whether defense counsel should have been given access will be moot. Should Ritchie appeal the trial court’s decision, the Commonwealth’s only method for preserving the constitutional issue would be by cross-claims. Thus the only way that this Court will be able to reach the Sixth Amendment issue is if Ritchie eventually files a petition for certiorari on the trial court’s adverse ruling, and the Commonwealth files a cross-petition. When a case is in this procedural posture, we have considered it sufficiently final to justify review. See, e. g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 651, n. 1 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 558, n. 6 (1983). Alternatively, if Ritchie is found to have been prejudiced by the withholding and is granted a new trial, the Commonwealth still will be unable to obtain a ruling from this Court. On retrial Ritchie either will be convicted, in which case the Commonwealth’s ability to obtain review again will rest on Ritchie’s willingness to appeal; or he will be acquitted, in which case the Commonwealth will be barred from seeking review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See ibid.; California v. Stewart, 384 U. S. 436, 498, n. 71 (1966) (decided with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)). Therefore, if this Court does not consider the constitutional claims now, there may well be no opportunity to do so in the future. The Sixth Amendment issue has been finally decided by the highest court of Pennsylvania, and unless we review that decision, the harm that the Commonwealth seeks to avoid— the disclosure of the entire confidential file — will occur regardless of the result on remand. We thus cannot agree with the suggestion in Justice Stevens’ dissent that if we were to dismiss this case and it was resolved on other grounds after disclosure of the file, “the Commonwealth would not have been harmed.” Post, at 74. This hardly could be true, because of the acknowledged public interest in ensuring the confidentiality of CYS records. See n. 17, infra. Although this consideration is not dispositive, we have noted that “statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 331, n. 11 (1976). We therefore reject Ritchie’s claim that the Court lacks jurisdiction, and turn to the merits of the case before us. HH HH 1 — I The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, through his lawyer, has the right to examine the full contents of the CYS records. The court found that this right of access is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process Clause. We discuss these constitutional provisions in turn. A The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 18-19 (1985) (per curiam). Ritchie does not allege a violation of the former right. He was not excluded from any part of the trial, nor did the prosecutor improperly introduce out-of-court statements as substantive evidence, thereby depriving Ritchie of the right to “confront” the declarant. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). Cf. United States v. Inadi, 475 U. S. 387 (1986). Instead, Ritchie claims that by denying him access to the information necessary to prepare his defense, the trial court interfered with his right of cross-examination. Ritchie argues that he could not effectively question his daughter because, without the CYS material, he did not know which types of questions would best expose the weaknesses in her testimony. Had the files been disclosed, Ritchie argues that he might have been able to show that the daughter made statements to the CYS counselor that were inconsistent with her trial statements, or perhaps to reveal that the girl acted with an improper motive. Of course, the right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable. United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (1974). Because this type of evidence can make the difference between conviction and acquittal, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 269 (1959), Ritchie argues that the failure to disclose information that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause’s purpose of increasing the accuracy of the truth-finding process at trial. See United States v. Inadi, supra, at 396. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted this argument, relying in part on our decision in Davis v. Alaska, supra. In Davis the trial judge prohibited defense counsel from questioning a witness about the latter’s juvenile criminal record, because a state statute made this information presumptively confidential. We found that this restriction on cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, despite Alaska’s legitimate interest in protecting the identity of juvenile offenders. 415 U. S., at 318-320. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court apparently interpreted our decision in Davis to mean that a statutory privilege cannot be maintained when a defendant asserts a need, prior to trial, for the protected information that might be used at trial to impeach or otherwise undermine a witness’ testimony. See 509 Pa., at 365-367, 502 A. 2d, at 152-153. If we were to accept this broad interpretation of Davis, the effect would be to transform the Confrontation Clause into a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery. Nothing in the case law supports such a view. The opinions of this Court show that the right to confrontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 157 (1970) (“[I]t is this literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause”); Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 725 (1968) (“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right”). The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Normally the right to confront one’s accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S., at 20. In short, the Confrontation Clause only guarantees “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Id., at 20 (emphasis in original). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at 73, n. 12 (except in “extraordinary cases, no inquiry into ‘effectiveness’ [of cross-examination] is required”). We reaffirmed this interpretation of the Confrontation Clause last Term in Delaware v. Fensterer, supra. In that case, the defendant was convicted in part on the testimony of the State’s expert witness, who could not remember which scientific test he had used to form his opinion. Although this inability to recall frustrated defense counsel’s efforts to discredit the testimony, we held that there had been no Sixth Amendment violation. The Court found that the right of confrontation was not implicated, “for the trial court did not limit the scope or nature of defense counsel’s cross-examination in any way.” 474 U. S., at 19. Fensterer was in full accord with our earlier decisions that have upheld a Confrontation Clause infringement claim on this issue only when there was a specific statutory or court-imposed restriction at trial on the scope of questioning. The lower court’s reliance on Davis v. Alaska therefore is misplaced. There the state court had prohibited defense counsel from questioning the witness about his criminal record, even though that evidence might have affected the witness’ credibility. The constitutional error in that case was not that Alaska made this information confidential; it was that the defendant was denied the right “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” 415 U. S., at 318. Similarly, in this case the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the withholding of the CYS file; it only would have been impermissible for the judge to have prevented Ritchie’s lawyer from cross-examining the daughter. Because defense counsel was able to cross-examine all of the trial witnesses fully, we find that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that the failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Confrontation Clause. B The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also suggested that the failure to disclose the CYS file violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of compulsory process. Ritchie asserts that the trial court’s ruling prevented him from learning the names of the “witnesses in his favor,” as well as other evidence that might be contained in the file. Although the basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling on this point is unclear, it apparently concluded that the right of compulsory process includes the right to have the State’s assistance in uncovering arguably useful information, without regard to the existence of a state-created restriction — here, the confidentiality of the files. 1 This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause. The first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, during the treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled that Burr’s compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting the production of allegedly incriminating evidence. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). Despite the implications of the Burr decision for federal criminal procedure, the Compulsory Process Clause rarely was a factor in this Court’s decisions during the next 160 years. More recently, however, the Court has articulated some of the specific rights secured by this part of the Sixth Amendment. Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity of witnesses, or to require the government to produce exculpatory evidence. But cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709, 711 (1974) (suggesting that the Clause may require the production of evidence). Instead, the Court traditionally has evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). See also Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1973). Because the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a clear framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case. Although we conclude that compulsory process provides no greater protections in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie’s claims more properly are considered by reference to due process. 2 It is well settled that the government has the-obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, supra, at 87. Although courts have used different terminologies to define “materiality,” a majority of this Court has agreed, “[ejvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S., at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see id., at 685 (opinion of White, J.). At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any information in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie’s claim of innocence, because neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the information, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no materiality inquiry is required, because a statute renders the contents of the file privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued, would override the Commonwealth’s compelling interest in confidentiality on the mere speculation that the file “might” have been useful to the defense. Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances. This is not a case where a state statute grants CYS the absolute authority to shield its files from all eyes. Cf. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5945.1(b) (1982) (unqualified statutory privilege for communications between sexual assault counselors and victims). Rather, the Pennsylvania law provides that the information shall be disclosed in certain circumstances, including when CYS is directed to do so by court order. Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 11, §2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1986). Given that the Pennsylvania Legislature contemplated some use of CYS records in judicial proceedings, we cannot conclude that the statute prevents all disclosure in criminal prosecutions. In the absence of any apparent state policy to the contrary, we therefore have no reason to believe that relevant information would not be disclosed when a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the information is “material” to the defense of the accused. We therefore affirm the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent it orders a remand for further proceedings. Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. c This ruling does not end our analysis, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did more than simply remand. It also held that defense counsel must be allowed to examine all of the confidential information, both relevant and irrelevant, and present arguments in favor of disclosure. The court apparently concluded that whenever a defendant alleges that protected evidence might be material, the appropriate method of assessing this claim is to grant full access to the disputed information, regardless of the State’s interest in confidentiality. We cannot agree. A defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the Commonwealth’s files. See United States v. Bagley, supra, at 675; United States v. Agurs, supra, at 111. Although the eye of an advocate may be helpful to a defendant in ferreting out information, Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855, 875 (1966), this Court has never held — even in the absence of a statute restricting disclosure — that a defendant alone may make the determination as to the materiality of the information. Settled practice is to the contrary. In the typical case where a defendant makes only a general request for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), it is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court’s attention, the prosecutor’s decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State’s files to argue relevance. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one”). We find that Ritchie’s interest (as well as that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial court for in camera review. Although this rule denies Ritchie the benefits of an “advocate’s eye,” we note that the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded. If a defendant is aware of specific information contained in the file (e. g., the medical report), he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Moreover, the duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed immaterial upon original examination may become important as the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to release information material to the fairness of the trial. To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth’s compelling interest in protecting its child-abuse information. If the CYS records were made available to defendants, even through counsel, it could have a seriously adverse effect on Pennsylvania’s efforts to uncover and treat abuse. Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim. A child’s feelings of vulnerability and guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute when the abuser is a parent. It therefore is essential that the child have a state-designated person to whom he may turn, and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality. Relatives and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more willing to come forward if they know that their identities will be protected. Recognizing this, the Commonwealth — like all other States — has made a commendable effort to assure victims and witnesses that they may speak to the CYS counselors without fear of general disclosure. The Commonwealth’s purpose would be frustrated if this confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand to a defendant charged with criminal child abuse, simply because a trial court may not recognize exculpatory evidence. Neither precedent nor common sense requires such a result. > I — I We agree that Ritchie is entitled to know whether the CYS file contains information that may have changed the outcome of his trial had it been disclosed. Thus we agree that a remand is necessary. We disagree with the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the extent that it allows defense counsel access to the CYS file. An in camera review by the trial court will serve Ritchie’s interest without destroying the Commonwealth’s need to protect the confidentiality of those involved in child-abuse investigations. The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Although the 1978 investigation took place during the period that the daughter claimed she was being molested, it is undisputed that the daughter did not tell CYS about the assaults at that time. No criminal charges were filed as a result of this earlier investigation. The statute provides in part: “(a) Except as provided in section 14 [Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, §2214 (Purdon Supp. 1986)], reports made pursuant to this act including but not limited to report summaries of child abuse . . . and written reports ... as well as any other information obtained, reports written or photographs or X-rays taken concerning alleged instances of child abuse in the possession of the department, a county children and youth social service agency or a child protective service shall be confidential and shall only be made available to: “(5) A court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order.” Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, § 2215(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). At the time of trial the statute only provided five exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality, including the exception for court-ordered disclosure. The statute was amended in 1982 to increase the number of exceptions. For example, the records now may be revealed to law enforcement officials for use in criminal investigations. § 2215(a)(9). But, the identity of a person who reported the abuse or who cooperated in the investigation may not be released if the disclosure would be detrimental to that person’s safety. § 2215(c). The trial judge stated that he did not read “50 pages or more of an extensive record.” App. 72a. The judge had no knowledge of the case before the pretrial hearing. See id,., at 68a. There is no suggestion that the Commonwealth’s prosecutor was given access to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware of its contents. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects both the right of confrontation and the right of compulsory process: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Both Clauses are made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403-406 (1965) (Confrontation Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (Compulsory Process Clause). The court noted that the trial court should take “appropriate steps” to guard against improper dissemination of the confidential material, including, for example, “fashioning of appropriate protective orders, or conducting certain proceedings in camera.” 509 Pa., at 368, n. 16, 502 A. 2d, at 153, n. 16. These steps were to be taken, however, subject to “the right of [Ritchie], through his counsel, to gain access to the information.” Ibid. As Justice Stevens’ dissent points out, post, at 74, there is a third possibility. If the trial court finds prejudicial error and orders a retrial, the Commonwealth may attempt to take an immediate appeal of this order. See Pa. Rule App. Proe. 311(a). Justice Stevens’ dissent suggests that because the Commonwealth can raise the Sixth Amendment issue again in this appeal, respect for the finality doctrine should lead us to dismiss. But even if we were persuaded that an immediate appeal would lie in this situation, it would not necessarily follow that the constitutional issue will survive. The appellate court could find that the failure to disclose was harmless, precluding further review by the Commonwealth. Alternatively, the appellate court could agree that the error was prejudicial, thus permitting the Commonwealth to claim that the Sixth Amendment does not compel disclosure. But as Justice Stevens’ dissent recognizes, the Pennsylvania courts already have considered and resolved this issue in their earlier proceedings; if the Commonwealth were to raise it again in a new set of appeals, the courts below would simply reject the claim under the law-of-the-case doctrine. Law-of-the-case principles are not a bar to this Court’s jurisdiction, of course, and thus Justice Stevens’ dissent apparently would require the Commonwealth to raise a fruitless Sixth Amendment claim in the trial court, the Superior Court, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still another time before we regrant certiorari on the question that is now before us. The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather than furthered, by these wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual facts of this ease, the justifications for the finality doctrine — efficiency, judicial restraint, and federalism, see Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945); post, at 72 — would be ill served by another round of litigation on an issue that has been authoritatively decided by the highest state court. Nothing in our decision in United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971), requires a different result. In that case the respondent was served with a subpoena requiring him to produce business records for a grand jury. The District Court denied a motion to quash, and respondent appealed. We concluded that the District Court order was not appealable. Id., at 532. We rejected the contention that immediate review was necessary to avoid the harm of disclosing otherwise protected material, noting that parties who face such an order have the option of making the decision “final” simply by refusing to comply with the subpoena. Although there are similarities between this case and Ryan, the analogy is incomplete. In Ryan the Court was concerned about the “necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law,” id., at 533, an interest that would be undermined if all pretrial orders were immediately ap-pealable. Ryan also rests on an implicit assumption that unless a party resisting discovery is willing to risk being held in contempt, the significance of his claim is insufficient to justify interrupting the ongoing proceedings. That is not the situation before us. Here the trial already has taken place, and the issue reviewed by the Commonwealth appellate courts. The interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of delay, rather than being hindered, would be best served by resolving the issue. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S., 469, 477-478 (1975) (exceptions to finality doctrine justified in part by need to avoid economic waste and judicial delay). We also reject Ritchie’s suggestion that we should dismiss this action and allow the ease to return to the trial court, so that the Commonwealth can formally refuse to comply with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision and be held in contempt. Here we are not faced merely with an individual’s assertion that a subpoena is unduly burdensome, but with a holding of a State Supreme Court that the legislative interest in confidentiality will not be given effect. The Commonwealth’s interest in immediate review of this case is obvious and substantial. Contrary to Justice Stevens’ dissent, we do not think that the finality doctrine requires a new round of litigation and appellate review simply to give the Commonwealth “the chance to decide whether to comply with the order.” Post, at 77. See n. 7, supra. To prolong the proceedings on this basis would be inconsistent with the “pragmatic” approach we normally have taken to finality questions. See generally Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U. S. 696, 722-723, n. 28 (1974) (“This Court has been inclined to follow a ‘pragmatic approach’ to the question of finality”) (citation omitted). This is not to suggest, of course, that there are no protections for pretrial discovery in criminal cases. See discussion in Part IH-B, infra. We simply hold that with respect to this issue, the Confrontation Clause only protects a defendant’s trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for trial. Also, we hardly need say that nothing in our opinion today is intended to alter a trial judge’s traditional power to control the scope of cross-examination by prohibiting questions that are prejudicial, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 678 (1986). “See, e. g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra (denial of right to cross-examine to show bias); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (1973) (denial of right to impeach own witness); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to ask witness’ real name and address at trial); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965) (denial of right to cross-examine codefendant). Moreover, the Court normally has refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation when the asserted interference with cross-examination did not occur at trial. Compare McCray v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300, 311-313 (1967) (no Confrontation Clause violation where defendant was denied the chance to discover an informant’s name at pretrial hearing), with Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957) (on the facts presented, Government required to disclose informant’s name at trial). See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71,125-126 (1974) (“The right of confrontation is exclusively a ‘trial right’ .... It does not . . . require the government to produce witnesses whose statements are not used at trial, or to produce the underlying information on which its witnesses base their testimony”) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Westen). The evidence consisted of a letter that was sent to President Jefferson by General James Wilkinson that allegedly showed that Burr was planning to invade Mexico and set up a separate government under his control. After being ordered to do so, Jefferson eventually turned over an edited version of the letter. For an excellent summary of the Burr case and its implications for compulsory process, see Westen 101-108. The pre-1967 eases that mention compulsory process do not provide an extensive analysis of the Clause. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378, n. 1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 442 (1932); United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782 (1887). See generally Westen 108, and n. 164. See, e. g., Chambers v. Mississippi, supra; Cool v. United States, 409 U. S. 100 (1972) (per curiam); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967). Cf. Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. 95 (1972) (per curiam) (decision based on Due Process Clause). We express no opinion on whether the result in this case would have been different if the statute had protected the CYS files from disclosure to anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel. The Commonwealth also argues that Ritchie is not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information he was seeking or how it would be material. See Brief for Petitioner 18 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 109-110 (1976) (“The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense . . . does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense”)). Ritchie, of course, may not require the trial court to search through the CYS file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 867 (1982) (“He must at least make some plausible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense”). Although the obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not depend on the presence of a specific request, we note that the degree of specificity of Ritchie’s request may have a bearing on the trial court’s assessment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682-683 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). See Fed. Rule Crim. Proe. 16(d)(2); Pa. Rule Crim. Proe. 305(E) (“If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [mandating disclosure of exculpatory evidence], the court may... enter such... order as it deems just under the circumstances”). The importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced by the fact that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect the confidentiality of their official records concerning child abuse. See Brief for State of California ex reí. John K. Van de Kamp et al. as Amici Curiae 12, n. 1 (listing illustrative statutes). See also Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vill. L. Rev. 458, 508-512 (1978).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. CABOT CARBON CO. et al. No. 329. Argued March 24, 1959. Decided June 8, 1959. Thomas J. McDermott argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief' were Solicitor General Rankin,' Jerome D. Fenton, Dominick L. Manoli and Fannie M. Boyls..' Haywood H. Hillyer, Jr. argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were M. Truman Woodward, Jr., Richard C. Keenan and Milton C. Dehbo. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision in this cáse is whether “Employee Committees” established and supported by respondents at each of their several plants for the stated purposes of meeting regularly with management to consider and discuss problems of mutual interest, including grievances, and of handling “grievances at nonunion plants and departments,” are, in the light of their declared purposes and actual practices, “labor organizations” within the meaning of §2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. Respondents are affiliated corporations under -the same general management and maintain their principal office at Pampa, Texas. They are, and for many years have been, engaged in operating a number of plants, principally. in Texas and Louisiana, primarily for the purposes of manufacturing and selling carbon black and oil field equipment. Pursuant to a suggestion of the War Production Board in 1943, respondents decided to establish an Employee Committee at each of their plants. To that end, respondents prepared, in collaboration with employee representatives from their several plants, a set of bylaws, stating the purposes, duties and functions of the proposed Employee Committees, for transmittal to and adoption by the employees in establishing such Committees. The bylaws were adopted by a majority of employees at each, plant and by respondents, and, thus, the Employee Committees were established. Those bylaws, and certain related company rules, were later published by respondents in a company manual called “The Guide,” and are still in effect. In essence, the bylaws state: that the purpose of the Committees is to provide a procedure for considering employees’ ideas and problems of mutual interest to employees and management; that-each plant Committee shall consist», of a stated number of employees (ranging from 2 to 3) whose terms shall be one year, and that retiring members, with the help of plant clerks, will conduct the nomination and election of their successors ; that each plant Committee shall meet with the plant management at regular, monthly meetings and at all special meetings called by management, shall assist the plant management in solving problems of mutual interést, and that'time so spent will be. considered time worked; and that “It shall be the Committee’s responsibility to: ... Handle grievances at nonunion plants and departments according to procedure set up for these, plants and departments.” In November 1954, International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, filed with the National Labor Relations Board, and later several times amended, an unfair labor practice charge against respondents, alleging, in part, that respondents-were unlawfully dominating, filterfering with and supporting labor organizations, called Employee Committees, at their several plants. Thereafter the Board, in Apiril 1956, issued a complaint against respondents under § 10 (b) of the Act (29 U. S. C. § 160 (b)) alleging, inter alia, that the Employee Committees were labor organizations within the meaning of §2 (5^ (see note 1), and that respondents, since May 1954, had dominated, interfered with, and supported the Committees in violation of § 8 (a) (2) of the Act. After a hearing, the trial examiner issued-his intermediate.report containing detailed findings of fact. The relevant findings, mainly based on undisputed evidence, may be summarized as follows: The Committees’ bylaws were prepared and adopted in the manner, and contáin the provisions, above stated. During the period here involved (from May 1954 to the date of the hearing before the Board in June 1956), the Employee Committees, in addition to considering and discussing with respondents’ plant officials problems of the nature covered by the bylaws, made and discussed proposals and requests respecting many other aspects of the employee relationship, including seniority, job classifications, job bidding, makeup time, overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and conditions. Respondents’ plant officials participated in those discussions and in some instances granted the Committees’ .requests. Although not provided for in the bylaws, a “Central Committee,” consisting of the chairmen of the several plant Committees, met annually with respondents’ Director of Industrial Relations in Pampa, Texas, where, during the 1955 and 1956 meetings, the Central Committee made proposals and requests with respect to many matters covering nearly the whole scope of the employment relationship. The Director of Industrial Relations discussed those proposals.and requests, their feasibility and economic consequences from respondents’ point of view, and sought to reach some solution. In some instances he expressed approval of requests or promised to see what could be done toward meeting them, in other instances he suggested that the matter be taken up with local management, and in still other instances he rejected the proposals and requests and explained his reasons for doing so. The trial examiner also found that the Employee Committees have no membership requirements, collect no dues and havg no funds; that plant clerks assist the Committees in conducting their elections and do all of their clerical work; and that respondents pay all of the necessary expenses of the Committees. None of the Committees has ever attempted to negotiate a collective bargaining contract with respondents. From time to time the- Board has certified independent labor organizations as the exclusive bargaining agents for certain bargaining units of employees in approximately one-third of respondents’ plants, and, as such agents for those bargaining imite, the respective certified labor organizations have entered into collective bargaining contracts with respondents which, as they máy have been amended, are still in effect. Since the respective dates of those collective bargaining contracts the certified labor organizations and the Employee Committees have coexisted in those plants, but the functions of those Employee Committees have generally been reduced to plant efficiency, production promotion and the handling of grievances for employees who are not included in the bargaining units. o Upon these findings the trial examiner concluded in his intermediate report that the Employee Committees and the Central Committee are labor organizations within the meaning of § 2 (5), and that during the period here involved respondents dominated, interfered with, and supported those labor organizations in violation of § 8 (a) (2) (see note 4). He therefore recommended that respondents be ordered to cease such condúct, and to withdraw all recognition from, and completely disestablish, the Committees “as the representative of any of [their] employees for the purpose of dealing with Respondents concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” The Board adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the.trial examiner and entered its order accordingly. 117 N. L. R. B. 1633. Respondents then petitioned the Court of Appeals to review and vacate the Board’s findings and order, and the Board’s answer sought enforcement of its order. The Court of Appeals denied enforcement of ’the Board’s order and set it aside. 256 F. 2d 281. It found that respondents dominated and supported the Committees but held that they were not “labor organizations” within the meaning of § 2 (5) (see note 1) because it thought (a) that the term “dealing with,” as used in that section, means “bargaining with,” ánd that these Committees “avoid[ed] the usual concept of collective bargaining,” and (b) that the provisions and legislative history of the 1947 amendment of § 9 (a) of the Act show that Congress, in effect, excluded such employee committees from the definition of “labor organization” contained in § 2 (5). 256 F. 2d, at 285-289. Because of an asserted conflict of that decision with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, and of the importance of the matter to the proper administration of the National Labor Relations Act, we granted certiorari. 358 U. S. 863. We turn first to the Court of Appeals’ holding that an employee committee which does not “bargain with” employers in “the usual concept of collective bargaining” does not engage in “dealing with” employers, and is therefore not. a “labor organization” within the meaning of § 2 (5). Our study of the matter has convinced us that there is nothing in the plain words of § 2 (5), initsTegislative history, or in the decisions construing it, that supports that conclusion. Section 2 (5) includes in its definition of “labor organization” any, “employee representation committee or plan . . . which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” (Emphasis added.) Certainly nothing in that section indicates that the broad term “dealing with” is to be read as synonymous with the more limited term “bargaining with.” See, e. g., Labor Board v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F. 2d 706, 708, and Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. Labor Board, 202 F. 2d 613, 620-621. The legislative history of § 2 (5) strongly confirms that Congress did not understand or intend those terms to be synonymous. When the original print of the 1935 Wagner bill (S. 1958) was being Considered in the Senate, the then Secretary of Labor proposed an amendment to § 2 (5) which, if adopted, would have given that section the meaning now ascribed to it by the Court of Appeals. The proposal was that the term “bargaining collectively” be substituted for the term “dealing.” But the proposal was not adopted. It is therefore quite clear that Congress, by adopting the broad term “dealing” and rejecting the more limited term “bargaining collectively,” did not intend that the broad term “dealing with” should be limited to and mean only “bargaining with” as held by the Court of Appeals. Construing § 2 (5) of the original Wagner Act, the Courts of Appeals uniformly held that employee committees or plans, under whatever name called, that functioned similarly to those here, were “labor organizations” as defined in that statute. With full knowledge of the terms of § 2 (5) of the original Wagner Act, and of its legislative history and judicial interpretation, Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act re-enacted the section without change. Since that time, as before, the several Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that employee committees or plans, functioning similarly to those here, were “labor organizations” within the definition of § 2 (5). The Court of Appeals was therefore in error in holding that company-dominated Employee Committees, which exist for the purpose, in part at least, “of dealing with employers concerning grievances ... or conditions of work,” are not “labor organizations,” within the meaning of § 2 (5), simply because' they do not “bargain with” employers in “the usual concept of collective bargaining.” (Emphasis added.) Consideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of these Committees shows that they existed for the purpose, in part at least, “of dealing with, employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of- employment, or conditions of work.” It cannot be, apd is not, disputed that, by "the terms of the bylaws, which were accepted both by the employees and by respondents, the Employee Committees undertook the “responsibility to,” and did, “[h]andle grievances [with respondents on behalf of employees] at nonunion plants and departments according to grievance procedure set up [by respondents] for these plants and departments” (see note 3). It is therefore as plain as words can express that these Committees existed, at least in part, for the purpose “of dealing with employers concerning grievances . . . .” This alone brings these Committees squarely within the statutory definition of “labor organizations.” Moreover, although none of the Employee Committees attempted to negotiate any formal bargaining contract with respondents, the Employee Committees, at the regu_lar Employee Committee-Management meetings held during the period here involved, made proposals and requests respecting such matters as seniority, job classification, job bidding, working schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, a merit system, wage corrections, and improvement of working facilities and conditions. Respondents’ plant officials participated in the discussion of these matters and frequently granted the Committees’ requests (see note 5). Also, .during the 1955 and 1956 meetings of the Central Committee with respondents’ Director of Industrial Relations in Pampa, Texas, the Central Committee made proposals and requests with respect to matters covering' nearly the whole scope, of the employment relationship and which are commonly considered and dealt with in collective bargaining (see note 6). The Director of Industrial Relations discussed those proposals and requests with the Central Committee, and sought to reach some solution. He granted some of them and rejected others, explaining his reasons for doing so. Respondents say that these activities by the Committees and respondents’ officials do not mean that the Committees were “dealing with” respondents in respect to those matters, because, they argue, the proposals and requests amounted only to recommendations and that final decision remained with respondents. But this is true of all such “dealing,” whether with an independent or a company-dominated “labor organization.” The principal distinction lies in the unfettered power of the former to insist upon its requests. Labor Board v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F. 2d 706, 708. Whether those proposals and requests by the Committees, and respondents’ consideration of and action upon them, do or do not constitute “the usual concept of collective bargaining” (256 F. 2d, at 285), we think, that those activities establish that the Committees were “dealing with” respondents, with respect to those subjects, within the meaning of § 2 (5). We therefore conclude that under' the declared purposes and actual practices of these Committees they are labor organizations unless, as the Court of Appeals held and as respondents contend, Congress by the 1947 amendment of § 9 (a), in legal effect, eliminated such committees from the term “labor organization” as defined in §2(5) and used in §8 (a) (2) (see note 4). We now turn to that contention. In 1947 the House passed H. R. 3020, known as the “Hartley Bill,” which, among other things, proposed a new section, to be designated 8 (d)(3), providing: “(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following shall not constitute or be evidence of- an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act: “(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working conditions, . if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recognized a representative as their representative under section 9.” The Senate amended H. R. 3020 by substituting its own bill, S. 1126, known as the “Taft Bill.” The Senate bill contained no provision corresponding to the new § 8 (d) (3) proposed by the House, but it did propose an amendment to § 9 (a) of the original Wagner Act (49 Stat. 453) by adding to the proviso of that section which read: “Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer” the words “and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.” . Thereupon the Senate requested a conference. The conferees later reported a new measure, taken partly from the House bill and partly from the Senate bill and containing some, entirely new provisions. That bill as finally agreed upon by the conferees did not contain the House’s proposed new ■§ 8 (d) (3) or any similar language, but it did contain the .Senate’s proposed amendment to §9 (a). In reporting to the House, the House conferees stated with respect to the elimination of its proposed new §8 (d)(3) that: “Section 8 (d) (3) . . . in the House bill provided that nothing in the act was to be construed as prohibiting an employer from forming'or maintaining a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, if the employees did not have a bargaining representative. This provision is omitted from the conference agreement since the act by its terms permits individual employees and groups of employees to meet with the employer and section 9 (a) of the conference agreement permits employers to answer their grievances.” The bill so agreed upon by the conferees was passed by both Houses and eventually became the law-. Notwithstanding the fact that Congress rejected the House proposal of a new section, to be designated. § 8 (d)(3), which, if adopted, would have permitted an employer to form or maintain a committee of employees and to discuss with it matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working conditions, if there was no employee representative, respondents contend that Congress intended to accomplish the same purposes by its amendment to § 9 (a), and that, in consequence, an employer, whose employees have no bargaining representative, may now legally form or maintain a committee of employees and discuss with it the matters referred to in the proposed § 8 (d) (3) advocated by the House. This argument treats the amendment to § 9 (a) as though Congress, had adopted, rather than rejected as-it did, the proposed §8 (d)(3) advocated by the House. And it overlooks thé facts that the Héuse Conference Report itself declared that “The conference agreement does not make any change” in the definition of “labor organization,” and that, as pointed out by Senator Taft, the conferees specifically rejected all attempts to “amend . . . the provisions in subsection 8’ (2) [of the original Wagner Act] relating to company-dominated unions” and had left its prohibitions “unchanged.” Thet&mendment to is 9 (a) does not say that an employer may form or maintain an employee committee for the purpose of “dealing with” the employer, on behalf of employees, concerning grievances. On the contrary the amendment to § 9 (a) simply provides, in substance, that' any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right personally to present their own grievances to their employer, and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of any bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of any collective bargaining contract then in effect, provided that the bargaining representative, if there is one, has been given an opportunity to be present. It is thus evident that there is nothing in the amendment of § 9 (a) that authorizes an employer to engage in “dealing with” an employer-dominated “labor organization” as the representative bf his employees concerning their grievances. We therefore conclude that there is nothing in the amendment of § 9 (a), or in its legislative history, to indicate that Congress thereby eliminated or intended to eliminate such employee committees from the term “labor organization” as defined in § 2 (5) and used in § 8 (a) (2). Respondents argue that to hold these employee committees to be labor organizations would prevent employers and employees from discussing matters of mutual interest concerning the employment relationship, and would thus abridge freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. But the Board’s order does not impose any such bar; it:merely precludes the employers from dominating, interfering with or supporting such employee committees which Congress has defined to be labor organizations. >The judgment of the Court of Appeals.is reversed arid the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Section 2 (.5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 138, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (5) provides: “The term ‘labor organization’ means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions bf work.” Examples of the problems of mutual interest to employees and management to be considered at the Committee-Management meetings were stated in the bylaws to be, but were not limited to, safety; increased efficiency and production; conservation of supplies, materials, and equipment; encouragement of ingenuity and initiative; and grievances at nonunion plants or departments. As published in The Guide the established grievance procedure applicable to nonunion plants and departments provides, in summary, that in handling an employee’s grievance it shall be the Committee’s duty to consult with the Foreman, the Assistant Plant Superintendent and the Plant Superintendent," and consider all the facts. .If, after having -done so, the Committee believes that the employee has a just grievance it shall prepare in writing, a formal statement of its supporting reasons and presfent it to the Plant Superintendent, who shall send copies of it, attaching his own report and recommendations, to the. District'Superintendent, the department head and Industrial Relations Department of the company. Within five days after receipt of such grievance the District Superintendent or the department head, or both, shall meet with the Committee and plant management and discuss the problem and announce their decision. If the Committee still feels that the grievance has not been, fairly settled it may appeal to the General Managér who, within five days, shall meet- with the Committee and plant management and announce his decision. • Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (2), provides: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “ (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it; Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by' the Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited, from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Among other things, respondents’ plant officials agreed to Employee Committee requests to change from á company to a plant seniority system in several plants where employees desired the change; to provide longer notice periods concerning jobs up for bid; to permit employees to report early and leave early on week ends; to establish an annual basis for allocating overtime; and to install vents in the roofs of warehouses. The subjects discussed by the Central Committee with respondents’ Director of Industrial Relations at those meetings included Committee proposals and requests for: a vacation of 3 weeks for employees with 10 years’ service; annual sick leave; a disability benefit plan; amendments-in the practice of working on holidays; the establishment and financing by respondents of an employee educational program; the granting of leaves of absence to employees wishing to attend college; the furnishing to certain employees of work clothing; a change in policy to permit shiftmen to make up work days lost; the creation of more job classifications, with resulting higher wages; more opportunities for employees to transfer from one plant or department?"to another; payment of wages to employees while attending National Guard camps; making the working day of shift-workers the same as that of the gangs with which they work; and a general wage increase. “The term ‘labor organization’ is phrased very broadly in order that the independence of action guaranteed by section 7 . . . and protected by section 8 shall extend to all- organizations of employees that deal with employers in regard to ‘grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.’ This definition includes employee-representation committees and plans in order that the employers’ activities in connection therewith shall be equally subject to the application of section 8.” S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, p. 2306. (The latter publication .will hereafter be cited, for example, as 2 Leg. Hist. (1935) 2306.) Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67, reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1935) 1442-1443. S. 1958 (2d print), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 2 Leg. Hist. (1935) 2287. See comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.), pp. 1, 22-23, reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1935) 1320, 1347. Labor Board v. American Furnace Co., 158 F. 2d 376, 378 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Labor Board v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F. 2d 706, 707-708 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Labor Board v. C. Nelson Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 444, 445 (C. A. 8th Cir.). Compare Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 268-269; Labor Board v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241, 246-248. 49 Stat. 450. 61 Stat. 138, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (5). Pacemaker Corp. v. Labor Board, 260 F. 2d 880, 883 (C. A. 7th Cir.) (where the Seventh Circuit expréssly disagreed with the ruling below); Labor Board v. Standard Coil Products Co., 224 F. 2d 465, 467-468 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Labor Board v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F. 2d 900, 903-904 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. Sharples Chemicals, Inc., 209 F. 2d 645, 651-652 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. Labor Board, 202 F. 2d 613, 621 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Labor Board, 194 F. 2d 407, 410 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Labor Board v. General Shoe Corp., 192 F. 2d 504, 507 (C. A. 6th Cir.). But see Labor Board v. Associated Machines, 219 F. 2d 433 (C. A. 6th Cir.). In Labor Board v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., the court said: “Respondents say 'that this Junior Board did not deal, it only recommended and that final decision was with management. Final decision is always with management, although when a claim is made by a well organized, good sized union, management' is doubtless more strongly influenced in its decision than it would be by a recommendation of a board which it, itself, has selected and which has been provided with no fighting arms.” 156 F. 2d, at 708. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1947) 183. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1947) 99. H. R. 3020, as amended by the Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86, reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1947) 244; now 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). 93 Cong. Rec. 5298, reprinted in 2 Leg. Hist. (1947) 1522. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1947) 505. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1 Leg. Hist. (1947) 549. 61 Stat. 136 et seq., 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 1 Leg. Hist. (1947) 537. 93 Cong. Rec. 6600, reprinted in 2 Leg. Hist. (1947) 1539.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JOY OIL CO., LTD. v. STATE TAX COMMISSION. No. 223. Argued January 6-7, 1949. — Decided June 13, 1949. Clayton F. Jennings argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Eugene F. Black, Attorney General, Daniel J. O’Hara, Assistant Attorney General, Dale H. Fillmore and Joel K. Underwood. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. On December 29, 1945, petitioner Joy Oil Company, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, purchased 1,500,000 gal-Ions of gasoline from Mid-West Refineries, Inc., of Grand Rapids, Michigan. The bills of lading issued by the railroad to which the gasoline was delivered were marked “For Export to Canada,” but the gasoline was consigned to petitioner at Detroit. In order to secure the benefits of lower export freight rates and exemption from the federal transportation and manufacturers’ excise taxes, petitioner furnished Mid-West Refineries and the railroad with prescribed forms certifying that the gasoline was purchased for export. Rail shipments' were begun in January and completed in February of 1946. As the gasoline reached Detroit it was accumulated in storage tanks leased by petitioner at Dearborn. On April 1, 1947, the city of Dearborn assessed an ad valorem property tax on the gasoline, all of which, except 60,000 gallons, shipped to Canada by truck over the Ambassador Bridge, had then been in the Dearborn tanks for fifteen months. Shipment by truck was halted by a federal regulation prohibiting the transportation of inflammables over any international bridge, and petitioner apparently chose not to ship the gasoline by rail across the Detroit River. Iru July of 1947 petitioner began to ship it to Canada by water; the last tanker load departed on August 22, 1947. Petitioner explains the delay as due to inability to obtain shipping space at any earlier date. Petitioner resisted payment of the tax on the ground that it infringed Art. I, § 10, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The Tax Commission of Michigan sustained Dearborn’s assessment of the tax, and the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. 321 Mich. 335, 32 N. W. 2d 472." We granted certiorari because the case presented a sufficiently important question in the accommodation of State and Federal interests under the Constitution. 335 U. S. 812. The circumstances which tended, at the time when the tax was assessed, to establish petitioner’s intent to export the gasoline and the fact that the gasoline was eventually exported are not enough, by themselves, to confer immunity from local taxation. See, e. g., Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418; Empresa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U. S. 154. Nor is it enough that by the rail shipment to Detroit one step in the process of exportation had been taken or that a part of the total bulk had already departed for its foreign destination. It is of course true that commodities destined for shipment by water must be transshipped at the water’s edge and so may require a brief period of storage at that point which will not be deemed a delay sufficient to interrupt the continuity of the export process. Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U. S. 95; see Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U. S. 498; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. Ill. But here the period of storage at Dearborn was so long ,as to preclude holding that the first step toward exportation would inevitably be followed by others. See, by way of contrast, Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 469. While in storage, the gasoline might have been diverted to domestic markets without disruption of any existing arrangement for its transshipment and without even breach of any contractual commitment to a foreign purchaser. Neither the character of the property nor any event equivalent to its redelivery to a common carrier made export certain for all practical purposes. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U. S. 69, 82. The Export-Import Clause was meant to confer immunity from local taxation upon property being exported, not to relieve property eventually to be exported from its share of the cost of local services. See Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 527-28. The fifteen-month delay at Dear-born barred immunity of petitioner’s gasoline from the taxing power of the municipality. Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GEDULDIG, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT v. AIELLO et al. No. 73-640. Argued March 26, 1974 Decided June 17, 1974 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, BlackmuN, Powell, and RehNQüist, JJ., joined. BrenNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 497. Joanne Condas, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Palmer, Assistant Attorney General. Wendy W. Williams argued the cause for appellees. With her on the briefs were Peter Hart Weiner, Boland C. Davis, and Victor J. Van Bourg Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Milton A. Smith, Gerard C. Smetana, Lawrence D. Ehrlich, and Jerry Kronen-herg for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Raymond M. Momboisse for the Pacific Legal Foundation; by Richard D. Godown and Myron G. Hill, Jr., for the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States; by Willard Z. Carr, Jr., for the Merchants and Manufacturers Assn.; by F. Mark Garlinghouse and James D. Hutchinson for the American Telephone and Telegraph Co.; and by Theophil C. Kammholz, Stanley B. Strauss, John S. Battle, Jr., and J. Robert Brame III for the General Electric Co. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Joseph T. Eddins and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; by Winn Newman and Ruth Weyand for the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC; by Joseph N. Onek for Women’s Equity Action League et al.; and by Harry I. Rand for the Physicians Forum. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. For almost 30 years California has administered a disability insurance system that pays benefits to persons in private employment who are temporarily unable to work because of disability not covered by workmen’s compensation. The appellees brought this action to challenge the constitutionality of a provision of the California program that, in defining “disability,” excludes from coverage certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy. Because the appellees sought to enjoin the enforcement of this state statute, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284. On the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the District Court, by a divided vote, held that this provision of the disability insurance program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore enjoined its continued enforcement. 359 F. Supp. 792. The District Court denied a motion to stay its judgment pending appeal. The appellant thereupon filed a similar motion in this Court, which we granted. 414 U. S. 897. We subsequently noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. 414 U. S. 1110. I California’s disability insurance system is funded entirely from contributions deducted from the wages of participating employees. Participation in the program is mandatory unless the employees are protected by a voluntary private plan approved by the State. Each employee is required to contribute one percent of his salary, up to an annual maximum of $85. These contributions are placed in the Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund, which is established and administered as a special trust fund within the state treasury. It is from this Disability Fund that benefits under the program are paid. An individual is eligible for disability benefits if, during a one-year base period prior to his disability, he has contributed one percent of a minimum income of $300 to the Disability Fund. In the event he suffers a com-pensable disability, the individual can receive a “weekly benefit amount” of between $25 and $105, depending on the amount he earned during the highest quarter of the base period. Benefits are not paid until the eighth day of disability, unless the employee is hospitalized, in which case benefits commence on the first day of hospitalization. In addition to the “weekly benefit amount,” a hospitalized employee is entitled to receive “additional benefits” of $12 per day of hospitalization. “Weekly benefit amounts” for any one disability are payable for 26 weeks so long as the total amount paid does not exceed one-half of the wages received during the base period. “Additional benefits” for any one disability are paid for a maximum of 20 days. In return for his one-percent contribution to the Disability Fund, the individual employee is insured against the risk of disability stemming from a substantial number of “mental or physical illness[es] and mental or physical injuries].” Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §2626. It is not every disabling condition, however, that triggers the obligation to pay benefits under the program. As already noted, for example, any disability of less than eight days’ duration is not compensable, except when the employee is hospitalized. Conversely, no benefits are payable for any single disability beyond 26 weeks. Further, disability is not compensable if it results from the individual’s court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual psychopath. Finally, § 2626 of the Unemployment Insurance Code excludes from coverage certain disabilities that are attributable to pregnancy. It is this provision that is at issue in the present case. Appellant is the Director of the California Department of Human Resources Development. He is responsible for the administration of the State’s disability insurance program. Appellees are four women who have paid sufficient amounts into the Disability Fund to be eligible for benefits under the program. Each of the appellees became pregnant and suffered employment disability as a result of her pregnancy. With respect to three of the ap-pellees, Carolyn Aiello, Augustina Armendariz, and Elizabeth Johnson, the disabilities were attributable to abnormal complications encountered during their pregnancies. The fourth, Jacqueline Jaramillo, experienced a normal pregnancy, which was the sole cause of her disability. At all times relevant to this case, § 2626 of the Unemployment Insurance Code provided: Appellant construed and applied the final sentence of this statute to preclude the payment of benefits for any disability resulting from pregnancy. As a result, the appellees were ruled ineligible for disability benefits by reason of this provision, and they sued to enjoin its enforcement. The District Court, finding “that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is not based upon a classification having a rational and substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose,” held that the exclusion was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 359 F. Supp., at 801. “ ‘Disability’ or ‘disabled’ includes both mental or physical illness and mental or physical injury. An individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in which, because of his physical or mental condition, he is unable to perform his regular or customary work. In no case shall the term ‘disability’ or ‘disabled’ include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) Shortly before the District Court’s decision in this case, the California Court of Appeal, in a suit brought by a woman who suffered an ectopic pregnancy, held that § 2626 does not bar the payment of benefits on account of disability that results from medical complications arising during pregnancy. Rentzer v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973). The state court construed the statute to preclude only the payment of benefits for disability accompanying normal pregnancy. The appellant acquiesced in this construction and issued administrative guidelines that exclude only the payment of “maternity benefits” — i. e., hospitalization and disability benefits for normal delivery and recuperation. Although Rentzer was decided some 10 days before the District Court’s decision in this case, there was apparently no opportunity to call the court’s attention to it. The appellant, therefore, asked the court to reconsider its decision in light of the construction that the California Court of Appeal had given to § 2626 in the Rentzer case. By a divided vote, the court denied the motion for reconsideration. Although a more definitive ruling would surely have been preferable, we interpret the District Court’s denial of the appellant’s motion as a determination that its decision was not affected by the limiting construction given to § 2626 in Rentzer. Because of the Rentzer decision and the revised administrative guidelines that resulted from it, the appellees Aiello, Armendariz, and Johnson, whose disabilities were attributable to causes other than normal pregnancy and delivery, became entitled to benefits under the disability insurance program, and their claims have since been paid. With respect to appellee Jaramillo, however, whose disability stemmed solely from normal pregnancy and childbirth, § 2626 continues to bar the payment of any benefits. It is evident that only Jaramillo continues to have a live controversy with the appellant as to the validity of § 2626. The claims of the other appellees have been mooted by the change that Rentzer worked in the construction and application of that provision. Thus, the issue before the Court on this appeal is whether the California disability insurance program invidiously discriminates against Jaramillo and others similarly situated by not paying insurance benefits for disability that accompanies normal pregnancy and childbirth. II It is clear that California intended to establish this benefit system as an insurance program that was to function essentially in accordance with insurance concepts. Since the program was instituted in 1946, it has been totally self-supporting, never drawing on general state revenues to finance disability or hospital benefits. The Disability Fund is wholly supported by the one percent of wages annually contributed by participating employees. At oral argument, counsel for the appellant informed us that in recent years between 90% and 103% of the revenue to the Disability Fund has been paid out in disability and hospital benefits. This history strongly suggests that the one-percent contribution rate, in addition to being easily computable, bears a close and substantial relationship to the level of benefits payable and to the disability risks insured under the program. Over the years California has demonstrated a strong commitment not to increase the contribution rate above the one-percent level. The State has sought to provide the broadest possible disability protection that would be affordable by all employees, including those with very low incomes. Because any larger percentage or any flat dollar-amount rate of contribution would impose an increasingly regressive levy bearing most heavily upon those with the lowest incomes, the State has resisted any attempt to change the required contribution from the one-percent level. The program is thus structured, in terms of the level of benefits and the risks insured, to maintain the solvency of the Disability Fund at a one-percent annual level of contribution. In ordering the State to pay benefits for disability accompanying normal pregnancy and delivery, the District Court acknowledged the State’s contention “that coverage of these disabilities is so extraordinarily expensive that it would be impossible to maintain a program supported by employee contributions if these disabilities are included.” 359 F. Supp., at 798. There is considerable disagreement between the parties with respect to how great the increased costs would actually be, but they would clearly be substantial. For purposes of analysis the District Court accepted the State's estimate, which was in excess of $100 million annually, and stated: “[I]t is clear that including these disabilities would not destroy the program. The increased costs could be accommodated quite easily by making reasonable changes in the contribution rate, the maximum benefits allowable, and the other variables affecting the solvency of the program.” Ibid. Each of these “variables” — the benefit level deemed appropriate to compensate employee disability, the risks selected to be insured under the program, and the contribution rate chosen to maintain the solvency of the program and at the same time to permit low-income employees to participate with minimal personal sacrifice- — -represents a policy determination by the State. The essential issue in this case is whether the Equal Protection Clause requires such policies to be sacrificed or compromised in order-to finance the payment of benefits to those whose disability is attributable to- normal pregnancy and delivery. We cannot agree that the exclusion of this disability from coverage amounts to invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for disability insurance protection under the program. The classification challenged in this case relates to the asserted underinclusiveness of the set of risks that the State has selected to insure. Although California has.created a program to insure most risks of employment disability, it has not chosen to insure all such risks, and this decision is reflected in the level of annual contributions exacted from participating employees. This Court has held that, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, a State “may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.... The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. .. .” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). Particularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point. “ [T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486-487 (1970). The District Court suggested that moderate alterations in what it regarded as “variables” of the disability insurance program could be made to accommodate the substantial expense required to include normal pregnancy within the program’s protection. The same can be said, however, with respect to the other expensive class of disabilities that are excluded from coverage — short-term disabilities. If the Equal Protection Clause were thought to compel disability payments for normal pregnancy, it is hard to perceive why it would not also compel payments for short-term disabilities suffered by participating employees. It is evident that a totally comprehensive program would be substantially more costly than the present program and would inevitably require state subsidy, a higher rate of employee contribution, a lower scale of benefits for those suffering insured disabilities, or some combination of these measures. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that requires the State to subordinate or compromise its legitimate interests solely to create a more comprehensive social insurance program than it already has. The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program. Similarly, it has an interest in distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately. Finally, California has a legitimate concern in maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly burden participating employees, particularly low-income employees who may be most in need of the disability insurance. These policies provide an objective and wholly non-invidious basis for the State’s decision not to create a more comprehensive insurance program than it has. There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program. There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not. The appellee simply contends that, although she has received insurance protection equivalent to that provided all other participating employees, she has suffered discrimination because she encountered a risk that was outside the program’s protection. For the reasons we have stated, we hold that this contention is not a valid one under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The stay heretofore issued by the Court is vacated, and the judgment of the District Court is Reversed. This litigation began as two separate suits on behalf of California employees who had paid sufficient amounts into the Disability Fund to be eligible generally for benefits under the program. Carolyn Aiello brought, her suit against appellant in the Federal District Court. Augustina Armendariz, Elizabeth Johnson, and Jacqueline Jaramillo jointly initiated their suit as a petition for a writ of mandate in the California Supreme Court. Both suits were brought as class actions and asserted the unconstitutionality of § 2626 of the California Unemployment Insurance Code under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellant removed the state court suit to the Federal District Court, where the two actions were consolidated. See 28 U. S. C. § 1441 (b). Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 3251-3254. §§ 984, 985, 2901. § 3OO1. § 2652. § 2655. This provision has been amended, effective July 1, 1974, to provide for a maximum weekly benefit amount of $119. §§ 2627 (b) and 2802. § 2801. §2653. § 2801. Section 2608 provides a formula for determining whether a disabling condition that is intermittent is one disability or more than one disability for purposes of applying the limitations in §§ 2653 and 2801 on the maximum amount of benefits payable. § 2678. Sections 2675-2677 contain various other factors that will disqualify an employee from receiving benefits but that relate to matters other than the nature of the disabling condition. Effective July 1, 1974, the Department of Human Resources •Development will be renamed the Department of Employment Development. See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 301 et seq. Aiello and Johnson suffered ectopic and tubal pregnancies, respectively, which required surgery to terminate the pregnancies. Armendariz suffered a miscarriage. In an earlier decision, the Court of Appeal had sustained § 2626 against an equal protection challenge by a female employee who had suffered disability as a result of normal pregnancy and delivery. Clark v. California Employment Stabilization Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 2d 326, 332 P. 2d 716 (1958). Section 2626 was later amended, and a new § 2626.2 was added, in order clearly to reflect this interpretation. The two sections now provide as follows: § 2626 “ 'Disability’ or ‘disabled’ includes both mental or physical illness, mental or physical injury, and, to the extent specified in Section 2626.2, pregnancy. An individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in which, because of his physical or mental condition, he is unable to perform his regular or customary work.” §2626.2 “Benefits relating to pregnancy shall be paid under this part only in accordance with the following: “(a) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor’s certification that the claimant is disabled because of an abnormal and involuntary complication of pregnancy, including but not limited to: puerperal infection, eclampsia, caesarian section delivery, ectopic pregnancy, and toxemia. “(b) Disability benefits shall be paid upon a doctor’s certification that a condition possibly arising out of pregnancy would disable the claimant without regard to the pregnancy, including but not limited to: anemia, diabetes, embolism, heart disease, hypertension, phlebitis, phlebothrombosis, pyelonephritis, thrombophlebitis, vagi-nitis, varicose veins, and venous thrombosis.” These amendments took effect on January I, 1974. In his message to the state legislature proposing the creation of this program, Governor Earl Warren stated: “It is not possible for employees to obtain from private insurance companies protection against loss of wages or salary during sickness as adequately or cheaply as that protection could be obtained by diverting their present 1 per cent contribution for the support of a Disability Benefits Program.” California Senate Journal, Jan. 23, 1946, p. 229. The California Supreme Court has concluded “that the legislative purpose in providing unemployment disability benefits . . . was to provide an insurance program to pay benefits to individuals who are unemployed because of illness or injury. . . Garcia v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 41 Cal. 2d 689, 692, 263 P. 2d 8, 10 (1953) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 2604 of the Unemployment Insurance Code vests the Governor and the appellant with authority to modify the payment of benefits and to increase the waiting time for eligibility if such steps are necessary to forestall insolvency of the Disability Fund. But neither the Governor nor the appellant is authorized to increase the contribution rate under any circumstances. Appellant’s estimate of the increased cost of including normal pregnancy within the insured risks has varied between $120.2 million and $131 million annually, or between a 33% and 36% increase in the present amount of benefits paid under the program. On the other hand, appellee contends that the increased cost would be $48.9 million annually, or a 12% increase over present expenditures. The same could be said of disabilities continuing beyond 26 weeks. The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition — pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become pregnant,, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed, supra, and Frontiero, supra. Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups — pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes. Indeed, the appellant submitted to the District Court data that indicated that both the annual claim rate and the annual claim cost are greater for women than for men. As the District Court acknowledged, “women contribute about 28 percent of the total disability insurance fund and receive back about 38 percent of the fund in benefits.” 359 F. Supp. 792, 800. Several amici curiae have represented to the Court that they have had a similar experience under private disability insurance programs.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PROCUNIER, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR, et al. v. NAVARETTE No. 76-446. Argued October 11, 1977 Decided February 22, 1978 Sanford Svetcov, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, and W. Eric Collins, Deputy Attorney General. Michael E. Adams argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Leon Friedman, Joel M. Gora, and Alvin J. Bronstein filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Navarette, an inmate of Soledad Prison in California when the events revealed here occurred, filed his second amended complaint on January 19, 1974, charging six prison officials with various types of conduct allegedly violative of his constitutional rights and of 42 U.. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Three of the defendants were subordinate officials at Soledad; three were supervisory officials: the director of the State Department of Corrections and the warden and assistant warden of Soledad. The first three of nine claims for relief alleged wrongful interference with Navarette's outgoing mail. The first claim charged that the three subordinate officers, who were in charge of mail handling, had failed to mail various items of correspondence during the 15 months that respondent was incarcerated at Soledad, from September 1, 1971, to December 11, 1972. These items, described in 13 numbered paragraphs, included letters to legal assistance groups, law students, the news media, and inmates in other state prisons, as well as personal friends. Some of these items had been returned to Navarette, some the defendants had refused to send by registered mail as Navarette had requested, and, it was alleged, none of the items had ever reached the intended recipient. This “interference” or “confiscation” was asserted to have been in “knowing disregard” of the applicable statewide prisoner mail regulations and of Navarette's “constitutional rights,” including his rights to free speech and due process as guaranteed by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The three supervisory officers were alleged to have knowingly condoned this conduct and to have conspired with their subordinates for forbidden ends. The second claim for relief alleged wrongful failure to mail the same items of correspondence and asserted that the “interference or confiscation” had been conducted with “bad faith disregard” for Navarette’s rights. The third claim posed the same failures to mail but claimed that the “interference” or “confiscation” had occurred because the three subordinate officers had “negligently and inadvertently” misapplied the prison mail regulations and because the supervisory officers had “negligently]” failed to provide sufficient training and direction to their subordinates, all assertedly in violation of Navarette’s constitutional rights. Petitioners moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted or alternatively for summary judgment. Affidavits in support of the motion and counter-affidavits opposing it were also before the District Court. By order and without opinion, the court then granted summary judgment for petitioners on the first three claims and dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a federal claim. The Court of Appeals reversed as to the first three claims. Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F. 2d 277 (CA9 1976). It held, first, that prisoners themselves are entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection for their outgoing mail and that Navarette’s allegations were sufficient to encompass proof that would entitle him to relief in damages. Second, the court ruled that summary judgment on the first two claims was improper because there were issues of fact to be tried, particularly with respect to the claim that “a reasonable and good faith belief of a state official that his or her conduct is lawful, even where in fact it is not, constitutes a complete defense to a § 1983 claim for damages.” Id., at 280. Third, the Court of Appeals held that Navarette’s “allegations that state officers negligently deprived him of [his constitutional] rights state a § 1983 cause of action” and that summary judgment on the third purported claim was “improper because, as in the case of counts one and two, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Navarette, we are unable to say appellees are entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id., at 282, and n. 6. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 1060, and the question before us is whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the District Court’s judgment with respect to Navarette’s third claim for relief alleging negligent interference with a claimed constitutional right. In support of their motion for summary judgment, petitioners argued that on the record before the court they were immune from liability for damages under § 1983 and hence were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The claim was not that they shared the absolute immunity accorded judges and prosecutors but that they were entitled to the qualified immunity accorded those officials involved in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975). The Court of Appeals appeared to agree that petitioners were entitled to the claimed degree of immunity but held that they were nevertheless not entitled to summary judgment because in the court’s view there were issues of fact to be resolved and because when the facts were viewed most favorably to respondent, it could not be held that petitioners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Without disagreeing that petitioners enjoyed a qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983, respondent defends the judgment of the Court of Appeals as a proper application of § 1983 and of the Court’s cases construing it. Although the Court has recognized that in enacting § 1983 Congress must have intended to expose state officials to damages liability in some circumstances, the section has been consistently construed as not intending wholesale revocation of the common-law immunity afforded government officials. Legislators, judges, and prosecutors have been held absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976). Only a qualified immunity from damages is available to a state Governor, a president of a state university, and officers and members of a state National Guard., Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra. The same is true of local school board members, Wood v. Strickland, supra; of the superintendent of a state hospital, O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975); and of policemen, Pierson v. Ray, supra; see Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 418-419. We agree with petitioners that as prison officials and officers, they were not absolutely immune from liability in this § 1983 damages suit and could rely only on the qualified immunity described in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, and Wood v. Strickland, supra. Scheuer declared: “[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.” 416 U. S., at 247-248. We further held in Wood v. Strickland, that “if the work of the schools is to go forward,” there must be a degree of immunity so that “public school officials understand that action taken in the good-faith fulfillment of their responsibilities and within the bounds of reason under all the circumstances will not be punished and that they need not exercise their discretion with undue timidity.” 420 U. S., at 321. This degree of immunity would be unavailable, however, if the official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.” Id., at 322. The official cannot be expected to predict the future course of constitutional law, ibid.; Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 557, but he will not be shielded from liability if he acts “with such disregard of the [plaintiff's] clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.” 420 U. S., at 322. Under the first part of the Wood v. Strickland rule, the immunity defense would be unavailing to petitioners if the constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their challenged conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right, and if they knew or should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm. Petitioners claim that in 1971 and 1972 when the conduct involved in this case took place there was no established First Amendment right protecting the mailing privileges of state prisoners and that hence there was no such federal right about which they should have known. We are in essential agreement with petitioners in this respect and also agree that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In ruling that petitioners’ conduct had encroached on Navarette’s First Amendment rights, the Court of Appeals relied on two of its own decisions, one in 1973 and the other in 1974, as well as upon Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (ND Cal.), a 1973 three-judge court opinion with which the Court of Appeals said it was in essential agreement. The court relied on no earlier opinions, and this Court, in affirming the judgment in Martinez v. Procunier, did so on the ground that the constitutional rights of the addressees of a prisoner’s correspondence were involved when prison officials interfered with a prisoner’s outgoing mail. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974). The question of the rights of the prisoner himself was left open. The Court referred to the “tension between the traditional policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect constitutional rights” which has “led the federal courts to adopt a variety of widely inconsistent approaches to the problem” of constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail and to the “absence of any generally accepted standard for testing the constitutionality of prison mail censorship regulations . . . .” Id., at 406, 407. Some Courts of Appeals were said to have maintained a “hands off posture”; others to have extended various degrees of protection to prisoners’ mail. The Court referred to no relevant pronouncements by courts in the Ninth Circuit other than the one then under review; and it is apparent that Procunier, the defendant in the Martinez suit and in this one, was then maintaining that there was no established constitutional right protecting prison mail under which his mail regulations could be challenged. Respondent relies on Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (ND Cal. 1970); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (ND Cal. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U. S. 15 (1971); Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (ND Cal. 1970); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (ND Cal. 1971); and Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (ND Cal. 1972). But none of these cases deals with the rights of convicted prisoners in their mail and none furnishes an adequate basis for claiming that in 1971 and 1972 there was a “clearly established” constitutional right protecting Navarette’s correspondence involved in this case. Whether the state of the law is evaluated by reference to the opinions of this Court, of the Courts of Appeals, or of the local District Court, there was no “clearly established” First and Fourteenth Amendment right with respect to the correspondence of convicted prisoners in 1971-1972. As a matter of law, therefore, there was no basis for rejecting the immunity defense on the ground that petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. Because they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of a constitutional right that had not yet been declared, petitioners did not act with such disregard for the established law that their conduct “cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S., at 322. Neither should petitioners’ immunity defense be overruled under the second branch of the Wood v. Strickland standard, which would authorize liability where the official has acted with “malicious intention” to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right or to cause him “other injury.” This part of the rule speaks of “intentional injury,” contemplating that the actor intends the consequences of his conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965). The third claim for relief with which we are concerned here, however, charges negligent conduct, which normally implies that although the actor has subjected the plaintiff to unreasonable risk, he did not intend the harm or injury that in fact resulted. See id., at § 282 and Comment d. Claims 1 and 2 of the complaint alleged intentional and bad-faith conduct in disregard of Navarette’s constitutional rights; but claim 3, as the court below understood it and as the parties have treated it, was limited to negligence. The prison officers were charged with negligent and inadvertent interference with the mail and the supervisory personnel with negligent failure to provide proper training. To the extent that a malicious intent to harm is a ground for denying immunity, that consideration is clearly not implicated by the negligence claim now before us. We accordingly conclude that the District Court was correct in entering summary judgment for petitioners on the third claim of relief and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Section 1985 proscribes certain conspiracies interfering with civil rights. The named subordinate officials were two correctional counselors at Soledad and a member of the prison staff in charge of handling incoming and outgoing prisoner mail. The complaint also referred to unnamed defendants Does I through IV. Regulations promulgated January 5, 1970, permitted each inmate to send letters to 10 persons on an approved correspondence list plus other special-purpose letters as authorized. Director’s Rule (“D.”) 2403. Except with permission of the institutional head, correspondence with other inmates was prohibited. D.2402 (13). The inmate was also advised: “You may not send or receive letters that pertain to criminal activity; are lewd, obscene, or defamatory; contain prison gossip or discussion of other inmates; or are otherwise inappropriate.” D. 2402 (8). The regulations assured confidentiality for correspondence with state and federal officials and also stated: “Nothing in these rules shall deprive you of correspondence with your attorney, or with the courts having jurisdiction over matters of legitimate concern to you.” D.2402 (10). These regulations controlled prisoner correspondence until August 10, 1972, and were in effect at the time that all but one of respondent’s letters were posted. Subsequent regulations expanded inmate correspondence rights. Claims 4, 5, and 6 concerned the termination of a law student visitation program in which respondent had participated and the removal of respondent from the post of prison librarian. Claims 7, 8, and 9 realleged the substance of claims 1 through 6 and sought to hold the supervisory officials hable upon a theory of vicarious rather than personal liability. All nine claims also claimed a conspiracy in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985. The Court of Appeals also reversed the ruling of the District Court with respect to the 4th, 5th, and 6th claims on the theory that “[t]he termination or denial of prison privileges because of a prisoner’s legal activities on his own behalf or those of other inmates is an impermissible interference with his or her constitutional right of access to the courts.” 536 F. 2d, at 280. Since this issue is not related to the question on which we granted certiorari, we express no view on the resolution of these claims by the court below. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the claims based on vicarious liability (claims 7, 8, and 9) and also affirmed its dismissal of all claims predicated on 42 U. S. C. § 1985. 536 F. 2d, at 282. Neither of these issues is raised here. The questions presented in the petition for certiorari were: “1. Whether negligent failure to mail certain of a prisoner’s outgoing letters states a cause of action under section 1983 ? “2. Whether removal of a prisoner as a prison law librarian and termination of a law student-inmate visitation program in which he participated states a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act for either knowingly or negligently interfering with the prisoner’s right of access to the courts? “3. Whether deliberate refusal to mail certain of a prisoner’s correspondence in 1971-1972 prior to Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974), and refusal to send certain correspondence by registered mail states a cause of action for violation of his First Amendment right to free expression?” Our order granting the petition was limited to Question No. 1. In their submissions on the merits, the parties deal with this issue as subsuming the questions whether at the time of the occurrence of the relevant events the Federal Constitution had been construed to protect Navarette’s mailing privileges and whether petitioners knew or should have known that their alleged conduct violated Navarette’s constitutional rights. Since consideration of these issues is essential to analysis of the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment on claim 3 of the complaint, we shall also treat these questions as subsidiary issues “fairly comprised” by the question presented. This Court’s Rule 23.1 (c). In any event, our power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320 n. 6 (1971). The Courts of Appeals have generally accorded prison and jail administrators performing discretionary functions a qualified immunity from monetary liability under § 1983. E. g., Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F. 2d 720 (CA7 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F. 2d 598, 601 (CA1 1974); Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F. 2d 877 (CA10 1974); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F. 2d 183 (CA5 1971), modified on rehearing, 456 F. 2d 835 (1972); see Bryan v. Jones, 530 F. 2d 1210 (CA5), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 865 (1976). 416 U. S., at 406, citing McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F. 2d 72 (CA4 1964); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F. 2d 970 (CA8 1965); Knupnick v. Crouse, 366 F. 2d 851 (CA10 1966); Pope v. Daggett, 350 F. 2d 296 (CA10 1965). 416 U. S., at 406-407, citing, inter alia, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F. 2d 178, 199 (CA2 1971) (censorship of personal correspondence must have support “in any rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system”); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F. 2d 529 (CA5 1968) (censorship of prisoner mail must be supported by a compelling state interest); Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F. 2d 670, 672-673 (CA2 1972) (requiring a “clear and present danger”). The jurisdictional statement filed by Procunier stated that “the vast majority of reported cases held that restrictions on the extent and character of prisoners’ correspondence and examination and censorship thereof are inherent incidents in the conduct of penal institutions,” but noted that in the federal courts there were “widely diverging views regarding the scope and propriety of federal intervention in matters of internal prison regulation,” particularly with respect to inmate mail. Jurisdictional Statement filed in Procunier v. Martinez, O. T. 1973, No. 72-1465, p. 9. In Hyland v. Procunier, the District Court enjoined correctional officials from requiring a parolee to obtain advance permission for speeches to public gatherings. The opinion did not discuss the rights of prisoners. Gilmore v. Lynch concerned regulations limiting prisoner access to. legal materials and mutual legal assistance. The decision rested on the prisoners’ right to reasonable access to the courts. Northern v. Nelson upheld an inmate’s right to receive a newspaper which was “necessary for effective exercise of plaintiff’s right to practice the Muslim religion.” 315 F. Supp., at 688. Payne v. Whitmore affirmed the inmates’ First Amendment right to receive newspapers and magazines. The theory of the decision was that “prison rules must bear a reasonable relationship to valid prison goals, and rules which infringe upon particularly important rights will require a proportionately stronger justification.” 325 F. Supp., at 1193. It contained no discussion concerning either the importance of prisoner correspondence rights or the type of correspondence rules which would be reasonable. Toward the end of the relevant period, in May 1972, Brenneman v. Madigan held that pretrial detainees had a First Amendment right in their correspondence. The court recognized, however, that “[p] re-trial detainees do not stand on the same footing as convicted inmates.” 343 F. Supp., at 142. Although some of the items of correspondence with which respondent claims interference concerned legal matters or were addressed to lawyers, respondent is foreclosed from asserting any claim with respect to mail interference based on infringement of his right of access to the courts because such a claim was dismissed with prejudice in an earlier phase of this case. Order of Feb. 9, 1973, No. C-72-1954 SW (ND Cal.). In his Points and Authorities Against Motion to Dismiss filed in connection with the present complaint on April 17, 1974, respondent stated that “[t]he claim against mail interference does not purport to allege denial of access to the courts,” and explained that “[i]n ruling on defendants’ previous Motion to Dismiss, in February, 1973, this Court dismissed plaintiff’s claim against mail interference insofar as it alleged denial of access to the courts.” Record 171. There is thus no occasion to address this case on the assumption that Navarette’s mailing privileges were protected by a constitutional rule of which petitioners could reasonably have been expected to be aware in 1971 and 1972 and to inquire whether petitioners knew or should have known that their conduct was in violation of that constitutional proscription. Because of the disposition of this case on immunity grounds, we do not address petitioners’ other submissions: that § 1983 does not afford a remedy for negligent deprivation of constitutional rights and that state prisoners have no First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in their outgoing mail.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LASSITER v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF DURHAM COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA No. 79-6423. Argued February 23, 1981 Decided June 1, 1981 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 34. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 35. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 59. Leowen Evans argued the cause pro hoc vice for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gregory C. Malhoit and Robert L. Walker. Thomas Russell Odom argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Lester W. Owen. Steven Mansfield Shaber, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of North Carolina as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief for the State of North Carolina et al. as amici curiae were Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina; Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, and Regina Mullen Small, State Solicitor; Bill Allain, Attorney General of Mississippi, and Jim R. Bruce, Special Assistant Attorney General; Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, and Sidney H. McKenzie, Assistant Attorney General; Richard R. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada, and Claudia K. Cormier, Deputy Attorney General; and Steve Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Robert R. Ross, Deputy Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Louise Gruner Gans, Catherine P. Mitchell, and Phyllis Gelman for the National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc., et al.; by David B. Lundberg for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association; and by Robert S. Payne for the North Carolina Civil Liberties Union. Wm. Reece Smith, Jr., filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus curiae. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. I In the late spring of 1975, after hearing evidence that the petitioner, Abby Gail Lassiter, had not provided her infant son William with proper medical care, the District Court of Durham County, N. C., adjudicated him a neglected child and transferred him to the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services, the respondent here. A year later, Ms. Lassiter was charged with first-degree murder, was convicted of second-degree murder, and began a sentence of 25 to 40 years of imprisonment. In 1978 the Department petitioned the court to terminate Ms. Lassiter’s parental rights because, the Department alleged, she “has not had any contact with the child since December of 1975” and “has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecutive years without showing that substantial progress has been made in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the child, or without showing a positive response to the diligent efforts of the Department of Social Services to strengthen her relationship to the child, or to make and follow through with constructive planning for the future of the child.” Ms. Lassiter was served with the petition and with notice that a hearing on it would be held. Although her mother had retained counsel for her in connection with an effort to invalidate the murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter never mentioned the forthcoming hearing to him (or, for that matter, to any other person except, she said, to “someone” in the prison). At the behest of the Department of Social Services’ attorney, she was brought from prison to the hearing, which was held August 31, 1978. The hearing opened, apparently at the judge’s instance, with a discussion of whether Ms. Lassiter should have more time in which to find legal assistance. Since the court concluded that she “has had ample opportunity to seek and obtain counsel prior to the hearing of this matter, and [that] her failure to do so is without just cause,” the court did not postpone the proceedings. Ms. Lassiter did not aver that she was indigent, and the court did not appoint counsel for her. A social worker from the respondent Department was the first witness. She testified that in 1975 the Department “received a complaint from Duke Pediatrics that William had not been followed in the pediatric clinic for medical problems and that they were having difficulty in locating Ms. Las-siter . . . .” She said that in May 1975 a social worker had taken William to the hospital, where doctors asked that he stay “because of breathing difficulties [and] malnutrition and [because] there was a great deal of scarring that indicated that he had a severe infection that had gone untreated.” The witness further testified that, except for one “prearranged” visit and a chance meeting on the street, Ms. Las-siter had not seen William after he had come into the State’s custody, and that neither Ms. Lassiter nor her mother had “made any contact with the Department of Social Services regarding that child.” When asked whether William should be placed in his grandmother’s custody, the social worker said he should not, since the grandmother “has indicated to me on a number of occasions that she was not able to take responsibility for the child” and since “I have checked with people in the community and from Ms. Lassiter’s church who also feel that this additional responsibility would be more than she can handle.” The social worker added that William “has not seen his grandmother since the chance meeting in July of ’76 and that was the only time.” After the direct examination of the social worker, the judge said: “I notice we made extensive findings in June of ’75 that you were served with papers and called the social services and told them you weren’t coming; and the serious lack of medical treatment. And, as I have said in my findings of the 16th day of June ’75, the Court finds that the grandmother, Ms. Lucille Lassiter, mother of Abby Gail Lassiter, filed a complaint on the 8th day of May, 1975, alleging that the daughter often left the children, Candina, Felicia and William L. with her for days without providing money or food while she was gone.” Ms. Lassiter conducted a cross-examination of the social worker, who firmly reiterated her earlier testimony. The judge explained several times, with varying degrees of clarity, that Ms. Lassiter should only ask questions at this stage; many of her questions were disallowed because they were not really questions, but arguments. Ms. Lassiter herself then testified, under the judge’s questioning, that she had properly cared for William. Under cross-examination, she said that she had seen William more than five or six times after he had been taken from her custody and that, if William could not be with her, she wanted him to be with her mother since, “He knows us. Children know they family. . . . They know they people, they know they family and that child knows us anywhere. ... I got four more other children. Three girls and a boy and they know they little brother when they see him.” Ms. Lassiter’s mother was then called as a witness. She denied, under the questioning of the judge, that she had filed the complaint against Ms. Lassiter, and on cross-examination she denied both having failed to visit William when he was in the State’s custody and having said that she could not care for him. The court found that Ms. Lassiter “has not contacted the Department of Social Services about her child since December, 1975, has not expressed any concern for his care and welfare, and has made no efforts to plan for his future.” Because Ms. Lassiter thus had “wilfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for the welfare of the minor,” and because it was “in the best interests of the minor,” the court terminated Ms. Lassiter’s status as William’s parent. On appeal, Ms. Lassiter argued only that, because she was indigent, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled her to the assistance of counsel, and that the trial court had therefore erred in not requiring the State to provide counsel for her. The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided that “[w]hile this State action does invade a protected area of individual privacy, the invasion is not so serious or unreasonable as to compel us to hold that appointment of counsel for indigent parents is constitutionally mandated.” In re Lassiter, 43 N. C. App. 525, 527, 259 S. E. 2d 336, 337. The Supreme Court of North Carolina summarily denied Ms. Lassiter’s application for discretionary review, 299 N. C. 120, 262 S. E. 2d 6, and we granted certiorari to consider the petitioner’s claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 449 U. S. 819. II For all its consequence, “due process” has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. “ [U] nlike some legal rules,” this Court has said, due process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895. Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of “fundamental fairness,” a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what “fundamental fairness” consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake. A The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this Court’s precedents on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Thus, when the Court overruled the principle of Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, that counsel in criminal trials need be appointed only where the circumstances in a given case demand it, the Court did so in the case of a man sentenced to prison for five years. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. And thus Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, established that counsel must be provided before any indigent may be sentenced to prison, even where the crime is petty and the prison term brief. That it is the defendant’s interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel is demonstrated by the Court’s announcement in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed,” the juvenile has a right to appointed counsel even though those proceedings may be styled “civil” and not “criminal.” Id., at 41 (emphasis added). Similarly, four of the five Justices who reached the merits in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, concluded that an indigent prisoner is entitled to appointed counsel before being involuntarily transferred for treatment to a state mental hospital. The fifth Justice differed from the other four only in declining to exclude the “possibility that the required assist-anee may be rendered by competent laymen in some cases.” Id., at 500 (separate opinion of Powell, J.). Significantly, as a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel. In Gag-non v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, the Court gauged the due process rights of a previously sentenced probationer at a probation-revocation hearing. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480, which involved an analogous hearing to revoke parole, the Court had said: “Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.” Relying on that discussion, the Court in Scarpelli declined to hold that indigent probationers have, per se, a right to counsel at revocation hearings, and instead left the decision whether counsel should be appointed to be made on a case-by-case basis. Finally, the Court has refused to extend the right to appointed counsel to include prosecutions which, though criminal, do not result in the defendant’s loss of personal liberty. The Court in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, for instance, interpreted the “central premise of Argersinger” to be “that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment,” and the Court endorsed that premise as “eminently sound and warrant [ing] adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.” Id., at 373. The Court thus held “that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.” Id., at 373-374. In sum, the Court’s precedents speak with one voice about what “fundamental fairness” has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due process decision must be measured. B The case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335, propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process requires, viz., the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions. We must balance these elements against each other, and then set their net weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom. This Court’s decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent’s desire for and right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children” is an important interest that “undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.” Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651. Here the State has sought not simply to infringe upon that interest, but to end it. If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation. Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 533; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545. A parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one. Since the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent’s interest in an accurate and just decision. For this reason, the State may share the indigent parent’s interest in the availability of appointed counsel. If, as our adversary system presupposes, accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed interests, the State’s interest in the child’s welfare may perhaps best be served by a hearing in which both the parent and the State acting for the child are represented by counsel, without whom the contest of interests may become unwholesomely unequal. North Carolina itself acknowledges as much by providing that where a parent files a written answer to a termination petition, the State must supply a lawyer to represent the child. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.29 (Supp. 1979). The State’s interests, however, clearly diverge from the parent’s insofar as the State wishes the termination decision to be made as economically as possible and thus wants to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may cause. But though the State’s pecuniary interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here, particularly in light of the concession in the respondent’s brief that the “potential costs of appointed counsel in termination proceedings ... is [sic] admittedly de minimis compared to the costs in all criminal actions.” Finally, consideration must be given to the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel. North Carolina law now seeks to assure accurate decisions by establishing the following procedures: A petition to terminate parental rights may be filed only by a parent seeking the termination of the other parent’s rights, by a county department of social services or licensed child-placing agency with custody of the child, or by a person with whom the child has lived continuously for the two years preceding the petition. § 7A-289.24. A petition must describe facts sufficient to warrant a finding that one of the grounds for termination exists, § 7A-289.25 (6), and the parent must be notified of the petition and given 30 days in which to file a written answer to it, § 7A-289.27. If that answer denies a material allegation, the court must, as has been noted, appoint a lawyer as the child’s guardian ad litem and must conduct a special hearing to resolve the issues raised by the petition and the answer. § 7A-289.29. If the parent files no answer, “the court shall issue an order terminating all parental and custodial rights . . . ; provided the court shall order a hearing on the petition and may examine the petitioner or others on the facts alleged in the petition.” § 7A-289.28. Findings of fact are made by a court sitting without a jury and must “be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” § 7A-289.30. Any party may appeal who gives notice of appeal within 10 days after the hearing. § 7A-289.34. The respondent argues that the subject of a termination hearing — the parent’s relationship with her child — far from being abstruse, technical, or unfamiliar, is one as to which the parent must be uniquely well informed and to which the parent must have given prolonged thought. The respondent also contends that a termination hearing is not likely to produce difficult points of evidentiary law, or even of substantive law, since the evidentiary problems peculiar to criminal trials are not present and since the standards for termination are not complicated. In fact, the respondent reports, the North Carolina Departments of Social Services are themselves sometimes represented at termination hearings by social workers instead of by lawyers. Yet the ultimate issues with which a termination hearing deals are not always simple, however commonplace they may be. Expert medical and psychiatric testimony, which few parents are equipped to understand and fewer still to confute, is sometimes presented. The parents are likely to be people with little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing with life, and who are, at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation. That these factors may combine to overwhelm an uncounseled parent is evident from the findings some courts have made. See, e. g., Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 261 (SD Fla. 1977); State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 117-118, 444 P. 2d 15, 17 (1968). Thus, courts have generally held that the State must appoint counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings. State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 399 N. E. 2d 66 (1980); Department of Public Welfare v. J. K. B., 379 Mass. 1, 393 N. E. 2d 406 (1979); In re Chad S., 580 P. 2d 983 (Okla. 1978); In re Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d 252, 533 P. 2d 841 (1975); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Services, 128 N. J. Super. 102, 320 A. 2d 203 (1974); Danforth v. Maine Dept. of Health and Welfare, 303 A. 2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347, 208 N. W. 2d 259 (1973). The respondent is able to point to no presently authoritative case, except for the North Carolina judgment now before us, holding that an indigent parent has no due process right to appointed counsel in termination proceedings. C The dispositive question, which must now be addressed, is whether the three Eldridge factors, when weighed against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty, suffice to rebut that presumption and thus to lead to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel when a State seeks to terminate an indigent’s parental status. To summarize the above discussion of the Eldridge factors: the parent’s interest is an extremely important one (and may be supplemented by the dangers of criminal liability inherent in some termination proceedings); the State shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest, and, in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal procedures; and the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent’s rights insupportably high. If, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel. But since the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and since “due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S., at 788, neither can we say that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. We therefore adopt the standard found appropriate in Gagnon v. Scar- pelli, and leave the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review. See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261. Ill Here, as in Scarpelli, “[i]t is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements,” since here, as in that case, “[t]he facts and circumstances . . . are susceptible of almost infinite variation . . . .” 411 U. S., at 790. Nevertheless, because child-custody litigation must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with fairness, we decide today whether the trial judge denied Ms. Lassiter due process of law when he did not appoint counsel for her. The respondent represents that the petition to terminate Ms. Lassiter’s parental rights contained no allegations of neglect or abuse upon which criminal charges could be based, and hence Ms. Lassiter could not well have argued that she required counsel for that reason. The Department of Social Services was represented at the hearing by counsel, but no expert witnesses testified, and the case presented no specially troublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive. While hearsay evidence was no doubt admitted, and while Ms. Lassiter no doubt left incomplete her defense that the Department had not adequately assisted her in rekindling her interest in her son, the weight of the evidence that she had few sparks of such an interest was sufficiently great that the presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative difference. True, a lawyer might have done more with the argument that William should live with Ms. Lassiter’s mother — but that argument was quite ex-plicity made by both Lassiters, and the evidence that the elder Ms. Lassiter had said she could not handle another child, that the social worker’s investigation had led to a similar conclusion, and that the grandmother had displayed scant interest in the child once he had been removed from her daughter’s custody was, though controverted, sufficiently substantial that the absence of counsel’s guidance on this point did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. Finally, a court deciding whether due process requires the appointment of counsel need not ignore a parent’s plain demonstration that she is not interested in attending a hearing. Here, the trial court had previously found that Ms. Las-siter had expressly declined to appear at the 1975 child custody hearing, Ms. Lassiter had not even bothered to speak to her retained lawyer after being notified of the termination hearing, and the court specifically found that Ms. Lassiter’s failure to make an effort to contest the termination proceeding was without cause. In view of all these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to appoint counsel for Ms. Lassiter. IV In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial proceedings are fundamentally fair. A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution. Informed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well. IJA-ARA Standards for Juvenile Justice, Counsel for Private Parties 2.3 (b) (1980); Uniform Juvenile Court Act § 26 (a), 9A U. L. A. 35 (1979); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, Rule 39 (1969); U. S. Dept, of HEW, Children’s Bureau, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts §25 (b) (1969); U. S. Dept, of HEW, Children’s Bureau, Legislative Guides for the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children, Pt. II, § 8 (1961); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Standard Juvenile Court Act § 19 (1959). Most significantly, 33 States and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases. The Court’s opinion today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in reviewing the petitioner’s-conviction, indicated that the murder occurred during an altercation between Ms. Lassiter, her mother, and the deceased: “Defendant’s mother told [the deceased] to 'come on.’ They began to struggle and deceased fell or was knocked to the floor. Defendant’s mother was beating deceased with a broom. While deceased was still on the floor and being beaten with the broom, defendant entered the apartment. She went into the kitchen and got a butcher knife. She took the knife and began stabbing the deceased who was still prostrate. The body of deceased had seven stab wounds . . . .” State v. Lassiter, No. 7614SC1054 (June 1, 1977). After her conviction was affirmed on appeal, Ms. Lassiter sought to attack it collaterally. Among her arguments was that the assistance of her trial counsel had been ineffective because he had failed to “seek to elicit or introduce before the jury the statement made by [Ms. Lassiter’s mother,] ‘And I did it, I hope she dies.’ ” Ms. Lassiter’s mother had, like Ms. Lassiter, been indicted on a first-degree murder charge; however, the trial court granted the elder Ms. Lassiter’s motion for a nonsuit. The North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, denied Ms. Lassiter’s motion for collateral relief. File No. 76-CR-31Q2 (Mar. 20, 1979). The petition had also asked that the parental rights of the putative father, William Boykin, be terminated. Boykin was not married to Ms. Lassiter, he had never contributed to William’s financial support, and indeed he denied that he was William’s father. The court granted the petition to terminate his alleged parental status. Some parents will have an additional interest to protect. Petitions to terminate parental rights are not uncommonly based on alleged criminal activity. Parents so accused may need legal counsel to guide them in understanding the problems such petitions may create. The respondent also points out that parental termination hearings commonly occur only after a custody proceeding in which the child has judicially been found to be abused, neglected, or dependent, and that an indigent parent has a right to be represented by appointed counsel at the custody hearing. § 7A-587. Ms. Lassiter’s hearing occurred before some of these provisions were enacted. She did not, for instance, have the benefit of the “clear, cogent, and convincing” evidentiary standard, nor did she have counsel at the hearing in which William was taken from her custody. Both the respondent and the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 4 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Prob. 230 (1968), have conducted surveys purporting to reveal whether the presence of counsel reduces the number of erroneous determinations in parental termination proceedings. Unfortunately, neither survey goes beyond presenting statistics which, standing alone, are unilluminating. The Journal note does, however, report that it questioned the New York Family Court judges who preside over parental termination hearings and found that 72.2% of them agreed that when a parent is unrepresented, it becomes more difficult to conduct a fair hearing (11.1% of the judges disagreed); 66.7% thought it became difficult to develop the facts (22.2% disagreed). A number of courts have held that indigent parents have a right to appointed counsel in child dependency or neglect hearings as well. E. g., Davis v. Page, 640 F. 2d 599 (CA5 1981) (en banc); Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F. 2d 940 (CA9 1974) (right to be decided case by case); Smith v. Edmiston, 431 F. Supp. 941 (WD Tenn. 1977). According to the respondent’s brief, William Lassiter is now living “in a pre-adoptive home with foster parents committed to formal adoption to become his legal parents.” He cannot be legally adopted, nor can his status otherwise be finally clarified, until this litigation ends. Ms. Lassiter’s argument here that her mother should have been given custody of William is hardly consistent with her argument in the collateral attack on her murder conviction that she was innocent because her mother was guilty. See n. 1, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 53. Argued November 19, 1952. Decided March 9, 1953. Elisha Hanson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were William K. Van Allen and Arthur B. Hanson. Bernard Dunau argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, George J. Bott, David P. Findling and Mozart G. Ratner. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether a labor organization engages in an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of § 8 (b) (6) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, when it insists that newspaper publishers pay printers for reproducing advertising matter for which the publishers ordinarily have no use. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it does not. Petitioner, American Newspaper Publishers Association, is a New York corporation the membership of which includes more than 800 newspaper publishers. They represent over 90% of the circulation of the daily and Sunday newspapers in the United States and carry oyer 90% of the advertising published in such papers. In November, 1947, petitioner filed with the National Labor Relations Board charges that the International Typographical Union, here called ITU, and its officers were engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8 (b)(1), (2) and (6) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, here called the Taft-Hartley Act. The Regional Director of the Board issued its complaint, including a charge of engaging in an unfair labor practice as defined in § 8 (b)(6), popularly known as the “anti-featherbedding” section of the Act. It is not questioned that the acts complained of affected interstate commerce. The trial examiner recommended that ITU be ordered to cease and desist from several of its activities but that the “featherbedding” charges under § 8 (b) (6) be dismissed. 86 N. L. R. B. 951, 964, 1024-1033. The Board dismissed those charges. Id., at 951, 963. Petitioner then filed the instant proceeding in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit seeking review and modification of the Board’s orders. That court upheld the Board’s dismissal of all charges under § 8 (b) (6). 193 F. 2d 782, 796, 802. See also, 190 F. 2d 45. A comparable view was expressed in Rabouin v. Labor Board, 195 F. 2d 906, 912-913 (C. A. 2d Cir.), but a contrary view was taken in Gamble Enterprises v. Labor Board, 196 F. 2d 61 (C. A. 6th Cir.). Because of this claimed conflict upon an important issue of first impression, we granted cer-tiorari in the instant case, 344 U. S. 812, and in Labor Board v. Gamble Enterprises, 344 U. S. 814. Our decision in the Gamble case follows this, post, p. 117. Printers in newspaper composing rooms have long sought to retain the opportunity to set up in type as much as possible of whatever is printed by their respective publishers. In 1872, when printers were paid on a piecework basis, each diversion of composition was at once reflected by a loss in their income. Accordingly, ITU, which had been formed in 1852 from local typographical societies, began its long battle to retain as much typesetting work for printers as possible. With the introduction of the linotype machine in 1890, the problem took on a new aspect. When a newspaper advertisement was set up in type, it was impressed on a cardboard matrix, or “mat.” These mats were used by their makers and also were reproduced and distributed, at little or no cost, to other publishers who used them as molds for metal castings from which to print the same advertisement. This procedure by-passed all compositors except those who made up the original form. Facing this loss of work, ITU secured the agreement of newspaper publishers to permit their respective compositors, at convenient times, to set up duplicate forms for all local advertisements in precisely the same manner as though the mat had not been used. For this reproduction work the printers received their regular pay. The doing of this “made work” came to be known in the trade as “setting bogus.” It was a wasteful procedure. Nevertheless, it has become a recognized idiosyncrasy of the trade and a customary feature of the wage structure and work schedule of newspaper printers. By fitting the “bogus” work into slack periods, the practice interferes little with “live” work. The publishers who set up the original compositions find it advantageous because it burdens their competitors with costs of mat making comparable to their own. Approximate time limits for setting “bogus” usually have been fixed by agreement at from four days to three weeks. On rare occasions the reproduced compositions are used to print the advertisements when rerun, but, ordinarily, they are promptly consigned to the “hell box” and melted down. Live matter has priority over reproduction work but the latter usually takes from 2 to 5% of the printers’ time. By 1947, detailed regulations for reproduction work were included in the “General Laws” of ITU. They thus became a standard part of all employment contracts signed by its local unions. The locals were allowed to negotiate as to foreign language publications, time limits for setting “bogus” and exemptions of mats received from commercial compositors or for national advertisements. Before the enactment of § 8 (b)(6), the legality and enforceability of payment for setting “bogus,” agreed to by the publisher, was recognized. Even now the issue before us is not what policy should be adopted by the Nation toward the continuance of this and other forms of featherbedding. The issue here is solely one of statutory interpretation: Has Congress made setting “bogus” an unfair labor practice? While the language of § 8 (b) (6) is claimed by both sides to be clear, yet the conflict between the views of the Seventh and Sixth Circuits amply justifies our examination of both the language and the legislative history of the section. The section reads: “Sec. 8. . . . “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed. . . .” 61 Stat. 140-142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) 1158(b)(6). From the above language and its history, the court below concluded that the insistence by ITU upon securing payment of wages to printers for setting “bogus” was not an unfair labor practice. It found that the practice called for payment only for work which actually was done by employees of the publishers in the course of their employment as distinguished from payment “for services which are not performed or not to be performed.” Setting “bogus” was held to be service performed and it remained for the parties to determine its worth to the employer. The Board here contends also that the insistence of ITU and its agents has not been “in the nature of an exaction” and did not “cause or attempt to cause an employer” to pay anything “in the nature of an exaction.” Agreement with the position taken by the court below makes it unnecessary to consider the additional contentions of the Board. However desirable the elimination of all industrial featherbedding practices may have appeared to Congress, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act demonstrates that when the legislation was put in final form Congress decided to limit the practice but little by law. A restraining influence throughout this congressional consideration of featherbedding was the fact that the constitutionality of the Lea Act penalizing featherbedding in the broadcasting industry was in litigation. That Act, known also as the Petrillo Act, had been adopted April 16, 1946, as an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. Its material provisions are stated in the margin. December 2, 1946, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that it violated the First, Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845. The case was pending here on appeal throughout the debate on the Taft-Hartley bill. Not until June 23, 1947, on the day of the passage of the Taft-Hartley bill over the President’s veto, was the constitutionality of the Lea Act upheld. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1. The purpose of the sponsors of the Taft-Hartley bill to avoid the controversial features of the Lea Act is made clear in the written statement which Senator Taft, cosponsor of the bill and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, caused to be incorporated in the proceedings of the Senate, June 5, 1947. Referring to the substitution of § 8 (b) (6) in place of the detailed featherbedding provisions of the House bill, that statement said: “The provisions in the Lea Act from which the House language was taken are now awaiting determination by the Supreme Court, partly because of the problem arising from the term ‘in excess of the number of employees reasonably required.’ Therefore, the conferees were of the opinion that general legislation on the subject of featherbedding was not warranted at least until the joint study committee proposed by this bill could give full consideration to the matter.” 93 Cong. Rec. 6443. On the same day this was amplified in the Senator’s oral statement on the floor of the Senate: “There is one further provision which may possibly be of interest, which was not in the Senate bill. The House had rather elaborate provisions prohibiting so-called feather-bedding practices and making them unlawful labor practices. The Senate conferees, while not approving of feather-bedding practices, felt that it was impracticable to give to a board or a court the power to say that so many men are all right, and so many men are too many. It would require a practical application of the law by the courts in hundreds of different industries, and a determination of facts which it seemed to me would be almost impossible. So we declined to adopt the provisions which are now in the Petrillo Act. After all, that statute applies to only one industry. Those provisions are now the subject of court procedure. Their constitutionality has been questioned. We thought that probably we had better wait and see what happened, in any event, even though we are in favor of prohibiting all feather-bedding practices. However, we did accept one provision which makes it an unlawful-labor practice for a union to accept money for people who do not work. That seemed to be a fairly clear case, easy to determine, and we accepted that additional unfair labor practice on the part of unions, which was not in the Senate bill.” 93 Cong. Rec. 6441. See also, his supplementary analysis inserted in the Record June 12, 1947. 93 Cong. Rec. 6859. As indicated above, the Taft-Hartley bill, H. R. 3020, when it passed the House, April 17, 1947, contained in §§ 2 (17) and 12 (a)(3)(B) an explicit condemnation of featherbedding. Its definition of featherbedding was based upon that in the Lea Act. For example, it condemned practices which required an employer to employ “persons in excess of the number of employees reasonably required by such employer to perform actual services,” as well as practices which required an employer to pay “for services . . . which are not to be performed.” The substitution of the present § 8 (b) (6) for that definition compels the conclusion that § 8 (b)(6) means what the court below has said it means. The Act now limits its condemnation to instances where a labor organization or its agents exact pay from an employer in return for services not performed or not to be performed. Thus, where work is done by an employee, with the employer’s consent, a labor organization’s demand that the employee be compensated for time spent in doing the disputed work does not become an unfair labor practice. The transaction simply does not fall within the kind of featherbedding defined in the statute. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the employee’s compensation reflects his entire relationship with his employer. We do not have here a situation comparable to that mentioned by Senator Taft as an illustration of the type of featherbedding which he would consider an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8 (b)(6). June 5, 1947, in a colloquy on the floor of the Senate he said in reference to § 8 (b) (6): “[I]t seems to me that it is perfectly clear what is intended. It is intended to make it an unfair labor practice for a man to say, ‘You must have 10 musicians, and if you insist that there is room for only 6, you must pay for the other 4 anyway.’ That is in the nature of an exaction from the employer for services which he does not want, does not need, and is not even willing to accept.” 93 Cong. Rec. 6446. In that illustration the service for which pay was to be exacted was not performed and was not to be performed by anyone. The last sentence of the above quotation must be read in that context. There was no room for more than six musicians and there was no suggestion that the excluded four did anything or were to do anything for their pay. Section 8 (b) (6) leaves to collective bargaining the determination of what, if any, work, including bona fide “made work,” shall be included as compensable services and what rate of compensation shall be paid for it. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining dismissal of the complaint, insofar as it was based upon § 8 (b)(6), is Affirmed. “Sec. 8. . . . “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— ■“(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed. . . 61 Stat. 140-142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (b) (6). 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., as amended, 61 Stat. 140-142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (b)(1), (2) and (6). The grant was— “limited to question No. 2 presented by the petition for the writ, i. e.: “Whether the demand and insistence of the International Typographical Union that publishers pay employees in their composing rooms for setting ‘bogus’ violated Section 8 (b) (6) of the National Labor Relations Act in view of the fact that composing room employees perform no service incident or essential to the production of a newspaper in their handling of such ‘bogused’ material.” For a general discussion of the problems in these cases, see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 19 V7, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 274, 288-290; Featherbedding and Taft-Hartle, 52 Col. L. Rev. 1020-1033. In metropolitan areas, only the printers on the “ad side” of a composing room, as contrasted with those on the “news side,” take part in the reproduction work and never on a full-time basis. Such work is not done at overtime rates but when there is an accumulation of it, the newspaper is not permitted to reduce its work force or decline to hire suitable extra printers applying for employment. The trial examiner, in the instant case, found that reproduction work at the Rochester Democrat & Chronicle cost over $5,000 a year, at the Chicago Herald-American, about $50,000, and at the New York Times, about $150,000. “Sec. 506. (a) It shall be unlawful, by the use or express or implied threat of the use of force, violence, intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to coerce, compel, or constrain a licensee— “(1) to employ or agree to employ, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services; or “(2) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value in lieu of giving, or on account of failure to give, employment to any person or persons, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services; or “(3) to pay or agree to pay more than once for services performed in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee; or “(4) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value for services, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, which are not to be performed; .... “(c) The provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall not be held to make unlawful the enforcement or attempted enforcement, by means lawfully employed, of any contract right heretofore or hereafter existing or of any legal obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred or assumed. “(d) Whoever willfully violates any provision of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. . . .” 60 Stat. 89, 90, 47 U. S. C. § 506 (a) (c)(d). For a report of the subsequent trial and acquittal on the merits, see United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176. In its report of December 31, 1948, the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, established under § 401 of the Taft-Hartley Act, later reviewed the litigation arising under § 8 (b) (6), including the trial examiner’s report in the instant case, and recommended “a continuing study of cases arising under the present featherbedding provision, since there has not been sufficient experience upon which to base intelligent amendments at this time.” S. Rep. No. 986, Pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, and see pp. 58-61. See also, Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy (1948), p. xiii (Taft), 174,182-183 (Hartley). H. R. 3020 as it passed the House provided that: “Sec. 2. When used in this Act— “(17) The term 'featherbedding practice’ means a practice which has as its purpose or effect requiring an employer— “(A) to employ or agree to employ any person or persons in excess of the number of employees reasonably required by such employer to perform actual services; or “(B) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value in lieu of employing, or on account of failure to employ, any person or persons, in connection with the conduct of the business of an employer, in excess of the number of employees reasonably required by such employer to perform actual services; or “(C) to pay or agree to pay more than once for services performed; or “(D) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of value for services, in connection with the conduct of a business, which are not to be performed; or “(E) to pay or agree to pay any tax or exaction for the privilege of, or on account of, producing, preparing, manufacturing, selling, buying, renting, operating, using, or maintaining any article, machine, equipment, or materials; or to accede to or impose any restriction upon the production, preparation, manufacture, sale, purchase, rental, operation, use, or maintenance of the same, if such restriction is for the purpose of preventing or limiting the use of such article, machine, equipment, or materials. “Sec. 12. (a) The following activities, when affecting commerce, shall be unlawful concerted activities: “(3) Calling, authorizing, engaging in, or assisting— “(B) any strike or other concerted interference with an employer’s operations, an object of which is to compel an employer to accede to featherbedding practices; . . . .” 1. Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 160, 170-171, 204, 205. Section 8 (b)(6) does not relate to union requests for, or insistence upon, such types of payments as employees’ wages during lunch, rest, waiting or vacation periods; payments for service on relief squads; or payments for reporting for duty to determine whether work is to be done. Such practices are recognized to be incidental to the employee’s general employment and are given consideration in fixing the rate of pay for it. They are not in the nature of exactions of pay for something not performed or not to be performed. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6859.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Shaun McCUTCHEON, et al., Appellants v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION. No. 12-536. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Oct. 8, 2013. Decided April 2, 2014. Held Unconstitutional 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(3) Syllabus* The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g.,Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659. It may not, however, regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2825-2826, 180 L.Ed.2d 664. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. Base limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee while aggregate limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. 2 U.S.C. § 441a. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, appellant McCutcheon contributed to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to 12 additional candidates and to a number of noncandidate political committees. He also alleges that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future, all within the base limits. McCutcheon and appellant Republican National Committee filed a complaint before a three-judge District Court, asserting that the aggregate limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Government's motion to dismiss. Assuming that the base limits appropriately served the Government's anticorruption interest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate limits survived First Amendment scrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits. Held : The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 893 F.Supp.2d 133, reversed and remanded. Chief Justice ROBERTS, joined by Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice ALITO, concluded that the aggregate limits are invalid under the First Amendment. Pp. 1444 - 1476. (a) Appellants' substantial First Amendment challenge to the current system of aggregate limits merits plenary consideration. Pp. 1444 - 1448. (1) In Buckley, this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits in FECA. Buckley distinguished the two types of limits based on the degree to which each encroaches upon protected First Amendment interests. It subjected expenditure limits to "the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." 424 U.S ., at 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612. But it concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech and thus applied a lesser but still "rigorous standard of review," id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612, under which such limits "may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms," id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. Because the Court found that the primary purpose of FECA-preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance-was a "sufficiently important" governmental interest, id., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612, it upheld the base limit under the "closely drawn" test, id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612. After doing so, the Court devoted only one paragraph of its 139-page opinion to the aggregate limit then in place under FECA, noting that the provision "ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties." Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. It concluded that the aggregate limit served to prevent circumvention of the base limit and was "no more than a corollary" of that limit. Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Pp. 1444 - 1445. (2) There is no need in this case to revisit Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corresponding distinction in standards of review. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the "closely drawn" test applies, the analysis turns on the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. Here, given the substantial mismatch between the Government's stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the "closely drawn" test. Buckley's ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley spent just three sentences analyzing that limit, which had not been separately addressed by the parties. Appellants here, by contrast, have directly challenged the aggregate limits in place under BCRA, a different statutory regime whose limits operate against a distinct legal backdrop. Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley. The 1976 FECA Amendments added another layer of base limits-capping contributions from individuals to political committees-and an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees. Since Buckley, the Federal Election Commission has also enacted an intricate regulatory scheme that further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits through "unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute" to a particular candidate. 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. In addition to accounting for such statutory and regulatory changes, appellants raise distinct legal arguments not considered in Buckley, including an overbreadth challenge to the aggregate limit. Pp. 1445 - 1448. (b) Significant First Amendment interests are implicated here. Contributing money to a candidate is an exercise of an individual's right to participate in the electoral process through both political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is hardly a "modest restraint" on those rights. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse. In its simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits. And it is no response to say that the individual can simply contribute less than the base limits permit: To require one person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to penalize that individual for "robustly exercis [ing]" his First Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737. In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper focus is on an individual's right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The whole point of the First Amendment is to protect individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view as useful to the democratic process. Pp. 1447 - 1450. (c) The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Pp. 1450 - 1460. (1) This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Davis,supra, at 741, 128 S.Ct. 2759. Moreover, the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder's official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner "influence over or access to" elected officials or political parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 359, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753. The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights, and the Court must "err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it." Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). Pp. 1450 - 1452. (2) The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount, even though Congress's selection of a base limit indicates its belief that contributions beneath that amount do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. The Government must thus defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits, a function they do not serve in any meaningful way. Given the statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley's fear that an individual might "contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through ... unearmarked contributions" to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612, is far too speculative. Even accepting Buckley's circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive "massive amounts of money" that could be traced back to a particular donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. The Government's scenarios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under current campaign finance laws or implausible. Pp. 1451 - 1457. (3) The aggregate limits also violate the First Amendment because they are not "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Buckley, supra, at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Government argues that the aggregate limits prevent an individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might then recontribute a donation, but experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions are retained and spent by their recipients. And the Government has provided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted. The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is thus disproportionate to the Government's interest in preventing circumvention. Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Government's interest in preventing circumvention while avoiding "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment rights. Buckley, supra, at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. Such alternatives might include targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political committees, or tighter earmarking rules. Transfers, after all, are the key to the Government's concern about circumvention, but they can be addressed without such a direct and broad interference with First Amendment rights. Pp. 1456 - 1460. (4) Disclosure of contributions also reduces the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements, which are justified by "a governmental interest in 'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of election-related spending," Citizens United, supra, at 367, 130 S.Ct. 876, may deter corruption "by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity," Buckley, supra at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612. Disclosure requirements may burden speech, but they often represent a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. Particularly with modern technology, disclosure now offers more robust protections against corruption than it did when Buckley was decided. Pp. 1459 - 1460. (d) The Government offers an additional rationale for the aggregate limits, arguing that the opportunity for corruption exists whenever a legislator is given a large check, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be divided among numerous candidates or committees. That rationale dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in prior cases. Buckley confined its analysis to the possibility that "massive amounts of money" could be funneled to a particular candidate in excess of the base limits. 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Recasting as corruption a donor's widely distributed support for a political party would dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. And though the Government suggests that solicitation of large contributions poses the corruption danger, the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Pp. 1460 - 1462. Justice THOMAS agreed that the aggregate limits are invalid under the First Amendment, but would overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, and subject BCRA's aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they would surely fail. Buckley's "analytic foundation ... was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening years." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Contributions and expenditures are simply "two sides of the same First Amendment coin," and this Court's efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere "word games" rather than any cognizable constitutional law principle. Buckley, supra, at 241, 244, 96 S.Ct. 612 (BURGER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Pp. 1440 - 1443. ROBERTS, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Erin E. Murphy, New York, NY, for Appellants. Bobby R. Burchfield, Washington, DC, for Senator Mitch Connell as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Appellants. Donald B. Verrilli, Solicitor General, for Appellee. Erin E. Murphy, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, Dan Backer, Paul Henry Jossey, DB Capitol Strategies, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, Michael T. Morley, Counsel of Record, Cranford, NJ, Jerad Wayne Najvar, Najvar Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Appellant Shaun McCutcheon. Stephen M. Hoersting, Dayton, OH, James Bopp, Jr., Counsel of Record, Richard E. Coleson, Anita Y. Woudenberg, The Bopp Law Firm, PC, Terre Haute, IN, for Appellant Republican National Committee. Lisa J. Stevenson, Deputy General Counsel, Kevin Deeley, Adav Noti, Acting Associate General Counsels, Charles Kitcher, Attorney, Federal Election Commission, Washington, D.C., Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. Dan Backer, Paul Henry Jossey, DB Capitol Strategies, PLLC, Washington, DC, Jerad Wayne Najvar, Najvar Law Firm, Houston, TX, Michael T. Morley, Counsel of Record, Cranford, NJ, for Appellant. Chief Justice ROBERTS announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice SCALIA, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice ALITO join. There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety of ways: They can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and contribute to a candidate's campaign. This case is about the last of those options. The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Our cases have held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g.,Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ( per curiam). At the same time, we have made clear that Congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2825-2826, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011). Many people might find those latter objectives attractive: They would be delighted to see fewer television commercials touting a candidate's accomplishments or disparaging an opponent's character. Money in politics may at times seem repugnant to some, but so too does much of what the First Amendment vigorously protects. If the First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades-despite the profound offense such spectacles cause-it surely protects political campaign speech despite popular opposition. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172 (2011); National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 53 L.Ed.2d 96 (1977) ( per curiam). Indeed, as we have emphasized, the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). In a series of cases over the past 40 years, we have spelled out how to draw the constitutional line between the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political process and the impermissible desire simply to limit political speech. We have said that government regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political access such support may afford. "Ingratiation and access ... are not corruption." Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). They embody a central feature of democracy-that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns. Any regulation must instead target what we have called " quid pro quo " corruption or its appearance. See id., at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876. That Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991). "The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo : dollars for political favors." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985). Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other objectives, we have explained, impermissibly inject the Government "into the debate over who should govern." Bennett, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2826. And those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern. The statute at issue in this case imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. The first, called base limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1). The second, called aggregate limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. § 441a(a)(3). This case does not involve any challenge to the base limits, which we have previously upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption. The Government contends that the aggregate limits also serve that objective, by preventing circumvention of the base limits. We conclude, however, that the aggregate limits do little, if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First Amendment. I A For the 2013-2014 election cycle, the base limits in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), permit an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election to a candidate ($5,200 total for the primary and general elections); $32,400 per year to a national party committee; 1 $10,000 per year to a state or local party committee; and $5,000 per year to a political action committee, or "PAC." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532 (2013). 2 A national committee, state or local party committee, or multicandidate PAC may in turn contribute up to $5,000 per election to a candidate. § 441a(a)(2).3 The base limits apply with equal force to contributions that are "in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit" to a candidate. § 441a(a)(8). If, for example, a donor gives money to a party committee but directs the party committee to pass the contribution along to a particular candidate, then the transaction is treated as a contribution from the original donor to the specified candidate. For the 2013-2014 election cycle, the aggregate limits in BCRA permit an individual to contribute a total of $48,600 to federal candidates and a total of $74,600 to other political committees. Of that $74,600, only $48,600 may be contributed to state or local party committees and PACs, as opposed to national party committees. § 441a(a)(3); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. All told, an individual may contribute up to $123,200 to candidate and noncandidate committees during each two-year election cycle. The base limits thus restrict how much money a donor may contribute to any particular candidate or committee; the aggregate limits have the effect of restricting how many candidates or committees the donor may support, to the extent permitted by the base limits. B In the 2011-2012 election cycle, appellant Shaun McCutcheon contributed a total of $33,088 to 16 different federal candidates, in compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that he wished to contribute $1,776 to each of 12 additional candidates but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates. McCutcheon also contributed a total of $27,328 to several noncandidate political committees, in compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that he wished to contribute to various other political committees, including $25,000 to each of the three Republican national party committees, but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to political committees. McCutcheon further alleges that he plans to make similar contributions in the future. In the 2013-2014 election cycle, he again wishes to contribute at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 to non-candidate political committees. Brief for Appellant McCutcheon 11-12. Appellant Republican National Committee is a national political party committee charged with the general management of the Republican Party. The RNC wishes to receive the contributions that McCutcheon and similarly situated individuals would like to make-contributions otherwise permissible under the base limits for national party committees but foreclosed by the aggregate limit on contributions to political committees. In June 2012, McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint before a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See BCRA § 403(a), 116 Stat. 113-114. McCutcheon and the RNC asserted that the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and to noncandidate political committees were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. They moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and the Government moved to dismiss the case. The three-judge District Court denied appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Government's motion to dismiss. Assuming that the base limits appropriately served the Government's anticorruption interest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate limits survived First Amendment scrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits. 893 F.Supp.2d 133, 140 (2012). In particular, the District Court imagined a hypothetical scenario that might occur in a world without aggregate limits. A single donor might contribute the maximum amount under the base limits to nearly 50 separate committees, each of which might then transfer the money to the same single committee. Ibid. That committee, in turn, might use all the transferred money for coordinated expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate, allowing the single donor to circumvent the base limit on the amount he may contribute to that candidate. Ibid. The District Court acknowledged that "it may seem unlikely that so many separate entities would willingly serve as conduits" for the single donor's interests, but it concluded that such a scenario "is not hard to imagine." Ibid. It thus rejected a constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits, characterizing the base limits and the aggregate limits "as a coherent system rather than merely a collection of individual limits stacking prophylaxis upon prophylaxis." Ibid. McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to this Court, as authorized by law. 28 U.S.C. § 1253. In such a case, "we ha[ve] no discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits," Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), and accordingly we noted probable jurisdiction. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1242, 185 L.Ed.2d 177 (2013). II A Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, presented this Court with its first opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits set forth in FECA. FECA imposed a $1,000 per election base limit on contributions from an individual to a federal candidate. It also imposed a $25,000 per year aggregate limit on all contributions from an individual to candidates or political committees. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b)(1), 608(b)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). On the expenditures side, FECA imposed limits on both independent expenditures and candidates' overall campaign expenditures. §§ 608(e)(1), 608(c). Buckley recognized that "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 424 U.S., at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612. But it distinguished expenditure limits from contribution limits based on the degree to which each encroaches upon protected First Amendment interests. Expenditure limits, the Court explained, "necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Id., at 19, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court thus subjected expenditure limits to "the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." Id., at 44-45, 96 S.Ct. 612. Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may regulate protected speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989). By contrast, the Court concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech because they "permit[ ] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do[ ] not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. As a result, the Court focused on the effect of the contribution limits on the freedom of political association and applied a lesser but still "rigorous standard of review." Id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612. Under that standard, "[e]ven a ' "significant interference" with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975)). The primary purpose of FECA was to limit quid pro quo corruption and its appearance; that purpose satisfied the requirement of a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. 424 U.S., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612. As for the "closely drawn" component, Buckley concluded that the $1,000 base limit "focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions ... while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources." Id., at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court therefore upheld the $1,000 base limit under the "closely drawn" test. Id., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court next separately considered an overbreadth challenge to the base limit. See id., at 29-30, 96 S.Ct. 612. The challengers argued that the base limit was fatally overbroad because most large donors do not seek improper influence over legislators' actions. Although the Court accepted that premise, it nevertheless rejected the overbreadth challenge for two reasons: First, it was too "difficult to isolate suspect contributions" based on a contributor's subjective intent. Id., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. Second, "Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Ibid. Finally, in one paragraph of its 139-page opinion, the Court turned to the $25,000 aggregate limit under FECA. As a preliminary matter, it noted that the constitutionality of the aggregate limit "ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties." Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Then, in three sentences, the Court disposed of any constitutional objections to the aggregate limit that the challengers might have had: "The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid." Ibid. B 1 The parties and amici curiae spend significant energy debating whether the line that Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures should remain the law. Notwithstanding the robust debate, we see no need in this case to revisit Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the applicable standards of review. Buckley held that the Government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance was "sufficiently important," id., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612; we have elsewhere stated that the same interest may properly be labeled "compelling," see National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 496-497, 105 S.Ct. 1459, so that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny. Moreover, regardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley's "closely drawn" test, we must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. See, e.g., National Conservative Political Action Comm.,supra, at 496-501, 105 S.Ct. 1459;Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 253-262, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (opinion of BREYER, J.). Or to put it another way, if a law that restricts political speech does not "avoid unnecessary abridgement" of First Amendment rights, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, it cannot survive "rigorous" review. Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government's stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the "closely drawn" test. We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards in this case. 2 Buckley treated the constitutionality of the $25,000 aggregate limit as contingent upon that limit's ability to prevent circumvention of the $1,000 base limit, describing the aggregate limit as "no more than a corollary" of the base limit. Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court determined that circumvention could occur when an individual legally contributes "massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions" to entities that are themselves likely to contribute to the candidate. Ibid. For that reason, the Court upheld the $25,000 aggregate limit. Although Buckley provides some guidance, we think that its ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley spent a total of three sentences analyzing that limit; in fact, the opinion pointed out that the constitutionality of the aggregate limit "ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties." Ibid. We are now asked to address appellants' direct challenge to the aggregate limits in place under BCRA. BCRA is a different statutory regime, and the aggregate limits it imposes operate against a distinct legal backdrop. Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley was decided, through both statutory additions and the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. With more targeted anticircumvention measures in place today, the indiscriminate aggregate limits under BCRA appear particularly heavy-handed. The 1976 FECA Amendments, for example, added another layer of base contribution limits. The 1974 version of FECA had already capped contributions from political committees to candidates, but the 1976 version added limits on contributions to political committees. This change was enacted at least "in part to prevent circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this Court upheld in Buckley." California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-198, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981) (plurality opinion); see also id., at 203, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Because a donor's contributions to a political committee are now limited, a donor cannot flood the committee with "huge" amounts of money so that each contribution the committee makes is perceived as a contribution from him. Buckley, supra, at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Rather, the donor may contribute only $5,000 to the committee, which hardly raises the specter of abuse that concerned the Court in Buckley. Limits on contributions to political committees consequently create an additional hurdle for a donor who seeks both to channel a large amount of money to a particular candidate and to ensure that he gets the credit for doing so. The 1976 Amendments also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5); 11 CFR § 100.5(g)(4). The Government acknowledges that this antiproliferation rule "forecloses what would otherwise be a particularly easy and effective means of circumventing the limits on contributions to any particular political committee." Brief for Appellee 46. In effect, the rule eliminates a donor's ability to create and use his own political committees to direct funds in excess of the individual base limits. It thus blocks a straightforward method of achieving the circumvention that was the underlying concern in Buckley. The intricate regulatory scheme that the Federal Election Commission has enacted since Buckley further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits via "unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute" to a particular candidate. 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Although the earmarking provision, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8), was in place when Buckley was decided, the FEC has since added regulations that define earmarking broadly. For example, the regulations construe earmarking to include any designation, "whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written." 11 CFR § 110.6(b)(1). The regulations specify that an individual who has contributed to a particular candidate may not also contribute to a single-candidate committee for that candidate. § 110.1(h)(1). Nor may an individual who has contributed to a candidate also contribute to a political committee that has supported or anticipates supporting the same candidate, if the individual knows that "a substantial portion [of his contribution] will be contributed to, or expended on behalf of," that candidate. § 110.1(h)(2). In addition to accounting for statutory and regulatory changes in the campaign finance arena, appellants' challenge raises distinct legal arguments that Buckley did not consider. For example, presumably because of its cursory treatment of the $25,000 aggregate limit, Buckley did not separately address an overbreadth challenge with respect to that provision. The Court rejected such a challenge to the base limits because of the difficulty of isolating suspect contributions. The propriety of large contributions to individual candidates turned on the subjective intent of donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to tell which donors sought improper influence over legislators' actions. See 424 U.S., at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. The aggregate limit, on the other hand, was upheld as an anticircumvention measure, without considering whether it was possible to discern which donations might be used to circumvent the base limits. See id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court never addressed overbreadth in the specific context of aggregate limits, where such an argument has far more force. Given the foregoing, this case cannot be resolved merely by pointing to three sentences in Buckley that were written without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the issue. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139-140, 62 S.Ct. 139, 86 L.Ed. 100 (1941) (departing from "[l]oose language and a sporadic, ill-considered decision" when asked to resolve a question "with our eyes wide open and in the light of full consideration"); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998) (departing from a prior decision where it "was rendered without full briefing or argument"). We are confronted with a different statute and different legal arguments, at a different point in the development of campaign finance regulation. Appellants' substantial First Amendment challenge to the system of aggregate limits currently in place thus merits our plenary consideration.4 III The First Amendment "is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, ... in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). As relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an individual's right to participate in the public debate through political expression and political association. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 15, 96 S.Ct. 612. When an individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of those rights: The contribution "serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views" and "serves to affiliate a person with a candidate." Id., at 21-22, 96 S.Ct. 612. Those First Amendment rights are important regardless whether the individual is, on the one hand, a "lone pamphleteer[ ] or street corner orator[ ] in the Tom Paine mold," or is, on the other, someone who spends "substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political ideas through sophisticated" means. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 493, 105 S.Ct. 1459. Either way, he is participating in an electoral debate that we have recognized is "integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution." Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley acknowledged that aggregate limits at least diminish an individual's right of political association. As the Court explained, the "overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support." 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. But the Court characterized that restriction as a "quite modest restraint upon protected political activity." Ibid. We cannot agree with that characterization. An aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an individual may support through contributions is not a "modest restraint" at all. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse. To put it in the simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption. The individual may give up to $5,200 each to nine candidates, but the aggregate limits constitute an outright ban on further contributions to any other candidate (beyond the additional $1,800 that may be spent before reaching the $48,600 aggregate limit). At that point, the limits deny the individual all ability to exercise his expressive and associational rights by contributing to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences. A donor must limit the number of candidates he supports, and may have to choose which of several policy concerns he will advance-clear First Amendment harms that the dissent never acknowledges. It is no answer to say that the individual can simply contribute less money to more people. To require one person to contribute at lower levels than others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader participation in the democratic process. And as we have recently admonished, the Government may not penalize an individual for "robustly exercis[ing]" his First Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). The First Amendment burden is especially great for individuals who do not have ready access to alternative avenues for supporting their preferred politicians and policies. In the context of base contribution limits, Buckley observed that a supporter could vindicate his associational interests by personally volunteering his time and energy on behalf of a candidate. See 424 U.S., at 22, 28, 96 S.Ct. 612. Such personal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes. Other effective methods of supporting preferred candidates or causes without contributing money are reserved for a select few, such as entertainers capable of raising hundreds of thousands of dollars in a single evening. Cf. Davis, supra, at 742, 128 S.Ct. 2759.5 The dissent faults this focus on "the individual's right to engage in political speech," saying that it fails to take into account "the public's interest" in "collective speech." Post, at 1467 - 1468 (opinion of BREYER, J.). This "collective" interest is said to promote "a government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment protects." Post, at 1468. But there are compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First Amendment by reference to such a generalized conception of the public good. First, the dissent's "collective speech" reflected in laws is of course the will of the majority, and plainly can include laws that restrict free speech. The whole point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals protection against such infringements. The First Amendment does not protect the government, even when the government purports to act through legislation reflecting "collective speech." Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). Second, the degree to which speech is protected cannot turn on a legislative or judicial determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic process. The First Amendment does not contemplate such "ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits." United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010); see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000) ("What the Constitution says is that" value judgments "are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority"). Third, our established First Amendment analysis already takes account of any "collective" interest that may justify restrictions on individual speech. Under that accepted analysis, such restrictions are measured against the asserted public interest (usually framed as an important or compelling governmental interest). As explained below, we do not doubt the compelling nature of the "collective" interest in preventing corruption in the electoral process. But we permit Congress to pursue that interest only so long as it does not unnecessarily infringe an individual's right to freedom of speech; we do not truncate this tailoring test at the outset. IV A With the significant First Amendment costs for individual citizens in mind, we turn to the governmental interests asserted in this case. This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741, 128 S.Ct. 2759;National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 496-497, 105 S.Ct. 1459. We have consistently rejected attempts to suppress campaign speech based on other legislative objectives. No matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to "level the playing field," or to "level electoral opportunities," or to "equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates." Bennett, 564 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2825-2826; Davis, supra, at 741-742, 128 S.Ct. 2759;Buckley, supra, at 56, 96 S.Ct. 612. The First Amendment prohibits such legislative attempts to "fine-tun[e]" the electoral process, no matter how well intentioned. Bennett, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2824. As we framed the relevant principle in Buckley, "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 424 U.S., at 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612. The dissent's suggestion that Buckley supports the opposite proposition, see post, at 1467 - 1468, simply ignores what Buckley actually said on the matter. See also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) ("Buckley ... made clear that contributors cannot be protected from the possibility that others will make larger contributions"). Moreover, while preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of corruption-" quid pro quo " corruption. As Buckley explained, Congress may permissibly seek to rein in "large contributions [that] are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders." 424 U.S., at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612. In addition to "actual quid pro quo arrangements," Congress may permissibly limit "the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions" to particular candidates. Id., at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption"). Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder's official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner "influence over or access to" elected officials or political parties. Id., at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876; see McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). And because the Government's interest in preventing the appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access. See Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 360, 130 S.Ct. 876. The dissent advocates a broader conception of corruption, and would apply the label to any individual contributions above limits deemed necessary to protect "collective speech." Thus, under the dissent's view, it is perfectly fine to contribute $5,200 to nine candidates but somehow corrupt to give the same amount to a tenth. It is fair to say, as Justice Stevens has, "that we have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice." Id., at 447, 130 S.Ct. 876 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The definition of corruption that we apply today, however, has firm roots in Buckley itself. The Court in that case upheld base contribution limits because they targeted "the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements" and "the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness" of such a system of unchecked direct contributions. 424 U.S., at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612.Buckley simultaneously rejected limits on spending that was less likely to "be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id., at 47, 96 S.Ct. 612. In any event, this case is not the first in which the debate over the proper breadth of the Government's anticorruption interest has been engaged. Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 356-361, 130 S.Ct. 876 (majority opinion), with id., at 447-460, 130 S.Ct. 876 (opinion of Stevens, J.). The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights. In addition, "[i]n drawing that line, the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it." Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). The dissent laments that our opinion leaves only remnants of FECA and BCRA that are inadequate to combat corruption. See post, at 1465. Such rhetoric ignores the fact that we leave the base limits undisturbed.6 Those base limits remain the primary means of regulating campaign contributions-the obvious explanation for why the aggregate limits received a scant few sentences of attention in Buckley.7 B "When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions." United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S., at 816, 120 S.Ct. 1878. Here, the Government seeks to carry that burden by arguing that the aggregate limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount. But Congress's selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all others corruptible if given a dime. And if there is no risk that additional candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to $5,200, then the Government must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits. The problem is that they do not serve that function in any meaningful way. In light of the various statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley's fear that an individual might "contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions" to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612, is far too speculative. And-importantly-we "have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000). As an initial matter, there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when money flows through independent actors to a candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly. When an individual contributes to a candidate, a party committee, or a PAC, the individual must by law cede control over the funds. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8); 11 CFR § 110.6. The Government admits that if the funds are subsequently re-routed to a particular candidate, such action occurs at the initial recipient's discretion-not the donor's. See Brief for Appellee 37. As a consequence, the chain of attribution grows longer, and any credit must be shared among the various actors along the way. For those reasons, the risk of quid pro quo corruption is generally applicable only to "the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or officeholder." McConnell, 540 U.S., at 310, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Buckley nonetheless focused on the possibility that "unearmarked contributions" could eventually find their way to a candidate's coffers. 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. Even accepting the validity of Buckley's circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive a "massive amount[ ] of money" that could be traced back to a particular contributor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. Ibid. The Government offers a series of scenarios in support of that possibility. But each is sufficiently implausible that the Government has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the aggregate limits further its anticircumvention interest. The primary example of circumvention, in one form or another, envisions an individual donor who contributes the maximum amount under the base limits to a particular candidate, say, Representative Smith. Then the donor also channels "massive amounts of money" to Smith through a series of contributions to PACs that have stated their intention to support Smith. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee 35-37; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 6. Various earmarking and antiproliferation rules disarm this example. Importantly, the donor may not contribute to the most obvious PACs: those that support only Smith. See 11 CFR § 110.1(h)(1); see also § 102.14(a). Nor may the donor contribute to the slightly less obvious PACs that he knows will route "a substantial portion" of his contribution to Smith. § 110.1(h)(2). The donor must instead turn to other PACs that are likely to give to Smith. When he does so, however, he discovers that his contribution will be significantly diluted by all the contributions from others to the same PACs. After all, the donor cannot give more than $5,000 to a PAC and so cannot dominate the PAC's total receipts, as he could when Buckley was decided. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C). He cannot retain control over his contribution, 11 CFR § 110.1(h)(3), direct his money "in any way" to Smith, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8), or even imply that he would like his money to be recontributed to Smith, 11 CFR § 110.6(b)(1). His salience as a Smith supporter has been diminished, and with it the potential for corruption. It is not clear how many candidates a PAC must support before our dedicated donor can avoid being tagged with the impermissible knowledge that "a substantial portion" of his contribution will go to Smith. But imagine that the donor is one of ten equal donors to a PAC that gives the highest possible contribution to Smith.8 The PAC may give no more than $2,600 per election to Smith. Of that sum, just $260 will be attributable to the donor intent on circumventing the base limits. Thus far he has hardly succeeded in funneling "massive amounts of money" to Smith. Buckley, supra, at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612. But what if this donor does the same thing via, say, 100 different PACs? His $260 contribution will balloon to $26,000, ten times what he may contribute directly to Smith in any given election. This 100-PAC scenario is highly implausible. In the first instance, it is not true that the individual donor will necessarily have access to a sufficient number of PACs to effectuate such a scheme. There are many PACs, but they are not limitless. For the 2012 election cycle, the FEC reported about 2,700 nonconnected PACs (excluding PACs that finance independent expenditures only). And not every PAC that supports Smith will work in this scheme: For our donor's pro rata share of a PAC's contribution to Smith to remain meaningful, the PAC must be funded by only a small handful of donors. The antiproliferation rules, which were not in effect when Buckley was decided, prohibit our donor from creating 100 pro-Smith PACs of his own, or collaborating with the nine other donors to do so. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) ("all contributions made by political committees established or financed or maintained or controlled by ... any other person, or by any group of such persons, shall be considered to have been made by a single political committee"). Moreover, if 100 PACs were to contribute to Smith and few other candidates, and if specific individuals like our ardent Smith supporter were to contribute to each, the FEC could weigh those "circumstantial factors" to determine whether to deem the PACs affiliated. 11 CFR § 100.5(g)(4)(ii). The FEC's analysis could take account of a "common or overlapping membership" and "similar patterns of contributions or contributors," among other considerations. §§ 100.5(g)(4)(ii)(D), (J). The FEC has in the past initiated enforcement proceedings against contributors with such suspicious patterns of PAC donations. See, e.g., Conciliation Agreement, In re Riley, Matters Under Review 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 2001). On a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational actor would engage in such machinations. In the example described, a dedicated donor spent $500,000-donating the full $5,000 to 100 different PACs-to add just $26,000 to Smith's campaign coffers. That same donor, meanwhile, could have spent unlimited funds on independent expenditures on behalf of Smith. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 44-51, 96 S.Ct. 612. Indeed, he could have spent his entire $500,000 advocating for Smith, without the risk that his selected PACs would choose not to give to Smith, or that he would have to share credit with other contributors to the PACs. We have said in the context of independent expenditures that " '[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent ... undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate.' " Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 357, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 47, 96 S.Ct. 612). But probably not by 95 percent. And at least from the donor's point of view, it strikes us as far more likely that he will want to see his full $500,000 spent on behalf of his favored candidate-even if it must be spent independently-rather than see it diluted to a small fraction so that it can be contributed directly by someone else.9 Another circumvention example is the one that apparently motivated the District Court. As the District Court crafted the example, a donor gives a $500,000 check to a joint fundraising committee composed of a candidate, a national party committee, and "most of the party's state party committees" (actually, 47 of the 50). 893 F.Supp.2d, at 140. The committees divide up the money so that each one receives the maximum contribution permissible under the base limits, but then each transfers its allocated portion to the same single committee. That committee uses the money for coordinated expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate. If that scenario "seem[s] unlikely," the District Court thought so, too. Ibid. But because the District Court could "imagine" that chain of events, it held that the example substantiated the Government's circumvention concerns. Ibid. One problem, however, is that the District Court's speculation relies on illegal earmarking. Lest there be any confusion, a joint fundraising committee is simply a mechanism for individual committees to raise funds collectively, not to circumvent base limits or earmarking rules. See 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(5). Under no circumstances may a contribution to a joint fundraising committee result in an allocation that exceeds the contribution limits applicable to its constituent parts; the committee is in fact required to return any excess funds to the contributor. See § 102.17(c)(6)(i). The District Court assumed compliance with the specific allocation rules governing joint fundraising committees, but it expressly based its example on the premise that the donor would telegraph his desire to support one candidate and that "many separate entities would willingly serve as conduits for a single contributor's interests." 893 F.Supp.2d, at 140. Regardless whether so many distinct entities would cooperate as a practical matter, the earmarking provision prohibits an individual from directing funds "through an intermediary or conduit" to a particular candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(8). Even the "implicit[ ]" agreement imagined by the District Court, 893 F.Supp.2d, at 140, would trigger the earmarking provision. See 11 CFR § 110.6(b)(1). So this circumvention scenario could not succeed without assuming that nearly 50 separate party committees would engage in a transparent violation of the earmarking rules (and that they would not be caught if they did). Moreover, the District Court failed to acknowledge that its $500,000 example cannot apply to most candidates. It crafted the example around a presidential candidate, for whom donations in the thousands of dollars may not seem remarkable-especially in comparison to the nearly $1.4 billion spent by the 2012 presidential candidates. The same example cannot, however, be extrapolated to most House and Senate candidates. Like contributions, coordinated expenditures are limited by statute, with different limits based on the State and the office. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3). The 2013 coordinated expenditure limit for most House races is $46,600, well below the $500,000 in coordinated expenditures envisioned by the District Court. The limit for Senate races varies significantly based on state population. See 78 Fed.Reg. 8531 (2013). A scheme of the magnitude imagined by the District Court would be possible even in theory for no House candidates and the Senate candidates from just the 12 most populous States. Ibid. Further, to the extent that the law does not foreclose the scenario described by the District Court, experience and common sense do. The Government provides no reason to believe that many state parties would willingly participate in a scheme to funnel money to another State's candidates. A review of FEC data of Republican and Democratic state party committees for the 2012 election cycle reveals just 12 total instances in which a state party committee contributed to a House or Senate candidate in another State. No surprise there. The Iowa Democratic Party, for example, has little reason to transfer money to the California Democratic Party, especially when the Iowa Democratic Party would be barred for the remainder of the election cycle from receiving another contribution for its own activities from the particular donor. These scenarios, along with others that have been suggested, are either illegal under current campaign finance laws or divorced from reality. The three examples posed by the dissent are no exception. The dissent does not explain how the large sums it postulates can be legally rerouted to a particular candidate, why most state committees would participate in a plan to redirect their donations to a candidate in another State, or how a donor or group of donors can avoid regulations prohibiting contributions to a committee "with the knowledge that a substantial portion" of the contribution will support a candidate to whom the donor has already contributed, 11 CFR § 110.1(h)(2). The dissent argues that such knowledge may be difficult to prove, pointing to eight FEC cases that did not proceed because of insufficient evidence of a donor's incriminating knowledge. See post, at 1477 - 1478. It might be that such guilty knowledge could not be shown because the donors were not guilty-a possibility that the dissent does not entertain. In any event, the donors described in those eight cases were typically alleged to have exceeded the base limits by $5,000 or less. The FEC's failure to find the requisite knowledge in those cases hardly means that the agency will be equally powerless to prevent a scheme in which a donor routes millions of dollars in excess of the base limits to a particular candidate, as in the dissent's "Example Two." And if an FEC official cannot establish knowledge of circumvention (or establish affiliation) when the same ten donors contribute $10,000 each to 200 newly created PACs, and each PAC writes a $10,000 check to the same ten candidates-the dissent's "Example Three"-then that official has not a heart but a head of stone. See post, at 1474 - 1475, 1477 - 1478. The dissent concludes by citing three briefs for the proposition that, even with the aggregate limits in place, individuals "have transferred large sums of money to specific candidates" in excess of the base limits. Post, at 1478. But the cited sources do not provide any real-world examples of circumvention of the base limits along the lines of the various hypotheticals. The dearth of FEC prosecutions, according to the dissent, proves only that people are getting away with it. And the violations that surely must be out there elude detection "because in the real world, the methods of achieving circumvention are more subtle and more complex" than the hypothetical examples. Ibid. This sort of speculation, however, cannot justify the substantial intrusion on First Amendment rights at issue in this case. Buckley upheld aggregate limits only on the ground that they prevented channeling money to candidates beyond the base limits. The absence of such a prospect today belies the Government's asserted objective of preventing corruption or its appearance. The improbability of circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits instead further the impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of money in political campaigns. C Quite apart from the foregoing, the aggregate limits violate the First Amendment because they are not "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require "a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,' ... that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982)). Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the Government's interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits, it impermissibly restricts participation in the political process. 1 The Government argues that the aggregate limits are justified because they prevent an individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might subsequently recontribute a donation. After all, only recontributed funds can conceivably give rise to circumvention of the base limits. Yet all indications are that many types of recipients have scant interest in regifting donations they receive. Some figures might be useful to put the risk of circumvention in perspective. We recognize that no data can be marshaled to capture perfectly the counterfactual world in which aggregate limits do not exist. But, as we have noted elsewhere, we can nonetheless ask "whether experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of abuse." Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 457, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001). It does not. Experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions made in excess of the aggregate limits are likely to be retained and spent by their recipients rather than rerouted to candidates. In the 2012 election cycle, federal candidates, political parties, and PACs spent a total of $7 billion, according to the FEC. In particular, each national political party's spending ran in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), however, spent less than $1 million each on direct candidate contributions and less than $10 million each on coordinated expenditures. Brief for NRSC et al. as Amici Curiae 23, 25 (NRSC Brief). Including both coordinated expenditures and direct candidate contributions, the NRSC and DSCC spent just 7% of their total funds on contributions to candidates and the NRCC and DCCC spent just 3%. Likewise, as explained previously, state parties rarely contribute to candidates in other States. In the 2012 election cycle, the Republican and Democratic state party committees in all 50 States (and the District of Columbia) contributed a paltry $17,750 to House and Senate candidates in other States. The state party committees spent over half a billion dollars over the same time period, of which the $17,750 in contributions to other States' candidates constituted just 0.003%. As with national and state party committees, candidates contribute only a small fraction of their campaign funds to other candidates. Authorized candidate committees may support other candidates up to a $2,000 base limit. 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(3)(B). In the 2012 election, House candidates spent a total of $1.1 billion. Candidate-to-candidate contributions among House candidates totaled $3.65 million, making up just 0.3% of candidates' overall spending. NRSC Brief 29. The most that any one individual candidate received from all other candidates was around $100,000. Brief for Appellee 39. The fact is that candidates who receive campaign contributions spend most of the money on themselves, rather than passing along donations to other candidates. In this arena at least, charity begins at home.10 Based on what we can discern from experience, the indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is disproportionate to the Government's interest in preventing circumvention. The Government has not given us any reason to believe that parties or candidates would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted. Absent such a showing, we cannot conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are appropriately tailored to guard against any contributions that might implicate the Government's anticircumvention interest. A final point: It is worth keeping in mind that the base limits themselves are a prophylactic measure. As we have explained, "restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo arrangements." Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 357, 130 S.Ct. 876. The aggregate limits are then layered on top, ostensibly to prevent circumvention of the base limits. This "prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach" requires that we be particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law's fit. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S., at 479, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.); see McConnell, 540 U.S., at 268-269, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). 2 Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Government's anticircumvention interest, while avoiding "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment rights. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. The most obvious might involve targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political committees. There are currently no such limits on transfers among party committees and from candidates to party committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4); 11 CFR § 113.2(c). Perhaps for that reason, a central concern of the District Court, the Government, multiple amici curiae, and the dissent has been the ability of party committees to transfer money freely. If Congress agrees that this is problematic, it might tighten its permissive transfer rules. Doing so would impose a lesser burden on First Amendment rights, as compared to aggregate limits that flatly ban contributions beyond certain levels. And while the Government has not conceded that transfer restrictions would be a perfect substitute for the aggregate limits, it has recognized that they would mitigate the risk of circumvention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. One possible option for restricting transfers would be to require contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated, nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients. Such a solution would address the same circumvention possibilities as the current aggregate limits, while not completely barring contributions beyond the aggregate levels. In addition (or as an alternative), if Congress believes that circumvention is especially likely to occur through creation of a joint fundraising committee, it could require that funds received through those committees be spent by their recipients (or perhaps it could simply limit the size of joint fundraising committees). Such alternatives to the aggregate limits properly refocus the inquiry on the delinquent actor: the recipient of a contribution within the base limits, who then routes the money in a manner that undermines those limits. See Citizens United,supra, at 360-361, 130 S.Ct. 876; cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529-530, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001). Indeed, Congress has adopted transfer restrictions, and the Court has upheld them, in the context of state party spending. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b). So-called "Levin funds" are donations permissible under state law that may be spent on certain federal election activity-namely, voter registration and identification, get-out-the-vote efforts, or generic campaign activities. Levin funds are raised directly by the state or local party committee that ultimately spends them. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). That means that other party committees may not transfer Levin funds, solicit Levin funds on behalf of the particular state or local committee, or engage in joint fundraising of Levin funds. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 171-173, 124 S.Ct. 619.McConnell upheld those transfer restrictions as "justifiable anticircumvention measures," though it acknowledged that they posed some associational burdens. Id., at 171, 124 S.Ct. 619. Here, a narrow transfer restriction on contributions that could otherwise be recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a similar justification. Other alternatives might focus on earmarking. Many of the scenarios that the Government and the dissent hypothesize involve at least implicit agreements to circumvent the base limits-agreements that are already prohibited by the earmarking rules. See 11 CFR § 110.6. The FEC might strengthen those rules further by, for example, defining how many candidates a PAC must support in order to ensure that "a substantial portion" of a donor's contribution is not rerouted to a certain candidate. § 110.1(h)(2). Congress might also consider a modified version of the aggregate limits, such as one that prohibits donors who have contributed the current maximum sums from further contributing to political committees that have indicated they will support candidates to whom the donor has already contributed. To be sure, the existing earmarking provision does not define "the outer limit of acceptable tailoring." Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S., at 462, 121 S.Ct. 2351. But tighter rules could have a significant effect, especially when adopted in concert with other measures. We do not mean to opine on the validity of any particular proposal. The point is that there are numerous alternative approaches available to Congress to prevent circumvention of the base limits. D Finally, disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements are in part "justified based on a governmental interest in 'provid[ing] the electorate with information' about the sources of election-related spending." Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 367, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612). They may also "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." Id., at 67, 96 S.Ct. 612. Disclosure requirements burden speech, but-unlike the aggregate limits-they do not impose a ceiling on speech. Citizens United, supra, at 366, 130 S.Ct. 876; but see McConnell,supra, at 275-277, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). For that reason, disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. See, e.g.,Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 262, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information. In 1976, the Court observed that Congress could regard disclosure as "only a partial measure." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612. That perception was understandable in a world in which information about campaign contributions was filed at FEC offices and was therefore virtually inaccessible to the average member of the public. See Brief for Cause of Action Institute as Amicus Curiae 15-16. Today, given the Internet, disclosure offers much more robust protections against corruption. See Citizens United, supra, at 370-371, 130 S.Ct. 876. Reports and databases are available on the FEC's Web site almost immediately after they are filed, supplemented by private entities such as OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org. Because massive quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible at the time Buckley, or even McConnell, was decided. The existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the movement of money away from entities subject to disclosure. Because individuals' direct contributions are limited, would-be donors may turn to other avenues for political speech. See Citizens United, supra, at 364, 130 S.Ct. 876. Individuals can, for example, contribute unlimited amounts to 501(c) organizations, which are not required to publicly disclose their donors. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d)(3). Such organizations spent some $300 million on independent expenditures in the 2012 election cycle. V At oral argument, the Government shifted its focus from Buckley's anticircumvention rationale to an argument that the aggregate limits deter corruption regardless of their ability to prevent circumvention of the base limits. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, 50-52. The Government argued that there is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large check is given to a legislator, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be appropriately divided among numerous candidates and committees. The aggregate limits, the argument goes, ensure that the check amount does not become too large. That new rationale for the aggregate limits-embraced by the dissent, see post, at 1472 - 1474 -does not wash. It dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases, and targets as corruption the general, broad-based support of a political party. In analyzing the base limits, Buckley made clear that the risk of corruption arises when an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or officeholder himself. See 424 U.S., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612.Buckley' s analysis of the aggregate limit under FECA was similarly confined. The Court noted that the aggregate limit guarded against an individual's funneling-through circumvention-"massive amounts of money to a particular candidate." Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). We have reiterated that understanding several times. See, e.g.,National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S., at 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459 ( quid pro quo corruption occurs when "[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns" (emphasis added)); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981)( Buckley's holding that contribution limits are permissible "relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate "); McConnell, 540 U.S., at 296, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) ( quid pro quo corruption in Buckley involved "contributions that flowed to a particular candidate's benefit" (emphasis added)). Of course a candidate would be pleased with a donor who contributed not only to the candidate himself, but also to other candidates from the same party, to party committees, and to PACs supporting the party. But there is a clear, administrable line between money beyond the base limits funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate-for which the candidate feels obligated-and money within the base limits given widely to a candidate's party-for which the candidate, like all other members of the party, feels grateful. When donors furnish widely distributed support within all applicable base limits, all members of the party or supporters of the cause may benefit, and the leaders of the party or cause may feel particular gratitude. That gratitude stems from the basic nature of the party system, in which party members join together to further common political beliefs, and citizens can choose to support a party because they share some, most, or all of those beliefs. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214-216, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). To recast such shared interest, standing alone, as an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption would dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. Cf. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-573, 120 S.Ct. 2402, 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000) (recognizing the Government's "role to play in structuring and monitoring the election process," but rejecting "the proposition that party affairs are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections"). The Government suggests that it is the solicitation of large contributions that poses the danger of corruption, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, 38-39, 50-51; see also post, at 1472 - 1473, 1475, but the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Cf. McConnell, supra, at 298-299, 308, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (rejecting a ban on "soft money" contributions to national parties, but approving a ban on the solicitation of such contributions as "a direct and necessary regulation of federal candidates' and officeholders' receipt of quids "). We have no occasion to consider a law that would specifically ban candidates from soliciting donations-within the base limits-that would go to many other candidates, and would add up to a large sum. For our purposes here, it is enough that the aggregate limits at issue are not directed specifically to candidate behavior. * * * For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve authority for the Government to combat corruption, without at the same time compromising the political responsiveness at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the Government to favor some participants in that process over others. As Edmund Burke explained in his famous speech to the electors of Bristol, a representative owes constituents the exercise of his "mature judgment," but judgment informed by "the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents." The Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke 129-130 (J. Burke ed. 1867). Constituents have the right to support candidates who share their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials. The Government has a strong interest, no less critical to our democratic system, in combatting corruption and its appearance. We have, however, held that this interest must be limited to a specific kind of corruption- quid pro quo corruption-in order to ensure that the Government's efforts do not have the effect of restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall govern them. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the aggregate limits on contributions do not further the only governmental interest this Court accepted as legitimate in Buckley. They instead intrude without justification on a citizen's ability to exercise "the most fundamental First Amendment activities." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 14, 96 S.Ct. 612. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. I adhere to the view that this Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ( per curiam), denigrates core First Amendment speech and should be overruled. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265-267, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 164-165, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465-466, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001)( Colorado II ) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412-420, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 635-640, 116 S.Ct. 2309, 135 L.Ed.2d 795 (1996)( Colorado I ) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). Political speech is " 'the primary object of First Amendment protection' " and "the lifeblood of a self-governing people." Colorado II, supra, at 465-466, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Contributions to political campaigns, no less than direct expenditures, "generate essential political speech" by fostering discussion of public issues and candidate qualifications. Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also id., at 410-411, 120 S.Ct. 897.Buckley itself recognized that both contribution and expenditure limits "operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities" and "implicate fundamental First Amendment interests." 424 U.S., at 14, 23, 96 S.Ct. 612. But instead of treating political giving and political spending alike, Buckley distinguished the two, embracing a bifurcated standard of review under which contribution limits receive less rigorous scrutiny. Id., at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. As I have explained before, "[t]he analytic foundation of Buckley ... was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening years." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). To justify a lesser standard of review for contribution limits, Buckley relied on the premise that contributions are different in kind from direct expenditures. None of the Court's bases for that premise withstands careful review. The linchpin of the Court's analysis was its assertion that "[w]hile contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. But that " 'speech by proxy' " rationale quickly breaks down, given that "[e]ven in the case of a direct expenditure, there is usually some go-between that facilitates the dissemination of the spender's message-for instance, an advertising agency or a television station." Colorado I,supra, at 638-639, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Moreover, we have since rejected the " 'proxy speech' " approach as affording insufficient First Amendment protection to "the voices of those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own resources." Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985); see Shrink Missouri, supra, at 413-414, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The remaining justifications Buckley provided are also flawed. For example, Buckley claimed that contribution limits entail only a "marginal" speech restriction because "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support." 424 U.S., at 20, 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. But this Court has never required a speaker to explain the reasons for his position in order to obtain full First Amendment protection. Instead, we have consistently held that speech is protected even "when the underlying basis for a position is not given." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415, n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 46, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (sign reading "For Peace in the Gulf"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415-416, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (black armband signifying opposition to Vietnam War); see also Colorado I, supra, at 640, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) ("Even a pure message of support, unadorned with reasons, is valuable to the democratic process") Equally unpersuasive is Buckley's suggestion that contribution limits warrant less stringent review because "[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution," and "[a]t most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate." 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Contributions do increase the quantity of communication by "amplifying the voice of the candidate" and "help[ing] to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey." Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415, 120 S.Ct. 897 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). They also serve as a quantifiable metric of the intensity of a particular contributor's support, as demonstrated by the frequent practice of giving different amounts to different candidates. Buckley simply failed to recognize that "we have accorded full First Amendment protection to expressions of intensity." Id., at 415, n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (protecting the use of an obscenity for emphasis). Although today's decision represents a faithful application of our precedents, the plurality's discussion of Buckley omits any reference to these discarded rationales. Instead, the plurality alludes only to Buckley's last remaining reason for devaluing political contributions relative to expenditures. See ante, at 1444 - 1445 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S., at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). The relevant sentence from Buckley reads as follows: "A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Ibid. That proposition, read in full, cannot be squared with a key premise of today's decision. Among the Government's justifications for the aggregate limits set forth in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) is that "an individual can engage in the 'symbolic act of contributing' to as many entities as he wishes." Brief for Appellee 20. That is, the Government contends that aggregate limits are constitutional as long as an individual can still contribute some token amount (a dime, for example) to each of his preferred candidates. The plurality, quite correctly, rejects that argument, noting that "[i]t is no answer to say that the individual can simply contribute less money to more people." Ante, at 1449. That is so because "[t]o require one person to contribute at lower levels than others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader participation in the democratic process." Ibid. What the plurality does not recognize is that the same logic also defeats the reasoning from Buckley on which the plurality purports to rely. Under the plurality's analysis, limiting the amount of money a person may give to a candidate does impose a direct restraint on his political communication; if it did not, the aggregate limits at issue here would not create "a special burden on broader participation in the democratic process." Ibid. I am wholly in agreement with the plurality's conclusion on this point: "[T]he Government may not penalize an individual for 'robustly exercis[ing]' his First Amendment rights." Ibid. (quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008)). I regret only that the plurality does not acknowledge that today's decision, although purporting not to overrule Buckley, continues to chip away at its footings. In sum, what remains of Buckley is a rule without a rationale. Contributions and expenditures are simply "two sides of the same First Amendment coin," and our efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere "word games" rather than any cognizable principle of constitutional law. Buckley, supra, at 241, 244, 96 S.Ct. 612 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For that reason, I would overrule Buckley and subject the aggregate limits in BCRA to strict scrutiny, which they would surely fail. See Colorado I, 518 U.S., at 640-641, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) ("I am convinced that under traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both spending and giving in the political process ... are unconstitutional"). This case represents yet another missed opportunity to right the course of our campaign finance jurisprudence by restoring a standard that is faithful to the First Amendment. Until we undertake that reexamination, we remain in a "halfway house" of our own design. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 410, 120 S.Ct. 897 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment. Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting. Nearly 40 years ago in Buckley v . Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) ( per curiam), this Court considered the constitutionality of laws that imposed limits upon the overall amount a single person can contribute to all federal candidates, political parties, and committees taken together. The Court held that those limits did not violate the Constitution. Id., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612; accord, McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 138, n. 40, 152-153, n. 48, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (citing with approval Buckley's aggregate limits holding). The Buckley Court focused upon the same problem that concerns the Court today, and it wrote: "The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid." 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 . Today a majority of the Court overrules this holding. It is wrong to do so. Its conclusion rests upon its own, not a record-based, view of the facts. Its legal analysis is faulty: It misconstrues the nature of the competing constitutional interests at stake. It understates the importance of protecting the political integrity of our governmental institutions. It creates a loophole that will allow a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate's campaign. Taken together with Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), today's decision eviscerates our Nation's campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve. I The plurality concludes that the aggregate contribution limits " 'unnecessar [ily] abridg[e]' " First Amendment rights. Ante, at 1444 - 1445, 1456 - 1457 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612). It notes that some individuals will wish to "spen[d] 'substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [their] political ideas through sophisticated' means." Ante, at 1447 - 1448 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985)( NCPAC )). Aggregate contribution ceilings limit an individual's ability to engage in such "broader participation in the democratic process," while insufficiently advancing any legitimate governmental objective. Ante, at 1448 - 1449, 1451 - 1456. Hence, the plurality finds, they violate the Constitution. The plurality's conclusion rests upon three separate but related claims. Each is fatally flawed. First, the plurality says that given the base limits on contributions to candidates and political committees, aggregate limits do not further any independent governmental objective worthy of protection. And that is because, given the base limits, "[s]pending large sums of money in connection with elections" does not "give rise to ... corruption." Ante, at 1450 - 1451. In making this argument, the plurality relies heavily upon a narrow definition of "corruption" that excludes efforts to obtain " 'influence over or access to' elected officials or political parties." Ibid. (quoting Citizens United, supra, at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876); accord, ante, at 1450 - 1451, 1452 - 1456. Second, the plurality assesses the instrumental objective of the aggregate limits, namely, safeguarding the base limits. It finds that they "do not serve that function in any meaningful way." Ante, at 1452. That is because, even without the aggregate limits, the possibilities for circumventing the base limits are "implausible" and "divorced from reality." Ante, at 1452 - 1453, 1453 - 1454, 1455 - 1456. Third, the plurality says the aggregate limits are not a " 'reasonable' " policy tool. Rather, they are "poorly tailored to the Government's interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits." Ante, at 1456 - 1457 (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)). The plurality imagines several alternative regulations that it says might just as effectively thwart circumvention. Accordingly, it finds, the aggregate caps are out of " 'proportion to the [anticorruption] interest served.' " Ante, at 1456 - 1457 (quoting Fox, supra, at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028). II The plurality's first claim-that large aggregate contributions do not "give rise" to "corruption"-is plausible only because the plurality defines "corruption" too narrowly. The plurality describes the constitutionally permissible objective of campaign finance regulation as follows: "Congress may target only a specific type of corruption- 'quid pro quo' corruption." Ante, at 1450 - 1451. It then defines quid pro quo corruption to mean no more than "a direct exchange of an official act for money"-an act akin to bribery. Ante, at 1441 - 1442. It adds specifically that corruption does not include efforts to "garner 'influence over or access to' elected officials or political parties." Ante, at 1450 - 1451 (quoting Citizens United, supra, at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876). Moreover, the Government's efforts to prevent the "appearance of corruption" are "equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption," as narrowly defined. Ante, at 1450 - 1451. In the plurality's view, a federal statute could not prevent an individual from writing a million dollar check to a political party (by donating to its various committees), because the rationale for any limit would "dangerously broade[n] the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases." Ante, at 1460. This critically important definition of "corruption" is inconsistent with the Court's prior case law (with the possible exception of Citizens United, as I will explain below). It is virtually impossible to reconcile with this Court's decision in McConnell, upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). And it misunderstands the constitutional importance of the interests at stake. In fact, constitutional interests-indeed, First Amendment interests-lie on both sides of the legal equation. A In reality, as the history of campaign finance reform shows and as our earlier cases on the subject have recognized, the anticorruption interest that drives Congress to regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more important interest than the plurality acknowledges. It is an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public governmental institutions. And it is an interest rooted in the Constitution and in the First Amendment itself. Consider at least one reason why the First Amendment protects political speech. Speech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, political communication seeks to secure government action. A politically oriented "marketplace of ideas" seeks to form a public opinion that can and will influence elected representatives. This is not a new idea. Eighty-seven years ago, Justice Brandeis wrote that the First Amendment's protection of speech was "essential to effective democracy." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (concurring opinion). Chief Justice Hughes reiterated the same idea shortly thereafter: "A fundamental principle of our constitutional system" is the "maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (emphasis added). In Citizens United, the Court stated that "[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people." 558 U.S., at 339, 130 S.Ct. 876 (emphasis added). The Framers had good reason to emphasize this same connection between political speech and governmental action. An influential 18th-century continental philosopher had argued that in a representative democracy, the people lose control of their representatives between elections, during which interim periods they were "in chains." J. Rousseau, An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Social Contract 265-266 (transl. 1791). The Framers responded to this criticism both by requiring frequent elections to federal office, and by enacting a First Amendment that would facilitate a "chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom they have committed the exercise of the powers of government." J. Wilson, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States of America 30-31 (1792). This "chain" would establish the necessary "communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments" between the people and their representatives, so that public opinion could be channeled into effective governmental action. The Federalist No. 57, p. 386 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); accord, T. Benton, 1 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, p. 141 (1857) (explaining that the First Amendment will strengthen American democracy by giving " 'the people' " a right to " 'publicly address their representatives,' " " 'privately advise them,' " or " 'declare their sentiments by petition to the whole body' " (quoting James Madison)). Accordingly, the First Amendment advances not only the individual's right to engage in political speech, but also the public's interest in preserving a democratic order in which collective speech matters. What has this to do with corruption? It has everything to do with corruption. Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary "chain of communication" between the people and their representatives. It derails the essential speech-to-government-action tie. Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard. Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political thought and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its point. That is one reason why the Court has stressed the constitutional importance of Congress' concern that a few large donations not drown out the voices of the many. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S., at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. 612. That is also why the Court has used the phrase "subversion of the political process" to describe circumstances in which "[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns." NCPAC, 470 U.S., at 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982) (the Government's interests in preventing corruption "directly implicate the integrity of our electoral process" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). See generally R. Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution 7-16, 80-94 (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that the efficacy of American democracy depends on "electoral integrity" and the responsiveness of public officials to public opinion). The "appearance of corruption" can make matters worse. It can lead the public to believe that its efforts to communicate with its representatives or to help sway public opinion have little purpose. And a cynical public can lose interest in political participation altogether. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) ("[T]he cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance"). Democracy, the Court has often said, cannot work unless "the people have faith in those who govern." United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961). The upshot is that the interests the Court has long described as preventing "corruption" or the "appearance of corruption" are more than ordinary factors to be weighed against the constitutional right to political speech. Rather, they are interests rooted in the First Amendment itself. They are rooted in the constitutional effort to create a democracy responsive to the people-a government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment protects. Given that end, we can and should understand campaign finance laws as resting upon a broader and more significant constitutional rationale than the plurality's limited definition of "corruption" suggests. We should see these laws as seeking in significant part to strengthen, rather than weaken, the First Amendment. To say this is not to deny the potential for conflict between (1) the need to permit contributions that pay for the diffusion of ideas, and (2) the need to limit payments in order to help maintain the integrity of the electoral process. But that conflict takes place within, not outside, the First Amendment's boundaries. B Since the kinds of corruption that can destroy the link between public opinion and governmental action extend well beyond those the plurality describes, the plurality's notion of corruption is flatly inconsistent with the basic constitutional rationale I have just described. Thus, it should surprise no one that this Court's case law ( Citizens United excepted) insists upon a considerably broader definition. In Buckley, for instance, the Court said explicitly that aggregate limits were constitutional because they helped "prevent evasion ... [through] huge contributions to the candidate's political party," 424 U.S., at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612 (the contrary to what the plurality today seems to believe, see ante, at 1460 - 1462). Moreover, Buckley upheld the base limits in significant part because they helped thwart "the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions." 424 U.S., at 27, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). And it said that Congress could reasonably conclude that criminal laws forbidding "the giving and taking of bribes" did not adequately "deal with the reality or appearance of corruption." Id., at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612. Bribery laws, the Court recognized, address "only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action." Ibid. The concern with corruption extends further. Other cases put the matter yet more strongly. In Beaumont, for example, the Court found constitutional a ban on direct contributions by corporations because of the need to prevent corruption, properly "understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder's judgment." Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155-156, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003). In Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441, 457-460, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001) (Colorado II ), the Court upheld limits imposed upon coordinated expenditures among parties and candidates because it found they thwarted corruption and its appearance, again understood as including "undue influence" by wealthy donors. In Shrink Missouri, the Court upheld limitations imposed by the Missouri Legislature upon contributions to state political candidates, not only because of the need to prevent bribery, but also because of "the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." 528 U.S., at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897. C Most important, in McConnell, this Court considered the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, an Act that set new limits on "soft money" contributions to political parties. "Soft money" referred to funds that, prior to BCRA, were freely donated to parties for activities other than directly helping elect a federal candidate-activities such as voter registration, "get out the vote" drives, and advertising that did not expressly advocate a federal candidate's election or defeat. 540 U.S., at 122-124, 124 S.Ct. 619. BCRA imposed a new ban on soft money contributions to national party committees, and greatly curtailed them in respect to state and local parties. Id., at 133-134, 161-164, 124 S.Ct. 619. The Court in McConnell upheld these new contribution restrictions under the First Amendment for the very reason the plurality today discounts or ignores. Namely, the Court found they thwarted a significant risk of corruption-understood not as quid pro quo bribery, but as privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected representatives. In reaching its conclusion in McConnell, the Court relied upon a vast record compiled in the District Court. That record consisted of over 100,000 pages of material and included testimony from more than 200 witnesses. See 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 209 (D.C.2003) ( per curiam). What it showed, in detail, was the web of relationships and understandings among parties, candidates, and large donors that underlies privileged access and influence. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 146-152, 154-157, 167-171, 182-184, 124 S.Ct. 619. The District Judges in McConnell made clear that the record did " not contain any evidence of bribery or vote buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (emphasis added). Indeed, no one had identified a "single discrete instance of quid pro quo corruption" due to soft money. Id., at 395 (opinion of Henderson, J.). But what the record did demonstrate was that enormous soft money contributions, ranging between $1 million and $5 million among the largest donors, enabled wealthy contributors to gain disproportionate "access to federal lawmakers" and the ability to "influenc[e] legislation." Id., at 481 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.). There was an indisputable link between generous political donations and opportunity after opportunity to make one's case directly to a Member of Congress. Testimony by elected officials supported this conclusion. See, e.g., ibid. (" 'Large donors of both hard and soft money receive special treatment' " (Sen. Simpson)); id., at 482 (" 'Donations, including soft money donations to political parties, do affect how Congress operates. It's only natural, and happens all too often, that a busy Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the call of a large soft money donor' " (Sen. Boren)); id., at 496 (" 'At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make their case to elected officials ...' " (Sen. McCain)). Furthermore, testimony from party operatives showed that national political parties had created "major donor programs," through which they openly "offer[ed] greater access to federal office holders as the donations gr[e]w larger." Id., at 502. I have placed in Appendix A more examples of the kind of evidence that filled the District Court record in McConnell. This Court upheld BCRA's limitations on soft money contributions by relying on just the kind of evidence I have described. We wrote: "The evidence in the record shows that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders.... Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote [in exchange for soft money] ..., Congress has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption.... [P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress' legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence.' " 540 U.S., at 146, 149-150, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 441, 121 S.Ct. 2351; emphasis added; paragraphs and paragraph breaks omitted). We specifically rejected efforts to define "corruption" in ways similar to those the plurality today accepts. We added: "Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder." 540 U.S., at 153, 124 S.Ct. 619. Insofar as today's decision sets forth a significantly narrower definition of "corruption," and hence of the public's interest in political integrity, it is flatly inconsistent with McConnell. D One case, however, contains language that offers the plurality support. That case is Citizens United. There, as the plurality points out, ante, at 1450 - 1451, the Court said that "[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption." 558 U.S., at 359, 130 S.Ct. 876. Further, the Court said that quid pro quo corruption does not include "influence over or access to elected officials," because " 'generic favoritism or influence theory ... is at odds with standard First Amendment analyses.' " Ibid. (quoting McConnell, supra, at 296, 124 S.Ct. 619 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). How should we treat these statements from Citizens United now? They are not essential to the Court's holding in the case-at least insofar as it can be read to require federal law to treat corporations and trade unions like individuals when they independently pay for, e.g., television advertising during the last 60 days of a federal election. Citizens United, supra, at 365, 130 S.Ct. 876. Taken literally, the statements cited simply refer to and characterize still-earlier Court cases. They do not require the more absolute reading that the plurality here gives them. More than that. Read as the plurality reads them today, the statements from Citizens United about the proper contours of the corruption rationale conflict not just with language in the McConnell opinion, but with McConnell 's very holding. See supra, at 1469 - 1470. Did the Court in Citizens United intend to overrule McConnell? I doubt it, for if it did, the Court or certainly the dissent would have said something about it. The total silence of all opinions in Citizens United with respect to this matter argues strongly in favor of treating the language quoted above as dictum, as an overstatement, or as limited to the context in which it appears. Citizens United itself contains language that supports the last mentioned reading, for it says that "[Buckley ] did not extend this rationale [about the reality or appearance of corruption] to independent expenditures, and the Court does not do so here." 558 U.S., at 357, 130 S.Ct. 876 (emphasis added). And it adds that, while "[t]he BCRA record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called 'soft money,' were made to gain access to elected officials," " [t]his case, however, is about independentexpenditures, not soft money." Id., at 360-361, 130 S.Ct. 876 (emphasis added). The plurality's use of Citizens United 's narrow definition of corruption here, however, is a different matter. That use does not come accompanied with a limiting context (independent expenditures by corporations and unions) or limiting language. It applies to the whole of campaign finance regulation. And, as I have pointed out, it is flatly inconsistent with the broader definition of corruption upon which McConnell 's holding depends. So: Does the Court intend today to overrule McConnell? Or does it intend to leave McConnell and BCRA in place? The plurality says the latter. Ante, at 1451, n. 6 ("Our holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not overrule McConnell 's holding about 'soft money' "). But how does the plurality explain its rejection of the broader definition of corruption, upon which McConnell 's holding depends? Compare ante, at 1450 - 1452, with McConnell, 540 U.S., at 146, 149-153, 124 S.Ct. 619. III The plurality invalidates the aggregate contribution limits for a second reason. It believes they are no longer needed to prevent contributors from circumventing federal limits on direct contributions to individuals, political parties, and political action committees. Ante, at 1452 - 1456. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct. 612 (aggregate limits "prevent evasion" of base contribution limits). Other "campaign finance laws," combined with "experience" and "common sense," foreclose the various circumvention scenarios that the Government hypothesizes. Ante, at 1455 - 1456. Accordingly, the plurality concludes, the aggregate limits provide no added benefit. The plurality is wrong. Here, as in Buckley, in the absence of limits on aggregate political contributions, donors can and likely will find ways to channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual candidates, producing precisely the kind of "corruption" or "appearance of corruption" that previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits constitutional. Those opportunities for circumvention will also produce the type of corruption that concerns the plurality today. The methods for using today's opinion to evade the law's individual contribution limits are complex, but they are well known, or will become well known, to party fundraisers. I shall describe three. A Example One: Gifts for the Benefit of the Party. Campaign finance law permits each individual to give $64,800 over two years to a national party committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532 (2013). The two major political parties each have three national committees. Ante, at 1442, n. 1. Federal law also entitles an individual to give $20,000 to a state party committee over two years. § 441a(a)(1)(D). Each major political party has 50 such committees. Those individual limits mean that, in the absence of any aggregate limit, an individual could legally give to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party about $1.2 million over two years. See Appendix B, Table 1, infra, at 1485. To make it easier for contributors to give gifts of this size, each party could create a "Joint Party Committee," comprising all of its national and state party committees. The titular heads could be the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader of the House. A contributor could then write a single check to the Joint Party Committee-and its staff would divide the funds so that each constituent unit receives no more than it could obtain from the contributor directly ($64,800 for a national committee over two years, $20,000 for a state committee over the same). Before today's decision, the total size of Rich Donor's check to the Joint Party Committee was capped at $74,600-the aggregate limit for donations to political parties over a 2-year election cycle. See § 441a(a)(3)(B); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. After today's decision, Rich Donor can write a single check to the Joint Party Committee in an amount of about $1.2 million. Will political parties seek these large checks? Why not? The recipient national and state committees can spend the money to buy generic party advertisements, say television commercials or bumper stickers saying "Support Republicans," "Support Democrats," or the like. They also can transfer the money to party committees in battleground States to increase the chances of winning hotly contested seats. See § 441a(a)(4) (permitting national or state political committees to make unlimited "transfers" to other committees "of the same political party"). Will party officials and candidates solicit these large contributions from wealthy donors? Absolutely. Such contributions will help increase the party's power, as well as the candidate's standing among his colleagues. Will elected officials be particularly grateful to the large donor, feeling obliged to provide him special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legislative favor? That is what we have previously believed. See McConnell, 540 U.S., at 182, 124 S.Ct. 619 ("Large soft-money donations at a candidate's or officeholder's behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder"); id., at 308, 124 S.Ct. 619 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) ("The making of a solicited gift is a quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who solicits the payment"); Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 460, n. 23, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (explaining how a candidate can "become a player [in his party] beyond his own race" by "directing donations to the party and making sure that the party knows who raised the money," and that "the donor's influence is multiplied" in such instances). And, as the statements collected in Appendix A, infra, make clear, we have believed this with good reason. Example Two: Donations to Individual Candidates (The $3.6 Million Check). The first example significantly understates the problem. That is because federal election law also allows a single contributor to give $5,200 to each party candidate over a 2-year election cycle (assuming the candidate is running in both a primary and a general election). § 441a(a)(1)(A); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. There are 435 party candidates for House seats and 33 party candidates for Senate seats in any given election year. That makes an additional $2.4 million in allowable contributions. Thus, without an aggregate limit, the law will permit a wealthy individual to write a check, over a 2-year election cycle, for $3.6 million-all to benefit his political party and its candidates. See Appendix B, Table 2(a), infra, at 1485. To make it easier for a wealthy donor to make a contribution of this size, the parties can simply enlarge the composition of the Joint Party Committee described in Example One, so that it now includes party candidates. And a party can proliferate such joint entities, perhaps calling the first the "Smith Victory Committee," the second the "Jones Victory Committee," and the like. See 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(5) (2012). (I say "perhaps" because too transparent a name might call into play certain earmarking rules. But the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) database of joint fundraising committees in 2012 shows similarly named entities, e.g., "Landrieu Wyden Victory Fund," etc.). As I have just said, without any aggregate limit, the law will allow Rich Donor to write a single check to, say, the Smith Victory Committee, for up to $3.6 million. This check represents "the total amount that the contributor could contribute to all of the participants" in the Committee over a 2-year cycle. § 102.17(c)(5). The Committee would operate under an agreement that provides a "formula for the allocation of fundraising proceeds" among its constituent units. § 102.17(c)(1). And that "formula" would divide the proceeds so that no committee or candidate receives more than it could have received from Rich Donor directly-$64,800, $20,000, or $5,200. See § 102.17(c)(6). So what is wrong with that? The check is considerably larger than Example One's check. But is there anything else wrong? The answer is yes, absolutely. The law will also permit a party and its candidates to shift most of Rich Donor's contributions to a single candidate, say Smith. Here is how: The law permits each candidate and each party committee in the Smith Victory Committee to write Candidate Smith a check directly. For his primary and general elections combined, they can write checks of up to $4,000 (from each candidate's authorized campaign committee) and $10,000 (from each state and national committee). 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(e)(3)(B), 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 CFR § 110.3(b). This yields a potential $1,872,000 (from candidates) plus $530,000 (from party committees). Thus, the law permits the candidates and party entities to redirect $2.37 million of Rich Donor's $3.6 million check to Candidate Smith. It also permits state and national committees to contribute to Smith's general election campaign through making coordinated expenditures-in amounts that range from $46,600 to $2.68 million for a general election (depending upon the size of Smith's State and whether he is running for a House or Senate seat). 78 Fed.Reg. 8530-8532. See Appendix B, Table 2(b), infra, at 1486. The upshot is that Candidate Smith can receive at least $2.37 million and possibly the full $3.6 million contributed by Rich Donor to the Smith Victory Committee, even though the funds must first be divided up among the constituent units before they can be rerouted to Smith. Nothing requires the Smith Victory Committee to explain in advance to Rich Donor all of the various transfers that will take place, and nothing prevents the entities in the Committee from informing the donor and the receiving candidate after the fact what has transpired. Accordingly, the money can be donated and rerouted to Candidate Smith without the donor having violated the base limits or any other FEC regulation. And the evidence in the McConnell record reprinted in Appendix A, infra-with respect to soft money contributions-makes clear that Candidate Smith will almost certainly come to learn from whom he has received this money. The parties can apply the same procedure to other large donations, channeling money from Rich Donor Two to Candidate Jones. If 10 or 20 candidates face particularly tight races, party committees and party candidates may work together to channel Rich Donor One's multimillion dollar contribution to the Most Embattled Candidate ( e.g., Candidate Smith), Rich Donor Two's multimillion dollar contribution to the Second Most Embattled Candidate ( e.g., Candidate Jones), and so on down the line. If this does not count as evasion of the base limits, what does? Present aggregate limits confine the size of any individual gift to $123,200. Today's opinion creates a loophole measured in the millions. Example Three: Proliferating Political Action Committees (PACs). Campaign finance law prohibits an individual from contributing (1) more than $5,200 to any candidate in a federal election cycle, and (2) more than $5,000 to a PAC in a calendar year. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A), (C); 78 Fed.Reg. 8532. It also prohibits (3) any PAC from contributing more than $10,000 to any candidate in an election cycle. § 441(a)(2)(A). But the law does not prohibit an individual from contributing (within the current $123,200 biannual aggregate limit) $5,000 to each of an unlimited total number of PACs. And there, so to speak, lies the rub. Here is how, without any aggregate limits, a party will be able to channel $2 million from each of ten Rich Donors to each of ten Embattled Candidates. Groups of party supporters-individuals, corporations, or trade unions-create 200 PACs. Each PAC claims it will use the funds it raises to support several candidates from the party, though it will favor those who are most endangered. (Each PAC qualifies for "multicandidate" status because it has received contributions from more than 50 persons and has made contributions to five federal candidates at some point previously. § 441a(a)(4); 11 CFR § 100.5(e)(3)). Over a 2-year election cycle, Rich Donor One gives $10,000 to each PAC ($5,000 per year)-yielding $2 million total. Rich Donor 2 does the same. So, too, do the other eight Rich Donors. This brings their total donations to $20 million, disbursed among the 200 PACs. Each PAC will have collected $100,000, and each can use its money to write ten checks of $10,000-to each of the ten most Embattled Candidates in the party (over two years). See Appendix B, Table 3, infra, at 1487. Every Embattled Candidate, receiving a $10,000 check from 200 PACs, will have collected $2 million. The upshot is that ten Rich Donors will have contributed $2 million each, and ten Embattled Candidates will have collected $2 million each. In this example, unlike Example Two, the recipient candidates may not know which of the ten Rich Donors is personally responsible for the $2 million he or she receives. But the recipient candidate is highly likely to know who the ten Rich Donors are, and to feel appropriately grateful. Moreover, the ability of a small group of donors to contribute this kind of money to threatened candidates is not insignificant. In the example above-with ten Rich Donors giving $2 million each, and ten Embattled Candidates receiving $2 million each-the contributions would have been enough to finance a considerable portion of, and perhaps all of, the candidates' races in the 2012 elections. See Appendix C, Table 1, infra, at 1488 (showing that in 2012, the average winning House candidate spent $1.6 million and the average winning Senate candidate spent $11.5 million). B The plurality believes that the three scenarios I have just depicted either pose no threat, or cannot or will not take place. It does not believe the scenario depicted in Example One is any cause for concern, because it involves only "general, broad-based support of a political party." Ante, at 1460 - 1461. Not so. A candidate who solicits a multimillion dollar check for his party will be deeply grateful to the checkwriter, and surely could reward him with a quid pro quo favor. The plurality discounts the scenarios depicted in Example Two and Example Three because it finds such circumvention tactics "illegal under current campaign finance laws," "implausible," or "divorced from reality." Ante, at 1452 - 1453, 1453 - 1454, 1455 - 1456. But they are not. The plurality's view depends in large part upon its claim that since this Court decided Buckley in 1976, changes in either statutory law or in applicable regulations have come to make it difficult, if not impossible, for these circumvention scenarios to arise. Hence, it concludes, there is no longer a need for aggregate contribution limits. See ante, at 1446 - 1447, 1452 - 1456. But a closer examination of the five legal changes to which the plurality points makes clear that those changes cannot effectively stop the abuses that I have depicted. First, the plurality points out that in 1976 (a few months after this Court decided Buckley ) Congress "added limits on contributions to political committees," i.e., to PACs. Ante, at 1446; accord, 90 Stat. 487 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C)). But Example Three, the here-relevant example, takes account of those limits, namely, $5,000 to a PAC in any given year. And it shows that the per-PAC limit does not matter much when it comes to the potential for circumvention, as long as party supporters can create dozens or hundreds of PACs. Federal law places no upper limit on the number of PACs supporting a party or a group of party candidates that can be established. And creating a PAC is primarily a matter of paperwork, a knowledgeable staff person, and a little time. Second, the plurality points out that in 1976, Congress "also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees." Ante, at 1446. The rule provides that "all contributions made by political committees established or financed or maintained or controlled" by the same corporation, labor organization, person, or group of persons, "shall be considered to have been made by a single political committee." § 441a(a)(5). But different supporters can create different PACs. Indeed, there were roughly 2,700 "nonconnected" PACs ( i.e., PACs not connected to a specific corporation or labor union) operating during the 2012 elections. Ante, at 1453 - 1454. In a future without aggregate contribution limits, far more nonconnected PACs will likely appear. The plurality also notes that the FEC can examine certain " 'circumstantial factors,' " such as " 'common or overlapping membership' " or " 'similar patterns of contributions,' " to determine whether a group of PACs are affiliated. Ante, at 1454 (quoting 11 CFR § 100.5(g)(4)(ii)). But the ultimate question in the affiliation inquiry is whether "one committee or organization [has] been established, financed, maintain or controlled by another committee or sponsoring organization." Ibid. Just because a group of multicandidate PACs all support the same party and all decide to donate funds to a group of endangered candidates in that party does not mean they will qualify as "affiliated" under the relevant definition. This rule appears inadequate to stop the sort of circumvention depicted in Example Three. Third, the plurality says that a post-Buckley regulation has strengthened the statute's earmarking provision. Ante, at 1446 - 1447. Namely, the plurality points to a rule promulgated by the FEC in 1976, specifying that earmarking includes any "designation 'whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or written.' " Ibid. (quoting 11 CFR § 110.6(b)); accord, 41 Fed.Reg. 35950 (1976). This means that if Rich Donor were to give $5,000 to a PAC while "designat[ing]" (in any way) that the money go to Candidate Smith, those funds must count towards Rich Donor's total allowable contributions to Smith-$5,200 per election cycle. But the virtually identical earmarking provision in effect when this Court decided Buckley would have required the same thing. That provision also counted, when applying the base contribution limits, "all contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to a candidate." 88 Stat. 1264; accord, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (same). What is the difference? Fourth, the plurality points out that the FEC's regulations "specify that an individual who has contributed to a particular candidate committee may not also contribute to a single-candidate committee for that candidate." Ante, at 1447 (citing 11 CFR § 110.1(h)(1); emphasis added). The regulations, however, do not prevent a person who has contributed to a candidate from also contributing to multi candidate committees that support the candidate. Indeed, the rules specifically authorize such contributions. See § 110.1(h) ("A person may contribute to a candidate ... and also contribute to a political committee which has supported, or anticipates supporting, the same candidate in the same election," as long as the political committee is "not the candidate's principal campaign committee" or a "single candidate committee" (emphasis added)). Example Three illustrates the latter kind of contribution. And briefs before us make clear that the possibility for circumventing the base limits through making such contributions is a realistic, not an illusory, one. See Brief for Appellee 36 (demonstrating that many PACs today explain in their public materials just what fairly small group of candidates they intend to support); Brief for Americans for Campaign Reform as Amicus Curiae 14-15 (similar). Fifth, the plurality points to another FEC regulation (also added in 1976), which says that "an individual who has contributed to a candidate" may not "also contribute to a political committee that has supported or anticipates supporting the same candidate if the individual knows that 'a substantial portion [of his contribution] will be contributed to, or expended on behalf of,' that candidate." Ante, at 1447 (quoting 11 CFR § 110.1(h)(2); brackets in original); accord, 41 Fed.Reg. 35948. This regulation is important, for in principle, the FEC might use it to prevent the circumstances that Examples Two and Three set forth from arising. And it is not surprising that the plurality relies upon the existence of this rule when it describes those circumstances as "implausible," "illegal," or "divorced from reality." Ante, at 1452 - 1453, 1453 - 1454, 1455 - 1456. In fact, however, this regulation is not the strong anti-circumvention weapon that the plurality imagines. Despite the plurality's assurances, it does not "disarm" the possibilities for circumvention. Ante, at 1452 - 1453. That is because the regulation requires a showing that donors have " knowledge that a substantial portion " of their contributions will be used by a PAC to support a candidate to whom they have already contributed. § 110.1(h)(2) (emphasis added). And "knowledge" is hard to prove. I have found nine FEC cases decided since the year 2000 that refer to this regulation. In all but one, the FEC failed to find the requisite "knowledge"-despite the presence of Example Two or Example Three circumstances. See Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Transfund PAC, Matter Under Review (MUR) 6221, p. 11 (FEC, June 7, 2010) (although the donor "might reasonably infer that some portion of his contribution" to a candidate's Leadership PAC would be used to support the candidate, "such an inference alone does not suggest that [he] had 'actual knowledge' " of such); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: John Shadegg's Friends, MUR 5968, pp. 3, 6-7 (FEC, Nov. 10, 2008) ("[T]here is no basis on which to conclude that [the donors] knew that the funds they contributed to LEAD PAC would be used to support the Shadegg Committee" even though Congressman Shadegg solicited the donations and LEAD PAC was Congressman Shadegg's Leadership PAC); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Walberg for Congress, MUR 5881, pp. 6, 9-11 (FEC, Aug. 15, 2007) (finding seven contributors, who gave to a candidate and to a PAC that provided 86% of the candidate's financing, had not shown "knowledge"); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Matt Brown for Senate, MUR 5732, p. 11 (FEC, Apr. 4, 2007) ("Though it may be reasonable to infer that the individual donors solicited by Brown gave to the State Parties under the assumption that some portion of their contribution might then be donated to the Brown Committee, such an inference alone is insufficient to find reason to believe 11 CFR § 110.1(h) has been violated"); First General Counsel's Report, In re: Liffrig for Senate, MUR 5678, pp. 8-9 (FEC, Nov. 27, 2006) (similar); First General Counsel's Report, In re: Nesbitt, MUR 5445, pp. 11-12 (FEC, Feb. 2, 2005) (similar); First General Counsel's Report, In re: Keystone Corp., MUR 5019, pp. 23-29 (FEC, Feb. 5, 2001) (similar); General Counsel's Report # 2, In re: Boston Capital Corp., MUR 4538, pp. 17-18 (FEC, Mar. 10, 2000) (recommending the FEC take no action with respect to the § 110.1(h) issue). Given this record of FEC (in)activity, my reaction to the plurality's reliance upon agency enforcement of this rule (as an adequate substitute for Congress' aggregate limits) is like Oscar Wilde's after reading Dickens' account of the death of Little Nell: "One must have a heart of stone," said Wilde, "to read [it] without laughing." Oxford Dictionary of Humorous Quotations 86 (N. Sherrin 2d ed. 2001). I have found one contrary example-the single example to which the plurality refers. Ante, at 1454 (citing Conciliation Agreement, In reRiley, MURs 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 2001)). In that case, the FEC found probable cause to believe that three individual contributors to several PACs had the requisite "knowledge" that the PACs would use a "substantial portion" of their contributions to support a candidate to whom they had already contributed-Sam Brownback, a candidate for the Senate (for two of the contributors), and Robert Riley, a candidate for the House (for the third). The individuals had made donations to several PACs operating as a network, under the direction of a single political consulting firm. The two contributors to Sam Brownback were his parents-in-law, and the FEC believed they might be using the PAC network to channel extra support to him. The contributor to Robert Riley was his son, and the FEC believed he might be doing the same. The facts in this case are unusual, for individual contributors are not typically relatives of the candidates they are seeking to support, and ordinary PACs do not tend to work in coordination under the direction of a consulting firm. In any event, this single swallow cannot make the plurality's summer. Thus, it is not surprising that throughout the many years this FEC regulation has been in effect, political parties and candidates have established ever more joint fundraising committees (numbering over 500 in the last federal elections); candidates have established ever more "Leadership PACs" (numbering over 450 in the last elections); and party supporters have established ever more multicandidate PACs (numbering over 3,000 in the last elections). See Appendix C, Tables 2-3, infra, at 1488 - 1489; FEC, 2014 Committee Summary (reporting the number of "qualified" (or multicandidate) PACs in 2012), online at http:// www. fec. gov/ data/ Committee Summary. do (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 28, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Using these entities, candidates, parties, and party supporters can transfer and, we are told, have transferred large sums of money to specific candidates, thereby avoiding the base contribution limits in ways that Examples Two and Three help demonstrate. See Brief for Appellee 38-39, 53-54; Brief for Campaign Legal Center, et al. as Amici Curiae 12-15; Brief of Democratic Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae 28-29. They have done so without drawing FEC prosecution-at least not according to my (and apparently the plurality's) search of publicly available records. That is likely because in the real world, the methods of achieving circumvention are more subtle and more complex than our stylized Examples Two and Three depict. And persons have used these entities to channel money to candidates without any individual breaching the current aggregate $123,200 limit. The plurality now removes that limit, thereby permitting wealthy donors to make aggregate contributions not of $123,200, but of several millions of dollars. If the FEC regulation has failed to plug a small hole, how can it possibly plug a large one? IV The plurality concludes that even if circumvention were a threat, the aggregate limits are "poorly tailored" to address it. Ante, at 1456 - 1457. The First Amendment requires " 'a fit that is ... reasonable,' " and there is no such "fit" here because there are several alternative ways Congress could prevent evasion of the base limits. Ibid. (quoting Fox, 492 U.S., at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028). For instance, the plurality posits, Congress (or the FEC) could "tighten ... transfer rules"; it could require "contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated, nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients"; it could define "how many candidates a PAC must support in order to ensure that 'a substantial portion' of a donor's contribution is not rerouted to a certain candidate"; or it could prohibit "donors who have contributed the current maximum sums from further contributing to political committees that have indicated they will support candidates to whom the donor has already contributed." Ante, at 1459 (quoting 11 CFR § 110.1(h)(2)). The plurality, however, does not show, or try to show, that these hypothetical alternatives could effectively replace aggregate contribution limits. Indeed, it does not even "opine on the validity of any particular proposal," ante, at 1459 -presumably because these proposals themselves could be subject to constitutional challenges. For the most part, the alternatives the plurality mentions were similarly available at the time of Buckley. Their hypothetical presence did not prevent the Court from upholding aggregate limits in 1976. How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the plurality now to conclude that aggregate limits are "poorly tailored?" See ante, at 1456 - 1457. How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the Court to overrule Buckley now? In sum, the explanation of why aggregate limits are needed is complicated, as is the explanation of why other methods will not work. But the conclusion is simple: There is no "substantial mismatch" between Congress' legitimate objective and the "means selected to achieve it." Ante, at 1445 - 1446. The Court, as in Buckley, should hold that aggregate contribution limits are constitutional. V The District Court in this case, holding that Buckley foreclosed McCutcheon's constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits, granted the Government's motion to dismiss the complaint prior to a full evidentiary hearing. See 893 F.Supp.2d 133, 140-141 (D.C.2012). If the plurality now believes the District Court was wrong, then why does it not return the case for the further evidentiary development which has not yet taken place? In the past, when evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions, we have typically relied upon an evidentiary record amassed below to determine whether the law served a compelling governmental objective. And, typically, that record contained testimony from Members of Congress (or state legislators) explaining why Congress (or the legislature) acted as it did. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S., at 147-154, 124 S.Ct. 619 (upholding federal restrictions on soft money by drawing on an extensive District Court record that contained declarations from current and former Members of Congress); Colorado II, 533 U.S., at 457-465, 121 S.Ct. 2351 (upholding federal limits on coordinated expenditures between parties and candidates on the basis of a summary judgment record that contained declarations from party operatives, fundraisers, and Members of Congress); Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S., at 393, 120 S.Ct. 897 (upholding Missouri's contribution limits on the basis of the lower court record, which contained similar declarations). If we are to overturn an act of Congress here, we should do so on the basis of a similar record. For one thing, an evidentiary record can help us determine whether or the extent to which we should defer to Congress' own judgments, particularly those reflecting a balance of the countervailing First Amendment interests I have described. Determining whether anticorruption objectives justify a particular set of contribution limits requires answering empirically based questions, and applying significant discretion and judgment. To what extent will unrestricted giving lead to corruption or its appearance? What forms will any such corruption take? To what extent will a lack of regulation undermine public confidence in the democratic system? To what extent can regulation restore it? These kinds of questions, while not easily answered, are questions that Congress is far better suited to resolve than are judges. Thus, while court review of contribution limits has been and should be "rigorous," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612, we have also recognized that "deference to legislative choice is warranted." Beaumont, 539 U.S., at 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200. And that deference has taken account of facts and circumstances set forth in an evidentiary record. For another thing, a comparison of the plurality's opinion with this dissent reveals important differences of opinion on fact-related matters. We disagree, for example, on the possibilities for circumvention of the base limits in the absence of aggregate limits. We disagree about how effectively the plurality's "alternatives" could prevent evasion. An evidentiary proceeding would permit the parties to explore these matters, and it would permit the courts to reach a more accurate judgment. The plurality rationalizes its haste to forgo an evidentiary record by noting that "the parties have treated the question as a purely legal one." Ante, at 1448, n. 4. But without a doubt, the legal question-whether the aggregate limits are closely drawn to further a compelling governmental interest-turns on factual questions about whether corruption, in the absence of such limits, is a realistic threat to our democracy. The plurality itself spends pages citing figures about campaign spending to defend its "legal" conclusion. Ante, at 1453 - 1455, 1455 - 1456, 1456 - 1458. The problem with such reasoning is that this Court's expertise does not lie in marshaling facts in the primary instance. That is why in the past, when answering similar questions about the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign contributions, we have relied on an extensive evidentiary record produced below to inform our decision. Without further development of the record, however, I fail to see how the plurality can now find grounds for overturning Buckley. The justification for aggregate contribution restrictions is strongly rooted in the need to assure political integrity and ultimately in the First Amendment itself. Part II, supra. The threat to that integrity posed by the risk of special access and influence remains real. Part III, supra. Even taking the plurality on its own terms and considering solely the threat of quid pro quo corruption ( i.e., money-for-votes exchanges), the aggregate limits are a necessary tool to stop circumvention. Ibid. And there is no basis for finding a lack of "fit" between the threat and the means used to combat it, namely the aggregate limits. Part IV, supra. The plurality reaches the opposite conclusion. The result, as I said at the outset, is a decision that substitutes judges' understandings of how the political process works for the understanding of Congress; that fails to recognize the difference between influence resting upon public opinion and influence bought by money alone; that overturns key precedent; that creates huge loopholes in the law; and that undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of campaign finance reform. With respect, I dissent. APPENDIXES A Existence of Large Donations Expert Report: "During the 1996 election cycle, the top 50 nonfederal money donors made contributions ranging from $530,000 to $3,287,175.... Soft money financing of party campaigning exploded in the 2000 election cycle. Soft money spending by the national parties reached $498 million, now 42% of their total spending. Raising a half billion dollars in soft money [in 2000] took a major effort by the national parties and elected officials, but they had the advantage of focusing their efforts on large donors.... The top 50 soft money donors ... each contributed between $955,695 and $5,949,000." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 440 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing T. Mann Expert Report, pp. 22, 24-25) Candidate Solicitation of Large Donations Judicial Finding of Fact: "It is a common practice for Members of Congress to be involved in raising both federal and non-federal dollars for the national party committees, sometimes at the parties' request. The personal involvement of high-ranking Members of Congress is a major component of raising federal and nonfederal funds." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 471. Senator Paul Simon: " 'While I was in Congress, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) would ask Members to make phone calls seeking contributions to the party. They would assign me a list of names, people I had not known previously, and I would just go down the list. I am certain they did this because they found it more effective to have Members make calls.' " Ibid. (quoting Simon Decl. ¶ 7). Senator John McCain: " '[T]he parties encourage Members of Congress to raise large amounts of soft money to benefit their own and others' re-election. At one recent caucus meeting, a Member of Congress was praised for raising $1.3 million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently told the New York Times that House leaders consider soft money fundraising prowess in assigning chairmanships and other sought-after jobs.... I share Mr. Greenwood's concerns.' " Id., at 476 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶ 7). Representative Christopher Shays: " 'Soft money is raised directly by federal candidates, officeholders, and national political party leaders. National party officials often raise these funds by promising donors access to elected officials. The national parties and national congressional campaign committees also request that Members of Congress make the calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.' " Id., at 471 (quoting Shays Decl. ¶ 18). Representative Marty Meehan: " 'Members of Congress raise money for the national party committees, and I have been involved in such fund-raising for the Democratic Party. At the request of the Party Members of Congress go to the [DCCC] and call prospective donors from lists provided by the Party to ask them to participate in Party events, such as DCCC dinners or Democratic National Committee (DNC) dinners. These lists typically consist of persons who have contributed to the Democratic Party in the past.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 471 (quoting Meehan Decl. in Republican National Committee v. FEC, No. 98-CV-1207 (DC), ¶ 6). Lobbyist: " 'Even though soft money contributions often go to political parties, the money is given so that the contributors can be close to, and recognized by, Members, Presidents, and Administration officials who have power. Members, not party staffers or party chairs, raise much of the large soft money contributions.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 472 (quoting Robert Rozen Decl. ¶ 15, a partner in a lobbying firm). Senator Fred Thompson: " 'We have gone from basically a small donor system ... where the average person believed they had a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely large amounts of money, where you are not a player unless you are in the $100,000 or $200,000 range [or more]....' " Id., at 433 (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. 4622 (2001)). Former DNC official: "Former DNC and DSCC official and current lobbyist Robert Hickmott testifies that even incumbents with safe seats have incentives to raise money for the parties. He explains: 'Incumbents who were not raising money for themselves because they were not up for reelection would sometimes raise money for other Senators, or for challengers. They would send $20,000 to the DSCC and ask that it be entered on another candidate's tally. They might do this, for example, if they were planning to run for a leadership position and wanted to obtain support from the Senators they assisted. This would personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to help retain Democratic control of the Senate, which would preserve the legislative power of all Democratic senators.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 475-476 (quoting Hickmott Decl., Exh. A ¶ 18). Judicial Finding of Fact: "The DSCC maintains a 'credit' program that credits nonfederal money raised by a Senator or candidate to that Senator or candidate's state party. Amounts credited to a state party can reflect that the Senator or candidate solicited the donation, or can serve as a donor's sign of tacit support for the state party or the Senate candidate." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 477 (citation omitted). Judicial Finding of Fact: "Federal candidates also raise nonfederal money through joint fundraising committees formed with national committees. One common method of joint fundraising is for a national congressional committee to form a separate joint fundraising committee with a federal candidate committee.... Two experts characterize the joint fundraising system as one 'in which Senate candidates in effect raise[ ] soft money for use in their own races.' " Id., at 478 (quoting J. Krasno and F. Sorauf Expert Report, p. 13; citation omitted). Donor Access and Influence Judicial Finding of Fact: "The fact that Members of Congress are intimately involved in the raising of money for the political parties, particularly unlimited nonfederal money donations, creates opportunities for corruption. The record does not contain any evidence of bribery or vote buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money; however, the evidence presented in this case convincingly demonstrates that large contributions, particularly those nonfederal contributions surpassing the federal limits, provide donors access to federal lawmakers which is a critical ingredient for influencing legislation, and which the Supreme Court has determined constitutes corruption." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481. Judicial Finding of Fact: "Individual donors testify that contributions provide access to influence federal officeholders on issue of concern to them." Id., at 498. Political donor: " 'I've been involved in political fundraising long enough to remember when soft money had little value to federal candidates.... [I]n recent election cycles, Members and national committees have asked soft money donors to write soft money checks to state and national parties solely in order to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money donors don't ask and don't care why the money is going to a particular state party, a party with which they may have no connection. What matters is that the donor has done what the Member asked.' " Id., at 472 (quoting Wade Randlett, Chief Executive Officer, Dashboard Technology, Decl. ¶¶ 6-9). Political donor: " 'As a result of my $500,000 soft money donation to the DNC, I was offered the chance to attend events with the President, including events at the White House, a number of times. I was offered special access....' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 499 (quoting Arnold Hiatt Decl. ¶ 9). Senator Alan Simpson: " 'Too often, Members' first thought is not what is right or wrong or what they believe, but how will it affect fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about-and quite possibly votes on-an issue? ... When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want to be in that situation.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481 (quoting Simpson Decl. ¶ 10). Senator Alan Simpson: " 'Large donors of both hard and soft money receive special treatment. No matter how busy a politician may be during the day, he or she will always make time to see donors who gave large amounts of money. Staffers who work for Members know who the big donors are, and those people always get their phone calls returned first and are allowed to see the Member when others are not.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481-482 (quoting Simpson Decl. ¶ 9). Senator David Boren: " 'Donations, including soft money donations to political parties, do affect how Congress operates. It's only natural, and happens all too often, that a busy Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the call of a large soft money donor rather than the call of any other constituent.... I know from my first-hand experience and from my interactions with other Senators that they did feel beholden to large donors." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 482 (quoting Boren Decl. ¶¶ 7-8). Senator Dale Bumpers: "[Senator Bumpers] had 'heard that some Members even keep lists of big donors in their offices,' and [stated] that 'you cannot be a good Democratic or good Republican Member and not be aware of who gave money to the party.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 487 (quoting Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20). Representative Christopher Shays: " 'The candidates know who makes these huge contributions and what these donors expect. Candidates not only solicit these funds themselves, they meet with big donors who have important issues pending before the government; and sometimes, the candidates' or the party's position appear to change after such meetings.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 487 (quoting 148 Cong Rec. 1305 (2002)). Senator Warren Rudman: " 'Large soft money contributions in fact distort the legislative process. They affect what gets done and how it gets done. They affect whom Senators and House members see, whom they spend their time with, what input they get....' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 496 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9). Senator Paul Simon: " 'While I realize some argue donors don't buy favors, they buy access. That access is the abuse and it affects all of us.... You feel a sense of gratitude for their support.... Because few people can afford to give over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those people who can will receive substantially better access to elected federal leaders than people who can only afford smaller contributions or can not afford to make any contributions. When you increase the amount that people are allowed to give, or let people give without limit to the parties, you increase the danger of unfair access.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 496 (quoting Simon Decl. ¶ 16). Senator John McCain: " 'At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make their case to elected officials ... in a way average citizens cannot.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 496 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶ 6). Senator Warren Rudman: " 'I understand that those who opposed passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, and those who now challenge its constitutionality in Court, dare elected officials to point to specific [instances of vote buying]. I think this misses the point altogether. [The access and influence accorded large donors] is inherently, endemically, and hopelessly corrupting. You can't swim in the ocean without getting wet; you can't be part of this system without getting dirty.' " 251 F.Supp.2d, at 481 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶ 10). Judicial Finding of Fact: "Lobbyists state that their clients make donations to political parties to achieve access." 251 F.Supp.2d, at 489. Letter from Republican National Committee (RNC) staffer: " 'As you know, [this executive] has been very generous to the RNC. If there is any way you can assist [in obtaining an appointment with an important Senator], it would be greatly appreciated.' " Id., at 501 (quoting Memorandum from Tim Barnes, RNC, to Royal Roth). Letter from RNC: "[The] letter from RNC to Senator Hagel staffer [asks] Senator Hagel to meet with a donor for four 'key' reasons including: ... '[h]e just contributed $100,000 to the RNC.' " Ibid. (quoting a letter in the judicial record). Judicial Finding of Fact: "The political parties have structured their donation programs so that donors are encouraged to contribute larger amounts in order to get access to more exclusive and intimate events at which Members or Congress are present. The evidence also shows that the parties use the enticement of access to secure larger donations." Id., at 502 (quoting a document in the judicial record). B IMAGE IMAGE IMAGE C IMAGE IMAGE The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. There are six authorized national party committees: the Republican National Committee, the Democratic National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(14). A PAC is a business, labor, or interest group that raises or spends money in connection with a federal election, in some cases by contributing to candidates. A so-called "Super PAC" is a PAC that makes only independent expenditures and cannot contribute to candidates. The base and aggregate limits govern contributions to traditional PACs, but not to independent expenditure PACs. See SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686, 695-696 (C.A.D.C.2010) (en banc). A multicandidate PAC is a PAC with more than 50 contributors that has been registered for at least six months and has made contributions to five or more candidates for federal office. 11 CFR § 100.5(e)(3) (2012). PACs that do not qualify as multicandidate PACs must abide by the base limit applicable to individual contributions. The dissent contends that we should remand for development of an evidentiary record before answering the question with which we were presented. See post, at 1479 - 1481 (opinion of BREYER, J.). But the parties have treated the question as a purely legal one, and the Government has insisted that the aggregate limits can be upheld under the existing record alone. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 55-56. We take the case as it comes to us. See, e.g., Felsenthal, Obama Attends Fundraiser Hosted by Jay-Z, Beyonce, Reuters, Sept. 18, 2012; Coleman, Kid Rock Supports Paul Ryan at Campaign Fundraiser, Rolling Stone, Aug. 25, 2012; Mason, Robert Duvall to Host Romney Fundraiser, L.A. Times, July 25, 2012; Piazza, Hillary Lands 2.5M with Rocket Man, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 10, 2008, p. 2. The fact that this opinion does not address the base limits also belies the dissent's concern that we have silently overruled the Court's holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003). See post, at 1470 - 1471. At issue in McConnell was BCRA's extension of the base limits to so-called "soft money"-previously unregulated contributions to national party committees. See 540 U.S., at 142, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also post, at 1481 - 1484 (appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.) (excerpts from McConnell record discussing unregulated "soft money"). Our holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not overrule McConnell 's holding about "soft money." It would be especially odd to regard aggregate limits as essential to enforce base limits when state campaign finance schemes typically include base limits but not aggregate limits. Just eight of the 38 States that have imposed base limits on contributions from individuals to candidates have also imposed aggregate limits (excluding restrictions on a specific subset of donors). See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-611(c) (2013); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., Tit. 21-A, § 1015(3) (Supp. 2013); Md. Elec. Law Code Ann. § 13-226(b) (Lexis Supp. 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55, § 7A(a)(5) (West 2012); N.Y. Elec. Law Ann. § 14-114(8) (West Supp. 2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-25-10.1(a)(1) (Lexis 2013); Wis. Stat. § 11.26(4) (2007-2008); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-25-102(c)(ii) (2013). The Government presents no evidence concerning the circumvention of base limits from the 30 States with base limits but no aggregate limits. Even those premises are generous because they assume that the donor contributes to non-multicandidate PACs, which are relatively rare. Multicandidate PACs, by contrast, must have more than 50 contributors. 11 CFR § 100.5(e)(3). The more contributors, of course, the more the donor's share in any eventual contribution to Smith is diluted. The Justice Department agrees. As Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman recently testified before Congress: "We anticipate seeing fewer cases of conduit contributions directly to campaign committees or parties, because individuals or corporations who wish to influence elections or officials will no longer need to attempt to do so through conduit contribution schemes that can be criminally prosecuted. Instead, they are likely to simply make unlimited contributions to Super PACs or 501(c)s." Hearing on Current Issues in Campaign Finance Law Enforcement before the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (2013). In addition, the percentage of contributions above the aggregate limits that even could be used for circumvention is limited by the fact that many of the modes of potential circumvention can be used only once each election. For example, if one donor gives $2,600 to 100 candidates with safe House seats in the hopes that each candidate will reroute $2,000 to Representative Smith, a candidate in a contested district, no other donor can do the same, because the candidates in the safe seats will have exhausted their permissible contributions to Smith. So there is no risk that the circumvention scheme will repeat itself with multiple other would-be donors to Smith.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, et al. v. ROBERTSON et al. No. 74-450. Argued April 15, 1975 — Decided June 24, 1975 Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for petitioners. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Hills, Allan Abbot Tuttle, Leonard Schaitman, and Thomas G. Wilson. Alan B. Morrison argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case in order to determine whether Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(3), permits nondisclosure to respondents of certain reports in the files of the Federal Aviation Administration. This exemption provides that material need not be disclosed if “specifically-exempted from disclosure by statute.” The reports are known as Systems Worthiness Analysis Program (SWAP) Reports. They consist of analyses made by representatives of the FAA concerning the operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines. Oversight and regulation of air travel safety is the responsibility of the FAA, § 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 775, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1421. The FAA claims the documents are protected from disclosure by virtue of § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. § 1504. The facts of the case, in its present posture, are quite simple. During the summer of 1970, in connection with a study of airline safety being conducted by them, the respondents, associated with the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, requested that the FAA make available certain SWAP Reports. The FAA declined to produce the documents. In accordance with established procedures adopted by the FAA, the respondents then filed timely notice of administrative appeal in August 1970. Several months later, while this administrative appeal was pending, the Air Transport Association, on behalf of its airline members, requested that the FAA make no public disclosure of the SWAP Reports. The Association noted that, in a prior memorandum of its own staff, the FAA had pointed out that “ ‘[t]he SWAP Program requires a cooperative effort on both the part of the company and FAA if it is to work effectively,’ ” and argued that “[t]he present practice of non-public submissions, which includes even tentative findings and opinions as well as certain factual material, encourages a spirit of openness on the part of airline management which is vital to the promotion of aviation safety — the paramount consideration of airlines and government alike in this area.” In February 1971, the FAA formally denied respondents’ request for the SWAP Reports. It took the position that the reports are exempt from public disclosure under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(3), the section at issue here. As previously noted, that section provides that such material need not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act when the material is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. The FAA noted that § 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 permits the Administrator to withhold information, public disclosure of which, in his judgment, would adversely affect the interests of the objecting party and is not required to be disclosed in the interest of the public. The FAA also based its denial of these data on the exemption for intra-agency memoranda (5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(5)), the exemption for investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes (§ 552 (b)(7)), and, finally, the exemption for documentation containing trade secrets and commercial or financial information of a privileged or confidential nature (§ 552 (b)(4)). The FAA’s answer also explained its view of the need for confidentiality in SWAP Reports: “The effectiveness of the in-depth analysis that is the essence of SWAP team investigation depends, to a great extent, upon the full, frank and open cooperation of the operator himself during the inspection period. His assurance by the FAA that the resulting recommendations are in the interest of safety and operational efficiency and will not be disclosed to the public are the major incentives impelling the operator to hide nothing and to grant free access to procedures, system of operation, facilities, personnel, as well as management and operational records in order to exhibit his normal course of operations to the SWAP inspectors.” Respondents then sued in the District Court, seeking, inter alia, the requested documents. The District Court held that “the documents sought by plaintiffs . . . are, as a matter of law, public and non-exempt within the meaning of 5 United States Code [§] 552, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment ... as a matter of law.” A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court “insofar as appellants rely upon Exemption (3),” but remanded the case for consideration of other exemptions which the FAA might wish to assert. 162 U. S. App. D. C. 298, 498 F. 2d 1031 (1974). Examining first what it felt was the ordinary meaning of the language of Exemption 3, the Court of Appeals held that its language required the exempting statute relied on to specify or categorize the particular documents it authorizes to be withheld. Because § 1104 delegated “broad discretionary authority” under a “public interest” standard, it was held not within the scope of Exemption 3. The Court of Appeals distinguished this Court’s decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973), on the ground that the exemption involved in that case was construed to be a specific reference by Congress to a definite class of documents, namely those that must be kept secret “ 'in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy/ ” 162 TJ. S. App. D. C., at 300,498 F. 2d, at 1033. The Court of Appeals read the Act as providing a comprehensive guide to congressional intent. One of the Act’s major purposes was seen as intending to eliminate what it characterized as vague phrases such as “in the public interest” or “for good cause” as a basis for withholding information. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that § 1104 cannot be considered a specific exemption by statute within the meaning of Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act. This case involves no constitutional claims, no issues regarding the nature or scope of “executive privilege,” but simply the scope and meaning of one of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. EPA v. Mink, supra, at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Act has two aspects. In one, it seeks to open public records to greater public access; in the other, it seeks to preserve the confidentiality undeniably essential in certain areas of Government operations. It is axiomatic that all parts of an Act “if at all possible, are to be given effect.” Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U. S. 609, 633 (1973). Accord, Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974). We have construed the Freedom of Information Act recently in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132 (1975); Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U. S. 168 (1975); Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1 (1974); EPA v. Mink, supra. In Mink, the Court set out the general nature and purpose of the Act, recognizing, as did the Senate committee report, that it is not “ ‘an easy task to balance the opposing interests . . .’” and “ ‘provid[e] a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests ....’” 410 U. S., at 80, quoting from S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). Nothing in the Act or its legislative history-gives any intimation that all information in all agencies and in all circumstances is to be open to public inspection. Because it considered the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238, 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (1964 ed.), inadequate, Congress sought to permit access to certain kinds of official information which it thought had unnecessarily been withheld and, by the creation of nine explicitly exclusive exemptions, to provide a more workable and balanced formula that would make available information that ought to be public and, at the same time, protect certain information where confidentiality was necessary to protect legitimate governmental functions that would be impaired by disclosure. The exemptions provided by the Act, one of which we deal with here, represent the congressional judgment as to certain kinds of “information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses,” 410 U. S., at 80. The language of Exemption 3 contains no “built-in” standard as in the case of some of the other exemptions. The variety of constructions given its language by the Courts of Appeals, is ample evidence that the relevant portions of the exemption are unclear and ambiguous, compelling resort to the legislative history. See United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U. S. 297, 303 (1969). Cf. United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961). That history must be read in light of the legislation in existence when the Act was passed; that history reveals “clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 129 (1974). Congress was aware, as it undertook a painstaking review, during several sessions, of the right of the public to information concerning the public business; it was aware that it was acting not only against the backdrop of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, supra, but also on the basis of a significant number of earlier congressional decisions that confidentiality was essential in certain departments and agencies in order to protect the public interest. No distinction seems to have been made on the basis of the standards articulated in the exempting statute or on the degree of discretion which it vested in a particular Government officer. When the continued vitality of these specialized exempting statutes was raised by the views of various agencies, the members of the committee consistently expressed the clear intention that these statutes would remain unaffected by the new Act. During the 1963 hearings, for example, Senator Long, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee stated: “It should be made clear that this bill in no way limits statutes specifically written with the congressional intent of curtailing the flow of information as a supplement necessary to the proper functioning of certain agencies.” Indeed, some provisions of bills which were not enacted could well have been construed as repealing all earlier legislation, but such provisions were not included in the bill that was finally enacted. More specifically, when the Civil Aeronautics Board brought § 1104 to the attention of both the House and Senate hearings of 1965, and expressed the agency interpretation that the provision was encompassed within Exemption 3, no question was raised or challenge made to the agency view of the impact of that exemption. When the House Committee on Government Operations focused on Exemption 3, it took note that there are “nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records. These would not be modified by the public records provisions of S. 1160.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). (Emphasis added.) The respondents can prevail only if the Act is to be read as repealing by implication all existing statutes “which restrict public access to specific Government records.” Ibid. The term “specific" as there used cannot be read as meaning that the exemption applies only to documents specified, i. e., by naming them precisely or by describing the category in which they fall. To require this interpretation would be to ask of Congress a virtually impossible task. Such a construction would also imply that Congress had undertaken to reassess every delegation of authority to withhold information which it had made before the passage of this legislation — a task which the legislative history shows it clearly did not undertake. Earlier this Term, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, noted that “repeals by implication are disfavored,” 419 U. S., at 133, and that, when courts are confronted with statutes “ ‘capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.’ ” Id., at 133-134, quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). As we have noted, here, as in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, there is “clear evidence that Congress was aware of the necessity to deal expressly with inconsistent laws,” 419 U. S., at 129. To spell out repeal by implication of a multitude of statutes enacted over a long period of time, each of which was separately weighed and considered by Congress to meet an identified need, would be a more unreasonable step by a court than to do so with respect to a single statute such as was involved in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra. Congress’ response was to permit the numerous laws then extant allowing confidentiality to stand; it is not for us to override that legislative choice. The discretion vested by Congress in the FAA, in both its nature and scope, is broad. There is not, however, any inevitable inconsistency between the general congressional intent to replace the broad standard of the former Administrative Procedure Act and its intent to preserve, for air transport regulation, a broad degree of discretion on what information is to be protected in the public interest in order to insure continuing access to the sources of sensitive information necessary to the regulation of air transport. Congress could not reasonably anticipate every situation in which the balance must tip in favor of nondisclosure as a means of insuring that the primary, or indeed sole, source of essential information would continue to volunteer information needed to develop and maintain safety standards. The public interest is served by assuring a free flow of relevant information to the regulatory authorities from the airlines. Congress could appropriately conclude that the public interest was better served by guaranteeing confidentiality in order to secure the maximum amount of information relevant to safety. The wisdom of the balance struck by Congress is not open to judicial scrutiny. It was inescapable that some regulatory authorities be vested with broad, flexible discretion, the exercise of which was made subject to continuing scrutiny by Congress. Following passage of the Act, “[g]eneral oversight into the administration of the Freedom of Information Act [was] exercised by the [House] Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee and the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.” H. R. Rep. No. 92-1419, pp. 3-4 (1972). It is not insignificant that this overall scrutiny of the Act in 1972 brought no change in Exemption 3. Indeed, when Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, it reaffirmed the continued vitality of this particular exemption, covering statutes vesting in the agencies wide authority. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, p. 12 (1974); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, p. 12 (1974). Moreover, Congress amended the Act in 1974 to require that all agencies submit to each House, on an annual basis, “the number of determinations made by such agency not to comply with requests for records... and the reasons for each such determination.” 88 Stat. 1564, 5 U. S. C. §552 (d)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In light of this continuing close scrutiny, we are bound to assume that Congress exercised an informed judgment as to the needs of the FAA and that it was persuaded as to the necessity, or at least of the practical compatibility, of both statutes. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan dissent for the reasons given in Judge Fahy’s opinion for the Court of Appeals, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 298, 498 F. 2d 1031 (1974). 419 U. S. 1067 (1974). The Act was amended in 1974, Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, to read in pertinent part: “(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: “(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Exemption 3, which was not amended in 1974, is provided by 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) (3), which reads as follows: “(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— “(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.” Prior to the 1974 amendments, § 552 (a) (3) read, in pertinent part: “Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. ...” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (3). The SWAP is set forth in the Federal Aviation Administration’s Systemworthiness Analysis Program Handbook, 8000.3B (reprinted Nov. 1970) (App. 44H11). A revised version of the SWAP Handbook is contained in FAA Order 8000.3C, Apr. 14, 1972. (With subsequent changes.) See also affidavit of FAA Administrator Shaffer, App. 40. Section 1104 provides: “Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information contained in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or of information obtained by the Board or the Administrator, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, stating the grounds for such objection. Whenever such objection is made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public. The Board or Administrator shall be responsible for classified information in accordance with appropriate law: Provided, That nothing in this section shall authorize the withholding of information by the Board or Administrator from the duly authorized committees of the Congress.” The respondents had also sought disclosure of Mechanical Reliability Reports, which are daily reports of mechanical malfunctions submitted to the FAA by the aircraft companies. On January 11, 1972, the Administrator determined that he would permit the disclosure of such documents received after April 18, 1972. The District Court’s subsequent order in this case, on November 8, 1972, ordered disclosure of these documents received prior to that date. The Administrator has not contested this aspect of the District Court’s order either on appeal to the Court of Appeals or in his petition for writ of certiorari to this Court. In Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F. 2d 821 (CA5 1971), the court held that 49 U. S. C. § 1504, the FAA statute in question here, was within the scope of Exemption 3. 446 F. 2d, at 824. The same Court of Appeals, however, in an unpublished opinion, Serchuk v. Weinberger, affirmance reported at 493 F. 2d 663 (1974), followed the Third Circuit in Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F. 2d 639 (1974), in holding that 53 Stat. 1398, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1306 (a) — requiring the confidentiality of all material obtained by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare “except as the Secretary . . . may by regulations prescribe” — was not within the scope of Exemption 3 because it neither “identifies some class or category of items that Congress considers appropriate for exemption,” 495 F. 2d, at 640, nor at least “sets out legislatively prescribed standards of guidelines that the Secretary must follow in determining what matter shall be exempted from disclosure.” Ibid. Accord, Schechter v. Weinberger, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 236, 238, 506 F. 2d 1275, 1277 (1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing his prior dissenting opinion in the same case, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 282, 498 F. 2d 1015 (1974)). In California v. Weinberger, 505 F. 2d 767 (1974), the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in regard to 42 U. S. C. § 1306 (a) on the ground that the general nondisclosure mandate constituted “words of congressional exemption,” 505 F. 2d, at 768, and thus the material was “specifically exempted ... by statute.” The Secretary merely had the authority “to relax the absolute prohibition established by Congress.” Ibid. Cf. Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F. 2d 122 (CA4 1974), finding sufficient specificity in the term “ [applications for patents” of 35 U. S. C. § 122 and in Rules 14 (a) and (b) of the Patent Office to satisfy even the objections of the Stretch court and to bring 35 U. S. C. § 122 within the scope of Exemption 3. Note, Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 Notre Dame Law. 417, 453 n. 254 (1965). Hearings on S. 1666 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1963) (statement of Senator Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee and sponsor of § 1666, which was not changed, in pertinent part, in the final enactment). See also Hearings on H. R. 5012 et al. before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1965) (statement of Rep. Moss, Subcommittee Chairman). Id., at 3: “All laws or part of laws inconsistent with the amendment made by the first section of this Act are hereby repealed.” Id., at 14, 20, 53. Id., at 237. See also Hearings on S. 1160 et al. before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 366 (1965). The statute’s predecessor (49 U. S. C. §674) also was specifically listed on an exhibit of “exempt statutes” submitted during the 1958 Hearing on S. 921 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, pp. 985-987, 997. Subsequent lists — specifically not claiming to be exhaustive — include similar statutes. See House-Committee on Government Operations, Federal Statutes on the Availability of Information, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 213, 209 (Comm. Print Mar. 1960), listing 26 U. S. C. § 6104 (a) and 15 U. S. C. § 78x (b). See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.18 (1970 Supp.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OHIO FORESTRY ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SIERRA CLUB et al. No. 97-16. Argued February 25, 1998 Decided May 18, 1998 Beeyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal respondents in support of petitioner, under this Court’s Rule 12.6. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Wax-man, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, and Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler. Steven P. Quarles argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Clifton S. Elgarten, Thomas R. Lundquist, and William R. Murray. Frederick M. Gittes argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Patti A. Goldman, Todd D. True, and Alex Levinson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alabama Forestry Association et al. by Charles Rothfeld; for Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics et al. by Michael Axline; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Robin L. Rivett; for the Southeastern Ohio Oil & Gas Association by James S. Huggins and M. Dale Leeper; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. William V. Luneburg filed a brief for the Institute for Fisheries Resources et al. as amici curiae. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Sierra Club challenges the lawfulness of a federal land and resource management plan adopted by the United States Forest Service for Ohio’s Wayne National Forest on the ground that the plan permits too much logging and too much elearcutting. We conclude that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. I The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) requires the Secretary of Agriculture to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for units of the National Forest System.” 90 Stat. 2949, as renumbered and amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). The System itself is vast. It includes 155 national forests, 20 national grasslands, 8 land utilization projects, and other lands that together occupy nearly 300,000 square miles of land located in 44 States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. § 1609(a); 36 CFR § 200.1(c)(2) (1997); Office of the Federal Register, United States Government Manual 135 (1997/1998). The National Forest Service, which manages the System, develops land and resource management plans pursuant to NFMA, and uses these forest plans to “guide all natural resource management activities,” 36 CFR § 219.1(b) (1997), including use of the land for “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness.” 16 U. S. C. § 1604(e)(1). In developing the plans, the Service must take both environmental and commercial goals into account. See, e. g., § 1604(g); 36 CFR § 219.1(a) (1997). This ease focuses upon a plan that the Forest Service has developed for the Wayne National Forest located in southern Ohio. When the Service wrote the plan, the forest consisted of 178,000 federally owned acres (278 sq. mi.) in three forest units that are interspersed among privately owned lands, some of which the Forest Service plans to acquire over time. See Land and Resource Management Plan, Wayne National Forest, United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Eastern Region (1987) 1-3,3-1, A-13 to A-17 (hereinafter Plan). The Plan permits logging to take place on 126,000 (197 sq. mi.) of the federally owned acres. Id., at 4-7, 4-180. At the same time, it sets a ceiling on the total amount of wood that can be cut — a ceiling that amounts to about 75 million board feet over 10 years, and which, the Plan projects, would lead to logging on about 8,000 acres (12.5 sq. mi.) during that decade. Id., at 4-180. According to the Plan, logging on about 5,000 (7.8 sq. mi.) of those 8,000 acres would involve clearcutting, or other forms of what the Forest Service calls “even-aged” tree harvesting. Id., at 3-5, 4-180. Although the Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas of the forest that are suited to timber production, 16 U. S. C. § 1604(k), and determines which “probable methods of timber harvest” are appropriate, § 1604(f)(2), it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Before the Forest Service can permit the logging, it must: (a) propose a specific area in which logging will take place and the harvesting methods to be used, Plan 4-20 to 4-25; 53 Fed. Reg. 26835-26836 (1988); (b) ensure that the project is consistent with the Plan, 16 U. S. C. § 1604(i); 36 CFR § 219.10(e) (1997); (c) provide those affected by proposed logging notice and an opportunity to be heard, 106 Stat. 1419 (note following 16 U. S. C. § 1612); 36 CFR pt. 215, § 217.1(b) (1997); Plan 5-2; (d) conduct an environmental analysis pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U. S. C. §4332 et seq.; Plan 4-14, to evaluate the effects of the specific project and to contemplate alternatives, 40 CFR §§1502.14, 1508.9(b) (1997); Plan 1-2; and (e) subsequently make a final decision to permit logging, which affected persons may challenge in an administrative appeals process and in court, see 106 Stat. 1419-1420 (note folowing 16 U. S. C. § 1612); 5 U. S. C. §701 et seq. See also 53 Fed. Reg. 26834-26835 (1988); 58 Fed. Reg. 19370-19371 (1998). Furthermore, the statute requires the Forest Service to “revise” the Plan “as appropriate.” 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). Despite the considerable legal distance between the adoption of the Plan and the moment when a tree is cut, the Plan’s promulgation nonetheless makes logging more likely in that it is a logging precondition; in its absence logging could not take place. See ibid, (requiring promulgation of forest plans); § 1604(i) (requiring all later forest uses to conform to forest plans). When the Forest Service first proposed its Plan, the Sierra Club and the Citizens Council on Conservation and Environmental Control each objected. In an effort to bring about the Plan’s modification, they (collectively Sierra Club), pursued various administrative remedies. See Administrative Decision of the Chief of the Forest Service (Nov. 14, 1990), Pet. for Cert. 66a; Appeal Decision, Wayne National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (Jan. 14, 1992), id., at 78a. The Sierra Club then brought this lawsuit in federal court, initially against the Chief of the Forest Service, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Regional Forester, and the Forest Supervisor. The Ohio Forestry Association, some of whose members harvest timber from the Wayne National Forest or process wood products obtained from the forest, later intervened as a defendant. The Sierra Club’s second amended complaint sets forth its legal claims. That complaint initially states facts that describe the Plan in detail and allege that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and eleareutting. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 13-47 (hereinafter Complaint), App. 16-23. The Complaint then sets forth three claims for relief. The first claim for relief says that the “defendants in approving the plan for the Wayne [National Forest] and in directing or permitting below-cost timber sales accomplished by means of eleareutting” violated various laws including the NFMA, the NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Complaint ¶ 49, id., at 24. The second claim says that the “defendants’ actions in directing or permitting below-cost timber sales in the Wayne [National Forest] under the plan violate [their] duties as public trustees.” Complaint ¶ 52, ibid. The third claim says that, in selecting the amount of the forest suitable for timber production, the defendants followed regulations that failed properly to identify “economically unsuitable lands.” Complaint ¶¶ 54-58, id., at 25-26. It adds that, because the Forest Service’s regulations thereby permitted the Service'to place “economically unsuitable lands” in the category of land where logging could take place, the regulations violated them authorizing statute, NFMA, 16 U. S. C. § 1600 et seq., and were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in accordance with law,” pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. Complaint ¶ 60, App. 26. The Complaint finally requests as relief: (a) a declaration that the Plan “is unlawful as are the below-cost timber sales and timbering, including eleareutting, authorized by the plan,” (b) an “injunction prohibiting the defendants from permitting or directing further timber harvest and/or below-cost timber sales” pending Plan revision, (e) costs and attorney’s fees, and (d) “such other further relief as may be appropriate.” Complaint ¶¶ (aMd), id., at 26-27. The District Court reviewed the Plan, decided that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various determinations that the Sierra Club had challenged, and granted summary judgment for the Forest Service. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 508 (SD Ohio 1994). The Sierra Club appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the dispute was justiciable, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was “ripe for review,” there was no need to wait “until a site-specific action occurs.” Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F. 3d 248, 250 (1997). The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court about the merits. It held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated NFMA. Id., at 251-252. We granted certiorari to determine whether the dispute about the Plan presents a controversy that is justiciable now, and if so, whether the Plan conforms to the statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan. II Petitioner alleges that this suit is nonjusticiable both because the Sierra Club lacks standing to bring this case and because the issues before us — over the Plan’s specifications for logging and clearcutting — are not yet ripe for adjudication. We find that the dispute is not justiciable, because it is not ripe for court review. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens For Better Environment, ante, at 100-101, n. 3. As this Court has previously pointed out, the ripeness requirement is designed “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148-149 (1967). In deciding whether an agency’s decision is, or is not, ripe for judicial review, the Court has examined both the “fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and the “hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id., at 149. To do so in this ease, we must consider: (1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (8) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented. These considerations, taken together, foreclose review in the present ease. First, to “withhold] court consideration” at present will not cause the parties significant “hardship” as this Court has come to use that term. Ibid. For one thing, the provisions of the Plan that the Sierra Club challenges do not create adverse effects of a strictly legal kind, that is, effects of a sort that traditionally would have qualified as harm. To paraphrase this Court’s language in United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 309-310 (1927) (opinion of Brandéis, J.), they do not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; they do not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability; they create no legal rights or obligations. Thus, for example, the Plan does not give anyone a legal right to cut trees, nor does it abolish anyone’s legal authority to object to trees being cut. Nor have we found that the Plan now inflicts significant practical harm upon the interests that the Sierra Club advances — an important consideration in light of this Court’s modern ripeness cases. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 152-154. As we have pointed out, before the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court. Supra, at 729-730. The Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain. Any such later challenge might also include a challenge to the lawfulness of the present Plan if (but only if) the present Plan then matters, i. e., if the Plan plays a causal role with respect to the future, then-imminent, harm from logging. Hence we do not find a strong reason why the Sierra Club must bring its challenge now in order to get relief. Cf. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 152. Nor has the Sierra Club pointed to any other way in which the Plan could now force it to modify its behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences, as, for example, agency regulations can sometimes force immediate compliance through fear of future sanctions. Cf. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 152-153 (finding challenge ripe where plaintiffs must comply with Federal Drug Administration labeling rule at once and incur substantial economic costs or risk later serious criminal and civil penalties for unlawful drug distribution); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 417-419 (1942) (finding challenge ripe where plaintiffs must comply with burdensome Federal Communications Commission rule at once or risk later loss of license and consequent serious harm). The Sierra Club does say that it will be easier, and certainly cheaper, to mount one legal challenge against the Plan now, than to pursue many challenges to each site-specific logging decision to which the Plan might eventually lead. It does not explain, however, why one initial site-specific victory (if based on the Plan’s unlawfulness) could not, through preclusion principles, effectively carry the day. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 894 (1990). And, in any event, the Court has not considered this kind of litigation cost saving sufficient by itself to justify review in a case that would otherwise be unripe. The ripeness doctrine reflects a judgment that the disadvantages of a premature review that may prove too abstract or unnecessary ordinarily outweigh the additional costs of — even repetitive— postimplementation litigation. See, e. g., ibid. (“The case-by-ease approach ... is understandably frustrating to an organization such as respondent, which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our Nation’s ... foreste .... But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts”); FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 244 (1980); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 24 (1974); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 304 U. S. 209, 222 (1938). Second, from the agency’s perspective, immediate judicial review directed at the lawfulness of logging and clearcutting could hinder agency efforts to refine its policies: (a) through revision of the Plan, e. g., in response to an appropriate pro-, posed site-specific action that is inconsistent with the Plan, see 53 Fed. Reg. 23807, 26836 (1988), or (b) through application of the Plan in practice, e. g., in the form of site-specific proposals, which are subject to review by a court applying purely legal criteria. Cf Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 149; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190, 201 (1983). Cf. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 242 (premature review “denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise”). And, here, the possibility that further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is implemented is not theoretical, but real. See, e. g., 60 Fed. Reg. 18886, 18901 (1995) (forest plans often not fully implemented), id., at 18905-18907 (discussing process for amending forest plans); 58 Fed. Reg. 19369, 19370-19371 (1993) (citing administrative appeals indicating that plans are merely programmatic in nature and that plan cannot foresee all effects on forest); Appeal Nos. 92-09-11-0008, 92-09-11-0009 (Lodging II) (successful Sierra Club administrative appeals against Wayne timber harvesting site-specific projects). Hearing the Sierra Club’s challenge now could thus interfere with the system that Congress specified for the agency to reach forest logging decisions. Third, from the courts’ perspective, review of the Sierra Club’s claims regarding logging and clearcutting now would require time-consuming judicial consideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan, which predicts consequences that may affect many different parcels of land in a variety of ways, and which effects themselves may change over time. That review would have to take place without benefit of the focus that a particular logging proposal could provide. Thus, for example, the court below in evaluating the Sierra Club’s claims had to focus upon whether the Plan as a whole was “improperly skewed,” rather than focus upon whether the decision to allow clearcutting on a particular site was improper, say, because the site was better suited to another use or logging there would cumulatively result in too many trees being cut. See 105 F. 3d, at 250-251. And, of course, depending upon the agency’s future actions to revise the Plan or modify the expected methods of implementation, review now may turn out to have been unnecessary. See Standard Oil Co., supra, at 242. This type of review threatens the kind of “abstract disagreements over administrative policies,” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U. S., at 148, that the ripeness doctrine seeks to avoid. In this case, for example, the Court of Appeals panel disagreed about whether or not the Forest Service suffered from a kind of general “bias” in favor of timber production and clearcutting. Review where the consequences had been “reduced to more manageable proportions,” and where the "factual components [were] fleshed out, by some concrete action” might have led the panel majority either to demonstrate that bias- and its consequences through record citation (which it did not do) or to abandon the claim. National Wildlife Federation, supra, at 891. All this is to say that farther factual development would "significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented” and would “aid us in their resolution.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 82 (1978). Finally, Congress has not provided for preimplementation judicial review of forest plans. Those plans are tools for agency planning and management. The Plan is consequently unlike agency rules that Congress has specifically instructed the courts to review "pre-enforcement.” Cf. National Wildlife Federation, supra, at 891; 15 U. S. C. § 2618 (Toxic Substances Control Act) (providing preenforeement review of agency action); 30 U. S. C. § 1276(a) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977) (same); 42 U. S. C. §6976 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976) (same); § 7607(b) (Clean Air Act) (same); 43 U. S. C. § 1349(c)(3) (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592-593 (1980). Nor does the Plan, which through standards guides future use of forests, resemble an environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to NEPA. That is because in this respect NEPA, unlike the NFMA, simply guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result. Compare 16 U. S. C. § 1604(e) (requiring that forest plans provide for multiple coordinated use of forests, including timber and wilderness) with 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (requiring that agencies prepare environmental impact statements where major agency action would significantly affect the environment). Hence a person with standing who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper. I — 1 Í — I The Sierra Club makes one further important contrary argument. It says that the Plan will hurt it in many ways that we have not yet mentioned. Specifically, the Sierra Club says that the Plan will permit “many intrusive activities, such as opening trails to motorcycles or using heavy machinery/’ which “will go forward without any additional consideration of their impact on wilderness recreation.” Brief for Respondents 34. At the same time, in areas designated for logging, “affirmative measures to promote undisturbed backcountry recreation, such as closing roads and building additional hiking trails,” will not take place. Ibid. These are harms, says the Sierra Club, that will not take place at a distant future time. Rather, they will take place now. This argument suffers from the legally fatal problem that it makes its first appearance here in this Court in the briefs on the merits. The Complaint, fairly read, does not include such claims. Instead, it focuses on the amount and method of timber harvesting. The Sierra Club has not referred us to any other court documents in which it protests the Plan’s approval of motorcycles or machinery, the Plan’s failure to close roads or to provide for the building of trails, or other disruptions that the Plan might cause those who use the forest for hiking. As far as we can tell, prior to the argument on the merits here, the harm to which the Sierra Club objected consisted of too much, and the wrong kind of, logging. The matter is significant because the Government concedes that if the Sierra Club had previously raised these other kinds of harm, the ripeness analysis in this ease with respect to those provisions of the Plan that produce the harm would be significantly different. The Government’s brief in the Court of Appeals said: “If, for example, a plan incorporated a final decision to close a specific area to off-road vehicles, the plan itself could result in imminent concrete injury to a party with an interest in the use of off-road vehicles in that area.” Brief for Federal Appellees in No. 94-3407 (CA6), p. 20. And, at oral argument, the Solicitor General agreed that if the Sierra Club’s claim was that the “plan was allowing motorcycles into a bird-watching area or something [like that], that would be immediately justiciable.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Thus, we believe these other claims that the Sierra Club now raises are not fairly presented here, and we cannot consider them. IV For these reasons, we find the respondents’ suit not ripe for review. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand this case with instructions to dismiss. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SAN FRANCISCO ARTS & ATHLETICS, INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE et al. No. 86-270. Argued March 24, 1987 Decided June 25, 1987 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and III of which Blackmun and O’Connor, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Black-mun, J., joined, post, p. 548. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 548. Mary C. Dunlap argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Paul Hoffman, Susan McGreivy, and Fred Okrand. John G. Kester argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward Bennett Williams, Vincent J. Fuller, Richard G. Kline, Edward T. Colbert, and Joseph D. Lewis. Robert H. Rotstein, Antonia Hernandez, E. Richard Larson, Abby R. Rubenfeld, Leonard Graff, and Armando M. Menocal filed a brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. George Kaufmann and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Michael Ratner, Rhonda Copelon, Randall Glenn Wick, and Richard A. Perkins filed a brief for the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States et al. as amici curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we consider the scope and constitutionality of a provision of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U. S. C. §§371-396, that authorizes the United States Olympic Committee to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word “Olympic.” I Petitioner San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), is a nonprofit California corporation. The SFAA originally sought to incorporate under the name “Golden Gate Olympic Association,” but was told by the California Department of Corporations that the word “Olympic” could not appear in a corporate title. App. 95. After its incorporation in 1981, the SFAA nevertheless began to promote the “Gay Olympic Games,” using those words on its letterheads and mailings and in local newspapers. Ibid. The games were to be a 9-day event to begin in August 1982, in San Francisco, California. The SFAA expected athletes from hundreds of cities in this country and from cities all over the world. Id., at 402. The Games were to open with a ceremony “which will rival the traditional Olympic Games.” Id., at 354. See id., at 402, 406, 425. A relay of over 2,000 runners would carry a torch from New York City across the country to Kezar Stadium in San Francisco. Id., at 98, 355, 357, 432. The final runner would enter the stadium with the “Gay Olympic Torch” and light the “Gay Olympic Flame.” Id., at 357. The ceremony would continue with the athletes marching in uniform into the stadium behind their respective city flags. Id., at 354, 357, 402, 404, 414. Competition was to occur in 18 different contests, with the winners receiving gold, silver, and bronze medals. Id., at 354-355, 359, 407, 410. To cover the cost of the planned Games, the SFAA sold T-shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and other merchandise bearing the title “Gay Olympic Games.” Id., at 67, 94, 107, 113-114, 167, 360, 362, 427-428. Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act (Act), 92 Stat. 3048, 36 U. S. C. § 380, grants respondent United States Olympic Committee (USOC) the right to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses of the word “Olympic” and various Olympic symbols. In late December 1981, the executive director of the USOC wrote to the SFAA, informing it of the existence of the Amateur Sports Act, and requesting that the SFAA immediately terminate use of the word “Olympic” in its description of the planned Games. The SFAA at first agreed to substitute the word “Athletic” for the word “Olympic,” but, one month later, resumed use of the term. The USOC became aware that the SFAA was still advertising its Games as “Olympic” through a newspaper article in May 1982. In August, the USOC brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California to enjoin the SFAA’s use of the word “Olympic.” The District Court granted a temporary restraining order and then a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After further proceedings, the District Court granted the USOC summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 781 F. 2d 733 (1986). It found that the Act granted the USOC exclusive use of the word “Olympic” without requiring the USOC to prove that the unauthorized use was confusing and without regard to the defenses available to an entity sued for a trademark violation under the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. It did not reach the SFAA’s contention that the USOC enforced its rights in a discriminatory manner, because the court found that the USOC is not a state actor bound by the constraints of the Constitution. The court also found that the USOC’s “property righ[t] [in the word ‘Olympic’ and its assodated symbols and slogans] can be protected without violating the First Amendment.” 781 F. 2d, at 737. The court denied the SFAA’s petition for rehearing en banc. Three judges dissented, finding that the panel’s interpretation of the Act raised serious First Amendment issues. 789 F. 2d 1319, 1326 (1986). We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 913 (1986), to review the issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation decided by the Court of Appeals. We now affirm. II The SFAA contends that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the Act as granting the USOC anything more than a normal trademark in the word “Olympic.” “[T]he ‘starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 43 (1986) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). Section 110 of the Act provides: “Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition— “(4) the words ‘Olympic’, ‘Olympiad’, ‘Citius Altius Fortius’, or any combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic activity; “shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies provided in the [Lanham] Act.” 36 U. S. C. § 380(a). The SFAA argues that the clause “tending to cause confusion” is properly read to apply to the word “Olympic.” But because there is no comma after “thereof,” the more natural reading of the section is that “tending to cause confusion” modifies only “any combination or simulation thereof.” Nevertheless, we do not regard this language as conclusive. We therefore examine the legislative history of this section. Before Congress passed § 110 of the Act, unauthorized use of the word “Olympic” was punishable criminally. The relevant statute, in force since 1950, did not require the use to be confusing. Instead, it made it a crime for: “any person . . . other than [the USOC]. . . for the purpose of trade, theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and competition or as an advertisement to induce the sale of any article whatsoever or attendance at any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, and competition or for any business or charitable purpose to use . . . the words ‘Olympic’, ‘Olympiad’, or ‘Citius Altius Fortius’ or any combination of these words.” 64 Stat. 901, as amended, 36 U. S. C. §379 (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). The House Judiciary Committee drafted the language of § 110 that was ultimately adopted. The Committee explained that the previous “criminal penalty has been found to be unworkable as it requires the proof of a criminal intent.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-1627, p. 15 (1978) (House Report). The changes from the criminal statute “were made in response to a letter from the Patent and Trademark Office of the Department of Commerce,” ibid., that the Committee appended to the end of its Report. This letter explained: “Section 110(a)(4) makes actionable not only use of the words ‘Olympic’, ‘Olympiad’, ‘Citius Altius Fortius’, and any combination thereof, but also any simulation or confusingly similar derivation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic activity. . . . “Section 110 carries forward some prohibitions from the existing statute enacted in 1950 and adds some new prohibitions, e. g. words described in section (a)(1) tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive with respect to the [USOC] or any Olympic activity.” Id., at 38 (emphasis added). This legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to provide the USOC with exclusive control of the use of the word “Olympic” without regard to whether an unauthorized use of the word tends to cause confusion. The SFAA further argues that the reference in §110 to Lanham Act remedies should be read as incorporating the traditional trademark defenses as well. See 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b). This argument ignores the clear language of the section. Also, this shorthand reference to remedies replaced an earlier draft’s specific list of remedies typically available for trademark infringement, e. g., injunctive relief, recovery of profits, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. See Lanham Act §§ 34, 35, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1116, 1117. This list contained no reference to trademark defenses. 124 Cong. Rec. 12865, 12866 (1978) (proposed § 110(c)). Moreover, the USOC already held a trademark in the word “Olympic.” App. 378-382. Under the SFAA’s interpretation, the Act would be largely superfluous. In sum, the language and legislative history of § 110 indicate clearly that Congress intended to grant the USOC exclusive use of the word “Olympic” without regard to whether use of the word tends to cause confusion, and that § 110 does not incorporate defenses available under the Lanham Act. III This Court has recognized that “[n]ational protection of trademarks is desirable . . . because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.” Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985). In the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., Congress established a system for protecting such trademarks. Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others.” 15 U. S. C. § 1127 (1982 ed., Supp. III). Under §32 of the Lanham Act, the owner of a trademark is protected from unauthorized uses that are “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” § 1114(1)(a). Section 33 of the Lanham Act grants several statutory defenses to an alleged trademark infringer. § 1115. The protection granted to the USOC’s use of the Olympic words and symbols differs from the normal trademark protection in two respects: the USOC need not prove that a contested use is likely to cause confusion, and an unauthorized user of the word does not have available the normal statutory defenses. The SFAA argues, in effect, that the differences between the Lanham Act and § 110 are of constitutional dimension. First, the SFAA contends that the word “Olympic” is a generic word that could not gain trademark protection under the Lanham Act. The SFAA argues that this prohibition is constitutionally required and thus that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting a trademark in the word “Olympic.” Second, the SFAA argues that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from granting exclusive use of a word absent a requirement that the authorized user prove that an unauthorized use is likely to cause confusion. We address these contentions in turn. A This Court has recognized that words are not always fungible, and that the suppression of particular words “run[s] a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 26 (1971). The SFAA argues that this principle prohibits Congress from granting the USOC exclusive control of uses of the word “Olympic,” a word that the SFAA views as generic. Yet this recognition always has been balanced against the principle that when a word acquires value “as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money” by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 239 (1918). See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 92 (1879). There is no need in this case to decide whether Congress ever could grant a private entity exclusive use of a generic word. Congress reasonably could conclude that the commercial and promotional value of the word “Olympic” was the product of the USOC’s “own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 575 (1977). The USOC, together with respondent International Olympic Committee (IOC), have used the word “Olympic” at least since 1896, when the modern Olympic Games began. App. 348. Baron Pierre de Coubertin of France, acting pursuant to a government commission, then proposed the revival of the ancient Olympic Games to promote international understanding. D. Chester, The Olympic Games Handbook 13 (1975). De Coubertin sought to identify the “spirit” of the ancient Olympic Games that had been corrupted by the influence of money and politics. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 4 (1976). De Coubertin thus formed the IOC, that has established elaborate rules and procedures for the conduct of the modern Olympics. See Olympic Charter, Rules 26-69 (1985). In addition, these rules direct every national committee to protect the use of the Olympic flag, symbol, flame, and motto from unauthoruse. Id., Bye-laws to Rules 6 and 53. Under the IOC Charter, the USOC is the national Olympic committee for the United States with the sole authority to represent the United States at the Olympic Games. Pursuant to this authority, the USOC has used the Olympic words and symbols extensively in this country to fulfill its object under the Olympic Charter of “ensuring] the development and safeguarding of the Olympic Movement and sport.” Id., Rule 24. The history of the origins and associations of the word “Olympic” demonstrates the meritlessness of the SFAA’s contention that Congress simply plucked a generic word out of the English vocabulary and granted its exclusive use to the USOC. Congress reasonably could find that since 1896, the word “Olympic” has acquired what in trademark law is known as a secondary meaning — it “has become distinctive of [the USOC’s] goods in commerce.” Lanham Act, § 2(f), 15 U. S. C. § 1052(f). See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U. S., at 194. The right to adopt and use such a word “to distinguish the goods or property [of] the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized.” Trade-Mark Cases, supra, at 92. Because Congress reasonably could conclude that the USOC has distinguished the word “Olympic” through its own efforts, Congress’ decision to grant the USOC a limited property right in the word “Olympic” falls within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus certainly within constitutional bounds. B Congress also acted reasonably when it concluded that the USOC should not be required to prove that an unauthorized use of the word “Olympic” is likely to confuse the public. To the extent that § 110 applies to uses “for the purpose of trade [or] to induce the sale of any goods or services,” 36 U. S. C. § 380(a), its application is to commercial speech. Commercial speech “receives a limited form of First Amendment protection.” Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, 340 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980). Section 110 also allows the USOC to prohibit the use of “Olympic” for promotion of theatrical and athletic events. Although many of these promotional uses will be commercial speech, some uses may go beyond the “strictly business” context. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). In this case, the SFAA claims that its use of the word “Olympic” was intended to convey a political statement about the status of homosexuals in society. Thus, the SFAA claims that in this case § 110 suppresses political speech. By prohibiting the use of one word for particular purposes, neither Congress nor the USOC has prohibited the SFAA from conveying its message. The SFAA held its athletic event in its planned format under the names “Gay Games I” and “Gay Games II” in 1982 and 1986, respectively. See n. 2, supra. Nor is it clear that § 110 restricts purely expressive uses of the word “Olympic.” Section 110 restricts only the manner in which the SFAA may convey its message. The restrictions on expressive speech properly are characterized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding the USOC’s activities. The appropriate inquiry is thus whether the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to further a substantial governmental interest. United States v. O’Brien, 891 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). One reason for Congress to grant the USOC exclusive control of the word “Olympic,” as with other trademarks, is to ensure that the USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts so that the USOC will have an incentive to continue to produce a “quality product,” that, in turn, benefits the public. See 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2:1, pp. 44-47 (1984). But in the special circumstance of the USOC, Congress has a broader public interest in promoting, through the activities of the USOC, the participation of amateur athletes from the United States in “the great four-yearly sport festival, the Olympic Games.” Olympic Charter, Rule 1 (1985). The USOC’s goal under the Olympic Charter, Rule 24(B), is to further the Olympic movement, that has as its aims: “to promote the development of those physical and moral qualities which are the basis of sport”; “to educate young people through sport in a spirit of better understanding between each other and of friendship, thereby helping to build a better and more peaceful world”; and “to spread the Olympic principles throughout the world, thereby creating international goodwill.”’ Id., Rule 1. See also id., Rule 11 (aims of the IOC). Congress’ interests in promoting the USOC’s activities include these purposes as well as those specifically enumerated in the USOC’s charter. Section 110 directly advances these governmental interests by supplying the USOC with the means to raise money to support the Olympics and encourages the USOC’s activities by ensuring that it will receive the benefits of its efforts. The restrictions of § 110 are not broader than Congress reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further these interests. Section 110 primarily applies to all uses of the word “Olympic” to induce the sale of goods or services. Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing uses, Congress’ judgment respecting a certain word is not so limited. Congress reasonably could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols are likely to be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the marks. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) (one injury to a trademark owner may be “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name” by nonconfusing uses). In this case, the SFAA sought to sell T-shirts, buttons, bumper stickers, and other items, all emblazoned with the title “Gay Olympic Games.” The possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious. Moreover, it is clear that the SFAA sought to exploit the “commercial magnetism,” see Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203, 205 (1942), of the word given value by the USOC. There is no question that this unauthorized use could undercut the USOC’s efforts to use, and sell the right to use, the word in the future, since much of the word’s value comes from its limited use. Such an adverse effect on the USOC’s activities is directly contrary to Congress’ interest. Even though this protection may exceed the traditional rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the application of the Act to this commercial speech is not broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional interest and therefore does not violate the First Amendment. Section 110 also extends to promotional uses of the word “Olympic,” even if the promotion is not to induce the sale of goods. Under § 110, the USOC may prohibit purely promotional uses of the word only when the promotion relates to an athletic or theatrical event. The USOC created the value of the word by using it in connection with an athletic event. Congress reasonably could find that use of the word by other entities to promote an athletic event would directly impinge on the USOC’s legitimate right of exclusive use. The SFAA’s proposed use of the word is an excellent example. The “Gay Olympic Games” were to take place over a 9-day period and were to be held in different locations around the world. They were to include a torch relay, a parade with uniformed athletes of both sexes divided by city, an “Olympic anthem” and “Olympic Committee,” and the award of gold, silver, and bronze medals, and were advertised under a logo of three overlapping rings. All of these features directly parallel the modern-day Olympics, not the Olympic Games that occurred in ancient Greece. The image the SFAA sought to invoke was exactly the image carefully cultivated by the USOC. The SFAA’s expressive use of the word cannot be divorced from the value the USOC’s efforts have given to it. The mere fact that the SFAA claims an expressive, as opposed to a purely commercial, purpose does not give it a First Amendment right to “appropriate] to itself the harvest of those who have sown.” International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S., at 239-240. The USOC’s right to prohibit use of the word “Olympic” in the promotion of athletic events is at the core of its legitimate property right. IV The SFAA argues that even if the exclusive use granted by § 110 does not violate the First Amendment, the USOC’s enforcement of that right is discriminatory in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The fundamental inquiry is whether the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions of the Constitution apply. The USOC is a “private corporatio[n] established under Federal law.” 36 U. S. C. § 1101(46). In the Act, Congress granted the USOC a corporate charter, § 371, imposed certain requirements on the USOC, and provided for some USOC funding through exclusive use of the Olympic words and symbols, § 380, and through direct grants. The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does not render the USOC a Government agent. All corporations act under charters granted by a government, usually by a State. They do not thereby lose their essentially private character. Even extensive regulation by the government does not transform the actions of the regulated entity into those of the government. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974). Nor is the fact that Congress has granted the USOC exclusive use of the word “Olympic” dispositive. All enforceable rights in trademarks are created by some governmental act, usually pursuant to a statute or the common law. The actions of the trademark owners nevertheless remain private. Moreover, the intent on the part of Congress to help the USOC obtain funding does not change the analysis. The Government may subsidize private entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for their actions. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 840 (1982). This Court also has found action to be governmental action when the challenged entity performs functions that have been “‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative’” of the Federal Government. Id., at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 353; quoted in Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1011) (emphasis added by the Rendell-Baker Court). Certainly the activities performed by the USOC serve a national interest, as its objects and purposes of incorporation indicate. See n. 17, supra. The fact “[t]hat a private entity performs a function which serves the public does not make its acts [governmental] action.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra, at 842. The Amateur Sports Act was enacted “to correct the disorganization and the serious factional disputes that seemed to plague amateur sports in the United States.” House Report, at 8. See Oldfield v. Athletic Congress, 779 F. 2d 505 (CA9 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-770, pp. 2-3 (1978)). The Act merely authorized the USOC to coordinate activities that always have been performed by private entities. Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional governmental function. Most fundamentally, this Court has held that a government “normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [government].” Blum v. Yaretsky, supra, at 1004; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra, at 840. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 173 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 170 (1970). The USOC’s choice of how to enforce its exclusive right to use the word “Olympic” simply is not a governmental decision. There is no evidence that the Federal Government coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise of its right. At most, the Federal Government, by failing to supervise the USOC’s use of its rights, can be said to exercise “[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives” of the USOC. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S., at 1004-1005. This is not enough to make the USOC’s actions those of the Government. Ibid. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S., at 357. Because the USOC is not a governmental actor, the SFAA’s claim that the USOC has enforced its rights in a discriminatory manner must fail. V Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It is so ordered. The SFAA’s president, Dr. Thomas F. Waddell, is also a petitioner. The 1982 athletic event ultimately was held under the name “Gay Games I.” App. 473. A total of 1,300 men and women from 12 countries, 27 States, and 179 cities participated. Id., at 475. The “Gay Games II” were held in 1986 with approximately 3,400 athletes participating from 17 countries. Brief for Respondents 8. The 1990 “Gay Games” are scheduled to occur in Vancouver, B. C. Ibid. The International Olympic Committee is also a respondent. Section 110 of the Act, as set forth in 36 U. S. C. § 380, provides: “Without the consent of the [USOC], any person who uses for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition— “(1) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of 5 interlocking rings; “(2) the emblem of the [USOC], consisting of an escutcheon having a blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with 5 interlocking rings displayed on the chief; “(3) any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee or the [USOC]; or “(4) the words ‘Olympic’, ‘Olympiad’, ‘Citius Altius Fortius’, or any combination or simulation thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the [USOC] or any Olympic activity; “shall be subject to suit in a civil action by the [USOC] for the remedies provided in the Act of July 5, 1946 (60 Stat. 427; popularly known as the Trademark Act of 1946 [Lanham Act]) [15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq.]. However, any person who actually used the emblem in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or the words, or any combination thereof, in subsection (a)(4) of this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950, shall not be prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose and for the same goods or services. In addition, any person who actually used, or whose assignor actually used, any other trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia described in subsections (a)(3) and (4) of this section for any lawful purpose prior to September 21, 1950 shall not be prohibited by this section from continuing such lawful use for the same purpose and for the same goods or services. “(b) The [USOC] may authorize contributors and suppliers of goods or services to use the trade name of the [USOC] as well as any trademark, symbol, insignia, or emblem of the International Olympic Committee or of the [USOC] in advertising that the contributions, goods, or services were donated, supplied, or furnished to or for the use of, approved, selected, or used by the [USOC] or United States Olympic or Pan-American team or team members. “(c) The [USOC] shall have exclusive right to use the name ‘United States Olympic Committee’; the symbol described in subsection (a)(1) of this section; the emblem described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; and the words ‘Olympic’, ‘Olympiad’, ‘Citius Altius Fortius’ or any combination thereof subject to the preexisting rights described in subsection (a) of this section.” Specifically, the SFAA argues that the USOC should not be able to prohibit its use of the word “Olympic” because its use “is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods or services.” 15 U. S. C. § 1115(b)(4). The user may, however, raise traditional equitable defenses, such as laches. See Brief for Respondents 20, n. 17. A common descriptive name of a product or service is generic. Because a generic name by definition does not distinguish the identity of a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark under-the Lanham Act. See §§ 2, 14(c), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1052, 1064(e). See also 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12:1, p. 520 (1984). This grant by statute of exclusive use of distinctive words and symbols by Congress is not unique. Violation of some of these statutes may result in criminal penalties. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 705 (veterans’ organizations); § 706 (American National Red Cross); § 707 (4-H Club); § 711 (“Smokey Bear”); § 711a (“Woodsy Owl”). See also FTC v. A. P. W. Paper Co., 328 U. S. 193 (1946) (reviewing application of Red Cross statute). Others, like the USOC statute, provide for civil enforcement. See, e. g., 36 U. S. C. § 18c (Daughters of the American Revolution); § 27 (Boy Scouts); § 36 (Girl Scouts); § 1086 (Little League Baseball); § 3305 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (American National Theater and Academy). The ancient Olympic Games were held from 776 B.C. until A.D. 393, when they were abolished by the Roman Emperor Theodosius I. The Olympic Games were the most important in a “circuit” of sporting festivals. The “circuit” also included the Pythian Games at Delphi, the Nemean Games at Nemea, and the Isthmian Games at Corinth. As these sporting festivals grew in importance, athletes turned from amateurs to true professionals, training all year and receiving substantial gifts and money from individuals and from their home cities. See M. Finley & H. Pleket, The Olympic Games: The First Thousand Years 68-82 (1976); 25 Encyc. Brit. 198 (15th ed. 1984). The Olympic flag was presented by Baron De Coubertin at the Congress of Paris in 1914. It has a white background with five interlocking rings in the center. The rings, in the colors blue, yellow, black, green, and red, in that order, “symbolize the union of the five continents and the meeting of athletes from all over the world at the Olympic Games in a spirit of fair and frank competition and good friendship, the ideal preached by Baron de Coubertin.” Olympic Charter, Rule 6 (1985). The Olympic rings alone are the Olympic symbol. Ibid. The Olympic flame is formally lit in Olympia under the auspices of the IOC. The Olympic motto is “Citius, Altius, Fortius,” meaning “Faster, Higher, Stronger,” and “expresses the aspirations of the Olympic Movement.” Ibid. The motto originated at an international conference on the principles of amateurism in sports organized by De Coubertin and held in 1894 at the Sorbonne in Paris. A French delegate, Pére Henri-Martin Didon suggested as a motto the words engraved on the entrance to his lycée (school), Albert le Grand. Shortly thereafter, De Coubertin founded the IOC, which adopted this motto. A. Guttmann, The Games Must Go On 13-14 (1984). The USOC was formally organized in 1921, replacing the more informally organized American Olympic Committee. The USOC received its first corporate charter in 1950. To the extent that § 110 regulates confusing uses, it is within normal trademark bounds. The Government constitutionally may regulate “deceptive or misleading” commercial speech. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1979). According to the SFAA’s president, the Gay Olympic Games would have offered three “very important opportunities”: “1) To provide a healthy recreational alternative to a suppressed minority. “2) To educate the public at large towards a more reasonable characterization of gay men and women. “3) To attempt, through athletics, to bring about a positive and gradual assimilation of gay men and women, as well as gays and non-gays, and to diminish the ageist, sexist and racist divisiveness existing in all communities regardless of sexual orientation.” App. 93. His expectations “were that people of all persuasions would be drawn to the event because of its Olympic format and that its nature of ‘serious fun’ would create a climate of friendship and eo-operation[;] false images and misconceptions about gay people would decline as a result of a particpatory [sic] educational process, and benefit ALL communities.” Id., at 93-94. He thought “[t]he term ‘Olympic’ best describe[d] [the SFAA’s] undertaking” because it embodied the concepts of “peace, friendship and positive social interaction.” Id., at 99. One court has found that § 110 does not prohibit the use of the Olympic logo of five interlocking rings and the Olympic torch on a poster expressing opposition to the planned conversion of the Olympic Village at Lake Placid, New York, into a prison. The court found that the use of the symbols did not fit the commercial or promotional definition of uses in § 110. Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Committee, 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1118-1121 (SDNY 1980). Justice Brennan finds the Act unconstitutionally overbroad. But on its face, it applies primarily to commercial speech, to which the application of the overbreadth doctrine is highly questionable. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (1978) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380 (1977)). There is no basis in the record to believe that the Act will be interpreted or applied to infringe significantly on noncommercial speech rights. The application of the Act to the SFAA is well within constitutional bounds, and the extent to which the Act may be read to apply to noncommercial speech is limited. We find no “realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.” City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984). Accordingly, we decline to apply the overbreadth doctrine to this case. A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if the government’s interest in the restriction is substantial, directly advances the government’s asserted interest, and is no more extensive than necessary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this test and the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O’Brien require a balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of the speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substantially similar, they will be discussed together. The objects and purposes of the USOC are to: “(1) establish national goals for amateur athletic activities and encourage the attainment of those goals; “(2) coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United States directly relating to international amateur athletic competition, so as to foster productive working relationships among sports-related organizations; “(3) exercise exclusive jurisdiction, either directly or through its constituent members of committees, over matters pertaining to the participation of the United States in the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games, including the representation of the United States in such games, and over the organization of the Olympic Games and the Pan-American Games when held in the United States; “(4) obtain for the United States, either directly or by delegation to the appropriate national governing body, the most competent amateur representation possible in each competition and event of the Olympic Games and of the Pan-American Games; “(5) promote and support amateur athletic activities involving the United States and foreign nations; “(6) promote and encourage physical fitness and public participation in amateur athletic activities; “(7) assist organizations and persons concerned with sports in the development of amateur athletic programs for amateur athletes; “(8) provide for the swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports organizations, and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete, coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to participate in amateur athletic competition; “(9) foster the development of amateur athletic facilities for use by amateur athletes and assist in making existing amateur athletic facilities available for use by amateur athletes; “(10) provide and coordinate technical information on physical training, equipment design, coaching, and performance analysis; “(11) encourage and support research, development, and dissemination ■ of information in the areas of sports medicine and sports safety; “(12) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic activities for women; “(13) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletic programs and competition for handicapped individuals, including, where feasible, the expansion of opportunities for meaningful participation by handicapped individuals in programs of athletic competition for able-bodied individuals; and “(14) encourage and provide assistance to amateur athletes of racial and ethnic minorities for the purpose of eliciting the participation of such minorities in amateur athletic activities in which they are underrepresented.” 36 U. S. C. §374. The ancient Olympic Games lasted 5 days, whereas the modern Olympics last for 10 days. The ancient Games always took place in Olympia in southern Greece; the modern Olympic Games normally move from city to city every four years. (As an effort to reduce nationalism, cities, as opposed to countries, host the modern Olympic Games.) In ancient Greece there may have been a burning fire for religious sacrifice, since the Olympic Games were part of a religious festival. See The Odes of Pindar, Olympia 8, 11. 1-9, p. 25 (R. Lattimore transi., 2d ed. 1976). The torch relay, however, was an innovation of the modern Olympic Committee. The closest parallel to the modern opening parade was the opening of the ancient Games with the chariot race. As the chariots entered the arena and passed the judges, a herald called out the names of the owner, his father, and his city. See Finley & Pleket, supra n. 9, at 27. There was no general parade of athletes by locality, as in the modern Games, and the athletes were naked, not uniformed. Athletes were eligible only if they were male, freeborn Greeks. There is no indication that the ancient Olympics included an “Olympic anthem” or were organized by an entity called an “Olympic Committee.” The awards in ancient Greece were wreaths of wild olive, rather than the gold, silver, and bronze medals presented at the modern Olympics. The logo of overlapping rings was created by the International Olympic Committee. See n. 10, supra. See generally The Olympics: A Book of Lists 10-13 (J. Beilenson & N. Beilenson eds. 1984); Finley & Pleket, supra n. 8; 25 Encyc. Brit. 197-201 (15th ed. 1984). The SFAA claims a superior right to the use of the word “Olympic” because it is a nonprofit corporation and its athletic event was not organized for the primary purpose of commercial gain. But when the question is the scope of a legitimate property right in a word, the SFAA’s distinction is inapposite. As this Court has noted in the analogous context of “fair use” under the Copyright Act: “The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the [protected] material without paying the customary price.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 562 (1985). He.re, the SFAA’s proposed use of the word “Olympic” was a clear attempt to exploit the imagery and goodwill created by the USOC. Although a theatrical production is not as closely related to the primary use of the word by the USOC as is an athletic event, Congress reasonably could have found that when the word “Olympic” is used to promote such a production, it would implicate the value given to the word by the USOC. The SFAA invokes the Fourteenth Amendment for its discriminatory enforcement claim. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to actions by a State. The claimed association in this case is between the USOC and the Federal Government. Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply. The Fifth Amendment, however, does apply to the Federal Government and contains an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). “This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). Petitioners raised the issue of discriminatory enforcement in their petition for certiorari, and both petitioners and respondents have briefed the issue fully. Accordingly, we address the claim as one under the Fifth Amendment. Because we find no governmental action, we need not address the merits of the SFAA’s discriminatory enforcement claim. We note, however, that the SFAA’s claim of discriminatory enforcement is far from compelling. As of 1982 when this suit began, the USOC had brought 22 oppositions to trademark applications and one petition to cancel. App. 61. For example, the USOC successfully prohibited registration of the mark “Golden Age Olympics.” Id., at 383. The USOC also litigated numerous suits prior to bringing this action, prohibiting use of the Olympic words and symbols by such entities as the National Amateur Sports Foundation, id., at 392, a shoe company, id., at 395, the International Federation of Body Builders, id., at 443, and a bus company, id., at 439. Since 1982, the USOC has brought a number of additional suits against various companies and the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, id., at 437, and Brief for Respondents 41, n. 58. The USOC has authorized the use of the word “Olympic” to organizations that sponsor athletic competitions and events for handicapped persons (“Special Olympics”) and for youth (“Junior Olympics” and “Explorer Olympics”). App. 33, 181. Both of these uses directly relate to a purpose of the USOC established by its charter. See 36 U. S. C. §§ 374(7), (13), reprinted supra, at 538-539, n. 17. The USOC has not consented to any other uses of the word in connection with athletic competitions or events. App. 33. The USOC necessarily has discretion as to when and against whom it files opposition to trademark applications, and when and against whom it institutes suits. The record before us strongly indicates that the USOC has acted strictly in accord with its charter and that there has been no actionable discrimination. As such, the USOC is listed with 69 other federally created private corporations such as the American Legion, Big Brothers — Big Sisters of America, Daughters of the American Revolution, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Ski Patrol System, Inc. 36 U. S. C. § 1101. It hardly need be said that if federally created private corporations were to be viewed as governmental rather than private actors, the consequences would be far reaching. Apart from subjecting these private entities to suits under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, presumably — by analogy — similar types of nonprofit corporations established under state law could be viewed as governmental actors subject to such suits under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the USOC may amend its constitution only after providing an opportunity for notice and hearing, § 375(b); the USOC must allow for reasonable representation in its membership of certain groups, § 376(b); the USOC must remain nonpolitical, § 377; and the USOC must report on its operations and expenditures of grant moneys to Congress each year, § 382a. The USOC may apply to the Secretary of Commerce for yearly grants not to exeeed a total of $16 million, § 384(a), but it has never done so. See Brief for Respondents 46. The only direct federal funding that the USOC has received is a $10 million grant in 1980, characterized by Congress as “a form of disaster payment” to help the USOC recover from the losses resulting from the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. See S. Rep. No. 96-829, p. 241 (1980); Act of July 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 857, 898. The Commission that recommended the current USOC powers “made it clear that it did not want the Federal Government directing amateur athletics in this country.” House Report, at 9. The dissent does not rely on the fact that the USOC is chartered by Congress to find governmental action in this case. Post, at 548-560. Justice Brennan attempts to distinguish the USOC from other private corporations that are chartered by Congress on the ground that the USOC performs the “distinctive, traditional governmental function” of “represent[ing] this Nation to the world community.” Post, at 550. But absent the additional element of governmental control, this representational function can hardly be called traditionally governmental. All sorts of private organizations send “national representatives” to participate in world competitions. Although many are of interest only to a select group, others, like the Davis Cup Competition, the America’s Cup, and the Miss Universe Pageant, are widely viewed as involving representation of our country. The organizations that sponsor United States participation in these events all perform “national. . . representational” as well as “administrative [and] adjudicative role[s],” see post, at 555, in selecting and presenting the national representatives. As with the corporate charter, the dissent acknowledges that the representational role of the USOC is not dispositive. Post, at 553. According to the dissent, the Olympic Games are “unique [because] at stake are significant national interests that stem not only from pageantry but from polities.” Post, at 551. The dissent then relies primarily on the sequence of events preceding the USOC’s decision not to send athletes to the 1980 summer Olympics as demonstrating “the impact and interrelationship of USOC decisions on the definition and pursuit of the national interest.” Post, at 553. But the governmental influence on that particular decision of the USOC is hardly representative in view of the absence of such influence on the vast majority of USOC decisions. Moreover, even the unique sequence of events in 1980 confirms that the USOC cannot properly be considered a governmental agency. Although the President and Congress indicated their view that United States athletes should not go to the Moscow Olympics, this was not the end of the matter. The President thought it would be necessary to take “legal actions [if] necessary” to prevent the USOC from sending a team to Moscow. See 1 Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter 1980-1981, p. 636 (1981). Previously, the Attorney General had indicated that the President believed that he had the power under the Emergency Powers Act, 50 U. S. C. § 1701, to bar travel to an area that he considered to pose a threat of national emergency. See Washington Post, Apr. 11, 1980, p. A1. The President’s statement indicated a clear recognition that neither he nor Congress could control the USOC’s actions directly. A District Court, confronted with the question whether the decision not to send athletes to the 1980 Olympics was state action, noted: “The USOC is an independent body, and nothing in its chartering statute gives the federal government the right to control that body or its officers. Furthermore, the facts here do not indicate that the federal government was able to exercise any type of ‘de facto’ control over the USOC. The USOC decided by a secret ballot of its House of Delegates. The federal government may have had the power to prevent the athletes from participating in the Olympics even if the USOC had voted to allow them to participate, but it did not have the power to make them vote in a certain way. All it had was the power of persuasion. We cannot equate this with control. To do so in cases of this type would be to open the door and usher the courts into what we believe is a largely nonjustieiable realm, where they would find themselves in the untenable position of determining whether a certain level, intensity, or type of ‘Presidential’ or ‘Administrative’ or ‘political’ pressure amounts to sufficient control over a private entity so as to invoke federal jurisdiction.” DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (DC), aff’d mem., 226 U. S. App. D. C. 210, 701 F. 2d 221 (1980). In sum, we remain unconvinced that the functions that the USOC performs can be viewed as “governmental” action. In fact, the Olympic Charter provides that the USOC “must be autonomous and must resist all pressures of any kind whatsoever, whether of a political, religious or economic nature.” Rule 24. For all of the same reasons indicated above, we reject the SFAA’s argument that the United States Government should be viewed as a “joint participant” in the USOC’s efforts to enforce its right to use the word “Olympic.” See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 725 (1961). The SFAA has failed to demonstrate that the Federal Government can or does exert any influence over the exercise of the USOC’s enforcement decisions. Abs.ent proof of this type of “close nexus between the [Government] and the challenged action of the [USOC],” the challenged action may not be “fairly treated as that of the [Government] itself.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S., at 351. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners argued only that because the USOC is a “state actor” it is prohibited from “selecting among diverse potential users of the word ‘Olympic’, based upon speech-suppressing and invidiously discriminatory motives.” Pet. for Cert. i. The SFAA now argues that under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), the District Court’s entry of the injunction prohibiting the SFAA’s use of the word “Olympic” constitutes governmental action sufficient to require a constitutional inquiry into the USOC’s motivation in seeking the injunction. This new theory of governmental action is not fairly encompassed within the questions presented and thus is not properly before the Court. See this Court’s Rule 21.1(a).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GOGGIN, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY, v. DIVISION OF LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 35. Argued November 15, 1948. Decided January 31, 1949. Martin Gendel argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. By special leave of Court, Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle and A. F. Prescott. Edward M. Belasco argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Fred M. Howser, Attorney General of California, and Frank W. Richards, Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This case deals with the question whether § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act, in determining priorities in the payment of claims, speaks as of the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy. The precise issue presented is whether a tax claim of the United States, secured by a lien perfected before the bankruptcy of the taxpayer and accompanied, at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, by the Collector of Internal Revenue’s actual possession of the bankrupt’s personal property, is required by § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act to be postponed in payment to debts owed by the bankrupt for wages to claimants specified in clause (2) of § 64a of that Act,* because the Collector later relinquished possession of such property to the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate for sale by him. We hold that the lien was valid and entitled to priority of payment as against the wage claims at the date of bankruptcy and that the Collector’s relinquishment of possession of the bankrupt’s property did not change the result. The facts are undisputed. Before March 26, 1946, a Collector of Internal Revenue of the United States perfected a statutory lien upon the personal property of the Kessco Engineering Corporation, a California corporation, and took actual possession of such property pursuant to that lien. He attempted to sell such assets and received bids for them but did not complete the sale because the price obtainable was unsatisfactory to him. He instituted a second sale but abandoned it when he relinquished possession of the property to the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate. On March 26, 1946, the corporation filed its voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, was adjudicated a bankrupt and George T. Goggin (who later became the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate and is the petitioner herein) was appointed receiver. Having qualified as receiver on March 28, 1946, he communicated with counsel for the Collector as to the Collector’s turning over to him the bankrupt’s personal property. In this connection, the referee in bankruptcy later made a finding of fact which was adopted by the District Court and is as follows: “. . . the personal property of the bankrupt in the hands of the Collector of Internal Revenue, . . . was turned over to the said George T. Goggin, who accepted the terms and conditions of a telegram from J. P. Wenchel, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, reading as follows: “ ‘Reference to telephone conversation today with Mr. Webb [member of the Los Angeles office of Internal Revenue] relative to Kessco Engineering Corporation, Bankrupt, no objection by this office to Collector relinquishing personal property to Trustee for sale. Government’s lien to attach to proceeds from sale subject to Trustee’s expenses including costs of sale. J. P. Wenchel, Chief Counsel.’ ” Goggin, in his final capacity as trustee for the bankrupt, caused these assets to be sold at public auction, pursuant to order of court. Having liquidated all assets which had come into his possession, he had on hand, on December 12, 1946, about $31,206.20, which the referee certified was insufficient to pay in full the expenses of administration, the lien claims, the prior labor claims and prior tax claims in the case. The gross amount of the amended claim of the Collector for taxes, penalties and interest was $78,865.03. The prior wage claims totaled $3,424.87. The Department of Employment of the State of California also filed a tax claim for $15,135, which was recorded as a lien on or about December 24, 1945. Neither the validity nor the amount of any of these claims is in issue here. The present proceeding originated in a petition filed with the referee in bankruptcy by the trustee, seeking an order to show cause why the order of priority of the payment of the tax and prior wage claims and the expenses of administration should not be determined by the District Court. The referee made findings of fact and reached conclusions of law upon the basis of which he ordered that, from the monies in the possession of the trustee, there first be paid the expenses of administration and that the balance of such funds then in the hands of the trustee be paid to the Collector of Internal Revenue in partial payment of the Government’s tax claims and the interest thereon as prescribed by law. The .District Court adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the referee and entered judgment thereon. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that judgment and held that, by virtue of the Collector’s relinquishment of his possession of the personal property of the bankrupt, the taxes due to the United States must be postponed, in payment, to the debts of the bankrupt for certain wage claims, pursuant to § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act. 165 F. 2d 155. Because of the importance of the issue in the administration of the Bankruptcy Act, we granted certiorari. 333 U. S. 860. The bankrupt filed its petition and was adjudicated a bankrupt on March 26, 1946. The personal property of the bankrupt was then subject to the perfected statutory lien of the United States for taxes and that lien was accompanied by the actual physical possession of the property by a Collector of Internal Revenue on behalf of the United States. Those facts completely satisfy § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act. Subsequent events, such as the relinquishment of his possession by the Collector in favor of the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate for the purpose of facilitating a sale of the property by the trustee, are not material to the determination of the issue before us. The terms under which the Collector’s possession was relinquished are consistent with and support this result but the Government’s right to payment ahead of the wage claims was determined at the time of bankruptcy and did not arise out of the arrangement under which possession was relinquished to the trustee. This general point of view in interpreting the Bankruptcy Act is one of long standing. In Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474, 479, this Court said: “We think that the purpose of the law was to fix the line of cleavage with reference to the condition of the bankrupt estate as of the time at which the petitioi t was filed and that the property which vests in the trustee at the time of adjudication is that which the bankrupt owned at the time of the filing of the petition.” See also, Myers v. Matley, 318 U. S. 622, 626; United States v. Marxen, 307 U. S. 200, 207-208; Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U. S. 300, 307. While § 67c was added to the Bankruptcy Act by the Chandler Act in 1938, we find nothing in it or in its legislative history to suggest an abandonment of the underlying point of view as to the time as of which it speaks and the general purpose of Congress to continue to safeguard interests under liens perfected before bankruptcy. City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174; In re Knox-Powell-Stockton Co., 100 F. 2d 979; In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711. While § 64, as amended, somewhat readjusts priorities among unsecured claims, § 67 continues to recognize the validity of liens perfected before bankruptcy as against unsecured claims. Section 67b has clarified the validity of statutory liens, including those for taxes, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. It expressly recognizes that the validity of liens existing at the time of filing a petition in bankruptcy may be perfected under some circumstances after bankruptcy. Section 67c, as amended in 1938, does, however, introduce a new postponement in the payment of certain claims secured by liens to the payment of other claims specified in clauses (1) (for certain administrative expenses, etc.) and (2) (for certain wages) of § 64a. This subordination is, however, sharply limited. For example, it does not apply to statutory liens on real property, or to those actually enforced by sale before bankruptcy, or, in general, to liens on personal property when accompanied by actual possession of such property. The background of § 67c suggests a conscious purpose to give a narrowly limited priority to administrative expenses and to certain wage claims, at least in instances disclosing accumulations of unpaid taxes the priority of which wage earners had no good reason to suspect, and which might absorb the entire estate of the bankrupt unless postponed by these provisions. The purpose of § 67 in requiring a public warning of the existence of an enforceable statutory lien for taxes was served in the instant case not only by the steps taken to perfect the Government’s lien but by the Collector’s seizure and actual possession of the personal property of the taxpayer before the filing of the taxpayer’s petition in bankruptcy. The validity of the lien for taxes as against the wage claimants was thus established at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy and the Collector’s possession of the personal property of the bankrupt excluded the application of § 67c which otherwise would have postponed the payment of the tax claims to the payment of the claims for administrative expenses and wages specified in clauses (1) and (2) of § 64a. By his subsequent arrangement with the trustee for the sale of the bankrupt’s property, the Collector did not lose the right to priority of payment accorded to the perfected tax liens, at the time of bankruptcy, as against the wage claims. The arrangement between the Collector and the trustee was a natural and proper one. While the amended claim for taxes, penalties and interest, dated August 28, 1946, amounted to $78,865.03, the original claim, filed with the notices of lien prior to March 26, 1946, amounted to only $40,921.94 (even including the interest and costs later computed to August 21, 1946). Of this sum the taxes themselves amounted only to $34,848.04. To meet this, the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate, on December 12, 1946, had on hand $31,206.20, evidently derived from the sale of the property originally held by the Collector. These figures, accordingly, suggest the possibility that, in March, 1946, it reasonably may have been supposed that a surplus above the amount of the Government’s tax claim might be realized from the sale of the assets then in the possession of the Collector. In that event, it would have been the obviously appropriate procedure for the trustee to sell that property free and clear of liens and encumbrances and then distribute the proceeds to the rightful claimants. Even though there was little or no prospect of realizing such a surplus, it was reasonable and appropriate for the trustee, with the consent of the lien holder, thus to sell the property and distribute its proceeds. See Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U. S. 225; 6 Remington on Bankruptcy §§ 2577-2578 (4th ed. 1937). The propriety of the present conclusion is emphasized by the fact that the opposite conclusion would, in many other cases, operate to the detriment both of unsecured creditors and of the statutory lien holders. It would compel a lien holder to retain his actual possession of the property in order to be sure of his full priority in the payment of his tax claim. He would be compelled to do this, even though by doing so the bankrupt’s property probably would yield a smaller sales price than if sold by the trustee. Furthermore, the lien holder would be brought into sharp conflict with the trustee whenever there was reason to suppose that the proceeds of the sale might equal or exceed the tax claims secured by the lien. Under such circumstances the bankruptcy court generally may order the sale of the bankrupt’s property by the trustee, free and clear of liens and encumbrances. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § § 70.97, 70.99 (14th ed. 1942); 6 Remington on Bankruptcy § 2583 (4th ed. 1937). Accordingly, we find no substantial support for the argument that the lien holder’s voluntary relinquishment of his possession of the bankrupt’s property, in favor of the bankrupt’s trustee, for the purpose of permitting the trustee to sell the property in this case, must carry with it, as a matter of law, a postponement of the payment of the lien holder’s tax claim to that of the claims for wages here presented. For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. As § 67b is referred to in § 67e and is material to its interpretation, both subdivisions of § 67 are quoted below: “Sec. 67. Liens and Fraudulent Transfers.— . . . “b. The provisions of section 60 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding, statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or other classes of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States or any State or subdivision thereof, created or recognized by the laws of the United States or of any State, may be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while the debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or of the original petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act, by or against him. Where by such laws such liens are required to be perfected and arise but are not perfected before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless be valid, if perfected within the time permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of such laws, except that if such laws require the liens to be perfected by the seizure of property, they shall instead be perfected by filing notice thereof with the court. “a. Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy or of an original petition under chapter X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act, though valid under subdivision b of this section, statutory liens, including liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States or to any State or subdivision thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession of such property, and liens whether statutory or not, of distress for rent shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this Act, and, except as against other liens, such liens for wages or for rent shall be restricted in the amount of their payment to the same extent as provided for wages and rent respectively in subdivision a of section 64 of this Act.” (Italics supplied.) Bankruptcy Act of 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 564, as amended by the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 875-877, 11 U. S. C. § 107 (b) and (c). Not only the portions of § 64a specifying the wages here in controversy but those otherwise related to the issues of this case are quoted below: “Sec. 64. Debts Which Have Priority. — a. The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be (1) the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition; the fees for the referees’ salary fund and for the referees’ expense fund; the filing fees paid by creditors in involuntary cases; where property of the bankrupt, transferred or concealed by him either before or after the filing of the petition, shall have been recovered for the benefit of the estate of the bankrupt by the efforts and at the cost and expense of one or more creditors, the reasonable costs and expenses of such recovery; the costs and expenses of administration, including the trustee’s expenses in opposing the bankrupt’s discharge, the fees and mileage payable to witnesses as now or hereafter provided by the laws of the United States, and one reasonable attorney’s fee, for the professional services actually rendered, irrespective of the number of attorneys employed, to the petitioning creditors in involuntary cases and to the bankrupt in voluntary and involuntary cases, as the court may allow; (2) wages, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen on salary or commission basis, whole or part time, whether or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt; . . . (4) taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof: Provided, That no order shall be made for the payment of a tax assessed against any property of the bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein as determined by the court: And provided further, That, in case any question arises as to the amount or legality of any taxes, such question shall be heard and determined by the court; and (5) debts owing to any person, including the United States, who by the laws of the United States in [is] entitled to priority, and rent owing to a landlord who is entitled to priority by applicable State law: Provided, however, That such priority for rent to a landlord shall be restricted to the rent which is legally due and owing for the actual use and occupancy of the premises affected, and which accrued within three months before the date of bankruptcy.” (Italics supplied.) Bankruptcy Act of 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 563, as amended by the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 874, and 60 Stat. 323,330,11 U. S. C. § 104 (a). There is no issue here as to the amount of penalties or interest included in the Collector’s claim .for taxes or as to the date to which interest on such claim shall be computed. There is no issue here as to any difference between statutory liens which were perfected more than four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or those perfected within less than that time. As the lien claimed by the United States exceeds the funds available, it has filed its brief in this Court as the sole real party in interest and in opposition to the wage claims. The respondent, Division of Labor Law Enforcement of the State of California, appears on behalf of all of the labor claimants. There also is no issue here as to the amount to be paid for the expenses of administration or the items which such expenses may include in addition to the costs of the sale made by the trustee. Provision, not material here, was made that, if additional money came into the possession of the trustee, the court, upon notice to all necessary and proper parties, should determine the respective liens or priorities, if any there be, of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the prior labor claimants, the Department of Employment of the State of California and other tax claimants entitled to be heard. See note 1, supra. See Davis v. City of New York, 119 F. 2d 559. In that case the City perfected its lien for retail sales taxes by seizure of assets of the taxpayer, May 16, 1939. An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed, June 7, 1939, against the taxpayer and it was adjudicated a bankrupt, June 17,1939. The assets were thereafter sold in execution of the warrant issued by the city treasurer. The levy was held to be a valid statutory levy as against the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate and the City was allowed to retain the proceeds of the sale, under §§ 67b and 67c of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended in 1938. For a converse situation see City of New York v. Hall, 139 F. 2d 935. In that case the City perfected its lien on personal property of the taxpayer, arising out of long delinquent business and sales taxes, by the delivery of warrants on January 14, 1943, at 10:15 a. m., to the city’s warrant agent for execution and levy on the property. The actual levy on, and inventory of, the property and the posting of notices of sale were not effected until shortly after 4:30 p. m. In the meantime, at 4:22 p. m., an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the taxpayer and upon this he was adjudicated a bankrupt. Pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy court, a receiver sold the property and the court declined to order the net proceeds to be turned over to the City. The City was the holder of a statutory lien but, at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the lien was not accompanied by actual possession of the personal property to which it attached. It, therefore, was subordinated, under § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act, to the administration expenses and wages covered by clauses (1) and (2) of § 64a. “Notwithstanding the admonition of Section 67, sub. c, the City chose to slumber on its rights. Congress intended to penalize such somnolence.” Id. at p. 936. “Section 1. Meaning op Words and Phrases. — -The words and phrases used in this Act and in proceedings pursuant hereto shall, unless the same be inconsistent with the context, be construed as follows: “(13) ‘Date of bankruptcy’, ‘time of bankruptcy’, ‘commencement of proceedings’, or ‘bankruptcy’, with reference to time, shall mean the date when the petition was filed; . . . .” 30 Stat. 544, as amended by 52 Stat. 840-841. “. . . the rights of creditors are fixed by the Bankruptcy Act as of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. This is true both as to the bankrupt and among themselves. The assets at that time are segregated for the benefit of creditors. The transfer of the assets to someone for application to ‘the debts of the insolvent, as the rights and priorities of creditors may be made to appear’ [citing Bramwell v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 269 U. S. 483, 490], takes place as of that time.” United States v. Marxen, 307 U. S. 200, 207-208. “The general rule in bankruptcy is that the filing of the petition freezes the rights of all parties interested in the bankrupt estate. Exceptions only emphasize the rule. Whatever disagreement in opinion there may have been on the matter prior to the Act of 1938, it is now clear that statutory liens may be valid if they arise before bankruptcy although they are perfected after bankruptcy, if the perfection is within the time permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of applicable law.” 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 228-229 (14th ed. 1942). These provisions apparently originated in Amendments proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference which were before Congress in a Committee Report Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). This report states that the bill was introduced by Mr. Chandler, May 28, 1936, containing Amendments proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference, and the several Sections are accompanied by explanatory notes. Section 67c, as there proposed, resembles substantially the Section as finally enacted. The note explanatory of it, attributed to Jacob I. Weinstein, a member of the Conference, includes the following statement: “Section 64 [of the Bankruptcy Act before amendment by the Chandler Act] is declaratory of a policy that the costs and expenses in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding and its administration shall be first paid in distribution. It is a sound policy and is in accordance with the general principles well established in liquidation proceedings. But Section 67 of the Act does not apply the same limitation with respect to valid liens. The Supreme Court, in the case of City of Richmond v. Bird, [249 U. S. 174,] 43 A. B. R. 260 (1919), resolved the conflict in the lower court decisions by holding that the priority provisions of Section 64 do not apply to liens valid under Section 67. . . . "It is significant that in recent years state legislatures have been enacting special legislation in favor of tax claims, public debts, and a variety of private claims. Statistics in the bankruptcy cases show that the effective administration of the bankruptcy law has seriously suffered therefrom. Such claims, particularly tax liens, often consume the entire estate, leaving nothing for the payment of the costs and expenses of administration incurred in reducing the assets to cash. In many such cases the tax liens represent an accumulation of delinquent items covering a long period of time, without any attempt on the part of tax collectors to enforce payment prior to the bankruptcy proceeding. “There is therefore need for a provision to protect the administration costs and expenses; and similar considerations apply to wage claims. Accordingly we have selected, from among the priorities fixed by Section 64 (as revised), these particular items for protection. However, by reason of the historical development and the inherent differences existing in the incidents attaching to real and personal property, it would seem advisable to restrict the remedy thus provided to liens on personal property, where such liens have not been enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy.” (Italics supplied.) Id. at p. 212 n. 1. At that time the bill did not also except from subordination statutory tax liens on personal property “accompanied by possession of such property.” The addition of that clause gives it special emphasis and suggests its appropriate effect as a warning to other claimants that the property, so possessed, will not be available in the first instance for the administrative expenses and wage claims specified in clauses (1) and (2) of § 64a. The report filed by Mr. Chandler for the Committee on the Judiciary, July 29, 1937, to accompany the bill then known as H. It. 8046 merely stated: “In subdivisions b and c statutory liens are protected and permitted to be perfected if the time allowed by law for perfecting them has not expired.” H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1937), and see references to §§64 and 67c on pp. 9, 15-16. See also, Weinstein, The Bankruptcy Law of 1938 (1938): “This subdivision is new and is designed to correct an inequitable condition which existed under the old Act, particularly with respect to tax liens allowed, through the inaction of tax authorities, to be accumulated over a long period of time. Frequently, such liens consumed the entire estate, even to the exclusion of the costs and expenses incurred in the proceeding. While subd. a of sec. 64 provides for priority of payment of such costs and expenses, such payment is prior only to the other unsecured debts and does not affect or impair valid liens, whether statutory or otherwise. But tax claims may take the form of unsecured debts due to the sovereign, and thus payable by way of priority in the order as provided in sec. 64, or the form of liens created by local statutes. As indicated, if the tax claim takes the form of a lien, or is reduced to the form of a lien, it is not affected by the provisions of sec. 64. In view of the inequitable condition above referred to, there was need for a provision to protect the administration costs and expenses, and like considerations of public policy required a similar protection for wage claimants. However, the historical development, and the inherent differences in the incidents attaching to real and personal property, made it advisable to restrict the remedy provided by this paragraph to liens on personal property; but, in respect even to personal property, the provisions are applicable only where the property has not been reduced to possession or where the liens have not been enforced by sale prior to bankruptcy." (Italics supplied in the second instance.) (At pp. 144r-145.) The only question then arising would be as to the extent to which the trustee might deduct from those proceeds his general expenses of administration, as well as the costs of the sale itself. This question was touched upon in the agreement with the trustee but no issue is presented here as to it.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. MOSS et al. No. 74-883. Argued December 3, 1975 Decided March 3, 1976 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 505. Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Mark L. Evans argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Drexel D. Journey, Robert W. Perdue, and Allan Abbot Tuttle. Morton L. Simons argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Barbara M. Simons, Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., William T. Miller, Frank W. Frisk, Jr., Richard L. Curry, and Bernard Rane. Jerome J. McGrath filed a brief for the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b), provides that “[n]o natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the [Federal Power] Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission . . . that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.” The question presented in this case is whether the FPC may, upon a proper finding of public convenience or necessity, simultaneously authorize both the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce by a producer and the abandonment of the sale at a future date certain. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit construed § 7 (b) to empower the FPC to authorize abandonment only when and if proposed at the end of the contract term, thus precluding power to authorize abandonment simultaneously with certificating new producer sales. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set aside the FPC order involved in this case insofar as it permits the Commission, at the time it issues a certificate of public convenience and necessity, to authorize the producer to terminate the sale at the end of the contract term. 164 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 502 F. 2d 461 (1974). We granted certiorari. 422 U. S. 1006 (1975). We reverse. I FPC Order No. 455, 48 F. P. C. 218, issued August 3, 1972, is the order involved. The order was promulgated under FPC rulemaking authority pursuant to a notice of April 6, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 7345, as an addition to the FPC’s general rules of practice and procedure, 18 CFR §2.75 (1975). Order No. 455 established an “optional procedure for certificating new producer sales of natural gas.” 48 F. P. C., at 218. The new procedure did not displace area pricing, but instead provided an alternative to “stimulate and accelerate domestic exploration and development of natural gas reserves.” Id., at 225. The procedure was necessary, the Commission found, because natural gas producers were frequently unable, due to hazards of area price revisions in lengthy appellate review proceedings, to rely upon rates established by the FPC in its area rate orders, and thus were discouraged from exploring for new gas and committing it to the interstate market. For “there is no assurance at the present time that a producer may not ultimately have to refund some of an initial rate ... upon which the producer relied when it dedicated a new gas supply to the interstate market.” Id., at 222-223. “[T]he producer does not know ... how much it will get if it develops and sells new gas to the interstate market. The producer knows for sure only that once it sells in interstate commerce it cannot stop deliveries.” Id., at 223. “This uncertainty,” the Commission found, “has impeded domestic exploration and development.” Ibid. The optional procedure introduced by Order No. 455 was designed to “lessen rate uncertainty which has prevailed since the early 1960’s.” Id., at 219. The procedure has several features. First, it permits producers to tender for FPC approval contracts for the sale of new natural gas at rates that may exceed the maximum authorized by the applicable rate order. Second, the FPC will determine in a single proceeding whether the “public convenience and necessity” under § 7 (c) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (c), warrants the issuance of a certificate authorizing the sale and whether the rates called for by the contract are “just and reasonable” under §4 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a). Third, a permanent certificate issued by the Commission and accepted by the producer is not subject to change in later proceedings under § 4 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717c, and the rates may be collected without risk of refund obligations. 48 F. P. C., at 226. See 18 CFR § 2.75(d) (1975). Fourth, Order No. 455 authorizes inclusion in the permanent certificate of the abandonment assurance — or “pregranted abandonment” — called in question in this case. 18 CFR § 2.75 (e) (1975). The authority to include assurance that the producer may abandon the sale at the end of the contract term is, however, to be exercised only upon appropriate findings by the FPC of public convenience or necessity, as required by § 7 (b). Order No. 455-A, 48 F. P. C. 477, 481 (1972). The importance to the producer of the pregranted abandonment provision is obvious. Pregranted abandonment gives the producer assurance that his present sale will not indefinitely commit the gas to what may be a lower priced interstate market: he will be free on the. contract expiration date to discontinue deliveries to the purchaser without having to demonstrate again that abandonment is consistent with the public convenience or necessity. II The entire optional procedure of Order No. 455 was attacked in petitions for review before the Court of Appeals, which upheld the order in all respects save the pregranted abandonment authority. In holding that § 7 (b) requires a public-convenience-or-necessity finding by the FPC at the time of the proposed abandonment, thus precluding such finding at the time of certification, the Court of Appeals stated, 164 U. S. App. D. C., at 12, 502 F. 2d, at 472: “Pregranted abandonment would leave a producer free to discontinue service to the interstate market, perhaps years after the original certification, with no contemporaneous obligation on the producer to justify withdrawal of service as consistent with the public convenience and necessity. We think Section 7 (b) does not contemplate or authorize such procedure. “... It appears to us . .. that pregranted abandonment requires more clairvoyance than even the Commission's expertise reasonably encompasses.” We find nothing on the face of § 7 (b) to support the holding that the section “does not contemplate or authorize such procedure.” There is no express provision prescribing the timing of the finding of public convenience or necessity that is prerequisite to FPC authority to allow the producer to abandon a sale. In the absence of an explicit direction, the inference may reasonably be made that Congress left the timing of the finding within the general discretionary power granted the FPC “to regulate the abandonment of service,” S. Rep. No. 1162, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). “[T]he Commission's broad responsibilities . . . demand a generous construction of its statutory authority,” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 776 (1968) (footnote omitted), and that inference is plainly consistent with Congress’ regulatory goals. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals that pregranted abandonment requires “clairvoyance” overlooks the express power granted to the FPC in § 7 (b) to allow abandonment upon a proper finding that the “present or future” public convenience or necessity warrants permission to abandon. The power to authorize an abandonment upon finding that it is justified by future public convenience or necessity clearly encompasses advance authorization warranted by consideration of future circumstances and the necessary estimation of tomorrow’s needs. That has been our conclusion when FPC authority to make forecasts of future events has been challenged in other contexts. For example, in rejecting the contention that the FPC could not consider forecasts of the future under the nearly identical standard of § 7 (e), FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 29 (1961), stated that “a forecast of the direction in which future pub-lie interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency.” Similarly, as to another agency, we have stated our unwillingness to let “uncertainties as to the future ... paralyze the [Interstate Commerce] Commission into inaction.” United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Nav. Co., 326 U. S. 236, 241 (1945). Thus, to the extent that exercising the pregranted abandonment authority entails forecasting future developments affecting supply and demand, we cannot say that requiring this degree of “clairvoyance” renders the provision beyond FPC authority. Furthermore, the FPC may determine that present supply and demand conditions require that pregranted abandonment be authorized in appropriate cases to encourage exploration for new gas and its dedication to the interstate market, since the unwillingness of producers to make indefinite commitments has made potentially available supplies inaccessible to the interstate market. We conclude therefore that an optional procedure encompassing pregranted authority intended to draw new gas supplies to the interstate market is clearly within FPC authority to permit abandonments justified by either present or future public convenience or necessity. Order No. 455 does not authorize specific abandon-ments. It merely establishes an optional procedure under which pregranted abandonment may be authorized in appropriate cases. Any pregranted abandonments approved under this procedure are subject to judicial review under the Act. See § 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b). We should not presume, as the Court of Appeals did, that the Commission is not competent to make proper findings supported by substantial evidence and consistent with § 7 (b) in approving pregranted abandonment. Rather, the question whether particular pre-granted abandonment authorization's are beyond the Commission’s expertise should await resolution in concrete cases. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 392 (1974). It suffices for the purposes of this case that we read § 7 (b) as leaving the timing of approval of abandonments to FPC discretion. Ill The Court of Appeals stated that its construction of § 7 (b) as denying FPC authority to authorize abandonment on a future date certain at the time of certification was “fortified” by Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137 (1960) (Sunray II). Sunray II held that the FPC had authority to tender a certificate of public convenience and necessity without time limitation to a producer who applied for a certificate authorizing sales for 20 years only. The Court reasoned, id., at 142: “If petitioners’ contentions, as to the want of authority in the Commission to grant a permanent certificate where one of limited duration has been sought for, were to be sustained, the way would be clear for every independent producer of natural gas to seek certification only for the limited period of its initial contract with the transmission company, and thus automatically be free at a future date, untrammeled by Commission regulation, to reassess whether it desired to continue serving the interstate market.” We understand the Court of Appeals to read this passage as implying that a limited-term certificate would be barred by the Act, and that a permanent certificate with pregranted abandonment would also be barred since such a certificate, as the FPC concedes, Brief for FPC 22, is legally and functionally indistinguishable from a limited-term certificate. But the Court of Appeals’ reading of Sunray II was patently erroneous. Sunray II in fact indicated that the FPC is authorized to issue limited-term certificates. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had addressed that question at an earlier stage of the litigation and had held that the FPC was authorized to issue such certificates. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 239 F. 2d 97 (1956), rev’d on other grounds, 353 U. S. 944 (1957) (Sunray I). Sunray II implicitly approved this holding in stating, 364 U. S., at 157: “There is no contention that the Commission was again indulging in the erroneous notion that it had no power to issue a limited certificate.” Thus, rather than imply that the Act forbids the issuance of a limited-term certificate, Sunray II approved the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that the Act permits the issuance of such a certificate. Sunray II therefore supports the conclusion we have reached and does not fortify the Court of Appeals’ construction of § 7 (b). In both the case of the limited-term certificate and the case of the permanent certificate with pregranted abandonment, the FPC determines at the time of certification that the present or future public convenience or necessity justifies the issuance of a certificate that allows discontinuance of service at a future date certain without need for further proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it set aside the pregranted abandonment provision of Order No. 455, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 7 (b) of the Act provides in full text: “No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.” The optional procedure is available for sales of gas produced from wells commenced after April 6, 1972, and gas that has not previously been sold in the interstate market. 18 CFR § 2.75 (b)(5) (1975). After adoption of the optional procedure, the FPC established a national ceiling rate for some sales of natural gas. Opinion No. 699, 51 F. P. C. 2212 (1974). The optional procedure was then amended to permit producers to tender contracts for certification including rates exceeding the national ceiling, as well as area rates. Order No. 455-B, 52 F. P. C. 1416 (1974). The procedure does not, however, limit the applicability of § 5, 15 U. S. C. § 717d. See 18 CFR § 2.75 (d) (1975). The Commission noted in Order No. 455 that it was unable to “bind a future Commission not to invoke the prospective operation of Section 5”; the Commissioners further stated that “[t]o the extent that this Commission can grant certainty of rates, we do so.” 48 F. P. C. 218, 223 (1972). This provision reads as follows: “Applications presented hereunder will be considered for permanent certification, either with or without pregranted abandonment, notwithstanding that the contract rate may be in excess of an area ceiling rate established in a prior opinion or order of this Commission.” Respondents’ cross-petition seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision to the extent that it adversely resolved their contentions was denied. 422 U. S. 1020 (1975). The FPC has disclaimed any reliance on the ground, permitted under § 7 (b), that "the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted.” We therefore have no occasion to address the question whether pregranted abandonment on that ground would exceed FPC authority. Paradoxically, similar considerations led the Court of Appeals to reject respondents’ challenge to a provision of the optional procedure requiring the Commission to determine the reasonableness of future rate escalations included in contracts submitted purr suant to the procedure. Yet no attempt was made to distinguish the case of future rate escalations from that of pregranted abandonment in this respect. The Court said: “We cannot say as an abstract proposition of law that it is impossible for the Commission to make an advance determination of ‘reasonableness’ in proceedings under Section 4. Although as a practical matter one may be skeptical about the ability of the Commission to succeed in this endeavor, we think it may make the attempt. Whether it succeeds will depend upon the evidentiary basis for the escalations proposed in a given contract and the reasonableness of Commission findings and projections supporting and approving such escalations. The question is one of proof which can be answered only on a record setting out a particular proposal and the evidence supporting it.” 164 U. S. App. D. C., at 8, 502 F. 2d, at 468. Respondents claim that the pregranted abandonment provision amounts to deregulation akin to that condemned in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 400 (1974). But, unlike the small-producer exemption involved there, the FPC in the optional procedure retains full control over its regulatory jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that pregranted abandonment has “the same potentiality of prejudice to consumers” that this Court was concerned about in Sunray II. 164 U. S. App. D. C., at 12, 502 F. 2d, at 472. In that case, however, Sunray’s position would .have removed FPC discretion not to issue limited-term certificates whenever a producer sought a limited certificate. Both Sunray II and today’s decision maintain FPC discretion in this regard, while the Court of Appeals’ conclusion reduces the FPC’s ability to exercise its regulatory responsibility. The first decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was reversed in Sunray I on the ground that the Court had itself decided whether the FPC should have issued a limited-term certificate, rather than remanding to the Commission to resolve this question in the first instance, 353 U. S. 944. Sunray II sustained the Court of Appeals’ later affirmance of the FPC’s issuance of an unlimited certificate, 267 F. 2d 471 (1959). Moreover, if issuance of limited-term certificates were barred by the Act, there would have been no need to decide Sunray II. In that circumstance the producer could hardly have complained that the FPC failed to recognize its request for only a limited certificate, since such a reading of the Act requires the FPC in all cases to issue unlimited-term certificates.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MISSISSIPPI CHEMICAL CORP. et al. No. 70-52. Argued January 10, 1972 Decided March 6, 1972 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Blackmun, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Walters, Thomas L. Stapleton, and Leonard J. Henzke, Jr. John C. Satterfield argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was /. Dudley Buford. Mac Asbitt, Jr., Harold S. Cook, D. Jeff Lance, and William W. Beckett filed a brief for Agway, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Marshauu delivered the opinion of the Court. Mississippi Chemical Corp. and Coastal Chemical Corp. (hereinafter taxpayers) instituted this action for a tax refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Both taxpayers are "cooperative associations” within the meaning of § 15 of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 46 Stat. 18, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1141 j, and thus qualify for membership in one of the 12 “Banks for Cooperatives” (hereinafter Bank(s)) established by the Farm Credit Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 257, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1134 et seq. Since their principal places of business are located in Mississippi, their regional Bank is the one located in New Orleans. The Farm Credit Act of 1933 provides that members may borrow money from their Banks and, soon after securing membership in the New Orleans Bank, the taxpayers elected to borrow. Thereafter, they were required by the Farm Credit Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 656, 12 U. S. C. § 1134d (a) (3), which partially amended the 1933 Act, to make quarterly purchases of $100 par value Class C stock of the Bank equal to not less than 10% nor more than 25% of the amount of the quarterly interest that they paid to the Bank on their loans. During the period relevant to this lawsuit, the rate set by the Bank was 15%. On their tax returns for the years in question, the taxpayers claimed a $99 interest expense deduction for every $100 stock purchase required by the statute. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions, the taxpayers paid the assessed deficiencies, and this action arose. The United States has consistently contended that the stock that the taxpayers were required to purchase under the 1955 Act is a capital asset as defined by § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1221, and that its cost is nondeductible. See 26 U. S. C. § 263. The taxpayers have persistently urged that the money expended for this stock is part of “the amount [they] . . . contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money,” Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 560 (1932), and is deductible as interest. 26 U. S. C. § 163 (a). The District Court found for the taxpayers and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed over the dissent of Judge Godbold. 431 F, 2d 1320 (1970). We granted certiorari on February 22, 1971, to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 401 U. S. 908. We reverse for the reasons stated below. h-i Early in. this century, Congress recognized that farmers had a tremendous need for long-term capital at low interest rates. This led to the enactment of the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 360, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 641 et seq. The immediate purpose of the bill was “to afford those who [were] engaged in farming or who desire [d] to engage in that occupation a vastly greater volume of land credit on more favorable terms and at materially lower and more nearly uniform interest rates than [were] presently] available.” H. R. Rep. No. 630, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. The long-range purpose was to stimulate and foster a cooperative spirit among farmers who, it was hoped, would work together to seek agricultural improvements which they would finance themselves. Id., at 2-3; S. Rep. No. 144, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 5. The 1916 Act divided the United States into 12 regional districts under the general supervision of a Federal Farm Loan Board. Each district contained a federal land bank designed to loan money to farmers at low interest rates. Persons desiring to borrow were required to organize into groups of 10 or more which were called “national farm loan associations.” Sec. 7, 39 Stat. 365. In order to borrow from the district bank, an association had to establish that each of its members was an owner or a prospective owner of a farm, that the loan desired by each member- was not less than $100 nor more than $10,000, and that the aggregate of the loans was not less than $20,000. Each association also had to subscribe for capital stock of the bank in the amount of 5%' of the total loan sought by its members. The association, in turn, was required to compel each of its members to purchase stock in the association equal to 5% of the amount of the loan sought by that member. Hence, there were two separate levels of cooperative association. The legislative history and the language of the Act itself indicate that Congress faced somewhat of a dilemma in structuring the land bank system. On the one hand, there was a strong congressional desire to stimulate a privately controlled, privately owned, and privately financed program based upon the cooperative efforts of dedicated farmers. This desire was effectuated in large measure in the stock-purchase requirements discussed above. On the other hand, Congress realized that without federal help, the existing plight of the farmers would probably render them unable to support the system themselves, and it would thus be doomed to failure: “The greatest difficulty in the establishment of a rural-credit system, based upon the cooperative principle, is met in connection with the inauguration of the system. Ample capital is absolutely necessary at the start and whatever sums the first borrowers might be able to contribute would in no wise suffice to get the system into successful operation. The system must be endowed, temporarily at least, with capital from sources other than the subscriptions to capital stock among the borrowers.” H. R. Rep. No. 630, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 9. Accord, S. Rep. No. 144, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 4. To resolve the dilemma, Congress provided for temporary public financing without charge to supplement the stock-purchase requirements of the statute. Congress also provided that each land bank must periodically increase its capital shares in order to achieve the goal of private ownership of the system, and to repay the temporary federal financing. The land bank system remained virtually untouched until the economic depression of the 1930’s when Congress determined that more action was needed to aid farmers in establishing privately owned institutions designed to provide ready sources of long-term credit. The Farm Credit Act of 1933 was passed to supplement the 1916 legislation. It established, inter alia, regional Banks for Cooperatives in each of the 12 land bank districts and a Central Bank for Cooperatives in Washington, D. C. These Banks were authorized to make loans to “cooperative associations,” defined as “association[s] in which farmers act together in processing, preparing for market, handling, and/or marketing the farm products of persons so engaged, and also . . . association [s] in which farmers act together in purchasing, testing, grading, processing, distributing, and/or furnishing farm supplies and/or farm business services.” Agricultural Marketing Act § 16, 46 Stat. 18, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1141j. The new Banks paralleled in many ways those already established under the 1916 legislation. The same regional districts were used, many of the same persons were eligible for loans from both institutions, and borrowers from both banks were required to be stockholders. The 1933 Act required cooperative associations to own, at the time a loan was made, an amount of stock in the Bank for Cooperatives equal in fair book value (not to exceed par value) to $100 per $2,000 of the amount of the loan, or 5%-, the same amount of stock required of borrowers from land banks under the 1916 Act. One notable difference between the 1916 and the 1933 Acts was that the latter did not regulate the membership of the cooperative association to any great degree. For example, members of cooperative associations did not have to own stock in the associations, only in the Banks; they did not have to borrow a minimum amount; and they did not have to be farm owners or prospective farm owners, but could be processors, handlers, testers, or marketers. This is in sharp contrast to the stringent requirements of the 1916 legislation. Another notable difference is that Congress invested substantially more money in the 1933 program ($110,000,000) than it had invested in the land banks ($9,000,000). See S. Rep. No. 1201, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 5, 7. As time passed, Congress watched the land bank system develop as planned. The temporary Government capitalization that had solidified the program in its inception was gradually replaced by private capital, and by the end of 1947, the Government’s capital had been completely returned. S. Doc. No. 7, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4; S. Rep. No. 1201, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 7. The land banks became totally private concerns — owned, operated, and financed by farmers without Government assistance. Congress also watched the development of the Banks for Cooperatives and became concerned about their lack of success in attracting and keeping private investment. By the 1950’s, the Government still retained over 88% of the stock in the Banks. In § 2 of the Farm Credit Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 390, 12 U. S. C. § 636a, Congress stated that “[i]t is declared to be the policy of the Congress to encourage and facilitate increased borrower participation in the management, control, and ultimate ownership of the permanent system of agricultural credit made available through institutions operating under the supervision of the Farm Credit Administration . . . .” A Federal Farm Credit Board was created for the purpose, inter alia, of making recommendations concerning the best way to convert the Banks for Cooperatives from predominantly Government-owned to predominantly privately owned institutions. The result of the Board’s report and recommendations was the Farm Credit Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 655. It sought to effectuate Congress’ policy by providing for the orderly withdrawal of Government capital from the Banks and the continual influx and retention of substitute private financing. See S. Doc. No. 7, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 6; S. Rep. No. 1201, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1; Hearings on Farm Credit Act of 1955 before the House Committee on Agriculture, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 30-31. II Under the Farm Credit Act of 1933, there was only one class of capital stock in the Banks for Cooperatives. The Farm Credit Act of 1955 provided for three distinct classes of stock — A, B, and C. Class A stock may only be held by the Governor of the Farm Credit Association on behalf of the United States. Whatever stock the Government held in the Banks prior to the 1955 Act was converted to Class A stock. This stock is nonvoting and receives no dividends. Class A stock must be retired each year in an amount equal to the amount of Class C stock issued during the year. 12 U. S. C. § 1134d (a)(1). Once the United States’ stock is completely redeemed, the Government will invest no more in the Banks, except that it may purchase additional shares of the Class A stock if an emergency makes it necessary in order for the bank to meet the credit needs of eligible borrowers. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 1134d (a)(1), 1134b, 1134L Class B stock represents a new approach to capitalizing the Banks. It is an investment stock available to the public. It pays noncumulative dividends upon certain conditions. Class B stock may be retired only after all Class A stock. 12 U. S. C. § 1134d (a)(2). Class C stock may be issued only to farmers’ cooperative associations, except that each regional bank is required to purchase such shares from the Central Bank. This stock may be obtained under four circumstances. One share is required to initially qualify any association as a borrower of a regional Bank. Each borrower must then make the quarterly stock purchases which gave rise to this lawsuit. In addition, 12 U. S. C. § 1134Í (b) provides that after certain expenditures are made each year, patronage refunds may be allocated to borrowers in the form of Class C stock. “All patronage refunds shall be paid in the proportion that the amount of interest earned on the loans of each borrower bears to the total interest earned on the loans of all borrowers during the fiscal year.” Ibid. Borrowers also receive at the end of each fiscal year an “allocated surplus” credit which is payable out of the Bank’s net savings. Like patronage refunds, allocated surplus is credited to each member in accordance with the proportion that the interest on its loans bears to the interest on all loans. When the surplus account reaches 25%- of the total outstanding capital stock of the Bank, the excess may be distributed to members in the form of Class C stock. Only the tax treatment of the quarterly purchases is disputed here. The taxpayers correctly note that the Class C stock has attributes which would make a normal commercial stock undesirable. For example, the C stock pays no dividends; it is transferable only between cooperatives and only under rare circumstances; additional shares do not provide additional voting power; and the stock cannot be redeemed until all A, all B issued earlier or in the same year, and all earlier issued C shares have been called for redemption. These characteristics render the market for C shares virtually nonexistent. It must be remembered, however, that the stock was intentionally given these characteristics by a Congress with definite goals in mind. The legislative history of the Farm Credit Act of 1955 indicates that Congress placed much of the blame for the Bank’s inability to repay the capital extended by the Government and to retain private capital on the provision in the 1933 legislation which permitted borrowers to redeem their stock for cash upon paying off their loans. The restrictions on redemption and transferability and the dividend prohibition were designed to obviate this difficulty and to provide both a stable membership and permanent capital, two necessities for the success of any cooperative venture. Ill The taxpayers do not seek to deduct the cost of their initial shares in the Bank as interest. They accept the fact that these shares represent one cost of membership and that this cost is a capital expense because membership is a valuable asset in more than one taxable year. But, they argue that once they purchased their initial shares, they obtained full membership rights, and, a fortiori, that Congress must have intended the quarterly expenditures for stock to be a charge for borrowing money since the stock has no value. The fact is, however, that the stock purchased quarterly is indeed valuable. The amounts paid for C shares become part of the permanent capital structure of the Bank, thereby increasing the stability of the Bank and insuring its continued ability to extend credit. Each share also provides an opportunity for more patronage and surplus dividends, an ultimate right of redemption, and an asset that may be used as a set-off in case of a default on the loan. In sum, every share of stock purchased quarterly by the taxpayers is nearly as valuable as the shares purchased initially. It is therefore difficult to understand why these different purchases should receive radically different tax treatment. If Congress had required 1,000 or 100,000 shares of Class C stock to be purchased before an association could borrow from the Banks, under the taxpayers’ theory of the case the cost of those shares would be a nondeductible capital expense. Simply because Congress eased the burden on farmers by spreading the requirement of capital investment over a period of time rather than requiring it as a prerequisite to borrowing, the taxpayers are entitled to no more favorable tax treatment. It is important not to lose sight of the congressional purposes in enacting the farm credit legislation. The immediate goal was to provide loans to farmers at low interest rates. It would, therefore, be odd for Congress to provide a “hidden” interest charge in the legislation. The long-range goal was to make the Banks “fully cooperative and to place full ownership and responsibility for their operations and success in the hands of those eligible to borrow from them.” Hearings on Farm Credit Act of 1955 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 60. Congress felt, in light of its experience under the Farm Credit Act of 1933, that the long-range goal could only be achieved if Bank members made long-term investments in the Banks. Hence, Congress created Class C stock, a security with a special value in cooperative ventures. While this security is sui generis, the congressional scheme makes it clear that it has value over the long run. Since the security is of value in more than one taxable year, it is a capital asset within the meaning of § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, and its cost is nondeductible. Cf. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 403 U. S. 345 (1971); Old Colony R. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 552 (1932); 26 CFR § 1.461-1. We reject the contention that while the Class C stock may be a capital asset, it is worth only $1, and that the additional $99 paid for each share must represent interest. Were we dealing with the traditional corporate structure in this case, the taxpayers' argument would have strength. But, as we have pointed out previously, the essential nature of cooperatives and corporations differs. The value of the Class C stock derives primarily from attributes other than marketability. The stock has value because it is the foundation of the cooperative scheme; it insures stability and continuity. The stock also has value because it enables the farmers to work together toward common goals. It enables them to share in a venture of common concerns and to reap the rewards of knowing that they can finance themselves without the assistance of the Federal Government. It is perhaps debatable whether these attributes should properly be valued at $100 per share, but we are not called upon merely to resolve a question of valuation. Rather, we must decide whether it is artificial to characterize these unique expenditures as payments for a capital asset. We find that it is not. The taxpayers and the Government each allege that the other is looking at form rather than substance. At some point, however, the form in which a transaction is cast must have considerable impact. Guterman, Substance v. Form in the Taxation of Personal and Business Transactions, N. Y. U. 20th Inst, on Fed. Tax. 951 (1962). Congress chose to make the taxpayers buy stock; Congress determined that the stock was worth $100 a share; and this stock was endowed with a long-term value. While Congress might have been able to achieve the same ends through additional interest payments, it chose the form of stock purchases. This form assures long-term commitment and has bearing on the tax consequences of the purchases. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with direction that judgment be entered for the United States. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mississippi Chemical Corp. acquired the share of stock qualifying it as a borrower in 1956; Coastal Chemical Corp. acquired its qualifying share in 1957. Mississippi Chemical Corp. challenges the Government’s tax treatment of $55,113.19 spent from 1961 to 1963; Coastal Chemical Corp. challenges the treatment of $211,799.68 expended from 1958 to 1963. One dollar was treated as the cost of acquiring a capital asset. This decision is unreported but is found in App. 342-346. Other lower courts have split on the issue presented. Compare, e. g., M. F. A. Central Cooperative v. Bookwalter, 427 F. 2d 1341 (CA8 1970), rev’g 286 F. Supp. 956 (ED Mo. 1968), pet. for cert. pending (No. 70-22), with Penn Yan Agway Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 434, 417 F. 2d 1372 (1969). The statute also provided that “joint stock land banks” could be formed. These were corporations, composed of 10 or more persons, who desired to form banks to loan money to farmers without the aid of congressional financing. They were subject to the same restrictions and conditions imposed on the district land banks. While Congress did not disturb the land bank system, it added to it at various times. For example, Title II of the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923, 42 Stat. 1461, 12 U. S. C. § 1151 et seq. (1958 ed.), was designed to aid farmers in obtaining short-term credit. The Act also established a production credit system to improve short-term financing for farmers. That system has no bearing on this case. There is evidence in the record that the Government capital is being revolved out of the Banks just as Congress anticipated. See Farm Credit Administration, Banks for Cooperatives — A Quarter of a Century of Progress, excerpted in App. 157, 175. See also 431 F. 2d 1320, 1332, and n. 17 (Godbold, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States 7. The Class B shares are of only nominal importance. In 1963, they amounted to only some 5% of the total outstanding stock of the New Orleans Bank. The patronage refunds and the allocated surplus, discussed infra, are not a return on the amount of capital that the borrower contributes to the Bank; they are distributions of earnings, not presently convertible to cash, but are eventually convertible just as the quarterly Class C purchases may eventually be redeemed. The Government contended in the District Court that the taxpayers should have reported the patronage dividends as income. The District Court disagreed and the Government did not appeal this point. It is not, therefore, reviewable here, and the Government does not urge that we consider it. While no formal dividends are paid on the C stock, it is apparent that the patronage dividend is in many ways equivalent to the traditional corporate dividend. As noted above, the patronage dividend is not immediately convertible to cash, but it is far from worthless. Like the usual corporate dividends, the patronage dividends are paid in proportion to stock ownership. Stock ownership is apportioned according to the amount a Bank member borrows. Thus, those who borrow the most own the most stock and receive the most patronage dividends (and surplus as well). As the Class A stock and the earlier issued Class B and Class C stock are redeemed, the C stock issued as dividends will become convertible to cash and its value will be realized at that time. In the event of a default by a borrower, the Class C stock is set off against the amount of the loan. Hence, the more patronage dividends the member receives, the more security he has in case of default. Cooperative associations are entitled to vote in polls designating nominees for appointment to the Federal Farm Credit Board, established by the Farm Credit Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 390, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 636c, to help effectuate congressional policy; to vote in the nomination polls and elections of members of district farm credit boards established by the Farm Credit Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 703, 12 U. S. C. § 640a; and to vote in the nomination and elections of directors of the Central Bank for Cooperatives. It is normal for every member of a cooperative to have only one vote, irrespective of a disparity between the shares held. See Frost v. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U. S. 515, 536-537 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); I. Packel, The Law of Cooperatives §§23-24 (a), pp. 136-140 (3d ed. 1956). It is interesting that the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388, 7 U. S. C. §§ 291-292, permits a cooperative marketing association immunity from the Sherman Act under some circumstances, but only if no member is entitled to more than one vote. Cooperatives and corporations operate on different principles. Whereas the corporate structure separates control and management, the essence of a cooperative requires that these functions be integrated. And, whereas the value of corporate stock depends on ease of transferability (or marketability), the value of cooperative stock lies in the durable, long-term nature of the investment. See Nieman, Revolving Capital in Stock Cooperative Corporations, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 393 (1948). It is by no means clear that the Class C stock is worth only $1 even under a traditional market value analysis. The lower courts failed to include the value of the patronage and surplus dividends in computing the value of the quarterly purchases. The Class C stock may, therefore, be worth considerably more than $1, although the Government concedes that it is not worth $100. Because of the result we reach in this case, we have no occasion to make a final determination as to what value the stock would have under a market-value analysis.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ESTATE OF SPIEGEL et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 3. Argued October 24, 1947. Reargued October 11-12, 1948. Decided January 17, 1949. Herbert A. Friedlich argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Leo F. Tierney, Harry Thom and Louis A. Kohn. Joseph M. Weil was also on the brief on the reargument. Arnold Raum argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Lee A. Jackson and L. W. Post. Helen R. Carloss was also on the brief on the original argument, and Ellis N. Slack was also on the brief on the reargument. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a federal estate tax controversy. Here, as in Commissioner v. Church, ante, p. 632, we granted cer-tiorari to consider questions dependent upon the meaning and application of a provision of § 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code. 47 Stat. 169, 279, as amended, 26 U. S. C. §811 (c). The particular provision requires including in a decedent’s gross estate the value at his death of all property “To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise . . . intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death In 1920 Sidney M. Spiegel, a resident of Illinois, made a transfer by trust of certain stocks to himself and another. He died in 1940. During his life the trust income was to be divided among his three children; if they did not survive him, to any of their surviving children. On his death the trust provided that the corpus was to be distributed in the same manner. But no provision was made for distribution of the corpus and its accumulated income should Mr. Spiegel survive all of his children and grandchildren. For this reason the Government has contended that under controlling state law the property would have reverted to Mr. Spiegel had he survived his designated beneficiaries. The value of the corpus of this trust was not included in the Spiegel estate tax return. The Commissioner concluded that its value with accumulated income, about $1,140,000, should have been included in the gross estate under § 811 (c). The Tax Court held otherwise in an unreported opinion. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 159 F. 2d 257. It held that the possession or enjoyment provision of §811 (c) required inclusion of the value of the trust property and accumulated income under the rule declared in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, because under state law the trust agreement left the way open for the property to revert to Mr. Spiegel in case he outlived all the beneficiaries. This holding rested on the agreement of parties that whether there was a right of reverter depended on Illinois law, and the court’s conclusion that under Illinois law a right of reverter did exist. The Hallock case on which the Court of Appeals relied held that the value of trust properties should have been included in a settlor’s gross estate under the “possession or enjoyment” provision where trust agreements had expressly provided that the corpus should revert to the set-tlor in the event he outlived the beneficiaries. The taxpayer has contended here, as in the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, that the Hallock rule is not applicable to this trust, where the settlor’s chance to get back his property depended on state law and not on an express reservation by the settlor. This contention of the taxpayer rests in part on the argument that § 811 (c) imposes a tax only where it can be shown that the settlor’s intent was to reserve for himself a contingent reversionary interest in the property. Another contention is that the value of this contingent reversionary interest was so small in comparison with the total value of the corpus that the Hallock rule should not be applied. A third contention is that the Court of Appeals holding was erroneous in that under Illinois law the corpus of this trust would not have reverted to the settlor had all the beneficiaries died while the settlor was still living. Petitioners urge that in that event the Illinois courts would have held that the corpus passed to the heirs of the last surviving beneficiary. We hold that the Hallock rule was rightly applied by the Court of Appeals and we accept its holding as to the applicable Illinois law. First. In Commissioner v. Church, ante, p. 632, we have discussed the Hallock holding in relation to the scope of the “possession or enjoyment” provision of § 811 (c) and need not elaborate what we said there. What we said demonstrates that the taxability of a trust corpus under this provision of §811 (c) does not hinge on a set-tlor’s motives, but depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer. In the Church case we stated that a trust transaction cannot be held to alienate all of a settlor’s “possession or enjoyment” under § 811 (c) unless it effects “a bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property. After such a transfer has been made, the set-tlor must be left with no present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right to possess or to enjoy the property then or thereafter. In other words such a transfer must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies.” We add to that statement, if it can be conceived of as an addition, that it is immaterial whether such a present or future interest, absolute or contingent, remains in the grantor because he deliberately reserves it or because, without considering the consequences, he conveys away less than all of his property ownership and attributes, present or prospective. In either event the settlor has not parted with all of his presently existing or future contingent interests in the property transferred. He has therefore not made that “complete” kind of trust transfer that § 811 (c) commands as a prerequisite to a showing that he has certainly and irrevocably parted with his “possession or enjoyment.” Any requirement less than that which we have outlined, such as a post-death attempt to probe the settlor’s thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the effectiveness of the “possession or enjoyment” provision as an instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions. To this extent it would defeat the precise purpose for which the provision was originated and which prompted Congress to include it in § 811 (c). Determination of such issues as ownership, possession, enjoyment, whether transfers have been made and the reach of those transfers, may involve many questions of fact. And we have held in many cases that to the extent the determination of such issues depends upon fact finding, many different facts may be relevant. These fact issues in federal tax cases are for the Tax Court to decide in cases brought before it. In this case the Tax Court made findings of fact and then decided against the Government. It did so, however, by holding as a matter of law that those facts did not require inclusion of the value of this corpus in the settlor’s estate. But the Tax Court’s findings of fact showed that the trust contained no provision for disposition of the corpus should the settlor outlive the beneficiaries. This finding of fact, which we accept, plus the Court of Appeals determination of controlling Illinois law, without more, brings this trust transaction within the scope of the possession or enjoyment provision of § 811(c) as we have interpreted that section in the Hallock and Church cases. And petitioner has not contended that it was denied an opportunity to present any relevant evidence concerning ownership, possession, or enjoyment. It is therefore not necessary to remand the case to the Tax Court for any further finding of facts. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 559-560. Second. It is contended that since the monetary value of the settlor’s contingent reversionary interest is small in comparison with the total value of the corpus, the possession or enjoyment provision of § 811 (c) should not be applied. But inclusion of a trust corpus under that provision is not dependent upon the value of the rever-sionary interest. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 324 U. S. 108, 112; Commissioner v. Estate of Field, 324 U. S. 113, 116; see Goldstone v. United States, 325 U. S. 687, 691. The question is not how much is the value of a reservation, but whether after a trust transfer, considered by Congress to be a potentially dangerous tax evasion transaction, some present or contingent right or interest in the property still remains in the settlor so that full and complete title, possession or enjoyment does not absolutely pass to the beneficiaries until at or after the settlor’s death. See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 181. Third. It is contended that under Illinois law the corpus of this trust would not have reverted to the settlor had he outlived the beneficiaries. The record reveals that the state law problem here is not an easy one, but under this Court’s decision in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, the difficulty involved did not relieve the Court of Appeals of its duty to make a decision. The questioned ruling was made by three judges who are constantly required to pass upon Illinois law questions. One of the three judges has long been a resident and lawyer of Illinois. Examination of the Illinois state court opinions pressed upon us leaves us unable to say with any degree of certainty that the Court of Appeals holding was wrong. It is certainly neither novel nor unreasonable for state law to provide that when all trust beneficiaries die the trust corpus should revert to the donor. It would be wholly unprofitable for us to analyze Illinois cases on the point here urged. It is sufficient for us to say that we think reasonable arguments can be made based on Illinois cases to support a determination of this question either for or against the petitioner’s contention. Under these circumstances we will follow our general policy and leave undisturbed this Court of Appeals holding on a question of state law. All other arguments of the petitioners have been noted and we find them without merit. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Jackson dissents. [For opinion of Mr. Justice Reed, concurring in this decision but dissenting from that in Commissioner v. Estate of Church, ante, p. 632, see ante, p. 651.] [For opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting from this decision and also that in Commissioner v. Estate of Church, ante, p. 632, see ante, p. 667.] This Court of Appeals interpretation and application of § 811 (c) was in conflict with the holding of the Third Circuit in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Church’s Estate, 161 F. 2d 11. We granted certiorari in both cases, arguments have been heard together, and we have today reversed the Church case, ante, p. 632. The Tax Court’s conclusion of law that the “possession or enjoyment” clause of § 811 (c) was inapplicable to the facts of this trust rested in part on its belief that Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, had decided the issue. But the Halloek case was decided after Reinecke, and the question here involved was not specifically raised in the Reinecke case. Nor did the Court’s opinion in that case, written by the late Chief Justice Stone, indicate that a transfer of bare legal title in a transfer must always be accepted as a conclusive showing that the possession and enjoyment provision of § 811 (c) cannot be applied to the trust corpus. Cf. Court’s opinion in Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, written by Chief Justice Stone. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 162-165; cf. Steele v. General Mills, 329 U. S. 433.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE, INC. No. 85-701. Argued October 7, 1986 Decided December 15, 1986 Brennan, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, an opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-B and III-C, in which Marshall, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which Marshall, Powell, and Scalia, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 265. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which White, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 266. White, J., filed a separate statement, post, p. 271. Charles N. Steele argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Richard B. Bader. Francis H. Fox argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was E. Susan Garsh. Roger M. Witten, William T. Lake, Carol F. Lee, and Archibald Cox filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Marjorie Heins, Burt Neuborne, and Jack Novik; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Steven Frederick McDowell; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Judith K. Richmond, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Jan W. Baran; for the Home Builders Association of Massachusetts by Wayne S. Henderson; for the National Rifle Association of America by James J. Featherstone and Richard E. Gardiner; and for Joseph M. Scheidler et al. by Edward 'R. Grant and Maura K. Quinlan. Jane E. Kirtley, David Barr, Nancy H. Hendry, J. Laurent Scharff, and Bruce W. Sanford filed a brief for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as amici curiae. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-B, and III-C, and an opinion with respect to Part III-A, in which Justice Marshall, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia join. The questions for decision here arise under §316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA or Act), 90 Stat. 490, as renumbered and amended, 2 U. S. C. §441b. The first question is whether appellee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), a nonprofit, nonstock corporation, by financing certain activity with its treasury funds, has violated the restriction on independent spending contained in § 441b. That section prohibits corporations from using treasury funds to make an expenditure “in connection with” any federal election, and requires that any expenditure for such purpose be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segregated fund. If appellee has violated § 441b, the next question is whether application of that section to MCFL’s conduct is constitutional. We hold that the appellee’s use of its treasury funds is prohibited by §441b, but that §441b is unconstitutional as applied to the activity of which the Federal Election Commission (FEC or Commission) complains. J — < □> MCFL was incorporated m January 1973 as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation under Massachusetts law. Its corporate purpose as stated in its articles of incorporation is: “To foster respect for human life and to defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn, through educational, political and other forms of activities and in addition to engage in any other lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized . . . App. 84. MCFL does not accept contributions from business corporations or unions. Its resources come from voluntary donations from “members,” and from various fundraising activities such as garage sales, bake sales, dances, raffles, and picnics. The corporation considers its “members” those persons who have either contributed to the organization in the past or indicated support for its activities. Appellee has engaged in diverse educational and legislative activities designed to further its agenda. It has organized an ecumenical prayer service for the unborn in front of the Massachusetts Statehouse; sponsored a regional conference to discuss the issues of abortion and euthanasia; provided speakers for discussion groups, debates, lectures, and media programs; and sponsored an annual March for Life. In addition, it has drafted and submitted legislation, some of which has become law in Massachusetts; sponsored testimony on proposed legislation; and has urged its members to contact their elected representatives to express their opinion on legislative proposals. MCFL began publishing a newsletter in January 1973. It was distributed as a matter of course to contributors, and, when funds permitted, to noncontributors who had expressed support for the organization. The total distribution of any one issue has never exceeded 6,000. The newsletter was published irregularly from 1973 through 1978: three times in 1973, five times in 1974, eight times in 1975, eight times in 1976, five times in 1977, and four times in 1978. Id., at 88. Each of the newsletters bore a masthead identifying it as the “Massachusetts Citizens for Life Newsletter,” as well as a volume and issue number. The publication typically contained appeals for volunteers and contributions and information on MCFL activities, as well as on matters such as the results of hearings on bills and constitutional amendments, the status of particular legislation, and the outcome of refer-enda, court decisions, and administrative hearings. Newsletter recipients were usually urged to contact the relevant decisionmakers and express their opinion. B In September 1978, MCFL prepared and distributed a “Special Edition” prior to the September 1978 primary elections. While the May 1978 newsletter had been mailed to 2,109 people and the October 1978 newsletter to 3,119 people, more than 100,000 copies of the “Special Edition” were printed for distribution. The front page of the publication was headlined “EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE,” and readers were admonished that “[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November without your vote in September.” “VOTE PRO-LIFE” was printed in large bold-faced letters on the back page, and a coupon was provided to be clipped and taken to the polls to remind voters of the name of the “pro-life” candidates. Next to the exhortation to vote “pro-life” was a disclaimer: “This special election edition does not represent an endorsement of any particular candidate.” Id., at 101. To aid the reader in selecting candidates, the flyer listed the candidates for each state and federal office in every voting district in Massachusetts, and identified each one as either supporting or opposing what MCFL regarded as the correct position on three issues. A “y” indicated that a candidate supported the MCFL view on a particular issue and an “n” indicated that the candidate opposed it. An asterisk was placed next to the names of those incumbents who had made a “special contribution to the unborn in maintaining a 100% pro-life voting record in the state house by actively supporting MCFL legislation.” While some 400 candidates were running for office in the primary, the “Special Edition” featured the photographs of only 13. These 13 had received a triple “y” rating, or were identified either as having a 100% favorable voting record or as having stated a position consistent with that of MCFL. No candidate whose photograph was featured had received even one “n” rating. The “Special Edition” was edited by an officer of MCFL who was not part of the staff that prepared the MCFL newsletters. The “Special Edition” was mailed free of charge and without request to 5,986 contributors, and to 50,674 others whom MCFL regarded as sympathetic to the organization’s purposes. The Commission asserts that the remainder of the 100,000 issues were placed in public areas for general distribution, but MCFL insists that no copies were made available to the general public. The “Special Edition” was not identified on its masthead as a special edition of the regular newsletter, although the MCFL logotype did appear at its top. The words “Volume 5, No. 3, 1978” were apparently handwritten on the Edition submitted to the FEC, but the record indicates that the actual Volume 5, No. 3, was distributed in May and June 1977. The corporation spent $9,812.76 to publish and circulate the “Special Edition,” all of which was taken from its general treasury funds. A complaint was filed with the Commission alleging that the “Special Edition” was a violation of §441b. The complaint maintained that the Edition represented an expenditure of funds from a corporate treasury to distribute to the general public a campaign flyer on behalf of certain political candidates. The FEC found reason to believe that such a violation had occurred, initiated an investigation, and determined that probable cause existed to believe that MCFL had violated the Act. After conciliation efforts failed, the Commission filed a complaint in the District Court under § 437g(a)(6)(A), seeking a civil penalty and other appropriate relief. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted MCFL’s motion, holding that: (1) the election publications could not be regarded as “expenditures” under §441b(b)(2); (2) the “Special Edition” was exempt from the statutory prohibition by virtue of § 431(9)(B)(i), which in general exempts news commentary distributed by a periodical publication unaffiliated with any candidate or political party; and (3) if the statute applied to MCFL, it was unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. 589 F. Supp. 646, 649 (Mass. 1984). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the statute was applicable to MCFL, but affirmed the District Court’s holding that the statute as so applied was unconstitutional. 769 F. 2d 13 (1985). We granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1049 (1986), and now affirm. r-H hH We agree with the Court of Appeals that the “Special Edition” is not outside the reach of §441b. First, we find no merit in appellee’s contention that preparation and distribution of the “Special Edition” does not fall within that section’s definition of “expenditure.” Section 441b(b)(2) defines “contribution or expenditure” as the provision of various things of value “to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election . . .” (emphasis added). MCFL contends that, since it supplied nothing to any candidate or organization, the publication is not within § 441b. However, the general definitions section of the Act contains a broader definition of “expenditure,” including within that term the provision of anything of value made “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office . . . 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Since the language of the statute does not alone resolve the issue, we must look to the legislative history of §441b to determine the scope of the term “expenditure.” That history clearly confirms that § 441b was meant to proscribe expenditures in connection with an election. We have exhaustively recounted the legislative history of the predecessors of this section in prior decisions. See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 402-409 (1972); United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 570-587 (1957). This history makes clear that Congress has long regarded it as insufficient merely to restrict payments madadirectly to candidates or campaign organizations. The first explicit expression of this came in 1947, when Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, §304, 61 Stat. 136, 159, as amended, 18 U. S. C. §610 (1970 ed.), the criminal statute prohibiting corporate contributions and expenditures to candidates. The statute as amended forbade any corporation or labor organization to make a “contribution or expenditure in connection with any election ...” for federal office. The 1946 Report of the House Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures explained the rationale for the amendment, noting that it would undermine the basic objective of § 610 “if it were assumed that the term ‘making any contribution' related only to the donating of money directly to a candidate, and excluded the vast expenditures of money in the activities herein shown to be engaged in extensively. Of what avail would a law be to prohibit the contributing direct to a candidate and yet permit the expenditure of large sums in his behalf?” H. R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 40, quoted in Automobile Workers, supra, at 581. During the legislative debate on the bill, Senator Taft was asked whether § 610 permitted a newspaper published by a railway union to put out a special edition in support of a political candidate, or whether such activity would be considered a political expenditure. The Senator replied: “If it were supported by union funds contributed by union members as union dues it would be a violation of the law, yes. It is exactly as if a railroad itself, using its stockholders’ funds, published such an advertisement in the newspaper supporting one candidate as against another . . . .” 93 Cong. Rec. 6436-6437 (1947). United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948), narrowed the scope of this prohibition, by permitting the use of union funds to publish a special edition of the weekly CIO News distributed to union members and purchasers of the issue. In Automobile Workers, supra, however, we held that a union was subject to indictment for using union dues to sponsor political advertisements on commercial television. Distinguishing CIO, we stated that the concern of the statute “is the use of corporation or union funds to influence the public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a particular party.” 352 U. S., at 589. The Federal Election Campaign Act enacted the prohibition now found in § 441b. This portion of the Act simply ratified the existing understanding of the scope of § 610. See Pipefitters, supra, at 410-411. Representative Hansen, the sponsor of the provision, declared: “The effect of this language is to carry out the basic intent of section 610, which is to prohibit the use of union or corporate funds for active electioneering directed at the general public on behalf of a candidate in a Federal election.” 117 Cong. Rec. 43379 (1971). The Representative concluded: “The net effect of the amendment, therefore, is to tighten and clarify the provisions of section 610 of title 18, United States Code, and to codify the case law.” Ibid. Thus, the fact that § 441b uses the phrase “to any candidate ... in connection with any election,” while § 610 provided “in connection with any primary election,” is not evidence that Congress abandoned its restriction, in force since 1947, on expenditures on behalf of candidates. We therefore find no merit in MCFL’s argument that only payments to a candidate or organization fall within the scope of § 441b. Appellee next argues that the definition of an expenditure under § 441b necessarily incorporates the requirement that a communication “expressly advocate” the election of candidates, and that its “Special Edition” does not constitute express advocacy. The argument relies on the portion of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), that upheld the disclosure requirement for expenditures by individuals other than candidates and by groups other than political committees. See 2 U. S. C. § 434(c). There, in order to avoid problems of overbreadth, the Court held that the term “expenditure” encompassed “only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted). The rationale for this holding was: “[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public interest.” Id., at 42 (footnote omitted). We agree with appellee that this rationale requires a similar construction of the more intrusive provision that directly regulates independent spending. We therefore hold that an expenditure must constitute “express advocacy” in order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b. We also hold, however, that the publication of the “Special Edition” constitutes “express advocacy.” Buckley adopted the “express advocacy” requirement to distinguish discussion of issues and candidates from more pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons. We therefore concluded in that case that a finding of “express advocacy” depended upon the use of language such as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” etc., Buckley, supra, at 44, n. 52. Just such an exhortation appears in the “Special Edition.” The publication not only urges voters to vote for “pro-life” candidates, but also identifies and provides photographs of specific candidates fitting that description. The Edition cannot be regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by their nature raise the names of certain politicians. Rather, it provides in effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates. The fact that this message is marginally less direct than “Vote for Smith” does not change its essential nature. The Edition goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy. The disclaimer of endorsement cannot negate this fact. The “Special Edition” thus falls squarely within § 441b, for it represents express advocacy of the election of particular candidates distributed to members of the general public. Finally, MCFL argues that it is entitled to the press exemption under 2 U. S. C. § 431(9)(B)(i) reserved for “any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any . . . newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate.” MCFL maintains that its regular newsletter is a “periodical publication” within this definition, and that the “Special Edition” should be regarded as just another issue in the continuing newsletter series. The legislative history on the press exemption is sparse; the House of Representatives’ Report on this section states merely that the exemption was designed to “make it plain that it is not the intent of Congress in the present legislation to limit or burden in any way the first amendment freedoms of the press or of association. [The exemption] assures the unfettered right of the newspapers, TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on political campaigns.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 4 (1974). We need not decide whether the regular MCFL newsletter is exempt under this provision, because, even assuming that it is, the “Special Edition” cannot be considered comparable to any single issue of the newsletter. It was not published through the facilities of the regular newsletter, but by a staff which prepared no previous or subsequent newsletters. It was not distributed to the newsletter’s regular audience, but to a group 20 times the size of that audience, most of whom were members of the public who had never received the newsletter. No characteristic of the Edition associated it in any way with the normal MCFL publication. The MCFL masthead did not appear on the flyer, and, despite an apparent belated attempt to make it appear otherwise, the Edition contained no volume and issue number identifying it as one in a continuing series of issues. MCFL protests that determining the scope of the press exemption by reference to such factors inappropriately focuses on superficial considerations of form. However, it is precisely such factors that in combination permit the distinction of campaign flyers from regular publications. We regard such an inquiry as essential, since we cannot accept the notion that the distribution of such flyers by entities that happen to publish newsletters automatically entitles such organizations to the press exemption. A contrary position would open the door for those corporations and unions with in-house publications to engage in unlimited spending directly from their treasuries to distribute campaign material to the general public, thereby eviscerating § 441b’s prohibition. In sum, we hold that MCFL’s publication and distribution of the “Special Edition” is in violation of § 441b. We therefore turn to the constitutionality of that provision as applied to appellee. Ill A Independent expenditures constitute expression “‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.’” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 32 (1968)). See also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U. S. 480, 493 (1985) (NCPAC) (independent expenditures “produce speech at the core of the First Amendment”). We must therefore determine whether the prohibition of § 441b burdens political speech, and, if so, whether such a burden is justified by a compelling state interest. Buckley, supra, at 44-45. The FEC minimizes the impact of the legislation upon MCFL’s First Amendment rights by emphasizing that the corporation remains free to establish a separate segregated fund, composed of contributions earmarked for that purpose by the donors, that may be used for unlimited campaign spending. However, the corporation is not free to use its general funds for. campaign advocacy purposes. While that is not an absolute restriction on speech, it is a substantial one. Moreover, even to speak through a segregated fund, MCFL must make very significant efforts. If it were not incorporated, MCFL’s obligations under the Act would be those specified by § 434(c), the section that prescribes the duties of “[e]very person (other than a political committee).” Section 434(c) provides that any such person that during a year makes independent expenditures exceeding $250 must: (1) identify all contributors who contribute in a given year over $200 in the aggregate in funds to influence elections, § 434(c)(1); (2) disclose the name and address of recipients of independent expenditures exceeding $200 in the aggregate, along with an indication of whether the money was used to support or oppose a particular candidate, § 434(c)(2)(A); and (3) identify any persons who make contributions over $200 that are earmarked for the purpose of furthering independent expenditures, § 434(c)(2)(C). All unincorporated organizations whose major purpose is not campaign advocacy, but who occasionally make independent expenditures on behalf of candidates, are subject only to these regulations. Because it is incorporated, however, MCFL must establish a “separate segregated fund” if it wishes to engage in any independent spending whatsoever. § § 441b(a), (b)(2)(C). Since such a fund is considered a “political committee” under the Act, § 431(4)(B), all MCFL independent expenditure activity is, as a result, regulated as though the organization’s major purpose is to further the election of candidates. This means that MCFL must comply with several requirements in addition to those mentioned. Under § 432, it must appoint a treasurer, § 432(a); ensure that contributions are forwarded to the treasurer within 10 or 30 days of receipt, depending on the amount of contribution, § 432(b)(2); see that its treasurer keeps an account of every contribution regardless of amount, the name and address of any person who makes a contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from political committees, and the name and address of any person to whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount, § 432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over $200 and all records for three years, §§ 432(c),(d). Under §433, MCFL must file a statement of organization containing its name, address, the name of its custodian of records, and its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositories, §§ 433(a),(b); must report any change in the above information within 10 days, § 433(c); and may dissolve only upon filing a written statement that it will no longer receive any contributions nor make disbursements, and that it has no outstanding debts or obligations, § 433(d)(1). Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, a pre-election report no later than the 12th day before an election, a postelection report within 30 days after an election, and reports every 6 months during nonelection years, §§ 434(a)(4)(A),(B). These reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate’s authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. § 434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segregated fund only from its “members,” §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past. See FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197, 204 (1982). It is evident from this survey that MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and more stringent restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated. These additional regulations may create a disincentive for such organizations to engage in political speech. Detailed record-keeping and disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose administrative costs that many small entities may be unable to bear. Furthermore, such duties require a far more complex and formalized organization than many small groups could manage. Restriction of solicitation of contributions to “members” vastly reduces the sources of funding for organizations with either few or no formal members, directly limiting the ability of such organizations to engage in core political speech. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, as in this case, an incorporated group of like-minded persons might seek donations to support the dissemination of their political ideas and their occasional endorsement of political candidates, by means of garage sales, bake sales, and raffles. Such persons might well be turned away by the prospect of complying with all the requirements imposed by the Act. Faced with the need to assume a more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed reports, and to monitor garage sales lest nonmembers take a fancy to the merchandise on display, it would not be surprising if at least some groups decided that the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it. Thus, while §441b does not remove all opportunities for independent spending by organizations such as MCFL, the avenue it leaves open is more burdensome than the one it forecloses. The fact that the statute’s practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize §441b as an infringement on First Amendment activities. In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), for instance, we held that the absence of certain procedural safeguards rendered unconstitutional a State’s film censorship program. Such procedures were necessary, we said, because, as a practical matter, without them “it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor’s determination.” Id., at 59. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), reviewed a state program under which taxpayers applying for a certain tax exemption bore the burden of proving that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United States and would not support a foreign government against this country. We noted: “In practical operation, therefore, this procedural device must necessarily produce a result which the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free.” Id., at 526. The same may be said of §441b, for its practical effect on MCFL in this case is to make engaging in protected speech a severely demanding task. B When a statutory provision burdens First Amendment rights, it must be justified by a compelling state interest. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 31; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). The FEC first insists that justification for §441b’s expenditure restriction is provided by this Court’s acknowledgment that “the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation.” National Right to Work Committee, supra, at 209-210. The Commission thus relies on the long history of regulation of corporate political activity as support for the application of § 441b to MCFL. Evaluation of the Commission’s argument requires close examination of the underlying rationale for this longstanding regulation. We have described that rationale in recent opinions as the need to restrict “the influence of political war chests tunneled through the corporate form,” NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 501; to “eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on federal elections,” Pipefitters, 407 U. S., at 416; to curb the political influence of “those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital,” Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 585; and to regulate the “substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization,” National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S., at 207. This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas. It acknowledges the wisdom of Justice Holmes’ observation that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace. Political “free trade” does not necessarily require that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources. See NCPAC, supra (invalidating limits on independent spending by political committees); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 39-51 (striking down expenditure limits in 1971 Campaign Act). Relative availability of funds is after all a rough barometer of public support. The resources in the treasury of a business corporation, however, are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas. By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be financed through a political committee expressly established to engage in campaign spending, § 441b seeks to prevent this threat to the political marketplace. The resources available to this fund, as opposed to the corporate treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the political positions of the committee. Pipefitters, supra, acknowledged this objective of § 441b in noting the statement of Representative Hansen, its sponsor, that the “ ‘underlying theory’ ” of this regulation “ ‘is that substantial general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political purposes,’” and that requiring funding by voluntary contributions would ensure that “‘the money collected is that intended by those who contribute to be used for political purposes and not money diverted from another source.’” 407 U. S., at 423-424 (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 43381 (1971)). See also Automobile Workers, supra, at 582 (Congress added proscription on expenditures to Corrupt Practices Act “to protect the political process from what it deemed to be the corroding effect of money employed in elections by aggregated power”). The expenditure restrictions of §441b are thus meant to ensure that competition among actors in the political arena is truly competition among ideas. Regulation of corporate political activity thus has reflected concern not about use of the corporate form per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes. Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that danger of corruption. MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace. While MCFL may derive some advantages from its corporate form, those are advantages that redound to its benefit as a political organization, not as a profit-making enterprise. In short, MCFL is not the type of “traditional corporatio[n] organized for economic gain,” NCPAC, supra, at 500, that has been the focus of regulation of corporate political activity. National Right to Work Committee does not support the inclusion of MCFL within § 441b’s restriction on direct independent spending. That case upheld the application to a nonprofit corporation of a different provision of §441b: the limitation on who can be solicited for contributions to a political committee. However, the political activity at issue in that case was contributions, as the committee had been established for the purpose of making direct contributions to political candidates. 459 U. S., at 200. We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less com-polling justification than restrictions on independent spending. NCPAC, 470 U. S. 480 (1985); California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 194, 196-197 (1981); Buckley, supra, at 20-22. In light of the historical role of contributions in the corruption of the electoral process, the need for a broad prophylactic rule was thus sufficient in National Right to Work Committee to support a limitation on the ability of a committee to raise money for direct contributions to candidates. The limitation on solicitation in this case, however, means that nonmember corporations can hardly raise any funds at all to engage in political speech warranting the highest constitutional protection. Regulation that would produce such a result demands far more precision than §441b provides. Therefore, the desirability of a broad prophylactic rule cannot justify treating alike business corporations and appellee in the regulation of independent spending. The Commission next argues in support of §441b that it prevents an organization from using an individual’s money for purposes that the individual may not support. We acknowledged the legitimacy of this concern as to the dissenting stockholder and union member in National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S., at 208, and in Pipefitters, 407 U. S., at 414-415. But such persons, as noted, contribute investment funds or union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily authorize the use of their money for political ends. Furthermore, because such individuals depend on the organization for income or for a job, it is not enough to tell them that any unhappiness with the use of their money can be redressed simply by leaving the corporation or the union. It was thus wholly reasonable for Congress to require the establishment of a separate political fund to which persons can make voluntary contributions. This rationale for regulation is not compelling with respect to independent expenditures by appellee. Individuals who contribute to appellee are fully aware of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes. It is true that a contributor may not be aware of the exact use to which his or her money ultimately may be put, or the specific candidate that it may be used to support. However, individuals contribute to a political organization in part because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than spending the money under their own personal direction. Any contribution therefore necessarily involves at least some degree of delegation of authority to use such funds in a manner that best serves the shared political purposes of the organization and contributor. In addition, an individual desiring more direct control over the use of his or her money can simply earmark the contribution for a specific purpose, an option whose availability does not depend on the applicability of § 441b. Cf. § 434(c)(2)(C) (entities other than political committees must disclose names of those persons making earmarked contributions over $200). Finally, a contributor dissatisfied with how funds are used can simply stop contributing. The Commission maintains that, even if contributors may be aware that a contribution to appellee will be used for political purposes in general, they may not wish such money to be used for electoral campaigns in particular. That is, persons may desire that an organization use their contributions to further a certain cause, but may not want the organization to use their money to urge support for or opposition to political candidates solely on the basis of that cause. This concern can be met, however, by means far more narrowly tailored and less burdensome than §441b’s restriction on direct expenditures: simply requiring that contributors be informed that their money may be used for such a purpose. It is true that National Right to Work Committee, supra, held that the goal of protecting minority interests justified solicitation restrictions on a nonprofit corporation operating a political committee established to make direct contributions to candidates. As we have noted above, however, the Government enjoys greater latitude in limiting contributions than in regulating independent expenditures. Supra, at 259-260. Given a contributor’s awareness of the political activity of appellee, as well as the readily available remedy of refusing further donations, the interest protecting contributors is simply insufficient to support § 441b’s restriction on the independent spending of MCFL. Finally, the FEC maintains that the inapplicability of § 441b to MCFL would open the door to massive undisclosed political spending by similar entities, and to their use as conduits for undisclosed spending by business corporations and unions. We see no such danger. Even if § 441b is inapplicable, an independent expenditure of as little as $250 by MCFL will trigger the disclosure provisions of § 434(c). As a result, MCFL will be required to identify all contributors who annually provide in the aggregate $200 in funds intended to influence elections, will have to specify all recipients of independent spending amounting to more than $200, and will be bound to identify all persons making contributions over $200 who request that the money be used for independent expenditures. These reporting obligations provide precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL’s independent spending activity and its receipt of contributions. The state interest in disclosure therefore can be met in a manner less restrictive than imposing the full panoply of regulations that accompany status as a political committee under the Act. Furthermore, should MCFL’s independent spending become so extensive that the organization’s major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be classified as a political committee. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 79. As such, it would automatically be subject to the obligations and restrictions applicable to those groups whose primary objective is to influence political campaigns. In sum, there is no need for the sake of disclosure to treat MCFL any differently than other organizations that only occasionally engage in independent spending on behalf of candidates. Thus, the concerns underlying the regulation of corporate political activity are simply absent with regard to MCFL. The dissent is surely correct in maintaining that we should not second-guess a decision to sweep within a broad prohibition activities that differ in degree, but not kind. Post, at 268-269. It is not the case, however, that MCFL merely poses less of a threat of the danger that has prompted regulation. Rather, it does not pose such a threat at all. Voluntary political associations do not suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate form. Given this fact, the rationale for restricting core political speech in this case is simply the desire for a bright-line rule. This hardly constitutes the compelling state interest necessary to justify any infringement on First Amendment freedom. While the burden on MCFL’s speech is not insurmountable, we cannot permit it to be imposed without a constitutionally adequate justification. In so holding, we do not assume a legislative role, but fulfill our judicial duty — to enforce the demands of the Constitution. C Our conclusion is that § 441b’s restriction of independent spending is unconstitutional as applied to MCFL, for it infringes protected speech without a compelling justification for such infringement. We acknowledge the legitimacy of Congress’ concern that organizations that amass great wealth in the economic marketplace not gain unfair advantage in the political marketplace. Regardless of whether that concern is adequate to support application of §441b to commercial enterprises, a question not before us, that justification does not extend uniformly to all corporations. Some corporations have features more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, and therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely because of their incorporated status. In particular, MCFL has three features essential to our holding that it may not constitutionally be bound by § 441b’s restriction on independent spending. First, it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that political resources refléct political support. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace. It may be that the class of organizations affected by our holding today will be small. That prospect, however, does not diminish the significance of the rights at stake. Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as this Court has said, freedom of thought and speech “is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327 (1937). Our pursuit of other governmental ends, however, may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss that would be unthinkable if inflicted all at once. For this reason, we must be as vigilant against the modest diminution of speech as we are against its sweeping restriction. Where at all possible, government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation. In enacting the provision at issue in this case, Congress has chosen too blunt an instrument for such a delicate task. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MCFL concedes that under this Court’s decision in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197 (1982), such a definition does not permit it to solicit contributions from such persons for use by a separate segregated fund established under the Act. That case held that in order to be considered a “member” of a nonstock corporation under the Act, one must have “some relatively enduring and independently significant financial or organizational attachment” to the corporation. Id., at 204. The FEC submitted an affidavit from a person who stated that she obtained a copy of the “Special Edition” at a statewide conference of the National Organization for Women, where a stack of about 200 copies were available to the general public. App. 174. MCFL argues that the definition in the general definitions section is not as broad as it appears, for § 431(9)(B)(v) says that nothing shall be considered an “expenditure” under § 431 that would not be regarded as such under § 441b(b). Therefore, MCFL argues, the definition of expenditure under § 431 necessarily incorporates § 441b’s restriction of that term to payments to a candidate. It is puzzling, however, why § 431 would in one subsection purport to define an expenditure as a payment made for the purpose of influencing an election and in another subsection eliminate precisely that type of activity from the ambit of its definition. The answer may lie in the fact that § 441b(b)(2) says that expenditures “include” payments to a candidate, a term that indicates that activities not specifically enumerated in that section may nonetheless be encompassed by it. In any event, the need for such speculation signals that the language of the statute is not on its face dispositive. See also 117 Cong. Rec. 43381 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Hays); id., at 43383-43385 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id., at 43388-43389 (remarks of Reps. Steiger and Gude). Nor do we find the “Special Edition” akin to the normal business activity of a press entity deemed by some lower courts to fall within the exemption, such as the distribution of a letter soliciting subscriptions, see FEC v. Phillips Publishing Co., 517 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (DC 1981), or the dissemination of publicity, see Reader’s Digest Assn. v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210 (SDNY 1981). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court said that an entity subject to regulation as a “political committee” under the Act is one that is either “under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.” Id., at 79. It is undisputed on this record that MCFL fits neither of these descriptions. Its central organizational purpose is issue advocacy, although it occasionally engages in activities on behalf of political candidates. It is true that we acknowledged in Buckley, supra, that, although the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act “will deter some individuals who otherwise might contribute,” id., at 68, this is a burden that is justified by substantial Government interests. Id., at 66-68. However, while the effect of additional reporting and disclosure obligations on an organization’s contributors may not necessarily constitute an additional burden on speech, the administrative costs of complying with such increased responsibilities may create a disincentive for the organization itself to speak. The fact that MCFL established a political committee .in 1980 does not change this conclusion, for the corporation’s speech may well have been inhibited due to its inability to form such an entity before that date. Furthermore, other organizations comparable to MCFL may not find it feasible to establish such a committee, and may therefore decide to forgo engaging in independent political speech. The Commission relies on Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U. S. 540 (1983), in support of its contention that the requirement that independent spending be conducted through a separate segregated fund does not burden MCFL’s First Amendment rights. Regan, however, involved the requirement that a nonprofit corporation establish a separate lobbying entity if contributions to the corporation for the conduct of other activities were to be tax deductible. If the corporation chose not to set up such a lobbying arm, it would not be eligible for tax-deductible contributions. Such a result, however, would infringe no protected activity, for there is no right to have speech subsidized by the Government. Id., at 545-546. By contrast, the activity that may be discouraged in this ease, independent spending, is core political speech under the First Amendment. While this market metaphor has guided congressional regulation in the area of campaign activity, First Amendment speech is not necessarily limited to such an instrumental role. As Justice Brandéis stated in his discussion of political speech in his concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927): “Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.” While business corporations may not represent the only organizations that pose this danger, they are by far the most prominent example of entities that enjoy legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth. That Congress does not at present seek to regulate every possible type of firm fitting this description does not undermine its justification for regulating corporations. Rather, Congress’ decision represents the “careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a ‘cautious advance, step by step,’ ” to which we have said we owe considerable deference. FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197, 209 (1982) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 46 (1937)). The regulation imposed as a result of this concern is of course distinguishable from the complete foreclosure of any opportunity for political speech that we invalidated in the state referendum context in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978). This restriction does not deprive such organizations of “members” that can be solicited for donations to a separate segregated fund that makes contributions to candidates, a fund that, under our decision in National Right to Work Committee, must be established by all corporations wishing to make such candidate contributions. National Right to Work Committee requires that “members” have either a “financial or organizational attachment” to the corporation, 459 U. S., at 204 (emphasis added). Our decision today merely states that a corporation that does not have persons affiliated financially must fall outside §441b’s prohibition on direct expenditures if it also has the other two characteristics possessed by MCFL that we discuss in text.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WATTERS, COMMISSIONER, MICHIGAN OFFICE OF FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE SERVICES v. WACHOVIA BANK, N. A., et al. No. 05-1342. Argued November 29, 2006 Decided April 17, 2007 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. X, and Scalia, X, joined, post, p. 22. Thomas, X, took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. E. John Blanchard, Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael A. Cox, former Attorney General, and Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General. Robert A. Long argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stuart C. Stock, Keith A. Noreika, Emily Johnson Henn, Lori McAllister, and William J. Perrone. Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General PLungar, Julie L. Williams, Daniel P. Stipano, Horace G. Sneed, and Douglas B. Jordan Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, former Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General, Michelle Aronowitz, Deputy Solicitor General, and Kathryn Sheingold, Assistant Solicitor General, by Anne Milgram, former Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, and by the Attorneys General and former Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Troy King of Alabama, David W. Márquez of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, John Suthers of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Robert J. Spagnoletti of the District of Columbia, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas Miller of Iowa, Phill Kline of Kansas, Greg Stumbo of Kentucky, Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, George J. Chanos of Nevada, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Roberto J. Sánchez-Ramos of Puerto Rico, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Larry Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtlejf of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Robert F McDonnell of Virginia, Rob McKenna of Washington, Darrell V. Mc-Graw, Jr., of West Virginia, Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for Charles W. Tumbaugh, Commissioner of Financial Regulation for the State of Maryland et al. by Mr. Curran, former Attorney General of Maryland, Steven M. Sullivan, Solicitor General, Jonathan R. Krasnoff, Thomas L. Gounaris, and Christopher J. Young, Assistant Attorneys General, and Keith R. Fisher, Special Assistant Attorney General; for A ARP et al. by Amanda Quester; for the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws, Inc., by Thomas W. Merrill and Stephen D. Houck; for the National Association of Realtors by David C. Frederick, Scott H. Angstreich, and Ralph W Holmen; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bankers Association et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Mark A Perry, John D. Hawke, Jr., Howard N. Cayne, Laurence J. Hutt, and Nancy L. Perkins; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Alan Untereiner, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for the Clearing House Association L.L.C. by Michael M. Wiseman, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Suhana S. Han, Seth P. Waxman, Christopher R. Lipsett, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, and David A Luigs; for National City Bank by Glen D. Nager and Beth Heifetz; for the New England Legal Foundation by Michael E. Malamut and Martin J. Newhouse; for Richard J. Pierce, Jr., et al. by Walter Dellinger, Jonathan D. Hacker, Christopher H. Schroeder, and Nicole A Saharsky; and for Marcus Cole et al. by Sam Kazman and Hans Bader. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Business activities of national banks are controlled by the National Bank Act (NBA or Act), 12 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). See §§24, 93a, 371(a). As the agency charged by Congress with supervision of the NBA, OCC oversees the operations of national banks and their interactions with customers. See NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 254, 256 (1995). The agency exercises visitorial powers, including the authority to audit the bank’s books and records, largely to the exclusion of other governmental entities, state or federal. See § 484(a); 12 CFR § 7.4000 (2006). The NBA specifically authorizes federally chartered banks to engage in real estate lending. 12 U. S. C. § 371. It also provides that banks shall have power “[t]o exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.” §24 Seventh. Among incidental powers, national banks may conduct certain activities through “operating subsidiaries,” discrete entities authorized to engage solely in activities the bank itself could undertake, and subject to the same terms and conditions as those applicable to the bank. See § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 CFR § 5.34(e) (2006). Respondent Wachovia Bank, a national bank, conducts its real estate lending business through Wachovia Mortgage Corporation, a wholly owned, state-chartered entity, licensed as an operating subsidiary by OCC. It is uncontested in this suit that Wachovia’s real estate business, if conducted by the national bank itself, would be subject to OCC’s superintendence, to the exclusion of state registration requirements and visitoria! authority. The question in dispute is whether the bank’s mortgage lending activities remain outside the governance of state licensing and auditing agencies when those activities are conducted, not by a division or department of the bank, but by the bank’s operating subsidiary. In accord with the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue, we hold that Wachovia’s mortgage business, whether conducted by the bank itself or through the bank’s operating subsidiary, is subject to OCC’s superintendence, and not to the licensing, reporting, and visitorial regimes of the several States in which the subsidiary operates. I Wachovia Bank is a national banking association chartered by OCC. Respondent Wachovia Mortgage is a North Carolina corporation that engages in the business of real estate lending in the State of Michigan and elsewhere. Michigan’s statutory regime exempts banks, both national and state, from state mortgage lending regulation, but requires mortgage brokers, lenders, and servicers that are subsidiaries of national banks to register with the State’s Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) and submit to state supervision. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§445.1656(1), 445.1679(1)(a) (West 2002), 493.52(1), and 493.53a(d) (West 1998). From 1997 until 2003, Wachovia Mortgage was registered with OFIS to engage in mortgage lending. As a registrant, Wachovia Mortgage was required, inter alia, to pay an annual operating fee, file an annual report, and open its books and records to inspection by OFIS examiners. §§445.1657, 445.1658, 445.1671 (West 2002), 493.54, 493.56a(2), (13) (West 1998). Petitioner Linda Watters, the commissioner of OFIS, administers the State’s lending laws. She exercises “general supervision and control” over registered lenders, and has authority to conduct examinations and investigations and to enforce requirements against registrants. See §§445.1661, 445.1665, 445.1666 (West 2002), 493.58, 493.56b, 493.59, 493.62a (West 1998 and Supp. 2005). She also has authority to investigate consumer complaints and take enforcement action if she finds that a complaint is not “being adequately pursued by the appropriate federal regulatory authority.” §445.1663(2) (West 2002). On January 1, 2003, Wachovia Mortgage became a wholly owned operating subsidiary of Wachovia Bank. Three months later, Wachovia Mortgage advised the State of Michigan that it was surrendering its mortgage lending registration. Because it had become an operating subsidiary of a national bank, Wachovia Mortgage maintained, Michigan’s registration and inspection requirements were preempted. Watters responded with a letter advising Wachovia Mortgage that it would no longer be authorized to conduct mortgage lending activities in Michigan. Wachovia Mortgage and Wachovia Bank filed suit against Watters, in her official capacity as commissioner, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Watters from enforcing Michigan’s registration prescriptions against Wachovia Mortgage, and from interfering with OCC’s exclusive visitorial authority. The NBA and regulations promulgated thereunder, they urged, vest supervisory authority in OCC and preempt the application of the state-law controls at issue. Specifically, Wachovia Mortgage and Wachovia Bank challenged as preempted certain provisions of two Michigan statutes — the Mortgage Brokers, Lenders, and Services Licensing Act and the Secondary Mortgage Loan Act. The challenged provisions (1) require mortgage lenders — including national bank operating subsidiaries but not national banks themselves — to register and pay fees to the State before they may conduct banking activities in Michigan, and authorize the commissioner to deny or revoke registrations, §§445.1652(1) (West Supp. 2006), 445.1656(l)(d) (West 2002), 445.1657(1), 445.1658, 445.1679(l)(a), 493.52(1) (West 1998), 493.53a(d), 493.54, 493.55(4), 493.56a(2), and 493.61; (2) require submission of annual financial statements to the commissioner and retention of certain documents in a particular format, §§445.1657(2) (West 2002), 445.1671, 493.56a(2) (West 1998); (3) grant the commissioner inspection and enforcement authority over registrants, §§445.1661 (West 2002), 493.56b (West Supp. 2005); and (4) authorize the commissioner to take regulatory or enforcement actions against covered lenders, §§445.1665 (West 2002), 445.1666, 493.58-59, and 493.62a (West 1998). In response, Watters argued that, because Wachovia Mortgage was not itself a national bank, the challenged Michigan controls were applicable and were not preempted. She also contended that the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits OCC’s exclusive superintendence of national bank lending activities conducted through operating subsidiaries. The District Court granted summary judgment to the banks in relevant part. 334 F. Supp. 2d 957, 966 (WD Mich. 2004). Invoking the two-step framework of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), the court deferred to the Comptroller’s determination that an operating subsidiary is subject to state regulation only to the extent that the parent bank would be if it performed the same functions. 334 F. Supp. 2d, at 963-965 (citing, e.g., 12 CFR §§ 5.34(e)(3), 7.4006 (2004)). The court also rejected Watters’ Tenth Amendment argument. 334 F. Supp. 2d, at 965-966. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. 431 F. 3d 556 (2005). We granted certiorari. 547 U. S. 1205 (2006). II A Nearly 200 years ago, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), this Court held federal law supreme over state law with respect to national banking. Though the bank at issue in McCulloch was short-lived, a federal banking system reemerged in the Civil War era. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U. S. 213, 221-222 (1997); B. Hammond, Banks and Polities in America: from the Revolution to the Civil War (1957). In 1864, Congress enacted the NBA, establishing the system of national banking still in place today. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99; Atherton, 519 U. S., at 222; Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U. S. 299, 310, 314-315 (1978). The Act vested in nationally chartered banks enumerated powers and “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.” 12 U. S. C. §24 Seventh. To prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation from impairing the national system, Congress provided: “No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law ....” §484(a). In the years since the NBA’s enactment, we have repeatedly made clear that federal control shields national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation. See, e. g., Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U. S. 1, 10 (2003) (national banking system protected from “possible unfriendly State legislation” (quoting Tiffany v. National Bank of Mo., 18 Wall. 409, 412 (1874))). Federally chartered banks are subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the NBA. Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S. 275, 290 (1896). See also Atherton, 519 U. S., at 223. For example, state usury laws govern the maximum rate of interest national banks can charge on loans, 12 U. S. C. §85, contracts made by national banks “are governed and construed by State laws,” National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 362 (1870), and national banks’ “acquisition and transfer of property [are] based on State law,” ibid. However, “the States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in any wise affect their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit. Any thing beyond this is an abuse, because it is the usurpation of power which a single State cannot give.” Farmers’ and, Mechan ics’ Nat Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 34 (1875) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have “interpretjed] grants of both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.” Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U. S. 25, 32 (1996). See also Franklin Nat Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U. S. 373, 375-379 (1954). States are permitted to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s or the national bank regulator’s exercise of its powers. But when state prescriptions significantly impair the exercise of authority, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the State’s regulations must give way. Barnett Bank, 517 U. S., at 32-34 (federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in small towns preempted state statute prohibiting banks from selling most types of insurance); Franklin Nat Bank, 347 U. S., at 377-379 (local restrictions preempted because they burdened exercise of national banks’ incidental power to advertise). The NBA authorizes national banks to engage in mortgage lending, subject to OCC regulation. The Act provides: “Any national banking association may make, arrange, purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in real estate, subject to 1828(o) of this title and such restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or order.” 12 U. S. C. § 371(a). Beyond genuine dispute, state law may not significantly burden a national bank’s own exercise of its real estate lending power, just as it may not curtail or hinder a national bank’s efficient exercise of any other power, incidental or enumerated under the NBA. See Barnett Bank, 517 U. S., at 33-34; Franklin, 347 U. S., at 375-379. See also 12 CFR § 34.4(a)(1) (2006) (identifying preempted state controls on mortgage lending, including licensing and registration). In particular, real estate lending, when conducted by a national bank, is immune from state visitorial control: The NBA specifically vests exclusive authority to examine and inspect in OCC. 12 U. S. C. § 484(a) (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law.”). Harmoniously, the Michigan provisions at issue exempt national banks from coverage. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.1675(a) (West 2002). This is not simply a matter of the Michigan Legislature’s grace. Cf. post, at 34, and n. 17. For, as the parties recognize, the NBA would have preemptive force, i. e., it would spare a national bank from state controls of the kind here involved. See Brief for Petitioner 12; Brief for Respondents 14; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9. State laws that conditioned national banks’ real estate lending on registration with the State, and subjected such lending to the State’s investigative and enforcement machinery would surely interfere with the banks’ federally authorized business: National banks would be subject to registration, inspection, and enforcement regimes imposed not just by Michigan, but by all States in which the banks operate. Diverse and duplicative superintendence of national banks’ engagement in the business of banking, we observed over a century ago, is precisely what the NBA was designed to prevent: “Th[e] legislation has in view the erection of a system extending throughout the country, and independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and as numerous as the States.” Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 229 (1903). Congress did not intend, we explained, “to leave the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare and stability of national banks by direct legislation. . . . [C]on-fusion would necessarily result from control possessed and exercised by two independent authorities.” Id., at 231-232. Recognizing the burdens and undue duplication state controls could produce, Congress included in the NBA an express command: “No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law ....” 12 U. S. C. § 484(a). See supra, at 11-12, 13; post, at 31 (acknowledging that national banks have been “exemp[t] from state visitorial authority ... for more than 140 years”). “Visitation,” we have explained “is the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to examine into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and regulations.” Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 158 (1905) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also 12 CFR § 7.4000(a)(2) (2006) (defining “visitorial” power as “(i) [e]xamination of a bank; (ii) [inspection of a bank’s books and records; (iii) [Regulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law; and (iv) [e]nforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those activities”). Michigan, therefore, cannot confer on its commissioner examination and enforcement authority over mortgage lending, or any other banking business done by national banks. B While conceding that Michigan’s licensing, registration, and inspection requirements cannot be applied to national banks, see, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 10, 12, Watters argues that the State’s regulatory regime survives preemption with respect to national banks’ operating subsidiaries. Because such subsidiaries are separately chartered under some State’s law, Watters characterizes them simply as “affiliates” of national banks, and contends that even though they are subject to OCC’s superintendence, they are also subject to multistate control. Id., at 17-22. We disagree. Since 1966, OCC has recognized the “incidental” authority of national banks under § 24 Seventh to do business through operating subsidiaries. See 31 Fed. Reg. 11459-11460 (1966); 12 CFR § 5.34(e)(1) (2006) (“A national bank may conduct in an operating subsidiary activities that are permissible for a national bank to engage in directly either as part of, or incidental to, the business of banking ... .”). That authority is uncontested by Michigan’s commissioner. See Brief for Petitioner 21 (“[N]o one disputes that 12 USC §24 (Seventh) authorizes national banks to use nonbank operating subsidiaries ....”). OCC licenses and oversees national bank operating subsidiaries just as it does national banks. § 5.34(e)(3) (“An operating subsidiary conducts activities authorized under this section pursuant to the same authorization, terms and conditions that apply to the conduct of such activities by its parent national bank.”); United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Related Organizations: Comptroller’s Handbook 53 (Aug. 2004) (hereinafter Comptroller’s Handbook) (“Operating subsidiaries are subject to the same supervision and regulation as the parent bank, except where otherwise provided by law or OCC regulation.”). In 1999, Congress defined and regulated “financial” subsidiaries; simultaneously, Congress distinguished those national bank affiliates from subsidiaries — typed “operating subsidiaries” by OCC — which may engage only in activities national banks may engage in directly, “subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national banks.” Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), § 121(a)(2), 113 Stat. 1378 (codified at 12 U. S. C. § 24a(g)(3)(A)). For supervisory purposes, OCC treats national banks and their operating subsidiaries as a single economic enterprise. Comptroller’s Handbook 64. OCC oversees both entities by reference to “business line,” applying the same controls whether banking “activities are conducted directly or through an operating subsidiary.” Ibid. As earlier noted, Watters does not contest the authority of national banks to do business through operating subsidiaries. Nor does she dispute OCC’s authority to supervise and regulate operating subsidiaries in the same manner as national banks. Still, Watters seeks to impose state regulation on operating subsidiaries over and above regulation undertaken by OCC. But just as duplicative state examination, supervision, and regulation would significantly burden mortgage lending when engaged in by national banks, see supra, at 11-15, so too would those state controls interfere with that same activity when engaged in by an operating subsidiary. We have never held that the preemptive reach of the NBA extends only to a national bank itself. Rather, in analyzing whether state law hampers the federally permitted activities of a national bank, we have focused on the exercise of a national bank’s powers, not on its corporate structure. See, e. g., Barnett Bank, 517 U. S., at 32. And we have treated operating subsidiaries as equivalent to national banks with respect to powers exercised under federal law (except where federal law provides otherwise). In NationsBank of N. C., N. A., 513 U. S., at 256-261, for example, we upheld OCC’s determination that national banks had “incidental” authority to act as agents in the sale of annuities. It was not material that the function qualifying as within “the business of banking,” §24 Seventh, was to be carried out not by the bank itself, but by an operating subsidiary, i. e., an entity “subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of [the activity] by national banks [themselves],” § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 CFR § 5.34(e)(3) (2006). See also Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987) (national banks, acting through operating subsidiaries, have power to offer discount brokerage services). Security against significant interference by state regulators is a characteristic condition of the “business of banking” conducted by national banks, and mortgage lending is one aspect of that business. See, e.g., 12 U. SC. §484(a); 12 CFR § 34.4(a)(1) (2006). See also supra, at 11-15; post, at 27 (acknowledging that, in 1982, Congress broadly authorized national banks to engage in mortgage lending); post, at 36-37, and n. 20 (acknowledging that operating subsidiaries “are subject to the same federal oversight as their national bank parents”). That security should adhere whether the business is conducted by the bank itself or is assigned to an operating subsidiary licensed by OCC whose authority to carry on the business coincides completely with that of the bank. See Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. Boutris, 419 F. 3d 949, 960 (CA9 2005) (determination whether to conduct business through operating subsidiaries or through subdivisions is “essentially one of internal organization”). Watters contends that if Congress meant to deny States visitorial powers over operating subsidiaries, it would have written § 484(a)’s ban on state inspection to apply not only to national banks but also to their affiliates. She points out that §481, which authorizes OCC to examine “affiliates” of national banks, does not speak to state visitorial powers. This argument fails for two reasons. First, one cannot ascribe any intention regarding operating subsidiaries to the 1864 Congress that enacted §§481 and 484, or the 1933 Congress that added the provisions on examining affiliates to §481 and the definition of “affiliate” to §221a. That is so because operating subsidiaries were not authorized until 1966. See supra, at 15-16. Over the past four decades, during which operating subsidiaries have emerged as important instrumentalities of national banks, Congress and OCC have indicated no doubt that such subsidiaries are “subject to the same terms and conditions” as national banks themselves. Second, Watters ignores the distinctions Congress recognized among “affiliates.” The NBA broadly defines the term “affiliate” to include “any corporation” controlled by a national bank, including a subsidiary. See 12 U. S. C. § 221a(b). An operating subsidiary is therefore one type of “affiliate.” But unlike affiliates that may engage in functions not authorized by the NBA, e.g., financial subsidiaries, an operating subsidiary is tightly tied to its parent by the specification that it may engage only in “the business of banking” as authorized by the Act. § 24a(g)(3)(A); 12 CFR § 5.34(e)(1) (2006). See also supra, at 16-17, and n. 10. Notably, when Congress amended the NBA confirming that operating subsidiaries may “engag[e] solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage in directly,” 12 U. S. C. §24a(g)(3)(A), it did so in an Act, the GLBA, providing that other affiliates, authorized to engage in nonbanking financial activities, e. g., securities and insurance, are subject to state regulation in connection with those activities. See, e. g., §§ 1843(k), 1844(c)(4). See also 15 U. S. C. § 6701(b) (any person who sells insurance must obtain a state license to do so). C Recognizing the neeessary consequence of national banks’ authority to engage in mortgage lending through an operating subsidiary “subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national banks,” 12 U. S. C. §24a(g)(3)(A), see also §24 Seventh, OCC promulgated 12 CFR § 7.4006 (2006): “Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.” See Investment Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34784, 34788 (2001). Watters disputes the authority of OCC to promulgate this regulation and contends that, because preemption is a legal question for determination by courts, § 7.4006 should attract no deference. See also post, at 38-43. This argument is beside the point, for under our interpretation of the statute, the level of deference owed to the regulation is an academic question. Section 7.4006 merely clarifies and confirms what the NBA already conveys: A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law. See, e. g., Barnett Bank, 517 U. S., at 33-34; 12 U. S. C. §§24 Seventh, 24a(g)(3)(A), 371. The NBA is thus properly read by OCC to protect from state hindrance a national bank’s engagement in the “business of banking” whether conducted by the bank itself or by an operating subsidiary, empowered to do only what the bank itself could do. See supra, at 16-17. The authority to engage in the business of mortgage lending comes from the NBA, §371, as does the authority to conduct business through an operating subsidiary. See §§24 Seventh, 24a(g)(3)(A). That Act vests visitorial oversight in OCC, not state regulators. § 484(a). State law (in this case, North Carolina law), all agree, governs incorporation-related issues, such as the formation, dissolution, and internal governance of operating subsidiaries. And the laws of the States in which national banks or their affiliates are located govern matters the NBA does not address. See supra, at 11. But state regulators cannot interfere with the “business of banking” by subjecting national banks or their OCC-licensed operating subsidiaries to multiple audits and surveillance under rival oversight regimes. III Watters’ alternative argument, that 12 CFR §7.4006 violates the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, is unavailing. As we have previously explained, “[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States.” New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 156 (1992). Regulation of national bank operations is a prerogative of Congress under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U. S. 52, 58 (2003) (per curiam). The Tenth Amendment, therefore, is not implicated here. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Sixth Circuit is Affirmed. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. National City Bank of Indiana v. Turnbaugh, 463 F. 3d 325 (CA4 2006); Wachovia Bank, N. A. v. Burke, 414 F. 3d 305 (CA2 2005); 431 F. 3d 556 (CA6 2005) (case below); Wells Fargo Bank N. A. v. Boutris, 419 F. 3d 949 (CA9 2005). Michigan’s law exempts subsidiaries of national banks that maintain a main office or branch office in Michigan. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§445.1652(1)(b) (West Supp. 2006), 445.1675(m) (West 2002), 493.53a(d) (West 1998). Wachovia Bank has no such office in Michigan. The Act of June 3,1864, ch. 106,13 Stat. 99, was originally entitled “An Act to provide a National Currency... its title was altered by Congress in 1874 to “the National Bank Act.” Ch. 343, 18 Stat. 123. Title 12 U. S. C. §1828(o) requires federal banking agencies to adopt uniform regulations prescribing standards for real estate lending by depository institutions and sets forth criteria governing such standards. See, e. g., § 1828(o)(2)(A) (“In prescribing standards ... the agencies shall consider — (i) the risk posed to the deposit insurance funds by such extensions of credit; (ii) the need for safe and sound .operation of insured depository institutions; and (iii) the availability of credit.”). See also 2 R. Taylor, Banking Law §37.02, p. 37-5 (2006) (“[OCC] has exclusive authority to charter and examine [national] banks.” (footnote omitted)). See 69 Fed. Reg. 1908 (2004) (“The application of multiple, often unpredictable, different state or local restrictions and requirements prevents [national banks] from operating in the manner authorized under Federal law, is costly and burdensome, interferes with their ability to plan their business and manage their risks, and subjects them to uncertain liabilities and potential exposure.”). Ours is indeed a “dual banking system.” See post, at 22-26,43. But it is a system that has never permitted States to license, inspect, and supervise national banks as they do state banks. The dissent repeatedly refers to the policy of “competitive equality” featured in First Nat. Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U. S. 122, 131 (1969). See post, at 25, 35, 40, 43. Those words, however, should not be ripped from their context. Plant City involved the McFadden Act (Branch Banks), 44 Stat. 1228, 12 U. S. C. § 36, in which Congress expressly authorized national banks to establish branches “only when, where, and how state law would authorize a state bank to establish and operate such [branches].” 396 U. S., at 130. See also id., at 131 (“[W]hile Congress has absolute authority over national banks, the [McFadden Act] has incorporated by reference the limitations which state law places on branch banking activities by state banks. Congress has deliberately settled upon a policy intended to foster competitive equality.... [The] Act reflects the congressional concern that neither system ha[s] advantages over the other in the use of branch banking.” (quoting First Nat. Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U. S. 252, 261 (1966))). “[W]here Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant of‘power’ upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no such condition applies.” Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U. S. 25, 34 (1996). The NBA provisions before us, unlike the McFadden Act, do not condition the exercise of power by national banks on state allowance of similar exercises by state banks. See supra, at 13. The regulation further provides: “If, upon examination, the OCC determines that the operating subsidiary is operating in violation of law, regulation, or written condition, or in an unsafe or unsound manner or otherwise threatens the safety or soundness of the bank, the OCC will direct the bank or operating subsidiary to take appropriate remedial action, which may include requiring the bank to divest or liquidate the operating subsidiary, or discontinue specified activities.” 12 CFR § 5.34(e)(3) (2006). OCC subsequently revised its regulations to track the statute. See <§ 5.34(e)(1), (3); Financial Subsidiaries and Operating Subsidiaries, 65 Fed. Reg. 12905, 12911 (2000). C£ post, at 29, 30 (dissent’s grudging acknowledgment that Congress “may have acquiesced” in OCC’s position that national banks may engage in “the business of banking” through operating subsidiaries empowered to do only what the bank itself can do). For example, “for purposes of applying statutory or regulatory limits, such as lending limits or dividend restrictions,” e. g., 12 U. S. C. §§56, 60, 84, 371d, “[t]he results of operations of operating subsidiaries are consolidated with those of its parent.” Comptroller’s Handbook 64. Likewise, for accounting and regulatory reporting purposes, an operating subsidiary is treated as part of the member bank; assets and liabilities of the two entities are combined. See 12 CFR §§ 5.34(e)(4)(i), 223.3(w) (2006). OCC treats financial subsidiaries differently. A national bank may not consolidate the assets and liabilities of a financial subsidiary with those of the bank. Comptroller’s Handbook 64. It cannot be fairly maintained “that the transfer in 2003 of [Wachovia Mortgage’s] ownership from the holding company to the Bank” resulted in no relevant changes to the company’s business. Compare post, at 35, with supra, at 16, n. 8. On becoming Wachovia’s operating subsidiary, Wachovia Mortgage became subject to the same terms and conditions as national banks, including the full supervisory authority of OCC. This change exposed the company to significantly more federal oversight than it experienced as a state nondepository institution. Cf. Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U. S. 299, 308, and n. 19 (1978) (holding that national bank may charge home State’s interest rate, regardless of more restrictive usury laws in borrower’s State, but declining to consider operating subsidiaries). The dissent protests that the GLBA does not itself preempt the Michigan provisions at issue. C£ post, at 36-38. We express no opinion on that matter. Our point is more modest: The GLBA simply demonstrates Congress’ formal recognition that national banks have incidental power to do business through operating subsidiaries. See supra, at 16-17; cf. post, at 30-31. Because we hold that the NBA itself — independent of OCC’s regulation — preempts the application of the pertinent Michigan laws to national bank operating subsidiaries, we need not consider the dissent’s lengthy discourse on the dangers of vesting preemptive authority in administrative agencies. See post, at 38-43; cf. post, at 43, 44 (maintaining that “[w]hatever the Court says, this is a case about an administrative agency’s power to preempt state laws,” and accusing the Court of “endors[ing] administrative action whose sole purpose was to preempt state law rather than to implement a statutory command”). Watters does not assert that Wachovia Mortgage is out of compliance with any North Carolina law governing its corporate status.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROSEWELL, TREASURER OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al. v. LaSALLE NATIONAL BANK, TRUSTEE No. 79-1157. Argued November 10, 1980 Decided March 24, 1981 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, BlacKMUn, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 528. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 529. Henry A. Hauser argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Bernard Carey and Michael F. Baccash. James L. Fox argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Donald P. Colleton. Henry Rose and Michael A. O’Connor filed a brief for the Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation ex rel. Fred Schubert as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Tax Injunction Act of 1937 provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341. The question we must decide in this case is whether an Illinois remedy which requires property owners contesting their property taxes to pay under protest and if successful obtain a refund without interest in two years is “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” within the meaning of the Act. I LaSalle National Bank is trustee of a land trust for Patricia Cook, the beneficial owner of property improved with a 22-unit apartment building in' the all-black low-income community of East Chicago Heights, Ill., located in Cook County. Respondent alleged that, as of January 1, 1977, her property had a fair market value of $46,000. In accordance with a Cook County ordinance, her property should have been assessed for property tax purposes at 33% of fair market value — $15,180. Instead, for the 1977 tax year, the County Assessor assessed the property at $52,150. As a result, respondent's property tax liability was $6,106 instead of $1,775, an overcharge of $4,331. Respondent also claimed that the County Assessor “knowingly as official policy or governmental custom maintained, adopted or promulgated policy statements, regulations, decisions and systems of assessment which have produced egregious disparities in assessments throughout the County." Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 11, App. 7. In particular, she cited a study of the Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs showing that, for 1975, property in the same class as respondent's was assessed as low as 3% and as high as 973% of fair market value. She furthermore alleged that such disparities in assessments were “far greater in number and size in older, inner city and county areas, owned, inhabited or used to a larger extent by minorities and poorer people.” Ibid. Finally, she contended that the Assessor knew that she had previously challenged the 1974, 1975, and 1976 assessments of her property. Respondent first exhausted her administrative remedy by appealing unsuccessfully for a correction of her 1977 assessment before the Cook County Board of Appeals. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 594 (1), 596, 597, 598, 599 (1977). Her only remaining state remedy was to pay the contested tax under protest, and then to file an objection to the Cook County Collector’s Application for Judgment before the Circuit Court of Cook County — in effect a reverse suit for refund. §§ 675, 716. Although Illinois’ statutory refund procedure could theoretically provide a final resolution of the dispute within one year of payment of the tax under protest, respondent alleged that the customary delay from the time of payment until the receipt of refund upon successful protest is two years. The tax refund is not accompanied by a payment of interest. Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 109, 306 N. E. 2d 299, 303 (1973); Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 422-423, 167 N. E. 2d 236, 240-241 (1960). Respondent refused to pay her 1977 property taxes and instead brought this 42 U. S. C. § 1983 action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent petitioner Rosewell from publishing an advertisement of notice and the intended date of Application for Judgment, from applying for judgment and order of sale against her property, and from selling it. Respondent contended that, by requiring payment of taxes times the lawful amount, petitioners deprived her of equal protection and due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and violated state constitutional and statutory rights as well. Respondent further alleged that she had no plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the Illinois courts. Petitioners moved to dismiss, claiming that actions challenging state tax assessments are not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343, and that Illinois’ statutory refund procedure is a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy even though it fails to pay interest. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, App. 11. The District Court denied respondent’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1341. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-21a. However, the court enjoined petitioner Rose well from proceeding to judgment and order of sale against respondent’s property pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 62 (c). The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal district court jurisdiction because Illinois’ procedure of no-interest refunds after two years was not “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” 604 F. 2d 530, 536-537 (1979). A petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied. Id., at 530. We granted certiorari, 445 U. S. 925 (1980), and now reverse. II At the outset, it must be recognized that the issue we decide is one of statutory construction. Our task is to determine whether the Illinois refund procedure constitutes “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy ... in the courts of such State” within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, thereby barring federal jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Our review of the plain language of the Act, its legislative history, and its underlying purpose persuades us that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Illinois remedy is not “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” A The starting point of our inquiry is the plain language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979); 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951). See ERA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64, 73 (1980). The Tax Injunction Act generally prohibits federal district courts from enjoining state tax administration except in instances where the state-court remedy is not “plain, speedy and efficient.” On its face, the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exception appears to require a state-court remedy that meets certain minimal procedural criteria. The Court has only occasionally sought to define the meaning of the exception since passage of the Act in 1937. When it has done so, however, the Court has emphasized a procedural interpretation in defining both the entire phrase and its individual word components. Discussing the general meaning of the phrase, the Court, in Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 74 (1976), described its “basic inquiry” as “whether under New York law there is a 'plain, speedy and efficient’ way for [the taxpayer] to press its constitutional claims while preserving the right to challenge the amount of tax due.” More directly, in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 300-301 (1943), the Court stated: “[I]t is the court’s duty to withhold such relief when, as in the present case, it appears that the state legislature has provided that on payment of any challenged tax to the appropriate state officer, the taxpayer may maintain a suit to recover it back. In such a suit he may assert his federal rights and secure a review of them by this Court. This affords an adequate remedy to the taxpayer, and at the same time leaves undisturbed the state’s administration of its taxes.” (Emphasis added.) See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 625 (1946) (issue is “whether the State affords full protection to the federal rights”). What little can be gleaned from the legislative history of the Act on the phrase “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” lends further support to a procedural interpretation. Senator Bone, the Act’s primary sponsor, referred to the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” provision and then stated: “Thus a full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy is assured.” 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). The Senate Report accompanying the Act mirrors Senator Bone’s understanding, adding that “[a]n appeal to the Supreme Court of the United State is available as in other cases.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). The phrase “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in the Tax Injunction Act was “modeled” after verbatim language in the Johnson Act of 1934, an Act prohibiting federal-court interference with orders issued by state administrative agencies to public utilities. As Senator Bone made clear, “[m]ost of the arguments which were used in support of the Johnson Act . . . apply in like manner” to the Tax Injunction Act. 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). Our examination of the Johnson Act and its legislative history reveals the same procedural emphasis as found in the Tax Injunction Act and its legislative history. As gloss on the words “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” the Senate Report on the Johnson Act spoke of state laws that provided for an appeal from the determination of the state agency by any dissatisfied party. S. Rep. No. 701, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1932). The Senate Report continued: “This appeal is taken to the courts of the State, thus giving to both sides of any controversy which may arise a full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy.” Id., at 2 (emphasis added). There is no doubt that the Illinois state-court refund procedure provides the taxpayer with a “full hearing and judicial determination” at which she may ratee any and all constitutional objections to the tax. LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N. E. 2d 252, 255-256 (1974). Appeal to the higher Illinois courts is authorized, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675 (1977), and review is ultimately available in this Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Respondent does not allege any procedural defect in the Illinois remedy, other than delay, that would preclude preservation and consideration of her federal rights, since she is free to raise her equal protection and due process federal constitutional objections during the Application for Judgment proceedings before the Circuit Court of Cook County. Rather, respondent's argument — that Illinois’ failure to pay interest on the tax refund makes the remedy not “plain, speedy and efficient” — appears to address a more substantive concern. Whether she has any “federal right” to receive interest — a right she has not asserted and on which we express no view — it would appear that she could assert this right in the state-court proceeding. The procedural mechanism for correction of her tax bill remains the same, however, whether interest is paid or not. B A procedural interpretation of the phrase “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy,” and the procedural sufficiency of Illinois’ remedy, are supported further by analysis of the phrase’s individual words. According to the 1934 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary, plain means “clear” or “manifest,” speedy means “quick,” efficient means “characterized by effective activity,” and a remedy is the “legal means to recover a right ... or obtain redress for ... a wrong.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 819, 1878, 2106, 2418 (2d ed. 1934). While the Court has never addressed the meaning of the word “speedy,” it has interpreted the words “plain” and “efficient.” Thus, the Court suggested that “uncertainty concerning a State’s remedy may make it less than ‘plain’ under 28 U. S. C. § 1341.” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 76. Earlier cases, without making a direct connection to the word “plain,” have held that “uncertainty” surrounding a state-court remedy lifts the bar to federal-court jurisdiction. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 625-626. Respondent has made no argument that the Illinois refund procedure is uncertain or otherwise unclear. There is no question that under the Illinois procedure, the court will hear and decide any federal claim. Paying interest or eliminating delay would not make the remedy any more “plain.” This Court’s interpretation of the word “efficient” has also stressed procedural elements. In Tully, the Court commented that “a State’s remedy does not become ‘inefficient,’ merely because a taxpayer must travel across a state line in order to resist or challenge the taxes sought to be imposed.” 429 U. S., at 73. In addition, without explicitly mentioning the word “efficient,” we have permitted federal-court jurisdiction when the taxpayer’s state-court remedy would require a multiplicity of suits, Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 303 (1952) (where remedy “would require the filing of over three hundred separate claims in fourteen different counties to protect the single federal claim asserted by [the taxpayer]”), or when the remedy would allow a challenge against only one of many taxing authorities, id., at 301, 303 (where suit-for-refund remedy-applied only to state taxes, yet taxpayer railroad also wanted to challenge on the same basis taxes paid to counties, school districts, and municipalities). Because the Illinois remedy imposes no unusual hardship on respondent requiring ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy, we cannot say that it is not “efficient.” This Court has never expressly discussed the meaning of the word “speedy,” an issue that is squarely presented in this case. We must decide whether Illinois’ refund after two years qualifies as a “speedy” remedy. “Speedy” is perforce a relative concept, and we must assess the 2-year delay against the usual time for similar litigation. It surely is no secret that state and federal trial courts have been beset by docket congestion and delay for many years. Whether this is a necessary, let alone a reasonable, condition of 20th-century litigation is beside the point: The fact of the matter is that legal conflicts are not resolved as quickly as we would like. In 1976, the median number of days from filing a complaint to disposition of a civil trial matter in 13 urban trial courts ranged from 357 to 980. National Center for State Courts, Justice Delayed 10-11 (1978). In 7 of the 13, over 30% of the civil cases took more than two years from start to finish. Id., at 13. The Cook County Circuit Court had a similar record: from 1974 to 1975, the average time from date of filing to verdict was about 40 months. U. S. Department of Justice, State Court Caseload Statistics: The State of the Art 7 (1978). Federal district courts have not fared much better. As of 1980, the median time interval from filing to disposition for civil cases going to trial was 20 months; 10% of those took more than 46 months. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 81, A-30 (1980). For the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the District in which respondent brought this suit, the median time interval was 23 months, with 10% of all cases over 53 months. Id., at A-31. Cast in this light, respondent’s 2-year wait, regrettably, is not unusual. Nowhere in the Tax Injunction Act did Congress suggest that the remedy must be the speediest. The payment of interest might make the wait more tolerable, but it would not affect the amount of time necessary to adjudicate respondent’s federal claims. Limiting ourselves to the circumstances of the instant case, we cannot say that respondent’s 2-year delay falls outside the boundary of a “speedy” remedy. c The overall purpose of the Tax Injunction Act is consistent with the view that the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” exception to the Act’s prohibition was only designed to require that the state remedy satisfy certain procedural criteria, and that Illinois’ refund procedure meets such criteria. The statute “has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 73. This last consideration was the principal motivating force behind the Act: this legislation was first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes. 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 301 (Act “predicated upon the desirability of freeing, from interference by the federal courts, state procedures which authorize litigation challenging a tax after the tax has been paid”). When it passed the Act, Congress knew that state tax systems commonly provided for payment of taxes under protest with subsequent refund as their exclusive remedy. The Senate Report to the Act noted: “It is the common practice for statutes of the various States to forbid actions in State courts to enjoin the collection of State and county taxes unless the tax law is invalid or the property is exempt from taxation, and these statutes generally provide that taxpayers may contest their taxes only in refund actions after payment under protest. This type of State legislation makes it possible for the States and their various agencies to survive while long-drawn-out tax litigation is in progress.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937). See H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). See also Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 526 (1932). It is only common sense to presume that Congress was also aware that some of these same States did not pay interest on their refunds to taxpayers, following the then-familiar rule that interest in refund actions was recoverable only when expressly allowed by statute. 3 T. Cooley, Law of Taxation § 1308, pp. 2596-2597 (4th ed. 1924). It would be wholly unreasonable, therefore, to construe a statute passed to limit federal-court interference in state tax matters to mean that Congress nevertheless wanted taxpayers from States not paying interest on refunds to have unimpaired access to the federal courts. If Congress had meant to carve out such an expansive exception, one would expect to find some mention of it. The statute’s broad prophylactic language is incompatible with such an interpretation. Ill For the most part, respondent rests her case on the persuasiveness of a syllogism: the Tax Injunction Act is coterminous with pre-1937 federal equity treatment of challenges to state taxes; federal equity practice at that time viewed a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate; therefore, it must follow that the Tax Injunction Act would view a no-interest refund remedy as inadequate, thereby authorizing federal jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent 21. This argument also forms part of the basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision. 604 F. 2d, at 533, n. 4. And even petitioners, Brief for Petitioners 40, suggest that the Tax Injunction Act is “a congressional confirmation of the Court’s prior federal equity practice in the area of state and local taxation.” We are unpersuaded. It is true that post-1937 Court cases have suggested that the Tax Injunction Act recognized and sanctioned pre-existing federal equity practice. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 470 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 622-623; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 298-299. But these cases do no more than confirm that “the statute has its roots in equity practice,” Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S., at 73, and that it was a longstanding rule of federal equity to keep out of state tax matters as long as a “plain, adequate and complete remedy” could be had at law. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, supra, at 622-623. Nothing in our decisions suggests that every wrinkle of federal equity practice was codified, intact, by Congress. Indeed, Congress, among other things, legislated to solve an existing problem by cutting back federal equity jurisdiction. Senator Bone commented that the “existing practice of the Federal courts to entertain tax-injunction suits make[s] it possible for foreign corporations to withhold from a State and its governmental subdivisions taxes in such vast amounts and for such long periods as to disrupt State and county finances, and thus make it possible for such corporations to determine for themselves the amount of taxes they will pay.” 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (emphasis added). See S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). He furthermore noted that “[p] revision is made that the bill is not to affect suits pending at the time of its enactment.” 81 Cong. Rec., at 1415. Thus, Congress plainly did not intend to permit the federal courts after passage of the Tax Injunction Act to entertain suits in all cases cognizable by them prior to the Act. Furthermore, Congress did not equate § 1341’s “plain, speedy and efficient” with equity’s “plain, adequate and complete.” Ever since the early days of Congress, this “plain, adequate and complete”. standard of federal equity practice had been codified into statutory form. 1 Stat. 82. And it was not until 1948, more than 10 years after passage of the Tax Injunction Act, that the “Suits in Equity” statute was repealed. 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1946 ed.) (repealed June 25, 1948). Against this background, we will not interpret the Tax Injunction Act as substantially redundant of § 384. IV Finally, we note that the reasons supporting federal noninterference are just as compelling today as they were in 1937. If federal injunctive relief were available, “state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The compelling nature of these considerations is underscored by the dependency of state budgets on the receipt of local tax revenues. In 1978, States derived over 61% of their revenue from property, sales, income, and other taxes. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 53, 56 (1980). For Illinois, the percentage was even higher — 67.4%. Ibid. The property tax is by far the most important source of tax revenue for cities and counties. For the year 1977-1978, almost 33% of all their income nationwide came from the local property tax; for Illinois’ local governments, the amount was greater — 39.2%. Id., at 78. The experience of Cook County itself demonstrates how ominous would be the potential for havoc should federal injunctive relief be widely available. The county collected over $1.5 billion in real estate taxes for the tax year 1975. Ganz & Laswell, Review of Real Estate Assessments — Cook County (Chicago) vs. Remainder of Illinois, 11 John Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 19, and n. 2 (1977). During the same year, the number of complaints filed with the Cook County Board of Appeals totaled 22,262. Id., at 31, n. 61. We may readily appreciate the difficulties encountered by the county should a substantial portion of its rightful tax revenue be tied up in injunction actions. If each of these complaints alleged entitlement to a refund of around $5,000, as does respondent, over $113 million in revenues potentially could be encumbered in federal-court litigation. See also City of New York, Annual Report of the Tax Commission for Fiscal Year 1978-1979, p. 14 (1979) (41,449 applications for correction of taxes owed concerning 48,170 parcels of land, of which 40,793 applications concerning 47,512 parcels of land involved hearings). Accordingly, we hold that Illinois' legal remedy that provides property owners paying property taxes under protest a refund without interest in two years is “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” under the Tax Injunction Act. Reversed. This Court expressly did not decide whether omission to provide interest on a successful refund application rendered a state remedy not “plain, speedy and efficient,” in Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358 (1966). Patricia Cook, the real party in interest, is the beneficial owner of Illinois Land Trust No. 44891, of which LaSalle National Bank serves as trustee. Although she was not a named party in this litigation, this opinion will nevertheless refer to her as the respondent. The facts as stated in this opinion are drawn largely from respondent’s complaint. For purposes of our consideration, the allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 174-175 (1965). Article IX, §4 (b), of the Illinois Constitution provides that, subject only to limitations prescribed by the State’s General Assembly, counties with populations of more than 200,000, which includes Cook County, may classify real property for purposes of taxation. The classification must be reasonable, and the assessments uniform within each class. Moreover, the level of assessment of the highest class canpot exceed 2% times the level of assessment of the lowest class in the county. Under authority of the Illinois Constitution, Art. IX, § 4, the Illinois General Assembly passed legislation requiring that any “such classification must be established by ordinance of the county board.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 501a (1977). Pursuant to this authority, the Cook County Board of Commissioners passed the following ordinance: “Section 2. Real estate is divided into the following assessment classes: “Class 1: Unimproved real estate. “Class 2: Real estate used as a farm, or real estate used for residential purposes when improved with a house, an apartment building of not more than six living units, or residential condominium, a residential cooperative or a government-subsidized housing project if required by statute to be assessed in the lowest assessment category. “Class 3: All improved real estate used for residential purposes which is not included in Class 2. “Class 4: Real estate owned and used by a not-for-profit corporation in furtherance of the purposes set forth in its charter unless used for residential purposes. If such real estate is used for residential purposes it shall be classified in the appropriate residential class. “Class 5: All real estate not included in any of the above four classes. “Section 3. The Assessor shall assess, and the Board of Appeals shall review assessments on real estate in the various classes at the following percentages of market value: “Class 1: — 22% “Class 2: — 17% “Class 3: — 33% “Class 4: — 30% “Class 5: — 40%” Cook County, Ill., Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance, §§ 2, 3 (originally enacted Dec. 17, 1973, as amended through June 6, 1977). Respondent’s property qualified as Class 3 real estate. Respondent had previously challenged her 1974, 1975, and 1976 property tax assessments, first by appealing to the Board of Appeals, and then by objecting in December 1975, November 1976, and December 1977 respectively to the Collector’s annual Applications for Judgment. The Circuit Court of Cook County, noting that the parties had agreed to a compromise and settlement at a pretrial conference, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675a (1977), issued three separate judgments simultaneously on March 16, 1978, and ordered refunds to respondent on the erroneously collected portions of her protested tax payments, for $4,586.24, $3,656.29, and $3,937.66 respectively. Respondent had asked for refunds of $5,700, $4,750, and $5,452.41 for the three years. To challenge a property tax assessment, a Cook County property owner must follow a specific statutory procedure. See generally Ganz & Laswell, Review of Real Estate Assessments — Cook County (Chicago) vs. Remainder of Illinois, 11 John Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 19 (1977); Par-ham, Procedures For Obtaining Relief With Respect To Property Tax Assessments and Rates, 61 Ill. Bar J. 306 (1973). The taxpayer may file a written complaint with the County Assessor and is thereafter entitled to a hearing. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §578 (1977). If no relief is obtained, the taxpayer may appeal to the Board of Appeals of Cook County for correction of the assessment. §§ 594 (1), 596, 597, 598, 599. The Board must forward one copy of the complaint to the County Assessor. § 598. Before seeking a legal remedy in state court, the taxpayer must exhaust the available administrative remedy before the Board of Appeals by filing a complaint. People ex rel. Korzen v. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co., 62 Ill. 2d 443, 446-447, 343 N. E. 2d 450, 452, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 833 (1976). After exhaustion of the Board of Appeals’ administrative remedy, the taxpayer’s legal remedy requires payment of the tax under protest and a subsequent court challenge. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 675, 716 (1977). See Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 104, 306 N. E. 2d 299, 301 (1973). The tax is due in two installments. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 705, 705.1 (1977). The taxpayer must file a written protest along with the second installment payment setting forth grounds for the objection to the tax. § 675. Then, the Collector of -Cook County publishes an advertisement giving notice and stating the date of his intended application to the Circuit Court of Cook County for judgment fixing the correct amount of any tax paid under protest. § 706. Although the month of October is the apparent target date for applying for judgment, § 710, respondent contends that the Cook County Collector’s applications are not made until late November or early December, Brief for Respondent 14, n. 14. The Collector at the same time applies to the Circuit Court for judgment for sale of delinquent lands and lots whose owners have failed to pay their property tax bills. § 706. Once the Collector’s Application for Judgment is filed with the Circuit Court, the taxpayer must file a written objection to the application within a period of time specified by the judge, stating his reasons for challenging the tax. The taxpayer may raise constitutional challenges to the assessment in his objection. LaSalle 'National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N. E. 2d 252, 255-256 (1974). After the filing of the objection, the court must hold a settlement conference between the two sides within 90 days. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 675a (1977). If no settlement is reached, the court must upon demand of either party set the matter for hearing within 90 days of the conference, and decide the case. §§ 675a, 716. Finally, the court enters judgment and orders a refund for any or all of the tax erroneously paid by the taxpayer. §§ 675, 716. The dissatisfied taxpayer may appeal any such judgment to the higher courts of Illinois. § 675. Illinois courts grant equitable relief by way of injunction against collection of property taxes only when the tax is unauthorized by law or when the tax is levied on exempt properties, LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, supra, at 323, 312 N. E. 2d, at 255, on the basis that the state statutory refund procedure is an adequate legal remedy. Ibid. It has been suggested, however, that in certain cases of fraudulently excessive assessments, the statutory remedy will be found inadequate and an equitable remedy will lie. See Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, supra, at 108, 306 N. E. 2d, at 303. Accord, Chicago Sheraton Corp. v. Zaban, 71 Ill. 2d 85, 92-93, 373 N. E. 2d 1318, 1322, appeal dism’d, 439 U. S. 998 (1978); LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, supra, at 323, 312 N. E. 2d, at 255; 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullerton, 523 F. 2d 439, 441-442 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1073 (1976). Neither petitioners nor respondent suggests that respondent could have obtained equitable relief. For instance, respondent’s 1976 tax protest was resolved within one year from the date of payment. Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 14, App. 9. For purposes of their motion to dismiss in Federal District Court, petitioners agreed that the delay was two years. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. Respondent claimed that, based on an 8% average prime rate for the 3-year period during which she paid taxes under protest, she lost approximately $2,000 of potential interest on the use of her money. Plaintiff’s Complaint '¶ 14, App. 8-9. Respondent sued Edward J. Rosewell, the Treasurer of Cook County, and Thomas M. Tully, the County Assessor. Petitioners likewise urge here that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. ■§ 1343 (3). Since the “Question Presented” in their petition for certiorari did not refer to this issue, Pet. for Cert. 2, we question that it is even properly before us. In any event, our resolution of the case makes it unnecessary to address this additional contention. The District Court stated: “1. The availability of equitable and declaratory relief in the Illinois state courts provides the plaintiff with a ‘plain, speedy and efficient' remedy. Tully v. Griffin, 429 U. S. 68 (1976). “2. The non-payment of interest on refunds pursuant to Sections 675 and 716 of Chapter 120, Illinois Revised Statutes, does not render the remedy in Illinois courts not ‘plain, speedy and efficient.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-21a. The Court of Appeals also held that the availability of a § 1983 action in state court does not bar federal jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act. 604 F. 2d, at 540. Because of the result in this case, we do not reach this issue. Although the issue in Great Lakes concerned the availability of federal declaratory relief rather than the scope of the Tax Injunction Act itself, the decision was predicated on “[t]he considerations which persuaded federal courts of equity not to grant relief . . . and which led to the enactment of the [Tax Injunction] Act.” 319 U. S., at 300. We have no doubt that, had the case presented an injunction suit, the Court would have found it precluded under the Tax Injunction Act. The Johnson Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1342 (emphasis added), states in pertinent part: , "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where “(4) A ■plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” This argument is discussed infra, at 518-521. Although respondent could have raised federal constitutional claims in her objection to the Collector’s Application for Judgment, she expressly declined to do so in her prior objections in 1974, 1975, and 1976. For example, her objection to the 1976 tax bill stated: “Objector reserves to the federal courts the adjudication of its rights under the United States Constitution . . . .” Objections for 1976, p. 8, ¶ 8. She did claim that the ordinance and assessment were violations of equal protection and due process under the Illinois Constitution. Id., at 9, ¶ 11. The dissent construes our opinion to mean that “a state remedy which could not possibly afford any relief or which had the potential for only nominal relief would defeat federal jurisdiction.” Post, at 537 (footnote omitted). The dissent thus concludes that, under our view, “a computerized calculation accompanied by a preprinted rejection slip would qualify as a 'plain, speedy and efficient remedy.’ ” Post, at 530. But our opinion suggests nothing of the kind. We explicitly state that a state remedy must “provid [e] the taxpayer with a 'full hearing and judicial determination’ at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax.” Supra, at 514. The dissent’s hypothetical computer-card remedy would hardly meet this requirement. The Tax Injunction Act embodied Congress’ decision to transfer jurisdiction over a class of substantive federal claims from the federal district courts to the state courts, as long as state-court procedures were “plain, speedy and efficient” and final review of the substantive federal claim could be obtained in this Court. Under the Illinois refund procedure, a taxpayer may raise all constitutional objections, including those based on the State’s failure to pay interest or to return all unconstitutionally collected taxes, in the Illinois legal refund proceeding, supra, at 514, after which the litigants have an opportunity to seek review in this Court. The Act contemplates nothing more. Neither the opinion below nor the brief for respondent specifies whether the remedy fails because it is not “plain,” not “speedy,” not “efficient,” or not a “remedy” at all. The superficial linguistic difficulty of describing interest payments in these terms can be readily observed. Indeed at oral argument, respondent’s counsel had some difficulty deciding under which of the words the Illinois remedy foundered: “QUESTION: Do you equate inadequate with inefficient? “MR. FOX: Yes, sir. ‘Inadequate’ has been used commonly in the federal court, sir, Mr. Chief Justice, with the ‘PS&E,’ plain, speedy, and efficient. “QUESTION: Well, what you’re saying, it seems to me, is that you treat ‘efficient’ as a synonym for ‘adequate.’ And this remedy is not efficient, that is, adequate, because it isn’t speedy. “MR. FOX: Nor is it plain. “QUESTION: Well, I’m not sure what it means. Plain or fancy wouldn’t make much difference. The important thing is whether it’s speedy and whether it’s adequate. And speedy and adequate are really interrelated, aren’t they? “MR. FOX: I believe so; yes. I think they are subsumed, that speedy is subsumed under the word adequate, which seems to be more generic.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 34, 35. In Hillsborough, the Court concluded that, because it was at best “speculative” whether the New Jersey courts followed the federal constitutional rule that a State may not “imposfe] on him against whom the discrimination has been directed the burden of seeking an upward revision of the taxes of other members of the class,” 326 U. S., at 623; see Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 445-447 (1923), federal jurisdiction would lie. In addition, protection of federal rights was uncertain because the State Board of Tax Appeals had no right to pass on constitutional questions, the allowance of a writ of certiorari to that Board from the New Jersey Supreme Court was only discretionary, and the refusal of a writ was not judicially reviewable by the Court of Errors and Appeals. 326 U. S., at 625-626. A remedy to contest a tax that requires repetitive suits on the same issue in succeeding years may not be “efficient.” However, on the record properly before us, the Illinois remedy has not shown itself not “efficient.” It is true that respondent appealed unsuccessfully to the Board of Appeals for four straight years, 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, see n. 5, swpra, but it was not until after her 1977 appeal that the Circuit Court of Cook County rendered its judgment. Therefore, neither the County Assessor nor the Board had yet had the benefit of a judicial determination to weigh in their considerations. Further resort to the Illinois statutory refund remedy would become unnecessary should subsequent assessments reflect the Circuit Court's judgment of the correct assessment. Respondent informs us, however, that her 1978 and 1979 tax assessments were set at the 1977 discriminatory level, despite a complaint filed with the Assessor for 1978 and appeals to the Board for both years. Brief for Respondent 2. Together with her previous four appeals, respondent notes that she has been forced to take remedial action for six successive years. Id,., at 31, n. 27. Because these additional facts are not part of the record before us, we have not considered them. Respondent may present these new facts in her pending suit in Federal District Court to enjoin collection of her 1978 property tax. See id., at 2. For instance, discussing the New York state courts in 1839, David Dudley Field noted that “[sjpeedy justice is a thing unknown; and any justice, without delays almost ruinous, is most rare.” Vanderbilt, Improving the Administration of Justice — Two Decades of Development, 26 U. Cin. L. Rev. 155, 157 (1957). Many have long since lamented the seeming inseparability of judicial proceedings and delay. See, e. g., National Center for State Courts, Justice Delayed 2 (1978); Lagging Justice, 328 Annuals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. (1960); Vanderbilt, supra; Warren, Delay and Congestion in the Federal Courts, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 6, 7-8 (1958); Congestion and Delay: A Selected Bibliography of Recent Materials 1953-1958, in Proceedings of the Attorney General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation 212-245 (1958). For over half of the 13 courts surveyed, the median number of days was over a year and a half. National Center for State Courts, Justice Delayed 10-11 (1978). Delay has been a particularly pronounced problem for state trial courts located in metropolitan centers. See generally Virtue, The Two Faces of Janus: Delay in Metropolitan Trial Courts, in Lagging Justice, 328 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 125 (1960). This results in part from an observed correlation between population and calendar congestion. Institute of Judicial Administration, Calendar Status, in Proceedings of the Attorney General’s Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation 196 (1958). For example, in 1958, the average time from the beginning of suit until the commencement of jury trial was 18.8 months for counties with populations over 750,000, 11.4 months for counties between 500,000 and 750,000, and 5.6 months for counties under 500,000. Ibid. Current statistics are only the latest in a long history of delay and congestion in federal and state courts. Congress discussed the problem of congestion in federal district courts in connection with the Tax Injunction Act itself. 81 Cong. Rec. 1417 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone) (citing portions of Report on the Johnson Act deemed applicable to the Tax Injunction Act). For the year ending June 30, 1930, 37.7% of federal-question law cases terminated without a jury in 13 selected Federal District Courts took 12 months or more to complete. American Law Institute, A Study of the Business of the Federal Courts, Pt. II, p. 87 (1934). In 1942, the median time interval for civil nonjury trials from filing to disposition in all federal district courts was 12.3 months. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Table 9 (1942). The median time for New York’s Southern District was 25 months. Ibid. Unfortunately state-court statistics on civil litigation in the 1930’s and 1940’s are virtually nonexistent. The Institute of Judicial Administration conducted the first major compilation of state civil case data in 1953. See U. S. Dept. of Justice, State Court Caseload Statistics: The State of the Art 15, 22 (1978). Even the latest information on state-court time intervals is more complete for appellate than trial litigation. See National Center for State Courts, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1976 (1980). Part of the problem of delay inheres in the very nature of state tax administration. There has yet to be devised a taxing system universally viewed as speedy enough to resolve complaints. This is largely because “[t]he procedures for mass assessment and collection of state taxes and for administration and adjudication of taxpayers’ disputes with tax officials are generally complex and necessarily designed to operate according to established rules.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (BreNNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The property tax is especially vulnerable to criticism over its administration. Unlike state income or sales taxes that usually can be calculated automatically from the taxpayer’s income or the price of a good or service, the property tax is levied on the value of real estate. This element necessarily introduces a degree of subjective individualized judgment by the assessor that would understandably give rise to frequent taxpayer challenges and place pressure on the appellate review procedures. See generally 0. Oldman & F. Schoettle, State and Local Taxes and Finance 262-265 (1974); Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Property Tax in a Changing Environment 3-20 (1974); H. Aaron, Who Pays the Property Tax?, 59-67 (1975); Pomp, What Is Happening to the Property Tax, 15 Assessors Journal 107, 108-116 (1980). The dissent relies on four factors which it believes “combine to make the Illinois remedial scheme demonstrably unjust.” Post, at 538-541. Leaving aside the issue whether the phrase “demonstrably unjust” describes the proper inquiry, these four factors boil down to the same two elements of delay and failure to pay interest addressed in this Court’s opinion. The dissent’s first factor — “the tax assessments themselves reveal gross inequities,” post, at 539 — merely states that respondent has alleged a constitutional violation, surely not a ground for federal-court jurisdiction here. The second — that overassessment continues “notwithstanding [the taxpayer’s] formal protests and the manifest error in the original assessment,” ibid. — would appear to require error-free administration that even the best procedures could not guarantee. Indeed, absent a judicial determination of the correct assessment, it is not surprising that respondent’s “formal protests” failed to persuade the Assessor and Board of Appeals of their “manifest error.” See n. 22, supra. Here, respondent’s challenges to the three tax years were resolved within two years in a single court proceeding. Those challenges explicitly were not based on federal constitutional grounds, and it is hardly the duty of federal courts to intervene in state-law tax questions. N. 18, supra. As we suggest, n. 22, supra, the Federal District Court in respondent’s pending 1978 litigation may evaluate her latest claim in light of the “efficient” prong of our analysis, now that the Assessor and Board of Appeals are aware of the Circuit Court of Cook County’s adjudication and apparently have nevertheless repeated their prior assessment practices. The dissent’s third factor — delay—and fourth factor — failure to pay interest — are addressed above. The Tax Injunction Act was only one of several statutes reflecting congressional hostility to federal injunctions issued against state officials in the aftermath of this Court's decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 155— 156 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from enjoining unconstitutional actions of state officers). See generally Perez v. Ledesma, supra, at 106-115 (BrennaN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937) (“This legislation does not introduce a new principle, since the Congress has passed statutes of similar import”). The Court of Appeals suggested that the purpose of the Act was to prevent out-of-state corporations, through diversity suits, from delaying payment of state taxes during the pendency of federal litigation while instate citizens would have to pay first and then litigate in state courts. 604 F. 2d, at 535. It is true that the drafters of the Act were particularly concerned with this practice of out-of-state corporations. S. Rep. No. 1035, supra, at 1-2; 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). But the expansive language of the statute belies the notion that Congress was concerned exclusively with this problem. If Congress had wanted solely to address this issue, it surely would have done so by limiting the Act’s jurisdictional bar to suits brought in federal diversity jurisdiction. In addition, the Court of Appeals’ narrow interpretation of the Act’s purpose might have the perverse effect of making the Act moot. In 1938, one year after its passage, this Court held that federal courts in diversity suits must apply the general case law as well as statutory law of the State. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). If federal courts followed the State’s equity law, then out-of-state corporations contesting taxes would be treated no differently from in-state citizens. See Note, The Tax Injunction Act and Suits for Monetary Relief, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 736, 743, n. 37 (1979). One source suggested that the “apparent weight of authority” supported the opposite rule — that interest was allowable even in the absence of a statute. Annot., 112 A. L. R. 1183-1184 (1938). But even that source acknowledged the existence of the contrary view, one that “ha[d] been asserted somewhat more frequently in recent cases.” Id., at 1184. Accord, Annot., 57 A. L. R. 357-364 (1928). See Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 386, n. 2 (1931); Hopkins v. Southern California Telephone Co., 275 U. S. 393, 399-400 (1928); Procter & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Sherman, 2 F. 2d 165, 166 (SDNY 1924). These cases’ treatment of a no-interest refund remedy was undercut by later cases. Without expressly addressing the issue, the Court in two cases decided the same day, Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 528 (1932) (Mississippi refund remedy); Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 284 U. S. 530, 534 (1932) (Illinois refund remedy), found adequate two state refund remedies that apparently did not pay interest, Gulf, M. & O. R. Co. v. Webster County, 194 Miss. 660, 662, 13 So. 2d 644, 645 (1943); Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 422-423, 167 N. E. 2d 236, 240-241 (1960). Therefore, prior federal equity practice is a two-sided sword. Commentators agree that this issue has never been definitively resolved. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 979 (2d ed. 1973); Berry, A Federal Forum for Broad Constitutional Deprivation by Property Tax Assessment, 65 Calif. L. Rev. 828, 833-834 (1977). Most believe that the Act is not equivalent to prior federal equity practice, although they do not agree on the quantity and quality of difference. See, e. g., Comment, 93 Ilarv. L. Rev. 1016, 1021-1022 (1980) (Act reduces scope of equity); Comment, Jurisdiction to Enforce Federal Statutes Regulating State Taxation: The Eleventh Amendment-Section 1341 Imbroglio, 70 Yale L. J. 636, 643 (1961) (Act limited relief available under equity); Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 783-784 (1946) (Act limited equity to relief from procedural defects in state courts). Of course, this is not to say that prior federal equity cases may not be instructive on whether a state remedy is “plain, speedy and efficient.” And even where the Tax Injunction Act would not bar federal-court interference in state tax administration, principles of federal equity may nevertheless counsel the withholding of relief. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 301 (1943) (Act not “a mandatory withdrawal from [federal equity courts] of their traditional power to decline jurisdiction in the exercise of their discretion”). Senator Bone noted that the Tax Injunction Act “does not take away any equitable right of a taxpayer, or deprive him of a day in court,” because a “full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy” remained assured. 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937). See S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). This statement was merely declaratory of the Act’s general continuation of an exception to its broad jurisdictional bar against federal injunctive relief. “[S]uits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.” § 16, 1 Stat. 82. It is true that, if we found the Illinois remedy inadequate because of its failure to pay interest, the State or county could avoid any problems of federally enjoined tax payments by choosing to pay interest. See United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 15 (EDSC 1959) (three-judge court), aff’d per curiam, 364 U. S. 281 (1960). But Congress surely did not intend that the threat of federal injunctive relief be used as a lever to force States to appropriate funds for interest payable to their taxpayers.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER et al. v. MANHART et al. No. 76-1810. Argued January 18, 1978 Decided April 25, 1978 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, and Powell, JJ., joined, in all but Part IV of which Marshall, J., joined, and in Part IV of which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 723. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 725. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part., post, p. 728. Brennan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. David J. Oliphant argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Burt Pines and J. David Hanson. Robert M. Dohrmann argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Kenneth M. Schwarts, Laurence D. Steinsapir, Howard M. Knee, and Katherine Stoll Burns Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by James A. Redden, Attorney General, Al J. Laue, Solicitor General, and William F. Hoelscher, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Oregon; and by Harry L. Du Brin, Jr., for the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Thomas S. Martin, Brian K. Landsberg, Cynthia L. Attwood, Abner W. Sibal, Joseph T. Eddins, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Mary-Helen Mautner for the United States et ah; by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Marjorie Mazen Smith, and Matthew W. Finkin for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Michael Evan Gold and Fred Okrand for the ACLU Foundation of Southern California; by Jonathan R. Harkavy for the American Nurses’ Assn.; by Marguerite Rawalt and Margaret Young for the Association for Women in Mathematics et al.; and by John A. Fillion, Stephen P. Berzon, Fred H. Altshuler, J. Albert Woll, and Laurence Gold for the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by W. Bernard Richland and L. Kevin Sheridan for the city of New York; by Edward Silver, Larry M. Lavinsky, Stephen E. Tisman, and William B. Harman, Jr., for the American Council of Life Insurance; by Lawrence J. Lotto for the Society of Actuaries et al.; and by William R. Glendon, James B. Weidner, and James W. Paul for the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America et al. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. As a class, women live longer than men. For this reason, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power required its female employees to make larger contributions to its pension fund than its male employees. We granted certiorari to decide whether this practice discriminated against individual female employees because of their sex in violation of § 703 (a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. For many years the Department has administered retirement, disability, and death-benefit programs for its employees. Upon retirement each employee is eligible for a monthly retirement benefit computed as a fraction of his or her salary multiplied by years of service. The monthly benefits for men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary are equal. Benefits are funded entirely by contributions from the employees and the Department, augmented by the income earned on those contributions. No private insurance company is involved in the administration or payment of benefits. Based on a study of mortality tables and its own experience, the Department determined that its 2,000 female employees, on the average, will live a few years longer than its 10,000 male employees. The cost of a pension for the average retired female is greater than for the average male retiree because more monthly payments must be made to the average woman. The Department therefore required female employees to make monthly contributions to the fund which were 14.84% higher than the contributions required of comparable male employees. Because employee contributions were withheld from paychecks, a female employee took home less pay than a male employee earning the same salary. Since the effective date of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Department has been an employer within the meaning of Title V.II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e (1970 ed., Supp. V). In 1973, respondents brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of a class of women employed or formerly employed by the Department. They prayed for an injunction and restitution of excess contributions. While this action was pending, the California Legislature enacted a law prohibiting certain municipal agencies from requiring female employees to make higher pension fund contributions than males. The Department therefore amended its plan, effective January 1, 1975. The current plan draws no distinction, either in contributions or in benefits, on the basis of sex. On a motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that the contribution differential violated § 703 (a)(1) and ordered a refund of all excess contributions made before the amendment of the plan. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Department and various amici curiae contend that: (1) the differential in take-home pay between men and women was not discrimination within the meaning of § 703 (a) (1) because it was offset by a difference in the value of the pension benefits provided to the two classes of employees; (2) the differential was based on a factor “other than sex” within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and was therefore protected by the so-called Bennett Amendment; (3) the rationale of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, requires reversal; and (4) in any event, the retroactive monetary recovery is unjustified. We consider these contentions in turn. I There are both real and fictional differences between women and men. It is true that the average man is taller than the average woman; it is not true that the average woman driver is more accident prone than the average man. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, an employer could fashion his personnel policies on the basis of assumptions about the differences between men and women, whether or not the assumptions were valid. It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere “stereotyped” impressions about the characteristics of males or females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman’s inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less. This case does not, however, involve a fictional difference between men and women. It involves a generalization that the parties accept as unquestionably true: Women, as a class, do live longer than men. The Department treated its women employees differently from its men employees because the two classes are in fact different. It is equally true, however, that all individuals in the respective classes do not share the characteristic that differentiates the average class representatives. Many women do not live as long as the average man and many men outlive the average woman. The question, therefore, is whether the existence or nonexistence of “discrimination” is to be determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteristics. A “stereotyped” answer to that question may not be the same as the answer that the language and purpose of the statute command. The statute makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute’s focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. If height is required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because, on the average, women are too short. Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply. That proposition is of critical importance in this case because there is no assurance that any individual woman working for the Department will actually fit the generalization on which the Department’s policy is based. Many of those individuals will not live as long as the average man. While they were working, those individuals received smaller paychecks because of their sex, but they will receive no compensating advantage when they retire. ■ It is true, of course, that while contributions are being collected from the employees, the Department cannot know which individuals will predecease the average woman. Therefore, -unless women as a. class are assessed an extra charge, they will be subsidized, to some extent, by the class of male employees. It follows, according to the Department, that fairness to its class of male employees justifies the extra assessment against all of its female employees. But the question of fairness to various classes affected by the statute is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature to address. Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like those based on national origin or race, are unlawful. Actuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as sex. But a statute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the employment market, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 436, could not reasonably be construed to permit a take-home-pay differential based on a racial classification. Even if the statutory language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes. Practices that classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals. The generalization involved in this case illustrates the point. Separate mortality tables are easily interpreted as reflecting innate differences between the sexes; but a significant part of the longevity differential may be explained by the social fact that men are heavier smokers than women. Finally, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended a special definition of discrimination in the context of employee group insurance coverage. It is true that insurance is concerned with events that are individually unpredictable, but that is characteristic of many employment decisions. Individual risks, like individual performance, may not be predicted by résort to classifications proscribed by Title VII. Indeed, the fact that this case involves a group insurance program highlights a basic flaw in the Department’s fairness argument. For when insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always subsidize the poorer risks. Healthy persons subsidize medical benefits for the less healthy; unmarried workers subsidize the pensions of married workers; persons who eat, drink, or smoke to excess may subsidize pension benefits for persons whose habits are more temperate. Treating different classes of risks as though they were the same for purposes of group insurance is a common practice that has never been considered inherently unfair. To insure the flabby and the fit as though they were equivalent risks may be more common than treating men and women alike; but nothing more than habit makes one “subsidy” seem less fair than the other. An employment practice that requires 2,000 individuals to contribute more money into a fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them is a woman, rather than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the Act. Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows “treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.” It constitutes discrimination and is unlawful unless exempted by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 or some other affirmative justification. II Shortly before the enactment of Title VII in 1964, Senator Bennett proposed an amendment providing that a compensation differential based on sex would not be unlawful if it was authorized by the Equal Pay Act, which had been passed a year earlier. The Equal Pay Act requires employers to pay members of both sexes the same wages for equivalent work, except when the differential is pursuant to one of four specified exceptions. The Department contends that the fourth exception applies here. That exception authorizes a “differential based on any other factor other than sex.” The Department argues that the different contributions exacted from men and women were based on the factor of longevity rather than sex. It is plain, however, that any individual’s life expectancy is based on a number of factors, of which sex is only one. The record contains no evidence that any factor other than the employee’s sex was taken into account in calculating the 14.84% differential between the respective contributions by men and women. We agree with Judge Duniway’s observation that one cannot “say that an actuarial distinction, based entirely on sex is 'based on any other factor other than sex.’ Sex is exactly what it is based on.” 553 F. 2d 581, 588, (1976). We are also unpersuaded by the Department’s reliance on a colloquy between Senator Randolph and Senator Humphrey during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Commenting on the Bennett Amendment, Senator Humphrey expressed his understanding that it would allow many differences in the treatment of men and women under industrial benefit plans, including earlier retirement options for women. Though h© did not address differences in employee contributions based on sex, Senator Humphrey apparently assumed that the 1964 Act would have little, if any, impact on existing pension plans. His statement cannot, however, fairly be made the sole guide to interpreting the Equal Pay Act,, which had been adopted a year earlier ; and it is the 1963 statute, with its exceptions, on which the Department ultimately relies. We conclude that Senator Humphrey’s isolated comment on the Senate floor cannot change the effect of the plain language of the statute itself. Ill The Department argues that reversal is required by General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125. We are satisfied, however, that neither the holding nor the reasoning of Gilbert is controlling. In Gilbert the Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer’s disability benefit plan did not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. Relying on the reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S. 484, the Court first held that the General Electric plan did not involve “discrimination based upon gender as such.” The two groups of potential recipients which that cáse concerned were pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. “ ‘While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.’ ” 429 U. S., at 135. In contrast, each of the two groups of employees involved in this case is composed entirely and exclusively of members of the same sex. On its face, this plan discriminates on the basis of sex whereas the General Electric plan discriminated on the basis of a special physical disability. In Gilbert the Court did note that the plan as actually administered had provided more favorable benefits to women as a class than to men as a class. This evidence supported the conclusion that not only had plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case by proving that the plan was discriminatory on its face, but they had also failed to prove any discriminatory effect. In this case, however, the Department argues that the absence of a discriminatory effect on women as a class justifies an employment practice which, on its face, discriminated against individual employees because of their sex. But even if the Department’s actuarial evidence is sufficient to prevent plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case on the theory that the effect of the practice on women as a class was discriminatory, that evidence does not defeat the claim that the practice, on its face, discriminated against every individual woman employed by the Department. In essence, the Department is arguing that the prima facie showing of discrimination based on evidence of different contributions for the respective sexes is rebutted by its demonstration that there is a like difference in the cost of providing benefits for the respective classes. That argument might prevail if Title VII contained a cost-justification defense comparable to the affirmative defense available in a price discrimination suit. But neither Congress nor the courts have recognized such a defense under Title VII. Although we conclude that the Department’s practice violated Title VII, we do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries. All that is at issue today is a requirement that men and women make unequal contributions to an employer-operated pension fund. Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions could command in the open market. Nor does it call into question the insurance industry practice of considering the composition of an employer’s work force in determining the probable cost of a retirement or death benefit plan. Finally, we recognize that in a case of this kind it may be necessary to take special care in fashioning appropriate relief. IV The Department challenges the District Court’s award of retroactive relief to the entire class of female employees and retirees. Title VII does not require a district court to grant any retroactive relief. A court that finds unlawful discrimination “may enjoin [the discrimination] . . . and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement . . . with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. V). To the point of redundancy, the statute stresses that retroactive relief “may” be awarded if it is “appropriate.” In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, the Court reviewed the scope of a district court’s discretion to fashion appropriate remedies for a Title VII violation and concluded that “backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.” Id., at 421. Applying that standard, the Court ruled that an award of backpay should not be conditioned on a showing of bad faith. Id., at 422-423. But the Albemarle Court also held that backpay was not to be awarded automatically in every case. The Albemarle presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom be overcome, but it does not make meaningless the district courts’ duty to determine that such relief is appropriate. For several reasons, we conclude that the District Court gave insufficient attention to the equitable nature of Title VII remedies. Although we now have no doubt about the application of the-statute in this case, we must recognize that conscientious and intelligent administrators of pension funds, who did not have the benefit of the extensive briefs and arguments presented to us, may well have assumed that a program like the Department’s was entirely lawful. The courts had been silent on the question, and the administrative agencies had conflicting views. The Department’s failure to act more swiftly is a sign, not of its recalcitrance, but of the problem’s complexity. As commentators have noted, pension administrators could reasonably have thought it unfair— or even illegal — to make male employees shoulder more than their “actuarial share” of the pension burden. There is no reason to believe that the threat of a backpay award is needed to cause other administrators to amend their practices to conform to this decision. Nor can we ignore the potential impact which changes in rules affecting insurance and pension plans may have on the economy. Fifty million Americans participate in retirement plans other than Social Security. The assets held in trust for these employees are vast and growing — more than $400 billion was reserved for retirement benefits at the end of 1976 and reserves are increasing by almost $50 billion a year. These plans, like other forms of insurance, depend on the accumulation of large sums to cover contingencies. The amounts set aside are determined by a painstaking assessment of the insurer’s likely liability. Risks that the insurer foresees will be included in the calculation of liability, and the rates or contributions charged will reflect that calculation. The occurrence of major unforeseen contingencies, however, jeopardizes the insurer’s solvency and, ultimately, the insureds’ benefits. Drastic changes in the legal rules governing pension and insurance funds, like other unforeseen events, can have this effect. Consequently, the rules that apply to these funds should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has plainly commanded that result. The EEOC itself has recognized that the administrators of retirement plans must be given time to adjust gradually to Title VII’s demands. Courts have also shown sensitivity to the special dangers of retroactive Title VII awards in this field. See Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454, 466-468 (NJ 1971). There can be no doubt that the prohibition against sex-differentiated employee contributions represents a marked departure from past practice. Although Title VII was enacted in 1964, this is apparently the first litigation challenging contribution differences based on valid actuarial tables. Retroactive liability could be devastating for a pension fund. The harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties. If, as the courts below apparently contemplated, the plaintiffs’ contributions are recovered from the pension fund, the administrators of the fund will be forced to meet unchanged obligations with diminished assets. If the reserve proves inadequate, either the expectations of all retired employees will be disappointed or current employees will be forced to pay not only -for their own future security but also for the unanticipated reduction in the contributions of past employees. Without qualifying the force of the Albemarle presumption in favor of retroactive relief, we conclude that it was error to grant such relief in this case. Accordingly, although we agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the statute, we vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ionIt is so ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The section provides: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2 (a)(1). In addition to the Department itself, the petitioners include members of the Board of Commissioners of the Department and members of the plan’s Board of Administration. The plan itself is not in the record. In its brief the Department states that the plan provides for several kinds of pension benefits at the employee’s option, and that the most common is a formula pension equal to 2% of the average monthly salary paid during the last year of employment times the number of years of employment. The benefit is guaranteed for life. The Department contributes an amount equal to 110% of all employee contributions. The significance of the disparity is illustrated by the record of one woman whose contributions to the fund (including interest on the aihount withheld each month) amounted to $18,171.40; a similarly situated male would have contributed only $12,843.53. 86 Stat. 103 (effective Mar. 24, 1972). In addition to five individual plaintiffs, respondents include the individuals’ union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 18. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 7500 (West Supp. 1978). The court had earlier granted a preliminary injunction. 387 P. Supp. 980 (1975). 553 F. 2d 581 (1976). Two weeks after the Ninth Circuit decision, this Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125. In response to a petition for rehearing, a majority of the Ninth Circuit panel concluded that its original decision did not conflict with Gilbert. 553 F. 2d, at 592 (1977). Judge Kilkenny dissented. Id., at 594. See nn. 22 and 23, infra. See Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1174 (1971). “In forbidding employers to discriminate agaipst individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Section 703 (a) (1) subjects to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities and enjoymept which have plagued women in the past.” Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). The size of the subsidy involved in this case is open to doubt, because the Department’s plan provides for survivors’ benefits. Since female spouses of male employees are likely to have greater life expectancies than the male spouses of female employees, whatever benefits men lose in “primary” coverage for themselves, they may regain in “secondary” coverage for their wives. For example, the life expectancy of a white baby in 1973 was 72.2 years; a nonwhite baby could expect to live 65.9 years, a difference of 6.3 years. See Public Health Service, IIA Vital Statistics of the United States, 1973, Table 5-3. Fortifying this conclusion is the fact that some States have banned higher life insurance rates for blacks since the 19th century. See generally M. James, The Metropolitan Life — A Study in Business Growth 338-339 (1947). See R. Retherford, The Changing Sex Differential in Mortality 71-82 (1975). Other social causes, such as drinking or eating habits — perhaps even the lingering effects of past employment discrimination — may also affect the mortality differential. A study of life expectancy in the United States for 1949-1951 showed that 20-year-old men could expect to live to 60.6 years of age if they were divorced. If married, they could expect to reach 70.9 years of age, a difference of more than 10 years. Id., at 93. The record indicates, however, that the Department has funded its death-benefit plan by equal contributions from male and female employees. A death benefit — unlike a pension benefit — has less value for persons with longer life expectancies. Under the Department’s concept of fairness, then, this neutral funding of death benefits is unfair to women as a class. A variation on the Department’s fairness theme is the suggestion that a gender-neutral pension plan would itself violate Title VII because of its disproportionately heavy impact on male employees. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424. This suggestion has no force in the sex discrimination context because each retiree’s total pension benefits are ultimately determined by his actual life span; any differential in benefits paid to men and women in the aggregate is thus “based on [a] factor other than sex,” and consequently immune from challenge under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U. S. C § 206 (d); cf. n 24, infra. Even under Title VII itself— assuming disparate-impact analysis applies to fringe benefits, cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 144-145 — the male employees would not prevail. Even a completely neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one group or another. Griggs does not imply, and this Court has never held, that discrimination must always be inferred from such consequences. Developments in the Law, supra n. 12, at 1170; see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d, at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Bennett Amendment became part of § 703 (h), which provides in part: “It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6 (d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U. S. C. § 206 (d)).” 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h). The Equal Pay Act provides, in part: “No employer having employees subject to any provisions of thist section, shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who' is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.” 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. §206 (d). We need not decide whether retirement benefits or contributions to benefit plans are “wages” under the Act, because the Bennett Amendment extends the Act’s four exceptions to all forms of “compensation” covered by Title VII. See n. 22, supra. The Department’s pension benefits, and the contributions that maintain them, are “compensation” under Title VII. Cf. Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., 483 F. 2d 490, 492 n. 3 (CA5 1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1002. The Department’s argument is specious because its contribution schedule distinguished only imperfectly between long-lived and short-lived employees, while distinguishing precisely between male and female employees. In contrast, an entirely gender-neutral system of contributions and benefits would result in differing retirement benefits precisely “based on” longevity, for retirees with long lives would always receive more money than comparable employees with short lives. Such a plan would also distinguish in a crude way between male and female pensioners, because of the difference in their average life spans. It is this sort of disparity — and not an explicitly gender-based differential — that the Equal Pay Act intended to authorize. “MR. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I wish to ask of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Humphrey], who is the effective manager of the pending bill, a clarifying question on the provisions of title VII. “I have in mind that the social security system, in certain respects, treats men and women differently. For example, widows’ benefits are paid automatically; but a widower qualifies only if he is disabled or if he was actually supported by his deceased wife. Also, the wife of a retired employee entitled to social security receives an additional old age benefit; but the husband of such an employee does not. These differences in treatment as I recall, are of long standing. “Am I correct, I ask the Senator from Minnesota, in assuming that similar differences of treatment in industrial benefit plants, including earlier retirement options for women, may continue in operation under this bill, if it becomes law? “MR. HUMPHREY. Yes. That point was made unmistakably clear earlier today by the adoption of the Bennett amendment; so there can be n,o doubt about it.” 110 Cong. Rec. 13663-13664 (1964). The administrative constructions of this provision look in two directions. The Wage and Hour Administrator, who is charged with enforcing the Equal Pay Act, has never expressly approved different employee contribution rates, but he has said that either equal employer contributions or equal benefits will satisfy the Act. 29 CFR § 800.116 (d) (1977). At the same time, he has stated that a wage differential based on differences in the average costs of employing men and women is not based on a “ 'factor other than sex.’” 29 CFR §800.151 (1977). The Administrator’s reasons for the second ruling are illuminating: “To group employees solely on the basis of sex for purposes of comparison of costs necessarily rests on the assumption that the sex factor alone may justify the wage differential — an assumption plainly contrary to the terms and purpose of the Equal Pay Act. Wage differentials so based would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed, because in any grouping by sex of the employees to which the cost data relates, the group cost experience is necessarily assessed against an individual of one sex without regard to whether it costs an employer more or less to employ such individual than a particular individual of the opposite sex under similar working conditions in jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” Ibid. To the extent that they conflict, we find that the reasoning of § 800.151 has more “power to persuade” than the ipse dixit of § 800.116. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140. Quoting from the Geduldig opinion, the Court stated: “ ‘[T]his case is thus a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance program does not exclude anyone .from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition — pregnancy—from the list of compensable disabilities.’ ” 429 U. S., at 134. After further quotation, the Court added: “The quoted language from Geduldig leaves no doubt that our reason for rejecting appellee’s equal protection claim in that case was that the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under California’s disability-benefits plan was not in itself discrimination based on sex.” Id., at 135. See id., at 130-131, n. 9. As the Court recently noted in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S., at 144, the Gilbert holding “did not depend on this evidence.” Rather, the holding rested on the plaintiff’s failure to prove either facial discrimination or discriminatory effect. Some amici suggest that the Department’s discrimination is justified by business necessity. They argue that, if no gender distinction is drawn, many male employees will withdraw from the plan, or even the Department, because they can get a better pension plan in the private market. But the Department has long required equal contributions to its death-benefit plan, see n. 19, supra, and since 1975 it has required equal contributions to its pension plan. Yet the Department points to no “adverse selection” by the affected employees, presumably because an employee who wants to leave the plan must also leave his job, and few workers will quit because one of their fringe benefits could theoretically be obtained at a marginally lower price on the open market. In short, there has been no showing that sex distinctions are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the Department’s retirement plan. See 15 U. S. C. §13 (a) (1976 ed.). Under the Robinson-Patman Act, proof of cost differences justifies otherwise illegal price discrimination; it does not negate the existence of the discrimination itself. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 44-45. So here, even if the contribution differential were based on a sound and well-recognized business practice, it would nevertheless be discriminatory, and the defendant would be forced to assert an affirmative defense to escape liability. Defenses under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are considerably narrower. See, e. g., n. 30, supra. A broad cost-differential defense was proposed and rejected when the Equal Pay Act became law. Representative Findley offered an amendment to the Equal Pay Act that would have expressly authorized a wage differential tied to the “ascertainable and specific added cost resulting from employment of the opposite sex.” 109 Cong. Rec. 9217 (1963). He pointed out that the employment of women might be more costly because of such matters as higher turnover and state laws restricting women’s hours. Id., at 9205. The Equal Pay Act’s supporters responded that any cost differences could be handled by focusing on the factors other than sex which actually caused the differences, such as absenteeism or number of hours worked. The amendment was rejected as largely redundant for that reason. Id., at 9217. The Senate Report, on the other hand, does seem to assume that the statute may recognize a very limited cost defense, based on “all of the elements'of the employment costs of both men and women.” S. Rep. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1963). It is difficult to find language in the statute supporting even this limited defense; in any event, no defense based on the total cost of employing men and women was attempted in this case. Title VII and the Equal Pay Act primarily govern relations between employees and their employer, not between employees and third parties. We do not suggest, of course, that an employer can avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells. Title VII applies to “any agent” of a covered employer, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e (b) (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Equal Pay Act applies to “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U. S. C. § 203 (d). In this case, for example, the Department could not deny that the administrative board was its agent after it successfully argued that the two were so inseparable that both shared the city’s immunity from suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Title VII bans discrimination against an “individual” because of “such individual’s” sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1). The Equal Pay Act prohibits discrimination “within any establishment,” and discrimination is defined as “paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which [the employer] pays wages to employees of the opposite sex” for equal work. 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d) (1). Neither of these provisions makes it unlawful to determine the funding requirements for an establishment’s benefit plan by considering the composition of the entire force. Specifically, the Court held that a defendant prejudiced by his reliance on a plaintiff’s initial waiver of any backpay claims could be absolved of backpay liability by a district court. 422 U. S., at 424. The Court reserved the question whether reliance of a different kind — on state “protective” laws requiring sex differentiation — would also save a defendant from liability. Id., at 423 n. 18. According to the District Court, the defendant’s liability for contributions did not begin until April 5, 1972, the day the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued an interpretation casting doubt on some varieties of pension fund discrimination. See 37 Fed. Reg. 6835-6837. Even assuming that the EEOC’s decision should have put the defendants on notice that they were acting illegally, the date chosen by the District Court was too early. The court should have taken into account the difficulty of amending a major pension plan, a task that cannot be accomplished overnight. Moreover, it should not have given conclusive weight to the EEOC guideline. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S., at 141. The Wage and Hour Administrator, whose rulings also provide a defense in sex discrimination cases, 29 U. S. C. § 259, refused to follow the EEOC. See n. 37, infra. Further doubt about the District Court’s equitable sensitivity to the impact of a refund order is raised by the court’s decision to award the full difference between the contributions made by male employees and those made by female employees. This may give the victims of the discrimination more than their due. If an undifferentiated actuarial table had been employed in 1972, the contributions of women employees would no doubt have been lower than they were, but they would not have been as low as the contributions actually made by men in that period. The District Court should at least have considered ordering a refupd of only the difference between contributions made by women and the contributions they would have made under an actuarially sound and nondiscriminatory plan. As noted earlier, n. 26, supra, the position of the Wage and Hour Administrator has been somewhat confusing. His general rule rejected differences in average cost as a defense, but his more specific rule lent some support to the Department’s view by simply requiring an employer to equalize either his contributions or employee benefits. Compare 29 CFR §800.151 (1977) with § 800.116 (d). The EEOC requires equal benefits. See 29 CFR §§ 1604.9 (e) and (f) (1977). Two other agencies with responsibility for equal opportunity in employment adhere to the Wage and Hour Administrator’s position. See 41 CFR § 60.20.3 (c) (1977) (Office of Federal Contract Compliance); 45 CFR §86.56 (b)(2) (1976) (Dept, of Health, Education, and Welfare). See also 40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975) (HEW). “If an employer establishes a pension plan, the charges of discrimination will be reversed: if he chooses a money purchase formula, women can complain, that they receive less per month. While the employer and the insurance company are quick to point out that women as a group actually receive more when equal contributions are made — because of the long-term effect of compound interest — women employees still complain of discrimination. If the employer chooses the defined benefit formula, his male employees can allege discrimination because he contributes more for women as a group than for men as a group. The employer is in a dilemma: he is damned in the discrimination context no matter what he does.” Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B. U. L. Rev. 624, 633-634 (1973) (footnotes omitted). American Council of Life Insurance, Pension Facts 1977, pp. 20-23. In 1974, Congress underlined the importance of making only gradual and prospective changes in the rules that govern pension plans. In that year, Congress passed a bill regulating employee retirement programs. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829. The bill paid careful attention to the problem of retroactivity. It set a wide variety of effective dates for different provisions of the new law; some of the rules will not be fully effective until 1984, a decade after the law was enacted. See, e. g., in 1970 ed., Supp. Y of 29 U. S. C., § 1061 (a) (Sept. 2, 1974) ; §1031 (b)(1) (Jan. 1, 1975); § 1086 (b) (Dec. 31, 1975); §1114 (c)(4) (June 30, 1977); § 1381 (c) (1) (Jan. 1, 1978); § 1061 (c) (Dec. 31, 1980); § 1114 (c) (June 30, 1984). In February 1968, the EEOC issued guidelines disapproving differences in male and female retirement ages. In September of the same year, EEOC’s general counsel gave an opinion that retirement plans could set gradual schedules for complying with the guidelines and that the judgment of the parties about how speedily to comply “would carry considerable weight.” See Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F. 2d 1040, 1045 (CA4 1976). The plaintiffs assert that the award in this case would not be crippling to these defendants, because it is limited to contributions between, 1972 and 1975. But we cannot base a ruling on the facts of this case alone. As this Court noted in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, equitable remedies may be flexible but they still must be founded on principle. “Important national goals would be frustrated by a regime of discretion that ‘produce [d] different results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy.’ ” Id., at 417. Employers are not liable for improper contributions made more than two years before a charge was filed with the EE0C. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. V). But it is not unusual for cases to remain within the EEOC for years after a charge is filed, see, e. g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355 (3 years, 2 ¿months), and that delay is but a prelude to the time inevitably consumed in civil litigation. The Court of Appeals plainly expected the plan to pay the award, for it noted that imposing retroactive liability “might leave the plan somewhat under-funded.” 553 F. 2d, at 592. After making this observation, the Court of Appeals suggested a series of possible solutions to the problem — the benefits of all retired workers could be lowered, the burden on current employees could be increased, or the Department could decide to contribute enough to offset the plan’s unexpected loss. Ibid. Two commentators urging the illegality of gender-based pension plans noted the danger of “staggering damage awards,” and they proposed as one cure the exercise of judicial “discretion, [to] refuse a back-pay award because of the hardship it would work on an employer who had acted in good faith . . . .” Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1203, 1226, 1227 (1974).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROBERTSON, CHIEF OF THE FOREST SERVICE, et al. v. METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS COUNCIL et al. No. 87-1703. Argued January 9, 1989 Decided May 1, 1989 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Brennan, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 359. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Marzulla, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jeffrey P. Minear, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., and Vicki L. Plaut. David A. Bricklin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Methow Valley Citizens Council was Michael W. Gendler. Glenn J. Amster filed a brief for respondent Methow Recreation, Inc. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for the Institute of Law and Public Health Protection by Steven R. Perles and Scott C. Whitney; and for the Northwest Forest Resource Council et al. by Mark C. Rutzick and Douglas C. Blomgren. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, and Clifford L. Rechtschaffen and Mary Gray Holt, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Grace Berg Schaible of Alaska, Duane Woodard of Colorado, Jim Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Frederick J. Cowan of Kentucky, James E. Tierney of Maine, James J. Shannon of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Mike Greely of Montana, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Robert Abrams of New York, Brian McKay oí Nevada, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Robert H. Henry of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jim Mattox of Texas, Jeffrey Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, and Charles G. Brown of West Virginia; for the American Planning Association by Stephen C. Kelly; for the International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies by Paul A. Lenzini; and for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by Victor M. Sher, Todd D. True, and Tom Lustig. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center for Enviromental Education by Nicholas C. Yost and William A. Butler; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to decide two questions of law. As framed by petitioners, they are: “1. Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires federal agencies to include in each environmental impact statement: (a) a fully developed plan to mitigate environmental harm; and (b) a ‘worst case’ analysis of potential environmental harm if relevant information concerning significant environmental effects is unavailable or too costly to obtain. “2. Whether the Forest Service may issue a special use permit for recreational use of national forest land in the absence of a fully developed plan to mitigate environmental harm.” Pet. for Cert. i. Concluding that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit misapplied the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq., and gave inadequate deference to the Forest Service’s interpretation of its own regulations, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I The Forest Service is authorized by statute to manage the national forests for “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” 74 Stat. 215, 16 U. S. C. §528. See also 90 Stat. 2949, 16 U. S. C. § 1600 et seq. Pursuant to that authorization, the Forest Service has issued “special use” permits for the operation of approximately 170 Alpine and Nordic ski areas on federal lands. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-709, pt. 1, p. 2 (1986). The Forest Service permit process involves three separate stages. The Forest Service first examines the general environmental and financial feasibility of a proposed project and decides whether to issue a special use permit. See 36 CFR § 251.54(f) (1988). Because that decision is a “major Federal action” within the meaning of NEPA, it must be preceded by the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 42 U. S. C. § 4332. If the Service decides to issue a permit, it then proceeds to select a developer, formulate the basic terms of the arrangement with the selected party, and issue the permit. The special use permit does not, however, give the developer the right to begin construction. See 36 CFR § 251.56(c) (1988). In a final stage of review, the Service evaluates the permittee’s “master plan” for development, construction, and operation of the project. Construction may begin only after an additional environmental analysis (although it is not clear that a second EIS need always be prepared) and final approval of the developer’s master plan. This case arises out of the Forest Service’s decision to issue a special use permit authorizing the development of a major destination Alpine ski resort at Sandy Butte in the North Cascade Mountains. Sandy Butte is a 6,000-foot mountain located in the Okanogan National Forest in Okanogan County, Washington. At present Sandy Butte, like the Methow Valley it overlooks, is an unspoiled, sparsely populated area that the District Court characterized as “pristine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. In 1968, Congress established the North Cascades National Park and directed the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture to agree on the designation of areas within, and adjacent to, the park for public uses, including ski areas. 82 Stat. 926, 930, 16 U. S. C. §§90, 90d-3. A 1970 study conducted by the Forest Service pursuant to this congressional directive identified Sandy Butte as having the highest potential of any site in the State of Washington for development as a major downhill ski resort. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. In 1978, Methow Recreation, Inc. (MRI), applied for a special use permit to develop and operate its proposed “Early Winters Ski Resort” on Sandy Butte and an 1,165-acre parcel of land it had acquired adjacent to the National Forest. The proposed development would make use of approximately 3,900 acres of Sandy Butte; would entice visitors to travel long distances to stay at the resort for several days at a time; and would stimulate extensive commercial and residential growth in the vicinity to accommodate both vacationers and staff. In response to MRI’s application, the Forest Service, in cooperation with state and county officials, prepared an EIS known as the Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study (Early Winters Study or Study). The stated purpose of the EIS was “to provide the information required to evaluate the potential for skiing at Early Winters” and “to assist in making a decision whether to issue a Special Use Permit for downhill skiing on all or a portion of approximately 3900 acres of National Forest System land.” Early Winters Study 1. A draft of the Study was completed and circulated in 1982, but release of the final EIS was delayed as Congress considered including Sandy Butte in a proposed wilderness area. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. When the Washington State Wilderness Act of 1984 was passed, however, Sandy Butte was excluded from the wilderness designation, and the EIS was released. The Early Winters Study is a printed document containing almost 150 pages of text and 12 appendices. It evaluated five alternative levels of development of Sandy Butte that might be authorized, the lowest being a “no action” alternative and the highest being development of a. 16-lift ski area able to accommodate 10,500 skiers at one time. The Study considered the effect of each level of development on water resources, soil, wildlife, air quality, vegetation, and visual quality, as well as land use and transportation in the Methow Valley, probable demographic shifts, the economic market for skiing and other summer and winter recreational activities in the Valley, and the energy requirements for the ski area and related developments. The Study’s discussion of possible impacts was not limited to on-site effects, but also, as required by Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, see 40 CFR §1502.16(b) (1987), addressed “off-site impacts that each alternative might have on community facilities, socio-economic and other environmental conditions in the Upper Methow Valley.” Early Winters Study 1. As to off-site effects, the Study explained that “due to the uncertainty of where other public and private lands may become developed,” it is difficult to evaluate off-site impacts, id., at 76, and thus the document’s analysis is necessarily “not site-specific,” id., at 1. Finally, the Study outlined certain steps that might be taken to mitigate adverse effects, both on Sandy Butte and in the neighboring Methow Valley, but indicated that these proposed steps are merely conceptual and “will be made more specific as part of the design and implementation stages of the planning process.” Id., at 14. The effects of the proposed development on air quality and wildlife received particular attention in the Study. In the chapter on “Environmental Consequences,” the first subject discussed is air quality. As is true of other subjects, the discussion included an analysis of cumulative impacts over several years resulting from actions on other lands as well as from the development of Sandy Butte itself. The Study concluded that although the construction, maintenance, and operation of the proposed ski area “will not have a measurable effect on existing or future air quality,” the off-site development of private land under all five alternatives — including the “no action” alternative — “will have a significant effect on air quality during severe meteorological inversion periods.” Id., at 65. The burning of wood for space heat, the Study explained, would constitute the primary cause of diminished air quality, and the damage would increase incrementally with each of the successive levels of proposed development. Ibid. The Study cautioned that without efforts to mitigate these effects, even under the “no action” alternative, the increase in automobile, fireplace, and wood stove use would reduce air quality below state standards, but added that “[t]he numerous mitigation measures discussed” in the Study “will greatly reduce the impacts presented by the model.” Id., at 67. In its discussion of air-quality mitigation measures, the EIS identified actions that could be taken by the county government to mitigate the adverse effects of development, as well as those that the Forest Service itself could implement at the construction stage of the project. The Study suggested that Okanogan County develop an air quality management plan, requiring weatherization of new buildings, limiting the number of wood stoves and fireplaces, and adopting monitoring and enforcement measures. In addition, the Study suggested that the Forest Service require that the master plan include procedures to control dust and to comply with smoke management practices. In its discussion of adverse effects on area wildlife, the EIS concluded that no endangered or threatened species would be affected by the proposed development and that the only impact on sensitive species was the probable loss of a pair of spotted owls and their progeny. Id., at 75. With regard to other wildlife, the Study considered the impact on 75 different indigenous species and predicted that within a decade after development vegetational change and increased human activity would lead to a decrease in population for 31 species, while causing an increase in population for another 24 species on Sandy Butte. Ibid. Two species, the pine marten and nesting goshawk, would be eliminated altogether from the area of development. Ibid. In a comment in response to the draft EIS, the Washington Department of Game voiced a special concern about potential losses to the State’s largest migratory deer herd, which uses the Methow Valley as a critical winter range and as its migration route. Id., at Appendix D (letter of November 18, 1982). The state agency estimated that the total population of mule deer in the area most likely to be affected was “better than 30,000 animals” and that “the ultimate impact on the Methow deer herd could exceed a 50 percent reduction in numbers.” Ibid. The agency asserted that “Okanogan County residents place a great deal of importance on the area’s deer herd.” Ibid. In addition, it explained that hunters had “harvested” 3,247 deer in the Methow Valley area in 1981, and that, since in 1980 hunters on average spent $1,980 for each deer killed in Washington, they had contributed over $6 million to the State’s economy in 1981. Because the deer harvest is apparently proportional to the size of the herd, the state agency predicted that “Washington business can expect to lose over $3 million annually from reduced recreational opportunity.” Ibid. The Forest Service’s own analysis of the impact on the deer herd was more modest. It first concluded that the actual operation of the ski hill would have only a “minor” direct impact on the herd, but then recognized that the off-site effect of the development “would noticeably reduce numbers of deer in the Methow [Valley] with any alternative.” Id., at 76. Although its estimate indicated a possible 15 percent decrease in the size of the herd, it summarized the State’s contrary view in the text of the EIS, and stressed that off-site effects are difficult to estimate due to uncertainty concerning private development. Ibid. As was true of its discussion of air quality, the EIS also described both on-site and off-site mitigation measures. Among possible on-site mitigation possibilities, the Study recommended locating runs, ski lifts, and roads so as to minimize interference with wildlife, restricting access to selected roads during fawning season, and further examination of the effect of the development on mule deer migration routes. Off-site options discussed in the Study included the use of zoning and tax incentives to limit development on deer winter range and migration routes, encouragement of conservation easements, and acquisition and management by local government of critical tracts of land. As with the measures suggested for mitigating the off-site effects on air quality, the proposed options were primarily directed to steps that might be taken by state and local government. Ultimately, the Early Winters Study recommended the issuance of a permit for development at the second highest level considered — a 16-lift ski area able to accommodate 8,200 skiers at one time. On July 5, 1984, the Regional Forester decided to issue a special use permit as recommended by the Study. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. In his decision, the Regional Forester found that no major adverse effects would result directly from the federal action, but that secondary effects could include a degradation of existing air quality and a reduction of mule deer winter range. Id., at 67a. He therefore directed the supervisor of the Okanogan National Forest, both independently and in cooperation with local officials, to identify and implement certain mitigating measures. Id., at 67a-70a. Four organizations (respondents) opposing the decision to issue a permit appealed the Regional Forester’s decision to the Chief of the Forest Service. See 36 CFR § 211.18 (1988). After a hearing, he affirmed the Regional Forester’s decision. Stressing that the decision, which simply approved the general concept of issuing a 30-year special use permit for development of Sandy Butte, did not authorize construction of a particular ski area and, in fact, did not even act on MRI’s specific permit application, he concluded that the EIS’ discussion of mitigation was “adequate for this stage in the review process.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a. Thereafter, respondents brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§701-706, to obtain judicial review of the Forest Service’s decision. Their principal claim was that the Early Winters Study did not satisfy the requirements of NEPA, 42 U. S. C. §4332. With the consent of the parties, the case was assigned to a United States Magistrate. See 28 U. S. C. § 636(c). After a trial, the Magistrate filed a comprehensive written opinion and concluded that the EIS was adequate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. Specifically, he found that the EIS had adequately disclosed the adverse impacts on the mule deer herd and on air quality and that there was no duty to prepare a “worst case analysis” because the relevant information essential to a reasoned decision was available. Id., at 39a-44a. In concluding that the discussion of off-site, or secondary, impacts was adequate, the Magistrate stressed that courts apply a “rule of reason” in evaluating the adequacy of an EIS and “take the uncertainty and speculation involved with secondary impacts into account in passing on the adequacy of the discussion of secondary impacts.” Id,., at 38a. On the subject of mitigation, he explained that “[m]ere listing ... is generally inadequate to satisfy the CEQ regulations,” but found that “in this EIS there is more — not much more — but more than a mere listing of mitigation measures.” Id., at 41a. Moreover, emphasizing the tiered nature of the Forest Service’s decisional process, the Magistrate noted that additional mitigation strategies would be included in the master plan, that the Forest Service continues to develop mitigation plans as further information becomes available, and that the Regional Forester’s decision conditioned issuance of the special use permit on execution of an agreement between the Forest Service, the State of Washington, and Okanogan County concerning mitigation. Id., at 41a-42a, 45a. Concluding that the Early Winters Study was inadequate as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals reversed. Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F. 2d 810 (CA9 1987). The court held that the Forest Service could not rely on “ ‘the implementation of mitigation measures’ ” to support its conclusion that the impact on the mule deer would be minor, “since not only has the effectiveness of these mitigation measures not yet been assessed, but the mitigation measures themselves have yet to be developed.” Id., at 817. It then added that if the agency had difficulty obtaining adequate information to make a reasoned assessment of the environmental impact on the herd, it had a duty to make a so-called “worst case analysis.” Such an analysis is “‘formulated on the basis of available information, using reasonable projections of the worst possible consequences of a proposed action.’ Save our Ecosystems, 747 F. 2d, at 1244-45 (quoting 46 Fed. Reg. 18032 (1981)).” Ibid. The court found a similar defect in the EIS’ treatment of air quality. Since the EIS made it clear that commercial development in the Methow Valley will result in violations of state air-quality standards unless effective mitigation measures are put in place by the local governments and the private developer, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Forest Service had an affirmative duty to “develop the necessary mitigation measures before the permit is granted.” Id., at 819 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The court held that this duty was imposed by both the Forest Service’s own regulations and § 102 of NEPA. Ibid. It read the statute as imposing a substantive requirement that “ ‘action be taken to mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions.’” Ibid. (quoting Stop H-3 Assn. v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (Haw. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 533 F. 2d 434 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 999 (1976)). For this reason, it concluded that “an EIS must include a thorough discussion of measures to mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of a proposed action.” 833 F. 2d, at 819. The Court of Appeals concluded by quoting this paragraph from an opinion it had just announced: “‘The importance of the mitigation plan cannot be overestimated. It is a determinative factor in evaluating the adequacy of an environmental impact statement. Without a complete mitigation plan, the decisionmaker is unable to make an informed judgment as to the environmental impact of the project — one of the main purposes of an environmental impact statement.’” Id., at 820 (quoting Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F. 2d 1489, 1493 (CA9 1987), rev’d, post, p. 360). II Section 101 of NEPA declares a broad national commitment to protecting and promoting environmental quality. 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4331. To ensure that this commitment is “infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government, the act also establishes some important ‘action-forcing’ procedures.” 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (remarks of Sen. Jackson). See also S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 19 (1969); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350 (1979); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409, and n. 18 (1976). Section 102 thus, among other measures “directs that, to the fullest extent possible ... all agencies of the Federal Government shall— “(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332. The statutory requirement that a federal agency contemplating a major action prepare such an environmental impact statement serves NEPA’s “action-forcing” purpose in two important respects. See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87, 97 (1983); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U. S. 139, 143 (1981). It ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision. Simply by focusing the agency’s attention on the environmental consequences of a proposed project, NEPA ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast. See ibid.; Kleppe, supra, at 409. Moreover, the strong precatory language of § 101 of the Act and the requirement that agencies prepare detailed impact statements inevitably bring pressure to bear on agencies “to respond to the needs of environmental quality.” 115 Cong. Rec. 40425 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). Publication of an EIS, both in draft and final form, also serves a larger informational role. It gives the public the assurance that the agency “has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process,” Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., supra, at 97, and, perhaps more significantly, provides a springboard for public comment, see L. Caldwell, Science and the National Environmental Policy Act 72 (1982). Thus, in this case the final draft of the Early Winters Study reflects not only the work of the Forest Service itself, but also the critical views of the Washington State Department of Game, the Methow Valley Citizens Council, and Friends of the Earth, as well as many others, to whom copies of the draft Study were circulated. See Early Winters Study, Appendix D. Moreover, with respect to a development such as Sandy Butte, where the adverse effects on air quality and the mule deer herd are primarily attributable to predicted off-site development that will be subject to regulation by other governmental bodies, the EIS serves the function of offering those bodies adequate notice of the expected consequences and the opportunity to plan and implement corrective measures in a timely manner. The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus realized through a set of “action-forcing” procedures that require that agencies take a “‘hard look’ at environmental consequences,” Kleppe, 427 U. S., at 410, n. 21 (citation omitted), and that provide for broad dissemination of relevant environmental information. Although these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1980) (per curiam); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 558 (1978). If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs. See ibid.; Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc., supra, at 227-228; Kleppe, supra, at 410, n. 21. In this case, for example, it would not have violated NEPA if the Forest Service, after complying with the Act’s procedural prerequisites, had decided that the benefits to be derived from downhill skiing at Sandy Butte justified the issuance of a special use permit, notwithstanding the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or even 100 percent of the mule deer herd. Other statutes may impose substantive environmental obligations on federal agencies, but NEPA merely prohibits uninformed — rather than unwise — agency action. To be sure, one important ingredient of an EIS is the discussion of steps that can be taken to mitigate adverse environmental consequences. The requirement that an EIS contain a detailed discussion of possible mitigation measures flows both from the language of the Act and, more expressly, from CEQ’s implementing regulations. Implicit in NEPA’s demand that an agency prepare a detailed statement on “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,” 42 U. S. C. § 4332(C)(ii), is an understanding that the EIS will discuss the extent to which adverse effects can be avoided. See D. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 10:38 (1984). More generally, omission of a reasonably complete discussion of possible mitigation measures would undermine the “action-forcing” function of NEPA. Without such a discussion, neither the agency nor other interested groups and individuals can properly evaluate the severity of the adverse effects. An adverse effect that can be fully remedied by, for example, an inconsequential public expenditure is certainly not as serious as a similar effect that can only be modestly ameliorated through the commitment of vast public and private resources. Recognizing the importance of such a discussion in guaranteeing that the agency has taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of proposed federal action, CEQ regulations require that the agency discuss possible mitigation measures in defining the scope of the EIS, 40 CFR § 1508.25(b) (1987), in discussing alternatives to the proposed action, § 1502.14(f), and consequences of that action, § 1502.16(h), and in explaining its ultimate decision, § 1505.2(c). There is a fundamental distinction, however, between a requirement that mitigation be discussed in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated, on the one hand, and a substantive requirement that a complete mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted, on the other. In this case, the off-site effects on air quality and on the mule deer herd cannot be mitigated unless nonfederal government agencies take appropriate action. Since it is those state and local governmental bodies that have jurisdiction over the area in which the adverse effects need be addressed and since they have the authority to mitigate them, it would be incongruous to conclude that the Forest Service has no power to act until the local agencies have reached a final conclusion on what mitigating measures they consider necessary. Even more significantly, it would be inconsistent with NEPA’s reliance on procedural mechanisms — as opposed to substantive, result-based standards — to demand the presence of a fully developed plan that will mitigate environmental harm before an agency can act. Cf. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 462 U. S., at 100 (“NEPA does not require agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking structure”). We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals erred, first, in assuming that “NEPA requires that ‘action be taken to mitigate the adverse effects of major federal actions,”’ 833 F. 2d, at 819 (quoting Stop H-3 Assn. v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp., at 1111), and, second, in finding that this substantive requirement entails the further duty to include in every EIS “a detailed explanation of specific measures which will be employed to mitigate the adverse impacts of a proposed action,” 833 F. 2d, at 819 (emphasis supplied). Ill The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Forest Service had an obligation to make a “worst case analysis” if it could not make a reasoned assessment of the impact of the Early Winters project on the mule deer herd. Such a “worst case analysis” was required at one time by CEQ regulations, but those regulations have since been amended. Moreover, although the prior regulations may well have expressed a permissible application of NEPA, the Act itself does not mandate that uncertainty in predicting environmental harms be addressed exclusively in this manner. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the “worst case” study. In 1977, President Carter directed that CEQ promulgate binding regulations implementing the procedural provisions of NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 123 (1977 Comp.). Pursuant to this Presidential order, CEQ promulgated implementing regulations. Under § 1502.22 of these regulations — a provision which became known as the “worst case requirement” — CEQ provided that if certain information relevant to the agency’s evaluation of the proposed action is either unavailable or too costly to obtain, the agency must include in the EIS a “worst case analysis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence.” 40 CFR § 1502.22 (1985). In 1986, however, CEQ replaced the “worst case” requirement with a requirement that federal agencies, in the face of unavailable information concerning a reasonably foreseeable significant environmental consequence, prepare “a summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the . . . adverse impacts” and prepare an “evaluation of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community.” 40 CFR § 1502.22(b) (1987). The amended regulation thus “retains the duty to describe the consequences of a remote, but potentially severe impact, but grounds the duty in evaluation of scientific opinion rather than in the framework of a conjectural ‘worst case analysis.’” 50 Fed. Reg. 32237 (1985). The Court of Appeals recognized that the “worst case analysis” regulation has been superseded, yet held that “[t]his rescission . . . does not nullify the requirement . . . since the regulation was merely a codification of prior NEPA case law.” 833 F. 2d, at 817, n. 11. This conclusion, however, is erroneous in a number of respects. Most notably, review of NEPA case law reveals that the regulation, in fact, was not a codification of prior judicial decisions. See Note, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 777, 798, 800-802, 813-814 (1988). The cases cited by the Court of Appeals ultimately rely on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F. 2d 957 (1983). Sigler, however, simply recognized that the “worst case analysis” regulation codified the “judicially created principl[e]” that an EIS must “consider the probabilities of the occurrence of any environmental effects it discusses.” Id., at 970-971. As CEQ recognized at the time it superseded the regulation, case law prior to the adoption of the “worst case analysis” provision did require agencies to describe environmental impacts even in the face of substantial uncertainty, but did not require that this obligation necessarily be met through the mechanism of a “worst case analysis.” See 51 Fed. Reg. 15625 (1986). CEQ’s abandonment of the “worst case analysis” provision, therefore, is not inconsistent with any previously established judicial interpretation of the statute. Nor are we convinced that the new CEQ regulation is not controlling simply because it was preceded by a rule that was in some respects more demanding. In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S., at 358, we held that CEQ regulations are entitled to substantial deference. In that case we recognized that although less deference may be in order in some cases in which the “ ‘administrative guidelines’ ” conflict “ ‘with earlier pronouncements of the agency,”’ ibid, (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976)), substantial deference is nonetheless appropriate if there appears to have been good reason for the change, 442 U. S., at 358. Here, the amendment only came after the prior regulation had been subjected to considerable criticism. Moreover, the amendment was designed to better serve the twin functions of an EIS — requiring agencies to take a “hard look” at the consequences of the proposed action and providing important information to other groups and individuals. CEQ explained that by requiring that an EIS focus on reasonably foreseeable impacts, the new regulation “will generate information and discussion on those consequences of greatest concern to the public and of greatest relevance to the agency’s decision,” 50 Fed. Reg. 32237 (1985), rather than distorting the decisionmaking process by overemphasizing highly speculative harms, 51 Fed. Reg. 15624-15625 (1986); 50 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985). In light of this well-considered basis for the change, the new regulation is entitled to substantial deference. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Early Winters Study is inadequate because it failed to include a “worst case analysis.” IV The Court of Appeals also held that the Forest Service’s failure to develop a complete mitigation plan violated the agency’s own regulations. 833 F. 2d, at 814, n. 3, 819, and n. 14. Those regulations require that an application for a special use permit include “measures and plans for the protection and rehabilitation of the environment during construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of the project,” 36 CFR § 251.54(e)(4) (1988), and that “[e]ach special use authorization . . . contain . . . [t]erms and conditions which will. . . minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment,” § 251.56(a)(1)(h). Applying those regulations, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[sjince the mitigation ‘plan’ here at issue is so vague and undeveloped as to be wholly inadequate, . . . the Regional Forester’s decision to grant the special use permit could be none other than arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.” 833 F. 2d, at 814, n. 3. We disagree. The Early Winters Study made clear that on-site effects of the development will be minimal and will be easily mitigated. For example, the Study reported that “[i]mpacts from construction, maintenance and operation of the proposed ‘hill’ development on National Forest land will not have a measurable effect on existing or future air quality,” Early Winters Study 65, and that “[t]he effect development and operation of the ski hill would have on deer migration should be minor,” id., at 76. Given the limited on-site effects of the proposed development, the recommended ameliorative steps — which, for example, called for “prompt re vegetation of all disturbed areas,” id., at 69, and suggested locating “new service roads away from water resources and fawning cover,” id., at 16— cannot be deemed overly vague or underdeveloped. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Early Winters Study’s treatment of possible mitigation measures is inadequate apparently turns on the court’s review of the proposed off-site measures. Although NEPA and CEQ regulations require detailed analysis of both on-site and off-site mitigation measures, see, e. g., 40 CFR § 1502.16(b) (1987), there is no basis for concluding that the Forest Service’s own regulations must also be read in all cases to condition issuance of a special use permit on consideration (and implementation) of off-site mitigation measures. The Forest Service regulations were promulgated pursuant to a broad grant of authority “to permit the use and occupancy of suitable areas of land within the national forests . . . for the purpose of constructing or maintaining hotels, resorts, and any other structures or facilities necessary or desirable for recreation, public convenience, or safety,” 16 U. S. C. §497, and were not based on the more direct congressional concern for environmental quality embodied in NEPA. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-709, pt. 1, p. 2 (1986). As is clear from the text of the permit issued to MRI, the Forest Service has decided to implement its mitigation regulations by imposing appropriate controls over MRI’s actual development and operation during the term of the permit. It was surely not unreasonable for the Forest Service in this case to have construed those regulations as not extending to actions that might be taken by Okanogan County or the State of Washington to ameliorate the off-site effects of the Early Winters project on air quality and the mule deer herd. This interpretation of the agency’s own regulation is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” and is thus controlling. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). See also Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 939 (1986); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965). V In sum, we conclude that NEPA does not require a fully developed plan detailing what steps will be taken to mitigate adverse environmental impacts and does not require a “worst case analysis.” In addition, we hold that the Forest Service has adopted a permissible interpretation of its own regulations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In the order granting certiorari, we consolidated this case with Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, No. 87-1704. See 487 U. S. 1217 (1988). Our decision in Marsh appears post, p. 360. The developer is chosen based on: (1) “[k]ind and quality of services to be offered”; (2) “[f]inancial capability”; (3) “[ejxperience and qualifications in relation to the proposed use”; (4) “[a]bility to perform according to per'mit terms including Federal, State, and local laws”; and (5) “[e]ontrol of private lands necessary to develop the proposed use.” U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, Final EIS, Early Winters Alpine Winter Sports Study 4 (1984). The 1970 report was entitled the North Cascades Winter Sports Study. Its conclusion that Sandy Butte is well suited for development as an Alpine ski resort was repeated in the Joint Plan for the North Cascades area, which was issued by the Park Service and the Forest Service in 1974. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. See 98 Stat. 299. In the Senate Committee Report explaining the decision to exclude Sandy Butte from the wilderness designation in the bill, the Committee made this quite remarkable comment for a legislative committee: “The Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture are directed to allow the evaluation process for the Sandy Butte development to proceed without additional delay . . . .” S. Rep. No. 98-461, p. 11 (1984). The Study recommended the following action: “1. The County will initiate the formation of an Air Quality Control Authority or similar administrative structure pursuant to Washington State statutes. “2. The County will develop an airshed management plan that incorporates strategies which will result in ambient air quality standards for the Methow Valley that are stricter than existing State standards. As part of the airshed management plan, the following mitigation measures will be considered: “ — Development of land use codes specifically addressing site development and project design directed at energy efficiency and air pollution control. “ — Requiring all new construction to be fully weatherized to reduce the need for supplemental heating sources (i. e., wood) beyond the central facilities heating needs. “ — Restricting the number of fireplaces and wood stoves. At a minimum, few fireplaces should be allowed in accommodations constructed for tourist use. “ — Encouraging the use of alternative, non-polluting energy sources. “ — Establishing a certification mechanism for wood stoves and fireplace inserts. “ — Establishing an air pollution monitoring system specifically designed to alert local residents to impending pollution episodes and to record long term changes in air quality levels. Such long term data will be used to evaluate the success or failure of the mitigation and impose more stringent measures if standards are violated. “ — Development of enforcement measures to assure that standards will be met.” Early Winters Study 68-69. The Study recommended the following on-site, air-quality mitigation measures: “1. The Master Plan will require prompt revegetation of all disturbed areas and the mandatory application of dust control measures (e. g., rocking and oiling) on unpaved construction roads. “2. The construction phase will follow established Forest Service/State of Washington smoke management practices identified in the Washington State Smoke Management Plan. The Master Plan will identify opportunities for utilization of waste wood, generated by the project, thereby minimizing open burning.” Id., at 69. Id., at 76. The Study predicted that development of the ski area would dimmish available summer range for the deer by between 5 and 10 percent, depending on the level of development chosen. Moreover, it recognized that although disturbance would be greatest during fawning season, “[fjawning would not be adversely affected with implementation of mitigation measures.” Id., at 75-76. The EIS listed the following opportunities for on-site mitigation: “a) Locate runs, lifts, roads, and other facilities to minimize disturbance of blue grouse wintering areas (primarily ridgetops). “b) Leave dead and defective trees standing in timbered areas where skier safety can be protected. “c) Restrict activities and travel on selected roads during the fawning season (June). “d) Locate new service roads away from water sources and fawning cover, “e) Evaluate impact to mule deer migration routes in review of Master Plan. “f) Design and harvest nearby, off-site timber sales to retain adequate travel corridors, foraging, roosting, and nesting sites for spotted owls. “g) Protect other likely migration routes between summer and winter habitats for spotted owls. “h) Restrict other activities within the spotted owls home range. “i) Springs and riparian areas in the permit area will be protected as water sources and wildlife habitat. . . .” Id., at 16-17. The Study further noted that additional mitigation opportunities might result from review of the master plan. Id., at 77. The Study listed the following steps that state and local government might take to mitigate off-site effects: “[1] Limit development on deer winter range and along migration routes through rezoning options, tax incentives and other means. “Since loss of winter range and disruption of migration routes are primarily concerns which will cause declines in deer numbers, protection of vital portions will be assured prior to a ski hill development. Rezoning is essential and will occur, to include County rezoning options such as: “(a) The Methow Review District which is currently applied to obtain certain densities, open space, and design. “(b) Other optional zone districts such as Conservation Districts which are available for amending existing zoning and protecting environmentally sensitive lands. “Other measures are probably needed, and which could occur, include: “(c) Conservation Easements between private individuals and trust agencies (e. g., Washington Department of Game) should be encouraged. Benefits would occur to both the landowner in the form of tax breaks, and the wildlife resource in the form of undeveloped, status quo habitat. “(d) Acquisition of certain land tracts essential to migrating deer may be needed to insure continued passage. These lands would be administered by a wildlife management agency (e. g., Washington Department of Game). “[2] Minimize potential road kills of deer and other wildlife by use of warning signs, speed limits, and roadway design where wildlife crossings and high speed driving occur. Responsibility rests with the appropriate agency’s road department (i. e., County, State, Federal) in the Methow Valley. “[3] Protect wildlife from free-ranging dogs through County ordinances that are enforceable. “[4] Through zoning, discourage development in riparian areas.” Id., at 77-78. His decision did not identify a particular developer, but rather simply authorized the taking of competitive bids. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. It was not until July 21, 1986, almost one month after the District Court affirmed the Forester’s decision, that a special use permit was issued to MRI. The four organizations were Methow Valley Citizens Council, Washington State Sportsmen’s Council, Washington Environmental Council, and the Cascade Chapter, Sierra Club. These organizations, with the exception of Washington State Sportsmen’s Council, are respondents herein. MRI, the permittee, is also a respondent in this Court, but since it supports the Government’s action, we shall use the term “respondents” to refer only to the opponents of the Early Winters proposal. Respondents also alleged violations of the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U. S. C. §§ 1600-1614, and the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7401-7626. These claims were dismissed on petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and are no longer in issue. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. The CEQ regulations require that, after preparing a draft EIS, the agency request comments from other federal agencies, appropriate state and local agencies, affected Indian tribes, any relevant applicant, the public generally, and, in particular, interested or affected persons or organizations. 40 CFR § 1503.1 (1987). In preparing the final EIS, the agency must “discuss at appropriate points . . . any responsible opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement and [must] indicate the agency’s response to the issue raised.” § 1502.9. See also § 1503.4. See, e. g., the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 892, 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring that every federal agency “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species”); the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U. S. C. §303 (Secretary of Transportation may approve “use of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge . . . or land of an historic site . . . only if . . . there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and . . . the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the [area] resulting from the use”). CEQ regulations define “mitigation” to include: “(a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action. “(b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation. “(c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment. “(d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action. “(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resoui’ces or environments.” 40 CFR § 1508.20 (1987). After the Early Winters Study was completed and distributed, the Forest Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the State Department of Ecology, and Okanogan County entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) committing various parties to take certain actions in mitigation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a-46a. In concluding that this agreement did not satisfy the mitigation discussion requirement, the Court of Appeals wrote: “[T]he MOU offers no assurance whatsoever that the vague mitigation objectives it features — performance of almost all of which would be the responsibility of third parties to the permit process — would ever in fact be achieved or even that effective measures would ever be designed (let alone implemented), if the Early Winters development were to proceed. Cf. Preservation Coalition [v. Pierce, 667 F. 2d 851, 860 (CA9 1982)] (‘Since many of the “mitigations” proposed by the agency were . . . potential actions to be taken by [third parties] reliance on them . . . was improper’).” Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F. 2d 810, 819-820 (CA9 1987). Because NEPA imposes no substantive requirement that mitigation measures actually be taken, it should not be read to require agencies to obtain an assurance that third parties will implement particular measures. As CEQ explained: “Many respondents to the Council’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-making pointed to the limitless nature of the inquiry established by this requirement; that is, one can always conjure up a worse ‘worst case’ by adding an additional variable to a hypothetical scenario. Experts in the field of risk analysis and perception stated that the ‘worst case analysis’ lacks defensible rationale or procedures, and that the current regulatory language stands ‘without any discernible link to the disciplines that have devoted so much thought and effort toward developing rational ways to cope with problems of uncertainty. It is, therefore, not surprising that no one knows how to do a worst case analysis . . .’, Slovic, P., February 1, 1985, Response to ANPRM. “Moreover, in the institutional context of litigation over EIS(s) the ‘worst case’ rule has proved counterproductive, because it has led to agencies being required to devote substantial time and resources to preparation of analyses which are not considered useful to decisionmakers and divert the EIS process from its intended purpose.” 50 Fed. Reg. 32236 (1985). Amicus curiae Center for Environmental Education argues that the Court of Appeals properly applied the “worst case analysis” provision because the new regulation only applies to “environmental impact statements for which a Notice of Intent (40 CFR § 1508.22) [was] published ... on or after May 27, 1986.” 40 CFR § 1502.22(c) (1987). The grandfather clause of the regulation, however, further specifies that agencies have the option of applying the old or new regulation to EIS’s commenced prior to May 27, 1986, that are still “in progress” after that date. Ibid. Because the Court of Appeals ordered that the Forest Service revise the Early Winters Study, and because such a revision is necessary even though we hold today that the Court of Appeals erred in part, the Study remains “in progress” and thus the Forest Service is entitled to rely on the new regulation. In October 1986, after the Forest Service issued its special use permit to MRI, Congress substantially revised the process for authorizing use of lands within the National Forest system for Nordic and Alpine ski operations. See National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3000, 16 U. S. C. §497b (1982 ed., Supp. V). These new procedures are not in issue in this case. The special use permit provides, in part, that the permittee “shall submit plans to reasonably restore or protect all areas disturbed during construction,” and that “[e]ach stage of construction will be considered complete only upon completion and acceptance of the successful seeding and planting in the vicinity of construction,” Special Use Authorization 17 (July 21, 1986); that the permittee shall prevent soil erosion “by carrying out the provisions of the erosion control plan prepared by the holder and approved by the authorized officer,” id., at 19; that “[plesticides may not be used to control undesirable woody and herbaceous vegetation, aquatic plants, insects, rodents, etc., without the prior written approval of the Forest Service,” ibid.; and that “[o]pen fireplaces shall be equipped with spark screens,” id., at 20.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. JACOBSON. Nos. 32 and 33. Argued November 8, 1948. Decided January 17, 1949. Arnold Raum argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson, Hilbert P. Zarky, Morton K. Rothschild and Philip Elman. Theodore R. Colborn argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Wm. B. Cockley and Walter A. Marting. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This decision applies the federal income tax to gains derived by a debtor from his purchase of his own obligations at a discount and his consequent control over their discharge. It presents the specific question whether a solvent natural person, in straitened financial circumstances, must include in his gross income for federal income tax purposes the difference between (1) the face amount of his personal indebtedness as the maker of secured bonds, originally issued by him at face value for cash, and (2) a lesser amount paid by him for their purchase. The debtor’s obligations were not unpaid balances of purchase prices which could be readjusted by the discharge of the obligations. The proceeds of the obligations were not traced into identifiable losses offsetting the debtor’s realized gains from the discharge of these obligations. Each seller knew that the bonds he sold were being bought by or for the maker of them. In each sale the bondholder sought to minimize his probable loss by getting as much as possible, directly or indirectly, from the maker of the bonds as the one available purchaser of them. The maker of the bonds, at the same time, sought to reduce his obligations as much as possible by buying the bonds as cheaply as he could. While each seller thus knew that he was receiving from the maker of the bonds less than their face amount, there is no finding that any seller intended to transfer or release something for nothing or to make a gift of any part of his claim, as distinguished from making a sale and assignment of his whole claim for the highest available price. The maker thus realized a gain from each purchase and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found correctly that, for federal income tax purposes, the maker must include that gain in his gross income for the tax year in which he made the purchase. The respondent, Lewis F. Jacobson, in 1938, 1939 and 1940 resided, practiced law and owned or controlled substantial property interests in Chicago, Illinois. In 1943 the petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, found deficiencies in the income taxes paid by the respondent for each of those years. Those deficiencies totaled $3,967.97, of which about $2,500 are now before us. This case arose from the Commissioner’s addition to the reported gross income of the respondent of the differences between (1) the principal face amounts of certain leasehold bonds executed by the respondent and (2) the lesser amounts paid by him for their purchase. Such purchases were made by or for him substantially as follows: Upon the respondent’s petition, the Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner’s findings and— “Held that, as to the bonds acquired by petitioner [Jacobson, the respondent here] through direct negotiations with the bondholders, he is not taxable on the gain therefrom under the doctrine of Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322; held, further, that petitioner is taxable on the gain realized in the purchases from bondholders through the secretary of the bondholders’ committee and the security dealers, under the doctrine of the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1, he being at all times solvent.” 6 T. C. 1048. Six of the sixteen judges dissented and five of those six voted to uphold the Commissioner completely, on the ground that none of the transactions were gratuitous. 6 T. C. 1048, 1057-1059. The Commissioner petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review that part of the judgment which was unfavorable to him. The respondent did the same as to the remainder of the judgment. That court decided against the Commissioner on both petitions. It held that, because the respective sellers knew that the bonds they sold were being bought by or for the respondent, as the maker of them, any excess of the face values of the bonds over their sales prices should be treated as gifts to the respondent and as exempt from income tax. 164 F. 2d 594. Due to the importance of the issues in the unsettled field of the taxability of gains derived by a debtor from his discharge of his own obligations at a discount, we granted certiorari in both cases. 333 U. S. 866. We have heard and decided them together. The further material facts, as found by the Tax Court or as shown by undisputed evidence, are as follows: By purchases made in 1922 and 1923 the respondent acquired a 99-year lease, running from May 1, 1914, together with a two-story store, office and apartment building on the leased premises in Chicago. On or about May 1, 1925, he borrowed $90,000 from a nearby bank and, together with his wife, executed in return 200 bonds secured by a trust deed mortgaging to that bank the leasehold and the improvements thereon. The bonds bore interest at 6% per cent per annum and were for the total principal amount of $90,000, with $2,500 maturing semiannually up to and including November 1, 1931. The balance of the bonds, totalling $57,500, were to mature May 1, 1932. The original proceeds were used by the respondent to retire the existing encumbrance, of an undisclosed amount, on the property, pay for a $16,250 addition made by him to the building on the leasehold and pay the necessary brokerage commission of approximately 10 per cent of the loan, plus the cost of printing the bonds and other expenses in connection with the loan. A remaining “small surplus” was paid to the respondent. In 1925 the respondent, for the purposes of computing depreciation, allocated $76,580.56 to the improvements, including the new addition, and $40,000 to the leasehold, out of their total cost to him of $116,580.56. The bonds due on or before November 1, 1931, were paid at or about their maturities. The debtor has never been in default on any interest payment. However, after the trustee bank closed on June 8, 1931, a committee was formed to represent the holders of this issue of bonds. May 1, 1932, the respondent secured from the committee and individual bondholders a five-year extension of the maturity on all of the bonds and a reduction in the interest rate from 6% to 5 per cent. During this extension the respondent issued his checks in the names of the respective bondholders to cover interest due them. The checks were delivered by the secretary of the bondholders’ committee, the respondent kept himself fully informed as to the identity and location of the respective bondholders and they, in turn, frequently visited him to learn about his financial condition and that of the trusteed property. In 1937 he procured a further extension of the maturity of the bonds to May 1, 1942, and, in that connection, paid 10 per cent on the principal of each bond, leaving a total outstanding balance of $51,750 payable on these bonds. The Tax Court found that in 1938 the fair market value of the leasehold and the improvements thereon was $80,000 and that in 1939 and 1940 it was the same, less accrued depreciation. The respondent testified that he valued it at considerably less, even as low as twice the amount of its gross income, or about $32,000. The gross and net income from the trusteed property, after deduction of expenses, depreciation and also the interest on the bonds, was: Year Gross income Net income 1938 ............ $16,550.00 $1,233.95 1939 ............ 16,520.75 1,107.11 1940 ............ 15,578.50 1,719.41 The respondent received from his law practice and other sources the following additional gross income: 1938, $38,390.85; 1939, $35,644.78; and 1940, $35,279.59. The Tax Court said that: “On the strength of the showing of petitioner’s assets and liabilities, we find petitioner was solvent during each of the taxable years 1938, 1939, and 1940.” 6 T. C. at p. 1053. The Court of Appeals said: “The Tax Court found that the taxpayer was solvent during each of the taxable years 1938, 1939 and 1940, and we accept the finding, although a perusal of the record makes it quite apparent that he was in straitened financial circumstances.” 164 F. 2d at p. 596. In his petition to the Tax Court the respondent stated, and it has not been disputed, that the value of the leasehold and building had sharply depreciated since his acquisition of them. The neighborhood had changed, stores were vacant or paid less than half of their previous rents, from 1932 to 1938 the value of the property was substantially less than its cost to him, conditions were getting worse and he felt certain that he would sustain a large loss in connection with the property. The Tax Court’s findings describe each bond sale that is material. Some were to the respondent personally and some to his law partner, acting on his behalf. The rest were made indirectly to the respondent through brokers or through the bondholders’ committee. The Tax Court said that each sale that was made through a broker or the committee was closely akin to an open market transaction. It made no finding that any seller intended to transfer or release something for nothing. It referred to all of the respondent’s acquisitions of bonds as purchases. Apparently the bonds were payable to bearer and the Tax Court referred to them as negotiable bonds. Each seller made a complete transfer to the respondent of all the seller’s rights to or under the bonds. Each seller thus determined the amount of his own loss on his investment. Each knew that the maker of the bond would acquire or secure control over it and would thus be enabled to reduce his liabilities by its face amount. Except for the 10 per cent paid on each bond in 1937, there is no evidence that any bondholder at any time received any partial payment on any bond or consented to a reduction of the indebtedness evidenced by the bond. There is no suggestion that any of the respondent’s payments made in 1938, 1939 or 1940 were made specifically in partial reduction of the respondent’s obligation as evidenced by a bond or that any bondholder specifically discharged him from any part of the balance of that obligation. On the other hand, it does appear that each of such payments was made in consideration of the transfer to the respondent of title to the entire bond. Each bond was delivered to the respondent evidencing his obligation for its full original face amount, less only the 10 per cent payment made, on account, in 1937. At the time of the trial, the respondent apparently still held the purchased bonds “intact.” The Court of Appeals repudiated any distinction made by the Tax Court for present purposes between the direct and indirect sales to the respondent. The Court of Appeals based its decision on each seller’s knowledge that he was transferring his bond to the maker of it. Thus far we agree. The Court of Appeals, however, without any finding of intent' by the respective sellers to transfer or release something for nothing, as distinguished from an intent to get the highest available price for their entire claims, treated the respondent’s gain from each purchase as exempt from the taxation imposed by § 22 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1938 and of the Internal Revenue Code, because that court felt itself obliged by precedent to classify each such gain as a “gift” under § 22 (b) (3) of that Act and Code. We hold, however, that those Sections do not, in the light of the decisions of this Court, permit that result. The first test of the taxability of such gains relates to their inclusion within the gross income of the taxpayer under § 22 (a), without reference to the specific exclusions made from it by § 22(b). The other test consists of the application to such gains of any of those specific exclusions. We hold that these gains come within § 22 (a) but not within any of the exclusions from gross income stated in § 22 (b). The respondent realized an immediate financial gain from his purchase of these bonds at a discount. By that acquisition he was enabled, at will, to cancel them and thus discharge himself from liability to pay them. While the record indicates that he held them “intact,” apparently without crediting released indebtedness on them or otherwise physically cancelling them in whole or in part (except for the 10 per cent payments made by him on each bond in 1937), his possession of them and control over them is not disputed and the petitioner has properly treated their acquisition as constituting a reduction of the respondent’s debts to the extent of their face amount. At the time of their purchase the respondent was unconditionally and primarily bound to pay their face amounts on May 1, 1942, with interest. Although in straitened financial circumstances he was solvent, both before and after his acquisition of the bonds, and the bonds apparently were collectible from him in full through appropriate enforcement proceedings. His acquisition, and consequent control over the discharge of these bonds, therefore, improved his net worth by the difference between their face amount and the price he paid for them. It also relieved him of the semiannual interest payments on them of 5 per cent per annum. His acquisition of them likewise reduced the face amount of the lien held by others upon his leasehold property. In the first instance he had received the full face amount in cash for these bonds so that his repurchase of them for 50 per cent, or less, of that amount reflected a substantial benefit which he had derived from the use of that borrowed money. These were not purchase money bonds. The gains from their cancellation were not akin to reductions in balances due on the prices of previously acquired property. The respective sellers of the bonds bore no relation to the respondent other than that of creditors. The gains derived by the respondent through these purchases were comparable to those he would have realized if he had purchased, at the same discount, like bonds issued by a third party and had resold them at full face value or had turned them in at full value as a credit upon some other indebtedness of the respondent. His gains were comparable in their nature to those which he would have realized if a third party, pursuant to a contract, had paid off his indebtedness on these bonds for him to the extent of the discount at which he purchased them. The nature of the gain derived by a debtor from his.purchase of his own obligations at a discount is the same whether the debtor is a corporation or a natural person. That such a gain comes within the meaning of gross income as used in federal income tax laws was long ago recognized by the Treasury Department’s Regulations and by this Court in the leading cases in this field. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1; Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U. S. 426. Similar provisions appeared in the Regulations in effect in 1938-1940. If § 22 (a) stood alone, without the exclusions stated in § 22 (b), the gain realized by the respondent in this case unquestionably would constitute gross income for income tax purposes. The provisions of § 22 (b) and the decisions of this Court do not change that result. On the contrary, they confirm it. A striking demonstration of the meaning given by Congress to § 22 (a) appears in its Amendments to § 22 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1939, c. 247, 53 Stat. 862, approved June 29, 1939. These Amendments then applied only to taxable years beginning after December 31,1938, and only to discharges of indebtedness occurring on or after June 29, 1939. The value of these Amendments for the purposes of the instant case is not so much in the exclusions which they prescribe, as in the clear light which their own limitations shed upon §§ 22 (a) and 22 (b) to the extent that those Sections remain unchanged. Unless those Sections as they stood in 1938 meant that the gains derived by a debtor corporation from its purchases of its own obligations at a discount resulted in gross income under § 22 (a), there was no need for these 1939 Amendments. Furthermore, as the status of natural persons and corporations is not differentiated in § 22 (a), the new Amendments make it equally clear that, inasmuch as they relieve only certain corporations from the taxability of gains derived from their purchases of their own obligations at a discount, it must be that similar gains derived by natural persons also remain taxable under §22 (a). The strength of this reflection of the Amendments upon the unamended Sections is emphasized by their temporary character. The Amendments expressly provide that they shall not apply to a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1942. This indicates that, for its permanent program, Congress regarded such gains as properly taxable and it indicates that the Amendments were intended to authorize temporary changes in policy and were not clarifications of existing or continuing tax policies. While the time limit originally prescribed has been subsequently extended, the extensions have been made by separate Acts, each for a period of one to three years. This repeated emphasis upon their temporary character increases the contrast which they make with the permanent policy of Congress as to the general tax-ability of this kind of gains under § 22 (a). These Amendments describe gains corresponding almost precisely with those derived by the respondent from his transactions in the instant case but the Amendments apply only to corporate gains. They thus indicate that such gains were recognized as not having been excluded from gross income by § 22 (b) (3) or by any other Section. If they had been so excluded there would have been no need for the new Amendments to exclude those which they did, even temporarily. Furthermore, those gains are not excluded from gross income for all purposes of the income tax laws. Section 22 (b) (9) excludes them only from the ordinary income taxes for the taxable year in which the taxpaying corporation purchases its own securities at a discount. Furthermore, the exclusion under § 22 (b) (9), as distinguished from other exclusions under § 22 (b), is available only upon the express condition that the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing the return its consent to the Regulations* prescribed under § 113 (b) (3) then in effect. That Section and such Regulations require that, where any amount is excluded by a corporation from its gross income under § 22 (b) (9) on account of its discharge of its own indebtedness, the whole or a part of such amount shall be applied to the reduction of the basis of property held by the taxpayer during any portion of the taxable year in which such discharge occurs. The amount to be so applied and the properties to which the reduction shall be allocated are to be determined by Regulations approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. This means that such a gain, instead of being completely excluded as exempt from taxation, is postponed, for income tax purposes, until a later date when the property is disposed of in a way which will permit another form of ascertainment of the taxpayer’s gain or loss in its disposition. These provisions therefore demonstrate that Congress, at least since 1939, has prescribed that, in order for a corporate taxpayer to exclude from its gross income under § 22 (a) certain gains attributable to the discharge within the taxable year of the taxpayer’s indebtedness evidenced by bonds, the taxpayer must consent to the subsequent use of those gains in reducing the basis of property held by the taxpayer during any portion of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred. A corporate taxpayer with gains meeting these specifications but not filing the required consent would be obliged to include those gains in its gross income, unless additional facts brought them under some other exemption. A fortiori, a natural person, such as the respondent in the instant case, who has derived gains precisely within these specifications but who, as a natural person, is ineligible to file the required consent is obliged to include those gains in his gross income under § 22 (a). It remains, therefore, to consider whether there are facts in this case which bring this respondent’s transactions within any exclusion other than that stated in § 22 (b) (9). The only provision for the exclusion of these types of gains from the respondent’s gross income that is presented for our consideration is the general exemption of gifts from taxation prescribed by § 22 (b) (3). This was applied by this Court in favor of a taxpayer in Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322, as well as by the court below in the instant case. Both the general provision for taxation of income and this provision for the exclusion of gifts from gross income, for income tax purposes, have been in the Federal Income Tax Acts in substantially their present form since the Revenue Act of 1916. The contrast between the provisions is striking. The income taxed is described in sweeping terms and should be broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income comprehensively. The exemptions, on the other hand, are specifically stated and should be construed with restraint in the light of the same policy. Congress could have excluded from the gross income of all taxpayers the gains derived by debtors either from their acquisitions of their own obligations at a discount and their consequent control over them, or from their respective releases from all or part of such obligations by their respective creditors upon the debtor’s payment to the creditor of something less than the full amount of the debt. Congress, especially since the Revenue Act of 1938, has been cognizant of this issue and of its power to meet it as stated, but it has chosen to extend such relief only on the above described restricted and temporary basis and only in the case of corporations. In its treatment of the issue Congress also has required the corporate taxpayer’s consent to an alternative plan for a reduction of the corporation’s basis of property values to be used in later determinations of its gains or losses. This special treatment is far different from the total exclusion of a gain resulting from an exempt gift. If such gains were already exempted as gifts under § 22 (b) (3), as representing something transferred to the debtor for nothing, there would have been no need for § 22 (b) (9). The conclusion to be drawn is that such transfers as are described in § 22 (b) (9) could not, without more, qualify as exempt gifts under § 22 (b) (3). The same may be said of the acquisition, by a natural person, of his own obligations as debtor. The facts in the instant case present a situation quite similar to one contemplated by § 22 (b) (9) except that the taxpayer here is a natural person. This emphasizes the taxability of the gains before us. In the instant case the relation between the bondholder and the respondent may be assumed in each transaction to have been one in which the ultimate parties were known to each other to be such. There was no suggestion in the evidence or the findings that any bondholder was acting from any interest other than his own. Each transaction was a sale. The seller sought to get as high a price as he could for the bond and the buyer sought to pay as low a price as he could for the same bond. If the transaction had been completely on the open market through a stock exchange, the conduct and intent of each party could have been the same and there would have been little, if any, basis for any claim that the respondent’s gain was not taxable income. The mere fact that the seller knew that he was selling to the maker of the bond as his only available market did not change the sale into a gift. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the intent of the seller may be assumed to have been to get all he could for his entire claim. Although the sales price was less than the face of the bond and less than the original issuing price of the bond, there was nothing to indicate that the seller was not getting all that he could for all that he had. There is nothing in the evidence or findings to indicate that he intended to transfer or did transfer something for nothing. The form of the transaction emphasized this relationship. The seller assigned the entire bond to his purchaser. The seller did not first release the maker from a part of the maker’s obligation and, having made the maker a gift of that release, then sell him the balance of the bond or vice versa. If the seller actually had intended to give the maker some gift the natural reflection of that gift would have been a credit on the face of the bond or at least some record or testimony evidencing the release. This is not saying that the form of the transaction is conclusive. Assuming that the extension of the maturity of the bonds in the instant case was binding on the creditor, we do not rest this case upon the fact that the sale was made before maturity or that the seller may have received valid consideration for a total release of his claim because the debtor’s payment was made before maturity. It is quite possible that a bondholder might make a gift of an entire bond to anyone, including the maker of it. The facts and findings in this case do not establish any such intent of the seller to make a gift in contradiction of the natural implications arising from the sales and assignments which he made. It is conceivable, although hardly likely, that a bondholder, in the ordinary course of business and without any express release of his debtor, might have sold part of his claims on the bonds he held at the full face value of those parts and then have made a gift of the rest of his claims on those bonds to the same debtor “for nothing.” It is that kind of extraordinary transaction that the respondent asks us, as a matter of law, to read into the simple sales which actually took place and from which he derived financial gains. We are unable to do so on the findings before us. Cf. Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 34. The situation in each transaction is a factual one. It turns upon whether the transaction is in fact a transfer of something for the best price available or is a transfer or release of only a part of a claim for cash and of the balance “for nothing.” The latter situation is more likely to arise in connection with a release of an open account for rent or for interest, as was found to have occurred in Helvering v. American Dental Co., supra, than in the sale of outstanding securities, either of a corporation as described in § 22 (b) (9), or of a natural person as presented in this case. For these reasons we hold that the Commissioner was justified in finding a taxable gain, rather than an exempt gift, in each of the transactions before us. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed and the cause is remanded for further action in accordance with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Rutledge, although joining in the Court’s judgment and opinion, is of the view that the result is essentially in conflict with that reached in Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322. Mr. Justice Reed, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, dissenting. As detailed in Helvering v. American Dental Company, 318 U. S. 322, the problems of the tax results to the debtor of the release of indebtedness have been difficult. That opinion shows that both Congress and Internal Revenue Regulations have taken varying views as to whether a taxpayer should pay an income tax on such balance sheet improvements. We held in the American Dental case in 1943 that the “receipt of financial advantages gratuitously” was a gift under Int. Rev. Code § 22. Congress has made no change in the law since that time, nor has it been requested to do so. For the reasons discussed at length in that case, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. In his petition to the Tax Court, the respondent, in describing the sale of bonds to him at a discount in 1939, said: “It was self interest and good business judgment exercised by all prudent persons to take cash settlements, when otherwise greater losses might be incurred. I have done that very thing myself, and have advised clients to do so in similar circumstances. Most real estate bonds in Chicago were selling from 5c to 25e on the dollar in 1932 to 1940.” In the instant case the respondent was found to have been solvent before, as well as after, his realization of the gains in question. The payment of the bonds purchased by him was secured by the mortgage of his leasehold property which property had a fair market value substantially in excess of the face amount of the bonds. The record fails to establish any sufficient basis for a claim that the respondent had suffered losses which, for tax purposes, offset his gains from his purchase of the bonds. Little of the $90,000 originally received by him for the bonds was used to purchase property. There is no finding or substantial evidence showing specifically how those funds were invested. Even if they are traced, in part, into the addition made to the building on the leasehold premises and into the discharge of the then existing encumbrance on those premises, the total so used is not shown and the shrinkage in the value of those investments is not clearly ascertained in the taxable years in question. The ratio of the loss in value of the leasehold property indicated by the Tax Court findings is about 32 per cent of its cost in 1925 but this loss is merely based upon estimates. The respondent claims a larger shrinkage but there is not a sufficient ascertainment of it to permit consideration of its use as an offset to the respondent’s gains in 1938, 1939 or 1940. See 2 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 11.20 and n. 99 (1942). “SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME. “ (a) General Definition. — 'Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . .” 52 Stat. 457. This was re-enacted as § 22 (a), I. R. C., 53 Stat. 9, and amended in a manner not material here in 53 Scat. 574r-575, 26 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 22 (a). The Revenue Act of 1938 applied to the respondent’s income in 1938 and the Internal Revenue Code to that in 1939 and 1940. “SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME. “(b) Exclusions from Gross Income. — The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this title: “(3) Gifts, bequests, and devises. — The value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance (but the income from such property shall be included in gross income); ” 52 Stat. 458. This was re-enacted as § 22 (b) (3), I. R. C., 53 Stat. 10, 26 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 22 (b) (3), without material change. See note 1, supra, showing the varied uses to which the respondent applied these proceeds and showing that it is not practicable in this case to determine his losses from his resulting investments, and much less to offset them against his gains now at issue. His tax benefits from those losses are thus postponed until some such occasion as the sale of the properties reflecting them makes it possible to ascertain the losses clearly. Such discharges of a taxpayer’s debts by payments made for his benefit are realizable income to him. In Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 9, this Court said: “The question is one of statutory construction. We think that the definitions of gross income (Revenue Acts, 1926, § 213; 1928, § 22) are broad enough to cover income of that description. They are to be considered in the light of the evident intent of the Congress ‘to use its power to the full extent.’ Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161; Helvering v. Stockholms Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 89. We have held that income was received by a taxpayer, when, pursuant to a contract, a debt or other obligation was discharged by another for his benefit. The transaction was regarded as being the same in substance as if the money had been paid to the taxpayer and he had transmitted it to his creditor. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716; United States v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 279 U. S. 732.” “. . . By the Revenue Act of (November 23,) 1921, c. 136, § 213 (a) gross income includes ‘gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever,’ and by the Treasury Regulations authorized by § 1303, that have been in force through repeated reenactments, ‘If the corporation purchases and retires any of such bonds at a price less than the issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value over the purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year.’ Article 545 (1) (c) of Regulations 62, under Revenue Act of 1921. See Article 544 (1) (c) of Regulations 45, under Revenue Act of 1918; Article 545 (1) (c) of Regulations 65, under Revenue Act of 1924; Article 545 (1) (c) of Regulations 69, under Revenue Act of 1926; Article 68 (1) (c) of Regulations 74, under Revenue Act of 1928. We see no reason why the Regulations should not be accepted as a correct statement of the law. “. . . The defendant in error has realized within the year an accession to income, if we take words in their plain popular meaning, as they should be taken here.” United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1, 2-3. “Art. 22 (a)-14. Cancellation op indebtedness. — (a) In general. — The cancellation of indebtedness, in whole or in part, may result in the realization of income. If, for example, an individual performs services for a creditor, who in consideration thereof cancels the debt, income in the amount of the debt is realized by the debtor as compensation for his services. A taxpayer realizes income by the payment or purchase of his obligations at less than their face value. . . . “Art. 22 (a)-18. Sale and purchase by corporation op its bonds. — (1) (a) If bonds are issued by a corporation at their face value, the corporation realizes no gain or loss. (b) If the corporation purchases any of such bonds at a price in excess of the issuing price or face value, the excess of the purchase price over the issuing price or face value is a deductible expense for the taxable year, (c) If, however, the corporation purchases any of such bonds at a price less than the issuing price or face value, the excess of the issuing price or face value over the purchase price is gain or income for the taxable year.” Treasury Regulations 101, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1938. In Treasury Regulations 103, promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 19.22 (a)-14 and 19.22 (a)-18 were identical with the above. Even today they are the same in Treasury Regulations 111, promulgated under the Internal Revenue. Code, as §§29.22 (a)-13 and 29.22 (a)-17. These Amendments are contained in § 215 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1939, c. 247, 53 Stat. 862, 875-876, 26 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) §§22 (b) (9), 113 (b) (3). They added to the Internal Revenue Code § 22 (b) (9) and § 113 (b) (3), both relating to the discharge of indebtedness. A cross reference is made to the latter in the former. Such § 215, in its entirety, is as follows: “SEC. 215. DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. “(a) Income From Discharge op Indebtedness. — Section 22 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to exclusions from gross income) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: “(9) Income prom discharge op indebtedness. — In the case of a corporation, the amount of any income of the taxpayer attributable to the discharge, within the taxable year, of any indebtedness of the taxpayer or for which the taxpayer is liable evidenced by a security (as hereinafter in this paragraph defined) if— (A) it is established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, or (B) it is certified to the Commissioner by any Federal agency authorized to make loans on behalf of the United States to such corporation or by any Federal agency authorized to exercise regulatory power over such corporation, that at the time of such discharge the taxpayer was in an unsound financial condition, and if the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing the return, in such manner as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, by regulations prescribes, its consent to the regulations prescribed under section 113 (b) (3) then in effect. In such case the amount of any income of the taxpayer attributable to any unamortized premium (computed as of the first day of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred) with respect to such indebtedness shall not be included in gross income and the amount of the deduction attributable to any unamortized discount (computed as of the first day of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred) with respect to such indebtedness shall not be allowed as a deduction. As used in this paragraph the term 'security’ means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation, in existence on June 1, 1939. This paragraph shall not apply to any discharge occurring before the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939, or in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1942. “(b) Basis Reduced. — Section 113 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to the adjusted basis of property) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph: “(3) Discharge of indebtedness. — Where in the case of a corporation any amount is excluded from gross income under section 22 (b) (9) on account of the discharge of indebtedness the whole or a part of the amount so excluded from gross income shall be applied in reduction of the basis of any property held (whether before or after the time of the discharge) by the taxpayer during any portion of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred. The amount to be so applied (not in excess of the amount so excluded from gross income, reduced by the amount of any deduction disallowed under section 22 (b) (9)) and the particular properties to which the reduction shall be allocated, shall be determined under regulations (prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary) in effect at the time of the filing of the consent by the taxpayer referred to in section 22 (b) (9). The reduction shall be made as of the first day of the taxable year in which the discharge occurred except in the case of property not held by the taxpayer on such first day, in which case it shall take effect as of the time the holding of the taxpayer began. “(c) Taxable Years to Which Applicable. — The amendments made by this section shall be applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31,1938.” 53 Stat. 875-876. See also, Treasury Regulations 103, promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code: § 19.22 (b) (9)-l, Income from discharge of indebtedness; § 19.22 (b) (9)-2, Making and filing of consent; § 19.113 (b) (3) — 1, Adjusted basis: Discharge of corporate indebtedness: General rule; § 19.113 (b) (3)-2, Adjusted basis: Discharge of corporate indebtedness: Special cases. While § 22 (b) (9) originally did not apply to any discharge occurring in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1942, 53 Stat. 875, this date was changed to December 31, 1945, 56 Stat. 811; December 31, 1946, 59 Stat. 574; December 31, 1947, 60 Stat. 749; and December 31, 1949, 61 Stat. 179. The exclusions made by § 22 (b) apply to the taxes imposed by the Income Tax Chapter of the Internal Revenue Code. These include the ordinary income taxes but not the additional income taxes such as those imposed on personal holding companies or the excess-profits taxes. Treasury Regulations 103, supra, §§ 19.113 (b) (3)~1 and 2 cover the subject. They provide a comprehensive procedure for decreasing the cost or other basis of a taxpaying corporation’s properties as a condition of its taking advantage of § 22 (b) (9). This procedure applies not only in “the case of indebtedness incurred to purchase specific property” but also in “the case of specific property (other than inventory or notes or accounts receivable) against which, at the time of the discharge of the indebtedness, there is a lien (other than a lien securing indebtedness incurred to purchase such property) . . . .” It even provides that if any excess of amount excluded from gross income under § 22 (b) (9) exceeds those two adjustments, the cost or other basis of all the property of the debtor other than inventory and notes and accounts receivable shall be reduced proportionately and, finally, the balance, if any, of the amount excluded from the debtor’s gross income is applied to the reduction of the cost or other basis of the debtor’s inventory or notes or accounts receivable. It thus offers affirmatively a broad alternative plan for reaching the corporate debtor’s gains from its discharge of its indebtedness at a discount. See note 8, supra. Subsequent Amendments have altered these provisions but have not changed their general effect nor their reflection upon the meaning of § 22 (a). For the extension of the temporary nature of the provisions, see note 9, supra. The requirement of a specially certified “unsound financial condition” for a corporate taxpayer in order to make § 22 (b) (9) applicable was eliminated by the Revenue Act of 1942. That Act also eliminated the limitation to securities in existence on June 1,1939. 56 Stat. 811. In making these temporary provisions Congress had in mind especially the conditions presented by railroads and other corporations then seeking to liquidate heavy indebtedness. The Committees reporting the bills for passage emphasized the limitations that were imposed by these Amendments upon corporations seeking to exclude from taxable income the gains derived from their acquisition of their own securities at a discount. H. R. Rep. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 23-25 (1939); Sen. Rep. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 5 (1939). Obviously it was expected that these provisions would decrease the existing burdens of income taxation. It certainly was not intended to impose a burden of postponed taxability upon gains which otherwise would have been completely exempted from taxation by §22 (b) (3). Several provisions have extended comparable relief to other taxpayers. None of them apply to the respondent. They emphasize, however, the understanding of Congress that, without special provision for their exclusion, the gains of a taxpayer from the discharge of his indebtedness at a discount are required by § 22 (a) to be included in his gross income. They recognize that the mere exclusion of “gifts” under § 22 (b) (3) is not enough to cover factual situations like those presented in § 22 (b) (9) or in the other relief provisions above mentioned. Among these relief provisions are the following: Exclusion, from excess profits credit, of income derived from the retirement or discharge by the taxpayer of the taxpayer’s own obligations if they have been outstanding more than 18 months. Internal Revenue Code, §§711 (a) (1) (C), 711 (a) (2) (E), and §711 (b) (1) (C) added by the Second Revenue Act of 1940, c. 757, 54 Stat. 976-978, repealed by the Revenue Act of 1945, c. 453, 59 Stat. 568. Exclusion, from gross income, for income tax purposes, of the income of railroad corporations attributable to their discharge of their indebtedness to the extent realized from a modification or cancellation of indebtedness, pursuant to an order of court. Internal Revenue Code, §22 (b) (10), added by the Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 812, applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1939, but not applicable to any discharge in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1945; this latter date extended to December 31, 1946, 59 Stat. 574; December 31, 1947, 60 Stat. 749; and December 31,1949, 61 Stat. 179. See note 3, swpra. “Sec. 2. (a) That, subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever: . . . . “Sec. 4. The following income shall be exempt from the provisions of this title [Title I. — Income Tax]: “The proceeds of life insurance policies paid to individual beneficiaries upon the death of the insured; the amount received by the insured, as a return of premium or premiums paid by him under life insurance, endowment, or annuity contracts, either during the term or at the maturity of the term mentioned in the contract or upon the surrender of the contract; the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent (but the income from such property shall be included as income); interest upon the obligations of a State or any political subdivision thereof or upon the obligations of the United States or its possessions or securities issued under the provisions of the Federal farm loan Act of July seventeenth, nineteen hundred and sixteen; the compensation of the present President of the United States during the term for which he has been elected, and the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States now in office, and the compensation of all officers and employees of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, except when such compensation is paid by the United States Government.” (Italics supplied.) Revenue Act of 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 757, 758-759. See also, An Act To reduce tariff duties and to provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes. (October 3, 1913.) 38 Stat. 114,167, § IIB. Helvering v. American Dental Co., supra, p. 326, note 5; p. 328, note 9, particularly tax free railroad adjustments under c. XV, § 735, 53 Stat. 1140.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GENTILE v. STATE BAR OF NEVADA No. 89-1836. Argued April 15, 1991 Decided June 27, 1991 Michael E. Tigar argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Samuel J. Buffone, Terrance G. Reed, and Neil G. Galatz. Robert H. Klonoff argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Donald B. Ayer and John E. Howe. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Leon Friedman, Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Elliot Mincberg; and for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Alice Neff Lucan, Harold W. Fuson, Jr., Jane E. Kirtley, David M. Olive, Deborah R. Linfield, W. Terry Maguire, René P. Milam, Bruce W. Sanford, J. Laurent Scharff, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., and Barbara Wartelle Wall. Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Stephen J. Marzen filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Bar Association by John J. Curtin, Jr., and George A. Kuhlman; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by William J. Genego; and for Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice by Kevin M. Kelly. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and VI, and an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and V, in which Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join. Hours after his client was indicted on criminal charges, petitioner Gentile, who is a member of the Bar of the State of Nevada, held a press conference. He made a prepared statement, which we set forth in Appendix A to this opinion, and then he responded to questions. We refer to most of those questions and responses in the course of our opinion. Some six months later, the criminal case was tried to a jury and the client was acquitted on all counts. The State Bar of Nevada then filed a complaint against petitioner, alleging a violation of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, a rule governing pretrial publicity almost identical to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6. We set forth the full text of Rule 177 in Appendix B. Rule 177(1) prohibits an attorney from making “an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Rule 177(2) lists a number of statements that are “ordinarily . . . likely” to result in material prejudice. Rule 177(3) provides a safe harbor for the attorney, listing a number of statements that can be made without fear of discipline notwithstanding the other parts of the Rule. Following a hearing, the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board of the State Bar found that Gentile had made the statements in question and concluded that he violated Rule 177. The board recommended a private reprimand. Petitioner appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, waiving the confidentiality of the disciplinary proceeding, and the Nevada court affirmed the decision of the board. Nevada’s application of Rule 177 in this case violates the First Amendment. Petitioner spoke at a time and in a manner that neither in law nor in fact created any threat of real prejudice to his client’s right to a fair trial or to the State’s interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws. Furthermore, the Rule’s safe harbor provision, Rule 177(3), appears to permit the speech in question, and Nevada’s decision to discipline petitioner in spite of that provision raises concerns of vagueness and selective enforcement. I — The matter before us does not call into question the constitutionality of other States’ prohibitions upon an attorney’s speech that will have a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding,” but is limited to Nevada’s interpretation of that standard. On the other hand, one central point must dominate the analysis: this case involves classic political speech. The State Bar of Nevada reprimanded petitioner for his assertion, supported by a brief sketch of his client’s defense, that the State sought the indictment and conviction of an innocent man as a “scapegoat” and had not “been honest enough to indict the people who did it; the police department, crooked cops.” See infra, Appendix A. At issue here is the constitutionality of a ban on political speech critical of the government and its officials. A Unlike other First Amendment cases this Term in which speech is not the direct target of the regulation or statute in question, see, e. g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., ante, p. 560 (ban on nude barroom dancing); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S. 439 (1991) (sales tax on cable and satellite television), this case involves punishment of pure speech in the political forum. Petitioner engaged not in solicitation of clients or advertising for his practice, as in our precedents from which some of our colleagues would discern a standard of diminished First Amendment protection. His words were directed at public officials and their conduct in office. There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the very center of the First Amendment. Nevada seeks to punish the dissemination of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct, which only-last Term we described as “speech which has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First Amendment.” Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U. S. 624, 632 (1990). The judicial system, and in particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a democratic state, and the public has a legitimate interest in their operations. See, e. g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 838-839 (1978). “[I]t would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 575 (1980). Public vigilance serves us well, for “[t]he knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. . . . Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.” In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 270-271 (1948). As we said in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941), limits upon public comment about pending cases are “likely to fall not only at a crucial time but upon the most important topics of discussion. . . . “No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression.” Id., at 268-269. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 350 (1966), we reminded that “[t]he press . . . guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.” Public awareness and criticism have even greater importance where, as here, they concern allegations of police corruption, see Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 606 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (“[C]ommen-tary on the fact that there is strong evidence implicating a government official in criminal activity goes to the very core of matters of public concern”), or where, as is also the present circumstance, the criticism questions the judgment of an elected public prosecutor. Our system grants prosecutors vast discretion at all stages of the criminal process, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 727-728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The public has an interest in its responsible exercise. B We are not called upon to determine the constitutionality of the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1981), but only Rule 177 as it has been interpreted and applied by the State of Nevada. Model Rule 3.6’s requirement of substantial likelihood of material prejudice is not necessarily flawed. Interpreted in a proper and narrow manner, for instance, to prevent an attorney of record from releasing information of grave prejudice on the eve of jury selection, the phrase substantial likelihood of material prejudice might punish only speech that creates a danger of imminent and substantial harm. A rule governing speech, even speech entitled to full constitutional protection, need not use the words “clear and present danger” in order to pass constitutional muster. “Mr. Justice Holmes’ test was never intended ‘to express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.’ Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Properly applied, the test requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from the particular utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression. The possibility that other measures will serve the State’s interests should also be weighed.” Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 842-843. The drafters of Model Rule 3.6 apparently thought the substantial likelihood of material prejudice formulation approximated the clear and present danger test. See ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 243 (1984) (“formulation in Model Rule 3.6 incorporates a standard approximating clear and present danger by focusing on the likelihood of injury and its substantiality”; citing Landmark Communications, supra, at 844; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962); and Bridges v. California, supra, at 273, for guidance in determining whether statement “poses a sufficiently serious and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice”); G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 397 (1985) (“To use traditional terminology, the danger of prejudice to a proceeding must be both clear (material) and present (substantially likely)”); In re Hinds, 90 N. J. 604, 622, 449 A. 2d 483, 493 (1982) (substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard is a linguistic equivalent of clear and present danger). The difference between the requirement of serious and imminent threat found in the disciplinary rules of some States and the more common formulation of substantial likelihood of material prejudice could prove mere semantics. Each standard requires an assessment of proximity and degree of harm. Each may be capable of valid application. Under those principles, nothing inherent in Nevada’s formulation fails First Amendment review; but as this case demonstrates, Rule 177 has not been interpreted in conformance with those principles by the Nevada Supreme Court. II Even if one were to accept respondent’s argument that lawyers participating in judicial proceedings may be subjected, consistent with the First Amendment, to speech restrictions that could not be imposed on the press or general public, the judgment should not be upheld. The record does not support the conclusion that petitioner knew or reasonably should have known his remarks created a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, if the Rule’s terms are given any meaningful content. We have held that “in cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284-286 (1964)). Neither the disciplinary board nor the reviewing court explains any sense in which petitioner’s statements had a substantial likelihood of causing material prejudice. The only evidence against Gentile was the videotape of his statements and his own testimony at the disciplinary hearing. The Bar’s whole case rests on the fact of the statements, the time they were made, and petitioner’s own justifications. Full deference to these factual findings does not justify abdication of our responsibility to determine whether petitioner’s statements can be punished consistent with First Amendment standards. Rather, this Court is “compelled to examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see whether or not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality and good order of the courts or whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect.” Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 335 (1946). “ ‘Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech . . . are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature.’” Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S., at 844 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 378-379 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Whether one applies the standard set out in Landmark Communications or the lower standard our colleagues find permissible, an examination of the record reveals no basis for the Nevada court’s conclusion that the speech presented a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. Our decision earlier this Term in Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U. S. 415 (1991), provides a pointed contrast to respondent’s contention in this case. There, the community had been subjected to a barrage of publicity prior to Mu’Min’s trial for capital murder. News stories appeared over a course of several months and included, in addition to details of the crime itself, numerous items of prejudicial information inadmissible at trial. Eight of the twelve individuals seated on Mu’Min’s jury admitted some exposure to pretrial publicity. We held that the publicity did not rise even to a level requiring questioning of individual jurors about the content of publicity. In light of that holding, the Nevada court’s conclusion that petitioner’s abbreviated, general comments six months before trial created a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” the proceeding is, to say the least, most unconvincing. A Pre-Indictment Publicity. On January 31, 1987, undercover police officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) reported large amounts of cocaine (four kilograms) and travelers’ checks (almost $300,000) missing from a safety deposit vault at Western Vault Corporation. The drugs and money had been used as part of an undercover operation conducted by Metro’s Intelligence Bureau. Petitioner’s client, Grady Sanders, owned Western Vault. John Moran, the Las Vegas sheriff, reported the theft at a press conference on February 2, 1987, naming the police and Western Vault employees as suspects. Although two police officers, Detective Steve Scholl and Sargeant Ed Schaub, enjoyed free access to the deposit box throughout the period of the theft, and no log reported comings and goings at the vault, a series of press reports over the following year indicated that investigators did not consider these officers responsible. Instead, investigators focused upon Western Vault and its owner. Newspaper reports quoted the sheriff and other high police officials as saying that they had not lost confidence in the “elite” Intelligence Bureau. From the beginning, Sheriff Moran had “complete faith and trust” in his officers. App. 85. The media reported that, following announcement of the cocaine theft, others with deposit boxes at Western Vault had come forward to claim missing items. One man claimed the theft of his life savings of $90,000. Id., at 89. Western Vault suffered heavy losses as customers terminated their box rentals, and the company soon went out of business. The police opened other boxes in search of the missing items, and it was reported they seized $264,900 in United States currency from a box listed as unrented. Initial press reports stated that Sanders and Western Vault were being cooperative; but as time went on, the press noted that the police investigation had failed to identify the culprit and through a process of elimination was beginning to point toward Sanders. Reports quoted the affidavit of a detective that the theft was part of an effort to discredit the undercover operation and that business records suggested the existence of a business relation between Sanders and the targets of a Metro undercover probe. Id., at 85. The deputy police chief announced the two detectives with access to the vault had been “cleared” as possible suspects. According to an unnamed “source close to the investigation,” the police shifted from the idea that the thief had planned to discredit the undercover operation to the theory that the thief had unwittingly stolen from the police. The stories noted that Sanders “could not be reached for comment.” Id., at 93. The story took a more sensational turn with reports that the two police suspects had been cleared by police investigators after passing lie detector tests. The tests were administered by one Ray Slaughter. But later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Slaughter for distributing cocaine to an FBI informant, Belinda Antal. It was also reported that the $264,900 seized from the unrented safety deposit box at Western Vault had been stored there in a suitcase owned by one Tammy Sue Markham. Markham was “facing a number of federal drug-related charges” in Tucson, Arizona. Markham reported items missing from three boxes she rented at Western Vault, as did one Beatrice Connick, who, according to press reports, was a Columbian national living in San Diego and “not facing any drug related charges.” (As it turned out, petitioner impeached Connick’s credibility at trial with the existence of a money laundering conviction.) Connick also was reported to have taken and passed a lie detector test to substantiate her charges. Id., at 94-97. Finally, press reports indicated that Sanders had refused to take a police polygraph examination. Id., at 41. The press suggested that the FBI suspected Metro officers were responsible for the theft, and reported that the theft had severely damaged relations between the FBI and Metro. B The Press Conference. Petitioner is a Las Vegas criminal defense attorney, an author of articles about criminal law and procedure, and a former associate dean of the National College for Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public Defenders. Id., at 36-38. Through leaks from the police department, he had some advance notice of the date an indictment would be returned and the nature of the charges against Sanders. Petitioner had monitored the publicity surrounding the case, and, prior to the indictment, was personally aware of at least 17 articles in the major local newspapers, the Las Vegas Sun and Las Vegas Review-Journal, and numerous local television news stories which reported on the Western Vault theft and ensuing investigation. Id., at 38-39; see Respondent’s Exhibit A, before Disciplinary Board. Petitioner determined, for the first time in his career, that he would call a formal press conference. He did not blunder into a press conference, but acted with considerable deliberation. 1 Petitioner’s Motivation. As petitioner explained to the disciplinary board, his primary motivation was the concern that, unless some of the weaknesses in the State’s case were made public, a potential jury venire would be poisoned by repetition in the press of information being released by the police and prosecutors, in particular the repeated press reports about polygraph tests and the fact that the two police officers were no longer suspects. App. 40-42. Respondent distorts Rule 177 when it suggests this explanation admits a purpose to prejudice the venire and so proves a violation of the Rule. Rule 177 only prohibits the dissemination of information that one knows or reasonably should know has a ‘'substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Petitioner did not indicate he thought he could sway the pool of potential jurors to form an opinion in advance of the trial, nor did he seek to discuss evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. He sought only to counter publicity already deemed prejudicial. The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board so found. It said petitioner attempted “(i) to counter public opinion which he perceived as adverse to Mr. Sanders, (ii) ... to refute certain matters regarding his client which had appeared in the media, (iii) to fight back against the perceived efforts of the prosecution to poison the prospective juror pool, and (iv) to publicly present Sanders’ side of the case.” App. 3-4. Far from an admission that he sought to “materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding,” petitioner sought only to stop a wave of publicity he perceived as prejudicing potential jurors against his client and injuring his client’s reputation in the community. Petitioner gave a second reason for holding the press conference, which demonstrates the additional value of his speech. Petitioner acted in part because the investigation had taken a serious toll on his client. Sanders was “not a man in good health,” having suffered multiple open-heart surgeries prior to these events. Id., at 41. And prior to indictment, the mere suspicion of wrongdoing had caused the closure of Western Vault and the loss of Sanders’ ground lease on an Atlantic City, New Jersey, property. Ibid. An attorney’s duties do not begin inside the courtroom door. He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal proceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may recommend a plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse consequences of a possible loss after trial, so too an attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client’s reputation and reduce the adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper motives. A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried. 2 Petitioner’s Investigation of Rule 177. Rule 177 is phrased in terms of what an attorney “knows or reasonably should know.” On the evening before the press conference, petitioner and two colleagues spent several hours researching the extent of an attorney’s obligations under Rule 177. He decided, as we have held, see Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984), that the timing of a statement was crucial in the assessment of possible prejudice and the Rule’s application, accord, Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 191-194 (1952). App. 44. Upon return of the indictment, the court set a trial date for August 1988, some six months in the future. Petitioner knew, at the time of his statement, that a jury would not be empaneled for six months at the earliest, if ever. He recalled reported cases finding no prejudice resulting from juror exposure to “far worse” information two and four months before trial, and concluded that his proposed statement was not substantially likely to result in material prejudice. Ibid. A statement which reaches the attention of the venire on the eve of voir dire might require a continuance or cause difficulties in securing an impartial jury, and at the very least could complicate the jury selection process. See ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 243 (1984) (timing of statement a significant factor in determining seriousness and imminence of threat). As turned out to be the case here, exposure to the same statement six months prior to trial would not result in prejudice, the content fading from memory long before the trial date. In 1988, Clark County, Nevada, had population in excess of 600,000 persons. Given the size of the community from which any potential jury venire would be drawn and the length of time before trial, only the most damaging of information could give rise to any likelihood of prejudice. The innocuous content of petitioner’s statements reinforces my conclusion. 3 The Content of Petitioner’s Statements. Petitioner was disciplined for statements to the effect that (1) the evidence demonstrated his client’s innocence, (2) the likely thief was a police detective, Steve Scholl, and (3) the other victims were not credible, as most were drug dealers or convicted money launderers, all but one of whom had only accused Sanders in response to police pressure, in the process of “trying to work themselves out of something.” Appendix A, infra, at 1059. App. 2-3 (Findings and Recommendation of the State Bar of Nevada, Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board). He also strongly implied that Steve Scholl could be observed in a videotape suffering from symptoms of cocaine use. Of course, only a small fraction of petitioner’s remarks were disseminated to the public, in two newspaper stories and two television news broadcasts. The stories mentioned not only Gentile’s press conference but also a prosecution response and police press conference. See App. 127-129, 131-132; Respondent’s Exhibit A, before Disciplinary Board. The chief deputy district attorney was quoted as saying that this was a legitimate indictment, and that prosecutors cannot bring an indictment to court unless they can prove the charges in it beyond a reasonable doubt. App. 128-129. Deputy Police Chief Sullivan stated for the police department: “ ‘We in Metro are very satisfied our officers (Scholl and Sgt. Ed Schaub) had nothing to do with this theft or any other. They are both above reproach. Both are veteran police officers who are dedicated to honest law enforcement.’ ” Id., at 129. In the context of general public awareness, these police and prosecution statements were no more likely to result in prejudice than were petitioner’s statements, but given the repetitive publicity from the police investigation, it is difficult to come to any conclusion but that the balance remained in favor of the prosecution. Much of the information provided by petitioner had been published in one form or another, obviating any potential for prejudice. See ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 243 (1984) (extent to which information already circulated significant factor in determining likelihood of prejudice). The remainder, and details petitioner refused to provide, were available to any journalist willing to do a little bit of investigative work. Petitioner’s statements lack any of the more obvious bases for a finding of prejudice. Unlike the police, he refused to comment on polygraph tests except to confirm earlier reports that Sanders had not submitted to the police polygraph; he mentioned no confessions and no evidence from searches or test results; he refused to elaborate upon his charge that the other so-called victims were not credible, except to explain his general theory that they were pressured to testify in an attempt to avoid drug-related legal trouble, and that some of them may have asserted claims in an attempt to collect insurance money. C Events Folloioing the Press Conference. Petitioner’s judgment that no likelihood of material prejudice would result from his comments was vindicated by events at trial. While it is true that Rule 177’s standard for controlling pretrial publicity must be judged at the time a statement is made, ex post evidence can have probative value in some cases. Here, where the Rule purports to demand, and the Constitution requires, consideration of the character of the harm and its heightened likelihood of occurrence, the record is altogether devoid of facts one would expect to follow upon any statement that created a real likelihood of material prejudice to a criminal jury trial. The trial took place on schedule in August 1988, with no request by either party for a venue change or continuance. The jury was empaneled with no apparent difficulty. The trial judge questioned the jury venire about publicity. Although many had vague recollections of reports that cocaine stored at Western Vault had been stolen from a police undercover operation, and, as petitioner had feared, one remembered that the police had been cleared of suspicion, not a single juror indicated any recollection of petitioner or his press conference. App. 48-49; Respondent’s Exhibit B, before Disciplinary Board. At trial, all material information disseminated during petitioner’s press conference was admitted in evidence before the jury, including information questioning the motives and credibility of supposed victims who testified against Sanders, and Detective Scholl’s ingestion of drugs in the course of undercover operations (in order, he testified, to gain the confidence of suspects). App. 47. The jury acquitted petitioner’s client, and, as petitioner explained before the disciplinary board, “when the trial was over with and the man was acquitted the next week the foreman of the jury phoned me and said to me that if they would have had a verdict form before them with respect to the guilt of Steve Scholl they would have found the man proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 47-48. There is no support for the conclusion that petitioner’s statements created a likelihood of material prejudice, or indeed of any harm of sufficient magnitude or imminence to support a punishment for speech. Ill As interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court, the Rule is void for vagueness, in any event, for its safe harbor provision, Rule 177(3), misled petitioner into thinking that he could give his press conference without fear of discipline. Rule 177(3)(a) provides that a lawyer “may state without elaboration . . . the general nature of the . . . defense.” Statements under this provision are protected “[notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2 (a-f).” By necessary operation of the word “notwithstanding,” the Rule contemplates that a lawyer describing the “general nature of the . . . defense” “without elaboration” need fear no discipline, even if he comments on “[t]he character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a. . . witness,” and even if he “knows or reasonably should know that [the statement] will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Given this grammatical structure, and absent any clarifying interpretation by the state court, the Rule fails to provide “‘fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed.’” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 112 (1972). A lawyer seeking to avail himself of Rule 177(3)’s protection must guess at its contours. The right to explain the “general” nature of the defense without “elaboration” provides insufficient guidance because “general” and “elaboration” are both classic terms of degree. In the context before us, these terms have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law. The lawyer has no principle for determining when his remarks pass from the safe harbor of the general to the forbidden sea of the elaborated. Petitioner testified he thought his statements were protected by Rule 177(3), App. 59. A review of the press conference supports that claim. He gave only a brief opening statement, see Appendix A, infra, at 1059-1060, and on numerous occasions declined to answer reporters’ questions seeking more detailed comments. One illustrative exchange shows petitioner’s attempt to obey the rule: “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Dominick, you mention you question the credibility of some of the witnesses, some of the people named as victims in the government indictment. “Can we go through it and elaborate on their backgrounds, interests — “MR. GENTILE: I can’t because ethics prohibit me from doing so. “Last night before I decided I was going to make a statement, I took a good close look at the rules of professional responsibility. There are things that I can say and there are things that I can’t. Okay? “I can’t name which of the people have the drug backgrounds. I’m sure you guys can find that by doing just a little bit of investigative work.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the disciplinary board said only that petitioner’s comments “went beyond the scope of the statements permitted by SCR 177(3),” App. 5, and the Nevada Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s defense based on Rule 177(3) was just as terse, App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The fact that Gentile was found in violation of the Rules after studying them and making a conscious effort at compliance demonstrates that Rule 177 creates a trap for the wary as well as the unwary. The prohibition against vague regulations of speech is based in part on the need to eliminate the impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357-358, 361 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 572-573 (1974), for history shows that speech is suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of those who enforce the law. The question is not whether discriminatory enforcement occurred here, and we assume it did not, but whether the Rule is so imprecise that discriminatory enforcement is a real possibility. The inquiry is of particular relevance when one of the classes most affected by the regulation is the criminal defense bar, which has the professional mission to challenge actions of the State. Petitioner, for instance, succeeded in preventing the conviction of his client, and the speech in issue involved criticism of the government. > I — I The analysis to this point resolves the case, and m the usual order of things the discussion should end here. Five Members of the Court, however, endorse an extended discussion which concludes that Nevada may interpret its requirement of substantial likelihood of material prejudice under a standard more deferential than is the usual rule where speech is concerned. It appears necessary, therefore, to set forth my objections to that conclusion and to the reasoning which underlies it. Respondent argues that speech by an attorney is subject to greater regulation than speech by others, and restrictions on an attorney’s speech should be assessed under a balancing test that weighs the State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against the lawyer’s First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue. The cases cited by our colleagues to support this balancing, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U. S. 91 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978); and Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20 (1984), involved either commercial speech by attorneys or restrictions upon release of information that the attorney could gain only by use of the court’s discovery process. Neither of those categories, nor the underlying interests which justified their creation, were implicated here. Petitioner was disciplined because he proclaimed to the community what he thought to be a misuse of the prosecutorial and police powers. Wide-open balancing of interests is not appropriate in this context. A Respondent would justify a substantial limitation on speech by attorneys because “lawyers have special access to information, including confidential statements from clients and information obtained through pretrial discovery or plea negotiations,” and so lawyers’ statements “are likely to be received as especially authoritative.” Brief for Respondent 22. Rule 177, however, does not reflect concern for the attorney’s special access to client confidences, material gained through discovery, or other proprietary or confidential information. We have upheld restrictions upon the release of information gained “only by virtue of the trial court’s discovery processes.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, supra, at 32. And Seattle Times would prohibit release of discovery information by the attorney as well as the client. Similar mies require an attorney to maintain client confidences. See, e. g., ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 (1981). This case involves no speech subject to a restriction under the rationale of Seattle Times. Much of the information in petitioner’s remarks was included by explicit reference or fair inference in earlier press reports. Petitioner could not have learned what he revealed at the press conference through the discovery process or other special access afforded to attorneys, for he spoke to the press on the day of indictment, at the outset of his formal participation in the criminal proceeding. We have before us no complaint from the prosecutors, police, or presiding judge that petitioner misused information to which he had special access. And there is no claim that petitioner revealed client confidences, which may be waived in any event. Rule 177, on its face and as applied here, is neither limited to nor even directed at preventing release of information received through court proceedings or special access afforded attorneys. Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 632-634. It goes far beyond this. B Respondent relies upon obiter dicta from In re Sawyer, 360 U. S. 622 (1959), Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), and Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), for the proposition that an attorney’s speech about ongoing-proceedings must be subject to pervasive regulation in order to ensure the impartial adjudication of criminal proceedings. In re Sawyer involved general comments about Smith Act prosecutions rather than the particular proceeding in which the attorney was involved, conduct which we held not sanctionable under the applicable ABA Canon of Professional Ethics, quite apart from any resort to First Amendment principles. Nebraska Press Assn, considered a challenge to a court order barring the press from reporting matters most prejudicial to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment trial right, not information released by defense counsel. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, we overturned a conviction after a trial that can only be described as a circus, with the courtroom taken over by the press and jurors turned into media stars. The prejudice to Dr. Sheppard’s fair trial right can be traced in principal part to police and prosecutorial irresponsibility and the trial court’s failure to control the proceedings and the courthouse environment. Each case suggests restrictions upon information release, but none confronted their permitted scope. At the very least, our cases recognize that disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment, and that First Amendment protection survives even when the attorney violates a disciplinary rule he swore to obey when admitted to the practice of law. See, e. g., In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra. We have not in recent years accepted our colleagues’ apparent theory that the practice of law brings with it comprehensive restrictions, or that we will defer to professional bodies when those restrictions impinge upon First Amendment freedoms. And none of the justifications put forward by respondent suffice to sanction abandonment of our normal First Amendment principles in the case of speech by an attorney regarding pending cases. V Even if respondent is correct, and as in Seattle Times we must balance “whether the ‘practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression’ and whether ‘the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved,”’ Seattle Times, supra, at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974)), the Rule as interpreted by Nevada fails the searching inquiry required by those precedents. A Only the occasional case presents a danger of prejudice from pretrial publicity. Empirical research suggests that in the few instances when jurors have been exposed to extensive and prejudicial publicity, they are able to disregard it and base their verdict upon the evidence presented in court. See generally Simon, Does the Court’s Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 515 (1977); Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations: What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1989). Voir dire can play an important role in reminding jurors to set aside out-of-court information and to decide the case upon the evidence presented at trial. All of these factors weigh in favor of affording an attorney’s speech about ongoing proceedings our traditional First Amendment protections. Our colleagues’ historical survey notwithstanding, respondent has not demonstrated any sufficient state interest in restricting the speech of attorneys to justify a lower standard of First Amendment scrutiny. Still less justification exists for a lower standard of scrutiny here, as this speech involved not the prosecutor or police, but a criminal defense attorney. Respondent and its amici present not a single example where a defense attorney has managed by public statements to prejudice the prosecution of the State’s case. Even discounting the obvious reason for a lack of appellate decisions on the topic — the difficulty of appealing a verdict of acquittal — the absence of anecdotal or survey evidence in a much-studied area of the law is remarkable. The various bar association and advisory commission reports which resulted in promulgation of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1981), and other regulations of attorney speech, and sources they cite, present no convincing case for restrictions upon the speech of defense attorneys. See Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B. U. L. Rev. 1003, 1031-1049 (1984) (summarizing studies and concluding there is no empirical or anecdotal evidence of a need for restrictions on defense publicity); see also Drechsel, supra, at 35 (“[D]ata showing the heavy reliance of journalists on law enforcement sources and prosecutors confirms the appropriateness of focusing attention on those sources when attempting to control pre-trial publicity”). The police, the prosecution, other government officials, and the community at large hold innumerable avenues for the dissemination of information adverse to a criminal defendant, many of which are not within the scope of Rule 177 or any other regulation. By contrast, a defendant cannot speak without fear of incriminating himself and prejudicing his defense, and most criminal defendants have insufficient means to retain a public relations team apart from defense counsel for the sole purpose of countering prosecution statements. These factors underscore my conclusion that blanket rulés restricting speech of defense attorneys should not be accepted without careful First Amendment scrutiny. B Respondent uses the “officer of the court” label to imply that attorney contact with the press somehow is inimical to the attorney’s proper role. Rule 177 posits no such inconsistency between an attorney’s role and discussions with the press. It permits all comment to the press absent “a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Respondent does not articulate the principle that contact with the press cannot be reconciled with the attorney’s role or explain how this might be so. Because attorneys participate in the criminal justice system and are trained in its complexities, they hold unique qualifications as a source of information about pending cases. “Since lawyers are considered credible in regard to pending litigation in which they are engaged and are in one of the most knowledgeable positions, they are a crucial source of information and opinion.” Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F. 2d 242, 250 (CA7 1975). To the extent the press and public rely upon attorneys for information because attorneys are well informed, this may prove the value to the public of speech by members of the bar. If the dangers of their speech arise from its persuasiveness, from their ability to explain judicial proceedings, or from the likelihood the speech will be believed, these are not the sort of dangers that can validate restrictions. The First Amendment does not permit suppression of speech because of its power to command assent. One may concede the proposition that an attorney’s speech about pending cases may present dangers that could not arise from statements by a nonparticipant, and that an attorney’s duty to cooperate in the judicial process may prevent him or her from taking actions with an intent to frustrate that process. The role of attorneys in the criminal justice system subjects them to fiduciary obligations to the court and the parties. An attorney’s position may result in some added ability to obstruct the proceedings through well-timed statements to the press, though one can debate the extent of an attorney’s ability to do so without violating other established duties. A court can require an attorney’s cooperation to an extent not possible of nonparticipants. A proper weighing of dangers might consider the harm that occurs when speech about ongoing proceedings forces the court to take burdensome steps such as sequestration, continuance, or change of venue. If as a regular matter speech by an attorney about pending cases raised real dangers of this kind, then a substantial governmental interest might support additional regulation of speech. But this case involves the sanction of speech so innocuous, and an application of Rule 177(3)’s safe harbor provision so begrudging, that it is difficult to determine the force these arguments would carry in a different setting. The instant case is a poor vehicle for defining with precision the outer limits under the Constitution of a court’s ability to regulate an attorney’s statements about ongoing adjudicative proceedings. At the very least, however, we can say that the Rule which punished petitioner’s statements represents a limitation of First Amendment freedoms greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest, and does not protect against a danger of the necessary gravity, imminence, or likelihood. The vigorous advocacy we demand of the legal profession is accepted because it takes place under the neutral, dispassionate control of the judicial system. Though cost and delays undermine it in all too many cases, the American judicial trial remains one of the purest, most rational forums for the lawful determination of disputes. A profession which takes just pride in these traditions may consider them disserved if lawyers use their skills and insight to make untested allegations in the press instead of in the courtroom. But constraints of professional responsibility and societal disapproval will act as sufficient safeguards in most cases. And in some circumstances press comment is necessary to protect the rights of the client and prevent abuse of the courts. It cannot be said that petitioner’s conduct demonstrated any real or specific threat to the legal process, and his statements have the full protection of the First Amendment. HH > The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nevada is Reversed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF KENNEDY, J. Appendix A Petitioner’s Opening Remarks at the Press Conference of February 5, 1988. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a-9a. “ME. GENTILE: I want to start this off by saying in clear terms that I think that this indictment is a significant event in the history of the evolution of the sophistication of the City of Las Vegas, because things of this nature, of exactly this nature have happened in New York with the French connection case and in Miami with cases — at least two cases there— have happened in Chicago as well, but all three of those cities have been honest enough to indict the people who did it; the police department, crooked cops. “When this case goes to trial, and as it develops, you’re going to see that the evidence will prove not only that Grady Sanders is an innocent person and had nothing to do with any of the charges that are being leveled against him, but that the person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the drugs and money, the American Express Travelers’ checks, is Detective Steve Scholl. “There is far more evidence that will establish that Detective Scholl took these drugs and took these American Express Travelers’ checks than any other living human being. “And I have to say that I feel that Grady Sanders is being used as a scapegoat to try to cover up for what has to be obvious to people at the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and at the District Attorney’s office. “Now, with respect to these other charges that are contained in this indictment, the so-called other victims, as I sit here today I can tell you that one, two — four of them are known drug dealers and convicted money launderers and drug dealers; three of whom didn’t say a word about anything until after they were approached by Metro and after they were already in trouble and are trying to work themselves out of something. “Now, up until the moment, of course, that they started going along with what detectives from Metro wanted them to say, these people were being held out as being incredible and liars by the very same people who are going to say now that you can believe them. “Another problem that you are going to see develop here is the fact that of these other counts, at least four of them said nothing about any of this, about anything being missing until after the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department announced publicly last year their claim that drugs and American Express Travelers’ c[h]ecks were missing. “Many of the contracts that these people had show on the face of the contract that there is $100,000 in insurance for the contents of the box. “If you look at the indictment very closely, you’re going to see that these claims fall under $100,000. “Finally, there were only two claims on the face of the indictment that came to our attention prior to the events of January 31 of ’87, that being the date that Metro said that there was something missing from their box. “And both of these claims were dealt with by Mr. Sanders and we’re dealing here essentially with people that we’re not sure if they ever had anything in the box. “That’s about all that I have to say.” [Questions from the floor followed.] Appendix B Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, as in effect prior to January 5, 1991. “Trial Publicity “1. A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. “2. A statement referred to in subsection 1 ordinarily is likely to have such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to: “(a) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness; “(b) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect or that person’s refusal or failure to make a statement; “(c) the performance or results of any examination or test or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented; “(d) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; “(e) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or “(f) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. “3. Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f), a lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration: “(a) the general nature of the claim or defense; “(b) the information contained in a public record; “(c) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the general scope of the investigation, the offense or claim or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; “(d) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; “(e) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; “(f) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and “(g) in a criminal case: “(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; “(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person; “(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and “(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.” Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and delivered a dissenting opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter join. Petitioner was disciplined for making statements to the press about a pending case in which he represented a criminal defendant. The state bar, and the Supreme Court of Nevada on review, found that petitioner knew or should have known that there was a substantial likelihood that his statements would materially prejudice the trial of his client. Nonetheless, petitioner contends that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a stricter standard to be met before such speech by an attorney may be disciplined: there must be a finding of “actual prejudice or a substantial and imminent threat to fair trial.” Brief for Petitioner 15. We conclude that the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard applied by Nevada and most other States satisfies the First Amendment. HH Petitioner’s client was the subject of a highly publicized case, and in response to adverse publicity about his client, Gentile held a press conference on the day after Sanders was indicted. At the press conference, petitioner made, among others, the following statements: “When this case goes to trial, and as it develops, you’re going to see that the evidence will prove not only that Grady Sanders is an innocent person and had nothing to do with any of the charges that are being leveled against him, but that the person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the drugs and the money, the American Express Travelers’ cheeks, is Detective Steve Scholl. “There is far more evidence that will establish that Detective Scholl took these drugs and took these American Express Travelers’ checks than any other living human being. “. . . the so-called other victims, as I sit here today I can tell you that one, two — four of them are known drug dealers and convicted money launderers and drug dealers; three of whom didn’t say a word about anything until after they were approached by Metro and after they were already in trouble and are trying to work themselves out of something. “Now, up until the moment, of course, that they started going along with what detectives from Metro wanted them to say, these people were being held out as being incredible and liars by the very same people who are going to say now that you can believe them.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a-9a. The following statements were in response to questions from members of the press: “. . . because of the stigma that attaches to merely being accused — okay—I know I represent an innocent man .... The last time I had a conference with you, was with a client and I let him talk to you and I told you that that case would be dismissed and it was. Okay? “I don’t take cheap shots like this. I represent an innocent guy. All right? “[The police] were playing very fast and loose. . . . We’ve got some video tapes that if you take a look at them, I’ll tell you what, [Detective Scholl] either had a hell of a cold or he should have seen a better doctor.” Id., at 12a, 14a. Articles appeared in the local newspapers describing the press conference and petitioner’s statements. The trial took place approximately six months later, and although the trial court succeeded in empaneling a jury that had not been affected by the media coverage and Sanders was acquitted on all charges, the state bar disciplined petitioner for his statements. The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board found that petitioner knew the detective he accused of perpetrating the crime and abusing drugs would be a witness for the prosecution. It also found that petitioner believed others whom he characterized as money launderers and drug dealers would be called as prosecution witnesses. Petitioner’s admitted purpose for calling the press conference was to counter public opinion which he perceived as adverse to his client, to fight back against the perceived efforts of the prosecution to poison the prospective juror pool, and to publicly present his client’s side of the case. The board found that in light of the statements, their timing, and petitioner’s purpose, petitioner knew or should have known that there was a substantial likelihood that the statements would materially prejudice the Sanders trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the board’s decision, finding by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner “knew or reasonably should have known that his comments had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the adjudication of his client’s case.” 106 Nev. 60, 62, 787 P. 2d 386, 387 (1990). The court noted that the case was “highly publicized”; that the press conference, held the day after the indictment and the same day as the arraignment, was “timed to have maximum impact”; and that petitioner’s comments “related to the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of the police detective and other potential witnesses.” Ibid. The court concluded that the “absence of actual prejudice does not establish that there was no substantial likelihood of material prejudice.” Ibid. h-H h-1 Gentile asserts that the same stringent standard applied m Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), to restraints on press publication during the pendency of a criminal trial should be applied to speech by a lawyer whose client is a defendant in a criminal proceeding. In that case, we held that in order to suppress press commentary on eviden-tiary matters, the State would have to show that “further publicity, unchecked, would so distort the views of potential jurors that 12 could not be found who would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to render a just verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in open court.” Id., at 569. Respondent, on the other hand, relies on statements in cases such as Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), which sharply distinguished between restraints on the press and restraints on lawyers whose clients are parties to the proceeding: “Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” Id., at 363. To evaluate these opposing contentions, some reference must be made to the history of the regulation of the practice of law by the courts. In the United States, the courts have historically regulated admission to the practice of law before them and exercised the authority to discipline and ultimately to disbar lawyers whose conduct departed from prescribed standards. “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,” to use the oft-repeated statement of Cardozo, J., in In re Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 84, 116 N. E. 782, 783 (1917), quoted in Theard v. United States, 364 U. S. 278, 281 (1957). More than a century ago, the first official code of legal ethics promulgated in this country, the Alabama Code of 1887, warned attorneys to “Avoid Newspaper Discussion of Legal Matters,” and stated that “[n]ewspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of pending or anticipated litigation . . . tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.” H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 23, 356 (1953). In 1908, the American Bar Association promulgated its own code, entitled “Canons of Professional Ethics.” Many States thereafter adopted the ABA Canons for their own jurisdictions. Canon 20 stated: “Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.” In the last quarter century, the legal profession has reviewed its ethical limitations on extrajudicial statements by lawyers in the context of this Court’s cases interpreting the First Amendment. ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.6 resulted from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press (Advisory Committee), created in 1964 upon the recommendation of the Warren Commission. The Warren Commission’s report on the assassination of President Kennedy included the recommendation that “representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the news media work together to establish ethical standards concerning the collection and presentation of information to the public so that there will be no interference with pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair trial.” Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (1964), quoted in Ainsworth, “Fair Trial-Free Press,” 45 F. R. D. 417 (1968). The Advisory Committee developed the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, comprehensive guidelines relating to disclosure of information concerning criminal proceedings, which were relied upon by the ABA in 1968 in formulating Rule 3.6. The need for, and appropriateness of, such a rule had been identified by this Court two years earlier in Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, at 362-363. In 1966, the Judicial Conference of the United States authorized a “Special Subcommittee to Implement Sheppard v. Maxwell” to proceed with a study of the necessity of promulgating guidelines or taking other corrective action to shield federal juries from prejudicial publicity. See Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the “Free Press-Fair Trial” Issue, 45 F. R. D. 391, 404-407 (1968). Courts, responding to the recommendations in this report, proceeded to enact local rules incorporating these standards, and thus the “reasonable likelihood of prejudicing a fair trial” test was used by a majority of courts, state and federal, in the years following Sheppard. Ten years later, the ABA amended its guidelines, and the “reasonable likelihood” test was changed to a “clear and present danger” test. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 8-1.1 (as amended 1978) (2d ed. 1980, Supp. 1986). When the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were drafted in the early 1980’s, the drafters did not go as far as the revised fair trial-free press standards in giving precedence to the lawyer’s right to make extrajudicial statements when fair trial rights are implicated, and instead adopted the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” test. Currently, 31 States in addition to Nevada have adopted — either verbatim or with insignificant variations — Rule 3.6 of the ABA’s Model Rules. Eleven States have adopted Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility, which is less protective of lawyer speech than Model Rule 3.6, in that it applies a “reasonable likelihood of prejudice” standard. Only one State, Virginia, has explicitly adopted a clear and present danger standard, while four States and the District of Columbia have adopted standards that arguably approximate “clear and present danger.” Petitioner maintains, however, that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a State, such as Nevada in this case, to demonstrate a “clear and present danger” of “actual prejudice or an imminent threat” before any discipline may'be imposed on a lawyer who initiates a press conference such as occurred here. He relies on decisions such as Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941), Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946), and Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947), to support his position. In those cases we held that trial courts might not constitutionally punish, through use of the contempt power, newspapers and others for publishing editorials, cartoons, and other items critical of judges in particular cases. We held that such punishments could be imposed only if there were a clear and present danger of “some serious substantive evil which they are designed to avert.” Bridges v. California, supra, at 270. Petitioner also relies on Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962), which held that a court might not punish a sheriff for publicly criticizing a judge’s charges to a grand jury. Respondent State Bar of Nevada points out, on the other hand, that none of these cases involved lawyers who represented parties to a pending proceeding in court. It points to the statement of Holmes, J., in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General of Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 463 (1907), that “[w]hen a case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other people, but the propriety and necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimidation hardly can be denied.” Respondent also points to a similar statement in Bridges, supra, at 271: “The very word ‘trial’ connotes decisions on the evidence and arguments properly advanced in open court. Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.” These opposing positions illustrate one of the many dilemmas which arise in the course of constitutional adjudication. The above quotes from Patterson and Bridges epitomize the theory upon which our criminal justice system is founded: The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors, who know as little as possible of the case, based on material admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding. Extrajudicial comments on,' or discussion of, evidence which might never be admitted at trial and ex parte statements by counsel giving their version of the facts obviously threaten to undermine this basic tenet. At the same time, however, the criminal justice system exists in a larger context of a government ultimately of the people, who wish to be informed about happenings in the criminal justice system, and, if sufficiently informed about those happenings, might wish to make changes in the system. The way most of them acquire information is from the media. The First Amendment protections of speech and press have been held, in the cases cited above, to require a showing of “clear and present danger” that a malfunction in the criminal justice system will be caused before a State may prohibit media speech or publication about a particular pending trial. The question we must answer in this case is whether a lawyer who represents a defendant involved with the criminal justice system may insist on the same standard before he is disciplined for public pronouncements about the case, or whether the State instead may penalize that sort of speech upon a lesser showing. It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to “free speech” an attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal. Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 8 (1952) (criminal trial); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155 (1949) (civil trial). Even outside the courtroom, a majority of the Court in two separate opinions in the case of In re Sawyer, 360 U. S. 622 (1959), observed that lawyers in pending cases were subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be. There, the Court had before it an order affirming the suspension of an attorney from practice because of her attack on the fairness and impartiality of a judge. The plurality opinion, which found the discipline improper, concluded that the comments had not in fact impugned the judge’s integrity. Justice Stewart, who provided the fifth vote for reversal of the sanction, said in his separate opinion that he could not join any possible “intimation that a lawyer can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical conduct.” Id., at 646. He said that “[ojbedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.” Id., at 646-647. The four dissenting Justices who would have sustained the discipline said: ) has a con-“Of course, a lawyer is a person and he too stitutional freedom of utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their administration of jlistice. But a lawyer actively participating in a trial, particularly an emotionally charged criminal prosecution, is not merely a person and not even merely a lawyer. “He is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an ‘officer of the court' in the most compelling sense.” Id., at 666, 668 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ.). Likewise, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, where the defendant’s conviction was overturned because extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity had denied the defendant a fair trial, we held that a new trial was a remedy for such publicity, but “we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U. S., at 363 (emphasis added). We expressly contemplated that the speech of those participating before the courts could be limited. This distinction between participants in the litigation and strangers to it is brought into sharp relief by our holding in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20 (1984). There, we unanimously held that a newspaper, which was itself a defendant in a libel action, could be restrained from publishing material about the plaintiffs and their supporters to which it had gained access through court-ordered discovery. In that case we said that “[although litigants do not ‘surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,’ those rights may be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting,” id., at 32-33, n. 18 (citation omitted), and noted that “on several occasions [we have] approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant.” Ibid. Even in an area far from the courtroom and the pendency of a case, our decisions dealing with a lawyer’s right under the First Amendment to solicit business and advertise, contrary to promulgated rules of ethics, have not suggested that lawyers are protected by the First Amendment to the same extent as those engaged in other businesses. See, e. g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U. S. 9 (1990); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978). In each of these cases, we engaged in a balancing process, weighing the State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer’s First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue. These cases recognize the long-established principle stated in In re Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 495, 166 N. E. 2d 672, 675 (1960): “Appellant as a citizen could not be denied any of the common rights of citizens. But he stood before the inquiry and before the Appellate Division in another quite different capacity, also. As a lawyer he was ‘an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument. . . of justice . . . (quoted in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117, 126 (1961)). We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer, 360 U. S. 622 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, rather plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976), and the cases which preceded it. Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct. As noted by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press, which was joined by Justices Stewart and MARSHALL, “[a]s officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair administration of justice.” Id., at 601, n. 27. Because lawyers have special access to information through discovery and client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding since lawyers’ statements are likely to be received as especially authoritative. See, e. g., In re Hinds, 90 N. J. 604, 627, 449 A. 2d 483, 496 (1982) (statements by attorneys of record relating to the case “are likely to be considered knowledgeable, reliable and true” because of attorneys’ unique access to information); In re Rachmiel, 90 N. J. 646, 656, 449 A. 2d 505, 511 (1982) (attorneys’ role as advocates gives them “extraordinary power to undermine or destroy the efficacy of the criminal justice system”). We agree with the majority of the States that the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair trials. When a state regulation implicates First Amendment rights, the Court must balance those interests against the State’s legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question. See, e. g., Seattle Times, supra, at 32. The “substantial likelihood” test embodied in Rule 177 is constitutional under this analysis, for it is designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a State’s judicial system, and it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech. The limitations are aimed at two principal evils: (1) comments that are likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found. Few, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by “impartial” jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that fundamental right. See, e. g., Sheppard, 384 U. S., at 350-351; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466, 473 (1965) (evidence in criminal trial must come solely from witness stand in public courtroom with full evidentiary protections). Even if a fair trial can ultimately be ensured through voir dire, change of venue, or some other device, these measures entail serious costs to the system. Extensive voir dire may not be able to filter out all of the effects of pretrial publicity, and with increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal trials, a change of venue may not suffice to undo the effects of statements such as those made by petitioner. The State has a substantial interest in preventing officers of the court, such as lawyers, from imposing such costs on the judicial system and on the litigants. The restraint on speech is narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited — it applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the trial. While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding by those who have a duty to protect its integrity, the Rule is limited on its face to preventing only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding. Ill To assist a lawyer in deciding whether an extrajudicial statement is problematic, Rule 177 sets out statements that are likely to cause material prejudice. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, these are not improper evidentiary presumptions. Model Rule 3.6, from which Rule 177 was derived, was specifically designed to avoid the categorical prohibitions of attorney speech contained in ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-107 (1981). See ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Notes and Comments 143-144 (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981) (Proposed Final Draft). The statements listed as likely to cause material prejudice closely track a similar list outlined by this Court in Sheppard: “The fact that many of the prejudicial news items can be traced to the prosecution, as well as the defense, aggravates the judge’s failure to take any action. . . . Effective control of these sources — concededly within the court’s power — might well have prevented the divul-gence of inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations that made up much of the inflammatory publicity .... “More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take any lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to officials; the identity of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the case. See State v. Van Duyne, 43 N. J. 369, 389, 204 A. 2d 841, 852 (1964), in which the court interpreted Canon 20 of the American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics to prohibit such statements.” 384 U. S., at 361. Gentile claims that Rule 177 is overbroad, and thus unconstitutional on its face, because it applies to more speech than is necessary to serve the State’s goals. The “overbreadth” doctrine applies if an enactment “prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 114 (1972). To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be “substantial.” Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 485 (1989). Rule 177 is no broader than necessary to protect the State’s interests. It applies only to lawyers involved in the pending case at issue, and even those lawyers involved in pending cases can make extrajudicial statements as long as such statements do not present a substantial risk of material prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding. The fact that Rule 177 applies to bench trials does not make it overbroad, for a substantial likelihood of prejudice is still required before the Rule is violated. That test will rarely be met where the judge is the trier of fact, since trial judges often have access to inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or disregard it. For these reasons Rule 177 is constitutional on its face. Gentile also argues that Rule 177 is void for vagueness because it did not provide adequate notice that his comments were subject to discipline. The void-for-vagueness doctrine is concerned with a defendant’s right to fair notice and adequate warning that his conduct runs afoul of the law. See, e. g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 572-573 (1974); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 110 (1972). Rule 177 was drafted with the intent to provide “an illustrative compilation that gives fair notice of conduct ordinarily posing unacceptable dangers to the fair administration of justice.” Proposed Final Draft 143. The Rule provides sufficient notice of the nature of the prohibited conduct. Under the circumstances of his case, petitioner cannot complain about lack of notice, as he has admitted that his primary objective in holding the press conference was the violation of Rule 177’s core prohibition — to prejudice the upcoming trial by influencing potential jurors. Petitioner was clearly given notice that such conduct was forbidden, and the list of conduct likely to cause prejudice, while only advisory, certainly gave notice that the statements made would violate the Rule if they had the intended effect. The majority agrees with petitioner that he was the victim of unconstitutional vagueness in the regulations because of the relationship between §3 and §§ 1 and 2 of Rule 177 (see ante, at 1033-1034). Section 3 allows an attorney to state “the general nature of the claim or defense” notwithstanding the prohibition contained in § 1 and the examples contained in § 2. It is of course true, as the majority points out, that the word “general” and the word “elaboration” are both terms of degree. But combined as they are in the first sentence of § 3, they convey the very definite proposition that the authorized statements must not contain the sort of detailed allegations that petitioner made at his press conference. No sensible person could think that the following were “general” statements of a claim or defense made “without elaboration”: “the person that was in the most direct position to have stolen the drugs and the money ... is Detective Steve Scholl”; “there is far more evidence that will establish that Detective Scholl took these drugs and took these American Express Travelers’ checks than any other living human being”; “[Detective Scholl] either had a hell of a cold, or he should have seen a better doctor”; and “the so-called other victims . . . one, two — four of them are known drug dealers and convicted money launderers.” Section 3, as an exception to the provisions of §§1 and 2, must be read in the light of the prohibitions and examples contained in the first two sections. It was obviously not intended to negate the prohibitions or the examples wholesale, but simply intended to provide a “safe harbor” where there might be doubt as to whether one of the examples covered proposed conduct. These provisions were not vague as to the conduct for which petitioner was disciplined; “[i]n determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged.” United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29, 33 (1963). Petitioner’s strongest arguments are that the statements were made well in advance of trial, and that the statements did not in fact taint the jury panel. But the Supreme Court of Nevada pointed out that petitioner’s statements were not only highly inflammatory — they portrayed prospective government witnesses as drug users and dealers, and as money launderers — but the statements were timed to have maximum impact, when public interest in the case was at its height immediately after Sanders was indicted. Reviewing independently the entire record, see Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S., at 335, we are convinced that petitioner’s statements were “substantially likely to cause material prejudice” to the proceedings. While there is evidence pro and con on that point, we find it persuasive that, by his own admission, petitioner called the press conference for the express purpose of influencing the venire. It is difficult to believe that he went to such trouble, and took such a risk, if there was no substantial likelihood that he would succeed. While in a case such as this we must review the record for ourselves, when the highest court of a State has reached a determination “we give most respectful attention to its rea- soiling and conclusion.” Ibid. The State Bar of Nevada, which made its own factual findings, and the Supreme Court of Nevada, which upheld those findings, were in a far better position than we are to appreciate the likely effect of petitioner’s statements on potential members of a jury panel in a highly publicized case such as this. The board and the Nevada Supreme Court did not apply the list of statements likely to cause material prejudice as presumptions, but specifically found that petitioner had intended to prejudice the trial, and that based upon the nature of the statements and their timing, they were in fact substantially likely to cause material prejudice. We cannot, upon our review of the record, conclude that they were mistaken. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 394-396 (1948). Several amici argue that the First Amendment requires the State to show actual prejudice to a judicial proceeding before an attorney may be disciplined for extrajudicial statements, and since the board and the Nevada Supreme Court found no actual prejudice, petitioner should not have been disciplined. But this is simply another way of stating that the stringent standard of Nebraska Press should be applied to the speech of a lawyer in a pending case, and for the reasons heretofore given we decline to adopt it. An added objection to the stricter standard when applied to lawyer participants is that if it were adopted, even comments more flagrant than those made by petitioner could not serve as the basis for disciplinary action if, for wholly independent reasons, they had no effect on the proceedings. An attorney who made prejudicial comments would be insulated from discipline if the government, for reasons unrelated to the comments, decided to dismiss the charges, or if a plea bargain were reached. An equally culpable attorney whose client’s case went to trial would be subject to discipline. The United States Constitution does not mandate such a fortuitous difference. When petitioner was admitted to practice law before the Nevada courts, the oath which he took recited that “I will support, abide by and follow the Rules of Professional Conduct as are now or may hereafter be adopted by the Supreme Court. . . .” Rule 73, Nevada Supreme Court Rules (1991). The First Amendment does not excuse him from that obligation, nor should it forbid the discipline imposed upon him by the Supreme Court of Nevada. I would affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada. The sole summary of television reports of the press conference contained in the record is as follows: “2-5-88: “GENTILE NEWS CONFERENCE STORY. GENTILE COMPARES THE W. VAULT BURGLARY TO THE FRENCH CONNECTION CASE IN WHICH THE BAD GUYS WERE COPS. GENTILE SAYS THE EVIDENCE IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND THAT THE COPS SEEM THE MORE LIKELY CULPRITS, THAT DET. SCHOLL HAS SHOWN SIGNS OF DRUG USE, THAT THE OTHER CUSTOMERS WERE PRESSURED INTO COMPLAINING BY METRO, THAT THOSE CUSTOMERS ARE KNOWN DRUG DEALERS, AND THAT OTHER AGENCIES HAVE OPERATED OUT OF W. VAULT WITHOUT HAVING SIMILAR PROBLEMS. “2-5-88: METRO NEWS CONFERENCE IN WHICH CHIEF SULLIVAN EXPLAINS THAT THE OFFICERS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN CLEARED BY POLYGRAPH TESTS. STORY MENTIONS THAT THE POLYGRAPHER WAS RAY SLAUGHTER, UNUSUAL BECAUSE SLAUGHTER IS A PRIVATE EXAMINER, NOT A METRO EXAMINER. REPORTER DETAILS SLAUGHTER’S BACKGROUND, INCLUDING HIS TEST OF JOHN MORAN REGARDING SPILOTRO CONTRIBUTIONS. ALSO MENTIONS SLAUGHTER’S DRUG BUST, SPECULATES ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS A SETUP BY THE FBI. QUOTES GENTILE AS SAYING THE TWO CASES ARE DEFINITELY RELATED.” App. 131-132 (emphasis added). Other occasions are as follows: “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Do you believe any other police officers other than Scholl were involved in the disappearance of the dope and— “MR. GENTILE: Let me say this: What I believe and what the proof is are two different things. Okay? I’m reluctant to discuss what I believe because I don’t want to slander somebody, but I can tell you that the proof shows that Scholl is the guy that is most likely to have taken the cocaine and the American Express traveler’s checks. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: What is that? What is that proof? “MR. GENTILE: It’ll come out; it’ll come out.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: I have seen reports that the FBI seems to think sort of along the lines that you do. “MR. GENTILE: Well, I couldn’t agree with them more. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Do you know anything about it? “MR. GENTILE: Yes, I do; but again, Dan, I’m not in a position to be able to discuss that now. “All I can tell you is that you’re in for a very interesting six months to a year as this case develops.” Id., at 10a. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Did the cops pass the polygraph? “MR. GENTILE: Well, I would like to give you a comment on that, except that Ray Slaughter’s trial is coming up and I don’t want to get in the way of anybody being able to defend themselves. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Do you think the Slaughter ease— that there’s a connection? “MR. GENTILE: Absolutely. I don’t think there is any question about it, and— “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: What is that? “MR. GENTILE: Well, it’s intertwined to a great deal, I think. “I know that what I think the connection is, again, is something I believe to be true. I can’t point to it being true and until I can I’m not going to say anything. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Do you think the police involved in this passed legitimate — legitimately passed lie detector tests? “MR. GENTILE: I don’t want to comment on that for two reasons: “Number one, again, Ray Slaughter is coming up for trial and it wouldn’t be right to call him a liar if I didn’t think that it were true. “But, secondly, I don’t have much faith in polygraph tests. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Did [Sanders] ever take one? “MR. GENTILE: The police polygraph? “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Yes. “MR. GENTILE: No, he didn’t take a police polygraph. “QUESTION FROM THE FLOOR: Did he take one with you? “MR. GENTILE: I'm not going to disclose that now.” Id., at 12a-13a. Petitioner argues that Rule 177(2) is a categorical speech prohibition which fails First Amendment analysis because of overbreadth. Petitioner interprets this subsection as providing that particular statements are “presumptively prohibited regardless of the circumstances surrounding the speech. ” Brief for Petitioner 48. Respondent does not read Rule 177(2)’s list of statements “ordinarily likely” to create material prejudice as establishing an evidentiary presumption, but rather as intended to “assist a lawyer” in compliance. Brief for Respondent 28, n. 27. The opinions of the Disciplinary Board and the Nevada Supreme Court do not address this point, though petitioner’s reading is plausible, and at least one treatise supports petitioner’s reading. See G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 398-399 (1985) (analogous subsection (b) of ABA Model Rule 3.6 creates a presumption of prejudice). Given the lack of any discussion in the lower court opinion, and the other difficulties we find, we do not address these arguments. Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming have adopted Model Rule 3.6 verbatim. Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin have adopted Model Rule 3.6 with minor modifications that are irrelevant to the issues presented in this case. Michigan and Washington have adopted only subsection (a) of Model Rule 3.6, and Minnesota has adopted only subsection (a) and limits its application to “pending criminal jury trial[s].” Utah adopted a version of Model Rule 3.6 employing a “substantial likelihood of materially influencing” test. Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont have adopted Disciplinary Rule 7-107 verbatim. North Carolina also uses the “reasonable likelihood of . . . prejudicio]" test. Rule of Professional Conduct 7.7 (1991). Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1990) (“serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding”); Maine Bar Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.7(j) (1990) (“substantial danger of interference with the administration of justice”); North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1990) (“serious and imminent threat of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding”); Oregon DR 7-107 (1991) (“serious and imminent threat to the fact-finding process in an adjudicative proceeding and acts with indifference to that effect”); and the District of Columbia DR 7-101 (Supp. 1991) (“serious and imminent threat to the impartiality of the judge or jury”). We disagree with Justice Kennedy’s statement that this case “does not call into question the constitutionality of other States’ prohibitions upon an attorney’s speech that will have a ‘substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding,’ but is limited to Nevada’s interpretation of that standard.” Ante, at 1034. Petitioner challenged Rule 177 as being unconstitutional on its face in addition to as applied, contending that the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” test was unconstitutional, and that lawyer speech should be punished only if it violates the standard for clear and present danger set forth in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539 (1976). See Brief for Petitioner 27-31. The validity of the rules in the many States applying the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” test has, therefore, been called into question in this case. The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently read all parts of Rule 177 as applying only to lawyers in pending cases, and not to other lawyers or nonlawyers. We express no opinion on the constitutionality of a rule regulating the statements of a lawyer who is not participating in the pending case about which the statements are made. We note that of all the cases petitioner cites as supporting the use of the clear and present danger standard, the only one that even arguably involved a nonthird party was Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962), where a county sheriff was held in contempt for publicly criticizing instructions given by a judge to a grand jury. Although the sheriff was technically an “officer of the court” by virtue of his position, the Court determined that his statements were made in his capacity as a private citizen, with no connection to his official duties. Id., at 393. The same cannot be said about petitioner, whose statements were made in the course of, and in furtherance of, his role as defense counsel. Justice Kennedy appears to contend that there can be no material prejudice when the lawyer’s publicity is in response to publicity favorable to the other side. Ante, at 1041-1043. Justice Kennedy would find that publicity designed to counter prejudicial publicity cannot be itself prejudicial, despite its likelihood of influencing potential jurors, unless it actually would go so far as to cause jurors to be affirmatively biased in favor of the lawyer’s client. In the first place, such a test would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply. But more fundamentally, it misconceives the constitutional test for an impartial juror — whether the “ ‘juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict on the evidence presented in court.’” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 800 (1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (1961)). A juror who may have been initially swayed from open-mindedness by publicity favorable to the prosecution is not rendered fit for service by being bombarded by publicity favorable to the defendant. The basic premise of our legal system is that lawsuits should be tried in court, not in the media. See, e. g., Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 271 (1941); Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General of Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1970). A defendant may be protected from publicity by, or in favor of, the police, and prosecution through voir dire, change of venue, jury instructions, and, in extreme cases, reversal on due process grounds. The remedy for prosecutorial abuses that violate the rule lies not in self-help in the form of similarly prejudicial comments by defense counsel, but in disciplining the prosecutor.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRYAN v. ITASCA COUNTY, MINNESOTA No. 75-5027. Argued April 20, 1976 Decided June 14, 1976 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Bernard P. Becker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Gerald L. Beck, Michael Hagedorn, and Daniel H. Israel. C. H. Luther, Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, and Paul R. Kempainen and Steven G. Thorne, Special Assistant Attorneys General. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Harry B. Sachse, Edmund B. Clark, and Jacques B. Gelin filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question reserved in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 178 n. 18 (1973): whether the grant of civil jurisdiction to the States conferred by § 4 of Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 589, 28 U. S. C. § 1360, is a congressional grant of power to the States to tax reservation Indians except insofar as taxation is expressly excluded by the terms of the statute. Petitioner Russell Bryan, an enrolled member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, resides in a mobile home on land held in trust by the United States for the Chippewa Tribe on the Leech Lake Reservation in Minnesota. In June 1972, petitioner received notices from the auditor of respondent Itasca County, Minn., that he had been assessed personal property tax liability on the mobile home totaling $147.95. Thereafter, in September 1972, petitioner brought this suit in the Minnesota District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the State and county were without authority to levy such a tax on personal property of a reservation Indian on the reservation and that imposition of such a tax was contrary to federal law. The Minnesota District Court rejected the contention and entered judgment for respondent county. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, 303 Minn. 395, 228 N. W. 2d 249 (1975). We granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 923 (1975), and now reverse. I Principles defining the power of States to tax reservation Indians and their property and activities on federally established reservations were clarified in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra. As summarized in its companion case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), McClanahan concluded: “[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan ... lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent Congressional consent.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 148. McClanahan held that Arizona was disabled in the absence of congressional consent from imposing a state income tax on the income of a reservation Indian earned solely on the reservation. On the authority of McClanahan, Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), held this Term that in the absence of congressional consent the State was disabled from imposing a personal property tax on motor vehicles owned by tribal members living on the reservation, or a vendor license fee applied to a reservation Indian conducting a business for the tribe on reservation land, or a sales tax as applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to Indians. Thus McClanahan and Moe preclude any authority in respondent county to levy a personal property tax upon petitioner’s mobile home in the absence of congressional consent. Our task therefore is to determine whether § 4 of Pub. L. 280, 28 U. S. C. § 1360, constitutes such consent. Section 4 (a), 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (a), provides: “Each of the States . . . listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State . . . that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State . . . : “Minnesota ... All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation.” The statute does not in terms provide that the tax laws of a State are among “civil laws ... of general application to private persons or private property.” The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded, however, that they were, finding in § 4 (b) of the statute a negative implication of inclusion in § 4 (a) of a general power of tax. Section 4 (b), 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (b), provides: “Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership, or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.” The Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that “unless paragraph (a) is interpreted as a general grant of the power to tax, then the exceptions contained in paragraph (b) are limitations on a nonexistent power.” 303 Minn., at 402, 228 N. W. 2d, at 253. Therefore, the state court held: “Public Law 280 is a clear grant of the power to tax.” Id., at 406, 228 N. W. 2d, at 256. We disagree. That conclusion is foreclosed by the legislative history of Pub. L. 280 and the application of canons of construction applicable to congressional statutes claimed to terminate Indian immunities. II The primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280 that emerges from its sparse legislative history was with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement. See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 535, 541-542 (1975). The House Report states: “These States lack jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for most offenses committed on Indian reservations or other Indian country, with limited exceptions. The applicability of Federal criminal laws in States having Indian reservations is also limited. The United States district courts have a measure of jurisdiction over offenses committed on Indian reservations or other Indian country by or against Indians, but in cases of offenses committed by Indians against Indians that jurisdiction is limited to the so-called 10 major crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny. “As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order among the Indians in the Indian country has been left largely to the Indian groups themselves. In many States, tribes are not adequately organized to perform that function; consequently, there has been created a hiatus in law-enforcement authority that could best be remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on States indicating an ability and willingness to accept such responsibility.” H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1953). Thus, provision for state criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians on the reservations was the central focus of Pub. L. 280 and is embodied in § 2 of the Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1162. In marked contrast in the legislative history is the virtual absence of expression of congressional policy or intent respecting § 4’s grant of civil jurisdiction to the States. Of special significance for our purposes, however, is the total absence of mention or discussion regarding a congressional intent to confer upon the States an authority to tax Indians or Indian property on reservations. Neither the Committee Reports nor the floor discussion in either House mentions such authority. This omission has significance in the application of the canons of construction applicable to statutes affecting Indian immunities, as some mention would normally be expected if such a sweeping change in the status of tribal government and reservation Indians had been contemplated by Congress. The only mention of taxation authority is in a colloquy between Mr. Sellery, Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Congressman Young during House committee hearings on Pub. L. 280. That colloquy strongly suggests that Congress did not mean to grant tax authority to the States: “Mr. Young. Does your bill limit the provision for Federal assistance to States in defraying .the increased expenses of the courts in connection with the widening of the jurisdiction that the bill encompasses? “Mr. Sellery. No; it does not. “Mr. Young. Do you think it would be necessary to provide for some payment, inasmuch as the great portion of Indian lands are not subject to taxation? “Mr. Sellery. . . . Generally, the Department’s views are that if we started on the processes of Federal financial assistance or subsidization of law enforcement activities among the Indians, it might turn out to be a rather costly program, and it is a problem which the States should deal with and accept without Federal financial assistance; otherwise there will be some tendency, the Department believes, for the Indian to be thought of and perhaps to think of himself because of the financial assistance which comes from the Federal Government as still somewhat a member of a race or group which is set apart from other citizens of the State. And it is desired to give him and the other citizens of the State the feeling of a conviction that he is in the same status and has access to the same services, including the courts, as other citizens of the State who are not Indians. “Mr. Young. That would not quite be true, though; would it? Because for the most part he does not pay any taxes. “Mr. Sellery. No. There is that difference. “Mr. Young. A rather sizable difference in not paying for the courts or paying for the increased expenses for judicial proceedings. “Mr. Sellery. The Indians, of course, do pay other forms of taxes. I do not know how the courts of Nevada are supported financially, but the Indians do pay the sales tax and other taxes. “Mr. Young. But no income tax or corporation tax or profits tax. You understand a large portion of the land is held in trust and therefore is not subject to tax. “Mr. Sellery. That is correct. “Mr. Young. So far as my State is concerned, it would be a large burden on existing costs of judicial procedure. I think it is only right that the Federal Government should make some contribution for that. You seem to differentiate. I think there is a differentiation, too, in that they are not paying taxes. “Mr. Sellery. I will concede your point that they are not paying taxes. The Department has recommended, nevertheless, that no financial assistance be afforded to the States.” App. 55-56. Piecing together as best we can the sparse legislative history of § 4, subsection (a) seems to have been primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes; this is definitely the import of the statutory wording conferring upon a State “jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in . . . Indian country ... to the same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action.” With this as the primary focus of §4 (a), the wording that follows in § 4 (a)— “and those civil laws of such State . .. that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State” — authorizes application by the state courts of their rules of decision to decide such disputes. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1652. This construction finds support in the consistent and uncon-tradicted references in the legislative history to “permitting” “State courts to adjudicate civil controversies” arising on Indian reservations, H. R. Rep. No. 848, pp. 5, 6 (emphasis added), and the absence of anything remotely resembling an intention to confer general state civil regulatory control over Indian reservations. In short, the consistent and exclusive use of the terms “civil causes of action,” “aris[ing] on,” “civil laws ... of general application to private persons or private property,” and “adjudication],” in both the Act and its legislative history virtually compels our conclusion that the primary intent of § 4 was to grant jurisdiction over private civil litigation involving reservation Indians in state court. Furthermore, certain tribal reservations were completely exempted from the provisions of Pub. L. 280 precisely because each had a “tribal law-and-order organization that functions in a reasonably satisfactory manner.” H. R. Rep. No. 848, p. 7. Congress plainly meant only to allow state courts to decide criminal and civil matters arising on reservations not so organized. Accordingly, rather than the expansive reading given § 4 (a) by the Minnesota Supreme Court, we feel that the construction we give the section is much more consonant with the revealed congressional intent. Moreover, our construction is consistent with our prior references to § 4 as “the extension of state jurisdiction over civil causes of action by or against Indians arising in Indian country.” Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423, 427 (1971). See also id., at 424 n. 1; id., at 430-431 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685, 687 n. 3 (1965); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S. 404, 416 n. 8 (1968) (Stewart, J.; dissenting). Our construction is also more consistent with Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321-1326. Title IV repeals § 7 of Pub. L. 280 and requires tribal consent as a condition to further state assumptions of the jurisdiction provided in 18 U. S. C. § 1162 and 28 U. S. C. § 1360. Section 402 of Title IV, 25 U. S. C. § 1322, tracks the language of § 4 of Pub. L. 280. Section 406 of Title IV, 25 U. S. C. § 1326, which provides for Indian consent, refers to “State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action . . . .” It is true, of course, that the primary interpretation of § 4 must have reference to the legislative history of the Congress that enacted it rather than to the history of Acts of a later Congress. Nevertheless, Title IV of the 1968 Act is intimately related to § 4, as it provides the method for further state assumptions of the jurisdiction conferred by § 4, and we previously have construed the effect of legislation affecting reservation Indians in light of “intervening” legislative enactments. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S., at 472-475. It would be difficult to suppose that Congress in 1968 intended the meaning of § 4 to vary depending upon the time and method by which particular States acquired jurisdiction. And certainly the legislative history of Title IV makes it difficult to construe § 4 jurisdiction acquired pursuant to Title IV as extending general state civil regulatory authority, including taxing power, to govern Indian reservations. Senator Ervin, who offered and principally sponsored Title IV, see Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, supra, at 429 n. 5, referred to § 1360 civil jurisdiction as follows: “Certain representatives of municipalities have charged that the repeal of [§ 7 of] Public Law 280 would hamper air and water pollution controls and provide a haven for undesirable, unrestricted business establishments within tribal land borders. Not only does this assertion show the lack of faith that certain cities have in the ability and desire of Indian tribes to better themselves and their environment, but, most importantly, it is irrelevant, since Public Law 880 relates primarily to the application of state civil and criminal law in court proceedings, and has no bearing on programs set up by the States to assist economic and environmental development in Indian territory.” (Emphasis added.) Hearing before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, No. 90-23, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 136 (1968). Ill Other considerations also support our construction. Today’s congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly than in 1963 favor their assimilation, but Pub. L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total assimilation. Public L. 280 was only one of many types of assimilationist legislation under active consideration in 1953. H. R. Rep. No. 848, pp. 3-5; Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F. 2d 655, 662 (CA9 1975). And nothing in its legislative history remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act’s extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in the undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes into little more than “ 'private, voluntary organizations,’ ” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975) — a possible result if tribal governments and reservation Indians were subordinated to the full panoply of civil regulatory powers, including taxation, of state and local governments. The Act itself refutes such an inference: there is notably absent any conferral of state jurisdiction over the tribes themselves, and § 4 (c), 28 U. S. C. § 1360 (c), providing for the “full force and effect” of any tribal ordinances or customs “heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe ... if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State,” contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal government. Moreover, the same Congress that enacted Pub. L. 280 also enacted several termination Acts — legislation which is cogent proof that Congress knew well how to express its intent directly when that intent was to subject reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws and state taxation. Cf. Board of Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 713 (1943); Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146, 149 (1906). These termination enactments provide expressly for subjecting distributed property “and any income derived therefrom by the individual, corporation, or other legal entity ... to the same taxes, State and Federal, as in the case of non-Indians,” 25 U. S. C. §§ 564j, 749, 898, and provide that “all statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the members of the tribe, and the laws of the several States shall apply to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction.” 25 U. S. C. §§ 564q, 757, 899; cf. 25 U. S. C. § 726, These contemporaneous termination Acts are in pari materia with Pub. L. 280. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U. S., at 411. Reading this express language respecting state taxation and application of the full range of state laws to tribal members of these contemporaneous termination Acts, the negative inference is that Congress did not mean in § 4 (a) to subject reservation Indians to state taxation. Thus, rather than inferring a negative implication of a grant of general taxing power in § 4 (a) from the exclusion of certain taxation in § 4 (b), we conclude that construing Pub. L. 280 in pari materia with these Acts shows that if Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory powers, including taxation, over reservation Indians, it would have expressly said so. IV Additionally, we note that §4(b), excluding “taxation of any real or personal property . . . belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe . . . that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States,” is not obviously the narrow exclusion of state taxation that the Minnesota Supreme Court read it to be. On its face the statute is not clear whether the exclusion is applicable only to taxes levied directly on the trust property specifically, or whether it also excludes taxation on activities taking place in conjunction with such property and income deriving from its use. And even if read narrowly to apply only to taxation levied against trust property directly, § 4 (b) certainly does not expressly authorize all other state taxation of reservation Indians. Moreover, the express prohibition of any “alienation, encumbrance, or taxation” of any trust property can be read as prohibiting state courts, acquiring jurisdiction over civil controversies involving reservation Indians pursuant to § 4, from applying state laws or enforcing judgments in ways that would effectively result in the “alienation, encumbrance, or taxation” of trust property. Indeed, any other reading of this provision of § 4 (b) is difficult to square with the identical prohibition contained in § 2 (b) of the Act, which applies the same restrictions upon States exercising criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. It would simply make no sense to infer from the identical language of § 2 (b) a general power in § 2 (a) to tax Indians in all other respects since § 2 (a) deals only with criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, § 4 (b) in its entirety may be read as simply a reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal Government relationship in all respects save the conferral of state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate private civil causes of action involving Indians. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that § 4 (b) “is entirely consistent with, and in effect is a reaffirmation of, the law as it stood prior to its enactment.” Kirkwood v. Arenas, 243 F. 2d 863, 865-866 (1957). The absence of more precise language respecting state taxation of reservation Indians is entirely consistent with a general uncertainty in 1953 of the precise limits of state power to tax reservation Indians respecting other than their trust property, and a eon-gressional intent merely to reaffirm the existing law whatever subsequent litigation might determine it to be. Finally, in construing this “admittedly ambiguous” statute, Board of Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S., at 713, we must be guided by that “eminently sound and vital canon,” Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U. S. 649, 655 n. 7 (1976), that “statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.” Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918). See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 675 (1912); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 199-200 (1975). This principle of statutory construction has particular force in the face of claims that ambiguous statutes abolish by implication Indian tax immunities. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S., at 174; Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1930). “This is so because . . . Indians stand in a special relation to the federal government from which the states are excluded unless the Congress has manifested a clear purpose to terminate [a tax] immunity and allow states to treat Indians as part of the general community.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, 613-614 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting). What we recently said of a claim that Congress had terminated an Indian reservation by means of an ambiguous statute is equally applicable here to the respondent’s claim that § 4 (a) of Pub. L. 280 is a clear grant of power to tax, and hence a termination of traditional Indian immunity from state taxation: “Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination could be effected. But clear-termination language was not employed in the . . . Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to terminate .... A congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 504-505 (1973). The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is Reversed. The Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is a federally recognized tribe with a constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae 2 n. 2. Its reservation was established by the Treaty of Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165. The McClanahan principle derives from a general pre-emption analysis, 411 U. S., at 172, that gives effect to the plenary and exclusive power of the Federal Government to deal with Indian tribes, United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 554 n. 11 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551-552 (1974); Board of Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715-716 (1943), and “to regulate and protect the Indians and their property against interference even by a state,” id., at 715. This pre-emption analysis draws support from “the ‘backdrop’ of the Indian sovereignty doctrine,” Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 475 (1976); “‘[t]he policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control [which] is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history,’ ” McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 168; and the extensive federal legislative and administrative regulation of Indian tribes and reservations, id., at 173-179. “Congress has . . . acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,” Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), and therefore “‘State laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.’ ” McClanahan, supra, at 170-171 (quoting United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 845 (1958)). Of course, this pre-emption model usually yields different conclusions as to the application of state laws to tribal Indians who have left or never inhabited federally established reservations, or Indians “who do not possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government,” McClanahan, supra, at 167-168; see Mescolero Apache Tribe, 411 U. S., at 148-149. The State Supreme Court relied upon Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 382 F. Supp. 421 (1974), aff'd, 516 F. 2d 133 (CA8 1975), where the District Court for the District of Nebraska gave the same construction to Pub. L. 280 in upholding a state income tax levied against reservation Indian income. Petitioner had not properly raised a claim that his mobile home was in fact annexed to tribal trust land and therefore a part of the real property expressly excluded from taxation by § 4 (b). The Minnesota Supreme Court found, therefore, that the mobile home was personal property taxable as such under Minnesota law. This House Report and the Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), are in all material respects identical. All citations herein are to the House Report. Section 2 of Pub. L. 280, 18 U. S. C. § 1162, provides: “State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the Indian country. “(a) Each of the States or Territories listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian! country listed opposite the name of the State or Territory to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or Territory: “State or Territory of Indian country affected “Minnesota. All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation. “(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof. “(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this section as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.” 99 Cong. Rec. 9962, 10782-10784, 10928 (1953). See Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Development, 49 N. D. L. Rev. 267, 292 (1973). Unpublished Transcript of Hearings on H. R. 1063 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The transcript was produced by the United States during the briefing of Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U. S. 451 (1973). The portion quoted in the text is reproduced in the Appendix in the instant case. Cf. Israel & Smithson, supra, n. 8, at 296: “A fair reading of these two clauses suggests that Congress never intended 'civil laws’ to mean the entire array of state noncriminal laws, but rather that Congress intended ‘civil laws’ to mean those laws which have to do with private rights and status. Therefore, ‘civil laws ... of general application to private persons or private property’ would include the laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent, etc., but would not include laws declaring or implementing the states’ sovereign powers, such as the power to tax, grant franchises, etc. These are not within the fair meaning of ‘private’ laws.” Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the title of Pub. L. 280, H. R. Rep. No. 848, p. 3: “A bill to confer jurisdiction on the States . . . , with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such States, and for other purposes” (the other purposes being § 8’s withdrawal from the affected areas of the operation of the Federal Indian Liquor Laws, and §§ 6-7’s provision of a method whereby additional States could assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations). Additionally, this interpretation is buttressed by § 4 (c), which provides that “any tribal ordinance or custom . . . adopted by an Indian tribe ... in the exercise of any authority which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action pursuant to this section” (emphasis added). Finally, reading § 4 (a) as an integrated whole, with the reference to state civil law as intended to provide the rules of decision for the private civil causes of action over which state courts were granted jurisdiction is consistent with § 3 of Pub. L. 280, which codifies § 4 in Title 28 of the United States Code. That Title collects Acts of Congress governing jurisdiction and the judiciary. Section 4 would be expected to be codified in Title 25, governing Indian affairs if general state regulatory power over Indian reservations were being granted. Indeed, § 4 is entitled, as provided in Pub. L. 280 and codified at 28 U. S. C. § 1360, “State civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are parties.” Tribal groups in the affected States which were exempted from the coverage of Pub. L. 280 because they had “reasonably satisfactory law-and-order” organizations, had objected to the extension of state criminal and civil jurisdiction on various grounds. Three of the tribes exempted objected due to their fear of inequitable treatment of reservation Indians in the state courts. H. R. Rep. No. 848, pp. 7-8. Two of the objecting tribes expressed the fear that “the extension of State law to their reservations would result in the loss of various rights.” Id,., at 8. One tribe objected on the ground that its members were “not yet ready to be subjected to State laws.” Ibid. Certainly if abolition of traditional Indian immunity from state taxation, except insofar as expressly excluded, was an anticipated result of Pub. L. 280’s extension of civil jurisdiction, vehement Indian objections on this specific ground would also have been voiced. The legislative history of Pub. L. 280 does contain a congressional expression that “the Indians of several States have reached a stage of acculturation and development that malees desirable extension of State civil jurisdiction to the Indian country.” H. R. Rep. No. 848, p. 6. But not too much can be made of this un-elaborated statement; its thrust is too difficult to reconcile with the focus of Pub. L. 280 — extending state jurisdiction to those reservations with the least developed and most inadequate tribal legal institutions; presumably those tribes evincing the least “acculturation and development” in terms of the mainstream of American society. See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 535, 543 (1975). Much has been written on the subject of a devastating impact on tribal governments that might result from an interpretation of § 4 as conferring upon state and local governments general civil regulatory control over reservation Indians. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F. 2d 655, 662-663, 666-668 (CA9 1975); Goldberg, supra; Note, The Extension of County Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations in California: Public Law 280 and the Ninth Circuit, 25 Hastings L. J. 1451 (1974); Comment, Indian, Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1261 (1971). The suggestion is that since tribal governments are disabled under many state laws from incorporating as local units of government, Goldberg, supra, at 581, general regulatory control might relegate tribal governments to a level below that of counties and municipalities, thus essentially destroying them, particularly if they might raise revenue only after the tax base had been filtered through many governmental layers of taxation. Present federal policy appears to be returning to a focus upon strengthening tribal self-government, see, e. g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. Y); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has expressed the view that courts “are not obliged in ambiguous instances to strain to implement [an assim-ilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, particularly where to do so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what is, after all, an ongoing relationship.” Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, supra, at 663. 68 Stat. 718, 25 U. S. C. § 564 (Klamath Tribe); 68 Stat. 768, 25 U. S. C. §§ 721-728 (Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas); 68 Stat. 1099, 25 U. S. C. §§ 741-760 (Paiute Indians of Utah); 68 Stat. 250, 25 U. S. C. §§891-901 (Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin). Congress would have been fully justified in 1953 in being uncertain as to state power to levy a personal property tax on reservation Indians. No decision of this Court directly resolved the issue until Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976), decided earlier this Term. It appears that the only decision of this Court prior to 1953 dealing with state power to levy a personal property tax on reservation Indians was United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 443-444 (1903), which held exempt from state taxation personal Indian property purchased with federal funds. See United States Department of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 865 (1958).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TOLL, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND v. MORENO et al. No. 77-154. Argued February 22, 1978 Question certified April 19, 1978 Decided April 30, 1979 Per Curiam. This decision supplements Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647 (1978), decided last Term. Respondents in Elkins represented a class of nonimmigrant alien residents of Maryland who either held or were financially dependent upon a person who held a “G-4 visa/’ that is, a nonimmigrant visa granted to “officers, or employees of . . . international organizations, and the members of their immediate families” pursuant to 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a)(15)(G)(iv). Respondents were not granted “in-state” status for tuition purposes at the University of Maryland because they were conclusively presumed by the University to be nondomiciliaries of the State. Respondents brought suit against the University and its President, alleging that the University’s failure to grant respondents in-state status violated various federal laws, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. The District Court held for respondents on the ground that the University’s procedures for determining in-state status violated principles established in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp. 541 (Md. 1976), affirmance order, 556 F. 2d 573 (CA4 1977). In Elkins v. Moreno, supra, we held that “[bjecause petitioner makes domicile the ‘paramount’ policy consideration and because respondents’ contention is that they can be domiciled in Maryland but are conclusively presumed to be unable to do so, this case is squarely within Vlandis as limited by Salfi to those situations in which a State ‘purport [s] to be concerned with [domicile, but] at the same time den[ies] to one seeking to meet its test of [domicile] the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on that issue.’ Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. [749,] 771 [1975].” 435 U. S., at 660. Since the applicability of Vlandis depended on whether respondents could in fact become Maryland domicili-arles, we certified, pursuant to Subtit. 6 of Tit. 12 of the Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code (1974), the following question to the Maryland Court of Appeals: “Are persons residing in Maryland who hold or are named in a visa under 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15) (G) (iv) (1976 ed.), or who are financially dependent upon a person holding or named in such a visa, incapable as a matter of state law of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland?” Elkins v. Moreno, supra, at 668-669. On June 23, 1978, approximately two months after the decision in Elkins the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland unanimously adopted “A Resolution Clarifying the Purposes, Meaning, and Application of the Policy of the University of Maryland for Determination of In-State Status for Admission, Tuition, and Charge-Differential Purposes, Insofar as It Denies In-State Status to Nonimmigrant Aliens.” In this resolution, the Board of Regents stated, inter alia: “Purposes and Interests of In-State Policy. The Board of Regents finds and declares that the policy approved on September 21, 1973, insofar as it denies in-state status to nonimmigrant aliens, serves a number of substantial purposes and interests, whether or not it conforms to the generally or otherwise applicable definition of domicile under the Maryland common law, including but not limited to: “(a) limiting the University’s expenditures by granting a higher subsidy toward the expenses of providing educational services to that class of persons who, as a class, are more likely to have a close affinity to the State and to contribute more to its economic well-being; “(b) achieving equalization between the affected classes of the expenses of providing educational services; “(c) efficiently administering the University’s in-state determination and appeals process; and “(d) preventing disparate treatment among categories of nonimmigrants with respect to admissions, tuition, and charge-differentials. “Reaffirmation of In-State Policy. Regardless of whether or not the policy approved by the Board of Regents on September 21, 1973, conforms with the generally or otherwise applicable definition of domicile under the Maryland common law, the Board of Regents reaffirms that policy because it intends and deems it to serve a number of substantial purposes and interests, including but not limited to those set forth above.” On February 21, 1979, the Maryland Court of Appeals unanimously answered our certified question in the negative, stating that “[s]ince nothing in the general Maryland law of domicile renders G-4 visa holders, or their dependents, incapable of becoming domiciled in this State, the answer to the certified question is ‘No.’ ” Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 444, 397 A. 2d 1009, 1019. The Maryland Court of Appeals also declined to consider the implications of the Board of Regents’ clarifying resolution, because, although the resolution represented a change of the University’s position, the implications of that change were beyond the scope of the certified question. Id., at 436-437, 397 A. 2d, at 1014-1015. The Attorney General of Maryland now requests that this case “be restored to the Supreme Court’s active docket for further briefing and argument . . . .” We must deny this request because the Board of Regents’ clarifying resolution has fundamentally altered the posture of the case. Our decision in Elkins rests on the premise that “the University apparently has no interest in continuing to deny in-state status to G-4 aliens as a class if they can become Maryland domiciliarles since it has indicated both here and in the District Court that it would redraft its policy To accommodate’ G-4 aliens were the Maryland courts to hold that G-4 aliens can” acquire such domicile. 435 U. S., at 661. After the clarifying resolution, this premise no longer appears to be true. And if domicile is not the “paramount” policy consideration of the University, this case is no longer “squarely within Vlandis as limited by Salfi . . . Id., at 660. The clarifying resolution thus raises new issues of constitutional law which should be addressed in the first instance by the District Court. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the District Court for further consideration in light of our opinion and judgment in Elkins, the opinion and judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Toll, and the Board of Regents’ clarifying resolution of June 23, 1978. So ordered. The order certifying the question to the Maryland Court of Appeals was dated April 25, 1978.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE et al. v. STATE TAX COMMISSION et al. No. 75-1019. Argued November 2, 1976 Decided January 12, 1977 Roger Pascal argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Milton H. Cohen. Robert W. Bush, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowits, Attorney General, and Ruth Kessler Toch, Solicitor General. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are asked to decide the constitutionality of a recent amendment to New York State’s longstanding tax on securities transactions. Since 1905, New York has imposed a tax (transfer tax) on securities transactions, if part of the transaction occurs within the State. In 1968, the state legislature amended the transfer tax statute so that transactions involving an out-of-state sale are now taxed more heavily than most transactions involving a sale within the State. In 1972, appellants, six “regional” stock exchanges located outside New York, filed an action in state court against the State Tax Commission of New York and its members. The Exchanges’ complaint alleged that the 1968 amendment unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce by imposing a greater tax burden on securities transactions involving out-of-state sales than on transactions of the same magnitude involving in-state sales.' The State Supreme Court denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss the action and the Commission appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered that the Commission’s motion be granted to the extent of entering a judgment declaring the 1968 amendment to be constitutional. 45 App. Div. 2d 365, 357 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (1974). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order, 37 N. Y. 2d 535, 337 N. E. 2d 758 (1975), and we noted probable jurisdiction of the Exchanges’ appeal, 424 U. S. 964 (1976). I New York Tax Law § 270.1 (McKinney 1966) provides that “all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales and all deliveries or transfers of shares or certificates of stock” in any foreign or domestic corporation are subject to the transfer tax. Administrative regulations promulgated with respect to the transfer tax provide that the tax applies if any one of the five taxable events occurs within New York, regardless of where the rest of the transaction takes place, and that if more than one taxable event occurs in the State, only one tax is payable on the entire transaction. 20 N. Y. C. R. R. 440.2 (1976). For transactions involving sales, the rate of tax depends on the selling price per share and the total tax liability is determined by the number of shares sold. N. Y. Tax Law § 270.2 (McKinney 1966). Thus, under the unamended version of § 270, a transaction involving a sale and a transfer of shares in New York was taxed the same as a transaction involving an in-state transfer but an out-of-state sale. In both instances, the occasion for the tax was the occurrence of at least one taxable event in the State, the rate of tax was based solely on the price of the securities, and the total tax was determined by the number of shares sold. The Exchanges do not challenge the constitutionality of § 270. None of the States in which the appellant Exchanges are located taxes the sale or transfer of securities. During the 1960’s the New York Stock Exchange became concerned that the New York transfer tax created a competitive disadvantage for New York trading and was thus responsible for the growth of out-of-state exchanges. In response to this concern and fearful that the New York Stock Exchange would relocate outside New York, the legislature in 1968 enacted § 270-a to amend the transfer tax by providing for two deviations from the uniform application of § 270 when one of the taxable events, a sale, takes place in New York. First, transactions by nonresidents of New York are afforded a 50% reduction (“nonresident reduction”) in the rate of tax when the transaction involves an in-state sale. Taxable transactions by residents (regardless of where the sale is made) and by nonresidents selling outside the State do not benefit from the rate decrease. Second, § 270-a limits the total tax liability of any taxpayer (resident or nonresident) to $350 (maximum tax) for a single transaction when it involves a New York sale. If a sale is made out-of-State, the § 270 tax rate applies to an in-state transfer (or other taxable event) without limitation. The reason for the enactment of § 270-a and the intended effect of the amendment are clear from tlie legislative history. With respect to the amendment, the legislature found: “The securities industry, and particularly the stock exchanges located within the state have contributed importantly to the economy of the state and its recognition as the financial center of the world. The growth of exchanges in other regions of the country and the diversion of business to those exchanges of individuals who are nonresidents of the state of New York, requires recognition that the tax on transfers of stock imposed by article twelve of the tax law, is an important contributing element to the diversion of sales to other areas to the detriment of the economy of the state. Furthermore, in the case of transactions involving large blocks of stock, recognition must be given to the ease of completion of such sales outside the state of New York without the payment of any tax. In order to encourage the effecting by nonresidents of the state of New York of their sales within the state of New York and the retention within the state of New York of sales involving large blocks of stock, a separate classification of the tax on sales by nonresidents of the state of New York and a maximum tax for certain large block sales are desirable.” 1968 N. Y. Laws, c. 827, § 1. In granting executive approval to § 270-a, then Governor Nelson Rockefeller confirmed that the purpose of the new law was to “provide long-term relief from some of the competitive pressures from outside the State.” The Governor announced that as a result of the transfer tax amendment the New York Stock Exchange intended to remain in New York. Appellant Exchanges contend that the legislative history-states explicitly what is implicit in the operation of § 270-a: The amendment imposes an unequal tax burden on out-of-state sales in order to protect an in-state business. They argue that this discrimination is impermissible under the Commerce Clause. Appellees do not dispute the statements of the legislature and the Governor that § 270-a is a measure to reduce out-of-state competition with an in-state business. They agree, however, with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the legislature" has chosen a nondiscriminatory, and therefore constitutionally permissible, means of “encouraging” sales on the New York Stock Exchange. We hold that § 270-a discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. II As in Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366 (1976), we begin with the principle that “[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States.” McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 330 (1944). It is now established beyond dispute that “the Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States. ... [T]he Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.” Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). The Commerce Clause does not, however, eclipse the reserved “power of the States to tax for the support of their own governments,” Gib bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824), or for other purposes, cf. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42, 44-45 (1950); rather, the Clause is a limit on state power. Defining that limit has been the continuing task of this Court. On various occasions when called upon to make the delicate adjustment between the national interest in free and open trade and the legitimate interest of the individual States in exercising their taxing powers, the Court has counseled that the result turns on the unique characteristics of the statute at issue and the particular circumstances in each case. E. g., Freeman v. Hewit, supra, at 252. This case-by-case approach has left “much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.” Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 457 (1959). Nevertheless, as observed by Mr. Justice Clark in the case just cited: “[Fjrom the quagmire there emerge . . . some firm peaks of decision which remain unquestioned.” Id., at 458. Among these is the fundamental principle that we find dispositive of the case now before us: No State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may “impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.” Ibid. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64 (1963); Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946); I. M. Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113 (1908); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876). The prohibition against discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the Clause. Permitting the individual States to enact laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses “would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive” of the free trade which the Clause protects. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 356 (1951). Although apparently accepting the teaching of the prior cases, the Court of Appeals seemed to view § 270-a as “compensatory legislation” enacted to “neutralize” the competitive advantage § 270 conferred on stock exchanges outside New York. Thus, it analogized the New York statute to state use taxes which have survived Commerce Clause challenges. 37 N. Y. 2d, at 542, 337 N. E. 2d, at 762. The statute will not support this characterization. Prior to the 1968 amendment, the New York transfer tax was neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales. An in-state transfer or delivery of securities triggered the tax and the burden fell equally on all transactions regardless of the situs of sale. Thus, the choice of an exchange for the sale of securities that would be transferred or delivered in New York was not influenced by the transfer tax; wherever the sale was made, tax liability would arise. The flow of interstate commerce in securities was channeled neither into nor out of New York by the state tax. Section 270-a upset this equilibrium.. After the amendment took effect, a nonresident contemplating the sale of securities that would be delivered or transferred in New York faced two possible tax burdens. If he elected to sell on an out-of-state exchange, the higher rates of § 270 applied without limitation on the total tax liability; if he sold the securities on a New York exchange, the one-half rate of § 270-a applied and then only up to a $350 tax liability. Similarly, residents engaging in large block transactions on the New York exchanges were subject to a maximum tax levy of $350; but if they sold out-of-State, their tax bill would be limited only by the number of shares sold. Thus, under § 270-a the choice of exchange by all nonresidents and by residents engaging in large transactions is not made solely on the basis of nontax criteria. Because of the delivery or transfer in New York, the seller cannot escape tax liability by selling out of State, but he can substantially reduce his liability by selling in State. The obvious effect of the tax is to extend a financial advantage to sales on the New York exchanges at the expense of the regional exchanges. Rather than “compensating” New York for a supposed competitive disadvantage resulting from § 270, the amendment forecloses tax-neutral decisions and creates both an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a discriminatory burden on commerce to its sister States. Equal treatment of interstate commerce, lacking in § 270-a, has been the common theme running through the cases in which this Court has sustained “compensating,” state use taxes. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937), Washington imposed a 2% sales tax on all goods sold at retail in the State. Since the sales tax would have the effect of encouraging residents to purchase at out-of-state stores, Washington also imposed a 2% “compensating tax” on the use of goods within the State. The use tax did not apply, however, when the article had already been subjected to a tax equal to or greater than 2%. The effect of this constitutional tax system was nondiscriminatory treatment of in-state and out-of-state purchases: “Equality exists when the chattel subjected to the use tax is bought in another state and then carried into Washington. It exists when the imported chattel is shipped from the state of origin under an order received directly from, the state of destination. In each situation the burden borne by the owner is balanced by an equal burden where the sale is strictly local.” Id., at 584. A similar use-sales-tax structure was sustained in General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335 (1944), because the “tax [was] what it professes to be — a nondiscriminatory excise laid on all personal property” regardless of where the sale was made. Id., at 338. See also International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1944); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 204 (1961). In all the use tax cases, an individual faced with the choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase could make that choice without regard to the tax consequences. If he purchased in State, he paid a sales tax; if he purchased out of State but carried the article back for use in State, he paid a use tax of the same amount. The taxes treated both transactions in the same manner. Because it imposes a greater tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales, the New York transfer tax, as amended by § 270-a, falls short of the substantially evenhanded treatment demanded by the Commerce Clause. The extra tax burden on out-of-state sales created by § 270-a is not what the New York Court of Appeals holds it out to be; it neither compensates for a like burden on in-state sales, nor neutralizes an economic advantage previously enjoyed by the appellant Exchanges because of § 270. III The court below further attempted to save § 270-a from invalidation under the Commerce Clause by finding that the effect the amendment might have on sales by residents and nonresidents did not amount to unconstitutional discrimination. As to New York residents, the court found that the higher tax on large out-of-state sales would have no “practical” effect since “it is more than likely . . . that the sale would be made on a New York exchange in any event.” 37 N. Y. 2d, at 543, 337 N. E. 2d, at 762. As to the discriminatory tax burden on all out-of-state sales by nonresidents, the court observed that because New York sales by nonresidents also involve interstate commerce, § 270-a does not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce; rather, it discriminates between two kinds of interstate transactions. Ibid. Although it did not so state, the Court of Appeals apparently believed that such discrimination was permissible under the Commerce Clause. We disagree with the Court of Appeals with respect to both residents and nonresidents. The maximum tax discrimination against out-of-state sales by residents is not triggered until the taxed transaction involves a substantial number of shares. Investors, institutional and individual, engaging in such large-block transactions can be expected to choose an exchange on the basis of services, prices, and other market conditions rather than geographical proximity. Even a small difference in price (of either the securities or the sales services) can, in a large sale, provide a substantial enough additional profit to outweigh whatever additional transaction costs might be incurred from trading on an out-of-state exchange. The New York Legislature, in its legislative findings in connection with § 270-a, recognized that securities transactions by residents were not being conducted only on the New York exchanges; it therefore considered the amendment necessary to “[retain] within the state of New York . . . sales involving large blocks of stock.” If, as the Court of Appeals assumed, it were “more than likely” that residents would sell in New York, there would have been no reason for the legislature to reduce the tax burden on in-state sales by residents in order to retain their sales in New York. Nor is the discriminatory burden of the maximum tax insubstantial. On a transaction of 30,000 shares selling at $20 or more, for example, the tax on an in-state sale is the maximum $350, while an out-of-state sale is taxed $1,500. The disparity between the two taxes increases with the number of shares sold. Such a large tax penalty for trading on out-of-state markets cannot be deemed to have no. practical effect on interstate commerce. Both the maximum tax and the rate reduction provisions of § 270-a discriminate against out-of-state sales by nonresidents. The fact that this discrimination is in favor of nonresident, in-state sales which may also be considered as interstate commerce, see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S., at 258-259, does not save § 270-a from the restrictions of the Commerce Clause. A State may no more use discriminatory taxes to assure that nonresidents direct their commerce to businesses within the State than to assure that residents trade only in intrastate commerce. As we stated at the outset, the fundamental purpose of the Clause is to assure that there be free trade among the several States. This free trade purpose is not confined to the freedom to trade with only one State; it is a freedom to trade with any State, to engage in commerce across all state boundaries. There has been no prior occasion expressly to address the question whether a State may tax in a manner that discriminates between two types of interstate transactions in order to favor local commercial interests over out-of-state businesses, but the clear import of our Commerce Clause cases is that such discrimination is constitutionally impermissible. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S., at 443, held that no State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may “build up its domestic commerce by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry and business of other States”; and in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935), New York was prohibited from regulating the price of out-of-state milk purchases because the effect of that regulation would be “to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states.” Id., at 522. More recently, we noted that this “Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 145 (1970). Cf. Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S., at 72-73. Although the statutes at issue in those cases had the primary effect of prohibiting or discriminatorily burdening a resident’s purchase of out-of-state goods and services, the constitutional policy of free trade and competition that led to their demise is equally fatal to the New York transfer tax. New York’s discriminatory treatment of out-of-state sales is made possible only because some other taxable event (transfer, delivery, or agreement to sell) takes place in the State. Thus, the State is using its power to tax an in-state operation as a means of “requiring [other] business operations to be performed in the home State.” As a consequence, the flow of securities sales is diverted from the most economically efficient channels and directed to New York. This diversion of interstate commerce and diminution of free competition in securities sales are wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the Commerce Clause. IV Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold only that in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State. The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Appellants are the Boston Stock Exchange, Detroit Stock Exchange, Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange, and the PBW (Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington) Stock Exchange. The Exchanges provide facilities for their members to effect the purchase and sale of securities for their own accounts and the accounts of their customers. In the courts below the Exchanges also contended that the amendment to the transfer tax was unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They have not brought those claims to this Court and we do not address them. The Commission’s motion to dismiss was based on three grounds: (1) the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) the Exchanges did not have standing to question the constitutionality of the statute, and (3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action. All three state courts agreed that there was jurisdiction and standing, but the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the merits because the statute was constitutional. We agree, of course, that state courts of general jurisdiction have the power to decide cases involving federal constitutional rights where, as here, neither the Constitution nor statute withdraws such jurisdiction. We also agree that the Exchanges have standing under the two-part test of Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Appellants’ complaint alleged that a substantial portion of the transactions on their exchanges involved securities that are subject to the New York transfer tax, and that the higher tax on out-of-state sales of such securities diverted business from their facilities to exchanges in New York. This diversion was the express purpose of the challenged statute. See infra, at 325-328, and nn. 7, 10. The allegation establishes that the statute has caused them “injury in fact,” and that a case or controversy exists. 397 U. S., at 151-152. The Exchanges are asserting their right under the Commerce Clause’to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory taxes on their»business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right. Thus, they are “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected ... by the . . . constitutional guarantee in question.” Id., at 153. Moreover, the Exchanges brought this action also on behalf of their members. “[A]n association may have standing solely as the representative of its members ... [if it] allege[s] that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 (1975). See also National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States, 372 U. S. 246 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 458-460 (1958). The Exchanges’ complaint alleged that their members traded on their own accounts in securities subject to the New York transfer tax. The members therefore suffer an actual injury within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause, and the Exchanges satisfy the requirements for representational standing. After the decision by the New York Court of Appeals in this case, § 21 (2) (d) of the Federal Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 became effective. This amendment provides that no State may tax a change in beneficial or record ownership of securities if the change is effected through the facilities of a registered clearing house of registered transfer agent unless the change would otherwise be taxable if the facilities were not physically located in the taxing State. §21 (2) (d), 89 Stát. 161, amending § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V). A transfer agent is defined in § 3 (6) of the 3975 amendments, 89 Stat. 100, amending § 3 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78e(a)(25) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Although the Senate Committee was unclear as to whether the New York transfer tax reached such changes in ownership, the Senate Report on the 1975 amendments indicates that § 21 (2) (d) was directed to New York’s transfer tax in particular, and in general to similar taxes being considered by other States. S. Rep. No. 94r-75, p. 60 (1975). See N. Y. Tax Law § 270.5(i)-(l) (McKinney Supp. 1976). On December 1, 1975, counsel for the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance issued an .opinion that the 1975 amendments limited the types of taxable events covered by §270: “[W]here the sole event in New York State is the delivery or transfer to or by a ‘registered clearing agency’ or a ‘registered transfer agent,’ as those terms are defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there is no stock transfer tax due and owing on and after December 1, 1975. However, where a sale, agreement to sell, memorandum of sale or any other delivery or transfer takes place in New York State, the stock transfer tax due and owing thereon must be paid.” 2 CCH N. Y. Tax Rep. ¶ 57-101.605 (1976). Although the new federal law may eliminate many transactions as taxable events under §270, the constitutional questions raised by the Exchanges on this appeal still apply to the transactions that are taxable under § 270 after the 1975 amendments. The rates provided for in §270.2 range from 1.25 cents per share when the sale price of the security is_ less than $5 to the highest rate of 5 cents per share when the price is $20 or more. When no sale is involved, e. g., a gift, the rate is a constant 2.5 cents per share. In recent years, a 25% surcharge has been added to all transfer taxes. N. Y. Tax Law § 270-d (McKinney Supp. 1976). Shortly after it was first enacted, the New York transfer tax was upheld against a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment in New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 (1907). The writ of error in Hatch did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause, but both parties argued that issue before the Court. Id., at 157. In response to those arguments, Mr. Justice Holmes observed only that the particular transaction involved was intrastate and that therefore the tax as applied to the party before the Court, did not implicate the Commerce Clause. Id., a.t 161-162. As to the question of whether the statute should fall because it would also be applied to interstate transactions, the Court found that the seller lacked standing to raise that claim. The Commerce Clause question was thus left undecided. Id., at 160-161. Thirty-three j-ears later, the New York Court of Appeals held, in a 4 — 3 decision, that the transfer tax did not violate the Commerce Clause. O’Kane v. State, 283 N. Y. 439, 28 N. E. 2d 905 (1940). The challenge there was to a tax levy “upon an agreement for the sale of shares of stock which are to be sold and delivered across State lines.” Id., at 442, 28 N. E. 2d, at 906. The state court expressly noted that the tax, as then applied, was “a non-discriminatory State tax,” and that “no discrimination was practiced on interstate commerce.” Id., at 444, 447, 28 N. E. 2d, at 907, 909. In the absence of discrimination, the tax was held not to be an undue burden on commerce. In a public statement on the proposed amendment to § 270, the president of the New York Stock Exchange explained the competitive problems of his organization and urged that the transfer tax be amended to help solve them: “[T]he stock transfer tax has been the subject of extensive study by the City, State and the securities industry. These studies indicate that the New York securities markets have experienced increasing competitive problems in recent years from regional stock exchanges located in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia and Boston. Some 88% of share trading on these exchanges is in New York Stock Exchange listed securities. “From 1965 through 1967, the volume of trading on the regional exchanges increased by 73.2%. Regional ‘cross’ volume (a transaction on a regional exchange in which the broker finds both the buyer and seller) has increased by 202% in 1965-67. This indicates the loss of business by the New York markets to the regionals. As their volume continues to grow, a snowball effect develops. They become more competitive and are able to take more and more business away from New York. A loss of business to New York securities markets also means a loss of stock transfer tax revenue to New York City. “. . . However, the existing law can be amended in such a way as to ease the competitive disadvantage of the tax on New York securities markets and still preserve the revenue from the tax. “Competitive problems are particularly acute in two areas — non-resident investors and large block transactions.” Statement of Robert W. Haack, Mar. 4, 1968. The Exchanges do not challenge New York’s authority to tax residents in a greater amount than nonresidents as long as the extent of the tax burden does not depend on an out-of-state sale. The nonresident reduction and the maximum tax of § 270-a initially involved a smaller disparity between in-state and out-of-state sales. The gap was gradually increased until the current rates took effect on July 1, 1973. The relevant provisions of N. Y. Tax Law § 270-a (McKinney Supp. 1976) are as follows: “1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section two hundred seventy of this chapter on and after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-nine, the rates of tax set forth in paragraph (a) of this subdivision and the maximum amounts of tax set forth in subdivision two of this section shall apply, in the case of those sales made within this state subject to tax under section two hundred seventy and described in paragraph (a) of this subdivision and subdivision two of this section. “(a) On such sales by a nonresident during the periods set forth in the following table, the rates of tax shall be the percentages, set forth in such table, of the rates of tax provided in section two hundred seventy of this article: “2. Where any sale made within the state and subject to the tax imposed by this chapter relates to shares or certificates of the same class and issued by the same issuer the amount of tax upon any such single taxable sale shall not exceed, during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred sixty-nine and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy, the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars; during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred seventy and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-one, the sum of one thousand two hundred fifty dollars; during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-two, the sum of seven hundred fifty dollars; during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred seventy-two and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-three, the sum of five hundred dollars; and on and after July first, nineteen hundred seventy-three, the sum of three hundred fifty dollars; provided, however, that sales made within this state by any member of a securities exchange or by any registered dealer, who is permitted or required pursuant to any rules and regulations promulgated by the tax commission pursuant to the provisions of section two hundred eighty-one-a of this chapter to pay the taxes imposed by this article without the use of the stamps prescribed by this article, pursuant to one or more orders placed with the same member of a securities exchange or the same registered dealer on one day, by the same person, each relating to shares or certificates of the same class and issued by the same issuer, all of which sales are executed on the same day (regardless of whether it be the day of the placing of the orders), shall, for the purposes of this subdivision two, be considered to constitute a single taxable sale.” In his memorandum of approval of the transfer tax amendment, Governor Kockefeller explained the changing competitive patterns in the securities industry and acknowledged that § 270-a was a response to these changes: “Since the stock transfer tax was enacted in 1905, there have been far reaching changes in the securities industry, but the stock transfer tax has not been revised to keep pace with those changes. The securities industry has grown from an essentially New York industry to one of national and international scope. While the bulle of stock transfers still funnels through New York, only twelve percent of the Nation’s investors are located in the State. At the same time, competition for the New York markets has been heightened by the rise of regional stock exchanges located outside the State where more than 90 percent of trading is in securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The development of modem telecommunications and electronic computer systems has, of course, greatly expanded the capacity of the regional exchanges to challenge the New York exchanges for business. “The bill recognizes the changing character of the securities industry and the importance of its continued presence and strength for the future economic prosperity of the State and will provide long-term relief from some of the competitive pressures from outside the State. “As a result of adoption of the revisions of the stock transfer tax contained in this bill, the New York Stock Exchange has announced that it intends to remain and expand in New York and is now studying sites for a new exchange building in downtown Manhattan.” Public Papers of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller 553 (1968). Of course, the unamended § 270 did discourage sales in New York when no other taxable event would occur in that State, since out-of-state sales would not be taxed at all while in-state sales would be taxed at the full rate. Section 270-a, however, does not neutralize this competitive disadvantage of the New York exchanges. Although the reduced tax of the amendment decreases the disincentive to trade out of State, to the extent that any tax is imposed on transactions involving only an in-state sale, sales in New York are discouraged. Had New York sought to eliminate the only competitive edge enjoyed by the regional exchanges as- a result of § 270, it could have done so without burdening commerce to its sister States by simply declaring that sales would not be a taxable event. Under that system, sellers who would not otherwise be liable for the tax would not incur liability by electing to sell on a New York exchange. Because of the discrimination inherent in § 270-a, we also reject the Commission’s argument that the tax should be sustained because it is imposed on a local event at the end of interstate commerce. While it is true that, absent an undue burden on interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause does not prohibit the States from taxing the transfer of property within the State, the tax may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 347-348 (1944). As was held in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 282 (1876): “[T]he commercial power [of the Federal Government] continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin.” Even if we did not conclude that large-block sellers are likely to rely on economic rather than geographical factors in choosing an exchange, § 270-a would fall before the Commerce Clause. Whatever the current inclinations of New York investors, the Clause protects out-of-state businesses from any discriminatory burden on their interstate commercial activities. Even if the tax is not now the sole cause of New York residents’ refusal to trade on out-of-state exchanges, at the very least it reinforces their choice of an in-state exchange and is an inhibiting force to selling out of State; that inhibition is an unconstitutional barrier to the free flow of commerce. Baldwin is particularly relevant to this case. After holding that the Commerce Clause prohibits obstructions to competition between the States, Mr. Justice Cardozo expressly rejected the proposition that such obstructions may be justified as measures to assure the economic health of local industry: “If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation. “The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long ran prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” 294 U. S., at 522-523. For the same reasons that Baldwin rejected New York’s attempts to protect its dairy industry from competition from without, we now reject a similar attempt to protect New York’s securities industry. When it enacted § 270-a, the New York Legislature also enacted a saving provision such that the invalidity of any part of the amendment should not affect the enforcement of any other part. It is not clear from the saving provision whether the legislature intended that the distinction between residents and nonresidents should survive the invalidation of the discrimination between in-state and out-of-state sales. Compare 1968 N. Y. Laws, c. 827, § 10 with § 11. Construction of the saving clause is, of course, a question of state law appropriately-decided by the state courts.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KNETSCH et ux. v. UNITED STATES. No. 23. Argued October 17-18, 1960. Decided November 14, 1960. W. Lee McLane, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Ñola M. McLane. Grant W. Wiprud argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Harry Baum. Richard H. Appert, Converse Murdoch and Douglas W. McGregor filed briefs, as amici curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question of whether deductions from gross income claimed on petitioners’ 1953 and 1954 joint federal income tax returns, of $143,465 in 1953 and of $147,105 in 1954, for payments made by petitioner, Karl F. Knetsch, to Sam Houston Life Insurance Company, constituted “interest paid ... on indebtedness” within the meaning of § 23 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and § 163 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency for each year. The petitioners paid the deficiencies and brought this action for refund in the District Court for the Southern District of California. The District Court rendered judgment for the United States, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 272 F. 2d 200. Because of a suggested conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bond, 258 F. 2d 577, we granted certiorari, 361 U. S. 958. On December 11, 1953, the insurance company sold Knetsch ten 30-year maturity deferred annuity savings bonds, each in the face amount of $400,000 and bearing interest at 2compounded annually. The purchase price was $4,004,000. Knetsch gave the Company his check for $4,000, and signed $4,000,000 of nonrecourse annuity loan notes for the balance. The notes bore 3%% interest and were secured by the annuity bonds. The interest was payable in advance, and Knetsch on the same day prepaid the first year’s interest, which was $140,000. Under the Table of Cash and Loan Values made part of the bonds, their cash or loan value at December 11, 1954, the end of the first contract year, was to be $4,100,000. The contract terms, however, permitted Knetsch to borrow any excess of this value above his indebtedness without waiting until December 11, 1954. Knetsch took advantage of this provision only five days after the purchase. On December 16, 1953, he received from the company $99,000 of the $100,000 excess over his $4,000,000 indebtedness, for which he gave his notes bearing 3%% interest. This interest was also payable in advance and on the same day he prepaid the first year’s interest of $3,465. In their joint return for 1953, the petitioners deducted the sum of the two interest payments, that is $143,465, as “interest paid . . . within the taxable year on indebtedness,” under § 23 (b) of the 1939 Code. The second contract year began on December 11, 1954, when interest in advance of $143,465 was payable by Knetsch on his aggregate indebtedness of $4,099,000. Knetsch paid this amount on December 27, 1954. Three days later, on December 30, he received from the company cash in the amount of $104,000, the difference less $1,000 between his then $4,099,000 indebtedness and the cash or loan value of the bonds of $4,204,000 on December 11, 1955. He gave the company appropriate notes and prepaid the interest thereon of $3,640. In their joint return for the taxable year 1954 the petitioners deducted the sum of the two interest payments, that is $147,105, as “interest paid . . . within the taxable year on indebtedness,” under § 163 (a) of the 1954 Code. The tax years 1955 and 1956 are not involved in this proceeding, but a recital of the events of those years is necessary to complete the story of the transaction. On December 11, 1955, the start of the third contract year, Knetsch became obligated to pay $147,105 as prepaid interest on an indebtedness which now totalled $4,203,000. He paid this interest on December 28, 1955. On the same date he received $104,000 from the company. This was $1,000 less than the difference between his indebtedness and the cash or loan value of the bonds of $4,308,000 at December 11, 1956. Again he gave the company notes upon which he prepaid interest of $3,640. Petitioners claimed a deduction on their 1955 joint return for the aggregate of the payments, or $150,745. Knetsch did not go on with the transaction for the fourth contract year beginning December 11, 1956, but terminated it on December 27, 1956. His indebtedness at that time totalled $4,307,000. The cash or loan value of the bonds was the $4,308,000 value at December 11, 1956, which had been the basis of the “loan” of December 28, 1955. He surrendered the bonds and his indebtedness was canceled. He received the difference of $1,000 in cash. The contract called for a monthly annuity of $90,171 at maturity (when Knetsch would be 90 years of age) or for such smaller amount as would be produced by the cash or loan value after deduction of the then existing indebtedness. It was stipulated that if Knetsch had held the bonds to maturity and continued annually to borrow the net cash value less $1,000, the sum available for the annuity at maturity would be $1,000 ($8,388,000 cash or loan value less $8,387,000 of indebtedness), enough to provide an annuity of only $43 per month. The trial judge made findings that “[tjhere was no commercial economic substance to the . . . transaction,” that the parties did not intend that Knetsch “become indebted to Sam Houston,” that “[n]o indebtedness of [Knetsch] was created by any of the . . . transactions,” and that “[n]o economic gain could be achieved from the purchase of these bonds without regard to the tax consequences . . . His conclusion of law, based on this Court’s decision in Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, was that “[w]hile in form the payments to Sam Houston were compensation for the use or forbearance of money, they were not in substance. As a payment of interest, the transaction was a sham.” We first examine the transaction between Knetsch and the insurance company to determine whether it created an “indebtedness” within the meaning of § 23 (b) of the 1939 Code and § 163 (a) of the 1954 Code, or whether, as the trial court found, it was a sham. We put aside a finding by the District Court that Knetsch’s “only motive in purchasing these 10 bonds was to attempt to secure an interest deduction.” As was said in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465, 469: “The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. . . . But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.” When we examine “what was done” here, we see that Knetsch paid the insurance company $294,570 during the two taxable years involved and received $203,000 back in the form of “loans.” What did Knetsch get for the out-of-pocket difference of $91,570? In form he had an annuity contract with a so-called guaranteed cash value at maturity of $8,388,000, which would produce monthly annuity payments of $90,171, or substantial life insurance proceeds in the event of his death before maturity. This, as we have seen, was a fiction, because each year Knetsch’s annual borrowings kept the net cash value, on which any annuity or insurance payments would depend, at the relative pittance of $1,000. Plainly, therefore, Knetsch’s transaction with the insurance company did “not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax . . . Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F. 2d 399, 411 (dissenting opinion). For it is patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax deduction. What he was ostensibly “lent” back was in reality only the rebate of a substantial part of the so-called “interest” payments. The $91,570 difference retained by the company was its fee for providing the fagade of “loans” whereby the petitioners sought to reduce their 1953 and 1954 taxes in the total sum of $233,297.68. There may well be single-premium annuity arrrangements with nontax substance which create an “indebtedness” for the purposes of § 23 (b) of the 1939 Code and § 163 (a) of the 1954 Code. But this one is a sham. The petitioners contend, however, that the Congress in enacting § 264 of the 1954 Code authorized the deductions. They point out that § 264 (a)(2) denies a deduction for amounts paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry a single-premium annuity contract, but only as to contracts purchased after March 1,1954. The petitioners thus would attribute to Congress a purpose to allow the deduction of pre-1954 payments under transactions of the kind carried on by Knetsch with the insurance company without regard to whether the transactions created a true obligation to pay interest. Unless that meaning plainly appears we will not attribute it to Congress. “To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.” Gregory v. Helvering, supra, p. 470. We, therefore, look to the statute and materials relevant to its construction for evidence that Congress meant in § 264 (a) (2) to authorize the deduction of payments made under sham transactions entered into before 1954. We look in vain. Provisions denying deductions for amounts paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry insurance contracts are not new in the revenue acts. A provision applicable to all annuities, but not to life insurance or endowment contracts, was in the statute from 1932 to 1934, 47 Stat. 179. It was added at a time when Congress was developing a policy to deny a deduction for interest allo-cable to tax-exempt income; the proceeds of annuities were excluded from gross income up to the amount of the consideration paid in by the annuitant. See H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. The provision was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 688, when the method by which annuity payments were taken into gross income was changed in such way that more would be included. 48 Stat. 687. See S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 24. Congress then in 1942 denied a deduction for amounts paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase single-premium life insurance and endowment contracts. This provision was enacted by an amendment to the 1939 Code, 56 Stat. 827, “to close a loophole” in respect of interest allocable to partially exempt income. See Hearings before Senate Finance Committee on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 54; § 22 (b)(1) of the 1939 Code (now § 101 (a)(1) of the 1954 Code). The 1954 provision extending the denial to amounts paid on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry single-premium annuities appears to us simply to expand the application of the policy in respect of interest allocable to partially exempt income. The proofs are perhaps not as strong as in the case of life insurance and endowment contracts, but in the absence of any contrary expression of the Congress, their import is clear enough. There is first the fact that the provision was incorporated in the section covering life insurance and endowment contracts, which unquestionably was adopted to further that policy. There is second the fact that Congress’ attention was directed to annuities in 1954; the same 1954 statute again changed the basis for taking part of the proceeds of annuities into gross income. See § 72 (b) of the 1954 Code. These are signs that Congress’ long-standing concern with the problem of interest allocable to partially exempt income, and not any concern with sham transactions, explains the provision. Moreover the provision itself negates any suggestion that sham transactions were the congressional concern, for the deduction denied is of certain interest payments on actual “indebtedness.” And we see nothing in the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee Reports on § 264, H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 31; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 38, to suggest that Congress in exempting pre-1954 annuities intended to protect sham transactions. Some point is made in an amicus curiae brief of the fact that Knetsch in entering into these annuity agreements relied on individual ruling letters issued by the Commissioner to other taxpayers. This argument has never been advanced by petitioners in this case. Accordingly, we have no reason to pass upon it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The relevant words of the two sections are the same, namely that there shall be allowed as a deduction “All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness . . . We likewise put aside Knetsch's argument that, because he received ordinary income when he surrendered the annuities in 1956, he has suffered a net loss even if the contested deductions are allowed, and that therefore his motive in taking out the annuities could not have been tax avoidance. Petitioners argue further that in 10 years the net cash value of the bonds would have exceeded the amounts Knetsch paid as “interest.” This contention, however, is predicated on the wholly unlikely assumption that Knetsch would have paid off in cash the original $4,000,000 “loan.” Every court which has considered this or similar contracts has agreed with our conclusion, except the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Bond case and one District Court bound by that decision, Roderick v. United States, 59-2 U. S. T. C. ¶ 9650. See Diggs v. Commissioner, 281 F. 2d 326 (C. A. 2d Cir.), pending on petition for certiorari (later denied, post, p. 908); Emmons and Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F. 2d 294 (C. A. 3d Cir.), pending on petitions for certiorari (later denied, post, p. 908); Haggard v. United States, 59-1 U. S. T. C. ¶ 9299; Oliver L. Williams, 18 T. C. M. 205. See also Rev. Rul. 54-94, 1954r-l Cum. Bull. 53, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Wisdom in Bond. Section 264 (a) (2) provides: “(a) General Rule. — No deduction shall be allowed for— “(2) Any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a single premium life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract. “Paragraph (2) shall apply in respect of annuity contracts only as to contracts purchased after March 1, 1954” (Emphasis supplied.) The substance of the section without the italicized language was added to the 1939 Code in 1942. 56 Stat. 827. See § 23 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 179, which provided: “ (b) INTEREST. — All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness, except (1) on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations or securities (other than obligations of the United States issued after September 24, 1917, and originally subscribed for by the taxpayer) the interest upon which is wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this title, or (2) on indebtedness incurred or continued in connection with the purchasing or carrying of an annuity.” The Reports are as follows: “Under existing law, no interest deduction is allowed in the case of indebtedness incurred, or continued, to purchase a single-premium life-insurance or endowment contract. . . . “Existing law does not extend the denial of the interest deduction to indebtedness incurred to purchase single-premium annuity contracts. It has come to your committee's attention that a few insurance companies have promoted a plan for selling annuity contracts based on the tax advantage derived from omission of annuities from the treatment accorded single-premium life-insurance or endowment contracts. The annuity is sold for a nominal cash payment with a loan to cover the balance of the single-premium cost of the annuity. Interest on the loan (which may be a nonrecourse loan) is then taken as a deduction annually by the purchaser with a resulting tax saving that reduces the real interest cost below the increment in value produced by the annuity. “Your committee’s bill will deny an interest deduction in such cases but only as to annuities purchased,- after March I, 1954.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DELAWARE STATE COLLEGE et al. v. RICKS No. 79-939. Argued October 7, 1980 Decided December 15, 1980 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Btjkger, C. J., and White, BlachmtjN, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 262. SteveNS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 265. Nicholas H. Rodriguez argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Harold Schmittinger and William D. Fletcher, Jr. Judith E. Harris argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edwin S. Kneedler, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, and Lutz Alexander Prayer for the United States et al.; and by David M. Rabban and Victor J. Stone for the American Association of University Professors. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether respondent, a college professor, timely complained under the civil rights laws that he had been denied academic tenure because of his national origin. I Columbus Ricks is a black Liberian. In 1970, Ricks joined the faculty at Delaware State College, a state institution attended predominantly by blacks. In February 1973, the Faculty Committee on Promotions and Tenure (the tenure committee) recommended that Ricks not receive a tenured position in the education department. The tenure committee, however, agreed to reconsider its decision the following year. Upon reconsideration, in February 1974, the committee adhered to its earlier recommendation. The following month, the Faculty Senate voted to support the tenure committee’s negative recommendation. On March 13, 1974, the College Board of Trustees formally voted to deny tenure to Ricks. Dissatisfied with the decision, Ricks immediately filed a grievance with the Board’s Educational Policy Committee (the grievance committee), which in May 1974 held a hearing and took the matter under submission. During the pendency of the grievance, the College administration continued to plan for Ricks’ eventual termination. Like many colleges and universities, Delaware State has a policy of not discharging immediately a junior faculty member who does not receive tenure. Rather, such a person is offered a “terminal” contract to teach one additional year. When that contract expires, the employment relationship ends. Adhering to this policy, the Trustees on June 26, 1974, told Ricks that he would be offered a 1-year “terminal” contract that would expire June 30, 1975. Ricks signed the contract without ob-jeetion or reservation on September 4, 1974. Shortly thereafter, on September 12, 1974, the Board of Trustees notified Ricks that it had denied his grievance. Ricks attempted to file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 4, 1975. Under Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, however, state fair employment practices agencies have primary jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c). The EEOC therefore referred Ricks’ charge to the appropriate Delaware agency. On April 28, 1975, the state agency waived its jurisdiction, and the EEOC accepted Ricks’ complaint for filing. More than two years later, the EEOC issued a “right to sue” letter. Ricks filed this lawsuit in the District Court on September 9, 1977. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the College had discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VII and 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The District Court sustained the College’s motion to dismiss both claims as untimely. It concluded that the only unlawful employment practice alleged was the College’s decision to deny Ricks tenure, and that the limitations periods for both claims had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the President of the Board of Trustees officially notified Ricks that he would be offered a 1-year “terminal” contract. See n. 2, supra. The Title YII claim was not timely because Ricks had not filed his charge with the EEOC within 180 days after that date. Similarly, the § 1981 claim was not timely because the lawsuit had not been filed in the District Court within the applicable 3-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 605 F. 2d 710 (1979). It agreed with the District Court that Ricks’ essential allegation was that he. had been denied tenure illegally. Id., at 711. According to the Court of Appeals, however, the Title YII filing requirement, and the statute of limitations for the § 1981 claim, did not commence to run until Ricks’ “terminal” contract expired on June 30, .1975. The court reasoned: “ ‘ [A] terminated employee who is still working should not be required to consult a lawyer or file charges of discrimination against his employer as long as he is still working, even though he has been told of the employer’s present intention to terminate him in the future.’ ” Id., at 712, quoting Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F. 2d 187, 192 (CA3 1977), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 821 (1978). See Egelston v. State University College at Geneseo, 535 F. 2d 752 (CA2 1976); cf. Noble v. University of Rochester, 535 F. 2d 756 (CA2 1976). The Court of Appeals believed that the initial decision to terminate an employee sometimes might be reversed. The aggrieved employee therefore should not be expected to resort to litigation until termination actually has occurred. Prior resort to judicial or administrative remedies would be “likely to have the negative side effect of reducing that employee’s effectiveness during the balance of his or her term. Working relationships will be injured, if not sundered, and the litigation process will divert attention from the proper fulfillment of job responsibilities.” 605 F. 2d, at 712. Finally, the Court of Appeals thought that a rule focusing on the last day of employment would provide a “bright line guide both for the courts and for the victims of discrimination.” Id., at 712-713. It therefore reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for trial on the merits of Ricks’ discrimination claims. We granted certiorari. 444 U. S. 1070 (1980). For the reasons that follow, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the filing limitations periods did not commence to run until June 30, 1975. We agree instead with the District Court that both the Title YII and § 1981 claims were untimely. Accordingly, we reverse. II Title VII requires aggrieved persons to file a complaint with the EEOC “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Similarly, § 1981 plaintiffs in Delaware must file suit within three years of the unfavorable employment decision. See n. 5, supra. The limitations periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are long past. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 463-464 (1975); see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558 (1977). Determining the timeliness of Ricks’ EEOC complaint, and this ensuing lawsuit, requires us to identify precisely the “unlawful employment practice” of which he complains. Ricks now insists that discrimination motivated the College not only in denying him tenure, but also in terminating his employment on June 30, 1975. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 26, 31-32. In effect, he is claiming a “continuing violation” of the civil rights laws with the result that the limitations periods did not commence to run until his 1-year “terminal” contract expired. This argument cannot be squared with the allegations of the complaint. Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, supra, at 558. If Ricks intended to complain of a discriminatory discharge, he should have identified the alleged discriminatory acts that continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termination of his employment. But the complaint alleges no such facts. Indeed, the contrary is true. It appears that termination of employment at Delaware State is a delayed, but inevitable, consequence of the denial of tenure. In order for the limitations periods to commence with the date of discharge, Ricks would have had to allege and prove that the manner in which his employment was terminated differed discriminatorily from the manner in which the College terminated other professors who also had been denied tenure. But no suggestion has been made that Ricks was treated differently from other unsuccessful tenure aspirants. Rather, in accord with the College’s practice, Ricks was offered a 1-year “terminal” contract, with explicit notice that his employment would end upon its expiration. In sum, the only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing limitations periods therefore commenced — at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure — the eventual loss of a teaching position — did not occur until later. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly held, in a similar tenure case, that “[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F. 2d 202, 209 (1979) (emphasis added); see United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S., at 558. It is simply insufficient for Ricks to allege that his termination “gives present effect to the past illegal act and therefore perpetuates the consequences of forbidden discrimination.” Id., at 557. The emphasis is not upon the effects of earlier employment decisions; rather, it “is [upon] whether any present violation exists.” Id., at 558 (emphasis in original). III We conclude for the foregoing reasons that the limitations periods commenced to run when the tenure decision was made and Ricks was notified. The remaining inquiry is the identification of this date. A Three dates have been advanced and argued by the parties. As indicated above, Ricks contended for June 30, 1975, the final date of his “terminal” contract, relying on a continuing-violation theory. This contention fails, as we have shown, because of the absence of any allegations of facts to support it. The Court of Appeals agreed with Ricks that the relevant date was June 30, 1975, but it did so on a different theory. It found that the only alleged discriminatory act was the denial of tenure, 605 F. 2d, at 711, but nevertheless adopted the “final date of employment” rule primarily for policy reasons. Supra, at 255-256. Although this view has the virtue of simplicity, the discussion in Part II of this opinion demonstrates its fallacy as a rule of general application. Congress has decided that time limitations periods commence with the date of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Where, as here, the only challenged employment practice occurs before the termination date, the limitations periods necessarily commence to run before that date. It should not be forgotten that time-limitations provisions themselves promote important interests; “the period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S., at 463-464. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 820, 825 (1980). B The EEOC, in its amicus brief, contends in the alternative for a different date. It was not until September 12, 1974, that the Board notifiéd Ricks that his grievance had been denied. The EEOC therefore asserts that, for purposes of computing limitations periods, this was the date of the unfavorable tenure decision. Two possible lines of reasoning underlie this argument. First, it could be contended that the Trustees’ initial decision was only an expression of intent that did not become final until the grievance was denied. In support of this argument, the EEOC notes that the June 26 letter explicitly held out to Ricks the possibility that he would receive tenure if the Board sustained his grievance. See n. 2, supra. Second, even if the Board’s first decision expressed its official position, it could be argued that the pendency of the grievance should toll the running of the limitations periods. We do not find either argument to be persuasive. As to the former, we think that the Board of Trustees had made clear well before September 12 that it had formally rejected Ricks’ tenure bid. The June 26 letter itself characterized that as the Board’s "official position.” Ibid. It is apparent, of course, that the Board in the June 26 letter indicated a willingness to change its prior decision if Ricks’ grievance were found to be meritorious. But entertaining a grievance complaining of the tenure decision does not suggest that the earlier decision was in any respect tentative. The grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is made. As to the latter argument, we already have held that the pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the limitations periods. Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U. S. 229 (1976). The existence of careful procedures to assure fairness in the tenure decision should not obscure the principle that limitations periods normally commence when the employer’s decision is made. Of. id., at 234-235. C The District Court rejected both the June 30, 1975, date and the September 12, 1974, date, and concluded that the limitations periods had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the President of the Board notified Ricks that he would be offered a "terminal” contract for the 1974-1975 school year. We cannot say that this decision was erroneous. By June 26, the tenure committee had twice recommended that Ricks not receive tenure; the Faculty Senate had voted to support the tenure committee’s recommendation; and the Board of Trustees formally had voted to deny Ricks tenure. In light of this unbroken array of negative decisions, the District Court was justified in concluding that the College had established its official position — and made that position apparent to Ricks — ho later than June 26, 1974. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court so that it may reinstate the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint. Reversed and remanded. According to the Court of Appeals, the grievance committee almost immediately recommended to the Board that Ricks’ grievance be denied. 605 F. 2d 710, 711 (CA3 1979). Nothing in the record, however, reveals the date on which the grievance committee rendered its decision. The June 26 letter stated: June 26, 1974 Dr. Columbus Ricks Delaware State College Dover, Delaware Dear Dr. Ricks: On March 13, 1974, the Board of Trustees of Delaware State College officially endorsed the recommendations of the Faculty Senate at its March 11, 1974 meeting, at which time the Faculty Senate recommended that the Board not grant you tenure. As we are both aware, the Educational Policy Committee of the Board of Trustees has heard your grievance and it is now in the process of coming to a decision. The Chairman of the Educational Policy Committee has indicated to me that a decision may not be forthcoming until sometime in July. In order to comply with the 1971 Trustee Policy Manual and AAUP requirements with regard to the amount of time needed in proper notification of non-reappointment for non-tenured faculty members, the Board has no choice but to follow actions according to its official position prior to the grievance process, and thus, notify you of its intent not to renew your contract at the end of the 1974-75 school year. Please understand that we have no way of knowing what the outcome of the grievance process may be, and that this action is being taken at this time in order to be consistent with the present formal position of the Board and AAUP time requirements in matters of this kind. Should the Educational Policy Committee decide to recommend that you be granted tenure, and should the Board of Trustees concur with their recommendation, then of course, it will supersede any previous action taken by the Board. Sincerely yours, /s/ Walton H. Simpson, President Board of Trustees of Delaware State College In addition to the College itself, other defendants (petitioners in this Court) are Trustees Walton H. Simpson, William H. Davis, William G. Dix, Edward W. Hagemeyer, James C. Hardcastle, Delma Lafferty, James H. Williams, William S. Young, Burt C. Pratt, Luna I. Mishoe, and Pierre S. duPont IV (ex officio); the academic dean, M. Milford Caldwell (now deceased); the education department chairman, George W. McLaughlin; and tenure committee members Romeo C. Henderson, Harriet R. Williams, Arthur E. Bragg, Ora Bunch, Ehsan Helmy, Vera Powell, John R. Price, Herbert Thompson, W. Richard Wynder, Ulysses Washington, and Jane Laskaris. Section 1981 provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” The statute of limitations in § 1981 cases is that applicable to similar claims under state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 462 (1975). The parties in this case agree that the applicable limitations period under Delaware law is three years. Because the claims were not timely filed, we do not decide whether a claim of national origin discrimination is cognizable under § 1981. Under certain circumstances, the filing period is extended to 300 days. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e); see Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980). Sixteen paragraphs in the complaint describe in detail the sequence of events surrounding the tenure denial. Only one paragraph even mentions Ricks’ eventual departure from Delaware State, and nothing in that paragraph alleges any fact suggesting discrimination in the termination of Ricks’ employment. The complaint does allege that a variety of unusual incidents occurred during the 1974-1975 school year, including one in which the education department chairman, George W. McLaughlin, physically attacked Ricks. This incident allegedly resulted in McLaughlin’s conviction for assault. Counsel for Ricks conceded at oral argument that incidents such as this were not independent acts of discrimination, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, but at most evidence that could be used at a trial. Complaints that employment termination resulted from discrimination can present widely varying circumstances. In this case the only alleged discriminatory act is the denial of tenure sought by a college professor, with the termination of employment not occurring until a later date. The application of the general principles discussed herein necessarily must be made on a case-by-case basis. Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae 19-22; 605 F. 2d, at 712-713. The Court of Appeals also thought it was significant that a final-date-of-employment rule would permit the teacher to conclude his affairs at a school without the acrimony engendered by the filing of an administrative complaint or lawsuit. Id., at 712. It is true that “the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S., at 461. But this is the “natural effec[t] of the choice Congress has made,” ibid., in explicitly requiring that the limitations period commence with the date of the “alleged unlawful employment practice,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (c). It is conceivable that the Court of Appeals’ "final day of employment” rule might discourage colleges even from offering a “grace period,” such as Delaware State’s practice of 1-year “terminal” contracts, during which the junior faculty member not offered tenure may seek a teaching position elsewhere. If September 12 were the critical date, the § 1981 claim would be timely. Counting from September 12, the Title VII claim also would be timely if Ricks is entitled to 300 days, rather than 180 days, in which to file with the EEOC. In its brief before this Court, the EEOC as amicus curiae noted that Delaware is a State with its own fair employment practices agency. According to the EEOC, therefore, Ricks was entitled to 300 days to file his complaint. See n. 7, supra. Because we hold that the time-limitations periods commenced to run no later than June 26, 1974, we need not decide whether Ricks was entitled to 300 days to file under Title VII. Counting from the June 26 date, Ricks’ filing with the EEOC was not timely even with the benefit of the 300-day period. See also B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 235 (1979 Supp.), and cases cited therein. We do not suggest that aspirants for academic tenure should ignore available opportunities to request reconsideration. Mere requests to reconsider, however, cannot extend the limitations periods applicable to the civil rights laws. We recognize, of course, that the limitations periods should not commence to run so soon that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil rights statutes. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 761 (1979); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 526-527 (1972). But, for the reasons we have stated, there can be no claim here that Ricks was not abundantly forewarned. In NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U. S. 672, 677 (1980), we noted that university boards of trustees customarily rely on the professional expertise of the tenured faculty, particularly with respect to decisions about hiring, tenure, termination, and promotion. Thus, the action of the Board of Trustees on March 13, 1974, affirming the faculty recommendation, was entirely predictable. The Board’s letter of June 26, 1974, simply repeated to Ricks the Board’s official position and acknowledged the pendency of the grievance through which Ricks hoped to persuade the Board to change that position. We need not decide whether the District Court correctly focused on the June 26 date, rather than the date the Board communicated to Ricks its unfavorable tenure decision made at the March 13, 1974, meeting. As we have stated, see n. 13, supra, both the Title VII and § 1981 complaints were not timely filed even counting from the June 26 date.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MICHIGAN CANNERS & FREEZERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AND BARGAINING BOARD et al. No. 82-1577. Argued March 19, 1984 Decided June 11, 1984 Joseph G. Scoville argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Ernest M. Sharpe and JonD. Botsford. John H. Garvey argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on brief were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Geller. James A. White argued the cause for appellees and filed a brief for appellee Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. With him on the brief were Theodore W. Swift and Michael J. Schmedlen. Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Charles D. Hackney, Henry J. Boynton, and Michael J. Moquin, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for appellee Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Frozen Food Institute by James F. Rill and Norman G. Knopf; and for the National Food Processors Association by H. Edward Dunkelberger, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation by John J. Rademacher and C. David Mayfield; and for the California Tomato Grower’s Association et al. by Gerald D. Marcus. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. A perceived need to help the American farmer in his economic relations with large and powerful agricultural processors has moved Congress and various States to enact laws designed to bolster the farmer’s bargaining power when bringing his goods to market. This case involves two such laws: the federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967 and the State of Michigan’s Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act (Michigan Act). The question presented is whether certain provisions of the Michigan Act, which accord agricultural cooperative associations exclusive bargaining authority for the sale of agricultural products, are pre-empted by the federal Act. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the Michigan Act is not pre-empted. 416 Mich. 706, 332 N. W. 2d 134 (1982). We noted probable jurisdiction, 464 U. S. 912 (1983), and now reverse. h — 1 <C The federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA), 82 Stat. 93, 7 U. S. C. §2301 et seq., protects the right of farmers and other producers of agricultural commodities to join cooperative associations through which to market their products. Responding to “the growing concentration of power in the hands of fewer and larger buyers [of agricultural products],” S. Rep. No. 474, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1967), Congress enacted the AFPA to rectify a perceived imbalance in bargaining position between producers and processors of such products. Although the Act’s principal purpose is to protect individual producers from interference by processors when deciding whether to belong to a producers’ association, the Act also protects the producer from coercion by associations of producers. The AFPA thus provides that it is unlawful for either a processor or a producers’ association to engage in practices that interfere with a producer’s freedom to choose whether to bring his products to market himself or to sell them through a producers’ cooperative association. 7 U. S. C. §2303. Specifically, § 2303(a) forbids “handlers”— defined to include both processors and producers’ associations — to “coerce any producer in the exercise of his right to join and belong to or to refrain from joining or belonging to an association of producers.” Similarly, § 2303(c) forbids handlers to “coerce or intimidate any producer to enter into, maintain, breach, cancel, or terminate a membership agreement or marketing contract with an association of producers or a contract with a handler.” The Michigan Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §290.701 et seq. (1984), also designed to facilitate collective action among producers, includes the same prohibitions as the federal Act. It goes beyond the federal statute, however, by extensively regulating the activities of producers’ associations. Most importantly, the Michigan Act establishes a state-administered system by which producers’ associations are organized and certified as exclusive bargaining agents for all producers of a particular commodity. §§290.703, 290.707. Under Michigan’s system, if an association’s membership constitutes more than 50% of the producers of a particular commodity, and its members’ production accounts for more than 50% of the commodity’s total production, the association may apply to the state Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board for accreditation as the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of that particular commodity. § 290.707(c). When the Board accredits an association as the agent for the producers of a particular commodity, all producers of that commodity, regardless of whether they have chosen to become members of the association, must pay a service fee to the association and must abide by the terms of the contracts the association negotiates with processors. §§290.710(1), 290.713(1). Thus, the Michigan Act creates an “agency shop” arrangement among agricultural producers whenever there is majority support for such an arrangement among the producers of a particular commodity. B The Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (MACMA), a producers’ association accredited under the Michigan Act, is the sole sales and bargaining representative for asparagus producers in the State. In 1974, as permitted by the Michigan Act, MACMA negotiated contracts on behalf of Michigan asparagus growers to sell the 1974 asparagus crop. In response, appellants Dukesherer Farms and Ferris Pierson, asparagus growers that would be bound by the contract, along with the Michigan Canners & Freezers Association, Inc., an association of asparagus processors, sued MACMA in state court seeking a declaratory judgment that those provisions of the Michigan Act requiring service fees and mandatory adherence to an association-negotiated contract are pre-empted by the AFPA. The Supreme Court of Michigan rejected appellants’ claim, holding that the Michigan Act operated in an area that the federal Act did not regulate. 416 Mich. 706, 332 N. W. 2d 134 (1976). Specifically, the Michigan court held that the federal Act prohibited only processor misconduct, whereas the challenged portions of the Michigan Act regulated producers’ activities. We disagree. II Federal law may pre-empt state law in any of three ways. First, in enacting the federal law, Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it intends to pre-empt state law. E. g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95-96 (1983). Second, even in the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy an entire field of regulation, in which case the States must leave all regulatory activity in that area to the Federal Government. E. g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Finally, if Congress has not displaced state regulation entirely, it may nonetheless pre-empt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn., supra, at 153. It is the last basis of pre-emption that applies in this case. The AFPA contains no pre-emptive language; nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of agricultural-product marketing. Indeed, the Act states that it “shall not be construed to change or modify existing State law.” 7 U. S. C. §2305(d). And, as this Court has recognized, “the supervision of the readying of foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a matter of peculiarly local concern.” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., supra, at 144. Appellants contend that the service-fee and mandatory-representation provisions of the Michigan Act frustrate the purpose and objective of the AFPA by imposing on unwilling producers an exclusive bargaining arrangement with associations. In their view, although Congress’ chief interest in enacting the AFPA was to facilitate the growth of agricultural cooperative associations, an equally important congressional objective was to preserve the free choice of producers to join associations or to remain independent. The Michigan Act, appellants contend, deprives producers of that choice and allows associations, in effect, to coerce producers into association affiliation. A We turn first to the wording of the AFPA. The Act begins with a finding that “the marketing and bargaining position of individual farmers will be adversely affected unless they are free to join together voluntarily in cooperative organizations as authorized by law.” §2301 (emphasis added). More significantly, however, the theme of voluntariness is carried through to the provisions of the Act that define those practices that are prohibited. Thus, in addition to forbidding various practices that could discourage producers from joining associations, the Act explicitly makes unlawful the coercion of a producer “in the exercise of his right ... to refrain from joining or belonging to an association of producers,” and the coercion of a producer to “enter into [or] maintain ... a membership agreement or marketing contract with an association of producers. ” § § 2303(a) and (c) (emphasis added). Moreover, by defining the term “handler” to include producers’ associations as well as processors of agricultural products, see supra, at 464-465, the Act prohibits interference by the former to the same extent that it prohibits interference by the latter. In short, just as the Act forbids processors to interfere in a producer’s decision to become or remain affiliated with an association, it also forbids an association of producers to interfere in that decision by coercing producers to belong to, or participate in a marketing contract with, the association. B Congress’ intent to shield producers from coercion by both processors and producers’ associations is confirmed by the legislative history of the AFPA, which reveals that the question of the producer’s free choice was a central focus of congressional attention during the passage of the Act. Although the AFPA began as a bill aimed solely at the threat of processor coercion, its orientation shifted as it progressed through Congress to one of sheltering the producer from coercion in either direction. The bill originally introduced in the Senate, S. 109, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), did not explicitly protect the producer’s right to remain independent from an association and for that reason provoked considerable criticism in the hearings that followed. Critics of the bill offered several reasons for prohibiting association coercion to the same extent as processor coercion. First, some producers stated that they preferred to remain independent because they believed they could earn more money if they marketed their products themselves. Second, processors testified that unless associations were also prohibited from pressuring producers, there would be a serious risk that the associations would attain a bargaining position of monopoly proportion, to the detriment of not only the processor, but the consumer as well. Third, witnesses testified that a prohibition on interference by producers’ associations would promote competition on the merits among associations seeking membership. Fourth, many handlers testified that they would be disadvantaged in the quality of the product they could buy as well as the price they would have to pay if producers’ associations were permitted substantially to diminish the ranks of the independent producer. Finally, witnesses testified that the producer’s right to remain independent of an association was simply “a basic American right” deserving of protection. In response to these concerns, the Senate passed an amended bill that prohibited coercion by both processors and associations, thereby protecting the producer’s right to remain independent. The new bill opened with a legislative finding that “the marketing and bargaining position of individual farmers will be adversely affected unless they are free to join together or not join together in cooperative organizations as authorized by law.” 113 Cong. Rec. 21410 (1967) (emphasis added). The bill went on to provide: “It shall be unlawful for any handler or association of producers knowingly to engage ... in the following practices: “(a) To coerce any producer in the exercise of his right to join and belong to or to refrain from joining or belonging to an association of producers . . . ; or “(c) To coerce or intimidate any producer or other person to enter into [or] maintain ... a membership agreement or marketing contract with an association of producers or a contract with a handler . . . Ibid, (emphasis added). The Senate Report explaining these provisions of the bill stated: “The objective of the bill is to protect the producer in the exercise of a free choice. Many witnesses suggested that the bill did not fully accomplish this purpose, because it protected the producer only from improper pressure not to join an association. To protect his free choice he should also be protected from improper pressure in the other direction, that is, improper pressure to join an association. The committee did not have before it any testimony to indicate that producers were being subjected to any improper pressure to join associations, but was convinced by the logic of the situation that if the objective is to protect the producer and afford him a free choice, the bill should protect him from pressure in either direction.” S. Rep. No. 474, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967). Similarly, when Senator Aiken introduced the bill on the floor of the Senate, he stated that the bill “is designed to protect the agricultural producer’s right to decide, free from improper pressures, whether or not he wishes to belong to a marketing or bargaining association.” 113 Cong. Rec. 21411 (1967). The Senate bill was next referred to the House Committee on Agriculture, ibid., which heard testimony from producers’ associations opposed to their inclusion in the prohibited-practices section of the bill. The Committee rejected their plea, however, and declined to adopt a proposed amendment to the bill that would have limited its application to processors. H. R. Rep. No. 824, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1967). Ultimately, the House deleted the explicit reference to associations of producers from the prohibited-practices section of the bill, 114 Cong. Rec. 7449 (1968), and it amended the legislative findings and declaration of policy to read: “the marketing and bargaining position of individual farmers will be adversely affected unless they are free to join together voluntarily in cooperative organizations as authorized by law.” Id., at 7469 (emphasis added). In so doing, however, the House indicated that it did not intend to alter the substance of the bill. Representative Sisk explained: “Since the bill already makes clear that associations of producers are not excluded from the term ‘handler,’ the phrase [‘association of producers’ in the prohibited-practices section] is redundant and could be misconstrued as unfairly pointing the finger of accusation to associations of producers. This is not the intent; and while my amendments do not change the purpose or basic meaning of the bill, they make misinterpretation more difficult.” Id., at 7464. Similarly, in reference to the proposed amendment, Representative Latta stated that “I want the record to clearly show that our farmers under the present language of this bill. . . have the right not to join these associations if they so choose.” Id., at 7449. In response to Representative Latta, Representative Poage, Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, stated: “It was clearly the opinion of the entire committee that there was not any intention or desire to give anybody the right to discriminate against anybody else because of his failure to join any of these associations. “I cannot see that the amendments do anything more than to make the matter read a little differently and a little more satisfactorily, to certain groups, without changing in one iota, so far as I can see, the legal effect of the legislation. “I do not think taking out the words in numerous places — ‘associations of producers’ — will in anywise change the legal effect.” Id, at 7449-7450. Finally, highlighting its intent to prohibit coerced affiliation with associations, the House amended the definition of the term “handler” to include any association “contracting or negotiating contracts or other arrangements, written or oral, with or on behalf of producers or associations of producers.” Id., at 7465, 7469 (emphasis added). The Senate agreed to the House amendments without debate. Id., at 8419. Hence, in passing S. 109, both the House and the Senate unequivocally expressed an intent to prohibit producers’ associations from coercing a producer to agree to membership or any other agency relationship that would impinge on the producer’s independence. It would appear, therefore, that despite the fact that the Michigan Act and the AFPA share the goal of augmenting the producer’s bargaining power, the Michigan Act nonetheless conflicts with the AFPA by establishing “accredited” associations that wield the power to coerce producers to sell their products according to terms established by the association and to force producers to pay a service fee for the privilege. C The Michigan Supreme Court held that “[w]hile §2303 makes it unlawful for a handler to coerce a producer to ‘join or belong to’ an association, it does not forbid a state from requiring exclusive representation of individual producers where a producer majority sees fit.” 416 Mich., at 719, 332 N. W. 2d, at 139. The Michigan Act, however, empowers producers’ associations to do precisely what the federal Act forbids them to do. Once an association reaches a certain size and receives its accreditation, it is authorized to bind nonmembers, without their consent, to the marketing contracts into which it enters with processors. In effect, therefore, an accredited association operating under the Michigan Act may coerce a producer to “enter into [or] maintain... a marketing contract with an association of producers or a contract with a handler” — a clear violation of § 2303(c). In addition, although the Michigan Act does not compel a producer to join an association, it binds him to the association’s marketing contracts, forces him to pay fees to the association, and precludes him from marketing his goods himself. See n. 6, supra. In practical effect, therefore, the Michigan Act imposes on the producer the same incidents of association membership with which Congress was concerned in enacting § 2303(a). In conclusion, because the Michigan Act authorizes producers’ associations to engage in conduct that the federal Act forbids, it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67. To that extent, therefore, the Michigan Act is pre-empted by the AFPA, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is reversed. It is so ordered. Title 7 U. S. C. § 2302(b) defines the term “producer” to mean “a person engaged in the production of agricultural products as a farmer, planter, rancher, dairyman, fruit, vegetable, or nut grower.” Under § 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U. S. C. § 291, and § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 17, most activities of agricultural cooperatives were already exempt from the antitrust laws. Thus, producers already had a legal right to belong to such associations. The AFPA went further than the prior Acts by protecting the right against economic coercion. The term “association of producers,” also referred to herein as “producers’ associations,” is defined to mean “any association of producers of agricultural products engaged in marketing, bargaining, shipping, or processing as defined in section 1141(j) of title 12, or in section 291 of this title.” 7 U. S. C. § 2302(c). The term “handler” generally refers to buyers and processors of agricultural products. As the AFPA evolved through the legislative process, however, and Congress decided to apply most of its prohibitions to producers’ associations as well as to handlers, Congress expanded the definition of “handler” to include associations of producers. Thus 7 U. S. C. § 2302(a) provides: “The term ‘handler’ means any person engaged in the business or practice of (1) acquiring agricultural products from producers or associations of producers for processing or sale; or (2) grading, packaging, handling, storing, or processing agricultural products received from producers or associations of producers; or (3) contracting or negotiating contracts or other arrangements, written or oral, with or on behalf of producers or associations of producers with respect to the production or marketing of any agricultural product; or (4) acting as an agent or broker for a handler in the performance of any function or act specified in clause (1), (2), or (3) of this paragraph” (emphasis added). In addition, 7 U. S. C. § 2302(d) provides that “the term ‘person’ includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations” (emphasis added). The term “processor” is used herein to refer to all “handlers” under the federal Act except producers’ associations acting in their capacity as marketing representatives of producers. Section 2303 provides in full: “It shall be unlawful for any handler knowingly to engage or permit any employee or agent to engage in the following practices: “(a) To coerce any producer in the exercise of his right to join and belong to or to refrain from joining or belonging to an association of producers, or to refuse to deal with any producer because of the exercise of his right to join and belong to such an association; or “(b) To discriminate against any producer with respect to price, quantity, quality, or other terms of purchase, acquisition, or other handling of agricultural products because of his membership in or contract with an association of producers; or “(c) To coerce or intimidate any producer to enter into, maintain, breach, cancel, or terminate a membership agreement or marketing contract with an association of producers or a contract with a handler; or “(d) To pay or loan money, give any thing of value, or offer any other inducement or reward to a producer for refusing to or ceasing to belong to an association of producers; or “(e) To make false reports about the finances, management, or activities of associations of producers or handlers; or “(f) To conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other person to do, or aid or abet the doing of, any act made unlawful by this chapter.” Section 290.707 provides in pertinent part: “An association shall be accredited upon determination by the board that the association meets all of the following: “(c) The association has marketing and bargaining contracts for the current or next marketing period with more than 50% of the producers of an agricultural commodity who are in the bargaining unit and these contracts cover more than 50% of the quantity of that commodity produced by producers in the bargaining unit. The board may determine the quantity produced by the bargaining unit using information on production in prior marketing periods, current market information, and projections on production during the current market periods. The board shall exclude from that quantity any quantity of the agricultural commodity contracted by pro-dueers with producer owned and controlled processing cooperatives and any quantity produced by handlers. An association whose main purpose is bargaining but which processes a surplus into a form which is not the subject of bargaining is not a processing cooperative. The contracts with members shall specify the agricultural commodity and that the members have appointed the association as their exclusive agent in negotiations with handlers for prices and other terms of trade with respect to the sale and marketing of the agricultural commodity and obligate them to dispose of their production or holdings of the agricultural commodity through or at the direction of the association.” The Michigan Act also provides a mechanism whereby producers of various commodities are divided into “bargaining units” so that, once an association is accredited, it represents essentially 100% of the production of the commodity produced by its members. Thus § 290.706 provides: “(1) The board shall determine whether a proposed bargaining unit is appropriate. This determination shall be made upon the petition of an association representing not less than 10% of the producers of the commodity eligible for membership in the proposed bargaining unit as defined by the association. An association with an overlapping definition of bargaining unit may, upon the presentation of a petition by not less than 10% of the producers eligible for membership in the overlapping bargaining unit, contest the proposed bargaining unit. . . . “(2) In making its determination, the board shall define as appropriate the largest bargaining unit in terms of the quantity of the agricultural commodity produced, the definition of the agricultural commodity, geographic area covered and number of producers included as is consistent with the following criteria: “(a) The community of interest of the producers included; “(b) The potential serious conflicts of interests among members of the proposed unit; “(c) The effect of exclusions on the capacity of the association to effectively bargain for the bargaining unit as defined; “(d) The kinds, types and subtypes of products to be classed together as agricultural commodity for which the bargaining unit is proposed; “(e) Whether the producers eligible for membership in the proposed bargaining unit meet the definition of “producer” for the agricultural commodity involved; “(f) The wishes of the producers; “(g) The pattern of past marketing of the commodity.” Although the Michigan Act does not explicitly prohibit a producer represented by an accredited association from negotiating directly with a processor, it does prohibit the processor from negotiating with such a producer. § 290.704(l)(h). The Michigan Act thus effectively eliminates direct dealing between a producer that is represented by an accredited association and a processor. The bargaining unit for which MACMA is accredited includes all Michigan farmers who produced a certain minimum quantity of asparagus during a defined marketing period. The Michigan Canners & Freezers Association, Inc., is an association of fruit and vegetable processors whose members process asparagus. Duke-sherer Farms, Inc. is a corporation engaged in asparagus farming. And Ferris Pierson is an individual engaged in asparagus farming. Appellee MACMA argues that this provision eliminates the preemptive effect the AFPA might otherwise have on the Michigan Act, despite the fact that the Michigan Act was enacted after the enactment of the AFPA. Brief for Appellee MACMA 8-14. MACMA contends that at the time of the passage of the AFPA, California’s Agricultural Prorate Act, upheld by this Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), contained provisions “similar” to the provisions of the Michigan Act. Even if we were to accept MACMA’s interpretation of § 2305(d), however, this argument is unpersuasive. The California Prorate Act bears no relevant similarity to the Michigan Act. The California Act provides for the orderly marketing of certain commodities by imposing marketing plans that restrict the quantity of a commodity that farmers may produce, regulate the flow of commodities to market, and establish grade and quality requirements. The basic goal of the California Act, as identified in Parker v. Brown, is to minimize the adverse effects of a market surplus. 317 U. S., at 355. Appellants argue that the AFPA accords processors the right to deal with producers individually and that the Michigan Act deprives processors of that right. This conflict, they contend, provides an additional basis upon which to decide that the Michigan Act is pre-empted. In light of our disposition of appellants’ primary claim, however, we need not address that question. See, e. g., Agricultural Producers Marketing Act: Hearings on S. 109 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 144 (statement of Earl W. Kintner, National Tax Equality Association), 173-183 (statement of Paul L. Phillips) (1967) (hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings). See, e. g., Discrimination Against Members of Farmer Cooperatives:Hearings on S. 109 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 135 (1966) (statement of A. Starke Taylor Jr., Independent Cotton Industries Association) (hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Hearings); 1967 Senate Hearings, at 110, 113-114 (statement of W. W. Holding III, American Cotton Shippers Association), 151 (statement of Earl W. Kintner, National Tax Equality Association), 196 (statement of Irving Isaacson, Maine Poultry Associates). See, e.g., 1966 Senate Hearings, at 187 (statement of Harry L. Graham, National Grange). See, e. g., 1967 Senate Hearings, at 69 (statement of Edward Brown Williams, National Association of Frozen Food Packers), 91-92 (statement of G. Ted Cameron, National Broiler Council). 1967 Senate Hearings, at 10-11 (statement of Sen. Williams). See, e. g., 1966 Senate Hearings, at 146 (statement of Donald G. Smith, Texas Independent Ginners Association), 196-197 (statement of Edward Dunkel-berger, National Canners Association). In addition, much of the testimony focused on the case of vertically integrated producers’ associations that process their members’ products. As several witnesses explained, because such associations compete in the processing market, the one-sided orientation of the bill provided these associations with an unfair competitive advantage over other processors. Indeed, many of these processors feared that the bill would, for that reason, drive them entirely out of business. See, e. g., id., at 135 (statement of A. Starke Taylor, Jr., Independent Cotton Industries Association), 138-140 (statement of Paul L. Courtney, National Association of Wholesalers); 1967 Senate Hearings, at 122-123 (statement of Herman Eubank, Texas Independent Ginners Association). The Michigan Act, however, effectively excludes vertically integrated associations from the accreditation process. In calculating the representational strength of an association seeking accreditation, the Michigan Act provides that “[t]he board shall exclude from [the total quantity of a commodity produced] any quantity of the agricultural commodity contracted by producers with producer owned and controlled processing cooperatives and any quantity produced by handlers.” § 290.707(c). See n. 5, supra. § 4. Section 4(d), which addresses the provision of “inducements and rewards” to producers, applies only to those seeking to have a producer refuse or cease to belong to an association, an approach that was ultimately adopted in the AFPA. See 7 U. S. C. § 2303(d). The Senate Report explained that “[t]he association of producers should not be prohibited from offering inducements to producers to belong to an association, since it is quite proper for an association to pursue vigorously the voluntary organization of farmers in its attempt to secure a better bargaining position for farmers.” S. Rep. No. 474, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1967). Agricultural Fair Trade Practices: Hearings on S. 109 before the House Committee on Agriculture, 90th Cong,. 1st Sess., 66-67 (statement of Harry L. Graham, National Grange), 79 (statement of Tony T. Dechant, National Farmers Union), 89-90 (statement of Robert N. Hampton, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives), 109-110 (statement of Ralph B. Bunje, California Canning Peach Association) (1967). The Senate bill had stated that “the marketing and bargaining position of individual farmers will be adversely affected unless they are free to join together or not join together in cooperative organizations as authorized by law.” 113 Cong. Rec. 21410 (1967) (emphasis added). Indeed, throughout the legislative debate on S. 109, an interest in protecting the producer from coercion by either processors or producers was frequently expressed. For example, Representative Poage, Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, stated: “In the House we felt it could be just as offensive to have discrimination against producers because of their lack of membership as to have discrimination against them because of their membership. It was basically that we wanted to make this bill apply in both directions — to make of it a two-way street — to make of it a protector of the right of the producer to determine for himself whether he cared to or did not care to become a member of a cooperative. . . We made of the original legislation a two-way proposal which would actually assure to any producer the right to belong or not to belong to a cooperative.” 114 Cong. Rec. 7451 (1968). Similarly, Representative May stated: “There was no one on the committee, either in testimony or in our discussion, that in any way wanted to confuse anyone about the farmer’s right not to join an organization when he did not wish to do so. Actually that is spelled out in the prohibited practices ... of the bill . . . when we say: To coerce any producer in the exercise of his right to join and belong to or to refrain from joining or belonging to an association of producers.” Id., at 7450. And Representative Latta stated that “the farmers of this Nation will still have the right... to say to an association, T do not want to join your association and you cannot force me into it.’ ” Ibid. Appellees attempt to draw an analogy between this case and cases covered by the “state-action exemption” to the federal antitrust laws. Brief for Appellee Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board 26-36; Brief for Appellee MACMA 22-31. The state-action exemption, however, is based on an interpretation of the antitrust laws and therefore has no direct application here. See, e. g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Moreover, the Michigan Act does not provide for the type of active state involvement in the market that the state-action exemption would require even if it were applicable. Because the Michigan Act is cast in permissive rather than mandatory terms — an association may, but need not, act as exclusive bargaining representative — this is not a case in which it is impossible for an individual to comply with both state and federal law. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. v. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al. No. 99-1257. Argued November 7, 2000 Decided February 27, 2001 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and IV of which were unanimous, Part II of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., and Part III of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 486. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 487. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 490. Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 99-1257 and federal respondents in No. 99-1426. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jeffrey P. Minear, Christopher S. Vaden, David J. Kaplan, Mary F. Edgar, Gary S. Guzy, Gerald K. Gleason, and Michael L. Goo. Edward W. Warren argued the cause for American Trucking Associations et al., respondents in No. 99-1257 and cross-petitioners in No. 99-1426. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey B. Clark, Daryl Joseffer, Charles Fried, Robin S. Conrad, Beth L. Law, Robert S. Digges, Gary H. Baise, David M. Friedland, Erika Z. Jones, Timothy S. Bishop, Jan S. Amundson, Dimetria G. (Jim) Daskal, Douglas I. Greenhaus, and Chet M. Thompson. Judith L. French, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for respondents State of Ohio et al. in No. 99-1257. With her on the brief in No. 99-1257 and on the briefs for State of Ohio et al., respondents in support of cross-petitioners in No. 99-1426, were Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, Elise W Porter, Frank J. Reed, Jr., and James G. Tassie, Assistant Attorneys General, Mark J. Rudolph, Jennifer M. Gran-holm, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas Casey, Solicitor General, and Alan F. Hoffman and Pamela J. Stevenson, Assistant Attorneys General. Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Edward G. Bohlen, Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Heinzerling, John J. Farmer, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Howard L. Geduldig and John R. Renella, Deputy Attorneys General, filed briefs for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al., respondents in support of petitioners in No. 99-1257 and respondents in No. 99-1426. Howard I. Fox filed briefs for the American Lung Association, respondent in support of petitioners in No. 99-1257 and respondent in No. 99-1426. Henry V. Nickel, F. William Brownell, Lucinda Minton Langworthy, David E. Menotti, William F. Pedersen, Jeffrey A. Knight, G. William Frick, M. Elizabeth Cox, Russel S. Frye, Richard Wasserstrom, Grant Crandall, David F Zoll, Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, Julie Becker, Harold P. Quinn, Jr., Newman R. Porter, David M. Flannery, and Kurt E. Blase filed briefs for Appalachian Power Co. et al., respondents in No. 99-1257 and respondents in support of cross-petitioners in No. 99-1426. Robert E. Yuhnke filed a brief for Citizens for Balanced Transportation et al., respondents in No. 99-1426. Together with No. 99-1426, American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. v. Whitman, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General, Daniel X. Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, and Lisa Feiner and J. Jared Snyder, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Lock-yer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Philip McLaughlin of New Hampshire, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, and William H. Sorrell of Vermont; for the State of North Carolina by Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, Daniel C. Oakley, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Marc D. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General; for the American Boiler Manufacturers Association by Gene E. Godley and Shannon H. Ratliff II; and for the American Crop Protection Association et al. by Herbert L. Fenster and Lawrence S. Ebner. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora P. Berger, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Susan L. Durbin and Sean B. Hecht, Deputy Attorneys General, Rickard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Andrew Ket-terer, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Patricia Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Preeta D. Bansal, Solicitor General, and Daniel X. Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and Christine 0. Gregoire, Attorney General of Washington; for the Commonwealth of Virginia by Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, William Hurd, Solicitor General, Roger L. Chaffe, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Stewart T. Leeth, Assistant Attorney General; for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Douglas R. Cox, and Mark A. Perry; for the Association of American Physicians & Surgeons et al. by Erik S. Jaffe; for the Clean Air Trust et al. by Christopher H. Schroeder; for the Lincoln Institute for Research and Education et al. by William J. Olson, John S. Miles, Herbert W. Titus, and Lawrence J. Straw, Jr.; for the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc. et al. by David Schoenbrod and Marci A Hamilton; for the United States Public Interest Research Group Education Fund by James Keith Weeks and David M. Driesen; and for Senator James H. Inhofe et al. by Paul Rosenzweig. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et al. by Robert E. Litan; for Alcan Aluminum Corp. by Lawrence A. Salibra II; for Environmental Defense et al. by Richard L. Revesz and Ann Brewster Weeks; for General Electric Co. by Laurence H. Tribe, Jonathan S. Massey, Thomas C. Goldstein, Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Brackett B. Denniston III, and Matthew Tanzer; for the Institute for Justice et al. by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, Deborah Simpson, Timothy Lynch, and Ronald D. Rotunda; for Intel Corp. et al. by Richard R Bress, Claudia M. O’Brien, and Gregory S. Slater; for the Mercatus Center by Ernest Gelhorn and Ann G. Weymouth; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by M. Reed Hopper; for People for the U. S. A. et al. by Christopher C. Horner; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Paul D. Clement, Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar; for Senator Orrin Hatch et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Alan Charles Raul, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Lloyd N. Cutler, and C. Boyden Gray; and for Gary E. Marchant et al. by Cary Coglianese. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present the following questions: (1) Whether § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (2) Whether the Administrator may consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under § 109(b)(1). (3) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EPA’s interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7501-7515, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS. (4) If so, whether the EPA’s interpretation of that part was permissible. I . Section 109(a) of the CAA, as added, 84 Stat. 1679, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 7409(a), requires the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate NAAQS for each air pollutant for which “air quality criteria” have been issued under § 108, 42 U. S. C. § 7408. Once a NAAQS has been promulgated, the Administrator must review the standard (and the criteria on which it is based) “at five-year intervals” and make “such revisions ... as may be appropriate.” CAA § 109(d)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 7409(d)(1). These cases arose when, on July 18, 1997, the Administrator revised the NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone. See NAAQS for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38652 (codified in 40 CFR §50.7 (1999)); NAAQS for Ozone, id., at 38856 (codified in 40 CFR §§50.9, 50.10 (1999)). American Trucking Associations, Inc., and its corespondents in No. 99-1257 — which include, in addition to other private companies, the States of Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia — challenged the new standards in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1). The District of Columbia Circuit accepted some of the challenges and rejected others. It agreed with the No. 99-1257 respondents (hereinafter respondents) that § 109(b)(1) delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 1, because it found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no “intelligible principle” to guide the agency’s exercise of authority. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 175 F. 3d 1027, 1034 (1999). The court thought, however, that the EPA could perhaps avoid the unconstitutional delegation by adopting a restrictive construction of § 109(b)(1), so instead of declaring the section unconstitutional the court remanded the NAAQS to the agency. Id., at 1038. (On this delegation point, Judge Tatel dissented, finding the statute constitutional as written. Id., at 1057.) On the second issue that the Court of Appeals addressed, it unanimously rejected respondents’ argument that the court should depart from the rule of Lead Industries Assn., Inc. v. EPA, 647 F. 2d 1130, 1148 (CADC 1980), that the EPA may not consider the cost of implementing a NAAQS in setting the initial standard. It also rejected respondents’ argument that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Sub-part 2, of Title I of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7511-7511f, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard. The court held that although Subpart 2 constrained the agency’s method of implementing the new standard, 175 F. 3d, at 1050, it did not prevent the EPA from revising the standard and designating areas of the country as “nonattainment areas,” see 42 U. S. C. § 7407(d)(1), by reference to it, 175 F. 3d, at 1047-1048. On the EPA’s petition for rehearing, the panel adhered to its position on these points, and unanimously rejected the EPA’s new argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to reach the implementation question because there had been no “final” implementation action. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. EPA, 195 F. 3d 4 (CADC 1999). The Court of Appeals denied the EPA’s suggestion for rehearing en banc, with five judges dissenting. Id., at 13. The Administrator and the EPA petitioned this Court for review of the first, third, and fourth questions described in the first paragraph of this opinion. Respondents conditionally cross-petitioned for review of the second question. We granted certiorari on both petitions, 529 U. S. 1129 (2000); 530 U. S. 1202 (2000), and scheduled the cases for argument in tandem. We have now consolidated the cases for purposes of decision. II In Lead Industries Assn., Inc. v. EPA, supra, at 1148, the District of Columbia Circuit held that “economic considerations [may] play no part in the promulgation of ambient air quality standards under Section 109” of the CAA. In the present cases, the court adhered to that holding, 175 F. 3d, at 1040-1041, as it had done on many other occasions. See, e. g., American Lung Assn. v. EPA, 134 F. 3d 388, 389 (1998); NRDC v. Administrator, EPA, 902 F. 2d 962, 973 (1990), vacated in part on other grounds, NRDC v. EPA, 921 F. 2d 326 (CADC 1991); American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F. 2d 1176, 1185 (1981). Respondents argue that these decisions are incorrect. We disagree; and since the first step in assessing whether a statute delegates legislative power is to determine what authority the statute confers, we address that issue of interpretation first and reach respondents’ constitutional arguments in Part III, infra. Section 109(b)(1) instructs the EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards “the attainment and maintenance of which ... are requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” 42 U. S. C. § 7409(b)(1). Were it not for the hundreds of pages of briefing respondents have submitted on the issue, one would have thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to consider costs in setting the standards. The language, as one scholar has noted, “is absolute.” D. Currie, Air Pollution: Federal Law and Analysis 4-15 (1981). The EPA, “based on” the information about health effects contained in the technical “criteria” documents compiled under § 108(a)(2), 42 U. S. C. § 7408(a)(2), is to identify the maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an “adequate” margin of safety, and set the standard at that level. Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation. Against this most natural of readings, respondents make a lengthy, spirited, but ultimately unsuccessful attack. They begin with the object of § 109(b)(l)’s focus, the “public health.” When the term first appeared in federal clean air legislation — in the Act of July 14, 1955 (1955 Act), 69 Stat. 322, which expressed “recognition of the dangers to the public health” from air pollution — its ordinary meaning was “[t]he health of the community.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2005 (2d ed. 1950). Respondents argue, however, that § 109(b)(1), as added by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,84 Stat. 1676, meant to use the term’s secondary meaning: “[t]he ways and means of conserving the health of the members of a community, as by preventive medicine, organized care of the sick, etc.” Ibid. Words that can have more than one meaning are given content, however, by their surroundings, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 182-183 (2000); Jones v. United States, 527 U. S. 373, 389 (1999), and in the context of § 109(b)(1) this second definition makes no sense. Congress could not have meant to instruct the Administrator to set NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect” “the art and science dealing with the protection and improvement of community health.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1836 (1981). We therefore revert to the primary definition of the term: the health of the public. Even so, respondents argue, many more factors than air pollution affect public health. In particular, the economic cost of implementing a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the health gains achieved in cleaning the air — for example, by closing down whole industries and thereby impoverishing the workers and consumers dependent upon those industries. That is unquestionably true, and Congress was unquestionably aware of it. Thus, Congress had commissioned in the Air Quality Act of 1967 (1967 Act) “a detailed estimate of the cost of carrying out the provisions of this Act; a comprehensive study of the cost of program implementation by affected units of government; and a comprehensive study of the economic impact of air quality standards on the Nations industries, communities, and other contributing sources of pollution.” §2, 81 Stat. 505. The 1970 Congress, armed with the results of this study, see The Cost of Clean Air, S. Doc. No. 91-40 (1969) (publishing the results of the study), not only anticipated that compliance costs could injure the public health, but provided for that precise exigency. Section 110(f)(1) of the CAA permitted the Administrator to waive the compliance deadline for stationary sources if, inter alia, sufficient control measures were simply unavailable and “the continued operation of such sources is essential... to the public health or welfare.” 84 Stat. 1683 (emphasis added). Other provisions explicitly permitted or required economic costs to be taken into account in implementing the air quality standards. Section 111(b)(1)(B), for example, commanded the Administrator to set “standards of performance” for certain new sources of emissions that as specified in § 111(a)(1) were to “reflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.” Section 202(a)(2) prescribed that emissions standards for automobiles could take effect only “after such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.” 84 Stat. 1690. See also § 202(b)(5)(C) (similar limitation for interim standards); § 211(c)(2) (similar limitation for fuel additives); § 231(b) (similar limitation for implementation of aircraft emission standards). Subsequent amendments to the CAA have added many more provisions directing, in explicit language, that the Administrator consider costs in performing various duties. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 7545(k)(1) (reformulate gasoline to “require the greatest reduction in emissions ... taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emissions reductions”); § 7547(a)(3) (emission reduction for nonroad vehicles to be set “giving appropriate consideration to the cost” of the standards). We have therefore refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S. 246, 257, and n. 5 (1976). Cf. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U. S. 530, 538, 541 (1990) (refusing to infer in certain provisions of the CAA deadlines and enforcement limitations that had been expressly imposed elsewhere). Accordingly, to prevail in their present challenge, respondents must show a textual commitment of authority to the EPA to consider costs in setting NAAQS under § 109(b)(1). And because § 109(b)(1) and the NAAQS for which it provides are the engine that drives nearly all of Title I of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. §§7401-7515, that textual commitment must be a clear one. Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions — it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra, at 159-160. Respondents’ textual arguments ultimately founder upon this principle. Their first claim is that §109(b)(l)’s terms “adequate margin” and “requisite” leave room to pad health effects with cost concerns. Just as we found it “highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion — and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements,” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 231, so also we find it implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards. Accord, Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 590, n. (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The implausibility of Congress’s leaving a highly significant issue unaddressed (and thus ‘delegating’ its resolution to the administering agency) is assuredly one of the factors to be considered in determining whether there is ambiguity” (emphasis deleted)). The same defect inheres in respondents’ next two arguments: that while the Administrator’s judgment about what is requisite to protect the public health must be “based on [the] criteria” documents developed under § 108(a)(2), see § 109(b)(1), it need not be based solely on those criteria; and that those criteria themselves, while they must include “effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air,” are not necessarily limited to those effects. Even if we were to concede those premises, we still would not conclude' that one of the unenumerated factors that the agency can consider in developing and applying the criteria is cost of implementation. That factor is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly mentioned in §§ 108 and 109 had Congress meant it to be considered. Yet while those provisions describe in detail how the health effects of pollutants in the ambient air are to be calculated and given effect, see § 108(a)(2), they say not a word about costs. Respondents point, finally, to a number of provisions in the CAA that do require attainment cost data to be generated. Section 108(b)(1), for example, instructs the Administrator to “issue to the States,” simultaneously with the criteria documents, “information on air pollution control techniques, which information shall include data relating to the cost of installation and operation.” 42 U. S. C. § 7408(b)(1). And § 109(d)(2)(C)(iv) requires the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee to “advise the Administrator of any adverse public health, welfare, social, economic, or energy effects which may result from various strategies for attainment and maintenance” of NAAQS. 42 U. S. C. § 7409(d)(2)(C)(iv). Respondents argue that these provisions make no sense unless costs are to be considered in setting the NAAQS. That is not so. These provisions enable the Administrator to assist the States in carrying out their statutory role as primary implementers of the NAAQS. It is to the States that the CAA assigns initial and primary responsibility for deciding what emissions reductions will be required from which sources. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 7407(a), 7410 (giving States the duty of developing implementation plans). It would be impossible to perform that task intelligently without considering which abatement technologies are most efficient, and most economically feasible — which is why we have said that “the most important forum for consideration of claims of economic and technological infeasibility is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan,” Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U. S., at 266. Thus, federal clean air legislation has, from the very beginning, directed federal agencies to develop and transmit implementation data, including cost data, to the States. See 1955 Act, §2(b), 69 Stat. 322; Clean Air Act of 1963, amending §§3(a), (b) of the CAA, 77 Stat. 394; 1967 Act, §§ 103(a)-(d), 104, 107(c), 81 Stat. 486-488. That Congress chose to carry forward this research program to assist States in choosing the means through which they would implement the standards is perfectly sensible, and has no bearing upon whether cost considerations are to be taken into account in formulating the standards. It should be clear from what we have said that the canon requiring texts to be so construed as to avoid serious constitutional problems has no application here. No matter how severe the constitutional doubt, courts may choose only between reasonably available interpretations of a text. See, e. g., Miller v. French, 530 U. S. 327, 341 (2000); Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998). The text of § 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. III Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA instructs the EPA to set “ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria [documents of § 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.” 42 U. S. C. § 7409(b)(1). The Court of Appeals held that this section as interpreted by the Administrator did not provide an “intelligible principle” to guide the EPA’s exercise of authority in setting NAAQS. “[The] EPA,” it said, “lack[ed] any determinate criteria for drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much.” 175 F. 3d, at 1034. The court hence found that the EPA’s interpretation (but not the statute itself) violated the non-delegation doctrine. Id., at 1038. We disagree. In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the United States.” This text permits no delegation of those powers, Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748, 771 (1996); see id., at 776-777 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and so we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928). We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute. Both Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 252-253 (1947), and Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 783 (1948), mention agency regulations in the course of their nondelegation discussions, but Lichter did so because a subsequent Congress had incorporated the regulations into a revised version of the statute, ibid., and Fahey because the customary practices in the area, implicitly incorporated into the statute, were reflected in the regulations, 832 U. S., at 250. The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally stand-ardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise — that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted — would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer. We agree with the Solicitor General that the text of § 109(b)(1) of the CAA at a minimum requires that “[flor a discrete set of pollutants and based on published air quality criteria that reflect the latest scientific knowledge, [the] EPA must establish uniform national standards at a level that is requisite to protect public health from the adverse effects of the pollutant in the ambient air.” Tr. of Oral Arg. ih-No. 99-1257, p. 5. Requisite, in turn, “mean[s] sufficient, but not more than necessary.” Id., at 7. These limits on the EPA’s discretion are strikingly similar to the ones we approved in Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160 (1991), which permitted the Attorney General to designate a drug as a controlled substance for purposes of criminal drug enforcement if doing so was “ ‘necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.’” Id., at 163. They also resemble the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provision requiring the agency to “ ‘set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health’ ” — which the Court upheld in Industrial Union Deyt., AFL-GIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 646 (1980), and which even then-JuSTlCE Rehnquist, who alone in that case thought the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine, see id., at 671 (opinion concurring in judgment), would have upheld if, like the statute here, it did not permit economic costs to be considered. See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 545 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The scope of discretion § 109(b)(1) allows is in fact well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents. In the. history of the Court we have found the requisite “intelligible principle” lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring “fair competition.” See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). We have, on the other hand, upheld the validity of § 11(b)(2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 821, which gave the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to modify the structure of holding company systems so as to ensure that they are not “unduly or unnecessarily complicate^]” and do not “unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 104 (1946). We have approved the wartime conferral of agency power to fix the prices of commodities at a level that “ ‘will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the [in some respects conflicting] purposes of th[e] Act.’” Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 420, 423-426 (1944). And we have found an “intelligible principle” in various statutes authorizing regulation in the “public interest,” See, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (Federal Communications Commission’s power to regulate airwaves); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (Interstate Commerce Commission’s power to approve railroad consolidations). In short, we have “almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id., at 373 (majority opinion). It is true enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power eon-gressionally conferred. See Loving v. United States, 517 U. S., at 772-773; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 556-557 (1975). While Congress need not provide any direction to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define “country elevators,” which are to be exempt from new-stationary-source regulations governing grain elevators, see 42 U. S. C. §7411(i), it must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy. But even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded, as the Court of Appeals did here, that statutes provide a “determinate criterion” for saying “how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.” 175 F. 3d, at 1034. In Touby, for example, we did not require the statute to decree how “imminent” was too imminent, or how “necessary” was necessary enough, or even — most relevant here — how “hazardous” was too hazardous. 500 U. S., at 165-167. Similarly, the statute at issue in Lichter authorized agencies to recoup “excess profits” paid under wartime Government contracts, yet we did not insist that Congress specify how much profit was too much. 334 U. S., at 783-786. It is therefore not conclusive for delegation purposes that, as respondents argue, ozone and particulate matter are “nonthreshold” pollutants that inflict a continuum of adverse health effects at any airborne concentration greater than zero, and hence require the EPA to make judgments of degree. “[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action.” Mistretta v. United States, supra, at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted); see 488 U. S., at 378-379 (majority opinion). Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA, which to repeat we interpret as requiring the EPA to set air quality standards at the level that is “requisite” — that is, not lower or higher than is necessary — to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety, fits comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding for reinterpretation that would avoid a supposed delegation of legislative power. It will remain for the Court of Appeals — on the remand that we direct for other reasons — to dispose of any other preserved challenge to the NAAQS under the judicial-review provisions contained in 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(9). IV The final two issues on which we granted certiorari concern the EPA’s authority to implement the revised ozone NAAQS in areas whose ozone levels currently exceed the maximum level permitted by that standard. The CAA designates such areas “nonattainment,” § 107(d)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 7407(d)(1); see also Pub. L. 105-178, §6103, 112 Stat. 465 (setting timeline for new ozone designations), and it exposes them to additional restrictions over and above the implementation requirements imposed generally by §110 of the CAA. These additional restrictions are found in the five substantive subparts of Part D of Title I, 42 U. S. C. §§7501-7515. Subpart 1, §§7501-7509a, contains general nonattainment regulations that pertain to every pollutant for which a NAAQS exists. Subparts 2 through 5, §§ 7511— 7514a, contain rules tailored to specific individual pollutants. Subpart 2, added by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, §103, 104 Stat. 2423, addresses ozone. 42 U. S. C. §§ 7511— 75111 The dispute before us here, in a nutshell, is whether Subpart 1 alone (as the agency determined), or rather Sub-part 2 or some combination of Subparts 1 and 2, controls the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS in non-attainment areas. A The Administrator first urges, however, that we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue because it lacked jurisdiction to review the EPA’s implementation policy. Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1), gives the court jurisdiction over “any . . . nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator,” but the EPA argues that its implementation policy was not agency “action,” was not “final” action, and is not ripe for review. We reject each of these three contentions. At the same time the EPA proposed the revised ozone NAAQS in 1996, it also proposed an “interim implementation policy” for the NAAQS, see 61 Fed. Reg. 65752 (1996), that was to govern until the details of implementation could be put in final form through specific “rulemaking actions.” The preamble to this proposed policy declared that “the interim implementation policy . . . represent^] EPA’s preliminary views on these issues and, while it may include various statements that States must take certain actions, these statements are made pursuant to EPA’s preliminary interpretations, and thus do not bind the States and public as a matter of law.” Ibid. If the EPA had done no more, we perhaps could accept its current claim that its action was not final. However, after the agency had accepted comments on its proposed policy, and on the same day that the final ozone NAAQS was promulgated, the White House published in the Federal Register what it titled a “Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency” that prescribed implementation procedures for the EPA to follow. 62 Fed. Reg. 38421 (1997). (For purposes of our analysis we shall assume that this memorandum was not itself action by the EPA.) The EPA supplemented this memorandum with an explanation of the implementation procedures, which it published in the explanatory preamble to its final ozone NAAQS under the heading, “Final decision on the primary standard.” Id., at 38873. “In light of comments received regarding the interpretation proposed in the Interim Implementation Policy,” the EPA announced, it had “reconsidered that interpretation” and settled on a new one. Ibid. The provisions of “subpart 1 of part D of Title I of the Act” will immediately “apply to the implementation of the new 8-hour [ozone] standards.” Ibid.; see also id., at 38885 (new standard to be implemented “simultaneously [with the old standard] . . . under the provisions of . . . subpart 1”). Moreover, the provisions of subpart 2 “will [also] continue to apply as a matter of law for so long as an area is not attaining the [old] 1-hour standard.” Id., at 38873. Once the area reaches attainment for the old standard, however, “the provisions of subpart 2 will have been achieved and those provisions will no longer apply.” Ibid.; see also id., at 38884-38885. We have little trouble concluding that this constitutes final agency action subject to review under §307. The bite in the phrase “final action” (which bears the same meaning in § 307(b)(1) that it does under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 704, see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 586 (1980)), is not in the word “action,” which is meant to cover comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its power. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 238, n. 7 (1980). It is rather in the word “final,” which requires that the action under review “mark the consummation of the agency’s de-cisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177-178 (1997). Only if the “EPA has rendered its last word on the matter” in question, Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., supra, at 586, is its action “final” and thus reviewable. That standard is satisfied here. The EPA’s “decision-making process,” which began with the 1996 proposal and continued with the reception of public comments, concluded when the agency, “in light of [these comments],” and in conjunction with a corresponding directive from the White House, adopted the interpretation of Part D at issue here. Since that interpretation issued, the EPA has refused in subsequent rulemakings to reconsider it, explaining to disappointed commenters that its earlier decision was conclusive. See 63 Fed. Reg. 31014, 31018-31019 (1998). Though the agency has not dressed its decision with the conventional procedural accoutrements of finality, its own behavior thus belies the claim that its interpretation is not final. The decision is also ripe for our review. “Ripeness ‘requires] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Texas v. United States, 523 U. S. 296, 300-301 (1998) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967)). The question before us here is purely one of statutory interpretation that would not “benefit from further factual development of the issues presented.” Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 (1998). Nor will our review “inappropriately interfere with further administrative action,” ibid., since the EPA has concluded its consideration of the implementation issue. Finally, as for hardship to the parties: The respondent States must — on pain of forfeiting to the EPA control over implementation of the NAAQS — promptly undertake the lengthy and expensive task of developing state implementation plans (SIP’s) that will attain the new, more stringent standard within five years. See 42 U. S. C. §§7410, 7502. Whether or not this would suffice in an ordinary ease brought under the review provisions of the APA, see 5 U. S. C. § 704, we have characterized the special judicial-review provision of the CAA, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b), as one of those statutes that specifically provides for “preenforcement” review, see Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, supra, at 737. Such statutes, we have said, permit “judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891 (1990). The effects at issue here surely meet that lower standard. Beyond all this, the implementation issue was fairly included within the challenges to the final ozone rule that were properly before the Court of Appeals. Respondents argued below that the EPA could not revise the ozone standard, because to do so would trigger the use of Subpart 1, which had been supplanted (for ozone) by the specific rules of Sub-part 2. Brief for Industry Petitioners and Intervenors in No. 97-1441 (and consolidated cases) (CADC), pp. 82-84. The EPA responded that Subpart 2 did not supplant but simply supplemented Subpart 1, so that the latter section still “applies to all nonattainment areas for all NAAQS, . . . including nonattainment areas for any revised ozone standard.” Final Brief for EPA in No. 97-1441 (and consolidated cases) (CADC), pp. 67-68. The agency later reiterated that Subpart 2 “does not supplant implementation provisions for revised ozone standards. This interpretation fully harmonizes Subpart 2 with EPA’s clear authority to revise any NAAQS.” Id., at 71. In other words, the EPA was arguing that the revised standard could be issued, despite its apparent incompatibility with portions of S'ubpart 2, because it would be implemented under Subpart 1 rather than Subpart 2. The District of Columbia Circuit ultimately agreed that Subpart 2 could be harmonized with the EPA’s authority to promulgate revised NAAQS, but not because Subpart 2 is entirely inapplicable — which is one of EPA’s assignments of error. It is unreasonable to contend, as the EPA now does, that the Court of Appeals was obligated to reach the agency’s preferred result, but forbidden to assess the reasons the EPA had given for reaching that result. The implementation issue was fairly included within respondents’ challenge to the ozone rule, which all parties agree is final agency action ripe for review. B Our approach to the merits of the parties’ dispute is the familiar one of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If the statute resolves the question whether Subpart 1 or Subpart 2 (or some combination of the two) shall apply to revised ozone NAAQS, then “that is the end of the matter.” Id., at 842-843. But if the statute is “silent or ambiguous” with respect to the issue, then we must defer to a “reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” Id., at 844. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that Sub-part 2 clearly controls the implementation of revised ozone NAAQS, see 175 F. 3d, at 1048-1050, because we find the statute to some extent ambiguous. We conclude, however, that the agency’s interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous and contradicts what in our view is quite clear. We therefore hold the implementation policy unlawful. See AT&T Corp. v. low a Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 392 (1999). The text of Subpart 1 at first seems to point the way to a clear answer to the question, which Subpart controls? Two sections of Subpart 1, 7502(a)(1)(C) and 7502(a)(2)(D), contain switching provisions stating that if the classification of ozone nonattainment areas is “specifically provided [for] under other provisions of [Part D],” then those provisions will control instead of Subpart l’s. Thus, it is true but incomplete to note, as the Administrator does, that the substantive language of Subpart 1 is broad enough to apply to revised ozone standards. See, e. g., § 7502(a)(1)(A) (instructing the Administrator to classify nonattainment areas according to “any revised standard, including a revision of any standard in effect on November 15, 1990”); § 7502(a)(2)(A) (setting attainment deadlines). To determine whether that language does apply one must resolve the further textual issue whether some other provision, namely Subpart 2, provides for the classification of ozone nonattainment areas. If it does, then according to the switching provisions of Sub-part 1 it will control. So, does Subpart 2 provide for classifying nonattainment ozone areas under the revised standard? It unquestionably does. The backbone of the subpart is Table 1, printed in § 7511(a)(1) and reproduced in the margin here, which defines five categories of ozone nonattainment areas and prescribes attainment deadlines for each. Section 7511(a)(1) funnels all nonattainment areas into the table for classification, declaring that “[e]ach area designated nonattainment for ozone . . . shall be classified at the time of such designation, under table 1, by operation of law.” And once an area has been classified, “the primary standard attainment date for ozone shall be as expeditiously as practicable but not later than the date provided in table 1.” The EPA argues that this text is not as clear or comprehensive as it seems, because the title of § 7511(a) reads “Classification and attainment dates for 1989 nonattainment areas,” which suggests that Subpart 2 applies only to areas that were in nonattainment in 1989, and not to areas later designated non-attainment under a revised ozone standard. The suggestion must be rejected, however, because § 7511(b)(1) specifically provides for the classification of areas that were in attainment in 1989 but have subsequently slipped into nonattainment. It thus makes clear that Subpart 2 is not limited solely to 1989 nonattainment areas. This eliminates the interpretive role of the title, which may only “she[d] light on some ambiguous word or phrase in the statute itself,” Carter v. United States, 530 U. S. 255, 267 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S., at 212, in turn quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947)). It may well be, as the EPA argues — and as the concurring opinion below on denial of rehearing pointed out, see 195 F. 3d, at 11-12 — that some provisions of Subpart 2 are ill fitted to implementation of the revised standard. Using the old 1-hour averages of ozone levels, for example, as Sub-part 2 requires, see § 7511(a)(1); 44 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979), would produce at best an inexact estimate of the new 8-hour averages, see 40 CFR §50.10, and App. I (1999). Also, to the extent that the new ozone standard is stricter than the old one, see Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 99-1257, p. 17 (“the stricter 8-hour NAAQS”); 62 Fed. Reg. 38856, 38858 (1997) (8-hour standard of 0.09 ppm rather than 0.08 ppm would have “generally represented] the continuation of the [old] level of protection”), the classification system of Subpart 2 contains a gap, because it fails to classify areas whose ozone levels are greater than the new standard (and thus nonattaining) but less than the approximation of the old standard codified by Table 1. And finally, Subpart 2’s method for calculating attainment dates — which is simply to count forward a certain number of years from November 15, 1990 (the date the 1990 CAA Amendments took force), depending on how far out of attainment the area started — seems to make no sense for areas that are first classified under a new standard after November 15, 1990. If, for example, areas were classified in the year 2000, many of the deadlines would already have expired at the time of classification. These gaps in Subpart 2's scheme prevent us from concluding that Congress clearly intended Subpart 2 to be the exclusive, permanent means of enforcing a revised ozone standard in nonattainment areas. The statute is in our view ambiguous concerning the manner in which Subpart 1 and Subpart 2 interact with regard to revised ozone standards, and we would defer to the EPA’s reasonable resolution of that ambiguity. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S., at 132; INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 424 (1999). We cannot defer, however, to the interpretation the EPA has given. Whatever effect may be accorded the gaps in Subpart 2 as implying some limited applicability of Subpart 1, they cannot be thought to render Subpart 2’s carefully designed restrictions on EPA discretion utterly nugatory once a new standard has been promulgated, as the EPA has concluded. The principal distinction between Subpart 1 and Subpart 2 is that the latter eliminates regulatory discretion that the former allowed. While Subpart 1 permits the EPA to establish classifications for nonattainment areas, Subpart 2 classifies areas as a matter of law based on a table. Compare § 7502(a)(1) with § 7511(a)(1) (Table 1). Whereas the EPA has discretion under Subpart 1 to extend attainment dates for as long as 12 years, under Subpart 2 it may grant no more than 2 years’ extension. Compare §§ 7502(a)(2)(A) and (C) with § 7511(a)(5). Whereas Subpart 1 gives the EPA considerable discretion to shape nonattainment programs, Subpart 2 prescribes large parts of them by law. Compare §§ 7502(c) and (d) with § 7511a. Yet according to the EPA, Subpart 2 was simply Congress’s “approach to the implementation of the [old] 1-hour” standard, and so there was no reason that “the new standard could not simultaneously be implemented under . . . subpart 1.” 62 Fed. Reg. 38856, 38885 (1997); see also id., at 38873 (“[T]he provisions of subpart 1 . . . would apply to the implementation of the new 8-hour ozone standards”). To use a few apparent gaps in Subpart 2 to render its textually explicit applicability to nonattainment areas under the new standard utterly inoperative is to go over the edge of reasonable interpretation. The EPA may not construe the statute in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit its discretion. The EPA’s interpretation making Subpart 2 abruptly obsolete is all the more astonishing because Subpart 2 was obviously written to govern implementation for some time. Some of the elements required to be included in SIP’s under Subpart 2 were not to take effect until many years after the passage of the CAA. See § 7511a(e)(3) (restrictions on “electric utility and industrial and commercial boilerfs]” to be “effective 8 years after November 15,1990”); §7511a(c)(5)(A) (vehicle monitoring program to “[b]egi[n] 6 years after November 15, 1990”); §7511a(g)(l) (emissions milestone requirements to be applied “6 years after November 15, 1990, and at intervals of every 3 years thereafter”). A plan reaching so far into the future was not enacted to be abandoned the next time the EPA reviewed the ozone standard — which Congress knew could happen at any time, since the technical staff papers had already been completed in late 1989. See 58 Fed. Reg. 13008, 13010 (1993); see also 42 U. S. C. § 7409(d)(1) (NAAQS must be reviewed and, if appropriate, revised at least once every five years). Yet nothing in the EPA’s interpretation would have prevented the agency from aborting Subpart 2 the day after it was enacted. Even now, if the EPA’s interpretation were correct, some areas of the country could be required to meet the new, more stringent ozone standard in at most the same time that Sub-part 2 had allowed them to meet the old standard. Compare § 7502(a)(2) (Subpart 1 attainment dates) with § 7511(a) (Sub-part 2 attainment dates). Los Angeles, for instance, “would be required to attain the revised NAAQS under Subpart 1 no later than the same year that marks the outer time limit for attaining Subpart 2’s one-hour ozone standard.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 99-1257, p. 49. An interpretation of Subpart 2 so at odds with its structure and manifest purpose cannot be sustained. We therefore find the EPA’s implementation policy to be unlawful, though not in the precise respect determined by the Court of Appeals. After our remand, and the Court of Appeals’ final disposition of these cases, it is left to the EPA to develop a reasonable interpretation of the nonattainment implementation provisions insofar as they apply to revised ozone NAAQS. * * * To summarize our holdings in these unusually complex cases: (1) The EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS under § 109(b) of the CAA. (2) Section 109(b)(1) does not delegate legislative power to the EPA in contravention of Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution. (3) The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the EPA’s interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, relating to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS. (4) The EPA’s interpretation of that Part is unreasonable. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. None of the sections of the CAA in which the District of Columbia Circuit has found authority for the EPA to consider costs shares § 109(b)(l)’s prominence in the overall statutory scheme. See, e. g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F. 3d 663, 678-679 (CADC 2000); George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F. 3d 616, 623-624 (CADC 1998); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F. 2d 1146, 1154-1163 (CADC 1987) (en banc). Respondents contend that this advice is required to be included in the NAAQS rulemaking record — which, if true, would suggest that it was relevant to the standard-setting process. But the provision respondents cite for their contention, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(3), requires only that “pertinent findings, recommendations, and comments by the Scientific Review Committee” be included. The Committee’s advice concerning certain aspects of “adverse public health . .. effects” from various attainment strategies is unquestionably pertinent; but to say that Committee-generated cost data are pertinent is to beg the question. Likewise, while “all written comments” must be placed in the docket, § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i), the EPA need respond only to the “significant” ones, § 7407(d)(6)(B); comments regarding cost data are not significant if cost data are irrelevant. Respondents scarcely mention in their arguments the secondary NAAQS required by § 109(b)(2), 42 U. S. C. § 7409(b)(2). For many of the same reasons described in the body of the opinion, as well as the text of § 109(b)(2), which instructs the EPA to set the standards at a level “requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air” (emphasis added), we conclude that the EPA may not consider implementation costs in setting the secondary NAAQS. Respondents’ speculation that the EPA is secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone is irrelevant to our interpretive inquiry. If such an allegation could be proved, it would be grounds for vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator had not followed the law. See, e. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382, 387 (1998). It would not, however, be grounds for this Court’s changing the law. TABLE 1 Primary standard Area class Design value* attainment date** Marginal. 0.121 up to 0.138. 3 years after November 15,1990 Moderate. 0.138 up to 0.160. 6 years after November 15,1990 Serious. 0.160 up to 0.180. 9 years after November 15,1990 Severe. 0.180 up to 0.280. 15 years after November 15,1990 Extreme. 0.280 and above. 20 years after November 15,1990 *The design value is measured in parts per million (ppm). **The primary standard attainment date is measured from November 15,1990.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOOPER et al. v. BERNALILLO COUNTY ASSESSOR No. 84-231. Argued February 20, 1985 Decided June 24, 1985 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 624. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 624. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. Alvin D. Hooper, pro se, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Harold L. Folley. H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Kenneth Hunt. David Greer filed a brief for the American Legion et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Paul Bardacke, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Jacober, Special Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New Mexico as amicus curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We noted probable jurisdiction to decide whether a New Mexico statute that grants a tax exemption limited to those Vietnam veterans who resided in the State before May 8, 1976, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I Pursuant to Art. VIII, § 5, of the New Mexico Constitution, the New Mexico State Legislature has granted annual property tax exemptions to residents who served in the Armed Forces. As applied to Vietnam veterans currently residing in New Mexico, § 7-37-5 of the New Mexico Statutes exempts $2,000 of the taxable value of property for any honorably discharged Vietnam veteran who served on active duty during the Vietnam War for at least 90 continuous days, N. M. Stat. Ann. §§7-37-5(0(1) and (2) (1983), and who was a New Mexico resident before May 8, 1976, § 7-37-5(C)(3)(d). Appellants, Alvin D. Hooper and his wife Mary, established residence in New Mexico on August 17, 1981. During the Vietnam War, Alvin Hooper had served for over 90 continuous days as a member of the United States Army; Hooper was honorably discharged in September 1965. For the 1983 tax year, the Hoopers applied for the $2,000 veterans’ tax exemption with respect to their jointly held real property in Bernalillo County. Appellee, the Bernalillo County Assessor, denied the claim because Hooper had not been a state resident before May 8, 1975. Appellants challenged § 7-37-5(C)(3)(d) as violative of their right to equal protection of the law and their constitutional right to migrate to New Mexico. After a hearing, the Ber-nalillo County Valuation Board rejected appellants’ constitutional challenge and upheld the Assessor’s denial of the tax exemption. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed. 101 N. M. 172, 679 P. 2d 840, cert. denied, 101 N. M. 77, 678 P. 2d 705 (1984). The court, noting that the statute did not affect “such fundamental interests as voting, welfare benefits, or public medical assistance,” concluded that the statute did not unconstitutionally burden an exercise of the right to travel. Id., at 175, 679 P. 2d, at 843. The court held that the statute was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause because it “reflects legitimate state purposes” and “bears a reasonable relationship to those purposes.” Ibid. The court reasoned that “[a] state’s interest in expressing gratitude and rewarding its pwn citizens for honorable military service is a rational basis for veterans’ preferences,” and that the state legislature is “entitled to limit the period of time within which [veterans] may choose to establish residency.” Id., at 176, 679 P. 2d at 844. We noted probable jurisdiction. 469 U. S. 878 (1984). We reverse. II The New Mexico veterans’ tax exemption differs from the durational residence requirements the Court examined in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). The statutes at issue in those cases conditioned eligibility for certain benefits, otherwise available on an equal basis to all residents, on a new resident’s living in the State for a fixed minimum period. The durational ^residence requirements purported to assure that only persons who had established bona fide residence received the benefits provided residents of the States. The New Mexico statute does not impose any threshold waiting period on those resident veterans seeking the tax exemption; resident veterans are entitled to the exemption provided they satisfy the statute’s other criteria. Nor does the statute purport to establish a test of the bona fides of state residence. Instead, the tax exemption contains a fixed-date residence requirement. The statute thus divides resident Vietnam veterans into two groups: resident veterans who resided in the State before May 8, 1976, qualify for the exemption; resident veterans who established residence after that date do not. Like the Alaska dividend distribution law examined in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55 (1982), the tax exemption statute thus creates “fixed, permanent distinctions between . . . classes of concededly bona fide residents” based on when they arrived in the State. Id., at 59. Appellants established residence in New Mexico several months after the 1981 amendment set the eligibility date as May 8, 1975. Appellants have no quarrel with the legislature’s changing the eligibility date after veterans have chosen to reside in New Mexico, for the enactment date is irrelevant to qualification for the tax exemption. Appellants instead challenge the distinction made by the State within the class of Vietnam veterans who currently are bona fide residents. Their challenge is that the exemption is accorded to those resident Vietnam veterans who resided in the State sometime before May 8, 1976, but not to those Vietnam veterans who have arrived since then. When a state distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Generally, a law will survive that scrutiny if the distinction rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose. Appellants claim that the distinction made by the New Mexico statute should be subjected to the higher level of scrutiny applied to the durational residence requirements in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra, and Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. Alternatively, appellants claim that the statute cannot withstand the minimum rationality inquiry applied to the Alaska dividend distribution law in Zobel v. Williams, supra. Ap-pellee, on the other hand, asserts that the statute need only satisfy the latter standard of review. As in Zobel, if the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimum rationality test, our inquiry ends. Ill The New Mexico Court of Appeals accepted two justifications for the distinction made by the Vietnam veterans’ tax exemption statute: the exemption encourages veterans to settle in the State and it serves as an expression of the State’s appreciation to its “own citizens for honorable military service.” 101 N. M., at 176, 679 P. 2d, at 844. Before this Court, the latter purpose has been refined as assisting “veterans who, as [New Mexico] citizens, were dependent on [the State] during a time of upheaval in their lives.” Brief for Appellee 22. This rationale assumes that the State accepted a special responsibility toward those veterans who “picked up or laid down the burdens of war” as state residents. A The distinction New Mexico makes between veterans who established residence before May 8, 1976, and those veterans who arrived in the State thereafter bears no rational relationship to one of the State’s objectives — encouraging Vietnam veterans to move to New Mexico. The legislature set this eligibility date long after the triggering event occurred. See n. 2, supra. The legislature cannot plausibly encourage veterans to move to the State by passing such retroactive legislation. It is possible that some Vietnam veterans, at least since 1981, might have been discouraged from settling in New Mexico given the State’s exclusion of new resident veterans from a benefit available only to those veterans who resided in the State before May 8, 1976. “The separation of residents into classes hardly seems a likely way to persuade new [residents] that the State welcomes them and wants them to stay.” Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S., at 62, n. 9. B The second purpose of the statute — rewarding veterans who resided in the State before May 8, 1976, for their military service — was primarily relied upon by the New Mexico Court of Appeals to support the statute’s distinction between resident veterans. One component of this rationale is, of course, plainly legitimate; only recently we observed that “[o]ur country has a longstanding policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with numerous advantages.” Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 551 (1983) (footnote omitted); see Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279, n. 25 (1979). And as Judge Friendly has noted, the various preferences for veterans are grounded in a “[djesire to compensate in some measure for the disruption of a way of life . . . and to express gratitude . . . .” Russell v. Hodges, 470 F. 2d 212, 218 (CA2 1972). See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., supra, at 551. Consistent with this policy, the State may award certain benefits to all its bona fide veterans, because it then is making neither an invidious nor irrational distinction among its residents. Resident veterans, as a group, may well deserve preferential treatment, and such differential treatment visa-vis non-veterans does not offend the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, supra; see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974). The New Mexico statute, however, does not simply distinguish between resident veterans and non-veteran residents; it confers a benefit only on “established” resident veterans, i. e., those who resided in the State before May 8,1976. Ap-pellee and the State justify this distinction on the basis that those veterans who left their homes in New Mexico to fight in Vietnam, as well as those who settled in the State within the few years after thé war ended, deserve to be treated differently from veterans who make New Mexico their home after May 8, 1976. The legislature is said to have decided it owed a special responsibility to these “established” veterans. Appellee and the State’s evaluation of this legislative judgment may be questioned on its own terms. Those who serve in the military during wartime inevitably have their lives disrupted; but it is difficult to grasp how New Mexico residents serving in the military suffered more than residents of other States who served, so that the latter would not deserve the benefits a State bestows for national military service. Moreover, the legislature provided this economic boon years after the dislocation occurred. Established state residents, by this time, presumably had become resettled in the community and the modest tax exemption hardly bears directly on the transition to civilian life long after the war’s end. Finally, the benefit of the tax exemption continues for the recipient’s life. The annual exemption, which will benefit this limited group of resident veterans long after the wartime disruption dissipated, is a continuing bounty for one group of residents rather than simply an attempt to ease the veteran’s return to civilian life. Even assuming that the State may legitimately grant benefits on the basis of a coincidence between military service and past residence, the New Mexico statute’s distinction between resident veterans is not rationally related to the State’s asserted legislative goal. The statute is not written to require any connection between the veteran’s prior residence and military service. Indeed, the veteran who resided in New Mexico as an infant long ago would immediately qualify for the exemption upon settling in the State at any time in the future regardless of where he resided before, during, or after military service. C Stripped of its asserted justifications, the New Mexico statute suffers from the same constitutional flaw as the Alaska statute in Zobel. The New Mexico statute, by singling out previous residents for the tax exemption, rewards only those citizens for their “past contributions” toward our Nation’s military effort in Vietnam. Zobel teaches that such an objective is “not a legitimate state purpose.” 457 U. S., at 63. The State may not favor established residents over new residents based on the view that the State may take care of “its own,” if such is defined by prior residence. Newcomers, by establishing bona fide residence in the State, become the State’s “own” and may not be discriminated against solely on the basis of their arrival in the State after May 8, 1976. See, e. g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 449-450, and n. 6 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 632-633; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C. J., dissenting). The New Mexico statute creates two tiers of resident Vietnam veterans, identifying resident veterans who settled in the State after May 8, 1976, as in a sense “second-class citizens.” This discrimination on the basis of residence is not supported by any identifiable state interest; the statute is not written to benefit only those residents who suffered dislocation within the State’s borders by reason of military service. Zobel made clear that the Constitution will not tolerate a state benefit program that “creates fixed, permanent distinctions . . . between . . . classes of concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they have been in the State.” 457 U. S., at 59. Neither the Equal Protection Clause, nor this Court’s precedents, permit the State to prefer established resident veterans over newcomers in the retroactive apportionment of an economic benefit. D We decline appellants’ request to rule on the severability of the unconstitutional aspect of the New Mexico veterans’ tax exemption statute. If the fixed-date residence requirement, § 7-37-5(C)(3)(d), were excised from the statute, the exemption would be available to all current resident veterans who served the requisite 90 days during the Vietnam War and received honorable discharges. It is for the New Mexico courts to decide, as a matter of state law, whether the state legislature would have enacted the statute without the invalid portion. See, e. g., Zobel v. Williams, supra, at 64-65; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S, 210, 234 (1932); State v. Spearman, 84 N. M. 366, 368, 503 P. 2d 649, 651 (App. 1972). IV We hold that the New Mexico veterans’ tax exemption statute violates ’the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the New Mexico Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of the case. Section 7-37-5 also provides the $2,000 property tax exemption, under substantially similar conditions, to certain resident veterans of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War. The one variable is the eligibility date: World War I veterans must have been residents of New Mexico before January 1, 1984; World War II veterans must have been residents before January 1, 1947; and Korean War veterans must have been residents before February 1, 1966. N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-37-5(C)(3)(a), (b), and (c) (1983). The initial statute extending an exemption to Vietnam veterans required that the veteran have been a New Mexico resident before “entering the armed services from New Mexico” and also that the veteran have been “awarded a Vietnam campaign medal for services in Vietnam” during a prescribed period. 1973 N. M. Laws, Ch. 258, p. 1052. In 1975, the state legislature eliminated the medal requirement but retained the condition that the veteran have entered the Armed Forces from the State. 1975 N. M. Laws, Ch. 3, p. 11. In 1981, the legislature dropped the requirement that the veteran have entered the military from New Mexico. The new statute extended the tax exemption to any Vietnam veteran who “was a New Mexico resident prior to . . . May 8, 1975.” 1981 N. M. Laws, Ch. 187, p. 1078. In 1988, the statute was amended to provide the exemption to any Vietnam veteran “who was a New Mexico resident prior to . . . May 8, 1976.” 1988 N. M. Laws, Ch. 330, p. 2112. The state legislature changed the eligibility date to May 8, 1976, after appellants had commenced administrative proceedings to challenge the denial of the exemption. The Board’s decision relied on the amended 1976 date. Before the New Mexico Court of Appeals, appellee conceded that this date was inapplicable to the 1983 tax year because the legislature intended that it apply starting with the 1984 tax year. Accordingly, appellants’ claimed exemption should have been denied on the basis of the 1975 eligibility date. Presumably because this discrepancy had no bearing on the constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals did not mention this point. For the sake of clarity, we analyze the statute using the 1976 eligibility date. In the durational residence cases, the Court reviewed state laws which established waiting periods on access to divorce courts, Sosna v. Iowa; eligibility for free nonemergency medical care, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County; qualification for voting rights, Dunn v. Blumstein; and receipt of welfare assistance, Shapiro v. Thompson. This eligibility date has a curious background, which is not explained simply as “one year [after] the final U. S. troop withdrawal [from Vietnam].” 101 N. M. 172,176, 679 P. 2d 840, 844, cert. denied, 101N. M. 77, 678 P. 2d 705 (1984). On January 27, 1973, the United States and other participants in the conflict signed the Vietnam cease-fire agreement in Paris, France. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, [1973] 24 U. S. T. 1, T. I. A. S. No. 7542. The last American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam on March 29, 1973. By Proclamation, President Ford designated May 7,1975, as the last day of the “Vietnam era.” Proclamation No. 4373, 3A CFR 48 (1976). The Federal Government uses this date to determine eligibility for veterans’ benefits for those persons who served in the Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. See 38 U. S. C. § 101(29), which defines the “Vietnam era” as that period beginning August 5,1964, and ending May 7,1975. In 1981, the New Mexico State Legislature adopted this date to determine eligibility for the Vietnam veterans’ tax exemption. In 1983, the state legislature changed the date to May 8, 1976, presumably to extend a “grace period” to veterans choosing to reside in New Mexico. See n. 2, supra. The New Mexico Court of Appeals considered whether the veterans’ tax exemption law violated appellants’ constitutional right to travel. Despite disagreement over its source in the Constitution, compare Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 65 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring), with id., at 71 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment), the Court has long held that the right to travel, “when applied to residency requirements, protects new residents of a State from being disadvantaged because of their recent migration or from otherwise being treated differently from longer term residents.” Id., at 60, n. 6; see, e. g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 261 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 629-631 (1969). As we noted in Zobel, “Might to travel cases have examined, in equal protection terms, state distinctions between newcomers and longer term residents.” 457 U. S., at 60, n. 6. This case involves a distinction between residents based on when they first established residence in the State. Following Zobel, we subject this case to equal protection analysis. The State of New Mexico, as amicus curiae, observes that the statute’s purpose “is to reward persons who served in periods of armed conflict as residents of New Mexico or who established residency in New Mexico shortly thereafter.” Brief for State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae 5. Although neither appellee nor the State of New Mexico presses the point, the statute could conceivably influence certain veterans, having already moved to New Mexico, to remain there so as to secure the tax benefit. Similarly, the statute could plausibly encourage certain veterans, who had once resided in New Mexico prior to May 8,1976, to return to the State. This selective incentive, however, would encounter the same constitutional barrier faced by the statute’s distinction between past and newly arrived residents. See infra. A state objective to inhibit migration into the State would encounter “insurmountable constitutional difficulties.” Zobel, supra, at 62, n. 9. See Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 629. For a compilation of the variety of state veterans’ preference statutes, see House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, State Veterans’ Laws, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-306 (Comm. Print No. 47, 1984). Veterans’ benefit statutes, which condition eligibility on state residence at the time of induction into the military, have survived challenges under the Equal Protection Clause before Zobel was decided. See, e. g., Langston v. Levitt, 425 F. Supp. 642 (SDNY 1977); August v. Bronstein, 369 F. Supp. 190 (SDNY), summarily aff’d, 417 U. S. 901 (1974); Leech v. Veterans’ Bonus Division Appeals, 179 Conn. 311, 426 A. 2d 289 (1979). The Court’s summary affirmance in August v. Bronstein may not be read as an adoption of the reasoning of the judgment under review. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S., at 64, n. 13; Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 391 (1975) (concurring opinion). Indeed, the Second Circuit recently has ruled that such a statute could not pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause in light of the Court’s holding in Zobel. Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Service Comm’n, 755 F. 2d 266 (1985), appeal docketed, No. 84-1803. Given the circumstances presented in this ease, we need not consider here the constitutionality of these statutes. Compare the New Mexico open-ended prior-residence requirement with the specific criteria of Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 12672, ¶ 57.52 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. §40.005 (1980); and Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 51, §§20122, 20123 (1976 and Supp. 1984-1985) (Purdon). We also note that the New Mexico statute differs from the local “bounty” laws enacted during the Civil War era, through which States paid residents cash bonuses for enlisting. See generally E. Murdock, Patriotism Unlimited, 1862-1865, pp. 16-41 (1967). In Zobel v. Williams, the Court held that an Alaska statute that used length of state residence to calculate distribution of dividends from the State’s oil reserves violated the Equal Protection Clause. We made clear that the statute’s only conceivable purpose — “to reward citizens for past contributions” — is “not a legitimate state purpose.” 457 U. S., at 63; see id., at 68 (Brennan, J., concurring). Concurring in Zobel, Justice Brennan noted that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on length of residenee. And the Equal Protection Clause would not tolerate such distinctions.” Id., at 69 (footnote omitted).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOCAL 60, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 68. Argued February 28, March 1, 1961. Decided April 17, 1961. Bernard Dunau argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Francis X. Ward. Norton J. Gome argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stuart Rothman, Dominick L. Manoli and Duane B. Beeson. J. Albert Woll, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, United Brotherhood, entered into a contract with Mechanical Handling Systems, Inc. (which we will call the Company), whereby the Company agreed to work the hours, pay the wages, abide by the rules and regulations of the union applicable to the locality where the work is done, and employ members of the union. The Company, undertaking work at Indianapolis, agreed to hire workers on referral from a local union, one of the petitioners in this case. Two applicants from another local union were denied employment by the Company because they could not get referral from petitioner local union. The Board found that petitioners had violated §8 (b)(1)(A) and §8 (b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158, in maintaining and enforcing an agreement which established closed-shop preferential hiring conditions and in causing the Company to refuse to hire the two applicants. 122 N. L. R. B. 396. After granting other relief the Board said: “[A]s we find that dues, nonmembership dues, assessments, and work permit fees, were collected under the illegal contract as the price employees paid in order to obtain or retain their jobs, we do not believe it would effectuate the policies of the Act to permit the retention of the payments which have been unlawfully exacted from the employees.” It added that the remedial provisions “are appropriate and necessary to expunge the coercive effect” of petitioners’ unfair labor practices. On application of the Board, the Court of Appeals enforced the order. 273 F. 2d 699. The case is here on a writ of certiorari, 363 U. S. 837, in which petitioners challenge no part of the Board’s order except the refund provision. The provision for refund in this case is the product of a rule announced by the Board in the Brown-Olds case, 115 N. L. R. B. 594, which involved the use of a closed-shop agreement despite the ban in the Taft-Hartley Act. In that case a panel of three members of the five-member Board found a violation of the closed-shop provision of the Act. Two of the three agreed to an order of reimbursement to all employees for any assessments collected by the union within the period starting from six months prior to the date of the filing of the charge. One member, Ivar H. Peterson, dissented, saying that the reimbursement was inappropriate since there was an absence of “specific evidence of coercion and evidence that payments were required as a condition of employment.” Id., 606. Later that remedy was extended to hiring arrangements, which though not operating in connection with a closed shop, were felt by the Board to have a coercive influence on applicants for work to join the union. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N. L. R. B. 1629. In neither of those cases nor in the present case was there any evidence that the union membership, fees, or dues were coerced. The Board as well as the Court of Appeals held that fact to be immaterial. Both said that the case was governed by Virginia Electric Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U. S. 533; and the Court of Appeals added that coercion was to be inferred as “there was present an implicit threat of loss of job if those fees were not paid.” 273 F. 2d, at 703. The Board argues, in support of that position, that reimbursement of dues where hiring arrangements have been abused is protective of rights vindicated by the Act and authorized by § 10 (c). We do not think this case is governed by Virginia Electric Co. v. Labor Board, supra. That case involved a company union whose very existence was unlawful. There were, indeed, findings that the union “was not the result of the employees’ free choice” (319 U. S., at 537), and that the employees had to remain members of the union to retain their jobs. Id., 540. Return of dues was one of the means for disestablishing an unlawful union. Id., 541. Cf. Labor Board v. Mine Workers, 355 U. S. 453, 458-459. The unions in the present case were not unlawfully created. On the record before us they have engaged in prohibited activity. But there is no evidence that any of them coerced a single employee to join the union ranks or to remain as members. All of the employees affected by the present order were union members when employed on the job in question. So far as we know, they may have been members for years on end. No evidence was offered to show that even a single person joined the union with the view of obtaining work on this project. Nor was there any evidence that any who had voluntarily joined the union was kept from resigning for fear of retaliatory measures against him. This case is therefore quite different from Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 48, where, discrimination having been shown, the inferences to be drawn were left largely to the Board. The Board has broad discretion to adapt its remedies to the needs of particular situations so that “the victims of discrimination” may be treated fairly. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 194. But the power of the Board “to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive, and is to be exercised in aid of the Board's authority to restrain violations and as a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 236. Where no membership in the union was shown to be influenced or compelled by reason of any unfair practice, no “consequences of violation” are removed by the order compelling the union to return all dues and fees collected from the members; and no “dissipation” of the effects of the prohibited action is achieved. Labor Board v. Mine Workers, supra, 463. The order in those circumstances becomes punitive and beyond the power of the Board. Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7, 10. As Judge Pope said in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Labor Board, 276 F. 2d 63, 76, “reimbursing a lot of old-time union men” by refunding their dues is not a remedial measure in the competence of the Board to impose, unless there is support in the evidence that their membership was induced, obtained, or retained in violation of the Act. It would be difficult, even with hostile eyes, to read the history of trade unionism except in terms of voluntary associations formed to meet pressing needs in a complex society. Reversed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The monthly dues payable to the local union were $3.50 and the initiation fee $125. Dues and fees in lesser amounts were payable by apprentices. A member who is working within the jurisdiction of a district council who has not transferred his membership to a local union of the council pays for a working permit that is not less than 75 cents a month nor more than the local monthly dues. Section 10 (c) provides in relevant part: “. ■ - If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: . . .” Accord: Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Labor Board, 275 F. 2d 914 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. United States Steel Corp., 278 F. 2d 896 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Labor Board v. Local Union No. 85, 274 F. 2d 344 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Labor Board v. International Union, 279 F. 2d 951 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Labor Board, 276 F. 2d 63 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Local 357 v. Labor Board, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 188, 275 F. 2d 646. Cf. Labor Board v. Carpenters Local, 276 F. 2d 583 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Perry Coal Co. v. Labor Board, 284 F. 2d 910 (C. A. 7th Cir.). See Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor, Vol. Ill (1945), c. VIII.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN FARM LINES v. BLACK BALL FREIGHT SERVICE et al. No. 369. Argued February 25, 1970 Decided April 20, 1970 Joseph A. Calif ano, Jr., argued the cause for appellant in No. 369. With him on the briefs were John D. Hawke, Jr., and William L. Peterson, Jr. Arthur J. Cerra argued the cause for appellant in No. 382. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Deputy Solicitor General Springer, John H. D. Wigger, and Robert W. Ginnane. William H. Dempsey, Jr., argued the cause for appel-lees in both cases and filed a brief for appellees Consolidated Freightways Corp. et al. In both cases Ed White filed a brief for railroad appellees; William B. Adams, Peter T. Beardsley, and Nelson J. Cooney filed a brief for certain motor carrier appellees, and James W. Wrape and Robert E. Joyner filed a brief for Dealers Transit, Inc., et al. Together with No. 382, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Black Ball Freight Service et al., on appeal from the same court. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission has statutory power to grant motor carriers temporary operating authority “without hearings or other proceedings” when the authority relates to a “service for which there is an immediate and urgent need” and where there is “no carrier service capable of meeting such need.” Interstate Commerce Act § 210a, 52 Stat. 1238, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 310a. The ICC processes applications for such authority under rules promulgated in 1965. 49 CFR pt. 1131. Among other things, those rules require that an applicant accompany his application with supporting statements of shippers that contain information “designed to establish an immediate and urgent need for service which cannot be met by existing carriers.” Id., § 1131.2 (c). Each such supporting statement “must contain at least” 11 items of information including the following: “(8) Whether efforts have been made to obtain the service from existing motor, rail, or water carriers, and the dates and results of such efforts. “(9) Names and addresses of existing carriers who have either failed or refused to provide the service, and the reasons given for any such failure or refusal.” Appellant American Farm Lines (AFL) filed an application for temporary operating authority. The application was accompanied by a supporting statement of the Department of Defense (DOD). The ICC Temporary Authorities Board denied the application on the ground that the “applicant has not established that there exists an immediate and urgent need for any of the service proposed.” Division I of the ICC (acting as an Appellate Division) reversed the Board and granted AFL temporary authority. Protesting carriers sought review of this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. A single judge of the District Court temporarily restrained the operation of the ICC order and the ICC thereupon ordered postponement of the operation of its grant. At that time numerous petitions for reconsideration were pending before the Commission and the stay order did not direct the Commission to stay its hand with respect to them. The record was indeed not filed with the court until much later. Meanwhile, the Commission granted the petitions and reopened the proceeding to receive a further supporting statement of DOD. This took the form of the verified statement of Vincent F. Caputo, DOD Director for Transportation and Warehousing Policy, which was submitted as a purported reply to the pending petitions for reconsideration. Based upon this statement, the ICC entered a new order granting the AFL application. A single judge of the District Court restrained the operation of the new order. Thereafter a three-judge District Court conducted a full hearing on the merits. The ICC admitted at that stage that its first order “may not have been based upon evidence to support its conclusion,” but argued that there was no infirmity in the new order. The three-judge court set aside both orders. 298 F. Supp. 1006. Both AFL and ICC appealed to this Court and we noted probable jurisdiction. 396 U. S. 884. I The first alleged error in the case is the failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission to require strict compliance with its own rules. The rules in question, unlike some of our own, do not involve “jurisdictional” problems but only require certain information to be set forth in statements filed in support of applications of motor carriers for temporary operating authority. The Caputo statement asserted that part of the tremendous volume of traffic that DOD moved in the territories involved had to be moved “in the most expeditious manner possible,” and that, since air transport was prohibitively expensive “except in the most extreme emergencies,” there was an “imperative” need for the most expeditious motor carrier service. The need for this expeditious transport did not rest merely on a desire to obtain the most efficient service, but in addition rested on the need to coordinate arrival times of shipments with factory production schedules and with ship-loading or airlift times for overseas shipments. The particular inadequacies in existing service were pointed out, namely, the delays inherent in joint-line service, regular-route service, and the use of single drivers. The statement did not assert that none of the existing carriers provided sufficiently expeditious service to meet DOD needs; rather it claimed that the carriers providing satisfactory service in the territories in question were so few in number that the additional services of AFL were required to meet DOD’s transportation needs. Concededly, the Caputo statement did not give the dates of DOD’s efforts to secure service from other existing carriers, or a complete list of the names and addresses of the carriers who failed or refused to provide service, as required by the terms of subsections (8) and (9), 49 CFR § 1131.2 (c). Such a complete listing of this information, given the volume of traffic involved, would indeed have been a monumental undertaking. The failure of the Caputo statement to provide these particular specifics did not prejudice the carriers in making precise and informed objections to AFL’s application. The briefest perusal of the objecting carriers’ replies, which cover some 156 pages in the printed record of these appeals, belies any such contention. Neither was the statement so devoid of information that it, along with the replies of the protesting carriers, could not support a finding that AFL’s service was required to meet DOD’s immediate and urgent transportation needs. In our view, the District Court exacted a standard of compliance with procedural rules that was wholly unnecessary to provide an adequate record to review the Commission’s decision. The Commission is entitled to a measure of discretion in administering its own procedural rules in such a manner as it deems necessary to resolve quickly and correctly urgent transportation problems. It is argued that the rules were adopted to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals; in opposition it is said the rules were intended primarily to facilitate the development of relevant information for the Commission’s use in deciding applications for temporary authority. We agree with the Commission that the rules were promulgated for the purpose of providing the “necessary information” for the Commission “to reach an informed and equitable decision” on temporary authority applications. ICC Policy Release of January 23, 1968. The Commission stated that requests for temporary authority would be turned down “if the applications do not adequately comply with [the] . . . rules.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The rules were not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion as in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535; nor is this a case in which an agency required by rule to exercise independent discretion has failed to do so. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260; Yellin v. United States, 374 U. S. 109. Thus there is no reason to exempt this case from the general principle that “[i]t is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it. The action of either in such a case is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.” NLRB v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 205 F. 2d 763, 764. And see NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F. 2d 126, 129; Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F. 2d 233; McKenna v. Seaton, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 50, 259 F. 2d 780. We deal here with the grant of temporary authority similar to that granted in Estes Express Lines v. United States, 292 F. Supp. 842, aff’d, 394 U. S. 718. There the grant of temporary authority was upheld even though there may not have been literal compliance with subsections (8) and (9) of the Commission’s rules. That result was in line with § 210a (a) of the Act which was designed to provide the Commission with a swift and procedurally simple ability to respond to urgent transportation needs. That functional approach is served by treating (8) and (9) not as inflexible procedural conditions but as tools to aid the Commission in exercising its discretion to meet “an immediate and urgent need” for services where the existing service is incapable of meeting that need. Unlike some rules, the present ones are mere aids to the exercise of the agency’s independent discretion. II After the Commission issued its first order, petitions for reconsideration were filed and before they were passed upon, some carriers filed suit and a single judge temporarily restrained operation of that first order. It was after that order issued and over a month before the case was argued to the three-judge court that the Commission granted the petitions for rehearing and reopened the record and received the Caputo verified statement. The District Court held that the pendency of the review proceedings deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to reopen the administrative record. Congress has provided as respects some regulatory systems that the agency may modify any finding up until the record is filed with a court. Such is the provision of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (d) and § 160 (e), which provides that any subsequent changes in the record will be made only at the direction of the court. A similar provision is included in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c) and in § 11. of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (c). And a like provision is included in the review by the courts of appeals of orders of other designated federal agencies. 28 U. S. C. §2347 (c) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). But there is no such requirement in the Interstate Commerce Act. It indeed empowers the Commission “at any time to grant rehearings as to any decision, order, or requirement and to reverse, change, or modify the same.” The power of the Commission to grant rehearings is not limited or qualified by the terms of 49 U. S. C. § 17 (6) or § 17 (7). Thus in § 17 (6) it is said, “Rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration may be granted if sufficient reason therefor be made to appear.” And § 17 (7) provides that if after rehearing or reconsideration the original decision, order, or requirement appears “unjust or unwarranted,” the Commission may “reverse, change, or modify” the same. These broad powers are plainly adequate to add to the findings or firm them up as the Commission deems desirable, absent any collision or interference with the District Court. Unless Congress provides otherwise, “[wjhere a motion for rehearing is in fact filed there is no final action until the rehearing is denied.” Outland v. CAB, 109 U. S. App. D. C. 90, 93, 284 F. 2d 224, 227. In multi-party proceedings, such as the present one, some may seek judicial review and others may seek administrative reconsideration. “That both tribunals have jurisdiction does not mean, of course, that they will act at cross purposes.” Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 324, 327, 248 F. 2d 646, 649. The concept “of an indivisible jurisdiction which must be all in one tribunal or all in the other may fit” some statutory schemes, ibid., but it does not fit this one. This power of the Commission to reconsider a prior decision does not necessarily collide with the judicial power of review. For while the court properly could provide temporary relief against a Commission order, its issuance does not mean that the Commission loses all jurisdiction to complete the administrative process. It does mean that thereafter the Commission is “without power to act inconsistently with the court’s jurisdiction.” Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 160. When the Commission made the additional findings after its first order was stayed by the court, it did not act inconsistently with what the court had done. It did not interfere in the slightest with the court’s protective order. What the Commission did came before the court was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before the record was filed with it. Moreover, the Commission in light of the District Court's stay, by express terms, directed AFL not to perform operations under the first order and made the second order effective only on further order of the Commission. Since by the Act the Commission never lost jurisdiction to pass on petitions for rehearing, and since the stay order did not forbid it from acting on those pending petitions, it was not necessary for the Commission to seek permission of the court to make those rulings. The Commission reopened the record merely to remedy a deficiency in it before any judicial review of the merits had commenced and fully honored the stay order of the District Court. It therefore acted in full harmony with the court’s jurisdiction. Reversed. Section 210a(a) provides in part: “To enable the provision of service for which there is an immediate and urgent need to a point or points or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such need, the Commission may, in its discretion and without hearings or other proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier or a contract carrier by motor vehicle, as the case may be. 2 49 CFR § 1131.4 (b) (2) defines the statutory term “immediate and urgent need” as follows: “An immediate and urgent need justifying a grant of temporary authority will be determined to exist only where it is established that there is or soon will be an immediate transportation need which reasonably cannot be met by existing carrier service. Such a showing may involve a new or relocated plant, different method of distribution, new or unusual commodities, an origin or destination not presently served by carriers, a discontinuance of existing service, failure of existing carriers to provide service, or comparable situations which require new motor carrier service before an application for permanent authority can be filed and processed.” See 49 CFR § 1131.2(c). AFL is a federation of agricultural marketing cooperatives created in 1964 to provide transportation for its members. By-virtue of § 203 (b) (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 921, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §303 (b)(5), AFL may transport freight for its members without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC. In 1965 § 203 (b) (5) was construed to exempt from the certification requirement any freight transportation by an agricultural cooperative for shippers other than its own members to the extent that such nonmember transportation is incidental and necessary to its principal transportation activities. See Northwest Agricultural Cooperative Assn. v. ICC, 350 F. 2d 252. The next year, AFL began transporting freight for DOD. In 1968-1969 AFL’s ability to continue serving DOD was restricted by two events. First, certain competing carriers obtained injunctions prohibiting AFL from making two consecutive movements for DOD and from transporting freight for any nonmember except when going to pick up, or returning from delivery of, a member’s freight. Munitions Carriers Conference, Inc. v. American Farm Lines, 415 F. 2d 747. Second, § 203 (b) (5) was amended to restrict the exemption for agricultural cooperatives to those whose transportation for nonmembers does not exceed 15% of their total annual interstate transportation, measured by tonnage. See 82 Stat. 448, 49 U. S. C. §303 (b)(5) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). AFL had transported 74,155,685 pounds for DOD between December 1966 and June 1968, and, in an effort to continue providing this service, applied to the ICC in May 1968 for temporary operating authority. The authority sought was to transport general commodities, including Class A and B explosives moving on government bills of lading over irregular routes between points in Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas on the one hand, and points in Washington, California, Nevada, Utah,, and Arizona on the other. AFL has applied to the ICC for a certificate of permanent authority. It was estimated at oral argument that final action on this application will not be taken by ICC before mid-1971. Meanwhile the ICC may extend the temporary authority. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 436. The precise chronology of these events is shown in n. 9, infra. ICC is not appealing from the District Court's decision setting aside' the first order. It was once proposed that the same requirement be written into the law respecting those orders of the Commission reviewed by the courts of appeal as distinguished from the three-judge district courts. See H. R. Rep. No. 1619, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. But the ICC was deleted from the measure. Id., at 1. And the Act as approved covered only other designated agencies. 28 U. S. C. §2342 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). See Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478, 484. The District Court’s stay was issued October 2, 1968. On October 9, the Commission stayed the effective date of its first order “until further order of the Commission.” On November 5, 1968, the Commission reopened the proceeding before it and directed AFL, in light of the District Court's order, “not to perform” any operations under its first order “until further order of the Commission.” On November 12, 1968, the Commission advised the District Court of its action. On December 20, 1968, the Commission entered its second order which authorized commencement of service by AFL only on further notice by the ICC. On December 31, 1968, a supplemental complaint was filed in the District Court challenging the Commission’s second order. On January 6, 1969, a single judge of the District Court stayed that order. On March 26, 1969, the District Court entered its judgment now being reviewed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. J. B. MONTGOMERY, INC. No. 66. Argued January 8, 1964. Decided March 23, 1964. Frank I. Goodman, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Robert B. Hummel, Elliott H. Moyer, Robert W. Ginnane and Betty Jo Christian. Charles W. Singer argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal tests the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued under § 212 (c) of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended in 1957, 71 Stat. 411, 49 U. S. C. § 312 (c), converting the appellee’s contract carrier permit into a common carrier certificate but limiting its coverage “to movements from, to, or between outlets or other facilities of particular businesses of the class of shippers with whom it may now contract.” Ap-pellee contends that this limitation violates the mandate of the Congress in § 212 (c) that any certificate so issued “shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same commodities between the same points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit.” The Commission answers that the restrictions are necessary to maintain “substantial parity” between the appel-lee’s old and new operations. The District Court held the Commission “without statutory authority to impose the restrictions in question” and set aside the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. 206 F. Supp. 455, 461. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 372 U. S. 952. We affirm the judgment. I. Prior to 1957 appellee operated under a contract carrier permit originally issued in 1943 under the “grandfather” clause contained in § 209 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, 49 Stat. 543, 552. It permitted carriage of: (1) such commodities as are usually dealt in by wholesale or retail hardware and automobile-accessory business houses, and in connection therewith, equipment, materials and supplies used in the conduct of such business; (2) such commodities as are usually dealt in, or used, by meat, fruit, and vegetable packing houses; and (3) such commodities as are usually dealt in, or used, by wholesale and retail department stores. The permit contained a “Keystone restriction” which limited appellee to transporting such commodities only under contracts with persons operating the businesses specified. It permitted the carriage of a wide variety of commodities within specified territories, without limitation of consignee, but only for those shippers under contract with appellee and engaged in the specified businesses. In 1957, at the behest of the Commission, the Congress amended the statutory definition of a contract carrier, § 203 (a)(15) of the Interstate Commerce Act, so as to thereafter read: “The term ‘contract carrier by motor vehicle’ means any person which engages in transportation by motor vehicle of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce, for compensation (other than transportation referred to in paragraph (14) and the exception therein), under continuing contracts with one person or a limited number of persons either (a) for the furnishing of transportation services through the assignment of motor vehicles for a continuing period of time to the exclusive use of each person served or (b) for the furnishing of transportation services designed to meet the distinct need of each individual customer.” In order to protect existing contract carrier permits, Congress enacted § 212 (c) which, as we have indicated, provided for the revocation of such a permit in appropriate proceedings before the Commission and the issuance of a common carrier certificate. In so doing, however, the Congress provided that the resulting common carrier certificate “shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same commodities between the same points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit.” In 1958 these proceedings were begun under this section and, after extended hearings, the Examiner found that the permit should be revoked and the common carrier certificate issued covering the same commodities and without restrictions. In addition he recommended the inclusion of authority for carriage of “materials, equipment, and supplies used by manufacturers of rubber and rubber products, from Chicago, and points in Illinois within 100 miles of Chicago, to Denver . . . The Commission adopted the latter recommendation and it was not contested in the District Court. As to the remaining authorizations, the Commission appended to the recommendations of the Examiner a restriction against combining or “tacking” appellee’s various operating rights in order to render a through service (likewise not contested), and also subjected each grant of authority to the following restriction: “Restriction: The. authority granted immediately above is restricted to shipments moving from, to, or between wholesale and retail outlets, . . .” The validity of this restriction is the sole challenge raised in this proceeding. II. The Commission contends that § 212 (c), read in the light of its background, is a “grandfather clause.” Its purpose, therefore, is merely to continue, without expanding, the authority of those contract carriers whose operations are lawful under United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U. S. 409 (1956), by revoking their contract carrier permits and issuing in lieu thereof common carrier certificates. The Commission concludes that, while the Congress specified only a continuance of the commodity and territorial limitations, Congress also intended that the effects of the “Keystone restriction” in the old permit be carried forward in the new one. Even if this is incorrect, the Commission says that it remains free to impose the restriction by reason of its general power under the Interstate Commerce Act to confine carrier operations within appropriate limits. The difficulty with this argument is that the “Keystone restriction” under which appellee operated permitted it to carry commodities “dealt in, or used by” certain businesses without limitation, except that appellee was required to have a contract with the shipper so engaged. Although the Commission has eliminated this last requirement by certificating appellee as a common carrier, the restriction it has imposed here limits shipments “to shipments moving from, to, or between wholesale and retail outlets” and stores. Appellee insists that this restriction limits its carriage in that appellee cannot deliver from a supplier to a consumer, to or from a public warehouse or ship dock, between warehouses, to consolidation or transfer points or to a laborer or modification agent. The record does not show whether appellee exercised these claimed privileges under its contract carrier permit. We hold that if it did enjoy them or any others that we have not enumerated, then it is entitled to have the same freedom in its common carrier certificate. The legislative history indicates that the Commission in its presentation to the Congress on § 212 (c) represented through its Chairman that the legislation would disturb no property rights of the contract carrier. Indeed, it asserted that such carriers would have “greater opportunity.” Moreover, the “Keystone restrictions” received the attention of the Congress. In the same Senate hearings, the difference between contract and common carriers was made clear, i. e., while the former were limited in the “character” of their carriage to the type of commodities named in their permits, they were not limited to particular shippers. Common carriers, on the other hand, were not limited in any way in their certificated territories. It appears to us that Congress intended to leave the converted contract carrier in as good a position as it previously enjoyed. Under the facts claimed, the Commission has not done so in this case. We do not believe that appellee waived its rights by not proving that it had exercised the claimed privileges under its contract carrier permit. The permit has no restriction on its face in this regard, and such proof was understandably not presented in light of the recommendation of the Examiner that a common carrier permit include no restrictions whatever. At this late date it would be unfair to strip appellee of its claimed rights upon this basis. Nor do we believe that the Commission can impose the restrictions on a rule of “substantial parity” under its general powers. Since § 212 (c) specifically commands that the Commission “shall” authorize the same carriage as was included in the contract carrier permit, we are unable to place § 212 (c) authority under the general power of other unrelated sections, such as § 208, where specific power is granted to assure “substantial parity.” The appellee carried on certain operations under its contract carrier permit. Congress intended that these operations be continued under the common carrier permit. The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed. On remand the Commission will be free to contest appellee’s factual claims as to what service it performed under its contract carrier permit and to limit the common carrier certificate to such activity. Affirmed. “The Commission shall examine each outstanding permit and may within one hundred and eighty days after ... [August 22,1957] institute a proceeding either upon its own initiative, or upon application of a permit holder actually in operation or upon complaint of an interested party, and after notice and hearing revoke a permit and issue in lieu thereof a certificate of public convenience and necessity, if it finds, first, that any person holding a permit whose operations on . . . [August 22, 1957] do not conform with the definition of a contract carrier in section 203 (a) (15) as in force on and after . . . [August 22, 1957]; second, are those of a common carrier; and, third, are otherwise lawful. Such certificate so issued shall authorize the transportation, as a common carrier, of the same commodities between the same points or within the same territory as authorized in the permit.” 71 Stat. 411. This provision is now substantially contained in 49 U. S. C. § 309 (a)(1) : “Except as otherwise provided in this section and in section 310a of this title, no person shall engage in the business of a contract carrier by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce on any public highway or within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a permit issued by the Commission, authorizing such person to engage in such business: Provided, That, subject to section 310 of this title, if any such carrier or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation as a contract carrier by motor vehicle on July 1, 1935, over the route or routes or within the territory for which application is made and has so operated since that time . . . the Commission shall issue such permit, without further proceedings, if application for such permit was made to the Commission as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and within one hundred and twenty days after October 1, 1935 The phrase “Keystone restriction” comes from the title of the proceeding, Keystone Transportation Co. Contract Carrier Application, 19 M. C. C. 475. Such restrictions were approved by this Court in Noble v. United States, 319 U. S. 88 (1943). 71 Stat. 411, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (a) (15). The former § 203 (a) (15) stated the definition as follows: “The term ‘contract carrier by motor vehicle1 means any person which, under individual contracts or agreements, engages in the transportation (other than transportation referred to in paragraph (14) and the exception therein) by motor vehicle of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation.” 54 Stat. 920. During the hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee the following colloquy ■occurred between Mr. Barton, transportation counsel of the committee, and Mr. Clarke, then chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission: “Mr. Barton: . . . “Mr. Clarke, do you think there is any constitutional difficulty in changing, as we say, as you propose, a contract carrier to a common-carrier status? “Mr. Clarke: No; I can see none. It isn’t taking away from them anything that they have; it isn’t disturbing any property rights of the contract carrier. It is giving him greater opportunity. He can still serve his contract shippers, but through the conversion provisions of the bill he would also have the opportunity to serve the general public as well as the obligation.” (Emphasis added.) Hearings before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Surface Transportation — Scope of Authority of I. C. C., p. 35. Id., at 182.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GAGNON, WARDEN v. SCARPELLI No. 71-1225. Argued January 9, 1973 Decided May 14, 1973 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a statement dissenting in part, post, p. 791. William, A. Platz, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Robert W. Warren, Attorney General. William M. Coffey, by appointment of the Court, 408 U. S. 921, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the related questions whether a previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked and, if so, whether he is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at such a hearing. I Respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July 1965, to a charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin. The trial Judge sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for seven years in the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Public Welfare (the Department). At that time, he signed an agreement specifying the terms of his probation and a “Travel Permit and Agreement to Return” allowing him to reside in Illinois, with supervision there under an interstate compact. On August 5, 1965, he was accepted for supervision by the Adult Probation Department of Cook County, Illinois. On August 6, respondent was apprehended by Illinois police, who had surprised him and one Fred Kleckner, Jr., in the course of the burglary of a house. After being apprised of his constitutional rights, respondent admitted that he and Kleckner had broken into the house for the purpose of stealing merchandise or money, although he now asserts that his statement was made under duress and is false. Probation was revoked by the Wisconsin Department on September 1, without a hearing. The stated grounds for revocation were that: “1. [Scarpelli] has associated with known criminals, in--direct violation of his probation regulations and his supervising agent’s instructions; “2. [Scarpelli,] while associating with a known criminal, namely Fred Kleckner, Jr., was involved in, and arrested for, a burglary ... in Deerfield, Illinois.” App. 20. On September 4, 1965, he was incarcerated in the Wisconsin State Reformatory at Green Bay to begin serving the 15 years to which he had been sentenced by the trial judge. At no time was he afforded a hearing. Some three years later, on December 16, 1968, respondent applied for a writ of habeas corpus. After the petition had been filed, but before it had been acted upon, the Department placed respondent on parole. The District Court found that his status as parolee was sufficient custody to confer jurisdiction on the court and that the petition was not moot because the revocation carried “collateral consequences,” presumably including the restraints imposed by his parole. On the merits, the District Court held that revocation without a hearing and counsel was a denial of due process. 317 F. Supp. 72 (ED Wis. 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed sub nom. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (CA7 1971), and we granted certiorari. 408 U. S. 921 (1972). II Two prior decisions set the bounds of our present inquiry. In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967), the Court held that a probationer is entitled to be represented by appointed counsel at a combined revocation and sentencing hearing. Reasoning that counsel is required “at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,” id., at 134, and that sentencing is one such stage, the Court concluded that counsel must be provided an indigent at sentencing even when it is accomplished as part of a subsequent probation revocation proceeding. But this line of reasoning does not require a hearing or counsel at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the present one, where the probationer was sentenced at the time of trial. Of greater relevance is our decision last Term in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). There we held that the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution. “Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.” Id., at 480. Even though the revocation of parole is not a part of the criminal prosecution, we held that the loss of liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that the parolee be accorded due process. Specifically, we held that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole, and the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the final revocation decision. Petitioner does not contend that there is any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, nor do we perceive one. Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra. III The second, and more difficult, question posed by this case is whether an indigent probationer or parolee has a due process right to be represented by appointed counsel at these hearings. In answering that question, we draw heavily on the opinion in Morrissey. Our first point of reference is the character of probation or parole. As noted in Morrissey regarding parole, the “purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able . . . .” 408 U. S., at 477. The duty and attitude of the probation or parole officer reflect this purpose: “While the parole or probation officer recognizes his double duty to the welfare of his clients and to the safety of the general community, by and large concern for the client dominates his professional attitude. The parole agent ordinarily defines his role as representing his client’s best interests as long as these do not constitute a threat to public safety.” Because the probation or parole officer’s function is not so much to compel conformance to a strict code of behavior as to supervise a course of rehabilitation, he has been entrusted traditionally with broad discretion to judge the progress of rehabilitation in individual cases, and has been armed with the power to recommend or even to declare revocation. In Morrissey, we recognized that the revocation decision has two analytically distinct components: “The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?” 408 U. S., at 479-480. The parole officer’s attitude toward these decisions reflects the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of the probation/parole system: “Revocation ... is, if anything, commonly treated as a failure of supervision. While presumably it would be inappropriate for a field agent never to revoke, the whole thrust of the probation-parole movement is to keep men in the community, working with adjustment problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort when treatment has failed or is about to fail.” But an exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of those who administer the probation/parole system when it is working successfully obscures the modification in attitude which is likely to take place once the officer has decided to recommend revocation. Even though the officer is not by this recommendation converted into a prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counsellor to the probationer or parolee is then surely compromised. When the officer’s view of the probationer’s or parolee’s conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter’s own view, due process requires that the difference be resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the probationer or parolee and the State have interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion — the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community. It was to serve all of these interests that Morrissey mandated preliminary and final revocation hearings. At the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a written report of the hearing. 408 U. S., at 487. The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision under consideration is the ultimate decision to revoke rather than a mere determination of probable cause, but the “minimum requirements of due process” include very similar elements: “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.” Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 489. These requirements in themselves serve as substantial protection against ill-considered revocation, and petitioner argues that counsel need never be supplied. What this argument overlooks is that the effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess. Despite the informal nature of the proceedings and the absence of technical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled or uneducated probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence. By the same token, we think that the Court of Appeals erred in accepting respondent’s contention that the State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases. While such a rule has the appeal of simplicity, it would impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel. In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the charges against him. And while in some cases he may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is often not susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either investigation or exposition by counsel. The introduction of counsel into a revocation proceeding will alter significantly the nature of the proceeding. If counsel is provided for the probationer or parolee, the State in turn will normally provide its own counsel; lawyers, by training and disposition, are advocates and bound by professional duty to present all available evidence and arguments in support of their clients’ positions and to contest with vigor all adverse evidence and views. The role of the hearing body itself, aptly described in Morrissey as being “predictive and discretionary” as well as factfinding, may become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs of the individual probationer or parolee. In the greater self-consciousness of its quasi-judicial role, the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation. Certainly, the decisionmaking process will be prolonged, and the financial cost to the State — for appointed counsel, counsel for the State, a longer record, and the possibility of judicial review — will not be insubstantial. In some cases, these modifications in the nature of the revocation hearing must be endured and the costs borne because, as we have indicated above, the probationer’s or parolee’s version of a disputed issue can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate. But due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed. In so concluding, we are of course aware that the case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in felony prosecutions adopted in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), was later rejected in favor of a per se rule in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). We do not, however, draw from Gideon and Argersinger the conclusion that a case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in varying types of proceedings: there are critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have stakes in preserving these differences. In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole. The need for counsel at revocation hearings derives, not from the invariable attributes of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular cases. The differences between a criminal trial and a revocation hearing do not dispose altogether of the argument that under a case-by-case approach there may be cases in which a lawyer would be useful but in which none would be appointed because an arguable defense would be uncovered only by a lawyer. Without denying that there is some force in this argument, we think it a sufficient answer that we deal here, not with the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime. We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness — the touchstone of due process — will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. It is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements. The facts and circumstances in preliminary and final hearings are susceptible of almost infinite variation, and a considerable discretion must be allowed the responsible agency in making the decision. Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record. IV We return to the facts of the present case. Because respondent was not afforded either a preliminary hearing or a final hearing, the revocation of his probation did not meet the standards of due process prescribed in Morrissey, which we have here held applicable to probation revocations. Accordingly, respondent was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. On remand, the District Court should allow the State an opportunity to conduct such a hearing. As to whether the State must provide counsel, respondent’s admission to having committed another serious crime creates the very sort of situation in which counsel need not ordinarily be provided. But because of respondent’s subsequent assertions regarding that admission, see supra, at 780, we conclude that the failure of the Department to provide respondent with the assistance of counsel should be re-examined in light of this opinion. The general guidelines outlined above should be applied in the first instance by those charged with conducting the revocation hearing. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court’s order placing respondent on probation provided, among other things, that “[i]n the event of his failure to meet the conditions of his probation he will stand committed under the sentence all ready [sic] imposed.” App. 10. The agreement specifying the conditions of the probation, duly executed by respondent, obligated him to “make a sincere attempt to avoid all acts which are forbidden by law . . . .” App. 12. Respondent was initially paroled to a federal detainer to serve a previously imposed federal sentence arising from another conviction. He was subsequently released from federal custody, but remains a parolee under the supervision of the Department. Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e. g., Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 175, 198 n. 182 (1964). It is clear at least after Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), that a probationer can no longer be denied due process, in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492 (1935), that probation is an “act of grace.” Petitioner argues, in addition, that the Morrissey hearing requirements impose serious practical problems in cases such as the present one in which a probationer or parolee is allowed to leave the convicting State for supervision in another State. Such arrangements are made pursuant to an interstate compact adopted by all of the States, including Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. Ann. §57.13 (1957). Petitioner’s brief asserts that as of June 30, 1972, Wisconsin had a total of 642 parolees and probationers under supervision in other States and that incomplete statistics as of June 30,1971, indicated a national total of 24,693 persons under out-of-state supervision. Brief for Petitioner 21-22. Some amount of disruption inevitably attends any new constitutional ruling. We are confident, however, that modification of the interstate compact can remove without undue strain the more serious technical hurdles to compliance with Morrissey. An additional comment is warranted with respect to the rights to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Petitioner’s greatest concern is with the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of miles away. While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States from holding both the preliminary and the final hearings at the place of violation or from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements. In Morrissey v. Brewer, we left open the question “whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent.” 408 U. S., at 489. Since respondent did not attempt to retain counsel but asked only for appointed counsel, we have no occasion to decide in this case whether a probationer or parolee has a right to be represented at a revocation hearing by retained counsel in situations other than those where the State would be obliged to furnish counsel for an indigent. F. Remington, D. Newman, E. Kimball, M. Melli & H. Goldstein, Criminal Justice Administration, Materials and Cases 910-911 (1969). The factors entering into these decisions relate in major part to a professional evaluation, by trained probation or parole officers, as to the overall social readjustment of the offender in the community, and include consideration of such variables as the offender’s relationship toward his family, his attitude toward the fulfillment of financial obligations, the e:xtent of his cooperation with the probation or parole officer assigned to his case, Ms personal associations, and — of course — whether there have been specific and sigmficant violations of the conditions of the probation or parole. The importance of these considerations, some factual and others entirely judgmental, is illustrated by a Wisconsin empirical study which disclosed that, in the sample studied, probation or parole was revoked in only 34.5% of the cases in which the probationer or parolee violated the terms of Ms release. S. Hunt, The Revocation Decision: A Study of Probation and Parole Agents’ Discretion 10 (unpublished thesis on file at the library of the University of Wisconsin) (1964), cited in Brief for Petitioner, Addendum 106. Remington, Newman, Kimball, Melli & Goldstein, supra, n. 7, at 910. See Sklar, supra, n. 3, at 192 (parole), 193 (probation). The scope of the practical problem which would be occasioned by a requirement of counsel in all revocation cases is suggested by the fact that in the mid-1960’s there was an estimated average of 20,000 adult felony parole revocations and 108,000 adult probation revocations each year. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 56 n. 28 (1967). Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), establishing a juvenile’s right to appointed counsel in a delinquency proceeding which, while denominated civil, was functionally akin to a criminal trial. A juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970) (the standard of proof in a juvenile delinquency-proceeding must be “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. PACIFICA FOUNDATION et al. No. 77-528. Argued April 18, 19, 1978 Decided July 3, 1978 Stevens, J., announced the Court’s judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I-III and IV-C, in which Burger, C. J'., and Rehnquist, J., joined, and in all but Parts IV-A and IV-B of which Blackmun and Powell, JJ., joined, and an opinion as to Parts IV-A and IV-B, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined.. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 755. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 762. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 777. Joseph A. Marino argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert R. Bruce and Daniel M. Armstrong. Harry M. Plotkin argued the cause for respondent Pacifica Foundation. With him on the brief were David Tillotson and Harry F. Cole. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States, a respondent under this Court’s Rule 21 (4). With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Civiletti, and Jerome M. Feit. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Anthony H. Atlas for Morality in Media, Inc.; and by George E. Reed and Patrick F. Geary for the United States Catholic Conference. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. Roger Wollen-berg, Timothy B. Dyk, James A. McKenna, Jr., Carl R. Ramey, Erwin G. Krasnow, Floyd Abrams, J. Laurent Scharff, Corydon B. Dunham, and Howard Monderer for the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et ah; by Henry R. Kaufman, Joel M. Gora, Charles Sims, and Bruce J. Ennis for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Irwin Karp for the Authors League of America, Inc;'; by James Bouras, Barbara Scott, and Fritz E. Attaway for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; and by Paul P. Selvin for the Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. Charles M. Firestone filed a brief for the Committee for Open Media as amicus curiae. Me. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II, III, and IV-C) and an opinion in which The Chief Justice and Me. Justice Rehnquist joined (Parts IV-A and IY-B). This case requires that we decide whether the Federal Communications Commission has any power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene. A satiric humorist named George Carlin recorded a 12-minute monologue entitled “Filthy Words” before a live audience in a California theater. He began by referring to his thoughts about “the words you couldn’t say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say, ever.” He proceeded to list those words and repeat them over and over again in a variety of colloquialisms. The transcript of the recording, which is appended to this opinion, indicates frequent laughter from the audience. At about 2 o’clock in the afternoon on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, a New York radio station, owned by respondent Pacifica Foundation, broadcast the “Filthy Words” monologue. A few weeks later a man, who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son, wrote a letter complaining to the Commission. He stated that, although he could perhaps understand the “record’s being sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of same over the air that, supposedly, you control.” The complaint was forwarded to the station for comment. In its response, Pacifica explained that the monologue had been played during a program about contemporary society’s attitude toward language and that, immediately before its broadcast, listeners had been advised that it included “sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.” Pacifica characterized George Carlin as “a significant social satirist” who “like Twain and Sahl before him, examines the language of ordinary people. . . . Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words.” Pacifica stated that it was not aware of any other complaints about the broadcast. On February 21, 1975, the Commission issued a declaratory order granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica “could have been the subject of administrative sanctions.” 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 99. The Commission did not impose formal sanctions, but it did state that the order would be “associated with the station’s license file, and in the event that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions it has been granted by Congress.” In its memorandum opinion the Commission stated that it intended to “clarify the standards which will be utilized in considering” the growing number of complaints about indecent speech on the airwaves. Id., at 94. Advancing several reasons for treating broadcast speech differently from other forms of expression, the Commission found a power to regulate indecent broadcasting in two statutes: 18 U. S. C. § 1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids the use of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications,” and 47 U. S. C. § 303 (g), which requires the Commission to “encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.” The Commission characterized the language used in the Carlin monologue as “patently offensive,” though not necessarily obscene, and expressed the opinion that it should be regulated by principles analogous to those found in the law of nuisance where the “law generally speaks to channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it. . . . [T]he concept of ‘indecent’ is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.” 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. Applying these considerations to the language used in the monologue as broadcast by respondent, the Commission concluded that certain words depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner, noted that they “were broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience (i. e., in the early afternoon),” and that the prerecorded language, with these offensive words “repeated over and over,” was “deliberately broadcast.” Id., at 99. In summary, the Commission stated: “We therefore hold that the language as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 U. S. C. [§] 1464.” Ibid. After the order issued, the Commission was asked to clarify its opinion by ruling that the broadcast of indecent words as part of a live newscast would not be prohibited. The Commission issued another opinion in which it pointed out that it “never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it.” 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1976). The Commission noted that its “declaratory order was issued in a specific factual context,” and declined to comment on various hypothetical situations presented by the petition. Id., at 893. It relied on its “long standing policy of refusing to issue interpretive rulings or advisory opinions when the critical facts are not explicitly stated or there is a possibility that subsequent events will alter them.” Ibid. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, with each of the three judges on the panel writing separately. 181 U. S. App. D. C. 132, 556 F. 2d 9. Judge Tamm concluded that the order represented censorship and was expressly prohibited by § 326 of the Communications Act. Alternatively, Judge Tamm read the Commission opinion as the functional equivalent of a rule and concluded that it was “overbroad.” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 141, 556 F. 2d, at 18. Chief Judge Bazelon’s concurrence rested on the Constitution. He was persuaded that § 326’s prohibition against censorship is inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by § 1464. However, he concluded that § 1464 must be narrowly construed to cover only language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment. 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 140-153, 556 F. 2d, at 24-30. Judge Leventhal, in dissent, stated that the only issue was whether the Commission could regulate the language “as broadcast.” Id., at 154, 556 F. 2d, at 31. Emphasizing the interest in protecting children, not only from exposure to indecent language, but also from exposure to the idea that such language has official approval, id., at 160, and n. 18, 556 F. 2d, at 37, and n. 18, he concluded that the Commission had correctly condemned the daytime broadcast as indecent. Having granted the Commission’s petition for certiorari, 434 U. S. 1008, we must decide: (1) whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more than the Commission’s determination that the monologue was indecent “as broadcast”; (2) whether the Commission’s order was a form of censorship forbidden by § 326; (3) whether the broadcast was indecent within the meaning of § 1464; and (4) whether the order violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. I The general statements in the Commission’s memorandum opinion do not change the character of its order. Its action was an adjudication under 5 U. S. C. § 554 (e) (1976 ed.); it did not purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in the promulgation of any regulations. The order “was issued in a specific factual context”; questions concerning possible action in other contexts were expressly reserved for the future. The specific holding was carefully confined to the monologue “as broadcast.” “This Court . . . reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.” Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U. S. 292, 297. That admonition has special force when the statements raise constitutional questions, for it is our settled practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of such issues. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-569. However appropriate it may be for an administrative agency to write broadly in an adjudicatory proceeding, federal courts have never been empowered to issue advisory opinions. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 126. Accordingly, the focus of our review must be on the Commission’s determination that the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast. II The relevant statutory questions are whether the Commission’s action is forbidden “censorship” within the meaning of 47 U. S. C. § 326 and whether speech that concededly is not obscene may be restricted as “indecent” under the authority of 18 U. S. C. § 1464 (1976 ed.). The questions are not unrelated, for the two statutory provisions have a common origin. Nevertheless, we analyze them separately. Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 provided: “Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication.” 44 Stat. 1172. The prohibition against censorship unequivocally denies the Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to excise material considered inappropriate for the airwaves. The prohibition, however, has never been construed to deny the Commission the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties. During the period between the original enactment of the provision in 1927 and its re-enactment in the Communications Act of 1934, the courts and the Federal Radio Commission held that the section deprived the Commission of the power to subject “broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its release,” but they concluded that the Commission’s “undoubted right” to take note of past program content when considering a licensee’s renewal application “is not censorship.” Not only did the Federal Radio Commission so construe the statute prior to 1934; its successor, the Federal Communications Commission, has consistently interpreted the provision in the same way ever since. See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964). And, until this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has consistently agreed with this construction. Thus, for example, in his opinion in Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 131 U. S. App.. D. C. 146, 403 F. 2d 169 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 930, Judge Wright forcefully pointed out that the Commission is not prevented from canceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of improper programming. He explained: “This would not be prohibited ‘censorship,’ . . . any more than would the Commission’s considering on a license renewal application whether a broadcaster allowed ‘coarse, vulgar, suggestive, double-meaning’ programming ; programs containing such material are grounds for denial of a license renewal.” 131 U. S. App. D. C., at 150-151, n. 3, 403 F. 2d, at 173-174, n. 3. See also Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 359 F. 2d 994 (1966). Entirely apart from the fact that the subsequent review of program content is not the sort of censorship at which the statute was directed, its history makes it perfectly clear that it was not intended to limit the Commission’s power to regulate the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language. A single section of the 1927 Act is the source of both the anticensorship provision and the Commission’s authority to impose sanctions for the broadcast of indecent or obscene language. Quite plainly, Congress intended to give meaning to both provisions. Respect for that intent requires that the censorship language be read as inapplicable to the prohibition on broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language. There is nothing in the legislative history to contradict this conclusion. The provision was discussed only in generalities when it was first enacted. In 1934, the anticensorship provision and the prohibition against indecent broadcasts were re-enacted in the same section, just as in the 1927 Act. In 1948, when the Criminal Code was revised to include provisions that had previously been located in other Titles of the United States Code, the prohibition against obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts was removed from the Communications Act and re-enacted as § 1464 of Title 18. 62 Stat. 769 and 866. That rearrangement of the Code cannot reasonably be interpreted as having been intended to change the meaning of the anticensorship provision. H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A106 (1947). Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151, 162. We conclude, therefore, that § 326 does not limit the Commission’s authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting. Ill The only other statutory question presented by this case is whether the afternoon broadcast of the “Filthy Words” monologue was indecent within the meaning of § 1464. Even that question is narrowly confined by the arguments of the parties. The Commission identified several words that referred to excretory or sexual activities or organs, stated that the repetitive, deliberate use of those words in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience was patently offensive, and held that the broadcast was indecent. Pacifica takes issue with the Commission’s definition of indecency, but does not dispute the Commission’s preliminary determination that each of the components of its definition was present. Specifically, Pacifica does not quarrel with the conclusion that this afternoon broadcast was patently offensive. Pacifica’s claim that the broadcast was not indecent within the meaning of the statute rests entirely on the absence of prurient appeal. The plain language of the statute does not support Pacifica’s argument. The words “obscene, indecent, or profane” are written in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning. Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal definition of “indecent” merely refers to noncon-formance with accepted standards of morality. Pacifica argues, however, that this Court has construed the term “indecent” in related statutes to mean “obscene,” as that term was defined in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15. Pacifica relies most heavily on the construction this Court gave to 18 U. S. C. § 1461 in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87. See also United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123, 130 n. 7 (18 U. S. C. § 1462) (dicta). Hamling rejected a vagueness attack on § 1461, which forbids the mailing of “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile” material. In holding that the statute’s coverage is limited to obscenity, the Court followed the lead of Mr. Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478. In that case, Mr. Justice Harlan recognized that § 1461 contained a variety of words with many shades of meaning. Nonetheless, he thought that the phrase “obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,” taken as a whole, was clearly limited to the obscene, a reading well grounded in prior judicial constructions: “[T]he statute since its inception has always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex.” 370 U. S., at 483. In Hamling the Court agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan that § 1461 was meant only to regulate obscenity in the mails; by reading into it the limits set by Miller v. California, supra, the Court adopted a construction which assured the statute’s constitutionality. The reasons supporting Hamling’s construction of § 1461 do not apply to § 1464. Although the history of the former revealed a primary concern with the prurient, the Commission has long interpreted § 1464 as encompassing more than the obscene. The former statute deals primarily with printed matter enclosed in sealed envelopes mailed from one individual to another; the latter deals with the content of public broadcasts. It is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended to impose precisely the same limitations on the dissemination of patently offensive matter by such different means. Because neither our prior decisions nor the language or history of § 1464 supports the conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential component of indecent language, we reject Pacifica’s construction of the statute. When that construction is put to one side, there is no basis for disagreeing with the Commission’s conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast. IV Pacifica makes two constitutional attacks on the Commission’s order. First, it argues that the Commission’s construction of the statutory language broadly encompasses so much constitutionally protected speech that reversal is required even if Pacifica’s broadcast of the “Filthy Words” monologue is not itself protected by the First Amendment. Second, Pacifica argues that inasmuch as the recording is not obscene, the Constitution forbids any abridgment of the right to broadcast it on the radio. A The first argument fails because our review is limited to the question whether the Commission has the authority to proscribe this particular broadcast. As the Commission itself emphasized, its order was “issued in a specific factual context.” 59 F. C. C. 2d, at 893. That approach is appropriate for courts as well as the Commission when regulation of indecency is at stake, for indecency is largely a function of context — it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract. The approach is also consistent with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367. In that case the Court rejected an argument that the Commission’s regulations defining the fairness doctrine were so vague that they would inevitably abridge the broadcasters’ freedom of speech. The Court of Appeals had invalidated the regulations because their vagueness might lead to self-censorship of controversial program content. Radio Television News Directors Assn. v. United States, 400 F. 2d 1002, 1016 (CA7 1968). This Court reversed. After noting that the Commission had indicated, as it has in this case, that it would not impose sanctions without warning in cases in which the applicability of the law was unclear, the Court stated: “We need not approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine to decide these cases, and we will not now pass upon the constitutionality of these regulations by envisioning the most extreme applications conceivable, United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 694 (1948), but will deal with those problems if and when they arise.” 395 U. S., at 396-. It is true that the Commission’s order may lead some broadcasters to censor themselves. At most, however, the Commission’s definition of indecency will -deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities. While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380-381. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 61. The danger 'dismissed so summarily in Red Lion, in contrast, was that broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the regulations by refusing to present programs dealing with important social and political controversies. Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court is “strong medicine” to be applied “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613. We decline to administer that medicine to preserve the vigor of patently offensive sexual and excretory speech. B When the issue is narrowed to the facts of this case, the question is whether the First Amendment denies government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language in any circumstances. For if the government has any such power, this was an appropriate occasion for its exercise. The words of the Carlin monologue are unquestionably “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment. It is equally clear that the Commission’s objections to the broadcast were based in part on its content. The order must therefore fall if, as Pacifica argues, the First Amendment prohibits all governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Our past cases demonstrate, however, that no such absolute rule is mandated by the Constitution. The classic exposition of the proposition that both the content and the context of speech are critical elements of First Amendment analysis is Mr. Justice Holmes’ statement for the Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52: “We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against-uttering words that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.” Other distinctions based on content have been approved in the years since Schenck. The government may forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568. It may pay heed to the “ 'commonsense differences’ between commercial speech and other varieties.” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 381. It may treat libels against private citizens more severely than libels against public officials. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323. Obscenity may be wholly prohibited. Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15. And only two Terms ago wé refused to hold that a “statutory classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment.” Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 52. The question in this case is whether a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its content. Obscene materials have been denied the protection of the First Amendment because their content is so offensive to contemporary moral standards. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. But the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for - suppressingyit. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas. If there were any reason to believe that the Commission’s characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced to its political content — or even to the fact that it satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words— First Amendment protection might be required. But that is simply not this case. These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: “[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S., at 572. Although these words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. Some uses of even the most offensive words are unquestionably protected. See, e. g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105. Indeed, we may assume, arguendo, that this monologue would be protected in other contexts. Nonetheless, the constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context. It is a characteristic of speech such as this that both its capacity to offend and its “social value,” to use Mr. Justice Murphy’s term, vary with the circumstances. Words that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan, one occasion’s lyric is another’s vulgarity. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25. In this case it is undisputed that the content of Pacifica’s broadcast was “vulgar,” “offensive,” and “shocking.” Because content of that character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we must consider its context in order to determine whether the Commission's action was constitutionally permissible. C We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 502-503. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although other speakers cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow official discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commission decides that such an action would serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Similarly, although the First Amendment protects newspaper publishers from being required to print the replies of those whom they criticize, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, it affords no such protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time to the victims of their criticism. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367. The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance to the present case. First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken place. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen’s written message might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, that the government’s interest in the “well-being of its youth” and in supporting “parents’ claim to authority in their own household” justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. Id., at 640 and 639. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting. It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission’s decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important. The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of day was emphasized by the Commission. The content of the program in which the language is used will also affect the composition of the audience, and differences between radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant. As Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote, a “nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, — like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.” Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 388. We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT The following is a verbatim transcript of “Filthy Words” prepared by the Federal Communications Commission. Aruba-du, ruba-tu, ruba-tu. I was thinking about the curse words and the swear words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say all the time, ['] cause words or people into words want to hear your words. Some guys like to record your words and sell them back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on the telephone, write down what words you say. A guy who used to be in Washington knew that his phone was tapped, used to answer, Fuck Hoover, yes, go ahead, (laughter) Okay, I was thinking one night about the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever, ['] cause I heard a lady say bitch one night on television, and it was cool like she was talking about, you know, ah, well, the bitch is the first one to notice that in the litter Johnie right (murmur) Right. And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I have to figure out which ones you couldn’t and ever and it came down to seven but the list is open to amendment, and in fact, has been changed, uh, by now, ha, a lot of people pointed things out to me, and I noticed some myself. The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter) um, and a bourbon, (laughter) And now the first thing that we noticed was that word fuck was really repeated in there because the word motherfucker is a compound word and it's another form of the word fuck, (laughter) You want to be a purist it doesn't really — it can’t be on the list of basic words. Also, cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that is really dirty. The word — the half sucker that’s merely suggestive (laughter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty word, 50% dirty — dirty half the time, depending on what you mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember when you first heard it, like in 6th grade, you used to giggle. And the cock crowed three times, heh (laughter) the cock — three times. It’s in the Bible, cock in the Bible, (laughter) And the first time you heard about a cock-fight, remember — What? Huh? naw. It ain’t that, are you stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It’s chickens, you know, (laughter) Then you have the four letter words from the old Anglo-Saxon fame. Uh, shit and fuck. The word shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in that the middle class has never really accepted it and approved it. They use it like, crazy but it’s not really okay. It’s still a rude, dirty, old kind of gushy word, (laughter) They don’t like that, but they say it, like, they say it like, a lady now in a middle-class home, you’ll hear most of the time she says it as an expletive, you know, it’s out of her mouth before she knows. She says, Oh shit oh shit, (laughter) oh shit. If she drops something, Oh, the shit hurt the broccoli. Shit. Thank you. (footsteps fading away) (papers ruffling) Read it! (from audience) Shit! (laughter) I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album. Isn’t that groovy? (clapping, whistling) (murmur) That’s true. Thank you. Thank you man. Yeah, (murmur) (continuous clapping) Thank you man. Thank you. Thank you very much, man. Thank, no, (end of continuous clapping) for that and for the Grammy, man, [’]cause (laughter) that’s based on people liking it man, yeh, that’s ah, that’s okay man. (laughter) Let’s let that go, man. I got my Grammy. I can let my hair hang down now, shit, (laughter) Ha! So! Now the word shit is okay for the man. At work you can say it like crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get that shit out of here, will ya? I don't want to see that shit anymore. I can’t cut that shit, buddy. I’ve had that shit up to here. I think you’re full of shit myself, (laughter) He don’t know shit from Shinola. (laughter) you know that? (laughter) Always wondered how the Shinola people felt about that (laughter) Hi,. I’m the new man from Shinola. (laughter) Hi, how are ya? Nice to see ya. (laughter) How are ya? (laughter) Boy, I don’t know whether to shit or wind my watch, (laughter) Guess, I’ll shit on my watch, (laughter) Oh, the shit is going to hit de fan. (laughter) Built like a brick shit-house, (laughter) Up, he’s up shit’s creek, (laughter) He’s had it. (laughter) He hit me, I’m sorry, (laughter) Hot shit, holy shit, tough shit, eat shit, (laughter) shit-eating grin. Uh, whoever thought of that was ill. (murmur laughter) He had a shit-eating grin! He had a what? (laughter) Shit on a stick, (laughter) Shit in a handbag. I always like that. He ain’t worth shit in a handbag, (laughter) Shitty. He acted real shitty, (laughter) You know what I mean? (laughter) I got the money back, but a real shitty attitude. Heh, he had a shit-fit. (laughter) Wow! Shit-fit. Whew! Glad I wasn’t there, (murmur, laughter) All the animals — Bull shit, horse shit, cow shit, rat shit, bat shit, (laughter) First time I heard bat shit, I really came apart. A guy in Oklahoma, Boggs, said it, man. Aw! Bat shit, (laughter) Vera reminded me of that last night, ah (murmur). Snake shit, slicker than owl shit, (laughter) Get your shit together. Shit or get off the pot. (laughter) I got a shit-load full of them, (laughter) I got a shit-pot full, all right. Shit-head, shit-heel, shit in your heart, shit for brains, (laughter) shit-face, heh (laughter) I always try to think how that could have originated; the first guy that said that. Somebody got drunk and fell in some shit, you know, (laughter) Hey, I’m shit-face, (laughter) Shit-face, today, (laughter) Anyway, enough of that shit, (laughter) The big one, the word fuck that’s the one that hangs them up the most. [’] Cause in a lot of cases that’s the very act that hangs them up the most. So, it's natural that the word would, uh, have the same effect. It’s a great word, fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to say. One syllable, short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You know, it's easy. Starts with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a huh. Right? (laughter) A little something for everyone. Fuck (laughter) Good word. Kind of a proud word, too. Who are you? I am FUCK, (laughter) FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN, (laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN, (laughter) It’s an interesting word too, [’]cause it’s got a double kind of a life — personality — dual, you know, whatever the right phrase is. It leads a double life, the word fuck. First of all, it means, sometimes, most of the time, fuck. What does it mean? -It means to make love. Right? We’re going to make love, yeh, we’re going to fuck, yeh, we’re going to fuck, yeh, we’re going to make love, (laughter) we’re really going to fuck, yeh, we’re going to make love. Right? And it also means the beginning of life, it’s the act that begins life, so there’s the word hanging around with words like love, arid life, and yet on the other hand, it’s also a word that we really use to hurt each other with, man. It’s a heavy. It’s one that you have toward the end of the argument, (laughter) Right? (laughter) You finally can’t make out. Oh, fuck you man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck, (laughter) Fuck you and everybody that looks like you. (laughter) man. It would.be nice to change the movies that we already have and substitute the word fuck for the word kill, wherever we could, and some of those movie cliches would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop me before I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch Bill, you’ll fuck that engine again, (laughter) The other shit one was, I don’t give a shit. Like it’s worth something, you know? (laughter) I don’t give a shit. Hey, well, I don’t take no shit, (laughter) you know what I mean? You know why I don’t take no shit? (laughter) [’] Cause I don’t give a shit, (laughter) If I give a shit, I would have to pack shit, (laughter) But I don’t pack no shit cause I don’t give a shit, (laughter) You wouldn’t shit me, would you? (laughter) That’s a joke when you’re a kid with a worm looking out the bird’s ass. You wouldn’t shit me, would you? (laughter) It’s an eight-year-old joke but a good one. (laughter) The additions to the list. I found three more words that had to be put on the list of words you could never say on television, and they were fart, turd and twat, those three, (laughter) Fart, we talked about, it’s harmless It’s like tits, it’s a cutie word, no problem. Turd, you can’t say but who wants to, you know? (laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I’m not worried about that one. Now the word twat is an interesting word. Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter) Twat is an interesting word because it’s the only one I know of, the only slang word applying to the, a part of the sexual anatomy that doesn’t have another meaning to it. Like, ah, snatch, box and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even in a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We’re going to snatch that pussy and put him in a box and bring him on the airplane, (murmur, laughter) Everybody loves it. The twat stands alone, man, as it should. And two-way words. Ah, ass is okay providing you’re riding into town on a religious feast day. (laughter) You can’t say, up your ass. (laughter) You can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can say its weird but you can just come so close. Before I cut, I, uh, want to, ah, thank you for listening to my words, man, fellow, uh space travelers. Thank you man for tonight and thank you also, (clapping whistling) 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 99. The Commission noted: “Congress has specifically empowered the FCC to (1) revoke a station’s license (2) issue a cease and desist order, or (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a violation of Section 1464, 47 U. S. C. [§§] 312 (a), 312 (b), 503 (b) (1) (E). The FCC can also (4) deny license renewal or (5) grant a short term renewal, 47 U. S. C. [§§] 307, 308.” Id., at 96 n. 3. “Broadcasting requires special treatment because of four important considerations: (1) children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people’s privacy interest is entitled to extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970); (3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore license in the public interest. Of special concern to the Commission as well as parents is the first point regarding the use of radio by children.” Id,., at 97. Title 18 U. S. C. § 1464 (1976 ed.) provides: “Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” Section 303 (g) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1082, as amended, as set forth in 47 U. S. C. § 303 (g), in relevant part, provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall— “(g) . . . generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.” Thus, the Commission suggested, if an offensive broadcast had literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and were preceded by warnings, it might not be indecent in the late evening, but would be so during the day, when children are in the audience. 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. Chairman Wiley concurred in the result without joining the opinion. Commissioners Reid and Quello filed separate statements expressing the opinion that the language was inappropriate for broadcast at any time. Id., at 102-103. Commissioner Robinson, joined by Commissioner Hooks, filed a concurring statement expressing the opinion: “[W]e can regulate offensive speech to the extent it constitutes a public nuisance. . . . The governing idea is that 'indecency’ is not an inherent attribute of words themselves; it is rather a matter of context and conduct. ... If I were called on to do so, I would find that Carlin’s monologue, if it were broadcast at an appropriate hour and accompanied by suitable warning, was distinguished by sufficient literary value to avoid being ‘indecent’ within the meaning of the statute.” Id., at 107-108, and n. 9. The Commission did, however, comment: “ '[I]n some cases, public events likely to produce offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity for journalistic editing.’ Under these circumstances we believe that it would be inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent language. . . . We trust that under such circumstances a licensee will exercise judgment, responsibility, and sensitivity to the community’s needs, interests and tastes.” 59 F. C. C. 2d, at 893 n. 1. “Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication.” 48 Stat. 1091, 47 U. S. C. § 326. Zechariah Chafee, defending the Commission’s authority to take into account program service in granting licenses, interpreted the restriction on “censorship” narrowly: “This means, I feel sure, the sort of censorship which went on in the seventeenth century in England — the deletion of specific items and dictation as to what should go into particular programs.” 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 641 (1947). In KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm’n, 60 App. D. C. 79, 47 F. 2d 670 (1931), a doctor who controlled a radio station as well as a pharmaceutical association made frequent broadcasts in which he answered the medical questions of listeners. He often prescribed mixtures prepared by his pharmaceutical association. The Commission determined that renewal of the station’s license would not be in the public interest, convenience, or necessity because many of the broadcasts served the doctor’s private interests. In response to the claim that this was censorship in violation of § 29 of the 1927 Act, the Court held: “This contention is without merit. There has been no attempt on the part of the commission to subject any part of appellant’s broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its release. In considering the question whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served by a renewal of appellant’s license, the commission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant’s past conduct, which is not censorship.” 60 App. D. C., at 81, 47 F. 2d, at 672. In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm’n, 61 App. D. C. 311, 62 F. 2d 850 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 599, the station was controlled by a minister whose broadcasts contained frequent references to “pimps” and “prostitutes” as well as bitter attacks on the Roman Catholic Church. The Commission refused to renew the license, citing the nature of the broadcasts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that First Amendment concerns did not prevent the Commission from regulating broadcasts that “offend the religious susceptibilities of thousands ... or offend youth and innocence by the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality.” 61 App. D. C., at 314, 62 F. 2d, at 853. The court recognized that the licensee had a right to broadcast this material free of prior restraint, but “this does not mean that the government, through agencies established by Congress, may not refuse a renewal of license to one who has abused it.” Id., at 312, 62 F. 2d, at 851. See, e. g., Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. FCC, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 216, 171 F. 2d 826 (1948); Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 122 U. S. App. D. C. 253, 352 F. 2d 729 (1965); National Assn. of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 136 U. S. App. D. C. 352, 420 F. 2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 922. See, e. g., 67 Cong. Rec. 12615 (1926) (remarks of Sen. Dill); id., at 5480 (remarks of Rep. White); 68 Cong. Rec. 2567 (1927) (remarks of Rep. Scott); Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1754 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 (1926); Hearings on H. R. 5589 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 and 40 (1926). See also Hearings on H. R. 8825 before the House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., passim (1928). In addition to § 1464, the Commission also relied on its power to regulate in the public interest under 47 U. S. C. §303 (g). We do not need to consider whether § 303 may have independent significance in a case such as this. The statutes authorizing civil penalties incorporate § 1464, a criminal statute. See 47 U. S. C. §§312 (a) (6), 312(b)(2), and 503 (b)(1)(E) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). But the validity of the civil sanctions is not linked to the validity of the criminal penalty. The legislative history of the provisions establishes their independence. As enacted in 1927 and 1934, the prohibition on indecent speech was separate from the provisions imposing civil and criminal penalties for violating the prohibition. Radio Act of 1927, §§ 14, 29, and 33, 44 Stat. 1168 and 1173; Communications Act of 1934, §§ 312, 326, and 501, 48 Stat. 1086, 1091, and 1100, 47 U. S. C. §§ 312, 326, and 501 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The 1927 and 1934 Acts indicated in the strongest possible language that any invalid provision was separable from the rest of the Act. Radio Act of 1927, § 38, 44 Stat. 1174; Communications Act of 1934, § 608, 48 Stat. 1105, 47 U. S. C. § 608. Although the 1948 codification of the criminal laws and the addition of new civil penalties changes the statutory structure, no substantive change was apparently intended. Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U. S. 151, 162. Accordingly, we need not consider any question relating to the possible application of § 1464 as a criminal statute. Webster defines the term as “a: altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable: UNSEEMLY . . . b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: . . . Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966). Indeed, at one point, he used “indecency” as a shorthand term for “patent offensiveness,” 370 U. S., at 482, a usage strikingly similar to the Commission’s definition in this case. 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. “ ‘[W]hile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the First Amendment . . . the televising of nudes might well raise a serious question of programming contrary to 18 U. S. C. § 1464. . . . Similarly, regardless of whether the “4-letter words” and sexual description, set forth in “lady Chatterly’s Lover,” (when considered in the context of the whole book) make the book obscene for mailability purposes, the utterance of such words or the depiction of such sexual activity on radio or TV would raise similar public interest and section 1464 questions.’” Enbanc Programing Inquiry, 44 F. C. C. 2303, 2307 (1960). See also In re WUHY-FM, 24 F. C. C. 2d 408, 412 (1970); In re Sonderliyig Broadcasting Corp., 27 R. R. 2d 285, on reconsideration, 41 F. C. C. 2d 777 (1973), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 169 U. S. App. D. C. 166, 515 F. 2d 397 (1974); In re Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F. C. C. 795 (1960); In re Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F. C. C. 250 (1962), reconsideration denied, 34 F. C. C. 101 (1963), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 144, 334 F. 2d 534 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 843. This conclusion is reinforced by noting the different constitutional limits on Congress’ power to regulate the two different subjects. Use of the postal power to regulate material that is not fraudulent or obscene raises “grave constitutional questions.” Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 156. But it is well settled that the First Amendment- has a special meaning in the broadcasting context. See, e. g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775; Bed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94. For this reason, the presumption that Congress never intends to exceed constitutional limits, which supported Hamling’s narrow reading of § 1461, does not support a comparable reading of § 1464. A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language. Pacifica’s position would, of course, deprive the Commission of any power to regulate erotic telecasts unless they were obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15. Anything that could be sold at a newsstand for private examination could be publicly displayed on television. We are assured by Pacifica that the free play of market forces will discourage indecent programming. “Smut may,” as Judge Leventhal put it, “drive itself from the market and confound Gresham,” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 158, 556 F. 2d, at 35; the prosperity of those who traffic in pornographic literature and films would appear to justify skepticism. Although neither Mr. Justice Powell nor Mr. Justice BrenNAN directly confronts this question, both have answered it affirmatively, the latter explicitly, post, at 768 n. 3, and the former implicitly by concurring in a judgment that could not otherwise stand. See, e. g., Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167, 175-176; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765. The monologue does present a point of view; it attempts to show that the words it uses are “harmless” and that our attitudes toward them are “essentially silly.” See supra, at 730. The Commission objects, not to this point of view, but to the way in which it is expressed. The belief that these words are harmless does not necessarily confer a First Amendment privilege to use them while proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity is harmless does not license one to communicate that conviction by the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene leaflet. The Commission stated: “Obnoxious, gutter language describing these matters has the effect of debasing and brutalizing human beings by reducing them to their mere bodily functions . . . .” 56 F. C. C. 2d, at 98. Our society has a tradition of performing certain bodily functions in private, and of severely limiting the public exposure or discussion of such matters. Verbal or physical acts exposing those intimacies are offensive irrespective of any message that may accompany the exposure. With respect to other types of speech, the Court has tailored its protection to both the abuses and the uses to which it might be put. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (special scienter rules in libel suits brought by public officials); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (government may strictly regulate truthfulness in commercial speech). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 82 n. 6 (Powell, J., concurring). The importance of context is illustrated by the Cohen case. That case arose when Paul Cohen entered a Los Angeles courthouse wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft.” After entering the courtroom, he took the jacket off and folded it. 403 U. S., at 19 n. 3. So far as the evidence showed, no one in the courthouse was offended by his jacket. Nonetheless, when he left the courtroom, Cohen was arrested, convicted of disturbing the peace, and sentenced to 30 days in prison. In holding that criminal sanctions could not be imposed on Cohen for his political statement in a public place, the Court rejected the argument that his speech would offend unwilling viewers; it noted that “there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid [his] conduct did in fact object to it.” Id., at 22. In contrast, in this case the Commission was responding to a listener’s strenuous complaint, and Pacifica does not question its determination that this afternoon broadcast was likely to offend listeners. It should be noted that the Commission imposed a far more moderate penalty on Pacifica than the state court imposed on Cohen. Even the strongest civil penalty at the Commission’s command does not include criminal prosecution. See n. 1, sufra. 47 U. S. C. §§309 (a), 312 (a)(2); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U. S. 223, 229. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147; Staub v. Baxley, 355 U. S. 313. Outside the home, the balance between the offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the speaker, requiring the offended listener to turn away. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205. As we noted in Cohen v. California: “While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue ... , we have at the same time consistently stressed that 'we are often “captives” outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.’ ” 403 U. S., at 21. The problem of harassing phone calls is hardly hypothetical. Congress has recently found it necessary to prohibit debt collectors from “plae[ing] telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity”; from “engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number”; and from “us[ing] obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.” Consumer Credit Protection Act Amendments, 91 Stat. 877, 15 U. S. C. § 1692d (1976 ed., Supp. II). The Commission’s action does not by any means reduce adults to ■hearing only what is fit for children. Cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383. Adults who feel the need may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear these words. In fact, the Commission has not unequivocally closed even broadcasting to speech of this sort; whether broadcast audiences in the late evening contain so few children that playing this monologue would be permissible is an issue neither the Commission nor this Court has decided. Even a prime-time recitation of Geoffrey Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale would not be likely to command the attention of many children who are both old enough to understand and young enough to be adversely affected by passages such as: “And prively he caughte hire by the queynte.” The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer’s Complete Works (Cambridge ed. 1933), p. 58, 1. 3276. See generally Judge Leventhal’s thoughtful opinion in the Court of Appeals. 181 U. S. App. D. C. 132, 155-158, 556 F. 2d 9, 32-35 (1977) (dissenting opinion).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SCHLEIER et al. No. 94-500. Argued March 27, 1995 — Decided June 14, 1995 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., concurred in the judgment. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, and in Part II of which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 337. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Ann B. Durney. Thomas F. Joyce argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Alan M. Serwer and Raymond C. Fay. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Douglas S. McDowell, Ann Elizabeth Rees-man, and Kimberly L. Japinga; for the Migrant Legal Action Program, Inc., by Collette C. Goodman, Julie M. Edmond, and Robert B. Wasser-man; and for the Pan Am Pilots Tax Group by Sanford Jay Rosen and Thomas Nolan. Cathy Ventrell-Monsees and L. Steven Platt filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. as amici curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes a taxpayer to exclude from his gross income the amount received in settlement of a claim for backpay and liquidated damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). I Erich Schleier (respondent) is a former employee of United Airlines, Inc. (United). Pursuant to established policy, United fired respondent when he reached the age of 60. Respondent then filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that his termination violated the ADEA. The ADEA “broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 577 (1978); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 120 (1985); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U. S. 352, 357 (1995). Subject to certain defenses, see 29 U. S. C. § 623(f) (1988 ed. and Supp. V), §§4 and 12 of the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer, inter alia, to discharge any individual between the ages of 40 and 70 “because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). The ADEA incorporates many of the enforcement and remedial mechanisms of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). Like the FLSA, the ADEA provides for “such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.” 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). That relief may include “without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion.” Ibid. More importantly for respondent’s purposes, the ADEA incorporates FLSA provisions that permit the recovery “of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” §216(b). See generally McKennon, 513 U. S., at 357. Despite these broad remedial mechanisms, there are two important constraints on courts’ remedial power under the ADEA. First, unlike the FLSA, the ADEA specifically provides that “liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.” 29 U. S. C. § 626(b); see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S., at 125. Second, the Courts of Appeals have unanimously held, and respondent does not contest, that the ADEA does not permit a separate recovery of compensatory damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress. Respondent’s ADEA complaint was consolidated with a class action brought by other former United employees challenging United’s policy. The ADEA claims were tried before a jury, which determined that United had committed a willful violation of the ADEA. The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, but that judgment was reversed on appeal. See Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F. 2d 394 (CA7 1984). The parties then entered into a settlement, pursuant to which respondent received $145,629. Half of respondent’s award was attributed to “backpay” and half to “liquidated damages.” United did not withhold any payroll or income taxes from the portion of the settlement attributed to liquidated damages. When respondent filed his 1986 federal income tax return, he included as gross income the backpay portion of the settlement, but excluded the portion attributed to liquidated damages. The Commissioner issued a deficiency notice, asserting that respondent should have included the liquidated damages as gross income. Respondent then initiated proceedings in the Tax Court, claiming that he had properly excluded the liquidated damages. Respondent also sought a refund for the tax he had paid on the backpay portion of the settlement. The Tax Court agreed with respondent that the entire settlement constituted “damages received ... on account of personal injuries or sickness” within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) of the Tax Code and was therefore excludable from gross income. Relying on a prior Circuit decision that had in turn relied on our decision in United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229 (1992), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 26 F. 3d 1119 (1994). Because the Courts of Appeals have reached inconsistent conclusions as to the taxability of ADEA recoveries in general and of the United settlement in particular, compare Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F. 3d 836 (CA7 1994) (United settlement award is taxable), with Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F. 3d 790 (CA9 1994) (United settlement award is excludable), we granted certiorari, 513 U. S. 998 (1994). Our consideration of the plain language of § 104(a), the text of the regulation implementing § 104(a)(2), and our reasoning in Burke convince us that a recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross income. II Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a broad definition of “gross income”: “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived.” 26 U. S. C. § 61(a). We have repeatedly emphasized the “sweeping scope” of this section and its statutory predecessors. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 429 (1965). See also United States v. Burke, 504 U. S., at 233; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940). We have also emphasized the corollary to § 61(a)’s broad construction, namely, the “default rule of statutory interpretation that exclusions from income must be narrowly construed.” United States v. Burke, 504 U. S., at 248 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); see United States v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB, 499 U. S. 573, 583-584 (1991); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, 49 (1949); United States v. Burke, 504 U. S., at 244 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Respondent recognizes § 61(a)’s “sweeping” definition and concedes that his settlement constitutes gross income unless it is expressly excepted by another provision in the Tax Code. Respondent claims, however, that his settlement proceeds are excluded from § 61(a)’s reach by 26 U. S. C. § 104(a). Section 104(a) provides an exclusion for five categories of “compensation for personal injuries or sickness.” Respondent argues that his settlement award falls within the second of those categories, which excludes from gross income “the amount of any damages received ... on account of personal injuries or sickness.” § 104(a)(2). In our view, the plain language of the statute undermines respondent’s contention. Consideration of a typical recovery in a personal injury case illustrates the usual meaning of “on account of personal injuries.” Assume that a taxpayer is in an automobile accident, is injured, and as a result of that injury suffers (a) medical expenses, (b) lost wages, and (c) pain, suffering, and emotional distress that cannot be measured with precision. If the taxpayer settles a resulting lawsuit for $30,000 (and if the taxpayer has not previously deducted her medical expenses, see § 104(a)), the entire $30,000 would be excludable under § 104(a)(2). The medical expenses for injuries arising out of the accident clearly constitute damages received “on account of personal injuries.” Similarly, the portion of the settlement intended to compensate for pain and suffering constitutes damages “on account of personal injury.” Finally, the recovery for lost wages is also excludable as being “on account of. personal injuries,” as long as the lost wages resulted from time in which the taxpayer was out of work as a result of her injuries. See, e. g., Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T. C. 1294, 1300 (1986) (hypothetical surgeon who loses finger through tortious conduct may exclude any recovery for lost wages because “[t]his injury ... will also undoubtedly cause special damages including loss of future income”), aff’d, 848 F. 2d 81 (CA6 1988). The critical point this hypothetical illustrates is that each element of the settlement is recoverable not simply because the taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each element of the settlement satisfies the requirement set forth in § 104(a)(2) (and in all of the other subsections of § 104(a)) that the damages were received “on account of personal injuries or sickness.” In contrast, no part of respondent’s ADEA settlement is excludable under the plain language of § 104(a)(2). Respondent’s recovery of back wages, though at first glance comparable to our hypothetical accident victim’s recovery of lost wages, does not fall within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion because it does not satisfy the critical requirement of being “on account of personal injury or sickness.” Whether one treats respondent’s attaining the age of 60 or his being laid off on account of his age as the proximate cause of respondent’s loss of income, neither the birthday nor the discharge can fairly be described as a “personal injury” or “sickness.” Moreover, though respondent’s unlawful termination may have caused some psychological or “personal” injury comparable to the intangible pain and suffering caused by an automobile accident, it is clear that no part of respondent’s recovery of back wages is attributable to that injury. Thus, in our automobile hypothetical, the accident causes a personal injury which'in turn causes a loss of wages. In age discrimination, the discrimination causes both personal injury and loss of wages, but neither is linked to the other. The amount of back wages recovered is completely independent of the existence or extent of any personal injury. In short, § 104(a)(2) does not permit the exclusion of respondent’s back wages because the recovery of back wages was not “on account of” any personal injury and because no personal injury affected the amount of back wages recovered. Respondent suggests, nonetheless, that the liquidated damages portion of his settlement fits comfortably within the plain language of § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion. He cites our observation in Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 (1942), that liquidated damages under the FLSA “are compensation, not a penalty or punishment,” and that such damages might compensate for “damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate.” Id., at 584-585; see also Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 707 (1945). He argues that Congress must be presumed to have known of our interpretation of liquidated damages when it incorporated FLSA’s liquidated damages provision into the ADEA, and that Congress must therefore have intended that liquidated damages under the ADEA serve, at least in part, to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries that are difficult to quantify. We agree with respondent that if Congress had intended the ADEA’s liquidated damages to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries, those damages might well come within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion. There are, however, two weaknesses in respondent’s argument. First, even if we assume that Congress was aware of the Court’s observation in Overnight Motor that the liquidated damages authorized by the FLSA might provide compensation for some “obscure” injuries, it does not necessarily follow that Congress would have understood that observation as referring to injuries that were personal rather than economic. Second, and more importantly, we have previously rejected respondent’s argument: We have already concluded that the liquidated damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant departure from those in the FLSA, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S., at 581; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S., at 126, and we explicitly held in Thurston: “Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature.” Id., at 125. Our holding in Thurston disposes of respondent’s argument and requires the conclusion that liquidated damages under the ADEA, like back wages under the ADEA, are not received “on account of personal injury or sickness.” HH ► — I HH Respondent seeks to circumvent the plain language of § 104(a)(2) by relying on the Commissioner’s regulation interpreting that section. Section 1.104-l(c) of the Treasury Regulations, 26 CFR § 1.104-l(c) (1994), provides: “Section 104(a)(2) [of the Internal Revenue Code] excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. The term ‘damages received (whether by suit or agreement)’ means an amount received (other than workmen’s compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.” Respondent contends that an action to- recover damages for a violation of the ADEA is “based upon tort or tort type rights” as those terms are used in that regulation, and that his settlement is thus excludable under the plain language of the regulation. Even if we accept respondent’s characterization of the action, but see infra, at 336, there is no basis for excluding the proceeds of his settlement from his gross income. The regulatory requirement that the amount be received in a tort type action is not a substitute for the statutory requirement that the amount be received “on account of personal injuries or sickness”; it is an additional requirement. Indeed, the statutory requirement is repeated in the regulation. As the Commissioner argues in her reply brief, an exclusion from gross income is authorized by the regulation “only when it both (i) was received through prosecution or settlement of an ‘action based upon tort or tort type rights’... and (ii) was received ‘on account of personal injuries or sickness.’” Reply Brief for Petitioner 2. We need not decide whether the Commissioner would have authority to dispense entirely with the statutory requirement, because she disclaims any intent to do so, and the text of the regulation does not belie her disclaimer. Thus, respondent’s reliance on the text of the regulation is unpersuasive. IV Respondent also suggests that our decision in United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229 (1992), compels the conclusion that his settlement award is excludable. In Burke, we rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the payment received in settlement of her backpay claim under the pre-1991 version of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was excludable from her gross income. Our decision rested on the conclusion that such a claim was not based upon “tort or tort type rights” within the meaning of the regulation quoted above. For two independent reasons, we think Burke provides no foundation for respondent’s argument. First, respondent’s ADEA recovery is not based upon “tort or tort type rights” as that term was construed in Burke. In Burke, we examined the remedial scheme established by the pre-1991 version of Title VII. Noting that “Title VII does not allow awards for compensatory or punitive damages,” and that “instead, it limits available remedies to backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief,” we con-eluded that Title VII was not tortlike because it addressed “‘legal injuries of an economic character.’” 504 U. S., at 238, 239. Respondent points to two elements of the ADEA that he argues distinguish it from the remedial scheme at issue in Burke: First, the ADEA provides for jury trial, see 29 U. S. C. § 626(b); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S., at 585; but cf. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981); and second, the ADEA allows for liquidated damages. We do not believe that these features of the ADEA are sufficient to bring it within Burke’s conception of a “tort type righ[t].” It is true, as respondent notes, that we emphasized in Burke the lack of a right to a jury trial and the absence of any provision for punitive damages as factors distinguishing the pre-1991 Title VII action from traditional tort litigation, 504 U. S., at 238-240. We did not, however, indicate that the presence of either or both of those factors would be sufficient to bring a statutory claim within the coverage of the regulation. In our view, respondent’s argument gives insufficient attention to what the Burke Court recognized as the primary characteristic of an “action based upon ... tort type rights”: the availability of compensatory remedies. Indeed, we noted that “one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff ‘fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights.’ ” Id., at 235. We continued: “Although these damages often are described in compensatory terms ..., in many cases they are larger than the amount necessary to reimburse actual monetary loss sustained or even anticipated by the plaintiff, and thus redress intangible elements of injury that are deemed important, even though not pecuniary in [their] immediate consequence[s].” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). Against this background, we found critical that the pre-1991 version of Title VII provided no compensation “for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages.” Id., at 239. Like the pre-1991 version of Title VII, the ADEA provides no compensation “for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury.” Monetary remedies under the ADEA are limited to back wages, which are clearly of an “economic character,” and liquidated damages, which we have already noted serve no compensatory function. Thus, though this is a closer case than Burke, we conclude that a recovery under the ADEA is not one that is “based upon tort or tort type rights.” Second, and more importantly, the holding of Burke is narrower than respondent suggests. In Burke, following the framework established in the Internal Revenue Service regulations, we noted that § 104(a)(2) requires a determination whether the underlying action is “based upon tort or tort type rights.” Id., at 234. In so doing, however, we did not hold that the inquiry into “tort or tort type rights” constituted the beginning and end of the analysis. In particular, though Burke relied on Title VII’s failure to qualify as an action based upon tort type rights, we did not intend to eliminate the basic requirement found in both the statute and the regulation that only amounts received “on account of personal injuries or sickness” come within § 104(a)(2)’s exclusion. Thus, though satisfaction of Burke’s “tort or tort type” inquiry is a necessary condition for excludability under § 104(a)(2), it is not a sufficient condition. In sum, the plain language of § 104(a)(2), the text of the applicable regulation, and our decision in Burke establish two independent requirements that a taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under § 104(a)(2). First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying cause of action giving rise to the recovery is “based upon tort or tort type rights”; and second, the taxpayer must show that the damages were received “on account of personal injuries or sickness.” For the reasons discussed above, we believe that respondent has failed to satisfy either requirement, and thus no part of his settlement is excludable under § 104(a)(2). The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment. Helen Schleier is also a respondent because she and her husband Erich filed a joint return. See, e. g., Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F. 2d 107 (CA1 1978); Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F. 2d 143, 147 (CA2 1984); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F. 2d 834 (CA3 1977); Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F. 2d 1292 (CA4 1979); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F. 2d 1036 (CA5 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1066 (1978); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F. 2d 233 (CA6 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F 2d 684, 687-688 (CA7), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1039 (1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F. 2d 806 (CA8 1982); Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F. 3d 790 (CA9 1994); Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F. 2d 654 (CA10 1984); Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc., 758 F. 2d 1435, 1446 (CA11 1985). See generally H. Eglit, 2 Age Discrimination § 18.19 (1982 and Supp. 1984); J. Kalet, Age Discrimination in Employment Law 110-111 (1986). At the time of respondent’s return, § 104(a) provided in relevant part: “Compensation for injuries or sickness “(a) In general. — Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include— “(1) amounts received under workmen’s compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness; “(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness; “(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer); “(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey or the Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable under the provisions of section 808 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980; and “(5) amounts received by an individual as disability income attributable .to injuries incurred as a direct result of a violent attack which the Secretary of State determines to be a terrorist attack and which occurred while such individual was an employee of the United States engaged in the performance of his official duties outside the United States.” 26 U. S. C. § 104 (1988 ed. and Supp. V). In 1989, § 104(a) was amended, adding, inter alia, the following provision: “Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness.” Ibid. Though the text of § 104(a)(2) might be considered ambiguous on this point, it is by now clear that § 104(a)(2) encompasses recoveries based on intangible as well as tangible harms. See United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 235, n. 6 (1992); id., at 244, and n. 3 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) (acknowledging that “ 'personal injuries or sickness’ ” includes nonphysical injuries). We find it noteworthy that the Court in Thurston was presented with many of the arguments offered by respondent today. For example, to counter the argument that “the ADEA liquidated damages provision is punitive,” the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that "the legislative history of the liquidated damages provision in the ADEA — as in the FLSA — shows that such damages are designed to provide full compensation to the employee, rather than primarily to punish the employer.” Brief for EEOC in Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, O. T. 1984, Nos. 83-997 and 83-1325, p. 36. The EEOC continued: “Thus, Congress focused on the need to be fair to the employee, and to provide him full compensation for nonpecuniary damages not readily calculable, including emotional injuries such as humiliation and loss of self respect.” Id., at 36-37. See also id., at 37 (relying on Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 672 (1942)). Against this background, the Court’s statement that “Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature” can only be taken as a rejection of the argument that those damages are also (or are exclusively) compensatory. We recognize that the House Conference Report accompanying the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA contains language that supports respondent. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950 (1978). However, this evidence was before the Court in Thurston, see Brief for EEOC, at 37, and the Court did not find it persuasive. We see no reason to reach a different result now. Moreover, there is much force to the Court’s conclusion in Thurston that the ADEA’s liquidated damages provisions are punitive. Under our decision in Thurston, liquidated damages are only available under the ADEA if “the employer . . . knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.” 469 U. S., at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). If liquidated damages were designed to compensate ADEA victims, we see no reason why the employer’s knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct should be the determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages. We find odd the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 341-342, that our holding today assumes that the intangible harms of discrimination do not constitute personal injuries. We of course have no doubt that the intangible harms of discrimination can constitute personal injury, and that compensation for such harms may be excludable under § 104(a)(2). However, to acknowledge that discrimination may cause intangible harms is not to say that the ADEA compensates for such harms, or that any of the damages received were on account of those harms. We recognize that the Commissioner has arguably in the past treated the regulation as though its second sentence superseded the first sentence. See, e. g., United States v. Burke, 504 U. S., at 242, n. 1 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). In this case, however, the Commissioner unambiguously contends that the regulation is not intended to eliminate the “on account of” requirement from the statutory language. In view of the Commissioner’s differing interpretations of her own regulation, we do not accord her present litigating position any special deference. We do agree, however, that she reads the regulation correctly in this case. We recognize that a recent Revenue Ruling from the IRS seems to rely on the same reading of Burke urged by respondent. See Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 Cum. Bull. 61. Though this Revenue Ruling is not before us, we note that “the Service’s interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations,” Davis v. United States, 495 U. S. 472, 484 (1990), and they may not be used to overturn the plain language of a statute. See, e. g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U. S. 126, 132 (1947).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?