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NATIONAL INDEPENDENT COAL OPERATORS’ ASSOCIATION et al. v. KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. No. 73-2066. Argued October 6, 1975 Decided January 26, 1976 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stevens, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. John L. Kilcullen argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Harriet S. Shapiro, Leonard Schaitman! and Michael Kimmel. Guy Farmer and William A. Gershuny filed a brief for the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Assn., Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a decision with formal findings of fact before assessing a civil penalty against a mine operator absent a request by the mine operator for an administrative hearing, the penalty being enforceable only by way of a subsequent judicial proceeding in which the operator is entitled to a trial de novo as to the amount of the penalty. The National Independent Coal Operators’ Association sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that certain civil penalty assessment regulations utilized by the Secretary violated the procedural requirements of the Act. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the regulations did not violate the Act. National Independent Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Morton, 161 U. S. App. D. C. 68, 494 F. 2d 987 (1974). We granted certiorari, 420 U. S. 906 (1975), to resolve the apparent conflict between the District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit holding in Morton v. Delta Mining, Inc., 495 F. 2d 38 (1974), reversed and remanded, post, p. 403. (1) The statutory provision in question, § 109 (a)(3), 30 U. S. C. § 819 (a)(3), is part of the enforcement scheme of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. The Act prescribes health and safety standards for the protection of coal miners, Titles II and III, 30 U. S. C. § 841 et seq.; it requires coal mine operators and miners to comply with the standards. § 2 (g)(2), 30 U. S. C. §801 (g)(2). Section 103 of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 813, requires the Secretary to conduct continuing surveillance of mines by inspectors. Among the purposes of the inspections are finding imminently dangerous conditions and violations of mandatory health or safety standards. Section 104, 30 U. S. C. § 814, provides procedures for abating the conditions • found by the inspectors. If an imminent danger is found, the inspector is required to issue a withdrawal order compelling the mine operator to withdraw all persons from the danger area. If a violation of a mandatory standard is found that is not imminently dangerous, the inspector issues a notice to the operator fixing a reasonable time for its abatement. If the violation is not abated and the time for abatement is not extended, the inspector then issues a withdrawal order. Withdrawal orders are also issued for any “unwarrantable failure” of mine operators to comply with the standards. The notices and orders issued contain a detailed description of the dangerous conditions or violations and their locations. The notices must be in writing and given promptly to the mine operators. Under § 105, 30 U. S. C. § 815, an operator may apply to the Secretary for review of the factual basis of any order or notice issued under § 104, or for review of the amount of time allowed for abatement of violations. Upon application from a mine operator the Secretary makes whatever investigation he deems appropriate; an opportunity for a public hearing is provided. Hearings are subject to § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 554, and following the hearing the Secretary must make findings of fact. Section 105 also requires that actions by the Secretary be taken promptly because of the urgent need for prompt decision. The orders issued by the Secretary under this section are subject to judicial review under § 106, 30 U. S. C. § 816, by a court of appeals. As part of the enforcement scheme, the Act requires the Secretary to assess and collect civil penalties. Section 109 (a)(1), 30 U. S. C. §819 (a)(1), subjects mine operators to civil penalties not exceeding $10,000 for each violation of a mandatory standard or other provision of the Act. In determining the amount of the penalty, § 109 (a)(1) requires the Secretary to consider “the operator’s history of previous violations, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the operator charged, whether the operator was negligent, the effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business, the gravity of the violation, and the demonstrated good faith of the operator charged in attempting to achieve rapid compliance after notification of a violation.” The provision in question, § 109 (a) (3), as noted above, authorizes the Secretary to assess a civil penalty only after the operator charged with a violation “has been given an opportunity for a public hearing and the Secretary has determined, by decision incorporating his findings of fact therein, that a violation did occur, and the amount of the penalty which is warranted . . . .” Hearings under this section are to be consolidated with other proceedings when appropriate. They must be of record and subject to provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ü. S. C. § 554. If the operator does not pay the penalty assessed, the Secretary is required, pursuant to § 109 (a) (4), 30 U. S. C. § 819 (a)(4), to petition for judicial enforcement of the assessment in the district court for the district in which the mine is located. At that stage the court must resolve the issues relevant to the amount of the penalty in a de novo proceeding with a jury trial if requested. The trial de novo with a jury is not available for review of issues of fact which “were or could have been litigated” in the court of appeals under § 106. (2) We are concerned in this case with the regulations the Secretary has adopted to govern only one part of this statutory scheme: the assessment of penalties under § 109 (a)(3). When the Secretary initially implemented the Act, he published regulations that provided for civil penalty assessments to be determined by a hearing examiner, with a right of appeal to a departmental appeals board. 30 CFR pt. 301 (1971), recodified, 43 CFR §4.540 et seg. (1972). Nine months later, due to the large numbers of violations charged (approximately 80,000 or more per year), the Secretary adopted the regulations contested here. 30 CFR pt. 100 (1972). These regulations provide that assessment officers assess a penalty based on a notice of violation issued by mine inspectors and a penalty schedule graduated according to the seriousness of the violation. The pt. 100 procedures follow the mandate of § 109 (a)(1) as to the criteria to be applied in determining the amount of the proposed penalty for an operator. 30 CFR § 100.4 (c). The regulations also provide that the operators are to be advised when they receive original or reissued proposed orders that they have 15 working days from the receipt of the order to “protest the proposed assessment, either partly or in its entirety.” If an operator fails to make a timely protest and request adjudication, he is “deemed to have waived his right of protest including his right of formal adjudication and opportunity for hearing . . . .” The proposed assessment order then becomes the “final assessment order of the Secretary.” 30 CFR § 100.4 (d-h). In any case in which an operator makes a timely request for a formal hearing, by so indicating in his protest, or in response to a reissued or amended proposed assessment order, the assessment officer is required to forward the matter to the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior; a petition to assess a penalty can then be filed by the Solicitor with the Department’s Office of Hearings and Appeals. 30 CFR § 100.4 (i) (1); 43 CFR §4.540 (a). The petition is served on the operator who then has an opportunity to answer and secure a public hearing. 30 CFR § 100.4 (i)(2). A hearing de novo is conducted and the examiner is free to assess a different penalty. 30 CFR § 100.4 (i) (4). The Bureau of Mines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor, has the burden of proving the penalty by a preponderance of the evidence. 43 CFR § 4.587. The regulations provide that the hearing examiner consider the statutory criteria. 43 CFR § 4.546. The decision is subject to review by the Secretary’s delegate, the Board of Mine Operations Appeals. 43 CFR §§4.1 (b)(4), 4.500 (a)(2), 4.600. Whether or not the operator requests formal adjudication, he may obtain de novo judicial review of the amount of the penalty by refusing to pay it and awaiting the Secretary’s enforcement action in the district court. § 109 (a)(4), 30 U. S. C. § 819 (a)(4). (3) The National Independent Coal Operators’ Association and various operators brought suit against the Secretary in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the use of the pt. 100 regulations. The court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the summary procedures were not authorized by § 109 (a) of the Act. 357 F. Supp. 509 (1973). The court noted that there were no written guidelines within the assessment office to guide the assessment officers in evaluating or applying the statutory criteria for penalty assessment. The court held that the Secretary must make express findings of fact whether or not a hearing is requested. The court believed that requiring a mine operator to request a hearing “would shift the initial burden to the mine operator.” Id., at 512. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary need not render a formal decision incorporating findings of fact; it held that, absent a request for a hearing, the Secretary is entitled to conclude that the operator does not dispute the proposed order, including the factual basis of the violation. In the view of that court, a “decision incorporating his findings of fact” with findings and conclusions is required only if a hearing is requested and takes place; otherwise, any findings of fact would consist of essentially the same information already recited in the proposed assessment order and would be a meaningless duplication. The court also noted that the legislative history of the Act supports an interpretation that the Secretary’s findings are not required unless the operator requests a hearing; however, when a hearing is requested, the burden of proof remains with the Secretary. 161 U. S. App. D. C. 68, 494 F. 2d 987 (1974). (4) Under the Act, a mine operator plainly has a right to notice of violations and proposed penalties; it is equally clear that an operator has a right to be heard, if a hearing is requested. In this Court the mine operators continue to urge that the Secretary may not assess a civil penalty without making formal “findings of fact” even though no hearing was requested as to the violation charged and the proposed order. Section 109 (a)(3), as previously noted, provides: “A civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary only after the person charged with a violation under this Act has been given an opportunity for a public hearing and the Secretary has determined, by decision incorporating his findings of fact therein, that a violation did occur, and the amount of the penalty which is warranted . . . .” The operators argue that a penalty assessment itself is an adjudicatory function and hence the Secretary must make a formal “decision incorporating his findings of fact” even when an operator has not requested a hearing on the violation issue. In short, what they argue for is the same type of formal findings of fact that are the usual product of the adversary hearing to which they have an absolute right, but which was waived by failure to make a request. Section 109 (a) (3) provides the mine operators with no more than “an opportunity” for a hearing. The word “opportunity” would be meaningless if the statute contemplated formal adjudicated findings whether or not a requested evidentiary hearing is held. Absent a request, the Secretary has a sufficient factual predicate for the assessment of a penalty based on the reports of the trained and experienced inspectors who find violations; when the assessment officers fix penalties as the Secretary’s “authorized representatives,” the operators may still have review of the penalty in the district court. See Morton v. Whitaker, Civ. No. 74.96 (ED Ky., Jan. 14, 1975) (appeal pending in CA6). We therefore agree with'the Court of Appeals that the language of the statute, especially when read in light of its legislative history, requires the Secretary to make formal findings of fact specified in § 109 (a) (3) only when the mine operator requests a hearing. The requirement for a formal hearing under § 109 (a) (3) is keyed to a request, and the requirement for formal findings is keyed to the same request. This reading of the statute plainly comports with the purpose of the Act. Congressional attention was focused on the need for stricter coal mine regulations by a 1968 explosion in a Farmington, W. Ya., mine which killed 78 miners, but Congress also recognized that an inordinate number of miners lose their lives in day-today accidents other than multidisaster situations. The Act was seen as a major step in preventing death and injury in mines. H. R. Rep. No. 91-563, pp. 1-3 (1969). The need for stricter regulation of coal mines was commented on by President Truman when he signed the 1952 amendment to the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act, 66 Stat. 692. In approving that measure into law he called the attention of Congress to its flaws: “The measure contains complex procedural provisions relating to inspections, appeals, and the postponing of orders which I believe will make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for those charged with the administration of the act to carry out an effective enforcement program.” Congress noted President Truman’s comments when it reported the 1969 Act. S. Rep. No. 91-411, p. 5 (1969). Effective enforcement of the Act would be weakened if the Secretary were required to make findings of fact for every penalty assessment including those cases in which the mine operator did not request a hearing and thereby indicated no disagreement with the Secretary’s proposed determination. While a protest by a mine operator may trigger an administrative re-examination, the protest is not the equivalent of a request for a hearing. When no request for a hearing is made, the operator has in effect voluntarily defaulted and abandoned the right to a hearing and findings of fact on the factual basis of the violation and the penalty. The Court of Appeals for-the District of Columbia Circuit regarded § 109 as possibly ambiguous and turned to the legislative history. Assuming, arguendo, that the statute is ambiguous, we read that history as supporting the result reached by the Court of Appeals. The bills passed by the Senate and House each called for hearings only if requested. The House bill provided: “Upon written request made by an operator within thirty days after receipt of an order assessing a penalty under this section, the Secretary shall afford such operator an opportunity for a hearing and, in accordance with the request, determine by decision whether or not a violation did occur or whether the amount of the penalty is warranted or should be compromised.” H. R. 13950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 109 (b) (1969). (Emphasis added.) The Senate bill read: “An order assessing a civil penalty under this subsection shall be issued by the Secretary only after the person against whom the order is issued has been given an opportunity for a hearing and the Secretary has determined by decision incorporating findings of fact based on the record of such hearing whether or not a violation did occur and the amount of the penalty, if any, which is warranted. Section 554 of title 5 of the United States Code shall apply to any such hearing and decision.” S. 2917, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., §308 (a) (3) (1969). (Emphasis added.) Thus it is clear that under both bills the requirement for a formal decision with findings was contingent on the operator's request for a hearing. Both bills were referred to a Conference Committee to resolve differences. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate version but deleted the second italicized phrase. That change did not alter the requirement that if findings of fact are desired, a hearing must be requested. The Conference Committee explained § 109 as follows: “Both the Senate bill and the House amendment provided an opportunity for a hearing in assessing such penalties, but the Senate bill required a record hearing under 5 U. S. C. [§] 554. The conference substitute adopts the Senate provision with the added provision that, where appropriate, such as in the case of an appeal from a withdrawal order, an effort should be made to consolidate the hearings. The commencement of such proceedings, however, shall not stay any notice or order involving a violation of a standard.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-761, p. 71 (1969). (Emphasis added.) No mention was made of the language deleted from the Senate bill or the similar language contained in the House bill. A change to require findings of fact without a request for a hearing would be a significant matter that would not likely have escaped attention; such a change would have called for explanation. The importance of § 109 in the enforcement of the Act cannot be overstated. Section 109 provides a strong incentive for compliance with the mandatory health and safety standards. That the violations of the Act have been abated or miners withdrawn from the dangerous area before § 109 comes into effect is not dis-positive; if a mine operator does not also face a monetary penalty for violations, he has little incentive to eliminate dangers until directed to do so by a mine inspector. The inspections may be as infrequent as four a year. A major objective of Congress was prevention of accidents and disasters; the deterrence provided by monetary sanctions is essential to that objective. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 does not mandate a formal decision with findings as a predicate for a penalty assessment order unless the mine operator exercises his statutory right to request a hearing on the factual issues relating to the penalty, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Consolidated with No. 74-521, Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc., post, p. 403. In the companion case, supra, three mine operators in a consolidated action raised the same challenge as a defense when the Secretary sought judicial enforcement of assessment orders in a suit, where, under the Act, the operators had a right to a trial de novo as to the amount of the penalties. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted the District of Columbia Circuit’s holding but held that the regulations were invalid for failure to require findings of fact, rejecting the Secretary’s contention that such findings are required only when an administrative hearing is requested by a mine operator. Respondents have suggested that trial de novo is available on the factual basis of the violation as well as on the amount of the penalty. The statutory scheme is less than clear on this matter. Compare § 106 with § 109 (a). See Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 491 F. 2d 277 (CA4 1974). We need not reach the issue to dispose of this case. Those regulations have been reissued, 39 Fed. Reg. 27558-27561 (1974), since these suits were initiated. The mine operators in the companion case, Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc., post, p. 403, argue that this case is moot. The case is not moot because there are assessments under the contested regulations awaiting enforcement and because the new regulations also do not provide a hearing unless one is requested. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Code of Federal Regulations throughout this opinion are to the regulations effective at the time this suit was initiated (Jan. 1, 1972, for 30 CFR, and Oct. 1,1972, for 43 CFR). Section 100.2 (b) of the regulations states that the amount of proposed civil penalty “shall be within guidelines established by the Secretary (see Appendix A to this part) and revised periodically in the light of experience gained under the Act . . . 30 CFR § 100.2(b). Appendix A in effect at the time of this suit provided a range between $5,000 and $10,000 for violations resulting in the issuance of imminent-danger withdrawal orders (under § 104 (a) of the Act); a range between $1,000 and $5,000 for violations resulting in the issuance of other withdrawal orders (under §§ 104 (b), (c), (h), and (i) of the Act); a range between $100 and $1,000 for “serious violations”; and a range between $25 and $500 for other violations. A penalty schedule with formulas for considering the six criteria was promulgated after these suits were filed. 30 CFR § 100.3 (1975). The mine operators in the companion case contend that these orders are not final since the regulations provide only that the orders become final if accepted. 30 CFR § 100.4 (h). The regulations provide that a hearing can be requested but do not specify what happens if neither the orders are accepted nor a hearing is requested. This contention is without merit. The order is final. See 30 CFR § 100.4(e). The regulation is not misleading. These uncontested regulations provide that if an operator fails to file a preliminary statement or response to a prehear-ing order, the hearing examiner can issue an order to show cause why the proceedings should not be summarily dismissed. 43 CFR § 4.545 (a). If the operator fails to respond to such an order, the proceedings are summarily dismissed and remanded to the assessment officer for entry of the last proposed order of assessment (issued under 30 CFR pt. 100) as the final assessment order of the Secretary. 43 CFR § 4.545 (b). At the time of the events giving rise to these actions, the Act was enforced by the Secretary’s delegate, the Bureau of Mines. The Bureau’s safety and enforcement functions have since been transferred to a newly created Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, Department of the Interior. 38 Eed. Reg. 18665-18668, 18695-18696 (1973). A Conference Committee does not have authority to make changes on matters as to which both bills agree. 2 U. S. C. § 190c (a) (Sen. Conf. Reps.); Rule XXVIII (3), Rules of the House of Representatives; and §546, Jefferson’s Manual, H. R. Doc. No. 384, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 526, 270-271 (1973).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. DEWEY et al. No. 80-901. Argued April 28, 1981 Decided June 17, 1981 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 606. Rehnquist, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 608. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 609. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Martin, Elliott Schulder, and William Ranter. Francis R. Croak argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Jan E. Kearney. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by J. Albert WoU, Laurence Gold, and Marsha S. Berzon for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by Fred Okrand, Mark D. Rosenbaum, and Dennis M. Perluss for the ACLU Foundation of Southern California. Wayne E. Bingham and W. Thomas Martin, Jr., filed a brief for Kent Nowlin Construction, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we consider whether § 103 (a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 813 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which authorizes warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines, violates the Fourth Amendment. Concluding that searches conducted pursuant to this provision are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we reverse the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin invalidating the statute. I The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1290, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), requires the Secretary of Labor to develop detailed mandatory health and safety standards to govern the operation of the Nation’s mines. 30 XJ. S. C. §811 (1976 ed., Supp. III). Section 103 (a) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 813 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. HI), provides that federal mine inspectors are to inspect underground mines at least four times per year and surface mines at least twice a year to insure compliance with these standards, and to make followup inspections to determine whether previously discovered violations have been corrected. This section also grants mine inspectors “a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal or other mine” and states that “no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person.” If a mine operator refuses to allow a warrant-less inspection conducted pursuant to § 103 (a), the Secretary is authorized to institute a civil action to obtain injunctive or other appropriate relief. 30 U. S. C. § 818 (a)(1)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. III). In July 1978, a federal mine inspector attempted to inspect quarries owned by appellee Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. in order to determine whether all 25 safety and health violations uncovered during a prior inspection had been corrected. After the inspector had been on the site for about an hour, Waukesha’s president, appellee Douglas Dewey, refused to allow the inspection to continue unless the inspector first obtain a search warrant. The inspector issued a citation to Waukesha for terminating the inspection, and the Secretary subsequently filed this civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking to enjoin appellees from refusing to permit warrantless searches of the Waukesha facility. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the ground that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless searches of stone quarries authorized by § 103 (a) of the Act. 493 F. Supp. 963 (1980). The Secretary appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. Because the District Court’s ruling invalidated an important prqvision of the Mine Safety and Health Act, we noted probable jurisdiction. Sub nom. Marshall v. Dewey, 449 U. S. 1122 (1981). II Our prior cases have established that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial property. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967). However, unlike searches of private homes, which generally must be conducted pursuant to a warrant in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970). The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections. United States v. Biswell, supra, at 316. The interest of the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from any inspections. Congress has broad authority to regulate commercial enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, and an inspection program may in some cases be a necessary component of federal regulation. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the interest of the owner of property in being free from unreasonable intrusions onto his property by agents of the government. Inspections of commercial property may be unreasonable if they are not authorized by law or are unnecessary for the furtherance of federal interests. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 77. Similarly, warrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally objectionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 323. “Where Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules governing the procedures that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply.” Colonnade Corp. v. United States, supra, at 77. In such cases, a warrant may be necessary to protect the owner from the “unbridled discretion [of] executive and administrative officers,” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, at 323, by assuring him that “reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 538 (1967). However, the assurance of regularity provided by a warrant may be unnecessary under certain inspection schemes. Thus, in Colonnade Corp. v. United States, we recognized that because the alcoholic beverage industry had long been “subject to close supervision and inspection,” Congress enjoyed “broad power to design such powers of inspection ... as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand.” 397 U. S., at 76-77. Similarly, in United States v. Biswell, this Court-concluded that the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. § 921 et seq., provided a sufficiently comprehensive and predictable inspection scheme that the warrantless inspections mandated under the statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment. After describing the strong federal interest in conducting unannounced, warrantless inspections, we noted: “It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer’s justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business ... , he does so with the knowledge that his records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection. . . . The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.” 406 U. S., at 316. These decisions make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes. We re-emphasized this exception to the warrant requirement most recently in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. In that case, we held that absent consent a warrant was constitutionally required in order to conduct administrative inspections under § 8 (a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. §657 (a). That statute imposes health and safety standards on all businesses engaged in or affecting interstate commerce that have employees, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (5), and authorizes representatives of the Secretary to conduct inspections to ensure compliance with the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 657 (a). However, the Act fails to tailor the scope and frequency of such administrative inspections to the particular health and safety concerns posed by the numerous and varied businesses regulated by the statute. Instead, the Act flatly authorizes administrative inspections of “any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace, or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer” and empowers inspectors conducting such searches to investigate “any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.” Ibid. Similarly, the Act does not provide any standards to guide inspectors either in their selection of establishments to be searched or in the exercise of their authority to search. The statute instead simply provides that such searches must be performed “at . . . reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner.” Ibid. In assessing this regulatory scheme, this Court found that the provision authorizing administrative searches “devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search.” 436 U. S., at 323. Accordingly, we concluded that a warrant was constitutionally required to assure a nonconsenting owner, who may have little real expectation that his business will be subject to inspection, that the contemplated search was “authorized by statute, and . . . pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.” Ibid. However, we expressly limited our holding to the inspection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, noting that the “reasonableness of a warrantless search . . . will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute” and that some statutes “apply only to a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply.” Id., at 321. Applying this analysis to the case before us, we conclude that the warrantless inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act do not offend the Fourth Amendment. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that there is a substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety conditions in the Nation’s underground and surface mines. In enacting the statute, Congress was plainly aware that the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the country and that the poor health and safety record of this industry has significant deleterious effects on interstate commerce. Nor is it seriously contested that Congress in this case could reasonably determine, as it did with respect to the Gun Control Act in Biswell, that a system of warrantless inspections was necessary “if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective.” United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S., at 316. In designing an inspection program. Congress expressly recognized that a warrant requirement could significantly frustrate effective enforcement of the Act. Thus, it provided in § 103 (a) of the Act that “no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person.” In explaining this provision, the Senate Report notes: “[I]n [light] of the notorious ease with which many safety or health hazards may be concealed if advance warning of inspection is obtained, a warrant requirement would seriously undercut this Act’s objectives.” S. Rep. No. 95-181, p. 27 (1977). We see no reason not to defer to this legislative determination. Here, as in Biswell, Congress could properly conclude: “[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection.” 406 U. S., at 316. Because a warrant requirement clearly might impede the “specific enforcement needs” of the Act, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S., at 321, the only real issue before us is whether the statute’s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. We believe that it does. Unlike the statute at issue in Barlow’s, the Mine Safety and Health Act applies to industrial activity with a notorious history of serious accidents and unhealthful working conditions. The Act is specifically tailored to address those concerns, and the regulation of mines it imposes is sufficiently pervasive and defined that the owner of such a facility cannot help but be aware that he “will be subject to effective inspection.” United States v. Biswell, supra, at 316. First, the Act requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection. Representatives of the Secretary must inspect all surface mines at least twice annually and all underground mines at least four times annually. 30 U. S. C. § 813 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Similarly, all mining operations that generate explosive gases must be inspected at irregular 5-, 10-, or 15-day intervals. § 813 (i). Moreover, the Secretary must conduct followup inspections of mines where violations of the Act have previously been discovered, § 813 (a), and must inspect a mine immediately if notified by a miner or a miner’s representative that a violation of the Act or an imminently dangerous condition exists. § 813 (g). Second, the standards with which a mine operator is required to comply are all specifically set forth in the Act or in Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Indeed, the Act requires that the Secretary inform mine operators of all standards proposed pursuant to the Act. § 811 (e). Thus, rather than leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers, the Act establishes a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence. Like the gun dealer in Biswell, the operator of a mine “is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.” 406 U. S., at 316. Finally, the Act provides a specific mechanism for accommodating any special privacy concerns that a specific mine operator might have. The Act prohibits forcible entries, and instead requires the Secretary, when refused entry onto a mining facility, to file a civil action in federal court to obtain an injunction against future refusals. 30 U. S. C. § 818 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). This proceeding provides an adequate forum for the mineowner to show that a specific search is outside the federal regulatory authority, or to seek from the district court an order accommodating any unusual privacy interests that the mineowner might have. See, e. g., Marshall v. Stoudt’s Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F. 2d 589, 594 (CA3 1979) (inspectors ordered to keep confidential mine's trade secrets), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1015 (1980). Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see what additional protection a warrant requirement would provide. The Act itself clearly notifies the operator that inspections will be performed on a regular basis. Moreover, the Act and the regulations issued pursuant to it inform the operator of what health and safety standards must be met in order to be in compliance with the statute. The discretion of Government officials to determine what facilities to search and what violations to search for is thus directly curtailed by the regulatory scheme. In addition, the statute itself embodies a means by which any special Fourth Amendment interests can be accommodated. Accordingly, we conclude that the general program of warrantless inspections authorized by § 103 (a) of the Act does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Appellees contend, however, that even if § 103 (a) is constitutional as applied to most segments of the mining industry, it nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment as applied to authorize warrantless inspections of stone quarries. Appel-lees’ argument essentially tracks the reasoning of the court below. That court, while expressly acknowledging our decisions in Colonnade and Biswell, found the exception to the warrant requirement defined in those cases to be inapplicable solely because surface quarries, which came under federal regulation in 1966, do “not have a long tradition of government regulation.” 493 F. Supp., at 964. To be sure, in Colonnade this Court referred to “the long history of the regulation of the liquor industry,” 397 U. S., at 75, and more recently in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S., at 313, we noted that a “long tradition of close government supervision” militated against imposition of a warrant requirement. However, as previously noted, see supra, at 599, it is the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus in United States v. Biswell, this Court upheld the warrantless search provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 despite the fact that “[f]ederal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry.” 406 U. S., at 315. Of course, the duration of a particular regulatory Scheme will often be an important factor in determining whether it is sufficiently pervasive to make the imposition of a warrant requirement unnecessary. But if the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur. Under appellees’ view, new or emerging industries, including ones such as the nuclear power industry that pose enormous potential safety and health problems, could never be subject to warrantless searches even under the most carefully structured inspection program simply because of the recent vintage of regulation. The Fourth Amendment’s central concept of reasonableness will not tolerate such arbitrary results, and we therefore conclude that warrantless inspection of stone quarries, like similar inspections of other mines covered by the Act, are constitutionally permissible. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. The Act supersedes the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, formerly 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., and repeals and replaces the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, formerly 30 U. S. C. § 721 et seq. The Act defines “coal or other mine” to include “an area of land from which minerals are extracted in nonliquid form or, if in liquid form, are extracted with workers underground.” 30 U. S. C. § 802 (h) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). It is undisputed that the quarry operated by appellee company falls within this definition. The Act provides that the Secretary shall issue citations and propose civil penalties for violations of the Act or standards promulgated under the Act. 30 U. S. C. §§ 814 (a), 820 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The Secretary’s regulations call for issuance of a citation and the assessment of a civil penalty for denial of entry. 30 CFR § 100.4 (1980). The Act also allows a mine operator to contest any citation in a hearing before an administrative law judge, whose decision is subject to discretionary review by the Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. 30 U. S. C. §§ 815 (d), 823 (d) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The operator thereafter is entitled to review of a final administrative ruling in the appropriate court of appeals. 30 U. S. C. §816 (1976 ed., Supp. III). In this case, the Administrative Law Judge upheld a $1,000 civil penalty proposed by the Secretary. This decision is currently under review by the Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Although the District Court limited its holding to the constitutionality of § 103 (a) as applied to warrantless inspections of stone quarries, the Act makes no distinction as to the type of mine to be inspected, and our conclusions here apply equally to all warrantless inspections authorized by the Act. Three Courts of Appeals have upheld the warrantless inspection provisions of the Act as they apply to quarry operations similar to appellees’ facility. See Marshall v. Texoline Co., 612 F. 2d 935 (CA5 1980); Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F. 2d 693 (CA6 1979), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 908 (1980); Marshall v. Stoudt’s Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F. 2d 589 (CA3 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1015 (1980). Absent consent or exigent circumstances, a private home may not be entered to conduct a search or effect an arrest without a warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948). Of course, these same restrictions pertain when commercial property is searched for contraband or evidence of crime. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 352-359 (1977). In the preamble to the Act, Congress declared: “[T]here is an urgent need to provide more effective means and measures for improving the working conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or other mines in order to prevent death and serious physical harm, and in order to prevent occupational diseases originating in such mines. . . . “[T]he existence of unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices in the Nation’s coal or other mines is a serious impediment to the future growth of the coal and other mining industry and cannot be tolerated. . . . “[T]he disruption of production and the loss of income to operators and miners as a result of coal or other mine accidents or occupationally caused diseases unduly impedes and burdens commerce.” 30 U. S. C. §§ 801 (c), (d), (f). These congressional findings were based on extensive evidence showing that the mining industry was among the most hazardous of the Nation’s industries. See S. Rep. No. 95-181 (1977); H. R. Rep. No. 95-312 (1977). Although Congress did not make explicit reference to stone quarries in these findings, stone quarries were deliberately included within the scope of the statute. Since the Mine Safety and Health Act, unlike the Occupational Safety and Health Act, is narrowly and explicitly directed at inherently dangerous industrial activity, the inclusion of stone quarries in the statute is presumptively equivalent to a finding that the stone quarrying industry is inherently dangerous. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 95-312, supra, at 1 (mining operations are “so unique, so complex, and so hazardous as to not fit neatly under the Occupational Safety and Health Act”). In contrast, the inspection scheme considered in Barlow’s did not require the periodic inspection of businesses covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and instead left the decision to inspect within the broad discretion of agency officials. Thus, when a Government official attempted to inspect the facility in that case, the owner had no indication of “why an inspection of [his] establishment was within the program.” 436 U. S., at 323, n. 20. Stone quarries were first subjected to federal health and safety inspections under the Federal Metal and Nonmetallie Mine Safety Act of 1966, 30 TJ. S. C. §§ 723, 724.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY v. EGAN No. 86-1552. Argued December 2, 1987 Decided February 23, 1988 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 534. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Cohen argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Michael K. Kellogg, Barbara L. Herwig, and Freddi Lipstein. William J. Nold argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Todd Nothin filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by John A. Powell, Helen Hershhoff, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by George Kaufmann and Laurence Gold; for the National Federation of Federal Employees by Patrick J. Riley; and for Ralph B. Bogdanowicz by Stuart A. Kirsch and Mark D. Roth. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Thomas M. Egan lost his laborer’s job at the Trident Naval Refit Facility in Bremerton, Wash., when he was denied a required security clearance. The narrow question presented by this case is whether the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) has authority by statute to review the substance of an underlying decision to deny or revoke a security clearance in the course of reviewing an adverse action. The Board ruled that it had no such authority. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue in its relation to national security concerns. 481 U. S. 1068 (1987). I Respondent Egan was a new hire and began his work at the facility on November 29,1981. He served as a veteran’s-preference-eligible civilian employee of the Navy subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act), 5 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq. The mission of the Refit Facility is to provide quick-turnaround repair, replenishment, and systems check-out of the Trident submarine over its extended operating cycle. The Trident is nuclear-powered and carries nuclear weapons. It has been described as the most sophisticated and sensitive weapon in the Navy’s arsenal and as playing a crucial part in our Nation’s defense system. See Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454, 462-466 (DC 1975), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 345, 555 F. 2d 817 (1977). As a consequence, all employee positions at the Refit Facility are classified as sensitive. Thus, as shown on his Standard Form, a condition precedent to Egan’s retention of his employment was “satisfactory completion of security and medical reports.” In April 1982, respondent gained the “noncritical-sensitive” position of laborer leader. Pending the outcome of his security investigation, however, he performed only limited duties and was not permitted to board any submarine. On February 16, 1983, the Director of the Naval Civilian Personnel Command issued a letter of intent to deny respondent a security clearance. This was based upon California and Washington state criminal records reflecting respondent’s convictions for assault and for being a felon in possession of a gun, and further based upon his failure to disclose on his application for federal employment two earlier convictions for carrying a loaded firearm. The Navy also referred to respondent’s own statements that he had had drinking problems in the past and had served the final 28 days of a sentence in an alcohol rehabilitation program. Respondent was informed that he had a right to respond to the proposed security-clearance denial. On May 6, he answered the Navy’s letter of intent, asserting that he had paid his debt to society for his convictions, that he had not listed convictions older than seven years because he did not interpret the employment form as requiring that information, and that alcohol had not been a problem for him for three years preceding the clearance determination. He also provided favorable material from supervisors as to his background and character. The Director, after reviewing this response, concluded that the information provided did not sufficiently explain, mitigate, or refute the reasons on which the proposed denial was based. Accordingly, respondent’s security clearance was denied. Respondent took an appeal to the Personnel Security Appeals Board, but his removal was effected before that Board acted (which it eventually did by affirming the denial of clearance). Without a security clearance, respondent was not eligible for the job for which he had been hired. Reassignment to a nonsensitive position at the facility was not possible because there was no nonsensitive position there. Accordingly, the Navy issued a notice of proposed removal, and respondent was placed on administrative leave pending final decision. Respondent did not reply to the notice. On July 15,1983, he was informed that his removal was effective July 22. Respondent, pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 7513(d), sought review by the Merit Systems Protection Board. Under § 7513(a), an agency may remove an employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” The statute, together with § 7701 to which § 7513(d) specifically refers, provides the employee with a number of procedural protections, including notice, an opportunity to respond and be represented by counsel, and a decision in writing. The employee, unless he is a nonveteran in the excepted service, may appeal the agency’s decision to the Board, as respondent did, which is to sustain the action if it is “supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” § 7701(c)(1)(B). The stated “cause” for respondent’s removal was his failure to meet the requirements for his position due to the denial of security clearance. Before the Board, the Government argued that the Board’s review power was limited to determining whether the required removal procedures had been followed and whether a security clearance was a condition for respondent’s position. It contended that the Board did not have the authority to judge the merits of the underlying security-clearance determination. The Board’s presiding official reversed the agency’s decision, ruling that the Board did have authority to review the merits. She further ruled that the agency must specify the precise criteria used in its security-clearance decision and must show that those criteria are rationally related to national security. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a-63a. The agency then must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee’s acts precipitating the denial of his clearance actually occurred, and that his “alleged misconduct has an actual or potentially detrimental effect on national security interests.” Id., at 63a. The official then held that the ultimate burden was upon the agency to persuade the Board of the appropriateness of its decision to deny clearance. Id., at 64a. The official concluded that it was not possible to determine whether the Navy’s denial of respondent’s security clearance was justified because it had not submitted a list of the criteria it employed and because it did not present evidence that it had “conscientiously weighed the circumstances surrounding [respondent’s] alleged misconduct and reasonably balanced it against the interests of national security.” Id., at 65a. She accordingly concluded that the Navy had “failed to show it reached a reasonable and warranted decision concerning the propriety of the revocation of [respondent’s] security clearance.” Id., at 66a. The decision to remove respondent, therefore, could not stand. The Navy petitioned for full Board review of the presiding official’s ruling. In a unanimous decision, the Board reversed the presiding official’s ruling and sustained the agency’s removal action. 28 M. S. P. R. 509 (1985). It observed that §§7512 and 7513 “do not specifically address the extent of the Board’s review of the underlying determinations.” 28 M. S. P. R., at 514. Neither did the legislative history of the Act “address the extent of the authority Congress intended the Board to exercise in reviewing revocations or denials of security clearances which result in Chapter 75 actions.” Id., at 515. The Board found no binding legal precedent. It acknowledged the presence of the decision in Hoska v. Department of Army, 219 U. S. App. D. C. 280, 677 F. 2d 131 (1982) (security clearance revocation leading to dismissal reviewed on its merits), but explained that case away on the ground that the court did not “expressly address the Board’s authority to review the underlying reasons for the agency’s security clearance determination.” 28 M. S. P. R., at 516. Thus, earlier Board cases that had relied upon Hoska, see, e. g., Bogdanowicz v. Department of Army, 16 M. S. P. R. 653 (1983), involved a “reliance misplaced,” and the holding that they stood “for the proposition that the Board has the authority to review the propriety of the agency’s . . . denial of a security clearance” was “now overrule[d].” 28 M. S. P. R., at 516. It went on to say that “section 7532 is not the exclusive basis for removals based upon security clearance revocations.” Id., at 521. Respondent, pursuant to § 7703, appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. By a divided vote, that court reversed the Board’s decision that it had no authority to review the merits of a security-clearance determination underlying a removal. 802 F. 2d 1563 (1986). It agreed with the Board that § 7532 is not the sole authority for a removal based upon national security concerns. 802 F. 2d, at 1568. It noted, however, that the agency had chosen to remove respondent under §7512 rather than §7532 and thus that it chose the procedure “that carrie[d] Board review under section 7513,” 802 F. 2d, at 1569, including review of the merits of the underlying agency determination to deny a security clearance. The court then remanded the case to the Board for such review, stating that the question of an appropriate remedy, should the Board now rule that a security clearance was improperly denied, was not yet ripe. Id., at 1573-1575. The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had received all the procedural protections to which he was entitled, id., at 1577-1578; that the majority in effect was transferring a discretionary decision vested in an executive agency to a body that had neither the responsibility nor the expertise to make that decision; that the ruling raised separation-of-powers concerns; and that the Board would be unable to provide an appropriate remedy. Id., at 1578, 1580-1583. II We turn first to the statutory structure. Chapter 75 of Title 5 of the United States Code is entitled “Adverse Actions.” Its subchapter II (§§ 7511-7514) relates to removals for “cause.” Subchapter IV (§§ 7531-7533) relates to removals based upon national security concerns. An employee removed for “cause” has the right, under § 7513(d), to appeal to the Board. In contrast, an employee suspended under § 7532(a) is not entitled to appeal to the Board. That employee, however, is entitled to specified preremoval procedural rights, including a hearing by an agency authority. § 7532(c)(3). Chapter 77 of Title 5 (§§7701-7703) is entitled “Appeals,” and Chapter 12 (§§ 1201-1209) relates to the “Merit Systems Protection Board and Special Counsel.” Section 1205(a) provides that the Board shall “hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or adjudication of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Board” and shall “order any Federal agency or employee to comply with any order or decision issued by the Board.” In the present litigation, there is no claim that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate respondent’s appeal. It is apparent that the statutes provide a “two-track” system. A removal for “cause” embraces a right of appeal to the Board and a hearing of the type prescribed in detail in § 7701. Suspension and removal under § 7532, however, entail no such right of appeal. Respondent takes the straightforward position that, inasmuch as this case proceeded under § 7513, a hearing before the Board was required. The Government agrees. What is disputed is the subject matter of that hearing and the extent to which the Board may exercise reviewing authority. In particular, may the Board, when §7513 is pursued, examine the merits of the security-clearance denial, or does its authority stop short of that point, that is, upon review of the fact of denial, of the position’s requirement of security clearance, and of the satisfactory provision of the requisite procedural protections? Ill The Court of Appeals’ majority stated: “The absence of any statutory provision precluding appellate review of security clearance denials in section 7512 removals creates a strong presumption in favor of appellate review,” citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). 802 F. 2d, at 1569. One perhaps may accept this as a general proposition of administrative law, but the proposition is not without limit, and it runs aground when it encounters concerns of national security, as in this case, where the grant of security clearance to a particular employee, a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call, is committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive Branch. The President, after all, is the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2. His authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will give that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 890 (1961). This Court has recognized the Government’s “compelling interest” in withholding national security information from unauthorized persons in the course of executive business. Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 267 (1967); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 10 (1953); Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 106 (1876). The authority to protect such information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief. Since World War I, the Executive Branch has engaged in efforts to protect national security information by means of a classification system graded according to sensitivity. See Note, Developments in the Law — The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1193-1194 (1972). After World War II, certain civilian agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission, were entrusted with gathering, protecting, or creating information bearing on national security. Presidents, in a series of Executive Orders, have sought to protect sensitive information and to ensure its proper classification throughout the Executive Branch by delegating this responsibility to the heads of agencies. See Exec. Order No. 10290, 3 CFR 789 (1949-1953 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 10501, 3 CFR 979 (1949-1953 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11652, 3 CFR 678 (1971-1975 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12065, 3 CFR 190 (1979); Exec. Order No. 12356, §4.1(a), 3 CFR 174 (1983). Pursuant to these directives, departments and agencies of the Government classify jobs in three categories: critical sensitive, noncritical sensitive, and nonsensitive. Different types and levels of clearance are required, depending upon the position sought. A Government appointment is expressly made subject to a background investigation that varies according to the degree of adverse effect the applicant could have on the national security. See Exec. Order No. 10450, §3, 3 CFR 937 (1949-1953 Comp.). It should be obvious that no one has a “right” to a security clearance. The grant of a clearance requires an affirmative act of discretion on the part of the granting official. The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.” See, e. g., Exec. Order No. 10450, §§2 and 7, 3 CFR 936, 938 (1949-1953 Comp.); 10 CFR §710.10(a) (1987) (Department of Energy); 32 CFR § 156.3(a) (1987) (Department of Defense). A clearance does not equate with passing judgment upon an individual’s character. Instead, it is only an attempt to predict his possible future behavior and to assess whether, under compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons, he might compromise sensitive information. It may be based, to be sure, upon past or present conduct, but it also may be based upon concerns completely unrelated to conduct, such as having close relatives residing in a country hostile to the United States. “[T]o be denied [clearance] on unspecified grounds in no way implies disloyalty or any other repugnant characteristic.” Molerio v. FBI, 242 U. S. App. D. C. 137, 146, 749 F. 2d 815, 824 (1984). The attempt to define not only the individual’s future actions, but those of outside and unknown influences renders the “grant or denial of security clearances ... an inexact science at best.” Adams v. Laird, 136 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 397, 420 F. 2d 230, 239 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1039 (1970). Predictive judgment of this kind must be made by those with the necessary expertise in protecting classified information. For “reasons . . . too obvious to call for enlarged discussion,” CIA v. Sims, 471 U. S. 159, 170 (1985), the protection of classified information must be committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include broad discretion to determine who may have access to it. Certainly, it is not reasonably possible for an outside non-expert body to review the substance of such a judgment and to decide whether the agency should have been able to make the necessary affirmative prediction with confidence. Nor can such a body determine what constitutes an acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk. The Court accordingly has acknowledged that with respect to employees in sensitive positions “there is a reasonable basis for the view that an agency head who must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information.” Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 546 (1956). As noted above, this must be a judgment call. The Court also has recognized “the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 293-294 (1981). “As to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 710 (1974). Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs. See, e. g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94 (1953); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 142, 144 (1953); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973), Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 757-758 (1975); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296 (1983). We feel that the contrary conclusion of the Court of Appeals’ majority is not in line with this authority. IV Finally, we are fortified in our conclusion when we consider generally the statute’s “express language” along with “the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 345 (1984). The Act by its terms does not confer broad authority on the Board to review a security-clearance determination. As noted above, the Board does have jurisdiction to review “adverse actions,” a term, however, limited to a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, and a furlough of 30 days or less. §§ 7513(d), 7512. A denial of a security clearance is not such an “adverse action,” and by its own force is not subject to Board review. An employee who is removed for “cause” under § 7513, when his required clearance is denied, is entitled to the several procedural protections specified in that statute. The Board then may determine whether such cause existed, whether in fact clearance was denied, and whether transfer to a nonsensitive position was feasible. Nothing in the Act, however, directs or empowers the Board to go further. Cf. Zimmer man v. Department of Army, 755 F. 2d 156 (CA Fed. 1985); Buriani v. Department of Air Force, 777 F. 2d 674, 677 (CA Fed. 1985); Bacon v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 757 F. 2d 265, 269-270 (CA Fed. 1985); Madsen v. VA, 754 F. 2d 343 (CA Fed. 1985). As noted above, security clearance normally will be granted only if it is “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.” The Board, however, reviews adverse actions under a preponderance of the evidence standard. § 7701(c)(1)(B). These two standards seem inconsistent. It is difficult to see how the Board would be able to review security-clearance determinations under a preponderance of the evidence standard without departing from the “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security” test. The clearly consistent standard indicates that security-clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials. Placing the burden on the Government to support the denial by a preponderance of the evidence would inevitably shift this emphasis and involve the Board in second-guessing the agency’s national security determinations. We consider it extremely unlikely that Congress intended such a result when it passed the Act and created the Board. Respondent presses upon us the existence of § 7532 with its provision for an employee’s summary removal. The Court of Appeals’ majority concluded that § 7532 was not the exclusive means for removal on national security grounds. 802 F. 2d, at 1568. The parties to the present litigation are in no dispute about the alternative availability of §7513 or §7532. They assume, as the Federal Circuit held, that §7532 does not pre-empt §7513 and that the two statutes stand separately and provide alternative routes for administrative action. There is no reason for us to dispute that conclusion here for, in this respect, we accept the case as it comes to us. Respondent points out the Government’s acknowledgment that the remedy under §7532 is “drastic” in that the employee may be suspended summarily and thereafter removed after such investigation and review as the agency head considers necessary; in that neither the suspension nor the removal is subject to outside review; in that the employee is not eligible for any other position in the agency and may not be appointed to a position elsewhere in the Government without consultation with the Office of Personnel Management; and in that the section requires the head of the agency to act personally. At the same time, respondent would say, as did the Court of Appeals, 802 F. 2d, at 1572, that the Board’s decision in the present case suggests an anomaly in that an employee removed under § 7513 is entitled to less process than one removed under § 7532. The argument is that the availability of the §7532 procedure is a “compelling” factor in favor of Board review of a security-clearance denial in a case under § 7513. We are not persuaded. We do not agree that respondent would have received greater procedural protections under § 7532 than he received in the present case. Respondent received notice of the reasons for the proposed denial, an opportunity to inspect all relevant evidence, a right to respond, a written decision, and an opportunity to appeal to the Personnel Security Appeals Board. Until the time of his removal, he remained on full-pay status. His removal was subject to Board review that provided important protections outlined above. In contrast, had he been removed under § 7532, he would have received notice to “the extent that the head of the agency determines that the interests of national security permit,” a hearing before an agency board, and a decision by the head of the agency. He could have been suspended without pay pending the outcome. He would not have been entitled to any review outside the agency, and, once removed, he would have been barred from employment with the agency. In short, § 7532, instead, provides a procedure that is harsh and drastic both for the employee and for the agency head, who must act personally in suspending and removing the employee. See §§ 7532(a) and (b). Respondent’s argument that the Board’s decision in this case creates an anomaly seems to come down to his contention that, had he been removed under § 7532, he would have been entitled to a trial-type hearing prior to his removal. Even assuming he would be entitled to such a hearing under § 7532, however, we would still consider the two procedures not anomalous, but merely different. As explained above, we doubt whether removal under § 7532, even as envisioned by respondent, would have amounted to “more” procedural protection. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. A “noncritical-sensitive” position is defined to include “[a]ccess to Secret or Confidential information.” Chief of Naval Operations Instructions (OPNAVINST) 5510. IF, K16-101-2.b (June 15, 1981). OPNAVINST 5510. IF was amended in April 1984 and is now OPNAVINST 5510.1G. This date is of some significance for by then respondent had been employed at the facility for more than a year. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7511(a)(1)(A) defines an “employee” as “an individual in the competitive service who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment or who has completed 1 year of current continuous employment under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less.” There is no dispute concerning respondent’s status as an employee within the meaning of § 7511(a)(1)(A). Section 7513(d) reads: “An employee against whom an action is taken under this section is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 7701 of this title.” We note at this point the presence of 5 U. S. C. §7532. Under § 7532(a), the “head of an agency,” “[n]otwithstanding other statutes,” may suspend an employee “when he considers that action necessary in the interests of national security.” After complying with specified procedures, the agency head may remove the suspended employee when “he determines that removal is necessary or advisable in the interests of national security.” His determination then is “final.” § 7532(b). Removal under § 7532 is not subject to Board review. § 7512(A). In respondent’s case the Navy did not invoke § 7532; his removal, therefore, presumably would be subject to Board review as provided in § 7513. The Solicitor General informs us, see Brief for Petitioner 6, that the Board had before it numerous petitions for review raising similar issues of law, and treated the present litigation as the lead case. The Board had invited and received briefs from interested agencies, employee organizations, and others concerning the proper scope of its review and whether § 7532, see n. 4, supra, is the exclusive authority for a removal based upon national security concerns. See 49 Fed. Reg. 48623-48624 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 2355 (1985). Prior to the Act’s passage in 1978, most federal employees dismissed for cause could pursue an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The parties here appear to agree that the old Commission never exercised jurisdiction over a security-clearance determination. We fail to see any indication that Congress intended to grant the Board greater jurisdiction in this respect than that possessed by the Civil Service Commission. The Board was created to assume the adjudicatory functions of the old Commission and, with certain exceptions, those functions passed unchanged from the Commission to the Board. When the Senate and House Committees listed the changes effected by the Act, they gave no indication that an agency’s security-clearance determination was now to be subject to review. See S. Rep. No. 95-969, pp. 46 and 52 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, pp. 21,22 (1978). Such changes as were made did not bear upon the issue. If there be any contrary implication in the legislative history, as respondent would suggest, it is much too frail for us to conclude that Congress intended a major change of that kind. But cf. Doe v. Weinberger, 261 U. S. App. D. C. 96, 101, 820 F. 2d 1275, 1280 (1987), cert. pending sub nom. Carlucci v. Doe, No. 87-751. If the District of Columbia Circuit’s holding in Doe (to the effect that § 7532 is not merely “an extra option,” 261 U. S. App. D. C., at 101, 820 P. 2d, at 1280, for the removal of an employee of the National Security Agency, to which 50 U. S. C. §§ 831 and 832 apply) is pertinent with respect to the Navy’s power to dismiss an employee for cause under § 7513, that ruling would conflict with the Federal Circuit’s holding in the present case that the Navy may proceed under § 7513. This Court will meet the issue in Doe when it comes to it. We decide the present case on the parties’ assumption that § 7513 was available to the Navy in this case and that it proceeded thereunder.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION et al. v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF RECYCLING INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. No. 80-568. Decided January 26, 1981 Per Curiam. Section 204 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory-Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 40, note following 45 U. S. C. § 793, directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to conduct an investigation to determine whether the rail rate structure for recyclable and competing virgin materials unjustly discriminates against recyclables or whether such rates are unreasonable, and, if found to be so, to require the removal of any such defect from the structure. The Act demonstrated congressional concern that rail rates may have been unjustly impeding the movement of recycled materials in a market of diminishing virgin resources. S. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 51 (1975). After conducting the investigation required by §§204 (a) (1) and (2), the Commission concluded that the rail rate structure was neither discriminatory with respect to recyclable materials, nor, with few exceptions, unreasonable. Investigation of Freight Rates for the Transportation of Recyclable or Recycled Commodities, 356 I. C. C. 114 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the Commission had applied an overly restrictive definition of “competitive” in assessing whether particular commodities were comparable for purposes of determining discrimination, and that the Commission had improperly shifted the burden of proof from the railroads. National Association of Recycling Industries, Inc. v. ICC, 190 U. S. App. D. C. 118, 585 F. 2d 522 (1978). The case was remanded with orders to the Commission to conduct an expedited investigation which would remedy these errors. On remand, the Commission found that certain recyclable materials were being discriminated against in the rate structure and concluded that, in general, rates for transportation of recyclables were unreasonably high if they produced a revenue-to-variable cost ratio exceeding 180%. The Commission ordered the elimination of all rate discrimination and ordered that rates for recyclable materials which produced revenue in excess of the 180% ratio be reduced accordingly. Investigation of Freight Rates for Transportation of Recyclable or Recycled Commodities, 361 I. C. C. 238 (1979). In eliminating the discrimination, the railroads were free to use any combination of raising or lowering rates which would equalize rates for recyclable and competing virgin materials, so long as the resulting rate would not be unreasonable. Investigation of Freight Rates for Transportation of Recyclable or Recycled Commodities, 361 I. C. C. 641 (1979). Under this approach, the railroads could raise the rates for recyclable material and competing virgin material to a level above the previous levels for either commodity, if the new rate did not produce revenue in excess of the 180% ratio. The Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to the Commission’s findings on discrimination. National Association of Recycling Industries, Inc. v. ICC, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 627 F. 2d 1328 (1980). However, the court found fault with the scope of the Commission’s remedy for eliminating discrimination and with the Commission’s failure adequately to justify the 180% ratio as indicative of reasonableness. The court revoked all rate increases for recyclable material put into effect pursuant to those perceived errors and remanded for further proceedings. In a supplementary order, the court made it clear that the central task on remand would be to determine whether the 180% ratio, or some other formula, provided the appropriate standard for determining reasonableness. Until such a standard had been adequately justified, the court enjoined implementation of any rate increase for recyclable material, excepting one caused by a general rate increase. The railroads sought certiorari, challenging only those aspects of the Court of Appeals’ decision which revoked or enjoined rate increases. The argument is that the lower court was without authority to enter such orders. We agree. The authority to determine when any particular rate should be implemented is a matter which Congress has placed squarely in the hands of the Commission. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 662-672 (1963). While the Court of Appeals was not without power to order further proceedings to determine the propriety of the 180% ratio standard, the court stepped beyond the proper exercise of its power when it revoked rates implemented under the standard and enjoined any further increases toward the 180% level. The basis for these remedies was the court’s conclusion that the Commission had failed to adequately support the choice of the 180% figure. That standard was not rejected outright; the court’s opinion leaves open the possibility that the 180% ratio may eventually prevail. Under the above circumstances, there is no basis in our prior decisions for the revocation order or for the injunction against further increases. “If a reviewing court cannot discern [the Commission’s] policies, it may remand the case to the agency for clarification and further justification of the departure from precedent. . . . When a case is remanded on the ground that the agency’s policies are unclear, an injunction ordinarily interferes with the primary jurisdiction of the Commission.” Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 822 (1973); see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 690-698 (1973); Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., supra; see also Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U. S. 444 (1979). Here, the court was dissatisfied with the Commission’s justification for adopting the 180% standard, and the case was remanded for further proceedings which could either produce a new standard or clarify the basis for the 180% ratio. Such a posture provides no basis for either revoking or enjoining rate increases under the above authorities. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, those portions of the Court of Appeals decision revoking or enjoining rate increases are vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with the immediate disposition. So ordered. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. On October 14, 1980, the President signed into law the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895. Section 204 of the Act amends 49 U. S. C. § 10731 (1976 ed, Supp. III) so as to provide guidelines under which the Commission must develop a new revenue-to-variable cost standard for all reeydables excepting iron and steel scrap. Congress has estimated that that ratio would not exceed 160%. S. Rep. No. 96-470, p. 34 (1979). Although the Act may result in the Commission’s adoption of a standard lower than 180%, that factor has no bearing on the Court of Appeals’ power to revoke or enjoin the rate increases at issue here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEWARK MORNING LEDGER CO., as successor to THE HERALD CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 91-1135. Argued November 10, 1992 Decided April 20, 1993 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 571. Robert H. Bork argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Bernard J. Long, Jr., Albert H. Turkus, Linda A. Fritts, Judith A. Mather, Corinne M. Antley, Peter C. Gould, and Steven Alan Reiss. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Kent L. Jones, Robert S. Pomerance, Francis M. Allegra, and Steven W. Parks. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Black •& Decker Corp. et al. by Mark I. Levy, Arthur I. Gould, Roger J. Jones, and Andrew L. Frey; for Charles Schwab Corp. by Glenn A Smith, Robert C. Alexander, and Teresa A Maloney; for Donrey, Inc., by Lester G. Fant III, Daniel M. Davidson, Rex E. Lee, and Carter G. Phillips; for the Independent Insurance Agents of America et al. by Kenneth J. Kies; for Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., by James L. Malone III and George W. Benson; for the New England Fuel Institute et al. by Gary J. Klein, Bernhardt K. Wruble, and John S. Moot; for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Timothy J. McCormally and Mary L. Fahey; and for Worrell Enterprises, Inc., by Malcolm L. Stein and Stanley E. Preiser. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Bankers Association by John J. Gill III, Michael F. Crotty, Joanne Ames, Philip C. Cook, Terence J. Greene, and Timothy J. Peaden; for the American Business Press by Robert A Saltzstein, Stephen M. Feldman, and David R. Straus; for Colorado National Bankshares, Inc., et al. by James E. Bye and Richard G. Wilkins; for Coopers & Lybrand by David L. McLean; for the Investment Counsel Association of America, Inc., by Kenneth W. Gideon; for the Newspaper Association of America by George L. Middleton, Jr., and Gorrine M. Yu; for Philip Morris Companies Inc. by Jerome B. Libin and Padric K. J. O’Brien; and for Frederic W. Hickman et al., pro se. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue whether, under § 167 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 167, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may treat as nondepreciable an intangible asset proved to have an ascertainable value and a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, solely because the IRS considers the asset to be goodwill as a matter of law. I Petitioner Newark Morning Ledger Co., a New Jersey corporation, is a newspaper publisher. It is the successor to The Herald Company with which it merged in 1987. Eleven years earlier, in 1976, Herald had purchased substantially all the outstanding shares of Booth Newspapers, Inc., the publisher of daily and Sunday newspapers in eight Michigan communities. Herald and Booth merged on May 31, 1977, and Herald continued to publish the eight papers under their old names. Tax code provisions in effect in 1977 required that Herald allocate its adjusted income tax basis in the Booth shares among the assets acquired in proportion to their respective fair market values at the time of the merger. See 26 U. S. C. §§332 and 334(b)(2) (1976 ed.). Prior to the merger, Herald’s adjusted basis in the Booth shares was approximately $328 million. Herald allocated $234 million of this to various financial assets (cash, securities, accounts and notes receivable, the shares of its wholly owned subsidiary that published Parade Magazine, etc.) and tangible assets (land, buildings, inventories, production equipment, computer hardware, etc.). Herald also allocated $67.8 million to an intangible asset denominated “paid subscribers.” This consisted of 460,000 identified subscribers to the eight Booth newspapers as of May 31, 1977, the date of merger. These subscribers were customers each of whom had requested that the paper be delivered regularly to a specified address in return for payment of the subscription price. The $67.8 million figure was petitioner’s estimate of future profits to be derived from these at-will subscribers, all or most of whom were expected to continue to subscribe after the Herald acquisition. The number of “paid subscribers” was apparently an important factor in Herald’s decision to purchase Booth and in its determination of the appropriate purchase price for the Booth shares. See Brief for Petitioner 4-5. After these allocations, the approximately $26.2 million remaining was allocated to going-concern value and goodwill. On its federal income tax returns for the calendar years 1977-1980, inclusive, Herald claimed depreciation deductions on a straight-line basis for the $67.8 million allocated to “paid subscribers.” The IRS disallowed these deductions on the ground that the concept of “paid subscribers” was indistinguishable from goodwill and, therefore, was nondepreciable under the applicable regulations. Herald paid the resulting additional taxes. After the 1987 merger, petitioner filed timely claims for refund. The IRS took no action on the claims, and, upon the expiration of the prescribed 6-month period, see 26 U. S. C. § 6532(a)(1), petitioner brought suit in the District of New Jersey to recover taxes and interest that it claimed had been assessed and collected erroneously. The case was tried to the court. Petitioner presented financial and statistical experts who testified that, using generally accepted statistical techniques, they were able to estimate how long the average at-will subscriber of each Booth newspaper as of May 31, 1977, would continue to subscribe. The estimates ranged from 14.7 years for a daily subscriber to The Ann Arbor News to 23.4 years for a subscriber to the Sunday edition of The Bay City Times. This was so despite the fact that the total number of subscribers remained almost constant during the tax years in question. The experts based their estimates on actuarial factors such as death, relocation, changing tastes, and competition from other media. The experts also testified that the value of “paid subscribers” was appropriately calculated using the “income approach.” Under this, petitioner’s experts first calculated the present value of the gross-revenue stream that would be generated by these subscriptions over their estimated useful lives. From that amount they subtracted projected costs of collecting the subscription revenue. Petitioner contended that the resulting estimated net-revenue stream — calculated as $67,773,000 by one of its experts — was a reasonable estimate of the value of “paid subscribers.” The Government did not contest petitioner’s expert evidence at all. In fact, it stipulated to the estimates of the useful life of “paid subscribers” for each newspaper. Also, on valuation, the Government presented little or no evidence challenging petitioner’s calculations. Instead, it argued that the only value attributable to the asset in question was the cost of generating 460,000 new subscribers through a subscription drive. Under this “cost approach,” the Government estimated the value of the asset to be approximately $3 million. The Government’s principal argument throughout the litigation has been that “paid subscribers” represents an asset indistinguishable from the goodwill of the Booth newspapers. According to the Government, the future stream of revenue expected to be generated by the 460,000 “paid subscribers” represented the very essence of the goodwill value of the newspapers. It argued that because goodwill is nondepre-ciable, the value of “paid subscribers” cannot be depreciated but must be added to basis so that, when the business is disposed of, the cost of the asset will be deducted from the proceeds in computing capital gain or loss. The District Court (Judge H. Lee Sarokin) ruled in petitioner’s favor. 734 F. Supp. 176 (NJ 1990). It found as a fact that the “paid subscribers” asset was not self-regenerating — it had a limited useful life the duration of which could be calculated with reasonable accuracy. Id., at 180. The court further found that the value of “paid subscribers” was properly calculated using the “income approach” and that the asset itself was separate and distinct from goodwill. “[0]ne must distinguish between a galaxy of customers who may or may not return, whose frequency is unknown, and whose quantity and future purchases cannot be predicted, against subscribers who can be predicted to purchase the same item, for the same price on a daily basis.” Id., at 176-177. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 945 F. 2d 555 (1991). It concluded that the District Court had erred in defining goodwill as that which remains after all assets with determinable useful lives and ascertainable values have been accounted for. Id., at 568. The court concluded that goodwill has a substantive meaning — the expectancy that “‘old customers will resort to the old place’ of business,” id., at 567 — and that “paid subscribers” is the essence of goodwill. Even though the “paid subscribers” asset may have a limited useful life that can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, the court held that its value is not separate and distinct from goodwill. Id., at 568. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s suggestion for rehearing in banc, with two judges dissenting. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a. In order to resolve an issue of substantial importance under the Internal Revenue Code and to settle a perceived conflict, we granted certiorari, 503 U. S. 970 (1992). II Section 167(a) of the Code allows as a deduction for depreciation a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion and wear and tear, including obsolescence, of property used in a trade or business or of property held for the production of income. See n. 1, supra. This Court has held that “the primary purpose” of an annual depreciation deduction is “to further the integrity of periodic income statements by making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use (excluding maintenance expense) of the asset to the periods to which it contributes.” Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U. S. 92, 104 (1960). The depreciation deduction has been a part of the federal tax system at least since 1909, when Congress recognized that a corporation should calculate its annual net income by deducting from gross income “all losses actually sustained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including a reasonable allowance for depreciation of property, if any.” Tariff of 1909, § 38 Second, 36 Stat. 113. Nothing in the text of the 1909 statute or in the implementing Treasury Decision precluded a depreciation allowance for intangible property. This changed in 1914 with the promulgation of Treas. Regs. 33 (1914) issued under the 1913 Income Tax Law. The Revenue Act of 1918, § 234(a)(7), authorized a “reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence.” 40 Stat. 1078 (1919). Treasury Regs. 45 (1919), promulgated under the 1918 Act, explicitly recognized that intangible assets “may be the subject of a depreciation allowance.” Art. 163. Thereafter, the regulations governing the depreciation of intangible assets have remained essentially unchanged. The current version is set forth in n. 1, swpra. Since 1927, the IRS consistently has taken the position that “goodwill” is nondepreciable. One court has said specifically: “Indeed, this proposition is so well settled that the only question litigated in recent years regarding this area of the law is whether a particular asset is ‘goodwill.’” Hous ton Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F. 2d 1240, 1247 (CA5 1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1129 (1974). III <ri ^ Goodwill is not defined in the Code or in any Treasury Department Regulations. There have been attempts, however, to devise workable definitions of the term. In Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436 (1893), for example, this Court considered whether a newspaper’s goodwill survived after it was purchased and ceased publishing under its old name. It ruled that the goodwill did not survive, relying on Justice Story’s notable description of “goodwill” as “ ‘the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessity, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.’ ” Id., at 446, quoting J. Story, Partnerships § 99 (1841). In Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153 (1915), the Court described goodwill as “that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable consideration of customers, arising from an established and well-known and well-conducted business.” Id., at 165. See also Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Comm’n of California, 289 U. S. 287, 313 (1933) (distinguishing “going concern” from “good will” when fixing rates for public utilities). Although the definition of goodwill has taken different forms over the years, the shorthand description of goodwill as “the expectancy of continued patronage,” Boe v. Commis sioner, 307 F. 2d 339, 343 (CA9 1962), provides a useful label with which to identify the total of all the imponderable qualities that attract customers to the business. See Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F. 2d, at 1248, n. 5. This definition, however, is of little assistance to a taxpayer trying to evaluate which of its intangible assets is subject to a depreciation allowance. The value of every intangible asset is related, to a greater or lesser degree, to the expectation that customers will continue their patronage. But since 1918, at least some intangible assets have been depreciable. Because intangible assets do not exhaust or waste away in the same manner as tangible assets, taxpayers must establish that public taste or other socioeconomic forces will cause the intangible asset to be retired from service, and they must estimate a reasonable date by which this event will occur. See B. Bittker & M. McMahon, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals ¶12.4, p. 12-10 (1988). Intangibles such as patents and copyrights are de-preciable over their “legal lives,” which are specified by statute. Covenants not to compete, leaseholds, and life estates, for example, are depreciable over their useful lives that are expressly limited by contract. The category of intangibles that has given the IRS and the courts difficulty is that group of assets sometimes denominated “customer-based intangibles.” This group includes customer lists, insurance expirations, subscriber lists, bank deposits, cleaning-service accounts, drugstore-prescription files, and any other identifiable asset the value of which obviously depends on the continued and voluntary patronage of customers. The question has been whether these intangibles can be depreciated notwithstanding their relationship to “the expectancy of continued patronage.” B When considering whether a particular customer-based intangible asset may be depreciated, courts often have turned to a “mass asset” or “indivisible asset” rule. The rule provides that certain kinds of intangible assets are properly grouped and considered as a single entity; even though the individual components of the asset may expire or terminate over time, they are replaced by new components, thereby causing only minimal fluctuations and no measurable loss in the value of the whole. The following is the usually accepted description of a mass asset: “[A] purchased terminable-at-will type of customer list is - an indivisible business property with an indefinite, nondepreciable life, indistinguishable from — and the principal element of — goodwill, whose ultimate value lies in the expectancy of continued patronage through public acceptance. It is subject to temporary attrition as well as expansion through departure of some customers, acquisition of others, and increase or decrease in the requirements of individual customers. A normal turnover of customers represents merely the ebb and flow of a continuing property status in this species, and does not within ordinary limits give rise to the right to deduct for tax purposes the loss of individual customers. The whole is equal to the sum of its fluctuating parts at any given time, but each individual part enjoys no separate capital standing independent of the whole, for its disappearance affects but does not interrupt or destroy the continued existence of the whole.” Golden State Towel & Linen Service, Ltd. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 300, 310, 373 F. 2d 938, 944 (1967). The mass-asset rule prohibits the depreciation of certain customer-based intangibles because they constitute self-regenerating assets that may change but never waste. Although there may have been some doubt prior to 1973 as to whether the mass-asset rule required that any asset related to the expectancy of continued patronage always be treated as nondepreciable goodwill as a matter of law, that doubt was put to rest by the Fifth Circuit in the Houston Chronicle case. The court there considered whether subscription lists, acquired as part of the taxpayer’s purchase of The Houston Press, were depreciable. The taxpayer had no intention of continuing publication of the purchased paper, so there was no question of the lists’ being self-regenerating; they had value only to the extent that they furnished names and addresses of prospective subscribers to the taxpayer’s newspaper. After reviewing the history of the mass-asset rule, the court concluded that there was no per se rule that an intangible asset is nondepreciable whenever it is related to goodwill. On the contrary, the rule does not prevent taking a depreciation allowance “if the taxpayer properly carries his dual burden of proving that the intangible asset involved (1) has an ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill, and (2) has a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy.” Houston Chronicle, 481 F. 2d, at 1250. Following the decision in Houston Chronicle, the IRS issued a new ruling, modifying prior rulings “to remove any implication that customer and subscription lists, location contracts, insurance expirations, etc., are, as a matter of law, indistinguishable from goodwill possessing no determinable useful life.” Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 65, 66. The IRS continued to claim that customer-based intangibles generally are in the nature of goodwill, representing “the customer structure of a business, their value lasting until an indeterminate time in the future.” Nonetheless, it acknowledged that, “in an unusual case,” the taxpayer may prove that the “asset or a portion thereof does not possess the characteristics of goodwill, is susceptible of valuation, and is of use to the taxpayer in its trade or business for only a limited period of time.” Ibid. Under these circumstances, the IRS recognized the possibility that the customer-based intangible asset could be depreciated over its useful life. Despite the suggestion by the Court of Appeals in this case that the mass-asset rule is “now outdated,” 945 F. 2d, at 561, it continues to guide the decisions of the Tax Court with respect to certain intangible assets. In Ithaca Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T. C. 253 (1991), for example, the Tax Court recently considered whether a taxpayer could depreciate the value allocated to the trained work force of a purchased going concern over the length of time each employee remained with the purchasing company. The court acknowledged that “whether the assembled work force is an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a limited useful life separate from goodwill or going-concern value is a question of fact.” Id., at 263-264. After reviewing the record, it concluded that the mass-asset rule applied to prohibit the depreciation of the cost of acquiring the assembled work force: “Although the assembled work force is used to produce income, this record fails to show that its value diminishes as a result of the passing of time or through use. As an employee terminated his or her employment, another would be hired and trained to take his or her place. While the assembled work force might be subject to temporary attrition as well as expansion through departure of some employees and the hiring of others, it would not be depleted due to the passage of time or as a result of use. The turnover rate of employees represents merely the ebb and flow of a continuing work force. An employee’s leaving does not interrupt or destroy the continued existence of the whole.” Id., at 267. As a factual matter, the Tax Court found that the taxpayer hired a new worker only so it could replace a worker “who resigned, retired, or was fired.” Id., at 268. The court found that the “assembled work force” was a nondiminishing asset; new employees were trained in order to keep the “assembled work force” unchanged, and the cost of the training was a deductible expense. Id., at 271. > I — Í Since 1973, when Houston Chronicle clarified that the availability of the depreciation allowance was primarily a question of fact, taxpayers have sought to depreciate a wide variety of customer-based intangibles. The courts that have found these assets depreciable have based their conclusions on carefully developed factual records. In Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 431, 537 F. 2d 446 (1976), for example, the court considered whether a taxpayer was entitled to a depreciation deduction for 1,383 insurance expirations that it had purchased from another insurer. The court concluded that the taxpayer had carried its heavy burden of proving that the expirations had an ascertainable value separate and distinct from goodwill and had a limited useful life, the duration of which could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. The court acknowledged that the insurance expirations constituted a “mass asset” the useful life of which had to be “determined from facts relative to the whole, and not from experience with any particular policy or account involved.” Id., at 443, 537 F. 2d, at 454. The court also noted, however, that the mass-asset rule does not prevent a depreciation deduction “where the expirations as a single asset can be valued separately and the requisite showing made that the useful life of the information contained in the intangible asset as a whole is of limited duration.” Id., at 439, 537 F. 2d, at 452. All the policies were scheduled to expire within three years, but their continuing value lay in their being renewable. Based on statistics gathered over a 5-year period, the taxpayer was able to estimate that the mass asset had a useful life of not more than 10 years from the date of purchase. Any renewals after that time would be attributable to the skill, integrity, and reputation of the taxpayer rather than to the value of the original expirations. “The package of expirations demonstrably was a wasting asset.” Id., at 444, 537 F. 2d, at 455. The court ruled that the taxpayer could depreciate the cost of the collection of insurance expirations over the useful life of the mass asset. In Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T. C. 463 (1988), aff’d, 919 F. 2d 1492 (CA11 1990), the taxpayer argued that it was entitled to depreciate the bank-deposit base acquired in the purchase of nine separate banks. The taxpayer sought to depreciate the present value of the income it expected to derive from the use of the balances of deposit accounts existing at the time of the bank purchases. The Commissioner argued that the value of the core deposits was inextricably related to the value of the overall customer relationship, that is, to goodwill. The Commissioner also argued that the deposit base consisted of purchased, terminable-at-will customer relationships that are equivalent to goodwill as a matter of law. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner’s position, concluding that the taxpayer had demonstrated with sufficient evidence that the economic value attributable to the opportunity to invest the core deposits could be (and, indeed, was) valued and that the fact that new accounts were opened as old accounts closed did not make the original purchased deposit base self-regenerating. 91 T. C., at 499. The court also concluded that, based on “lifing studies” estimating the percentage of accounts that would close over a given period of time, the taxpayer established that the deposit base had a limited useful life, the duration of which could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. The taxpayer had established the value of the intangible asset using the cost-savings method, entitling it to depreciate that portion of the purchase price attributable to the present value of the difference between the ongoing costs associated with maintaining the core deposits and the cost of the market alternative for funding its loans and other investments. Id., at 510. The Tax Court reached the same result in Colorado National Bankshares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 TCM 771 (1990), ¶90,495 P-H Memo TC, aff’d, 984 F. 2d 383 (CA10 1993). The Tax Court concluded that “the value of the deposit base does not depend upon a vague hope that customers will patronize the bank for some unspecified length of time in the future. The value of the deposit base rests upon the ascertainable probability that inertia will cause depositors to leave their funds on deposit for predictable periods of time.” Colorado National Bankshares, 60 TCM, at 789, ¶ 90,495 P-H Memo TC, at 2,396. The court specifically found that the deposit accounts could be identified; that they had limited lives that could be estimated with reasonable accuracy; and that they could be valued with a fair degree of accuracy. They were also not self-regenerating. “It is these characteristics which separate them from general goodwill and permits separate valuation.” Ibid. See also IT&S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T. C. 496, 509 (1991); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O’Malley, 277 F. 2d 128, 139 (CA8 1960) (concurring opinion). The Eighth Circuit has considered a factual situation nearly identical to the case now before us. In Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F. 2d 534 (1987), the taxpayer sought to depreciate the subscription list of a newspaper it had purchased as a going concern. The taxpayer asserted that the subscription list was not simply a list of customers but “a machine to generate advertising revenue.” Id., at 536. There was expert testimony that the value of the subscription list was “the present value of the difference in advertising revenues generated by the subscription list as compared to the revenues of an equivalent paper without a subscription list.” Ibid. A jury found that the list had a limited useful life, the duration of which could be ascertained with reasonable accuracy; that the useful life was 23 years; and that it had an ascertainable value of $559,406 separate and distinct from goodwill. The District Court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after concluding that, although reasonable minds could have differed as to the correct result, there was evidence from which the jury could properly find for the taxpayer. The Court of Appeals implicitly rejected the Government’s argument that the subscription list was necessarily inseparable from the value of goodwill when it deferred to the jury’s finding that the subscription list was depreciable because it had a determinable useful life and an ascertainable value. V A Although acknowledging the “analytic force” of eases such as those discussed above, the Court of Appeals in the present case characterized them as “no more than a minority strand amid the phalanx of cases” that have adopted the Government’s position on the meaning of goodwill. 945 F. 2d, at 565. “In any case, consistent with the prevailing case law, we believe that the [IRS] is correct in asserting that, for tax purposes, there are some intangible assets which, notwithstanding that they have wasting lives that can be estimated with reasonable accuracy and ascertainable values, are nonetheless goodwill and nondepreciable.” Id., at 568. The Court of Appeals concluded further that in “the context of the sale of a going concern, it is simply often too difficult for the taxpayer and the court to separate the value of the list qua list from the goodwill value of the customer relationships/structure.” Ibid. We agree with that general observation. It is often too difficult for taxpayers to separate depreciable intangible assets from goodwill. But sometimes they manage to do it. And whether or not they have been successful in any particular case is a question of fact. The Government concedes: “The premise of the regulatory prohibition against the depreciation of goodwill is that, like stock in a corporation, a work of art, or raw land, goodwill has no determinate useful life of specific duration.” Brief for United States 13. See also Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl., at 437, 537 F. 2d, at 450 (“Goodwill is a concept that embraces many intangible elements and is presumed to have a useful life of indefinite duration”). The entire justification for refusing to permit the depreciation of goodwill evaporates, however, when the taxpayer demonstrates that the asset in question wastes over an ascertainable period of time. It is more faithful to the purposes of the Code to allow the depreciation deduction under these circumstances, for “the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes,” INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U. S. 79, 84 (1992). In the case that first established the principle that goodwill was not depreciable, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the reason for treating goodwill differently was simple and direct: “ ‘As good will does not suffer wear and tear, does not become obsolescent, is not used up in the operation of the business, depreciation, as such, cannot be charged against it.’ ” Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F. 2d 626, 633 (1926). cert. denied, 273 U. S. 763 (1927). See also 5 J. Mer-tens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 23A.01, p. 7 (1990) (“Goodwill is not amortizable intangible property because its useful life cannot be ascertained with reasonable accuracy” (emphasis added)). It must follow that if a taxpayer can prove with reasonable accuracy that an asset used in the trade or business or held for the production of income has a value that wastes over an ascertainable period of time, that asset is depreciable under § 167, regardless of the fact that its value is related to the expectancy of continued patronage. The significant question for purposes of depreciation is not whether the asset falls “within the core of the concept of goodwill,” Brief for United States 19, but whether the asset is capable of being valued and whether that value diminishes over time. In a different context, the IRS itself succinctly articulated the relevant principle: “Whether or not an intangible asset, or a tangible asset, is depreciable for Federal income tax purposes depends upon the determination that the asset is actually exhausting, and that such exhaustion is susceptible of measurement.” Rev. Rul. 68-483, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 91-92. B Although we now hold that a taxpayer able to prove that a particular asset can be valued and that it has a limited useful life may depreciate its value over its useful life regardless of how much the asset appears to reflect the expectancy of continued patronage, we do not mean to imply that the taxpayer’s burden of proof is insignificant. On the contrary, that burden often will prove too great to bear. See, e. g., Brief for Coopers & Lybrand as Amicus Curiae 11 (“For example, customer relationships arising from newsstand sales cannot be specifically identified. In [our] experience, customers were identified but their purchases were too sporadic and unpredictable to reasonably ascertain either the duration of the relationships or the value of the relationships (based on their net income stream)” (emphasis in original)). Petitioner’s burden in this case was made significantly lighter by virtue of the Government’s litigation strategy: “[BJecause of the stipulation reached by the parties, Morning Ledger need not prove either the specific useful lives of the paid subscribers of the Booth newspapers as of May 31, 1977, or that Dr. Glasser [its statistical expert] has correctly estimated those lives. In light of the stipulation, [the Government’s] argument with regard to Dr. Glasser’s estimation of the specific useful lives of the Booth subscribers is wholly irrelevant. Instead, Dr. Glasser’s testimony establishes that qualified experts could estimate with reasonable accuracy the remaining useful lives of the paid subscribers of the Booth newspapers as of May 31, 1977.” 734 F. Supp., at 181. Petitioner also proved to the satisfaction of the District Court that the “paid subscribers” asset was not self-regenerating, thereby distinguishing it for purposes of applying the mass-asset rule: “[T]here is no automatic replacement for a subscriber who terminates his or her subscription. Although the total number of subscribers may have or has remained relatively constant, the individual subscribers will not and have not remained the same, and those that may or have discontinued their subscriptions can be or have been replaced only through the substantial efforts of the Booth newspapers.” Id., at 180. The 460,000 “paid subscribers” constituted a finite set of subscriptions, existing on a particular date — May 31,1977. The asset was not composed of constantly fluctuating components; rather, it consisted of identifiable subscriptions each of which had a limited useful life that could be estimated with reasonable accuracy according to generally accepted statistical principles. Petitioner proved as a matter of fact that the value of the “paid subscribers” diminished over an ascertainable period of time. C Petitioner estimated the fair market value of the “paid subscribers” at approximately $67.8 million. This figure was found by computing the present value of the after-tax subscription revenues to be derived from the “paid subscribers,” less the cost of collecting those revenues, and adding the present value of the tax savings resulting from the depreciation of the “paid subscribers.” As the District Court explained, the taxpayer’s experts “utilized this method because they each independently concluded that this method best determined the additional value of the Booth newspapers attributable to the existence of the paid subscribers as of May 31, 1977, and, thus, the fair market value of those subscribers.” Id., at 183. The Government presented no evidence challenging the accuracy of this methodology. It took the view that the only value attributable to the “paid subscribers” was equivalent to the cost of generating a similar list of new subscribers, and it estimated that cost to be approximately $3 million. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Government that this “cost approach” was the only appropriate method for valuing the list of subscribers. “The fact is that, when employed in the context of the sale of an ongoing concern, the income approach to valuing a list of customers inherently includes much or all of the value of the expectancy that those customers will continue their patronage — i. e., the goodwill of the acquired concern.” 945 F. 2d, at 568. Both the Government and the Court of Appeals mischarac-terized the asset at issue as a mere list of names and addresses. The uncontroverted evidence presented at trial revealed that the “paid subscribers” had substantial value over and above that of a mere list of customers. App. 67 (Price Waterhouse’s Fair Market Value Study of Paid Newspaper Subscribers to Booth Newspapers as of May 31,1977); id., at 108-111 (testimony of Roger J. Grabowski, Principal and National Director, Price Waterhouse Valuation Services). These subscribers were “seasoned”; they had subscribed to the paper for lengthy periods of time and represented a reliable and measurable source of revenue. In contrast to new subscribers, who have no subscription history and who might not last beyond the expiration of some promotional incentive, the “paid subscribers” at issue here provided a regular and predictable source of income over an estimable period of time. The cost of generating a list of new subscribers is irrelevant, for it represents the value of an entirely different asset. We agree with the District Court when it concluded: “Although it was possible to estimate the direct cost of soliciting additional subscribers to the Booth newspapers, those subscribers if obtained were not and would not have been comparable, in terms of life characteristics or value, to the paid subscribers of the Booth newspapers as of May 31, 1977. . . . The cost of generating such marginal subscribers would not reflect the fair market value of the existing subscribers of the Booth newspapers as of May 31, 1977.” 734 F. Supp., at 181. Because it continued to insist that petitioner had used the wrong valuation methodology, the Government failed to offer any evidence to challenge the accuracy of petitioner’s application of the “income approach.” The District Court found that the aggregate fair market value of the “paid subscribers” of the Booth newspapers as of May 31, 1977 — i. e., “the price at which the asset would change hands between a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts,” id., at 185 — was $67,773,000, with a corresponding adjusted income tax basis of $71,201,395. Petitioner was entitled to depreciate this adjusted basis using a straight-line method over the stipulated useful lives. VI Petitioner has borne successfully its substantial burden of proving that “paid subscribers” constitutes an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy. It has proved that the asset is not self-regenerating but rather wastes as the finite number of component subscriptions are canceled over a reasonably predictable period of time. The relationship this asset may have to the expectancy of continued patronage is irrelevant, for it satisfies all the necessary conditions to qualify for the depreciation allowance under § 167 of the Code. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 167 states: “(a) General rule “There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence)— “(1) of property used in the trade or business, or “(2) of property held for the production of income.” Treasury Regulations § 1.167(a)-(3) interprets § 167(a) and states: “If an‘intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.” • 26 CFR § 1.167(a)-3 (1992). The eight Michigan papers were The Ann Arbor News, The Bay City Times, The Flint Journal, The Grand Rapids Press, The Jackson Citizen Patriot, Kalamazoo Gazette, The Muskegon Chronicle, and The Saginaw News. Section 334(b)(2) was repealed in 1982 and replaced by the somewhat different provisions of the present § 338 of the Code. According to petitioner, the term “ ‘paid subscribers’ is intended to reflect the fact that the customers in question paid for their newspapers, rather than receiving them for free, and that they subscribed to the newspaper, requesting regular delivery, rather than purchasing it on a single copy basis.” Brief for Petitioner 4, n. 5. The term does not connote subscription payments in advance; indeed, the customer relationship was terminable at will. Compare the Third Circuit’s ruling in the present case with Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F. 2d 534 (CA8 1987). See also Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T. C. 463 (1988), aff’d, 919 F. 2d 1492 (CA11 1990). . According to the Treasury Department, the depreciation deduction “should be the estimated amount of the loss, accrued during the year to which the return relates, in the value of the property in respect of which such'deduction is claimed that arises from exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence out of the uses to which the property is put .... This estimate should be formed upon the assumed life of the property, its cost value, and its use.” Treas. Regs. 31, Art. 4, p. 11 (1909). Treasury Regs. 33 provided explicitly that the depreciation deduction should be “estimated on the cost of the physical property with respect to which such deduction is claimed, which loss results from wear and tear due to the use to which the property is put” (emphasis added). Art. 159. Furthermore, “[ajssets of any character whatever which are not affected by use, wear and tear (except patents, copyrights, etc.) are not subject to the depreciation allowance authorized by this act.” Art. 162. Between 1919 and 1927, the IRS recognized that the goodwill of distillers and dealers might be depreciable as a result of the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors. See T. B. R. 44,1 Cum. Bull. 133 (1919). But in 1926, the Eighth Circuit, in Red Wing Matting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F. 2d 626, cert. denied, 273 U. S. 763 (1927), ruled that, under the plain language of the Revenue Act of 1918, goodwill could not be depreciated, for the depreciation provision “limits the allowance for obsolescence to such property as is susceptible to exhaustion, wear, and tear by use in the business, and good will is not such property.” 15 F. 2d, at 633. Following Red Wing Malting, the Treasury Department amended its regulations to provide: “No deduction for depreciation, including obsolescence, is allowable in respect of good will.” T. D. 4055, VI-2 Cum. Bull. 63 (1927). That has been the position of the IRS ever since. We emphasize that while the “expectancy of continued patronage” is a serviceable description of what we generally mean when we describe an intangible asset that has no useful life and no ascertainable value, this shibboleth tells us nothing about whether the asset in question is deprecia-ble. The dissent concedes that “the law concerning the depreciation of intangible assets related to goodwill has developed on a case-by-case basis,” post, at 576, n. 4, yet, inexplicably, it suggests that “[s]uch matters are not at issue in this ease, however, because the asset that Ledger seeks to depreciate is indistinguishable from goodwill,” ibid. As we demonstrate below, an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a limited useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, is depreciable under § 167 of the Code. The fact that it may also be described as the “expectancy of continued patronage” is entirely beside the point. An “expiration” is a copy of the face of an insurance policy made when the policy is issued. It shows the name of the insured, the type of insurance, the premium, the covered property, and the expiration date. “Its principal value in the insurance business is its indication of the most advantageous time to solicit a renewal.” Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl., at 436, 537 F. 2d, at 450. The term “deposit base” describes “the intangible asset that arises in a purchase transaction representing the present value of the future stream of income to be derived from employing the purchased core deposits of a bank.” Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T. C., at 465. The value of the deposit base rests upon the “ascertainable probability that inertia will cause depositors to leave their funds on deposit for predictable periods of time.” Id., at 500. At least one commentator has taken issue with the Court of Appeals’ characterization of the recent cases as nothing but a “minority strand.” See Avi-Yonah, Newark Morning Ledger: A Threat to the Amortizability of Acquired Intangibles, 55 Tax Notes 981, 984 (1992) (of the 14 cases cited by the Third Circuit that were decided after Houston Chronicle in 1973, the IRS has prevailed in only 6 of them; “hardly an ‘overwhelming weight of authority’ in the IRS’ favor, especially given that two of the IRS victories, but none of the taxpayers,’ were only at the district court level”). Regardless of whether the cases discussed in Part IV, supra, are characterized as a “minority strand” or as a “modern trend,” we find their reasoning and approach persuasive. The dissent suggests that we are usurping the proper role of Congress by seeking to “modify the per se ban on depreciating goodwill,” post, at 582, n. 10. But we are doing nothing of the kind. We simply have determined that, in light of the factual record in this case, the “paid subscribers” asset is depreciable. The dissent’s mistake is to assume that because the “paid subscribers” asset looks and smells like the “expectancy of continued patronage,” it is, ipso facto, nondepreciable. In our view, however, whether or not an asset is depreciable is not a question to be settled by definition. “Goodwill” remains nondepreciable under applicable regulations, and we do not purport to change that fact. In interpreting those regulations, however, we have concluded that because the “paid subscribers” is an asset found to have a limited useful life and an ascertainable value which may be determined with reasonable accuracy, it is depreciable. By definition, therefore, it is not “goodwill.” The dissent spends a substantial amount of time worrying about the sufficiency of petitioner’s evidence. See post, at 576-582. The problem with petitioner’s expert, according to the dissent, is that he predicted only how long a subscriber is likely to subscribe, and this “tells us nothing about how long date-of-sale subscriber habit or inertia will remain a cause of predicted subscriber faithfulness.” Post, at 581. The dissent concludes that “Ledger’s expert on his own terms has not even claimed to make the showing of definite duration necessary to depreciate an asset under § 167(a).” Post, at 582. We have little doubt that had the Government presented credible evidence challenging the relevance of this testimony, the District Court would have had a more difficult time deciding this case. As it happened, however, petitioner’s evidence of the useful life of the “paid subscribers” was the only evidence the District Court had before it. The dissent skillfully demonstrates certain vulnerabilities in petitioner’s proof, but the Government chose, rather, to rest its entire case on a legal argument that we now reject. This case was lost at trial.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. No. 98. Argued January 21, 1965. Decided April 5, 1965. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come and Warren M. Davison. Burton A. Zorn argued the'cause for respondent. With him on the brief were George G. Gallantz, Thomas F. Delaney and Marvin Dicker. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court. On petition of Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, and over the protest of respondent, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, as to the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, the National Labor Relations Board, in a proceeding under § 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (c) (1958 ed.), certified the union as the bargaining representative of all debit insurance agents, including all canvassing regular and office account agents, at respondent’s district office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Respondent deliberately refused to bargain with the union in order to challenge the appropriateness of the employee unit certified by the Board. See Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 146. The union thereupon filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board. The Board, adhering to its prior unit determination, held that respondent violated §§ 8 (a)(1) and (5) of the Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1) and (5) (1958 ed.), and directed respondent to bargain with the union. 142 N. L. R. B. 491. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to enforce the order on the grounds that in light of the “Board’s failure to articulate specific reasons for its unit determination,”' 327 F. 2d 906, 909, the Board’s apparently inconsistent determinations of appropriate units of respondent’s employees in other cities or regions, see 138 N. L. R. B. 565 (Delaware) ; 138 N. L. R. B. 734 (Sioux City); 144 N. L. R. B. 149 (Chicago); 138 N. L. R. B. 512 (Cleveland), its failure to discuss in these cases what weight, if any, it gave to the factor of the extent of union organization, and the fact that in these cases the Board consistently certified the unit requested by the union, the Court of Appeals could “only conclude that the . . . Board . . . has indeed . . . [regarded] the extent of union organization as controlling in violation of §9 (c)(5) of the Act.” 327 F. 2d, at 911. We granted certiorari because of an apparent conflict between this decision and the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board, 328 F. 2d 820, petition for certiorari pending, No. 56 this Term, which sustained the Board’s determination in the Delaware case, 138 N. L. R. B. 565, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board, 330 F. 2d 62, petition for certiorari pending, No. 229 this Term, which sustained the Board’s determination in the Cleveland case, 138 N. L. R. B. 512. See also Labor Board v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 328 F. 2d 891 (C. A. 3d Cir.), petition for certiorari pending, No. 91 this Term. Section '9 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (b) (1958 ed.) provides: “The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . .” This broad delegation of authority, see Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. Labor Board, supra, was limited in 1947 by the enactment of §9 (c)(5) of the Act, 61 Stat. 144, 29 U. S. C. §159 (c)(5) (1958 ed.), which provides that “[i]n determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.” Although it is clear that in passing this amendment Congress intended to overrule Board decisions where the unit determined could only be supported on the basis of the extent of organization, both the language and legislative history of §9 (c)(5) demonstrate that the provision was not intended to prohibit the Board from considering the extent of organization as one factor, though not the controlling factor, in its unit determination. The Court of Appeals here properly recognized this effect of § 9 (c)(5), but held, in light of the unarticulated bases of decision, and what appeared to it to be inconsistent determinations approving units requested by the union, that the only conclusion that it could reach was that the Board has made the extent of organization the controlling factor, in violation of the congressional mandate. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the enforcing court should not overlook or ignore an evasion of the §9(c)(5) command. We further agree that in determining whether or not there has been such an evasion, the results in other recent decisions of the Board are relevant. We cannot, however, agree that the only possible conclusion here is that the Board has violated § 9 (c)(5). Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board (Cleveland), supra; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board (Delaware), supra. On the other hand, due to the Board’s lack of articulated reasons for the decisions in and distinctions among these cases, the Board’s action here cannot be properly reviewed. When the Board so exercises the discretion given to it by Congress, it must “disclose the basis of its order” and “give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 197. See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167-169; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U. S. 81, 93. Although Board counsel in his brief and argument before this Court has rationalized the different unit determinations in the variant factual situations of these cases on criteria other than a controlling effect being given to the extent of organization, the integrity of the administrative process requires that “courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action . . . .” Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, supra, at 168; see Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196. For reviewing courts to substitute counsel’s rationale or their discretion for that of the Board is incompatible with the orderly function of the process of judicial review. Such action would not vindicate, but would deprecate the administrative process for it would “propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.” Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., supra, at 196. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Decision and Direction of Election issued by the Board on October 24, 1962, is unreported. In the Delaware case the Board certified as a unit two of respondent’s three district offices in the State; in the Sioux City case the unit certified was respondent’s single district office in Sioux City, Iowa, together with two detached offices under its administrative control in Fargo, North Dakota, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota, 284 and 120 miles distant, respectively, from Sioux City; in the Chicago case the unit certified was that of all of the district offices within the city limits of Chicago, although some of the city offices had territories extending into the suburbs and some of the suburban offices’ territories extended into the city; in the Cleveland case the certified unit consisted of respondent’s six offices in the city as well as three offices in the suburbs; finally, in the instant case the unit certified was respondent’s single district office in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, out of the eight offices in the State and the 75 offices in respondent’s “New England Territory.” In addition to the instant case and the Sioux City case, the Board has certified single district offices in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 138 N. L. R. B. 538; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Meriden and New London), 147 N. L. R. B. 69; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Holyoke), 147 N. L. R. B. 688; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Chicago Heights), 148 N. L. R. B. No. 145. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Detroit), 146 N. L. R. B. 1577; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Toledo), 146 N. L. R. B. 967; Equitable Life Ins. Co., 138 N. L. R. B. 529. See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 37-38; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 48;. 93 Cong. Rec. 6444, 6860. See National Labor Relations Board, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report 51 (1963), which properly states this statutory test: “Although extent of organization may be a factor evaluated, under section 9 (c) (5) it cannot be given controlling weight.” The Board’s entire basis of decision on this issue in this case was set forth in the following footnote in its unit determination decision: “The Employer has eight district offices and two detached offices in Rhode Island, and has only one district office in Woonsocket. The nearest district office is located 12 miles away in Pawtucket. In the prior proceeding in Case No. 4-RC-4865, based on the same record incorporated by reference herein, we found that each of Employer’s individual district offices was in effect a separate administrative entity through which the Employer conducted its business operations, and therefore was inherently appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 138 NLRB . . , [565], Applying the tests set forth therein, we find that, since there is no recent history of collective bargaining, no union seeking a larger unit, and the district office sought is located in a separate and distinct geographical area, the employees located at the Woonsocket district office constitute an appropriate unit. See also Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, . . . [138] NLRB . . . [734].” The cases cited are the Board’s decisions in the Delaware and Sioux City cases discussed supra. They do not appear, because of their variant factual circumstances, to be direct authority for decision in this case. Moreover, the Board made no attempt to distinguish other cases, particularly the Chicago and Cleveland cases discussed supra, in which it certified different types of units. The unfair labor practice proceeding added nothing to the analysis, as the trial examiner did not review the issue, as he felt “bound by the Board’s ruling in the representation proceeding,” 142 N. L. R. B., at 492, and the Board affirmed the trial examiner’s ruling without discussion, id., at 491. Of course, the Board may articulate the basis of its order by reference to other decisions or its general policies laid down in its rules and its annual reports, reflecting its “cumulative experience,” Labor Board v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U. S. 344, 349, so long as the basis of the Board’s action, in whatever manner the Board chooses to formulate it, meets the criteria for judicial review. Cf. Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 299, 304; Radio & TV Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv., ante, p. 255.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MONTANA et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 79-1128. Argued December 3, 1980 Decided March 24, 1981 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 567. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 569. Urban L. Roth, Special Assistant Attorney General of Montana, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Michael T. Greely, Attorney General, Clayton R. Herron and F. Woodside Wright, Special Assistant Attorneys General, James E. Seykora, and Douglas Y. Freeman. Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Harlon L. Dalton, Robert L. Klarquist, and Steven E. Carroll. Thomas J. Lynaugh argued the cause for respondent Crow Tribe of Indians. With him on the brief was Charles A. Hobbs Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, James M. Schoessler, and Tom D. Tobin for the State of Minnesota et al.; by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and Timothy R. Malone, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert Corbin of Arizona, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, John Ashcroft of Missouri, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, and Robert B. Hansen of Utah; and by Paul A. Lenzini for the International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert D. Dellwo for the Coeur D’Alene Tribe of Indians et al.; and by Barry D. Ernstoff, Steven S. Anderson, Reid Peyton Chambers, Carl V. Ullman, and Arthur Lazarus, Jr., for the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation et al. A brief of amici curiae was filed by officials for their respective States as follows: David H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, and Robie G. Russell, Phillip J. Rassier, Steven V. Goddard, and Leslie L. Goddard, Deputy Attorneys General; Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona; George Deukmejian, Attorney General of California, and R. H. Connett, Assistant Attorney General; Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa; Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas; Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada; Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico; Allen I. Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota; Mark V. Meirhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota; Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah; Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General of West Virginia; and Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the sources and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. Relying on its purported ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River, on the treaties which created its reservation, and on its inherent power as a sovereign, the Crow Tribe of Montana claims the authority to prohibit all hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the Tribe on non-Indian property within reservation boundaries. We granted certiorari, 445 U. S. 960, to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals- for the Ninth Circuit that substantially upheld this claim. The Crow Indians originated in Canada, but some three centuries ago they migrated to what is now southern Montana. In_the 19th century, warfare between the Crows and several other tribes led the tribes and the United States to sign the First Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851, in which the signatory tribes acknowledged various designated lands as their respective territories. See 11 Stat. 749 and 2 C. Kap-pler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 594 (1904) (hereinafter Kappler). The treaty identified approximately 38.5 million acres as Crow territory and, in Article 5, specified that, by making the treaty, the tribes did not “surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over” any of the lands in dispute. In 1868, the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie established a Crow Reservation of roughly 8 million acres, including land through which the Big Horn River flows. 15 Stat. 649. By Article II of the treaty, the United States agreed that the reservation “shall be . . . set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” of the Crow Tribe, and that no non-Indians except agents of the Government “shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in” the reservation. Several subsequent Acts of Congress reduced the reservation to slightly fewer than 2.3 million acres. See 22 Stat. 42 (1882); § 31, 26 Stat. 1039-1040 (1891); ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352 (1904); ch. 890, 50 Stat. 884 (1937). In addition, the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751, authorized the issuance of patents in fee to individual Indian allottees within the reservation. Under these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-Indian after holding it for 25 years. Today, roughly 52 percent of the reservation is allotted to members of the Tribe and held by the United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in trust for the Tribe itself, and approximately 28 percent is held in fee by non-Indians. The State of Montana owns in fee simple 2 percent of the reservation, the United States less than 1 percent. Since the 1920’s, the State of Montana has stocked the waters of the reservation with fish, and the construction of a dam by the United States made trout fishing in the Big Horn River possible. The reservation also contains game, some of it stocked by the State. Since the 1950’s, the Crow Tribal Council has passed several resolutions respecting hunting and fishing on the reservation, including Resolution No. 74-05, the occasion for this lawsuit. That resolution prohibits hunting and fishing within the reservation by anyone who is not a member of the Tribe. The State of Montana, however, has continued to assert its authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians within the reservation. On October 9, 1975, proceeding in its own right and as fiduciary for the Tribe, the United States endeavored to resolve the conflict between the Tribe and the State by filing the present lawsuit. The plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory judgment quieting title to the bed of the Big Horn River in the United States as trustee for the Tribe, (2) a declaratory judgment establishing that the Tribe and the United States have sole authority to regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation, and (3) an injunction requiring Montana to secure the permission of the Tribe before issuing hunting or fishing licenses for use within the reservation. The District Court denied the relief sought. 457 F. Supp. . 599. In determining the ownership of the river, the court invoked the presumption that the United States does not intend to divest itself of its sovereign rights in navigable waters and reasoned that here, as in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, the language and circumstances of the relevant treaties were insufficient to rebut the presumption. The court thus concluded that the bed and banks of the river had remained in the ownership of the United States until they passed to Montana on its admission to the Union. As to the dispute over the regulation of hunting and fishing, the court found that “[iImplicit in the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant [v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191,] is the recognition that Indian tribes do not have the power, nor do they have the authority, to regulate non-Indians unless so granted by an act of Congress.” 457 F. Supp., at 609. Because no treaty or Act of Congress gave the Tribe authority to regulate hunting or fishing by non-Indians, the court held that the Tribe could not exercise such authority except by granting or withholding authority to trespass on tribal or Indian land. All other authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing resided concurrently in the State of Montana and, under 18 U. S. C. § 1165 (which makes it a federal offense to trespass on Indian land to hunt or fish without permission), the United States. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. 604 F. 2d 1162. Relying on its opinion in United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d 822, vacated on other grounds, 433 U. S. 676, the appellate court held that, pursuant to the treaty of 1868, the bed and banks of the river were held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Relying on the treaties of 1851 and 1868, the court held that the Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing within the reservation by nonmembers, although the court noted that the Tribe could not impose criminal sanctions on those nonmembers. The court also held, however, that the two Allotment Acts implicitly deprived the Tribe of the authority to prohibit hunting and fishing on fee lands by resident nonmember owners of those lands. Finally, the court held that nonmembers permitted by the Tribe to hunt or fish within the reservation remained subject to Montana's fish and game laws. II The respondents seek to establish a substantial part of their claim of power to control hunting and fishing on the reservation by asking us to recognize their title to the bed of the Big Horn River. The question is whether the United States conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore continues to hold the land in trust for the use and benefit of the Tribe, or whether the United States retained ownership of the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State of Montana upon its admission to the Union. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, 627-628. Though the owners of land riparian to nonnavigable streams may own the adjacent riverbed, conveyance by the United States of land riparian to a navigable river carries no interest in the riverbed. Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661, 672; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 289; 33 U. S. C. § 10; 43 U. S. C. § 931. Rather, the ownership of land under navigable waters is an incident of sovereignty. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 409-411. As a general principle, the Federal Government holds such lands in trust for future States, to be granted to such States when they enter the Union and assume sovereignty on an “equal footing” with the established States. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 222-223, 229. After a State enters the Union, title to the land is governed by state law. The State’s power over the beds of navigable waters remains subject to only one limitation: the paramount power of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign commerce. United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 14. It is now established, however, that Congress may sometimes convey lands below the high-water mark of a navigable water, “[and so defeat the title of a new State,] in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold the Territory.” Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48. But because control over the property underlying navigable waters is so strongly identified with the sovereign power of government, United States v. Oregon, supra, at 14, it will not be held that the United States has conveyed such land except because of “some international duty or public exigency.” United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S., at 55. See also Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48. A court deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must, therefore, begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the United States, United States v. Oregon, supra, at 14, and must not infer such a conveyance “unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made plain,” United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 55, or was rendered “in clear and especial words,” Martin v. Waddell, supra, at 411, or “unless the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the waters of the stream,” Packer v. Bird, supra, at 672. In United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, this Court applied these principles to reject an Indian Tribe’s claim of title to the bed of a navigable lake. The lake lay wholly within the boundaries of the Red Lake Indian Reservation, which had been created by treaties entered into before Minnesota joined the Union. In these treaties the United States promised to “set apart and withhold from sale, for the use of” the Chippewas, a large tract of land, Treaty of Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109, and to convey “a sufficient quantity of land for the permanent homes” of the Indians, Treaty of Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 389. The Court concluded that there was nothing in the treaties “which even approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying navigable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the established policy ... of treating such lands as held for the benefit of the future State.” United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S., at 58-59. Rather, “[t]he effect of what was done was to reserve in a general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what remained of their aboriginal territory.” Id., at 58. The Crow treaties in this case, like the Chippewa treaties in Holt State Bank, fail to overcome the established presumption that the beds of navigable waters remain in trust for future States and pass to the new States when they assume sovereignty. The 1851 treaty did not by its terms formally convey any land to the Indians at all, but instead chiefly represented a covenant among several tribes which recognized specific boundaries for their respective territories. Treaty of Fort Laramie, 1851, Art. 5, 2 Kappler 594-595. It referred to hunting and fishing only insofar as it said that the Crow Indians “do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore described,” a statement that had no bearing on ownership of the riverbed. By contrast, the 1868 treaty did expressly convey land to the Crow Tribe. Article II of the treaty described the reservation land in detail and stated that such land would be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named . . . .” Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, Art. II, 15 Stat. 650. The treaty then stated: “[T]he United States now solemnly agrees that no persons, except those herein designated and authorized to do so, and except such officers, agents, and employes of the Government as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this article for the use of said Indians . . . Ibid. Whatever property rights the language of the 1868 treaty created, however, its language is not strong enough to overcome the presumption against the sovereign’s conveyance of the riverbed. The treaty in no way expressly referred to the riverbed, Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S., at 672, nor was an intention to convey the riverbed expressed in “clear and especial words,” Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet., at 411, or “definitely declared or otherwise made very plain,” United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S., at 55. Rather, as in Holt, “[t]he effect of what was done was to reserve in a general way for the continued occupation of the Indians what remained of their aboriginal territory.” Id., at 58. Though Article 2 gave the Crow Indians the sole right to use and occupy the reserved land, and, implicitly, the power to exclude others from it, the respondents’ reliance on that provision simply begs the question of the precise extent of the conveyed lands to which this exclusivity attaches. The mere fact that the bed of a navigable water lies within the boundaries described in the treaty does not make the riverbed part of the conveyed land, especially when there is no express reference to the riverbed that might overcome the presumption against its conveyance. In the Court of Appeals’ Finch decision, on which recognition of the Crow Tribe’s title to the riverbed rested in this case, that court construed the language of exclusivity in the 1868 treaty as granting to the Indians all the lands, including the riverbed, within the described boundaries. United States v. Finch, 548 F. 2d, at 829. Such a construction, however, cannot survive examination. As the Court of Appeals recognized, ibid., and as the respondents concede, the United States retains a navigational easement in the navigable waters lying within the described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless of who owns the riverbed. Therefore, such phrases in the 1868 treaty as “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” and “no persons, except those herein designated . . . shall ever be permitted,” whatever they seem to mean literally, do not give the Indians the exclusive right to occupy all the territory within the described boundaries. Thus, even if exclusivity were the same as ownership, the treaty language establishing this “right of exclusivity” could not have the meaning that the Court of Appeals ascribed to it. Moreover, even though the establishment of an Indian reservation can be an “appropriate public purpose” within the meaning of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S., at 48, justifying a congressional conveyance of a riverbed, see, e. g., Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 85, the situation of the Crow Indians at the time of the treaties presented no “public exigency” which would have required Congress to depart from its policy of reserving ownership of beds under navigable waters for the future States. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48. As the record in this case shows, at the time of the treaty the Crows were a nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on buffalo, and fishing was not important to their diet or way of life. 1 App. 74. Cf., Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, supra, at 88; Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F. 2d 205, 212 (CA9). For these reasons, we conclude that title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to the State of Montana upon its admission into the Union, and that the Court of Appeals was in error in holding otherwise. Ill Though the parties in this case have raised broad questions about the power of the Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on the reservation, the regulatory issue before us is a narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, 604 F. 2d, at 1165-1166, and with this holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. Ibid. What remains is the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe. The Court of Appeals held that, with respect to fee-patented lands, the Tribe may regulate, but may not prohibit, hunting and fishing by nonmember resident owners or by those, such as tenants or employees, whose occupancy is authorized by the owners. Id., at 1169. The court further held that the Tribe may totally prohibit hunting and fishing on lands within the reservation owned by non-Indians who do not occupy that land. Ibid. The Court of Appeals found two sources for this tribal regulatory power: the Crow treaties, “augmented” by 18 U. S. C. § 1165, and “inherent” Indian sovereignty. We believe that neither source supports the court’s conclusion. A The purposes of the 1851 treaty were to assure safe passage for settlers across the lands of various Indian Tribes; to compensate the Tribes for the loss of buffalo, other game animals, timber, and forage; to delineate tribal boundaries; to promote intertribal peace; and to establish a way of identifying Indians who committed depredations against non-Indians. As noted earlier, the treaty did not even create a reservation, although it did designate tribal lands. See Crow Tribe v. United States. 151 Ct. Cl. 281, 285-286, 289, 292-293, 284 F. 2d 361, 364, 366, 368. Only Article 5 of that treaty referred to hunting and fishing, and it merely provided that the eight signatory tribes “do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore described.” 2 Kappler 595. The treaty nowhere suggested that Congress intended to grant authority to the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on nonmember lands. Indeed, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that after the treaty was signed non-Indians, as well as members of other Indian tribes, undoubtedly hunted and fished within the treaty-designated territory of the Crows. 604 F. 2d, at 1167. The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 649, reduced the size of the Crow territory designated by the 1851 treaty. Article II of the treaty established a reservation for the Crow Tribe, and provided that it be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named, and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit amongst them . . . ,” (emphasis added) and that “the United States now solemnly agrees that no persons, except those herein designated and authorized so to do . . . shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this article for the use of said Indians . . . .” The treaty, therefore, obligated the United States to prohibit most non-Indians from residing on or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and hunting on those lands. But that authority could only extend to land on which the Tribe exercises “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation.” And it is clear that the quantity of such land was substantially reduced by the allotment and alienation of tribal lands as a result of the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq., and the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 751. If the 1868 treaty created tribal power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot apply to lands held in fee by non-Indians. In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U. S. 165 (Puyallup III), the relevant treaty included language virtually identical to that in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. The Puyallup Reservation was to be “set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out for their exclusive use . . . [and no] white man [was to] be permitted to reside upon the same without permission of the tribe . . . See id., at 174. The Puyallup Tribe argued that those words amounted to a grant of authority to fish free of state interference. But this Court rejected that argument, finding, in part, that it “clashe[d] with the subsequent history of the reservation . . . ,” ibid., notably two Acts of Congress under which the Puyallups alienated, in fee simple, the great majority of the lands in the reservation, including all the land abutting the Puyallup River. Thus, “[n] either the Tribe nor its members continue to hold Puyallup River fishing grounds for their 'exclusive use.’ ” Ibid. Puyallup III indicates, therefore, that treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those lands. Accordingly, the language of the 1868 treaty provides no support for tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing on land owned by non-Indians. The Court of Appeals also held that the federal trespass statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, somehow "augmented” the Tribe’s regulatory powers over non-Indian land. 604 F. 2d, at 1167. If anything, however, that statute suggests the absence of such authority, since Congress deliberately excluded fee-patented lands from the statute’s scope. The statute provides: “Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or group and either are held by the United States in trust or are subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, or upon any lands of the United States that are reserved for Indian use, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the removal of game, peltries, or fish therefrom, shall be fined . . . .” The statute is thus limited to lands owned by Indians, held in trust by the United States for Indians, or reserved for use by Indians. If Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands owned by non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating in § 1165 the definition of “Indian country” in 18 U. S. C. § 1151: “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” Indeed, a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary proposed that this be done. But the Department of the Interior recommended against doing so in a letter dated May 23, 1958. The Department pointed out that a previous congressional Report, H. R. Rep. No. 2593, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), had made clear that the bill contained no implication that it would apply to land other than that held or controlled by Indians or the United States. The Committee on the Judiciary then adopted the present language, which does not reach fee-patented lands within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. B Beyond relying on the Crow treaties and 18 U. S. C. § 1165 as source for the Tribe’s power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation, the Court of Appeals also identified that power as an incident of the inherent sovereignty of the Tribe over the entire Crow Reservation. 604 F. 2d, at 1170. But “inherent sovereignty” is not so broad as to support the application of Resolution No. 74-05 to non-Indian lands. This Court most recently reviewed the principles of inherent sovereignty in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313. In that case, noting that Indian tribes are “unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,” id., at 323, the Court upheld the power of a tribe to punish tribal members who violate tribal criminal laws. But the Court was careful to note that, through their original incorporation into the United States as well as through specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the attributes of sovereignty. Id., at 326. The Court distinguished between those inherent powers retained by the tribes and those divested: “The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe. . . . These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian tribes within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. But the powers of self-government, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are of a different type. They involve only the relations among members of a tribe. Thus, they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe’s dependent status.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Thus, in addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. Id., at 322, n. 18. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 148; Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219-220; United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382; see McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 171. Since regulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a tribe on lands no longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations, the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty did not authorize the Crow Tribe to adopt Resolution No. 74-05. The Court recently applied these general principles in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, rejecting a tribal claim of inherent sovereign authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Stressing that Indian tribes cannot exercise power inconsistent with their diminished status as sovereigns, the Court quoted Justice Johnson’s words in his concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 — the first Indian case to reach this Court — that the Indian tribes have lost any “right of governing every person within their limits except themselves.” 435 U. S., at 209. Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Williams v. Lee, supra, at 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8); see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 152-154. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 386; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U. S. 118, 128-129; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 273. No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And nothing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the District Court did not allege that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe. Furthermore, the District Court made express findings, left unaltered by the Court of Appeals, that the Crow Tribe has traditionally accommodated itself to the State's “near exclusive” regulation of hunting and fishing on fee lands within the reservation. 457 F. Supp., at 609-610. And the District Court found that Montana's statutory and regulatory scheme does not prevent the Crow Tribe from limiting or forbidding non-Indian hunting and fishing on lands still owned by or held in trust for the Tribe or its members. Id., at 609. IV For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings. It is so ordered. According to the respondents, the Crow Tribe’s interest in restricting hunting and fishing on the reservation focuses almost entirely on sports fishing and duck hunting in the waters and on the surface of the Big Horn River. The parties, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals have all assumed that ownership of the riverbed will largely determine the power to control these activities. Moreover, although the complaint in this case sought to quiet title only to the bed of the Big Horn River, we note the concession of the United States that if the bed of the river passed to Montana upon its admission to the Union, the State at the same time acquired ownership of the banks of the river as well. Congress was, of course, aware of this presumption once it was established by this Court. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 588. The Hitchcock decision expressly stated that the Red Lake Reservation was “a reservation within the accepted meaning of the term.” 185 U. S., at 389. “[C]ommeneing where the 107th degree of longitude west of Greenwich crosses the south boundary of Montana Territory; thence north along said 107th meridian to the mid-channel of the Yellowstone River; thence up said mid-channel of the Yellowstone to the point where it crosses the said southern boundary of Montana, being the 45th degree of north latitude; and thence east along said parallel of latitude to the place of beginning . . . .” Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, May 7, 1868, Art. II, 15 Stat. 650. In one recent case, Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620, this Court did construe a reservation grant as including the bed of a navigable water, and the respondents argue that this case resembles Choctaw Nation more than it resembles the established line of cases to which Choctaw Nation is a singular exception. But the finding of a conveyance of the riverbed in Choctaw Nation was based on very peculiar circumstances not present in this case. Those circumstances arose from the unusual history of the treaties there at issue, a history which formed an important basis of the decision. Id., at 622-628. Immediately after the Revolutionary War, the United States had signed treaties of peace and protection with the Cherokee and Choctaw Tribes, reserving them lands in Georgia and Mississippi. In succeeding years, the United States bought large areas of land from the Indians to make room for white settlers who were encroaching on tribal lands, but the Government signed new treaties guaranteeing that the Indians could live in peace on those lands not ceded. The United States soon betrayed that promise. It proposed that the Tribes be relocated in a newly acquired part of the Arkansas Territory, but the new territory was soon overrun by white settlers, and through a series of new cession agreements the Indians were forced to relocate farther and farther west. Ultimately, most of the Tribes’ members refused to leave their eastern lands, doubting the reliability of the Government’s promises of the new western land, but Georgia and Mississippi, anxious for the relocation westward so they could assert jurisdiction over the Indian lands, purported to abolish the Tribes and distribute the tribal lands. The Choctaws and Cherokees finally signed new treaties with the United States aimed at rectifying their past suffering at the hands of the Federal Government and the States. Under the Choctaw treaty, the United States promised to convey new lands west of the Arkansas Territory in fee simple, and also pledged that “no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation . . . and that no part of the land granted to them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State.” Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333-334, quoted in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S., at 625. In 1835, the Cherokees signed a treaty containing similar provisions granting reservation lands in fee simple and promising that the tribal lands would not become part of any State or Territory. Id., at 626. In concluding that the United States had intended to convey the riverbed to the Tribes before the admission of Oklahoma to the Union, the Choctaw Court relied on these circumstances surrounding the treaties and placed special emphasis on the Government’s promise that the reserved lands would never become part of any State. Id., at 634-635. Neither the special historical origins of the Choctaw and Cherokee treaties nor the crucial provisions granting Indian lands in fee simple and promising freedom from state jurisdiction in those treaties have any counterparts in the terms and circumstances of the Crow treaties of 1851 and 1868. The complaint in this case did not allege that non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation lands has impaired this privilege. Article IV of the treaty addressed hunting rights specifically. But that Article referred only to “unoccupied lands of the United States,” viz., lands outside the reservation boundaries, and is accordingly not relevant here. The 1920 Crow Allotment Act was one of the special Allotment Acts Congress passed from time to time pursuant to the policy underlying the General Allotment Act. See S. Rep. No. 219, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1919). The Senate Committee Report on the Crow Allotment bill stated that it “is in accordance with the policy to which Congress gave its adherence many years ago, and which found expression in the [General Allotment Act].” Ibid. The Court of Appeals discussed the effect of the Allotment Acts as follows: “While neither of these Acts, nor any other to which our attention has been called, explicitly qualifies the Tribe’s rights over hunting and fishing, it defies reason to suppose that Congress intended that non-members who reside on fee patent lands could hunt and fish thereon only by consent of the Tribe. So far as the record of this case reveals, no efforts to exclude completely non-members of the Crow Tribe from hunting and fishing within the reservation were being made by the Crow Tribe at the time of enactment of the Allotment Acts.” 604 F. 2d 1162, 1168 (footnote omitted). But nothing in the Allotment Acts supports the view of the Court of Appeals that the Tribe could nevertheless bar hunting and fishing by nonresident fee owners. The policy of the Acts was the eventual assimilation of the Indian population, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 72, and the “gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian titles.” Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, 246. The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs repeatedly emphasized that the allotment policy was designed to eventually eliminate tribal relations. See, e. g., Secretary of the Interior Ann. Rep., vol. 1, pp. 25-28 (1885); Secretary of the Interior Ann. Rep., vol. 1, p. 4 (1886); Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann. Rep., vol. 1, pp. IV-X (1887); Secretary of the Interior Ann. Rep., vol. 1, pp. XXIX-XXXII (1888); Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann. Rep. 3-4 (1889); Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann. Rep. VI, XXXIX (1890); Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann. Rep., vol. 1, pp. 3-9, 26 (1891); Commissioner of Indian Affairs Ann. Rep. 5 (1892) ; Secretary of the Interior Ann. Rep., vol. 1, p. IV (1894). And throughout the congressional debates on the subject of allotment, it was assumed that the “civilization” of the Indian population was to be accomplished, in part, by the dissolution of tribal relations. See, e. g., 11 Cong. Rec. 779 (Sen. Vest), 782 (Sen. Coke), 783-784 (Sen. Saunders), 875 (Sens. Morgan and Hoar), 881 (Sen. Brown), 905 (Sen. Butler), 939 (Sen. Teller), 1003 (Sen. Morgan), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1064, 1065 (Sen. Plumb), 1067 (Sen. Williams) (1881). There is simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon alienated allotted lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority. Indeed, throughout the congressional debates, allotment of Indian land was consistently equated with the dissolution of tribal affairs and jurisdiction. See, e. g., id., at 785 (Sen. Morgan), 875 (Sen. Hoar), 876 (Sen. Morgan), 878 (Sens. Hoar and Coke), 881 (Sen. Brown), 908 (Sen. Call), 939 (Sen. Teller), 1028 (Sen. Hoar), 1067 (Sens. Edmunds and Williams). It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government. And it is hardly likely that Congress could have imagined that the purpose of peaceful assimilation could be advanced if feeholders could be excluded from fishing or hunting on their acquired property. The policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation land was, of course, repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. But what is relevant in this case is the effect of the land alienation occasioned by that policy on Indian treaty rights tied to Indian use and occupation of reservation land. See United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1336 (WD Wis.); United States v. Pollmann, 364 F. Supp. 995 (Mont.). House Report No. 2593 stated that the purpose of the bill that became 18 U. S. C. § 1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian land to hunt, trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe: “Indian propertj'' owners should have the same protection as other property owners, for example, a private hunting club may keep nonmembers off its game lands or it may issue a permit for a fee. One who comes on such lands without permission may be prosecuted under State law but a non-Indian trespasser on an Indian reservation enjoys immunity. “Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and cannot be tried in Indian courts on trespass charges. Further, there are no Federal laws which can be invoked against trespassers.” H. R. Rep. No. 2593, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2. Subsequent Reports in the House and Senate, H. R. Rep. No. 625, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. Rep. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), also refer to “Indian lands” and “Indian property owners” rather than “Indian country.” In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, this Court referred to S. Rep. No. 1686, which stated that “the legislation [18 U. S. C. § 1165] will give to the Indian tribes and to individual Indian owners certain rights that now exist as to others, and fills a gap in the present law for the protection of their property.” 435 U. S., at 206. (Emphasis added.) Before the Court of Appeals decision, several other courts interpreted § 1165 to be confined to lands owned by Indians, or held in trust for their benefit. State v. Baker, 464 F. Supp. 1377 (WD Wis.); United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316 (WD Wis.); United States v. Pollmann, supra; Donahue v. California Justice Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 557, 93 Cal. Rptr. 310. Cf. United States v. Sanford, 547 F. 2d 1085, 1089 (CA9) (holding that § 1165 was designed to prevent encroachments on Indian lands, rejecting the argument that § 1165 makes illegal the unauthorized killing of wildlife on an Indian reservation, and noting that “the application of Montana game laws to the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservations does not interfere with tribal self-government on reservations”). Any argument that Resolution No. 74r-05 is necessary to Crow tribal self-government is refuted by the findings of the District Court that the State of Montana has traditionally exercised “near exclusive” jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on fee lands within the reservation, and that the parties to this case had accommodated themselves to the state regulation. 457 F. Supp. 599, 610. The Court of Appeals left these findings unaltered and indeed implictly reaffirmed them, adding that the record reveals no attempts by the Tribe at the time of the Crow Allotment Act to forbid non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservation lands. 604 F. 2d, at 1168, and n. HA. By denying the Suquamish Tribe criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, the Oliphant case would seriously restrict the ability of a tribe to enforce any purported regulation of non-Indian hunters and fishermen. Moreover, a tribe would not be able to rely for enforcement on the federal criminal trespass statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1165, since that statute does not apply to fee patented lands. See supra, at 561-563, and nn. 10-12. As a corollary, this Court has held that Indian tribes retain rights to river waters necessary to make their reservations livable. Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 599. Similarly, the complaint did not allege that the State has abdicated or abused its responsibility for protecting and managing wildlife, has established its season, bag, or creel limits in such a way as to impair the Crow Indians’ treaty rights to fish or hunt, or has imposed less stringent hunting and fishing regulations within the reservation than in other parts of the State. Cf. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 410-411 (WD Wash.), aff’d, 520 F. 2d 676 (CA9).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTH DAKOTA v. UNITED STATES No. 81-773. Argued November 2, 1982 Decided March 7, 1983 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 321. Robert O. Wefald, Attorney General of North Dakota, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Murray G. Sagsveen, Special Assistant Attorney General, and David E. Engdahl. Barbara E. Etkind argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Edward J. Schawaker, and Robert L. Klarquist. Richard J. Himelfarb filed a brief for the National Wildlife Federation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the federal Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire easements over small wetland areas suitable for migratory waterfowl breeding and nesting grounds. Although the State of North Dakota initially consented to the Secretary’s acquisition of easements over certain wetlands, the State now seeks to withdraw its consent and to impose conditions on any future acquisitions. This has led to the present litigation, for the State’s present posture raises the question whether the Secretary may proceed to acquire easements pursuant to North Dakota’s prior consent. A In 1929, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act (Conservation Act), 45 Stat. 1222, ch. 257, 16 U. S. C. §715 et seq., became law. By § 5 of that Act, 45 Stat. 1223, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to acquire land “for use as inviolate sanctuaries for migratory birds.” Land acquisitions under the Conservation Act are subject to certain conditions: they must be approved in advance by the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, §§2 and 5, 16 U. S. C. §§715a and 715d, and the State in which the land is located must “have consented by law to the acquisition,” § 7, 16 U. S. C. § 715f. In 1934, in order to provide funding for land acquisitions under the Conservation Act, the Migratory Bird Hunting Stamp Act (Stamp Act), 48 Stat. 451, 16 U. S. C. §718 et seq., was enacted. Section 1 of the Stamp Act, 16 U. S. C. §718a, required waterfowl hunters to purchase migratory bird hunting stamps, commonly known as duck stamps. By §4, 16 U. S. C. §718d, the proceeds from the sale of the stamps were to form a special “migratory bird conservation fund” (conservation fund) to be used primarily to pay for “the location, ascertainment, acquisition, administration, maintenance, and development” of bird sanctuaries pursuant to the Conservation Act. To hasten the acquisition of land suitable for waterfowl habitats, Congress amended the Stamp Act in 1958. The price of a duck stamp was increased, and, most important for our present purposes, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to expend money from the conservation fund for a new type of property: “small wetland and pothole areas, interests therein, and rights-of-way to provide access thereto,” the small areas “to be designated as ‘Waterfowl Production Areas.’” Pub. L. 85-585, §3, 72 Stat. 487, 16 U. S. C. §718d(c). Such waterfowl production areas could be “acquired without regard to the limitations and requirements of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.” Ibid. Because these waterfowl production areas did not have to be maintained as sanctuaries, there was no need for them to be purchased outright; the Secretary was authorized to acquire easements prohibiting fee owners from draining their wetlands or otherwise destroying the wetlands’ suitability as breeding grounds. Despite the 1958 amendments, however, the proceeds from duck stamp sales proved insufficient to acquire land at the rate Congress deemed necessary. Accordingly, a new source of income was provided through the Wetlands Act of 1961 (Loan Act), Pub. L. 87-383, 75 Stat. 813. Section 1 of this new Act originally authorized sums for appropriation not to exceed $105 million for a 7-year period. These sums were to be added to the conservation fund in the form of interest-free loans that were to be repaid out of duck stamp proceeds. In addition, § 3 of the Loan Act provided that no land could be acquired with money from the conservation fund unless consent had been obtained from the Governor or an appropriate agency of the State in which the land was located. B The principal waterfowl breeding grounds in the continental United States are located in four States of the northern Great Plains — North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana. North Dakota, in particular, is rich in wetlands suitable for waterfowl breeding, and the Government’s acquisition of North Dakota land has been given high priority. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 95-1518, p. 5 (1978); S. Rep. No. 94-594, p. 3 (1976). For the most part, North Dakota has cooperated with federal efforts to preserve waterfowl habitats. Two years after the Conservation Act went into effect, the State, pursuant to § 7 of that Act, 45 Stat. 1223, 16 U. S. C. § 715f, gave its consent to the “acquisition by the United States ... of such areas of land or water, or of land and water, in the State of North Dakota, as the United States may deem necessary for the establishment of migratory bird reservations.” 1931 N. D. Laws, ch. 207, p. 360. By 1958, the United States had acquired more than 276,000 acres of North Dakota land for use as migratory bird refuges. Hearings on S. 2447 et al. before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 79-81 (1958). When the Loan Act was passed in 1961, the United States, through its Fish and Wildlife Service, promptly sought the necessary gubernatorial consent from Governor Guy of North Dakota. Between 1961 and 1977, Governor Guy and his successor, Governor Link, consented to the acquisition of easements covering approximately 1.5 million acres of wetlands. The consents specified the maximum acreage to be acquired within each county in the State, but did not list particular parcels. By 1977, the Fish and Wildlife Service had obtained easements covering about half of the total wetlands acreage authorized by the consents. In the mid-1970’s cooperation between North Dakota and the United States began to break down. The sources of the dispute are not altogether clear; the State accuses the United States of misleading landowners from whom it purchased easements, and of reneging on some unrelated agreements relating to flood-control projects. See Record 19-20, 40; Brief for Appellant 30-33. In any event, North Dakota enacted legislation in 1977 restricting the United States’ ability to acquire easements over wetlands. 1977 N. D. Laws, ch. 204, p. 461, and ch. 426, p. 923. The 1977 legislation affects the acquisition of wetlands easements in three major ways. First, §2 of ch. 204, codified as N. D. Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.1 (Supp. 1981), as amended by 1979 N. D. Laws, ch. 553, § 11, p. 1412, requires the Governor to submit proposed wetlands acquisitions for approval by the board of county commissioners of the county in which the land is located. The “federal agency involved” — here, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service — must provide the county with a “detailed impact analysis,” and the county, as well, is directed to prepare an impact analysis at federal expense. If the county does not recommend the acquisition, the Governor may not approve it. Next, §3 of ch. 204, codified as §20.1-02-18.2, as amended by 1981 N. D. Laws, ch. 258, p. 654, authorizes the landowner to negotiate the terms and time period of the easement acquired by the United States, to restrict the easement “by legal description to the land, wetland, or water areas being sought,” and to “drain any after-expanded wetland or water area in excess of the legal description.” Finally, §1 of ch. 426, codified as N. D. Cent. Code §47-05-02.1 (1978), restricts all easements to a maximum duration of 99 years. Because these restrictions have cast doubt upon the sufficiency of its title, the United States has acquired no easement over North Dakota wetlands since 1977. In 1979, the United States brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1977 state statutes were hostile to federal law in certain respects and could not be applied; that any easement acquired in violation of the 1977 statutes would nevertheless be valid; and that the legislative-consent provision of the Conservation Act, § 7, 45 Stat. 1223, 16 U. S. C. § 715f, did not apply to the acquisition of waterfowl production areas under the Stamp Act. The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States, App. to Juris. Statement 16a, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 650 F. 2d 911 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction over North Dakota’s appeal. 455 U. S. 987 (1982). II The protection of migratory birds has long been recognized as “a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude.” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 435 (1920). Since the turn of the century, the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior successively have been charged with responsibility for “the preservation, distribution, introduction, and restoration of game birds and other wild birds.” Act of May 25, 1900, 31 Stat. 187, 16 U. S. C. § 701. A series of treaties dating back to 1916 obligates the United States to preserve and protect migratory birds through the regulation of hunting, the establishment of refuges, and the protection of bird habitats. By providing for the acquisition of sanctuaries and waterfowl production areas, the Conservation Act and the Stamp Act play a central role in assuring that our Nation’s migratory birds will continue to flourish. In the absence of federal legislation to the contrary, the United States unquestionably has the power to acquire wetlands for waterfowl production areas, by purchase or condemnation, without state consent. Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 264 (1963); Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371-372 (1876). Here,. however, Congress has conditioned any such acquisition upon the United States’ obtaining the consent of the Governor of the State in which the land is located. North Dakota concedes that its Governors, at various times since 1961, have consented to the acquisition of easements over 1.5 million acres of North Dakota wetlands. The issue before us is whether North Dakota may revoke its consent to the acquisition of further easements in the State, and whether North Dakota by statute may impose conditions and restrictions on the United States’ power to acquire easements. A North Dakota’s central argument is that the gubernatorial consent required by 16 U. S. C. § 715k-5, once given, may be revoked by the State at will. North Dakota reads §715k-5 to require not only that the Governor have consented to the acquisition of land for waterfowl production areas, but also that the Governor (and his successors in office) must continue to consent until the moment the land is actually acquired. Thus, although the United States has acquired easements over only half the acreage authorized by Governors Guy and Link, North Dakota asserts that it can terminate the United States’ power to acquire the remainder. The United States takes the position that § 715k-5 does not permit a State to revoke its consent at will; once consent has been given, “the role assigned to the state by Congress has been exhausted.” Brief for United States 24. As with any case involving statutory interpretation, “we state once again the obvious when we note that, in determining the scope of a statute, one is to look first at its language.” Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., ante, at 110. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lems, 444 U. S. 11, 19 (1979). “Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). The language of §715k-5 is uncomplicated; it provides that money from the conservation fund shall not be used to acquire land “unless the acquisition thereof has been approved” by the Governor or the appropriate state agency. In this case, the acquisition of approximately 1.5 million acres of wetlands clearly “has been approved” by North Dakota’s Governors. Nothing in the statute authorizes the withdrawal of approval previously given. Nor does the legislative history of §715k-5 suggest that Congress intended to permit Governors to revoke their consent. Before 1961, neither legislative nor gubernatorial consent was required prior to the acquisition of wetlands for waterfowl production areas. State legislative consent was a prerequisite to the acquisition of bird sanctuaries, § 715f, but waterfowl production areas were expressly exempted from this requirement, § 718d(c). Nonetheless, the United States followed an informal practice of obtaining agreement from the Governor or appropriate state agency before acquisition. The gubernatorial-consent provision was intended simply to incorporate this practice. 107 Cong. Rec. 17171 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson); id., at 17172 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). There is no indication in the legislative history or elsewhere that under this prior practice a Governor could withdraw consent already given. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must conclude that the consent required by § 715k-5 cannot be revoked at the will of an incumbent Governor. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the very purpose behind the Loan Act of which § 715k-5 is a part. The Loan Act was expressly intended to facilitate the acquisition of wetlands by making available an additional source of funds. The legislative history is replete with references to the need to preserve the Nation’s wetlands by bringing four to five million additional acres under federal control. See Hearings on S. 2187 et al. before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 14-19, 23-24, 28-31, 33-39 (1961); S. Rep. No. 705, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961); H. R. Rep. No. 545, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1961). Obviously, this acquisition could not take place overnight; careful planning over many years was anticipated. See S. Rep. No. 705, supra, at 2. If consent under §715k-5 were revocable, the United States’ ability to engage in such planning would be severely hampered. A detailed federal program involving the estimate of needs, setting of priorities, allocation of funds, and negotiations with landowners could be negated in an instant by a Governor’s decision that the politics of the moment made further federal acquisitions undesirable. Our conclusion in this regard is strengthened by the fact that, at the time of its enactment, the gubernatorial-consent provision was not at all controversial. It was added by the Senate Committee on Commerce without explanation, see S. Rep. No. 705, supra, at 3, and was accepted by the House of Representatives without explanation or discussion, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1184, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1961); 107 Cong. Rec. 21184 (1961). The only discussion of the provision came on the Senate floor, when that body was assured that it did no more than formalize the existing practice of gaining state approval prior to acquiring land. We are unwilling to assume that Congress, while expressing its firm belief in the need to preserve additional wetlands, so casually would have undercut the United States’ ability to plan for their preservation. Clearly, Congress intended the States to play an important role in the planning process. But once plans have been made and the Governor’s approval has been freely given, the role of the State indeed is at an end. It is then up to the United States to choose how best to use its resources in putting its acquisition plans into effect. Although it has been intimated that a Governor’s consent might become revocable if the United States were to delay unreasonably its land acquisitions pursuant to the consent, see Brief for United States 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 35, we need not reach that issue here. In this case, there has been no unreasonable delay. Until North Dakota’s legislation interfered in 1977, the United States had pursued diligently its program of acquiring wetlands easements in North Dakota. The acreage fluctuated somewhat from year to year, but the acquisitions each year were substantial. In 1958, when Congress first authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire waterfowl production areas, it was generally anticipated that the United States’ acquisition program would take a minimum of 20 to 25 years to complete. The acquisition program had been underway for only 16 years in 1977, a time-span well within the limits contemplated by Congress. B We next consider North Dakota’s 1977 legislation, which purports to impose conditions on the United States’ power to acquire further wetlands easements. Because the statutes at issue raise somewhat different concerns, we discuss each in turn. 1. N. D. Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.1 (Supp. 1981). This statute sets out certain conditions that must be met “prior to final approval” of the acquisition of wetlands easements. The only sanction provided in §20.1-02-18.1 for failure to comply with its conditions is that consent for the acquisitions will be refused. North Dakota explains that this represents the State’s decision “to qualify or condition any consent to future acquisitions.” Brief for Appellant 33; see id., at 35. We thus need not consider in this case whether the gubernatorial-consent provision, 16 U. S. C. §715k-5, permits North Dakota to impose these conditions on any consent it chooses to give in the future. At issue here is the status of acquisitions authorized by consents already given. We do not understand the State to argue that §20.1-02-18.1 imposes retroactive conditions on these prior consents. By its terms, the statute has no application to the acquisition of easements for which consent previously has been given, because nothing in the statute purports to limit the United States’ power to acquire land once “final approval” has been obtained. Moreover, any attempt to impose retroactive conditions clearly would be unavailing. We have ruled above that once the requisite gubernatorial consent has been obtained, it may not be revoked. Since 16 U. S. C. § 715k-5 does not permit North Dakota to revoke its consent outright, North Dakota may not revoke its consent based on noncompliance with the conditions set forth in N. D. Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.1 (Supp. 1981). 2. N. D. Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.2 (Supp. 1981). The United States does not challenge those portions of §20.1-02-18.2 that permit a landowner to negotiate the conditions of an easement and restrict the scope of the easement to a particular legal description. The United States does object, however, to that part of § 20.1-02-18.2(2) that permits a landowner to “drain any after-expanded wetland or water area in excess of the legal description in the . . . easement . . . .” The United States’ standard easement agreement contains a clause prohibiting the draining of after-expanded wetlands, see n. 6, supra, and §20.1-02-18.2(2) might be read to void such clauses even when agreed to by the landowner. This Court addressed a similar situation in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580 (1978). In that case, the United States had exercised its authority under the Conservation Act to acquire land in Louisiana for use as a wildlife refuge. Mineral rights were reserved to the prior landowners for a period of 10 years, subject to extensions under certain conditions. A Louisiana statute barred the reversion of the mineral rights to the United States, and thus in effect extended the prior landowners’ mineral rights indefinitely. Applying Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943), this Court concluded that because the United States’ acquisition of land under the Conservation Act “is one arising from and bearing heavily upon a federal regulatory program . . . , the choice-of-law task is a federal task for federal courts.” 412 U. S., at 592. The key factors in Little Lake Misere were that “[w]e deal[t] with the interpretation of a land acquisition agreement (a) explicitly authorized, though not precisely governed, by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act and (b) to which the United States itself [was] a party.” Id., at 594. Although the present case involves acquisitions under the Stamp Act rather than the Conservation Act, the federal interests at stake are the same. Thus, the choice of applicable law presents a federal question. Although state law may be borrowed if appropriate, “specific aberrant or hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards for federal law.” Id., at 596. Because the Louisiana statute at issue in Little Lake Misere was “plainly hostile to the interests of the United States,” id., at 597, the Court refused to apply it. In language equally applicable to the present case, the Court said: “To permit state abrogation of the explicit terms of a federal land acquisition would deal a serious blow to the congressional scheme contemplated by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act and indeed all other federal land acquisition programs. These programs are national in scope. They anticipate acute and active bargaining by officials of the United States charged with making the best possible use of limited federal conservation appropriations. Certainty and finality are indispensable in any land transaction, but they are especially critical when, as here, the federal officials carrying out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit scarce fundsi” Ibid. To the extent that §20.1-02-18.2(2) authorizes landowners to drain after-expanded wetlands contrary to the terms of their easement agreements, we must conclude that it is equally hostile to federal interests and may not be applied to easements acquired under previously given consents. The United States is authorized to incorporate into easement agreements such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior deems necessary for the protection of wildlife, 16 U. S. C. § 715e, and these rules and regulations may include restrictions on land outside the legal description of the easement. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 546 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 525-526 (1897). To respond to the inherently fluctuating nature of wetlands, the Secretary has chosen to negotiate easement agreements imposing restrictions on after-expanded wetlands as well as those described in the easement itself. As long as North Dakota landowners are willing to negotiate such agreements, the agreements may not be abrogated by state law. 3. N. D. Cent. Code §17-05-02.1 (1978). Much the same analysis persuades us that this statute, which limits nonap-purtenant easements to a maximum term of 99 years, may not be applied to wetlands easements acquired by the United States under consents previously given pursuant to the Stamp Act. The United States’ commitment to the protection of migratory birds will not cease after 99 years have passed. This commitment has been incorporated into law for over 80 years and has been expressed in treaties since 1916, and the need to preserve migratory bird habitats is now no less than before. To ensure that essential habitats will remain protected, the United States has adopted the practice of acquiring permanent easements whenever possible. Permanent easements are authorized by the gubernatorial consents given from 1961 to 1977, and the United States apparently has had no difficulty in negotiating permanent easements with North Dakota landowners. The automatic termination of federal wetlands easements after 99 years would make impossible the “[certainty and finality” that we have regarded as “critical when . . . federal officials carrying out the mandate of Congress irrevocably commit scarce funds.” United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S., at 597. We conclude that § 47-05-02.1 is hostile to federal interests and may not be applied. See 412 U. S., at 596; United States v. Albrecht, 496 F. 2d 906, 911 (CA8 1974). HH I — I HH The District Court and the Court of Appeals held that gubernatorial consent was not required prior to federal acquisition of wetlands easements, and that North Dakota’s 1977 legislation could not be applied to any easements acquired under the Stamp Act. We conclude that although gubernatorial consent is required, it has been given here and cannot be revoked. We also conclude that North Dakota’s 1977 legislation cannot restrict the United States’ ability to acquire easements pursuant to consent previously given. To this extent, we affirm the judgment below. It is so ordered. Section 5 was amended by § 5(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Improvements Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-616, 92 Stat. 3113, with minor changes from the language quoted in the text. The sense of that language, however, was not altered. See 16 U. S. C. § 715d (1976 ed., Supp. V). The authorization loan limit was increased to $200 million by §2(a) of the Wetlands Loan Extension Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 189, 16 U. S. C. § 715k-3. Section 3 reads in relevant part: “Provided further, That no land shall be acquired with moneys from the migratory bird conservation fund unless the acquisition thereof has been approved by the Governor of the State or appropriate State agency.” 75 Stat. 813, 16 U. S. C. §715k-5. This proviso is in addition to the Conservation Act’s requirement, in its § 7, that the State “shall have consented by law” to the acquisition of land for inviolate bird sanctuaries. 45 Stat. 1223, 16 U. S. C. § 715f. The latter requires consent by the legislature; the former requires consent by the Governor or the “appropriate State agency.” When the glaciers retreated from the northern Great Plains at the end of the last ice age, they left in their wake thousands of shallow depressions. These depressions, known as prairie potholes, provide excellent breeding grounds for migratory ducks. In United States v. Albrecht, 496 F. 2d 906 (CA8 1974), the Court of Appeals described the characteristics of a prairie pothole region and its advantages for breeding ducks: “Each square mile of such land is dotted by approximately 70 to 80 potholes of three to four feet deep. . . . [On certain types of land] the potholes usually retain water through July or August, and therefore, provide an excellent environment for the production of aquatic invertebrates and aquatic plants, the basic foods for breeding adult ducks and their offspring. Essential to the maintenance of the land as a waterfowl production area is the availability of shallow water in these numerous potholes during the usually drier summer months. On the other hand, too much water, as a lake area with its deeper waters, does not provide the proper habitat for many species of duck to rear their young. Also, for the protection of their young, many species of duck prefer to be isolated in a small pothole, rather than to share a large lake.” Id., at 908-909. See generally Kantrud & Stewart, Use of Natural Basin Wetlands By Breeding Waterfowl in North Dakota, 41 J. Wildlife Management 243 (1977); Prairie Potholes: Draining the Duck Hatchery, National Wildlife (Oct.-Nov. 1981) p. 6. The consents were in written form prepared by the Fish and Wildlife Service. Each covered a separate county, and read substantially as follows: “I,-, Governor of the State of North Dakota, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of October 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 813, hereby grant approval to the acquisition of easements by the United States of America of any lands within the county of-, State of North Dakota, for Waterfowl Production Area purposes not to exceed- — acres of wetlands.” App. 3, 55. Some of the forms were signed by the North Dakota Game and Fish Commissioner as the authorized representative of the Governor. Id., at 4-5, 47. The typical easement agreement contained a legal description of a parcel of land, and imposed restrictions on all wetland areas within the parcel “now existing or subject to recurrence through natural or man-made causes,” including “any enlargements of said wetland areas resulting from normal or abnormal increased water.” The easements prohibit the owner from draining, filling, leveling or burning the wetlands, but permit farming and other activities whenever the wetlands “are dry of natural causes.” Id., at 14-16; see App. to Juris. Statement 6a-7a. North Dakota Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.1, as amended (Supp. 1981), provides: “Federal wildlife area acquisitions — Submission to county commissioners, opportunity for public comment, and impact analysis required. The governor, the game and fish commissioner, or their designees, responsible under federal law for final approval of land, wetland, and water acquisitions by the United States department of the interior, its bureaus or agencies, for waterfowl production areas, wildlife refuges or other wildlife or waterfowl purposes, shall submit the proposed acquisitions to the board of county commissioners of the county or counties in which the land, wetland, and water areas are located for the board’s recommendations. An affirmative recommendation by the board must be obtained prior to final approval of all such proposed acquisitions, whether by transfer of title, lease, easement, or servitude. “The board of county commissioners of the county affected, or a designee or designees of the board, shall, within twenty-one days of receipt of an acquisition proposal, physically inspect the proposed acquisition areas. The board shall give public notice of the date, hour, and place where the public may comment on the proposed acquisitions. The notice shall be published once each week for two successive weeks in the official newspaper of the county or counties in which the land and water areas are located. The notice shall set forth the substance of the proposed action, and shall include a legal description of the proposed acquisitions. The board of county commissioners shall make its recommendations within sixty days after receipt of an acquisition proposal. “A detailed impact analysis from the federal agency involved shall be included with the acquisition proposal for board of county commissioner consideration in making recommendations. Such analysis shall include, but shall not be limited to, the recreational and wildlife impacts. In addition, the county agent of the affected county or counties shall prepare an impact analysis for board of county commissioner consideration which shall include the fiscal, social, and agricultural impacts of the proposed acquisitions. The department of the interior shall reimburse the county or counties for any expenses incurred by the county agent in preparing the analysis. The analyses shall also be forwarded to the state federal aid coordinator office which shall furnish copies to all interested state agencies and political subdivisions, which agencies and political subdivisions shall have thirty days to review the analyses and return their comments to the state federal aid coordinator office. Upon expiration of the thirty-day period, all comments received by the state federal aid coordinator office shall be forwarded to the federal agency involved and to the state official or agency responsible for final acquisition approval. The federal agency may, after consideration of such comments, file a final impact analysis with the governor, the board of county commissioners, and any other state official or agency responsible for final acquisition approval.” North Dakota Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.2, as amended (Supp. 1981), provides: “Negotiation of leases, easements, and servitudes for wildlife production purposes. A landowner may negotiate the terms of a lease, easement, or servitude for land, wetland, or water areas sought to be acquired by the United States department of the interior, its bureaus or agencies, with moneys from the migratory bird conservation fund [16 U. S. C. 718d] for use as waterfowl production areas, wildlife refuges, or for other wildlife purposes. A landowner may: “1. Negotiate the time period of the lease, easement, or servitude being sought. “2. Restrict a lease, easement, or servitude by legal description to the land, wetland, or water areas being sought, and may drain any after- expanded wetland or water area in excess of the legal description in the lease, easement, or servitude. “Failure by the department of the interior, its bureaus or agencies, to agree to and comply with the above provisions shall nullify North Dakota’s consent to the federal Act under section 20.1-02-18.” As originally enacted, §20.1-02-18.2 also provided that any easement would terminate upon death of the landowner or a change in ownership. 1977 N. D. Laws, ch. 204, § 3, p. 463. This provision was repealed by 1981 N. D. Laws, ch. 258, § 1, p. 654. Section 47-05-02.1 provides in relevant part: “Regulations governing easements, servitudes, or nonappurtenant restrictions on the use of real property. — Real property easements, servi-tudes, or any nonappurtenant restrictions on the use of real property, which become binding after July 1,1977, shall be subject to the regulations contained in this section. These regulations shall be deemed a part of any agreement for such interests in real property whether or not printed in a document of agreement. “2. The duration of the easement, servitude, or nonappurtenant restriction on the use of real property shall be specifically set out, and in no case shall the duration of any interest in real property regulated by this section exceed ninety-nine years.” In 1981, while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, North Dakota added a further provision forbidding any new federal acquisition of land for a migratory bird reservation, and suspending the Governor’s authority to consent to any acquisition from the conservation fund. 1981 N. D. Laws, ch. 258, §2, p. 654, codified as N. D. Cent. Code §20.1-02-18.3 (Supp. 1981). The Court of Appeals held that neither legislative nor gubernatorial consent was required prior to the acquisition of waterfowl production areas, and that even if gubernatorial consent were required, it had been given here and could not be revoked. 650 F. 2d, at 916. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the challenged North Dakota statutes were void “[t]o the extent they encumber the federal statutes which provide for the acquisition of waterfowl habitat.” Id., at 918. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, United States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T. S. No. 628 (1916); Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T. S. No. 912 (1936); Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, United States-Japan, [1974] 25 U. S. T. 3331, T. I. A. S. No. 7990 (1972); Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, [1976— 1977] 29 U. S. T. 4647, T. I. A. S. No. 9073 (1976). Habitat protection is specifically mandated by the treaties with the Soviet Union, Art. IV, 29 U. S. T., at 4653-4654, and Japan, Art. VI, 25 U. S. T., at 3335. Despite some confusion on this issue in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, see App. to Juris. Statement 11a; 650 F. 2d, at 916, the parties now agree that gubernatorial consent is required. See Brief for United States 16, and n. 11. Section 4 of the Stamp Act, as amended in 1958, permits the acquisition of waterfowl production areas “without regard to the limitations and requirements of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.” Pub. L. 85-585, § 3, 72 Stat. 487, 16 U. S. C. § 718d(c). The Conservation Act, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222, is codified at 16 U. S. C. §§ 715-715k and 715n-715r. The District Court and the Court of Appeals read the gubernatorial-consent requirement — codified at § 715k-5 — as part of the Conservation Act, and concluded that it did not apply to the acquisition of waterfowl production areas. This reading of the statute, we have concluded, is incorrect. The gubernatorial-consent provision was enacted in 1961 as § 3 of the Loan Act. 75 Stat. 813. It has never been a part of the Conservation Act. Although the codifiers of the United States Code chose to place the gubernatorial-consent provision in the midst of the Conservation Act’s provisions, that choice, “made by a codifier without the approval of Congress . . . should be given no weight.” United States v. Welden, 377 U. S. 95, 99, n. 4 (1964). Because the gubernatorial-consent provision is not one of the “requirements of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act,” 16 U. S. C. § 718d(c), it does apply whenever waterfowl production areas are acquired with duck stamp funds. North Dakota advances two preliminary arguments which we find un--persuasive. The State first asserts that the gubernatorial consents given between 1961 and 1977 are invalid, because they do not specify the particular parcels to be acquired. The language of § 715k-5 does not suggest that parcel-by-parcel consent is nécessary, and the legislative history tells us only that § 715k-5 requires consent “as to the nature of the lands and the acreage involved.” 107 Cong. Rec. 17171 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Magnu-son). The county-by-county consents given by Governors Guy and Link satisfied this standard. They specified both the “nature of the lands . . . involved,” i. e., wetlands, and the maximum acreage to be acquired in each county. North Dakota next argues that the gubernatorial consents, if valid, have already been exhausted by acquisitions prior to 1977. This argument stems from the practice of including within each easement agreement the legal description of the entire parcel on which the wetlands are located, rather than merely the wetlands areas to which the easement restrictions, apply. If the entire parcels are counted toward the acreage permitted by the gubernatorial consents, the United States already has acquired nearly 4.8 million acres, far more than the 1.5 million acres authorized. The United States has conceded as much in its answers to North Dakota’s interrogatories. App. 49 (“The total acreage described in the permanent easements ... is 4,788,300 acres . . .”). As the easement agreements make clear, however, the restrictions apply only to wetlands areas and not to the entire parcels. The consents obtained by the United States authorize it to acquire up to 1.5 million “acres of wetlands.” See n. 5, swpra. The fact that the easement agreements include legal descriptions of much larger parcels does not change the acreage of the wetlands over which easements have been acquired. In the District Court and the Court of Appeals, North Dakota took the position that its prior consents had been revoked. See App. 72. At oral argument, North Dakota informed us that although the present Governor has not formally revoked the consents, he intends to engage in that formality if this Court holds that revocation is authorized. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Cf. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138, 142-143 (1930) (State may not revoke its consent to exercise of jurisdiction by the United States). Although the question of revoeability did not arise during the Senate debates, the Senate’s brief discussion of the gubernatorial-consent provision suggests that consent, once obtained, was expected to remain effective for as long as necessary. Senator Magnuson commented that he could not “conceive of any acreage of wetlands that it is intended to purchase in the next 3 or 4 years that has not already had the joint approval of all the States and everyone else involved.” 107 Cong. Rec. 17172 (1961). Senator Hruska, a member of the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission, confirmed that when the Commission met to approve land acquisitions, “[tjhere has already been processed before that time the area of agreement between the Federal agencies and the State agencies which makes the approval possible.” Ibid. Senators Magnuson and Hruska each envisioned precisely the sequence of events that has occurred here: the United States would develop a general plan for the acquisition of wetlands, the plan would be submitted to the Governor or appropriate state agency for approval, and, if approval was given, the United States would proceed to acquire wetlands pursuant to that approval — over the course of years, if need be. See United States Dept, of the Interior, Annual Report of Lands Under Control of the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1974-1977) (Table 4, Waterfowl Production Areas); United States Dept, of the Interior, Annual Report of Lands Under Control of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife (1961-1973) (Table 4, Waterfowl Production Areas). See; e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 2182, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1958); Hearings on H. R. 12006 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1958) (statement of Rep. Reuss); id., at 26 (testimony of Ross Leffler, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Dept, of the Interior); id., at 37 (statement of Daniel H. Janzen, Director of Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Dept, of the Interior); id., at 47 (statement of Rep. Metcalf); Hearings on S. 2447 et al. before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 85 (1958) (comments of Sen. Magnuson). Justice O’Connor finds this legislative history unpersuasive, primarily because the gubernatorial-consent provision was not added until 1961, three years after initial authorization of the acquisition of land for waterfowl production areas. Post, at 322. But as we have explained supra, at 313, the gubernatorial-consent provision was intended merely to formalize the prior practice of obtaining consent prior to the acquisition of any land under the Stamp Act. Compare United States v. Williams, 302 U. S. 46, 50 (1937) (federal statute, requiring parental consent prior to minor’s enlistment, does not confer right to impose conditions on consent), with, e. g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 146-147 (1937) (Article I, §8, cl. 17, of Constitution, requiring state consent prior to assumption of federal jurisdiction over land, does confer right to impose conditions on consent). Because this case concerns only the acquisition of easements under consents already given, we need not decide whether § 20.1-02-18.2(2) could be applied to easements acquired under consents North Dakota may choose to give in the future. See n. 20, supra. United States v. Burnison, 339 U. S. 87 (1950), on which North Dakota relies, is not to the contrary. In Bumison, the Court held that a State’s traditional power to control the testamentary transfer of property included the power to prohibit testamentary gifts to the United States. The Court stated specifically that its holding did not “affect the right of the United States to acquire property by purchase or eminent domain in the face of a prohibitory statute of the state.” Id., at 93, n. 14; see United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 320 (1877). Although N. D. Cent. Code § 47-05-02.1 (1978) applies to all nonappur-tenant easements, it was apparently enacted in response to dissatisfaction with the United States’ acquisition of permanent easements over wetlands. See Report of the Committee on Agriculture submitted to the North Dakota Legislative Council (Nov. 1976), reprinted at Record 22, 26; App. 39. We need not decide whether future consents could be limited so as to authorize the acquisition of 99-year easements only, or whether §47-05-02.1 could be applied to easements acquired under consents given in the future. See nn. 20 and 21, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MORTON No. 83-916. Argued April 25, 1984 Decided June 19, 1984 Michael W. McConnell argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Leonard Schaitman, Wendy M. Keats, and Mary S. Mitchelson. Kaletah N. Carroll argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Dan M. Kinter filed a brief for Sacramento County, California, et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the United States is liable for sums withheld from the pay of one of its employees because it complied with a direction to withhold those sums contained in a writ of garnishment issued by a court without personal jurisdiction over the employee. On December 27, 1976, respondent, a Colonel in the United States Air Force, was stationed at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. On that date Elmendorf’s Finance Office received by certified mail a writ of garnishment, accompanied by a copy of a judgment against respondent that had been issued by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama in a divorce proceeding. The writ, which was in the regular form used in Alabama, directed the Air Force to withhold $4,100 of respondent’s pay to satisfy sums due under the judgment “for alimony and child support.” The Finance Office promptly notified respondent that it had received the writ. On advice from an Air Force attorney, respondent told the Finance Office that the state court’s order was void because the Alabama court had no jurisdiction over him. Nevertheless, the Finance Officer honored the writ and paid $4,100 to the Clerk of the Alabama court, deducting that amount from respondent’s pay. Subsequently additional writs of garnishment were served on the Air Force with similar results. Respondent apparently never made any attempt to contest the garnishment itself beyond his initial protest to the Elmendorf Finance Office. Eventually, however, he in ef-feet collaterally attacked the garnishment by bringing this action against the United States to recover the amounts that had been withheld from his pay and remitted to the Alabama court. The Government took the position that it had a complete defense since Congress has by statute provided: “Neither the United States, any disbursing officer, nor governmental entity shall be liable with respect to any payment made from moneys due or payable from the United States to any individual pursuant to legal process regular on its face, if such payment is made in accordance with this section and the regulations issued to carry out this section.” 42 U. S. C. §659(f). The trial judge first noted that the Alabama writ was on the regular form used by the Alabama courts. Thus, he did not disagree with the Government’s position that the writ was “regular on its face” within the meaning of the statute. He held, however, that the writ was not “legal process” within the meaning of § 659(f) because the statutory definition of that term requires that it be issued by a “court of competent jurisdiction.” He reasoned that the portion of the divorce decree ordering respondent to make alimony and child support payments had not been issued by a court of competent jurisdiction because the Alabama court did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent. Since respondent was not domiciled in Alabama at the time of the divorce proceedings, and since Alabama did not then have a statute authorizing personal service on nonresidents for child support or alimony and could not assert jurisdiction under either its own law or the Due Process Clause because it lacked sufficient contacts with respondent, the trial judge concluded that the Alabama judgment on which the garnishment orders were based was void for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the trial judge held that respondent was entitled to recover the amounts withheld from his pay from the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, 708 F. 2d 680 (1983). It concluded that when an obligor notifies the Government that the court issuing the garnishment order does not have personal jurisdiction over him, the order does not constitute “legal process regular on its face” within the meaning of the statute. Judge Nies dissented, reasoning that the statute required only that the state court have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the writ of garnishment, and that the notice respondent had provided the disbursing officer did not affect the question whether the Alabama court was a “court of competent jurisdiction.” Because the holding of the Federal Circuit creates a substantial risk of imposing significant liabilities upon the United States as a result of garnishment proceedings, and because the decision below created a conflict in the Circuits, we granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, 465 U. S. 1004 (1984). b-i Ten years ago Congress decided that compensation payable to federal employees, including members of the Armed Services, should be subject to legal process to enforce employees’ obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments. Section 459(a) of the Social Services Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 2357-2358, was enacted as a result. As amended, it currently provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof) to any individual, including members of the armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same same extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were a private person, to legal process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments.” 42 U. S. C. § 659(a). In 1977 Congress amended the statute by specifying a procedure for giving notice to affected employees, directing that the normal federal pay and disbursement cycle should not be modified to comply with garnishment writs, authorizing promulgation of appropriate implementing regulations, and defining terms such as “alimony,” “child support,” and “legal process.” It also added subparagraph (f), the provision at issue in this case. See 91 Stat. 157-162. I — I h — i We assume, as does the Government, that the Alabama court lacked jurisdiction over respondent when it issued its writs of garnishment. Based on that assumption, respondent defends the judgment below by arguing that the Alabama court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction,” and hence its orders could not satisfy the statutory definition of “legal process.” If we were to look at the words “competent jurisdiction” in isolation, we would concede that the statute is ambiguous. The concept of a court of “competent jurisdiction,” though usually used to refer to subject-matter jurisdiction, has also been used on occasion to refer to a court’s jurisdiction over the defendant’s person. We do not, however, construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole. Thus, the words “legal process” must be read in light of the immediately following phrase — “regular on its face.” That phrase makes it clear that the term “legal process” does not require the issuing court to have personal jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to hear a given type of case, whereas personal jurisdiction protects the individual interest that is implicated when a nonresident defendant is haled into a distant and possibly inconvenient forum. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 701-703, and n. 10 (1982). The strength of this interest in a particular case cannot be ascertained from the “face” of the process; it can be determined only by evaluating a specific aggregation of facts, as well as the possible vagaries of the law of the forum, and then determining if the relationship between the defendant— in this case the obligor — and the forum, or possibly the particular controversy, makes it reasonable to expect the defendant to defend the action that has been filed in the forum State. The statutory requirement that the garnishee refer only to the “face” of the process is patently inconsistent with the kind of inquiry that may be required to ascertain whether the issuing court has jurisdiction over the obligor’s person. Nor can the plain language of § 659(f) be escaped simply because the obligor may have provided some information that raises a doubt concerning the issuing court’s jurisdiction over him, as he must do under the Court of Appeals’ holding. In such a case the determination would be based on the information provided by the obligor, rather than, as is required by the statute, “on the face” of the writ of garnishment. The writ is simply a direction to the garnishee; it contains no information shedding light upon the issuing court’s jurisdiction over the obligor. Inquiry into the issuing court’s jurisdiction over the debtor cannot be squared with the plain language of the statute, which requires the recipient of the writ to act on the basis of the “face” of the process. I — I HH HH The legislative history does not contain any specific discussion of the precise question presented by this case. It does, however, show that Congress did not contemplate the kind of inquiry into personal jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals’ holding would require, and it plainly identifies legislative objectives that would be compromised by requiring such an inquiry. In colloquy on the floor of the House during the consideration of the 1974 legislation, two of its principal sponsors made it clear that no more than the face of the writ of garnishment was to be the basis for the garnishment of a federal employee’s salary: “Mr. ST GERMAIN. Essentially, the mother or the wife goes into the State court and gets a judgment, and then proceeds on the judgment, on the execution of same, and proceeds with the garnishment; is that not correct? “Mr. ULLMAN. The gentleman is correct. “Mr. ST GERMAIN. And there are no other conditions precedent? “Mr. ULLMAN. The garnishment is on the basis of the court order or decision. It is on the basis of the court order or by trial by the court in the case of a father or mother failing to live up to his or her obligations. “Mr. ST GERMAIN. That is correct. Or with alimony? “Mr. ULLMAN. That is right, with alimony.” 120 Cong. Rec. 41810 (1974). Of course, it would be impossible to inquire into personal jurisdiction based on nothing more than the court order. No such inquiry could have been intended. The liability of private employers under similar circumstances is also illuminating. The legislative history, as well as the plain language of § 659(a), indicates that Congress intended the Government to receive the same treatment as a private employer with respect to garnishment orders. A construction of the statute that would impose liability on the Government for honoring a writ issued by a court with subject-matter jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the law applicable to private garnishees. It has long been the rule that at least when the obligor receives notice of the garnishment, the garnishee cannot be liable for honoring a writ of garnishment. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 226-227 (1905). For example, after imposing on all employers a duty to honor writs of garnishment, the District of Columbia Code, which Congress itself enacted, see 77 Stat. 555, provides: “Any payments made by an employer-garnishee in conformity with this section shall be a discharge of the liability of the employer to the judgment debtor to the extent of the payment.” D. C. Code § 16-573(c) (1981). The law in Alaska and Alabama is to similar effect, as it is in the great majority of jurisdictions. Thus, to hold the Government liable in this case would be to conclude that Congress intended to adopt a different standard for liability than would be applicable to a private employer. Such a conclusion is foreclosed by the statute and its legislative history. Finally, the underlying purpose of §659 is significant. The statute was enacted to remedy the plight of persons left destitute because they had no speedy and efficacious means of ensuring that their child support and alimony would be paid. Burdening the garnishment process with inquiry into the state court’s jurisdiction over the obligor can only frustrate this fundamental purpose as a consequence of the resulting delay in the process of collection. And “[bjecause delay so often results in loss of substantial rights, the effect frequently will be also to make impossible the ultimate as well as the immediate collection of what is due; and to substitute a right of lifelong litigation for one of certain means of subsistence.” Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 239, n. 4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part). Such a result could not be more at odds with congressional intent. IV As part of the 1977 amendment, Congress authorized the promulgation of “regulations for the implementation of the provisions of section 659,” 42 U. S. C. § 661(a). In the last sentence of § 659(f), Congress indicated that the United States could not be held liable for honoring a wait of garnishment so long as payment is made in accordance with these regulations. Because Congress explicitly delegated authority to construe the statute by regulation, in this case we must give the regulations legislative and hence controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly contrary to the statute. Moreover, implementing regulations which simplify a disbursing officer’s task in deciding whether to honor a writ of garnishment are entitled to special deference, since that was the precise objective of Congress when it delegated authority to issue regulations. The relevant regulations squarely address the question presented by this case. The regulations require that within 15 days of the service of process, the garnishee must give notice of service and a copy of the process to the employee. 5 CFR § 581.302(a) (1984). The regulations further provide that the garnishee entity must honor the process except in specified situations, none of which involves the issuing court’s lack of jurisdiction over the employee. They then state: “If a governmental entity receives legal process which, on its face, appears to conform to the laws of the jurisdiction from which it was issued, the entity shall not be required to ascertain whether the authority which issued the legal process had obtained personal jurisdiction over the obligor.” § 581.305(f). Thus, the regulations definitively resolve the question before us. They cannot possibly be considered “clearly inconsistent” with the statute or “arbitrary,” since the terms “legal process” and “court of competent jurisdiction” are at least ambiguous, and they further congressional intent to facilitate speedy enforcement of garnishment orders and to minimize the burden on the Government. V The plain language of the statute, its legislative history and underlying purposes, as well as the explicit regulations authorized by the statute itself, all indicate that the Government cannot be held liable for honoring a writ of garnishment which is “regular on its face” and has been issued by a court with subject-matter jurisdiction to issue such orders. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The trial court found that after respondent was first notified of the service of the writ, the Air Force attorney he consulted assured him that he could ignore the writ because he was not within the jurisdiction of the state court. Apparently the only remedy respondent has ever sought with respect to the garnishment of his salary is the instant action. The statute provides: “The term ‘legal process’ means any writ, order, summons, or other similar process in the nature of garnishment, which— “(1) is issued by (A) a court of competent jurisdiction within any State, territory, or possession of the United States . . . and “(2) is directed to, and the purpose of which is to compel, a governmental entity, which holds moneys which are otherwise payable to an individual, to make a payment from such moneys to another party in order to satisfy a legal obligation of such individual to provide child support or make alimony payments.” 42 U. S. C. § 662(e). See Calhoun v. United States, 557 F. 2d 401 (CA4), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 966 (1977). Although at least the initial garnishment in this ease occurred prior to the passage of the 1977 amendment, the parties agree that the statute as amended in 1977 applies to this case. This is, however, the only ground on which respondent attacks the enforcement of the writs of garnishment. Thus, no question is raised concerning the sufficiency of the notice and opportunity to contest the garnishment that respondent received prior to the execution of the writs, see generally Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922 (1982); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); and in particular no question is raised as to whether respondent was afforded an adequate opportunity to contest the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ in the jurisdiction where the writ was enforced, see generally Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U. S. 416 (1957); May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 (1953); Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 548-549 (1948); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220 (1946). As far back as Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), we drew a clear distinction between a court’s “competence” and its jurisdiction over the parties: “To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution — that is, by the law of its creation — to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.” Id., at 733. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11, Comment a (1982). See, e. g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U. S. 527, 535 (1980); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 713 (1975); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FPC, 420 U. S. 395, 403 (1975); Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 185 (1971). See, e. g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 775-776 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 292 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 203-204 (1977). The Comptroller General wrote in a similar ease: “The inquiry into whether an order is valid on its face is an examination of the procedural aspects of the legal process involved, not the substantive issues. Whether a process conforms or is regular ‘on its face’ means just that. Facial validity of a writ need not be determined ‘upon the basis of scrutiny by a trained legal mind,’ nor is facial validity to be judged in light of facts outside the writ’s provisions which the person executing the writ may know.” In re Mathews, 61 Comp. Gen. 229, 230-231 (1982). Moreover, the floor debates also indicate that Congress envisioned garnishments based on foreign judgments against nonresident debtors under the statute: “[Mr. WHITE.] As I read the conference report, a paternity suit could be brought in another State, a judgment rendered in that State, and then the judgment brought back into Texas where there is no paternity suit action line and brought into a U. S. Federal court and file a garnishment against social security and veterans’ benefits, is this true? “Mr. PETTIS. I understand that is correct.” 120 Cong. Rec. 41813 (1974). The 1977 amendment of the statute, adding § 659(f), did not alter this state of affairs, since it specifies only those circumstances in which the Government is not liable. In fact, the legislative history of the amendment indicates that it was intended only to clarify the law. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-263, p. 35 (1977); 123 Cong. Ree. 12909 (1977) (remarks of Sens. Curtis and Nunn). Inquiry into personal jurisdiction would actually be inconsistent with the intent of the 1977 amendment of the statute. In a memorandum explaining the amendment, its sponsors indicated that they intended federal agencies to respond to garnishment orders promptly: “The amendment provides specific conditions and procedures to be followed under section 459. It specifies that service of legal process brought for the enforcement of an individual’s obligation to provide child support or alimony is to be accomplished by certified or registered mail, or by personal service, upon the person designated to accept the service for a government entity. The process must be accomplished by sufficient data to permit prompt identification of the individual and the moneys which are involved. These provisions will permit inexpensive and expedited service and will enable the agency to respond in an efficient way.” Id., at 12912. This explanatory material was taken from the Report on a virtually identical bill which had been reported by the Senate Finance Committee during the preceding session of Congress. See S. Rep. No. 94-1350, p. 4 (1976). The 1977 amendment’s language and intent was substantially the same as this earlier version, 123 Cong. Rec. 12909 (1977) (remarks of Sens. Curtis and Nunn). This twice-stated congressional goal of speed and efficiency would be seriously undermined if the Government could not rely on the face of the garnishment order and instead had to inquire into the circumstances relating to the issuing court’s jurisdiction over the obligor. For example, the explanatory material accompanying the 1977 amendment stated: “It should be emphasized that the fact that section [6]59 is applicable to particular moneys does not necessarily mean that those moneys will be subjeet to legal process; it merely means that the question of whether such moneys will be subject to legal process will be determined in accordance with State law in like manner as if the United States were a private person.” Id., at 12914. See also S. Rep. No. 94-1350, p. 9 (1976); S. Rep. No. 93-1356, pp. 53-54 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 40338-40339 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Montoya); id., at 41810 (remarks of Reps. Ullman and Waggonner). See Ala. Code §§6-6-453(a), 6-6-461 (1975); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.40.040 (1983). See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §12-1592 (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. §31-146 (1962); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §706.154(b) (West Supp. 1984); Idaho Code §8-510 (1979); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, §12-812 (1983); Ind. Code § 34-1-11-29 (1982); Iowa Code § 642.18 (1983); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § ll-601(a) (1984); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 246, §43 (West 1959); Mich. Comp. Laws §600.4061(3) (1968); Minn. Stat. §571.54 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-35-37 (1972); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 525.070 (1978); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §512:38 (1983-1984); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2A:17-53 (West Supp. 1984); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 5209 (McKinney 1978); N. D. Cent. Code §32-09.1-15 (Supp. 1983); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2716.21(D) (Supp. 1983); Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, §1233 (1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. §29.195 (1983); S. D. Codified Laws § 21-18-32 (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-7-117 (1980); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, §3081 (1973); Wash. Rev. Code §7.33.200 (1983); W.Va. Code §38-7-25 (1966); Wis. Stat. §812.16(2) (1981-1982); Wyo. Stat. § 1-15-302 (1977). Senator Montoya said: “The modification proposed by the committee provides that money due from the United States to any individual citizen, including service men and women, may be garnished as a result of legal process for payment of alimony and child support. “What this really means is that civil servants and military personnel can be forced to accept full responsibility for care of families — especially dependent children — in the same way that other Americans can. “It is tragic that there are any men or women in the United States who would willingly desert their children, leaving wives and families to struggle alone or to go on our already overburdened welfare rolls. “However, as any member of the judiciary or legal profession can tell you, the truth is that there are always some who try to avoid responsibility and who must be forced to pay debts. “Mr. President, the child support proposal contained in the committee substitute will give us an opportunity to prove to these women and children that justice exists for them, too, in the United States. The proposal is not new. I believe it is time for us to make sure that this small change is made in our law in order to correct what is patently a disgraceful situation. We must give the wives and children of Federal employees and retirees the same legal protections which we have provided for all other American women and children.” 120 Cong. Rec. 40338-40339 (1974). To similar effect, see S. Rep. No. 93-1356, pp. 43-44 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 40323 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Long); id., at 41809 (remarks of Rep. Ullman). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-481, pp. 17-18 (1971). See Sckweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425-426 (1977). See 123 Cong. Rec. 12912-12913 (1977); S. Rep. No. 94-1350, p. 6 (1976). The regulations provide: “The governmental entity shall comply with legal process, except where the process cannot be complied with because: “(1) It does not, on its face, conform to the laws of the jurisdiction from which it was issued; “(2) The legal process would require the withholding of funds not deemed moneys due from, or payable by, the United States as remuneration for employment; “(3) The legal process is not brought to enforce legal obligation(s) for alimony and/or child support; “(4) It does not comply with the mandatory provisions of this part; “(5) An order of a court of competent jurisdiction enjoining or suspending the operation of the legal process has been served on the governmental entity; or “(6) Where notice is received that the obligor has appealed either the legal process or the underlying alimony and/or child support order, payment of moneys subject to the legal process shall be suspended until the governmental entity is ordered by the court, or other authority, to resume payments. However, no suspension action shall be taken where the applicable law of the jurisdiction wherein the appeal is filed requires compliance with the legal process while an appeal is pending. Where the legal process has been issued by a court in the District of Columbia, a motion to quash shall be deemed equivalent to an appeal.” 5 CFR § 581.305(a) (1984). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 811, 26279 (1983). Respondent argues that § 581.305(f) is not entitled to deference because it was not promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management until after this suit was brought. But that fact is of no consequence. Congress authorized the issuance of regulations so that problems arising in the administration of the statute could be addressed. Litigation often brings to light latent ambiguities or unanswered questions that might not otherwise be apparent. Thus, assuming the promulgation of § 581.305(f) was a response to this suit, that demonstrates only that the suit brought to light an additional administrative problem of the type that Congress thought should be addressed by regulation. When OPM responded to this problem by issuing regulations it was doing no more than the task which Congress had assigned it. See generally Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F. 2d 972, 979-985 (CA5 1977), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 944 (1978). See supra, at 828.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARCINIEGA v. FREEMAN, U. S. MARSHAL No. 70-5135. Decided October 26, 1971 Per Curiam. Petitioner’s parole was revoked by the Federal Parole Board because of association with other ex-convicts. In a petition for habeas corpus, petitioner contended that the record did not disclose any evidence in support of this conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sustained the revocation on the sole ground that petitioner worked at a restaurant-nightclub that employed other ex-convicts. 439 F. 2d 776. The Parole Board has wide authority to set conditions, 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (a), and here petitioner was forbidden to “associate” with other ex-convicts. But the Board’s own regulations require “satisfactory evidence” of a parole violation to justify an arrest warrant. 28 CFR § 2.35. We do not believe that the parole condition restricting association was intended to apply to incidental contacts between ex-convicts in the course of work on a legitimate job for a common employer. Nor is such occupational association, standing alone, satisfactory evidence of non-business association violative of the parole restriction. To so assume would be to render a parolee vulnerable to imprisonment whenever his employer, willing to hire .ex-convicts, hires more than one. Absent a clear Parole 'Board directive to this effect, we cannot sustain the judgment of the Court of Appeals that on-the-job contact with fellow employees with police records is sufficient evidence of parole violation. If there is in this record other evidence of forbidden association or evidence of other parole violations, neither the Court of Appeals nor the United States has identified it. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WHEELER et al. v. MONTGOMERY, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE OF CALIFORNIA, et al. No. 14. Argued October 13, 1969 Decided March 23, 1970 Peter E. Sitkin argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Steven J. Antler and Charles Stephen Ralston. Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Richard L. Mayers, Deputy Attorney General, Thomas M. O’Connor, and Raymond D. Williamson, Jr. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and Robert V. Zener filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Thomas L. Fike filed a brief for the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to No. 62, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 254. It is a class action brought by all recipients of old age benefits who are subject to California welfare termination provisions. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review in welfare cases satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause, 296 F. Supp. 138 (1968), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U. S. 970 (1969). This procedure requires notice to the recipient of the proposed discontinuance or suspension at least three days prior to its effective date, together with reasons for the intended action and a statement of what information or action is required to re-establish eligibility, advice that the recipient may meet his caseworker before his benefits are terminated “[t]o discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where possible, resolution,” and assurance that there will be “prompt investigation” of the case and restoration of payments “as soon as there is eligibility” to receive them. The procedure does not, however, afford the recipient an evidentiary hearing at which he may personally appear to offer oral evidence and confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. In Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, decided today, we held that procedural due process requires such an evidentiary pre-termination hearing before welfare payments may be discontinued or suspended. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court must be and is reversed on the authority of Goldberg v. Kelly. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black, for the reasons set forth in his dissenting opinion in No. 62, Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p. 271, dissents and would affirm the judgment below. California State Department of Social Welfare, Public Social Services Manual, Reg. 44-325 (effective April 1, 1968). The pertinent provisions of the regulation state: “.43 . . . The recipient . . . shall be notified,, in writing, immediately upon the initial decision being made to withhold a warrant beyond its usual delivery date . . . and in no case less than three . . . mail delivery days prior to the usual delivery date of the warrant .... The county shall give such notice as it has reason to believe will be effective including, if necessary, a home call by appropriate personnel. . . . Every notification shall include: “.431 A statement setting forth the proposed action and the grounds therefor, together with what information, if any, is needed or action required to reestablish eligibility .... “.432 Assurance that prompt investigation is being made; that the withheld warrant will be delivered as soon as there is eligibility to receive it; and that the evidence or other information which brought about the withholding action will be freely discussed with the recipient . . . if he so desires .... “.434 A statement that the recipient . . . may have the opportunity to meet with his caseworker ... in the county department, at a specified time, or during a given time period which shall not exceed three . . . working days, and the last day of which shall be at least one . . . day prior to the usual delivery date of the warrant, and at a place specifically designated in order to enable the recipient . . . “(a) To learn the nature and extent of the information on which the withholding action is based; “(b) To provide any explanation or information, including, but not limited to that described in the notification . . . ; “(c) To discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where possible, resolution.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ESTATE OF BOSCH. No. 673. Argued March 22, 1967. Decided June 5, 1967. Jack S. Levin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 673 and for the United States in No. 240. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Rogovin, Richard C. Pugh, Meyer Rothwacks, Robert N. Anderson and Thomas Silk, Jr. Curtiss K. Thompson argued the cause for petitioner in No. 240. With him on the briefs was John H. Weir. John W. Burke, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 673. Together with No. 240, Second National Bank of New Haven, Executor v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. These two federal estate tax cases present a common issue for our determination; Whether a federal court or agency in a federal estate tax controversy is conclusively bound by a state trial court adjudication of property rights or characterization of property interests when the United States is not made a party to such proceeding. In No. 673, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F. 2d 1009, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that since the state trial court had “authoritatively determined” the rights of the parties, it was not required to delve into the correctness of that state court decree. In No. 240, Second National Bank of New Haven, Executor v. United States, 351 F. 2d 489, another panel of the same Circuit held that the “decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court . . . under no circumstances can be construed as binding” on a federal court in subsequent litigation involving federal revenue laws. Whether these cases conflict in principle or not, which is disputed here, there does exist a widespread conflict among the circuits over the question and we granted certiorari to resolve it. 385 U. S. 966, 968. We hold that where the federal estate tax liability turns upon the character of a property interest held and transferred by the decedent under state law, federal authorities are not bound by the determination made of such property interest by a state trial court. I. (a) No. 673, Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch. In 1930, decedent, a resident of New York, created a revocable trust which, as amended in 1931, provided that the income from the corpus was to be paid to his wife during her lifetime. The instrument also gave her a general power of appointment, in default of which it provided that half of the corpus was to go to his heirs and the remaining half was to go to those of his wife. In 1951 the wife executed an instrument purporting to release the general power of appointment and convert it into a special power. Upon decedent’s death in 1957, respondent, in paying federal estate taxes, claimed a marital deduction for the value of the widow’s trust. The Commissioner determined, however, that the trust corpus did not qualify for the deduction under § 2056 (b)(5) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and levied a deficiency. Respondent then filed a petition for redetermination in the Tax Court. The ultimate outcome of the controversy hinged on whether the release executed by Mrs. Bosch in 1951 was invalid — as she claimed it to be — in which case she would have enjoyed a general power of appointment at her husband’s death and the trust would therefore qualify for the marital deduction. While the Tax Court proceeding was pending, the respondent filed a petition in the Supreme Court of New York for settlement of the trustee’s account; it also sought a determination as to the validity of the release under state law. The Tax Court, with the Commissioner’s consent, abstained from making its decision pending the outcome of the state court action. The state court found the release to be a nullity; the Tax Court then accepted the state court judgment as being an “authoritative exposition of New York law and adjudication of the property rights involved,” 43 T. C. 120, 124, and permitted the deduction. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that “[t]he issue is . . . not whether the federal court is ‘bound by’ the decision of the state tribunal, but whether or not a state tribunal has authoritatively determined the rights under state law of a party to the federal action.” 363 F. 2d, at 1013. The court concluded that the “New York judgment, rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over parties and subject matter, authoritatively settled the rights of the parties, not only for New York, but also for purposes of the application to those rights of the relevant provisions of federal tax law.” Id., at 1014. It declared that since the state court had held the wife to have a general power of appointment under its law, the corpus of the trust qualified for the marital deduction. We do not agree and reverse. (b) No. 240, Second National Bank of New Haven, Executor v. United States. Petitioner in this case is the executor of the will of one Brewster, a resident of Connecticut who died in September of 1958. The decedent’s will, together with a codicil thereto, was admitted to probate by the Probate Court for the District of Hamden, Connecticut. The will was executed in 1958 and directed the payment “out of my estate my just debts and funeral expenses and any death taxes which may be legally assessed . . . .” It further directed that the '‘provisions of any statute requiring the apportionment or proration of such taxes among the beneficiaries of this will or the transferees of such property, or the ultimate payment of such taxes by them, shall be without effect in the settlement of my estate.” The will also provided for certain bequests and left the residue in trust; one-third of the income from such trust was to be given to decedent’s wife for life, and the other two-thirds for the benefit of his grandchildren that were living at the time of his death. In July of 1958, the decedent executed a codicil to his will, the pertinent part of which gave his wife a general testamentary power of appointment over the corpus of the trust provided for her. This qualified it for the marital deduction as provided by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2056 (b)(5). In the federal estate tax return filed in 1959, the widow’s trust was claimed as part of the marital deduction and that was computed as one-third of the residue of the estate before the payment of federal estate taxes. It was then deducted, along with other deductions not involved here, from the total value of the estate and the estate tax was then computed on the basis of the balance. The Commissioner disallowed the claimed deduction and levied a deficiency which was based on the denial of the widow’s allowance as part of the marital deduction and the reduction of the marital deduction for the widow’s, trust, by requiring that the estate tax be charged to the full estate prior to the deduction of the widow’s trust. After receipt of the deficiency notice, the petitioner filed an application in the state probate court to determine, under state law, the proration of the federal estate taxes paid. Notice of such proceeding was given all interested parties and the District Director of Internal Revenue. The guardian ad litem for the minor grandchildren filed a verified report stating that there was no legal objection to the proration of the federal estate tax as set out in the application of the executor. Neither the adult grandchildren nor the District Director of Internal Revenue filed or appeared in the Probate Court. The court then approved the application, found that the decedent’s will did not negate the application of the state proration statute and ordered that the entire federal tax be prorated and charged against the grandchildren’s trusts. This interpretation allowed the widow a marital deduction of some $3,600,000 clear of all federal estate tax. The Commissioner, however, subsequently concluded that the ruling of the Probate Court was erroneous and not binding on him, and he assessed a deficiency. After payment of the deficiency, petitioner brought this suit in the United States District Court for a refund. On petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, the Government claimed that there was a genuine issue of material fact, i. e., whether the probate proceedings had been adversary in nature. The District Court held that the “decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court . . . under no circumstances can be construed as binding and conclusive upon a federal court in construing and applying the federal revenue laws.” 222 F. Supp. 446, 457. The court went on to hold that under the standard applied by the state courts, there was no “clear and unambiguous direction against proration,” and that therefore the state proration statute applied. Id., at 454. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the decedent’s will “would seem to be clear and unambiguous to the effect that taxes were to come out of his residual estate and that despite any contrary statute the testator specifically wished to avoid any proration.” 35,1 F. 2d, at 491. It agreed with the District Court that, in any event, the judgment of the State Probate Court was not binding on the federal court. II. Petitioner in No. 240 raises the additional point that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding that decedent’s will clearly negated the application of the state proration statute. While we did not limit the grant of certiorari, we affirm without discussion the holding of the Court of Appeals on the point. The issue presents solely a question of state law and “[w]e ordinarily accept the determination of local law by the Court of Appeals . . . and we will not disturb it here.” Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 530, 534 (1949); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U. S. 159, 165 (1956); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U. S. 588, 596 (1959). The Court of Appeals did not pass on the correctness of the resolution of the state law problem involved in Bosch, No. 673, and it is remanded for that purpose. III. The problem of what effect must be given a state trial court decree where the matter decided there is determinative of federal estate tax consequences has long burdened the Bar and the courts. This Court has not addressed itself to the problem for nearly a third of a century. In Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934), this Court, declining to find collusion between the parties on the record as presented there, held that a prior in personam judgment in the state court to which the United States was not made a party, “[o]bviously . . . had not the effect of res judicata, and could not furnish the basis for invocation of the full faith and credit clause At 43. In Freuler’s wake, at least three positions have emerged among the circuits. The first of these holds that “. . . if the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court for its independent decision and is so decided by the court the resulting judgment if binding upon the parties under the state law is conclusive as to their property rights in the federal tax case . . . .” Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218, 225. The opposite view is expressed in Faulkerson’s Estate v. United States, 301 F. 2d 231. This view seems to approach that of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), in that the federal court will consider itself bound by the state court decree only after independent examination of the state law as determined by the highest court of the State. The Government urges that an intermediate position be adopted; it suggests that a state trial court adjudication is binding in such cases only when the judgment is the result of an adversary proceeding in the state court. Pierpont v. C. I. R., 336 F. 2d 277. Also see the dissent of Friendly, J., in Bosch, No. 673. We look at the problem differently. First, the Commissioner was not made a party to either of the state proceedings here and neither had the effect of res judicata, Freuler v. Helvering, supra; nor did the principle of collateral estoppel apply. It can hardly be denied that both state proceedings were brought for the purpose of directly affecting federal estate tax liability. Next, it must be remembered that it was a federal taxing statute that the Congress enacted and upon which we are here passing. Therefore, in construing it, we must look to the legislative history surrounding it. We find that the report of the Senate Finance Committee recommending enactment of the marital deduction used very guarded language in referring to the very question involved here. It said that “proper regard,” not finality, “should be given to interpretations of the will” by state courts and then only when entered by a court “in a bona fide adversary proceeding.” S. Rep. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4. We cannot say that the authors of this directive intended that the decrees of state trial courts were to be conclusive and binding on the computation of the federal estate tax as levied by the Congress. If the Congress had intended state trial court determinations to have that effect on the federal actions, it certainly would have said so — which it did not do. On the contrary, we believe it intended the marital deduction to be strictly construed and applied. Not only did it indicate that only “proper regard” was to be accorded state decrees but it placed specific limitations on the allowance of the deduction as set out in §§ 2056 (b), (c), and (d). These restrictive limitations clearly indicate the great care that Congress exercised in the drawing of the Act and indicate also a definite concern with the elimination of loopholes and escape hatches that might jeopardize the federal revenue. This also is in keeping with the long-established policy of the Congress, as expressed in the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652. There it is provided that in the absence of federal requirements such as the Constitution or Acts of Congress, the “laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” This Court has held that judicial decisions are “laws of the . . . state” within the section. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra; Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949); King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U. S. 153 (1948). Moreover, even in diversity cases this Court has further held that while the decrees of “lower state courts” should be “attributed some weight . . . the decision [is] not controlling . . where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point. King v. Order of Travelers, supra, at 160-161. And in West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223 (1940), this Court further held that “an intermediate appellate state court ... is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” At 237. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling. It follows here then, that when the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling. This is but an application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, where state law as announced by the highest court of the State is to be followed. This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the State’s highest court is the best authority on its own law. If there be no decision by that court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving “proper regard” to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198 (1956). We believe that this would avoid much of the uncertainty that would result from the “non-adversary” approach and at the same time would be fair to the taxpayer and protect the federal revenue as well. The judgment in No. 240 is therefore affirmed while that in No. 673 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Illustrative of the conflict among the circuits are: Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218 (C. A. 3d Cir., 1955); Faulkerson’s Estate v. United States, 301 F. 2d 231 (C. A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 887 (1962); Pierpont v. C. I. R., 336 F. 2d 277 (C. A. 4th Cir., 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 908 (1965). Section. 2056 (b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §2056 (b)(5), provides: “(5) Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.— In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, . . . with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, . . . (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than the surviving spouse— “(A) the interest . . . thereof so passing shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and “(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), be considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse. “This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and in all events.” It may be claimed that Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937), dealt with the problem presently before us but that case involved the question of the effect of a property right determination by a state appellate court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KAHN v. SHEVIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, et al. No. 73-78. Argued February 25-26, 1974 Decided April 24, 1974 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Behnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J:, joined, post, p. 357. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 360. Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the cause for appellant. With her on' the briefs was Melvin L. Wulj. Sydney H. McKenzie III, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause- for appellees. With him on the brief was Robert L. Shevin, Attorney- General pro se. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Since at least 1885, Florida has provided for some form of property tax exemption for widows. The current law granting all widows an annual $500 exemption, Fla. Stat. § 196.202 (Supp. 1974-1975), has been essentially unchanged since 1941. Appellant Kahn is a widower who livés in Florida and applied for the exemption to the Dade County Tax Assessor’s Office. It was denied be-: cause the statute offers no analogous benefit for widowers.-Kahn then sought a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, and that court held the statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the classification “widow” was based upon gender. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, finding the classification valid because it has a “ ‘fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,’ ” that object being the reduction of “the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman.” Kahn appealed here, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 414 U. S. 973. We affirm. There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the .man. Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs. There are, of course, efforts under way to remedy this situation. On the federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits covered employers and labor unions from' discrimination on the basis of sex, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2 (a), (c), as does the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d). But firmly entrenched practices are resistant to such pressures, and, indeed, data compiled by the Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor show that in 1972 a woman working full time had a median income which was only 57.9% of the median for males — a figure actually six points lower than had been achieved in 1955. Other .data point in the same direction. The disparity is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. While the widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded, his spouse’s death, in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly forced into a job market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of her former economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Florida’s differing treatment of widows and widowers “ ‘rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.’ ” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415. This is not a case like Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, where the Government denied its female employees both substantive and procedural benefits granted males “solely . . .■ for administrative convenience.” Id., at 690 (emphasis in original). We deal here with a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately ..heavy burden. We have' long held that “[w]here taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment, produce reasonable systems of taxation.” Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359. A state tax law is not arbitrary although it “discriminate [s] in favor of a certain class ... if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or. difference in state policy,” not in conflict with the Federal Constitution. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 528. This principle has' weathered nearly a century of Supreme Court adjudication, and it applies here as well. The statute before us is well within those limits. Affirmed. Article IX, § 9, of the 1885 Florida Constitution provided that: “There shall be exempt from taxation property to the value of two hundred dollars to every widow that has a family dependent on her for support, and to every person • that has lost, a limb or been disabled in war or by misfortune.” In 1941. Fla. Stat. § 192.06 (7) exempted “[p]roperty to the value of five hundred dollars to every widow That provision has survived a variety of minor changes and renumbering in substantiafiy the same form, including Fla. Stat. § 196.191 (7) (1971) under which appellant-was denied the exemption. Currently Flá. Stat. § 196.202 provides: “Property to the value of five hundred dollars. ($500) of every widow, blind- person, or totally and permanently disabled' person who is a bona fide resident of this state shall be exempt from taxation.” ' Quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71,76. In 1970 while 40% of males in the work, force earned over $10,000, and 70% over $7,000, 45% of women working full time earned less than $5,000, and 73.9% earned less than $7,000. U. S. Bureau of the Census: Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 80. The Women’s Bureau provides the following data: Women’s median Median earnings earnings - as percent Year Women Men of men’s 1972..........................$5,903 $10,202 57.9 ' 1971.................'......... 5,593 9,399 59.5 1970.......................... 5,323 8,966 59.4 1969.......................... 4,977 8,227 60.5 1968 .......................... 4,457 7,664 58.2 1967.......................... 4,150 7,182 57.8 1966.......................... 3,973 6,848 58.0 1965.......................... 3,823 6,375 60.0 Women's median Year Median earnings Women Men earnmgs . as percent of men's 1964. .$3,690 $6,195 59.6 1963. . 3,561 5,978 59.6 1962. . 3,446 5,794 59.5 1961. . 3,351 5,644 59.4 1960. ..3,293 5,417 60.8 1959. . 3,193 5,209 61.3 1958. . 3,102 4,927 63.0 1957. . 3,008 4,713 63.8 1956. . 2,827 4,466 63.3 1955. . 2,719 4,252 63.9 Note. — Data for 1962-72 are not strictly comparable with those for prior years, which are for wage and salary income only and do not include earnings of self-employed persons. Source: Table prepared by Women’s Bureau, Employment Standards Administration, U. S. Department of Labor, from data published by Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce. For example, in 1972 the median income of women with four years of college was $8,736 — exactly $100 more than the median income of men who had never, even completed one year of high school. Of. those employed as managers or administrators, the women’s median income was only 53.2% ef the men’s, and in the professional and technical occupations the figure was 67.5%. Thus the disparity extends even to women occupying jobs usually thought of as well paid. Tables prepared by the Women’s Bureau, Employ.ment Standards Administration, U. S. Department of Labor. It is' still the case, that in the majority of. families where both spouses are present, the woman is'not émployed. A. Ferriss, Indicators of Trends in the Status of American Women 95 (1971). And in Frontiero the plurality opinion also rioted that the statutes there were “not in any sense designed to rectify the' effects of past discrimination against women. On the contrary, these statutes seize upon a group — women—who have historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects of this past discrimination' as a justification for heaping on additional economic disadvantages.” 411 U. S., at 689 n. 22 (citations omitted). See Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 87-88; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U. S. 276; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412. The dissents argue that the Florida Legislature could have drafted the statute differently, so that- its purpose would have been accomplished more precisely. But the issue, of course, is not whether the statute(could have been drafted more wisely, but whether the lines chosen by the Florida Legislature are within constitutional limitations. The dissents would use the Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for reinstating notions of substantive due process that have been repudiated. “We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, [which] are elected to pass laws.” Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730. Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in all instances. Congress has not so far drafted women into the Armed Services, 50 U. S. C. App. § 454. The famous Brandéis Brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, on which the Court specifically relied, id., at 419-420, emphasized that thé special physical structure of women has a bearing on the “conditions under which she should be permitted to toil.” Id., at 420. These instances are pertinent to the problem in the tax field which is presented by this present case. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in speaking for the Court said: “The States, in ,the exercise of their taxing power, as with respect to tne exertion of other powers, are subject to the requirements of. the due oro cess and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that Amendment imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to schemes of taxation. ... In levying such -taxes, the State is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value. To hold otherwise would be to subject- the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable supervision, hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to assure.” Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 159.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF CINCINNATI v. DISCOVERY NETWORK, INC., et al. No. 91-1200. Argued November 9, 1992 Decided March 24, 1993 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Blackmun, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 431. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 438. Mark S. Yurick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Fay D. Dupuis. Marc D. Mezibov argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Martha K. Landesberg. Richard Ruda, Michael G. Dzialo, and Peter Buscemi filed a brief for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Advertising Federation et al. by Richard E. Wiley, Lawrence W. Seer est III, Howard H. Bell, John F. Kamp, David S. Versfelt, Robert J. Levering, and Valerie Schulte; for the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., et al. by Burt Neuborne, Gilbert H. Weil, Randolph Z. Volkell, John F. Kamp, David Versfelt, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and Edward Dunkelberger; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor III and Clint Bolick; for the Learning Resources Network by Bruce R. Stewart; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Charles Fried, Richard Willard, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the City of New York by 0. Peter Sherwood, Leonard Koerner, and Paul T. Rephen; and for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by P. Cameron DeVore, Marshall J. Nelson, John F. Sturm, René Milam, Harold W. Fuson, Jr., David M. Olive, Richard J. Tofel, Barbara W. Wall, and Peter Stone. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Motivated by its interest in the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and sidewalks, the city of Cincinnati has refused to allow respondents to distribute their commercial publications through freestanding newsracks located on public property. The question presented is whether this refusal is consistent with the First Amendment. In agreement with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we hold that it is not. I Respondent Discovery Network, Inc., is engaged in the business of providing adult educational, recreational, and social programs to individuals in the Cincinnati area. It advertises those programs in a free magazine that it publishes nine times a year. Although these magazines consist primarily of promotional material pertaining to Discovery’s courses, they also include some information about current events of general interest. Approximately one-third of these magazines are distributed through the 38 newsracks that the city authorized Discovery to place on public property in 1989. Respondent Harmon Publishing Company, Inc., publishes and distributes a free magazine that advertises real" estate for sale at various locations throughout the United States. The magazine contains listings and photographs of available residential properties in the greater Cincinnati area, and also includes some information about interest rates, market trends, and other real estate matters. In 1989, Harmon received the city’s permission to install 24 newsracks at approved locations. About 15% of its distribution in the Cincinnati area is through those devices. In March 1990, the city’s Director of Public Works notified each of the respondents that its permit to use dispensing devices on public property was revoked, and ordered the newsracks removed within 30 days. Each notice explained that respondent’s publication was a “commercial handbill” within the meaning of §714-1-C of the Municipal Code and therefore §714-23 of the code prohibited its distribution on public property. Respondents were granted administrative hearings and review by the Sidewalk Appeals Committee. Although the Committee did not modify the city’s position, it agreed to allow the dispensing devices to remain in place pending a judicial determination of the constitutionality of its prohibition. Respondents then commenced this litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. After an evidentiary hearing the District Court concluded that “the regulatory scheme advanced by the City of Cincinnati completely prohibiting the distribution of commercial handbills on the public right of way violates the First Amendment. ” The court found that both publications were “commercial speech” entitled to First Amendment protection because they concerned lawful activity and were not misleading. While it recognized that a city “may regulate publication dispensing devices pursuant to its substantial interest in promoting safety and esthetics on or about the public right of way,” the District Court held, relying on Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989), that the city had the burden of establishing “a reasonable ‘fit' between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. (quoting Fox, 492 U. S., at 480). It explained that the “fit” in this case was unreasonable because the number of newsracks dispensing commercial handbills was “minute” compared with the total number (1,500-2,000) on the public right of way, and because they affected public safety in only a minimal way. Moreover, the practices in other communities indicated that the city’s safety and esthetic interests could be adequately protected “by regulating the size, shape, number or placement of such devices.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. On appeal, the city argued that since a number of courts had held that a complete ban on the use of newsracks dispensing traditional newspapers would be unconstitutional, and that the “Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression,” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 563 (1980), its preferential treatment of newspapers over commercial publications was a permissible method of serving its legitimate interest in ensuring safe streets and regulating visual blight. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the lesser status of commercial speech is relevant only when its regulation was designed either to prevent false or misleading advertising, or to alleviate distinctive adverse effects of the specific speech at issue. Because Cincinnati sought to regulate only the “manner” in which respondents’ publications were distributed, as opposed to their content or any harm caused by their content, the court reasoned that respondents’ publications had “high value” for purposes of the Fox “reasonable fit” test. 946 F. 2d 464, 471 (CA6 1991) (italics omitted). Applying that test, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the burden placed on speech “cannot be justified by the paltry gains in safety and beauty achieved by the ordinance.” Ibid. The importance of the Court of Appeals decision, together with the dramatic growth in the use of newsracks throughout the country, prompted our grant of certiorari. 503 U. S. 918 (1992). HH H-1 There is no claim in this case that there is anything unlawful or misleading about the contents of respondents’ publications. Moreover, respondents do not challenge their characterization as “commercial speech.” Nor do respondents question the substantiality of the city’s interest in safety and esthetics. It was, therefore, proper for the District Court and the Court of Appeals to judge the validity of the city’s prohibition under the standards we set forth in Central Hudson and Fox. It was the city’s burden to establish a “reasonable fit” between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests. There is ample support in the record for the conclusion that the city did not “establish the reasonable fit we require.” Fox, 492 U. S., at 480. The ordinance on which it relied was an outdated prohibition against the distribution of any commercial handbills on public property. It was enacted long before any concern about newsracks developed. Its apparent purpose was to prevent the kind of visual blight caused by littering, rather than any harm associated with permanent, freestanding dispensing devices. The fact that the city failed to address its recently developed concern about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it has not “carefully calculated” the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. The benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was considered “minute” by the District Court and “paltry” by the Court of Appeals. We share their evaluation of the “fit” between the city’s goal and its method of achieving it. In seeking reversal, the city argues that it is wrong to focus attention on the relatively small number of newsracks affected by its prohibition, because the city’s central concern is with the overall number of newsracks on its sidewalks, rather than with the unattractive appearance of a handful of dispensing devices. It contends, first, that a categorical prohibition on the use of newsracks to disseminate commercial messages burdens no more speech than is necessary to further its interest in limiting the number of newsracks; and, second, that the prohibition is a valid “time, place, and manner” regulation because it is content neutral and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. We consider these arguments in turn. II The city argues that there is a close fit between its ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills” and its interests in safety and esthetics because every decrease in the number of such dispensing devices necessarily effects an increase in safety and an improvement in the attractiveness of the cityscape. In the city’s view, the prohibition is thus entirely related to its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics. We accept the validity of the city’s proposition, but consider it an insufficient justification for the discrimination against respondents’ use of newsracks that are no more harmful than the permitted newsracks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks on the city’s sidewalks. The major premise supporting the city’s argument is the proposition that commercial speech has only a low value. Based on that premise, the city contends that the fact that assertedly more valuable publications are allowed to use newsracks does not undermine its judgment that its esthetic and safety interests are stronger than the interest in allowing commercial speakers to have similar access to the reading public. We cannot agree. In our view, the city’s argument attaches more importance to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech than our cases warrant and seriously underestimates the value of commercial speech. This very case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category. For respondents’ publications share important characteristics with the publications that the city classifies as “newspapers.” Particularly, they are “commercial handbills” within the meaning of §714-1-C of the city’s code because they contain advertising, a feature that apparently also places ordinary newspapers within the same category. Separate provisions in the code specifically authorize the distribution of “newspapers” on the public right of way, but that term is not defined. Presumably, respondents’ publications do not qualify as newspapers because an examination of their content discloses a higher ratio of advertising to other text, such as news and feature stories, than is found in the exempted publications. Indeed, Cincinnati’s City Manager has determined that publications that qualify as newspapers and therefore can be distributed by newsrack are those that are published daily and/or weekly and “primarily presen[t] coverage of, and commentary on, current events.” App. 230 (emphasis added). The absence of a categorical definition of the difference between “newspapers” and “commercial handbills” in the city’s code is also a characteristic of our opinions considering the constitutionality of regulations of commercial speech. Fifty years ago, we concluded that the distribution of a commercial handbill was unprotected by the First Amendment, even though half of its content consisted of political protest. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). A few years later, over Justice Black’s dissent, we held that the “commercial feature” of door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions was a sufficient reason for denying First Amendment protection to that activity. Breará v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951). Subsequent opinions, however, recognized that important commercial attributes of various forms of communication do not qualify their entitlement to constitutional protection. Thus, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we explained: “We begin with several propositions that already are settled or beyond serious dispute. It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 35-59 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S., at 384; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 266. Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S., at 111 (religious literature), and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429 (1963); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S., at 417; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306-307 (1940). “If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, therefore it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject. No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their advertisement forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a commercial advertisement is noneditorial, and merely reports a fact. Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S., at 822; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940).” Id., at 761-762. We then held that even speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 762. In later opinions we have stated that speech proposing a commercial transaction is entitled to lesser protection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978). We have also suggested that such lesser protection was appropriate for a somewhat larger category of commercial speech — “that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S., at 561. We did not, however, use that definition in either Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 (1983), or in Board of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989). In the Bolger case we held that a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives could not be applied to the appellee’s promotional materials. Most of the appellee’s mailings consisted primarily of price and quantity information, and thus fell “within the core notion of commercial speech — ‘speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”’” Bolger, 463 U. S., at 66 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U. S., at 762, in turn quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 385 (1973)). Relying in part on the appellee’s economic motivation, the Court also answered the “closer question” about the proper label for informational pamphlets that were concededly advertisements referring to a specific product, and concluded that they also were “commercial speech.” 463 U. S., at 66-67. It is noteworthy that in reaching that conclusion we did not simply apply the broader definition of commercial speech advanced in Central Hudson — a definition that obviously would have encompassed the mailings — but rather “examined [them] carefully to ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently suppressed.” 463 U. S., at 66. In Fox, we described the category even more narrowly, by characterizing the proposal of a commercial transaction as “the test for identifying commercial speech.” 492 U. S., at 473-474 (emphasis added). Under the Fox test it is clear that much of the material in ordinary newspapers is commercial speech and, conversely, that the editorial content in respondents’ promotional publications is not what we have described as “core” commercial speech. There is no doubt a “commonsense” basis for distinguishing between the two, but under both the city’s code and our cases the difference is a matter of degree. Nevertheless, for the purpose of deciding this case, we assume that all of the speech barred from Cincinnati’s sidewalks is what we have labeled “core” commercial speech and that no such speech is found in publications that are allowed to use newsracks. We nonetheless agree with the Court of Appeals that Cincinnati’s actions in this case run afoul of the First Amendment. Not only does Cincinnati’s categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city’s admittedly legitimate interests. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 120 (1991) (distinction drawn by Son of Sam law between income derived from criminal’s descriptions of his crime and other sources “has nothing to do with” State’s interest in transferring proceeds of crime from criminals to victims); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980) (State’s interest in residential privacy cannot sustain statute permitting labor picketing, but prohibiting nonlabor picketing when “nothing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy”). The city has asserted an interest in esthetics, but respondent publishers’ newsracks are no greater an eyesore than the newsracks permitted to remain on Cincinnati’s sidewalks. Each newsrack, whether containing “newspapers” or “commercial handbills,” is equally unattractive. While there was some testimony in the District Court that commercial publications are distinct from noncommercial publications in their capacity to proliferate, the evidence of such was exceedingly weak, the Court of Appeals discounted it, 946 F. 2d, at 466-467, and n. 3, and Cincinnati does not reassert that particular argument in this Court. As we have explained, the city’s primary concern, as argued to us, is with the aggregate number of newsracks on its streets. On that score, however, all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at fault. In fact, the newspapers are arguably the greater culprit because of their superior number. Cincinnati has not asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms by regulating the information distributed by respondent publishers’ newsracks, which is, of course, the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech. See, e. g., Bolger, 463 U. S., at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he commercial aspects of a message may provide a justification for regulation that is not present when the communication has no commercial character”); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S., at 456-456 (commercial speech, unlike other varieties of speech, “occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation”). A closer examination of one of the cases we have mentioned, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, demonstrates the fallacy of the city’s argument that a reasonable fit is established by the mere fact that the entire burden imposed on commercial speech by its newsrack policy may in some small way limit the total number of newsracks on Cincinnati’s sidewalks. Here, the city contends that safety concerns and visual blight may be addressed by a prohibition that distinguishes between commercial and noncommercial publications that are equally responsible for those problems. In Bolger, however, in rejecting the Government’s reliance on its interest in protecting the public from “offensive” speech, “[we] specifically declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech.” 463 U. S., at 71-72 (citing Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 701, n. 28 (1977)). Moreover, the fact that the regulation “provide[d] only the most limited incremental support for the interest asserted,” 463 U. S., at 73 — that it achieved only a “marginal degree of protection,” ibid., for that interest — supported our holding that the prohibition was invalid. Finally, in Bolger, as in this case, the burden on commercial speech was imposed by denying the speaker access to one method of distribution— there the United States mails, and here the placement of newsracks on public property — without interfering with alternative means of access to the audience. As then-Justice Rehnquist explained in his separate opinion, that fact did not minimize the significance of the burden: “[T]he Postal Service argues that Youngs can communicate with the public otherwise than through the mail. [This argument falls] wide of the mark. A prohibition on the use of the mails is a significant restriction of First Amendment rights. We have noted that ‘“[t]he United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it on the use of the mails is as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.”’ Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S., at 416, quoting Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 256 U. S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).” Id., at 79-80 (footnote omitted). In a similar vein, even if we assume, arguendo, that the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property, as long as this avenue of communication remains open, these devices continue to play a significant role in the dissemination of protected speech. In the absence of some basis for distinguishing between “newspapers” and “commercial handbills” that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the “low value” of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for. its selective and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills.” Our holding, however, is narrow. As should be clear from the above discussion, we do not reach the question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial newsracks. We simply hold that on this record Cincinnati has failed to make such a showing. Because the distinction Cincinnati has drawn has absolutely no bearing on the interests it has asserted, we have no difficulty concluding, as did the two courts below, that the city has not established the “fit” between its goals and its chosen means that is required by our opinion in Fox. It remains to consider the city’s argument that its prohibition is a permissible time, place, and manner regulation. IV The Court has held that government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified “‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984). Thus, a prohibition against the use of sound trucks emitting “loud and raucous” noise in residential neighborhoods is permissible if it applies equally to music, political speech, and advertising. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). The city contends that its regulation of newsracks qualifies as such a restriction because the interests in safety and esthetics that it serves are entirely unrelated to the content of respondents’ publications. Thus, the argument goes, the justification for the regulation is content neutral. The argument is unpersuasive because the very basis for the regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech. True, there is no evidence that the city has acted with animus toward the ideas contained within respondents’ publications, but just last Term we expressly rejected the argument that “discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas.” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 602 U. S., at 117. Regardless of the mens rea of the city, it has enacted a sweeping ban on the use of news-racks that distribute “commercial handbills,” but not “newspapers.” Under the city’s newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is “content based.” Nor are we persuaded that our statements that the test for whether a regulation is content based turns on the “justification” for the regulation, see, e. g., Ward, 491 U. S., at 791; Clark, 468 U. S., at 293, compel a different conclusion. We agree with the city that its desire to limit the total number of newsracks is “justified” by its interests in safety and esthetics. The city has not, however, limited the number of newsracks; it has limited (to zero) the number of newsracks distributing commercial publications. As we have explained, there is no justification for that particular regulation other than the city’s naked assertion that commercial speech has “low value.” It is the absence of a neutral justification for its selective ban on newsracks that prevents the city from defending its newsrack policy as content neutral. By the same reasoning, the city’s heavy reliance on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986), is misplaced. In Renton, a city ordinance imposed particular zoning regulations on movie theaters showing adult films. The Court recognized that the ordinance did not fall neatly into the “content-based” or “content-neutral” category in that “the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.” Id., at 47. We upheld the regulation, however, largely because it was justified not by an interest in suppressing adult films, but by the city’s concern for the “secondary effects” of such theaters on the surrounding neighborhoods. Id., at 47-49. In contrast to the speech at issue in Renton, there are no secondary effects attributable to respondent publishers’ newsracks that distinguish them from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on its sidewalks. In sum, the city’s newsrack policy is neither content neutral nor, as demonstrated in Part III, swpra, “narrowly tailored.” Thus, regardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, it cannot be justified as a legitimate time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech. Cincinnati has enacted a sweeping ban that bars from its sidewalks a whole class of constitutionally protected speech. As did the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we conclude that Cincinnati has failed to justify that policy. The regulation is not a permissible regulation of commercial speech, for on this record it is clear that the interests that Cincinnati has asserted are unrelated to any distinction between “commercial handbills” and “newspapers.” Moreover, because the ban is predicated on the content of the publications distributed by the subject newsracks, it is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech. For these reasons, Cincinnati’s categorical ban on the distribution, via newsrack, of “commercial handbills” cannot be squared with the dictates of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The First Amendment provides, in part: “Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been construed to make this prohibition applicable to state action. See, e. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938). That section provides: “ ‘Commercial Handbill’ shall mean any printed or written matter, dodger, circular, leaflet, pamphlet, paper, booklet or any other printed or otherwise reproduced original or copies of any matter of literature: “(a) Which advertises for sale any merchandise, product, commodity or thing; or “(b) Which directs attention to any business or mercantile or commercial establishment, or other activity, for the purpose of directly promoting the interest thereof by sales; or “(c) Which directs attention to or advertises any meeting, theatrical performance, exhibition or event of any kind for which an admission fee is charged for the purpose of private gain or profit.” Cincinnati Municipal Code § 714-1-C (1992). That section provides: “No person shall throw or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill in or upon any sidewalk, street or other public place within the city. Nor shall any person hand out or distribute or sell any commercial handbill in any public place. Provided, however, that it shall not be unlawful on any sidewalk, street or other public place within the city for any person to hand out or distribute, without charge to. the receiver thereof, any non-commercial handbill to any person willing to accept it, except within or around the city hall building.” § 714-23. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a. Id., at 23a. “Such regulation,” the District Court noted, “allows [a] city to control the visual effect of the devices and to keep them from interfering with public safety without completely prohibiting the speech in question.” Id., at 24a. See Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F. 2d 1189, 1196-1197 (CA11 1991), and cases cited therein. In the words of the Court of Appeals: “This ‘lesser protection’ afforded commercial speech is crucial to Cincinnati’s argument on appeal. Cincinnati argues that placing the entire burden of achieving its goal of safer streets and a more harmonious landscape on commercial speech is justified by this lesser protection.” 946 F. 2d 464, 469 (CA6 1991). See also id., at 471 (“The [city’s] defense of that ordinance rests solely on the low value allegedly accorded to commercial speech in general”). The Court of Appeals also noted that the general ban on the distribution of handbills had been on the books long before the newsrack problem arose. Id., at 473. We are advised that almost half of the single copy sales of newspapers are now distributed through newsracks. See Brief for American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. as Amici Curiae 2. While the Court of Appeals ultimately applied the standards set forth in Central Hudson and Fox, its analysis at least suggested that those standards might not apply to the type of regulation at issue in this case. For if commercial speech is entitled to “lesser protection” only when the regulation is aimed at either the content of the speech or the particular adverse effects stemming from that content, it would seem to follow that a regulation that is not so directed should be evaluated under the standards applicable to regulations on fully protected speech, not the more lenient standards by which we judge regulations on commercial speech. Because we conclude that Cincinnati’s ban on commercial newsracks cannot withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson and Fox, we need not decide whether that policy should be subjected to more exacting review. As we stated in Fox: “[Wjhile we have insisted that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing . . . the harmless from the harmful, we have not gone so far as to impose upon them the burden of demonstrating that the distinguishment is 100% complete, or that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end. What our decisions require is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends — a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served; that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental deci-sionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed.... “Here we require the government goal to be substantial, and the cost to be carefully calculated. Moreover, since the State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, it must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require.” 492 U. S., at 480 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We reject the city’s argument that the lower courts’ and our consideration of alternative, less drastic measures by which the city could effectuate its interests in safety and esthetics somehow violates Fox’s holding that regulations on commercial speech are not subject to “least-restrictive-means” analysis. To repeat, see n. 12, swpra, while we have rejected the “least-restrictive-means” test for judging restrictions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational-basis review. A regulation need not be “absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end,” Fox, 492 U. S., at 480, but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the “fit” between ends and means is reasonable. See n. 2, supra. Cincinnati Municipal Code § 862-1 (1992) provides: “Permission is hereby granted to any person or persons lawfully authorized to engage in the business of selling newspapers to occupy space on the sidewalks of city streets for selling newspapers, either in the morning or afternoon, where permission has been obtained from the owner or tenant of the adjoining building.” Some ordinary newspapers try to maintain a ratio of 70% advertising to 30% editorial content. See generally C. Fink, Strategic Newspaper Management 43 (1988). Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), summarized the reasons for extending First Amendment protection to “core” commercial speech: “The listener’s interest [in commercial speech] is substantial: the consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975). And commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U. S. 568, 603-604 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.” Id., at 364. Of course, we were not the first to recognize the value of commercial speech: “ ‘[Advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge and enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enumerated among the many methods of awakening and maintaining the popular attention, with which more modern times, beyond all preceding example, abound.”’ D. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience 328, 415 (1958), quoting I. Thomas, History of Printing in America with a Biography of Printers, and an Account of Newspapers (2d ed. 1810). When the Court first advanced the broader definition of commercial speech, a similar concern had been expressed. See Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). We note that because Cincinnati’s regulatory scheme depends on a governmental determination as to whether a particular publication is a “commercial handbill” or a “newspaper,” it raises some of the same concerns as the newsrack ordinance struck down in Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750 (1988). The ordinance at issue in Lakewood vested in the mayor authority to grant or deny a newspaper’s application for a newsrack permit, but contained no explicit limit on the scope of the mayor’s discretion. The Court struck down the ordinance, reasoning that a licensing scheme that vests such unbridled discretion in a government official may result in either content or viewpoint censorship. Id., at 757, 769-770. Similarly, because the distinction between a “newspaper” and a “commercial handbill” is by no means clear — as noted above, the city deems a “newspaper” as a publication “primarily presenting coverage of, and commentary on, current events,” App. 230 (emphasis added) — the responsibility for distinguishing between the two carries with it the potential for invidious discrimination of disfavored subjects. See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 536-537 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (ordinance which permits governmental unit to determine, in the first instance, whether speech is commercial or noncommercial “entailfs] a substantial exercise of discretion by a city’s official” and therefore “presents a real danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating commercial speech”). Cf. Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 230 (1987) (“In order to determine whether a magazine is subject to sales tax, Arkansas’ enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed .... Such official scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 (1981), upon which the city heavily relies, is not to the contrary. In that case, a plurality of the Court found as a permissible restriction on commercial speech a city ordinance that, for the most part, banned outdoor “offsite” advertising billboards, but permitted “onsite” advertising signs identifying the owner of the premises and the goods sold or manufactured on the site. Id., at 494, 503. Unlike this case, which involves discrimination between commercial and noncommercial speech, the “offsite-onsite” distinction involved disparate treatment of two types of commercial speech. Only the onsite signs served both the commercial and public interest in guiding potential visitors to their intended destinations; moreover, the plurality concluded that a “city may believe that offsite advertising, with its periodically changing content, presents a more acute problem than does onsite advertising,” id., at 511-512. Neither of these bases has any application to the disparate treatment of newsracks in this case. The Chief Justice is correct that seven Justices in the Metromedia case were of the view that San Diego could completely ban offsite commercial billboards for reasons unrelated to the content of those billboards. Post, at 444. Those seven Justices did not say, however, that San Diego could distinguish between commercial and noncommercial offsite billboards that cause the same esthetic and safety concerns. That question was not presented in Metromedia, for the regulation at issue in that case did not draw a distinction between commercial and noncommercial offsite billboards; with a few exceptions, it essentially banned all offsite billboards. Moreover, the principal reason for drawing a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech has little, if any, application to a regulation of their distribution practices. As we explained in Bolger: “Advertisers should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from government regulation simply by including references to public issues.” 463 U. S., at 68. The interest in preventing commercial harms justifies more intensive regulation of commercial speech than noncommercial speech even when they are intermingled in the same publications. On the other hand, the interest in protecting the free flow of information and ideas is still present when such expression is found in a commercial context.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARTIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION et al. No. 89-1541. Argued November 27, 1990 Decided March 20, 1991 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Clifford, M. Sloan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Allen H. Feldman, and Mark S. Flynn. John D. Faught argued the cause for respondent CF&I Steel Corp. With him on the brief were Randy L. Segó and Michael W. Coriden. George H. Cohen, Jeremiah A. Collins, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for nominal respondent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission by Robert C. Gombar, Glen D. Nager, and Earl R. Oilman, Jr.; for the American Iron and Steel Institute by Albert J. Beveridge III and Barton C. Green; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Stephen A. Bokat and Robin S. Conrad; and for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by W. Scott Railton, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and William H. Crabtree. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we consider the question to whom should a reviewing court defer when the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission furnish reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the Secretary under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §651 et seq. The Court of Appeals concluded that it should defer to the Commission’s interpretation under such circumstances. We reverse. I — I <J The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act or Act) establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed “to assure so far as possible . . . safe and healthful working conditions” for “every working man and woman in the Nation.” 29 U. S. C. § 651(b). See generally Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442, 444-445 (1977). To achieve this objective, the Act assigns distinct regulatory tasks to two different administrative actors: the Secretary of Labor (Secretary); and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission), a three-member board appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U. S. C. §§ 651(b)(3), 661. The Act charges the Secretary with responsibility for setting and enforcing workplace health and safety standards. See Cuyahoga Valley R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 474 U. S. 3, 6-7 (1985) (per curiam). The Secretary establishes these standards through the exercise of rulemaking powers. See 29 U. S. C. § 665. If the Secretary (or the Secretary’s designate) determines upon investigation that an employer is failing to comply with such a standard, the Secretary is authorized to issue a citation and to assess the employer a monetary penalty. §§658-659, 666. The Commission is assigned to “carr[y] out adjudicatory functions” under the Act. § 651(b)(3). If an employer wishes to contest a citation, the Commission must afford the employer an evidentiary hearing and “thereafter issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary’s citation or proposed penalty.” § 659(c). Initial decisions are made by an administrative law judge (ALJ), whose ruling becomes the order of the Commission unless the Commission grants discretionary review. §661(j). Both the employer and the Secretary have the right to seek review of an adverse Commission order in the court of appeals, which must treat as “conclusive” Commission findings of fact that are “supported by substantial evidence.” §660(a)-(b). B This case arises from the Secretary’s effort to enforce compliance with OSH Act standards relating to coke-oven emissions. Promulgated pursuant to the Secretary’s rulemaking powers, these standards establish maximum permissible emissions levels and require the use of employee respirators in certain circumstances. See 29 CFR §1910.1029 (1990). An investigation by one of the Secretary’s compliance officers revealed that respondent CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) had equipped 28 of its employees with respirators that failed an “atmospheric test” designed to determine whether a respirator provides a sufficiently tight fit to protect its wearer from carcinogenic emissions. As a result of being equipped with these loose-fitting respirators, some employees were exposed to coke-oven emissions exceeding the regulatory limit. Based on these findings, the compliance officer issued a citation to CF&I and assessed it a $10,000 penalty for violating 29 CFR § 1910.1029(g)(3) (1990), which requires an employer to “institute a respiratory protection program in accordance with § 1910.134.” CF&I contested the citation. The ALJ sided with the Secretary, but the full Commission subsequently granted review and vacated the citation. See CF&I, 12 OSHC 2067 (1986). In the Commission’s view, the “respiratory protection program” referred to in § 1910.1029(g)(3) expressly requires only that an employer train employees in the proper use of respirators; the obligation to assure proper fit of an individual employee’s respirator, the Commission noted, was expressly stated in another regulation, namely, § 1910.1029(g)(4)(i). See 12 OSHC, at 2077-2078. Reasoning, inter alia, that the Secretary’s interpretation of §.1910.1029(g)(3) would render §1910.1029 (g)(4) superfluous, the Commission concluded that the facts alleged in the citation and found by the ALJ did not establish a violation of § 1910.1029(g)(3). See 12 OSHC, at 2078-2079. Because § 1910.1029(g)(3) was the only asserted basis for liability, the Commission vacated the citation. See id., at 2079. The Secretary petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the Commission’s order. See Dole v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 891 F. 2d 1495 (1989). The court concluded that the relevant regulations were ambiguous as to the employer’s obligation to assure proper fit of an employee’s respirator. The court thus framed the issue before it as whose reasonable interpretation of the regulations, the Secretary’s or the Commission’s, merited the court’s deference. See id., at 1497. The court held that the Commission’s interpretation was entitled to deference under such circumstances, reasoning that Congress had intended to delegate to the Commission “the normal complement of adjudicative • powers possessed by traditional administrative agencies” and that “[s]uch an adjudicative function necessarily encompasses the power to ‘declare’ the law.” Id., at 1498. Although the court determined that it would “certainly [be] possible to reach an alternate interpretation of the ambiguous regulatory language,” the court nonetheless concluded that the Commission’s interpretation was a reasonable one. Id., at 1500. The court therefore deferred to the Commission’s interpretation without assessing the reasonableness of the Secretary’s competing view. See ibid. The Secretary thereafter petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition in order to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on the question whether a reviewing court should defer to the Secretary or to the Commission when these actors furnish reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous regulation under the OSH Act. 497 U. S. 1002 (1990). I — I l — l It is well established “that an agency s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U. S. 926, 989 (1986); accord, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965). In situations in which “the meaning of [regulatory] language is not free from doubt,” the reviewing court should give effect to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is “reasonable,” Ehlert v. United States, 402 U. S. 99, 105 (1971), that is, so long as the interpretation “sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations,” Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc., 423 U. S. 12, 15 (1975). Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 566, 568 (1980). The question before us in this case is to which administrative actor — the Secretary or the Commission — did Congress delegate this “interpretive” lawmaking power under the OSH Act. To put this question in perspective, it is necessary to take account of the unusual regulatory structure established by the Act. Under most regulatory schemes, rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers are combined in a single administrative authority. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §41 et seq. (Federal Trade Commission); 15 U. S. C. §§77s-77u (Securities and Exchange Commission); 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (Federal Communications Commission). Under the OSH Act, however, Congress separated enforcement and rulemaking powers from adjudicative powers, assigning these respective functions to two different administrative authorities. The purpose of this “split enforcement” structure was to achieve a greater separation of functions than exists within the traditional “unitary” agency, which under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally must divide enforcement and adjudication between separate personnel, see 5 U. S. C. § 554(d). See generally Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315, 317-319 (1987). This is not the first time that we have been called upon to resolve an OSH Act “jurisdictional” dispute between the Secretary and the Commission. See Cuyahoga Valley R. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 474 U. S., at 3. At issue in Cuyahoga Valley was whether the Commission could conduct an administrative adjudication notwithstanding the Secretary’s motion to vacate the citation. We held that the Commission had no such power. We noted that “enforcement of the Act is the sole responsibility of the Secretary” and concluded that “[a] necessary adjunct of that power is the authority to withdraw a citation and enter into settlement discussions with the employer.” Id., at 6-7. The Commission’s role as “neutral arbiter,” we explained, “plainly does not extend to overturning the Secretary’s decision not to issue or to withdraw a citation.” Id., at 7. Although the Act does not expressly address the issue, we now infer from the structure and history of the statute, see id., at 6-7, that the power to render authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations is a “necessary adjunct” of the Secretary’s powers to promulgate and to enforce national health and safety standards. The Secretary enjoys readily identifiable structural advantages over the Commission in rendering authoritative interpretations of OSH Act regulations. Because the Secretary promulgates these standards, the Secretary is in a better position than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations in question. Moreover, by virtue of the Secretary’s statutory role as enforcer, the Secretary comes into contact with a much greater number of regulatory problems than does the Commission, which encounters only those regulatory episodes resulting in contested citations. Cf. Note, Employee Participation in Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Proceedings, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1317, 1331, and n. 90 (1985) (reporting small percentage of OSH Act citations contested between 1979 and 1985). Consequently, the Secretary is more likely to develop the expertise relevant to assessing the ef-feet of a particular regulatory interpretation. Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the reviewing court, see, e. g., Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 484 U. S. 135, 159 (1987); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, supra, at 566; INS v. Stanisic, 395 U. S. 62, 72 (1969), we presume here that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop these attributes. The legislative history of the OSH Act supports this conclusion. The version of the Act originally passed by the House of Representatives vested adjudicatory power in the Commission and rulemaking power in an independent standards board, leaving the Secretary with only enforcement power. 116 Cong. Rec. 38716 (1970), reprinted in Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (S. 2193, Pub. L. 91-596) (Committee Print prepared by the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare), pp. 1094-1096 (1971) (Legislative History). The Senate version dispensed with the standards board and established the division of responsibilities that survives in the enacted legislation. The Senate Committee Report explained that combining legislative and enforcement powers in the Secretary would result in “a sounder program” because it would make a single administrative actor responsible both for “formulating] rules . . . and for seeing that they are workable and effective in their day-to-day application,” and would allow Congress to hold a single administrative actor politically “accountable for the overall implementation of that program.” S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 8 (1970), reprinted in Legislative History 148. Because dividing the power to promulgate and enforce OSH Act standards from the power to make law by interpreting them would make two administrative actors ultimately responsible for implementing the Act’s policy objectives, we conclude that Congress did not expect the Commission to possess authoritative interpretive powers. For the same reason, we reject the Court of Appeals’ inference that Congress intended “to endow the Commission with the normal complement of adjudicative powers possessed by traditional administrative agencies.” 891 F. 2d, at 1498 (emphasis added). Within traditional agencies — that is, agencies possessing a unitary structure — adjudication operates as an appropriate mechanism not only for factfinding, but also for the exercise of delegated lawmaking powers, including lawmaking by interpretation. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 292-294 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 201-203 (1947). But in these cases, we concluded that agency adjudication is a generally permissible mode of lawmaking and policymaking only because the unitary agencies in question also had been delegated the power to make law and policy through rulemak-ing. See Bell Aerospace, supra, at 292-294; Chenery Corp., supra, at 202-203. See generally Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965). Insofar as Congress did not invest the Commission with the power to make law or policy by other means, we cannot infer that Congress expected the Commission to use its adjudicatory power to play a policymaking role. Moreover, when a traditional, unitary agency uses adjudication to engage in lawmaking by regulatory interpretation, it necessarily interprets regulations that it has promulgated. This, too, cannot be said of the Commission’s power to adjudicate. Consequently, we think the more plausible inference is that Congress intended to delegate to the Commission the type of nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the agency-review context. Under this conception of adjudication, the Commission is authorized to review the Secretary’s interpretations only for consistency with the regulatory language and for reasonableness. In addition, of course, Congress expressly charged the Commission with making authoritative findings of fact and with applying the Secretary’s standards to those facts in making a decision. See 29 U. S. C. § 660(a) (Commission’s factual findings “shall be conclusive” so long as “supported by substantial evidence”). The Commission need be viewed as possessing no more power than this in order to perform its statutory role as “neutral arbiter.” See Cuyahoga Valley, 474 U. S., at 7. CF&I draws a different conclusion from the history and structure of the Act. Congress, CF&I notes, established the Commission in response to concerns that combining, rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory power in the Secretary would leave employers unprotected from regulatory bias. Construing the Act to separate enforcement and interpretive powers is consistent with this purpose, CF&I argues, because it protects regulated employers from biased prosecutorial interpretations of the Secretary’s regulations. Indeed, interpretations furnished in the course of administrative penalty actions, according to CF&I, are mere “litigating positions,” undeserving of judicial deference under our precedents. See, e. g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212 (1988). Although we find these concerns to be important, we think that they are overstated. It is clear that Congress adopted the split-enforcement structure in the OSH Act in order to achieve a greater separation of functions than exists in a conventional unitary agency. See S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 56, reprinted in Legislative History 195 (individual views of Sen. Javits) (noting that adjudication by independent panel goes beyond division of functions under the APA but defending split-enforcement structure as “more closely [in] accor[d] with traditional notions of due process”). But the conclusion that the Act should therefore be understood to separate enforcement powers from authoritative interpretive powers begs the question just how much Congress intended to depart from the unitary model. Sponsors of the Commission purported to be responding to the traditional objection that an agency head’s participation in or supervision of agency investigations results in biased review of the decisions of the hearing officer, notwithstanding internal separations within the agency. See ibid. See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.8, pp. 369-370 (2d ed. 1980). Vesting authoritative factfinding and ALJ-review powers in the Commission, an administrative body wholly independent of the administrative enforcer, dispels this concern. We harbor no doubt that Congress also intended to protect regulated parties from biased interpretations of the Secretary’s regulations. But this objective is achieved when the Commission, and ultimately the court of appeals, review the Secretary’s interpretation to assure that it is consistent with the regulatory language and is otherwise reasonable. Giving the Commission the power to substitute its reasonable interpretations for the Secretary’s might slightly increase regulated parties’ protection from overzealous interpretations. But it would also clearly frustrate Congress’ intent to make a single administrative actor “accountable for the overall implementation” of the Act’s policy objectives by combining legislative and enforcement powers in the Secretary. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 8, reprinted in Legislative History 148. We are likewise unpersuaded by the contention that the Secretary’s interpretations of regulations will necessarily appear in forms undeserving of judicial deference. Our decisions indicate that agency “litigating positions” are not entitled to deference when they are merely appellate counsel’s “post hoc rationalizations” for agency action, advanced for the first time in the reviewing court. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, supra, at 212; Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962). Because statutory and regulatory interpretations furnished in this setting occur after agency proceedings have terminated, they do not constitute an exercise of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers. The Secretary’s interpretation of OSH Act regulations in an administrative adjudication, however, is agency action, not a post hoc rationalization of it. Moreover, when embodied in a citation, the Secretary’s interpretation assumes a form expressly provided for by Congress. See 29 U. S. C. § 658. Under these circumstances, the Secretary’s litigating position before the Commission is as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers as is the Secretary’s promulgation of a workplace health and safety standard. In addition, the Secretary regularly employs less formal means of interpreting regulations prior to issuing a citation. These include the promulgation of interpretive rules, see, e. g., Marshall v. W and W Steel Co., 604 F. 2d 1322, 1325-1326 (CA10 1979); cf. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U. S. 1, 11 (1980), and the publication of agency enforcement guidelines, see United States Department of Labor, OSHA Field Operations Manual (3d ed. 1989). See generally S. Bokat & H. Thompson, Occupational Safety and Health Law 658-660 (1988). Although not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary’s delegated lawmaking powers, these informal interpretations are still entitled to some weight on judicial review. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425-426, and n. 9 (1977); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944); Whirlpool, supra, at 11. A reviewing court may certainly consult them to determine whether the Secretary has consistently applied the interpretation embodied in the citation, a factor bearing on the reasonableness of the Secretary’s position. See Ehlert v. United States, 402 U. S., at 105. III We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We deal in this case only with the division of powers between the Secretary and the Commission under the OSH Act. We conclude from the available indicia of legislative intent that Congress did not intend to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act regulations from the Secretary’s power to promulgate and enforce them. Subject only to constitutional limits, Congress is free, of course, to divide these powers as it chooses, and we take no position on the division of enforcement and interpretive powers within other regulatory schemes that conform to the split-enforcement structure. Nor should anything we say today be understood to bear on whether particular divisions of enforcement and adjudicative power within a unitary agency comport with § 554(d) of the APA. In addition, although we hold that a reviewing court may not prefer the reasonable interpretations of the Commission to the reasonable interpretations of the Secretary, we emphasize that the reviewing court should defer to the Secretary only if the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable. The Secretary’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is subject to the same standard of substantive review as any other exercise of delegated lawmaking power. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A); Batterton v. Francis, supra, at 426. As we have indicated, the Secretary’s interpretation is not undeserving of deference merely because the Secretary advances it for the first time in an administrative adjudication. But as the Secretary’s counsel conceded in oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19, 20-21, the decision to use a citation as the initial means for announcing a particular interpretation may bear on the adequacy of notice to regulated parties, see Bell Aerospace, 416 U. S., at 295; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S., at 220 (Scalia, J., concurring), on the quality of the Secretary’s elaboration of pertinent policy considerations, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983), and on other factors relevant to the reasonableness of the Secretary’s exercise of delegated lawmaking powers. CF&I urges us to hold that the Secretary unreasonably interpreted 29 CFR § 1910.1029(g)(3) (1990) in this case. However, because the Court of Appeals deferred to the Commission’s interpretation, it had no occasion to address the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation. Rather than consider this issue for the first time ourselves, we leave the issue for resolution on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Secretary has delegated certain statutory responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, who heads the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. See Secretary of Labor’s Order No. 12-71, 36 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971); Order No. 8-76, 41 Fed. Reg. 25059 (1976); Order No. 9-83, 48 Fed. Reg. 35736 (1983). “For safe use of any respirator, it is essential that the user be properly instructed in its selection, use, and maintenance. Both supervisors and workers shall be so instructed by competent persons. Training shall provide the men an opportunity to handle the respirator, have it fitted properly, test its face-piece-to-face seal, wear it in normal air for a long familiarity period, and, finally, to wear it in a test atmosphere.” 29 CFR § 1910.134(e)(5) (1990). This regulation states in pertinent part: “Respirator usage, (i) The employer shall assure that the respirator issued to the employee exhibits minimum facepiece leakage and that the respirator is fitted properly.” § 1910.1029. According to the Commission, the compliance officer who issued the citation “acknowledged that [§ 1910.1029(g)(4)(i)] applied,” and “that he might have cited the wrong standard.” CF&I, 12 OSHC 2067, 2078 (1986). Compare Brock v. Williams Enterprises of Georgia, Inc., 832 F. 2d 567, 569-570 (CA11 1987) (deference to Secretary); United Steelworkers of America v. Schuylkill Metals Corp., 828 F. 2d 314, 319 (CA5 1987) (same); and Donovan v. A. Amorello & Sons, Inc., 761 F. 2d 61, 65-66 (CA1 1985) (same), with Brock v. Cardinal Industries, Inc., 828 F. 2d 373, 376, n. 4 (CA6 1987) (deference to Commission); Brock v. Bechtel Power Corp., 803 F. 2d 999, 1000-1001 (CA9 1986) (same); and Marshall v. Western Electric, Inc., 565 F. 2d 240, 244 (CA2 1977) (same). The parties do not challenge the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the regulations at issue in this case are ambiguous. We assume that this conclusion is correct for purposes of our analysis.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE et al. v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION No. 74-1608. Argued February 25, 1976 Decided May 19, 1976 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 671. Burger, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 672. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Howard A. Glickstein argued the cause for petitioners in No. 74-1608 and for respondents in No. 74-1619. With him on the brief were William L. Taylor and Reuben B. Robertson III. Drexel D. Journey argued the cause for respondent in No. 74-1608 and for petitioner in No. 74-1619. With him on the briefs were Robert W. Perdue and Allan Abbot Tuttle. Together with No. 74-1619, Federal Power Commission v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, and Abner W. Sibal filed a memorandum for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases by Jerome J. Mc-Grath and Melvin Richter for the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America; by Cameron F. MacRae, Charles P. Sifton, and John A. Rudy for the Edison Electric Institute; and by the National Black Media Coalition et al. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is to what extent, if any, the Federal Power Commission, in the performance of its functions under the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq. (Power Act), and the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. (Gas Act), has authority to prohibit discriminatory employment practices on the part of its regulatees. I In 1972 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and several other organizations petitioned the Commission to issue a rule “requiring equal employment opportunity and nondiscrimination in the employment practices of its regulatees.” The proposed rule would have required the regulated companies to adopt affirmative action programs to combat discrimination in employment and would have given any person who believed himself to have been subjected to employment discrimination by any such company the right to file a complaint with the Commission. The Commission refused to adopt the proposed rule, holding that it had no jurisdiction to do so because “the purposes of the Natural Gas and Federal Power Acts are economic regulation of entrepreneurs engaged in resource developments. So considered, we do not find the necessary nexus between those aspects of our economic regulatory activities and the employment procedures of the utility systems which we regulate, as would justify [adopting petitioners’ proposed rule].” 48 F. P. C. 40, 44. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the Commission was without “power ... to prescribe personnel practices in detail and to receive complaints, adjudicate them, and punish directly infractions of those practices.” 172 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 35, 520 F. 2d 432, 435. The court held, however, that the Commission does have “power to take into account, in the performance of its regulatory functions, including licensing and rate review, evidence that the regulatee is a demonstrated discriminator in its employment relations.” Ibid. Because of doubt as to the Commission’s recognition of any power on its part to take into account the employment practices of its regulatees even in the narrower sense described above, the Court of Appeals vacated the Commission’s order and remanded the case. Id., at 47, 520 F. 2d, at 447. The Commission and the NAACP each petitioned for certiorari, and we granted both petitions in order to consider the scope of the Commission’s authority to deal with discriminatory employment; practices on the part of the companies that it regulates. 423 U. S. 890. II The question presented is not whether the elimination of discrimination from our society is an important national goal. It clearly is. The question is not whether Congress could authorize the Federal Power Commission to combat such discrimination. It clearly could. The question is simply whether or to what extent Congress did grant the Commission such authority. Two possible statutory bases have been advanced to justify the conclusion that the Commission can or must concern itself with discriminatory employment practices on the part of the companies it regulates. The first of these statutory bases is the legislative command to the Commission under the Power and Gas Acts to establish “just and reasonable” rates for the transmission and sale of electric energy, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (a), and for the transportation and sale of natural gas, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a), and, consequently, to allow only such rates as will prevent consumers from being charged any unnecessary or illegal costs. The second and broader statutory basis advanced for Commission regulation of employment discrimination is the Commission’s asserted duty to advance the public interest. The NAACP notes that Congress found that “the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest,” 16 U. S. C. § 824 (a), and that “the business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest,” 15 U. S. C. § 717 (a). From these and other references to the “public interest” in the Gas and Power Acts, it is argued that the Commission is charged with advancing the public interest in general, and that the Commission is thus authorized if not required to promulgate rules prohibiting its regulatees from engaging in discriminatory employment practices, since ending discrimination in employment is in the public interest. A The Court of Appeals basically accepted the first of these statutory arguments: “The Commission’s task in protecting the consumer against exploitation can be alternatively described as the task of seeing that no unnecessary or illegitimate costs are passed along to that consumer. Costs incurred by reason of a regulatee’s choosing to practice racial discrimination are within the reach of that responsibility. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration of such costs, we identify at least the following as indicative of those arguably within the Commission’s range of concern: (1) du-plicative labor costs incurred in the form of back pay recoveries by employees who have proven that they were discriminatorily denied employment or advancement, (2) the costs of losing valuable government contracts terminated because of employment discrimination, (3) the costs of legal proceedings in either of these two categories, (4) the costs of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts aimed against regula-tees because of employment discrimination, (5) excessive labor costs incurred because of the elimination from the prospective labor force of those who are discriminated against, and (6) the costs of inefficiency among minority employees demoralized by discriminatory barriers to their fair treatment or promotion. “Obviously such costs of employment discrimination range from the very definite and easily ascertainable to the very questionable and virtually unquantifiable. The problem of how to see that they are not borne by the consumer could arise in any number of different regulatory contexts, including both rate and certificate proceedings. We therefore do not attempt to detail all the various ways the Commission may thus ‘regulate’ employment discrimination, leaving this in the first instance to the Commission itself.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 44, 520 F. 2d, at 444 (footnote omitted). Without necessarily endorsing the specific identification of the costs “arguably within” the Commission’s “range of concern,” we agree with the basic conclusion of the Court of Appeals on this branch of the case. The Commission^ clearly has the duty to prevent its regulatees from charging rates based upon illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary labor costs. To the extent that such costs are demonstrably the product of a regulatee’s discriminatory employment practices, the Commission should disallow them. For example, when a company complies with a backpay award resulting from a finding of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., it pays twice for work that was performed only once. The amount of the backpay award, therefore, can and should be disallowed as an unnecessary cost in a ratemaking proceeding. To the extent that these and other similar costs, such as attorneys’ fees, can be or have been demonstrably quantified by judicial decree or the final action of an administrative agency charged with consideration of such matters, the Commission clearly should treat these costs as it treats any other illegal, unnecessary, or duplicative costs. We were told by counsel during oral argument that the Commission would routinely disallow the costs of a backpay award resulting from an order of the National Labor Relations Board or the decree of a court based upon a finding of an unfair labor practice. The governing principle is no different in the area of discriminatory employment practices. As a general proposition it is clear that the Commission has the discretion to decide whether to approach these problems through the process of rulemaking, individual adjudication, or a combination of the two procedures. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202-203. The present Commission practice, we are told, is to consider such questions only in individual ratemaking proceedings, under its detailed accounting procedures. Assuming that the Commission continues that practice, it has ample authority to consider whatever evidence and make whatever inquiries are necessary to determine whether a regulatee has incurred unnecessary or illegitimate costs because of racially discriminatory employment practices. 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c (e), 717m; 16 U. S. C. §§ 824d (e), 824f. B The Court of Appeals rejected the broader argument based upon the statutory criterion of “public interest,” and we hold that it was correct in doing so. This Court's cases have consistently held that the use of the words “public interest” in a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare. Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation. For example, in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which is responsible for enforcing an Act “designed ... to assure adequacy in transportation service,” “the term ‘public interest’ ... is not a concept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities . . . .” New York Central Securities Corp. v. United, States, 287 U. S. 12, 24-25. See also New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U. S. 392, 432; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 216; Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285. Thus, in order to give content and meaning to the words “public interest” as used in the Power and Gas Acts, it is necessary to look to the purposes for which the Acts were adopted. In the case of the Power and Gas Acts it is clear that the principal purpose of those Acts was to encourage the orderly development of plentiful supplies of electricity and natural gas at reasonable prices. While there are undoubtedly other subsidiary purposes contained in these Acts, the parties point to nothing in the Acts or their legislative histories to indicate that the elimination of employment discrimination was one of the purposes that Congress had in mind when it enacted this legislation. The use of the words “public interest” in the Gas and Power Acts is not a directive to the Commission to seek to eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just and reasonable rates. It is useful again to draw on the analogy of federal labor law. No less than in the federal legislation defining the national interest in ending employment discrimination, Congress in its earlier labor legislation unmistakably defined the national interest in free collective bargaining. Yet it could hardly be supposed that in directing the Federal Power Commission to be guided by the “public interest,” Congress thereby instructed it to take original jurisdiction over the processing of charges of unfair labor practices on the part of its regulatees. We agree, in short, with the Court of Appeals that the Federal Power Commission is authorized to consider the consequences of discriminatory employment practices on the part of its regulatees only insofar as such consequences are directly related to the Commission's establishment of just and reasonable rates in the public interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment before us. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Under the proposed rule, a complaint that indicated a probable violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., could be referred by the Commission to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The proposed rule is reproduced in full as an appendix to the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case. See 172 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 48, 520 F. 2d 432, 448, We deal here only with questions of statutory interpretation. In the Court of Appeals and in its cross-petition for certiorari the NAACP argued that the Commission has a duty under the Fifth Amendment to prevent employment discrimination by its regulatees. In its briefs on the merits, however, the NAACP notes that a decision on this constitutional question is unnecessary if we hold, as we do, that the Commission has statutory authority to consider the consequences of employment discrimination in performing its mandated regulatory functions. See, e. g., Acker v. United States, 298 U. S. 426, 430-431; Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. FPC, 424 E. 2d 411 (CA10); Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 179 F. 2d 179 (CA3). See also n. 5, infra. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §§ 717b, 717f (a), 717n; 16 U. S. C. §§797 (e), (g), 800 (a), 803 (i), 806, 815, 824a (a-c), (e), 824b (a-b), 824e (a). See also 15 U. S. C. §§ 717f (b-c), (e). 16 U. S. C. § 824a (a) (The purpose of the Power Act is to “assur[e] an abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy”); Pennsylvania Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U. S. 414, 418 (“A major purpose of the [Power] Act is to protect power consumers against excessive prices”); FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 610 (The “primary aim” of the Natural Gas Act is “to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies”). See also S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17; FPC v. Tennessee Gas Co., 371 U. S. 145, 154; Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 360 U. S. 378, 388; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 770. For example, the Commission has authority to consider conservation, environmental, and antitrust questions. See 15 U. S. C. § 717s (a); 16 U. S. C. §§803 (a), (h); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747; Udall v. FPC, 387 U. S. 428. The Federal Communications Commission has adopted regulations dealing with the employment practices of its regulatees. See 47 CFR §§ 73.125, 73.301, 73.599, 73.680, 73.793 (1975). These regulations can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC to satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., to ensure that its licensees’ programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 359 F. 2d 994; 33 Fed. Reg. 9960, 9962. It has nowhere been argued that the Federal Power Commission needs similar regulations in order to promote energy production at reasonable rates.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY et al. No. 88-2123. Argued January 8, 1990 Decided April 17, 1990 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 934. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 937. Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Harriet S. Shapiro, William Ranter, and Thomas M. Bondy. Robert J. Englehart argued the cause for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority. With him on the brief were William E. Persina and Arthur A. Horowitz. Gregory O’Duden argued the cause for respondent National Treasury Employees Union. With him on the brief were Elaine Kaplan and Clinton Wolcott Mark D. Roth, Stuart A. Kirsch, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we review the determination of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) that, under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Act), 5 U. S. C. §7101 et seq., the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must bargain with the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU or Union) over a proposed contract provision subjecting to grievance and arbitration procedures claims that the IRS had failed to comply with an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular relating to the “contracting out” of work. I Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act establishes a collective-bargaining system for federal agencies and their employees, under the administration of the FLRA. The Act recognizes the right of federal employees to form and join unions, 5 U. S. C. § 7102, and imposes upon management officials and employee unions the duty to “negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement.” § 7114(a)(4). A collective-bargaining agreement must provide procedures “for the settlement of grievances,” § 7121(a)(1), which are defined as “complaint[s] . . . concerning . . . any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment,” § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii); and the agreement must “provide that any grievance not satisfactorily settled under the negotiated grievance procedure shall be subject to binding arbitration” which may be invoked by either party. § 7121(b)(3)(C). The agency’s duty to bargain is qualified, however, in one pertinent respect. The Act reserves to management officials the authority “in accordance with applicable laws ... to make determinations with respect to contracting out.” § 7106(a)(2)(B). Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 generally directs federal agencies to “contract out” to the private sector their non-“governmental” activities (e. g., data processing) unless certain specified cost comparisons indicate that the activities can be performed more economically “in house.” Executive Office of the President, OMB Circular A-76, as revised, 48 Fed. Reg. 37110 (1983). The Circular also requires agencies to establish an administrative appeals procedure to resolve complaints by employees or private bidders relating to “determinations resulting from cost comparisons performed in compliance with [the] Circular,” or relating to decisions to contract out where no cost comparison is required. OMB Circular A-76, Supp. 1-14, 1-15 (1983). During the course of contract negotiations with the IRS, respondent NTEU put forward a proposal that, with respect to contracting-out decisions employees wished to contest, the “grievance and arbitration” provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement would constitute the “internal appeals procedure” required by the Circular. The IRS refused to bargain over this proposal, taking the position that its subject matter was nonnegotiable under the Act. The Union then petitioned for review by the Authority, which is empowered by the Act to “resolv[e] issues relating to the duty to bargain.” § 7105(a)(2)(E); see § 7117(c). The FLRA held that the IRS was required by §§ 7114 and 7121 to negotiate over the proposal. In its view the IRS’ failure to comply with Circular A-76 would be a “violation ... of [a] law, rule, or regulation” affecting “conditions of employment,” so that an employee complaint on the matter would qualify as a “grievance” for which procedures must be specified in the collective-bargaining agreement. 27 F. L. R. A. 976, 978-979 (1987). The FLRA found that the union’s proposal was not precluded by § 7106(a)(2)(B)’s reservation of management authority over contracting-out determinations, because it “would only contractually recognize external limitations on management’s right.” Id., at 978. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Authority’s decision. 274 U. S. App. D. C. 135, 862 F. 2d 880 (1988). We granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 807 (1989). II The management rights provision of the Act provides, in pertinent part: “(a) [N]othing in this chapter [i. e., the Act] shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency— “(2) in accordance with applicable laws— “(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the agency, or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees; “(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted; “(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from— “(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or “(ii) any other appropriate source . . . 5 U. S. C. § 7106 (emphasis added). In the proceedings below and again before this Court, the IRS has argued that even when an agency’s decision to contract out violates OMB Circular A-76 it is still a decision “in accordance with applicable laws” and is thus immunized by the foregoing provisions from contractually imposed substantive controls — rendering the proposal here nonbargainable. According to the IRS, the Circular is not a law, but an internal Executive Branch'directive to agency officials regarding matters of office management. The FLRA’s position is that the management rights provisions of §7106 do not trump §7121, which entitles the union to negotiate and enforce procedures for resolving any “grievance” as defined in §7103 — that is, any claimed “violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment.” 5 U. S. C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). Thus, according to the FLRA, it makes no difference whether OMB Circular A-76 is an “applicable law”; so long as it is a “law, rule, or regulation” within the meaning of §7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), § 7106(a) does not bar mandatory negotiation over NTEU’s proposal. This, it appears, has been the FLRA’s consistent position. See, e. g., AFSCME Local 3097 v. Department of Justice, Justice Management Div., 31 F. L. R. A. 322, 338 (1988) (§ 7106(a) reserves to management the right to make contracting-out decisions only when they are “in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations”); GSA v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO Nat. Council 236, 27 F. L. R. A. 3, 6 (1987) (§ 7106(a) does not preclude union from compelling agency compliance with any “applicable law, rule, or regulation”). A We do not lightly overturn the FLRA’s construction of the Act it is charged with administering. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983). We must accept that construction if it is a reasonable one, even though it is not the one we ourselves would arrive at. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984); NLRB v. Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U. S. 112, 123 (1987). For the reasons that follow, however, we conclude that the FLRA’s construction is not reasonable. The FLRA’s position is flatly contradicted by the language of §7106(a)’s command that “nothing in this chapter” — i. e., nothing in the entire Act — shall affect the authority of agency officials to make contracting-out determinations in accordance with applicable laws.' Section 7121 is among the provisions covered by that italicized language. The FLRA presents four arguments to overcome this plain text. First, it contends that reading § 7106(a) to supersede the grievance requirements of §7121 would render certain portions of §7121 superfluous. Subsection 7121(c) exempts from the grievance requirements, among other things, decisions concerning appointments and certain decisions concerning suspension and removal — decisions that are also referred to as protected management rights in § 7106(a). Compare §§ 7106(a)(2)(A) and (C)(i) with §§ 7121(c)(3) and (4). The suggestion is that these § 7121(c) exclusions would have been unnecessary if the decisions in question were already insulated from the grievance requirements by § 7106(a). We disagree. Subsection 7121(c) removes these agency decisions from the coverage of only § 7121(a)’s negotiated grievance provisions, yet does so whether or not the decisions are made in accordance with applicable laws; § 7106(a) removes the decisions from the coverage of the entire Act, but only to the extent the decisions are in accordance with applicable laws. Thus, although §§ 7106(a) and 7121(c) sometimes overlap in their treatment of these enumerated agency decisions (each removes the decisions from the coverage of § 7121(a) when they are made in accordance with applicable laws), each provision has quite a distinct effect on them as well. Second, the FLRA argues that § 7121 is among the “applicable laws” referred to in § 7106(a)(2) — so that § 7106(a) never excuses agency management from negotiating, and submitting to, grievance procedures over the exercise of reserved management rights. This cannot be the case. If the negotiation and grievance provisions of the Act, §§ 7114 and 7121, are “applicable laws” under this section, then presumably so is all the rest of the Act, there being no basis for treating those provisions specially. Thus, under the FLRA view, § 7106(a) in effect says that “nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of management to make contracting out decisions in accordance with this chapter” — a pointless tautology. It is clear that the term “applicable laws” refers to laws outside the Act. Third, the FLRA argues that the NTEU proposal is not barred by § 7106(a) because, in the words of the FLRA’s opinion, its incorporation into the collective-bargaining agreement would “not itself establish any particular substantive limitation on management in the exercise of its right to make contracting-out decisions”; rather, it “would only contractually recognize and provide for the enforcement of external limitations on management’s right.” 27 F. L. R. A., at 980. Referring to one of its earlier decisions, the FLRA emphasizes that in a negotiated grievance proceeding the arbitrator would not second-guess the IRS on discretionary aspects of the contracting-out determination, but would only review claims “that the agency failed to comply with mandatory and nondiscretionary provisions” of the Circular. Headquarters, 97th Combat Support Group (SAC) Blytheville Air Force Base, Ark. v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2840, 22 F. L. R. A. 656, 661-662 (1986). He could, for example, order the agency to “reconstruct” the cost data it relied on in making a contracting decision, ibid., and, if the decision was not cost justified as required by the Circular, he could order the agency to reconsider it; but he would impose no “substantive limitation” on the contracting-out decision (other than those imposed by the “law, rule, or regulation” invoked by the aggrieved employee). 27 F. L. R. A., at 980. The trouble with this argument is that it is entirely disconnected from the text of the statute. The Act does not empower unions to enforce all “external limitations” on management rights, but only limitations contained in “applicable laws.” Or to put the point differently, there are no “external limitations” on management rights, insofar as union powers under § 7106(a) are concerned, other than the limitations imposed by “applicable laws.” It makes no difference that, as a remedial matter, the arbitrator would at most order the IRS to redo its cost comparisons, and would not actually order a particular contract to be awarded or set aside. Section 7106(a) says that, insofar as union rights are concerned, it is entirely up to the IRS whether it will comply at all with Circular A-76’s cost-comparison requirements, except to the extent that such compliance is required by an “applicable law” outside the Act. Finally, the FLRA suggests that the term “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) is coextensive with the phrase “any law, rule, or regulation” in § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), so that any agency contracting decision that gives rise to a grievance is by definition not “in accordance with applicable laws.” The FLRA did not explicitly use this reasoning in its decision here, but it seems to have done so in other cases. See, e. g., AFSCME Local 3097 v. Department of Justice, Justice Management Div., 31 F. L. R. A., at 333, 338-339. This argument is simply contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the text. A statute that in one section refers to “law, rule or regulation,” and in another section to only “laws” cannot, unless we abandon all pretense at precise communication, be deemed to mean the same thing in both places. Nor can the modifier “applicable” make the difference — not only because its meaning has nothing to do with extending the coverage in this fashion, but also because the Act in several places employs the terms “rule” and “regulation” in conjunction with the term “applicable law.” See, e. g., § 7114(c)(2) (agency head shall approve collective-bargaining agreement “if the agreement is in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation”) (emphasis added); § 7122(a) (“If upon review [of an arbitrator’s decision] the Authority finds that the award is deficient — (1) because it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation . . . the authority may take such action and make such recommendations concerning the award as it considers necessary, consistent with applicable laws, rules, or regulations”) (emphasis added). There is, in short, no justification for saying that all “rules” and “regulations” are encompassed by the term “applicable laws.” It cannot be true, therefore, that all actions not in accordance with a “law, rule, or regulation” under § 7103(a) (9)(C)(ii) are, by definition, also actions not “in accordance with applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2). B At oral argument, counsel for NTEU urged that we could sustain the FLRA’s decision on the ground that the term “applicable laws” includes at least those regulations that carry the “force of law,” and that OMB Circular A-76 is such a regulation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. We cannot, however, adopt this ground. While we think it a permissible (though not an inevitable) construction of the statute that the term “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) extends to some, but not all, rules and regulations, that extension should be made, and its precise scope described, in the first instance by the FLRA — which has been proceeding until now on the mistaken assumption that § 7106(a) is irrelevant, or that “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) and “any law, rule or regulation” in § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) are entirely synonymous. As we emphasized in Chevron, when an agency is charged with administering a statute, part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statute’s textual ambiguities. 467 U. S., at 843-844. That is a task infused with judgment and discretion, requiring the “‘accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care.’” Id,., at 845, quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 383 (1961). It is not a task we ought to undertake on the agency’s behalf in reviewing its orders. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88, 95 (1943); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 169 (1962). The IRS contends that even though the term “applicable laws” includes some rules and regulations, under no reasonable construction could it include internal directives like OMB Circular A-76. We are poorly situated to evaluate that argument, since the Court of Appeals did not consider it, neither of the respondents briefed it, and counsel for respondents addressed it in only the most cursory fashion at oral argument. It is, moreover, an argument that calls for a very difficult abstract conclusion, to wit, that no conceivable reasonable interpretation of “applicable laws” could include this Circular. The Court of Appeals, on remand, may wish to enter into that inquiry, or may prefer to await the FLRA’s specification, on remand, of the particular permissible interpretation of “applicable laws” (if any) it believes embraces the Circular. In any event, we decline to consider the point at this stage in the proceedings. c Finally, the IRS argues that the decision below should be reversed outright on the ground that the Union’s proposal is inconsistent with the “no arbitration” language in OMB Circular A-76, and is therefore nonnegotiable under § 7117, which provides that “the duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation.” 5 U. S. C. § 7117(a)(1) (emphasis added). As this argument was not raised or considered in the Court of Appeals, we do not reach it. See EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U. S. 19, 24 (1986) (per curiam). Nor do we decide whether the FLRA properly held Circular A-76 to be a “rule” or “regulation” within the meaning of § 7103(a)(9); although the IRS raised this question as a separate ground for reversal in its petition for certiorari, it has relied only on the “management rights” clause of § 7106(a) in its argument before this Court. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting. Because the Court remands for further proceedings I believe are unnecessary, I respectfully dissent. As I read the opinion below, the agency found OMB Circular A-76 to be an “applicable law” within the meaning of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978’s management rights provision, 5 U. S. C. § 7106(a)(2), and therefore determined that the Union’s proposal would not infringe management’s reserved rights. Since the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) could permissibly interpret the statutory term to include regulations having the “force of law” and could permissibly find that the Circular is such a regulation, as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 932, I would affirm the judgment below. The FLRA’s decision that the Circular is an “applicable law” is entirely reasonable. The Circular was promulgated as a formal regulation, with notice published in the Federal Register and public comment invited. See Executive Office of the President, OMB Circular A-76, 44 Fed. Reg. 20556 (1979), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 37110 (1983), 50 Fed. Reg. 32812 (1985). It is referenced by, and its terms generally restated in, the Federal Acquisition Regulations, codified at 48 CFR pt. 7, subpt. 7.3 (1988). By its terms, agency compliance is mandatory and enforced. OMB Circular A-76, Supp. Intro, and 1-14, 1-15 (rev. Aug. 4, 1983). Hence, I would uphold the FLRA’s conclusion that the Circular is an “applicable law” within the meaning of § 7106(a)(2). The Court finds the FLRA’s interpretation of “applicable laws” unreasonable, not because it is an implausible reading in itself, but because it is indistinguishable from the Authority’s interpretation of the phrase “law, rule, or regulation” which is contained in a different section of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. See ante, at 931-932. I suspect the Court reads too much into the difference in language between “applicable laws” in § 7106(a)(2) and “law, rule, or regulation” in § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii). But, in any event, I understand the Court’s decision to say only that the two phrases are not synonymous. Ibid. If the FLRA, in fact, has employed the same definition for the two phrases, which is arguable, the Authority’s error most likely was to embrace too restrictive a view of the scope of “law, rule, or regulation.” Thus on remand the FLRA is free to interpret “applicable laws” to cover not only statutes, but also regulations and rules that are binding on the agency exercising its reserved rights. See n. 2, supra. The Authority is also free to interpret “law, rule, or regulation” to cover these and more — for instance, nonbinding policy statements and unpublished internal agency guidelines. Finally, I take issue with the Court’s expansive view of the management rights provision as abrogating any union rights vis-a-vis decisions such as contracting out, so long as agency decisions are made consistently with applicable laws. See ante, at 931. Section 7106(a) does not purport to make other provisions of the Act wholly inapplicable to the enumerated subject areas. It says only that nothing in the statute “shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency” to make certain types of decisions. (Emphasis added.) An exercise of union rights that does not affect management’s existing authority is fully consistent with this provision. Insofar as the Union proposal would require merely what is already required by OMB Circular A-76, it would not affect the Internal Revenue Service’s authority to make contracting out decisions. Therefore it would not infringe the agency’s reserved rights. Because I do not read the Authority’s decision as clearly relying on this ground, I 'do not think it necessary for the Court to have reached it. The proposed contract term read: “The Internal Appeals Procedure shall be the parties’ grievance and arbitration provisions of the Master Agreements.” 27 F. L. R. A. 976 (1987). The Court of Appeals characterized the proposal as “establishing] the ‘grievance and arbitration’ provisions of the master labor agreement between them as the internal ‘administrative appeals procedure’ mandated by the Supplement to the Circular for disputed ‘contracting-out’ cases.” 274 U. S. App. D. C. 135, 136, 862 F. 2d 880, 881 (1988). We follow the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the proposed term. The FLRA also held that although Circular A-76 was a “government-wide rule or regulation” within the meaning of § 7117(a), that section of the statute did not render the union’s proposal nonnegotiable because the proposal was “not inconsistent” with the Circular. 27 F. L. R. A., at 977. For reasons explained below in Part II-C, that issue is not properly before us. A qualification to §7106 permits contract negotiations regarding “procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising” the reserved management rights. 5 U. S. C. § 7106(b)(2). Although they call our attention to this qualification, NTEU and the FLRA rightly refrain from asserting that it governs this case. The proposal at issue would enable the grievance examiner to compel the IRS to follow the cost-comparison requirements of the OMB Circular, thereby dictating the substantive criteria for the contracting-out decision. See infra, at 931. The relevant language of § 7121 is the following: “(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any collective bargaining agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of grievances, including questions of arbitrability. . . . “(2) Any collective bargaining agreement may exclude any matter from the application of the grievance procedures which are provided for in the agreement. “(c) The preceding subsections of this section shall not apply wdth respect to any grievance concerning— “(1) any claimed violation of subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title (relating to prohibited political activities); “(2) retirement, life insurance, or health insurance; “(3) a suspension or removal under section 7532 of this title; “(4) any examination, certification, or appointment; or “(5) the classification of any position which does not result in the reduction in grade or pay of an employee.” The FLRA’s position gets no support from § 7121(a)’s language providing that “Except as provided, in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any collective bargaining agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of grievances . . . .” (Emphasis added.) If that italicized language were construed to create the Act’s only exception to the requirements of § 7121(a), then even the specific exclusions in subsection (c) of the provision would disappear. The IRS concedes this point. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. Justice Stevens contends that § 7117(a)(1) bars negotiation over the Union’s proposal for yet another reason, namely, that the proposal covers a matter that is “the subject” of a “‘Government-wide rule or regulation.’” Post, at 938 (dissenting opinion). This argument not only was not raised or considered below, but has not even been raised by the IRS here. We decline to address it. See 27 F. L. R. A. 976, 979 (1987) (the Union proposal “require[s] nothing that is not required by section 7106(a)(2) of the Statute itself, namely, that determinations as to contracting-out must be made ‘in accordance with applicable laws’ ”). 1 am inclined to agree with the position taken by the Deputy Solicitor General at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, that “applicable laws” include not only statutes but also regulations having the force of law, and that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides the relevant measure. See id., at 47 (“[I]f a private party could bring an APA action, that would be very strong, if not conclusive, evidence that. . . you are dealing with an applicable law”). Under the APA, an agency action inconsistent with any valid and binding rule or regulation is actionable by anyone “aggrieved” by it. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 702, 706(2)(A); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 264 U. S. App. D. C. 219, 223, 235, 828 F. 2d 799, 803, 815 (1987); Padula v. Webster, 261 U. S. App. D. C. 365, 368, 822 F. 2d 97, 100 (1987). 1 do not agree with Justice Stevens that, even if OMB Circular A-76 is an applicable law, § 7117(a)(1) precludes bargaining over the Union proposal because the Circular is also a “ ‘Government-wide rule or regulation.’” See post, at 938. Section 7117(a)(1) provides: “[T]he duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation.” I agree with Justice Stevens that the Circular is a Government-wide rule or regulation, but I do not read the provision to bar a union proposal that asks only that an existing rule or regulation be incorporated in its entirety into the union’s collective-bargaining agreement. The function of § 7117(a)(1) appears to be to insulate from the bargaining process union efforts to change anything that has already been settled by those with authority over the agency — e. g., Congress, the President, or OMB. The two clauses in § 7117(a)(1) explain that a union proposal in direct conflict with, or covering the same ground as, a Government-wide rule or regulation is not bargainable. They establish a kind of pre-emption by which agencies may not adopt rules where those with greater authority have adopted a contrary rule or occupied the field. Thus, no purpose is served by including the rule or regulation itself within “matters which are the subject of” any Government-wide rule or regulation. Incorporating a Government-wide rule into a collective-bargaining agreement does not place the agency at odds with any greater authority. That the Authority found below that OMB Circular A-76 is a “law, rule, or regulation” under § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii), see 27 F. L. R. A., at 978, does not undermine the validity of its decision even if its definition of “law, rule, or regulation” was too narrow. If the Circular fit within an overly restrictive definition of the phrase, a fortiori, it must fit within an appropriately broad definition. Moreover, the FLRA’s finding that the Union’s proposal did not interfere with reserved management rights because OMB Circular A-76 is encompassed by the term “applicable laws” is sufficient ground in itself for the decision and was relied on as such by the Authority. See 27 F. L. R. A., at 979.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BABBITT, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, et al. v. SWEET HOME CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON et al. No. 94-859. Argued April 17, 1995 — Decided June 29, 1995 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 708. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 714. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Beth S. Brink-mann, Martin W. Matzen, Ellen J. Durkee, and Jean E. Williams. John A. Macleod argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Steven P. Quarles, Clifton S. Elgar-ten, Thomas R. Lundquist, and William R. Murray. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Environmental Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Brent L. Brandenburg; for Friends of Animals, Inc., by Herman Kaufman; for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by Patti A Goldman and Todd D. Trice; and for Scientist John Cairns, Jr., et al. by Wm. Robert Irvin, Timothy Eichenberg, and Patrick A Parenteau. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Arizona ex rel. M. J. Hassel, Arizona State Land Commissioner, et al. by Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Mary Mangotich Grier, Assistant Attorney General, and Gale A Norton, Attorney General of Colorado; for the State of California et al. by Daniel Lungren, Attorney General of California, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Getz TV, Assistant Attorney General, and Linus Ma-souredis, Deputy Attorney General, and for the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Don Sten-berg of Nebraska, and Jan Graham of Utah; for the State of Texas by Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, Javier Aguilar and Sam Goodhope, Special Assistant Attorneys General, and Paul Terrill and Eugene Montes, Assistant Attorneys General; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Michael F. Rosenblum, John J. Rademacher, Richard L. Krause, Nancy N. McDonough, Carolyn S. Richardson, Douglas G. Caroom, and Sydney W. Falk, Jr.; for Anderson & Middleton Logging Co., Inc., by Mark C. Kutzick and J. J. Leary, Jr.; for Cargill, Inc., by Louis F. Claiborne, Edgar B. Washburn, and David Ivester; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Virginia S. Albrecht, Robin S. Conrad, Ted R. Brown, and Ralph W. Holmen; for the Competitive Enterprise Institute by Sam Kazman; for the Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Association et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Florida Legal Foundation et al. by Michael L. Rosen and G. Stephen Parker; for the Institute for Justice by Richard A Epstein, William H. Mellor III, and Clint Bolick; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by D. Barton Doyle; for the National Cattlemen’s Association et al. by Roger J. Marzulla, Michael T. Lempres, and William G. Myers III; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by William Perry Pendley; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Robin L. Rivett; for the State Water Contractors et al. by Gregory K. Wilkinson, Eric L. Garner, Thomas W. Birmingham, and Stuart L. Somach; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Albert Gidari, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar; and for Congressman Bill Baker et al. by Virginia S. Albrecht. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman, Kenneth S. Kamlet, and Duane J. Desiderio; and for the Navajo Nation et al. by Scott B. McElroy, Lester K. Taylor, Daniel H. Israel, and Stanley Pollack. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act), 87 Stat. 884,16 U. S. C. § 1631 (1988 ed. and'Supp. V), contains a variety of protections designed to save from extinction species that the Secretary of the Interior designates as endangered or threatened. Section 9 of the Act makes it unlawful for any person to “take” any endangered or threatened species. The Secretary has promulgated a regulation that defines the statute’s prohibition on takings to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.” This case presents the question whether the Secretary exceeded his authority under the Act by promulgating that regulation. I Section 9(a)(1) of the Act provides the following protection for endangered species: “Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to— “(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States.” 16 U. S. C. § 1538(a)(1). Section 3(19) of the Act defines the statutory term “take”: “The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U. S. C. § 1532(19). The Act does not further define the terms it uses to define “take.” The Interior Department regulations that implement the statute, however, define the statutory term “harm”: “Harm, in the definition of ‘take’ in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” 50 CFR § 17.3 (1994). This regulation has been in place since 1975. A limitation on the §9 “take” prohibition appears in § 10(a)(1)(B) of the Act, which Congress added by amendment in 1982. That section authorizes the Secretary to grant a permit for any taking otherwise prohibited by § 9(a)(1)(B) “if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” 16 U. S. C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). In addition to the prohibition on takings, the Act provides several other protections for endangered species. Section 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1533, commands the Secretary to identify species of fish or wildlife that are in danger of extinction and to publish from time to time lists of all species he determines to be endangered or threatened. Section 5, 16 U. S. C. § 1534, authorizes the Secretary, in cooperation with the States, see § 1535, to acquire land to aid in preserving such species. Section 7 requires federal agencies to ensure that none of their activities, including the granting of licenses and permits, will jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species “or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary ... to be critical.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). Respondents in this action are small landowners, logging companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their interests. They brought this declaratory judgment action against petitioners, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the statutory validity of the Secretary’s regulation defining “harm,” particularly the inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in the definition. Respondents challenged the regulation on its face. Their complaint alleged that application of the “harm” regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species, and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species, had injured them economically. App. 17-23. Respondents advanced three arguments to support their submission that Congress did not intend the word “take” in § 9 to include habitat modification, as the Secretary’s “harm” regulation provides. First, they correctly noted that language in the Senate’s original version of the ESA would have defined “take” to include “destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range” of fish or wildlife, but the Senate deleted that language from the bill before enacting it. Second, respondents argued that Congress intended the Act’s express authorization for the Federal Government to buy private land in order to prevent habitat degradation in § 5 to be the exclusive check against habitat modification on private property. Third, because the Senate added the term “harm” to the definition of “take” in a floor amendment without debate, respondents argued that the court should not interpret the term so expansively as to include habitat modification. The District Court considered and rejected each of respondents’ arguments, finding “that Congress intended an expansive interpretation of the word ‘take,’ an interpretation that encompasses habitat modification.” 806 F. Supp. 279, 285 (1992). The court noted that in 1982, when Congress was aware of a judicial decision that had applied the Secretary’s regulation, see Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F. 2d 495 (CA9 1981) (Palila I), it amended the Act without using the opportunity to change the definition of “take.” 806 F. Supp., at 284. The court stated that, even had it found the ESA “‘silent or ambiguous’” as to the authority for the Secretary’s definition of “harm,” it would nevertheless have upheld the regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id., at 285 (quoting Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984)). The District Court therefore entered summary judgment for petitioners and dismissed respondents’ complaint. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals initially affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 1 F. 3d 1 (CADC 1993). After granting a petition for rehearing, however, the panel reversed. 17 F. 3d 1463 (CADC 1994). Although acknowledging that “[t]he potential breadth of the word ‘harm’ is indisputable,” id., at 1464, the majority concluded that the immediate statutory context in which “harm” appeared counseled against a broad reading; like the other words in the definition of “take,” the word “harm” should be read as applying only to “the perpetrator’s direct application of force against the animal taken .... The forbidden acts fit, in ordinary language, the basic model ‘A hit B.’ ” Id., at 1465. The majority based its reasoning on a canon of statutory construction called noscitur a sociis, which holds that a word is known by the company it keeps. See Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 708-709 (1878). The majority claimed support for its construction from a decision of the Ninth Circuit that narrowly construed the word “harass” in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1372(a)(2)(A), see United States v. Hayashi, 5 F. 3d 1278, 1282 (1993); from the legislative history of the ESA; from its view that Congress must not have intended the purportedly broad curtailment of private property rights that the Secretary’s interpretation permitted; and from the ESA’s land acquisition provision in §5 and restriction on federal agencies’ activities regarding habitat in §7, both of which the court saw as evidence that Congress had not intended the §9 “take” prohibition to reach habitat modification. Most prominently, the court performed a lengthy analysis of the 1982 amendment to §10 that provided for “incidental take permits” and concluded that the amendment did not change the meaning of the term “take” as defined in the 1973 statute. Chief Judge Mikva, who had announced the panel's original decision, dissented. See 17 F. 3d, at 1473. In his view, a proper application of Chevron indicated that the Secretary had reasonably defined “harm,” because respondents had failed to show that Congress unambiguously manifested its intent to exclude habitat modification from the ambit of “take.” Chief Judge Mikva found the majority’s reliance on noscitur a sociis inappropriate in light of the statutory language and unnecessary in light of the strong support in the legislative history for the Secretary’s interpretation. He did not find the 1982 “incidental take permit” amendment alone sufficient to vindicate the Secretary’s definition of “harm,” but he believed the amendment provided additional support for that definition because it reflected Congress’ view in 1982 that the definition was reasonable. The Court of Appeals’ decision created a square conflict with a 1988 decision of the Ninth Circuit that had upheld the Secretary’s definition of “harm.” See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F. 2d 1106 (1988) (Palila II). The Court of Appeals neither cited nor distinguished Palila II, despite the stark contrast between the Ninth Circuit’s holding and its own. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 513 U. S. 1072 (1995). Our consideration of the text and structure of the Act, its legislative history, and the significance of the 1982 amendment persuades us that the Court of Appeals’ judgment should be reversed. II Because this case was decided on motions for summary-judgment, we may appropriately make certain factual assumptions in order to frame the legal issue. First, we assume respondents have no desire to harm either the red-cockaded woodpecker or the spotted owl; they merely wish to continue logging activities that would be entirely proper if not prohibited by the ESA. On the other hand, we must assume, arguendo, that those activities will have the effect, even though unintended, of detrimentally changing the natural habitat of both listed species and that, as a consequence, members of those species will be killed or injured. Under respondents’ view of the law, the Secretary’s only means of forestalling that grave result — even when the actor knows it is certain to occur — is to use his §5 authority to purchase the lands on which the survival of the species depends. The Secretary, on the other hand, submits that the § 9 prohibition on takings, which Congress defined to include “harm,” places on respondents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to § 10. The text of the Act provides three reasons for concluding that the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable. First, an ordinary understanding of the word “harm” supports it. The dictionary definition of the verb form of “harm” is “to cause hurt or damage to: injure.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1034 (1966). In the context of the ESA, that definition naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened species. Respondents argue that the Secretary should have limited the purview of “harm” to direct applications of force against protected species, but the dictionary definition does not include the word “directly” or suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads to injury constitutes “harm.” Moreover, unless the statutory term “harm” encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries, the word has no meaning that does not duplicate the meaning of other words that §3 uses to define “take.” A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage supports the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988). Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary’s decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978), we described the Act as “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.” Id., at 180. Whereas predecessor statutes enacted in 1966 and 1969 had not contained any sweeping prohibition against the taking of endangered species except on federal lands, see id., at 175, the 1973 Act applied to all land in the United States and to the Nation’s territorial seas. As stated in § 2 of the Act, among its central purposes is “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved . . . .” 16 U. S. C. § 1531(b). In Hill, we construed § 7 as precluding the completion of the Tellico Dam because of its predicted impact on the survival of the snail darter. See 437 U. S., at 193. Both our holding and the language in our opinion stressed the importance of the statutory policy. “The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute,” we recognized, “was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute.” Id., at 184. Although the §9 “take” prohibition was not at issue in Hill, we took note of that prohibition, placing particular emphasis on the Secretary’s inclusion of habitat modification in his definition of “harm.” In light of that provision for habitat protection, we could “not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without ‘harming’ the snail darter.” Id., at 184, n. 30. Congress’ intent to provide comprehensive protection for endangered and threatened species supports the permissibility of the Secretary’s “harm” regulation. Respondents advance strong arguments that activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable harm will not violate the Act as construed in the “harm” regulation. Respondents, however, present a facial challenge to the regulation. Cf. Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U. S. 143, 155-156, n. 6 (1995); INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U. S. 183, 188 (1991). Thus, they ask us to invalidate the Secretary’s understanding of “harm” in every circumstance, even when an actor knows that an activity, such as draining a pond, would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its habitat. Given Congress’ clear expression of the ESA’s broad purpose to protect endangered and threatened wildlife, the Secretary’s definition of “harm” is reasonable. Third, the fact that Congress in 1982 authorized the Secretary to issue permits for takings that § 9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, “if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity,” 16 U. S. C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), strongly suggests that Congress understood § 9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 274-275 (1974). The permit process requires the applicant to prepare a “conservation plan” that specifies how he intends to “minimize and mitigate” the “impact” of his activity on endangered and threatened species, 16 U. S. C. § 1539(a)(2)(A), making clear that Congress had in mind foreseeable rather than merely accidental effects on listed species. No one could seriously request an “incidental” take permit to avert §9 liability for direct, deliberate action against a member of an endangered' or threatened species, but respondents would read “harm” so narrowly that the permit procedure would have little more than that absurd purpose. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 397 (1995). Congress’ addition of the § 10 permit provision supports the Secretary’s conclusion that activities not intended to harm an endangered species, such as habitat modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the Secretary permits them. The Court of Appeals made three errors in asserting that “harm” must refer to a direct application of force because the words around it do. First, the court’s premise was flawed. Several of the words that accompany “harm” in the § 3 definition of “take,” especially “harass,” “pursue,” “wound,” and “kill,” refer to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force. Second, to the extent the court read a requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to define “take,” it ignored § ll’s express provision that a “know-in[g]” action is enough to violate the Act. Third, the court employed noscitur a sociis to give “harm” essentially the same function as other words in the definition, thereby denying it independent meaning. The canon, to the contrary, counsels that a word “gathers meaning from the words around it.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961). The statutory context of “harm” suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with, but distinct from, the functions of the other verbs used to define “take.” The Secretary’s interpretation of “harm” to include indirectly injuring endangered animals through habitat modification permissibly interprets “harm” to have “a character of its own not to be submerged by its association.” Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 514, 519 (1923). Nor does the Act’s inclusion of the § 5 land acquisition authority and the § 7 directive to federal agencies to avoid destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat alter our conclusion. Respondents’ argument that the Government lacks any incentive to purchase land under §5 when it can simply prohibit takings under § 9 ignores the practical considerations that attend enforcement of the ESA. Purchasing habitat lands may well cost the Government less in many circumstances than pursuing civil or criminal penalties. In addition, the § 5 procedure allows for protection of habitat before the seller’s activity has harmed any endangered animal, whereas the Government cannot enforce the § 9 prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or injured. The Secretary may also find the § 5 authority useful for preventing'modification of land that is not yet but may in the future become habitat for an endangered or threatened species. The §7 directive applies only to the Federal Government, whereas the § 9 prohibition applies to “any person.” Section 7 imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifications that §9 does not replicate, and §7 does not limit its admonition to habitat modification that “actually kills or injures wildlife.” Conversely, §7 contains limitations that §9 does not, applying only to actions “likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species,” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2), and to modifications of habitat that has been designated “critical” pursuant to § 4, 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2). Any overlap that § 5 or §7 may have with §9 in particular cases is unexceptional, see, e. g., Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 24, and n. 2 (1983), and simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act set out in § 2 and acknowledged in TVA v. Hill. We need not decide whether the statutory definition of “take” compels the Secretary’s interpretation of “harm,” because our conclusions that Congress did not unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt respondents’ view and that the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case. See generally Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1986). H-t H — t Our conclusion that the Secretary’s definition of “harm rests on a permissible construction of the ESA gains further support from the legislative history of the statute. The Committee Reports accompanying the bills that became the ESA do not specifically discuss the meaning of “harm,” but they make clear that Congress intended “take” to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions. The Senate Report stressed that “‘[t]ake’ is defined ... in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can ‘take’ or attempt to ‘take’ any fish or wildlife.” S. Rep. No. 93-307, p. 7 (1973). The House Report stated that “the broadest possible terms” were used to define restrictions on takings. H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 15 (1973). The House Report underscored the breadth of the “take” definition by noting that it included “harassment, whether intentional or not.” Id., at 11 (emphasis added). The Report explained that the definition “would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young.” Ibid. These comments, ignored in the dissent’s welcome but selective foray into legislative history, see post, at 726-729, support the Secretary’s interpretation that the term “take” in § 9 reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters and trappers. Two endangered species bills, S. 1592 and S. 1983, were introduced in the Senate and referred to the Commerce Committee. Neither bill included the word “harm” in its definition of “take,” although the definitions otherwise closely resembled the one that appeared in the bill as ultimately enacted. See Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7, 27 (1973) (hereinafter Hearings). Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate, subsequently introduced a floor amendment that added “harm” to the definition, noting that this and accompanying amendments would “help to achieve the purposes of the bill.” 119 Cong. Rec. 25683 (1973). Respondents argue that the lack of debate about the amendment that added “harm” counsels in favor of a narrow interpretation. We disagree. An obviously broad word that the Senate went out of its way to add to an important statutory definition is precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful reading. The definition of “take” that originally appeared in S. 1983 differed from the definition as ultimately enacted in one other significant respect: It included “the destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range” of fish and wildlife. Hearings, at 27. Respondents make much of the fact that the Commerce Committee removed this phrase from the “take” definition before S. 1983 went to the floor. See 119 Cong. Rec. 25663 (1973). We do not find that fact especially significant. The legislative materials contain no indication, why the habitat protection provision was deleted. That provision differed greatly from the regulation at issue today. Most notably, the habitat protection provision in S. 1983 would have applied far more broadly than the regulation does because it made adverse habitat modification a categorical violation of the “take” prohibition, unbounded by the regulation’s limitation to habitat modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. The S. 1983 language also failed to qualify “modification” with the regulation’s limiting adjective “significant.” We do not believe the Senate’s unelabo-rated disavowal of the provision in S. 1983 undermines the reasonableness of the more moderate habitat protection in the Secretary’s “harm” regulation. The history of the 1982 amendment that gave the Secretary authority to grant permits for “incidental” takings provides further support for his reading of the Act. The House Report expressly states that “[b]y use of the word ‘incidental’ the Committee intends to cover situations in which it is known that a taking will occur if the other activity is engaged in but such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-567, p. 31 (1982). This reference to the foreseeability of incidental takings undermines respondents’ argument that the 1982 amendment covered only accidental killings of endangered and threatened animals that might occur in the course of hunting or trapping other animals. Indeed, Congress had habitat modification directly in mind: Both the Senate Report and the House Conference Report identified as the model for the permit process a cooperative state-federal response to a case in California where a development project threatened incidental harm to a species of endangered butterfly by modification of its habitat. See S. Rep. No. 97-418, p. 10 (1982); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, pp. 30-32 (1982). Thus, Congress in 1982 focused squarely on the aspect of the “harm” regulation at issue in this litigation. Congress’ implementation of a permit program is consistent with the Secretary’s interpretation of the term “harm.” IV When it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 1533, 1540(f). The task of defining and listing endangered and threatened species requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of Congress. Fashioning appropriate standards for issuing permits under § 10 for takings that would otherwise violate § 9 necessarily requires the exercise of broad discretion. The proper interpretation of a term such as “harm” involves a complex policy choice. When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for his. See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 865-866. In this case, that reluctance accords with our conclusion, based on the text, structure, and legislative history of the ESA, that the Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he defined “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife.” In the elaboration and enforcement of the ESA, the Secretary and all persons who must comply with the law will confront difficult questions of proximity and degree; for, as all recognize, the Act encompasses a vast range of economic and social enterprises and endeavors. These questions must be addressed in the usual course of the law, through case-by-case resolution and adjudication. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The Act defines the term “endangered species” to mean “any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.” 16 U.S. C. §1532(6). The Secretary, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, originally promulgated the regulation in 1975 and amended it in 1981 to emphasize that actual death or injury of a protected animal is necessary for a violation. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44412,44416 (1975); 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750 (1981). Respondents also argued in the District Court that the Secretary’s definition of “harm” is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, but they do not press that argument here. The woodpecker was listed as an endangered species in 1970 pursuant to the statutory predecessor of the ESA. See 50 CFR § 17.11(h) (1994), issued pursuant to the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 275. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26114 (1990). Another regulation promulgated by the Secretary extends to threatened species, defined in the ESA as “any .species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” 16 U. S. C. § 1532(20), some but not all of the protections endangered species enjoy. See 50 CFR § 17.31(a) (1994). In the District Court respondents unsuccessfully challenged that regulation’s extension of § 9 to threatened species, but they do not press the challenge here. Senate 1983, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1973). Judge Sentelle filed a partial concurrence in which he declined to join the portions of the court’s opinion that relied on legislative history. See 17 F. 3d 1463, 1472 (CADC 1994). The 1982 amendment had formed the basis on which the author of the majority’s opinion on rehearing originally voted to affirm the judgment of the District Court. Compare 1 F. 3d 1, 11 (CADC 1993) (Williams, J., concurring in part), with 17 F. 3d, at 1467-1472. As discussed above, the Secretary’s definition of “harm” is limited to “act[s] which actually kil[l] or injurie] wildlife.” 50 CFR §17.3 (1994). In addition, in order to be subject to the Act’s criminal penalties or the more severe of its civil penalties, one must “knowingly violatfe]” the Act or its implementing regulations. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1540(a)(1), (b)(1). Congress added “knowingly” in place of “willfully” in 1978 to make “criminal violations of the act a general rather than a specific intent crime.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804, p. 26 (1978). The Act does authorize up to a $500 civil fine for “[a]ny person who otherwise violates” the Act or its implementing regulations. 16 U. S. C. § 1540(a)(1). That provision is potentially sweeping, but it would be so with or without the Secretary’s “harm” regulation, making it unhelpful in assessing the reasonableness of the regulation. We have imputed scienter requirements to criminal statutes that impose sanctions without expressly requiring scienter, see, e. g., Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), but the proper case in which we might consider whether to do so in the § 9 provision for a $500 civil penalty would be a challenge to enforcement of that provision itself, not a challenge to a regulation that merely defines a statutory term. We do not agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that are not “even foreseeable ... no matter how long the chain of causality between modification and injury.” Post, at 715. Respondents have suggested no reason why either the “knowingly violates” or the “otherwise violates” provision of the statute — or the “harm” regulation itself — should not be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability. In any event, neither respondents nor their amici have suggested that the Secretary employs the “otherwise violates” provision with any frequency. Respondents and the dissent emphasize what they portray as the “established meaning” of “take” in the sense of a “wildlife take,” a meaning respondents argue extends only to “the effort to exercise dominion over some creature, and the concrete effect of [sic] that creature.” Brief for Respondents 19; see post, at 717-718. This limitation ill serves the statutory text, which forbids not taking “some creature” but “tak[ing] any [endangered] species" — a formidable task for even the most rapacious feudal lord. More importantly, Congress explicitly defined the operative term “take” in the ESA, no matter how much the dissent wishes otherwise, see post, at 717-720, 722-723, thereby obviating the need for us to probe its meaning as we must probe the meaning of the undefined subsidiary term “harm.” Finally, Congress’ definition of “take” includes several words— most obviously “harass,” “pursue,” and “wound,” in addition to “harm” itself — that fit respondents’ and the dissent’s definition of “take” no better than does “significant habitat modification or degradation.” In contrast, if the statutory term “harm” encompasses such indirect means of killing and injuring wildlife as habitat modification, the other terms listed in §3 — “harass,” “pursue,” “hunt,” “shoot,” “wound,” “kill,” “trap,” “capture,” and “collect” — generally retain independent meanings. Most of those terms refer to deliberate actions more frequently than does “harm,” and they therefore do not duplicate the sense of indirect causation that “harm” adds to the statute. In addition, most of the other words in the definition describe either actions from which habitat modification does not usually result (e. g., “pursue,” “harass”) or effects to which activities that modify habitat do not usually lead (e. g., “trap,” “collect”). To the extent the Secretary’s definition of “harm” may have applications .that overlap with other words in the definition, that overlap reflects the broad purpose of the Act. See infra this page and 699-700. We stated: “The Secretary of the Interior has defined the term ‘harm’ to mean ‘an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of “harm.”’” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 184-185, n. 30 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). The dissent incorrectly asserts that the Secretary’s regulation (1) “dispenses with the foreseeability of harm” and (2) “fail[s] to require injury to particular animals,” post, at 731. As to the first assertion, the regulation merely implements the statute, and it is therefore subject to the statute’s “knowingly violates” language, see 16 U. S. C. §§ 1540(a)(1), (b)(1), and ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability. See n. 9, supra. Nothing in the regulation purports to weaken those requirements. To the contrary, the word “actually” in the regulation should be construed to limit the liability about which the dissent appears most concerned, liability under the statute’s “otherwise violates” provision. See n. 9, supra; post, at 721-722, 732-733. The Secretary did not need to include “actually” to connote “but for” causation, which the other words in the definition obviously require. As to the dissent’s second assertion, every term in the regulation’s definition of “harm” is subservient to the phrase “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.” The dissent acknowledges the legislative history’s clear indication that the drafters of the 1982 amendment had habitat modification in mind, see post; at 730, but argues that the text of the amendment requires a contrary conclusion. This argument overlooks the statute’s requirement of a “conservation plan,” which must describe an alternative to a known, but undesired, habitat modification. The dissent makes no effort to defend the Court of Appeals’ reading of the statutory definition as requiring a direct application of force. Instead, it tries to impose on § 9 a limitation of liability to “affirmative conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals.” Post, at 720. Under the dissent’s interpretation of the Act, a developer could drain a pond, knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered species of turtles, without even proposing a conservation plan or applying for a permit under § 10(a)(1)(B); unless the developer was motivated by a desire “to get at a turtle,” post, at 721, no statutory taking could occur. Because such conduct would not constitute a taking at common law, the dissent would shield it from § 9 liability, even though the words “kill” and “harm” in the statutory definition could apply to such deliberate conduct. We cannot accept that limitation. In any event, our reasons for rejecting the Court of Appeals’ interpretation apply as well to the dissent’s novel construction. Respondents’ reliance on United States v. Hayashi, 22 F. 3d 859 (CA9 1993), is also misplaced. Hayashi construed the term “harass,” part of the definition of “take” in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1361 et seq., as requiring a “direct intrusion” on wildlife to support a criminal prosecution. 22 F. 3d, at 864. Hayashi dealt with a challenge to a single application of a statute whose “take” definition includes neither “harm” nor several of the other words that appear in the ESA definition. Moreover, Hayashi was decided by a panel of the Ninth Circuit, the same court that had previously upheld the regulation at issue here in Palila II, 852 F. 2d 1106 (1988). Neither the Hayashi majority nor the dissent saw any need to distinguish or even to cite Palila II. Congress recognized that §§7 and 9 are not coextensive as to federal agencies when, in the wake of our decision in Hill in 1978, it added § 7(b), 16 U. S. C. § 1536(0), to the Act. That section provides that any federal project subject to exemption from §7, 16 U. S. C. § 1536(h), will also be exempt from § 9. Respondents also argue that the rule of lenity should foreclose any deference to the Secretary’s interpretation of the ESA because the statute includes criminal penalties. The rule of lenity is premised on two ideas: First, “ ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed’ second, “legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347-350 (1971) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931)). We have applied the rule of lenity in a case raising a narrow question concerning the application of a statute that contains criminal sanctions to a specific factual dispute — whether pistols with short barrels and attachable shoulder stocks are short-barreled rifles — where no regulation was present. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517-518, and n. 9 (1992). We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement. Even if there exist regulations whose interpretations of statutory criminal penalties provide such inadequate notice of potential liability as to offend the rule of lenity, the “harm” regulation, which has existed for two decades and gives a fair warning of its consequences, cannot be one of them. Respondents place heavy reliance for their argument that Congress intended the §5 land acquisition provision and not §9 to be the ESA’s remedy for habitat modification on a floor statement by Senator Tunney: “Many species have been inadvertently exterminated by a negligent destruction of their habitat. Their habitats have been cut in size, polluted, or otherwise altered so that they are unsuitable environments for natural populations of fish and wildlife. Under this bill, we can take steps to make amends for our negligent encroachment. The Secretary would be empowered to use the land acquisition authority granted to him in certain existing legislation to acquire land for the use of the endangered species programs. . . . Through these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction. “Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction of their natural habitats, a significant portion of these animals are subject to predation by man for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions in S. 1983 would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of endangered species . .. .” 119 Cong. Rec. 25669 (1973). Similarly, respondents emphasize a floor statement by Representative Sullivan, the House floor manager for the ESA: “For the most part, the principal threat to animals stems from destruction of their habitat. . . . H. R. 37 will meet this problem by providing funds for acquisition of critical habitat It will also enable the Department of Agriculture to cooperate with willing landowners who desire to assist in the protection of endangered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost to themselves. “Another hazard to endangered species arises from those who would capture or kill them for pleasure or profit. There is no way that Congress can make it less pleasurable for a person to take an animal, but we can certainly make it less profitable for them to do so.” Id., at 30162. Each of these statements merely explained features of the bills that Congress eventually enacted in §5 of the ESA and went on to discuss elements enacted in § 9. Neither statement even suggested that § 5 would be the Act’s exclusive remedy for habitat modification by private landowners or that habitat modification by private landowners stood outside the ambit of § 9. Respondents’ suggestion that these statements identified § 5 as the ESA’s only response to habitat modification contradicts their emphasis elsewhere on the habitat protections in § 7. See supra, at 702-703.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC. et al. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. No. 00-511. Argued October 10, 2001 — Decided May 13, 2002 William, P. Barr argued the cause for Verizon Communications, Inc., et al., petitioners in No. 00-511, and for BellSouth Corp. et al., respondents in Nos. 00-555, etc. With him on the briefs were M. Edward Whelan, Patrick F. Philbin, Michael E. Glover, Mark L. Evans, Michael K. Kellogg, Henk Brands, Charles R. Morgan, James G. Harralson, Andrew G. McBride, Scott Delacourt, Roger K. Toppins, Gary Phillips, Sean A. Lev, and Steven G Bradbury. Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the federal parties, petitioners in Nos. 00-587, etc., and respondents in No. 00-511. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Nannes, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Barbara McDowell, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, Nancy C. Garrison, and Laurence N. Bourne. David P. Murray filed briefs for respondent Sprint Corporation in Nos. 00-511, etc., in support of petitioner federal parties and in opposition to petitioners Verizon Communications, Inc., et al. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., argued the cause for WorldCom, Inc., et al., petitioners in No. 00-555 and respondents in No. 00-511, and for AT&T Corp., petitioner in No. 00-590 and respondent in Nos. 00-511, etc. With him on the briefs for WorldCom, Inc., et al. were Jodie L. Kelley, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Thomas F. O’Neil III, William Single IV, Carol Ann Bischoff, Robert M. McDowell, and Robert J. Aamoth. David W. Carpenter, Peter D. Keisler, Stephen B. Kinnaird, C. Frederick Beckner III, and Mark C. Rosen-blum filed briefs for AT&T. Briefs for respondents in Nos. 00-511, etc., were filed by Irwin A. Popowsky for the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates, by James Bradford Ramsay and Lawrence G. Malone for the Public Service Commission of New York et al., and by William T. Lake, John H. Har- wood II, and Robert B. McKennna for Qwest Communications International, Inc. Together with No. 00-555, WorldCom, Inc., et al. v. Verizon Communications Inc. et al., No. 00-587, Federal Communications Commission et al. v. Iowa Utilities Board et al., No. 00-590, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board et al., and No. 00-602, General Communications, Inc. v. Iowa Utilities Board et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Harisha J. Bastiampillai and Morton J. Posner filed a brief for Allegiance Telecom, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 00-511. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases arise under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Each is about the power of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate a relationship between monopolistic companies providing local telephone service and companies entering local markets to compete with the incumbents. Under the Act, the new entrants are entitled, among other things, to lease elements of the local telephone networks from the incumbent monopolists. The issues are whether the FCC is authorized (1) to require state utility commissions to set the rates charged by the incumbents for leased elements on a forward-looking basis untied to the incumbents’ investment, and (2) to require incumbents to combine such elements at the entrants’ request when they lease them to the entrants. We uphold the FCC’s assumption and exercise of authority on both issues. I The 1982 consent decree settling the Government’s antitrust suit against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) divested AT&T of its local-exchange carriers, leaving AT&T as a long-distance and equipment company, and limiting the divested carriers to the provision of local telephone service. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (DC 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U. S. 1001 (1983). The decree did nothing, however, to increase competition in the persistently monopolistic local markets, which were thought to be the root of natural monopoly in the telecommunications industry. See S. Benjamin, D. Lichtman, & H. Shelanski, Telecommunications Law and Policy 682 (2001) (hereinafter Benjamin et al.); P. Huber, M. Kellogg, & J. Thorne, Federal Telecommunications Law §2.1.1, pp. 84-85 (2d ed. 1999) (hereinafter Huber et al.); W. Baumol & J. Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony 7-10 (1994); S. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 291-292, 314 (1982). These markets were addressed by provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act or Act), Pub L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, that were intended to eliminate the monopolies enjoyed by the inheritors of AT&T’s local franchises; this objective was considered both an end in itself and an important step toward the Act’s other goals of boosting competition in broader markets and revising the mandate to provide universal telephone service. See Benjamin et al. 716. Two sets of related provisions for opening local markets •concern us here. First, Congress required incumbent local-exchange carriers to share their own facilities and services on terms to be agreed upon with new entrants in their markets. 47 U. S. C. § 251(c) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Second, knowing that incumbents and prospective entrants would sometimes disagree on prices for facilities or services, Congress directed the FCC to prescribe methods for state commissions to use in setting rates that would subject both incumbents and entrants to the risks and incentives that a competitive market would produce. § 252(d). The particular method devised by the FCC for setting rates to be charged for interconnection and lease of network elements under the Act, § 252(d)(1), and regulations the FCC imposed to implement the statutory duty to share these elements, § 251(c)(3), are the subjects of this litigation, which must be understood against the background of ratemaking for public utilities in the United States and the structure of local exchanges made accessible by the Act. A Companies providing telephone service have traditionally been regulated as monopolistic public utilities. See J. Bon-bright, Principles of Public Utility Rates 3-5 (1st ed. 1961) (hereinafter Bonbright); I. Barnes, Economics of Public Utility Regulation 37-41 (1942) (hereinafter Barnes). At the dawn of modern utility regulation, in order to offset monopoly power and ensure affordable, stable public access to a utility’s goods or services, legislatures enacted rate schedules to fix the prices a utility could charge. See id., at 170-173; C. Phillips, Regulation of Public Utilities 111-112, and n. 5 (1984) (hereinafter Phillips). See, e. g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 470-476 (1898) (statement of case); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134 (1877). As this job became more complicated, legislatures established specialized administrative agencies, first local or state, then federal, to set and regulate rates. Barnes 173-175; Phillips 115-117. See, e. g., Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 433 (1913) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 342, 354-355 (1914) (jurisdictional dispute between ICC and Texas Railroad Commission). See generally T. Mc-Craw, Prophets of Regulation 11-65 (1984). The familiar mandate in the enabling Acts was to see that rates be “just and reasonable” and not discriminatory. Barnes 289. See, e. g., Transportation Act of 1920, 49 U. S. C. § 1(5) (1934 ed.). All rates were subject to regulation this way: retail rates charged directly to the public and wholesale rates charged among businesses involved in providing the goods or services offered by the retail utility. Intrastate retail rates were regulated by the States or municipalities, with those at wholesale generally the responsibility of the National Government, since the transmission or transportation involved was characteristically interstate. See Phillips 143. Historically, the classic scheme of administrative rate-setting at the federal level called for rates to be set out by the regulated utility companies in proposed tariff schedules, on the model applied to railroad carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,24 Stat. 379. After interested parties had had notice of the proposals and a chance to comment, the tariffs would be accepted by the controlling agency so long as they were “reasonable” (or “just and reasonable”) and not “unduly discriminatory.” Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1103, 1104-1105 (1940). See, e. g., Southern Pacific Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 433, 445 (1911). The States generally followed this same tariff-schedule model. Barnes 297-298. See, e. g., Smyth, supra, at 470-476. The way rates were regulated as between businesses (by the National Government) was in some respects, however, different from regulation of rates as between businesses and the public (at the state or local level). In wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged were often sophisticated businesses enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a “just and reasonable” rate as between the two of them. Accordingly, in the Federal Power Act of 1920,41 Stat. 1063, and again in the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, Congress departed from the scheme of purely tariff-based regulation and acknowledged that contracts between commercial buyers and sellers could be used in ratesetting, 16 U. S. C. §824d(d) (Federal Power Act); 15 U. S. C. §717c(c) (Natural Gas Act). See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 338-339 (1956). When commercial parties did avail themselves of rate agreements, the principal regulatory responsibility was not to relieve a contracting party of an unreasonable rate, FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 355 (1956) (“its improvident bargain”), but to protect against potential discrimination by favorable contract rates between allied businesses to the detriment of other wholesale customers. See ibid. Cf. New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 296 (1947) (“The principal evil at which the Interstate Commerce Act was aimed was discrimination in its various manifestations”). This Court once summed up matters at the wholesale level this way: “[WJhile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain. In such circumstances the sole concern of the Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest — as where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.” Sierra Pacific Power Co., supra, at 355 (citation omitted). See also United Gas Pipe Line Co., supra, at 345. Regulation of retail rates at the state and local levels was, on the other hand, focused more on the demand for “just and reasonable” rates to the public than on the perils of rate discrimination. See Barnes 298-299. Indeed, regulated local telephone markets evolved into arenas of state-sanctioned discrimination engineered by the public utility commissions themselves in the cause of “universal service.” Huber et al. 80-85. See also Vietor 167-185. In order to hold down charges for telephone service in rural markets with higher marginal costs due to lower population densities and lesser volumes of use, urban and business users were charged subsidizing premiums over the marginal costs of providing their own service. See Huber et al. 84. These cross subsidies between markets were not necessarily transfers between truly independent companies, however, thanks largely to the position attained by AT&T and its satellites. This was known as the “Bell system,” which by the mid-20th century had come to possess overwhelming monopoly power in all telephone markets nationwide, supplying local-exchange and long-distance services as well as equipment. Vietor 174-175. See also R. Garnet, Telephone Enterprise: Evolution of Bell System’s Horizontal Structure, 1876-1909, pp. 160-163 (1985) (Appendix A). The same pervasive market presence of Bell providers that made it simple to provide cross subsidies in aid of universal service, however, also frustrated conventional efforts to hold retail rates down. See Huber et al. 84-85. Before the Bell system’s predominance, regulators might have played competing carriers against one another to get lower rates for the public, see Cohen 47-50, but the strategy became virtually impossible once a single company had become the only provider in nearly every town and city across the country. This rejgulatory frustration led, in turn, to new thinking about just and reasonable retail rates and ultimately to these cases. The traditional regulatory notion of the “just and reasonable” rate was aimed at navigating the straits between gouging utility customers and confiscating utility property. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 603 (1944). See also Barnes 289-290; Bonbright 38. More than a century ago, reviewing courts charged with determining whether utility rates were sufficiently reasonable to avoid unconstitutional confiscation took as their touchstone the revenue that would be a “fair return” on certain utility property known as a “rate base.” The fair rate of return was usually set as the rate generated by similar investment property at the time of the rate proceeding, and in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., at 546, the Court held that the rate base must be calculated as “the fair value of the property being used by [the utility] for the convenience of the public.” In pegging the rate base at “fair value,” the Smyth Court consciously rejected the primary alternative standard, of capital actually invested to provide the public service or good. Id., at 543-546. The Court made this choice in large part to prevent “excessive valuation or fictitious capitalization” from artificially inflating the rate base, id., at 544, lest “‘[t]he public ... be subjected to unreasonable rates in order simply that stockholders may earn dividends,’” id., at 545 (quoting Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 596 (1896)). But Smyth proved to be a troublesome mandate, as Justice Brandéis, joined by Justice Holmes, famously observed 25 years later. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U. S. 276, 292 (1923) (dissenting opinion). The Smyth Court itself had described, without irony, the mind-numbing complexity of the required enquiry into fair value, as the alternative to historical investment: “[I]n order to ascertain [fair] value, original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property.” 169 U. S., at 546-547. To the bewildered, Smyth simply threw up its hands, prescribing no one method for limiting use of these numbers but declaring all such facts to be “relevant.” Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 262 U. S., at 294-298, and n. 6 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). What is more, the customary checks on calculations of value in other circumstances were hard to come by for a utility’s property; its costly facilities rarely changed hands and so were seldom tagged with a price a buyer would actually pay and a seller accept, id., at 292; West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U. S. 662, 672 (1935). Neither could reviewing courts resort to a utility’s revenue as an index of fair value, since its revenues were necessarily determined by the rates subject to review, with the rate of return applied to the very property subject to valuation. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U. S. 299, 309, n. 5 (1989); Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 601. Small wonder, then, that Justice Brandéis was able to demonstrate how basing rates on Smyth’s galactic notion of fair value could produce revenues grossly excessive or insufficient when gauged against the costs of capital. He gave the example (simplified) of a $1 million plant built with promised returns on the equity of $90,000 a year. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, at 304-306. If the value were to fall to $600,000 at the time of a rate proceeding, with the rate of return on similar investments then at 6 percent, Smyth would say a rate was not confiscatory if it returned at least $36,000, a shortfall of'$54,000 from the costs of capital. But if the value of the plant were to rise to $1,750,000 at the time of the rate proceeding, and the rate of return on comparable investments stood at 8 percent, then constitutionality under Smyth would require rates generating at least $140,000, $50,000 above capital costs. The upshot of Smyth, then, was the specter of utilities forced into bankruptcy by rates inadequate to pay off the costs of capital, even when a drop in value resulted from general economic decline, not imprudent investment; while in a robust economy, an investment no more prescient could claim what seemed a rapacious return on equity invested. Justice Brandéis accordingly advocated replacing “fair value” with a calculation of rate base on the cost of capital prudently invested in assets used for the provision of the public good or service, and although he did not live to enjoy success, his campaign against Smyth came to fruition in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944). In Hope Natural Gas, this Court disavowed the position that the Natural Gas Act and the Constitution required fair value as the sole measure of a rate base on which “just and reasonable” rates were to be calculated. Id., at 601-602. See also FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 602-606 (1942) (Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., concurring). In the matter under review, the Federal Power Commission had valued the rate base by using “actual legitimate cost” reflecting “sound depreciation and depletion practices,” and so had calculated a value roughly 25 percent below the figure generated by the natural-gas company’s fair-value methods using “estimated reproduction cost” and “trended original cost.” Hope Natural Gas, 320 U. S., at 596-598, and nn. 4-5. The Court upheld the Commission. “Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called ‘fair value’ rate base.” Id., at 605. Although Hope Natural Gas did not repudiate everything said in Smyth, since fair value was still “the end product of the process of rate-making,” 320 U. S., at 601, federal and state commissions setting rates in the aftermath of Hope Natural Gas largely abandoned the old fair-value approach and turned to methods of calculating the rate base on the basis of “cost.” A. Kahn, Economics of Regulations: Principles and Institutions 40-41 (1988). “Cost” was neither self-evident nor immune to confusion, however; witness the invocation of “reproduction cost” as a popular method for calculating fair value under Smyth, see n. 5, supra, and the Federal Power Commission’s rejection of “trended original cost” (apparently, a straight-line derivation from the cost of capital originally invested) in favor of “actual legitimate cost,” Hope Natural Gas, supra, at 596. Still, over time, general agreement developed on a method that was primus inter pares, and it is essentially a modern gloss on that method that the incumbent carriers say the FCC should have used to set the rates at issue here. The method worked out is not a simple calculation of rate base as the original cost of “prudently invested” capital that Justice Brandéis assumed, presumably by reference to the utility’s balance sheet at the time of the rate proceeding. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 262 U. S., at 304-306. Rather, “cost” came to mean “cost of service,” that is, the cost of prudently invested capital used to provide the service. Bonbright 173; P. Garfield & W. Lovejoy, Public Utility Economics 56 (1964). This was calculated subject to deductions for accrued depreciation and allowances for working capital, see Phillips 282-283 (table 8-1) (“a typical electric utility rate base”), naturally leading utilities to minimize depreciation by using very slow depreciation rates (on the assumption of long useful lives), and to maximize working capital claimed as a distinct rate-base constituent. This formula, commonly called the prudent-investment rule, addressed the natural temptations on the utilities’ part to claim a return on outlays producing nothing of value to the public. It was meant, on the one hand, to discourage unnecessary investment and the “fictitious capitalization” feared in Smyth, 169 U. S., at 543-546, and so to protect ratepayers from supporting excessive capacity, or abandoned, destroyed, or phantom assets. Kahn, Tardiff, & Weisman, Telecommunications Act at three years: an economic evaluation of its implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 Information Economics & Policy 319, 330, n. 27 (1999) (hereinafter Kahn, Telecommunications Act). At the same time, the prudent-investment rule was intended to give utilities an incentive to make smart investments deserving a “fair” return, and thus to mimic natural incentives in competitive markets (though without an eye to fostering the actual competition by which such markets are defined). In theory, then, the prudent-investment qualification gave the ratepayer an important protection by mitigating the tendency of a regulated market’s lack of competition to support monopolistic prices. But the mitigation was too little, the prudent-investment rule in practice often being no match for the capacity of utilities having all the relevant information to manipulate the rate base and renegotiate the rate of return every time a rate was set. The regulatory response in some markets was adoption of a rate-based method commonly called “price caps,” United States Telephone Assn. v. FCC, 188 F. 3d 521, 524 (CADC 1999), as, for example, by the FCC’s setting of maximum access charges paid to large local-exchange companies by interexchange carriers, In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6787, ¶ 1 (1990). The price-cap scheme starts with a rate generated by the conventional cost-of-service formula, which it takes as a benchmark to be decreased at an average of some 2-3 percent a year to reflect productivity growth, Kahn, Telecommunications Act 330-332, subject to an upward adjustment if necessary to reflect inflation or certain unavoidable “exogenous costs” on which the company is authorized to recover a return. 5 FCC Red., at 6787, ¶ 5. Although the price caps do not eliminate gamesmanship, since there are still battles to be fought over the productivity offset and allowable exogenous costs, United States Telephone Assn., supra, at 524, they do give companies an incentive “to improve productivity to the maximum extent possible,” by entitling those that outperform the productivity offset to keep resulting profits, 5 FCC Red., at 6787-6788, ¶¶7-9. Ultimately, the goal, as under the basic prudent-investment rule, is to encourage investment in more productive equipment. Before the passage of the 1996 Act, the price cap was, at the federal level, the final stage in a century of developing ratesetting methodology. What had changed throughout the era beginning with Smyth v. Ames was prevailing opinion on how to calculate the most useful rate base, with the disagreement between fair-value and cost advocates turning on whether invested capital was the key to the right balance between investors and ratepayers, and with the price-cap scheme simply being a rate-based offset to the utilities’ advantage of superior knowledge of the facts employed in cost-of-service fatemaking. What is remarkable about this evolution of just and reasonable ratesetting, however, is what did not change. The enduring feature of ratesetting from Smyth v. Ames to the institution of price caps was the idea that calculating a rate base and then allowing a fair rate of return on it was a sensible way to identify a range of rates that would be just and reasonable to investors and ratepayers. Equally enduring throughout the period was dissatisfaction with the successive rate-based variants. From the constancy of this dissatisfaction, one possible lesson was drawn by Congress in the 1996 Act, which was that regulation using the traditional rate-based methodologies gave monopolies too great an advantage and that the answer lay in moving away from the assumption common to all the rate-based methods, that the monopolistic structure within the discrete markets would endure. Under the local-competition provisions of the Act, Congress called for ratemaking different from any historical practice, to achieve the entirely new objective of uprooting the monopolies that traditional rate-based methods had perpetuated. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 113 (1996). A leading backer of the Act in the Senate put the new goal this way: “This is extraordinary in the sense of telling private industry that this is what they have to do in order to let the competitors come in and try to beat your economic brains out... . “It is kind of almost a jump-start.... I will do everything I have to let you into my business, because we used to be a bottleneck; we used to be a monopoly; we used to control everything. “Now, this legislation says you will not control much of anything. You will have to allow for nondiserimina-tory access on an unbundled basis to the network functions and services of the Bell operating companies network that is at least equal in type, quality, and price to the access [a] Bell operating company affords to itself.” 141 Cong. Rec. 15572 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Breaux (La.) on Pub. L. 104-104). For the first time, Congress passed a ratesetting statute with the aim not just to balance interests between sellers and buyers, but to reorganize markets by rendering regulated utilities’ monopolies vulnerable to interlopers, even if that meant swallowing the traditional federal reluctance to intrude into local telephone markets. The approach was deliberate, through a hybrid jurisdictional scheme with the FCC setting a basic, default methodology for use in setting rates when carriers fail to agree, but leaving it to state utility commissions to set the actual rates. While the Act is like its predecessors in tying the methodology to the objectives of “just and reasonable” and nondiscriminatory rates, 47 U. S. C. § 252(d)(1), it is radically unlike all previous statutes in providing that rates be set “without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding,” § 252(d)(l)(A)(i). The Act thus appears to be an explicit disavowal of the familiar public-utility model of rate regulation (whether in its fair-value or cost-of-service incarnations) presumably still being applied by many States for retail sales, see In re Implementation of Local Competition in Telecommunications Act of 1996,11 FCC Rcd. 15499, 15857, ¶704 (1996) (First Report and Order), in favor of novel ratesetting designed to give aspiring competitors every possible incentive to enter local retail telephone markets, short of confiscating the incumbents’ property. B The physical incarnation of such a market, a “local exchange,” is a network connecting terminals like telephones, faxes, and modems to other terminals within a geographical area like a city. From terminal network interface devices, feeder wires, collectively called the “local loop,” are run to local switches that aggregate traffic into common “trunks.” The local loop was traditionally, and is still largely, made of copper wire, though fiber-optic cable is also used, albeit to a far lesser extent than in long-haul markets. Just as the loop runs from terminals to local switches, the trunks run from the local switches to centralized, or tandem, switches, originally worked by hand but now by computer, which operate much like railway switches, directing traffic into other trunks. A signal is sent toward its destination terminal on these common ways so far as necessary, then routed back down another hierarchy of switches to the intended telephone or other equipment. A local exchange is thus a transportation network for communications signals, radiating like a root system from a “central office” (or several offices for larger areas) to individual telephones, faxes, and the like. It is easy to see why a company that owns a local exchange (what the Act calls an “incumbent local exchange carrier,” 47 U. S. C. § 251(h)) would have an almost insurmountable competitive advantage not only in routing calls within the exchange, but, through its control of this local market, in the markets for terminal equipment and long-distance calling as well. A newcomer could not compete with the incumbent carrier to provide local service without coming close to replicating the incumbent’s entire existing network, the most costly and difficult part of which would be laying down the “last mile” of feeder wire, the local loop, to the thousands (or millions) of terminal points in individual houses and businesses. The incumbent company could also control its local-loop plant so as to connect only with terminals it manufactured or selected, and could place conditions or fees (called “access charges”) on long-distance carriers seeking to connect with its network. In an unregulated world, another telecommunications carrier would be forced to comply with these conditions, or it could never reach the customers of a local exchange. II The 1996 Act both prohibits state and local regulation that impedes the provision of “telecommunications service,” § 253(a), and obligates incumbent carriers to allow competitors to enter their local markets, § 251(c). Section 251(c) addresses the practical difficulties of fostering local competition by recognizing three strategies that a potential competitor may pursue. First, a competitor entering the market (a “requesting” carrier, § 251(c)(2)) may decide to engage in pure facilities-based competition, that is, to build its own network to replace or supplement the network of the incumbent. If an entrant takes this course, the Act obligates the incumbent to “interconnect” the competitor’s facilities to its own network to whatever extent is necessary to allow the competitor’s facilities to operate. §§ 251(a) and (c)(2). At the other end of the spectrum, the statute permits an entrant to skip construction and instead simply to buy and resell “telecommunications service,” which the incumbent has a duty to sell at wholesale. §§ 251(b)(1) and (e)(4). Between these extremes, an entering competitor may choose to lease certain of an incumbent’s “network elements,” which the incumbent has a duty to provide “on an unbundled basis” at terms that are “just, reasonable, and nondiseriminatory.” § 251(c)(3). Since wholesale markets for companies engaged in resale, leasing, or interconnection of facilities cannot be created without addressing rates, Congress provided for rates to be set either by contracts between carriers or by state utility commission rate orders. §§ 252(a)-(b). Like other federal utility statutes that authorize contracts approved by a regulatory agency in setting rates between businesses, e. g., 16 U. S. C. § 824d(d) (Federal Power Act); 15 U. S. C. §717c(c) (Natural Gas Act), the Act permits incumbent and entering carriers to negotiate private rate agreements, 47 U. S. C. § 252(a); see also § 251(c)(1) (duty to negotiate in good faith). State utility commissions are required to accept any such agreement unless it discriminates against a carrier not a party to the contract, or is otherwise shown to be contrary .to the public interest. §§ 252(e)(1) and (e)(2)(A). Carriers, of course, might well not agree, in which case an entering carrier has a statutory option to request mediation by a state commission, § 252(a)(2). But the option comes with strings, for mediation subjects the parties to the duties specified in §251 and the pricing standards set forth in § 252(d), as interpreted by the FCC’s regulations, § 252(e)(2)(B). These regulations are at issue here. As to pricing, the Act provides that when incumbent and requesting carriers fail to agree, state commissions will set a “just and reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory” rate for interconnection or the lease of network elements based on “the cost of providing the ... network element,” which “may include a reasonable profit.” §252(d)(1). In setting these rates, the state commissions are, however, subject to that important limitation previously unknown to utility regulation: the rate must be “determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding.” Ibid. In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366, 384-385 (1999), this Court upheld the FCC’s jurisdiction to impose a new methodology on the States when setting these rates. The attack today is on the legality and logic of the particular methodology the Commission chose. As the Act required, six months after its effective date the FCC implemented the local-competition provisions in its First Report and Order, whieh included as an appendix the new regulations at issue. Challenges to the order, mostly by incumbent local-exchange carriers and state commissions, were consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120 F. 3d 753, 792 (1997), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 525 U. S. 366, 397 (1999). See also California v. FCC, 124 F. 3d 934, 938 (1997), rev’d in part, 525 U. S. 366, 397 (1999) (challenges to In re Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Red. 19392 (1996) (Second Report and Order)). So far as it bears on where we are today, the initial decision by the Eighth Circuit held that the FCC had no authority to control the methodology of state commissions setting the rates incumbent local-exchange carriers could charge entrants for network elements, 47 CFR § 51.505(b)(1) (1997). Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, supra, at 800. The Eighth Circuit also held that the FCC misconstrued the plain language of § 251(c)(3) in implementing a set of “combination” rules, 47 CFR §§51.315(b)-(f) (1997), the most important of which provided that “an incumbent LEC shall not separate requested network elements that the incumbent LEC currently combines,” § 51.315(b). 120 F. 3d, at 813. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals accepted the FCC’s view that the Act required no threshold ownership of facilities by a requesting carrier, First Report and Order ¶¶ 328-340, and upheld Rule 319, 47 CFR §51.319 (1997), which read “network elements” broadly, to require incumbent carriers to provide not only equipment but also services and functions, such as operations support systems (e. g., billing databases), § 51.319(f)(1), operator services and directory assistance, § 51.319(g), and vertical switching features like call-waiting and caller I. D., First Report and Order ¶ ¶ 263, 413. 120 F. 3d, at 808-810. This Court affirmed in part and in larger part reversed. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S., at 397. We reversed in upholding, the FCC’s jurisdiction to “design a pricing methodology” to bind state ratemaking commissions, id., at 385, as well as one of the FCC’s combination rules, Rule 315(b), barring incumbents from separating currently combined network elements when furnishing them to entrants that request them in a combined form, id., at 395. We also reversed in striking down Rule 319, holding that its provision for blanket access to network elements was inconsistent with the “necessary” and “impair” standards of 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2), 525 U. S., at 392. We affirmed the Eighth Circuit, however, in upholding the FCC’s broad definition of network elements to be provided, id., at 387, and the FCC’s understanding that the Act imposed no facilities-ownership requirement, id., at 392-393. The case then returned to the Eighth Circuit. Id., at 397. With the FCC’s general authority to establish a pricing methodology secure, the incumbent carriers’ primary challenge on remand went to the method that the Commission chose. There was also renewed controversy over the combination rules (Rules 315(c)-(f)) that the Eighth Circuit had struck down along with Rule 315(b), but upon which this Court expressed no opinion when it reversed the invalidation of that latter rule. 219 F. 3d 744, 748 (2000). As for the method to derive a “nondiscriminatory,” “just and reasonable rate for network elements,” the Act requires the FCC to decide how to value “the cost ... of providing the . . . network element [which] may include a reasonable profit,” although the FCC is (as already seen) forbidden to allow any “reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding,” § 252(d)(1). Within the discretion left to it after eliminating any dependence on a “rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding,” the Commission chose a way of treating “cost” as “forward-looking economic cost,” 47 CFR §51.505 (1997), something distinct from the kind of historically based cost generally relied upon in valuing a rate base after Hope Natural Gas. In Rule 505, the FCC defined the “forward-looking economic cost of an element [as] the sum of (1) the total element long-run incremental cost of the element [TELRIC]; [and] (2) a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs,” § 51.505(a), common costs being “costs incurred in providing a group of elements that “cannot be attributed directly to individual elements,” § 51.505(c)(1). Most important of all, the FCC decided that the TELRIC “should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incumbentfs] wire centers.” § 51.505(b)(1). “The TELRIC of an element has three components, the operating expenses, the depreciation cost, and the appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital.” First Report and Order ¶ 703 (footnote omitted). See also 47 CFR §§ 51.505(b)(2)-(3) (1997). A concrete example may help. Assume that it would cost $1 a year to operate a most efficient loop element; that it would take $10 for interest payments on the capital a carrier would have to invest to build the lowest cost loop centered upon an incumbent carrier’s existing wire centers (say $100, at 10 percent per annum); and that $9 would be reasonable for depreciation on that loop (an 11-year useful life); then the annual TELRIC for the loop element would be $20. The Court of Appeals understood §252(d)(l)’s reference to “the cost ... of providing the . . . network element” to be ambiguous as between “forward-looking” and “historical” cost, so that a forward-looking ratesetting method would presumably be a reasonable implementation of the statute. But the Eighth Circuit thought the ambiguity afforded no leeway beyond that, and read the Act to require any forward-looking methodology to be “based on the incremental costs that an [incumbent] actually incurs or will incur in providing... the unbundled access to its specific network elements.” 219 F. 3d, at 751-753. Hence, the Eighth Circuit held that § 252(d)(1) foreclosed the use of the TELRIC methodology. In other words, the court read the Act as plainly requiring rates based on the “actual” not “hypothetical” “cost ... of providing the . . . network element,” and reasoned that TELRIC was clearly the latter. Id., at 750-751. The Eighth Circuit added, however, that if it were wrong and TELRIC were permitted, the claim that in prescribing TELRIC the FCC had effected an unconstitutional taking would not be “ripe” until “resulting rates have been determined and applied.” Id., at 753-754. The Court of Appeals also, and for the second time, invalidated Rules 315(c)-(f), 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(f) (1997), the FCC’s so-called “additional combination” rules, apparently for the same reason it had rejected them before, when it struck down Rule 315(b), the main combination rule. 219 F. 3d, at 758-759. In brief, the rules require an incumbent carrier, upon request and compensation, to “perform the functions necessary to combine” network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not “technically feasible.” Id., at 759. The Eighth Circuit read the language of § 251(c)(3), with its reference to “allowing] requesting carriers to combine ... elements,” as unambiguously requiring a requesting carrier, not a providing incumbent, to do any and all combining. Ibid. Before us, the incumbent local-exchange carriers claim error in the Eighth Circuit’s holding that a “forward-looking cost” methodology (as opposed to the use of “historical” cost) is consistent with § 252(d)(1), and its conclusion that the use of the TELRIC forward-looking cost methodology presents no “ripe” takings claim. The FCC and the entrants, on the other side, seek review of the Eighth Circuit’s invalidation of the TELRIC methodology and the additional combination rules. We granted certiorari, 531 U. S. 1124 (2001), and now affirm on the issues raised by the incumbents, and reverse on those raised by the FCC and the entrants. Ill A The incumbent carriers’ first attack charges the FCC with ignoring the plain meaning of the word “cost” as it occurs in the provision of § 252(d)(1) that “the just and reasonable rate for network elements ... shall be ... based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the . . . network element . . . The incumbents do not argue that in theory the statute precludes any forward-looking methodology, but they do claim that the cost of providing a competitor with a network element in the future must be calculated using the incumbent’s past investment in the element and the means of providing it. They contend that “cost” in the statute refers to “historical” cost, which they define as “what was in fact paid” for a capital asset, as distinct from “value,” or “the price that would be paid on the open market.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-511, p. 19. They say that the technical meaning of “cost” is “past capital expenditure,” ibid., and they suggest an equation between “historical” and “embedded” costs, id., at 20, which the FCC defines as “the costs that the incumbent LEC incurred in the past and that are recorded in the incumbent LEC’s books of accounts,” 47 CFR § 51.505(d)(1) (1997). The argument boils down to the proposition that “the cost of providing the network element” can only mean, in plain language and in this particular technical context, the past cost to an incumbent of furnishing the specific network element actually, physically, to be provided. The incumbents have picked an uphill battle. At the most basic level of common usage, “cost” has no such clear implication. A merchant who is asked about “the cost of providing the goods” he sells may reasonably quote their current wholesale market price, not the cost of the particular items he happens to have on his shelves, which may have been bought at higher or lower prices. When the reference shifts from common speech into the technical realm, the incumbents still have to attack uphill. To begin with, even when we have dealt with historical costs as a ratesetting basis, the cases have never assumed a sense of “cost” as generous as the incumbents seem to claim. “Cost” as used in calculating the rate base under the traditional cost-of-service method did not stand for all past capital expenditures, but at most for those that were prudent, while prudent investment itself could be denied recovery when unexpected events rendered investment useless, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U. S., at 312. And even when investment was wholly includable in the rate base, ratemakers often rejected the utilities’ “embedded costs,” their own book-value estimates, which typically were geared to maximize the rate base with high statements of past expenditures and working capital, combined with unduly low rates of depreciation. See, e. g., Hope Natural Gas, 320 U. S., at 597-598. It would also be a mistake to forget that “cost” was a term in value-based ratemaking and has figured in contemporary state and federal ratemaking untethered to historical valuation. What is equally important is that the incumbents’ plain-meaning argument ignores the statutory setting in which the mandate to use “cost” in valuing network elements occurs. First, the Act uses “cost” as an intermediate term in the calculation of “just and reasonable rates,” 47 U. S. C. § 252(d)(1), and it was the very point of Hope Natural Gas that regulatory bodies required to set rates expressed in these terms have ample discretion to choose methodology, 320 U. S., at 602. Second, it would have been passing strange to think Congress tied “cost” to historical cost without a more specific indication, when the very same sentence that requires “cost” pricing also prohibits any reference to a “rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding,” § 252(d)(1), each of which has been identified with historical cost ever since Hope Natural Gas was decided. The fact is that without any better indication of meaning than the unadorned term, the word “cost” in § 252(d)(1), as in accounting generally, is “a chameleon,” Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Dept. of Human Services, 96 F. 3d 542, 546 (CA1 1996), a “virtually meaningless” term, R. Estes, Dictionary of Accounting 32 (2d ed. 1985). As Justice Breyer put it in Iowa Utilities Bd., words like “cost” “give ratesetting commissions broad methodological leeway; they say little about the ‘method employed’ to determine a particular rate.” 525 U. S., at 423 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). We accordingly reach the conclusion adopted by the Court of Appeals, that nothing in § 252(d)(1) plainly requires reference to historical investment when pegging rates to forward-looking “cost.” B The incumbents’ alternative argument is that even without a stern anchor in calculating “the cost... of providing the . . . network element,” the particular forward-looking methodology the FCC chose is neither consistent with the plain language of § 252(d)(1) nor within the zone of reasonable interpretation subject to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-845 (1984). This is so, they say, because TELRIC calculates the forward-looking cost by reference to a hypothetical, most efficient element at existing wire centers, not the actual network element being provided. 1 The short answer to the objection that TELRIC violates plain language is much the same as the answer to the previous plain-language argument, for what the incumbents call the “hypothetical” element is simply the element valued in terms of a piece of equipment an incumbent may not own. This claim, like the one just considered, is that plain language bars a definition of “cost” untethered to historical investment, and as explained already, the term “cost” is simply too protean to support the incumbents’ argument. 2 Similarly, the claim that TELRIC exceeds reasonable interpretative leeway is open to the objection already noted, that responsibility for “just and reasonable” rates leaves methodology largely subject to discretion. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 790 (1968) (“We must reiterate that the breadth and complexity of the Commission’s responsibilities demand that it be given every reasonable opportunity to formulate methods of regulation appropriate for the solution of its intensely practical difficulties”). See generally Chevron, supra, at 843-845, 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail”). The incumbents nevertheless field three arguments. They contend, first, that a method of calculating wholesale lease rates based on the costs of providing hypothetical, most efficient elements may simulate the competition envisioned by the Act but does not induce it. Second, they argue that even if rates based on hypothetical elements could induce competition in theory, TELRIC cannot do this, because it does not provide the depreciation and risk-adjusted capital costs that the theory compels. Finally, the incumbents say that even if these objections can be answered, TELRIC is needlessly, and hence unreasonably, complicated and impracticable. a The incumbents’ (and Justice Breyer’s) basic critique of TELRIC is that by setting rates for leased network elements on the assumption of perfect competition, TELRIC perversely creates incentives against competition in fact. See post, at 548-551. The incumbents say that in purporting to set incumbents’ wholesale prices at the level that would exist in a perfectly competitive market (in order to make retail prices similarly competitive), TELRIC sets rates so low that entrants will always lease and never build network elements. See post, at 549-550. And even if an entrant would otherwise consider building a network element more efficient than the best one then on the market (the one assumed in setting the TELRIC rate), it would likewise be deterred by the prospect that its lower cost in building and operating this new element would be immediately available to its competitors; under TELRIC, the incumbents assert, the lease rate for an incumbent’s existing element would instantly drop to match the marginal cost of the entrant’s new element once built. See ante, at 550; Brief for Respondents BellSouth et al. in Nos. 00-555, etc., pp. 28-29. According to the incumbents, the result will be, not competition, but a sort of parasitic free riding, leaving TELRIC incapable of stimulating the facilities-based competition intended by Congress. We think there are basically three answers to this no-stimulation claim of unreasonableness: (1) the TELRIC methodology does not assume that the relevant markets are perfectly competitive, and the scheme includes several features of inefficiency that undermine the plausibility of the incumbents’ no-stimulation argument; (2) comparison of TELRIC with alternatives proposed by the incumbents as more reasonable are plausibly answered by the FCC’s stated reasons to reject the alternatives; and (3) actual investment in competing facilities since the effective date of the Act simply belies the no-stimulation argument’s conclusion. (1) The basic assumption of the incumbents’ no-stimulation argument is contrary to fact. As we explained, the argument rests on the assumption that in a perfectly efficient market, no one who can lease at a TELRIC rate will ever build. But TELRIC does not assume a perfectly efficient wholesale market or one that is likely to resemble perfection in any foreseeable time. The incumbents thus make the same mistake we attributed in a different setting to the FCC itself. In Iowa Utilities Bd., we rejected the FCC’s neeessary-and-impair rule, 47 CFR §51.319 (1997), which required incumbents to lease any network element that might reduce, however slightly, an entrant’s marginal cost of providing a telecommunications service, as compared with providing the service using the entrant’s own equivalent element. 525 U. S., at 389-390. “In a world of perfect competition, in which all carriers are providing their service at marginal cost, the Commission’s total equating of increased cost (or decreased quality) with ‘necessity’ and ‘impairment’ might be reasonable, but it has not established the existence of such an ideal world.” Id., at 390. Not only that, but the FCC has of its own accord allowed for inefficiency in the TELRIC design in additional ways affecting the likelihood that TELRIC will squelch competition in facilities. First, the Commission has qualified any assumption of efficiency by requiring ratesetters to calculate cost on the basis of “the existing location of the incumbent[’s] wire centers.” 47 CFR § 51.505(b)(1) (1997). This means that certain network elements, principally local-loop elements, will not be priced at their most efficient cost and configuration to the extent, say, that a shorter loop could serve a local exchange if the incumbent’s wire centers were relocated for a snugger fit with the current geography of terminal locations. Second, TELRIC rates in practice will differ from the products of a perfectly competitive market owing to built-in lags in price adjustments. In a perfectly competitive market, retail prices drop instantly to the marginal cost of the most efficient company. See Mankiw 283-288,312-313. As the incumbents point out, this would deter market entry because a potential entrant would know that even if it could provide a retail service at a lower marginal cost, it would instantly lose that competitive edge once it entered the market and competitors adjusted to match its price. See Brief for Respondents BellSouth et al. in Nos. 00-555, etc., at 28-29. Wholesale TELRIC rates, however, are set by state commissions, usually by arbitrated agreements with 3- or 4-year terms, see Brief for Respondent Qwest Communications International, Inc., in Nos. 00-511, etc., p. 39; Reply Brief for Petitioners Worldcom, Inc., et al. 6; Reply Brief for Respondent Sprint Corp. 7, and n. 3; Reply Brief for Petitioner AT&T Corp. 11-12; and no one claims that a competitor could receive immediately on demand a TELRIC rate on a leased element at the marginal cost of the entrant who introduces a more efficient element. But even if a competitor could call for a new TELRIC rate proceeding immediately upon the introduction of a more efficient element by a competing entrant, the competitor would not necessarily know enough to make the call; the fact of the element’s greater efficiency would only become apparent when reflected in lower retail prices drawing demand away from existing competitors (including the incumbent), forcing them to look to lowering their own marginal costs. In practice, it would take some time for the innovating entrant to install the new equipment, to engage in marketing offering a lower retail price to attract business, and to steal away enough customer subscriptions (given the limited opportunity to capture untapped customers for local telephone service) for competitors to register the drop in demand. Finally, it bears reminding that the FCC prescribes measurement of the TELRIC “based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available,” 47 CFR § 51.505(b)(1) (1997). Owing to that condition of current availability, the marginal cost of a most efficient element that an entrant alone has built and uses would not set a new pricing standard until it became available to competitors as an alternative to the incumbent’s corresponding element. As a reviewing Court we are, of course, in no position to assess the precise economic significance of these and other exceptions to the perfectly functioning market that the incumbents’ criticism assumes. Instead, it is enough to recognize that the incumbents’ assumption may well be incorrect. Inefficiencies built into the scheme may provide incentives and opportunities for competitors to build their own network elements, perhaps for reasons unrelated to pricing (such as the possibility of expansion into data-transmission markets by deploying “broadband” technologies, cf. post, at 552 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or the desirability of independence from an incumbent’s management and maintenance of network elements). In any event, the significance of the incumbents’ mistake of fact may be indicated best not by argument here, but by the evidence of actual investment in facilities-based competition since TELRIC went into effect, to be discussed at Part III-B-2a-(3), infra. (2) Perhaps sensing the futility of an unsupported theoretical attack, the incumbents make the complementary argument that the FCC’s choice of TELRIC, whatever might be said about it on its own terms, was unreasonable as a matter of law because other methods of determining cost would have done a better job of inducing competition. Having considered the proffered alternatives and the reasons the FCC gave for rejecting them, 47 CFR § 51.505(d) (1997); First Report and Order ¶¶ 630-711, we cannot say that the FCC acted unreasonably in picking TELRIC to promote the mandated competition. The incumbents present three principal alternatives for setting rates for network elements: embedded-cost methodologies, the efficient component pricing rule, and Ramsey pricing. The arguments that one or another of these methodologies is preferable to TELRIC share a basic claim: it was unreasonable for the FCC to choose a method of setting rates that fails to include, at least in theory, some additional costs beyond what would be most efficient in the long run, because lease rates that incorporate such costs will do a better job of inducing competition The theory is that once an entrant has its foot in the door, it will have a greater incentive to build and operate its own more efficient network element if the lease rates reflect something of the incumbents’ actual and inefficient marginal costs. And once the entrant develops the element at its lower marginal cost and the retail price drops accordingly, the incumbent will have no choice but to innovate itself by building the most efficient element or finding ways to reduce its marginal cost to retain its market share. The generic feature of the incumbents’ proposed alternatives, in other words, is that some degree of long-run inefficiency ought to be preserved through the lease rates, in order to give an entrant a more efficient alternative to leasing. Of course, we have already seen that TELRIC itself tolerates some degree of inefficient pricing in its existing wire-center configuration requirement and through the rate-making and development lags just described. This aside, however, there are at least two objections that generally undercut any desirability that such alternatives may seem to offer over TELRIC. The first objection turns on the fact that a lease rate that compensates the lessor for some degree of existing inefficiency (at least from the perspective of the long run) is simply a higher rate, and the difference between such a higher rate and the TELRIC rate could be the difference that keeps a potential competitor from entering the market. See n. 27, infra. Cf. First Report and Order ¶ 378 (“[I]n some areas, the most efficient means of providing competing service may be through the use of unbundled loops. In such cases, preventing access to unbundled loops would either discourage a potential competitor from entering the market in that area, thereby denying those consumers the benefits of competition, or cause the competitor to construct unnecessarily du-plicative facilities, thereby misalloeating societal resources”). If the TELRIC rate for bottleneck elements is $100 and for other elements (say, switches) is $10, an entering competitor that can provide its own, more efficient switch at what amounts to a $7 rate can enter the market for $107. If the lease rate for the bottleneck elements were higher (say, $110) to reflect some of the inefficiency of bottleneck elements that actually cost the incumbent $150, then the entrant with only $107 will be kept out. Is it better to risk keeping more potential entrants out, or to induce them to compete in less capital-intensive facilities with lessened incentives to build their own bottleneck facilities? It was not obviously unreasonable for the FCC to prefer the latter. The second general objection turns the incumbents’ attack on TELRIC against the incumbents’ own alternatives. If the problem with TELRIC is that an entrant will never build because at the instant it builds, other competitors can lease the analogous existing (but less efficient) element from an incumbent at a rate assuming the same most efficient marginal cost, then the same problem persists under the incumbents’ methods. For as soon as an entrant builds a more efficient element, the incumbent will be forced to price to match, and that rate will be available to all other competitors. The point, of course, is that things are not this simple. As we have said, under TELRIC, price adjustment is not instantaneous in rates for a leased element corresponding to an innovating entrant’s more efficient element; the same would presumably be true under the incumbents’ alternative methods, though they do not come out and say it. Once we get into the details of the specific alternative methods, other infirmities become evident that undermine the claim that the FCC could not reasonably have preferred TELRIC. As for an embedded-cost methodology, the problem with a method that relies in any part on historical cost, the cost the incumbents say they actually incur in leasing network elements, is that it will pass on to lessees the difference between most efficient cost and embedded cost. See First Report and Order ¶ 705. Any such cost difference is an inefficiency, whether caused by poor management resulting in higher operating costs or poor investment strategies that have inflated capital and depreciation. If leased elements were priced according to embedded costs, the incumbents could pass these inefficiencies to competitors in need of their wholesale elements, and to that extent defeat the competitive purpose of forcing efficient choices on all carriers whether incumbents or entrants. The upshot would be higher retail prices consumers would have to pay. Id., ¶¶ 655 and 705. There are, of course, objections other than inefficiency to any method of ratemaking that relies on embedded costs as allegedly reflected in incumbents’ book-cost data, with the possibilities for manipulation this presents. Even if incumbents have built and are operating leased elements at economically efficient costs, the temptation would remain to overstate book costs to ratemaking commissions and so perpetuate the intractable problems that led to the price-cap innovation. See supra, at 486-487. There is even an argument that the Act itself forbids embedded-cost methods, and while the FCC rejected this absolutistic reading of the statute, First Report and Order ¶ 704, it seems safe to say that the statutory language places a heavy presumption against any method resembling the traditional embedded-cost-of-service model of rate-setting. At the very least, proposing an embedded-cost alternative is a counterintuitive way to show that selecting TELRIC was unreasonable. Other incumbents say the FCC was unreasonable to pick TELRIC over a method of ratesetting commonly called the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR). See Brief for Respondent Qwest Communications International, Inc., in Nos. 00-511, etc., at 40-41. ECPR would base the rate for a leased element on its most efficient long-run incremental cost (presumably, something like the TELRIC) plus the opportunity cost to the incumbent when the entrant leasing the element provides a competing telecommunications service using it. See Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S., at 426 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); J. Sidak & D. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract 284-285 (1997); First Report and Order ¶ 708. The opportunity cost is pegged to the retail revenue loss suffered by the incumbent when the entrant provides the service in its stead to its former customers. Ibid. The FCC rejected ECPR because its calculation of opportunity cost relied on existing retail prices in monopolistic local-exchange markets, which bore no relation to efficient marginal cost. “We conclude that ECPR is an improper method for setting prices of interconnection and unbundled network elements because the existing retail prices that would be used to compute incremental opportunity costs under ECPR are not cost-based. Moreover, the ECPR does not provide any mechanism for moving prices towards competitive levels; it simply takes prices as given.” Id., ¶ 709. In effect, the adjustment for opportunity cost, because it turns on pre-existing retail prices generated by embedded costs, would pass on the same inefficiencies and be vulnerable to the same asymmetries of information in ratemaking as a straightforwárd embedded-cost scheme. The third category of alternative methodologies proposed focuses on costs over an intermediate term where some fixed costs are unavoidable, as opposed to TELRIC’s long run. See n. 25, supra (defining the long run). The fundamental intuition underlying this method of ratesetting is that competition is actually favored by allowing incumbents rate recovery of certain fixed costs efficiently incurred in the intermediate term. The most commonly proposed variant of fixed-cost recovery ratesetting is “Ramsey pricing.” See Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 426-427 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ramsey pricing was originally theorized as a method of discriminatory taxation of commodities to generate revenue with minimal discouragement of desired consumption. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ. J. 47,58-59 (1927). The underlying principle is that goods should be taxed or priced according to demand: taxes or prices should be higher as to goods for which demand is relatively inelastic. K. Train, Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly 122-125 (1991). As applied to the local-exchange wholesale market, Ramsey pricing would allow rate recovery of certain costs incurred by an incumbent above marginal cost, costs associated with providing an unbundled network element that are fixed and unavoidable over the intermediate run, typically the 3- or 4-year term of a rate arbitration agreement. The specific mechanism for recovery through wholesale lease rates would be to spread such costs across the different elements to be leased according to the demand for each particular element. First Report and Order ¶ 696. Cf. B. Mitchell & I. Vogelsang, Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice 43-61 (1991). Thus, when demand among entrants for loop elements is high as compared with demand for switch elements, a higher proportion of fixed costs would be added as a premium to the loop-element lease rate than to the switch lease rate. But this very feature appears to be a drawback when used as a method of setting rates for the wholesale market in unbundled network elements. Because the elements for which demand among entrants will be highest are the costly bottleneck elements, duplication of which is neither likely nor desired, high lease rates for these elements would be the rates most likely to deter market entry, as our earlier example showed: if the rate for bottleneck elements went from $100 to $110, the $107 competitor would be kept out. This is what the FCC has said: “[W]e conclude that an allocation methodology that relies exclusively on allocating common costs in inverse proportion to the sensitivity of demand for various network elements and services may not be used. We conclude that such an allocation could unreasonably limit the extent of entry into local exchange markets by allocating more costs to, and thus raising the prices of, the most critical bottleneck inputs, the demand for which tends to be relatively inelastic. Such an allocation of these costs would undermine the pro-competitive objectives of the 1996 Act.” First Report and Order ¶ 696 (footnote omitted). (3) At the end of the day, theory aside, the claim that TELRIC is unreasonable as a matter of law because it simulates but does not produce facilities-based competition founders on fact. The entrants have presented figures showing that they have invested in new facilities to the tune of $55 billion since the passage of the Act (through 2000), see Association for Local Telecommunications Services, Local Competition Policy & the New Economy 4 (Feb. 2,2001); Hearing on H. R. 1542 before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Ser. No. 107-24, p. 50 (2001) (statement of James H. Henry, Managing General Partner, Greenfield Hill Capital, LLP); see also M. Glover & D. Epps, Is the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Working?, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1013, 1015 (2000) ($30 billion invested through 1999). The FCC’s statistics indicate substantial resort to pure and partial facilities-based competition among the three entry strategies: as of June 30, 2001, 33 percent of entrants were using their own facilities; 23 percent were reselling services; and 44 percent were leasing network elements (26 percent of entrants leasing loops with switching; 18 percent without switching). See FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30,2001, p. 2 (Feb. 27, 2002) (tables 3-4). The incumbents do not contradict these figures, but merely speculate that the investment has not been as much as it could have been under other ratemaking approaches, and they note that investment has more recently shifted to nonfacilities entry options. We, of course, have no idea whether a different forward-looking pricing scheme would have generated even greater competitive investment than the $55 billion that the entrants claim, but it suffices to say that a regulatory scheme that can boast such substantial competitive capital spending over a 4-year period is not easily described as an unreasonable way to promote competitive investment in facilities. b The incumbents’ second reason for calling TELRIC an unreasonable exercise of the FCC’s regulatory discretion is the supposed incapacity of this methodology to provide enough depreciation and allowance for capital costs to induce rational competition on the theory’s own terms. This challenge must be assessed against the background of utilities’ customary preference for extended depreciation schedules in ratemaking (so as to preserve high rate bases), see n. 8, supra; we have already noted the consequence of the utilities’ approach, that the “book” value or embedded costs of capital presented to traditional ratemaking bodies often bore little resemblance to the economic value of the capital.. See FCC Releases Audit Reports on RBOCs’ Property Records, Report No. CC 99-3, 1999 WL 95044 (FCC, Feb. 25, 1999) (“[B]ook costs may be overstated by approximately $5 billion”); Huber et al. 116 (We now know that “[b]y the early 1980s, the Bell System had accumulated a vast library of accounting books that belonged alongside dime-store novels and other works of fiction. ... By 1987, it was widely estimated that the book value of telephone company investments exceeded market value by $25 billion dollars”). TELRIC seeks to avoid this problem by basing its valuation on the market price for most efficient elements; when rates are figured by reference to a hypothetical element instead of an incumbent’s actual element, the incumbent gets no unfair advantage from favorable depreciation rates in the traditional sense. This, according to the incumbents, will be fatal to competition. Their argument is that TELRIC will result in constantly changing rates based on ever cheaper, more efficient technology; the incumbents will be unable to write off each new piece of technology rapidly enough to anticipate an even newer gadget portending a new and lower rate. They will be stuck, they say, with sunk costs in less efficient plant and equipment, with their investment unrecoverable through depreciation, and their increased risk unrecognized and uncompensated. The argument, however, rests upon a fundamentally false premise, that the TELRIC rules limit the depreciation and capital costs that ratesetting commissions may recognize. In fact, TELRIC itself prescribes no fixed percentage rate as risk-adjusted capital costs and recognizes no particular useful life as a basis for calculating depreciation costs. On the contrary, the FCC committed considerable discretion to state commissions on these matters. “Based on the current record, we conclude that the currently authorized rate of return at the federal or state level is a reasonable starting point for TELRIC calculations, and incumbent LECs bear the burden of demonstrating with specificity that the business risks that they face in providing unbundled network elements and interconnection services would justify a different risk-adjusted cost of capital or depreciation rate. . . . States may adjust the cost of capital if a party demonstrates to a state commission that either a higher or a lower level of cost of capital is warranted, without that commission conducting a ‘rate-of-return or other rate based proceeding.’ We note that the risk-adjusted cost of capital need not be uniform for all elements. We intend to re-examine the issue of the appropriate risk-adjusted cost of capital on an ongoing basis, particularly in light of the state commissions’ experiences in addressing this issue in specific situations.” First Report and Order ¶ 702. The order thus treated then-current capital costs and rates of depreciation as mere starting points, to be adjusted upward if the incumbents demonstrate the need. That is, for calculating leased element rates, the Commission specifically permits more favorable allowances for costs of capital and depreciation than were generally allowed under traditional ratemaking practice. The incumbents’ fallback position, that existing rates of depreciation and costs of capital are not even reasonable starting points, is unpersuasive. As to depreciation rates, it is well to start by asking how serious a threat there may be of galloping obsolescence requiring commensurately rising depreciation rates. The answer does not support the incumbents. The local-loop plant makes up at least 48 percent of the elements incumbents will have to provide, see id., ¶ 378, n. 818 (“As of. . . 1995 . . . [l]ocal loop plant comprises approximately $109 billion of total plant in service, which represents ... 48 percent of network plant”), and while the technology of certain other elements like switches has evolved very rapidly in recent years, loop technology generally has gone no further than copper twisted-pair wire and fiber-optic cable in the past couple of decades. See n. 10, supra (less than 1 percent of local-exchange telephone lines employ technologies other than copper or fiber). We have been informed of no specter of imminently obsolescent loops requiring a radical revision of currently reasonable depreciation. This is significant because the FCC found as a general matter that federally prescribed rates of depreciation and counterparts in many States are fairly up to date with the current state of telecommunications technologies as to different elements. See First Report and Order ¶ 702. As for risk-adjusted costs of capital, competition in fact has been slow to materialize in local-exchange retail markets (as of June 30, 2001, the incumbents retained a 91 percent share of the local-exchange markets, FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001 (Feb. 27,2002) (table 1)), and whether the FCC’s assumption about adequate risk adjustment was based on hypothetical or actual competition, it seems fair to say that the rate of 11.25 percent mentioned by the FCC, First Report and Order ¶ 702, is a “reasonable starting point” for return on equity calculations based on the current lack of significant competition in local-exchange, markets. A basic weakness of the incumbents’ attack, indeed, is its tendency to argue in highly general terms, whereas TELRIC rates are calculated on the basis of individual elements. TELRIC rates leave plenty of room for differences in the appropriate depreciation rates and risk-adjusted capital costs depending on the nature and technology of the specific element to be priced (as between switches and loops, for example). For that matter, even the blanket assumption that on a TELRIC valuation the estimated purchase price of a most efficient element will necessarily be lower than the actual costs of current elements is suspect. The New York Public Service Commission, for example, used the cost of the more expensive fiber-optic cable as the basis for its TELRIC loop fixed rates, notwithstanding the fact that competitors argued that the cheaper copper-wire loop was more efficient for voice communications and should have been the underlying valuation for loop rates. See 2 Lodging Material for Respondents Worldcom, Inc., et al. 655-657 (Opinion No. 97-2, effective Apr. 1,1997 (Opinion and Order Setting Rates for First Group of Network Elements)). In light of the many different TELRIC rates to be calculated by state commissions across the country, see Brief for Petitioners Worldcom, Inc., et al. in No. 00-555, p. 21 (“millions”), the Commission’s prescription of a general “starting point” is reasonable enough. c Finally, as to the incumbents’ accusation that TELRIC is too complicated to be practical, a criticism at least as telling can be leveled at traditional ratemaking methodologies and the alternatives proffered. “One important potential advantage of the T[E]LRIC approach, however is its relative ease of calculation. Rather than estimate costs reflecting the present [incumbent] network — a difficult task even if [incumbents] provided reliable data — it is possible to generate T[E]LRIC estimates based on a ‘green field’ approach, which assumes construction of a network from scratch.” App. 182 (Reply Comments of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 24 (May 30, 1996)). To the extent that the traditional public-utility model generally relied on embedded costs, similar sorts of complexity in reckoning were exacerbated by an asymmetry of information, much to the utilities’ benefit. See supra, at 486-487, 499. And what we see from the record suggests that TELRIC rate proceedings are surprisingly smooth-running affairs, with incumbents and competitors typically presenting two conflicting economic models supported by expert testimony, and state commissioners customarily assigning rates based on some predictions from one model and others from its counterpart. See, e.g., 1 Lodging Material for Respondents Worldcom, Inc., et al. 146-147, 367-368 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In re: Determination of cost of basic local telecommunications service, pursuant to Section 364-025, Florida Statutes, issued Jan. 7, 1999); 2 id., at 589-598, 701-704 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Opinion No. 97-2, supra). At bottom, battles of experts are bound to be part of any ratesetting scheme, and the FCC was reasonable to prefer TELRIC over alternative fixed-cost schemes that preserve home-field advantages for the incumbents. ‡ * * We cannot say whether the passage of time will show competition prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC appears to be a reasonable policy for now, and that is all that counts. See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 866. The incumbents have failed to show that TELRIC is unreasonable on its own terms, largely because they fall into the trap of mischaracterizing the FCC’s departures from the assumption of a perfectly competitive market (the wire-center limitation, regulatory and development lags, or the refusal to prescribe high depreciation and capital costs) as inconsistencies rather than pragmatic features of the TELRIC plan. Nor have they shown it was unreasonable for the FCC to pick TELRIC over alternative methods, or presented evidence to rebut the entrants’ figures as to the level of competitive investment ifi local-exchange markets. In short, the incumbents have failed to carry their burden of showing unreasonableness to defeat the deference due the Commission. We therefore reverse the Eighth Circuit’s judgment insofar as it invalidated TELRIC as a method for setting rates under the Act. C The incumbents’ claim of TELRIC’s inherent inadequacy to deal with depreciation or capital costs has its counterpart in a further argument. They seek to apply the rule of constitutional avoidance in saying that “cost” ought to be construed by reference to historical investment in order to avoid a serious constitutional question, whether a methodology so divorced from investment actually made will lead to a taking of property in violation of the Fifth (or Fourteenth) Amendment. The Eighth Circuit did not think any such serious question was in the offing, 219 F. 3d, at 753-754, and neither do we. At the outset, it is well to understand that the incumbent carriers do not present the portent of a constitutional taking claim in the way that is usual in ratemaking cases. They do not argue that any particular, actual TELRIC rate is “so unjust as to be confiscatory,” that is, as threatening an incumbent’s “financial integrity.” Duquesne Light Co., 488 U. S., at 307, 312. Indeed, the incumbent carriers have not even presented us with an instance of TELRIC rates, which are to be set or approved by state commissions and reviewed in the first instance in the federal district courts, 47 U. S. C. §§ 252(e)(4) and (e)(6). And this, despite the fact that some States apparently have put rates in place already using TELRIC. See First Report and Order ¶ 631 and accompanying footnotes (“A number of states already employ, or have plans to utilize, some form of [long-run incremental cost] methodology in their approach to setting prices for unbundled network elements”). This want of any rate to be reviewed is significant, given that this Court has never considered a taking challenge on a ratesetting methodology without being presented with specific rate orders alleged to be confiscatory. See, e. g., Duquesne Light Co., supra, at 303-304 (denial of $3.5 million and $15.4 million increases to rate bases of electric utilities); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., at 470-476 (Nebraska carrier-rate tariff schedule alleged to effect a taking). Granted, the Court has never strictly held that a utility must have rates in hand before it can claim that the adoption of a new method of setting rates will necessarily produce an unconstitutional taking, but that has been the implication of much the Court has said. See Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 602 (“The fact that the method employed to reach [just and reasonable rates] may contain infirmities is not... important”); Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S., at 586 (“The Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas”); Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm’n of Cal, 289 U. S. 287, 305 (1933) (“Mindful of its distinctive function in the enforcement of constitutional rights, the Court has refused to be bound by any artificial rulé or formula which changed conditions might upset”). Undeniably, then, the general rule is that any question about the constitutionality of ratesetting is raised by rates, not methods, and this means that the policy of construing a statute to avoid constitutional questions where possible is presumptively out of place when construing statutes prescribing methods. The incumbents say this action is one of the rare ones placed outside the general rule by signs, too strong to ignore, that takings will occur if the TELRIC interpretation of § 252(d)(1) is allowed. First, they compare, at the level of the entire network (as opposed to element-by-element), industry balance-sheet indications of historical investment in local telephone markets with the corresponding estimate of a TELRIC evaluation of the cost to build a new and efficient national system of local exchanges providing universal service. Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-511, at 10-11, and n. 6. As against an estimated $180 billion for such a new system, the incumbents juxtapose a value representing “total plant” on the industry balance sheet for 1999 of roughly $342 billion. They argue that the huge and unreasonable difference is proof that TELRIC will necessarily result in confiscatory rates. Ibid, (citing FCC, 1999 Statistics of Communications Common Carriers 51 (Aug. 1, 2000) (table 2.9, line no. 32)). The comparison, however, is spurious because the numbers assumed by the incumbents are clearly wrong. On the one side, the $180 billion is supposed to be based on constructing a barebones universal-service telephone network, and so it fails to cover elements associated with more advanced telecommunications services that incumbents are required to provide by lease under 47 U. S. C. § 251(c)(3). See Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization under Section 271 of the Communications Act, 15 FCC Red. 3953, ¶ 245 (1999), aff’d, 220 F. 3d 607 (CADC 2000). See also In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 14 FCC Red. 20432, ¶ 41, and n. 125 (1999) (explaining that the universal-service model may not be “appropriate [for] determining ... prices for unbundled network elements”). We do not know how much higher the efficient replacement figure should be, but we can reasonably assume that $180 billion is too low. On the other side of the comparison, the “balance sheet” number is patently misstated. As explained above, any rates under the traditional public-utility model would be calculated on a rate base (whether fair value or cost of service) subject to deductions for accrued depreciation. See Phillips 310-315. The net plant investment after depreciation is not $342 billion but $166 billion, FCC, Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, at 51 (table 2.9, line no. 50), an amount less than the TELRIC figure the incumbents would like us to assume. And even after we increase the $166 billion by the amount of net current liabilities ($22 billion) on the balance sheet, ibid, (line no. 64 minus line no. 13), as a rough (and generous) estimate of the working-capital allowance under cost of service, the rate base would then be $188 billion, still a far cry from the $342 billion the incumbents tout, and less than 5 percent above the incumbents’ $180 billion universal-service TELRIC figure. What the best numbers may be we are in no position to say: the point is only that the numbers being thrown out by the incumbents are no evidence that TELRIC lease rates would be confiscatory, sight unseen. The incumbent carriers’ second try at nonrate constitutional litigation focuses on reliance interests allegedly jeopardized by an intentional switch in ratesetting methodologies. They rely on Duquesne, where we held as usual that a ratesetting methodology would normally be judged only by the “overall impact of the rate orders,” but went further in dicta. We remarked that “a State’s decision to arbitrarily switch back and forth between methodologies in a way which required investors to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the benefit of good investments at others would raise serious constitutional questions.” 488 U. S., at 315. In other words, there may be a taking challenge distinct from a plain-vanilla objection to arbitrary or capricious agency action if a ratemaking body were to make opportunistic changes in ratesetting methodologies just to minimize return on capital investment in a utility enterprise. In Duquesne itself, there was no need to decide whether there might be an exception to the rate-order requirement for a claim of taking by rates, and there is no reason here to decide whether the policy of constitutional avoidance should be invoked in order to anticipate a rate-order taking claim. The reason is the same in each case: the incumbent carriers here are just like the electric utilities in Duquesne in failing to present any evidence that the decision to adopt TELRIC was arbitrary, opportunistic, or undertaken with a confiscatory purpose. What we do know is very much to the contrary. First of all, there was no “switch” of methodologies, since the wholesale market for leasing network elements is something brand new under the 1996 Act. There was no replacement of any predecessor methods, much less an opportunistic switch “back and forth.” And to the extent that the incumbents argue that there was at least an expectation that some historically anchored cost-of-service method would set wholesale lease rates, no such promise was ever made. First Report and Order ¶ 706 (“[CJontrary to assertions by some [incumbents], regulation does not and should not guarantee full recovery of their embedded costs. Such a guarantee would exceed the assurances that [the FCC] or the states have provided in the past”). Cf. Duquesne, supra, at 815. Any investor paying attention had to realize that he could not rely indefinitely on traditional ratemaking methods but would simply have to rely on the constitutional bar against confiscatory rates. IV A The effort by the Government and the competing carriers to overturn the Eighth Circuit’s invalidation of the additional combination rules, 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(f) (1997), draws the incumbents’ threshold objection that the challenge is barred by waiver, since the 1999 petition to review the 1997 invalidation of Rule 315(b) did not extend to the Eighth Circuit’s simultaneous invalidation of the four companion rules, Rules 315(cMf), 120 F. 3d, at 813, 819, n. 39. The incumbents must, of course, acknowledge that the Court of Appeals sua sponte invited briefing on the status of Rules 315(c)-(f) on remand after this Court’s reinstatement of Rule 315(b), Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S., at 395, and specifically struck them down again, albeit on its 1997 rationale, 219 F. 3d, at 758-759. But the incumbent carriers argue that the Eighth Circuit exceeded the scope of this Court’s mandate when it revisited the unchallenged portion of its earlier holding, so that this Court should decline to reach the validity of Rules 315(c)-(f) today. To do so, they say, would encourage the sort of strategic, piecemeal litigation disapproved in Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U. S. 1, 30-31 (1961): “The demands not only of orderly procedure but of due procedure as the means of achieving justice according to law require that when a case is brought here for review of administrative action, all the rulings of the agency upon which the party seeks reversal, and which are then available to him, be presented. Otherwise we would be promoting the ‘sporting theory’ of justice, at the potential cost of substantial expenditures of agency time. To allow counsel to withhold in this Court and save for a later stage procedural error would tend to foist upon the Court constitutional decisions which could have been avoided had those errors been invoked earlier.” We do not think Communist Party blocks our consideration of Rules 315(c)-(f). The issue there was raised by the petitioner’s failure on an earlier trip to this Court to pursue a procedural objection to agency action. Litigation of the procedural point would not only have obviated the Court’s need to review the constitutionality of an Act of Congress when the case got here, but could have saved five years of litigation during which time “the Board and the Court of Appeals [had] each twice more reconsidered [the] steadily growing record . . . .” Id., at 31-32, n. 8. After all that time, petitioner sought review of the procedural point. Nothing like that can be said about these cases. Addressing the issue now would not “make waste” of years of efforts by the FCC or the Court of Appeals, id., at 32, n. 8, would not threaten to leave a constitutional ruling pointless, and would direct the Court’s attention not to an isolated, “long-stale” procedural error by the agency, ibid., but to the invalidation of FCC rules meant to have general and continuing applicability. There is no indication of litigation tactics behind the failure last time to appeal on these rules, which were reexamined on remand at the behest of the court, not the Government or the competing carriers. Any issue “pressed or passed upon below” by a federal court, United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. 36, 41 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), is subject to this Court’s broad discretion over the questions it chooses to take on cer-tiorari, and there are good reasons to look at Rules 315(c)-(f). The Court of Appeals passed on a significant issue, and one placed in a state of flux, see Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083, 1099, n. 8 (1991) (citations omitted), by the split between these cases and US West Communications v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F. 3d 1112, 1121 (CA9 1999), (affirming identical state-commission rules), cert. denied, 530 U. S. 1284 (2000). We accordingly rejected the incumbents’ claim of waiver when they raised it in opposition to the petition for certiorari, and we reject it again today. See Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U. S. 1, 8 (1991). B The Eighth Circuit found the four additional combination rules at odds with the plain language of the final sentence of 47 U. S. C. § 251(c)(3), which we quote more fully: “[E]ach incumbent local exchange carrier has ... “[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiseriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiseriminatory .... An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.” “Bundling” and “combination” are related but distinct concepts. Bundling is about lease pricing. To provide a network element “on an unbundled basis” is to lease the element, however described, to a requesting carrier at a stated price specific to that element. Iowa Utilities Bd., supra, at 394. The FCC’s regulations identify in advance a certain number of elements for separate pricing, 47 CFR §51.319 (1997), but the regulations do not limit the elements subject to specific rates. A separately priced element need not be the simplest possible configuration of equipment or function, and a predesignated unbundled element might actually comprise items that could be considered separate elements themselves. For example, “if the states require incumbent LECs to provision subloop elements [which together constitute a local loop], incumbent LECs must still provision a local loop as a single, combined element when so requested, because we identify local loops as a single element in this proceeding.” First Report and Order ¶295. The “combination” provided for in Rules 315(b) — (f), on the other hand, refers to a mechanical connection of physical elements within an incumbent’s network, or the connection of a competitive carrier’s element with the incumbent’s network “in a manner that would allow a requesting carrier to offer the telecommunications service.” Id., ¶ 294, n. 620. The additional combination rules are best understood as meant to ensure that the statutory duty to provide unbundled elements gets a practical result. A separate rate for an unbundled element is not much good if an incumbent refuses to lease the element except in combination with others that competing carriers have no need of; or if the incumbents refuse to allow the leased elements to be combined with a competitor’s own equipment. And this is just what was happening before the FCC devised its combination rules. Incumbents, according to the FCC’s findings, were refusing to give competitors’ technicians access to their physical plants to make necessary connections. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Red. 3696, 3910, ¶ 482 (1999) (Third Report and Order), petitions for review pending sub nom. United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, Nos. 00-1015, etc. (CADC). The challenged additional combination rules, issued under § 251(c)(3), include two that are substantive and two that are procedural, the latter having no independent significance here. Rule 315(c) requires an incumbent to “perform the functions necessary to combine unbundled network elements in any manner, even if those elements are not ordinarily combined” in the incumbent’s own network, so long as the combination is “[technically feasible” and “[w]ould not impair the ability of other carriers to obtain access to unbundled network elements or to interconnect” with the incumbent’s network. The companion Rule 315(d) likewise requires the incumbent to do the combining between the network elements it leases and a requesting carrier’s own elements, so long as technically feasible. The rules are challenged alternatively as inconsistent with statutory plain language and as unreasonable interpretations. The plain language in question is the sentence that “[a]n incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.” 47 U. S. C. § 251(c)(3). The Eighth Circuit read this as unambiguously excusing incumbents from any obligation to combine provided elements, 219 F. 3d, at 759. The ruling has a familiar ring, for this is the same reason that the Court of Appeals invalidated these rules in 1997 along with Rule 315(b), as being inconsistent with a plain limit on incumbents’ obligation under § 251(c)(3) to provide elements “on an unbundled basis.” 120 F. 3d, at 813. But the language is not that plain. Of course, it is true that the statute would not be violated literally by an incumbent that provided elements so that a requesting carrier could combine them, and thereafter sat on its hands while any combining was done. But whether it is plain that the incumbents have a right to sit is a question of context as much as grammar. If Congress had treated incumbents and entrants as equals, it probably would be plain enough that the incumbents’ obligations stopped at furnishing an element that could be combined. The Act, however, proceeds on the understanding that incumbent monopolists and contending competitors are unequal, cf. § 251(c) (“Additional obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers”), and within the actual statutory confines it is not self-evident that in obligating incumbents to furnish, Congress negated a duty to combine that is not inconsistent with the obligation to furnish, but not expressly mentioned. Thus, it takes a stretch to get from permissive statutory silence to a statutory right on the part of the incumbents to refuse to combine for a requesting carrier, say, that is unable to make the combination, First Report and Order ¶294, or may even be unaware that it needs to combine certain elements to provide a telecommunications service. Id., ¶ 293. And these are the only instances in which the additional combination rules obligate the incumbents according to the FCC’s clarification in the First Report and Order. The conclusion that the language is open is certainly in harmony with, if not required by, our holding in Iowa Utilities Bd., dealing with Rule 315(b). In reinstating that rule, we rejected the argument that furnishing elements “on an unbundled basis," § 251(c)(3), must mean “physically separated,” 525 U. S., at 394, and expressly noted that “§ 251(c)(3) is ambiguous on whether leased network elements may or must be separated,” id., at 395. We relied on that ambiguity in holding that an incumbent has no statutory right to separate elements when a competitor asks to lease them in the combined form employed by the incumbent in its own network. Ibid. That holding would make a very odd partner with a ruling that an ambiguous § 251(c)(3) plainly empowers incumbent carriers to refuse to combine elements even when requesting carriers cannot. We accordingly read the language of § 251(c)(3) as leaving open who should do the work of combination, and under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), that leaves the FCC’s rules intact unless the incumbents can show them to be unreasonable. For the decision whether Rules 315(cMf) survive Chevron step two, Iowa Utilities Bd. is, to be sure, less immediate help, since in that case we found Rule 315(b) reasonable because it prevented incumbents from dismantling existing combinations to sabotage competitors, 525 U. S., at 895, whereas here we deal not with splitting up but with joining together. We think, nonetheless, that the additional combination rules reflect a reasonable reading of the statute, meant to remove practical barriers to competitive entry into local-exchange markets while avoiding serious interference with incumbent network operations. At the outset, it is well to repeat that the duties imposed under the rules are subject to restrictions limiting the burdens placed on the incumbents. An obligation on the part of an incumbent to combine elements for an entrant under Rules 315(c) and (d) only arises when the entrant is unable to do the job itself. First Report and Order ¶ 294 (“If the carrier is únable to combine the elements, the incumbent must do so”). When an incumbent does have an obligation, the rules specify a duty to “perform the functions necessary to combine,” not necessarily to complete the actual combination. 47 CFR §§51.315(c)-(d) (1997). And the entrant must pay “a reasonable cost-based fee” for whatever the incumbent does. Brief for Petitioner Federal Parties in Nos. 00-587, etc., p. 34. See also id., at 10, 34, n. 14. The force of the objections is limited further by the FCC’s implementation in the rules of the statutory conditions that the incumbents’ duty arises only if the requested combination does not discriminate against other carriers by impeding their access, and only if the requested combination is “technically feasible,” § 251(c)(3). As to the latter restriction, the Commission “decline[d] to adopt the view proffered by some parties that incumbents must combine network elements in any technically feasible manner requested.” First Report and Order ¶ 296. The concern was that such a rule “could potentially affect the reliability and security of the incumbent’s network, and the ability of other carriers to obtain interconnection, or request and use unbundled elements.” Ibid. Thus, the incumbents are wrong to claim that the restriction to “technical feasibility” places only minimal limits on the duty to combine, since the First Report and Order makes it clear that what is “technically feasible” does not mean merely what is “economically reasonable,” id., ¶ 199, or what is simply practical or possible in an engineering sense, see id., ¶¶ 196-198. The limitation is meant to preserve “network reliability and security,” id., ¶296, n. 622, and a combination is not technically feasible if it impedes an incumbent carrier’s ability “to retain responsibility for the management, control, and performance of its own network,” id., ¶ 203. This demanding sense of “technical feasibility,” as a condition protecting the incumbent’s ability to control the performance of its own network, is in accord with what we said in Iowa Utilities Bd. There, for example, we reinstated the Commission’s “pick and choose” rule in part because the duty to provide network elements on matching terms to all comers did not arise when it was “not technically feasible,” § 51.809(b)(2). 525 U. S., at 396. If “technically feasible” meant what is merely possible, it would have been no limitation at all. The two substantive rules each have additional features that are consistent with the purposes of § 251(c)(3). Rule 315(c), to the extent that it raises a duty to combine what is “ordinarily combined,” neatly complements the facially similar Rule 315(b), upheld in Iowa Utilities Bd., id., at 395, forbidding incumbents to separate currently combined network elements when the entrant requests them in a combined form. If the latter were the only rule, an incumbent might well be within its rights to insist, for example, on providing a loop and a switch in a combined form when a naive entrant asked just for them, while refusing later to combine them with a network interface device, which is also ordinarily combined with the loop and the switch, and which is necessary to set up a telecommunications link. But under Rule 315(c), when the entrant later requires the element it missed the first time, the incumbent’s obligation is to “perform the functions necessary,” 47 CFR § 51.315(c) (1997), for a combination of what the entrant cannot combine alone, First Report and Order ¶294, and would not have needed to combine if it had known enough to request the elements together in a combined form in the first place. Cf. id., ¶ 297 (“[I]ncumbent[s] must work with new entrants to identify the elements the new entrants will need to offer a particular service in the manner the new entrants intend”). Of course, it is not this aspect of Rule 315(c), requiring the combination of what is ordinarily combined, that draws the incumbents’ (or Justice Breyer’s, see post, at 563) principal objection; they focus their attack, rather, on the additional requirement of Rule 315(c), that incumbents combine unbundled network elements “even if those elements are not ordinarily combined in the incumbentfs] network.” 47 CFR § 51.315(c) (1997). To build upon our previous example, this would seemingly require an incumbent to combine the loop, switch, and interface (ordinarily combined in its network) with a second loop and network interface (provided by the incumbent as a separate unbundled element), so that the competitive carrier could charge for a second-line connection, as for a fax or modem. See Brief for Petitioners Worldcom, Inc., et al. in No. 00-555, at 48 (providing the example). But this provision of Rule 315(c) is justified by the statutory requirement of “nondiscriminatory access.” § 251(c)(3). As we have said, the FCC has interpreted the rule as obligating the incumbent to combine “[i]f the carrier is unable to combine the elements.” First Report and Order ¶294. There is no dispute that the incumbent could make the combination more efficiently than the entrant; nor is it contested that the incumbent would provide the combination itself if a customer wanted it or the combination otherwise served a business purpose. See Third Report and Order ¶481. It hardly seems unreasonable, then, to require the incumbent to make the combination, for which it will be entitled to a reasonable fee; otherwise, an entrant would not enjoy true “nondiscriminatory access” notwithstanding the bare provision on an unbundled basis of the network elements it needs to provide a service. As to Rule 315(d), it is hard to see how this rule is any less reasonable than § 251(c)(2), which imposes a statutory duty to interconnect. The rule simply requires the incumbent to perform functions necessary to combine the unbundled elements it provides with elements owned by the requesting carrier “in any technically feasible manner.” Essentially, it appears to be nothing more than an element-to-element version of the incumbents’ statutory duty “to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting . . . carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network,” in § 251(c)(2). In sum, what we have are rules that say an incumbent shall, for payment, “perform the functions necessary,” 47 CFR §§ 51.315(c) and (d) (1997), to combine network elements to put a competing carrier on an equal footing with the incumbent when the requesting carrier is unable to combine, First Report and Order ¶ 294, when it would not place the incumbent at a disadvantage in operating its own network, and when it would not place other competing carriers at a competitive disadvantage, 47 CFR § 51.315(c)(2) (1997). This duty is consistent with the Act’s goals of competition and nondiscrimination, and imposing it is a sensible way to reach the result the statute requires. * * * The 1996 Act sought to bring competition to local-exchange markets, in part by requiring incumbent local-exchange carriers to lease elements of their networks at rates that would attract new entrants when it would be more efficient to lease than to build or resell. Whether the FCC picked the best way to set these rates is the stuff of debate for economists and regulators versed in the technology of telecommunications and microeconomic pricing theory. The job of judges is to ask whether the Commission made choices reasonably within the pale of statutory possibility in deciding what and how items must be leased and the way to set rates for leasing them. The FCC’s pricing and additional combination rules survive that scrutiny. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Justice Scalia joins Part III of this opinion. Justice Thomas joins Parts III and IV. Section 252(d) separately provides for ratesetting with respect to reciprocal compensation for interconnected facilities, § 252(d)(2), and resale, § 252(d)(3). Nationalization, the historical policy choice for regulation of telephone service in many other countries, was rejected in the United States. Cohen, The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the United States, 1876-1917, 3 J. of Policy History 42,46,55-56, 65 (1991) (hereinafter Cohen); S. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries 26-27 (1996). The first noteworthy federal rate-regulation statute was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,24 Stat. 379, which was principally concerned with railroad rates but generally governed all interstate rates. It was the model for subsequent federal public-utility statutes like the Federal Power Act of 1920,41 Stat. 1063, the Communications Act of 1934,48 Stat. 1064, the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973. The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC and was the first statute to address interstate telephone regulation in an independent and substantive way. Federal regulation in the area had previously been undertaken incidentally to general interstate carrier regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 539, was the earliest federal statute prescribing rates for interstate and foreign telephone and telegraph carriers, as part of revisions to railroad rates set by the ICC. See R. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America 171 (1994) (hereinafter Vietor). And the Court had no doubt who should make the sacrifice in that situation. “ ‘If a corporation cannot maintain such a highway and earn dividends for stockholders, it is a misfortune for it and them which the Constitution does not require to be remedied by imposing unjust burdens upon the public.’ ” Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S., at 545 (citation omitted). One of the referents of value that did prove possible was current replacement or reproduction cost, a primitive version of the criterion challenged in these cases. See McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 417 (1926); Goddard, The Problem of Valuation: The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction as the Rate Base, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 570-571 (1928). The fair-value concept survived to some degree in the “used and useful” qualification to the prudent-investment rule, that a utility can only recover prudently invested capital that is being “used and useful” in providing the public a good or service. For example, the Pennsylvania rate statute upheld in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U. S. 299 (1989), provided that capital invested with prudence at the time but rendered useless by unforeseen events would not be recoverable through regulated rates, just as it would be worthless in terms of market value. Id., at 311-312, n. 7 (“The loss to utilities from prudent ultimately unsuccessful investments under such a system is greater than under a pure prudent investment rule, but less than under a fair value approach”). Operating cash, inventory, and accounts receivable constitute typical current assets. Current liabilities consist of accounts payable, such as taxes, wages, rents, interest payable, and short-term debt. Because, for example, accounts receivable may not be collected until after liabilities come due, working capital is capital needed to pay current liabilities in the interim. Z. Bodie & R. Merton, Finance 427 (prelim, ed. 1998). For example, in 1997, regulated incumbent local-exchange carriers had an average depreciation cycle of 14.4 years for their assets (an average depreciation cost of $127 per line as against gross plant investment of $1,836 per line), roughly twice as long as the average cycle of 7.4 years for unregulated competitive carriers like WorldCom. Weingarten & Stuck, Rethinking Depreciation, 28 Business Communications Review 63 (Oct. 1998). In a competitive market, a company may not simply raise prices as much as it may need to compensate for poor investments (say, in a plant that becomes unproductive) because competitors will then undersell the company’s goods. See N. Mankiw, Principles of Economics 308-310 (1998) (hereinafter Mankiw). Some loop lines employ coaxial cable and fixed wireless technologies, but these constitute less than 1 percent of the total number of reported local-exchange lines in the United States. FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001 (Feb. 27, 2002) (table 5). A mininetwork connecting only some of the users in the local exchange would be of minimal value to customers, and, correspondingly, any value to customers would be exponentially increased with the interconnection of more users to the network. See generally W. Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy 1-12 (1994). Title 47 U. S. C. § 253(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: “No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” “Network element” is defined as “a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such term also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by means of such facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the transmission, routing, or other provision of a telecommunications service.” § 153(29). Section 252(a) provides: “(a) Agreements arrived at through negotiation “(1) Voluntary negotiations “Upon receiving a request for interconnection, services, or network elements pursuant to section 251 of this title, an incumbent local exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with the requesting telecommunications carrier or carriers without regard to the standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 of this title. The agreement shall include a detailed schedule of itemized charges for interconnection and each service or network element included in the agreement. The agreement, including any interconnection agreement negotiated before February 8,1996, shall be submitted to the State commission under subsection (e) of this section.” Rates for wholesale purchases of telecommunications services are covered separately, and must be based on the incumbent’s retail rates. § 252(d)(3). The actual TELRIC rate charged to an entrant leasing the element would be a fraction of the TELRIC figure, based on a “reasonable projection” of the entrant’s use of the element (whether on a flat or per-usage basis) as divided by aggregate total use of the element by the entrant, the incumbent, and any other competitor that leases it. 47 CFR §51.511 (1997). See also First Report and Order ¶ 682. Nor is it possible to argue that “cost” would have to mean past incurred cost if the technical context were economics. See D. Carlton & J. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 50-74 (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter Carlton & Perloff). “Sunk costs” are unrecoverable past costs; practically every other sort of economic “cost” is forward looking, or can be either historical or forward looking. “Opportunity cost,” for example, is “the value of the best forgone alternative use of the resources employed,” id., at 56, and as such is always forward looking. See Sidak & Spulber, Tragedy of the Telecommons: Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1081,1093 (1997) (hereinafter Sidak & Spulber, Telecommons) (“Opportunity costs are ... by definition forward-looking”). See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U. S. 211, 224-225 (1991); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 744 F. 2d 185, 193-194 (CADC 1984); Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F. 2d 20,27 (CADC 1982). Cf. National Assn. of Greeting Card Publishers v. Postal Service, 462 U. S. 810, 832 (1983). The incumbents make their own plain-language argument based on statutory context, relying on the part of § 252(d)(1)(B) which provides that a just and reasonable rate “may include a reasonable profit.” They say that because separate provision is made in § 252(d)(1)(A) for factoring “cost” into the rate, “reasonable profit” may only be understood as income above recovery of the actual cost of an incumbent’s investment. But as the FCC has noted, “profit” may also mean “normal” profit, which is “the total revenue required to cover all of the costs of a firm, including its opportunity costs.” First Report and Order ¶ 699, and n. 1705 (citing D. Pearce, MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics 310 (1994)). That is to say, a “reasonable profit” may refer to a “normal” return based on “the cost of obtaining debt and equity financing” prevailing in the industry. First Report and Order ¶ 700. This latter sense of “cost” (and accordingly “reasonable profit”) is fully incorporated in the FCC’s provisions as to “risk-adjusted cost of capital,” namely, that “States may adjust the cost of capital if a party demonstrates ... that either a higher or a lower level of cost of capital is warranted, without... conducting a ‘rate-of-return or other rate based proceeding.’ ” Id., ¶ 702. While Justice Breyer does not explicitly challenge the propriety of Chevron deference, he relies on our decision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 56 (1983), to argue that the FCC’s choice of TELRIC bears no “rational connection” to the Act’s deregulatory purpose. See post, at 542, 554 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). State Farm involved review of an agency’s “changing its course” as to the interpretation of a statute, 463 U. S., at 42; these cases, by contrast, involve the FCC’s first interpretation of a new statute, and so State Farm is inapposite to the extent that it may be read as prescribing more searching judicial review under the circumstances of that case. (Indeed, State Farm may be read to suggest the obverse conclusion, that the FCC would have had some more explaining to do if it had not changed its course by favoring TELRIC over forward-looking methodologies tethered to actual costs, given Congress’s clear intent to depart from past ratesetting statutes in passing the 1996 Act.) But even on Justice Breyer’s own terms, FCC rules stressing low wholesale prices are by no means inconsistent with the deregulatory and competitive purposes of the Act. As we discuss below, a policy promoting lower lease prices for expensive facilities unlikely to be duplicated reduces barriers to entry (particularly for smaller competitors) and puts competitors that can afford these wholesale prices (but not the higher prices the incumbents would like to charge) in a position to build their own versions of less expensive facilities that are sensibly duplicable. See n. 27, infra. See also infra, at 515-516 (discussing FCC’s objection to Ramsey pricing). And while it is true, as Justice Breyer says, that the Act was “deregula-tory,” in the intended sense of departing from traditional “regulatory” ways that coddled monopolies, see supra, at 488 (remarks of Sen. Breaux), that deregulatory character does not necessarily require the FCC to employ passive pricing rules deferring to incumbents’ proposed methods and cost data. On the contrary, the statutory provisions obligating the incumbents to lease their property, § 251(c)(3), and offer their services for resale at wholesale rates, § 251(c)(4), are consistent with the promulgation of a ratesetting method leaving state commissions to do the work of setting rates without any reliance on historical-cost data provided by incumbents. “Marginal cost” is “the increase in total cost [of producing goods] that arises from an extra unit of production.” See Mankiw 272; see also id., at 283-288, 312-313; Carlton & Perloff 51-52. The Michigan state commission’s September 1994 order implementing a long-run incremental cost method for leasing local-exchange network elements, which the FCC considered, see First Report and Order ¶ 631, and n. 1508, makes this limitation more explicit by specifying that rates are to be set based on the costs of elements using the most efficient technology “currently available for purchase.” Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Re A Methodology to Determine Long Run Incremental Cost, 156 P. U. R. 4th 1, 7,13 (1994). Justice Breyer characterizes these built-in inefficiencies as well as provisions for state-commission discretion as to permitted costs of depreciation and capital, see Part III-B-2-a-(2), infra, as “coincidences” that have favored considerable competitive investment by sheer luck. See post, at 552. He thus shares the assumption of an efficient market made by the incumbents in their argument, and like the incumbents, dismisses departures from the theoretical assumption of a perfectly competitive market as inconsistencies rather than pragmatic recognitions. The FCC is, of course, under no obligation to adopt a ratesetting scheme committed to realizing perfection in economic theory, see First Report and Order ¶ 683 (rejecting pricing premised on a fully “hypothetical least-cost most efficient network”). Justice Bheyer proposes a “less formal kind of ‘play it by ear’ system” based on recent European Community practices as yet another alternative, see post, at 558; but the incumbents do not appear to have advocated such an informal ratesetting scheme to the FCC, see First Report and Order ¶¶ 630-671, nor have they argued for this alternative before this Court. And to the extent that Justice Breyer’s proposal emphasizes state commissions’ discretion to vary rates according to local circumstances and the particulars of each case, this is a feature that is already built into TELRIC. See infra, at 519-520. In the long run, “all of a firm’s costs become variable or avoidable.” First Report and Order ¶ 677. See also Kahn, Telecommunications Act 326 (“[A]ll costs are variable and minimized”). In general, the costs of producing a good include variable and fixed costs. Variable costs depend on how much of a good is produced, like the cost of copper to make a loop which rises as the loop is made longer; fixed costs, like rent, must be paid in any event without regard to how much is produced. See Carlton & Perloff 51-56. The long run is a timeframe of sufficient duration that a company has no fixed costs of production. The argument that rates incorporating fixed costs are necessary to avoid an unconstitutional taking is taken up in Part III-C, infra. Indeed, the expert literature the incumbents rely on to advocate fixed-cost rate-setting systems, see infra, at 514-515, do so almost exclusively on the premise of averting unwanted confiscation, and thus offer little support for the incumbents’ argument that recovery of fixed costs is a better way to spur competition (as opposed to compensating incumbents). Justice Breyer may be right that “firms that share existing facilities do not compete in respect to the facilities that they share,” post, at 550 (at least in the near future), but this is fully consistent with the FCC’s point that entrants may need to share some facilities that are very expensive to duplicate (say, loop elements) in order to be able to compete in other, more sensibly duplicable elements (say, digital switches or signal-multiplexing technology). In other words, Justice Breyer makes no accommodation for the practical difficulty the FCC faced, that competition as to “unshared” elements may, in many cases, only be possible if incumbents simultaneously share with entrants some costly-to-duplicate elements jointly necessary to provide a desired telecommunications service. Such is the reality faced by the hundreds of smaller entrants (without the resources of a large competitive carrier such as AT&T or WorldCom) seeking to gain toeholds in local-exchange markets, see FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001, p. 4, n. 13. (Feb. 27, 2002) (485 firms self-identified as competitive local-exchange carriers). Justice Breyer elsewhere recognizes that the Act “does not require the new entrant and incumbent to compete in respect to” elements, the “duplication of [which] would prove unnecessarily expensive,” post, at 546. It is in just this way that the Act allows for an entrant that may have to lease some “unnecessarily expensive” elements in conjunction with building its own elements to provide a telecommunications service to consumers. In this case, low prices for the elements to be leased become crucial in inducing the competitor to enter and build. Cf. First Report and Order ¶ 630 (wholesale prices should send “appropriate signals”). That is to say, if the entrant could offer a telecommunications service at a lower retail price, competitors including the incumbent would have to match that price by looking into ways to reduce their marginal costs, and the incumbents’ recalibrated costs would form the basis of new lease rates. In theory, embedded cost could be lower than efficient cost, see Brief for Respondent Federal Parties 17, n. 8 (though the incumbents, understandably, do not avail themselves of this tack); in which case the goal of efficient competition would be set back for the different reason of too much market entry. “We find that the parenthetical, ‘(determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding),’ does not further define the type of costs that may be considered, but rather specifies a type of proceeding that may not be employed to determine the cost of interconnection and unbundled network elements.” First Report and Order ¶704 (footnote omitted). The parenthetical provision that “cost” for ratemaking purposes must be “determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding,” 47 U. S. C. § 252(d)(l)(A)(i), was in the Senate version of the 1996 Act, but not in the House version. S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 251(d)(6)(A) (1995) (“[T]he charge . . . (A) shall be (i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the unbundled element...”). Both the Senate and House bills contained additional language that was not enacted to the ef-feet that “rate of return regulation” would be “eliminated” or prescribing its “abolition.” S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 301(a)(3) (1995) provided: “Rate of Return Regulation Eliminated— “(A) In instituting the price flexibility required under paragraph (1) the Commission and the States shall establish alternative forms of regulation for Tier 1 telecommunications carriers that do not include regulation of the rate of return earned by such carrier .. ..” H. R. 1555,104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 248(b) (1995) stated: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the extent that a carrier has complied with sections 242 and 244 of this part, the Commission, with respect to rates for interstate or foreign communications, and State commissions, with respect to rates for intrastate communications, shall not require rate-of-return regulation.” The Commission inferred from the omission of the express prohibitions that Congress intended to forbid a “type of proceeding” not a method. This was a reasonable inference in light of the common practice of setting wholesale rates by contracts incorporating retail rates set in state rate-of-return proceedings, see, e. g., Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F. 3d 60, 62, and n. 1 (CA1 2000), though not the only one: Congress may, for example, have balked at limiting state regulation at such a level of specificity. Less plausible is Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the statutory language, as “reflecting] Congress’ desire to obtain not perfect prices but speedy results,” post, at 559; he concludes that the provision “specifies that States need not use formal methods, relying instead upon bargaining and yardstick competition,” ibid. Section 252(d)(1), however, specifies how a state commission should set rates when an incumbent and an entrant fail to reach a bargain, § 252(a)(2); it seems strange, then, to read the statutory prohibition as affirmatively urging more bargaining and regulatory flexibility, rather than as firing a warning shot to state commissions to steer clear of entrenched practices perceived to perpetuate incumbent monopolies. ECPR advocates have since responded that the FCC was wrong to assume a static tether to uncompetitive retail prices, because ECPR, properly employed, would dynamically readjust the opportunity-cost factor as retail prices drop. Sidak & Spulber, Telecommons 1097-1098. But this would not cure the distortions caused by passing any difference between retail price and most efficient cost back to the incumbents as a lease premium. Nor, for that matter, does the evidence support Justice Breyer’s assertion that TELRIC will stifle incumbents’ “incentive . . . either to innovate or to invest” in new elements. Post, at 551. As Justice Breyer himself notes, incumbents have invested “over $100 billion” during the same period. Post, at 552. The figure affirms the commonsense conclusion that so long as TELRIC brings about some competition, the incumbents will continue to have incentives to invest and to improve their services to hold on to their existing customer base. The incumbents also contend that underdepreciation, i e., book values in excess of the economic value of assets, is another reason for increasing depreciation costs under TELRIC. Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-511, pp. 4-5. This argument is unpersuasive. As we have described, under-depreciation (to the extent of its continuation today, which the Government disputes, Brief for Respondent Federal Parties 38-39) was undertaken largely by the incumbents themselves, not forced upon them by regulators, as a means to keep the rate base inflated under the public-utility model of regulation. See supra, at 485-487,499. For all we know, the incumbent carriers may yet be seeking low rates of depreciation in state retail-rate proceedings still conducted under that model, even as they seek high depreciation rates here today to factor into the wholesale prices they may charge for the same elements they use to provide retail services. In short, the incumbents have already benefited from under-depreciation in the calculation of retail rates, and there is no reason to allow them further recovery through wholesale rates. Justice Breyer makes much of the availability of new technologies, specifically, the use of fixed wireless and electrical conduits, see post, at 549; but the use of wireless technology in local-exchange markets is negligible at present (36,000 lines in the entire Nation, less than 0.02 percent of total lines, FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001 (Feb. 27, 2002) (table 5)), and the FCC has not reported any use whatsoever of electrical conduits to provide local telecommunications service. The Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute barring rate recovery of capital prudently invested in canceled power plants because the “overall impact of the rate orders,” which allowed returns on common equity of 16 percent and overall returns of 11 to 12 percent, was not “constitutionally objectionable.” 488 U. S., at 312; see also id., at 314 (“‘It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which counts’ ”) (quoting FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944)). The utilities in Duquesne, like the incumbents here, made “[n]o argument... that... reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise future capital.” 488 U. S., at 312. Nor did they show that allowed rates were “inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments under a modified prudent investment scheme.” Ibid. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice White and Justice O’Connor, concurred, and noted that “all prudently incurred investment may well have to be counted” to determine “whether the government’s action is confiscatory.” Id., at 317. The incumbents make the additional argument that it was arbitrary or capricious for the FCC to reject historical costs, Brief for Petitioners in No. 00-511, at 44-49, but this is simply a restatement of the argument that the FCC was unreasonable in interpreting § 252(d)(1) to foreclose the use of historical cost in ratesetting, which we have already addressed, see Part III-B-2, supra. In fact, the FCC’s order is more hospitable to early taking claims than any court would be under Duquesne: “Incumbent LECs may seek relief from the Commission’s pricing methodology, if they provide specific information to show that the pricing methodology, as applied to them, will result in confiscatory rates.” First Report and Order ¶ 739. The FCC, in other words, is willing to consider a challenge to TELRIC in advance of a rate order, but any challenger needs to go beyond general criticism of a method’s tendency, and to show with “specific information” that a confiscatory rate is bound to result. Additionally, as the FCC has acknowledged, the smallest, rural incumbent local-exchange carriers most likely to suffer immediately from the imposition of unduly low rates are expressly exempt from the TELRIC pricing rules under 47 U. S. C. § 252(f)(1), see First Report and Order ¶ 706, and other rural incumbents may obtain exemptions from the rules by applying to their state commissions under § 252(f)(2). AT&T did not raise the issue in the relevant petition for certiorari as it claims. See Pet. for Cert. in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., O. T. 1998, No. 97-826, pp. 9-10,13. See Order in Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, No. 96-3321, etc. (CA8, June 10,1999), pp. 2-3 (“The briefs should also address whether or not, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision, this court should take any further action with respect to ... § 315(c) — (f)”). Under Rules 315(e)-(f), an incumbent that denies a requested combination has the burden to prove technical infeasibility or to show how the combination would impede others’ access. “An incumbent LEC shall make available without unreasonable delay to any requesting telecommunications carrier any individual interconnection, service, or network element arrangement contained in any agreement to which it is a party that is approved by a state commission pursuant to section 252 of the Act, upon the same rates, terms, and conditions as those provided in the agreement.” 47 CFR §51.809(a) (1997).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIAMOND NATIONAL CORP. et al. v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION No. 75-1038. Decided April 19, 1976 Per Curiam. The judgment is reversed. We are not bound by the California court’s contrary conclusion and hold that the incidence of the state and local sales taxes falls upon the national bank as purchaser and not upon the vendors. The national bank is therefore exempt from the taxes under former 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1964 ed.), which was in effect at the time here pertinent. First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339, 346-348 (1968). Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 15. Argued December 9, 1957. Decided May 19, 1958. Calvin L. Rampton and Keith Sohm argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief were E. R. Cal-lister, Attorney General of Utah, and Raymond W. Cee, Assistant Attorney General. Charles H. Weston argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel-lees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Robert W. Ginnane and Charlie H. Johns. Elmer B. Collins argued the cause for the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were Bryan P. Leverich, Ernest P. Porter, Peter W. Billings, Wood R. Worsley and A. U. Miner. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents another clash between state and federal authority in the regulation of intrastate commerce. The Public Service Commission of Utah and the Utah Citizens Rate Association, appellants, seek to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission entered in a proceeding under § 13 (3) and (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act in which an increase in intrastate freight rates to the general level of interstate rates was granted to railroads operating in Utah. 297 I. C. C. 87. The principal contention here is that the evidence before the Commission was insufficient to support its ultimate finding that existing intrastate rates caused “undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination against interstate commerce.” 297 I. C. C., at 105. A three-judge District Court found against appellants on this and all subsidiary issues. 146 F. Supp. 803. Upon direct appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U. S. 888 (1956). Having concluded that certain findings of the Commission lack sufficient support in the evidence, we reverse the judgment of the District Court. The action of the Commission was limited to freight rates on intrastate traffic in Utah. In Ex Parte No. 175 the Commission had increased interstate freight rates on a national basis by an aggregate of 15%. The appellee railroads applied to the Public Service Commission of Utah for a like increase in intrastate rates. After a full hearing, the Utah Commission dismissed the application on the ground that the railroads had not produced evidence concerning their intrastate operations as required by Utah law. No appeal was taken. Instead, pursuant to 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3) and (4), the railroads filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission which led to the order under attack here. The Commission found the evidence insufficient to establish any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce, on the one hand, and interstate commerce on the other. But in findings patterned after those approved in King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254 (1952), it concluded that the intrastate rates caused “undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination against interstate commerce.” 297 I. C. C., at 105. It sought to remove this burden by generally applying to intrastate traffic the 15% interstate increase previously granted in Ex Parte No. 175. Appellants attack two findings of the Commission as not being supported by substantial evidence. The first is that existing intrastate rates were abnormally low and failed to contribute their fair share of the revenue needs of the railroads. Evidence was introduced to show that some of Utah's intrastate rates were lower than corresponding interstate rates for like distances. No showing was made, however, of the comparative costs of performing such services. The second finding under attack is that the conditions incident to intrastate transportation were not more favorable than those incident to interstate movements. The evidence underlying this finding indicated only that goods moving intrastate were handled precisely as were those in interstate transportation, being intermingled on the same trains. Intrastate transportation is primarily the concern of the State. Federal power exists in this area only when intrastate tariffs are so low that an undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice is created as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate commerce on the other, or when those rates cast an undue burden on interstate commerce. Proof of such must meet “a high standard of certainty,” Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 245 U. S. 493, 510 (1918); before a state rate can be nullified, the justification for the exercise of federal power must “clearly appear.” Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 211-212 (1931). The Court pointed out in North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511 (1945), that the findings supporting such an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission must encompass each of the elements essential to federal power. Thereafter, in King v. United States, supra, we stressed the necessity of substantial evidence to support the findings, although we held it unnecessary “to establish for each item in each freight rate a fully developed rate case.” 344 U. S., at 275. In King, however, the insufficiency of the findings rather than of the evidence was urged upon the Court. Those findings, which we held adequate to support an order increasing intrastate rates, were, inter alia, (1) that existing intrastate rates were abnormally low and did not contribute a fair share of the railroads’ revenue needs; (2) that conditions as to the movement of intrastate traffic were not more favorable than those existing in interstate commerce; (3) that the rates cast an undue burden on interstate commerce; (4) that the increase ordered by the Commission would yield substantial revenues; and (5) that such increase would not result in intrastate rates being unreasonable and would remove the existing discrimination against interstate commerce. 344 U. S., at 267-268, footnote 13. We also held in King that the Commission might give weight to deficits in passenger revenue when prescribing intrastate freight rates so as to meet over-all revenue needs. In our most recent review of federal power in this intrastate area, Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U. S. 300 (1958), we relied on the principles of the above cases in striking down an increase in intrastate passenger fares for a suburban commuter service because the Commission had failed to take into account “the carrier’s other intrastate revenues from Illinois traffic, freight and passenger.” 355 U. S., at 308. We do not believe that the evidence here met the exacting standards required by our prior cases. As to the finding that prevailing intrastate rates were abnormally low and failed to contribute a fair share of over-all revenue, we discover no positive evidence to indicate that the relative cost of intrastate traffic was as great as that of interstate shipments. The absence of such evidence is important, for it is not enough to say that interstate rates were higher on similar shipments for like distances, Florida v. United States, supra, at 212, especially where, as here, there was some indication that intrastate traffic moved at lower cost than interstate. The annual reports of the four interstate railroads operating in Utah showed that their Utah operating ratios (freight service cost divided by freight service revenue) and the Utah density statistics (ton miles of traffic per mile of main track) were more favorable than comparable system-wide figures. The Commission discredited the density statistics because of the absence of branch-line inclusion in the totals. This was true, however, in the case of both Utah and system-wide computations, leaving no apparent foundation for the conclusion of unreliability. Other evidence seemed to indicate that those railroads with the larger percentages of total operations within Utah enjoyed higher rates of over-all return for 1953, the year just prior to the hearings in this case. The Denver & Rio Grande, with almost half of its entire operations within Utah, showed a rate of return of 6.06%. The Southern Pacific and Union Pacific, with substantially smaller proportions of Utah operations, showed returns of 3.48% and 3.56%, respectively. Statistics introduced by the railroads as to comparative economic conditions showed recent economic improvement to be greater percentagewise in the West and particularly in Utah than in other sections. The emphasis recently has switched from agriculture to industrial and mining activity, with its resulting increase in traffic — a factor tending to suggest more favorable railroad operating conditions. As to the finding that intrastate conditions were not more favorable than those incident to interstate transportation, the railroad evidence on this point was far from substantial. In essence, it merely showed that intrastate and interstate traffic was handled by the same crews and intermingled in the same movement. This evidence failed to establish that all material factors bearing on the reasonableness of rates were substantially the same. As we have previously noted, appellants offered convincing evidence not only of greater density on intrastate operations, permitting a wider spread of fixed costs, but also of lower operating ratios and higher returns as the percentage of intrastate traffic increased. In the face of this proof the evidence as to general similarity of conditions falls short of the “high standard of certainty” required. It is suggested that the Commission, in granting general interstate increases, frequently proceeds on the assumption that intrastate rates will be raised to the same level. But this assumption is no through ticket permitting it to approach the question of intrastate rates with partiality for a uniform increase. Rate uniformity is not necessarily the goal of federal regulation, nor can the Commission’s wishful thinking be substituted for substantial evidence. Section 13 is not cast in terms of “assumption” or “partiality.” As applied to this case, it contemplates an inquiry into intrastate rates and conditions within Utah, and any conclusion that interstate operating conditions equally exist there must be ticketed on more than assumption. Finally, we note an absence in the findings of any indication that the Commission concerned itself with the revenues derived from, or the conditions incident to, intrastate passenger operations. While a sweeping inquiry into those operations is not required, we believe that in light of our opinion in Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, supra, the findings must reflect consideration of these factors in arriving at a general intrastate freight level. “A fair picture of the intrastate operation, and whether the intrastate trafile unduly discriminates against interstate trafile, is not shown ... by limiting consideration to the particular . . . service in disregard of the revenue contributed by the other intrastate services.” 355 U. S., at 308. This issue was not argued by the parties, our opinion in that case having been announced after submission of the instant case. We mention it at this point, however, since further proceedings before the Commission no doubt will ensue. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with instructions to set aside the order of the Commission and remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. Sec. 13. “(3) Whenever in any investigation under the provisions of this part, or in any investigation instituted upon petition of the carrier concerned, which petition is hereby authorized to be filed, there shall be brought in issue any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority of any State, or initiated by the President during the period of Federal control, the Commission, before proceeding to hear and dispose of such issue, shall cause the State or States interested to be notified of the proceeding. The Commission may confer with the authorities of any State having regulatory jurisdiction over the class of persons and corporations subject to this part or part III with respect to the relationship between rate structures and practices of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of such State bodies and of the Commission; and to that end is authorized and empowered, under rules to be prescribed by it, and which may be modified from time to time, to hold joint hearings with any such State regulating bodies on any matters wherein the Commission is empowered to act and where the rate-making authority of a State is or may be affected by the action taken by the Commission. The Commission is also authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of such State authorities in the enforcement of any provision of this part or part III. “(4) Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be observed while in effect by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding.” 41 Stat. 484, as amended, 49 Stat. 543, 54 Stat. 911, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3), (4). The increase was accomplished in three separate orders. 280 I. C. C. 179; 281 I. C. C. 557; 284 I. C. C. 589. Appellants challenge the validity of the interstate increases permitted in Ex Parte No. 175. That record, however, was not introduced in this proceeding; moreover, our disposition requires no decision on this phase of the case. See note 1, supra. “Where the conditions under which interstate and intrastate traffic move are found to be substantially the same with respect to all factors bearing on the reasonableness of the rate, and the two classes are shown to be intimately bound together, there is no occasion to deal with the reasonableness of the intrastate rates more specifically, or to separate intrastate and interstate costs and revenues.” Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 483-484 (1934); King v. United States, supra, at 273.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILLIAMS et al. v. VERMONT et al. No. 84-592. Argued March 19, 1985 Decided June 4, 1985 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 28. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 28. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the ease. Norman Williams argued the cause pro se and filed briefs for appellants. Andrew M. Eschen, Assistant Attorney General of Vermont, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Vermont collects a use tax when cars are registered with it. The tax is not imposed if the car was purchased in Vermont and a sales tax has been paid. The tax is also reduced by the amount of any sales or use tax paid to another State if that State would afford a credit for taxes paid to Vermont in similar circumstances. The credit is available, however, only if the registrant was a Vermont resident at the time he paid the taxes. Appellants, who bought cars outside of Vermont before becoming residents of that State, challenge the failure to grant them a similar credit. We agree that this failure denies them the equal protection of the laws. I Appellants’ complaint, which was dismissed before an answer was filed, sets out the following facts. In December 1980, appellant Norman Williams purchased a new car in Illinois, paying a five-percent sales tax. Three months later, he moved to Vermont, bringing the car with him. He subsequently attempted to register the car in Vermont without paying the required use tax. The Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles refused to register the car. Williams responded by suing in the Federal District Court for the District of Vermont, which, relying on 28 U. S. C. § 1341, dismissed his complaint. Williams then paid the tax, which came to $172, unsuccessfully sought a refund from the Department of Motor Vehicles, and filed the present suit in Vermont Superior Court. The complaint alleged a number of constitutional defects in the State’s failure to afford appellants credit for the sales taxes they had paid. One of them was that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the State to deny the credit to them while providing it in the case of vehicles “acquired outside the state by a resident of Vermont.” Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, §8911(9) (1981). The Superior Court dismissed the complaint. Acknowledging that the use tax “does not afford, on its face, equal treatment to residents and nonresidents who purchase cars out-of-state,” App. 14, the court considered the relevant inquiry to be “whether discrimination occurs within the state,” id., at 15. It saw no such discrimination, reasoning that in practice Vermont residents always pay the use tax, because reciprocal States excuse payment of the sales tax and therefore there is no out-of-state payment to credit the use tax against. The court also found no burden on the right to travel, no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and no interference with interstate commerce. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, 144 Vt. 649, 478 A. 2d 993 (1984), by citation to another decision handed down the same day, Leverson v. Conway, 144 Vt. 523, 481 A. 2d 1029, appeal dism’d for want of a substantial federal question, 469 U. S. 926 (1984), pet. for rehearing pending, No. 84-315. Leverson was an essentially identical case brought by a former Wisconsin resident who, like appellants, had purchased a car in his home State and paid a sales tax, then moved to Vermont and been obliged to pay the use tax. The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the tax. First, it rejected the argument that denying a credit for a sales tax paid to another State infringed the right to travel. The use tax did not impose a penalty for moving to Vermont — the obligation was incurred only by registering one’s car there. Absent such a penalty, and given that there is no fundamental right to have or to register a car, the Equal Protection Clause required only minimal scrutiny. The statute was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in raising revenue to maintain and improve the highways, and rationally placed the burden on those who used them. The exemption for residents who purchased cars in reciprocal States encouraged purchases within Vermont by residents of those States. This goal would not be furthered by granting an exemption to new residents who have already purchased cars elsewhere. The court went on to hold that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not come into play because no right, such as the right to travel, qualifying as a privilege or immunity was involved. It also rejected a Commerce Clause challenge, viewing this as a straightforward use tax, imposed only on goods that had come to rest in Vermont. The Vermont Supreme Court denied rehearing, and appellants brought this appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction, 469 U. S. 1085 (1984), and we now reverse. I — I 1 — I The Vermont Motor Vehicle Purchase and Use Tax, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, ch. 219 (1981), is distinct from the State’s general sales and use taxes. It is intended to “improve and maintain the state and interstate highway systems, to pay the principal and interest on bonds issued for the improvement and maintenance of those systems and to pay the cost of administering this chapter.” § 8901. The revenue from the tax goes into a distinct “transportation fund.” §8912. The tax is of two sorts: a four-percent sales tax is imposed at the time of purchase of a motor vehicle in Vermont by a Vermont resident, § 8903(a), and a four-percent use tax is imposed upon registration of a motor vehicle in Vermont unless the Vermont sales tax was paid, § 8903(b). A number of vehicles are exempt, including, for example, those owned by a State, the United States, or charitable institutions, and those transferred within a family. See generally § 8911. Prior to September 1, 1980, the statute also exempted “pleasure cars, the owners of which were not residents of this State at the time of purchase and had registered and used the vehicle for at least thirty days in a state or province other than Vermont.” Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, §8911(6) (1970 and Supp. 1981) (repealed). That provision would have exempted appellants from the use tax. Since its repeal, registrants who purchased their cars out-of-state when not Vermont residents have had to pay the use tax, regardless of whether they already paid a sales tax in another jurisdiction on the same car. One other exemption is critical to this case. Section 8911(9) provides that the tax does not apply to “pleasure cars acquired outside the state by a resident of Vermont on which a state sales or use tax has been paid by the person applying for a registration in Vermont, providing that the state or province collecting such tax would grant the same pro-rata credit for Vermont tax paid under similar circumstances. If the tax paid in another state is less than the Vermont tax the tax due shall be the difference.” There is some dispute as to the reach of this provision. Appellants assert that, in light of this provision, had they been residents when they purchased their cars, they would now be exempt from the use tax. The State disagrees, asserting that the exemption applies only to Vermont residents who register their cars in Vermont without first having registered them elsewhere. According to it, a resident who purchases, pays a sales or use tax on, and registers a car in another State must also pay the Vermont use tax upon his return, bearing the same obligation as appellants. The State’s submission, if it is to be accepted, would negate any claim that appellants were treated differently than Vermont residents in similar circumstances. For several reasons, however, we do not believe that in ruling on the equal protection claim the Vermont Supreme Court construed the exemption in this manner. The exemption contained in §8911(9) refers to “pleasure cars acquired outside the state by a resident of Vermont.” That language on its face exempts Vermont residents who register in another State, and in Leverson the Vermont Supreme Court appears to have proceeded on this basis. That court set out a comprehensive list of who must pay the tax, from which the Vermont resident who first registers the car in another State is conspicuously absent. 144 Vt., at 532, 481 A. 2d, at 1034. The opinion also several times points out that residents who pay a tax in a nonreciprocal State do not enjoy the credit upon registering their cars in Vermont. Id., at 532, 533, 481 A. 2d, at 1034, 1035. Had the court believed that those purchasing and registering a car in a reciprocal State are also not exempt, one would have expected it to have said so. Similarly, the court noted that someone in appellants’ position “is treated in exactly the same manner as all nonexempt persons, including the resident who purchases his vehicle in a nonreciprocal state.” Id., at 533, 481 A. 2d, at 1035. If the court had understood the statute as do appellees, it would also have noted that appellants were treated just like any resident who had previously registered a car elsewhere, not just one who purchased in a nonreciprocal State. More fundamentally, had the Vermont Supreme Court accepted the narrow construction of the exemption that the State urges, it surely would have stated that the new resident suffers no unequal treatment under the statute at all and would have found no necessity to justify any discriminatory impact of the tax. This would have been a simple and straightforward answer to the equal protection claim, and there would have been no occasion to address the level of scrutiny to be applied to the discrimination or to identify the State’s interest in imposing the differential treatment of the nonresident. Instead, the court concluded that the State need have only a rational basis for the discrimination, and proceeded to hold that there was adequate justification for not extending the exemption to nonresidents. In short, every indication is that a Vermont resident who, like appellants, bought a car in another State, paid a sales or use tax, and used the car there for a period of time before coming to Vermont, would receive the credit. Appellees offer only their own say-so to the contrary. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. Pointing to nothing in the statute or in the opinion below to support their narrow reading, they would have us essentially add a clause that is not there. We cannot do so without stronger authority. We therefore proceed on the understanding that a Vermonter enjoys a credit for any sales taxes paid to a reciprocating State, even if he registered and used the car there before registering the car in Vermont. HH HH h-i This Court has expressly reserved the question whether a State must credit a sales tax paid to another State against its own use tax. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 172 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 587 (1937). The District of Columbia and all but three States with sales and use taxes do provide such a credit, although reciprocity may be required. CCH, State Tax Guide 6013 (1984). As noted above, see n. 2, swpra, Vermont provides a credit with regard to its general use tax. Such a requirement has been endorsed by at least one state court, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 272 Cal. App. 2d 728, 78 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1040 (1970), was advocated 20 years ago in the much-cited Report of the Willis Subcommittee, H. R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1136, 1177-1178 (1965), is adopted in the Multistate Tax Compact, Art. V, § 1, and has significant support in the commentary, e. g., J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation 637-638 (1978); Developments in the Law: Federal Limits on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 999-1000 (1962). Appellants urge us to hold that it is a constitutional requirement. Brief for Appellants 31-35. Once again, however, we find it unnecessary to reach this question. Whatever the general rule may be, to provide a credit only to those who were residents at the time they paid the sales tax to another State is an arbitrary distinction that violates the Equal Protection Clause. This Court has many times pointed out that in structuring internal taxation schemes “the States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.” Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973). It has been reluctant to interfere with legislative policy decisions in this area. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540, 547-548 (1983); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40-41 (1973); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 526-527 (1959). An exemption such as that chai-lenged here “will be sustained if the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose.” Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 196 (1983). See generally Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 234-235 (1981). We perceive no legitimate purpose, however, that is furthered by this discriminatory exemption. As we said in holding that the use tax base cannot be broader than the sales tax base, “equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state.” Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 70 (1963). A State may not treat those within its borders unequally solely on the basis of their different residences or States of incorporation. WHYY v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117, 119 (1968); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 571-572 (1949). In the present case, residence at the time of purchase is a wholly arbitrary basis on which to distinguish among present Vermont registrants — at least among those who used their cars elsewhere before coming to Vermont. Having registered a car in Vermont they are similarly situated for all relevant purposes. Each is a Vermont resident, using a car in Vermont, with an equal obligation to pay for the maintenance and improvement of Vermont’s roads. The purposes of the statute would be identically served, and with an identical burden, by taxing each. The distinction between them bears no relation to the statutory purpose. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 61 (1982); cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516, 540 (1982). As the Court said in Wheeling, appellants have not been “accorded equal treatment, and the inequality is not because of the slightest difference in [Vermont’s] relation to the decisive transaction, but solely because of the[ir] different residence.” 337 U. S., at 572. In some ways, this is not a typical sales and use tax scheme. The proceeds go to a transportation fund rather than to general revenue. Perhaps as a result, the sales tax is narrower than most, in that it applies not to all sales within the jurisdiction, but only to those to residents. Conversely, the use tax is broader than most, in that it applies to items purchased by nonresidents and taxed by other States. As noted, the general sales and use tax provisions of Vermont, for example, have neither of these features. See n. 2, supra. Applied to those such as appellants, the use tax exceeds the usual justifications for such a tax. A use tax is generally perceived as a necessary complement to the sales tax, designed to “ ‘protect a state’s revenues by taking away the advantages to residents of traveling out of state to make untaxed purchases, and to protect local merchants from out-of-state competition which, because of its lower or nonexistent tax burdens, can offer lower prices.’” Leverson, 144 Vt., at 527, 481 A. 2d, at 1032, quoting Rowe-Genereux, Inc. v. Department of Taxes, 138 Vt. 130, 133-134, 411 A. 2d 1345, 1347 (1980); see Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra, at 581. This customary rationale for the use tax has no application to purchases made out-of-state by those who were not residents of the taxing State at the time of purchase. These home-state transactions cannot be seen as lost Vermont sales, and are certainly not ones lost as a result of Vermont’s sales tax. Imposing a use tax on them in no way protects local business. In short, in its structure, this sales and use tax combination is exactly the opposite of the customary provisions: there is no disincentive to the Vermont resident’s purchasing outside the State, and there is a penalty on those who bought out-of-state but could not have been expected to do otherwise. The first provision limits local commerce, the second does not help it. Despite Leverson’s passing reference to the standard rationale for use taxes, then, the only plausible justification for imposing the tax on those in appellants’ position in the first place — apart from the simple desire to raise funds — is the principle that those using the roads should pay for them. In Leverson, the Vermont Supreme Court supported the tax by reference to “Vermont’s basic policy” of making those who use the highways contribute to their maintenance and improvement. 144 Vt., at 532, 481 A. 2d, at 1034. Yet this does not explain the exemption for a resident who bought a car elsewhere and paid a tax to another State, which, as the dissent points out, post, at 32-33, is “directly contrary” to the user-pays principle. This “basic policy” arguably supports imposition of the use tax on appellants, and the denial of a credit to them; but it provides no rational reason to spare Vermont residents an equal burden. The same response applies to the Vermont court’s statement that to allow an exemption for people in appellants’ position, or for Vermonters who purchase in nonreciprocal States, “would run counter to the state’s present policies of requiring user contributions and encouraging purchases within the state, and would result in the loss of tax revenues to the state.” 144 Vt., at 533, 481 A. 2d, at 1035. This is no less true with regard to the Vermonter who purchases a car in a reciprocal State. Granting the resident a credit for sales tax paid to the other State is similarly “counter to the state’s policies of requiring user contributions and encouraging purchases within the state.” Ibid. The Leverson court’s primary explanation of the exemption was that it “appears to be based upon a policy of encouraging out-of-staters from reciprocal states to purchase their vehicles in Vermont and pay a sales tax to Vermont, secure in the knowledge that they will not be subject to a duplicate tax in their home states, and upon a legislative assumption that few, if any, tax dollars will be lost through this exercise in comity.” Id., at 532, 481 A. 2d, at 1034-1035. However, the exemption cannot be justified as an indirect means of encouraging out-of-staters to purchase in. Vermont and pay Vermont sales tax, for the straightforward reason that Vermont does not impose its sales tax on nonresidents. § 8903(a). Appellees take a different tack, suggesting that the exemption is designed to encourage interstate commerce by enabling Vermont residents, faced with limited automobile offerings at home, Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36, to shop outside the State without penalty. Brief for Appellees 7. This justification may sound plausible, but it fails to support the classification at issue. Those in appellants’ position pay exactly the penalty for purchasing out-of-state that Vermont spares its own residents. The credit may rationally further Vermont’s legitimate interest in facilitating Vermonters’ out-of-state purchases, but this interest does not extend to the facilitation of Vermonters’ out-of-state use. Vermont may choose not to penalize old residents who used their cars in other States, but it cannot extend that benefit to old residents and deny it to new ones. The fact that it may be rational or beneficent to spare some the burden of double taxation does not mean that the beneficence can be distributed arbitrarily. Finally, the Vermont court pointed out that Leverson was “treated in exactly the same manner as all nonexempt persons, including the resident who purchases his vehicle in a nonreciprocal state.” 144 Vt., at 533, 481 A. 2d, at 1035. Yet the fact that all those not benefited by the challenged exemption are treated equally has no bearing on the legitimacy of that classification in the first place. A State cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by observing that in light of the statutory classification all those within the burdened class are similarly situated. The classification must reflect pre-existing differences; it cannot create new ones that are supported by only their own bootstraps. “The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes.” Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 308 (1966). In sum, we can see no relevant difference between motor vehicle registrants who purchased their cars out-of-state while they were Vermont residents and those who only came to Vermont after buying a car elsewhere. To free one group and not the other from the otherwise applicable tax burden violates the Equal Protection Clause. > I — ( Our holding is quite narrow, and we conclude by emphasizing what we do not decide. We need not consider appellants’ various arguments based on the right to travel, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause. We again put to one side the question whether a State must in all circumstances credit sales or use taxes paid to another State against its own use tax. In addition, we note that this action was dismissed for failure to state a claim before an answer was filed. The “dominant theme running through all state taxation cases” is the “concern with the actuality of operation.” Halliburton, 373 U. S., at 69. It is conceivable that, were a full record developed, it would turn out that in practice the statute does not operate in a discriminatory fashion. Finally, in light of the fact that the action was dismissed on the pleadings, and given the possible relevance of state law, see Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 277 (1984), we express no opinion as to the appropriate remedy. We hold only that, when the statute is viewed on its face, appellants have stated a claim of unconstitutional discrimination. The decision below is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. Appellant Susan Levine moved to Vermont in 1979. She brought with her a car she had purchased in New York a year before on which she had paid a seven-percent state sales tax. Upon registering her car in Vermont in 1982, she paid a use tax of $110. She then successfully moved to intervene in Williams’ suit. The general sales and use tax provisions are found in Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 32, ch. 233 (1981). The present controversy could not have arisen under these provisions. Vermont’s ordinary use tax applies neither to “property purchased by the user while a nonresident of this State,” § 9744(a)(2), nor to any property to the extent the user has already paid a sales or use tax to a State with a reciprocal agreement, § 9744(a)(3). Appellants would be exempt under both these subsections. Both taxes have a ceiling of $600. The sales tax is paid on the purchase price. §§ 8902(4), (5) (1981), § 8903(a) (Supp. 1984). The use tax is paid on the car’s low book value at the time of registration. App. 16; § 8907. If the statute operated as the State says it does, it might still be discriminatory, at least in theory. A nonresident who buys his car in another State, pays a sales tax, but does not register it there, and brings it right to Vermont, would pay two taxes, whereas a Vermont resident doing the same thing would pay only one. But this is not a distinction that appellants could challenge. Since they registered their cars out-of-state, they would not qualify for the exemption, but neither would a resident who had done the same. The State put forward this reading of the statute in its briefs in this ease and in Leverson. See Brief for Appellees in No. 83-139 (Vt. Sup. Ct.), pp. 18-19, and n. 2; Brief for Appellee in No. 83-157 (Vt. Sup. Ct.), pp. 17-18, and n. 3. The dissent suggests that this reading is not consistent with the statutory language. Post, at 32-33, and n. 3. While it is not our business to interpret state statutes, there is no necessary inconsistency. The literal language applies whenever a Vermonter buys a car in another State, regardless of how quickly he returns to Vermont. Significantly, the tax from which § 8911(9) exempts Vermont residents is imposed “at the time of first registering or transferring a registration.” § 8903(b) (emphasis added); see also § 8905(b). In addition, the credit applies when a “state sales or use tax has been paid.” § 8911(9) (emphasis added). If it extended only to the Vermont resident who bought a car elsewhere and brought it straight to Vermont, the reference to a use tax would be meaningless. Finally, as the dissent itself notes, post, at 36, n. 5, if the credit only applied in these circumstances, the provision would be essentially superfluous. We should not assume the legislature passed a statute without effect. Halliburton was decided under the Commerce Clause and is not dis-positive. We do not consider in what way, if any, the failure to give appellants a credit might burden interstate commerce. The critical point is the Court’s emphasis on the need for equal treatment of taxpayers who can be distinguished only on the basis of residence. See also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 583-584 (1937). The dissent does not disagree that such people are similarly situated, nor does it identify any justification for preferential treatment of the resident. Post, at 32-34. It merely argues that the inequity is the acceptable result of the imprecision of a generally rational classification. Post, at 33-35. Under rational-basis scrutiny, legislative classifications are of course allowed some play in the joints. But the choice of a proxy criterion — here, residence for State of use — cannot be so casual as this, particularly when a more precise and direct classification is easily drawn. A nonrecurring use tax pegged to the value of the car is an exceedingly loosely tailored means to this end. The amount of such a payment has no relation to the extent of use, includes the irrelevant variable of the luxury value of the ear, and fails to account for the possibility of the owner moving out of the State or selling the car during its useful life. Reliance on annual registration fees would provide a more accurate measure of current use and would seem to be more closely related to the stated purpose. However, appellants do not challenge the tax itself as an equal protection violation. And despite the looseness of the fit, we would be hard pressed to say that this manner of funding highway maintenance and construction is irrational. “If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970), quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PEREZ v. BROWNELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL. No. 44. Argued May 1, 1957. Restored to the calendar for reargument June 24, 1957. Reargued October 28, 1957. Decided March 31, 1958. Charles A. Horsky argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Fred Okrand, A. L. Wirin, Jack Wasserman and Salvatore C. J. Fusco. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondent on the original argument, and Solicitor General Rankin on the reargument. With them on the briefs were Warren Olney, III, then Assistant Attorney General, and J. F. Bishop. Beatrice Rosenberg was also with them on the brief on the reargument. John W. Willis filed a brief for Mendoza-Martinez, as amicus curiae. [On the same day, an order was entered substituting Attorney General Rogers for former Attorney General Brownell as the party respondent. See post, p. 915.] Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a national of the United States by birth, has been declared to have lost his American citizenship by operation of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended by the Act of September 27, 1944, 58 Stat. 746. Section 401 of that Act provided that “A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: “(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; or “(j) Departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or during a period declared by the President to be a period of national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States.” He seeks a reversal of the judgment against him on the ground that these provisions were beyond the power of Congress to enact. Petitioner was born in Texas in 1909. He resided in the United States until 1919 or 1920, when he moved with his parents to Mexico, where he lived, apparently without interruption, until 1943. In 1928 he was informed that he had been born in Texas. At the outbreak of World War II, petitioner knew of the duty of male United States citizens to register for the draft, but he failed to do so. In 1943 he applied for admission to the United States as an alien railroad laborer, stating that he was a native-born citizen of Mexico, and was granted permission to enter on a temporary basis. He returned to Mexico in 1944 and shortly thereafter applied for and was granted permission, again as a native-born Mexican citizen, to enter the United States temporarily to continue his employment as a railroad laborer. Later in 1944 he returned to Mexico once more. In 1947 petitioner applied for admission to the United States at El Paso, Texas, as a citizen of the United States. At a Board of Special Inquiry hearing (and in his subsequent appeals to the Assistant Commissioner and the Board of Immigration Appeals), he admitted having remained outside of the United States to avoid military service and having voted in political elections in Mexico. He was ordered excluded on the ground that he had expatriated himself; this order was affirmed on appeal. In 1952 petitioner, claiming to be a native-born citizen of Mexico, was permitted to enter the United States as an alien agricultural laborer. He surrendered in 1953 to immigration authorities in San Francisco as an alien unlawfully in the United States but claimed the right to remain by virtue of his American citizenship. After a hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer, he was ordered deported as an alien not in possession of a valid immigration visa; this order was affirmed on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Petitioner brought suit in 1954 in a United States District Court for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States. The court, sitting without a jury, found (in addition to the undisputed facts set forth above) that petitioner had remained outside of the United States from November 1944 to July 1947 for the purpose of avoiding service in the armed forces of the United States and that he had voted in a “political election” in Mexico in 1946. The court, concluding that he had thereby expatriated himself, denied the relief sought by the petitioner. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 235 F. 2d 364. We granted certiorari because of the constitutional questions raised by the petitioner. 352 U. S. 908. Statutory expatriation, as a response to problems of international relations, was first introduced just a half century ago. Long before that, however, serious friction between the United States and other nations had stirred consideration of modes of dealing with the difficulties that arose out of the conflicting claims to the allegiance of foreign-born persons naturalized in the United States, particularly when they returned to the country of their origin. As a starting point for grappling with this tangle of problems, Congress in 1868 formally announced the traditional policy of this country that it is the “natural and inherent right of all people” to divest themselves of their allegiance to any state, 15 Stat. 223, R. S. § 1999. Although the impulse for this legislation had been the refusal by other nations, notably Great Britain, to recognize a right in naturalized Americans who had been their subjects to shed that former allegiance, the Act of 1868 was held by the Attorney General to apply to divestment by native-born and naturalized Americans of their United States citizenship. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 295, 296. In addition, while the debate on the Act of 1868 was proceeding, negotiations were completed on the first of a series of treaties for the adjustment of some of the disagreements that were constantly arising between the United States and other nations concerning citizenship. These instruments typically provided that each of the signatory nations would regard as a citizen of the other such of its own citizens as became naturalized by the other. E. g., Treaty with the North German Confederation, Feb. 22, 1868, 2 Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, etc. (comp. Malloy, 1910), 1298. This series of treaties initiated this country's policy of automatic divestment of citizenship for specified conduct affecting our foreign relations. On the basis, presumably, of the Act of 1868 and such treaties as were in force, it was the practice of the Department of State during the last third of the nineteenth century to make rulings as to forfeiture of United States citizenship by individuals who performed various acts abroad. See Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, §§ 319, 324. Naturalized citizens who returned to the country of their origin were held to have abandoned their citizenship by such actions as accepting public office there or assuming political duties. See Davis to Weile, Apr. 18, 1870, 3 Moore, Digest of International Law, 737; Davis to Taft, Jan. 18, 1883, 3 id., at 739. Native-born citizens of the United States (as well as naturalized citizens outside of the country of their origin) were generally deemed to have lost their American citizenship only if they acquired foreign citizenship. See Bayard to Suzzara-Verdi, Jan. 27, 1887, 3 id., at 714; see also Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 559. No one seems to have questioned the necessity of having the State Department, in its conduct of the foreign relations of the Nation, pass on the validity of claims to American citizenship and to such of its incidents as the right to diplomatic protection. However, it was recognized in the Executive Branch that the Department had no specific legislative authority for nullifying citizenship, and several of the Presidents urged Congress to define the acts by which citizens should be held to have expatriated themselves. E. g., Message of President Grant to Congress, Dec. 7, 1874, 7 Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Richardson ed. 1899) 284, 291-292. Finally in 1906, during the consideration of the bill that became the Naturalization Act of 1906, a Senate resolution and a recommendation of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs called for an examination of the problems relating to American citizenship, expatriation and protection abroad. In response to these suggestions the Secretary of State appointed the Citizenship Board of 1906, composed of the Solicitor of the State Department, the Minister to the Netherlands and the Chief of the Passport Bureau. The board conducted a study and late in 1906 made an extensive report with recommendations for legislation. Among the recommendations of the board were that expatriation of a citizen “be assumed” when, in time of peace, he became naturalized in a foreign state, engaged in the service of a foreign state where such service involved the taking of an oath of allegiance to that state, or domiciled in a foreign state for five years with no intention to return. Citizenship of the United States, Expatriation, and Protection Abroad, H. R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23. It also recommended that an American woman who married a foreigner be regarded as losing her American citizenship during coverture. Id., at 29. As to the first two recommended acts of expatriation, the report stated that “no man should be permitted deliberately to place himself in a position where his services may be claimed by more than one government and his allegiance be due to more than one.” Id., at 23. As to the third, the board stated that more and more Americans were going abroad to live “and the question of their protection causes increasing embarrassment to this Government in its relations with foreign powers.” Id., at 25. Within a month of the submission of this report a bill was introduced in the House by Representative Perkins of New York based on the board’s recommendations. Perkins’ bill provided that a citizen would be “deemed to have expatriated himself” when, in peacetime, he became naturalized in a foreign country or took an oath of allegiance to a'foreign state; it was presumed that a naturalized citizen who resided for five years in a foreign state had ceased to be an American citizen, and an American woman who married a foreigner would take the nationality of her husband. 41 Cong. Rec. 1463-1464. Perkins stated that the bill was designed to discourage people from evading responsibilities both to other countries and to the United States and “to save our Government [from] becoming-involved in any trouble or question with foreign countries where there is no just reason.” Id., at 1464. What little debate there was on the bill centered around the foreign domicile provision; no constitutional issue was canvassed. The bill passed the House, and, after substantially no debate and the adoption of a committee amendment adding a presumption of termination of citizenship for a naturalized citizen who resided for two years in the country of his origin, 41 Cong. Rec. 4116, the Senate passed it and it became the Expatriation Act of 1907. 34 Stat. 1228. The question of the power of Congress to enact legislation depriving individuals of their American citizenship was first raised in the courts by Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299. The plaintiff in that action, Mrs. Mackenzie, was a native-born citizen and resident of the United States. In 1909 she married a subject of Great Britain and continued to reside with him in the United States. When, in 1913, she applied to the defendants, members of a board of elections in California, to be registered as a voter, her application was refused on the ground that by reason of her marriage she had ceased to be a citizen of the United States. Her petition for a writ of mandamus was denied in the state courts of California, and she sued out a writ of error here, claiming that if the Act of 1907 was intended to apply to her it was beyond the power of Congress. The Court, through Mr. Justice McKenna, after finding that merging the identity of husband and wife, as Congress had done in this instance, had a “purpose and, it may be, necessity, in international policy,” continued: “As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers. ... We concur with counsel that citizenship is of tangible worth, and we sympathize with plaintiff in her desire to retain it and in her earnest assertion of it. But there is involved more than personal considerations. As we have seen, the legislation was urged by conditions of national moment.... It is the conception of the legislation under review that such an act may bring the Government into embarrassments and, it may be, into controversies. . . .” 239 U. S., at 311-312. The Court observed that voluntary marriage of an American woman with a foreigner may have the same consequences, and “involve national complications of like kind,” as voluntary expatriation in the traditional sense. It concluded: “This is no arbitrary exercise of government.” 239 U. S., at 312. See also Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445; Ex parte Ng Fung Sing, 6 F. 2d 670. By the early 1930’s, the American law on nationality, including naturalization and denationalization, was expressed in a large number of provisions scattered throughout the statute books. Some of the specific laws enacted at different times seemed inconsistent with others, some problems of growing importance had emerged that Congress had left unheeded. At the request of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, see 86 Cong. Rec. 11943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt established a Committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor to review the nationality laws of the United States, to recommend revisions and to codify the nationality laws into one comprehensive statute for submission to Congress; he expressed particular concern about “existing discrimina-tions” in the law. Exec. Order No. 6115, Apr. 25, 1933. The necessary research for such a study was entrusted to specialists representing the three departments. Five years were spent by these officials in the study and formulation of a draft code. In their letter submitting the draft code to the President after it had been reviewed within the Executive Branch, the Cabinet Committee noted the special importance of the provisions concerning loss of nationality and asserted that none of these provisions was “designed to be punitive or to interfere with freedom of action”; they were intended to deprive of citizenship those persons who had shown that “their real attachment is to the foreign country and not to the United States.” Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United States, H. R. Comm. Print, Pt. 1, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. v-vn. The draft code of the Executive Branch was an omnibus bill in five chapters. The chapter relating to “Loss of Nationality” provided that any citizen should “lose his nationality” by becoming naturalized in a foreign country; taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state; being employed by a foreign government in a post for which only nationals of that country are eligible; voting in a foreign political election or plebiscite; using a passport of a foreign state as a national thereof; formally renouncing American citizenship before a consular officer abroad; deserting the armed forces of the United States in wartime (upon conviction by court martial); if a naturalized citizen, residing in the state of his former nationality or birth for two years if he thereby acquires the nationality of that state; or, if a naturalized citizen, residing in the state of his former nationality or birth for three years. Id., at 66-76. In support of the recommendation of voting in a foreign political election as an act of expatriation, the Committee reported: “Taking an active part in the political affairs of a foreign state by voting in a political election therein is believed to involve a political attachment and practical allegiance thereto which is inconsistent with continued allegiance to the United States, whether or not the person in question has or acquires the nationality of the foreign state. In any event it is not believed that an American national should be permitted to participate in the political affairs of a foreign state and at the same time retain his American nationality. The two facts would seem to be inconsistent with each other.” Id., at 67. As to the reference to plebiscites in the draft language, the report states: “If this provision had been in effect when the Saar Plebiscite was held, Americans voting in it would have been expatriated.” Ibid. It seems clear that the most immediate impulse for the entire voting provision was the participation by many naturalized Americans in the plebiscite to determine sovereignty over the Saar in January 1935. H. R. Rep. No. 216, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1. Representative Dickstein of New York, Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, who had called the plebiscite an “international dispute” in which naturalized American citizens could not properly participate, N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1935, p. 12, col. 3, had introduced a bill in the House in 1935 similar in language to the voting provisions in the draft code, 79 Cong. Rec. 2050, but, although it was favorably reported, the House did not pass it. In June 1938 the President submitted the Cabinet Committee’s draft code and the supporting report to Congress. In due course, Chairman Dickstein introduced the code as H. R. 6127, and it was referred to his committee. In early 1940 extensive hearings were held before both a subcommittee and the full committee at which the interested Executive Branch agencies and others testified. With respect to the voting provision, Chairman Dickstein spoke of the Americans who had voted in the Saar plebiscite and said, “If they are American citizens they had no right to vote, to interfere with foreign matters or political subdivision.” Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 6127, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 287. Mr. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Adviser of the State Department, said that the provision would be “particularly applicable” to persons of dual nationality, id., at 132; however, a suggestion that the provision be made applicable only to dual nationals, id., at 398, was not adopted. Upon the conclusion of the hearings in June 1940 a new bill was drawn up and introduced as H. R. 9980. The only changes from the Executive Branch draft with respect to the acts of expatriation were the deletion of using a foreign passport and the addition of residence by a naturalized citizen for five years in any foreign country as acts that would result in loss of nationality. 86 Cong. Rec. 11960-11961. The House debated the bill for a day in September 1940. In briefly summarizing the loss of nationality provisions of the bill, Chairman Dickstein said that “this bill would put an end to dual citizenship and relieve this country of the responsibility of those who reside in foreign lands and only claim citizenship when it serves their purpose.” Id., at 11944. Representative Rees of Kansas, who had served as chairman of the subcommittee that studied the draft code, said that clarifying legislation was needed, among other reasons, “because of the duty of the Government to protect citizens abroad.” Id., at 11947. The bill passed the House that same day. Id., at 11965. In the Senate also, after a favorable report from the Committee on Immigration, the bill was debated very briefly. Committee amendments were adopted making the provision on foreign military service applicable only to dual nationals, making treason an act of expatriation and providing a procedure by which persons administratively declared to have expatriated themselves might obtain judicial determinations of citizenship. The bill as amended was passed. Id., at 12817-12818. The House agreed to these and all other amendments on which the Senate insisted, id., at 13250, and, on October 14, the Nationality Act of 1940 became law. 54 Stat. 1137. The loss of nationality provisions of the Act constituted but a small portion of a long omnibus nationality statute. It is not surprising, then, that they received as little attention as they did in debate and hearings and that nothing specific was said about the constitutional basis for their enactment. The bill as a whole was regarded primarily as a codification — and only secondarily as a revision — of statutes that had been in force for many years, some of them, such as the naturalization provisions, having their beginnings in legislation 150 years old. It is clear that, as is so often the case in matters affecting the conduct of foreign relations, Congress was guided by and relied very heavily upon the advice of the Executive Branch, and particularly the State Department. See, e. g., 86 Cong. Rec. 11943-11944. In effect, Congress treated the Cabinet Committee as it normally does its own committees charged with studying a problem and formulating legislation. These considerations emphasize the importance, in the inquiry into congressional power in this field, of keeping in mind the historical background of the challenged legislation, for history will disclose the purpose fairly attributable to Congress in enacting the statute. The first step in our inquiry must be to answer the question: what is the source of power on which Congress must be assumed to have drawn? Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318; Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 311-312. The States that joined together to form a single Nation and to create, through the Constitution, a Federal Government to conduct the affairs of that Nation must be held to have granted that Government the powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the company of sovereign nations. The Government must be able not only to deal affirmatively with foreign nations, as it does through the maintenance of diplomatic relations with them and the protection of American citizens sojourning within their territories. It must also be able to reduce to a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and interests. The inference is fairly to be drawn from the congressional history of the Nationality Apt of 1940, read in light of the historical background of expatriation in this country, that, in making voting in foreign elections (among other behavior) an act of expatriation, Congress was seeking to effectuate its power to regulate foreign affairs. The legislators, counseled by those on whom they rightly relied for advice, were concerned about actions by citizens in foreign countries that create problems of protection and are inconsistent with American allegiance. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that embarrassments in the conduct of foreign relations were of primary concern in the consideration of the Act of 1907, of which the loss of nationality provisions of the 1940 Act are a codification and expansion. Broad as the power in the National Government to regulate foreign affairs must necessarily be, it is not without limitation. The restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other nations. Since Congress may not act arbitrarily, a rational nexus must exist between the content of a specific power in Congress and the action of Congress in carrying that power into execution. More simply stated, the means — in this case, withdrawal of citizenship — must be reasonably related to the end — here, regulation of foreign affairs. The inquiry — -and, in the case before us, the sole inquiry — into which this Court must enter is whether or not Congress may have concluded not unreasonably that there is a relevant connection between this fundamental source of power and the ultimate legislative action. Our starting point is to ascertain whether the power of Congress to deal with foreign relations may reasonably be deemed to include a power to deal generally with the active participation, by way of voting, of American citizens in foreign political elections. Experience amply attests that, in this day of extensive international travel, rapid communication and widespread use of propaganda, the activities of the citizens of one nation when in another country can easily cause serious embarrassments to the government of their own country as well as to their fellow citizens. We cannot deny to Congress the reasonable belief that these difficulties might well become acute, to the point of jeopardizing the successful conduct of international relations, when a citizen of one country chooses to participate in the political or governmental affairs of another country. The citizen may by his action unwittingly promote or encourage a course of conduct contrary to the interests of his own government; moreover, the people or government of the foreign country may regard his action to be the action of his government, or at least as a reflection if not an expression of its policy. Cf. Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States, 28 Am. J. Int’l L. 649, 650. It follows that such activity is regulable by Congress under its power to deal with foreign affairs. And it must be regulable on more than an ad hoc basis. The subtle influences and repercussions with which the Government must deal make it reasonable for the generalized, although clearly limited, category of “political election” to be used in defining the area of regulation. That description carries with it the scope and meaning of its context and purpose; classes of elections — nonpolitical in the colloquial sense — as to which participation by Americans could not possibly have any effect on the relations of the United States with another country are excluded by any rational construction of the phrase. The classification that Congress has adopted cannot be said to be inappropriate to the difficulties to be dealt with. Specific applications are of course open to judicial challenge, as are other general categories in the law, by a “gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.” Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104. The question must finally be faced whether, given the power to attach some sort of consequence to voting in a foreign political election, Congress, acting under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, could attach loss of nationality to it. Is the means, withdrawal of citizenship, reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations attributable to voting by American citizens in foreign political elections? The importance and extreme delicacy of the matters here sought to be regulated demand that Congress be permitted ample scope in selecting appropriate modes for accomplishing its purpose. The critical connection between this conduct and loss of citizenship is the fact that it is the possession of American citizenship by a person committing the act that makes the act potentially embarrassing to the American Government and pregnant with the possibility of embroiling this country in disputes with other nations. The termination of citizenship terminates the problem. Moreover, the fact is not without significance that Congress has interpreted this conduct, not irrationally, as importing not only something less than complete and unswerving allegiance to the United States but also elements of an allegiance to another country in some measure, at least, inconsistent with American citizenship. Of course, Congress can attach loss of citizenship only as a consequence of conduct engaged in voluntarily. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 311-312. But it would be a mockery of this Court’s decisions to suggest that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so. The Court only a few years ago said of the person held to have lost her citizenship in Mackenzie v. Hare, supra: “The woman had not intended to give up her American citizenship.” Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U. S. 491, 501. And the latter case sustained the denationalization of Mrs. Savorgnan although it was not disputed that she “had no intention of endangering her American citizenship or of renouncing her allegiance to the United States.” 338 U. S., at 495. What both women did do voluntarily was to engage in conduct to which Acts of Congress attached the consequence of denationalization irrespective of — and, in those cases, absolutely contrary to — the intentions and desires of the individuals. Those two cases mean nothing — indeed, they are deceptive — if their essential significance is not rejection of the notion that the power of Congress to terminate citizenship depends upon the citizen’s assent. It is a distortion of those cases to explain them away on a theory that a citizen’s assent to denationalization may be inferred from his having engaged in conduct that amounts to an “abandonment of citizenship” or a “transfer of allegiance.” Certainly an Act of Congress cannot be invalidated by resting decisive precedents on a gross fiction — a fiction baseless in law and contradicted by the facts of the cases. It cannot be said, then, that Congress acted without warrant when, pursuant to its power to regulate the relations of the United States with foreign countries, it provided that anyone who votes in a foreign election of significance politically in the life of another country shall lose his American citizenship. To deny the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here would be to disregard the constitutional allocation of governmental functions that it is this Court’s solemn duty to guard. Because of our view concerning the power of Congress with respect to § 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, we find it unnecessary to consider — indeed, it would be improper for us to adjudicate — the constitutionality of § 401 (j), and we expressly decline to rule on that important question at this time. Judgment affirmed. Incorporated into § 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 267-268, 8 U. S. C. § 1481. Petitioner proceeded under § 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 1171, which authorizes an individual to bring suit for a declaration of nationality in a United States District Court against the head of any government agency that denies him a right or privilege of United States nationality on the ground that he is not a United States national. The judicial hearing in such an action is a trial de novo in which the individual need make only a prima jade case establishing his citizenship by birth or naturalization. See Pandolfo v. Acheson, 202 F. 2d 38, 40-41. The Government must prove the act of expatriation on which the denial was based by “ ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence which does not leave ‘the issue in doubt’.” Gonzales v. London, 350 U. S. 920; see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 158. The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . .” sets forth the two principal modes (but by no means the only ones) for acquiring citizenship. Thus, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting), it was held that a person of Chinese parentage born in this country was among “all persons born ... in the United States” and therefore a citizen to whom the Chinese Exclusion Acts did not apply. But there is nothing in the terms, the context, the history or the manifest purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to warrant drawing from it a restriction upon the power otherwise possessed by Congress to withdraw citizenship. The limit of the operation of that provision was clearly enunciated in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 329: “As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.” Petitioner in the case before us did not object to the characterization of the election in which he voted as a “political election.” It may be noted that, in oral argument, counsel for the petitioner expressed his understanding that the election involved was the election for Mexico’s president. The District Court in Savorgnan stated: “I am satisfied from the proofs submitted that at the time plaintiff signed Exhibits 1 and 2 [application for Italian citizenship and oath of allegiance to Italian' Government] she had no present or fixed intention in her mind to expatriate herself.” 73 F. Supp. 109, 111.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. CHRISTIAN ECHOES NATIONAL MINISTRY, INC. No. 71-565. Decided January 24, 1972 Per Curiam. This case began when the Internal Revenue Service revoked the tax-exempt status of the appellee, a nonprofit religious corporation. The appellee had previously enjoyed a tax exemption under § 501 (c) (3) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501 (c)(3). This section defines exempt organizations, in pertinent part, as: “Corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes ... , no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.” The appellee’s exemption under this provision was revoked on three grounds: (1) that the appellee was not operated exclusively for religious purposes, (2) that it had engaged in substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation, and (3) that it had intervened in political campaigns on behalf of candidates for public office. The appellee paid the taxes assertedly owed and then filed the present suit for a refund in Federal District Court, claiming that it was entitled to an exempt status under § 501 (c) (3) of the Code. The case was heard by a single District Judge sitting without a jury. The judge ultimately decided that the appellee was entitled to tax-exempt status and to a refund of the taxes paid. The District Court rejected all three grounds on which the Internal Revenue Service had revoked the appellee’s exempt status. It found, as fact, (1) that the appellee’s “activities have been directed toward achieving its religious goals,” (2) that “[w]ith the exception of support of the proposed Becker Amendment to the United States Constitution relating to voluntary prayer and Bible reading in public schools, [the appellee] has not engaged in attempts to influence legislation,” and (3) that the ap-pellee “has not endorsed a political candidate, and has not instructed its followers as to how to vote but only to vote.” On the basis of its findings of fact, the court concluded as law that the appellee fell within the terms of §501 (c)(3). That ended the case. But the District Court nonetheless went on to discuss certain constitutional issues. In its conclusions of law, the court stated that the First Amendment prohibits both the Government and the courts from determining whether a religious organization is operated for exclusively religious purposes, and is thus eligible for tax-exempt status, by analyzing each and every activity of the organization and classifying it as “religious” or “political.” In this case, the court said, the Internal Revenue Service conducted and relied upon such an analysis in revoking the appellee’s exemption and, for that reason, the Service denied the free exercise of religion to the appellee. The District Court also stated that the Internal Revenue Service violated the appellee’s right to due process of law by singling it out, among all other religious organizations, for investigation and exemption revocation “without evidence to support its action.” The United States seeks to appeal the decision of the single District Judge directly to this Court. It argues that we have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. That jurisdictional provision allows a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of “any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States ... is a party.” Such a direct appeal is allowed whether the Act of Congress was declared unconstitutional “as a whole” or simply “as applied.” Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100, 102-103. The findings and conclusions of the District Court in the present case, however, reveal that it did not hold § 501 (c) (3) unconstitutional in either of these ways. Hence, we must dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. The “basis” of the District Court’s decision, United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20, was that, under the facts adduced at trial, the appellee qualified for exempt status under §501 (c)(3). The court did not question or even consider the constitutionality of § 501 (c)(3) “as a whole.” Nor does any part of its opinion hold that the section was unconstitutional “as applied.” Indeed, the court in this case would hardly have found the appellee to be qualified for an exemption under §501 (c)(3), only to hold that the section could not be validly applied in the first place. The District Court’s commentary on the denial of due process to the appellee was directed simply to’ the method by which § 501 (c) (3) was enforced — not to its basic applicability. The court held that the Internal Revenue Service may not discriminate in applying the section. This holding restricts freewheeling enforcement and may make it more difficult to revoke certain tax exemptions. But it does not call into question the validity of the underlying statute. Under § 1252, direct appeal to the Supreme Court is authorized only in the latter situation. Similarly, the District Court’s commentary on the denial of the appellee’s First Amendment rights was directed to the particular interpretation given to § 501 (c)(3) by the Internal Revenue Service in this case and to its means of enforcing that interpretation. At most, the court’s reasoning on this point can be read to construe § 501 (c) (3) narrowly so as to avoid a First Amendment problem. The court refused to interpret and apply the section to require an analysis of the “religious'’ or “non-religious" character of every activity by a concededly religious organization, because such an interpretation and application would infringe the right to free exercise of religion. It stated that the Internal Revenue Service had already gone too far in its enforcement of this interpretation. But the statement that the Service violated the appellee’s First Amendment rights is not the same as a holding that Congress did so in enacting § 501 (c)(3). The court avoided holding that the section itself was unconstitutional “as applied” — i. e., that the section, by its own terms, infringed constitutional freedoms in the circumstances of the particular case. Rather, it held that the Service had misinterpreted § 501 (c) (3) and that the section must be narrowly construed. Although the construction was based on a constitutional premise, it did not amount to a holding that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional, as contemplated by § 1252. To the contrary, the District Court construed the section so as to save its constitutionality. Our interpretation of the District Court’s conclusions of law does not, of course, indicate approval of those conclusions. The issue is not before us. We hold only that there is an absence of appellate jurisdiction under § 1252. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded to the District Court for the entry of a fresh decree, so that the appellant may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the District Court in this case, entered on June 24, 1971, are not officially reported. By far the greatest portion of the District Court’s findings of fact are directed to the detailed history of the Government’s investigation of the appellee’s exempt status. For example, the District Court stated: “43. [The appellant] has characterized certain of [the appellee’s] activities during the years involved in this suit as urging the public to contact members of legislative bodies for the purpose of proposing, supporting or opposing legislation. [The appellee] has characterized the same activities as taking stands on issues of the day concerning matters which it construes to threaten its religious beliefs. The Court finds that these activities have resulted from [the appellee’s] religious beliefs and were merely incidental to the exercise of its religion and the expression and dissemination of its understanding of biblical concepts. The Court further finds that any such activities by [the appellee] were insubstantial in relationship to the totality of [the appellee’s] activities. “44. [The appellant], in describing and characterizing [the appel-lee’s] activities as political and non-religious, has in fact indicated a disagreement with the content and nature of what [the appellee] has said and written. [The appellant] has thereby sponsored its own definitions of ‘religion’ and ‘religious.’ Such definitions by [the appellant] are impermissable [sic], ... “45. [The appellee’s] expression of opinion on ‘current issues or issues of the day’ is not an act contemplated by prohibition against intervention in political campaigns or legislation and is not a violation of the provisions of Internal Revenue Code.” A similar distinction has been drawn in the context of the three-judge district court statute, 28 U. S. C. §2281. “It is necessary to distinguish between a petition for injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which requires a three-judge court, and a petition which seeks an injunction on the ground of.the uneonstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter petition does not require a three-judge court. In such a case the attack is aimed at an allegedly erroneous administrative action.” Ex parte Bransford, 310 U. S. 354, 361.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SORENSON v. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY et al. No. 84-1686. Argued January 15, 1986 Decided April 22, 1986 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 866. Peter Greenfield argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was J. Bruce Smith. Richard Farber argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Michael L. Paup, and Steven I. Frahm. Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Joseph X. Dumond, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Connecticut as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The Internal Revenue Code and the Social Security Act direct the Secretary of the Treasury to “intercept” certain tax refunds payable to persons who have failed to meet child-support obligations. In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that payments involving eamed-income credits could be intercepted. 752 F. 2d 1433 (1985). We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. 1016 (1985), because this ruling was in conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits. See Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d 351 (CA10 1984); Nelson v. Regan, 731 F. 2d 105 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Manning v. Nelson, 469 U. S. 853 (1984). I A Stanley Sorenson, the husband of petitioner Marie Soren-son, was legally obligated to make child-support payments for a child of his previous marriage who was in the custody of his former wife. Mr. Sorenson was unemployed because of a disability and fell behind on those support payments. His former wife applied for welfare benefits from the State of Washington. Since 1975, the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) has required, as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for welfare assign to the State concerned any right to child-support payments that has accrued at the time of assignment. Pub. L. 93-647, § 101(c)(5)(C), 88 Stat. 2359, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(26)(A). Thus, Stanley Sorenson’s former wife turned over to the State her right to collect the payments Mr. Sorenson had failed to make. Stanley and Marie Sorenson also had their own dependent child living with them. They thus were potentially eligible to receive an earned-income credit. For the calendar year 1981, the time relevant to this lawsuit, § 43 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, provided that an individual responsible for the support of a child living with him was allowed “as a credit against the tax imposed ... for the taxable year an amount equal to 10 percent of so much of the earned income for the taxable year as does not exceed $5,000.” As the amount of the taxpayer’s earned income increased, the amount of the credit decreased, reaching zero when the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income reached $10,000. Unlike certain other credits, which can be used only to offset tax that would otherwise be owed, the earned-income credit is “refundable.” Thus, if an individual’s earned-income credit exceeds his tax liability, the excess amount is “considered an overpayment” of tax under § 6401(b), as it then read, of the 1954 Code. Subject to specified setoffs, § 6402(a) directs the Secretary to credit or refund “any overpayment” to the person who made it. An individual who is entitled to an earned-income credit that exceeds the amount of tax he owes thereby receives the difference as if he had overpaid his tax in that amount. B In February 1982, petitioner and her husband timely filed a joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1981. Petitioner had worked during part of that year, and all the Sorenson family income for the year was attributable to her wages and unemployment compensation benefits. By the return so filed, the Sorensons anticipated a refund of $1408.90, consisting in part of excess withholding on petitioner’s wages and in part of an earned-income credit. The Internal Revenue Service, however, notified the Sorensons that $1,132 of the anticipated refund was being retained, under the authority granted it by the tax-intercept law, and would be paid over to the State of Washington because that State had been assigned the right to collect Mr. Sorenson’s unpaid child-support obligations. See Second Declaration of Peter Greenfield, Exh. B, Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, No. C82-441C (WD Wash.). The tax-intercept law essentially directs the Secretary to give priority to a State’s claim for recoupment of welfare payments made to a family who failed to receive child support, see § 402(a)(26)(A) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A), over an individual’s claim for refund of tax overpayment. See § 6402(a), as amended, of the 1954 Code. The intercept law originally was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. 97-35, §2331, 95 Stat. 860. First, OBRA § 2331(a) added §464 to the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §664. That section directs the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Health and Human Services to establish a scheme by which a State is to notify the Secretary of the Treasury of persons who owe past-due child-support payments that have been assigned to it, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to intercept tax-refund payments that would otherwise be paid to those persons: “Upon receiving notice from a State agency administering [an AFDC plan]. . . that a named individual owes past-due support which has been assigned to such State pursuant to section 402(a)(26), the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine whether any amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid, are payable to such individual (regardless of whether such individual filed a tax return as a married or unmarried individual). If the Secretary of the Treasury finds that any such amount is payable, he shall withhold from such refunds an amount equal to the past-due support, and pay such amount to the State agency (together with notice of the individual’s home address) for distribution in accordance with section 457(b)(3).” § 464(a), 42 U. S. C. § 664(a). Section 2331(c) of OBRA amended the Internal Revenue Code. It added a new subsection to the provision governing the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to refund overpay-ments to taxpayers. The new subsection, § 6402(c), requires the Secretary to withhold from the refund otherwise due the taxpayer the amount owed the State in past-due child support and to remit the amount withheld to the State: “The amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support (as defined in section 464(c) of the Social Security Act) owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act. The Secretary shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State to which such support has been assigned and notify the person making the overpayment that so much of the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support has been paid to the State. This subsection shall be applied to an overpayment prior to its being credited to a person’s future liability for an internal revenue tax.” C After negotiations concerning the status of tax refunds in community property States such as Washington — issues that are not germane to the question now presented to this Court — the Secretary ultimately withheld only half of the refund increment the Sorensons claimed. Petitioner then filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking, among other things, a declaration that §464 of the Social Security Act did not reach a refund attributable to an excess earned-income credit. The District Court rejected the Secretary’s jurisdictional arguments, which were renewed on appeal to the Court of Appeals but which are not pressed in this Court. See Brief for Respondents 5, n. 1. But it agreed with the Secretary’s arguments on the merits and granted summary judgment for the Government. 557 F. Supp. 729 (1982). The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 752 F. 2d 1433 (CA9 1985). It rejected petitioner’s statutory construction arguments, and held that, since the Code expressly defined excess earned-income credits as “overpayments,” and disbursed those excess credits to recipients through the income tax refund process, the credits were “payable ‘as’ refunds of federal taxes paid” and therefore could be intercepted. Id., at 1441 (emphasis in original). Congress used the broad terms “any amounts” and “any overpayment” in the tax-intercept law and gave no indication that it intended to exclude earned-income credit payments from these terms. The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner’s argument that the Secretary’s position conflicted with Congress’ intention to provide benefits to the poor through the earned-income credit. First, the legislative history of §43 did not suggest that the earned-income credit was intended primarily as a type of welfare grant; rather, it was meant to negate the disincentive to work caused by Social Security taxes. Since the earned-income credit was payable as a lump sum, it was more like excess withholding, which was clearly reachable by the intercept program, than it was like wages, a portion of which Congress exempted from the assessment and collection process. See 752 F. 2d, at 1443, n. 1. Second, had Congress intended to exempt earned-income credit payments from the intercept program, it could have done so expressly. Instead, it provided that any amount payable through the federal tax-refund process might be intercepted. “In the face of this rather clear statutory mandate,” said the Court of Appeals, “we conclude that we are not free to speculate that Congress intended otherwise.” Id., at 1443. HH hH Petitioner advances two arguments to support her claim that an excess earned-income credit cannot be intercepted. First, she claims that the language and structure of the interlocking statutory provisions that make up the intercept law exclude an earned-income credit from its reach: excess earned-income credits are neither “overpayments” nor “refunds of Federal taxes paid,” and only those items are subject to interception. Second, she claims that permitting interception of an earned-income credit would frustrate Congress’ aims in providing the credit, and thus that Congress could not have intended the intercept law to reach earned-income credits. We find neither argument persuasive. A The Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of earned-income credits supports the Government’s position. An individual can receive the amount by which his entitlement to an earned-income credit exceeds his tax liability only because § 6401(b) of the Code defines that amount as an “overpayment,” and § 6402 provides a mechanism for disbursing over-payments, namely, the income tax refund process. The re-fundability of the earned-income credit is thus inseparable from its classification as an overpayment of tax. Petitioner therefore acknowledges that the excess earned-income credit is an “overpayment” for purposes of § 6402(a), the general provision that authorizes all tax refunds. See n. 4, supra. If it were not, the Secretary would lack authorization for refunding it to her. She claims, however, that while an excess earned-income credit is an “overpayment” for purposes of § 6402(a), it is not an “overpayment” for purposes of § 6402(c), which requires that the “amount of any overpayment . . . shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support” assigned to the State. The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that “ ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934), quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). That the Internal Revenue Code includes an explicit definition of “overpayment” in the same sub-chapter strengthens the presumption. And that both subsections concern the tax-refund treatment of “overpayment[s]” is especially damaging to any claim that “the words, though in the same act, are found in such dissimilar connections as to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent.” Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S., at 87. Petitioner and the two Courts of Appeals that have excluded excess earned-income credits from the definition of “overpayment” used in § 6402(c) offer two bases for their position. First, they believe that § 6402(c) limits §6401(b)’s broad definition “by [using] the phrase ‘overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment.’” Nelson v. Regan, 731 F. 2d, at 111; see Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d, at 356. Not all overpayments, they suggest, are refunded to persons who “made” them, since some— those consisting of earned-income credits — may be refunded to persons who actually have not paid any tax. We disagree. All refunds made by the Secretary under § 6402(a) are paid to “the person who made the overpayment.” The phrase merely identifies the person entitled to the refund; it does not restrict the nature of the refund itself. Petitioner must characterize herself as a person who has “made” an overpayment; otherwise, she cannot claim her excess earned-income credit. The phrase in § 6402(c) on which petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits relied is virtually identical to the phrase used in § 6402(a). Since the words cannot have the limiting effect petitioner proposes when used in § 6402(a), no justification exists for giving them such a construction in § 6402(c). Second, petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits perceive a tension between § 6401(b)’s and § 6402(a)’s treatment of excess earned-income credits and §464(a)’s treatment of interceptable amounts. As used in those Code sections, “overpayment” includes more than “refunds of Federal taxes paid,” the phrase used in the Social Security Act. Since §464 and § 6402(c) were enacted simultaneously as part of OBRA, petitioner and the two Circuits believe that § 6402(c) should be harmonized with §464 rather than with §§ 6401(b) and 6402(a). See Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d, at 357; Nelson v. Regan, 731 F. 2d., at 111. This second argument, it seems to us, misperceives the structure of the tax-intercept law, and manufactures a tension that need not exist. OBRA’s placement of provisions regarding interception in both Acts reflects a division of functions. The tax-intercept program lies at the intersection of the Social Security Act’s concern in Subchapter IV, Part D, with child support, and the Internal Revenue Code’s concern in Chapter 65, Subchapter A, with the treatment of credits in the tax-refund process. Section 464 addresses the concerns of the States that have received AFDC-related grants. It defines past-due child support, authorizes procedures by which the States can notify the Secretary of the Treasury of their entitlement to recover such past-due support, and directs the Secretary to aid the States, through his control over the tax-refund process, in recouping that support. Sections 6401 and 6402 address the operation of the tax-refund process under the Internal Revenue Code. They define the status of certain tax credits, set up a mechanism for disbursing refunds, and direct the Secretary to divert certain amounts from the refund process. To the extent that the tax-intercept law regulates the relationship of the Secretary of the Treasury to refund claimants, it does so through § 6402, and not through a provision that governs the Secretary’s relationship to state agencies. Petitionerj however, views §6402(c)’s reference to §464 as indicating that § 464(a) is meant to be read into § 6402(c) as a limitation on the Secretary’s intercept powers. This argument depends on a somewhat strained construction of § 6402(c)’s statement that “[t]he amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support. . . owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act.” Petitioner claims that “[t]he words ‘in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act’... do not modify ‘has been notified by a State,’ as one might initially assume. Rather they belatedly modify the words ‘shall be reduced.’” Brief for Petitioner 18. In petitioner’s view, her construction would lead to the conclusion that a refund can be reduced only to the extent that the refund represents a refund of tax actually paid, since that is all § 464(a) permits. We disagree with both petitioner’s construction of § 6402(c) and her reading of § 464(a). First, it seems far more plausible that the words modify the nearest verb. If they are given this more natural reading, then § 6402(c) directs the Secretary to intercept only that amount which properly is classified as past-due support and of which he properly has been notified. But even if the reference in § 6402(c) to §464 were read to refer solely to § 464(a), nothing in that subsection exempts excess earned-income credits from interception. Petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits recast their argument regarding the meaning of “overpayment” by contending that the amount of a refund that is attributable to an excess earned-income credit is not a “refun[d] of Federal taxes paid,” and that § 464(a) permits interception of only “amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid”: “A refund of federal taxes is a repayment of money paid by a taxpayer in excess of that taxpayer’s liability. Although the earned income credit is given effect through the income tax return, the credit is not a tax refund because eligibility for the credit is not contingent upon payment of any federal income tax.” Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d, at 356. But just as eligibility for an earned-income credit does not depend upon an individual’s actually having paid any tax, the Code’s classification of the credit as an “overpayment” to be refunded is similarly independent of the individual’s actually having made any payment. Cf. § 6401(c). The Ninth Circuit correctly held that, to the extent an excess earned-income credit is “payable” to an individual, it is payable as if it were a refund of tax paid. 752 F. 2d, at 1441. Section 464(a)’s reference to the tax-refund process is best understood as a directive to the Secretary that he follow the procedures established by the Internal Revenue Code for calculating and disbursing refunds, rather than as an attempt implicitly to redefine terms given special meaning by the Code. B Nor do we agree with petitioner’s claim that Congress did not intend the intercept program to reach excess earned-income credits. Petitioner and the Government agree that Congress never mentioned the earned-income credit in enacting OBRA. See Brief for Petitioner 24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. But it defies belief that Congress was unaware, when it provided in § 6402(c) that “any overpayment to be refunded . . . shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support” (emphasis added), that this would include refunds attributable to excess earned-income credits. Congress had previously expressly defined an excess earned-income credit as an “overpayment,” in § 6401(b) of the Internal Revenue Code — the section immediately preceding the section to which Congress added the intercept provision. What petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits are really claiming is that the intercept law should be read narrowly to avoid frustrating the goals of the earned-income credit program. The earned-income credit was enacted to reduce the disincentive to work caused by the imposition of Social Security taxes on earned income (welfare payments are not similarly taxed), to stimulate the economy by tunneling funds to persons likely to spend the money immediately, and to provide relief for low-income families hurt by rising food and energy prices. Each is an undeniably important objective. It is impossible, however, for us to say that these goals outweigh the goals served by the subsequently enacted tax-intercept program — securing child support from absent parents whenever possible and reducing the number of families on welfare. Congress of course could conclude that families eligible for earned-income credits have a more compelling claim to the funds involved than do either the States or non-AFDC families. But it is equally clear that Congress could have decided that the more pressing need was to alleviate the “devastating consequences for children and the taxpayers” of the epidemic of nonsupport. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on Spending Reduction Proposals, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 34 (1981) (statement of Secretary Schweiker). The ordering of competing social policies is a quintessentially legislative function. In light of Congress’ decision to direct the interception of any overpayment otherwise refundable to a taxpayer, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to “speculate that Congress intended otherwise.” 752 F. 2d, at 1443. Its judgment, accordingly, is affirmed. It is so ordered. Section 402(a)(26)(A) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A), requires the assignment to the State of “any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed.” By the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 471(c)(1), 98 Stat. 826, Congress redesignated § 43 as § 32. By § 1042 of that Act, 98 Stat. 1043, it raised the earned-income percentage from 10 to 11 percent, the maximum amount of the credit from $500 to $550, and the eligibility ceiling from $10,000 to $11,000. At the time relevant to this lawsuit, § 6401(b) of the 1954 Code provided, in pertinent part: “If the amount allowable as credits under sections 31 (relating to tax withheld on wages), and 39 (relating to certain uses of gasoline, special fuels, and lubricating oil), and 43 (relating to earned income credit), exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A (reduced by the credits allowable under subpart A of part IV of subehapter A of chapter 1, other than the credits allowable under sections 31, 39, and 43), the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment.” Section 6401(b) was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Section 474(r)(36) of that Act, 98 Stat. 846, designated existing § 6401(b) as § 6401(b)(1) and substituted the following language for the language quoted above: “If the amount allowable as credits under subpart C of part IV of sub-chapter A of chapter 1 (relating to refundable credits) exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A (reduced by the credits allowable under subparts A, B, and D of such part IV), the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment.” The earned-income credit remains refundable under the revised provision, since it is within the category of “refundable credits.” See Tax Reform Act of 1984, §471, 98 Stat. 825. The version of § 6402(a) in effect for the tax year 1981 provided: “In the case of any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable period of limitations, may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest allowed thereon, against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of the person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to subsection (c), refund any balance to such person.” The question presented by this case is the scope of subsection (c) — the provision governing the offset of past-due child-support payments. Section 2653(b)(2) of the Spending Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1155, amended § 6402(a). Under amended § 6402(a), the Secretary’s authority, with respect to refunds payable after December 31, 1985, and before January 1, 1988, see § 2653(c) of the 1984 Act, 98 Stat. 1156, is restricted by a new subsection (d) as well as by subsection (e) of § 6402. Section 2653(b)(1) of the 1984 Act, 98 Stat. 1154, added the new subsection (d). Section 6402(d) requires the offset of debts owed to various federal agencies. Under § 6402(d)(2), the collection of past-due child-support payments pursuant to § 6402(c) has priority over the collection of debts covered by § 6402(d). Section 464(a) was amended by the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, § 21, 98 Stat. 1322, which authorized the interception and diversion of refunds for the benefit of non-AFDC children as well as children receiving AFDC benefits. The Amendments also provided additional procedural protections for refund claimants whose refunds are intercepted. In light of Congress’ specific reference to § 464(c) earlier in § 6402(c), it seems particularly likely that Congress would have referred to subsection (a) of § 464 expressly had it meant “in accordance with § 464(a)” rather than in accordance with the entire scheme for identifying past-due support payments and notifying the Federal Government of such obligations set out in §464. That Congress could not have viewed the earned-income credit as immune from seizure to satisfy child-support obligations is suggested by a number of other factors as well. As the Government notes, once an individual has actually received his tax-refund payment, the proceeds of that refund, even if they reflect an earned-income credit component, are subject to levy under § 6305 of the Code. The fact that the Government may not have used this cumbersome procedure, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-25, reflects the economic inefficiency of locating and pursuing a payment that cannot exceed $550 rather than a lack of authority to do so. And certainly no one has suggested that the former spouse to whom a support obligation not assigned to the State is owed would be precluded from employing the judicial process to attach and seize the credit once the recipient had received it. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 94-36, pp. 11, 33 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-19, pp. 3-4, 29-31 (1975); Hearings on H. R. 2166 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 66, 315 (1975); Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the President’s Authority to Adjust Imports of Petroleum; Public Debt Ceiling Increase; and Emergency Tax Proposals, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 661, 742-743, 797 (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 4609 (1975). See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 98-387, pp. 5-8 (1984); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on Spending Reduction Proposals, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 19, 34-35, 81, 312 (1981); Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Tax Aspects of the President’s Economic Program, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 159, 237 (1981). Even if Congress’ sole concern were providing funds to the neediest children involved, it is far from certain that all children living in households receiving refunds of earned-income credits are needier than all children owed past-due child support. When the earned-income credit is claimed at the end of the tax year (an individual can, pursuant to § 3507 of the Code, receive an advance on his earned-income credit over the course of the year), it may in fact go to a recipient who is not currently needy. For example, an individual, with a dependent child, who was unemployed during most of 1981 and therefore earned only $5,000, but found a job paying $20,000 per year on January 1, 1982, would have been able to claim in a tax return filed in April 1982 an earned-income credit of $500, despite the fact that, in late spring 1982, when the refund check ultimately arrived, the individual might no longer be needy.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. N. Y. RAYON IMPORTING CO., INC. (#2) et al. NO. 94. Argued January 8, 1947. Decided February 3, 1947. Samuel D. Slade argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Stanley M. Silverberg and Paul A. Sweeney. Joseph M. Proskauer argued the cause for the N. Y. Rayon Importing Co. et al. With him on the brief were Eugene Eisenmann and Albert L. Solodar. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Murphy, announced by Mr. Justice Rutledge. This case involves another impact of § 177 (a) of the Judicial Code on the power of the Court of Claims to award interest in a judgment against the United States. The N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., Inc., (Rayon #1) and the Nyrayco Importing & Converting Corporation (Ny-rayco) were engaged in the importation of rayon yarn. Between 1925 and 1929 they paid customs duties on such importations which they claimed were erroneous. Prior to March 1, 1930, they filed protests with the Collector of Customs in accordance with applicable Tariff Act provisions, which resulted in the institution of actions in the United States Customs Court. On March 1,1930, the N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., Inc., (Rayon #2) was incorporated for the purpose of acquiring all the assets and assuming all the liabilities of Rayon #1, Nyrayco and two other corporations in the rayon business. As a part of this reorganization, Rayon #1 was dissolved as of March 1, 1930, the New York Secretary of State issuing a certificate of dissolution on that date. Rayon #2 was voluntarily dissolved on January 9,1931, in accordance with New York law. Nyrayco was dissolved on December 16, 1935, by proclamation for nonpayment of New York franchise taxes. In 1937, long after these three corporations were dissolved, the Customs Court rendered decisions sustaining the protests which Rayon #1 and Nyrayco had filed in connection with the duties on rayon yarn imported between 1925 and 1929. A reliquidation of the customs entries was directed. On reliquidation, the Collector of Customs ascertained that a refund of $362,482.71 was payable to Rayon #1 and $30,809.75 to Nyrayco. Checks payable to those corporations were drawn, but since the corporations had been dissolved the Collector caused the checks to be transmitted to the General Accounting Office “for lawful disposition.” Representatives of Rayon #2 thereafter requested the General Accounting Office to deliver these checks to them; this request was denied and the Comptroller General deposited the proceeds of the checks in the Treasury in a trust fund entitled “Outstanding Liabilities 1938,” pursuant to law. Several unsuccessful attempts were made by the representatives of the three dissolved corporations to obtain the money in the trust fund. First, a consent decree was entered in a declaratory judgment proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of New York adjudicating that, as among the three dissolved corporations, Rayon #2 was the owner of these customs refunds or the proceeds thereof. But the General Accounting Office refused to make payment when confronted with this decree. Thereafter, on February 26, 1943, attorneys for the three dissolved corporations suggested to the Comptroller General that the money be released to Rayon #1 and Nyrayco with the consent of Rayon #2, each corporation being represented by its director or directors as trustees in liquidation. The Comptroller General rejected this proposal and stated that payment would be permitted only upon final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction concluding the issue of ownership. He suggested that a suit be brought for this purpose in the Court of Claims. Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees then brought this suit in the Court of Claims, claiming that Rayon #2 continued to exist for the purpose of collecting and distributing its assets and that it was the owner of the funds in issue. Rayon #1 and Nyrayco also brought suits in the Court of Claims; they claimed the amounts of their respective refunds and alleged that ownership remained in them. After consideration of all three claims, the court held that the rights of Rayon #1 and Nyrayco had been taken over by Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees, who were thus entitled to recover the amounts held in trust by the United States. 64 F. Supp. 684. As a part of its judgment, however, the Court of Claims awarded' 6% interest on the total fund, such interest to run from April 19, 1941, the date of an amendment to the New York Tax Law which retroactively clarified the capacity to sue of involuntarily dissolved corporations. We issued a writ of certiorari in No. 94, on petition of the United States, to review the action of the Court of Claims in awarding such interest. At the same time, we issued a writ of certiorari in No. 96 on a cross-petition of Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees urging that interest should have been allowed from the time of the issuance of the refund checks in 1937 and 1938 rather than from April 19,1941. In our opinion, § 177 (a) of the Judicial Code prohibits the award of any interest under the circumstances of this case. Section 177 (a) provides that “No interest shall be allowed on any claim up to the time of the rendition of judgment by the Court of Claims, unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for the payment of interest, . . As we recently pointed out in United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U. S. 585, this provision codifies the traditional rule regarding the immunity of the United States from liability for interest on unpaid accounts or claims. In other words, in the absence of constitutional requirements, interest can be recovered against the United States only if express consent to such a recovery has been given by Congress. And Congress has indicated in § 177 (a) that its consent can take only two forms: (1) a specific provision for the payment of interest in a statute; (2) an express stipulation for the payment of interest in a contract duly entered into by agents of the United States. Thus there can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed. Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43; United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., supra. Tested by those standards, the award of interest in this case cannot be sustained. There is obviously no contractual stipulation involved. And the appropriation statutes which cover the refunds here in issue contain no provision whatever for the recovery of interest. Act of May 14, 1937, 50 Stat. 137,142; Act of June 25,1938,52 Stat. 1114, 1149. The traditional immunity of the United States, as codified in § 177 (a), accordingly applies. The Court of Claims, without making a reference to §177 (a), sought to justify its award of interest on what it thought “would be right or just.” It felt that the officials of the General Accounting Office had delayed too long in determining the ownership of the refund claims and that, at the very least, they could have suggested at an earlier date that a suit in the Court of Claims was necessary. Inasmuch as it was known since the time of the Customs Court’s decisions in 1937 that the money did not belong to the Government, the Court of Claims believed that it was only fair that the true owners get interest from the time when all defects and uncertainties were removed in New York as to the capacity of dissolved corporations to maintain suits or to be sued. But assuming that the equities of the situation all favor the owners of the refund claims, the Court of Claims did not thereby acquire power to carve out an implied exception to the plain words of § 177 (a). Had Congress desired to permit the recovery of interest in situations where the Court of Claims felt it just or equitable, it could have so provided. The absence of such a provision is conclusive evidence that the court lacks any power of that nature. Indeed, any other conclusion would permit the Court of Claims to supply the consent which only Congress can give to the imposition of interest against the United States. By the same token, if we assume that the officials of the General Accounting Office unreasonably delayed the determination of ownership of the funds, such action or inaction could not operate as a consent on the part of the United States. Tillson v. United States, supra. It has long been settled that officers of the United States possess no power through their actions to waive an immunity of the United States or to confer jurisdiction on a court in the absence of some express provision by Congress. Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495. The same rule applies here. Only Congress can take the necessary steps to waive the immunity of the United States from liability for interest on unpaid claims. Cf. Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S. 329, 353. The owners of the refund claims, however, seek to avoid the effect of § 177 (a) by urging that it applies only to original claims which have not previously been reduced to judgment. This proceeding, it is said, is based upon the pre-existing judgments of the Customs Court, thereby precluding the application of § 177 (a). We do not pause here to inquire into the nature and effect of the decisions rendered by the Customs Court or the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to entertain suits based upon pre-existing judgments. It is enough to note that the traditional rule embodied in § 177 (a) is a complete one covering all types of claims, including those arising out of pre-existing judgments. As we have seen, any exception to that rule must be grounded upon an express provision in a statute or contract. It follows that any exception relating to preexisting judgments must be traced to specific language in a contract or some other statute. Section 177 (a) by itself warrants no such exception. Cf. 31 U. S. C. § 226. In this connection, the owners of the refund claims point to the Act of March 3, 1875, as amended in 1933. That Act directs the Comptroller General to withhold payment from a judgment creditor of the United States, if such creditor is indebted in turn to the United States, until the indebtedness is satisfied. The Comptroller General is to cause suit to be brought on the Government’s cross debt if the judgment creditor denies- the indebtedness. The Act then expressly permits 6% interest to be paid to the judgment creditor for the period of the withholding if the Government fails to win its suit and to substantiate its asserted set-off. Thus to that limited extent the Act of March 3, 1875, marks an exception to the traditional rule set forth in § 177 (a). See, for example, American Potash Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 160, 8 F. Supp. 717; Stewart & Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 126. But the inapplicability of that Act to the facts of this case is at once apparent. The Act relates solely to the situation where the Government asserts a set-off against a judgment creditor. No such set-off is here asserted; there is nothing more than a withholding of payment by the Government until an ascertainment of ownership. In fact, there is no real claim that the situation in the instant case can be fitted within the terms of the Act of March 3, 1875. There is merely an argument that the policy of that Act in providing for the payment of interest where the withholding results from an erroneous belief in the existence of a cross-indebtedness applies with equal force where the withholding results from an attempt to determine ownership of a claim. But the immunity of the United States from liability for interest is not to be waived by policy arguments of this nature. Courts lack the power to award interest against the United States on the basis of what they think is or is not sound policy. We reiterate that only express language in a statute or contract can justify the imposition of such interest. Such language is absent in this instance. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims in No. 94 to the extent that it includes an award of interest. And since it becomes unnecessary to consider the merits of the cross-claims, the writ of certiorari previously issued in No. 96 is dismissed. So ordered. U.S. C. §284 (a). Section 21 of the Act of June 26, 1934, c. 756, 48 Stat. 1235, 31 U. S. C. § 725t. This non-adversary proceeding only affected rights as between Rayon #1 and Nyrayco, on the one hand, and Rayon #2 on the other. It provided the Government no protection as against the other possible claimants who were later impleaded and cited in the Court of Claims action. See footnote 4. The three suits were consolidated. In all three cases, the Societé Pour Nouveaux Placements de Capitaux was impleaded as plaintiff. It filed a disclaimer of interest and the Court of Claims dismissed “all claims of interest” which it had. Several other persons and companies were named by the United States as having possible claims, but none of them asserted any claims or filed any intervening petitions; the court dismissed “all claims of interest” as to them. April 19, 1941, was the date when the Governor of New York approved an amendment to § 203a of the New York Tax Law, removing all possible question whether corporations which had previously and involuntarily been dissolved under the New York Tax Law for non-payment of franchise taxes had the right to maintain suits. This had relevance, however, only to Nyrayco. Rayon #1 and Rayon #2 were voluntarily dissolved in accordance with § 105 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. Their right to maintain suit to collect their assets was never questioned. Rayon #2 and its liquidating directors and trustees claim that the date of April 19, 1941, has no relevance whatever to the claim of Rayon #1. See footnote 5. And they claim that this date has no proper relation to the Nyrayco claim since the Government made no objection to Nyrayco’s capacity to sue until several years after the decisions of the Customs Court and after checks in its name had been drawn by the Government. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 481, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, c. 212, Title II, § 13, 47 Stat. 1516, 31 U. S. C. § 227. This provides: “When any final judgment recovered against the United States duly allowed by legal authority shall be presented to the Comptroller General of the United States for payment, and the plaintiff therein shall be indebted to the United States in any manner, whether as principal or surety, it shall be the duty of the Comptroller General of the United States to withhold payment of an amount of such judgment equal to the debt thus due to the United States; and if such plaintiff assents to such set-off, and discharges his judgment or an amount thereof equal to said debt, the Comptroller General of the United States shall execute a discharge of the debt due from the plaintiff to the United States. But if such plaintiff denies his indebtedness to the United States, or refuses to consent to the set-off, then the Comptroller General of the United States shall withhold payment of such further amount of such judgment, as in his opinion will be sufficient to cover all legal charges and costs in prosecuting the debt of the United States to final judgment. And if such debt is not already in suit, it shall be the duty of the Comptroller General of the United States to cause legal proceedings to be immediately commenced to enforce the same, and to cause the same to be prosecuted to final judgment with all reasonable dispatch. And if in such action judgment shall be rendered against the United States, or the amount recovered for debt and costs shall be less than the amount so withheld as before provided, the balance shall then be paid over to such plaintiff by such Comptroller General of the United States with 6 per centum interest thereon for the time it has been withheld from the plaintiff.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TURNER et al. v. FOUCHE et al. No. 23. Argued October 20, 1969 Decided January 19, 1970 Michael Meltsner argued the causé for appellants. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg and Howard Moore, Jr. Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for the State of Georgia were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney Géneral, Howard N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, and J. Lee Perry, Assistant Attorney General. Charles J. Bloch and Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., filed a brief for appellees Fouche et al. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, a companion to Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, ante, p. 320, involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the system used in many counties of Georgia to select juries and school boards. The basic statutory scheme at issue is this. The county board of education consists of five freeholders. It is selected by the grand jury, which in turn is drawn from a jury list selected by the six-member county jury commission. The commissioners are appointed by the judge of the state superior court for the circuit in which the county is located. Some 2,500 to 3,000 people live in Taliaferro County, Georgia, of whom about 60% are Negroes. The county school system consists of a grammar school and a high school, and all the students at both schools are Negroes, every white pupil having transferred elsewhere. Sandra and Calvin Turner, a Negro schoolchild and her father who reside in that county, brought this class action against the members of the county board of education, the jury commissioners, and three named white grand jurors. Their complaint alleged that the board of education consisted entirely of white people; that it had been selected by a predominantly white grand jury, which in turn had been selected by the jury commissioners, all of whom were white people. The complaint charged that the board of education had deprived the Negro schoolchildren of textbooks, facilities, and other advantages; also that the Turners and other Negro citizens had sought unsuccessfully to communicate their dissatisfaction to the board of education. According to the appellants, the members of the county grand jury, on which white people were perennially overrepresented and Negroes underrepresented, chose only white people as members of the board of education pursuant to the Georgia constitutional and statutory provisions governing the school-board selection. The complaint attacked those provisions as accounting for both the exclusion of Negroes and nonfreeholders from the board of education, and for the merely token inclusion of Negroes on the grand juries. The appellants sought (1) an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Georgia constitutional and statutory provisions by which the board of education and gránd jury were selected; (2) a declaration that the provisions were void on their face and as applied; (3) a further declaration that the various positions on the board of education, grand jury, and jury commission were vacant; (4) the appointment of a receiver for the school system and a special master for the selection of the grand jurors; and (5) $500,000 in ancillary damages. A three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, and conducted extensive evidentiary hearings. The evidence showed that whenever a jury commissioner thought a voter from his area of the county qualified as a potentially good juror, he offered the name for consideration to his fellow commissioners; if all agreed, the name went on the master jury list. No name of a county resident was placed on the list unless he was personally known to at least one of the jury commissioners. The commissioners looked for “people that we felt would be capable of interpreting proceedings of court and . . . render [ing] a just verdict . . . .” The state superior court judge had instructed them to put Negroes on the list. Following the compilation of the list, the commissioners “picked the ones we thought were the very best people in the county” and put them on the grand-jury list. The superior court judge then drew the names of the grand jurors at random in open court. Only he could excuse from grand-jury service those whose names he drew; and he denied that Negroes were ever excused out of turn, or on account of their race. At its first hearing, held in January 1968, the District Court voiced its concern that only 11 Negroes had found their way to the 130-member grand-jury list. The court adjourned for one month to enable the defendants to remedy the situation. It noted that two vacancies had opened up on the board of education and that, although the board had held an interim election, the grand jury had not yet confirmed the new members. The court suggested that “[i]f those two men would willingly stand aside the other members might select two outstanding Negro citizens ... to go on the Board.” The court also advised counsel for the defendants to explain the law of jury discrimination to his clients, and expressed the hope that the jury commissioners would be “generous” in their recomposition of the panel. At the adjourned hearing in February, it appeared that three days after the first hearing the state superior court judge had discharged the county grand jury and directed the jury commissioners to recompose the jury list. Working from the voter registration list at the last general election, the commissioners had prepared a new grand-jury list containing the names of 44 Negroes and 77 white people. From this list the superior court judge drew the names that led to the impaneling of a new grand jury of 23 members, of whom only six were Negroes. Meanwhile the board of education had elected a Negro and a white man to fill the two vacancies, and the new grand jury had confirmed the new members in their offices. Following these developments, the District Court declined to invalidate on their face either the various provisions governing the school-board and grand-jury selections, or the freeholder requirement for school-board membership. It found that at the commencement of suit Negroes had been systematically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion, but it concluded that the new grand-jury list, drawn following the January hearing, was not unconstitutional. 290 F. Supp. 648. Subsequently the District Court entered a final judgment permanently enjoining the defendant jury commissioners and their successors from systematically excluding Negroes from the Taliaferro County grand-jury system. The appellants, complaining of the court’s failure to hold the challenged provisions of Georgia law invalid on their face and as applied, took a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 393 U. S. 1078. I The appellants urge that the constitutional and statutory scheme by which the Taliaferro County grand jury selects the board of education is unconstitutional on its face. They point to the discretion of the state superior court judge to exclude anyone he deems not “discreet” from appointment to the jury commission, and of the jury commissioners to eliminate from grand-jury service anyone they find not “upright” and “intelligent.” These provisions, the appellants say, provide the county officials an opportunity to discriminate exercised both before and after the commencement of this litigation. It is argued that the terms are so vague as to leave the judge and jury commissioners at large in the exercise of discretion, with their decisions “unguided by statutory or other guidelines.” Only by excising the challenged terms from Georgia’s laws, it is urged, can the jury discrimination revealed in the record of this case be eliminated. Such arguments are similar to those advanced in Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, ante, p. 320. Our decision in that case fairly controls disposition of the contentions here. Georgia’s constitutional and statutory scheme for selecting its grand juries and boards of education is not inherently unfair, or necessarily incapable of administration without regard to race; the federal courts are not powerless to remedy unconstitutional departures from Georgia law by declaratory and injunctive relief. The challenged provisions do not refer to race; indeed, they impose on the jury commissioners the affirmative duty to supplement the jury lists by going out into the county and personally acquainting themselves with other citizens of the county whenever the jury lists in existence do not fairly represent a cross section of the county’s upright and intelligent citizens. But the appellants contend that even if the challenged provisions are not void on their face, they have been unconstitutionally applied. The District Court found that prior to the commencement of suit Negroes had been excluded in the administration of the grand-jury system, and the appellees do not contest that finding here. The District Court also concluded that the newly composed grand-jury list was constitutional, and the appellants challenge that ruling. Consideration of the issues thus presented requires a fuller statement of the events following the January hearing in the court below. As noted above, after the District Court had held its first hearing, the state superior court judge discharged the grand jury then sitting and ordered the jury commissioners to draw up a new jury list. The commissioners obtained the list of all persons registered to vote in the county in the last general election — 2,152 names. To assist in the identification of all the people on the list, the commissioners consulted with “three Negroes that [they] brought in to work with [them] one afternoon . . . .” From the list the commissioners eliminated 374 people for poor health and old age; 79 as under 21 years old; 93 as dead; 514 as away from the county most of the time but maintaining a permanent place of residence there; 48 who requested that they be removed from consideration; 225 about whom the commissioners could obtain no information; 33 as duplicated names; and 178 “as not conforming to the statutory qualifications for juries either because of their being unintelligent or because of their not being upright citizens.” The process of elimination left 608 names. The commissioners arranged the names in alphabetical order and placed every other one on the list of potential jurors. At this point, for the first time, the commissioners classified the remaining 304 people by race: 113 were Negro, 191 white people. From this list the commissioners drew two-fifths of the names by lot for the grand-jury list; a check revealed 44 Negroes and 77 white people. The state superior court judge drew from this group nine Negroes and 23 white people by lot. He excused nine, leaving a 23-member grand jury of whom only six were Negroes. It was this grand jury that the District Court determined had been constitutionally impaneled. After the February hearing of the District Court, and at that court's request, the commissioners classified by race the persons eliminated from the voter list in arriving at the 608 persons eligible for jury service. The classification revealed that 171 of those rejected as unintelligent or not upright were Negroes — 96% of the total removed for that reason. Although at the adjourned hearing the District Court recognized the potential for discrimination underlying the exclusion process, it did not reopen the matter following its receipt of the racial classification to consider the extraordinarily high percentage of Negroes eliminated as “unintelligent” or not “upright,” or the large number of persons about whom the commissioners said they could obtain no information even though they were registered to vote in the county. The appellants insist the District Court has erred. They say that since the grand jury selects the board of education, the situation must be viewed as one involving a distribution of voting power among the citizens of Taliaferro County in the manner of a voting apportionment case. A grand jury with only about 25% Negro membership, they say, constitutes the school-board “electorate” in a county whose population is about 60% Negro. The State must offer a compelling justification, it is argued, in support of its “fencing out” such a substantial proportion of the potential Negro “electors” in the county. We do not find it necessary to consider the appellants’ argument. Nor do we reach the premise upon which it rests — that the choice of the county board of education by the grand jury rather than delegates from local school boards turns the challenged procedure into an “election” for federal constitutional purposes. For we think that even under long-established tests for racial discrimination in the composition of juries, the District Court erred in its determination that the new list before it had been properly compiled. The undisputed fact was that Negroes composed only 37 % of the Taliaferro County citizens on the 304-member list from which the new grand jury was drawn. That figure contrasts sharply with the representation that their percentage (60%) of the general Taliaferro County population would have led them to obtain in a random selection. In the absence of a countervailing explanation by the appellees, we cannot say that the under-representation reflected in these figures is so insubstantial as to warrant no corrective action by a federal court charged with the responsibility of enforcing constitutional guarantees.. Specifically, we hold that the District Court should have responded to the elimination of 171 Negroes out of the 178 citizens disqualified for lack of “intelligence” or “uprightness.” On the record as presently constituted, it is impossible to say that this purge of Negroes from the roster of potential jurors did not contribute in substantial measure to the ultimate underrepresentation. The retention of these 178 citizens might well have produced a jury list of at least an equal percentage of Negroes and white people, instead of the highly disproportionate list that actually materialized. A second factor should have called itself to the District Court’s attention: the lack of information respecting the 225 citizens named on the county’s voting list but unknown to the jury commissioners or their assistants. Entirely apart from the question whether the commissioners’ failure to inquire into the eligibility of the 225 voters comported with their statutory duty to ensure that the jury list fairly represents a cross-section of the county’s intelligent and upright citizens, the court should not have passed without response the commissioners’ elimination from consideration for jury service of about 9% of the population of the entire county. In the face of the commissioners’ unfamiliarity with Negroes in the community and the informality of the arrangement by which they sought to remedy the deficiency in their knowledge upon recompiling the jury list, we cannot assume that inquiry would not have led to the discovery of many qualified Negroes. In sum, the appellants demonstrated a substantial disparity between the percentages of Negro residents in the county as a whole and of Negroes on the newly constituted jury list. They further demonstrated that the disparity originated, at least in part, at the one point in the selection process where the jury commissioners invoked their subjective judgment rather than objective criteria. The appellants thereby made out a prima facie case of jury discrimination, and the burden fell on the appellees to overcome it. The testimony of the jury commissioners and the superior court judge that they included or excluded no one because of race did not suffice to overcome the appellants’ prima facie case. So far the appellees have offered no explanation for the overwhelming percentage of Negroes disqualified as not “upright” or “intelligent,” or for the failure to determine the eligibility of a substantial segment of the county’s already registered voters. No explanation for this state of affairs appears in the record. The evidentiary void deprives the District Court’s holding of support in the record as presently constituted. “If there is a ‘vacuum’ it is one which the State must fill, by moving in with sufficient evidence to dispel the prima facie case of discrimination.” II The appellants also urge that the limitation of school-board membership to freeholders violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court rejected this claim, finding no evidence before it “to indicate that such a qualification resulted in an invidious discrimination against any particular segment of the community, based on race or otherwise.” 290 F. Supp., at 652. Subsequent to the ruling of the District Court, this Court decided Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701. The appellants urge that those decisions require Georgia to demonstrate a “compelling” interest in support of its freeholder requirement for school-board membership. The appellees reply that Kramer and Cipriano are inapposite because they involved exclusions from voting, not from office-holding. We find it unnecessary to resolve the dispute, because the Georgia freeholder requirement must fall even when measured by the traditional test for a denial of equal protection: whether the challenged classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid state objective. We may assume that the appellants have no right to be appointed to the Taliaferro County board of education. But the appellants and the members of their class do have a federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifications. The State may not deny to some the privilege of holding public office that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees. Georgia concedes that “the desirability and wisdom of ‘freeholder’ requirements for State or county political office may indeed be open to question . . . .” But apart from its contention that prior decisions of this Court foreclose any challenge to the constitutionality of such “freeholder” requirements — a contention we think ill-founded — the sole argument Georgia advances in support of its statute is that nothing in its constitution or laws specifies any minimum quantity or value for the real property the freeholder must own. Thus, says Georgia, anyone who seriously aspires to county school-board membership “would be able to obtain a conveyance of the single square inch of land he would require to become a ‘freeholder.’ ” If we take Georgia at its word, it is difficult to conceive of any rational state interest underlying its requirement. But even absent Georgia’s own indication of the insub-stantiality of its interest in preserving the freeholder requirement, it seems impossible to discern any interest the qualification can serve. It cannot be seriously urged that a citizen in all other respects qualified to sit on a school board must also own real property if he is to participate responsibly in educational decisions, without regard to whether he is a parent with children in the local schools, a lessee who effectively pays the property taxes of his lessor as part of his rent, or a state and federal taxpayer contributing to the approximately 85% of the Taliaferro County annual school budget derived from sources other than the board of education’s own levy on real property. Nor does the lack of ownership of realty establish a lack of attachment to the community and its educational values. However reasonable the assumption that those who own realty do possess such an attachment, Georgia may not rationally presume that that quality is necessarily wanting in all citizens of the county whose estates are less than freehold. Whatever objectives Georgia seeks to obtain by its “freeholder” requirement must be secured, in this instance at least, by means more finely tailored to achieve the desired goal. Without excluding the possibility that other circumstances might present themselves in which a property qualification for office-holding could survive constitutional scrutiny, we cannot say, on the record before us, that the present freeholder requirement for membership on the county board of education amounts to anything more than invidious discrimination. The judgment below is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Ga. Const., Art. VIII, §V, ¶1, Ga. Code Ann. §2-6801 (1948). At the oral argument we were advised that under Georgia law a “freeholder” is any person who owns real estate. Ibid. See also Ga. Code Ann. §32-902 (1969). Ga. Code Ann. §§ 59-101, 59-106 (1965 and Supp. 1968). Ga. Code Ann. §59-101 (1965). Prior to 1966 the superior court judges were elected by all the voters in the State, but now they are elected by the voters of the circuits over which they have jurisdiction. See Ga. Const., Art. VI, § III, ¶ II, Ga. Code Ann. § 2-3802 (Supp. 1968); Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575. In its brief Georgia informs us that its Department of Public Health estimates that Taliaferro County now has about 1,500 Negro and 1,000 white citizens. According to the 1960 federal census, the county had a population of 3,370, of whom 2,096 were Negroes and 1,273 white people. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of Population, Yol. I, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 12, Georgia, 12-83. This state of affairs has arisen following litigation attacking the county’s former dual school system. Prior to the fall of 1965 Taliaferro County had used one school building for Negroes and the other for whites. In that year, after 87 Negro pupils sought transfers to a desegregated school, the superintendent, knowing the white school would be closed, arranged for the transfer of the white pupils, at public expense, to public schools in adjoining counties. A three-judge District Court declared the arrangement illegal, placed the Taliaferro County school system in receivership under the State’s superintendent of schools, and instructed him to prepare a plan that would allow those Negroes who wanted to transfer to a desegregated school the opportunity to do so. Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724. It is undisputed that some white pupils now attend a private institution in the county. In addition, the appellants suggest that white children continue to attend public schools in neighboring counties. Efforts to combine districts to avoid an all-Negro school system in Taliaferro County have proved unsuccessful. The District Court struck the grand jurors as parties defendant for failure of the appellants to state as against them a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellants did not appeal from that portion of the judgment below, and the motion of the appellee grand jurors to dismiss the appeal as to them is granted. Georgia has used the voter registration lists rather than the books of the tax receiver since our decision in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545. The District Court found that the appellants’ claim that the board of education had deprived the Negro schoolchildren of textbooks, facilities, and other advantages failed for want of proof. The court also declined to reach the appellants’ claim for ancillary damages, leaving this question to single-judge inquiry. No issue concerning these rulings is presented on the appeal. We reject the appellees’ suggestion that we lack jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the District Court on the theory that a court of three judges was not required under 28 U. S. C. §2281 because the appellants sought to enjoin only the acts of county officials. The jury commissioners and members of the board of education were “functioning pursuant to a statewide policy and performing a state function,” Moody v. Flowers, 387 U. S. 97, 102; cf. Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 92-95; and see Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112,114; Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105, 107. The appellants cannot be denied a three-judge court below and direct review here simply because Georgia chooses to denominate as “local” or “county” the officials to whom it has entrusted the administration of the challenged constitutional and statutory provisions. Rorick v. Board of Commissioners, 307 U. S. 208, 212; cf. City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S. 329, 332. Under Georgia law Taliaferro County may replace the constitutional and statutory arrangement by which the grand jury elects the board of education with the direct election of the board by the qualified voters of the county upon the enactment of a local or special law by the legislature and its approval in a referendum by a majority of the qualified voters. Ga. Const., Art. VIII, § V, ¶ 2, Ga. Code Ann. § 2-6802 (Supp. 1968). But Georgia does not suggest that so many counties have taken advantage of this provision that the present selection of the board by the grand jury in effect amounts to a local option. The appellees also propose a distinction between attacks on statutes and attacks upon the results of their administration, and urge that the appellants’ case comes within the latter category. But this argument overlooks the line, delineated by our past decisions, that falls between a petition for injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a statute, either on its face or as applied, which requires a three-judge court, and a petition seeking an injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute not attacked as unconstitutional. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U. S. 145, 150 and n. 9; Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486, 489; Ex parte Bransford, 310 U. S. 354, 361; Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. B. Co., 282 TJ. S. 10,15; Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U. S. 168, 172. Similarly, we reject the appellees’ contention, ancillary to their basic attack on our jurisdiction, that the three-judge court was improperly convened because of the insubstantiality of the appellants’ challenge to the Georgia laws. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 115; Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U. S. 713, 715 (per curiam)] California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U. S. 252, 255 (per curiam); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30, 32 (per curiam). Further, the District Court properly entertained the question whether the constitutional and statutory complex, even if not invalid on its face, was unconstitutionally administered. Without regard to whether that issue was one by itself warranting a three-judge court, see Ex parte Bransford, supra; Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 37-50, it related to the appellants’ claim that Georgia’s school-board selection procedure was unlawful on its face. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 90-91; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 5-6; United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 371 U. S. 285, 287-288; Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 249-250; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 75-85; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303-304. Ga. Code Ann. §59-101 (1965). Ga. Code Ann. § 59-106 (Supp. 1968). Ibid. Our decisions in Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559, and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, cannot aid the appellants. In Avery we reversed a judgment of conviction where the names of prospective petit jurors had been printed on differently colored tickets according to their race — white tickets for white people, and yellow tickets for Negroes. A state superior court judge drew the names from the jury box and handed them to the sheriff, who entrusted them to the court clerk for arranging the tickets and typing up the list of persons to be called to serve on the panel. We found that the use of the white and yellow tickets made it easier “for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate,” and that even if the judge had drawn the names without looking to see the color of the tickets, “opportunity was available to resort to [discrimination] at other stages in the selection process.” 345 U. S., at 562. Whitus involved a refinement of the process we had condemned in Avery. In Whitus the jury commissioners made up the jury list from which both traverse and grand jurors were selected by reference to -the tax digest, which was segregated into sections — one with white sheets for white people and the other with yellow sheets for Negroes — and to an old jury list required by former law to be made up from the tax digest. We concluded that “[u]nder such a system the opportunity for discrimination was present,” and on the record before us we could not say that that opportunity “was not resorted to by the commissioners.” 385 U. S., at 552. In both Avery and Whitus we noted without comment the “upright and intelligent” requirement for jury membership. 385 U. S., at 552; 345 U. S., at 562. In Avery we expressly commented that Georgia law did not authorize the use of the potentially discriminatory process under review. 345 U. S., at 562. In both cases we struck down the white-and-yellow system, however varied in design, because of the obvious danger of abuse. See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375, 382. We dealt in both cases with a physical, even mechanical, aspect of the jury-selection process that could have no conceivable purpose or effect other than to enable those so disposed to discriminate against Negroes solely on the basis of their race. It is evident that the challenged provisions now before us contain no such defect. The appellants cannot contend that the present requirements serve no rational function other than to afford an opportunity to state officials to discriminate against Negroes if they desire to do so. Indeed, at the oral argument before this Court, counsel candidly conceded: “There is no question but that Georgia’s jury selection statute is capable of being improperly administered. There is no question but that in Taliaferro County, Georgia, it has been misadministered.” Although Georgia grants the franchise to its citizens at 18, Gi. Const., Art. II, § I, ¶11, Ga. Code Ann. §2-702 (1948), jurors must be over 21, Ga. Code Ann. §59-201 (1965), and so the jury commissioners struck all persons under 21. At the adjourned hearing the superior court judge testified that he regularly excuses people from the traverse-jury lists as well as the grand-jury panel he draws in the courtroom. Whether the request to be excused was made in open court, in writing, or over the telephone, only the judge could excuse from grand-jury service those whose names he had drawn. It also appeared that 191 of those stricken for poor health and old age were Negro (51%); 71 of those under 21 (90%); 263 of those away from the county (51%); and three who asked to be relieved from jury duty (6%). See Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U. S. 105, 106. Ga. Code Ann. § 59-106 (Supp. 1968). See Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (per curiam); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 22, 23 (per curiam); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559, 562-563; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 468-469; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 405-406; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 594-596, 598. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545, 551; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584, 587; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 481-482; Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 561; Norris v. Alabama, supra, at 598; cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 481. Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562; cf. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 361-362; Norris v. Alabama, supra, at 594-595, 598-599. We reserve the question whether a State that for years has provided separate and inferior schools for Negroes may now disqualify them from jury service on the “impartial” ground of educational inadequacy, however defined. See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285, 297. Georgia’s contention that no appellant has standing to raise this claim is without merit. The appellant Calvin Turner is a freeholder, but the appellant Joseph Heath is not. Heath’s motion to intervene was granted by the District Court for the express purpose of adding a party plaintiff to the case to ensure that the court could reach the merits of this issue. Georgia also argues that the question is not properly before us because the record is devoid of evidence that the freeholder requirement actually has operated to exclude anyone from the Taliaferro County board of education. But the appellant Heath’s allegation that he is npt a freeholder is uncontested, and Georgia can hardly urge that her county officials may be depended on to ignore a provision of state law. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426; Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, 556. Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 7. Cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U. S. 399, 402, 404; Snowden v. Hughes, supra, at 7-8. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91; Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45, 50-51; Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 632. Language to such effect may be found in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310. But the passage relied upon by Georgia is no more than dictum. Later decisions invoking Strauder fall in the same category. Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 580; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 386. Vought v. Wisconsin, 217 U. S. 590, is hardly apposite; there we dismissed an appeal for want of a meritorious question in a case where the appellant challenged a judgment of conviction arising from an indictment returned by a grand jury selected by commissioners required by statute to be freeholders. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 32-36; Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 468. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. SOUTHWESTERN CABLE CO. et al. No. 363. Argued March 12-13, 1968. Decided June 10, 1968. Henry Oeller argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Howard E. Shapiro, and DanielR. Ohlbaum. Ernest W. Jennes argued the cause for petitioners in No. 428. With him on the briefs was Charles A. Miller. Arthur Scheiner argued the cause for respondent Southwestern Cable Co. in both cases. With him on the brief were Morton H. Wilner and Harold F. Reis. Rob ert L. Heald argued the cause for respondents Mission Cable TV, Inc., et al. in both cases. With him on the brief were Frank U. Fletcher, Edward F. Kenehan, and James P. Riley. Michael Finkelstein filed a brief for the All-Channel Television Society, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Robert A. Marmet, Thomas W. Wilson, John D. Matthews, and Robert H. Young for the Alice Cable Television Corp. et al., and by Wayne W. Owen, Harry M. Plot-kin, and George H. Shapiro for the Black Hills Video Corp. et al. Together with No. 428, Midwest Television, Inc., et al. v. Southwestern Cable Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases stem from proceedings conducted by the Federal Communications Commission after requests by Midwest Television for relief under §§ 74.1107 and 74.1109 of the rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of community antenna television (CATV) systems. Midwest averred that respondents’ CATV systems transmitted the signals of Los Angeles broadcasting stations into the San Diego area, and thereby had, inconsistently with the public interest, adversely affected Midwest’s San Diego station. Midwest sought an appropriate order limiting the carriage of such signals by respondents’ systems. After consideration of the petition and of various responsive pleadings, the Commission restricted the expansion of respondents’ service in areas in which they had not operated on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to be conducted on the merits of Midwest’s complaints. 4 F. C. C. 2d 612. On petitions for review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Commission lacks authority under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151, to issue such an order. 378 F. 2d 118. We granted certiorari to consider this important question of regulatory authority. 389 U. S. 911. For reasons that follow, we reverse. I. CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations, amplify them, transmit them by cable or microwave, and ultimately distribute them by wire to the receivers of their subscribers. CATV systems characteristically do not produce their own programming, and do not recompense producers or broadcasters for use of the programming which they receive and redistribute. Unlike ordinary broadcasting stations, CATV systems commonly charge their subscribers installation and other fees. The CATV industry has grown rapidly since the establishment of the first commercial system in 1950. In the late 1950’s, some 50 new systems were established each year; by 1959, there were 550 “nationally known and identified” systems serving a total audience of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 persons. It has been more recently estimated that “new systems are being founded at the rate of more than one per day, and . . . subscribers . . . signed on at the rate of 15,000 per month.” By late 1965, it was reported that there were 1,847 operating CATY systems, that 758 others were franchised but not yet in operation, and that there were 938 applications for additional franchises. The statistical evidence is incomplete, but, as the Commission has observed, “whatever the estimate, CATY growth is clearly explosive in nature.” Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 738, n. 15. CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be possible; and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae. As the number and size of CATV systems have increased, their principal function has more frequently become the importation of distant signals. In 1959, only 50 systems employed microwave relays, and the maximum distance over which signals were transmitted was 300 miles; by 1964, 250 systems used microwave, and the transmission distances sometimes exceeded 665 miles. First Report and Order, 38 F. C. C. 683, 709. There are evidently now plans “to carry the programing of New York City independent stations by cable to . . . upstate New York, to Philadelphia, and even as far as Dayton.” And see Chan nel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 385 F. 2d 969; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 385 F. 2d 979. Thus, “while the CATV industry originated in sparsely settled areas and areas of adverse terrain ... it is now spreading to metropolitan centers . . . .” First Report and Order, supra, at 709. CATV systems, formerly no more than local auxiliaries to broadcasting, promise for the future to provide a national communications system, in which signals from selected broadcasting centers would be transmitted to metropolitan areas throughout the country. The Commission has on various occasions attempted to assess the relationship between community antenna television systems and its conceded regulatory functions. In 1959, it completed an extended investigation of several auxiliary broadcasting services, including CATV. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403. Although it found that CATV is “related to interstate transmission,” the Commission reasoned that CATV systems are neither common carriers nor broadcasters, and therefore are within neither of the principal regulatory categories created by the Communications Act. Id., at 427-428. The Commission declared that it had not been given plenary authority over “any and all enterprises which happen to be connected with one of the many aspects of communications.” Id., at 429. It refused to premise regulation of CATV upon assertedly adverse consequences for broadcasting, because it could not “determine where the impact takes effect, although we recognize that it may well exist.” Id., at 431. The Commission instead declared that it would forthwith seek appropriate legislation “to clarify the situation.” Id., at 438. Such legislation was introduced in the Senate in 1959, favorably reported, and debated on the Senate floor. The bill was, however, ultimately returned to committee. Despite its inability to obtain amendatory legislation, the Commission has, since 1960, gradually asserted jurisdiction over CATV. It first placed restrictions upon the activities of common carrier microwave facilities that serve CATV systems. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F. C. C. 459, aff’d, 321 F. 2d 359. Finally, the Commission in 1962 conducted a rule-making proceeding in which it re-evaluated the significance of CATV for its. regulatory responsibilities. First Order and Report, supra. The proceeding was explicitly restricted to those systems that are served by microwave, but the Commission's conclusions plainly were more widely relevant. The Commission found that “the likelihood or probability of [CATV’s] adverse impact upon potential and existing service has become too substantial to be dismissed.” Id., at 713-714. It reasoned that the importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations necessarily creates “substantial competition” for local broadcasting. Id., at 707. The Commission acknowledged that it could not “measure precisely the degree of . . . impact,” but found that “CATV competition can have a substantial negative effect upon station audience and revenues . . . .” Id., at 710-711. The Commission attempted to “accommodat[e]” the interests of CATV and of local broadcasting by the imposition of two rules. Id., at 713. First, CATV systems were required to transmit to their subscribers the signals of any station into whose service area they have brought competing signals. Second, CATV systems were forbidden to duplicate the programming of such local stations for periods of 15 days before and after a local broadcast. See generally First Report and Order, supra, at 719-730. These carriage and nonduplication rules were expected to “insur[e] many stations’ ability to maintain themselves as their areas’ outlets for highly popular network and other programs . . . .” Id., at 715. The Commission in 1965 issued additional notices of inquiry and proposed rule-making, by which it sought to determine whether all forms of CATV, including those served only by cable, could properly be regulated under the Communications Act. 1 F. C. C. 2d 453. After further hearings, the Commission held that the Act confers adequate regulatory authority over all CATV systems. Second Report and Order, supra, at 728-734. It promulgated revised rules, applicable both to cable and to microwave CATV systems, to govern the carriage of local signals and the nonduplication of local programming. Further, the Commission forbade the importation by CATV of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets, except insofar as such service was offered on February 15, 1966, unless the Commission has previously found that it “would be consistent with the public interest,” id., at 782; see generally id., at 781-785, “particularly the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area,” 47 CFR § 74.1107 (c). Finally, the Commission created “summary, nonhearing procedures” for the disposition of applications for separate or additional relief. 2 F. C. C. 2d, at 764; 47 CFR § 74.1109. Thirteen days after the Commission’s adoption of the Second Report, Midwest initiated these proceedings by the submission of its petition for special relief. II. We must first emphasize that questions as to the validity of the specific rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of CATY are not now before the Court. The issues in these cases are only two: whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to regulate CATV systems, and, if it has, whether it has, in addition, authority to issue the prohibitory order here in question. The Commission’s authority to regulate broadcasting and other communications is derived from the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Act’s provisions are explicitly applicable to “all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a). The Commission’s responsibilities are no more narrow: it is required to endeavor to “make available ... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 151. The Commission was expected to serve as the “single Government agency” with “unified jurisdiction” and “regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio.” It was for this purpose given “broad authority.” As this Court emphasized in an earlier case, the Act’s terms, purposes, and history all indicate that Congress “formulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the [broadcasting] industry.” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137. Respondents do not suggest that CATV systems are not within the term “communication by wire or radio.” Indeed, such communications are defined by the Act so as to encompass “the transmission of . . . signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds,” whether by radio or cable, “including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.” 47 U. S. C. §§ 153 (a), (b). These very general terms amply suffice to reach respondents' activities. Nor can we doubt that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communication, even where, as here, the intercepted signals emanate from stations located within the same State in which the CATY system operates. We may take notice that television broadcasting consists in very large part of programming devised for, and distributed to, national audiences; respondents thus are ordinarily employed in the simultaneous retransmission of communications that have very often originated in other States. The stream of communication is essentially uninterrupted and properly indivisible. To categorize respondents’ activities as intrastate would disregard the character of the television industry, and serve merely to prevent the national regulation that “is not only appropriate but essential to the efficient use of radio facilities.” Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279. Nonetheless, respondents urge that the Communications Act, properly understood, does not permit the regulation of CATV systems. First, they emphasize that the Commission in 1969 and again in 1966 sought legislation that would have explicitly authorized such regulation, and that its efforts were unsuccessful. In the circumstances here, however, this cannot be dispositive. The Commission’s requests for legislation evidently reflected in each instance both its uncertainty as to the proper width of its authority and its understandable preference for more detailed policy guidance than the Communications Act now provides. We have recognized that administrative agencies should, in such situations, be encouraged to seek from Congress clarification of the pertinent statutory provisions. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 47. Nor can we obtain significant assistance from the various expressions of congressional opinion that followed the Commission’s requests. In the first place, the views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by another Congress have “very little, if any, significance.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593; United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313; Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 87, n. 4. Further, it is far from clear that Congress believed, as it considered these requests for legislation, that the Commission did not already possess regulatory authority over CATV. In 1959, the proposed legislation was preceded by the Commission’s declarations that it “did not intend to regulate CATV,” and that it preferred to recommend the adoption of legislation that would impose specified requirements upon CATV systems. Congress may well have been more troubled by the Commission’s unwillingness to regulate than by any fears that it was unable to regulate. In 1966, the Commission informed Congress that it desired legislation in order to “confirm [its] jurisdiction and to establish such basic national policy as [Congress] deems appropriate.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 16. In response, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce said merely that it did not “either agree or disagree” with the jurisdictional conclusions of the Second Report, and that “the question of whether or not . . . the Commission has authority under present law to regulate CATV systems is for the courts to decide . . . .” Id., at 9. In these circumstances, we cannot derive from the Commission’s requests for legislation anything of significant bearing on the construction question now before us. Second, respondents urge that § 152 (a) does not independently confer regulatory authority upon the Commission, but instead merely prescribes the forms of communication to which the Act's other provisions may separately be made applicable. Respondents emphasize that the Commission does not contend either that CATY systems are common carriers, and thus within Title II of the Act, or that they are broadcasters, and thus within Title III. They conclude that CATV, with certain of the characteristics both of. broadcasting and of common carriers, but with all of the characteristics of neither, eludes altogether the Act’s grasp. We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the language of § 152 (a), in the surrounding language, or in the Act’s history or purposes limits the Commission’s authority to those activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by the Act’s other provisions. The section itself states merely that the “provisions of [the Act] shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio . . . .” Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the Commission was given “regulatory power over all forms of electrical communication . . . .” S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1. Certainly Congress could not in 1934 have foreseen the development of community antenna television systems, but it seems to us that it was precisely because Congress wished “to maintain, through appropriate administrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, that it conferred upon the Commission a “unified jurisdiction” and “broad authority.” Thus, “ [underlying the whole [Communications Act] is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors.” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138. Congress in 1934 acted in a field that was demonstrably “both new and dynamic,” and it therefore gave the Commission “a comprehensive mandate,” with “not niggardly but expansive powers.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 219. We have found no reason to believe that § 152 does not, as its terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over “all interstate . . . communication by wire or radio.” Moreover, the Commission has reasonably concluded that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other responsibilities. Congress has imposed upon the Commission the “obligation of providing a widely dispersed radio and television service,” with a “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” of service among the “several States and communities.” 47 U. S. C. § 307 (b). The Commission has, for this and other purposes, been granted authority to allocate broadcasting zones or areas, and to provide regulations “as it may deem necessary” to prevent interference among the various stations. 47 U. S. C. §§ 303 (f), (h). The Commission has concluded, and Congress has agreed, that these obligations require for their satisfaction the creation of a system of local broadcasting stations, such that “all communities of appreciable size [will] have at least one television station as an outlet for local self-expression.” In turn, the Commission has held that an appropriate system of local broadcasting may be created only if two subsidiary goals are realized. First, significantly wider use must be made of the available ultra-high-frequency channels. Second, communities must be encouraged “to launch sound and adequate programs to utilize the television channels now reserved for educational purposes.” These subsidiary-goals have received the endorsement of Congress. The Commission has reasonably found that the achievement of each of these purposes is “placed in jeopardy by the unregulated explosive growth of CATV.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7. Although CATV may in some circumstances make possible “the realization of some of the [Commission’s] most important goals,” First Report and Order, supra, at 699, its importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations may also “destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,” id,., at 700, and thus ultimately deprive the public of the various benefits of a system of local broadcasting stations. In particular, the Commission feared that CATY might, by dividing the available audiences and revenues, significantly magnify the characteristically serious financial difficulties of TJHF and educational television broadcasters. The Commission acknowledged that it could not predict with certainty the consequences of unregulated CATV, but reasoned that its statutory responsibilities demand that it “plan in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to react to them.” Id., at 701. We are aware that these consequences have been variously estimated, but must conclude that there is substantial evidence that the Commission cannot “discharge its overall responsibilities without authority ovér this important aspect of television service.” Staff of Senate Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., The Television Inquiry: The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities 19 (Comm. Print 1959). The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting. The significance of its efforts can scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is demonstrably a principal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation’s population. The Commission has reasonably found that the successful performance of these duties demands prompt and efficacious regulation of community antenna television systems. We have elsewhere held .that we may not, “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention . . . prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency’s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 780. Compare National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219-220; American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311. There is no such evidence here, and we therefore hold that the Commission’s authority over “all interstate . . . communication by wire or radio” permits the regulation of CATV systems. There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission’s authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under § 152 (a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes, issue “such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,” as “public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r). We express no views as to the Commission’s authority, if any, to regulate CATV under any other circumstances or for any other purposes. III. We must next determine whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to issue the particular prohibitory order in question in these proceedings. In its Second Report and Order, supra, the Commission concluded that it should provide summary procedures for the disposition both of requests for special relief and of “complaints or disputes.” Id., at 764. It feared that if evidentiary hearings were in every situation mandatory they would prove “time consuming and burdensome” to the CATV systems and broadcasting stations involved. Ibid. The Commission considered that appropriate notice and opportunities for comment or objection must be given, and it declared that “additional procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary hearing, or further written submissions” would be permitted "if they appear necessary or appropriate . . . .” Ibid. See 47 CFR § 74.1109 (f). It was under the authority of these provisions that Midwest sought, and the Commission granted, temporary relief. The Commission, after examination of various responsive pleadings but without prior hearings, ordered that respondents generally restrict their carriage of Los An-geles signals to areas served by them on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to determine whether the carriage of such signals into San Diego contravenes the public interest. The order does not prohibit the addition of new subscribers within areas served by respondents on February 15, 1966; it does not prevent service to other subscribers who began receiving service or who submitted an “accepted subscription request” between February 15, 1966, and the date of the Commission’s order; and it does not preclude the carriage of San Diego and Tijuana, Mexico, signals to subscribers in new areas of service. 4 F. C. C. 2d 612, 624-625. The order is thus designed simply to preserve the situation as it existed at the moment of its issuance. Respondents urge that the Commission may issue prohibitory orders only under the authority of § 312 (b), by which the Commission is empowered to issue cease-and-desist orders. We shall assume that, consistent with the requirements of § 312 (c), cease-and-desist orders are proper only after hearing or waiver of the right to hearing. Nonetheless, the requirement does not invalidate the order issued in this case, for we have concluded that the provisions of §§312 (b), '(c) are inapplicable here. Section 312 (b) provides that a cease-and-desist order may issue only if the respondent “has violated or failed to observe” a provision of the Communications Act or a rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission under the Act’s authority. Respondents here were not found to have violated or to have failed to observe any such restriction; the question before the Commission was instead only whether an existing situation should be preserved pending a determination “whether respondents’ present or planned CATV operations are consistent with the public interest and what, if any, action should be taken by the Commission.” 4 F. C. C. 2d, at 626. The Commission’s order was thus not, in form or function, a cease-and-desist order that must issue under §§312 (b), (c). The Commission has acknowledged that, in this area of rapid and significant change, there may be situations in which its generalized regulations are inadequate, and special or additional forms of relief are imperative. It has found that the present case may prove to be such a situation, and that the public interest demands “interim relief . . . limiting further expansion,” pending hearings to determine appropriate Commission action. Such orders do not exceed the Commission’s authority. This Court has recognized that “the administrative process [must] possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself” to the “dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, and that it was precisely for that reason that Congress declined to “stereo-typ[e] the powers of the Commission to specific details . . . .” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219. And compare American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311; R. A. Holman & Co. v. S. E. C., 112 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 47-48, 299 F. 2d 127, 131-132. Thus, the Commission has been explicitly authorized to issue “such orders, not inconsistent with this [Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i). See also 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r). In these circumstances, we hold that the Commission’s order limiting further expansion of respondents’ service pending appropriate hearings did not exceed or abuse its authority under the Communications Act. And there is no claim that its procedure in this respect is in any way constitutionally infirm. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. R ü s0 orderefL Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Midwest’s petition was premised upon its status as licensee of KFMB-TV, San Diego, California. It is evidently also the licensee of various other broadcasting stations. See Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 739. 47 CFR § 74.1107 (a) provides that “[n]o CATV system operating in a community within the predicted Grade A contour of a television broadcast station in the 100 largest television markets shall extend the signal of a television broadcast station beyond the Grade B contour of that station, except upon a showing approved by the Commission that such extension would be consistent with the public interest, and specifically the establishment and healthy maintenance of television broadcast service in the area. Commission approval of a request to extend a signal in the foregoing circumstances will be granted where the Commission, after consideration of the request and all related materials in a full evidentiary hearing, determines that the requisite showing has been made. The market size shall be determined by the rating of the American Research Bureau, on the basis of the net weekly circulation for the most recent year.” San Diego is the Nation’s 54th largest television market. Midwest Television, Inc., 11 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 2d 273, 276. 47 CFR § 74.1109 creates “procedures applicable to petitions for waiver of the rules, additional or different requirements and rulings on complaints or disputes.” It provides that petitions for special relief “may be submitted informally, by letter, but shall be accompanied by an affidavit of service on any CATV system, station licensee, permittee, applicant, or other interested person who may be directly affected if the relief requested in the petition should be granted.” 47 CFR §74.1109 (b). Provisions are made for comments or opposition to the petition, and for rejoinders by the petitioner. 47 CFR §§74.1109 (d), (e). Finally, the Commission “may specify other procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary hearing, or further written submissions directed to particular aspects, as it deems appropriate.” 47 CFR §74.1109 (f). Midwest asserted that respondents’ importation of Los Angeles signals had fragmented the San Diego audience, that this would reduce the advertising revenues of local , stations, and that the ultimate consequence would be to terminate or to curtail the services provided in the San Diego area by local broadcasting stations. Respondents’ CATV systems now carry the signals of San Diego stations, but Midwest alleged that the quality of the signals, as they are carried by respondents, is materially degraded, and that this serves only to accentuate the fragmentation of the local audience. February 15, 1966, is the date on which grandfather rights accrued under 47 CFR § 74.1107 (d). The initial decision of the hearing examiner, issued October 3, 1967, concluded that permanent restrictions on the expansion of respondents’ services were unwarranted. Midwest Television, Inc., 11 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 2d 273. The Commission has declined to terminate its interim restrictions pending consideration by the Commission of the examiner’s decision. Midwest Television, Inc., id., at 721. The opinion of the Court of Appeals could be understood to hold either that the Commission may not, under the Communications Act, regulate CATV, or, more narrowly, that it may not issue the prohibitory order involved here. We take the court’s opinion, in fact, to have encompassed both positions. We note that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that the Communications Act permits the regulation of CATV systems. See Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 262, 387 F. 2d 220. CATV systems are defined by the Commission for purposes of its rules as “any facility which . . . receives directly or indirectly over the air and amplifies or otherwise modifies the signals transmitting programs broadcast by one or more television stations and distributes such signals by wire or cable to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service, but such term shall not include (1) any such facility which serves fewer than 50 subscribers, or (2) any such facility which serves only the residents of one or more apartment dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, and commercial establishments located on the premises of such an apartment house.” 47 CFR §74.1101 (a). There is, however, no technical reason wiry they may not. See Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 367. Indeed, the examiner was informed in this case that respondent Mission Cable TV “intends to commence program origination in the near future.” Midwest Television, Inc., supra, at 283. The installation costs for CATV systems in 16 Connecticut communities were, for example, found to range from $31 to $147 per home. M. Seiden, An Economic Analysis of Community Antenna Television Systems and the Television Broadcasting Industry 24 (1965). CATV systems were evidently first established on a noncommercial basis in 1949. H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403, 408; Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 368. Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 368. Second Report and Order, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 738. The franchises are granted by state or local regulatory agencies. It was reported in 1965 that two States, Connecticut and Nevada, regulate CATY systems, and that some 86% of the systems are subject at least to some local regulation. Seiden, supra, at 44-47. See Conn. Gen. St-at. Rev., Tit. 16, c. 289 (1958); Nev. Stat. 1967, c. 458. The term "distant signal” has been given a specialized definition by the Commission, as a signal “which is extended or received beyond the Grade B contour of that station.” 47 CFR § 74.1101 (i). The Grade B contour is a line along which good reception may be expected 90% of the time at 50% of the locations. See 47 CFR §73.683 (a). Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 368 (notes omitted). It has thus been suggested that “a nationwide grid of wired CATV systems, interconnected by microwave frequencies and financed by subscriber fees, may one day offer a viable economic alternative to the advertiser-supported broadcast service.” Levin, New Technology and the Old Regulation in Radio Spectrum Management, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 339, 341 (Proceedings, May 1966). See S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. S. Rep. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. See 106 Cong. Rec. 10416-10436, 10520-10548. Id., at 10547. The Commission in 1966 made additional efforts to obtain suitable modifications in the Communications Act. See n. 30, infra. See generally First Report and Order, supra, at 716-719. The Commission held that a CATV system must, within the limits of its channel capacity, carry the signals of stations that place signals over the community served by the system. The stations are to be. given priority according to the strength of the signal available in the community, with the strongest signals given first priority. Exceptions are made for situations in which there would be substantial duplication or in which an independent or noncommercial station would be excluded. Id., at 717. It must also be noted that the CATY systems involved in these cases evidently do not employ microwave. We intimate no views on what differences, if any, there might be in the scope of the Commission’s authority over microwave and nonmicrowave systems. The phrase is taken from the message to Congress from President Roosevelt, dated February 26, 1934, in which he recommended the Commission’s creation. See H. R. Rep. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1. S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1. Ibid. The Committee also indicated that there was a “vital need” for such a commission, with jurisdiction “over all of these methods of communication.” Ibid. The phrase is taken from President Roosevelt’s message to Congress. H. R. Rep. No. 1850, supra, at 1. The House Committee added that “the primary purpose of this bill [is] to create such a commission armed with adequate statutory powers to regulate all forms of communication . . . .” Id., at 3. Respondents assert only that this “is subject to considerable question.” Brief for Respondent Southwestern Cable Co. 24, n. 25. They rely chiefly upon the language of § 152 (b), which provides that nothing in the Act shall give the Commission jurisdiction over “carriers” that are engaged in interstate communication solely through physical connection, or connection by wire or radio, with the facilities of another carrier, if they are not directly or indirectly controlled by such other carrier. The terms and history of this provision, however, indicate that it was “merely a perfecting amendment” intended to “obviate any possible technical argument that the Commission may attempt to assert common-carrier jurisdiction over point-to-point communication by radio between two points within a single State ...” S. Rep. No. 1090, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1. See also H. R. Rep. No. 910, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. The Commission and the respondents are agreed, we think properly, that these CATV systems are not common carriers within the meaning of the Act. See 47 U. S. C. § 153 (h); Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F. C. C. 251; Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 123 U. S. App. D. C. 298, 359 F. 2d 282; CATV and TV Repeater Services, supra, at 427-428. See H. R. 13286, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. The bill was favorably reported by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., but failed to reach the floor for debate. See, for the legislation proposed in 1959, CATV and TV Repeater Services, supra, at 427-431, 438-439. The Commission in 1966 explicitly stated in its explanation of its proposed amendments to the Act that “we believe it highly desirable that Congress . . . confirm [the Commission’s] jurisdiction and . . . establish such basic national policy as it deems appropriate.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, supra, at 16. See S. Rep. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6. Thus, the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce observed in its 1959 Report that although the Commission’s staff had recommended that authority be asserted over CATV, the Commission had “long hesitated,” and had only recently made clear “that it did not intend to regulate CATV systems in any way whatsoever.” S. Rep. No. 923, supra, at 5. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the debate on the Senate floor centered on the broad question whether the Commission should have authority to regulate CATV. See, e. g., 106 Cong. Rec. 10426. 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a) provides that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the United States, and to all persons engaged within the United States in such communication or such transmission of energy by radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter provided; but it shall not apply to persons engaged in wire or radio communication or transmission in the Canal Zone, or to wire or radio communication or transmission wholly within the Canal Zone.” S. Rep. No. 781, supra, at 1. H. R. Rep. No. 1850, supra, at 1. Respondents argue, and the Court of Appeals evidently concluded, that the opinion of the Court in Regents v. Carroll, 338 U. S. 586, supports the inference that the Commission’s authority is limited to licensees, carriers, and others specifically reached by the Act’s other provisions. We find this unpersuasive. The Court in Carroll considered the very general contention that the Commission had been given authority “to determine the validity of contracts between licensees and others.” Id., at 602. It was concerned, not with the limits of the Commission’s authority over a form of communication by wire or radio, but with efforts to enforce a contract that had been repudiated upon the demand of the Commission. The Court’s discussion of the Commission’s authority under § 303 (r), see id., at 600, must be read in that context, and as thus read it cannot be controlling here. S. Rep. No. 923, supra, at 7. The Committee added that “Congress and the people” have no particular interest in the success of any given broadcaster, but if the failure of a station “leaves a community with inferior service,” this becomes “a matter of real and immediate public concern.” Ibid. H. R. Rep. No. 1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 3; Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905. And see Staff of the Senate Comm, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., The Television Inquiry: The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities 3-4 (Comm. Print 1959). The Senate Committee has elsewhere stated that “[t]here should be no weakening of the Commission’s announced goal of local service.” S. Rep. No. 923, supra, at 7. The Commission has allocated 82 channels for television broadcasting, of which 70 are in the UHF portion of the radio spectrum. This permits a total of 681 VHF stations and 1,544 UHF stations. H. R. Rep. No. 1559, supra, at 2. In December 1964, 454 VHF stations were on the air, 25 permittees were not operating, and 11 applications were awaiting Commission action, leaving 63 unreserved VHF allocations available. Seiden, supra, 162, n. 11, at 10. At the same time, 90 UHF stations were operating, 66 were assigned but not operating, 52 applications were pending before the Commission, and 1,108 allocations were still available. Ibid. The Commission has concluded that, in these circumstances, “an adequate national television system can be achieved” only if more of the available UHF channels are utilized. H. R. Rep. No. 1559, supra, at 4. S. Rep. No. 67, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9. The Committee indicated that it was “of utmost importance to the Nation that a reasonable opportunity be afforded educational institutions to use television as a noncommercial educational medium.” Id., at 3. Similarly, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce has concluded that educational television will “provide a much needed source of cultural and informational programing for all audiences . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 1559, supra, at 3. It is thus an essential element of “an adequate national television system.” Id., at 4. See also H. R. Rep. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. Legislation was adopted in 1962 to amend the Communications Act in order to require that all television receivers thereafter shipped in interstate commerce for sale or resale to the public be capable of receiving both UHF and YHF frequencies. 76 Stat. 150. The legislation was plainly intended to assist the growth of UHF broadcasting. See H. R. Rep. No. 1559, supra. Moreover, legislation has been adopted to provide construction grants and other assistance to educational television systems. 76 Stat. 68, 81 Stat. 365. See generally Second Report and Order, supra, at 736-745. It is pertinent that the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce feared even in 1959 that the unrestricted growth of CATV would eliminate local broadcasting, and that, in turn, this would have four undesirable consequences: (1) the local community “would be left without the local service which is necessary if the public is to receive the maximum benefits from the television medium”; (2) the “suburban and rural areas surrounding the central community may be deprived not only of local service but of any service at all”; (3) even “the resident of the central community may be deprived of all service if he cannot afford the connection charge and monthly service fees of the CATV system”; (4) “[u]nrestrained CATV, booster, or translator operation might eventually result in large regions, or even entire States, being deprived of all local television service — or being left, at best, with nothing more than a highly limited satellite service.” S. Rep. No. 923, supra, at 7-8. The Committee concluded that CATV competition “does have an effect on the orderly development of television.” Id., at 8. The Commission has found that “we are in a critical period with respect to UHF development. Most of the new UHF stations will face considerable financial obstacles.” First Report and Order, supra, at 712. It concluded that “one general factor giving cause for serious concern,” ibid., was that there is “likely” to be a "severe” impact between new local stations, particularly UHF stations, and CATV systems. Id., at 713. Further, the Commission believed that there was danger that CATV systems would “siphon off sufficient local financial support” for educational television, with the result that such stations would fail or not be established at all. It feared that “the loss would be keenly felt by the public.” Second Report and Order, supra, at 761. The Commission concluded that the hazards to educational television were "sufficiently strong to warrant some special protection . . . .” Id., at 762. Similarly, a recent study has found that CATV systems may have a substantial impact upon station revenues, that many stations, particularly in small markets, cannot readily afford such competition, and that in consequence a “substantial percentage of potential new station entrants, particularly UHF, are likely to be discouraged Fisher & Ferrall, Community Antenna Television Systems and Local Television Station Audience, 80 Q. J. Econ. 227, 250. Compare the following. Seiden, supra, at 64-90; Note, The Federal Communications Commission and Regulation of CATV, 43 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 117, 133-139; Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, supra, at 376-383; Fisher & Ferrall, supra. We note, in addition, that the dispute here is in part whether local, advertiser-supported stations are an appropriate foundation for a national system of television broadcasting. See generally Coase, The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 440 (May 1966); Greenberg, Wire Television and the FCC’s Second Report and Order on CATV Systems, 10 J. Law & Econ. 181. Respondents urge that the legislative history of § 312 (b) indicates that the Commission may issue prohibitory orders only under, and in conformity with, that section. We find this unpersuasive. Nothing in that history suggests that the Commission was deprived of its authority, granted elsewhere in the Act, to issue orders “necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i). See also 47 U. S. C. §303 (r).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES et al. v. ABRAMS No. 03-1601. Argued January 19, 2005 Decided March 22, 2005 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 127. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 129. Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were T Peter Pierce, Gregory M. Kunert, and Nicholas P. Miller. James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, and Thomas M. Bondy. Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William T. Lake, Jonathan J. Frankel, Paul R. Q. Wolf son, Brian W. Murray, Wilkie Cheong, Christopher D. Imlay, and David J. Kaufman Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C. Newsom, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec-five jurisdictions as follows: Gregg D. Renkes of Alaska, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Douglas B. Moylan of Guam, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia; for Local Governments et al. by Roy T Englert, Jr., Max Huffman, James N. Horwood, and Peter J. Hopkins; and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, Robert A Long, and Heidi C. Doerhoff. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Mobile Telecommunications Association by Russell D. Lukas; for the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association by Andrew G. McBride, Joshua S. Turner, and Michael Altschul; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Reginald D. Steer and Michael L. Foreman; for Public Citizen, Inc., by Scott L. Nelson; and for James A. Kay, Jr., by Barry Richard. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide in this case whether an individual may enforce the limitations on local zoning authority set forth in § 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47. U. S. C. § 332(c)(7), through an action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. I Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 110 Stat. 56, to promote competition and higher quality in American telecommunications services and to “encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Ibid. One of the means by which it sought to accomplish these goals was reduction of the impediments imposed by local governments upon the installation of facilities for wireless communications, such as antenna towers. To this end, the TCA amended the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, to include § 332(c)(7), which imposes specific limitations on the traditional authority of state and local governments to regulate the location, construction, and modification of such facilities, 110 Stat. 151, codified at 47 U. S. C. § 332(c)(7). Under this provision, local governments may not * “unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), take actions that “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), or limit the placement of wireless facilities “on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). They must act on requests for authorization to locate wireless facilities “within a reasonable period of time,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), and each decision denying such a request must “be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Lastly, § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), which is central to the present case, provides as follows: “Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Respondent Mark Abrams owns a home in a low-density, residential neighborhood in the city of Rancho Palos Verdes, California (City). His property is located at a high elevation, near the peak of the Rancho Palos Verdes Peninsula. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 101 Cal. App. 4th 367, 371, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 82 (2002). The record reflects that the location is both scenic and, because of its high elevation, ideal for radio transmissions. Id., at 371-372, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 82-83. In 1989, respondent obtained a permit from the City to construct a 52.5-foot antenna on his property for amateur use. He installed the antenna shortly thereafter, and in the years that followed placed several smaller, tripod antennas on the property without prior permission from the City. He used the antennas both for noncommercial purposes (to provide an amateur radio service and to relay signals from other amateur radio operators) and for commercial purposes (to provide customers two-way radio communications from portable and mobile transceivers, and to repeat the signals of customers so as to enable greater range of transmission). Ibid. In 1998, respondent sought permission to construct a second antenna tower. In the course of investigating that application, the City learned that respondent was using his antennas to provide a commercial service, in violation of a City ordinance requiring a “conditional-use permit” from the City Planning Commission (Commission) for commercial antenna use. See Commission Resolution No. 2000-12 (“A Resolution of the Planning Commission of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes Denying With Prejudice Conditional Use Permit No. 207 for the Proposed Commercial Use of Existing Antennae on an Existing Antenna Support Structure, Located at 44 Oceanaire Drive in the Del Cerro Neighborhood”), App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. On suit by the City, Los Angeles County Superior Court enjoined respondent from using the antennas for a commercial purpose. Rancho Palos Verdes, supra, at 373, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 84; App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. Two weeks later, in July 1999, respondent applied to the Commission for the requisite conditional-use permit. The application drew strong opposition from several of respondent’s neighbors. The Commission conducted two hearings and accepted written evidence, after which it denied the application. Id., at 54a-63a. The Commission explained that granting respondent permission to operate commercially “would perpetuate ... adverse visual impacts” from respondent’s existing antennas and establish precedent for similar projects in residential areas in the future. Id., at 57a. The Commission also concluded that denial of respondent’s application was consistent with 47 U. S. C. § 332(c)(7), making specific findings that its action complied with each of that provision’s requirements. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a-62a. The city council denied respondent’s appeal. Id., at 52a. See generally No. CV00-09071-SVW (RNBx) (CD Cal., Jan. 9, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a-23a. On August 24, 2000, respondent filed this action against the City in the District Court for the Central District of California, alleging, as relevant, that denial of the use permit violated the limitations placed on the City’s zoning authority by § 332(c)(7). In particular, respondent charged that the City’s action discriminated against the mobile relay services he sought to provide, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), effectively prohibited the provision of mobile relay services, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), and was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. Respondent sought injunctive relief under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), and money damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Plaintiff/Petitioner’s Brief Re: Remedies and Damages, Case No. 00-09071-SVW (RNBx) (CD Cal., Feb. 25, 2002), App. to Reply Brief for Petitioners 2a-7a. Notwithstanding § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s direction that courts “hear and decide” actions “on an expedited basis,” the District Court did not act on respondent’s complaint until January 9,2002,16 months after filing; it concluded that the City’s denial of a conditional-use permit was not supported by substantial evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a-26a. The court explained that the City could not rest its denial on esthetic concerns, since the antennas in question were already in existence and would remain in place whatever the disposition of the permit application. Id., at 23a-24a. Nor, the court said, could the City reasonably base its decision on the fear of setting precedent for the location of commercial antennas in residential areas, since adverse impacts from new structures would always be a basis for permit denial. Id., at 25a. In light of the paucity of support for the City’s action, the court concluded that denial of the permit was “an act of spite by the community.” Id., at 24a. In an order issued two months later, the District Court held that § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) provided the exclusive remedy for the City’s actions. Judgment of Injunction, No. CV00-09071-SVW (RNBx) (CD Cal., Mar. 18, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. Accordingly, it ordered the City to grant respondent’s application for a conditional-use permit, but refused respondent’s request for damages under §1983. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the latter point, and remanded for determination of money damages and attorney’s fees. 354 P. 3d 1094, 1101 (2004). We granted certiorari. 542 U. S. 965 (2004)., II A Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), we held that this section “means what it says” and authorizes suits to enforce individual rights under federal statutes as well as the Constitution. Id., at 4. Our subsequent cases have made clear, however, that §1983 does not provide an avenue for relief every time a state actor violates a federal law. As a threshold matter, the text of § 1983 permits the enforcement of “rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests.’” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 283 (2002) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, to sustain a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the federal statute creates an individually enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries to which he belongs. See id., at 285. Even after this showing, “there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 341 (1997). The defendant may defeat this presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend that remedy for a newly created right. See ibid.; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984). Our cases have explained that evidence of such congressional intent may be found directly in the statute creating the right, or inferred from the statute’s creation of a “comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983.” Blessing, supra, at 341. See also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 19-20 (1981). “The crucial consideration is what Congress intended.” Smith, supra, at 1012. B. The City conceded below, and neither the City nor the Government as amicus disputes here, that § 332(c)(7) creates individually enforceable rights; we assume, arguendo, that this is so. The critical question, then, is whether Congress meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by § 332(c)(7) to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983 action. We conclude not. The provision of an express, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983. As we have said in a different setting, “[t]he express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 290 (2001). Thus, the existence of a more restrictive private remedy for statutory violations has been the dividing line between those cases in which we have held that an action would lie under § 1983 and those in which we have held that it would not. We have found § 1983 unavailable to remedy violations of federal statutory rights in two eases: Sea Clammers and Smith. Both of those decisions rested upon the existence of more restrictive remedies provided in the violated statute itself. See Smith, supra, at 1011-1012 (recognizing a § 1983 action “would . . . render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute”); Sea Clam-mers, supra, at 20 (“[W]hen a state official is alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under §1983” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, in all of the cases in which we have held that § 1983 is available for violation of a federal statute, we have emphasized that the statute at issue, in contrast to those in Sea Clammers and Smith, did not provide a private judicial remedy (or, in most of the cases, even a private administrative remedy) for the rights violated. See Blessing, supra, at 348 (“Unlike the federal programs at issue in [Sea Clammers and Smith], Title IV-D contains no private remedy— either judicial or administrative — through which aggrieved persons can seek redress”); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 133-134 (1994) (there was a “complete absence of provision for relief from governmental interference” in the statute); Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 108-109 (1989) (“There is ... no comprehensive enforcement scheme for preventing state interference with federally protected labor rights that would foreclose the §1983 remedy”); Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 521 (1990) (“The Medicaid Act contains no . . . provision for private judicial or administrative enforcement” comparable to those in Sea Clammers and Smith); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 427 (1987) (“In both Sea Clammers and Smith . .., the statutes at issue themselves provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy. There is nothing of that kind found in the . . . Housing Act”). The Government as amicus, joined by the City, urges us to hold that the availability of a private judicial remedy is not merely indicative of, but conclusively establishes, a congressional intent to preclude § 1983 relief. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17; Brief for Petitioners 35. We decline to do so. The ordinary inference that the remedy provided in the statute is exclusive can surely be overcome by textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy is to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983. There is, however, no such indication in the TCA, which adds no remedies to those available under § 1983, and limits relief in ways that § 1983 does not. Judicial review of zoning decisions under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) must be sought within 30 days after the governmental entity has taken “final action,” and, once the action is filed, the court must “hear and decide” it “on an expedited basis.” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The remedies available, moreover, perhaps do not include compensatory damages (the lower courts are seemingly in disagreement on this point), and certainly do not include attorney’s fees and costs. A § 1983 action, by contrast, can be brought much later than 30 days after the final action, and need not be heard and decided on an expedited basis. And the successful plaintiff may recover not only damages but reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 9. Liability for attorney’s fees would have a particularly severe impact in the § 332(c)(7) context, making local governments liable for the (often substantial) legal expenses of large commercial interests for the misapplication of a complex and novel statutory scheme. See Nextel Partners Inc. v. Kingston Township, 286 F. 3d 687, 695 (CA3 2002) (Alito, J.) (“TCA plaintiffs are often large corporations or affiliated entities, whereas TCA defendants are often small, rural municipalities”); Primeco Personal Communications, Ltd. Partnership v. Mequon, 352 F. 3d 1147, 1152 (CA7 2003) (Posner, J.) (similar). Respondent’s only response to the attorney’s-fees point is that it is a “policy argumen[t],” properly left to Congress. Brief for Respondent 35-36. That response assumes, however, that Congress’s refusal to attach attorney’s fees to the remedy that it created in the TCA does not itself represent a congressional choice. Sea Clammers and Smith adopt the opposite assumption — that limitations upon the remedy contained in the statute are deliberate and are not to be evaded through § 1983. See Smith, 468 U. S., at 1011-1012, and n. 5; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 14, 20. Respondent disputes that a § 1983 action to enforce § 332(c)(7)(B) would enjoy a longer statute of limitations than an action under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). He argues that the rule adopted in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985), that § 1983 claims are governed by the state-law statute of limitations for personal-injury torts, does not apply to § 1983 actions to enforce statutes that themselves contain a statute of limitations; in such cases, he argues, the limitations period in the federal statute displaces the otherwise applicable state statute of limitations. This contention cannot be reconciled with our decision in Wilson, which expressly rejected the proposition that the limitations period for a § 1983 claim depends on the nature of the underlying right being asserted. See id., at 271-275. We concluded instead that 42 U. S. C. § 1988 is “a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims.” 471 U. S., at 275 (emphasis added); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S. 235, 240-241 (1989) (“42 U. S. C. § 1988 requires courts to borrow and apply to all §1983 claims the one most analogous state statute of limitations” (emphasis added)). We acknowledged that “a few § 1983 claims are based on statutory rights,” Wilson, supra, at 278, but carved out no exception for them. Respondent also argues that, if 28 U. S. C. § 1658 (2000 ed., Supp. II), rather than Wilson, applies to his § 1983 action, see n. 5, supra, § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations is inapplicable. This is so, he claims, because § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s requirement that actions be filed within 30 days falls within § 1658’s prefatory clause, “Except as otherwise provided by law.” We think not. The language of §332(c)(7)(B)(v) that imposes the limitations period (“within 30 days after such action or failure to act”) is inextricably linked to — indeed, is embedded within — the language that creates the right of action (“may ... commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction”). It cannot possibly be regarded as a statute of limitations generally applicable to any action to enforce the rights created by §332(c)(7)(B). Cf. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 168 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Federal statutes of limitations . . . are almost invariably tied to specific causes of action”). Respondent’s argument thus reduces to a suggestion that we “borrow” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s statute of limitations and attach it to § 1983 actions asserting violations of § 332(c)(7)(B). Section 1658’s “[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law” clause does not support this suggestion. C The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion that Congress intended to permit plaintiffs to proceed under § 1983, in part, on the TCA’s so-called “saving clause,” TCA § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 143, note following 47 U. S. C. § 152. 354 F. 3d, at 1099-1100. That provision reads as follows: “(1) No IMPLIED EFFECT — This Act and the aménd-ments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.” The Court of Appeals took this to be an express statement of Congress’s intent not to preclude an action under § 1983, reasoning that to do so would be to “ ‘impair’ ” the operation of that section. Id., at 1100. We do not think this an apt assessment of what “impair[ment]” consists of. Construing § 332(c)(7), as we do, to create rights that may be enforced only through the statute’s express remedy leaves the pre-TCA operation of § 1983 entirely unaffected. Indeed, the crux of our holding is that § 332(c)(7) has no effect on §1983 whatsoever: The rights § 332(c)(7) created may not be enforced under § 1983 and, conversely, the claims available under § 1983 prior to the enactment of the TCA continue to be available after its enactment. The saving clause of the TCA does not require a court to go further and permit enforcement under § 1983 of the TCA’s substantive standards. To apply to the present case what we said with regard to a different statute: “The right [Abrams] claims under [§ 332(c)(7)] did not even arguably exist before the passage of [the TCA]. The only question here, therefore, is whether the rights created by [the TCA] may be asserted within the remedial framework of [§ 1983].” Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366, 376-377 (1979). This interpretation of the saving clause is consistent with Sea Clammers. Saving clauses attached to the statutes at issue in that case provided that the statutes should not be interpreted to “ ‘restrict any right which any person ... may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any . . . standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).’ 33 U. S. C. § 1365(e).” 453 U. S., at 7, n. 10; see also id., at 7-8, n. 11. We refused to read those clauses to “preserve” a § 1983 action, holding that they did not “refer ... to a suit for redress of a violation of th[e] statutes [at issue] . . . .” Id., at 20-21, n. 31. * * * Enforcement of § 332(c)(7) through § 1983 would distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies created by § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). We therefore hold that the TCA — by providing a judicial remedy different from § 1983 in § 332(c)(7) itself — precluded resort to § 1983. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The City’s approval specified a maximum height of 40 feet, but, because of an administrative error, the permit itself authorized respondent to construct a tower 12.5 feet taller. 354 F. 3d 1094, 1095 (CA9 2004). This does not contravene the canon against implied repeal, see Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936), because we have held that canon inapplicable to a statute that creates no rights but merely provides a civil cause of action to remedy “some otherwise defined federal right,” Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366, 376 (1979) (dealing with a provision related to § 1983,42 U. S. C. § 1985(3)). In such a case, “we are not faced ... with a question of implied repeal,” but with whether the rights created by a later statute “may be asserted within the remedial framework” of the earlier one. Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, at 376-377. Compare Primeco Personal Communications, Ltd. Partnership v. Mequon, 352 F. 3d 1147, 1152-1153 (CA7 2003) (damages are presumptively available), with Omnipoint Communications MB Operations, LLC v. Lincoln, 107 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120-121 (Mass. 2000) (“[T]he majority of district courts . . . have held that the appropriate remedy for a violation of the TCA is a mandatory injunction”). Absent express provision to the contrary, litigants must bear their own costs. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 249-250 (1975). The Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the award of attorney’s fees in a number of provisions, but not in §332(c)(7)(B)(v). See, e. g., 47 U. S. C. §§206, 825(e)(10), 551(f)(2)(C), 605(e)(3)(B)(iii). The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal-injury torts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 275, 276 (1985); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S. 235, 240-241 (1989). On this basis, the applicable limitations period for respondent’s § 1983 action would presumably be one year. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F. 3d 608, 610 (CA9 1999) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 340(3) (West 1982)). It may be, however, that this limitations period does not apply to respondent’s § 1983 claim. In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U. S. C. § 1658(a) (2000 ed., Supp. II), which provides a 4-year, catchall limitations period applicable to “civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress enacted after” December 1, 1990. In Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369 (2004), we held that this 4-year limitations period applies to all claims “made possible by a post-1990 [congressional] enactment.” Id., at 382. Since the claim here rests upon violation of the post-1990 TCA, §1658 would seem to apply. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1658(a) provides as follows: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA et al. No. 84-1044. Argued October 8, 1985 Decided February 25, 1986 Powell, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Brennan and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 21. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 21. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Part I of which White and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 26. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 35. Blackmun, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Robert L. Harris argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Malcolm H. Furbush. Mark Fogelman argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellee Public Utilities Commission of California were Janice E. Kerr and Hector Anninos. Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven L. Mayer, and Frederic D. Woocher filed a brief for appellees Toward Utility Rate Normalization et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Gas Association by George H. Lawrence, David J. Muchow, John H. Myler, and Carol A. Smoots; for Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies by Daniel A. Rezneck and Robert A. Levetown; for Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., by Joy Tannian, Peter P. Garam, and Bernard L. Sanoff; for the California Chamber of Commerce by John R. Reese; for the Edison Electric Institute by Robert L. Baum, Peter B. Kelsey, William L. Fang, and James H. Byrd; for the Gas Distributors Information Service by Paul A. Lenzini; for the Legal Foundation of America by David Crump, Jean F. Powers, and Bradley Ford Stuebling; for the Mid-America Legal Foundation by John M. Cannon, Susan W. Wanat, and Ann Plunkett Sheldon; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by Constance E. Brooks, K. Preston Oade, Jr., and Casey Shpall; for National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp. et al. by Stanley W. Widger, Jr., Richard N. George, and Thomas C. Hutton; for Pacific Bell et al. by Philip B. Kurland, John J. Coffey, Robert V. R. Dalenberg, Margaret deB. Brown, Thomas D. Clarke, Jeffrey E. Jackson, and Richard M. Cahill; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley; for Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co. et al. by Robert F. Harrington and Thomas H. Nelson; for Sierra Pacific Power Co. by Boris H. Lakusta, John Mada-riaga, and James D. Salo; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel C. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar; and for the Wisconsin State Telephone Association et al. by Robert A. Christensen, Ray J. Riordan, Jr., Philip L. Wettengel, Floyd S. Keene, and Renee M. Martin. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Herschel T. Elkins, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Botwin, Deputy Attorney General, Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, William B. Gundling, Assistant Attorney General, Elliot F. Gerson, Deputy Attorney General, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, William E. Daily, Deputy Attorney General, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Kendall L. Vick, Assistant Attorney General, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Patricia J. Schaeffer, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, John Boehm, Assistant Attorney General, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, William E. Isaeff, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Jo Anne Sanford, Special Deputy Attorney General, Karen E. Long, Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Terry L. Adkins, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Robert S. Tongren, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene Violet, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Constance L. Messore, Special Assistant Attorney General, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Larry J. Laurent, Assistant Attorney General, Charlie Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, and David L. Grubb, Deputy Attorney General; for the State of Illinois et al. by Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, Jill Wine-Banks, Solicitor General, John W. McCaffrey and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Assistant Attorneys General, Robert L. Graham and Laura A. Kastor; for the State of Oregon by Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, William F. Gary, Deputy Attorney General, and James E. Mountain, Jr., Solicitor General; for the State of Wisconsin by Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General, and David T. Flanagan, Assistant Attorney General; for the National League of Cities et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Jonathan B. Sallet; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha Berzon and Laurence Gold; for the Center for Public Interest Law of the University of San Diego School of Law by Robert C. Fellmeth; for the Legal Aid Society of New York City by Helaine Barnett, John E. Kirklin, and Kalman Finkel; for the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates et al. by William Paul Rodgers, Jr., Steven W. Hamm, and Raymon E. Lark, Jr.; and for the New York Citizens’ Utility Board, Inc., et al. by John Cary Sims and Alan B. Morrison; for the Public Service Commission of New York et al. by David E. Blabey, Timothy P. Sheehan, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, and Peter Bienstock; for the Telecommunications Research and Action Center et al. by Andrew J. Schwartzman; and for the Wisconsin Citizens’ Utility Board by Lee Cullen. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Brennan, and Justice O’Connor join. The question in this case is whether the California Public Utilities Commission may require a privately owned utility company to include in its billing envelopes speech of a third party with which the utility disagrees. I — I For the past 62 years, appellant Pacific Gas and Electric Company has distributed a newsletter in its monthly billing envelope. Appellant’s newsletter, called Progress, reaches over three million customers. It has included political editorials, feature stories on matters of public interest, tips on energy conservation, and straightforward information about utility services and bills. App. to Juris. Statement A-66, A-183 to A-190. In 1980, appellee Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), an intervenor in a ratemaking proceeding before California’s Public Utilities Commission, another appellee, urged the Commission to forbid appellant to use the billing envelopes to distribute political editorials, on the ground that appellant’s customers should not bear the expense of appellant’s own political speech. Id., at A-2. The Commission decided that the envelope space that appellant had used to disseminate Progress is the property of the ratepayers. Id., at A-2 to A-3. This “extra space” was defined as “the space remaining in the billing envelope, after inclusion of the monthly bill and any required legal notices, for inclusion of other materials up to such total envelope weight as would not result in any additional postage cost.” Ibid. In an effort to apportion this “extra space” between appellant and its customers, the Commission permitted TURN to use the “extra space” four times a year for the next two years. During these months, appellant may use any space not used by TURN, and it may include additional materials if it pays any extra postage. The Commission found that TURN has represented the interests of “a significant group” of appellant’s residential customers, id., at A-15, and has aided the Commission in performing its regulatory function, id., at A-49 to A-50. Consequently, the Commission determined that ratepayers would benefit from permitting TURN to use the extra space in the billing envelopes to raise funds and to communicate with ratepayers: “Our goal ... is to change the present system to one which uses the extra space more efficiently for the ratepayers’ benefit. It is reasonable to assume that the ratepayers will benefit more from exposure to a variety of views than they will from only that of PG&E.” Id., at A-17. The Commission concluded that appellant could have no interest in excluding TURN’S message from the billing envelope since appellant does not own the space that message would fill. Id., at A-23. The Commission placed no limitations on what TURN or appellant could say in the envelope, except that TURN is required to state that its messages are not those of appellant. Id., at A-17 to A-18. The Commission reserved the right to grant other groups access to the envelopes in the future. Ibid. Appellant appealed the Commission’s order to the California Supreme Court, arguing that it has a First Amendment right not to help spread a message with which it disagrees, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977), and that the Commission’s order infringes that right. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. We noted probable jurisdiction, 470 U. S. 1083 (1985), and now reverse. II The constitutional guarantee of free speech “serves significant societal interests” wholly apart from the speaker’s interest in self-expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 776 (1978). By protecting those who wish, to enter the marketplace of ideas from government attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 863-864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the “discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas” that the First Amendment seeks to foster. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 783 (citations omitted). Thus, in Bellotti, we invalidated a state prohibition aimed at speech by corporations that sought to influence the outcome of a state referendum. 435 U. S., at 795. Similarly, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 544 (1980), we invalidated a state order prohibiting a privately owned utility company from discussing controversial political issues in its billing envelopes. In both cases, the critical considerations were that the State sought to abridge speech that the First Amendment is designed to protect, and that such prohibitions limited the range of information and ideas to which the public is exposed. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 776-778, 781-783; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., supra, at 533-535. There is no doubt that under these principles appellant’s newsletter Progress receives the full protection of the First Amendment. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 452 (1938). In appearance no different from a small newspaper, Progress’ contents range from energy-saving tips to stories about wildlife conservation, and from billing information to recipes. App. to Juris. Statement A-183 to A-190 extends well beyond speech that proposes a business transaction, see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U. S. 626, 637 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 561-563 (1980), and includes the kind of discussion of “matters of public concern” that the First Amendment both fully protects and implicitly encourages. Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, at 101. The Commission recognized as much, but concluded that requiring appellant to disseminate TURN’S views did not infringe upon First Amendment rights. It reasoned that appellant remains free to mail its own newsletter except for the four months in which TURN is given access. The Commission’s conclusion necessarily rests on one of two premises: (i) compelling appellant to grant TURN access to a hitherto private forum does not infringe appellant’s right to speak; or (n) appellant has no property interest in the relevant forum and therefore has no constitutionally protected right in restricting access to it. We now examine those propositions. HH I — I I — I Compelled access like that ordered in this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do not set. These impermissible effects are not remedied by the Commission’s definition of the relevant property rights. A This Court has previously considered the question whether compelling a private corporation to provide a forum for views other than its own may infringe the corporation’s freedom of speech. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 85-88 (1980); id., at 98-100 (Powell, J., joined by White, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Tornillo involved a challenge to Florida’s right-of-reply statute. The Florida law provided that, if a newspaper assailed a candidate’s character or record, the candidate could demand that the newspaper print a reply of equal prominence and space. 418 U. S., at 244-245, and n. 2. We found that the right-of-reply statute directly interfered with the newspaper’s right to speak in two ways. Id., at 256. First, the newspaper’s expression of a particular viewpoint triggered an obligation to permit other speakers, with whom the newspaper disagreed, to use the newspaper’s facilities to spread their own message. The statute purported to advance free discussion, but its effect was to deter newspapers from speaking out in the first instance: by forcing the newspaper to disseminate opponents’ views, the statute penalized the newspaper’s own expression. We therefore concluded that a “[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.’” Id., at 257 (emphasis added) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279 (1963). Second, we noted that the newspaper’s “treatment of public issues and public officials — whether fair or unfair — constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” 418 U. S., at 258. Florida’s statute interfered with this “editorial control and judgment” by forcing the newspaper to tailor its speech to an opponent’s agenda, and to respond to candidates’ arguments where the newspaper might prefer to be silent. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S., at 714; West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 633-634 (1943). Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid, this effect was impermissible. As we stated last Term: “‘The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas. . . . There is necessarily .. . a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.’” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 524, 559 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N. Y. 2d 341, 348, 244 N. E. 2d 250, 255 (1968)) (emphasis in original). See PruneYard, supra, at 99-100 (opinion of Powell, J.). The concerns that caused us to invalidate the compelled access rule in Tomillo apply to appellant as well as to the institutional press. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 782-784. Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S., at 452. Just as the State is not free to “tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it cannot,” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S. 376, 400 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also PruneYard, supra, at 88, the State is not free either to restrict appellant’s speech to certain topics or views or to force appellant to respond to views that others may hold. Consolidated Edi son Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S., at 533-535. See PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 100 (opinion of Powell, J.); Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 241 (1977). Under Tomillo a forced access rule that would accomplish these purposes indirectly is similarly forbidden. The Court’s decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, supra, is not to the contrary. In PruneYard, a shopping center owner sought to deny access to a group of students who wished to hand out pamphlets in the shopping center’s common area. The California Supreme Court held that the students’ access was protected by the State Constitution; the shopping center owner argued that this ruling violated his First Amendment rights. This Court held that the shopping center did not have a constitutionally protected right to exclude the pamphleteers from the area open to the public at large. Id., at 88. Notably absent from PruneYard was any concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner’s exercise of his own right to speak: the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets; nor was the access right content based. PruneYard thus does not undercut the proposition that forced associations that burden protected speech are impermissible. B The Commission’s order is inconsistent with these principles. The order does not simply award access to the public at large; rather, it discriminates on the basis of the viewpoints of the selected speakers. Two of the acknowledged purposes of the access order are to offer the public a greater variety of views in appellant’s billing envelope, and to assist groups (such as TURN) that challenge appellant in the Commission’s ratemaking proceedings in raising funds. App. to Juris. Statement A-16 to A-17. Access to the envelopes thus is not content neutral. The variety of views that the Commission seeks to foster cannot be obtained by including speakers whose speech agrees with appellant’s. Similarly, the perceived need to raise funds to finance participation in ratemaking proceedings exists only where the relevant groups represent interests that diverge from appellant’s interests. Access is limited to persons or groups— such as TURN — who disagree with appellant’s views as expressed in Progress and who oppose appellant in Commission proceedings. Such one-sidedness impermissibly burdens appellant’s own expression. Tornillo illustrates the point. Access to the newspaper in that case was content based in two senses: (i) it was triggered by a particular category of newspaper speech, and (ii) it was awarded only to those who disagreed with the newspaper’s views. The Commission’s order is not, in Tor-nillo’s words, a “content-based penalty” in the first sense, because TURN’S access to appellant’s envelopes is not conditioned on any particular expression by appellant. Cf. Tornillo, 418 U. S., at 256. But because access is awarded only to those who disagree with appellant’s views and who are hostile to appellant’s interests, appellant must contend with the fact that whenever it speaks out on a given issue, it may be forced — at TURN’S discretion — to help disseminate hostile views. Appellant “might well conclude” that, under these circumstances, “the safe course is to avoid controversy,” thereby reducing the free flow of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to promote. Id., at 257. Appellant does not, of course, have the right to be free from vigorous debate. But it does have the right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own rights in order to “enhance the relative voice” of its opponents. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 49, and n. 55 (1976). The Commission’s order requires appellant to assist in disseminating TURN’S views; it does not equally constrain both sides of the debate about utility regulation. This kind of favoritism goes well beyond the fundamentally content-neutral subsidies that we sustained in Buckley and in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540 (1988). See Buckley, supra at 97-105 (sustaining funding of general election campaign expenses of major party candidates); Regan, supra, at 546-550 (sustaining tax deduction for contributors to veterans’ organizations). Unlike these permissible government subsidies of speech, the Commission’s order identifies a favored speaker “based on the identity of the interests that [the speaker] may represent,” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 784, and forces the speaker’s opponent — not the taxpaying public — to assist in disseminating the speaker’s message. Such a requirement necessarily burdens the expression of the disfavored speaker. The Commission’s access order also impermissibly requires appellant to associate with speech with which appellant may disagree. The order on its face leaves TURN free to use the billing envelopes to discuss any issues it chooses. Should TURN choose, for example, to urge appellant’s customers to vote for a particular slate of legislative candidates, or to argue in favor of legislation that could seriously affect the utility business, appellant may be forced either to appear to agree with TURN’S views or to respond. PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 98-100 (opinion of Powell, J.). This pressure to respond “is particularly apparent when the owner has taken a position opposed to the view being expressed on his property.” Id., at 100. Especially since TURN has been given access in part to create a multiplicity of views in the envelopes, there can be little doubt that appellant will feel compelled to respond to arguments and allegations made by TURN in its messages to appellant’s customers. That kind of forced response is antithetical to the free discussion that the First Amendment seeks to foster. Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 559. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S., at 714. For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say. Tornillo, supra, at 258. And we have held that speech does not lose its protection because of the corporate identity of the speaker. Bellotti, supra, at 777; Consolidated Edison, 447 U. S., at 533. Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next. It is therefore incorrect to say, as do appellees, that our decisions do not limit the government’s authority to compel speech by corporations. The danger that appellant will be required to alter its own message as a consequence of the government’s coercive action is a proper object of First Amendment solicitude, because the message itself is protected under our decisions in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison. Where, as in this case, the danger is one that arises from a content-based grant of access to private property, it is a danger that the government may not impose absent a compelling interest. C The Commission has emphasized that appellant’s customers own the “extra space” in the billing envelopes. App. to Juris. Statement A-64 to A-66. According to appellees, it follows that appellant cannot have a constitutionally protected interest in restricting.access to the envelopes. This argument misperceives both the relevant property rights and the nature of the State’s First Amendment violation. The Commission expressly declined to hold that under California law appellant’s customers own the entire billing envelopes and everything contained therein. Id., at A-2 to A-3. It decided only that the ratepayers own the “extra space” in the envelope, defined as that space left over after including the bill and required notices, up to a weight of one ounce. Ibid. The envelopes themselves, the bills, and Progress all remain appellant’s property. The Commission’s access order thus clearly requires appellant to use its property as a vehicle for spreading a message with which it disagrees. In Wooley v. Maynard, we held that New Hampshire could not require two citizens to display a slogan on their license plates and thereby “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message.” 430 U. S., at 715. The “private property” that was used to spread the unwelcome message was the automobile, not the license plates. Similarly, the Commission’s order requires appellant to use its property — the billing envelopes — to distribute the message of another. This is so whoever is deemed to own the “extra space.” A different conclusion would necessarily imply that our decision in Tornillo rested on the Miami Herald’s ownership of the space that would have been used to print candidate replies. Nothing in Tornillo suggests that the result would have been different had the Florida Supreme Court decided that the newspaper space needed to print candidates’ replies was the property of the newspaper’s readers, or had the court ordered the Miami Herald to distribute inserts owned and prepared by the candidates together with its newspapers. The constitutional difficulty with the right-of-reply statute was that it required the newspaper to disseminate a message with which the newspaper disagreed. This difficulty did not depend on whether the particular paper on which the replies were printed belonged to the newspaper or to the candidate. Appellees’ argument suffers from the same constitutional defect. The Commission’s order forces appellant to disseminate TURN’S speech in envelopes that appellant owns and that bear appellant’s return address. Such forced association with potentially hostile views burdens the expression of views different from TURN’S and risks forcing appellant to speak where it would prefer to remain silent. Those effects do not depend on who “owns” the “extra space.” H < Notwithstanding that it burdens protected speech, the Commission’s order could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S., at 535; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786. Appellees argue that the access order does in fact further compelling state interests. In the alternative, appellees argue that the order is a permissible time, place, or manner restriction. We consider these arguments in turn. A Appellees identify two assertedly compelling state interests that the access order is said to advance. First, appel-lees argue that the order furthers the State’s interest in effective ratemaking proceedings. TURN has been a regular participant in those proceedings, and the Commission found that TURN has aided the Commission in performing its regulatory task. Appellees argue that the access order permits TURN to continue to help the Commission by assisting TURN in raising funds from the ratepayers whose interest TURN seeks to serve. The State’s interest in fair and effective utility regulation may be compelling. The difficulty with appellees’ argument is that the State can serve that interest through means that would not violate appellant’s First Amendment rights, such as awarding costs and fees. The State’s interest may justify imposing on appellant the reasonable expenses of responsible groups that represent the public interest at ratemaking proceedings. But “we find ‘no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State’s effort’” to compel appellant to distribute TURN’S speech in appellant’s envelopes. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 795 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485 (1960)). Second, appellees argue that the order furthers the State’s interest in promoting speech by making a variety of views available to appellant’s customers. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 92-93, and n. 127. We have noted above that this interest is not furthered by an order that is not content neutral. Moreover, the means chosen to advance variety tend to inhibit expression of appellant’s views in order to promote TURN’S. Our cases establish that the State cannot advance some points of view by burdening the expression of others. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 785-786; Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 48-49. It follows that the Commission’s order is not a narrowly tailored means of furthering this interest. B Appellees argue, finally, that the Commission’s order is a permissible time, place, or manner regulation, since it “serve[s] a significant governmental interest and leave[s] ample alternative channels for communication.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., supra, at 535; see also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976). For a time, place, or manner regulation to be valid, it must be neutral as to the content of the speech to be regulated. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210-212 (1975). As we have shown, the State’s asserted interest in exposing appellant’s customers to a variety of viewpoints is not — and does not purport to be— content neutral. V We conclude that the Commission’s order impermissibly burdens appellant’s First Amendment rights because it forces appellant to associate with the views of other speakers, and because it selects the other speakers on the basis of their viewpoints. The order is not a narrowly tailored means of farthering a compelling state interest, and it is not a valid time, place, or manner regulation. For these reasons, the decision of the California Public Utilities Commission must be vacated. The case is remanded to the California Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. For example, the December 1984 issue of Progress included a story on appellant’s “automatic payment” and “balanced payment” plans, an article instructing ratepayers on how to weatherstrip their homes, recipes for holiday dishes, and a feature on appellant’s efforts to help bald eagles in the Pit River area of California. App. to Juris. Statement A-183 to A-190. When the Commission first addressed the question whether appellant could continue to have exclusive access to its billing envelopes, it noted that Progress has previously discussed the merits of recently passed and pending legislation in Congress. Id,., at A-66. In addition to TURN and the Commission, there are five other ap-pellees: Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of California, Common Cause of California, California Public Interest Research Group, and California Association of Utility Shareholders. Only TURN claims a direct interest in the outcome of this ease; the other appellees appear to be inter-venors concerned only with this case’s precedential effects. The Commission summarized its reasoning as follows: “[E]nvelope and postage costs and any other costs of mailing bills are a necessary part of providing utility service to the customer .... However, due to the nature of postal rates . . . extra space exists in these billing envelopes. . . . Mindful that the extra space is an artifact generated with ratepayer funds, and is not an intended or necessary item of rate base, and that the only alternative treatment would unjustly enrich PG&E and simultaneously deprive the ratepayers of the value of that space, we concluded that the extra space in the billing envelope ‘is properly considered as ratepayer property.’ ” Id., at A-3. Commissioners Bagley and Calvo dissented from the Commission’s decision to grant TURN access to the billing envelopes. Commissioner Bagley argued that the Commission’s order had potentially sweeping consequences for various kinds of property interests: “The face of every utility-owned dam, the side of every building, the surface of every gas holder rising above our cities, and the bumpers of every utility vehicle — to name just a few relevant examples — have ‘excess space’ and ‘economic advertising value.’ Some utility corporations place bumper-strip messages on their vehicles. Buses and trucks regularly carry advertising messages. In the words of the majority at page 23 of the decision, ‘It is reasonable to assume that the ratepayers will benefit from exposure to a variety of views. . . .’ Is it the postulate of this Commission, flowing from the decision’s stated premise . . . that ratepayers would benefit from exposure to some particular socially desirable message from some ratepayer group making use of any or all such areas of excess valuable space?” Id., at A-40. Commissioner Bagley also argued that the Commission’s decision would require the Commission to make forbidden content-based distinctions in order to allocate the extra space among competing speakers. Id., at A-41. Commissioner Calvo contended, first, that the order infringed appellant’s First Amendment rights, and, second, that it was unnecessary because “TURN has other opportunities to reach its natural audience.” Id., at A-56. Commissioner Calvo noted that the Commission often awarded TURN and similar groups fees for their participation in ratemaking proceedings, funds that presumably could finance separate mailings. Ibid. The Commission has already denied access to at least one group based on the content of its speech. The Commission denied the application of a taxpayer group — the Committee of More than One Million Taxpayers to Save Proposition 13— on the ground that that group neither wished to participate in Commission proceedings nor alleged that its use of the billing envelope space would improve consumer participation in those proceedings. Id., at A-157 to A-164. The record does not reveal whether any other groups have sought access to the billing envelopes. This Court has sustained a limited government-enforced right of access to broadcast media. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 (1973). Appellant’s billing envelopes do not, however, present the same constraints that justify the result in Red Lion: “[A] broadcaster communicates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. No person can broadcast without a license, whereas all persons are free to send correspondence to private homes through the mails.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 543 (1980). Unlike the right-of-reply statute at issue in Tomillo, the Commission’s order does not require appellant to place TURN’S message in appellant’s newsletter. Instead, the Commission ordered appellant to place TURN’S message in appellant’s envelope four months out of the year. Like the Miami Herald, however, appellant is still required to carry speech with which it disagreed, and might well feel compelled to reply or limit its own speech in response to TURN’S. The Court’s opinion in Tomillo emphasizes that the right-of-reply statute impermissibly deterred protected speech. 418 U. S., at 256-257. In the last paragraph of the opinion, the Court concluded that an independent ground for invalidating the statute was its effect on editors’ allocation of scarce newspaper space. Id., at 258. See also id., at 257, n. 22. That discussion in no way suggested that the State was free otherwise to burden the newspaper’s speech as long as the actual paper on which the newspaper was printed was not invaded. In addition, the relevant forum in PruneYard was the open area of the shopping center into which the general public was invited. This area was, almost by definition, peculiarly public in nature. PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 83, 88. There is no correspondingly public aspect to appellant’s billing envelopes. See post, at 22-23 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment). This is folly borne out by the order that triggered this appeal. TURN, the only entity to receive access to appellant’s billing envelope, purports to represent the interest of a group of appellant’s customers: residential ratepayers. App. to Juris. Statement A-14. The Commission’s opinion plausibly assumes that the interest of residential ratepayers will often conflict with appellant’s interest. Id., at A-50. Nor does the fact that TURN will use the envelopes to make fundraising appeals lessen the burden on appellant’s speech. Cf. post, at 36-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Commission has “disavowed any intention of looking at the way that TURN solicits funds,” leaving TURN free to “speak and advocate its own position as best it can” in its billing envelope inserts. Tr. Oral Arg. 31-32, 39. Thus, while TURN’S advocacy may be aimed at convincing ratepayers to make donations, that goal does not alter the open-ended nature of the access awarded in this case, because it does not restrict the scope or content of TURN’S message. Cf. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647 (1981). Justice Stevens analogizes this aspect of the Commission’s order to Securities and Exchange Commission regulations that require management to transmit proposals of minority shareholders in shareholder mailings. Post, at 39-40. The analogy is inappropriate. The regulations Justice Stevens cites differ from the Commission’s order in two important ways. First, they allocate shareholder property between management and certain groups of shareholders. Management has no interest in corporate property except such interest as derives from the shareholders; therefore, regulations that limit management’s ability to exclude some shareholders’ views from corporate communications do not infringe corporate First Amendment rights. Second, the regulations govern speech by a corporation to itself. Bellotti and Consolidated Edison establish that the Constitution protects corporations’ right to speak to the public based on the informational value of corporate speech. Supra, at 8. Rules that define how corporations govern themselves do not limit the range of information that the corporation may contribute to the public debate. The Commission’s order, by contrast, burdens appellant’s right freely to speak to the public at large. The presence of a disclaimer on TURN’S messages, see supra, at 7, does not suffice to eliminate the impermissible pressure on appellant to respond to TURN’S speech. The disclaimer serves only to avoid giving readers the mistaken impression that TURN’S words are really those of appellant. PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 99 (opinion of Powell, J.). It does nothing to reduce the risk that appellant will be forced to respond when there is strong disagreement with the substance of TURN’S message. Ibid. The Commission’s order is thus readily distinguishable from orders requiring appellant to carry various legal notices, such as notices of upcoming Commission proceedings or of changes in the way rates are calculated. The State, of course, has substantial leeway in determining appropriate information disclosure requirements for business corporations. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U. S. 626, 651 (1985). Nothing in Zauderer suggests, however, that the State is equally free to require corporations to carry the messages of third parties, where the messages themselves are biased against or are expressly contrary to the corporation’s views. As we stated in Wooley, “[a] system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.” 430 U. S., at 714. Appellees also argue that appellant’s status as a regulated utility company lessens its right to be free from state regulation that burdens its speech. We have previously rejected this argument. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S., at 534, n. 1 (“Consolidated Edison’s position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters”). See also Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566-568 (1980). As the dissenting Commissioners correctly noted, see n. 4, supra, ap-pellees’ argument logically implies that the State may compel appellant or any other regulated business to use many different kinds of property to advance views with which the business disagrees. “Extra space” exists not only in billing envelopes but also on billboards, bulletin boards, and sides of buildings and motor vehicles. Under the Commission’s reasoning, a State could force business proprietors of such items to use the space for the dissemination of speech the proprietor opposes. At least where access to such fora is granted on the basis of the speakers’ viewpoints, the public’s ownership of the “extra space” does not nullify the First Amendment rights of the owner of the property from which that space derives. Indeed, the Commission already does this. See n. 4, supra (discussing Commissioner Calvo’s dissent).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE CO. v. UNITED STATES No. 76-1058. Argued October 12, 1977 Decided February 28, 1978 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., joined, post, p. 33. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 38. Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 39. Sharon L. King argued the cause and filed briefs' for petitioner. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree and Assistant Attorney General Ferguson. David W. Richmond filed a brief for the American Gas Assn, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the issue whether an employer, who in 1963 reimbursed lunch expenses of employees who were on company travel but not away overnight, must withhold federal income tax on those reimbursements. Stated another way, the issue is whether the lunch reimbursements qualify as “wages” under § 3401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 3401 (a). I The facts are not in any real dispute. Petitioner Central Illinois Public Service Company (Company) is a regulated public utility engaged, in downstate Illinois, in the generation, transmission, distribution, and'sale of electric energy, and in the distribution and sale of natural gas. Its principal office is in Springfield. It serves a geographic area of some size. In order adequately to serve the area, the Company, in accord with long-established policy, reimburses its employees for reasonable, legitimate expenses of transportation, meals, and lodging they incur in travel on the Company’s business. Some of these trips are overnight; on others, the employees return before the end of the business day. In 1963, the tax year in issue, the Company had approximately 1,900 employees. It reimbursed its union employees and the operating employees of its western division (its only nonunionized division) for noon lunches consumed, while on authorized travel, in an amount not to exceed $1.40 per lunch. The amount was specified in the Company’s collective-bargaining agreement with the union. Other salaried employees were reimbursed for actual reasonable luncheon expenses up to a specified maximum amount. An employee on an authorized trip prepared his expense account on a company form. This was turned in to his supervisor for approval. The $1.40 rate sometimes was in excess of the actual lunch cost, but at other times it was insufficient to cover that cost. An employee who took lunch from home with him on a company trip was entitled to reimbursement. If, because of the locality of his work assignment on a particular day, the employee went home for lunch, he was not entitled to reimbursement. Many employees were engaged in open-air labor. Even in 1963 the $1.40 rate was “modest.” The employee on travel status rendered no service to the Company during his lunch. He was off duty and on his own time. He was subject to call, however, as were all employees at any time as emergencies required. The lunch payment was unrelated to the employee’s specific job title, the nature of his work, or his rate of pay. “[T]his lunch payment arrangement was beneficial and convenient for the company and served its business interest. It saved the company employee time otherwise spent in travelling back and forth as well as the usual travel expenses.” During 1963 the Company paid its employees a total of $139,936.12 in reimbursement for noon lunches consumed while away from normal duty stations on nonovernight trips. It did not withhold federal income tax for its employees with respect to the components of this sum. The Company in 1963, however, did withhold and pay federal income withholding taxes totaling $1,966,489.87 with respect to other employee payments. Upon audit in 1971, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that the lunch reimbursements in 1963 qualified as wages subject to withholding. A deficiency of $25,188.50 in withholding taxes was assessed. The Company promptly paid this deficiency together with $11,427.22 interest thereon, a total of $36,615.72. It then immediately filed its claim for refund of the total amount so paid and, with no action forthcoming on the claim for six months, see 26 U. S. C. § 6532 (a) (1), instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois to recover the amount so paid. The District Court ruled in the Company’s favor, holding that the reimbursements in question were not wages subject to withholding.. 405 F. Supp. 748 (1975). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 540 F. 2d 300 (1976). Because that decision appeared to be in conflict with the views and decision of the Fourth Circuit in Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F. 2d 387 (1973), we granted certiorari. 431 U. S. 903 (1977). II In Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U. S. 77 (1977), decided earlier this Term, the Court held that New Jersey’s cash reimbursements to its highway patrol officers for meals consumed while on patrol duty constituted income to the officers, within the broad definition of gross income under § 61 (a) of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 61 (a), and, further, that those cash payments were not excludable under § 119 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 119, relating to meals or lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer. Kowalski, however, concerned the federal income tax and the issue of what was income. Its pertinency for the present withholding tax litigation is necessarily confined to the income tax aspects of the lunch reimbursements to the Company’s employees. The income tax issue is not before us in this case. We are confronted here, instead, with the question whether the lunch reimbursements, even though now they may be held to constitute taxable income to the employees who are reimbursed, are or are not “wages” subject to withholding, within the meaning and requirements of §§ 3401-3403 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§3401-3403 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). These withholding statutes are in Subtitle C of the Code. The income tax provisions constitute Subtitle A. The income tax is imposed on taxable income. 26 IT. S. C. § 1. Generally, this is gross income minus allowable deductions. 26 IT. S. C. § 63 (a). Section 61 (a) defines as gross income “all income from whatever source derived” including, under § 61 (a) (1), “[c]ompensation for services.” The withholding tax, in some contrast, is confined to wages, § 3402 (a), and § 3401 (a) defines as “wages,” “all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash.” The two concepts — income and wages — obviously are not necessarily the same. Wages usually are income, but many items qualify as income and yet clearly are not wages. Interest, rent, and dividends are ready examples. And the very definition of “wages” in § 3401 (a) itself goes on specifically to exclude certain types of remuneration for an employee’s services to his employer (e. g., combat pay, agricultural labor, certain domestic service). Our task, therefore, is to determine the character of the lunch reimbursements in the light of the definition of “wages” in § 3401 (a), and the Company’s consequent obligation to withhold under § 3402 (a). Before we proceed to the resolution of that issue, however, one further observation about the income tax aspect of lunch reimbursements is in order. Although United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299 (1967), restricting to overnight trips the travel expense deduction for meal costs under § 162 (a)(2), dispelled some of the confusion, it is fair to say that until this Court’s very recent decision in Kowalski, the Courts of Appeals have been in disarray on the issue whether, under §§ 61 and 119 of the 1954 Code or under the respective predecessor sections of the 1939 Code, such reimbursements were income at all to the recipients. Thus, even the income tax character of lunch reimbursements was not yet partially clarified before the end of 1967, four full years after the tax year for which withholding taxes on lunch reimbursements are now being claimed from the Company in the present case, and were not entirely clarified until the Kowalski decision a few weeks ago. Ill The Sixteenth, or income tax, Amendment to the Constitution of the United States became effective in February 1913. The ensuing Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, § IIE, 38 Stat. 170, contained, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, a fairly expansive withholding provision. This, however, was repealed and in due course came to be replaced with the predecessor of the current “information at the source” provisions constituting § 6041 et seq. of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6041 et seq. The present withholding system has a later origin in the Victory Tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1942, § 172, 56 Stat. 884. This, with its then new § 465 (b) of the 1939 Code, embraced the basic definition of “wages” now contained in § 3401 (a) of the 1954 Code. The Victory Tax was replaced by the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 126, and was repealed by the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, § 6 (a), 58 Stat. 234. The structure of the 1943 Act survives to the present day. Li this legislation of 35 years ago Congress chose not to return to the inclusive language of the Tariff Act of 1913, but, specifically, “in the interest of simplicity and ease of administration,” confined the obligation to withhold to “salaries, wages, and other forms of compensation for personal services.” S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 165 (1942) The committee reports of the time stated consistently that “wages” meant remuneration “if paid for services performed by an employee for his employer” (emphasis supplied). H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 166 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 401, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1943); S. Rep. No. 221, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1943); H. R. Rep. No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1943). The current regulations also contain the “if” clause, Treas. Reg. on Employment Taxes, §31.3401 (a)-1(a)(2), 26 CFR § 31.3401 (a)-1(a) (2) (1977), and then, in § 31.3401 (a)-1 (b)(2) recite: “Amounts paid specifically — either as advances or reimbursements — for traveling or other bona fide ordinary and necessary expenses incurred or reasonably expected to be incurred in the business of the employer are not wages and are not subject to withholding.” But § 31.3401 (a)-1(b) (9) provides: “The value of any meals or lodging furnished to' an employee by his employer is not subject to withholding if the value of the meals or lodging is excludable from the gross income of the employee. See § 1.119-1 of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations).” The Internal Revenue Service by its Regulations thus now would tie the withholding obligation of the employer to the income tax result for the employee. IV The Government, straightforwardly and simplistically, argues that the definition of “wages” in § 3401 (a) corresponds to the first category of gross income set forth in § 61 (a)(1), and that the two statutes “although not entirely congruent [in their] relationship,” Brief for United States 11, have “equivalent scope,” id., at 15. It is claimed that the meal allowance was compensatory, for it was paid for the performance of assigned service at the place the employer determined. Thus, it is said, there was a direct causal connection between the receipt of the allowance and the performance of services. The allowance, then, was part of a total package of remuneration designed to attract and hold the employee to the Company. The Government further argues that this is in accord with the Court’s pronouncements as to what is compensation for purposes of the tax statutes. It states that § 3401 (a) broadly defines “wages,” and it cites Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929), where the Court held employees taxable for the amount of their income taxes paid by their employers; Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243 (1956), where the transfer of assets to an employee at less than fair market value in order to secure better service was held to result in taxable income to the employee; Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358 (1946), where the definition of wages under the Social Security Act was at issue; and Otte v. United States, 419 U. S. 43, 49-50 (1974), which concerned the payment of wage claims by a trustee in bankruptcy. For purposes of the tax law, the Government argues, there is no difference between benefits of this kind and traditional wage or salary payments. Both are “[Compensation for services” under §61 (a)(1) and “remuneration ... for services” under § 3401 (a). It would explain away the seemingly pertinent Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a)-l(b) (2) on the ground that it relates only to business expenses that are deductible under § 162 (a) of the Code, and that Correll excluded from the benefit of § 162 (a) the cost of meals consumed during nonovernight travel. And it urges that what is important is that the payments at issue were a result of the employment relationship and were a part of the total of the personal benefits that arose out of that relationship. y We do not agree with this rather facile conclusion advanced by the Government. The case, of course, would flow in the Government’s favor if the mere fact that the reimbursements were made in the context of the employer-employee relationship were to govern the withholding tax result. That they were so paid is obvious. But it is one thing to say that the reimbursements constitute income to the employees for income tax purposes, and it is quite another thing to say that it follows therefrom that the reimbursements in 1963 were subject to withholding. There is a gap between the premise and the conclusion and it is a wide one. Considerations that support subjectability to the income tax are not necessarily the same as the considerations that support withholding. To require the employee to carry the risk of his own tax liability is not the same as to require the employer to carry the risk of the tax liability of its employee. Required withholding, therefore, is rightly much narrower than subjectability to income taxation. As we have noted above, withholding, under § 3402, is required only upon wages, and § 3401 (a) defines wages as “all remuneration ... for services performed by an employee for his employer.” When the withholding system was effectuated in 1942, the obligation was confined to wages, and the like, “in the interest of simplicity and ease of administration.” S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 165 (1942). And what is now Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a)-l(b)(2), applicable to employers and excluding from the concepts of wages and of withholding amounts “paid specifically ... for traveling or other bona fide ordinary and necessary expenses incurred . . . in the business of the employer,” was issued originally — long prior to the Correll decision in 1967 — as § 404.14 of T. D. 5277, 1943 Cum. Bull. 927, 941. There is nothing in Correll that relates to the withholding provisions, and there is nothing in Treas. Reg. § 31.3401 (a)-1(b) (2) that incorporates any overnight concept. This is so despite the Government’s assertion that “consistently” since 1940, that is, since I. T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 64 (relating to railroad employees and their deducting the cost of room rentals and meals for necessary rest while away from home), it has adhered, to the overnight rule in determining income tax liability. Brief for United States 32. Such consistent adherence to the overnight rule in determining income tax liability — together with the consistent absence of any reference to the overnight rule in the withholding regulations — strongly indicates that it was intended that the overnight rule not apply in determining withholding tax obligations. Decided, cases have made the distinction, between wages and income and have refused to equate the two in withholding or similar controversies. Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 318, 332, 373 F. 2d 924, 932 (1967); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 944, 950, 442 F. 2d 1353, 1356 (1971); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 920, 442 F. 2d 1362 (1971); Stubbs, Overbeck Associates v. United States, 445 F. 2d 1142 (CA5 1971); Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F. 2d, at 390; Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (Md. 1967). The Government would distinguish these cases on the ground that some of them involved overnight travel, the expenses of which would be deductible, and that others were concerned with particularized allowances. We perceive the distinctions but are not persuaded that they blunt the basic difference between the wage and the income concepts the respective courts have emphasized. An expansive and sweeping definition of wages, such as was indulged in by the Court of Appeals, 540 F. 2d, at 302, and is urged by the Government here, is not consistent with the existing withholding system. As noted above, Congress chose simplicity, ease of administration, and confinement to wages as the standard in 1942. This was a standard that was intentionally narrow and precise. It has not been changed by Congress since 1942, although, of course, as is often the case, administrative and other pressures seek to soften and stretch the definition. Because the employer is in a secondary position as to liability for any tax of the employee, it is a matter of obvious concern that, absent further specific congressional action, the employer’s obligation to withhold be precise and not speculative. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl., at 933, 442 F. 2d, at 1369-1370. See also H. R. Rep. No. 94-1515, p. 489 (1976). In 1963 not one regulation or ruling required withholding on any travel expense reimbursement. The intimation was quite the other way. See Treas. Reg. § 31-3401 (a)-1(b) (2). No employer, in viewing the regulations in 1963, could reasonably suspect that a withholding obligation existed. The 1940 ruling upon which the Government would erect its case, I. T. 3395, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 64, predated the withholding regulations of 1943. Apart from the fact that this was a deduction ruling, it is also significant that the Government did not reflect it in its withholding regulations adopted shortly thereafter. With this omission on the part of the Government, it is hardly reasonable to require an employer to fill the gap on its own account. Further, in 1963 and for some time thereafter all judicial decisions were the other way, even on the deductibility issue. Only with Correll, decided by this Court in 1967, was there a ruling of nondeductibility. And until the Court of Appeals’ decision in the present case, no court had ever held lunch reimbursements to be wages for withholding purposes. The first published pronouncement by the Internal Revenue Service with respect to withholding came only in 1969 with Rev. Rul. 69-592, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 193, shortly after Correll came down. That Ruling’s suggestion that withholding was a possible requirement (when reimbursed travel expenses exceeded travel deductions) contained no reference whatsoever to wages, and thus avoided any mention of the statutory requirement that the payment must be a wage to be subject to withholding. This is not to say, of course, that the Congress may not subject lunch reimbursements to withholding if in its wisdom it chooses to do so by expanding the definition of wages for withholding. It has not done so as yet. And we cannot justify the Government's attempt to do so by judicial determination. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. In 1960 the noon meal reimbursement was $1.30. In 1961 the union negotiated an increase to $1.40. Tr. 93. The Company’s controller testified that the expense accounts of employees entitled to reimbursement for actual amounts expended were carefully reviewed, were often regarded as questionable ($2.50, at the trial date, was considered questionable), and were disallowed if deemed not to be reasonable. Id,, at 64-66. The District Court in its findings, in addition to describing the rate as “modest,” observed: “As a practical matter, it could hardly be considered a money making proposition for an employee.” 405 F. Supp. 748, 749 (SD Ill. 1975). Ibid, There are exceptions. E. g., 26 U. S. C. § 911 (a). E. g., Wilson v. United States, 412 F. 2d 694 (CA1 1969); Commissioner v. Bagley, 374 F. 2d 204 (CA1 1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1046 (1968); Saunders v. Commissioner, 215 F. 2d 768 (CA3 1954); Koerner v. United States, 550 F. 2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 984 (1977); Smith v. United States, 543 F. 2d 1155 (CA5 1976), vacated and remanded, 434 U. S. 978 (1977); United States v. Barrett, 321 F. 2d 911 (CA5 1963); Magness v. Commissioner, 247 F. 2d 740 (CA5 1957), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 931 (1958); Correll v. United States, 369 F. 2d 87 (CA6 1966), rev’d, 389 U. S. 299 (1967); United States v. Morelan, 356 F. 2d 199 (CA8 1966); Hanson v. Commissioner, 298 F. 2d 391 (CA8 1962); United States v. Keeton, 383 F. 2d 429 (CA10 1967). “All persons . . . [or] corporations . . . having the control ... or payment of . . . salaries [or] wages ... of another person, exceeding $3,000 for any taxable year ... are hereby authorized and required to deduct and withhold from such . . . income such sum as will be sufficient to pay the normal tax imposed thereon by this section . . . .” Act of Oct. 3, 1917, § 1204 (2), 40 Stat. 300. The House would have included withholding on dividends and bond interest as well as wages. H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 (1942). Similarly, Treas. Reg. §31.3401 (a)-l (b)(10), promulgated originally as § 404.15 of T. D. 5277, excluded from “wages” facilities and privileges (such as entertainment, medical services, and courtesy discounts) offered by the employer. ' Yet those, obviously, are also offered in the employer-employee relationship. See S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 208 (1964); H. R. Rep. No. 1149, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1964); S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 110 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, p. 77 (1969). See also Rev. Rul. 55-520, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 393; Rev. Rul. 56-249, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 488; Rev. Rul. 58-301, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 23; Rev. Rul. 58-145, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 360; and Rev. Rul. 59-227, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 13, modified and superseded prospectively by Rev. Rul. 75-44, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 15, for other instances of payments made in the employer-employee relationship where withholding was not required despite includability for income tax purposes. In the District Court in the Royster case, the Government abandoned its position that the income tax provisions of the Code were in pari materia with the withholding provisions. See 479 F. 2d, at 388. An imposition of withholding responsibility on the Company for the lunch reimbursements as far back as 1963 strikes us as somewhat retroactive in character and almost punitive in the light of the facts of this case. Needless to say, we do not decide today whether a new regulation that, for withholding purposes, would require the treatment of lunch reimbursements as wages under the existing statute would or would not be valid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARSH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, et al. v. OREGON NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL et al. No. 87-1704. Argued January 9, 1989 Decided May 1, 1989 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Marzulla, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jeffrey P. Min-ear, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., and Vicki L. Plant. David A. Bricklin argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Neil S. Kagan and Michael D. Axline. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Institute of Law and Public Health Protection by Steven R. Perles and Scott C. Whitney; and for the Northwest Forest Resource Council et al. by Mark C. Rutzick and Douglas C. Blomgren. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, and Clifford L. Rechtschaffen and Mary Gray Holt, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Grace Berg Schaible of Alaska, Duane Woodard of Colorado, Jim Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Frederick J. Coioan of Kentucky, James E. Tierney of Maine, James J. Shannon of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Greely of Montana, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Brian McKay of Nevada, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Robert Abrams of New York, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Robert H. Henry of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Jim Mattox of Texas, Jeffrey Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, and Charles G. Brown of West Virginia; for the Environmental Defense Fund et al. by Victor M. Sher, Todd D. True, and Tom Lustig; and for the International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies by Paul A. Lenzini. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center for Enviromental Education by Nicholas C. Yost and William A. Butler; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a companion to Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, ante, p. 332. It arises out of a controversial decision to construct a dam at Elk Creek in the Rogue River Basin in southwest Oregon. In addition to the question whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq., must contain a complete mitigation plan and a “worst case analysis,” which we answered in Robertson, it presents the question whether information developed after the completion of the EIS requires that a supplemental EIS be prepared before construction of the dam may continue. I In the 1930’s in response to recurring floods in the Rogue River Basin, federal and state agencies began planning a major project to control the water supply in the Basin. See, e. g., ch. 346, 49 Stat. 439. In 1961 a multiagency study recommended the construction of three large dams: the Lost Creek Dam on the Rogue River, the Applegate Dam on the Applegate River, and the Elk Creek Dam on the Elk Creek near its confluence with the Rogue River. See H. R. Doc. No. 566, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-89 (1962). The following year, Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to construct the project in accordance with the recommendations of the 1961 study. See Flood Control Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-874, §203, 76 Stat. 1192-1193. The Lost Creek Dam was completed in 1977, and the Applegate Dam was completed in 1981. Plans for the Elk Creek Dam describe a 238-foot-high concrete structure that will control the run-off from 132 square miles of the 135-square-mile Elk Creek watershed. When full, the artificial lake behind the dam will cover 1,290 acres of land, will have an 18-mile shoreline, and will hold 101,000 acre-feet of water. The dam will cost approximately $100 million to construct and will produce annual benefits of almost $5 million. It will be operated in coordination with the nearby Lost Creek Dam, where the control center for both dams will be located. Its “multiport” structure, which will permit discharge of water from any of five levels, makes it possible to regulate, within limits, the temperature, turbidity, and volume of the downstream flow. Although primarily designed to control flooding along the Rogue River, additional project goals include enhanced fishing, irrigation, and recreation. In 1971, the Corps completed its EIS for the Elk Creek portion of the three-dam project and began development by acquiring 26,000 acres of land and relocating residents, a county road, and utilities. Acknowledging incomplete information, the EIS recommended that further studies concerning the project’s likely effect on turbidity be developed. The results of these studies were discussed in a draft supplemental EIS completed in 1975. However, at the request of the Governor of Oregon, further work on the project was suspended, and the supplemental EIS was not filed to make it possible to analyze the actual consequences of the construction of the Lost Creek Dam, which was nearing completion, before continuing with the Elk Creek project. Following that analysis and the receipt of a statement from the Governor that he was “extremely interested in pursuing construction of the Elk Creek Dam,” the Corps completed and released its final Environmental Impact Statement, Supplement No. 1 (FEISS), in December 1980. Because the Rogue River is one of the Nation’s premier fishing grounds, the FEISS paid special heed to the effects the dam might have on water quality, fish production, and angling. In its chapter on the environmental effects of the proposed project, the FEISS explained that water quality studies were prepared in 1974 and in 1979 and that “[w]ater temperature and turbidity have received the most attention.” FEISS 33. Using computer simulation models, the 1974 study predicted that the Elk Creek Dam might, at times, increase the temperature of the Rogue River by one to two degrees Fahrenheit and its turbidity by one to three JTU’s. Ibid. The 1979 study took a second look at the potential effect of the Elk Creek Dam on turbidity and, by comparing the 1974 study’s predictions concerning the effects of the Lost Creek Dam with actual measurements taken after that dam became operational, it “increased technical confidence in the mathematical model predictions . . . and reinforced the conclusions of the 1974 [study].” Id., at 33-34. Based on these studies, the FEISS predicted that changes in the “turbidity regime” would not have any major effect on fish production, but that the combined effect of the Lost Creek and Elk Creek Dams on the turbidity of the Rogue River might, on occasion, impair fishing. Other adverse effects described by the FEISS include the displacement of wildlife population — including 100 black-tailed deer and 17 elk — and the loss of forest land and vegetation resulting from the inundation of 1,290 acres of land with the creation of the artificial lake. Id., at 26, 38, 46. Most significantly, it is perfectly clear that the dam itself would interfere with the migration and spawning of a large number of anadromous fish, but this effect has been mitigated by the construction of a new hatchery. Id., at 35. Finally, the FEISS found that no endangered or threatened species would be affected by the project. Id., at 27. On February 19, 1982, after reviewing the FEISS, the Corps’ Division Engineer made a formal decision to proceed with construction of the Elk Creek Dam, “subject to the approval of funds by the United States Congress.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. In his decision, he identified the mitigation measures that had already been taken with respect to the loss of anadromous fish spawning habitat, as well as those that would “most likely” be taken to compensate for the loss of other wildlife habitat. Id., at 56a-57a. He concluded that the benefits that would be realized from the project “outweigh the economic and environmental costs” and that completion would serve “the overall public interest.” Id., at 58a. In August 1985, Congress appropriated the necessary funds. Act of Aug. 15, 1985, Pub. L. 99-88, 99 Stat. 314. The dam is now about one-third completed and the creek has been rechanneled through the dam. II In October 1985, four Oregon nonprofit corporations filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon seeking to enjoin construction of the Elk Creek Dam. Their principal claims were that the Corps violated NEPA by failing (1) to consider the cumulative effects of the three dams on the Rogue River Basin in a single EIS; (2) adequately to describe the environmental consequences of the project; (3) to include a “worst case analysis” of uncertain effects; and (4) to prepare a second supplemental EIS to review information developed after 1980. After conducting a hearing on respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Judge denied relief on each of the NEPA claims. 628 F. Supp. 1557 (1986). He first held that courts must employ a standard of “reasonableness” in reviewing an agency’s compliance with NEPA. Under this standard of review, the court must “ ‘make a pragmatic judgment whether the EIS’s form, content and preparation foster both informed decision-making and informed public participation.’” Id., at 1562 (quoting California v. Block, 690 F. 2d 753, 761 (CA9 1982)). Applying this standard, the District Judge concluded that the Corps had, in fact, taken a sufficiently “hard look” at the cumulative effects of the three dams and at the individual effects of the Elk Creek Dam. 628 F. Supp., at 1563-1565. He also con-eluded that a “worst case analysis” was not required because the Corps used state-of-the-art mathematical models, thus avoiding scientific uncertainty and the need to fill gaps in information with a worst case scenario. Id., at 1567. Finally, the District Court held that the Corps’ decision not to prepare a second supplemental EIS to address new information was “reasonable.” The new information relied upon by respondents is found in two documents. The first, an internal memorandum prepared by two Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) biologists based upon a draft ODFW study, suggested that the dam will adversely affect downstream fishing, and the second, a soil survey prepared by the United States Soil Conservation Service (SCS), contained information that might be taken to indicate greater downstream turbidity than did the FEISS. As to both documents, the District Judge concluded that the Corps acted reasonably in relying on the opinions of independent and Corps experts discounting the significance of the new information. Id., at 1567-1568. At the conclusion of his opinion, the District Judge directed that the motion for preliminary relief be consolidated with trial on the merits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2), and thus denied respondents’ claim for a permanent injunction as well. The Court of Appeals reversed. 832 F. 2d 1489 (CA9 1987). Applying the same “reasonableness” standard of review employed by the District Court, the Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion, holding that the Corps had not adequately evaluated the cumulative environmental impact of the entire project. Id., at 1497. Since the Corps did not seek review of that holding, we do not discuss it. The court also held that the FEISS was defective because it did not include a complete mitigation plan and because it did not contain a “worst case analysis.” Id., at 1493-1494, 1496-1497. These holdings were erroneous for the reasons stated in our opinion in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, ante, p. 332, and will not be further discussed. With regard to the failure to prepare a second supplemental EIS, the Court of Appeals'concluded that the ODFW and SCS documents brought to light “significant new information” concerning turbidity, water temperature, and epizootic fish disease; that this information, although “not conclusive,” is “probably accurate;” and that the Corps’ experts failed to evaluate the new information with sufficient care. 832 F. 2d, at 1494-1496. The court thus concluded that a second supplemental EIS should have been prepared. Judge Wallace, writing in dissent, took issue with the majority’s analysis of the new information. In his view, it was reasonable for the Corps to have concluded, based on its own expert evaluation, that the information contained in the ODFW document was inaccurate, and that the information contained in the SCS document was insignificant. Id., at 1500 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ill The subject of postdecision supplemental environmental impact statements is not expressly addressed in NEPA. Preparation of such statements, however, is at times necessary to satisfy the Act’s “action-forcing” purpose. NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive environmental results. Rather, NEPA promotes its sweeping commitment to “prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere” by focusing Government and public attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency action. 42 U. S. C. § 4321. By so focusing agency attention, NEPA ensures that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to correct. See Robertson, ante, at 349. Similarly, the broad dissemination of information mandated by NEPA permits the public and other government agencies to react to the effects of a proposed action at a meaningful time. Ante, at 349-350. It would be incongruous with this approach to environmental protection, and with the Act’s manifest concern with preventing uninformed action, for the blinders to adverse environmental effects, once unequivocally removed, to be restored prior to the completion of agency action simply because the relevant proposal has received initial approval. As we explained in TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 188, n. 34 (1978), although “it would make sense to hold NEPA inapplicable at some point in the life of a project, because the agency would no longer have a meaningful opportunity to weigh the benefits of the project versus the detrimental effects on the environment,” up to that point, “NEPA cases have generally required agencies to file environmental impact statements when the remaining governmental action would be environmentally ‘significant.’” “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332. This reading of the statute is supported by Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and Corps regulations, both of which make plain that at times supplementation is required. The CEQ regulations, which we have held are entitled to substantial deference, see Robertson, ante, at 355-356; Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 358 (1979), impose a duty on all federal agencies to prepare supplements to either draft or final EIS’s if there “are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” Similarly, the Corps’ own NEPA implementing regulations require the preparation of a supplemental EIS if “new significant impact information, criteria or circumstances relevant to environmental considerations impact on the recommended plan or proposed action.” The parties are in essential agreement concerning the standard that governs an agency’s decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS. They agree that an agency should apply a “rule of reason,” and the cases they cite in support of this standard explicate this rule in the same basic terms. These cases make clear that an agency need not supplement an EIS every time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized. To require otherwise would render agency decisionmaking intractable, always awaiting updated information only to find the new information outdated by the time a decision is made. On the other hand, and as petitioners concede, NEPA does require that agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental effects of their planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval. See Brief for Petitioners 36. Application of the “rule of reason” thus turns on the value of the new information to the still pending decisionmaking process. In this respect the decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS is similar to the decision whether to prepare an EIS in the first instance: If there remains “major Federal actio[n]” to occur, and if the new information is sufficient to show that the remaining action will “affec[t] the quality of the human environment” in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental EIS must be prepared. Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C). The parties disagree, however, on the standard that should be applied by a court that is asked to review the agency’s decision. Petitioners argue that the reviewing court need only decide whether the agency decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” whereas respondents argue that the reviewing court must make its own determination of reasonableness to ascertain whether the agency action complied with the law. In determining the proper standard of review, we look to § 10e of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 706, which empowers federal courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” if they fail to conform with any of six specified standards. We conclude that review of the narrow question before us whether the Corps’ determination that the FEISS need not be supplemented should be set aside is controlled by the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of § 706(2)(A). Respondents contend that the determination whether the new information suffices to establish a “significant” effect is either a question of law or, at a minimum, a question of ultimate fact and, as such, “deserves no deference” on review. Brief for Respondents 29. Apparently, respondents maintain that the question for review centers on the legal meaning of the term “significant” or, in the alternative, the predominantly legal question whether established and uncontested historical facts presented by the administrative record satisfy this standard. Characterizing the dispute in this manner, they posit that strict review is appropriate under the “in accordance with law” clause of §706(2)(A) or the “without observance of procedure required by law” provision of § 706 (2)(D). We disagree. The question presented for review in this case is a classic example of a factual dispute the resolution of which implicates substantial agency expertise. Respondents’ claim that the Corps’ decision not to file a second supplemental EIS should be set aside primarily rests on the contentions that the new information undermines conclusions contained in the FEISS, that the conclusions contained in the ODFW memorandum and the SCS survey are accurate, and that the Corps’ expert review of the new information was incomplete, inconelusive, or inaccurate. The dispute thus does not turn on the meaning of the term “significant” or on an application of this legal standard to settled facts. Rather, resolution of this dispute involves primarily issues of fact. Because analysis of the relevant documents “requires a high level of technical expertise,” we must defer to “the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 412 (1976). See also Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When examining this kind of scientific determination ... a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential”). Under these circumstances, we cannot accept respondents’ supposition that review is of a legal question and that the Corps’ decision “deserves no deference.” Accordingly, as long as the Corps’ decision not to supplement the FEISS was not “arbitrary or capricious,” it should not be set aside. As we observed in Citizens to Presene Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971), in making the factual inquiry concerning whether an agency decision was “arbitrary or capricious,” the reviewing court “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” This inquiry must “be searching and careful,” but “the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.” Ibid. When specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive. On the other hand, in the context of reviewing a decision not to supplement an EIS, courts should not automatically defer to the agency’s express reliance on an interest in finality without carefully reviewing the record and satisfying themselves that the agency has made a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the significance— or lack of significance — of the new information. A contrary approach would not simply render judicial review generally meaningless, but would be contrary to the demand that courts ensure that agency decisions are founded on a reasoned evaluation “of the relevant factors.” > hH Respondents’ argument that significant new information required the preparation of a second supplemental EIS rests on two written documents. The first of the documents is the so-called “Cramer Memorandum,” an intraoffice memorandum prepared on February 21, 1985, by two scientists employed by ODFW. See Cramer Memorandum 3a. The Cramer Memorandum, in turn, relied on a draft ODFW study describing the effects of the Lost Creek Dam on fish production. The second document is actually a series of maps prepared in 1982 by SCS to illustrate the composition of soil near the Elk Creek shoreline. The information was provided to the Corps for use in managing the project. Although respondents contend that the maps contained data relevant to a prediction of the dam’s impact on downstream turbidity, the maps do not purport to shed any light on that subject. Nor do they purport to discuss any conditions that had changed since the FEISS was completed in 1980. The Corps responded to the claim that these documents demonstrate the need for supplementation of the FEISS by preparing a formal Supplemental Information Report, dated January 10, 1986. See U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District, Elk Creek Lake Supplemental Information Report No. 2, p. 7a (hereinafter SIR). The SIR explained: “While it is clear based upon our review that this information does not require additional NEPA documentation, Corps regulations provide that a Supplemental Information Report can be used to disseminate information on points of concern regarding environmental impacts set forth in the EIS.” The significance of the Cramer Memorandum and the SCS survey is subject to some doubt. Before respondents commenced this litigation in October 1985, no one had suggested that either document constituted the kind of new information that made it necessary or appropriate to supplement the FEISS. Indeed, the record indicates that the Corps was not provided with a copy of the Cramer Memorandum until after the lawsuit was filed. Since the probative value of that document depends largely on the expert qualification of its authors, the fact that they did not see fit to promptly apprise the Corps of their concern — or to persuade ODFW to do so— tends to discount the significance of those concerns. Similarly, the absence of any pretrial expression of concern about the soil characteristics described in the 1982 SCS survey is consistent with the view that it shed little, if any, new light on the turbidity potential of the dam. Yet, even if both documents had given rise to prompt expressions of concern, there are good reasons for concluding that they did not convey significant new information requiring supplementation of the FEISS. The Court of Appeals attached special significance to two concerns discussed in the Cramer Memorandum: the danger that an increase in water temperature downstream during fall and early winter will cause an early emergence and thus reduce survival of spring chinook fry and the danger that the dam will cause high fish mortality from an epizootic disease. Both concerns were based partly on fact and partly on speculation. With respect to the first, the Cramer Memorandum reported that the authors of the draft ODFW study had found that warming of the Rogue River caused by the Lost Creek Dam had reduced the survival of spring chinook fry; however, the extent of that reduction was not stated, nor did the memorandum estimate the extent of warming to be expected due to closure of the Elk Creek Dam. Instead, the memorandum estimated that an increase of only one degree centigrade in river temperature in January would decrease survival of spring chinook “from by 60-80%.” Cramer Memorandum 3a. The authors of the memorandum concluded that because the Elk Creek Dam is likely to increase the temperature of the Rogue River, further evaluation of this effect should be completed “before ODFW sets its final position on this project.” Ibid. The Corps’ response to this concern in its SIR acknowledged that the “biological reasoning is sound and has been recognized for some time,” but then explained why the concern was exaggerated. SIR 10a. The SIR stressed that because the model employed by ODFW had not been validated, its predictive capability was uncertain. Indeed, ODFW scientists subsequently recalculated the likely effect of a one-degree-centigrade increase in temperature, adjusting its estimate of a 60-to-80 percent loss downward to between 30 and 40 percent. Id., at 9a. Moreover, the SIR supplied a variable missing in the Cramer Memorandum, suggesting that the Elk Creek Dam would, in most cases, either reduce or leave unchanged the temperature of the Rogue River. Id., at 10a. Discernible increases were only found in July, August, and December of the study year, and even during those months the maximum temperature increase was only 0.6 degrees centigrade. Ibid. Finally, the SIR observed that the Cramer Memorandum failed to take into account the dam’s beneficial effects, including its ability to reduce peak downstream flow during periods of egg incubation and fry rearing and its ability to reduce outflow temperature through use of the multiport structure. Id., at 9a-10a. Given these positive factors, the Corps concluded that any adverse effects of the 0.6-degree temperature increase can be offset. Id., at 10a. With respect to the second concern emphasized by the Court of Appeals, the Cramer Memorandum reported the fact that “an unprecedented 76% of the fall chinook in 1979 and 32% in 1980 were estimated to have died before spawning” and then speculated that the Lost Creek Dam, which had been completed in 1977, was a contributing cause of this unusual mortality. Cramer Memorandum 4a. The Corps responded to this by pointing out that the absence of similar epizootics after the closure of the Applegate Dam and the evidence of prespawning mortality in the Rogue River prior to the closing of the Lost Creek Dam were inconsistent with the hypothesis suggested in the Cramer Memorandum. See SIR 10a-lla. In addition, the Corps noted that certain diseased organisms thought to have been the cause of the unusually high mortality rates were not found in the outflow from the Lost Creek Dam. Id., at 11a. In thus concluding that the Cramer Memorandum did not present significant new information requiring supplementation of the FEISS, the Corps carefully scrutinized the proffered information. Moreover, in disputing the accuracy and significance of this information, the Corps did not simply rely on its own experts. Rather, two independent experts hired by the Corps to evaluate the ODFW study on which the Cramer Memorandum was premised found significant fault in the methodology and conclusions of the study. We also think it relevant that the Cramer Memorandum did not express the official position of ODFW. See SIR 9a. In preparing the memorandum, the authors noted that the agency had “adopted a neutral stand on Elk Creek Dam” and argued that new information raised the question whether “our agency should continue to remain neutral. ” Cramer Memorandum 3a. The concerns disclosed in the memorandum apparently were not sufficiently serious to persuade ODFW to abandon its neutral position. The Court of Appeals also expressed concern that the SCS survey, by demonstrating that the soil content in the Elk Creek watershed is different than assumed in the FEISS, suggested a greater turbidity potential than indicated in the FEISS. 832 F. 2d, at 1495. In addition, the court observed that ODFW scientists believe that logging and road building in the Elk Creek watershed has caused increased soil disturbance resulting in higher turbidity than forecast by the FEISS. Ibid. As to this latter point, the SIR simply concluded that although turbidity may have increased in the early 1980’s due to logging, “watershed recovery appears to have occurred to reduce the turbidity levels back to those of the 1970’s.” SIR 12a. The implications of the SCS soil survey are of even less concern. As discussed in the FEISS, water quality studies were conducted in 1974 and 1979 using computer simulation models. FEISS 33. The 1974 study indicated that turbidity in the Rogue River would increase by no more than one to three JTU’s as a result of the Elk Creek Dam, and the 1979 study verified this result. Ibid. These studies used water samples taken from Elk Creek near the proposed dam site and from near the Lost Creek Dam, and thus did not simply rely on soil composition maps in drawing their conclusions. Id., at 18-19, 21-22, 33-34. Although the SIR did not expressly comment on the SCS survey, in light of the in-depth 1974 and 1979 studies, its conclusion that “the turbidity effects are not expected to differ from those described in the 1980 EISS” surely provided a legitimate reason for not preparing a supplemental FEISS to discuss the subject of turbidity. SIR 12a. There is little doubt that if all of the information contained in the Cramer Memorandum and SCS survey was both new and accurate, the Corps would have been required to prepare a second supplemental EIS. It is also clear that, regardless of its eventual assessment of the significance of this information, the Corps had a duty to take a hard look at the proffered evidence. However, having done so and having determined based on careful scientific analysis that the new information was of exaggerated importance, the Corps acted within the dictates of NEPA in concluding that supplementation was unnecessary. Even if another decisionmaker might have reached a contrary result, it was surely not “a clear error of judgment” for the Corps to have found that the new and accurate information contained in the documents was not significant and that the significant information was not new and accurate. As the SIR demonstrates, the Corps conducted a reasoned evaluation of the relevant information and reached a decision that, although perhaps disputable, was not “arbitrary or capricious.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. As described by the Army Corps of Engineers: “Lying within the southwest corner of Oregon, the Rogue River Basin drains a 5,060 square mile area in Jackson, Josephine, Coos, and Klamath Counties, as well as small portions of Del Norte and Siskiyou Counties in California.... Rogue River passes through vastly different environmental settings in the course of its journey from its upper reaches near Crater Lake to the Pacific Ocean at Gold Beach, Oregon. The climatological factors and other characteristics of the basin are such that floods are frequently experienced.” U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District, Elk Creek Lake Environmental Impact Statement, Supplement No. 1, p. 1 (Dec. 1980) (hereinafter PEISS). “Turbidity is an expression of the optical property of water which causes light to be scattered and absorbed rather than transmitted through in straight lines. Turbidity is caused by the presence of suspended matter.” Id., App. E, p. 3. This optical property of water is most commonly measured using the Jackson Turbidity Unit (JTU). “A general rule of thumb guideline is that 5 JTU is the limit for drinking water, 10 JTU impairs flyfishing, 20 JTU impairs other fishing methods, and long-term 50 JTU water alters fish behavior.” Id., at 21. See Letter from Governor Atiyeh of August 1, 1979, reprinted in id., App. F. See n. 2, supra. The FEISS explained that suspended sediments can reduce fish production by clogging or injuring gill structures, by causing abrasions, by reducing food supply, and by making it more difficult for fish to locate what food is available by reducing visibility. FEISS 37. The study nonetheless concluded: “Much of the heavy suspended materials will settle out in Elk Creek reservoir so no downstream effect of siltation is expected. Average annual downstream turbidity will be the same with or without the project. “No major adverse effect on fish production in the Rogue River is expected as a result of the changes in the turbidity regime as a result of the Elk Creek project. Minor effects on production can be expected in the reach of Elk Creek between the project and its confluence with the Rogue River during normal years when turbidity will be higher than without the project. However, the project will also provide periods when turbidity will be lower than without the project. The multi-level withdrawal capability which will be built into the Elk Creek project will provide the ability to minimize turbidity effects on fish production.” Ibid. The impact on fishing is described as follows: “Increases in magnitude and extended duration of turbidity in the Rogue River are expected to result from operation of Elk Creek Dam. These increases could affect angling for salmonids in the Rogue because the ability of fish to see lures or flies is impaired by turbidity. Fly-fishing for resident trout and summer steelhead would be the most vulnerable to effects of turbidity. The fly-fishing season runs from late July into October. According to Rogue River guides and [Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife] biologists, fly-fishing success declines at a turbidity level of 10 JTU or greater. Other fishing methods are not productive when turbidity exceeds 20 JTU. It is possible that fisheries at other times, such as in the winter, will be affected for short periods. It is not expected that outflow from Lost Creek and Elk Creek Dams would, under the worst conditions, ever cause turbidity in the Rogue River to exceed 13 JTUs during late summer and early fall.” Id., at 36. A “salmonid” is a soft-finned, elongated fish that has an upturned final vertebrae. See Webster’s Third International Dictionary 2004 (1981). Salmon and trout are two common salmonids. Ibid. “Anadromous fish are those which spend most of their life in the open sea, but which return as adults to freshwater streams ... to spawn.” Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U. S. 165, 168 (1977). As described in the FEISS: “Cole M. Rivers Fish Hatchery was constructed to mitigate the loss of anadromous fish-spawning habitat in Elk Creek, Applegate River, and the upper Rogue River, as well as to provide rainbow trout and kokanee for stocking in the reservoirs as mitigation for lost trout production. The hatchery is located about 0.2 miles downstream of Lost Creek Dam. It has a design capacity of 355,000 pounds of salmon and steelhead and 71,000 pounds of trout and kokanee. Production for Elk Creek would utilize approximately 14 percent of the total design capacity . . . .” FEISS 35. In the Report accompanying this legislation the Senate Appropriations Committee stressed that it “included specific language in the legislation directing the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, to award a continuing contract for construction of the main dam for the Elk Creek Lake project.” S. Rep. No. 99-82, p. 97 (1985). The four corporations, which are respondents herein, are the Oregon Natural Resources Council, the Oregon Guides and Packers Association, Inc., the Rogue Fly-fishers, Inc., and the Rogue River Guides Association. Respondents’ complaint also included claims under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WASRA), 16 U. S. C. § 1278, and the Freedom of Informatio¿i Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552. However, prior to the hearing, respondents withdrew their WASRA claim. In order to facilitate prompt consideration of respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction on the NEPA claims, the District Judge postponed consideration of the FOIA claim for a later date. After considering the NEPA claims, the District Judge directed the entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to permit prompt appellate review. An epizootic disease is one that affects many animals of the same kind at the same time. See 832 F. 2d, at 1496, n. 5. NEPA provides in pertinent part: “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible ... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— “(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environftient and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and Cf. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 Ind. L. J. 205, 247-248 (1989) (Supplementation is at times necessary because “[t]he entire efficacy of the EIS process is called into question when changes are made to a project after the publication of a final impact statement”). The term “action forcing” was introduced during the Senate’s consideration of NEPA, see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409, n. 18 (1976), and refers to the notion that preparation of an EIS ensures that the environmental goals set out in NEPA are “infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government,” 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson). See also 40 CFR § 1500.1(a) (1987) (“Section 102(2) contains ‘action-forcing’ provisions to make sure that federal agencies act according to the letter and spirit of the Act”). In support of this latter proposition, we cited Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F. 2d 1164 (CA6 1972), with approval. In that case the Court of Appeals upheld an injunction barring the continued construction of a dam on the Little Tennessee River pending the filing of an adequate EIS, notwithstanding the fact that the project was initially approved and construction commenced prior to the effective date of NEPA. The CEQ regulation provides, in part: “Agencies: “(1) Shall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact statements if: “(i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or “(ii) There are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts. “(2) May also prepare supplements when the agency determines that the purposes of the Act will be furthered by doing so.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(c) (1987). The Corps regulations provide in relevant part: “Supplements. A Supplement to the draft or final EIS on file will be prepared whenever significant impacts resulting from changes in the proposed plan or new significant impact information, criteria or circumstances relevant to environmental considerations impact on the recommended plan or proposed action as discussed in 40 CFR 1502.9(c). A supplement to a draft EIS will be prepared, filed and circulated in the same manner as a draft EIS .... A supplement to a final EIS will be prepared and filed first as a draft supplement and then as a final supplement. ...” 33 CFR §230.11(b) (1987). Compare Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F. 2d 1017, 1024 (CA9 1980) (cited in Brief for Respondents 32), and Stop H-3 Assn. v. Dole, 740 F. 2d 1442, 1463-1464 (CA9 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1108 (1985), with Cuomo v. NRC, 249 U. S. App. D. C. 54, 57, 772 F. 2d 972, 975 (1985) (per curiam) (cited in Reply Brief for Petitioners 14), and Friends of the River v. FERC, 231 U. S. App. D. C. 329, 345, 720 F. 2d 93, 109 (1983) (same). In other contexts we have observed: ‘“Administrative consideration of evidence . . . always creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is promulgated. ... If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehearing as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening.’” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 554-555 (1978) (quoting ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503, 514 (1944)). See also Northern Lines Merger Cases, 396 U. S. 491, 521 (1970) (same). CEQ regulations define the term “significantly” as follows: “ ‘Significantly’ as used in NEPA requires considerations of both context and intensity: “(a) Context. This means that the significance of an action must be analyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality. Significance varies with the setting of the proposed action. . . . “(b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of impact. . . . The following should be considered in evaluation of intensity: “(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial. “(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety. “(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic rivers, or ecologically critical areas. “(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial. “(5) The degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks. “(6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions with significant effects or represents a decision in principle about future consideration. “(7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. . . . “(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or historic resources. “(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its habitat .... “(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law____” 40 CFR § 1508.27 (1987). Title 5 U. S. C. § 706(2) provides that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; “(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; “(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; “(D) without observance of procedure required by law; “(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of any agency hearing provided by statute; or “(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. “In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” It is uncontested that the present controversy is not controlled by §§ 706(2)(E) or 706(2)(F), which primarily apply in cases involving either agency rulemaking or adjudication. Nor is there a claim that the Corps exceeded its constitutional authority under § 706(2)(B) or its statutory authority under § 706(2)(C). Of course, whenever a court reviews an agency decision or action under the APA, some legal standard is involved. Otherwise, there would be “no law to apply” and thus no basis for APA review. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971) (discussing 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2)). Respondents note that several Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as articulated in this and other cases, have adopted a “reasonableness” standard of review, see, e. g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 816 F. 2d 205, 210 (CA5 1987); Enos v. Marsh, 769 F. 2d 1363, 1373 (CA9 1985); National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 721 F. 2d 767, 782 (CA11 1983); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F. 2d 946, 948 (CA1 1983); Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F. 2d 1083, 1087-1088 (CA8 1979), and argue that we should not upset this well-settled doctrine. This standard, however, has not been adopted by all of the Circuits. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F. 2d 412, 417 (CA7 1984) (adopting “arbitrary and capricious” standard). Moreover, as some of these courts have recognized, the difference between the “arbitrary and capricious” and “reasonableness” standards is not of great pragmatic consequence. See Manasota-88, Inc. v. Thomas, 799 F. 2d 687, 692, n. 8 (CA11 1986) (“As a practical matter, . . . the differences between the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standards of review are often difficult to discern”); River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 764 F. 2d 445, 449 (CA7 1985) (“[W]e are not sure how much if any practical difference there is between ‘abuse of discretion’ and ‘unreasonable’ ”), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1055 (1986). Accordingly, our decision today will not require a substantial reworking of long-established NEPA law. The Cramer Memorandum is reprinted in the brief for petitioners. Page references are to the appendix to that brief. The SIR is reprinted in the brief for petitioners. Page references are to the appendix to that brief. Corps regulations provide: “Whenever it is clearly understood that an EIS supplement is not necessary but where [it] is only necessary to provide supplemental information to a point of concern discussed in the final EIS . . .a supplemental information report will be prepared and filed with EPA.” 33 CFR § 230.11(d) (1987). In this respect, the SIR noted that “[t]he reduction in peak floodflows can partially or fully offset the negative effects of temperature increases on fry survival,” and any remaining adverse effects can be “further mitigated by the ability of the intake tower to regulate outflow temperatures.” SIR 9a-10a. A letter sent from ODFW to the Corps in August 1985 supports the conclusion that the multiport system can be used to regulate temperature. The letter, reporting on an attempt to reduce outflow temperature at the Lost Creek Dam, asserts: “The experimental reduction in outflow temperatures last October and November, in conjunction with other factors, appears to have improved survival to the fry stage. We had the lowest number on record of wild fish spawning, yet this spring we had the second highest abundance of spring chinook fry on record. The low density of spawners, the absence of floods last winter, and the low incubation temperatures all contributed to the high survival of chinook eggs. We do not know yet what the river temperatures last October-November would have been without the dam, but release temperatures were lower than previous years since dam closure.” Letter from Dr. John R. Donaldson of August 15, 1985, Admin. Record, Doc. No. 109. The authors made clear that their concern was not based on any identifiable nexus between the dam closure and the epizootics: “We have not determined the actual cause of the epizootics in 1979 and 1980, but we suspect that Lost Creek Dam contributed to them because no such mortality of fall chinook had been documented previously. ” Cramer Memorandum 4a. As Judge Wallace noted in his dissenting opinion, the Cramer Memorandum did not address the possibility that diseased hatchery fish, rather than the Lost Creek Dam, caused the 1979 and 1980 epizootics. See 832 F. 2d 1489, 1501 (CA9 1987) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Cramer Memorandum also raised concerns about the effect of increased downstream flow on fishing and fish production. The memorandum explained that “[ajnglers and guides have complained that high flows have ‘washed out’ many of their favorite fishing riffles and that fly angling is no longer effective in most areas because the water is too deep and swift.” Id., at 4a. In addition, the memorandum observed that “increased flows during September and October cause spring chinook to spawn higher on the gravel bars and this increases the chances that redds will be dewatered when flows are reduced as the dams fill during February-April.” Ibid. However, as the SIR observed, the FEISS did indicate that construction of the dam would cause some unavoidable adverse effects on fishing. See SIR 11a. Moreover, the Cramer Memorandum did not suggest that there has been, or will likely be, any significant increase in mortality due to dewatering or that this effect cannot be minimized through control of the dam’s outflow. Ibid. The first of these experts, although agreeing with portions of the ODWF study, indicated that the study “contains considerable statistical inaccuracies, over-extension of statistical methods and undue biological speculation that detracts from an otherwise very laudable professional effort.” S. B. Mathews, Critique of Lost Creek Dam Fisheries Evaluation 1, Admin. Record, Doc. No. 112. The second, although providing a generally more positive assessment of the study, indicated that comparisons between predam and postdam years “is not likely to yield conclusive results.” L. Calvin, Lost Creek Dam Fisheries Evaluation, Phase I Completion Report 2, Admin. Record, Doc. No. 114. Their memorandum concluded: “Harry, the spring chinook runs on the Rogue are at an all-time low point. Anglers are becoming increasingly frustrated and upset about low runs, shortened seasons and smaller bag limits. They are also becoming more vocal. We feel the agency stands to lose much of its credibility if we continue to support Elk Creek Dam after knowing what has occurred to the adult spring chinook returns following completion of Lost Creek Dam. The Commission should be made aware of this new information and the possible consequences if they continue to hold to the middle of the road.” Cramer Memorandum 5a.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RAPANOS et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 04-1034. Argued February 21, 2006 Decided June 19, 2006 M. Reed Hopper argued the cause for petitioners in No. 04-1034. With him on the briefs was Robin L. Rivett. Timothy A. Stoepker argued the cause for petitioners in No. 04-1384. With him on the briefs were Dennis W. Archer and Paul R. Bernard. Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Wooldridge, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Malcolm L. Stewart, Greer S. Goldman, Ellen J. Durkee, Todd S. Kim, and Katherine W. Hazard. Together with No. 04-1384, Carabell et al. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by David W. Marquez, Attorney General of Alaska, and Ruth Hamilton Heese and John T. Baker, Assistant Attorneys General, Roderick E. Walston, Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, Guy R. Martin, Jeffrey Kightlinger, Thomas W. Birmingham, and Daniel S. Hentschke; for the American Farm Bureau Federation by Timothy S. Bishop; for the American Petroleum Institute by Thomas Sayre Llewellyn, Harry M. Ng, and Ralph J. Colleli, Jr.; for the Attainable Housing Alliance by Sebastian Rued; for the Cato Institute by Timothy Lynch; for the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John G. Eastman and Edwin Meese III; for CropLife America et al. by Richard E. Schwartz; for the Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress et al. by Virginia S. Albrecht, Deidre G. Duncan, David J. De-Pippo, Ralph W. Holmen, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for the Home Builders Association of Central Arizona by Michael J. Pearce; for the International Council of Shopping Centers et al. by Gus Bauman; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by William Perry Pendley; for the National Association of Home Builders by Duane J. Desiderio and Thomas J. Ward; for the National Stone, Sand and Gravel Association et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman; for Pulte Homes, Inc., et al. by Carter G. Phillips and Stephen B. Kinnaird; for the Western Coalition of Arid States by Lawrence S. Bazel and John Briscoe; for John J. Duncan, Jr., by Thomas C. Jackson; and for Charles R. Johnson et al. by Michael E. Malamut, Andrew R. Grainger, Martin J. Newhouse, and Martin S. Kaufman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both eases were filed for the State of New York et al. by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General, Peter H. Lehner, Daniel Smirlock, Deputy Solicitor General, Benjamin N. Gutman, Assistant Solicitor General, and Lemuel M. Srolovic, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Susan Shinkman, and Margaret O. Murphy, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Robert J. Spagnoletti of the District of Columbia, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Charles C. Foti, Jr., of Louisiana, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Peter C. Harvey of New Jersey, Patri cia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Rob McKenna of Washington, and Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for the City of New York by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, and Hilary Meltzer; for American Rivers et al. by Howard I. Fox; for the Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators by Timothy J. Dowling; for the Association of State Wetland Managers et al. by Patrick Parenteau; for the Chesapeake Bay Foundation by Jan Goldman-Carter; for Ducks Unlimited, Inc., et al. by James Murphy, Thomas M. France, and Neil S. Kagan; for the Environmental Law Institute by Seth P. Waxman, Louis R. Cohen, and Leslie Carothers; for the National Mitigation Banking Association by Margaret N. Strand, John F. Cooney, and Royal C. Gardner; for the Western Organization of Resource Councils et al. by Charles M. Tebbutt; for Carol M. Browner et al. by Deborah A. Sivas, Lawrence C. Marshall, and Holly D. Gordon; for Jared M. Diamond et al. by Jason C. Rylander; for Rep. John D. Dingell et al. by Robert W. Adler and Amy J. Wildermuth; and for Calvin H. Johnson by Mr. Johnson, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the American Planning Association by Nancy Stroud; for the Mackinac Center for Public Policy by Patrick J. Wright; for the National Association of Waterfront Employers by Francis Edwin Froelich and Charles T. Carroll, Jr.; and for the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation by Robert R. Gasaway and Ashley C. Parrish. Mark A. Perry, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 04-1034. James Blanding Holman TV and Derb S. Carter, Jr., filed a brief for the Ecological Society of America et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 04-1384. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in No. 04-1384 for Donald L. Harkins by William J. Reisdorf; and for Macomb County, Michigan, by Mark A. Richardson. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join. In April 1989, petitioner John A. Rapanos backfilled wetlands on a parcel of land in Michigan that he owned and sought to develop. This parcel included 54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated soil conditions. The nearest body of navigable water was 11 to 20 miles away. 339 F. 3d 447, 449 (CA6 2003) (Rapanos I). Regulators had informed Mr. Rapanos that his saturated fields were “waters of the United States,” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(7), that could not be filled without a permit. Twelve years of criminal and civil litigation ensued. The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is not trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot, relying on such factors as “economics,” “aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general, the needs and welfare of the people,” 33 CFR § 320.4(a) (2004). The average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915 — not counting costs of mitigation or design changes. Sunding & Zilberman, The Economies of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 Natural Resources J. 59, 74-76 (2002). “[0]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.” Id., at 81. These costs cannot be avoided, because the Clean Water Act “impose[s] criminal liability,” as well as steep civil fines, “on a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial activities.” Hanousek v. United States, 528 U. S. 1102, 1103 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In this litigation, for example, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil fines. See United States v. Rapanos, 235 F. 3d 256, 260 (CA6 2000). The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rápanos are a small part of the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act — without any change in the governing statute — during the past five Presidential administrations. In the last three decades, the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have interpreted their jurisdiction over “the waters of the United States” to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United States — including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States. And that was just the beginning. The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit — whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or ephemeral — through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermittently flow. On this view, the federally regulated “waters of the United States” include storm drains, roadside ditches, ripples of sand in the desert that may contain water once a year, and lands that are covered by floodwaters once every 100 years. Because they include the land containing storm sewers and desert washes, the statutory “waters of the United States” engulf entire cities and immense arid wastelands. In fact, the entire land area of the United States lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land containing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a “water of the United States.” I Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) in 1972. The Act’s stated objective is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a). The Act also states that “[i]t is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.” § 1251(b). One of the statute’s principal provisions is 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a), which provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” “The discharge of a pollutant” is defined broadly to include “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” § 1362(12), and “pollutant” is defined broadly to include not only traditional contaminants but also solids such as “dredged spoil,... rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt,” § 1362(6). And, most relevant here, the CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” § 1362(7). The Act also provides certain exceptions to its prohibition of “the discharge of any pollutant by any person.” § 1311(a). Section 1342(a) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, . . . notwithstanding section 1311(a) of this title.” Section 1344 authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to “issue permits ... for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” § 1344(a), (d). It is the discharge of “dredged or fill material” — which, unlike traditional water pollutants, are solids that do not readily wash downstream — that we consider today. For a century prior to the CWA, we had interpreted the phrase “navigable waters of the United States” in the Act’s predecessor statutes to refer to interstate waters that are “navigable in fact” or readily susceptible of being rendered so. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871); see also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 406 (1940). After passage of the CWA, the Corps initially adopted this traditional judicial definition for the Act’s term “navigable waters.” See 39 Fed. Reg. 12119, codified at 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(1) (1974); see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 168 (2001) (SWANCC). After a District Court enjoined these regulations as too narrow, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (DC 1975), the Corps adopted a far broader definition. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31324-31325 (1975); 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (1977). The Corps’ new regulations deliberately sought to extend the definition of “the waters of the United States” to the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power. See id., at 37144, n. 2. The Corps’ current regulations interpret “the waters of the United States” to include, in addition to traditional interstate navigable waters, 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(1) (2004), “[a]ll interstate waters including interstate wetlands,” § 328.3(a)(2); “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” § 328.3(a)(3); “[tributaries of [such] waters,” § 328.3(a)(5); and “[w]etlands adjacent to [such] waters [and tributaries] (other than waters that are themselves wetlands),” § 328.3(a)(7). The regulation defines “adjacent” wetlands as those “bordering, contiguous [to], or neighboring” waters of the United States. § 328.3(c). It specifically provides that “[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are 'adjacent wetlands.’” Ibid. We first addressed the proper interpretation of 33 U. S. C. §1362(7)’s phrase “the waters of the United States” in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121 (1985). That case concerned a wetland that “was adjacent to a body of navigable water,” because “the area characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent’s property to ... a navigable waterway.” Id., at 131; see also 33 CFR § 328.3(b). Noting that “the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one,” and that “the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins,” 474 U. S., at 132, we upheld the Corps’ interpretation of “the waters of the United States” to include wetlands that “actually abut[ted] on” traditional navigable waters. Id., at 135. Following our decision in Riverside Bayview, the Corps adopted increasingly broad interpretations of its own regulations under the Act. For example, in 1986, to “clarify” the reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps announced the so-called “Migratory Bird Rule,” which purported to extend its jurisdiction to any intrastate waters “[wjhich are or would be used as habitat” by migratory birds. 51 Fed. Reg. 41217; see also SWANCC, supra, at 163-164. In addition, the Corps interpreted its own regulations to include “ephemeral streams” and “drainage ditches” as “tributaries” that are part of the “waters of the United States,” see 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(5), provided that they have a perceptible “ordinary high water mark” as defined in § 328.3(e). 65 Fed. Reg. 12823 (2000). This interpretation extended “the waters of the United States” to virtually any land feature over which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark— even if only “the presence of litter and debris.” 33 CFR § 328.3(e). See also U. S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulating Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District Office Practices in Determining Jurisdiction, GAO-04-297, pp. 20-22 (Feb. 2004) (hereinafter GAO Report), http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d04297.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Prior to our decision in SWANCC, lower courts upheld the application of this expansive definition of “tributaries” to such entities as storm sewers that contained flow to covered waters during heavy rainfall, United States v. Eidson, 108 F. 3d 1336, 1340-1342 (CA11 1997), and dry arroyos connected to remote waters through the flow of groundwater over “centuries,” Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F. 2d 126, 129 (CA10 1985). In SWANCC, we considered the application of the Corps’ “Migratory Bird Rule” to “an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois.” 531 U. S., at 162. Observing that “[i]t was the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview,” id., at 167 (emphasis added), we held that Riverside Bayview did not establish “that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent to open water,” 531 U. S., at 168 (emphasis deleted). On the contrary, we held that “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters,” id., at 171 — which, unlike the wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview, did not “actually abu[t] on a navigable waterway,” 531 U. S., at 167 — were not included as “waters of the United States.” Following our decision in SWANCC, the Corps did not significantly revise its theory of federal jurisdiction under § 1344(a). The Corps provided notice of a proposed rule-making in light of SWANCC, 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (2003), but ultimately did not amend its published regulations. Because SWANCC did not directly address tributaries, the Corps notified its field staff that they “should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters . . . and, generally speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands).” 68 Fed. Reg. 1998. In addition, because SWANCC did not overrule Riverside Bayview, the Corps continues to assert jurisdiction over waters “ ‘neighboring’ ” traditional navigable waters and their tributaries. 68 Fed. Reg. 1997 (quoting 33 CFR § 328.3(c) (2002)). Even after SWANCC, the lower courts have continued to uphold the Corps’ sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains as “tributaries.” For example, courts have held that jurisdictional “tributaries” include the “intermittent flow of surface water through approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches (paralleling and crossing under 1-64),” Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F. 3d 407, 410 (CA4 2003); a “roadside ditch” whose water took “a winding, thirty-two-mile path to the Chesapeake Bay,” United States v. Deaton, 332 F. 3d 698, 702 (CA4 2003); irrigation ditches and drains that intermittently connect to covered waters, Community Assn. for Restoration of Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F. 3d 943, 954-955 (CA9 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F. 3d 526, 534 (CA9 2001); and (most implausibly of all) the “washes and arroyos” of an “arid development site,” located in the middle of the desert, through which “water courses . . . during periods of heavy rain,” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F. 3d 1113, 1118 (CA9 2005). These judicial constructions of “tributaries” are not outliers. Rather, they reflect the breadth of the Corps’ determinations in the field. The Corps’ enforcement practices vary somewhat from district to district because “the definitions used to make jurisdictional determinations” are deliberately left “vague.” GAO Report 26; see also id., at 22. But district offices of the Corps have treated, as “waters of the United States,” such typically dry land features as “arroyos, coulees, and washes,” as well as other “channels that might have little water flow in a given year.” Id., at 20-21. They have also applied that definition to such man-made, intermittently flowing features as “drain tiles, storm drains systems, and culverts.” Id., at 24 (footnote omitted). In addition to “tributaries,” the Corps and the lower courts have also continued to define “adjacent” wetlands broadly after SWANCC. For example, some of the Corps’ district offices have concluded, that wetlands are “adjacent” to covered waters if they are hydrologically connected “through directional sheet flow during storm events,” GAO Report 18, or if they lie within the “100-year floodplain” of a body of water — that is, they are connected to the navigable water by flooding, on average, once every 100 years, id., at 17, and n. 16. Others have concluded that presence within 200 feet of a tributary automatically renders a wetland “adjacent” and jurisdictional. Id., at 19. And the Corps has successfully defended such theories of “adjacency” in the courts, even after SWANCC’s excision of “isolated” waters and wetlands from the Act’s coverage. One court has held since SWANCC that wetlands separated from flood control channels by 70-foot-wide berms, atop which ran maintenance roads, had a “significant nexus” to covered waters because, inter alia, they lay “within the 100 year floodplain of tidal waters.” Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. Army Corps of Engineers, 425 F. 3d 1150, 1152, 1157 (CA9 2005). In one of the cases before us today, the Sixth Circuit held, in agreement with “[t]he majority of courts,” that “while a hydrological connection between the non-navigable and navigable waters is required, there is no ‘direct abutment’ requirement” under SWANCC for “‘adjacency.’” 376 F. 3d 629, 639 (2004) (Rapanos II). And even the most insubstantial hydrologic connection may be held to constitute a “significant nexus.” One court distinguished SWANCC on the ground that “a molecule of water residing in one of these pits or ponds [in SWANCC] could not mix with molecules from other bodies of water” — whereas, in the case before it, “water molecules currently present in the wetlands will inevitably flow towards and mix with water from connecting bodies,” and “[a] drop of rainwater landing in the Site is certain to intermingle with water from the [nearby river].” United States v. Rueth Development Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877-878 (ND Ind. 2002). II In these consolidated cases, we consider whether four Michigan wetlands, which lie near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters, constitute “waters of the United States” within the meaning of the Act. Petitioners in No. 04-1034, the Rápanos and their affiliated businesses, deposited fill material without a permit into wetlands on three sites near Midland, Michigan: the “Salzburg site,” the “Hines Road site,” and the “Pine River site.” The wetlands at the Salzburg site are connected to a man-made drain, which drains into Hoppler Creek, which flows into the Kawkawlin River, which empties into Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron. See Brief for United States in No. 04-1034, p. 11; 339 F. 3d, at 449. The wetlands at the Hines Road site are connected to something called the “Rose Drain,” which has a surface connection to the Tittabawassee River. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1034, pp. A23, B20. And the wetlands at the Pine River site have a surface connection to the Pine River, which flows into Lake Huron. Id., at A23-A24, B26. It is not clear whether the connections between these wetlands and the nearby drains and ditches are continuous or intermittent, or whether the nearby drains and ditches contain continuous or merely occasional flows of water. The United States brought civil enforcement proceedings against the Rapanos petitioners. The District Court found that the three described wetlands were “within federal jurisdiction” because they were “ 'adjacent to other waters of the United States,’ ” and held petitioners liable for violations of the CWA at those sites. Id., at B32-B35. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was federal jurisdiction over the wetlands at all three sites because “there were hydrological connections between all three sites and corresponding adjacent tributaries of navigable waters.” 376 F. 3d, at 643. Petitioners in No. 04-1384, the Carabells, were denied a permit to deposit fill material in a wetland located on a triangular parcel of land about one mile from Lake St. Clair. A man-made drainage ditch runs along one side of the wetland, separated from it by a 4-foot-wide man-made berm. The berm is largely or entirely impermeable to water and blocks drainage from the wetland, though it may permit occasional overflow to the ditch. The ditch empties into another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which empties into Lake St. Clair. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1384, pp. 2a-3a. After exhausting administrative appeals, the Carabell petitioners filed suit in the District Court, challenging the exercise of federal regulatory jurisdiction over their site. The District Court ruled that there was federal jurisdiction because the wetland “is adjacent to neighboring tributaries of navigable waters and has a significant nexus to ‘waters of the United States.’” Id., at 49a. Again the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Carabell wetland was “adjacent” to navigable waters. 391 F. 3d 704, 708 (2004) (Carabell). We granted certiorari and consolidated the cases, 546 U. S. 932 (2005), to decide whether these wetlands constitute “waters of the United States” under the Act, and if so, whether the Act is constitutional. Ill The Rapanos petitioners contend that the terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the United States” in the Act must be limited to the traditional definition of The Daniel Ball, which required that the “waters” be navigable in fact, or susceptible of being rendered so. See 10 Wall, at 563. But this definition cannot be applied wholesale to the CWA. The Act uses the phrase “navigable waters” as a defined term, and the definition is simply “the waters of the United States.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(7). Moreover, the Act provides, in certain circumstances, for the substitution of state for federal jurisdiction over “navigable waters ... other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce ... including wetlands adjacent thereto.” § 1344(g)(1) (emphasis added). This provision shows that the Act’s term “navigable waters” includes something more than traditional navigable waters. We have twice stated that the meaning of “navigable waters” in the Act is broader than the traditional understanding of that term, SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 167; Riverside Bayview, 474 U. S., at 133. We have also emphasized, however, that the qualifier “navigable” is not devoid of significance, SWANCC, supra, at 172. We need not decide the precise extent to which the qualifiers “navigable” and “of the United States” restrict the coverage of the Act. Whatever the scope of these qualifiers, the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over “waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(7). The only natural definition of the term “waters,” our prior and subsequent judicial constructions of it, clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court’s canons of construction all confirm that “the waters of the United States” in § 1362(7) cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps would give it. The Corps’ expansive approach might be arguable if the CWA defined “navigable waters” as “water of ±he United States.” But “the waters of the United States” is something else. The use of the definite article (“the”) and the plural number (“waters”) shows plainly that § 1362(7) does not refer to water in general. In this form, “the waters” refers more narrowly to water “[a]s found in streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” or “the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster’s Second). On this definition, “the waters of the United States” include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water. The definition refers to water as found in “streams,” “oceans,” “rivers,” “lakes,” and “bodies” of water “forming geographical features.” Ibid. All of these terms connote continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flows. Even the least substantial of the definition’s terms, namely, “streams,” connotes a continuous flow of water in a permanent channel— especially when used in company with other terms such as “rivers,” “lakes,” and “oceans.” None of these terms encompasses transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of water. The restriction of “the waters of the United States” to exclude channels containing merely intermittent or ephemeral flow also accords with the commonsense understanding of the term. In applying the definition to “ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,” storm sewers and culverts, “directional sheet flow during storm events,” drain tiles, man-made drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps has stretched the term “waters of the United States” beyond parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize this “Land Is Waters” approach to federal jurisdiction. In addition, the Act’s use of the traditional phrase “navigable waters” (the defined term) further confirms that it confers jurisdiction only over relatively permanent bodies of water. The Act adopted that traditional term from its predecessor statutes. See SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the traditional understanding, “navigable waters” included only discrete bodies of water. For example, in The Daniel Ball, we used the terms “waters” and “rivers” interchangeably. 10 Wall., at 563. And in Appalachian Electric, we consistently referred to the “navigable waters” as “waterways.” 311 U. S., at 407-409. Plainly, because such “waters” had to be navigable in fact or susceptible of being rendered so, the term did not include ephemeral flows. As we noted in SWANCC, the traditional term “navigable waters” — even though defined as “the waters of the United States” — carries some of its original substance: “[I]t is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever.” 531 U. S., at 172. That limited effect includes, at bare minimum, the ordinary presence of water. Our subsequent interpretation of the phrase “the waters of the United States” in the CWA likewise confirms this limitation of its scope. In Riverside Bayview, we stated that the phrase in the Act referred primarily to “rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters’” than the wetlands adjacent to such features. 474 U. S., at 131 (emphasis added). We thus echoed the dictionary definition of “waters” as referring to “streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.” Webster’s Second 2882 (emphasis added). Though we upheld in that case the inclusion of wetlands abutting such a “hydrographic featur[e]” — principally due to the difficulty of drawing any clear boundary between the two, see 474 U. S., at 132; Part IV, infra — nowhere did we suggest that “the waters of the United States” should be expanded to include, in their own right, entities other than “hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters,’” id., at 131. Likewise, in both Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, we repeatedly described the “navigable waters” covered by the Act as “open water” and “open waters.” See Riverside Bayview, supra, at 132, and n. 8, 134; SWANCC, supra, at 167, 172. Under no rational interpretation are typically dry channels described as “open waters.” Most significant of all, the CWA itself categorizes the channels and conduits that typicálly carry intermittent flows of water separately from “navigable waters,” by including them in the definition of “ ‘point source.’ ” The Act defines “ ‘point source’” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14). It also defines “ ‘discharge of a pollutant’ ” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” §1362(12)(A) (emphasis added). The definitions thus conceive of “point sources” and “navigable waters” as separate and distinct categories. The definition of “discharge” would make little sense if the two categories were significantly overlapping. The separate classification of “ditch[es], channels], and conduit[s]” — which are terms ordinarily used to describe the watercourses through which intermittent waters typically flow — shows that these are, by and large, not “waters of the United States.” Moreover, only the foregoing definition of “waters” is consistent with the CWA’s stated “policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . § 1251(b). This statement of policy was included in the Act as enacted in 1972, see 86 Stat. 816, prior to the addition of the optional state administration program in the 1977 amendments, see 91 Stat. 1601. Thus the policy plainly referred to something beyond the subsequently added state administration program of 33 U. S. C. § 1344(g)-(Z). But the expansive theory advanced by the Corps, rather than “preserving] the primary rights and responsibilities of the States,” would have brought virtually all “plan[ning of] the development and use ... of land and water resources” by the States under federal control. It is therefore an unlikely reading of the phrase “the waters of the United States.” Even if the phrase “the waters of the United States” were ambiguous as applied to intermittent flows, our own canons of construction would establish that the Corps’ interpretation of the statute is impermissible. As we noted in SWANCC, the Government’s expansive interpretation would “result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.” 531 U. S., at 174. Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a quintessential state and local power. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 767-768, n. 30 (1982); Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 44 (1994). The extensive federal jurisdiction urged by the Government would authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate land — an authority the agency has shown its willingness to exercise with the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning board. See 33 CFR § 320.4(a)(1) (2004). We ordinarily expect a “clear and manifest” statement from Congress to authorize an unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 544 (1994). The phrase “the waters of the United States” hardly qualifies. Likewise, just as we noted in SWANCC, the Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power and raises difficult questions about the ultimate scope of that power. See 531 U. S., at 173. (In developing the current regulations, the Corps consciously sought to extend its authority to the farthest reaches of the commerce power. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37127 (1977).) Even if the term “the waters of the United States” were ambiguous as applied to channels that sometimes host ephemeral flows of water (which it is not), we would expect a clearer statement from Congress to authorize an agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of constitutional validity. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). In sum, on its only plausible interpretation, the phrase “the waters of the United States” includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water “forming geographic features” that are described in ordinary parlance as “streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.” See Webster’s Second 2882. The phrase does not include channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall. The Corps’ expansive interpretation of the “the waters of the United States” is thus not “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). IV In Carabell, the Sixth Circuit held that the nearby ditch constituted a “tributary” and thus a “water of the United States” under 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(5). See 391 F. 3d, at 708-709. Likewise in Rapanos II, the Sixth Circuit held that the nearby ditches were “tributaries” under § 328.3(a)(5). 376 F. 3d, at 643. But Rapanos II also stated that, even if the ditches were not “waters of the United States,” the wetlands were “adjacent” to remote traditional navigable waters in virtue of the wetlands’ “hydrological connection” to them. See id., at 639-640. This statement reflects the practice of the Corps’ district offices, which may “assert jurisdiction over a wetland without regulating the ditch connecting it to a water of the United States.” GAO Report 23. We therefore address in this Part whether a wetland may be considered “adjacent to” remote “waters of the United States,” because of a mere hydrologic connection to them. In Riverside Bayview, we noted the textual difficulty in including “wetlands” as a subset of “waters”: “On a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable to classify ‘lands,’ wet or otherwise, as ‘waters.’ ” 474 U. S., at 132. We acknowledged, however, that there was an inherent ambiguity in drawing the boundaries of any “waters”: “[T]he Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs — in short, a huge array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the limit of ‘waters’ is far from obvious.” Ibid. Because of this inherent ambiguity, we deferred to the agency’s inclusion of wetlands “actually abut[ting]” traditional navigable waters: “Faced with such a problem of defining the bounds of its regulatory authority,” we held, the agency could reasonably conclude that a wetland that “adjoin[ed]” waters of the United States is itself a part of those waters. Id., at 132, 135, and n. 9. The difficulty of delineating the boundary between water and land was central to our reasoning in the case: “In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.” Id., at 134 (emphasis added). When we characterized the holding of Riverside Bayview in SWANCC, we referred to the close connection between waters and the wetlands that they gradually blend into: “It was the significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes.” 531 U. S., at 167 (emphasis added). In particular, SWANCC rejected the notion that the ecological considerations upon which the Corps relied in Riverside. Bayview — and upon which the dissent repeatedly relies today, see post, at 796, 797-798, 798-799, 800, 803, 806, 807, 809-810 — provided an independent basis for including entities like “wetlands” (or “ephemeral streams”) within the phrase “the waters of the United States.” SWANCC found such ecological considerations irrelevant to the question whether physically isolated waters come within the Corps’ jurisdiction. It thus confirmed that Riverside Bayview rested upon the inherent ambiguity in defining where water ends and abutting (“adjacent”) wetlands begin, permitting the Corps’ reliance on ecological considerations only to resolve that ambiguity in favor of treating all abutting wetlands as waters. Isolated ponds were not “waters of the United States” in their own right, see 531 U. S., at 167, 171, and presented no boundary-drawing problem that would have justified the invocation of ecological factors to treat them as such. Therefore, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are “waters of the United States” in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between “waters” and wetlands, are “adjacent to” such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to “waters of the United States” do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to covered waters that we described as a “significant nexus” in SWANCC. 531 U. S., at 167. Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the Rápanos and Carabell sites are covered by the Act requires two findings: first, that the adjacent channel contains a “wate[r] of the United States,” (i. e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the “water” ends and the “wetland” begins. V Respondents and their amici urge that such restrictions on the scope of “navigable waters” will frustrate enforcement against traditional water polluters under 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311 and 1342. Because the same definition of “navigable waters” applies to the entire statute, respondents contend that water polluters will be able to evade the permitting requirement of § 1342(a) simply by discharging their pollutants into noncovered intermittent watercourses that lie upstream of covered waters. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 74-75. That is not so. Though we do not decide this issue, there is no reason to suppose that our construction today significantly affects the enforcement of § 1342, inasmuch as lower courts applying §1342 have not characterized intermittent channels as “waters of the United States.” The Act does not forbid the “addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,” but rather the “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.” § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added); § 1311(a). Thus, from the time of the CWA’s enactment, lower courts have held that the discharge into intermittent channels of any pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if the pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit “directly into” covered waters, but pass “through conveyances” in between. United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945, 946-947 (WD Tenn. 1976) (a municipal sewer system separated the “point source” and covered navigable waters). See also Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F. 3d 1133, 1137, 1141 (CA10 2005) (2.5 miles of tunnel separated the “point source” and “navigable waters”). In fact, many courts have held that such upstream, intermittently flowing channels themselves constitute “point sources” under the Act. The definition of “point source” includes “any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14). We have held that the Act “makes plain that a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’” South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U. S. 95, 105 (2004). Cases holding the intervening channel to be a point source include United States v. Ortiz, 427 F. 3d 1278, 1281 (CA10 2005) (a storm drain that carried flushed chemicals from a toilet to the Colorado River was a “point source”), and Dague v. Burlington, 935 F. 2d 1343, 1354-1355 (CA2 1991) (a culvert connecting two bodies of navigable water was a “point source”), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U. S. 557 (1992). Some courts have even adopted both the “indirect discharge” rationale and the “point source” rationale in the alternative, applied to the same facts. See, e. g., Concerned Area Residents for Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F. 3d 114, 118-119 (CA2 1994). On either view, however, the lower courts have seen no need to classify the intervening conduits as “waters of the United States.” In contrast to the pollutants normally covered by the permitting requirement of § 1342(a), “dredged or fill material,” which is typically deposited for the sole purpose of staying put, does not normally wash downstream, and thus does not normally constitute an “addition ... to navigable waters” when deposited in upstream isolated wetlands. §§ 1344(a), 1362(12). The Act recognizes this distinction by providing a separate permitting program for such discharges in § 1344(a). It does not appear, therefore, that the interpretation we adopt today significantly reduces the scope of § 1342. Respondents also urge that the narrower interpretation of “waters” will impose a more difficult burden of proof in enforcement proceedings under §§ 1311(a) and 1342(a), by requiring the agency to demonstrate the downstream flow of the pollutant along the intermittent channel to traditional “waters.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 57. But, as noted above, the lower courts do not generally rely on characterization of intervening channels as “waters of the United States” in applying § 1311 to the traditional pollutants subject to § 1342. Moreover, the proof of downstream flow of pollutants required under § 1342 appears substantially similar, if not identical, to the proof of a hydrologic connection that would be required, on the Sixth Circuit’s theory of jurisdiction, to prove that an upstream channel or wetland is a “wate[r] of the United States.” See Rapanos II, 376 F. 3d, at 639. Compare, e. g., App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 04-1034, at Bll, B20, B26 (testimony of hydrologic connections based on observation of surface water connections), with Southview Farm, supra, at 118-121 (testimony of discharges based on observation of the flow of polluted water). In either case, the agency must prove that the contaminant-laden waters ultimately reach covered waters. Finally, respondents and many amici admonish that narrowing the definition of “the waters of the United States” will hamper federal efforts to preserve the Nation’s wetlands. It is not clear that the state and local conservation efforts that the CWA explicitly calls for, see 33 U. S. C. § 1251(b), are in any way inadequate for the goal of preservation. In any event, a Comprehensive National Wetlands Protection Act is not before us, and the “wis[dom]” of such a statute, post, at 805 (opinion of Stevens, J.), is beyond our ken. What is clear, however, is that Congress did not enact one when it granted the Corps jurisdiction over only “the waters of the United States.” VI In an opinion long on praise of environmental protection and notably short on analysis of the statutory text and structure, the dissent would hold that “the waters of the United States” include any wetlands “adjacent” (no matter how broadly defined) to “tributaries” (again, no matter how broadly defined) of traditional navigable waters. For legal support of its policy-laden conclusion, the dissent relies exclusively on two sources: “[o]ur unanimous opinion in Riverside Bayview,” post, at 792; and “Congress’ deliberate acquiescence in the Corps’ regulations in 1977,” post, at 797. Each of these is demonstrably inadequate to support the apparently limitless scope that the dissent would permit the Corps to give to the Act. A The dissent’s assertion that Riverside Bayview “squarely controls these cases,” post, at 792, is wholly implausible. First, Riverside Bayview could not possibly support the dissent’s acceptance of the Corps’ inclusion of dry beds as “tributaries,” post, at 804, because the definition of tributaries was not at issue in that case. Riverside Bayview addressed only the Act’s inclusion of wetlands abutting navigable-in-fact waters, and said nothing at all about what nonnavigable tributaries the Act might also cover. Riverside Bayview likewise provides no support for the dissent’s complacent acceptance of the Corps’ definition of “adjacent,” which (as noted above) has been extended beyond reason to include, inter alia, the 100-year floodplain of covered waters. See supra, at 728. The dissent notes that Riverside Bayview quoted without comment the Corps’ description of “adjacent” wetlands as those “ ‘that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters’... of the United States.” Post, at 793 (citing 474 U. S., at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37128)). As we have already discussed, this quotation provides no support for the inclusion of physically unconnected wetlands as covered “waters.” See supra, at 741, n. 10. The dissent relies principally on a footnote in Riverside Bayview recognizing that “ ‘not every adjacent wetland is of great importance to the environment of adjoining bodies of water,’ ” and that all “ ‘adjacent’ ” wetlands are nevertheless covered by the Act, post, at 793 (quoting 474 U. S., at 135, n. 9). Of course, this footnote says nothing to support the dissent’s broad definition of “adjacent” — quite the contrary, the quoted sentence uses “adjacent” and “adjoining” interchangeably, and the footnote qualifies a sentence holding that the wetland was covered “fbjecause” it “actually abutfted] on a navigable waterway.” Id., at 135 (emphasis added). Moreover, that footnote’s assertion that the Act may be interpreted to include even those adjoining wetlands that are “lacking in importance to the aquatic environment,” id., at 135, n. 9, confirms that the scope of ambiguity of “the waters of the United States” is determined by a wetland’s physical connection to covered waters, not its ecological relationship thereto. The dissent reasons (1) that Riverside Bayview held that “the waters of the United States” include “adjacent wetlands,” and (2) we must defer to the Corps’ interpretation of the ambiguous word “adjacent.” Post, at 805-806. But this is mere legerdemain. The phrase “adjacent wetlands” is not part of the statutory definition that the Corps is authorized to interpret, which refers only to “the waters of the United States,” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(7). In expounding the term “adjacent” as used in Riverside Bayview, we are explaining our own prior use of that word to interpret the definitional phrase “the waters of the United States.” However ambiguous the term may be in the abstract, as we have explained earlier, “adjacent” as used in Riverside Bayview is not ambiguous between “physically abutting” and merely “nearby.” See supra, at 740-742. The dissent would distinguish SWANCC on the ground that it “had nothing to say about wetlands,” post, at 794— i. e., it concerned “isolated ponds” rather than isolated wetlands. This is the ultimate distinction without a difference. If isolated “permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size ... and depth,” 531 U. S., at 163 — which, after all, might at least be described as “waters” in their own right — did not constitute “waters of the United States,” a fortiori, isolated swampy lands do not constitute “waters of the United States.” See also 474 U. S., at 132. As the author of today’s dissent has written, “[i]f, as I believe, actually navigable waters lie at the very heart of Congress’ commerce power and 'isolated,’ nonnavigable waters lie closer to . . . the margin, 'isolated wetlands,’ which are themselves only marginally 'waters,’ are the most marginal category of 'waters of the United States’ potentially covered by the statute.” 531 U. S., at 187, n. 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only other ground that the dissent offers to distinguish SWANCC is that, unlike the ponds in SWANCC, the wetlands in these cases are “adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries” — where “adjacent” may be interpreted who-knows-how broadly. It is not clear why roughly defined physical proximity should make such a difference — without actual abutment, it raises no boundary-drawing ambiguity, and it is undoubtedly a poor proxy for ecological significance. In fact, though the dissent is careful to restrict its discussion to wetlands “adjacent” to tributaries, its reasons for including those wetlands are strictly ecological — such wetlands would be included because they “serve . . . important water quality roles,” post, at 796, and “play important roles in the watershed,” post, at 803. This reasoning would swiftly overwhelm SWANCC altogether; after all, the ponds at issue in SWANCC could, no less than the wetlands in these cases, “offer ‘nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic or land species,’” and “‘serve as valuable storage areas for storm and flood waters,’ ” post, at 796. The dissent’s exclusive focus on ecological factors, combined with its total deference to the Corps’ ecological judgments, would permit the Corps to regulate the entire country as “waters of the United States.” B Absent a plausible ground in our case law for its sweeping position, the dissent relies heavily on “Congress’ deliberate acquiescence in the Corps’ regulations in 1977,” post, at 797 — noting that “[w]e found [this acquiescence] significant in Riverside Bay view,” and even “acknowledged in SWANCC” that we had done so, ibid. SWANCC “acknowledged” that Riverside Bayview had relied on congressional acquiescence only to criticize that reliance. It reasserted in no uncertain terms our oft-expressed skepticism toward reading the tea leaves of congressional inaction: “Although we have recognized congressional acquiescence to administrative interpretations of a statute in some situations, we have done so with extreme care. Failed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute. . . . The relationship between the actions and inactions of the 95th Congress and the intent of the 92d Congress in passing [§ 1344(a)] is also considerably attenuated. Because subsequent history is less illuminating than the contemporaneous evidence, respondents face a difficult task in overcoming the plain text and import of [§ 1344(a)].” 531 U. S., at 169-170 (brackets, citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted). Congress takes no governmental áction except by legislation. What the dissent refers to as “Congress’ deliberate acquiescence” should more appropriately be called Congress’s failure to express any opinion. We have no idea whether the Members’ failure to act in 1977 was attributable to their belief that the Corps’ regulations were correct, or rather to their belief that the courts would eliminate any excesses, or indeed simply to their unwillingness to confront the environmental lobby. To be sure, we have sometimes relied on congressional acquiescence when there is evidence that Congress considered and rejected the “precise issue” presented before the Court, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 600 (1983) (emphasis added). However, “[a]bsent such overwhelming evidence of acquiescence, we are loath to replace the plain text and original understanding of a statute with an amended agency interpretation.” SWANCC, supra, at 169-170, n. 5 (emphasis added). The dissent falls far short of producing “overwhelming evidence” that Congress considered and failed to act upon the “precise issue” before the Court today — namely, what constitutes an “adjacent” wetland covered by the Act. Citing Riverside Bayview’s account of the 1977 debates, the dissent claims nothing more than that Congress “conducted extensive debates about the Corps’ regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands [and] rejected efforts to limit that jurisdiction____” Post, at 797. In fact, even that vague description goes too far. As recounted in Riverside Bayview, the 1977 debates concerned a proposal to “limi[t] the Corps’ authority under [§ 1344] to waters navigable in fact and their adjacent wetlands (defined as wetlands periodically inundated by contiguous navigable waters),” 474 U. S., at 136. In rejecting this proposal, Congress merely failed to enact a limitation of “waters” to include only navigable-in-fact waters — an interpretation we affirmatively reject today, see supra, at 731 — and a definition of wetlands based on “periodi[e] inundation]” that appears almost nowhere in the briefs or opinions of these cases. No plausible interpretation of this legislative inaction can construe it as an implied endorsement of every jot and tittle of the Corps’ 1977 regulations. In fact, Riverside Bayview itself relied on this legislative inaction only as “at least some evidence of the reasonableness” of the agency’s inclusion of adjacent wetlands under the Act, 474 U. S., at 137, and for the observation that “even those who would have restricted the reach of the Corps’ jurisdiction” would not have excised adjacent wetlands, ibid. Both of these conclusions are perfectly consistent with our interpretation, and neither illuminates the disputed question of what constitutes an “adjacent” wetland. C In a curious appeal to entrenched executive error, the dissent contends that “the appropriateness of the Corps’ 30-year implementation of the Clean Water Act should be addressed to Congress or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary.” Post, at 799; see also post, at 787-788, 807. Surely this is a novel principle of administrative law — a sort of 30-year adverse possession that insulates disregard of statutory text from judicial review. It deservedly has no precedent in our jurisprudence. We did not invoke such a principle in SWANCC, when we invalidated one aspect of the Corps’ implementation. The dissent contends that “[bjecause there is ambiguity in the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ and because interpreting it broadly to cover such ditches and streams advances the purpose of the Act, the Corps’ approach should command our deference.” Post, at 804. Two defects in a single sentence: “[WJaters of the United States” is in some respects ambiguous. The scope of that ambiguity, however, does not conceivably extend to whether storm drains and dry ditches are “waters,” and hence does not support the Corps’ interpretation. And as for advancing “the purpose of the Act”: We have often criticized that last resort of extravagant interpretation, noting that no law pursues its purpose at all costs, and that the textual limitations upon a law’s scope are no less a part of its “purpose” than its substantive authorizations. See, e. g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 135-136 (1995). Finally, we could not agree more with the dissent’s statement, post, at 799, that “[wjhether the benefits of particular conservation measures outweigh their costs is a classic question of public policy that should not be answered by appointed judges.” Neither, however, should it be answered by appointed officers of the Corps of Engineers in contradiction of congressional direction. It is the dissent’s opinion, and not ours, which appeals not to a reasonable interpretation of enacted text, but to the great environmental benefits that a patently unreasonable interpretation can achieve. We have begun our discussion by mentioning, to be sure, the high costs imposed by that interpretation — but they are in no way the basis for our decision, which rests, plainly and simply, upon the limited meaning that can be borne by the phrase “waters of the United States.” VII Justice Kennedy’s opinion concludes that our reading of the Act “is inconsistent with its text, structure, and purpose.” Post, at 776. His own opinion, however, leaves the Act’s “text” and “structure” virtually unaddressed, and rests its case upon an interpretation of the phrase “significant nexus,” ibid., which appears in one of our opinions. To begin with, Justice Kennedy’s reading of “significant nexus” bears no easily recognizable relation to either the case that used it (SWANCC) or to the earlier case that that case purported to be interpreting (Riverside Bayview). . To establish a “significant nexus,” Justice Kennedy would require the Corps to “establish ... on a case-by-case basis” that wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’” Post, at 782, 780. This standard certainly does not come from Riverside Bayview, which explicitly rejected such case-by-case determinations of ecological significance for the jurisdictional question whether a wetland is covered, holding instead that all physically connected wetlands are covered. 474 U. S., at 135, n. 9. It is true enough that one reason for accepting that physical-connection criterion was the likelihood that a physically connected wetland would have an ecological effect upon the adjacent waters. But case-by-case determination of ecological effect was not the test. Likewise, that test cannot be derived from SWANCC’s characterization of Riverside Bayview, which emphasized that the wetlands which possessed a “significant nexus” in that earlier case “actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” 531 U. S., at 167, and which specifically rejected the argument that physically unconnected ponds could be included based on their ecological connection to covered waters. In fact, Justice Kennedy acknowledges that neither Riverside Bayview nor SWANCC required, for wetlands abutting navigable-in-fact waters, the case-by-case ecological determination that he proposes for wetlands that neighbor non-navigable tributaries. See post, at 780. Thus, JUSTICE Kennedy misreads SWANCC’,s “significant nexus” statement as mischaracterizing Riverside Bayview to adopt a case-by-case test of ecological significance; and then transfers that standard to a context that Riverside Bayview expressly declined to address (namely, wetlands nearby non-navigable tributaries); while all the time conceding that this standard does not apply in the context that Riverside Bay-view did address (wetlands abutting navigable waterways). Truly, this is “turtles all the way down.” But misreading our prior decisions is not the principal problem. The principal problem is reading them in utter isolation from the text of the Act. One would think, after reading Justice Kennedy’s exegesis, that, the crucial provision of the text of the CWA was a jurisdictional requirement of “significant nexus” between wetlands and navigable waters. In fact, however, that phrase appears nowhere in the Act, but is taken from SWANCC’s cryptic characterization of the holding of Riverside Bayview. Our interpretation of the phrase is both consistent with those opinions and compatible with what the Act does establish as the jurisdictional criterion: “waters of the United States.” Wetlands are “waters of the United States” if they bear the “significant nexus” of physical connection, which makes them as a practical matter indistinguishable from waters of the United States. What other nexus could conceivably cause them to be “waters of the United States”? Justice Kennedy’s test is that they, “either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable,’” post, at 780 (emphasis added). But what possible linguistic usage would accept that whatever (alone or in combination) affects waters of the United States is waters of the United States? Only by ignoring the text of the statute and by assuming that the phrase of SWANCC (“significant nexus”) can properly be interpreted in isolation from that text does JUSTICE Kennedy reach the conclusion he has arrived at. Instead of limiting its meaning by reference to the text it was applying, he purports to do so by reference to what he calls the “purpose” of the statute. Its purpose is to clean up the waters of the United States, and therefore anything that might “significantly affect” the purity of those waters bears a “significant nexus” to those waters, and thus (he never says this, but the text of the statute demands that he mean it) is those waters. This is the familiar tactic of substituting the purpose of the statute for its text, freeing the Court to write a different statute that achieves the same purpose. To begin with, as we have discussed earlier, clean water is not the only purpose of the statute. So is the preservation of primary state responsibility for ordinary land-use decisions. 33 U. S. C. § 1251(b). Justice Kennedy’s test takes no account of this purpose. More fundamentally, however, the test simply rewrites the statute, using for that purpose the gimmick of “significant nexus.” It would have been an easy matter for Congress to give the Corps jurisdiction over all wetlands (or, for that matter, all dry lands) that “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of” waters of the United States. It did not do that, but instead explicitly limited jurisdiction to “waters of the United States.” Justice Kennedy’s disposition would disallow some of the Corps’ excesses, and in that respect is a more moderate flouting of statutory command than Justice Stevens’. In another respect, however, it is more extreme. At least Justice Stevens can blame his implausible reading of the statute upon the Corps. His error consists of giving that agency more deference than reason permits. Justice Kennedy, however, has devised his new statute all on his own. It purports to be, not a grudging acceptance of an agency’s close-to-the-edge expansion of its own powers, but rather the most reasonable interpretation of the law. It is far from that, unless whatever affects waters is waters. VIII Because the Sixth Circuit applied the wrong standard to determine if these wetlands are covered “waters of the United States,” and because of the paucity of the record in both of these cases, the lower courts should determine, in the first instance, whether the ditches or drains near each wetland are “waters” in the ordinary sense of containing a relatively permanent flow; and (if they are) whether the wetlands in question are “adjacent” to these “waters” in the sense of possessing a continuous surface connection that creates the boundary-drawing problem we addressed in Riverside Bayview. * * * We vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit in both No. 04-1034 and No. 04-1384, and remand both cases for further proceedings. It is so ordered. In issuing permits, the Corps directs that “[a]ll factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economies, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people.” § 320.4(a). We are indebted to the Sonoran court for a famous exchange, from the movie Casablanca (Warner Bros. 1942), which portrays most vividly the absurdity of finding the desert filled with waters: “ ‘Captain Renault [Claude Rains]: “What in heaven’s name brought you to Casablanca?” “‘Rick [Humphrey Bogart]: “My health. I came to Casablanca for the waters.” “ ‘Captain Renault: “The waters? What waters? We’re in the desert.” “ ‘Rick: “I was misinformed.” ’ ” 408 F. 3d, at 1117. One possibility, which we ultimately find unsatisfactory, is that the “other” waters covered by 33 U. S. C. § 1344(g)(1) are strictly intrastate waters that are traditionally navigable. But it would be unreasonable to interpret “the waters of the United States” to include all and only traditional navigable waters, both interstate and intrastate. This would preserve the traditional import of the qualifier “navigable” in the defined term “navigable waters,” at the cost of depriving the qualifier “of the United States” in the definition of all meaning. As traditionally understood, the latter qualifier excludes intrastate waters, whether navigable or not. See The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871). In SWANCC, we held that “navigable” retained something of its traditional import. 531 U. S., at 172. A fortiori, the phrase “of the United States” in the definition retains some of its traditional meaning. Justice Kennedy observes, post, at 770 (opinion concurring in judgment), that the dictionary approves an alternative, somewhat poetic usage of “waters” as connoting “[a] flood or inundation; as the waters have fallen. ‘The peril of waters, wind, and rocks.' Shak." Webster’s Second 2882. It seems to us wholly unreasonable to interpret the statute as regulating only “floods” and “inundations” rather than traditional waterways — and strange to suppose that Congress had waxed Shakespearean in the definition section of an otherwise prosaic, indeed downright tedious, statute. The duller and more commonplace meaning is obviously intended. By describing “waters” as “relatively permanent,” we do not necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought. We also do not necessarily exclude seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during dry months — such as the 290-day, continuously flowing stream postulated by Justice Stevens’ dissent (hereinafter the dissent), post, at 800. Common sense and common usage distinguish between a wash and seasonal river. Though scientifically precise distinctions between “perennial” and “intermittent” flows are no doubt available, see, e. g., Dept, of Interior, U. S. Geological Survey, E. Hedman & W. Osterkamp, Streamflow Characteristics Related to Channel Geometry of Streams in Western United States 15 (1982) (Water-Supply Paper 2193), we have no occasion in this litigation to decide exactly when the drying-up of a streambed is continuous and frequent enough to disqualify the channel as a “wate[r] of the United States.” It suffices for present purposes that channels containing permanent flow are plainly within the definition, and that the dissent’s “intermittent” and “ephemeral” streams, post, at 801 — that is, streams whose flow is “[doming and going at intervals ... [b]roken, fitful,” Webster’s Second 1296, or “existing only, or no longer than, a day; diurnal. . . short-lived,” id., at 857 — are not. The principal definition of “stream” likewise includes reference to such permanent, geographically fixed bodies of water: “[a] current or course of water or other fluid, flowing on the earth, as a river, brook, etc.” Id., at 2493 (emphasis added). The other definitions of “stream” repeatedly emphasize the requirement of continuous flow: “[a] steady flow, as of water, air, gas, or the like”; “[a]nything issuing or moving with continued succession of parts”; “[a] continued current or course; current; drift.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The definition of the verb form of “stream” contains a similar emphasis on continuity: “[t]o issue or flow in a stream; to issue freely or move in a continuous flow or course.” Ibid, (emphasis added). On these definitions, therefore, the Corps’ phrases “intermittent streams,” 33 CFR §328.3(a)(3) (2004), and “ephemeral streams,” 65 Fed. Reg. 12823 (2000), are — like Senator Bentsen’s “ ‘flowing gullies,’ ” post, at 801, n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.) — useful oxymora. Properly speaking, such' entities constitute extant “streams” only while they are “continuously] ñow[ing]”; and the usually dry channels that contain them are never “streams.” Justice Kennedy apparently concedes that “an intermittent flow can constitute a stream” only “while it is flowing,” post, at 770 (emphasis added) — which would mean that the channel is a “water” covered by the Act only during those times when water flow actually occurs. But no one contends that federal jurisdiction appears and evaporates along with the water in such regularly dry channels. It is of course true, as the dissent and Justice Kennedy both observe, that ditches, channels, conduits and the like “can all hold water permanently as well as intermittently,” post, at 802 (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also post, at 771-772 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). But when they do, we usually refer to them as “rivers,” “creeks,” or “streams.” A permanently flooded ditch around a castle is technically a “ditch,” but (because it is permanently filled with water) we normally describe it as a “moat.” See Webster’s Second 1575. ■ And a permanently flooded man-made ditch used for navigation is normally described, not as a “ditch,” but as a “canal.” See id., at 388. Likewise, an open channel through which water permanently flows is ordinarily described as a “stream,” not as a “channel,” because of the continuous presence of water. This distinction is particularly apt in the context of a statute regulating water quality, rather than (for example) the shape of streambeds. Cf. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 454-456 (1879) (referring to man-made channels as “ditches” when the alleged injury arose from physical damage to the banks of the ditch); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U. S. 700, 709 (1994) (referring to a water-filled tube as a “tunnel” in order to describe the shape of the conveyance, not the fact that it was water-filled), both cited post, at 802, n. 12 (opinion of Stevens, J.). On its only natural reading, such a statute that treats “waters” separately from “ditch[es], channel[s], tunnel[s], and eonduit[s],” thereby distinguishes between continuously flowing “waters” and channels containing only an occasional or intermittent flow. It is also true that highly artificial, manufactured, enclosed conveyance systems — such as “sewage treatment plants,” post, at 772 (opinion of Kennedy, J.), and the “mains, pipes, hydrants, machinery, buildings, and other appurtenances and incidents” of the city of Knoxville’s “system of waterworks,” Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 27 (1906), cited post, at 802, n. 12 (opinion of Stevens, J.) — likely do not qualify as “waters of the United States,” despite the fact that they may contain continuous flows of water. See post, at 772 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); post, at 802, n. 12 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But this does not contradict our interpretation, which asserts that relatively continuous flow is a necessary condition for qualification as a “water,” not an adequate condition. Just as ordinary usage does not treat typically dry beds as “waters,” so also it does not treat such elaborate, man-made, enclosed systems as “waters” on a par with “streams,” “rivers,” and “oceans.” Justice Kennedy contends that the Corps’ preservation of the “responsibilities and rights” of the States is adequately demonstrated by the fact that “33 States plus the District of Columbia have filed an amici brief in this litigation” in favor of the Corps’ interpretation, post, at 777. But it makes no difference to the statute’s stated purpose of preserving States’ “responsibilities and rights,” § 1251(b), that some States wish to unburden themselves of them. Legislative and executive officers of the States may be content to leave “responsibility]” with the Corps because it is attractive to shift to another entity controversial decisions disputed between politically powerful, rival interests. That, however, is not what the statute provides. Justice Kennedy objects that our reliance on these two dear-statement rules is inappropriate because “the plurality’s interpretation does not fit the avoidance concerns that it raises,” post, at 776 — that is, because our resolution both eliminates some jurisdiction that is clearly constitutional and traditionally federal, and retains some that is questionably constitutional and traditionally local. But a elear-statement rule can carry one only so far as the statutory text permits. Our resolution, unlike Justice Kennedy’s, keeps both the overinclusion and the underinelusion to the minimum consistent with the statutory text. Justice Kennedy’s reading — despite disregarding the text — fares no better than ours as a precise “fit” for the “avoidance concerns” that he also acknowledges. He admits, post, at 782, that “the significant-nexus requirement may not align perfectly with the traditional extent of federal authority” over navigable waters — an admission that “tests the limits of understatement,” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 286 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) — and it aligns even worse with the preservation of traditional state land-use regulation. “Since the wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview actually abutted waters of the United States, the case could not possibly have held that merely “neighboring” wetlands came within the Corps’ jurisdiction. Obiter approval of that proposition might be inferred, however, from the opinion’s quotation without comment of a statement by the Corps describing covered “adjacent” wetlands as those “ ‘that form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the United States.’ ” 474 U. S., at 134 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37128 (1977); emphasis added). The opinion immediately reiterated, however, that adjacent wetlands could be regarded as “the waters of the United States” in view of “the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters,” 474 U. S., at 134 — a rationale that would have no application to physically separated “neighboring” wetlands. Given that the wetlands at issue in Riverside Bayview themselves “actually abut[ted] on a navigable waterway,” id., at 135; given that our opinion recognized that unconnected wetlands could not naturally be characterized as “ ‘waters’ ” at all, id., at 132; and given the repeated reference to the difficulty of determining where waters end and wetlands begin; the most natural reading of the opinion is that a wetlands’ mere “reasonable proximity” to waters of the United States is not enough to confer Corps jurisdiction. In any event, as discussed in our immediately following text, any possible ambiguity has been eliminated by SWANCC, 531 U. S. 159 (2001). The dissent argues that “the very existence of words like ‘alluvium’ and ‘silt’ in our language suggests that at least some [dredged or fill material] makes its way downstream,” post, at 807 (citation omitted). See also post, at 774-775 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). By contrast, amici cite multiple empirical analyses that contradict the dissent’s philological approach to sediment erosion — including one which concludes that “[t]he idea that the discharge of dredged or fill material into isolated waters, ephemeral drains or non-tidal ditches will pollute navigable waters located any appreciable distance from them lacks credibility.” R. Pierce, Technical Principles Related to Establishing the Limits of Jurisdiction for Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 34-40 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.wetland training.com/tpreljscwa.pdf, cited in Brief for International Council of Shopping Centers et al. as Amici Curiae 26-27; Brief for Pulte Homes, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 20-21; Brief for Foundation for Environmental and Economic Progress et al. as Amici Curiae 29, and n. 53 (“Fill material does not migrate”). Such scientific analysis is entirely unnecessary, however, to reach the unremarkable conclusion that the deposit of mobile pollutants into upstream ephemeral channels is naturally described as an “addition ... to navigable waters,” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(12), while the deposit of stationary fill material generally is not. Nor does the passing reference to “wetlands adjacent thereto” in § 1344(g)(1) purport to expand that statutory definition. As the dissent concedes, post, at 805, that reference merely confirms that the statutory definition can be read to include some wetlands — namely, those that directly “abut” covered waters. Riverside Bayview explicitly acknowledged that § 1344(g)(1) “does not conclusively determine the construction to be placed on the use of the term ‘waters’ elsewhere in the Act (particularly in [§1862(7)], which contains the relevant definition of ‘navigable waters’); however, ... it does at least suggest strongly that the term ‘waters’ as used in the Act does not necessarily exclude ‘wetlands.’ ” 474 U. S., at 138, n. 11 (emphasis added). The sole exception is in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which argues that Riverside Bayview rejected our physical-connection requirement by accepting as a given that any wetland formed by inundation from covered waters (whether or not continuously connected to them) is covered by the Act: “The Court in Riverside Bayview ... did not suggest that a flood-based origin would not support jurisdiction; indeed, it presumed the opposite. See 474 U. S., at 134 (noting that the Corps’ view was valid ‘even for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation’ (emphasis added)).” Post, at 773. Of course Justice Kennedy himself fails to observe this supposed presumption, since his “significant nexus” test makes no exception for wetlands created by inundation. In any event, the language from Riverside Bayview in Justice Kennedy’s parenthetical is wrenched out of context. The sentence which Justice Kennedy quotes in part immediately followed the Court’s conclusion that “adjacent” wetlands are included because of “the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters,” 474 U. S., at 134. And the full sentence reads as follows: “This holds true even for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation by water having its source in adjacent bodies of open water,” ibid, (emphasis added). Clearly, the “wetlands” referred to in the sentence are only “adjacent” wetlands — namely, those with the continuous physical connection that the rest of the Riverside Bayview opinion required, see supra, at 740-742. Thus, it is evident that the quoted language was not at all a rejection of the physical-connection requirement, but rather a rejection of the alternative position (which had been adopted by the lower court in that case, see 474 U. S., at 125) that the only covered wetlands are those created by inundation. As long as the wetland is “adjacent” to covered waters, said Riverside Bayview, its creation vel non by inundation is irrelevant. The allusion is to a classic story told in different forms and attributed to various authors. See, e. g., Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in The Interpretation of Cultures 28-29 (1973). In our favored version, an Eastern guru affirms that the earth is supported on the back of a tiger. When asked what supports the tiger, he says it stands upon an elephant; and when asked what supports the elephant he says it is a giant turtle. When asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly taken aback, but quickly replies “Ah, after that it is turtles all the way down.” It is unclear how much more moderate the flouting is, since Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard is perfectly opaque. When, exactly, does a wetland “significantly affect” covered waters, and when are its effects “in contrast . . . speculative or insubstantial”? Post, at 780. Justice Kennedy does not tell us clearly — except to suggest, post, at 782, that “ ‘ “isolated” is generally a matter of degree’ ” (quoting Leibowitz & Nadeau, Isolated Wetlands: State-of-the-Science and Future Directions, 23 Wetlands 663, 669 (2003)). As the dissent hopefully observes, post, at 808, such an unverifiable standard is not likely to constrain an agency whose disregard for the statutory language has been so long manifested. In fact, by stating that “[i]n both the consolidated eases before the Court the record contains evidence suggesting the possible existence of a significant nexus according to the principles outlined above,” post, at 783, Justice Kennedy tips a wink at the agency, inviting it to try its same expansive reading again.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC., et al. v. WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, INC., et al. No. 76-1121. Argued December 5, 1977 Reargued March 20, 1978 Decided June 21, 1978 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BtjRger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and RehNquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 438. Norton J. Come reargued the cause for petitioner in No. 76-1162. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, and John G. Elligers. Harry J. Keaton reargued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 76-1153. Charles G. Bakaly reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 76-1121. With him on the briefs was Gordon E. Krischer. Julius Reich reargued the cause for respondent Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., in all cases. With him on the briefs was Paul P. Selvin. Laurence Gold reargued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief was /. Albert Woll. Together with No. 76-1153, Association of Motion Picture & Television Producers, Inc. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al.; and No. 76-1162, National Labor Relations Board v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Me. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this litigation is whether a labor union commits an unfair labor practice when it disciplines a member who is a supervisory employee for crossing the union’s picket line during a strike and performing his regular supervisory duties, which include the adjustment of grievances. I Respondent Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. (hereafter respondent), represents persons hired to perform writing functions for employers engaged in the production of motion pictures and television films, and in 1973 had contracts with certain petitioners that were about to expire. Petitioner in No. 76-1153 is the Association of Motion Picture and Television Producers, Inc., whose members are engaged in the production of motion pictures and television films. Petitioner represents its members in the negotiation and administration of collective-bargaining contracts. The three television networks, NBC, CBS, and ABC, petitioners in No. 76-1121, are also engaged in the production of television films and negotiate and administer collective-bargaining contracts. In March 1973, respondent engaged in a strike against both of these groups of petitioners, picketed the various premises, and issued strike rules that it enforced against its own members. It is this action which gave rise to this case. Among respondent’s members are a substantial number of persons who were engaged by petitioners primarily to perform executive and supervisory functions including the selection and direction of writers and including certain limited writing duties. These persons are referred to as “hyphenates” and include various categories of producers, directors, and story editors. Although the primary function of hyphenates is not to write, they do perform minor writing tasks (referred to in the contract as “A to H” functions) that are an integral part of their primary duties and that expressly are not covered by the contracts between petitioners and respondent. Only in the event hyphenates are assigned or employed by petitioners to perform additional writing services are the rates for such services governed by the collective-bargaining contracts with respondent. In connection with the performance of their regular, primary duties, which, with the limited exception noted, do not include writing services, many, but not all, hyphenates are represented by labor organizations other than respondent. Some of the contracts between these other organizations and petitioners contained no-strike clauses when the events involved herein occurred. Certain hyphenates were pressured by these other labor organizations to honor these no-strike pledges by reporting to work. Respondent, meanwhile, was preparing its own kinds of pressure to keep the hyphenates from working. In preparation for the strike, respondent issued and distributed to its members, including the hyphenates, some 31 strike rules. The rules, among other things, forbade any act prejudicial to the welfare of respondent such as conduct tending to defeat a strike or to weaken its effectiveness (Rule 1); prohibited all members “from crossing a picket line which is established by the Guild at any entrance” of a struck premises (Rule 12); forbade the entry of any struck premises for certain purposes and required notice to respondent when entry was made for other purposes (Rule 13); and obliged members to accept picket duty when assigned by respondent (Rule 28). Another rule (Rule 30), rescinded midway in the strike, provided that no member could work with any individual, including the writer-executive, who had violated union strike rules. The strike rules' applicability to hyphenates was made clear in Rule 24: “All members, regardless of the capacity in which they are working, are bound by all strike rules and regulations in the same manner and to the same extent as members who confine their efforts to writing.” The rules were widely publicized, and respondent repeatedly emphasized, orally and in writing, that it would enforce the rules against hyphenates. Nor could a hyphenate escape those strictures by resigning, for it was respondent’s policy, once the strike was under way, not to permit withdrawal from the union, then or for six months following the completion of negotiations. Petitioners, however, informed the hyphenates that petitioners’ operations were continuing and that the hyphenates were expected to report for work and perform their regular supervisory functions. Petitioners were careful to assure that hyphenates would not be requested to perform writing duties covered by the union contract. Some hyphenates went to work, informing their employers, as respondent knew, that they would perform only their primary duties as producer, director, or story editor. Others refrained from reporting for work. Between April 6 and November 8, 1973, respondent notified more than 30 hyphenates who returned to work that they had been charged with violating one or more of the strike rules. Most often, the charges related to Rules 1, 12, and 13. Various disciplinary trials ensued. In these proceedings, the evidence was that the hyphenates who returned to duty performed only the normal functions of the supervisory positions for which they were employed. There was no proof that hyphenates performed any work covered by the recently terminated contracts between petitioners and respondent. As the Administrative Law Judge observed, respondent “for the most part professed little or no interest in what kind of work was done during the strike” by the hyphenates who chose to work. Between June 25 and September 28, 1973, various penalties were imposed by respondent as the result of these disciplinary proceedings. The penalties included expulsions, suspensions, and quite substantial fines. Meanwhile, the Association and network petitioners had filed unfair labor practice charges, and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board had issued complaints against respondent charging violations of §8 (b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1)(B), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ... to restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.” Extensive hearings followed, the Administrative Law Judge ultimately recommending that the charges be sustained and making findings and conclusions that were adopted by the National Labor Relations Board. These findings included an analysis of the primary functions for which the hyphenates were employed. It was concluded that all of the producers, directors, and story editors involved were employed to perform supervisory functions and were supervisors within the meaning of § 2 (11) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (11). It was also found that the hyphenates in each of these categories regularly had the authority and the task of adjusting grievances. “It is clear, as has been found, that the normal performance of the hyphenates’ primary functions involves the adjustment of employee grievances, and, in the case of producers on distant location, to engage in collective bargaining with labor organizations.” Furthermore, the record indicated that “during the strike, where the situation arose, the hyphenates dealt with grievances of employees who worked during the strike, or, in any event, were available to deal with such matters in their normal capacities when and if such grievances arose.” It was also found that the hyphenates who reported for duty during the strike performed only their primary functions and did not engage in writing or do any work that had been covered by respondent’s collective-bargaining contract. Significantly, none of the hyphenates was charged with violating the strike rule forbidding the performance of writing functions for a struck employer. During the disciplinary hearings, respondent was “not concerned with what work the hyphenates did when working during the strike,” although it would have been quite easy to determine these facts from testimony of union writers about what work was found completed upon their return. The ultimate factual conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge were that the hyphenates were supervisors "selected by their employers to adjust grievances”; that in issuing strike rules and engaging in other conduct designed to compel the hyphenates to refrain from working respondent had “restrained and coerced the hyphenates from performing managerial and supervisory services for their employers during the strike, including the adjustment of employee grievances and participation in collective bargaining,” and had thus “coerced and restrained those employers in the selection of representatives for collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances within the meaning of Section 8 (b)(1)(B)”; and that by charging, trying, and disciplining the hyphenates who chose to work and who, the Administrative Law Judge found, “performed managerial and supervisory functions including the adjustment of grievances on collective bargaining as required, and did not perform rank and file work,” respondent “further coerced and restrained the employers” within the meaning of § 8 (b)(1) (B). In arriving at these conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge rejected the claim that Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790 (1974) (FP&L), required a contrary result, saying that respondent’s conduct “violated the plain meaning of the statute without the necessity of resort to statutory exegesis.” On exceptions and supporting briefs, a majority of a three-member panel of the Board, except in one respect, adopted as its own the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. The Board also reasoned that FP&L, which involved supervisors who performed bargaining-unit work, did not extend to cases where union discipline was imposed upon supervisors who performed only their ordinary supervisorial functions (including the adjustment of grievances). The Board relied upon two of its cases decided subsequent to FP&L: Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 (Hammond Publishers, Inc.), 216 N. L. R. B. 903 (1975); New York Typographical Union No. 6, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO (Daily Racing Form, a subsidiary of Triangle Publishers, Inc.), 216 N. L. R. B. 896 (1975). On application to review by the networks and the Board’s application to enforce, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforcement in a brief per curiam opinion indicating that, like the dissenting member of the Board, it considered FP&L, supra, to bar the results reached by the Board in this case. 547 F. 2d 159 (1976). We granted the petitions for certiorari of the Board as well as of the Association and the networks because of an apparent conflict between the decision below and decisions in other Courts of Appeals and because of the recurring nature of the issue. 430 U. S. 982(1977). II As the Court has set out in greater detail in its comprehensive review of § 8 (b) (1) (B) in FP&L, the prohibition against restraining or coercing an employer in the selection of his bargaining representative was, until 1968, applied primarily to pressures exerted by the union directly upon the employer to force him into a multiemployer bargaining unit or otherwise to dictate or control the choice of his representative for the purpose of collective bargaining or adjusting grievances in the course of administering an existing contract. In San Francisco-0akland Mailers’ Union No. 18, International Typographical Union (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N. L. R. B. 2173 (1968), however, the Board applied the section to prohibit union discipline of one of its member-supervisors for the manner in which he had performed his supervisory task of grievance adjustment. Although the union “sought the substitution of attitudes rather than persons, and may have exerted its pressures upon the [employer] by indirect rather than direct means,” the ultimate fact was that the pressure interfered with the employer’s control over his representative. “Realistically, the Employer would have to replace its foremen or face de facto nonrepresentation by them.” Oakland Mailers, supra, at 2173. The application of the section to indirect coercion of employers through pressure applied to supervisory personnel continued to evolve until the FP&L and Illinois Bell cases reached the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and then this Court. In each of those cases, the union disciplined supervisor-members who had performed rank-and-file work behind a union picket line during a strike. In a companion case to Illinois Bell, upon which Illinois Bell explicitly relied, the Board found an infraction of § 8 (b) (1)(B), broadly construing its purpose “to assure to the employer that its selected collective-bargaining representatives will be completely faithful to its desires” and holding that this could not be achieved “if the union has an effective method, union disciplinary action, by which it can pressure such representatives to deviate from the interests of the employer.” In like fashion, in FP.&L, the Board held that fining supervisors for doing rank-and-file work during a work stoppage “struck at the loyalty an employer should be able to expect from its representatives for the adjustment of grievances and therefore restrained and coerced employers in their selection of such representatives.” The Court of Appeals overturned both decisions of the Board, holding that although the section could be properly applied to union efforts to discipline supervisors for their performance as collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives, it could not reasonably be applied to prohibit union discipline of supervisors crossing picket lines to perform bargaining-unit work: “When a supervisor forsakes his supervisory role to do rank-and-file work ordinarily the domain of nonsupervisory employees, he is no longer acting as a management representative and no longer merits any immunity from discipline.” 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 286, 487 F. 2d, at 1157. This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals: “The conclusion is thus inescapable that a union's discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of § 8 (b)(1)(B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor’s conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer.” 417 U. S., at 804-805. The Court thus rejected the claim that “even if the effect of [union] discipline did not carry over to the performance of the supervisor’s grievance adjustment or collective bargaining functions,” it was enough to show that the result would be “to deprive the employer of the full allegiance of, and control over, a representative he has selected for grievance adjustment or collective bargaining purposes.” Id., at 807. Assuming without deciding that the Board’s decision in Oakland Mailers fell within the outer reaches of § 8 (b) (1) (B.), the Court concluded that the Illinois Bell and FP&L decisions did not, because it was “certain that these supervisors were not engaged in collective bargaining or grievance adjustment, or in any activities related thereto, when they crossed union picket lines during an economic strike to engage in rank-and-file struck work.” 417 U. S., at 805. Subsequent to FP&L, in applying §8 (b)(1)(B) to cases involving union discipline of supervisor-members, the Board directed its attention, as it understood FP&L to require, to the question whether the discipline may adversely affect the supervisor’s conduct in performing his grievance-adjustment or collective-bargaining duties on behalf of the employer. In Hammond Publishers, supra, and Triangle Publishers, supra, the Board held that it was an unfair practice under § 8 (b)(1)(B) for a union to discipline a supervisor-member whose regular duties included the adjustment of grievances for crossing a picket line to perform his regular functions during a strike. See also Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council (Skippy Enterprises, Inc.), 218 N. L. R. B. 1063 (1975). These cases rested on the Board’s conclusion that such discipline imposed on the supervisor would have a “carryover” effect and would influence the supervisor in the performance of his adjustment functions after the strike and hence interfere with and coerce the employer in the choice of his grievance representative. See Triangle, 216 N. L. R. B., at 897; Hammond, 216 N. L. R. B., at 904. The Triangle decision was not challenged in the courts, but Hammond was enforced, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 240, 539 F. 2d 242 (1976), as was Skippy Enterprises, 532 F. 2d 47 (CA7 1976). III This case was tried to the Administrative Law Judge prior to the issuance of this Court's decision in FP&L, but hearings continued and the record was not closed until after the Court of Appeals’ final decision in that case; and the FP&L opinion here was handed down on June 24, 1974, some three months before the Administrative Law Judge issued his recommended decision. As we have already indicated, the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, accepted by the Board, were that the hyphenates’ regular supervisory duties included the performance of grievance adjustment; that the employer insisted that hyphenates return to work but only to perform supervisory, not rank-and-file, duties; and that the hypen-ates who reported did only supervisory work and had the authority to adjust grievances which they did when the occasion arose. After analyzing this Court's pronouncements in FP&L, the Administrative Law Judge rejected the claim that union discipline of a supervisor-member for working during a strike can never be a § 8 (b) (1) (B) violation and went on to hold that under the test prescribed by FP&L, there was a violation here. His conclusions were that through its strike rules and other pressures “designed to compel such hyphenates from going to work during the strike,” regardless of the tasks that they might perform, the union had “restrained and coerced the hyphenates from performing managerial and supervisory services for their employers during the strike, including the adjustment of employee grievances and participation in collective bargaining . . . .” By “coercing or restraining” hyphenates from going in to do their normal work, which included grievance adjustment, or in the case of producers, on distant location, the task of collective bargaining, the union had “actually coerced and restrained their employers from selecting those persons as the employers' representatives for the adjustment of grievances and for collective bargaining during the strike.” He also concluded that by charging, trying, and disciplining those hyphenates who did report for work and by “threatening to blacklist in perpetuity . . . [and] to drive [them] out of the industry,” the union had coerced and restrained these hyphenates from performing their regular duties in the normal manner, including the adjustment of grievances and collective bargaining. The employer, in turn, had been further coerced and restrained in the free selection of those hyphenates as his collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment representatives. The Administrative Law Judge thus found the section violated according to the test as elaborated in FP&L because, by keeping hyphenates from work, the union had deprived the employer of any opportunity to select those particular supervisors as his grievance-adjusting or collective-bargaining representatives and because disciplining and threatening those supervisors who had reported for duty deprived the employer of fully effective §8 (b)(1)(B) representatives. Although the Board embraced these findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, it also found that the disciplinary-action taken by the union against those hyphenates who crossed the picket line was an unfair practice under § 8 (b) (1)(B) as that section had been construed in Hammond and Triangle and that threats of such illegal discipline against others also violated the section. IV We cannot agree with what appears to be the fundamental position of the Court of Appeals and the union that under §8 (b)(1)(B), as the section was construed in FP&L, it is never an unfair practice for a union to discipline a supervisor-member for working during a strike, regardless of the work that he may perform behind the picket line. The opinion in FP&L expressly refrained from questioning Oakland Mailers or the proposition that an employer could be coerced or restrained within the meaning of §8 (b)(1)(B) not only by picketing or other direct actions aimed at him but also by debilitating discipline imposed on his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representative. Indeed, after focusing on the purposes of the section, the Court in FP&L delineated the boundaries of when that “carryover” effect would violate § 8 (b) (1) (B) : whenever such discipline may adversely affect the supervisor’s conduct in his capacity as a grievance adjustor or collective bargainer. In these situations — that is, when such impact might be felt — the employer would be deprived of the full services of his representatives and hence would be restrained and coerced in his selection of those representatives. Furthermore, because this was the test prescribed and employed by the Court to adjudicate the very situation where union discipline was imposed for crossing a picket line, it is unlikely that the Court anticipated that the test could never be satisfied in such disciplinary cases, that it could never be true that the sanction could or would affect the supervisor's collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment functions, or that the employer in such circumstances could never be restrained or coerced in the selection of his representatives. This is not to say that every effort by a union to discipline a supervisor for crossing a picket line to do supervisory rather than rank-and-file work would satisfy the standards specified by FP&L, or that on facts present here there is necessarily a violation of §8(b)(l)(B). But we are of the view that the Board correctly understood FP&L to mean that in ruling upon a § 8 (b)(1)(B) charge growing out of union discipline of a supervisory member who elects to work during a strike, it may- — indeed, it must — inquire whether the sanction may adversely affect the supervisor’s performance of his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and thereby coerce or restrain the employer contrary to §8 (b)(1)(B). The Board addressed those issues here, and if its ultimate factual conclusions in this regard are capable of withstanding judicial review, it seems to us that its construction of the section fairly recognizes and respects the outer boundaries established by FP&L, and represents an “acceptable reading of the statutory language and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statutory sections.” NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 341 (1978). Respondent objects that this construction of the Act imper-missibly intrudes on the union’s right to resort to economic sanctions during a strike. However, an employer also has economic rights during a strike, and the statute declares that, in the unrestrained freedom to select a grievance-adjustment and collective-bargaining representative, the employer’s rights dominate. Ample leeway is already accorded to a union in permitting it to discipline any member, even a supervisor, for performing struck work — to carry that power over to the case of purely supervisory work is an inappropriate extension and interference with the employer’s prerogative. The Board has so ruled, and as the Court has often observed, “ ‘[t]he function of striking [the] balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.’ ” NLRB v. Iron Workers, supra, at 350, quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957); NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 499 (1960). Here, in adjudicating as it did the intertwining interests of union, employer, and supervisor-member during an economic strike, we cannot say that the Board has moved into a new area of regulation not committed to it by Congress, ibid., or conclude that the role assumed by the Board is “fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act and the function of the sections relied upon.” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 318 (1965); NLRB v. Iron Workers, supra. Y We are also unpersuaded that the Board’s findings and conclusions are infirm on any of the grounds submitted. First, it is urged that there was an insufficient showing and insufficient findings that any hyphenates were coerced or restrained from reporting for work. But the Administrative Law Judge carefully detailed the strike rules that he expressly found were designed and enforced with the intent of restraining hyphenates from going to work and from performing the normal duties of their positions, which included the adjustment of grievances. It was also found that the hyphenates were especially vulnerable to pressure from the union and that many of them were actually restrained and prevented from performing their normal duties, including the adjustment of grievances. These are sufficiently clear findings that union pressures kept many hyphenates from the job, and, on the record before us, it approaches the frivolous to argue that there is insufficient evidence to support them. It also follows, as the Administrative Law Judge and the Board concluded, that as to those hyphenates whom the union kept from work, the employer was restrained and coerced within the meaning of § 8 (b)(1)(B) by being totally deprived of the opportunity to choose these particular supervisors as his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives during the strike. Second, as to those hyphenates who reported for work, it is strenuously urged that there is no basis for concluding that the discipline imposed upon them would adversely affect the performance of their grievance-adjustment duties either during or after the strike. Again, however, we are unwilling to differ with the Board in these respects. The inquiry whether union conduct would or might adversely affect the performance of the hyphenates' grievance-adjustment duties is, as petitioners assert, necessarily a matter of probabilities, and its resolution depends much on what experience would suggest are the justifiable inferences from the known facts. This seems to us to be peculiarly the kind of determination that Congress has assigned to the Board: “An administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration.” Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 800 (1945); Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 48-49 (1954). See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 227 (1963); Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 675 (1961). The Board’s findings are “entitled to the greatest deference in recognition of its special competence in dealing with labor problems.” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 316. Furthermore, it does not strike us as groundless or lacking substantial evidence for the Board to conclude on this record that the discipline imposed would have the necessary adverse effect. Strike rules were distributed in February; the strikes against the Association began on March 4 and terminated June 24; the strikes against the networks began on March 29 and ended on July 12. Between April 6 and November 8— both during and after the strikes — some 31 hyphenates who had worked during the strikes were charged with violating union rules, 15 hearings had been held prior to the closing of evidence in November 1973, and from June 25 to September 28, very substantial penalties were imposed in 10 cases although 9 have already been reduced on appeal. These penalties were widely publicized at the time of their imposition. Other charges were pending and remained to be tried when the record was closed in this case. These penalties were meted out at least in part because the accused hyphenates had complied with the orders of their employers by reporting for work and performing only their normal supervisory functions, including the adjustment of grievances, during the strike. Hyphenates who worked were thus faced not only with threats but also with the actuality of charges, trial, and severe discipline simply because they were working at their normal jobs. And if this were not enough, they were threatened with a union blacklist that might drive them from the industry. How long such hyphenates would remain on the job under such pressure was a matter no one, particularly the employer, could predict. Moreover, after the strike, with the writers back at work, the hyphenates who had worked during the strike still faced charges and trials or were appealing large fines and long suspensions. At the same time, they were expected to perform their regular supervisory duties and to adjust grievances whenever the occasion demanded, functions requiring them to deal with the same union which was considering the appeal of their personal sanctions. As to these supervisors, who had felt the union’s wrath, not for doing rank-and-file work contrary to union rules, but for performing only their primary supervisory duties during the strike and who were in a continuing controversy with the union, it was not untenable for the Board to conclude that these disciplined hyphenates had a diminished capacity to carry out their grievance-adjustment duties effectively and that the employer was deprived of the full range of services from his supervisors. Such a hyphenate might be tempted to give the union side of a grievance a more favorable slant while the threat of discipline remained, or while his own appeal of a union sanction was pending. At the very least, the employer could not be certain that a fined hyphenate would willingly answer the employer’s call to duty during a subsequent work stoppage, particularly if it occurred in the near future. For an employer in these circumstances to insure having satisfactory collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment services would require a change in his representative. As the Board has construed the Act from Oakland Mailers to Triangle, Hammond, and the cases now before us, such a likely impact on the employer constitutes sufficient restraint and coercion in connection with the selection of collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment representatives to violate § 8 (b) (1) (B). In FP&L the Court declined the invitation to overrule Oakland Mailers, and we do so again. Union pressure on supervisors can affect either their willingness to serve as grievance adjustors or collective bargainers, or the manner in which they fulfill these functions; and either effect impermissibly coerces the employer in his choice of representative. Third, it is further urged that union discipline could not adversely affect a supervisor’s later performance of his § 8 (b)(1) (B) duties because the employer could require him to leave the union and thus free himself from further threats of union discipline. This submission has little force in this case, since, as the Administrative Law Judge found, the union’s known policy was not to permit a member to resign during a strike and for a period of six months thereafter. For the entire period to which the Board’s findings were addressed, hyphenates could not terminate their membership, and the employer’s only recourse would have been to replace them as his grievance representatives. Carried to its logical end, this submission is simply another argument that union sanctions applied to supervisor-members who work during a strike can never violate §8 (b)(1)(B), because the employer could always insist that his supervisors either terminate union affiliation or face discharge. Yet, as we have noted, the test posited by this Court in FP.&L plainly recognizes the possibility of a § 8 (b)(1)(B) violation arising from union fines imposed during a strike. Moreover, if the argument were to be accepted, indirect pressures on the employer by sanctioning supervisor-members for the manner in which they perform their grievance-adjusting function (as in Oakland Mailers) would never be a violation because the supervisor could, at the employer’s request, escape from union threats and sanctions. The Board’s construction of the Act is to the contrary, however, and, as we have said, we are not prepared at this juncture to override it. Because we have concluded that the Board’s construction of § 8 (b)(1) (B) is not an unreasonable reading of its language or inconsistent with its purposes, and because we cannot say that the Board’s findings lacked substantial evidence, we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So ordered. Executive producers, with the help of producers and associate producers, have the primary responsibility for the production of films for motion pictures or for television. The responsibility begins with the idea or concept for the film or the series and carries through to the post-production stages after filming. Directors are in personal charge of the principal photography of the film. They are responsible for the employment of crew and actors and effectively direct such employees. Story editors, story consultants, script consultants, executive story editors, and executive story consultants principally assist the producer in the highly important function of dealing with scripts and writers. They have individual judgment, initiative, and responsibility, and their tasks are clearly supervisory. Approximately SO hyphenate members of respondent were principally employed as producers of one kind or another, approximately 15 were directors, and another 15 were in the story editor category. The finding of the Administrative Law Judge in this regard was: “The important point is that when these executives and supervisors perform those functions excluded from the Respondent’s bargaining agreements they thereby perform functions which the parties have acknowledged do not constitute work reserved to Respondent’s non-hyphenate members under the agreements, but rather are accepted as a normal part of the duties and responsibilities of the executives and supervisors (as herein-above discussed) employed by the employers involved.” (Footnote omitted.) App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-1162, p. 35a. The contract provided that performance of any “A to H” writing “shall not constitute such person a writer hereunder.” Id., at 33a. Rule 13 provided: “Members are prohibited from entering the premises of any struck producer for the purpose of discussion of the sale of material or contract of employment, regardless of the time it is to take effect. Members are also prohibited from entering the premises of any struck producer for the purpose of viewing any film. . . . [S]hould a member find it necessary to visit the premises of a struck producer for any reason apart from the foregoing he should inform the Guild in advance of the nature of such prospective visit.” Id., at 36a-37a. Rule 30 provided: “No member shall work with any individual, including a writer-executive who has been suspended from Guild membership by reason of his violation of strike rules, or has been found by the Council to have violated strike rules, in the event no disciplinary action was instituted against such person.” Id., at 38a. After the issuance of the initial complaint in this case, Rule 30 was rescinded by respondent in a letter to all of its members, which stated, among other things, that “because the old rule could be misconstrued to mean that the Guild was maintaining an improper sanction, a matter of anathema to this Guild, the Board of Directors rescinded old Rule 30 . . . .” The assessment of the Administrative Law Judge was: “In particular, by threatening to blacklist in perpetuity such hyphenates who worked during the strike, the rules threatened to drive these hyphenates out of the industry. Though the mandatory effect of the rule was rescinded . . . there are other indications that Respondent's actions encourage a voluntary blacklist. . . . [T]he fact is that Respondent did suggest it, and it is now impossible to disentangle the consequences flowing from its actions.” Id., at 69a-70a. The Administrative Law Judge found that a typical notice of charges against a hyphenate contained the following: “Specifically,, you are charged with: (1) having crossed the Guild’s picket lines . . . during the months of March, April, May and June 1973, without having informed the Guild in advance of the nature of your business with said company and without having obtained a Guild pass to enter said premises; (2) having during the months of March, April, May and June 1973, rendered services for ... a company against whom the Guild was at such times on strike; and (3) refusing to perform picket duties during the strike after having been requested to do so by representatives of the Guild.” Id., at 45a. (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 43a-44a. Respondent, through counsel, took the position at the disciplinary hearings that the hyphenates charged were subject to discipline simply for crossing respondent’s picket line, whether or not they crossed for the purpose of performing bargaining services for a struck employer. Respondent held that charges would properly lie even against hyphenates who had given assurances not to perform any writing services for a struck employer. The Administrative Law Judge noted the penalties against 10 of the hyphenates charged and tried: “Two were expelled from membership and fined $50,000 each; one was expelled from membership and fined $10,000; one was suspended from membership for 2 years and fined $10,000; one was suspended for 2 years and fined $7,500; one was suspended for 3 years and fined $5,000; one was expelled from membership and fined $2,000; one was expelled and fined $100; and one was suspended for 2 years and fined $100. These penalties received wide publicity in the local press and trade papers. The appeals of nine of these men has [sic] been voted upon by Respondent’s membership at a special meeting and the penalties were drastically reduced. Apparently all remaining actions with respect to discipline of hyphenate-members for working during the strike are now being held in abeyance pending resolution of these cases.” Id., at 46a. The Administrative Law Judge found: “The producer has substantial responsibility and authority in adjusting grievances between directors and craft employees, directors and actors and actresses, between two or more actors or actresses, and in other similar situations. Producers also have responsibility and authority to adjust grievances involving writers, as in the case of disputes between writers and story editors.” Id., at 26a. Executive producers supervise one or more producers, and associate producers assist the producer. “Without distinguishing among them in detail, it is clear on this record that persons occupying these positions in the motion picture or television industries have the authority to hire, terminate, and responsibly direct other employees, and to adjust employee grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, and are thus supervisors within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act.” Id., at 27a. With respect to directors, the Administrative Law Judge determined that they “hire or effectively recommend the employment of crew and actors, effectively direct such employees, and may discharge or effectively recommend the discharge of employees. They have authority to and do adjust grievances of such employees. It is found that persons performing the functions of director in the television and motion picture industries are supervisors and adjust grievances of employees within the meaning of the Act.” Id., at 28a. Story editors supervise writers in the development of ideas and the preparation of scripts. They interview and recommend the hiring of new writers, and advise the producer concerning writers who should not be retained. “On a television series, the story editor may participate with the producer in the initial determination of any dispute over screen credits. He also may serve as a buffer between management and the writer, as in ameliorating a writer’s distress over material that has been rewritten. . . . “On the basis of the entire record, it is found that those persons in the television and motion picture industries performing the functions of story editor, story consultant, script consultant, executive story editors, and executive story consultants are supervisors and adjust grievances of employees within the meaning of the Act.” Id., at 29a-30a. Id., at 57a. Id., at 60a. Id., at 59a. Id., at 62a. Ibid. Id., at 63a. Ibid. The Board held that there had been a violation with respect to certain hyphenates in addition to those in the categories of producer, director, and story editor. In Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. NLRB, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 240, 539 F. 2d 242 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enforced the Board's order in Hammond Publishers, relied on by the Board in this case. In Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 532 F. 2d 47 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also took a position seemingly at odds with the judgment under review here. The issue is also a recurring one before the Board. IBEW, Local 134 v. NLRB, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 487 F. 2d 1113, rev’d on rehearing en banc, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 487 F. 2d 1143 (1973), refusing to enforce IBEW, Local 134, 192 N. L. R. B. 85 (1971) [Illinois Bell), and IBEW Systems Council U-4, 193 N. L. R. B. 30 (1971) [FP&L). Local Union No. 2150, IBEW, and Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 77 (1971). “We find no discernible difference between the two cases, and for the reasons set forth in that case, we find that, in the instant case, the Union violated Section 8 (b) (1) (B) . . . .” Illinois Bell, 192 N. L. R. B., at 86. Id., at 78. 193 N. L. R. B., at 31. In Hammond and Skippy, the supervisor also performed some rank- and-file work during the strike. The Board in Hammond characterized the amount of rank-and-file work as minimal, and only incidental to the supervisory functions, but in Skippy, the supervisor performed rank-and-file work for about 30% of his time. In light of the finding that the supervisors performed no rank-and-file writing in this case, we are not presented with that element of the Board's reasoning in Hammond and Skippy. We note also respondent’s argument that the limited writing duties— the A-to-H functions — normally performed by the hyphenates should be considered rank-and-file work within the meaning of FP&L. The Administrative Law Judge gave careful attention to the issue and concluded to the contrary, App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-1162, p. 59a, and the Board accepted his findings and conclusions in this respect. We also find them unexceptionable. The dissenting Board member did not premise his opinion on the A-to-H issue. We thus do not have here the situation where the disciplined supervisor has performed not only supervisory duties, including grievance adjustment, but also has done some rank-and-file tasks. See Hammond and Triangle, and also Wisconsin River Valley. It is suggested that there was insufficient proof that the hyphenates who worked actually engaged in grievance adjustment of any Mnd during the strike. But the findings were to the contrary; and, in any event, there is no question that they were authorized to do so and were available for that purpose when and if the occasion arose. Section 8 (b) (1) (B) obviously can be violated by attempting coercively to control the choice of the employer’s representative, before, as well as after, the representative has actually dealt with the grievance. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-1162, p. 62a. Id., at 64a. Id., at 69a. The Administrative Law Judge reasoned, as follows, in support of his conclusion. “To illustrate: A person performing the function of a director acts in a managerial or supervisory capacity, which normally includes the adjustment of grievances of actors, actresses, craft employees and others. One occupying the position of a producer normally has a similar capacity and similar duties with respect to employee grievances. In addition, if the film is being shot on distant location the producer has authority to negotiate on the spot agreements with local unions. Thus when Respondent prevented or sought to prevent, such hyphenate members from going to work in their managerial and supervisory capacities as producers and directors during the strike, Respondent obviously coerced and restrained their employers in the selection of those specific producers and directors for the purpose of collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances of employees working during the strike within the plain meaning of the statute. Similarly, those persons employed as story editors or in like classifications perform executive functions normally, and appear to have done so during the strike, in which the record indicates they were engaged as supervisors and actual or potential representatives of their employers for the adjustment of grievances. Respondent, by coercing or restraining persons in these classifications from going in to do their normal work thereby actually coerced and restrained their employers from selecting those persons as the employers’ representatives for the adjustment of grievances and for collective bargaining during the strike.” Id., at 63a-64a. (Footnote omitted.) It is suggested by respondent that the Board did not fully adopt the approach of the Administrative Law Judge, but it is plain that, with the single exception noted above, the Board adopted all of the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. The Board's decision holding the union responsible under § 8 (b) (1) (B) for the foreseeable course and consequences of its actions is not inconsistent with Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667 (1961), and NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U. S. 695 (1961). The holding does not rest on any assumption that the union will act illegally in the future. The findings were also that: “The record is convincing that Respondent, well aware of the primary supervisory, management, and executive functions of its hyphenate-members, drafted its strike rules and enforced them with the intent of compelling those hyphenate-members from going to work during the strike, without regard to the capacity in which they performed or the work done.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-1162, p. 69a. Violations of Rules 1, 12, 13, and 28 were alleged. See, supra, at 415, 416, 417, and n. 3. In determining that the Board had exceeded the limitations of the statute in the FP&L and Illinois Bell cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that when a supervisor acts as a grievance adjustor, “he is a representative of management, and as such he should be immune from union discipline. The unions participating in the present cases conceded as much at oral argument when they agreed that when a supervisor crosses a picket line to perform supervisory work he remains immune from discipline. . . . The dividing line between supervisory and nonsupervisory work in the present context is sharply defined and easily understood.” 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 286, 487 F. 2d, at 1157. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said: “[W]here supervisors cross picket lines to perform rank-and-file struck work, union discipline does not violate Section 8 (b) (1) (B) since it merely deprives the employer of services normally rendered by strikebreaking replacement employees.” Skippy Enterprises, 532 F. 2d 47, 53 (1976). On the other hand, “Where supervisors cross picket fines to perform regular supervisory duties, union discipline violates Section 8 (b) (1) (B) since it tends to deprive the employer of its supervisors’ services — including their § 8 (b) (1) (B) services — and because the supervisors would reasonably anticipate that union discipline would also be imposed if future performance of their § 8 (b) (1) (B) functions did not meet with union approval.” Ibid. Union discipline might even result in depriving the employer of the supervisors’ services forever, if the blacklist involved in this case had been successful. The employer would have had no choice but to let the hyphenate go, since the positions of director, producer, and script editor unavoidably require working with rank-and-file writers. In the FP&L and Illinois Bell cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that its consistent view has been that the “basic rationale [of Oakland Mailers] is consistent with the purposes of Section 8 (b) (1) (B) . . . [for] management’s right to a free selection would be hollow indeed if the union could dictate the manner in which the selected representative performed his collective bargaining and grievance adjustment duties.” 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 282, 283, 487 F. 2d, at 1153, 1154. The court also noted its agreement with New Mexico District Council of Carpenters and Joiners of America ( A. S. Horner, Inc.), 177 N. L. R. B. 500 (1969), enf.’d, 454 F. 2d 1116 (CA10 1972), where a union member worked as a supervisor for a company which had no contract with the union. 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 284 n. 19, 487 F. 2d, at 1155 n. 19. A fine imposed in these circumstances violated the section because compliance by the supervisor with the union’s demands would have required his leaving his job and thus have “the effect of depriving the Company of the services of its selected representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.” 177 N. L. R. B., at 502. The Court of Appeals said that A. S. Horner “thus falls close to the original rationale of § 8 (b) (1) (B) which was to permit the employer to keep the bargaining representative of his own choosing.” 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 284 n. 19, 487 F. 2d., at 1155 n. 19. It is also- argued that at the very least the Board erred with respeet to director-hyphenates because there is no evidence and no finding that directors ever dealt with writers or adjusted their grievances even if producers and story editors did. Hence, it is alleged that union discipline of directors could not possibly affect their adjustment of writers’ grievances during or after the strike for the simple reason that they had none to adjust. But during the strike, no supervisor, writer, director, producer, or story editor had writer grievances to adjust — at least no new grievances — because there were no writers on the job and only the possibility that there might be replacements or a few strikebreakers. Nevertheless, directors, as well as others, had adjustment duties with respect to other employees. The Administrative Law Judge found that directors “hire or effectively recommend the employment of crew and actors, effectively direct such employees, and . . . have authority to and do adjust grievances of such employees.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No.' 76-1162, p. 28a. Directors’ willingness to work and to perform these duties subjected them to sanctions and financial loss, making them less than completely reliable and effective employer representatives for the duration of the strike, and less likely to perform any supervisory task during future strikes. A union may no- more interfere with the employer’s choice of a grievance representative with respect to employees represented by other unions than with respect to those employees whom it itself represents. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, International Marine Division, 197 N. L. R. B. 400 (1972), enf’d, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 11, 14, 486 F. 2d 1271, 1274 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 956 (1974), and International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots v. NLRB, 539 F. 2d 554, 559-560 (CA5 1976). We note also that all hyphenates, including directors, were threatened with a permanent blacklist — a refusal by other Guild members, including producers, other directors, and story editors, as well as writers, to work with the offending director — and that revocation of the formal rule on April 30 did not completely remove the threat. Because of his central role, refusal to work with a director means refusal to participate at all in a particular film. The union thus threatened a strike by all of its members against the employer who permitted director-hyphenates to work, plainly an independent violation of § 8 (b) (1) (B). The Administrative Law Judge found that of the 15 union members employed as directors by petitioners, 3 were charged with strike rule violations, and 1 was brought before a trial panel and disciplined. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-1162, p. 29a.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE et al. v. DAVENPORT et ux. No. 89-156. Argued February 20, 1990 Decided May 29, 1990 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 564. Walter W. Cohen, First Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General, John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General, and Mary Benefield Seiverling, Deputy Attorney General. David A. Searles argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Eric L. Frank and Henry J. Sommer. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorneys General Dennis and Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, and Stephen L. Nightingale; for the State of Alabama et al. by Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Walter A. McFarlane, Deputy Attorney General, and Jeffrey A. Spencer, Assistant Attorney General, Don Siegelman, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Attorney General of Connecticut, and John J. Kelly, Chief States Attorney, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, James T. Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, James, E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, James M. Shannon, Attorney General of Massachusetts, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Peter N. Perretti, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, Hal Stratton, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Anthony. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Jorge E. Perez-Diaz, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Godfrey R. de Castro, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Thomas D. Goldberg; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Richard A. Samp. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 50 (1986), this Court held that restitution obligations imposed as conditions of probation in state criminal actions are nondischargeable in proceedings under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §701 et seq. The Court rested its holding on its interpretation of the Code provision that protects from discharge any debt that is “a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” § 523(a)(7). Because the Court determined that restitution orders fall within § 523(a)(7)’s exception to discharge, it declined to reach the question whether restitution orders are “debt[s]” as defined by §101(11) of the Code. In this case, we must decide whether restitution obligations are dischargeable debts in proceedings under Chapter 13, § 1301 et seq. The exception to discharge relied on in Kelly does not extend to Chapter 13. We conclude, based on the language and structure of the Code, that restitution obligations are “debt[s]” as defined by §101(11). We therefore hold that such payments are dis-chargeable under Chapter 13. I In September 1986, respondents Edward and Debora Davenport pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania court to welfare fraud and were sentenced to one year’s probation. As a condition of probation, the state court ordered the Davenports to make monthly restitution payments to the county probation department, which in turn would forward the payments to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the victim of the Davenports’ fraud. Pennsylvania law mandates restitution of welfare payments obtained through fraud, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 62, §481(c) (Purdon Supp. 1989), and directs the probation section to “forward to the victim the property or payments made pursuant to the restitution order,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1106(e) (1988). In May 1987, the Davenports filed a petition under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In their Chapter 13 statement, they listed their restitution obligation as an unsecured debt payable to the Department of Public Welfare. Soon thereafter, the Adult Probation and Parole Department of Bucks County (Probation Department) commenced a probation violation proceeding, alleging that the Davenports had failed to comply with the restitution order. The Davenports informed the Probation Department of the pending bankruptcy proceedings and requested that the Department withdraw the probation violation charges until the bankruptcy issues were settled. The Probation Department refused, and the Davenports filed an adversary action in Bankruptcy Court seeking both a declaration that the restitution obligation was a dischargeable debt and an injunction preventing the Probation Department from undertaking any further efforts to collect on the obligation. While the adversary action was pending, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Davenports’ Chapter 13 plan without objection from any creditor. Although notified of the proceedings, neither the Probation Department nor the Department of Public Welfare filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy action. Meanwhile, the Probation Department proceeded in state court on its motion to revoke probation. Although the court declined to revoke the Davenports’ probation and extended their payment period, it nonetheless ruled that its restitution order remained in effect. The Bankruptcy Court subsequently held that the Davenports’ restitution obligation was an unsecured debt dis-chargeable under 11 U. S. C. § 1328(a). 83 B. R. 309 (ED Pa. 1988). On appeal, the District Court reversed, holding that state-imposed criminal restitution obligations cannot be discharged in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 89 B. R. 428 (ED Pa. 1988). The District Court emphasized the federalism concerns that are implicated when federal courts intrude on state criminal processes, id., at 430, and relied substantially on dicta in Kelly, supra, at 50, where the Court expressed “serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal penalties ‘debts’ ” under the Code. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that “the plain language of the chapter” demonstrated that restitution orders are debts within the meaning of the Code and hence dis-chargeable in proceedings under Chapter 13. In re Johnson-Alien, 871 F. 2d 421, 428 (1989). To address a conflict among Bankruptcy Courts on this issue, we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 808 (1989). II Our construction of the term “debt” is guided by the fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685 (1985). Section 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code defines “debt” as a “liability on a claim.” This definition reveals Congress’ intent that the meanings of “debt” and “claim” be coextensive. See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 310 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 23 (1978). Thus, the meaning of “claim” is crucial to our analysis. A “claim” is a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U. S. C. §101(4)(A) (emphasis added). As is apparent, Congress chose expansive language in both definitions relevant to this case. For example, to the extent the phrase “right to payment” is modified in the statute, the modifying language (“whether or not such right is . . .”) reflects Congress’ broad rather than restrictive view of the class of obligations that qualify as a “claim” giving rise to a “debt.” See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 309 (describing definition of “claim” as “broadest possible” and noting that Code “contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor . . . will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case”); accord, S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 22. Petitioners maintain that a restitution order is not a “right to payment” because neither the Probation Department nor the victim stands in a traditional creditor-debtor relationship with the criminal offender. In support of this position, petitioners refer to Kelly’s discussion of the special purposes of punishment and rehabilitation underlying the imposition of restitution obligations. 479 U. S., at 52. Petitioners also emphasize that restitution orders are enforced differently from other obligations that are considered “rights to payment.” In Kelly, the Court decided that restitution orders fall within 11 U. S. C. § 523(a)(7)’s exception to discharge provision, which protects from discharge any debt “to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” In reaching that conclusion, the Court necessarily found that such orders are “not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” Rather, “[bjecause criminal proceedings focus on the State’s interests in rehabilitation and punishment,” the Court held that “restitution orders imposed in such proceedings operate ‘for the benefit of’ the State” and not “‘for . . . compensation’ of the victim.” 479 U. S., at 53. Contrary to petitioners’ argument, however, the Court’s prior characterization of the purposes underlying restitution orders does not bear on our construction of the phrase “right to payment” in § 101(4)(A). The Court in Kelly analyzed the purposes of restitution in construing the qualifying clauses of § 523(a)(7), which explicitly tie the application of that provision to the purpose of the compensation required. But the language employed to define “claim” in § 101(4)(A) makes no reference to purpose. The plain meaning of a “right to payment” is nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the objectives the State seeks to serve in imposing the obligation. Nor does the State’s method of enforcing restitution obligations suggest that such obligations are not “claims.” Although neither the Probation Department nor the victim can enforce restitution obligations in civil proceedings, Commonwealth v. Mourar, 349 Pa. Super. 583, 603, 504 A. 2d 197, 208 (1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 517 Pa. 83, 534 A. 2d 1050 (1987), the obligation is enforceable by the substantial threat of revocation of probation and incarceration. That the Probation Department’s enforcement mechanism is criminal rather than civil does not alter the restitution order’s character as a “right to payment.” Indeed, the right created by such an order made as a condition of probation is in some sense greater than the right conferred by an ordinary civil obligation, because it is secured by the debtor’s freedom rather than his property. Accordingly, we do not regard the purpose or enforcement mechanism of restitution orders as placing such orders outside the scope of § 101(4)(A). Ill Moving beyond the language of § 101, the United States, appearing as amicus in support of petitioners, contends that other provisions in the Code, particularly the exemption to the automatic stay provision, § 362(b)(1), and Chapter 7’s distribution of claims provision, § 726, reflect Congress’ intent to exempt restitution orders from discharge under Chapter 13. We are not persuaded, however, that the language or the structure of the Code as a whole supports that conclusion. Section 362(a) automatically stays a wide array of collection and enforcement proceedings against the debtor and his property. Section 362(b)(1) exempts from the stay “the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.” According to the Senate Report, the exception from the automatic stay ensures that “[t]he bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal offenders.” S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 51. Section 362(b)(1) does not, however, explicitly exempt governmental efforts to collect restitution obligations from a debtor. Cf. 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(2) (“collection of alimony, maintenance, or support” is not barred by the stay). Nonetheless, the United States argues that it would be anomalous to construe the Code as eliminating a haven for criminal offenders under the automatic stay provision while granting them sanctuary from restitution obligations under Chapter 13. We find no inconsistency in these provisions. Section 362(b)(1) ensures that the automatic stay provision is not construed to bar federal or state prosecution of alleged criminal offenses. It is not an irrational or inconsistent policy choice to permit prosecution of criminal offenses during the pend-ency of a bankruptcy action and at the same time to preclude probation officials from enforcing restitution orders while a debtor seeks relief under Chapter 13. Congress could well have concluded that maintaining criminal prosecutions during bankruptcy proceedings is essential to the functioning of government but that, in the context of Chapter 13, a debtor’s interest in full and complete release of his obligations outweighs society’s interest in collecting or enforcing a restitution obligation outside the agreement reached in the Chapter 13 plan. The United States’ reliance on § 726 is likewise unavailing. That section establishes the order in which claims are settled under Chapter 7. Section 726(a)(4) assigns a low priority to “any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture ... to the extent that such fine, penalty, forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim.” The United States argues that the phrase “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” should be construed to apply only to civil fines, penalties, and forfeitures, and not to criminal restitution obligations. Otherwise, State and Federal Governments will receive disfavored treatment relative to other creditors both in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 proceedings, see § 1325(a)(4) (a Chapter 13 plan must ensure that unsecured creditors receive no worse treatment than they would under Chapter 7), a result the United States regards as anomalous given the strength of the governmental interest in collecting restitution payments. The central difficulty with the United States’ construction of § 726(a)(4) is that it conflicts with Kelly’s holding that § 523(a)(7), the exception to discharge provision, applies to criminal restitution obligations. 479 U. S., at 51 (§ 523(a)(7) “creates a broad exception for all penal sanctions”). The United States acknowledges that the phrase “fine, penalty, or forfeiture” as it appears in § 726(a)(4) must have the same meaning as in § 523(a)(7). We are unwilling to revisit Kelly’s determination that § 523(a)(7) “protects traditional criminal fines [by] codif[ying] the judicially created exception to discharge for fines.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, we reject the view that §§ 523(a)(7) and 726(a)(4) implicitly refer only to civil fines and penalties. The United States’ position here highlights the tension between Kelly’s, interpretation of § 523(a)(7) and its dictum suggesting that restitution obligations are not “debts.” See supra, at 557. As stated above, Kelly found explicitly that § 523(a)(7) “codifies the judicially created exception to discharge” for both civil and criminal fines. 479 U. S., at 51. Had Congress believed that restitution obligations were not “debts” giving rise to “claims,” it would have had no reason to except such obligations from discharge in § 523(a)(7). Given Kelly’s interpretation of § 523(a)(7), then, it would be anomalous to construe “debt” narrowly so as to exclude criminal restitution orders. Such a narrow construction of “debt” necessarily renders § 523(a)(7)’s codification of the judicial exception for criminal restitution orders mere surplusage. Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837 (1988). Moreover, in locating Congress’ policy choice regarding the dischargeability of restitution orders in § 523(a)(7), Kelly is faithful to the language and structure of the Code: Congress defined “debt” broadly and took care to except particular debts from discharge where policy considerations so warranted. Accordingly, Congress secured a broader discharge for debtors under Chapter 13 than Chapter 7 by extending to Chapter 13 proceedings some, but not all, of § 523(a)’s exceptions to discharge. See 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1328.01 [l][c] (15th ed. 1986) (“[T]he dischargeability of debts in chapter 13 that are not dischargeable in chapter 7 represents a policy judgment that [it] is preferable for debtors to attempt to pay such debts to the best of their abilities over three years rather than for those debtors to have those debts hanging over their heads indefinitely, perhaps for the rest of their lives”) (footnote omitted). Among those exceptions that Congress chose not to extend to Chapter 13 proceedings is § 523(a)(7)’s exception for debts arising from a “fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” Thus, to construe “debt” narrowly in this context would be to override the balance Congress struck in crafting the appropriate discharge exceptions for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors. IV Our refusal to carve out a broad judicial exception to discharge for restitution orders does not signal a retreat from the principles applied in Kelly. We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure. Kelly, supra, at 47 (citing Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 494 (1986)). In Kelly, the Court examined pre-Code practice and identified a general reluctance “to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to remit state criminal judgments.” 479 U. S., at 44. This pre-Code practice informed the Court’s conclusion that § 523(a)(7) broadly applies to all penal sanctions, including criminal fines. Here, on the other hand, the statutory language plainly reveals Congress’ intent not to except restitution orders from discharge in certain Chapter 13 proceedings. This intent is clear from Congress’ decision to limit the exceptions to discharge applicable to Chapter 13, § 1328(a), as well as its adoption of the “broadest possible” definition of “debt” in § 101(11). See supra, at 558. Nor do we conclude lightly that Congress intended to interfere with States’ administration of their criminal justice systems. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 46 (1971). As the Court stated in Kelly, permitting discharge of criminal restitution obligations may hamper the flexibility of state criminal judges in fashioning appropriate sentences and require state prosecutors to participate in federal bankruptcy proceedings to safeguard state interests. 479 U. S., at 49. Certainly the legitimate state interest in avoiding such intrusions is not lessened simply because the offender files under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7. Nonetheless, the concerns animating Younger cannot justify rewriting the Code to avoid federal intrusion. Where, as here, congressional intent is clear, our sole function is to enforce the statute according to its terms. V Restitution obligations constitute debts within the meaning of § 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code and are therefore dis-chargeable under Chapter 13. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. The Davenports subsequently fulfilled their obligations under the plan and received a discharge pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 1328(a), which provides: “As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title.” The section contains two exceptions that the parties agree are not applicable to this case. Compare, e. g., In re Kohr, 82 B. R. 706, 712 (MD Pa. 1988) (restitution obligations are not “debts” within the meaning of the Code), with In re Cullens, 77 B. R. 825, 828 (Colo. 1987) (restitution orders are “debts”). Although the automatic stay protects a debtor from various collection efforts over a specified period, it does not extinguish or discharge any debt. See generally 1 W. Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice §§20.04-20.36 (1986 and Supp. 1989). In any event, the Government’s contention that Congress must have intended to favor criminal, as opposed to civil, claims held by the government is unsubstantiated. The United States’ view about the wisdom of this policy choice, unsupported by any textual authority that Congress in fact adopted such a policy, is an inadequate basis for rejecting the statute’s broad definition of “debt.” See supra, at 557-558.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. NORTH CAROLINA et al. No. 74. Argued January 14-15, 1964. Decided February 17, 1964. William T. Joyner argued the cause for appellant in No. 74. With him on the brief were Earl E. Eisenhart, Jr., Robert L. Randall and William H. Allen. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States et al. in No. 93. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Philip B. Heymann, Robert B. Hummel and H. Neil Garson. Charles W. Barbee, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, and F. Gordon Battle argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With them on the brief were Thomas Wade Bruton, Attorney General of North Carolina, E. C. Bryson, Victor S. Bryant, A. H. Graham, Jr. and E. C. Brooks, Jr. Edward J. Hickey, Jr. and James L. Highsaw, Jr. filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Together with No. 93, United States et al. v. North Carolina et al., also on appeal to the same court. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1959 the appellant Southern Railway Company filed a petition with the North Carolina Utilities Commission for an order permitting it to discontinue operation of two intrastate passenger trains between Greensboro and Goldsboro, North Carolina, a distance of about 130 miles. The trains in question are No. 16, which operates eastbound in the morning from Greensboro to Goldsboro, and No. 13, consisting of the same equipment, which operates westbound in the late afternoon. Since 1958 these two trains have provided the last remaining railway passenger service between the two communities. The State Commission denied the petition, and its decision was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court. State of North Carolina v. Southern Railway Co., 254 N. C. 73, 118 S. E. 2d 21 (1961). Thereafter the railway company filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to § 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, seeking authority to discontinue operation of the trains. After a hearing at which several protestants, including the State of North Carolina, appeared, the examiner recommended that the petition be granted. Division 3 of the Commission agreed with the examiner and ordered discontinuance of the trains. The Division issued a report in which it found, inter alia, that the trains, which in 1948 had carried 56,739 passengers, carried only 14,776 passengers in 1960, the last full year for which figures were available; that the direct expenses of operating the trains during the latter year were over three times their total revenue ; that discontinuance of the trains would result in savings of at least $90,689 per year; that the need shown for these trains was relatively insubstantial when viewed in light of the density of the population of the area served; that existing alternate transportation service by rail, bus, airline, and other means was reasonably adequate; and that the discontinuance of the passenger train service would not seriously affect the industrial growth of the area. Against the backgound of these findings, the examiner and Commission considered, but gave “little or no weight” to the overall prosperity of the carrier. The Commission’s basic conclusions were summed up as follows: “that the public will not be materially inconvenienced by the discontinuance of the service here involved; that the savings to be realized by the carrier outweigh the inconvenience to which the public may be subjected by such discontinuance; that such savings will enable the carrier more efficiently to provide transportation service to the public which remains in substantial demand; and that the continued operation of trains Nos. 13 and 16 would constitute a wasteful service and would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.” 317 I. C. C. 265, 260. After a petition for reconsideration by the entire Commission had been denied, the protestants instituted an action in a three-judge District Court seeking to set aside the order of the Commission. The court held, first, that it was erroneous as a matter of law for the Commission to order discontinuance of passenger trains under the provisions of § 13a (2) without first determining whether, once the profits from freight operations on the same line were taken into account, “the particular segment of the railway involved is contributing its fair share to the over-all company operations . . . .” 210 F. Supp. 675, 688. The court also proceeded to find, inter alia, that “Taking into account total operation of this line, there is a profit not a loss, a benefit, not a burden,” 210 F. Supp., at 688; that passenger traffic had slightly increased during the first five months of 1961; that the carrier had done little to promote the use of the passenger trains; that continued existence of the alternative of railway passenger service might be considered a necessity under such circumstances as airline strikes or bad weather; and that, in light of the overall prosperity of the Southern Railway Company, “[t]he effect of the losses of the Greensboro-Goldsboro passenger service on the financial structure of the railroad is inconsequential.” 210 F. Supp., at 688. On this basis, although it explicitly refused to set aside any of the subsidiary findings of fact on which the Commission’s order was based, 210 F. Supp., at 689, 690, the court held that “the ultimate conclusions of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the service in question constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce and that the present or future public convenience and necessity permits such discontinuance . . . are arbitrary and capricious because . . . not supported by substantial evidence,” 210 F. Supp., at 689. The court itself then concluded that discontinuance was not warranted. It therefore set aside the Commission’s order, and perpetually enjoined the carrier from discontinuing the Greensboro-Goldsboro passenger trains. The United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the carrier all appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument. 373 U. S. 907. The District Court’s action in setting aside the Commission’s conclusions as to public convenience and necessity and undue burden on interstate commerce was explicitly based upon the court’s view that the Commission had applied erroneous legal standards in reaching those conclusions. The court did not question that the Commission’s subsidiary findings of fact were supported by a substantial evidentiary foundation. It simply disagreed with the Commission as to the kind of evidence required to support an order permitting discontinuance of an intrastate passenger train under § 13a (2). The court reached its conclusion that the Commission had erred in not taking into account profits from freight operations along the Greensboro-Goldsboro line primarily in reliance upon this Court’s decisions in Public Service Comm’n of Utah v. United States, 356 U. S. 421, and Chicago, M., St. P. P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U. S. 300. Both those cases dealt with § 13 (4), which requires the Commission to change intrastate rates wherever such rates are found to discriminate against interstate commerce. This Court held in those cases that the Commission could not authorize higher intrastate rates either for passenger or freight operations without first taking into account the revenues derived by the carrier from the totality of intrastate operations. In 1958, the year in which § 13a (2) was enacted, § 13 (4) was amended to permit the Commission to act “without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier . . . wholly within any State.” The District Court’s holding that the same kind of data should be considered in § 13a (2) proceedings was premised upon the fact that no language similar to that of the § 13 (4) amendment was included in § 13a (2), and that proceedings under the latter provision, which permits discontinuance of given operations, have a far more serious impact upon intrastate passengers than proceedings under the former, which provides only for an increase in the rates to be charged. But when § 13 (4) was amended in 1958 as a result of the two decisions relied on by the District Court, Congress was simply reaffirming what it conceived as the original intent of the section. There is therefore no reason to assume that Congress regarded the new language as embodying a standard which had to bé specifically incorporated into every statutory provision to which it was intended to apply. The legislative history clearly indicates that Congress in enacting § 13a (2) was addressing itself to a problem quite distinct from that reflected by overall unprofitable operation of an entire segment of railroad line. The Commission already had authority prior to 1958, under §§ 1 (18) — (20), to authorize discontinuance of all services on any given intrastate line where continuance of such services would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153. However, the Commission totally lacked power to discontinue particular trains or services while leaving the remaining services in operation. It was precisely this gap which § 13a (2) was intended to fill. New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U. S. 1, 5-6. As both the House and Senate Committee Reports on the legislation which became § 13a (2) make clear, Congress was primarily concerned with the problems posed by passenger services for which significant public demand no longer existed and which were consistently deficit-producing, thus forcing the carriers to subsidize their operation out of freight profits. Far from permitting the carrier’s need for discontinuance of passenger services to be balanced against profits from other operations conducted along the same line, the bill as originally reported by the Senate Committee would have required the Commission to permit discontinuance, even if there was great public need for the service, so long as the continued operation of a particular service would result in a net loss to the carrier. Senator Javits unsuccessfully attempted to amend the bill on the floor of the Senate to delete the net loss standard and to substitute a requirement that the Commission balance the public need for the service against the deficit resulting from it. Such an amendment, proposed by Chairman Harris of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, was adopted by the House, and accepted by the Senate in conference. The deletion of the net loss standard, however, by no means implied that freight profits along a given line could be offset against deficits incurred by passenger services for purposes of determining whether the latter constituted an undue burden on interstate operations or commerce. As Congressman Harris made clear after his amendment had been accepted, the situation “we are trying to get at” is that in which “the [freight] shippers of this country are making up a deficit every year ... in losses in passenger service.” The bill as originally reported by the Senate Committee would have applied the net loss standard to both interstate and intrastate operations, the Committee Report having concluded that state regulatory bodies required “the maintenance of uneconomic and unnecessary services and facilities.” The bill was amended on the Senate floor to limit the Commission’s discontinuance authority to interstate trains, and the House version of the bill was similarly limited. In conference, however, the Commission’s authority over intrastate trains was restored and, except for differences in the procedures prerequisite to a hearing in the case of a wholly intrastate train, the Commission was required to apply the same standard to interstate and intrastate operations in determining whether discontinuance of a train or service is justified. Contrary to the suggestion of the District Court that its interpretation of § 13a (2) must be accepted to avoid “requiring] the intrastate operations to bear more than their share,” 210 F. Supp., at 680, the statutory scheme which Congress has embodied in § 13a thus prescribes precisely the same substantive standard to govern discontinuance of either interstate or intrastate operations. All that need properly be considered under this standard, as both the language and history of § 13a (2) thus make abundantly clear, is what effect the discontinuance of the specific train or service in question will have upon the public convenience and necessity and upon interstate operations or commerce. As the Commission has correctly summed up the matter in another case: “The burden [upon the carrier’s interstate operations or upon interstate commerce, as expressed in section 13a (2)] ... is to be measured by the injurious effect that the continued operation of the train proposed for discontinuance would have upon interstate commerce. As is indicated by its legislative history, the purpose of section 13a (2) is to permit the discontinuance of the operation of services that 'no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the heavy financial losses involved.’ (S. Rep. 1647, 85th Cong.). Nowhere in section. 13a (2) or elsewhere in the law is there any requirement that the prosperity of the intrastate operations of the carrier as a whole, or any particular segment thereof, must be given effect in determining whether the operation of an individual intrastate train imposes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the apparent intent of the Congress.” Southern Pac. Co., Partial Discontinuance, 312 I. C. C. 631, 633-634 (1961). This Court has long recognized that the Commission may properly give varying weights to the overall prosperity of the carrier in differing situations. Thus, in Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, which also involved a situation in which the Commission was required to balance public convenience and necessity against undue burdens on interstate commerce, it was specifically noted that “In many cases, it is clear that the extent of the whole traffic, the degree of dependence of the communities directly affected upon the particular means of transportation, and other attendant conditions, are such that the carrier may not justly be required to continue to bear the financial loss necessarily entailed by operation. In some cases . . . the question is whether abandonment may justly be permitted, in view of the fact that it would subject the communities directly affected to serious injury while continued operation would impose a relatively light burden upon a prosperous carrier.” 271 U. S., at 168-169. In cases falling within the latter category, such as those involving vital commuter services in large metropolitan areas where the demands of public convenience and necessity are large, it is of course obvious that the Commission would err if it did not give great weight to the ability of the carrier to absorb even large deficits resulting from such services. But where, as here, the Commission’s findings make clear that the demands of public convenience and necessity are slight and that the situation is, therefore, one falling within the first category delineated in Colorado, it is equally proper for the Commission, in determining the existence of the burden on interstate commerce, to give little weight to the factor of the carrier’s overall prosperity. Whatever room there may be for differing views as to the wisdom of the policy reflected in § 13a (2), it is the duty of the Commission to effectuate the statutory scheme. We cannot agree with the District Court that the Commission departed in any respect from that duty here. We therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions to reinstate the report and order of the Commission. Reversed. Section 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (2), provides in pertinent part: “Where the discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, by a carrier or carriers subject to this chapter, of the operation or service of any train or ferry operated wholly within the boundaries of a single State is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of any State or where the State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition duly filed with it by said carrier or carriers for authority to discontinue or change, in whole or in part, the operation or service of any such train or ferry or shall not have acted finally on such an application or petition within one hundred and twenty days from the presentation thereof, such carrier or carriers may petition the Commission for authority to effect such discontinuance or change. The Commission may grant such authority only after full hearing and upon findings by it that (a) the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, of the operation or service of such train or ferry, and (b) the continued operation or service of such train or ferry without discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the interstate operations of such carrier or carriers or upon interstate commerce. When any petition shall be filed with the Commission under the provisions of this paragraph the Commission shall notify the Governor of the State in which such train or ferry is operated at least thirty days in advance of the hearing provided for in this paragraph, and such hearing shall be held by the Commission in the State in which such train or ferry is operated; and the Commission is authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records and facilities of the authorities in such State in the performance of its functions under this paragraph.” It should be noted, in connection with the findings made by the District Court, that the Commission had noted that the increase in passenger traffic during 1961 was largely due to group movements of school children; that, as to Southern’s failure to seek passengers, “prospective patrons who must be coaxed to use a service have no urgent need for it”; and that, after a broad study and investigation in 1959, the Commission had concluded that “public convenience and necessity” does not require the maintenance of deficit passenger services as a standby service for travelers who customarily travel by highway or by air. Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, 306 I. C. C. 417, 482. 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4), as so amended, provides in pertinent part: “Whenever in any such investigation the Commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against, or undue burden on, interstate or foreign commerce (which the Commission may find without a separation of interstate and intrastate property, revenues, and expenses, and without considering in totality the operations or results thereof of any carrier, or group or groups of carriers wholly within any State), which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, discrimination, or burden . . . .” “[I]t is the possible interpretation of these recent court decisions that would create a change in the present regulatory scheme.” H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12. 49 U. S. C. § 1 (18) provides in pertinent part: “No carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad, or the construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation under this chapter over or by means of such additional or extended line of railroad, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line of railroad, and no carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (19) provides in pertinent part: “The application for and issuance of any such certificate shall be under such rules and regulations as to hearings and other matters as the Commission may from time to time prescribe, and the provisions of this chapter shall apply to all such proceedings.” 49 TJ. S. C. § 1 (20) provides in pertinent part: “The Commission shall have power to issue such certificate as prayed for, or to refuse to issue it, or to issue it for a portion or portions of a line of railroad, or extension thereof, described in the application, or for the partial exercise only of such right or privilege, and may attach to the issuance of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require.” “A major cause of the worsening railroad situation is the unsatisfactory passenger situation. Not only is the passenger end of the business not making money — it is losing a substantial portion of that produced by freight operations. “It is obvious that in very great measure these passenger losses are attributable to commuter service. ... It is unreasonable to expect that such service should continue to be subsidized by the freight shippers throughout the country. “There are substantial losses, howéver, occurring in passenger service beyond those attributable solely to commuter service. Where this passenger service . . . cannot be made to pay its own way because of lack of patronage at reasonable rates, abandonment seems called for.” H. R. Rep. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12. “A most serious problem for the railroads is the difficulty and delay they often encounter when they seek to discontinue or change the operation of services or facilities that no longer pay their way and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify the heavy financial losses entailed. The subcommittee believes that the maintenance and operation of such outmoded services and facilities constitutes a heavy burden on interstate commerce.” S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 21. S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 6. See also the remarks of Senator Smathers, Chairman of the Surface Transportation Subcommittee, who made it clear that the net loss standard did not refer to all operations on a line or all operations within a State but rather to “the loss from the particular operation the railroad is rendering.” 104 Cong. Rec. 10849. See 104 Cong. Rec. 10846-10849. See also pp. 10838-10839. 104 Cong. Rec. 12547-12548. 104 Cong. Rec. 12551. S. Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 22. 104 Cong. Rec. 10862, 10864. H. R. 12832, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 10. Under § 13a (2), which applies solely to intrastate trains, the Commission may not authorize discontinuance until after the appropriate state regulatory agency has been given an opportunity to act and has failed or refused to authorize discontinuance. See New Jersey v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 372 U. S. 1, 4. See 49 U. S. C. § 13a (1), (2). The fact that Congress intended the same substantive standards to be applied both to intrastate and interstate discontinuances wholly vitiates appellees’ argument that the Commission is required to take into account, wherever presented, the profitability of intrastate operations as a whole or any segment thereof whenever an intrastate service is sought to be discontinued. Thus, consideration of the overall prosperity of the carrier is necessarily relevant to a determination of the degree to which a deficit resulting from a given service constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. But neither the profitability of such freight operations as are fortuitously conducted on the same line as a given passenger service nor the profitability of all operations within any given State bears any practical relationship either to the public’s need for the service in question or to the burden which the deficit imposes on interstate commerce.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. THOMAS No. 02-763. Argued October 14, 2003 Decided November 12, 2003 Scaua, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCollum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Kanter, Wendy M. Keats, and Barbara L. Spivak. Abraham S. Alter argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is authorized to pay disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons who have a “disability.” A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U. S. C. §§423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The issue we must decide is whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not disabled because she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without investigating whether that previous work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. I Pauline Thomas worked as an elevator operator for six years until her job was eliminated in August 1995. In June 1996, at age 53, Thomas applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See 49 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (Title II); as added, 86 Stat. 1465, and as amended, § 1381 et seq. (Title XVI). She claimed that she suffered from, and was disabled by, heart disease and cervical and lumbar radiculopathy. After the SSA denied Thomas’s application initially and on reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Thomas had “hypertension, cardiac arrythmia, [and] cervical and lumbar strain/sprain.” Decision of ALJ 5, Record 15. He concluded, however, that Thomas was not under a “disability” because her “impairments do not prevent [her] from performing her past relevant work as an elevator operator.” Id,., at 6, Record 16. He rejected Thomas’s argument that she is unable to do her previous work because that work no longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA’s Appeals Council denied Thomas’s request for review. Thomas then challenged the ALJ’s ruling in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, renewing her argument that she is unable to do her previous work due to its scarcity. The District Court affirmed the ALJ, concluding that whether Thomas’s old job exists is irrelevant under the SSA’s regulations. Thomas v. Apfel, Civ. No. 99-2234 (Aug. 17, 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded. Over the dissent of three of its members, it held that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability to perform prior work disqualifies from benefits only if it is “substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 294 F. 3d 568, 572 (2002). That holding conflicts with the decisions of four other Courts of Appeals. See Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F. 2d 1453, 1457 (CA9 1989); Garcia v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 46 F. 3d 552, 558 (CA6 1995); Pass v. Chater, 65 F. 3d 1200, 1206-1207 (CA4 1995); Rater v. Chater, 73 F. 3d 796, 799 (CA8 1996). We granted the SSA’s petition for certiorari. 537 U. S. 1187 (2003). II. As relevant to the present ease, Title II of the Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(1)(A). That definition is qualified, however, as follows; “An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. ...” § 423(d)(2)(A) (emphases added). “[W]ork which exists in the national economy” is defined to mean “work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” Ibid. Title XVI of the Act, which governs Supplemental Security Income for disabled indigent persons, employs the same definition of “disability” used in Title II, including a qualification that is verbatim the same as § 423(d)(2)(A). See 42 U. S. C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). For simplicity’s sake, we will refer only to the Title II provisions, but our analysis applies equally to Title XVI. Section 423(d)(2)(A) establishes two requirements for disability. First, an individual’s physical or mental impairment must render him “unable to do his previous work.” Second, the impairment must also preclude him from “engaging] in any other kind of substantial gainful work.” The parties agree that the latter requirement is qualified by the clause that immediately follows it — “which exists in the national economy.” The issue in this case is whether that clause also qualifies “previous work.” The SSA has answered this question in the negative. Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority, 42 U. S. C. §§ 405(a) (Title II), 1383(d)(1) (Title XVI), the agency has promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. See 2Ó CFR §404.1520 (2003) (governing claims for disability insurance benefits); § 416.920 (parallel regulation governing claims for Supplemental Security Income). If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find nondisability unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful activity.” §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find nondisability unless the claimant shows that he has a “severe impairment,” defined as “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth, and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called “vocational factors” (the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(e). As the above description shows, step four can result in a determination of no disability without inquiry into whether the claimant’s previous work exists in the national economy; the regulations explicitly reserve inquiry into the national economy for step five. Thus, the SSA has made it perfectly clear that it does not interpret the clause “which exists in the national economy” in § 423(d)(2)(A) as applying to “previous work.” The issue presented is whether this agency interpretation must be accorded deference. As we held in Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984), when a statute speaks clearly to the issue at hand we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” but when the statute “is silent or ambiguous” we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency charged with its implementation. The Third Circuit held that, by referring first to “previous work” and then to “any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,” 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute unambiguously indicates that the former is a species of the latter. “When,” it said, “a sentence sets out one or more specific items followed by ‘any other’ and a description, the specific items must fall within the description.” 294 F. 3d, at 572. We disagree. For the reasons discussed below, the interpretation adopted by SSA is at least a reasonable construction of the text and must therefore be given effect. The Third Circuit’s reading disregards — indeed, is precisely contrary to — the grammatical “rule of the last antecedent,” according to which a limiting clause or phrase (here, the relative clause “which exists in the national economy”) should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows (here, “any other kind of substantial gainful work”). See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.33, p. 369 (6th rev. ed. 2000) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent”). While this rule is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning, we have said that construing a statute in accord with the rule is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar.” Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U. S. 324, 330 (1993). In FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385 (1959), this Court employed the rule to interpret a statute strikingly similar in structure to § 423(d)(2)(A) — a provision of the Fur Products Labeling Act, 15 U. S. C. § 69, which defined “ 'invoice’ ” as “ 'a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog... transported or delivered to a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or agent, or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in fur products or furs.”’ 359 U. S., at 386 (quoting 15 U. S. C. § 69(f)) (emphasis added). Like the Third Circuit here, the Court of Appeals in Mandel Brothers had interpreted the phrase “'any other’” as rendering the relative clause (“ 'who is engaged in dealing commercially’ ”) applicable to all the specifically listed categories. 359 U. S., at 389. This Court unanimously reversed, concluding that the “limiting clause is to be applied only to the last antecedent.” Id., at 389, and n. 4 (citing 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4921 (3d ed. 1943)). An example will illustrate the error of the Third Circuit’s perception that the specifically enumerated “previous work” “must” be treated the same as the more general reference to “any other kind of substantial gainful work.” 294 F. 3d, at 572. Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any other activity that damages the house. As far as appears from what they said, their reasons for prohibiting the home-alone party may have had nothing to do with damage to the house — for instance, the risk that underage drinking or sexual activity would occur. And even if their only concern was to prevent damage, it does not follow from the fact that the same interest underlay both the specific and the general prohibition that proof of impairment of that interest is required for both. The parents, foreseeing that assessment of whether an activity had in fact “damaged” the house could be disputed by their son, might have wished to preclude all argument by specifying and categorically prohibiting the one activity — hosting a party — that was most likely to cause damage and most likely to occur. The Third. Circuit suggested that interpreting the statute as does the SSA would lead to “absurd results.” Ibid. See also Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F. 2d 212, 213 (CA7 1991) (the fact that a claimant could perform a past job that no longer exists would not be “a rational ground for denying benefits”). The court could conceive of “no plausible reason why Congress might have wanted to deny benefits to an otherwise qualified person simply because that person, although unable to perform any job that actually exists in the national economy, could perform a previous job that no longer exists.” 294 F. 3d, at 572-573. But on the very next page the Third Circuit conceived of just such a plausible reason, namely, that “in the vast majority of cases, a claimant who is found to have the capacity to perform her past work also will have the capacity to perform other types of work.” Id., at 574, n. 5. The conclusion which follows is that Congress could have determined that an analysis of a claimant’s physical and mental capacity to do his previous work would “in the vast majority of cases” serve as an effective and efficient administrative proxy for the claimant’s ability to do some work that does exist in the national economy. Such a proxy is üseful because the step-five inquiry into whether the claimant’s cumulative impairments preclude him from finding “other” work is very difficult, requiring consideration of “each of th[e] [vocational] factors and ... an individual assessment of each claimant’s abilities and limitations,” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-461, n. 1 (1983) (citing 20 CFR §§404.1545-404.1565 (1982)). There is good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the more expansive and individualized step-five analysis. As we have observed, “[t]he Social Security hearing system is ‘probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.’ . . . The need for efficiency is self-evident.” 461 U. S., at 461, n. 2 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit rejected this proxy rationale because it would produce results that “may not always be true, and ... may not be true in this case.” 294 F. 3d, at 576. That logic would invalidate a vast number of the procedures employed by the administrative state. To generalize is to be imprecise. Virtually every legal (or other) rule has imperfect applications in particular circumstances. Cf. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U. S. 137, 157 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring) (“To be sure the Secretary faces an administrative task of staggering proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of the Social Security Act. Perfection in processing millions of such claims annually is impossible”). It is true that, under the SSA’s interpretation, a worker with severely limited capacity who has managed to find easy work in a declining industry could be penalized for his troubles if the job later disappears. It is also true, however, that under the Third Circuit’s interpretation, impaired workers in declining or marginal industries who cannot do “other” work could simply refuse to return to their jobs — even though the jobs remain open and available — and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give rise to undesirable results in some instances (as here both constructions can), but rather whether, in light of the alternatives, the agency construction is reasonable. In the present ease, the SSA’s authoritative interpretation certainly satisfies thát test. We have considered respondent’s other arguments and find them to be without merit. * * * We need not decide today whether § 423(d)(2)(A) compels the interpretation given it by the SSA. It suffices to conclude, as we do, that § 423(d)(2)(A) does not unambiguously require a different interpretation, and that the SSA’s regulation is an entirely reasonable interpretation of the text. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The step-four instructions to the claimant read as follows: “If we cannot make a decision based on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a severe impairments), we then review your residual functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.” 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (2003). In regulations that became effective on September 25, 2003, the SSA amended certain aspects of the five-step process in ways not material to this opinion. The provisions referred to as subsections (e) and (f) in this opinion are now subsections (f) and (g). This interpretation was embodied in the regulations that first established the five-step process in 1978, see 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (codified, as amended, at 20 CFR §§404.1520 and 416.920 (1982)). Even before enactment of § 423(d)(2)(A) as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1967, the SSA disallowed disability benefits when the inability to work was caused by “technological changes in the industry in which [the claimant] has worked.” 20 CFR § 404.1502(b) (1961).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MALONE, COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY FOR MINNESOTA v. WHITE MOTOR CORP. et al. No. 76-1184. Argued January 10, 1978 Decided April 3, 1978 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., post, p. 515, and Powell, J., post, p. 516, filed dissenting opinions, in which Burger, C. J., joined. Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Richard B. Allyn, Solicitor General of Minnesota, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, and Kent G. Harbison, Richard A. Lockridge, and Jon K. Murphy, Special Assistant Attorneys General. Frank C. Heath argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Curtis L. Roy, Erwin Griswold, and John L. Strauch. Allan A. Rycrn, Jr., argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General McCree. John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and David S. Fishback. Peter G. Nash, Eugene B. Granof, and Stephen A. Bokat filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. J. Albert Woll and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. A Minnesota statute, the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, Minn. Stat. § 181B.01 et seq. (1976) (Pension Act), passed in April 1974, established minimum standards for the funding and vesting of employee pensions. The question in this case is whether this statute, which since January 1, 1975, has been pre-empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), was pre-empted prior to that time by federal labor policy insofar as it purported to override or control the terms of collective-bargaining agreements negotiated under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). A Federal District Court held that it was not, 412 F. Supp. 372 (Minn. 1976), but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed and held the Pension Act invalid. 545 F. 2d 599 (1976). Because the case fell within our mandatory appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2), we noted probable jurisdiction. 434 U. S. 813. We reverse. I In 1963, White Motor Corp. and its subsidiary, White Farm Equipment Co. (hereafter collectively referred to as appellee), purchased from another company two farm equipment manufacturing plants, located in Hopkins, Minn., and Minneapolis, Minn, (on Lake Street). The employees at these plants, represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), were covered by a pension plan established through collective bargaining. Under the 1971 collective-bargaining contract, the Pension Plan provided that an employee who attained the age of 40 and completed 10 or more years of credited service with the company was entitled to a pension. The amount of the pension would depend upon the age at which the employee retired. In language unchanged since 1950, the 1971 Plan provided that “ [p] ensions shall be payable only from the Fund, and rights to pensions shall be enforceable only against the Fund.” App. 155. The Plan, however, was to be funded in part on a deferred basis. The unpaid past service liability— the excess of accrued liability over the present value of the assets of the Fund — was to be met through contributions by the employer from its continuing operations. Section 10.02 of the Plan provided that “[t]he Company shall have the sole right at any time to terminate the entire plan.” During the 1968 and 1971 negotiations, however, the UAW obtained from appellee guarantees that, upon termination, pensions for those entitled to them would remain at certain designated levels, though lower than those specified in the Plan. By virtue of these guarantees, appellee assumed a direct liability for pension payments amounting to $7 million above the assets in the Fund. Appellee exercised its contractual right to terminate the Pension Plan on May 1, 1974. A few weeks before, however, the Pension Act had been enacted. This statute imposed “a pension funding charge” directly against any employer who ceased to operate a place of employment or a pension plan. This charge would be sufficient to insure that all employees with 10 or more years of service would receive whatever pension benefits had accrued to them, regardless of whether their rights to those benefits had “vested” within the terms of the Plan. The funds obtained through the pension funding charge would then be used to purchase an annuity payable to the employee when he reached normal retirement age. Although the Pension Act did not compel an employer to adopt or continue a pension plan, it did guarantee to employees with 10 or more years’ service full payment of their accrued pension benefits. Pursuant to the Pension Act, the appellant, Commissioner of Labor and Industry of the State of Minnesota, undertook an investigation of the pension plan termination here involved and later certified that the sum necessary to achieve compliance with the Pension Act was $19,150,053. Under the Pension Act, a pension funding charge in this amount became a lien on the assets of appellee. Appellee promptly filed this suit in Federal District Court. Appellee’s complaint, as amended, asserted violations of the Supremacy Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy. Clause claim was based on the argument that the Pension Act was in conflict with several provisions of the NLRA, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., because it “interferes with the right of Plaintiffs to free collective bargaining under federal law and . . . vitiates collective bargaining agreements entered into under the authority of federal law, by imposing upon Plaintiffs obligations which, by the express terms of such collective bargaining agreements, Plaintiffs were not required to assume.” App. A-9 — A-10. Appellee moved for partial summary judgment or, alternatively, for a preliminary injunction based on the pre-emption claim. Distinguishing Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959), and relying on evidence of congressional intent contained in the federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act), 72 Stat. 997, as amended, 76 Stat. 35, 29 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., the District Court held that the Pension Act was not pre-empted by federal law. 412 P. Supp. 372 (Minn. 1976). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the Pension Act was pre-empted by federal labor law, and reversed the District Court. 545 P. 2d 599 (1976). The reason was that the Pension Act purported to override the terms of the existing pension plan, arrived at through collective bargaining, in at least three ways: It granted employees vested rights not available under the pension plan; to the extent of any deficiency in the pension fund, it required payment from the general assets of the employer, while the pension plan provided that benefits shall be paid only out of the pension fund; and the Pension Act imposed liability for post-termination payments to the pension fund beyond those specifically guaranteed.- This, the court ruled, the State could not do; for if, under Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 (1976), “states cannot control the economic weapons of the parties at the bargaining table, a fortiori, they may not directly control the substantive terms of the contract which results from that bargaining.” 545 F. 2d, at 606. Further, as the court understood the opinion in Oliver, supra, “a state cannot modify or change an otherwise valid and effective provision of a collective bargaining agreement.” 545 F. 2d, at 608. Finally, the Court of Appeals found that the pre-emption disclaimer in the Disclosure Act relied on by the District Court related only “to state statutes governing those obligations of trust undertaken by persons managing, administrating or operating employee benefit funds, the violation of which gives rise to civil and criminal penalties. Accordingly, no warrant exists for construing this legislation to leave to a state the power to change substantive terms of pension plan agreements.” Id., at 609. II It is uncontested that whether the Minnesota statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause depends on the intent of Congress. “The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963). Often Congress does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-empt state laws; and in such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., ante, at 157-158; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525, 540-541 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). “We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 289 (1971). The Pension Act “leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible.” Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485, 488 (1953). Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Minnesota statute was invalid because it trenched on what the court considered to be subjects that Congress had committed for determination to the collective-bargaining process. There is little doubt that under the federal statutes governing labor-management relations, an employer must bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions and that pension benefits are proper subjects of compulsory bargaining. But there is nothing in the NLRA, including those sections on which appellee relies, which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues, such as pension plans, that may be the subject of collective bargaining. If the Pension Act is pre-empted here, the congressional intent to do so must be implied from the relevant provisions of the labor statutes. We have concluded, however, that such implication should not be made here and that a far more reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority to regulate pension plaps is to be found in § 10 of the Disclosure Act. Section 10.(b) provided: “The provisions of this Act, except subsection (a) of this section and section 13 and any action taken thereunder, shall not be held to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of the United States or of any State affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension benefit plans, or in any manner to authorize the operation or administration of any such plan contrary to any such law.” Also, § 10 (a), after shielding an employer from duplicating state and federal filing requirements, makes clear that other state laws remained unaffected: “Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any State from obtaining such additional information relating to any such plan as it may desire, or from otherwise regulating such plan.” Contrary to the Court of Appeals, we believe that the foregoing provisions, together with the legislative history of the 1958 Disclosure Act, clearly indicate that Congress at that time recognized and preserved state authority to regulate pension plans, including those plans which were the product of collective bargaining. Because the 1958 Disclosure Act was in effect at the time of the crucial events in this case, the expression of congressional intent included therein should control the decision here. Congressional consideration of the problems in the pension field began in 1954, after the President sent a message to Congress recommending that “Congress initiate a thorough study of welfare and pension funds covered by collective bargaining agreements, with a view of enacting such legislation as will protect and conserve these funds for the millions of working men and women who are the beneficiaries.” In the next four years, through hearings, studies, and investigations, a Senate Subcommittee canvassed the problems of the nearly unregulated pension field and possible solutions to them. Although Congress turned up extensive evidence of kickbacks, embezzlement, and mismanagement, it concluded: “The most serious single weakness in this private social insurance .complex is not in the abuses and failings enumerated above. Overshadowing these is the too frequent practice of withholding from those most directly affected, the employee-beneficiaries, information which will permit them to determine (1) whether the program is being administered efficiently and equitably, and (2) more importantly, whether or not the assets and prospective income of the programs are sufficient to guarantee the benefits which have been promised to them.” S. Rep. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1958) (hereinafter S. Rep.). As a first step toward protection of the workers’ interests in their pensions, Congress enacted the 1958 Disclosure Act. The statute required plan administrators to file with the Labor Department and make available upon request both a description of the plan and an annual report containing financial information. In the case of a plan funded through a trust, the annual report was to include, inter alia, “the type and basis of funding, actuarial assumptions used, the amount of current and past service liabilities, and the number of employees both retired and nonretired covered by the plan . . . as well as a valuation of the assets of the fund. The statute did not, however, prescribe any substantive rules to achieve either of the two purposes described above. The Senate Report explained: “[T]he legislation proposed is not a regulatory statute. It is a disclosure statute and by design endeavors to leave regulatory responsibility to the States.” S. Rep. 18. This objective was reflected in §§ 10 (a) and 10 (b), quoted above. As the Senate Report explained, the statute was designed “to leave to the States the detailed regulations relating to insurance, trusts and other phases of their operations.” S. Rep. 19. There was “no desire to get the Federal Government involved in the regulation of these plans but a disclosure statute which is administered in close cooperation with the States could also be of great assistance to the States in carrying out their regulatory functions.” Id., at 18. There is also no doubt that the Congress which adopted the Disclosure Act recognized that it was legislating with respect to pension funds many of which had been established by collective bargaining. The message from the President which had prompted the original inquiry had focused on the need to protect workers “covered by collective bargaining agreements.” The problems that Congress had identified were characteristic of bargained-for plans as well as of others. The Reports of both the Senate and House Committees explained that pension funds were frequently established through the collective-bargaining process. S. Rep. 8; H. R. Rep. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1958) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). The Senate Report emphasized the need for protection even where the plan was incorporated in a collective-bargaining agreement. S. Rep. 4, 8, 14. Congressmen explaining the bill on the floor also made clear that the bill would apply to pension plans “whether or not they have been brought into existence through collective bargaining.” 104 Cong. Rec. 16420 (1958) (remarks of Cong. Lane); id., at 16425 (remarks of Cong. Wolverton); see id., at 7049-7052 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Indeed, the bill met opposition in both the Senate and the House on the ground that its approach would “require employers to surrender to labor unions economic and bargaining power which should be negotiated through the normal channels of collective bargaining.” S. Rep. 34 (minority view of Sen. Allott); accord, H. R. Rep. 25 (minority views). Yet neither the bill as enacted nor its legislative history drew a distinction between collectively bargained and all other plans, either with regard to the disclosure role of the federal legislation or the regulatory functions that would remain with the States. Appellee argues that the Disclosure Act’s allocation of regulatory responsibility to the States is irrelevant here because the Disclosure Act was “enacted to deal with corruption and mismanagement of funds.” Brief for Appellees 36. We think that the appellee advances an excessively narrow view of the legislative history. Congress was concerned not only with corruption, but also with the possibility that honestly managed pension plans would be terminated by the employer, leaving the employees without funded pensions at retirement age. The Senate Report specifically stated: “Entirely aside from abuses or violations, there are compelling reasons why there should be disclosure of the financial operation of all types of plans.” S. Rep. 16. The Report then reproduced a chart showing the number of pension plans registered with the Internal Revenue Service that had been terminated during a 2-month period. Ibid. The Senate Committee also observed: “Trusteed pension plans commonly limit benefits, even though fixed, to what can be paid out of the funds in the pension trust.” Id., at 15. As an illustration, the Report quoted language from a collectively bargained pension plan disclaiming any liability of the company in the event of termination. Ibid. The Senate Report also showed an awareness of the problems posed by vesting requirements and expressed concern that “employees whose rights do not mature within such contract period must rely upon the expectation that their union will be able to renew the contract or negotiate a similar one upon its termination.” Id., at 8. Thus, Congress was concerned with many of the same issues as are involved in this case — unexpected termination, inadequate funding, unfair vesting requirements. In preserving generally state laws “affecting the operation or administration of employee welfare or pension benefit plans,” 72 Stat. 1003, Congress indicated that the States had and were to have authority to deal with these problems. Moreover, it should be emphasized that § 10 of the Disclosure Act referred specifically to the “future,” as well as “present” laws of the States. Congress was aware that the States had thus far attempted little regulation of pension plans. The federal Disclosure Act was envisioned as laying a foundation for future state regulation. The Congress sought “to provide adequate information in disclosure legislation for possible later State . . . regulatory laws.” H. R. Rep. 2. Senator Kennedy, a manager of the bill, explained to his colleagues: “The objective of the bill is to provide more adequate protection for the employee-beneficiaries of these plans through a uniform Federal disclosure act which will . . . make the facts available not only to. the participants and the Federal Government but to the States, in order that any desired State regulation can be more effectively accomplished.” 104 Cong. Rec. 7050 (1958). See also S. Rep. 18.. Senator Kennedy had “no doubt that this [was] an area in which the States [were] going to begin to move.” 104 Cong. Rec. 7053 (1958). The aim of the Disclosure Act was perhaps best summarised by Senator Smith, the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee and a supporter of the bill. He stated: “It seems to be the policy of the pending legislation to extend beyond the problem of corruption. As stated in the language of the bill, one of its aims is to make available to the employee-beneficiaries information which will permit them to determine, first, whether the program is being administered efficiently and equitably; and, second, more importantly, whether or not the assets and prospective income of the programs are sufficient to guarantee the benefits which have been promised to them. “This present bill provides for far more than anti-corruption legislation directed against the machinations of dishonest men who betray their trust. Rather, it inaugurates a new social policy of accountability. . . . “This policy could very well lead to the establishment of mandatory standards by which these plans must be governed.” Id., at 7517. It is also clear that Congress contemplated that the primary responsibility for developing such “mandatory standards” would lie with the States. Although Congress came to a quite different conclusion in 1974 when ERISA was adopted, the 1958 Disclosure Act clearly anticipated a broad regulatory role for the States. In light of this history, we cannot hold that the Pension Act is nevertheless implicitly pre-empted by the collective-bargaining provisions of the NLRA. Congress could not have intended that bargained-for plans, which were among those that had given rise to the very problems that had so concerned Congress, were to be free from either state or federal regulation insofar as their substantive provisions were concerned. The Pension Act seeks to protect the accrued benefits of workers in the event of plan termination and to insure that' the assets and prospective income of the plan are sufficient to guarantee the benefits promised — exactly the kind of problems which the 85th Congress hoped that the States would solve. This conclusion is consistent with the Court’s decision in Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959), which concerned a claimed conflict between a state antitrust law and the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement specially adapted to the trucking business. The agreement prescribed a wage scale for truckdrivers and, in order to prevent evasion, provided that drivers who own and drive their own vehicles should be paid, in addition to the prescribed wage, a stated minimum rental for the use of their vehicles. An Ohio court had invalidated this portion of the collective-bargaining agreement under Ohio antitrust law. This Court reversed, noting that “[t]he application [of the Ohio law] would frustrate the parties’ solution of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here.” Id., at 296. The Oliver opinion contains broad language affirming the independence of the collective-bargaining process from state interference: “Federal law here created the duty upon the parties to bargain collectively; Congress has provided for a system of federal law applicable to the agreement the parties made in response to that duty . . . and federal law sets some outside limits (not contended to be exceeded here) on what their agreement may provide .... We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the application here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties’ agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working conditions.” Ibid, (citations omitted). The opinion nevertheless recognizes exceptions to this general rule. One of them, necessarily anticipated, was the situation where it is evident that Congress intends a different result: “The solution worked out by the parties was not one of a sort which Congress has indicated may be left to prohibition by the several States. Cf. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 301, 307-312.” Ibid. As we understand the 1958 Disclosure Act and its legislative history, the collective-bargaining provisions at issue here dealt with precisely the sort of subject matter “which Congress . . . indicated may be left to [regulation] by the several states.” Congress clearly envisioned the exercise of state regulation power over pension funds, and we do not depart from Oliver in sustaining the Minnesota statute. Ill Insofar as the Supremacy Clause issue is concerned, no different conclusion is called for because the Minnesota statute was enacted after the UAW-White Motor Corp. agreement had been in effect for several years. Appellee points out that the parties to the 1971 collective-bargaining agreement therefore had no opportunity to consider the impact of any such legislation. Although we understand the equitable considerations which underlie appellee’s argument, they are not material to the resolution of the pre-emption issue since they do not render the Minnesota Pension Act any more or less consistent with congressional policy at the time it was adopted. Our decision in this case is, of course, limited to appellee’s claim that the Minnesota statute is inconsistent with the federal labor statutes. Appellee’s other constitutional claims are not before us. It remains for the District Court to consider on remand the contentions that the Minnesota Pension Act impairs contractual obligations and fails to provide due process in violation of the United States Constitution. Without intimating any views on the merits of those questions, we note that appellee’s claim of unfair retroactive impact can be considered in that context. All that we decide here is that the decision of the Court of Appeals finding federal preemption of the Minnesota Pension Act should be and hereby is Reversed. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. ERISA, 88 Stat. 832, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. Y), provides for comprehensive federal regulation of employee pension plans, and contains a provision expressly pre-empting all state laws regulating covered plans. § 1144 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. Y). Because ERISA did not become effective until January 1, 1975, and expressly disclaims any effect with regard to events before that date, it does not apply to the facts of this case. Section 6.17 of the Plan also stated: “No benefits other than those specifically provided for are to be provided under this Plan. No employee shall have any vested right under the Plan prior to his retirement and then only to the extent specifically provided herein.” App. to Jurisdictional Statement A-29. Section 9.04, “Rights of Employees in Fund,” is also relevant: “No employee, participant or pensioner shall have any right to, or interest in any part of any Trust Fund created hereunder, upon termination of employment or otherwise, except as provided under this Plan and only to the extent therein provided. All payments of benefits as provided for in this Plan shall be made only out of the Fund or Funds of the Plan, and neither the Company nor any Trustee nor any Pension Committee or Member thereof shall be liable therefore in any manner or to any extent.” App. to Jurisdictional Statement A-7. The 1971 version of the Plan contained a provision which required the employer to fund the net deficiency over a period of 35 years, beginning in 1971. The 1968 version contained a similar provision which contemplated that the deficiency would be amortized over a 30-year period. The effect of the guarantees was to assure that the employees would receive pension benefits at a level about 60% of that specified in the Plan. In January 1972, after several years of losses, appellee informed the UAW that it intended to close both of the plants at issue. As a result of negotiations, the Hopkins plant continued to operate, but the Lake Street plant was closed. At the time the Lake Street plant was closed, there was a net deficiency in the Pension Fund of $14 million. As of January 1, 1975, there were 981 retirees under the Plan and 233 persons eligible for deferred pensions. In addition, there were 44 terminated employees who at the time of the termination had 10 years of service but had not attained the age of 40. Two hundred and sixty employees continued to work at the Hopkins plant. Appellee also attempted to terminate the Pension Plan on June 30, 1972, but the UAW challenged this action on the ground that the Plan could not be terminated until expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement on May 1, 1974. An arbitrator upheld the union’s position. See International Union, UAW v. White Motor Corp., 505 F. 2d 1193 (CA8 1974). The complaint claimed a conflict with the provisions and policies of §§ 1, 7, 8 (a) (5), 8 (b) (3), and 8 (d) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151, 157,158 (a) (5), 158 (b) (3), and 158 (d). The Disclosure Act, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., was specifically repealed by ERISA. 29 U. S. C. §1031 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. V). However, ERISA was enacted on September 2, 1974 — after the operative events in this case — and the repeal did not take effect until January 1, 1975. § 1031 (b)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V). See generally n. 1, supra. Public Papers of The Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, ¶ 5, p. 43 (1960). Opponents of the bill argued that the legislation would “seriously interfere with . . . bargaining relationships” by giving labor unions access to information about the costs of certain employer-administered benefit plans. 104 Cong. Rec. 7209 (1958) (remarks of Sen. Allott). In these level-of-benefit plans, the employer guaranteed to his employees specified benefits and then undertook the full cost and management of the plan. The unions were often not told the annual cost of providing benefits under the plan. Senator Allott, the principal opponent of the bill, argued on the floor: “Where the employer, either on his own initiative or as a result of collective bargaining, agrees to provide a level-of-benefits plan, the question of whether employees or their representatives should have further information is one to be bargained between them. How the employer intends to meet this financial obligation, or how the financial operation of the fund is set up to pay the benefits, is a matter to be settled by the parties concerned — not granted by operation of law.” Id., at 7208. Congressman Bosch, the leading opponent of the bill in the House, argued bluntly: “.Those level-of-benefits plans which now operate under collective bargaining contracts were agreed to with the full knowledge by the unions involved, that the cost, operation and management were the exclusive right of the persons responsible under the plans and, if the unions desired it otherwise, they could have bargained on some other basis than level-of-benefits. If the labor unions wish to change this situation, they should do it through the normal channels of collective bargaining and not by legislation.” Id., at 16424. Amendments proposed by Senator Allott and Congressman Bosch seeking to exempt level-of-benefits plans from the statute were defeated. Id., at 7333, 16442. The Report quoted “representative language” from a General Motors-UAW contract which provided: “The pension benefits of the plan shall be only such as can be provided by the assets of the pension fund or by any insured fund, and there shall be no liability or obligation on the part of the corporation to make any further contributions to the trustee or the insurance company in event of termination of the plan. No liability for the payment of pension benefits under the plan shall be imposed upon the corporation, the officers, directors, or stockholders of the corporation.” S. Rep. 15. Among the “basic facts” noted by the Committee were: “9. The employees covered by these group plans have no specific rights until they meet the conditions of the particular plans. For example, in the case of a pension plan this might involve 30 years’ service and the attainment of age 65 .... “10. Although these plans envisaged a continuing operation to provide benefits for all employees covered — in plans which are not collectively bargained, which constitute the majority of all plans and which are predominantly administered by employers, there is actually no assurance that the benefits will be forthcoming in view of a universally employed clause in such plans to the effect that the employer can terminate the plan at his discretion. Even in collectively bargained plans the employer’s agreement to provide for part or all the costs of the benefits is a short-term contract of 1 to 5 years,” Id., at 4. Senator Ives, who had served as chairman of the Senate Investigating Committee during the 83d Congress, explained: "Six States already have enacted legislation on the general subject of pension and welfare plans. Other States are considering such legislation.” 104 Cong. Rec. 7186-7187 (1958). The coverage of extent state legislation was more fully discussed in S. Rep. 18. The Court also pointed out: “We have not here a case of a collective bargaining agreement in conflict with a local health or safety regulation; the conflict here is between the federally sanctioned agreement and state policy which seeks specifically to adjust relationships in the world of commerce.” 358 TJ. S., at 297. The State claims that the statute is a health or safety regulation that would be valid under Oliver, wholly aside from the Disclosure Act. We need not pass on this contention. We note that the United States as amicus curiae, argues that the Minnesota statute is not pre-empted. Its view is that application of the Minnesota Pension Act to pre-1974 labor agreements is not disruptive of the federal labor scheme. In Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (Minn. 1977), a three-judge District Court upheld the Minnesota Pension Act against a federal institutional challenge based on the Contract Clause, as well as other constitutional provisions. We have noted probable jurisdiction in that case sub nom. Allied Structured Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 434 U. S. 1045, but have not yet heard oral argument.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHWARE v. BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS OF NEW MEXICO. No. 92. Argued January 14-15, 1957. Decided May 6, 1957. Herbert Monte Levy argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. William A. Sloan and Fred M. Standley, Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether petitioner, Rudolph Schware, has been denied a license to practice law in New Mexico in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. New Mexico has a system for the licensing of persons to practice law similar to that in effect in most States. A Board of Bar Examiners determines if candidates for admission to the bar have the necessary qualifications. When the Board concludes that an applicant qualifies it recommends to the State Supreme Court that he be admitted. If the court accepts the recommendation, the applicant is entitled to practice law upon taking an oath to support the constitutions and laws of the United States and New Mexico. An applicant must pass a bar examination before the Board will give him its recommendation. The Board can refuse to permit him to take this examination unless he demonstrates that he has “good moral character.” In December 1953, on the eve of his graduation from the University of New Mexico School of Law, Schware filed an application with the Board of Bar Examiners requesting that he be permitted to take the bar examination scheduled for February 1954. His application was submitted on a form prescribed by the Board that required answers to a large number of questions. From the record, it appears that he answered these questions in detail. Among other things, he disclosed that he had used certain aliases between 1933 and 1937 and that he had been arrested on several occasions prior to 1940. When he appeared to take the examination, the Board informed him that he could not do so. He later requested a formal hearing on the denial of his application. The Board granted his request. At the hearing the Board told him for the first time why it had refused to permit him to take the bar examination. It gave him a copy of the minutes of the meeting at which it had voted to deny his application. These minutes read: “No. 1309, Rudolph Schware. It is moved by Board Member Frank Andrews that the application of Rudolph Schware to take the bar examination be denied for the reason that, taking into consideration the use of aliases by the applicant, his former connection with subversive organizations, and his record of arrests, he has failed to satisfy the Board as to the requisite moral character for admission to the Bar of New /Mexico. Whereupon said motion is duly-seconded- by Board Member Ross L. Malone, and unanimously passed.” At the hearing petitioner called his wife, the rabbi of his synagogue, a local attorney and the secretary to the dean of the law school to testify about his character. He took the stand himself and was thoroughly examined under oath by the Board. His counsel introduced a series of letters that petitioner had written his wife from 1944 through 1946 while he was on duty in the Army. Letters were also introduced from every member of petitioner’s law school graduating class except one who did not comment. And all of his law school professors who were then available wrote in regard to his moral character. The Board called no witnesses and introduced no evidence. The record of the formal hearing shows the following facts relevant to Schware’s moral character. He was born in a poor section of New York City in 1914 and grew up in a neighborhood inhabited primarily by recent immigrants. His father was an immigrant and like many of his neighbors had a difficult time providing for his family. Schware took a job when he was nine years old and throughout the remainder of school worked to help provide necessary income for his family. After 1929, the economic condition of the Schware family and their neighbors, as well as millions of others, was greatly worsened. Schware was then at a formative stage in high school. He was interested in and enthusiastic for socialism and trade-unionism as was his father. In 1932, despairing at what he considered lack of vigor in the socialist movement at a time when the country was in the depths of the great depression, he joined the Young Communist League. At this time he was 18 years old and in the final year of high school. From the time he left school until 1940 Schware, like many others, was periodically unemployed. He worked at a great variety of temporary and ill-paying jobs. In 1933, he found work in a glove factory and there he participated in a successful effort to unionize the employees. Since these workers were principally Italian, Schware assumed the name Rudolph Di Caprio to forestall the effects of anti-Jewish prejudice against him, not only in securing and retaining a job but in assisting in the organization of his fellow employees. In 1934 he went to California where he secured work on the docks. He testified that he continued to use the name Rudolph Di Caprio because Jews were discriminated against in employment for this work. Wherever Schware was employed he was an active advocate of labor organization. In 1934 he took part in the great maritime strikes on the west coast which were bitterly fought on both sides. While on strike in San Pedro, California, he was arrested twice on “suspicion of criminal syndicalism.” He was never formally charged nor tried and was released in each instance after being held for a brief period. He testified that the San Pedro police in a series of mass arrests jailed large numbers of the strikers. At the time of his father’s death in 1937 Schware left the Communist Party but later he rejoined. In 1940 he was arrested and indicted for violating the Neutrality Act of 1917. He was charged with attempting to induce men to volunteer for duty on the side of the Loyalist Government in the Spanish Civil War. Before his case came to trial the charges were dismissed and he was released. Later in 1940 he quit the Communist Party. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 had greatly disillusioned him and this disillusionment was made complete as he came to believe that certain leaders in the Party were acting to advance their own selfish interests rather than the interests of the working class which they purported to represent. In 1944 Schware entered the armed forces of the United States. While in the service he volunteered for duty as a paratrooper and was sent to New Guinea. While serving in the Army here and abroad he wrote a number of letters to his wife. These letters show a desire to serve his country and demonstrate faith in a free democratic society. They reveal serious thoughts about religion which later led him and his wife to associate themselves with a synagogue when he returned to civilian life. He was honorably discharged from the Army in 1946. After finishing college, he entered the University of New Mexico law school in 1950. At the beginning he went to the dean and told him of his past activities and his association with the Communist Party during the depression and asked for advice. The dean told him to remain in school and put behind him what had happened years before. While studying law Schware operated a business in order to support his wife and two children and to pay the expenses of a professional education. During his three years at the law school his conduct was exemplary. At the conclusion of the hearing the Board reaffirmed its decision denying Schware the right to take the bar examination. He appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court. That court upheld the denial with one justice dissenting. 60 N. M. 304, 291 P. 2d 607. In denying a motion for rehearing the court stated that: “[Schware’s membership in the Communist Party], together with his other former actions in the use of aliases and record of arrests, and his present attitude toward those matters, were the considerations upon which [we approved the denial of his application].” Schware then petitioned this Court to review his case alleging that he had been denied an opportunity to qualify for the practice of law contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 821. Cf. In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 562, 564-569. And see Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, post, p. 252, decided this day. A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114. Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. And see Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13. A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 319-320. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502. Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. Here the State concedes that Schware is fully qualified to take the examination in all respects other than good moral character. Therefore the question is whether the Supreme Court of New Mexico on the record before us could reasonably find that he had not shown good moral character. There is nothing in the record which suggests that Schware has engaged in any conduct during the past 15 years which reflects adversely on his character. The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that he “presently enjoys good repute among his teachers, his fellow students and associates and in his synagogue.” Schware’s professors, his fellow students, his business associates and the rabbi of the synagogue of which he and his family are members, all gave testimony that he is a good man, a man who is imbued with a sense of deep responsibility for his family, who is trustworthy, who respects the rights and beliefs of others. From the record it appears he is a man of religious conviction and is training his children in the beliefs and practices of his faith. A solicitude for others is demonstrated by the fact that he regularly read the Bible to an illiterate soldier while in the Army and law to a blind student while at the University of New Mexico law school. His industry is depicted by the fact that he supported his wife and two children and paid for a costly professional education by operating a business separately while studying law. He demonstrated candor by informing the Board of his personal history and by going to the dean of the law school and disclosing his past. The undisputed evidence in the record shows Schware to be a man of high ideals with a deep sense of social justice. Not a single witness testified that he was not a man of good character. Despite Schware’s showing of good character, the Board and court below thought there were certain facts in the record which raised substantial doubts about his moral fitness to practice law. (1) Aliases. — From 1934 to 1937 Schware used certain aliases. He testified that these aliases were adopted so he could secure a job in businesses which discriminated against Jews in their employment practices and so that he could more effectively organize non-Jewish employees at plants where he worked. Of course it is wrong to use an alias when it is done to cheat or defraud another but it can hardly be said that Schware’s attempt to forestall anti-Semitism in securing employment or organizing his fellow workers was wrong. He did give an assumed name to police in 1934 when he was picked up in a mass arrest during a labor dispute. He said he did this so he would not be fired as a striker. This is certainly not enough evidence to support an inference that petitioner has bad moral character more than 20 years later. (2) Arrests. — In response to the questions on the Board’s application form Schware stated that he had been arrested on several occasions: 1. In 1934, while he was participating in a bitter labor dispute in the California shipyards, petitioner was arrested at least two times on “suspicion of criminal syndicalism.” After being held for a brief period he was released without formal charges being filed against him. He was never indicted nor convicted for any offense in connection with these arrests. The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense. When formal charges are not filed against the arrested person and he is released without trial, whatever probative force the arrest may have had is normally dissipated. Moreover here, the special facts surrounding the 1934 arrests are relevant in shedding light on their present significance. Apparently great numbers of strikers were picked up by police in a series of arrests during the strike at San Pedro and many of these were charged with “criminal syndicalism.” The California syndicalism statutes in effect in 1934 were very broad and vague. There is nothing in the record which indicates why Schware was arrested on “suspicion” that he had violated this statute. There is no suggestion that he was using force or violence in an attempt to overthrow the state or national government. Again it should be emphasized that these arrests were made more than 20 years ago and petitioner was never formally charged nor tried for any offense related to them. 2. In 1940 Schware was arrested for violating the Neutrality Act of 1917 which makes it unlawful for a person within the United States to join or to hire or retain another to join the army of any foreign state. He was indicted but before the case came to trial the prosecution dropped the charges. He had been charged with recruiting persons to go overseas to aid the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War. Schware testified that he was unaware of this old law at the time. From the facts in the record it is not clear that he was guilty of its violation. But even if it be assumed that the law was violated, it does not seem that such an offense indicated moral turpitude — even in 1940. Many persons in this country actively supported the Spanish Loyalist Government. During the prelude to World War II many idealistic young men volunteered to help causes they believed right. It is commonly known that a number of Americans joined air squadrons and helped defend China and Great Britain prior to this country’s entry into the war. There is no record that any of these volunteers were prosecuted under the Neutrality Act. Few Americans would have regarded their conduct as evidence of moral turpitude. In determining whether a person’s character is good the nature of the offense which he has committed must be taken into account. In summary, these arrests are wholly insufficient to support a finding that Schware had bad moral character at the time he applied to take the bar examination. They all occurred many years ago and in no case was he ever tried or convicted for the offense for which he was arrested. (3) Membership in the Communist Party. — Schware admitted that he was a member of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940. Apparently the Supreme Court of New Mexico placed heavy emphasis on this past membership in denying his application. It stated: “We believe ope who has knowingly given his loyalties to [the Communist Party] for six to seven years during a period of responsible adulthood is a person of questionable character.” 60 N. M., at 319, 291 P. 2d, at 617. The court assumed that in the 1930’s when petitioner was a member of the Communist Party, it was dominated by a foreign power and was dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Government and that every member was aware of this. It based this assumption primarily on a view of the nature and purposes of the Communist Party as of 1950 expressed in a concurring opinion in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 422. However that view did not purport to be a factual finding in that case and obviously it cannot be used as a substitute for evidence in this case to show that petitioner participated in any illegal activity or did anything morally reprehensible as a member of that Party. During the period when Schware was a member, the Communist Party was a lawful political party with candidates on the ballot in most States. There is nothing in the record that gives any indication that his association with that Party was anything more than a political faith in a political party. That faith may have been unorthodox. But as counsel for New Mexico said in his brief, “Mere unorthodoxy [in the field of political and social ideas] does not as a matter of fair and logical inference, negative ‘good moral character.’ ” Schware joined the Communist Party when he was a young man during the midst of this country’s greatest depression. Apparently many thousands of other Americans joined him in this step. During the depression when millions were unemployed and our economic system was paralyzed many turned to the Communist Party out of desperation or hope. It proposed a radical solution to the grave economic crisis. Later the rise of fascism as a menace to democracy spurred others who feared this form of tyranny to align with the Communist Party. After 1935, that Party advocated a “Popular Front” of “all democratic parties against fascism.” Its platform and slogans stressed full employment, racial equality and various other political and economic changes. During the depression Schware was led to believe that drastic changes needed to be made in the existing economic system. There is nothing in the record, however, which indicates that he ever engaged in any actions to overthrow the Government of the United States or of any State by force or violence, or that he even advocated such actions. Assuming that some members of the Communist Party during the period from 1932 to 1940 had illegal aims and engaged in illegal activities, it cannot automatically be inferred that all members shared their evil purposes or participated in their illegal conduct. As this Court declared in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191: “Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power.” Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 136. And finally, there is no suggestion that Schware was affiliated with the Communist Party after 1940 — more than 15 years ago. We conclude that his past membership in the Communist Party does not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral character. The State contends that even though the use of aliases, the arrests, and the membership in the Communist Party would not justify exclusion of petitioner from the New Mexico bar if each stood alone, when all three are combined his exclusion was not unwarranted. We cannot accept this contention. In the light of petitioner’s forceful showing of good moral character, the evidence upon which the State relies — the arrests for offenses for which petitioner was neither tried nor convicted, the use of an assumed name many years ago, and membership in the Communist Party during the 1930’s — cannot be said to raise substantial doubts about his present good moral character. There is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Schware was morally unfit to practice law. On the record before us we hold that the State of New Mexico deprived petitioner of due process in denying him the opportunity to qualify for the practice of law. The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Generally, see N. M. Stat. Ann., 1953, § 18-1-8 and the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar appended thereto. Apparently the Board had received confidential information that Schware had once been a member of the Communist Party. The Board’s application form did not request disclosure of such information and so Schware did not mention it in his application. At the hearing he testified at length about his membership. The Board refused to let petitioner see the confidential information against him, although it appears that its initial denial of his application was partially based on this information. While this secret evidence was- not made a part of the record of the hearing, counsel for petitioner contends that the Board was influenced by it in adhering to its view that petitioner was not qualified. In the New Mexico Supreme Court the members of the majority did not look at the confidential information. And while that court passed on petitioner’s qualifications in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the majority placed considerable reliance on the Board’s recommendations. Therefore, petitioner contends, the Board’s use of confidential information deprived him of procedural due process. Cf. Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117; Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110; Minkoff v. Payne, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 123, 210 F. 2d 689, 691; In re Carter, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 192 F. 2d 15, cert. denied, 342 U. S. 862. We find it unnecessary to consider this contention. The dean was on sabbatical leave and not available. At times during 1932 more than 12,060,000 of the nation’s 51,000,000 working persons were unemployed. Statistical Abstract of the United States (1956) 197. We need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a “right” or “privilege.” Regardless of how the State’s grant of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State’s grace. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379. Arrest, by itself, is not considered competent evidence at either a criminal or civil trial to prove that a person did certain prohibited acts. Cf. Wigmore, Evidence, § 980a. Petitioner testified that during a two-month period about 2,000 persons were arrested in connection with the strike. Generally, for criticism of these arrests and the conduct of the police during these and related strikes see S. Rep. No. 1150, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, 131, 133-141. “The term ‘criminal syndicalism’ as used in this act is hereby defined as any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.” Cal. Stat. 1919, c. 188, § 1. See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, where application of a similar statute was held unconstitutional. 40 Stat. 39, now 18 U. S. C. § 959 (a). See Kiker, J. (dissenting), 60 N. M. 304, 321, 291 P. 2d 607, 618. For example, New Mexico makes conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor grounds for disbarment only if it involves moral turpitude. N. M. Stat. Ann., 1953, § 18-1-17 (1). Compare In re Burch, 73 Ohio App. 97, 54 N. E. 2d 803, where, in a disbarment proceeding, conviction for violation of a federal statute for failing to register as an agent of the German Government in 1941 was held not to evidence moral turpitude. In 1941 Schware was arrested by police in Texas while driving a friend’s ear to the west coast. Apparently the police suspected the car was stolen. After a brief delay they became convinced that the car was rightfully in petitioner’s possession and he was allowed to go on his way. This detention offers no proof of bad moral character and the State does not rely on it here. Petitioner argues that a State constitutionally cannot consider his membership in a lawful political party in determining whether he is qualified for admission to the bar. He contends that a denial based on such membership abridges the right of free political assoeiation guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of our disposition of this case, we find it unnecessary to pass on this contention. For example in 1936 its presidential nominee was on the ballot in 35 States, including New Mexico. Statistical Abstract of the United States (1937) 159. In West Virginia State Board v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642, this Court declared: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” According to figures of the Communist Party it had 14,000 members in 1932, 26,000 in 1934, 41,000 in 1936. W. Z. Foster, From Bryan to Stalin (1937), 303. It has been estimated that more than 700,000 persons in this country have been members of the Communist Party at one time or another between 1919 and 1951. Ernst and Loth, Report on The American Communist (1952), 14. For the numerous and varied reasons why individuals have joined the Communist Party, see Taylor, Grand Inquest (1955), 155-159; Ernst and Loth, Report ..on The American Communist (1952); Almond, The Appeals of Communism (1954); Crossman, The God That Failed (1949); Department of Defense, Know Your Communist Enemy: Who Are Communists and Why?, DOD PAM 4-6, Dec. 8, 1955. Many of these reasons are not indicative of bad moral character. See Moore, The Communist Party of the U. S. A.; An Analysis of a Social Movement, 39 Am. Pol. Sei. Rev. 31, 32-33. And see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 136, where this Court stated: . . under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association, and that men in adhering to a political party or other organization notoriously do not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles.” It must be borne in mind that if petitioner otherwise qualifies for the practice of law and is admitted to the bar, the State has ample means to discipline him for any future misconduct. N. M. Stat. Ann., 1953, §§ 18-1-15 to 18-1-18.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. ERIE RESISTOR CORP. et al. No. 288. Argued February 18-19, 1963. Decided May 13, 1963. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Stuart Roth-man and Dominick L. Manoli. John G. Wayman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Erie Resistor Corp. were John C. Bane, Jr. and Irving Olds Murphy. On the briefs for respondent International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, Local 613, AFL-CIO, were Benjamin C. Sigal and David S. Davidson. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Thé question before us is whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 158' when he extends a 20-year seniority credit to strike replacements and strikers who leave the strike and return to work. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case joined the Ninth Circuit, Labor Board v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 189 F. 2d 82 (and see Labor Board v. Lewin-Mathes, 285 F. 2d 329, from the Seventh Circuit), to hold that such super-seniority awards are not unlawful absent a showing of an illegal motive on the part of the employer. 303 F. 2d 359. The Sixth Circuit, Swarco, Inc., v. Labor Board, 303 F. 2d 668, and the National Labor Relations Board are of the opinion that such conduct can be unlawful even when the employer asserts that these additional benefits are necessary to continue his operations during a strike. To resolve these conflicting views upon an important question in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act, we brought the case here. 371 U. S. 810. Erie Resistor Corporation and Local 613 of the Inter-, national Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers were bound by a collective bargaining agreement which was due to expire on March 31, 1959. In January 1959, both parties met to negotiate new terms but, after extensive bargaining, they were unable to reach agreement. Upon expiration of the contract, the union-, in support of its contract demands, called a strike which was joined by all of the 478 employees in the unit. The company, under intense competition and subject to insistent demands from its customers to maintain deliveries, decided to continue production operations. Transferring clerks, engineers and other nonunit employees to production jobs, the company managed to keep production at about 15% to 30% of normal during the month of April. . On May 3, however, the company notified the union members that it intended to begin hiring replacements and that strikers would retain their jobs until replaced. The plant was located in an area classified by the United States Department of Labor as one of severe unemployment and the company had in fact received applications for .employment as early as a week or two after the strike began. Replacements were to.ld that they would not be laid off or discharged at the end of the strike. To implement that assurance, particularly in view of the 450 employees already laid off on March 31, the company .notified the union that it intended to accord the replacements some form of super-seniority. At regular bargaining sessions between the company and union,, the union made it clear that, in its view, no matter what form the super-seniority plan might take, it would necessarily work an illegal discrimination against the strikers. As negotiations •advanced on other issues, it became evident that super-seniority was fast becoming the focal point of disagreement. On May 28, the company informed the union that it had decided to award 20 years’ additional seniority both to replacements and to strikers who returned to work, which would be available only for credit against future layoffs and which could not be used for other employee benefits based on years of service. The strikers, at a union meeting the next day, unanimously resolved to continue striking now in protest against the proposed plan as well. The company made its first official announcement of the super-seniority plan on June 10, and by June 14, 34 new employees, 47 employees recalled from layoff status and 23 returning strikers had accepted production jobs. The union, now under great pressure, offered to give up some of its contract demands if the company would abandon super-seniority or go to arbitration on the question, but the company refused. In the following week, 64 strikers returned to work and 21 replacements took jobs, bringing the total to 102- replacements and recalled workers and 87 returned strikers. When the number of returning strikers went up to 125 during the following week, the union capitulated. A new labor agreement on the remaining economic issues was executed on July 17, and an accompanying settlement agreement was signed providing that the company’s replacement and job assurance policy should be resolved by the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts but was to remain in effect pending final disposition. Following the strike’s termination, the company reinstated those strikers whose jobs had not been filled (all but 129 were returned to their jobs). At about the same time,' the union received some 173 resignations from membership. By September of 1959, the production unit work force had reached a high of 442 employees, but by May of 1960, the work force had gradually slipped back to 240. Many employees laid off during this cutback period were reinstated strikers whose seniority was insufficient to retain their jobs as a consequence of the company’s super-seniority policy. The union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging.that awarding super-seniority during the course of the strike constituted an unfair labor practice and that the subsequent layoff of the recalled strikers pursuant to such a plan was unlawful. The Trial Examiner found that the policy was promulgated for legitimate economic reasons; not for illegal or discriminatory purposes, and recommended that the union’s complaint be dismissed. The Board could not agree with the Trial Examiner’s conclusion that specific evidence of subjective intent to discriminate against the union was necessary to finding that super-seniority granted during a strike is an unfair labor practice. Its consistent view, the Board said, had always been that super-seniority, in circumstances such as these, was an unfair labor practice. The Board rejected the argument that super-seniority granted during a strike is a legitimate corollary of the employer’s right of replacement under Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, and detailed at some length the factors which to it indicated that “superseniority is a form of discrimination extending far beyond the employer’s right of replacement sanctioned by Mackay, and is, moreover, in- direct conflict with the express provisions of the Act prohibiting discrimination.” Having put aside Mackay, the Board went on to deny “that specific evidence of Respondent’s discriminatory motivation is required to establish the alleged violations of the Act,” relying upon Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, and Teamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667. Moreover, in the Board’s judgment, the employer’s insistence that its overriding purpose in granting super-seniority was to keep its plant open and that business necessity justified its conduct was unacceptable since “to excuse such conduct would greatly diminish, if not déstroy, the right to strike guaranteed by the Act, and would run directly counter to. the guarantees of Sections 8 (a)(1) and (3) that employees shall not be discriminated against for engaging in protected concerted activities.” Accordingly, the Board declined , to make findings as to the specific motivation of the plan or its business necessity in the circumstances here'. The Court of Appeals rejected as unsupportable the rationale of the Board that a preferential seniority policy is illegal however motivated. “We are of the opinion that inherent in the right of an employer to replace strikers during a strike is the concomitant right to adopt a preferential seniority policy which will assure the replacements some form of tenure, provided the policy is adopted Solely to protect and continue the business of the employer. We find nothing in the Act which proscribes such a policy. Whether the policy adopted by the Company in the instant case was illegally motivated we do not decide. The question is one of fact for decision by the Board.” 303 F. 2d, at 364. It consequently denied the Board’s petition for enforcement and remanded the case for further findings. We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, in the absence of a finding of specific illegal intent, a legitimate business purpose is always' a defense to an unfair labor practice charge. Cases in- this Court dealing with unfair labor practices have recognized the relevance and importance of showing the employer’s intent or motive to discriminate or to interfere with union rights. But specific evidence of such subjective intent is “not an indispensable element of proof of violation.” Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 44. “Some conduct may by its very nature contain the implications of the required intent; the natural foreseeable consequences of certain action may warrant the inference. . . . The existence of discrimination may at times be inferred by the Board, for ‘it is permissible to draw on experience in factual inquiries.’ ” Teamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667, 675. Though the intent necessary for an unfair labor practice may be shown in different ways, proving it in one manner may have far different weight and far different consequences than proving it in another. When specific evidence of a subjective intent to discriminate or to encourage or discourage union membership is shown, and found, many otherwise innocent or ambiguous • actions which are normally incident to the conduct of a’business may, without more, be converted into unfair labor practices. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 46 (discharging employees); Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103, 132 (discharging employees); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177 (hiring employees). Compare Labor Board v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F. 2d 17, with Labor Board v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F. 2d 848 (subcontracting union work); and Fiss Corp., 43 N. L. R. B. 125, with Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N. L. R. B. 746 (movement of plant to another town). Such proof itself is normally sufficient to destroy the employer’s claim of a legitimate business purpose, if one is made, and provides strong support to a finding that there is interference with union rights or that union membership will be discouraged. Conduct which on its face appears to serve legitimate business ends in these cases is wholly impeached by the showing of an intent to encroach upon protected rights. The employer’s claim of legitimacy is totally dispelled. The outcome may well be the same when intent is founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very consequences which fore-seeably and inescapably flow from his actions and if he fails to explain away, to justify or to characterize his actions as something different than they appear on their face, an unfair labor practice charge is made out. Radio Officers v. Labor Board, supra. But, as often happens, the employer may counter by claiming that his actions were taken in the pursuit of legitimate business ends and that his dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to invade union rights but to accomplish business objectives acceptable under the Act. Nevertheless, his conduct does speak for itself — it is discriminatory and it does discourage union membership and whatever the claimed overriding justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended. . As is not uncommon in human experience, such situations present a complex of motives and preferring one motive to another is in reality the far more delicate task, reflected in part in decisions of this Court, of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against the interest of the employer in. operating his business in a particular manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the employer’s conduct. This essentially is the teaching of the Court’s prior cases dealing with this problem and, in our view, the Board did not depart from it. The Board made a detailed assessment of super-seniority and, to its experienced eye, such a plan had the following characteristics: (1) Super-seniority affects the tenure of all strikers whereas permanent replacement, proper under Mackay, affects only those who are, in actuality, replaced. It is one thing to say that a striker is subject to loss of his job at the strike’s end but quite another to hold that in addition to the threat of replacement, all strikers will at best return to their jobs with seniority inferior to that of the replacements and of those who left the strike. (2) A super-seniority award necessarily operates to the detriment of those who participated in the strike as compared to nonstrikers. (3) Super-seniority made available to striking bargaining unit employees as well as to new employees is in effect offering individual benefits to the strikers to induce them to abandon the strike. (4) Extending the benefits of super-seniority to striking bargaining unit employees as well as to new replacements deals a crippling blow to the strike effort. At one stroke, those with low seniority have the opportunity to obtain the job security which ordinarily only long years of service can bring, while conversely, the accumulated’ seniority of older employees is seriously diluted. This combination of threat and promise couM be expected to undermine the strikers’ mutual interest and place the entire strike effort in. jeopardy. The history of this strike and its virtual collapse following the announcement of the plan emphasize the grave repercussions of super-seniority. (5) Super-seniority renders future bargaining difficult, if not impossible, for the.collective bargaining representative. Unlike the replacement granted in Mackay which ceases to be an issue once the strike is over, the plan here creates a cleavage in the plant continuing long after the strike is ended. Employees are henceforth divided into two camps: those who stayed with the union and those who returned before the end of the strike and thereby gained extra seniority. This breach is re-emphasized with each subsequent layoff and stands as an ever-present reminder of the dangers connected with striking and with union activities in general. In the light of this analysis, super-seniority by its very terms operates to discriminate between strikers and non-strikers, both during and after a strike, and its destructive impact upon the strike and union activity cannot be doubted. The origin of the plan, as respondent insists, may have been to keep production going and it may have been necessary to offer super-seniority to attract replacements and induce union members to leave the strike. But if this is true, accomplishment of respondent’s business purpose inexorably was contingent upon attracting sufficient replacements and strikers by offering preferential inducements to those who worked as opposed to those who struck: We think the Board was entitled to treat this case as involving conduct which carried its own indicia of intent and which is barred by the Act unless saved from illegality by an overriding business purpose justifying the invasion of union rights. The Board concluded that the business purpose asserted was insufficient to insulate the super-seniority plan from the reach of §8 (a)(1) and § 8 (a)(3), and we turn now to a review of that conclusion. The Court of Appeals and respondent rely upon Mac-kay as precluding the result reached by the Board but we are not persuaded. .Under the decision in that case an employer may operate his plant during a strike and at its conclusion need not discharge those who worked during the strike in order to make way for returning strikers. It may be, as the Court of Appeals said, that “such a replacement policy is obviously discriminatory and may tend to discourage union membership.” But Mackay did not deal with super-seniority, with its effects upon all strikers, whether replaced or not, or with its powerful impact upon a strike itself. Because the employer’s interest must be deemed to outweigh the damage to concerted activities caused by permanently replacing strikers does not mean it also outweighs the far greater • encroachment resulting from super-seniority in addition to permanent replacement. We have no intention of questioning the continuing vitality of the Mackay rule, but we are not prepared to extend it to the situation we have here. To do so would require us to set aside the Board’s considered judgment that the Act and its underlying policy require, in the present context, giving more weight to the harm wrought by super-seniority than to the interest of the employer in operating its plant during the strike by utilizing this particular means of attracting replacements. We find nothing in the Act or its legislative history to indicate that super-seniority is necessarily an acceptable method of resisting the économic impact of a strike, nor do we find anything inconsistent with the result which the Board reached. On the contrary, these sources are wholly consistent with, and lend full support to, the conclusion of the Board. Section 7 guarantees, and §8 (a)(1) protects from employer interference the rights of employees to engage in concerted activities, which, as Congress has indicated, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, include the right to strike.- Under § 8 (a)(3), it is unlawful for an employer by discrimination in terms of employment to discourage “membership in any labor organization,” which includes discouraging participation in concerted activities, Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 39-40, such as a legitimate strike. Labor Board v. Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc., 229 F. 2d 391; Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 114 F. 2d 820. Section 13 makes clear that although the strike weapon is not an unqualified right, nothing in the Act except as specifically provided is to be construed to interfere with this means of redress, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, and § 2 (3) pieserves to strikers their unfilled positions and status as employees during the pendency of a strike. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6. This repeated solicitude for the right to strike is predicated upon the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is . an economic weapon which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system. While Congress has from .time to time revamped and redirected national labor policy, its concern for the integrity of the strike weapon has remained constant. Thus when Congress chose to qualify the use of the strike, it did so by prescribing the limits and conditions of the abridgment in exacting detail, e. g., §§ 8 (b)(4), 8 (d), by indicating the precise procedures to be followed in effecting the interference, e. g., § 10 (j), (k), (1); §§ 206-210, Labor Management Relations Act, and by preserving the positive command of § 13 that the right to strike is to be given a generous interpretation within the scope of the labor Act. The courts have likewise repeatedly recognized and effectuated the strong interest of federal labor policy in the legitimate use of the strike. Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454; Amalgamated Assn. of Elec. Ry. Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 340 U. S. 383; Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 P. 2d 919; Gusano v. Labor Board, 190 F. 2d 898; cf. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195. Accordingly, in view of the deference paid the strike weapon by the federal labor laws and the devastating consequences upon it which the Board found was and would be precipitated by respondent’s inherently discriminatory super-seniority plan, we cannot say the Board erred in the balance which it struck here. Although the Board’s decisions are by no means immune from attack in the courts as cases in this Court amply illustrate, e. g., Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105; Labor Board v. United Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357; Labor Board v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, its findings here are supported by substantial evidence, Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, its explication is not inadequate, irrational or arbitrary, compare Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 196-197; Labor Board v. United Steeworkers, supra, and it did not.exceed its powers or venture into an area barred by the statute. Compare Labor Board v. Insurance Agents, supra. The matter before the Board lay well within the mainstream of its duties. It was attempting to deal with an issue which Congress had placéd in its hands and “where Congress has in the statute given the Board a question to answer, .the courts will give respect to that answer.” Labor Board v. Insurance Agents, supra, at 499. Here, as in other cases, we must recognize the Board’s special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life, Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 798; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at 194, and of “[appraising] carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases” from its special understanding of “the actualities of industrial relations.” Labor Board v. United Steelworkers, supra, at 362-363. “The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.” Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87, 96. Consequently, because the Board’s judgment was that ■ the claimed business purpose, would not outweigh the necessary harm to employee rights: — & judgment which we sustain — it could properly put aside evidence of respondent’s motive and decline to find whether the conduct was or was not prompted by the claimed business purpose. We reverse the judgment of the Court , of Appeals and remand the case to that court since its review was a limited one and it must now reach the remaining questions before it, including the propriety of the remedy which at least in part turns upon the Board’s construction of the settlement agreement as being no barrier to an award not only of reinstatement but of back pay as well. Reversed and remanded. “Sec. 8 (a). It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; . . . “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a) In addition to these employees, 450 employees in the unit were on layoff status. The figure of 20 years was developed from a projection, on the basis of expected orders, of what the company’s work force would be following the strike. As of March 31, the beginning of the strike, a male employee. needed seven years’ seniority-.to avoid layoff and a female employee nine years’. The Examiner had relied upon the company’s employment records for his conclusion that the replacement program was ineffective until the announcement of the super-seniority awards. The General Counsel, to show that such a plan was not necessary for that purpose,'pointed to the facts that the company had 300 unprocessed job applications when the strike ended, that the company declared to the union that it could have replaced all the strikers and that the company did not communicate its otherwise well-publicized policy to replacements before they were hired but only after they accepted jobs. In addition, the Board held that continued insistence on this or a similar- proposal as a condition to negotiating an agreement constituted .a refusal to bargain in good faith under §8 (a)(5). See Labor Board v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 356 U. S. 342. . The Board also concluded that on May 29, when the union voted to continue striking in protest against the super-seniority plan, the strike wás converted into an unfair labor practice strike. All strikers not replaced at that date, the Board held, were entitled to reinstatement as of the date of their unconditional abandonment of the strike regardless of replacements. See Labor Board v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F. 2d 393. Accordingly, those cases holding unlawful a super-seniority plan prompted by a desire on the part of the employer to penalize or discriminate against striking employees, Ballas Egg Products v. Labor Board, 283 F. 2d 871; Labor Board v. California Date Growers Assn., 259 F. 2d 587; Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Labor Board, 232 F. 2d 158, aff’d per curiam, 352 U. S. 1020, are explainable without reaching the considerations present here. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333; Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793; Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105; Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87. In a variety of situations, the lower courts have dealt with and rejected the approach urged here that conduct otherwise unlawful is automatically excused upon a showing that it was motivated by business exigencies. Thus, it has been held that an employer cannot justify the discriminatory discharge of union members upon the ground that such conduct is the only way to induce a rival union to remove a picket line and permit the resumption of business, Labor Board v. Star Publishing Co., 97 F. 2d 465, or rearrange the bargaining unit because of an expected adverse effect on production, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 162 F. 2d 435, or defend a refusal to bargain in good faith on the ground that unless the employer’s view prevails dire consequences to the business will follow, Labor Board v. Harris, 200 F. 2d 656, or refuse exclusive recognition to a union for fear that such recognition will bring reprisals from rival unions, McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 116 F. 2d 748, cert. denied, 313 U. S. 565; Labor Board v. National Broadcasting Co., 150 F. 2d 895, or discriminate in his business operations against employees of rival unions or without union affiliation solely in order to keep peace in the plant and avoid disruption of business, Wilson & Co., Inc., v. Labor Board, 123 F. 2d 411; Labor Board v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F. 2d 528; Labor Board v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F. 2d 847; Labor Board v. Oertel Brewing Co., 197 F. 2d 59; Labor Board v. McCatron, 216 F. 2d 212, cert. denied, 348 U. S. 943; Labor Board v. Richards, 265 F. 2d 855. See also Idaho Potato Growers v. Labor Board, 144 F. 2d 295; Cusano v. Labor Board, 190 F. 2d 898; Labor Board v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F. 2d 87, cert. denied, 347 U. S. 935. Indeed, many employers doubtless could conscientiously assert that their unfair labor practices were not malicious but were prompted by their best judgment as to the interests of their business. Such good-faith motive itself, however, has not been deemed an absolute defense to an unfair labor practice charge. “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of- collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”. “The term 'employee’. . . shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment . . . .” This concern for the maintenance of the status prevailing before the strike has had its most recent manifestation in the 1959 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Congress there withdrew the ban inserted- by the Taft-Hartley amendment disqualifying replaced strikers from voting in union elections. Now, employees not entitled to reinstatement can, under regulations promulgated by the Board, exercise their pre-strike voting rights. See § 9 (c) (3); S. R,ep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-33. “Labor unions . . .' were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with' an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a body in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms with them. They were withholding their labor of economic value to make him pay' what they thought it was worth. The right to combine for such a lawful purpose has in many years not been denied by any court. The strike became a lawful instrument in a lawful economic struggle or competition between employer and employees as to the share or division between them of the joint product of labor and capital.” American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209, quoted in Staff Report of Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.) 20. See also, Remarks of Senator Wagner before Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Hearings on S. 2926, 10-11: “It has been urged .that the bill places a premium on discord by declaring that none of its provisions shall impair the right to strike. On the contrary, nothing would do more to alienate employee cooperation and to promote unrest than a law which did not make it clear that employees could refrain from working if that should become their only redress.” Remarks of Senator Taft, 93 Cong. Rec. 3835 (1947): “That means that we recognize freedom to strike when the question involved is the improvement of wages, hours, and working conditions, when a contract has expired and neither side is bound by a contract. We recognize that right in spite of the inconvenience, and in some cases perhaps danger, to the people of the United States which may result from the exercise of such right. . . . We have considered the question whether the right to strike can be modified. I think it can be modified in cases which do not involve the basic question of wages, prices, and working conditions. ... So far as the bill is concerned, we have proceeded on the theory that there is a right to strike and that labor peace must be based on free collective bargaining. We have done nothing to outlaw strikes for basic wages, hours, and working conditions after proper opportunity for mediation.” ‘‘We do not agree with Respondent’s CQntention that the Union in its strike settlement .agreement of July 17 waived' ajl rights for these employees. The settlement agreement provided, inter alia: ‘The Company’s replacement and job assurance policy to be resolved by the NLRB and the Federal Courts and to remain in effect pending final disposition.’ It is clear that this agreement was intended merely as an interim settlement pending legal determination of the employees’ rights. In any event, we would not in our discretion honor a private settlement which purported to deny to employees the rights guaranteed them by the Act. Cf. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 121 NLRB 1492, 1495.” Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N. L. R. B. 621, 631 n. 31.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VLANDIS v. KLINE et al. No. 72-493. Argued March 20, 1973 Decided June 11, 1973 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blacicmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 454. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 456. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 459. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, J., joined, post, p. 463. John G. Hill, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Robert K. Killian, Attorney General. John A. Dziamba argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Douglas M. Crockett Leonard J. Schwartz filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Slade Gorton, Attorney General, James B. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Gerald L. Coe, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Washington as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Like many other States, Connecticut requires nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 10-329 (b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 122 (June Sess. 1971). The constitutional validity of that requirement is not at issue in the case before us. What is at issue here is Connecticut’s statutory definition of residents and nonresidents for purposes of the above provision. Section 126 (a) (2) of Public Act No. 5, amending § 10-329 (b), provides that an unmarried student shall be classified as a nonresident, or “out of state,” student if his “legal address for any part of the one-year period immediately prior to his application for admission at a constituent unit of the state system of higher education was outside of Connecticut.” With respect to married students, § 126 (a)(3) of the Act provides that such a student, if living with his spouse, shall be classified as “out of state” if his “legal address at the time of his application for admission to- such a unit was outside of Connecticut.” These classifications are permanent and irrebuttable for the whole time that the student remains at the university, since § 126 (a) (5) of the Act commands that: “The status of a student, as established at the time of his application for admission at a constituent unit of the state system of higher education under the provisions of this section, shall be his status for the entire period of his attendance at such constituent unit.” The present case concerns the constitutional validity of this conclusive and unchangeable presumption of nonresident status from the fact that, at the time of application for admission, the student, if married, was then living outside of Connecticut, or, if single, had lived outside the State at some point during the preceding year. One appellee, Margaret Marsh Kline, is an undergraduate student at the University of Connecticut. In May 1971, while attending college in California, she became engaged to Peter Kline, a lifelong Connecticut resident. Because the Klines wished to reside in Connecticut after their marriage, Mrs. Kline applied to the University of Connecticut from California. In late May, she was accepted and informed by the University that she would be considered an in-state student. On June 26, 1971, the appellee and Peter Kline were married in California, and soon thereafter took up residence in Storrs, Connecticut, where they have established a permanent home. Mrs. Kline has a Connecticut driver’s license, her car is registered in Connecticut, and she is registered as a Connecticut voter. In July 1971, Public Act No. 5 went into effect. Accordingly, the appellant, Director of Admissions at the University of Connecticut, irreversibly classified Mrs. Kline as an out-of-state student, pursuant to § 126 (a) (3) of that Act. As a consequence, she was required to pay $150 tuition and a $200 nonresident fee for the first semester, whereas a student classified as a Connecticut resident paid no tuition; and upon registration for the second semester, she was required to pay $425 tuition plus another $200 nonresident fee, while a student classified as a Connecticut resident paid only $175 tuition. The other appellee, Patricia Catapano, is an unmarried graduate student at the same University. She applied for admission from Ohio in January 1971, and was accepted in February of that year. In August 1971, she moved her residence from Ohio to Connecticut and registered as a full-time student at the University. Like Mrs. Kline, she has a Connecticut driver’s license, her car is registered in Connecticut, and she is registered as a Connecticut voter. Pursuant to § 126 (a) (2) of the 1971 Act, the appellant classified her permanently as an out-of-state student. Consequently, she, too, was required to pay $150 tuition and a $200 nonresident fee for her first semester, and $425 tuition plus a $200 nonresident fee for her second semester. Appellees then brought suit in the District Court pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, contending that they were bona fide residents of Connecticut, and that § 126 of Public Act No. 5, under which they were classified as nonresidents for purposes of their tuition and fees, infringed their rights to due process of law and equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. After the convening of a three-judge District Court, that court unanimously held §§ 126 (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(5) unconstitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, and enjoined the appellant from enforcing those sections. 346 F. Supp. 526 (1972). The court also found that before the commencement of the spring semester in 1972, each appellee was a bona fide resident of Connecticut; and it accordingly ordered that the appellant refund to each of them the amount of tuition and fees paid in excess of the amount paid by resident students for that semester. On December 4, 1972, we noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal. 409 U. S. 1036. The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State’s right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Rather, the appellees attack Connecticut’s irreversible and irre-buttable statutory presumption that because a student’s legal address was outside the State at the time of his application for admission or at some point during the preceding year, he remains a nonresident for as long as he is a student there. This conclusive presumption, they say, is invalid in that it allows the State to classify as “out-of-state students” those who are, in fact, bona fide residents of the State. The appellees claim that they have a constitutional right to controvert that presumption of nonresidence by presenting evidence that they are bona fide residents of Connecticut. The District Court agreed: “Assuming that it is permissible for the state to impose a heavier burden of tuition and fees on non-resident than on resident students, the state may not classify as 'out of state students' those who do not belong in that class.” 346 F. Supp., at 528. We affirm the judgment of the District Court. Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932), the Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to a federal statute that created a conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years prior to the donor's death were made in contemplation of death, thus requiring payment by his estate of a higher tax. In holding that this irrefutable assumption was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive the taxpayer of his property without due process of law, the Court stated that it had “held more than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 329. See, e. g., Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926); Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n, 284 U. S. 206 (1931). See also Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 468-469 (1943); Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 29-53 (1969). Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398, 418-419 (1970). The more recent case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), involved a Georgia statute which provided that if an uninsured motorist was involved in an accident and could not post security for the amount of damages claimed, his driver’s license must be suspended without any hearing on the question of fault or responsibility. The Court held that since the State purported to be concerned with fault in suspending a driver’s license, it could not, consistent with procedural due process, conclusively presume fault from the fact that the uninsured motorist was involved in an accident, and could not, therefore, suspend his driver’s license without a hearing on that crucial factor. Likewise, in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), the Court struck down, as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Illinois’ irrebut-table statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their children. Because of that presumption, the statute required the State, upon the death of the mother, to take custody of all such illegitimate children, without providing any hearing on the father’s parental fitness. It may be, the Court said, “that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. . . . But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.” Id., at 654. Hence, the Court held that the State could not conclusively presume that any individual unmarried father was unfit to raise his children; rather, it was required by the Due Process Clause to provide a hearing on that issue. According to the Court, Illinois “insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing . . . .” Id., at 658. The same considerations obtain here. It may be that most applicants to Connecticut’s university system who apply from outside the State or within a year of living out of State have no real intention of becoming Connecticut residents and will never do so. But it is clear that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this category. Indeed, in the present case, both appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers’ licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the District Court to have become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester. Yet, under the State’s statutory scheme, neither was permitted any opportunity to demonstrate the bona fides of her Connecticut residency for tuition purposes, and neither will ever have such an opportunity in the future so long as she remains a student. The State proffers three reasons to justify that permanent irrebuttable presumption. The first is that the State has a valid interest in equalizing the cost of public higher education between Connecticut residents and nonresidents, and that by freezing a student’s residential status as of the time he applies, the State ensures that its bona fide in-state students will receive their full subsidy. The State’s objective of cost equalization between bona fide residents and nonresidents may well be legitimate, but basing the bona fides of residency solely on where a student lived when he applied for admission to the University is using a criterion wholly unrelated to that objective. As is evident from the situation of the appellees, a student may be a bona fide resident of Connecticut even though he applied to the University from out of State. Thus, Connecticut’s conclusive presumption of nonresidence, instead of ensuring that only its bona fide residents receive their full subsidy, ensures that certain of its bona fide residents, such as the ap-pellees, do not receive their full subsidy, and can never do so while they remain students. Second, the State argues that even if a student who applied to the University from out of State may at some point become a bona fide resident of Connecticut, the State can nonetheless reasonably decide to favor with the lower rates only its established residents, whose past tax contributions to the State have been higher. According to the State, the fact that established residents or their parents have supported the State in the past justifies the conclusion that applicants from out of State — who are presumed not to be such established residents — may be denied the lower rates, even if they have become bona fide residents. Connecticut’s statutory scheme, however, makes no distinction on its face between established residents and new residents. Rather, through § 122, the State purports to distinguish, for tuition purposes, between residents and nonresidents by granting the lower rates to the former and denying them to the latter. In these circumstances, the State cannot now seek to justify its classification of certain bona fide residents as nonresidents, on the basis that their Connecticut residency is “new.” Moreover, § 126 would not always operate to effectuate the State’s asserted interest. For it is not at all clear that the conclusive presumption required by that section prevents only “new” residents, rather than “established” residents, from obtaining the lower tuition rates. For example, a student whose parents were lifelong residents of Connecticut, but who went to college at Harvard, established a legal address there, and applied to the University of Connecticut’s graduate school during his senior year, would be permanently classified as an “out of state student,” despite his family’s status as “established” residents of Connecticut. Similarly, the appellee Kline may herself be a “new” resident of Connecticut; but her husband is an established, lifelong resident, whose past tax contribution to the State, under the State’s theory, should entitle his family to the lower rates. Conversely, the State makes no attempt to ensure that those students to whom it does grant in-state status are “established” residents of Connecticut. Any married person, for instance, who moves to Connecticut before applying to the University would be considered a Connecticut resident, even if he has lived there only one day. Thus, even in terms of the State’s own asserted interest in favoring established residents over new residents, the provisions of § 126 are so arbitrary as to constitute a denial of due process of law. The third ground advanced to justify § 126 is that it provides a degree of administrative certainty. The State points to its interest in preventing out-of-state students from coming to Connecticut solely to obtain an education and then claiming Connecticut residence in order to secure the lower tuition and fees. The irrebutta-ble presumption, the State contends, makes it easier to separate out students who come to the State solely for its educational facilities from true Connecticut residents, by eliminating the need for an individual determination of the bona fides of a person who lived out of State at the time of his application. Such an individual determination, it is said, would not only be an expensive administrative burden, but would also be very difficult to make, since it is hard to evaluate when bona fide residency exists. Without the conclusive presumption, the State argues, it would be almost impossible to prevent out-of-state students from claiming a Connecticut residence merely to obtain the lower rates. In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, however, the Court stated that “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.” 405 U. S., at 656. The State’s interest in administrative ease and certainty cannot, in and of itself, save the conclusive presumption from invalidity under the Due Process Clause where there are other reasonable and practicable means of establishing the pertinent facts on which the State’s objective is premised. In the situation before us, reasonable alternative means for determining bona fide residence are available. Indeed, one such method has already been adopted by Connecticut; after § 126 was invalidated by the District Court, the State established reasonable criteria for evaluating bona fide residence for purposes of tuition and fees at its university system. These criteria, while perhaps more burdensome to apply than an irre-buttable presumption, are certainly sufficient to prevent abuse of the lower, in-state rates by students who come to Connecticut solely to obtain an education. In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates. Since § 126 precluded the appellees from ever rebutting the presumption that they were nonresidents of Connecticut, that statute operated to deprive them of a significant amount of their money without due process of law. We are aware, of course, of the special problems involved in determining the bona fide residence of college students who come from out of State to attend that State’s public university. Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents, for purposes of tuition and fees, just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis. We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence — the means adopted by Connecticut to preserve that legitimate interest — is violative of the Due Process Clause, because it provides no opportunity for students who applied from out of State to demonstrate that they have become bona fide Connecticut residents. The State can establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status as to make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state rates. Indeed, as stated above, such criteria exist; and since § 126 was invalidated, Connecticut, through an official opinion of its Attorney General, has adopted one such reasonable standard for determining the residential status of a student. The Attorney General’s opinion states: “In reviewing a claim of in-state status, the issue becomes essentially one of domicile. In general, the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. This general statement, however, is difficult of application. Each individual case must be decided on its own particular facts. In reviewing a claim, relevant criteria include year-round residence, voter registration, place of filing tax returns, property ownership, driver’s license, car registration, marital status, vacation employment, etc.” Because we hold that the permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence created by subsections (a)(2), (a) (3), and (a) (5) of Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 10-329 (b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 126 (June Sess. 1971), violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Section 122 of that Act provides that “the board of trustees of The University of Connecticut shall fix fees for tuition of not less than three hundred fifty dollars for residents of this State and not less than eight hundred fifty dollars for nonresidents . . . .” Pursuant to this statute, the University promulgated regulations fixing the tuition per semester as follows: Fall semester Spring semester 1971-72 1972, and thereafter None $175.00 In-state student $150.00 $425.00 Out-of-state student In addition, out-of-state students must pay a $200 nonresident fee per semester. See n. 1, supra. While the case was pending in the District Court, the Connecticut Legislature passed a bill relating to tuition payments by nonresidents, House Bill No. 5302, which would have repealed the particular portions of the statute that were under constitutional attack. On May 18, 1972, however, the Governor of Connecticut vetoed that bill. Moreover, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), the Court held that a permanent irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case involved a provision of the Texas Constitution which prohibited any member of the Armed Forces who entered the service as a resident of another State and then moved his home to Texas during the course of his military duty, from ever satisfying the residence requirement for voting in Texas elections, so long as he remained a member of the Armed Forces. The effect of that provision was to create a conclusive presumption that all servicemen who moved to Texas during their military service, even if they became bona fide residents of Texas, nonetheless remained nonresidents for purposes of voting. The Court held that “[b]y forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of non-residence, the Texas Constit ution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 96. See als o Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 349-352 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). See n. 1, supra. But even if we accepted the State’s argument that its statutory scheme operates to apportion tuition rates on the basis of old and new residency, that justification itself would give rise to grave problems under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, the Court rejected the contention that a challenged classification could be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between old and new residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through past payment of taxes. That reasoning, the Court stated, “would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.” 394 U. S., at 632-633. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S., at 96; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 354. See infra, at 454. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 95-96; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 349-352; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 636. In Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (Minn. 1970), the District Court upheld a regulation of the University of Minnesota providing that no student could qualify as a resident for tuition purposes unless he had been a bona fide domiciliary of the State for at least a year immediately prior thereto. This Court affirmed summarily. 401 U. S. 985 (1971). Minnesota’s one-year durational residency requirement, however, differed in an important respect from the permanent irrebuttable presumption at issue in the present case. Under the regulation involved in Stams, a student who applied to the University from out of State could rebut the presumption of nonresidency, after having lived in the State for one year, by presenting sufficient other evidence to show bona fide domicile within Minnesota. In other words, residence within the State for one year, whether or not in student status, was merely one element which Minnesota required to demonstrate bona fide domicile. By contrast, the Connecticut statute prevents a student who applied to the University from out of State, or within a year of living out of State, from ever rebutting the presumption of nonresidence during the entire time that he remains a student, no matter how long he has been a bona fide resident of the State for other purposes. Under Minnesota’s durational residency requirement, a student could qualify for in-state rates by living within the State for a year in student status; whereas under Connecticut’s scheme, a person who applied from out of State can never so qualify so long as he remains in student status. See also Kirk v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U. S. 554 (1970). Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Connecticut Regarding Non-Resident Tuition, Sept. 6, 1972 (unreported).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PAUL, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE OF CALIFORNIA, et al. v. UNITED STATES. No. 19. Argued October 17-18, 1962. — Decided January 14, 1963. John Fourt, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Lawrence E. Doxsee, Deputy Attorney General, and Roger Kent. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Guilfoyle and Alan S. Rosenthal. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed for the State of Mississippi by Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General; for the State of Nevada by Charles E. Springer, Attorney General, and Louis Mead Dixon, Special Deputy Attorney General; for the State of Oregon by Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and Don Parker, Assistant Attorney General; for Consolidated Milk Producers of San Francisco, Inc., by Gerald D. Marcus; for the Dairy Institute of California et al. by Emil Steck, Jr., Thomas G. Baggot and Jesse E. Baskette; for Petaluma Cooperative Creamery by Joseph A. Rattigan; and for the Protected Milk Producers Association of Paramount, California, et al. by George E. Atkinson, Jr. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The main question in this case is whether California can enforce her minimum wholesale price regulations as respects milk sold to the United States at three military installations (Travis Air Force Base, Castle Air Force Base, and Oakland Army Terminal) located within California and used for strictly military consumption, for resale at federal commissaries and for consumption or resale at various military clubs and post exchanges. Milk used for the first two categories of use is paid for with appropriated funds, while that used in the clubs and exchanges is purchased with nonappropriated funds. Prior to January 1959, the milk supplies purchased with appropriated funds and used at those installations were obtained as a result of competitive bidding and on terms below the minimum prices prescribed by the Director of Agriculture of California. The Director advised distributors that the State’s minimum price regulations were applicable to sales at Travis. Subsequently bids for milk-supply contracts at Travis were in strict compliance with California’s regulations, the added cost to the Federal Government being about $15,000 a month. Later that year California instituted a civil action in the state courts against a cooperative that had supplied milk at Travis below the state minimum price, seeking civil penalties and an injunction. Thereafter the United States brought this suit in the District Court. The complaint alleged that state price regulation of milk sales at Travis, a federal enclave, was barred by the Constitution, since Travis is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. It also alleged that such regulation was an unconstitutional burden on the United States in the exercise of its constitutional power to establish and maintain the Armed Forces and to acquire and manage a federal enclave. The complaint asked that a three-judge court be convened. Meanwhile, the Director of Agriculture of California warned distributors that the California regulation would be enforced at Castle and at Oakland. Bids for milk thereafter received at Castle were all at or above the state minimum price; and accordingly they were rejected. A new invitation for bids was issued, and one of those received was below the state minimum. Thereupon California sued the successful bidder for an injunction; and later it sued other like bidders. A similar experience was had at Oakland; bids at or above the minimum were rejected, and a contract with a distributor for a prior period was extended for three months with an estimated saving to the United States of over $30,000. California again instituted suit to enjoin the supplier from selling at below established minimum wholesale prices. The United States amended its complaint to include its purchases at Castle. As respects Oakland the United States commenced a separate action by a complaint substantially identical with the other one; and they were later consolidated. Appellants denied that these three installations were federal enclaves giving the United States exclusive jurisdiction and that there was any conflict between the state regulatory scheme and the federal procurement policy. Appellants also moved that the District Court stay these actions pending determination of state-law questions by the state courts in the pending actions. The three-judge District Court refused to stay the proceedings and granted the motion of the United States for summary judgment. 190 F. Supp. 645.. We postponed a determination of jurisdiction to the merits. 368 U. S. 965. Here, as in United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, post, p. 285, decided this day, the suit was one “required” to be heard by a three-judge court within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1253 and therefore properly brought here by direct appeal. Apart from the question whether the three federal areas were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the issue as to whether or not the state regulatory scheme burdened the exercise by the United States of its constitutional powers to maintain the Armed Services and to regulate federal territory was a substantial federal question, as Penn Dairies, Inc., v. Milk Comm’n, 318 U. S. 261, Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, and United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, supra, make clear. A three-judge court was therefore required even if other issues that might not pass muster on their own were also tendered. See 28 U. S. C. § 2281; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73. II. The California Act authorizes the Director of Agriculture to prescribe minimum wholesale and retail prices “at which fluid milk or fluid cream shall be sold by distributors to retail stores, restaurants, confectioneries and other places for consumption on the premises.” The prohibitions run both against sales and against purchases; and both criminal and civil penalties are provided. The minimum wholesale prices, promulgated by the Director of Agriculture, have been enforced with respect to sales to the United States, as already noted. In Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, supra, we held that the federal procurement policy, which required competitive bidding as the general rule and negotiated purchase or contract as the exception, prevailed over California’s regulated rate system. That case, like United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, supra, concerned transportation of commodities. But the federal policy at the times relevant here was the same for procurement of supplies and services. The statutes in effect at the time of the Public Utilities Comm’n of California case are still the basic provisions governing all procurement by the Armed Services out of appropriated funds. They require that contracts be placed by competitive bidding, the award to be granted “to the responsible bidder whose bid . . . will be the most advantageous to the United States, price and other factors considered.” There are statutory exceptions, the relevant ones being as follows: “(a) Purchases of and contracts for property or services covered by this chapter shall be made by formal advertising in all cases in which the use of such method is feasible and practicable under the existing conditions and circumstances. If use of such method is not feasible and practicable, the head of an agency, subject to the requirements for determinations and findings in section 2310, may negotiate such a purchase or contract, if— “(8) the purchase or contract is for property for authorized resale ; “(9) the purchase or contract is for perishable or nonperishable subsistence supplies; “(10) the purchase or contract is for property or services for which it is impracticable to obtain competition; “(15) the purchase or contract is for property or services for which he determines that the bid prices received after formal advertising are unreasonable as to all or part of the requirements, or were not independently reached in open competition, and for which (A) he has notified each responsible bidder of intention to negotiate and given him reasonable opportunity to negotiate; (B) the negotiated price is lower than the lowest rejected bid of any responsible bidder, as determined by the head of the agency; and (C) the negotiated price is the lowest negotiated price offered by any responsible supplier.” The Armed Services Procurement Regulation speaks in unambiguous terms of a policy “to use that method of procurement which will be most advantageous to the Government — price, quality, and other factors considered.” The Regulation states, “Such procurement shall be made on a competitive basis, whether by formal advertising or by negotiation, to the maximum practicable extent . . . .” Whatever method is used — formal advertising or negotiation — “competitive proposals” must be “solicited from all such qualified sources of supplies or services as are deemed necessary by the contracting officer to assure such full and free competition as ... to obtain for the Govérnment the most advantageous contract — • price, quality, and other factors considered.” If advertising for bids is used, the contract is to be awarded “to the lowest responsible bidder.” Moreover, even when advertising for bids is not used, competitive standards are not relaxed. The policy is “to procure supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices calculated to result in the lowest ultimate over-all cost to the Government.” “The fact that a procurement is to be negotiated does not relax the requirements for competition.” “Whenever supplies . . . are to be procured by negotiation, price quotations . . . shall be solicited from all such qualified sources of supplies or services as are deemed necessary ... to assure full and free competition ... to the end that the procurement will be made to the best advantage of the Government, price and other factors considered.” The Regulation then specifies 20 separate considerations for the selection of a supplier in case of a negotiated procurement. The first of these is a “comparison of prices quoted.” We have said enough to show that the Regulation does more than authorize procurement officers to negotiate for lower rates. It directs that negotiations or, wherever possible, advertising for bids shall reflect active competition so that the United States may receive the most advantageous contract. While the federal procurement policy demands competition, the California policy, as respects milk, effectively eliminates competition. The California policy defeats the command to federal officers to procure supplies at the lowest cost to the United States by having a state officer fix the price on the basis of factors not specified in the federal law. Moreover, when the supply contract is negotiated because “it is impracticable to obtain competition,” to use the statutory words, it is the state agency, not the federal procurement officer and the seller, that determines the price provisions of the contract, if state policy prevails. The collision between the federal policy of negotiated prices and the state policy of regulated prices is as clear and acute here as was the conflict between federal negotiated rates and state regulated rates in Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, supra. In that case we said that the Regulation then existing, which was promulgated under the same Act here involved, “sanction[ed] the policy of negotiating rates for shipment of federal property and entrust [ed] the procurement officers with the discretion to determine when existing rates'will be accepted and when negotiation for lower rates will be undertaken.” 355 U. S., at 542-543. Penn Dairies, Inc., v. Milk Control Comm’n, supra, is not opposed. As we noted in United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, supra, Congress, after the Penn Dairies decision and before Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, revised and restated the federal procurement policy. As stated in the House Report, “. . . the bill represents a comprehensive revision and restatement of the laws governing the procurement of supplies and services by the War and Navy Departments. It holds to the time-tested method of competitive bidding. At the same time it puts within the framework of one law almost a century’s accumulation of statutes and incorporates new safeguards designed to eliminate abuses, assures the Government of fair and reasonable prices for the supplies and services procured and affords an equal opportunity to all suppliers to compete for and share in the Government’s business.” The Regulation controlling the Penn Dairies decision stated, as does the present Act, that supplies might be purchased on the open market where it is “impracticable to secure competition.” 318 U. S., at 277. But, unlike the present Regulation, the earlier one declared that such a situation arose “when the price is fixed by federal, state, municipal or other competent legal authority.” Ibid. The earlier Regulation further stated that federal procurement officers should not require suppliers to comply with state price-fixing laws before it was judicially determined whether the latter were applicable to government contracts (id., at 276), a provision which the Court said manifested a federal “hands off” policy-respecting minimum price laws of the States. Id,., at 278. The present Regulation makes no such allowances, contains no such qualifications, and provides for no such exception. Its unqualified command is that purchases for the Armed Services be made on a competitive basis; and it has, of course, the force of law. Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, supra, at 542-543. California’s price-fixing policy for milk is as opposed to this federal procurement policy as was California’s rate-making policy in Public Utilities Comm’n of California v. United States, supra. Policy-wise, it might be better if state price-fixing systems were honored by federal procurement officials. It is urged that if that were done substandard producers of some suppliers would lose the advantage they may enjoy in competitive bidding. Congress could of course write that requirement into the law. Congress has written into the Act certain provisions of that character. It has required that contractors or manufacturers pay not less than the minimum wage as determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing wage; that building contractors pay such minimum wages to laborers and mechanics; and that no laborer or mechanic doing any work for contractors and subcontractors on government contracts shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours a day, unless one and a half times the basic rate is paid for overtime. The inclusion of these provisions, aimed as they are at substandard working conditions, shows that Congress has been alert to the problem. Their inclusion makes more eloquent the omission of any like requirement as respects prices or rates fixed by state law. It is argued that the Act of September 10, 1962, 76 Stat. 528, changed the situation. California points to § 2306 (f), which requires contractors to submit cost or pricing data for any negotiated contract, but goes on to lift that requirement where “prices [are] set by law or regulation.” But this provision does not say, even equivocally, that federal procurement officers must abandon competitive bidding where prices are “set by law or regulation.” The Regulation makes competitive bidding the rule, as we have seen. Section 2306 (f) only provides for waiver of “cost or pricing data” under certain kinds of negotiated contracts if the prices of some commodities included in the contract have been “set by law or regulation.” That is to say, as, if, and when the procurement officer is authorized to accept prices “set by law or regulation,” he need not follow the requirements of § 2306 (f) concerning “cost or pricing data.” California cites but builds no argument around § 2304 (g), also added in 1962. It is now suggested for the first time that § 2304 (g) requires federal procurement to follow state rate-fixing and state price-fixing. It provides in relevant part: “In all negotiated procurements in excess of $2,500 in which rates or prices are not fixed by law or regulation and in which Jime of delivery will permit, proposals shall be solicited from the maximum number of qualified sources consistent with the nature and requirements of the supplies or services to be procured, and written or oral discussions shall be conducted with all responsible offerors who submit proposals within a competitive range, price, and other factors considered. . . .” Here again, the new statutory provision does not purport to say when rates or prices “fixed by law or regulation” govern federal procurement. At the time § 2304 (g) was added to the Act, the Regulation which we have discussed at length was in full force. That Regulation, unlike the one in Penn Dairies, eliminated the earlier provisions which had been construed to manifest a federal “hands off” policy respecting minimum price laws of the States. 318 U. S., at 278. The Regulation in force when this litigation started and in force when the 1962 Act was passed provides unequivocally for competitive bidding “to the maximum practicable extent,” as we have noted. That might well permit procurement officers under some circumstances to purchase at state-fixed prices. But competitive bidding is the rule, not the exception. There is not a word in the legislative history of the 1962 Act which indicates a congressional policy to uproot the Regulation or to change it. It was, indeed, repeatedly approved. See S. Rep. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1638, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Parts I and II; Cong. Rec., June 7, 1962, p. 9231 et seg. Four years before the 1962 Act was passed California Comm’n had held that state regulations cannot preclude the Federal Government from negotiating lower rates. This result was not once questioned in the legislative history of the 1962 Act, even though the instant case was being litigated during this entire period. That Act only reflects an effort to provide collateral accommodations as, if, and when federal procurement follows state price-fixing. The mandate of 10 U. S. C. § 2305 (a) is still unequivocal; and the statutory exceptions to competitive bidding contained in § 2304 (a), discussed above, remain unchanged. The 1962 Act fails to show a congressional purpose to abandon competitive bidding. On the contrary the purpose, as stated in S. Rep. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., was to increase the efficacy of the competitive bidding system then in force. Not only was the existing Regulation cited repeatedly with approval, but the aim of the Act was described in unambiguous terms: “In general, the objectives of the changes are— “(1) To encourage more effort to accomplish procurements by formal advertising; “(2) To require a clearer justification before certain authorities to negotiate contracts are used; “(3) To obtain more competition in negotiated procurement; “(4) To provide safeguards for the Government against inflated cost estimates in negotiated contracts.” Id., p. 1. The House received an equally unambiguous explanation from the floor manager of the bill: “[TJhis bill . . . has for its chief purpose, an increase in competitive purchasing. . . . [OJnly 13 percent of purchasing is now done by sealed competitive bidding. That is clearly not enough. Competition must be increased; competition must be had even in negotiated purchasing; and all negotiated purchasing must be further reduced.” Cong. Rec., June 7, 1962, p. 9234. If there had been a desire to make federal procurement policy bow to state price-fixing in face of the contrary policy expressed in the Regulation, we can only believe that the objectives of the Act would have been differently stated. In sum, the references to rates or prices “fixed by law or regulation” are merely minor collateral accommodations to those situations where, within the limits of the Regulation and the 1962 Act, the federal procurement official decides that the practical way to obtain the supplies or services is by following the state price-fixing or rate-fixing system. California, however, says that whatever may be the federal policy as to purchases of milk for mess-hall use, purchases of milk for resale at federal commissaries stand on a different footing. These commissaries are “arms of the Government deemed by it essential for the performance of governmental functions” and “partake of whatever immunities” the Armed Services “may have under the Constitution and federal statutes.” Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 485. Purchases for resale at these federal commissaries are made from appropriated funds; and the procurement officers act under the same Regulation when they purchase milk for the commissaries as they do when they purchase it for mess-hall use. California points out, however, that the federal statute provides that where commodities are purchased for resale, they may be procured by negotiation rather than by formal advertising — a provision we have quoted above and which was written into the law because purchases for commissaries “are generally not made by specifications but by brand names.” Milk, however, does not fit the category of commodities for which that exception was designed. Moreover, the statutory exception to formal advertising is merely permissive; the procurement officer “may” negotiate for articles to be resold but he is not required so to do. He is free to purchase by formal advertising from the responsible bidder whose bid “will be the most advantageous to the United States.” Whether he negotiates milk contracts or uses competitive bidding is made dependent by the federal statute on his informed discretion, not on state price-fixing policies. Moreover, as, if, and when he negotiates, the Regulation, as already-noted, requires price quotations “from all such qualified sources of supplies or services as are deemed necessary by the contracting officer to assure full and free competition ... to the end that the procurement will be made to the best advantage of the Government, price and other factors considered.” And, to repeat, the procurement officer when he negotiates is controlled by 20 separate factors, one of which is “comparison of prices quoted,” and none of which relates in any manner whatsoever to the price-fixing policies of a State. The fact that the cost of products sold at commissaries benefits commissary purchasers does not make the commissary any the less a federal agency. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, supra. Congress authorizes the payment for commissary supplies from appropriated funds. The federal statutes dealing with procurement policies expressly make them applicable to all purchases “for which payment is to be made from appropriated funds.” Congress, to be sure, has provided that commissaries may not use any appropriated funds “unless the Secretary of Defense has certified that items normally procured from commissary stores are not otherwise available at a reasonable distance and a reasonable price in satisfactory quality and quantity to the military and civilian employees of the Department of Defense.” Here again, however, the question of what is a “reasonable price” is left to the discretion of a federal officer. Congress has not directed that commissaries be removed from the purview of federal procurement policies; nor has it adopted state price-fixing policies as federal policies when it comes to purchases for commissaries or otherwise. III. What we have said would dispose of the entire case but for the fact that some of the milk was purchased out of nonappropriated funds for use in military clubs and for resale at post exchanges. This brings us to the question whether Congress has power to exercise “exclusive legislation” over these enclaves within the meaning of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, which reads in relevant part: “The Congress shall have Power ... To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” over the District of Columbia and “to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” The power of Congress over federal enclaves that come within the scope of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, is obviously the same as the power of Congress over the District of Columbia. The cases make clear that the grant of “exclusive” legislative power to Congress over enclaves that meet the requirements of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, by its own weight, bars state regulation without specific congressional action. The question was squarely presented in Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U. S. 285, which involved, as does the present litigation, California’s Act and an attempt to fix the prices at which milk could be sold at Moffett Field. We held that “sales consummated within the enclave cannot be regulated” by California because of the constitutional grant of “exclusive legislation” respecting lands purchased by the United States with the consent of the State {id., at 294), even though there was no conflicting federal Regulation. Thus the first question here is whether the three enclaves in question were “purchased by the Consent of the Legislature” of California within the meaning of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The power of the Federal Government to acquire land within a State by purchase or by condemnation without the consent of the State is well established. Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371. But without the State’s “consent” the United States does not obtain the benefits of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, its possession being simply that of an ordinary proprietor. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 141-142. In that event, however, it was held in Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 541, 542, that a State could complete the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Federal Government over such an enclave by “a cession of legislative authority and political jurisdiction.” Thus if the United States acquires with the “consent” of the state legislature land within the borders of that State by purchase or condemnation for any of the purposes mentioned in Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, or if the land is acquired without such consent and later the State gives its “consent,” the jurisdiction of the Federal Government becomes “exclusive.” Since 1940 Congress has required the United. States to assent to the transfer of jurisdiction over the property, however it may be acquired. In either event — whether the land is acquired by purchase or condemnation on the one hand or by cession on the other — a State may condition its “consent” upon its retention of jurisdiction over the lands consistent with the federal use. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra, 146-149. Moreover, as stated in Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94, 99-100: “The Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws of the former sovereignty must vanish. On the contrary its language has long been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of those rules existing at the time of the surrender of sovereignty which govern the rights of the occupants of the territory transferred. This assures that no area however small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights.” California has had several statutory provisions relevant to our problem under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. One pertained to acquisition of land by the United States through “purchase or condemnation.” Another concerned land “ceded or granted” by California to the United States. Those provisions were codified in 1943, acquisitions by “purchase or condemnation” appearing in one section and acquisitions by cession in another. Another section of the codification, after stating that California “cedes” to the United States “exclusive jurisdiction” over all lands “held, occupied, or reserved” by the United States “for military purposes or defense,” provides that a description of the land by metes and bounds and a map or plat of the land “shall first be filed in the proper office of record in the county in which the lands are situated.” Most of the transactions creating these three federal enclaves took place between 1942 and 1944, some in 1946 and some even later. Whether the United States has acquired exclusive jurisdiction over a federal enclave is a federal question. As stated in Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, 197: “The question of exclusive territorial jurisdiction is distinct. That question assumes the absence of any interference with the exercise of the functions of the Federal Government and is whether the United States has acquired exclusive legislative authority so as to debar the State from exercising any legislative authority, including its taxing and police power, in relation to the property and activities of individuals and corporations within the territory. The acquisition of title by the United States is not sufficient to effect that exclusion. It must appear that the State, by consent or cession, has transferred to the United States that residuum of jurisdiction which otherwise it would be free to exercise. ... In this instance, the Supreme Court of Washington has held that the State has not yielded exclusive legislative authority to the Federal Government. . . . That question, however, involving the extent of the jurisdiction of the United States, is necessarily a federal question.” As already noted, a California statute “cedes to the United States exclusive jurisdiction” over described lands provided a description of the metes and bounds and a map of the land first be filed. California earnestly argues that “cedes” in that context includes “purchases” and “acquisitions by condemnation.” But the California statutes have consistently drawn the line between acquisitions by cession on the one hand and all other acquisitions on the other. That is the gist of a recent opinion of the Attorney General of California, in which he treats an acquisition by cession as an alternative to acquisition in other ways and rules that when the acquisition is by means other than cession no map of the land need first be filed. That seems to us to be the fair meaning of the statutory provisions. The conditions expressed in the California Acts, by which California consented to “the purchase or condemnation” of land by the United States for the prescribed purposes, do not undertake to make applicable to the federal enclaves all future laws of California. Since a State may not legislate with respect to a federal enclave unless it reserved the right to do so when it gave its consent to the purchase by the United States, only state law existing at the time of the acquisition remains enforceable, not subsequent laws. See Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, supra; Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439. If the price-control laws California is now seeking to apply to sales on federal enclaves were not in effect when the United States acquired these lands, the case is on all fours with Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, supra. There the Court held that the California statutes under which some of the present acquisitions were made granted the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the tracts in question in spite of the express conditions therein contained (id., at 293) and that this price-control law was not enforceable on a federal enclave in California because it was adopted “long after the transfer of sovereignty.” 318 U. S., at 294. The United States seeks shelter under that rule, saying California is trying to enforce its current regulatory scheme, not the price regulations in effect when the purchases were made. Yet if there were price control of milk at the time of the acquisition and the same basic scheme has been in effect since that time, we fail to see why the current one, albeit in the form of different regulations, would not reach those purchases and sales of milk on the federal enclave made from nonappropriated funds. Congress could provide otherwise and has done so as respects purchases and sales of milk from appropriated funds. But since there is no conflicting federal policy concerning purchases and sales from nonappropriated funds, we conclude that the current price controls over milk are applicable to these sales, provided the basic state law authorizing such control has been in effect since the times of these various acquisitions. A remand will be necessary to resolve that question, as the present record does not show the precise evolution of the present regulatory scheme. There also remains another uncertainty concerning the purchases and sales of milk out of nonappropriated funds. There is a dispute over where some of these sales are made. Each of the three enclaves has numerous units acquired at various times, some of which may be subject to “exclusive” federal jurisdiction and some of which may not be. California earnestly claims that some sales out of nonappropriated funds were made on units of land over which the United States does not have “exclusive” jurisdiction. She makes the claim as respects some milk used at Travis, some at Castle, and some at Oakland. We do not resolve the question but vacate the judgment of the District Court insofar as it relates to purchases and sales of milk made from nonappropriated funds and remand the case to the District Court to determine whether at the respective times when the various tracts in question were acquired California’s basic price-control law as respects milk was in effect. If so, judgment on this class of purchases and sales should be for appellants. If not, then the District Court must make particularized findings as to where the purchases and sales of milk from nonappropriated funds are made and whether or not those tracts are areas over which the United States has “exclusive” jurisdiction within the meaning of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution. Moreover, the decree must be modified to reflect the change in federal procurement policy as respects producers, already noted. Accordingly the judgment is affirmed in part and in part vacated and remanded. It is so ordered. The United States has abandoned a further claim that California cannot constitutionally enforce her price regulations against producers with respect to milk sold to distributors for processing and ultimately resold to the United States. The abandonment of this claim is not a confession of error but only a decision not to assert immunity from that price control as a matter of procurement policy. It appears that while California has authorized her Director of Agriculture to establish minimum wholesale prices for both “fluid milk” and “fluid cream,” and that while the Director has done so for a marketing area encompassing another base, all of the minimum wholesale price regulations appearing in the record pertain only to “fluid milk.” In view of these facts, the case now involves only California’s power to enforce her minimum wholesale prices for “fluid milk” with respect to sales to the United States at the three bases involved. Article I, § 8, el. 17, of the Constitution gives Congress power “To exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” Calif. Agr. Code, § 4350. Md., §4352. Id., § 4361. Id., §4410. 10 U. S. C. §2305 (c). This statute is a recodifieation without substantial change of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. See S. Rep. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20-21. Id., §2304 (a) (8) (9) (10) (15). Armed Services Procurement Regulation (revised to April 20, 1959), ¶1-301. Ibid. Id., ¶ 1-302.2. Id., ¶ 1-301. Id., ¶3-801.1. Id., ¶3-101 (a) (Army Procurement Procedure). Id., ¶ 3-101. Ibid. Ibid. 10 U. S. C. §2304 (a) (10). H. R. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6. Section 2304 (f), which incorporates the Walsh-Healey Act (41 U. S. C. §§35-45), the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U. S. C. §276a), and the Eight Hour Law (40 U. S. C. §§ 324, 325a). The ill which § 2304 (g) was designed to cure was a service-employed negotiating process which did not always produce low enough prices. Informal quotations, usually accompanied by a breakdown of cost elements, were first secured from as many sources as practicable. Separate negotiations with only a few low bidders were then undertaken in order to reduce the price by eliminating unnecessary or unjustified charges. Congress and the Comptroller General condemned this kind of “negotiation” because: “It is our opinion that the authority to negotiate does not, of itself, warrant the curtailment of competition. Yet this may be the result where several proposals are received and the contracting officer decides to negotiate with only one offeror or to award a contract without discussion with any offeror. . . . We believe that . . . negotiations [should be conducted] with all responsible offerors who submit proposals within a competitive range, price and other factors considered.” H. R. Rep. No. 1959, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 17. See also S. Rep. No. 1900, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 27; S. Rep. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 21-22; H. R. Rep. No. 1638, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5. The exact meaning of the “rates or prices . . . fixed by law or regulation” exception to this “discussion” requirement is not too clear. The one short reference to § 2304 (g) in the congressional debates implies that a procurement officer could accept any price set “by law or regulation” without attempting to get a better price from the offeror: “Section (e) of the bill [§ 2304 (g)] defines what actions shall constitute a negotiation. It requires that there be discussions between bidder and Government excepting in those limited instances where it would be futile to have discussions; for example, prices fixed by ratemaking authority or where there is an established market, as in foodstuffs.” Cong. Rec., June 7, 1962, p. 9234. But in view of the history of the “impracticable to obtain competition” exception in §2304 (a) (10), with which this exception to the discussion requirement is linked (see S. Rep. No. 1900, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12), and the holding in California Comm’n, 355 U. S., at 542-543, it is impossible to read this exception either as requiring procurement by negotiation rather than by competitive bidding — or as absolutely prohibiting negotiation when prices are fixed by state law. Section 2304 (a) (10) came to the 1947 Act from earlier Army procurement statutes. See H. R. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. It was “intended to place the maximum responsibility for decisions as to when it is impracticable to secure competition in the hands of the agency concerned.” S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. The House floor manager explained: “This subsection will permit the services to negotiate contracts in situations where there is an absence of competitive conditions. The most typical situation involves an article which can be obtained from only one supplier. But the authority will be available even where there are multiple sources if real competition is nonetheless lacking.” (Emphasis added.) 93 Cong. Rec. 2319. Negotiation.was authorized in exceptional situations, such as §2304 (a) (10), to “promote the best interests of the Government.” Ibid. See id., at 2316. In order to allay fears by some that “negotiation” “means . . . the selection by more or less arbitrary methods of a supplier and the payment to him of a price which he has been able to set without fear of competition . . . ,” the floor manager explained that: “Experience has shown that by careful negotiation and by drafting a suitable contract it is frequently possible to secure substantial savings for the Government. In fact, negotiation properly employed often promotes and.intensifies competition.” Id., at 2320. It is now suggested that certain statements by witnesses at Committee Hearings show that by enacting § 2304 (a) (10) Congr'ess indicated that it did not intend to allow the services to seek prices lower than those established by state regulatory agencies. Clearly those statements reinforce the congressional purpose to allow "negotiation” “where prices are set by law or regulation.” S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. See Hearings on H. R. 1366 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (July 1, 1947); Hearings on H. R. 1366 and H. R. 3394 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 29; Hearings on H. R. 1366 before Subcommittee No. 6 of the House Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 51, at 521. But they in no way suggest that negotiations must be had unless they will “promote the best interests of the Government” (93 Cong. Rec. 2319), and they do not imply that the regulated price must be accepted. From the Committee reports and congressional debates previously cited, it seems that a recent Senate report, issued after California Comm’n was decided, correctly interprets the purpose of §2304 (a)(10): “An examination of the 15 illustrative circumstances in which Exception 10 may be used readily reveals that some of these circumstances necessarily involve only one source of supply. Others offer the opportunity for competition.” S. Rep. No. 1900, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12. One of the illustrations was “Stevedoring, terminal services, when rates are prescribed by law.” Ibid. 10 U. S. C. §2304 (a)(8). S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7. 10 U. S. C. §2305 (c). Armed Services Procurement Regulation (revised to April 20, 1959), ¶3-101. Ibid. See, e. g., 75 Stat. 377. 10 U. S. C. § 2303. 75 Stat. 377-378. 40 U. S. C. § 255 provides in part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over lands or interests therein which have been or shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required; but the head or other authorized officer of any department or independent establishment or agency of the Government may, in such cases and at such times as he may deem desirable, accept or secure from the State in which any lands or interests therein under his immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, consent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, not theretofore obtained, over any such lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States by filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State or in such other manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such lands are situated. Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted.” Cal. Stat. 1939, c. 710, §34, provides: “The Legislature consents to the purchase or condemnation by the United States of any tract of land within this State for the purpose of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, upon the express condition that all civil process issued from the courts of this State, and such criminal process as may issue under the authority of this State, against any person charged with crime, may be served and executed thereon in the same mode and manner and by the same officers as if the purchase or condemnation had not been made and upon the further express condition that the State reserves its entire power of taxation with respect to such tracts of land and may levy and collect all taxes now or hereafter imposed in the same manner and to the same extent as if this consent had not been granted.” Ibid..: “The authority to serve civil and criminal process and power to tax hereinabove reserved to the State in the case of the purchase or condemnation by the United States of any tract of land within this State shall, any law to the contrary notwithstanding, also be reserved to the State with respect to any tract of land over which any jurisdiction is ceded or granted by the State to the United States under any law of this State now in effect or which may hereafter be adopted, the authority and power herein reserved by the State to be exercised in the same manner and to the same extent as if such jurisdiction had not been ceded or granted by the State to the United States.” Calif. Gov. Code, § 111. Id., §113. Id., § 114. In the case of Oakland, the United States having first accepted jurisdiction in 1943, accepted again in 1949 after enactment in 1946 (Calif. Gov. Code, § 126) of a new and expanded statutory provision whereby California gave its consent “to the acquisition” by the United States of land in that State. This provision required that findings be made by the State Lands Commission, after hearings, that the statutory conditions had been met. The Commission made the findings describing by metes and bounds three parcels of land at Oakland as respects which California consented to the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the United States. Note 35, supra. 23 Op. Atty. Gen. Calif. 14. Note 31, supra. We do not reach the question that would be presented where a state law in effect at that time was later repealed and subsequently reenacted. See note 1, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES ex rel. HINTOPOULOS et ux. v. SHAUGHNESSY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 205. Argued March 4, 1957. Decided March 25, 1957. Jay Nicholas Long argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Maurice A. Roberts argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, John F. Davis and Isabelle Cappello. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a habeas corpus proceeding to test the validity of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying petitioners’ request for suspension of deportation. Petitioners are husband and wife, both aliens. Prior to 1951 both worked as seamen on foreign vessels. In July 1951 the wife lawfully entered the United States as a crew member of a ship in a United States port. Being pregnant, she sought medical advice; subsequently she decided in the interest of her health to stay ashore. A month later, on the next occasion his ship arrived in the United States, her husband joined her; he also failed to leave on the expiration of his limited lawful stay. In November 1951 their child was born; the child is, of course, an American citizen by birth. In January 1952 petitioners voluntarily disclosed their illegal presence to the Immigration Service and applied for suspension of deportation under § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, which provides, in part: “In the case of any alien . . . who is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the Attorney General may . . . suspend deportation of such alien if he is not ineligible for naturalization ... if he finds (a) that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien . ...” Deportation proceedings were instituted in May 1952 and a hearing was held. On the undisputed facts both aliens were found deportable. As to the issue of suspension of deportation, the Hearing Officer, while finding petitioners eligible for such relief, denied the request, stating as follows: “Both respondents have applied for suspension of deportation on the ground of the economic detriment that would befall their minor son in the event they were deported. . . . Both disclaim having a criminal record anywhere and both allege that they have been persons of good moral character. Evidence of record would tend to corroborate their testimony in this respect. Their only income is from the employment of the male respondent on two jobs . . . . Their joint assets consist of savings in the sum of about $500 and their furniture and other personal property which they value at $1500. While it would seem that their son . . . would suffer economically if his parents should be deported, it is not believed that as a matter of administrative discretion the respondents’ applications for suspension of deportation should be granted. They have been in the United States for a period of less than one year. They have no relatives in this country other than each other and their son. To grant both this form of relief upon the accident of birth in the United States of their son would be to deprive others, who are patiently awaiting visas under their already oversubscribed quotas. It is noted also that neither respondent reported his and her presence in the United States at any time until January, 1952 when they filed applications for suspension of deportation just two months after the birth of their child. . . .” The Board of Immigration Appeals heard petitioners’ appeal, and on March 18, 1954, upheld the Hearing Officer’s recommendation and denied suspension of deportation. The Board stated: “It is obvious that the American citizen infant child is dependent upon the alien parents for economic support, care and maintenance. Documentary and other evidence establish good moral character for the requisite period. The aliens have no connection with subversive groups. “As stated above, we have, in the instant case, a family consisting of two alien parents illegally residing in the United States and one American citizen child, age about two and one-half years. These respondents have been in the United States for a period of less than three years. Both arrived in this country as seamen. They have no other dependents or close family ties here. The record indicates that the male respondent may be able to obtain work as a Greek seaman and earn about $85 monthly. “Notwithstanding the fact that . . . the deportation of these respondents would result in a serious economic detriment to an American citizen infant child, the granting or withholding of maximum discretionary relief depends on the factors and merits in each individual case, and is a matter of administrative discretion. We have carefully examined the facts and circumstances in the instant case and we find that the granting of the maximum relief is not warranted by the record in the case. . . .” Petitioners thereupon moved for reconsideration. On May 5, 1954, the Board denied the motion, stating: "Counsel’s motion sets forth no matters of which we were unaware at the time our previous decision was rendered. It is crystal clear that Congress intended to greatly restrict the granting of suspension of deportation by the change of phraseology which was used in Section 244 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [of 1952] as well as the Congressional comment at the time this provision was enacted. [] We indicated in our previous order that the deportation of the respondents would result in a serious economic detriment to their citizen minor child, and we do not question that the respondents have established the statutory requirements for suspension of deportation .... “Upon our further review of the cases of the two respondents,, we adhere to our previous decision that suspension of deportation should be denied as a matter of administrative discretion . . . .” Taken into custody for deportation, petitioners instituted the present habeas corpus proceeding, alleging that the Board abused its discretion in denying their application for suspension of deportation. The District Court dismissed the writ, 133 F. Supp. 433, and the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed, 233 F. 2d 705. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 819. We do not think that there was error in these proceedings. It is clear from the record that the Board applied the correct legal standards in deciding whether petitioners met the statutory prerequisites for suspension of deportation. The Board found that petitioners met these standards and were eligible for relief. But the statute does not contemplate that all aliens who meet the minimum legal standards will be granted suspension. Suspension of deportation is a matter of discretion and of administrative grace, not mere eligibility; discretion must be exercised even though statutory prerequisites have been met. Nor can we say that it was abuse of discretion to withhold relief in this case. The reasons relied on by the Hearing Officer and the Board — mainly the fact that petitioners had established no roots or ties in this country— were neither capricious nor arbitrary. Petitioners urge that the Board applied an improper standard in exercising its discretion when, in its opinion on rehearing, it took into account the congressional policy-underlying the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the latter being concededly inapplicable to this case. We cannot agree with this contention. The second opinion makes clear that the Board still considered petitioners eligible for suspension under the 1917 Act and denied relief solely as a matter of discretion. And we cannot say that it was improper or arbitrary for the Board to be influenced, in exercising that discretion, by its views as to congressional policy as manifested by the 1952 Act. Section 19 (c) does not state what standards are to guide the Attorney General in the exercise of his discretion. Surely it is not unreasonable for him to take cognizance of present-day conditions and congressional attitudes, any more than it would be arbitrary for a judge, in sentencing a criminal, to refuse to suspend sentence because contemporary opinion, as exemplified in recent statutes, has increased in rigour as to the offense involved. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that § 19 (c) provides for close congressional supervision over suspensions of deportation. In every case where suspension for more than six months is granted a report must be submitted to Congress, and if thereafter Congress does not pass a concurrent resolution approving the suspension of deportation, the alien must then be deported. In other words, every such suspension must be approved by Congress, and yet petitioners would have us hold that the Attorney General may not take into account the current policies of Congress in exercising his discretion. This we cannot do. There being no error, the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. MR. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Under certain conditions alien crewmen are permitted to enter the United States for periods not exceeding 29 days. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1281-1287. 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 155 (c). Section 244 of the 1952 Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254 (a), provides, in pertinent part: “As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation ... in the case of an alien who— “(5) . . . has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years . . . and proves that during all of such period he has been and is a person of good moral character ; has not been served with a final order of deportation . . . and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” A report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on this provision states: “The bill accordingly establishes a policy that the administrative remedy should be available only in the very limited category of cases in which the deportation of the alien would be unconscionable. Hardship or even unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child is not sufficient to justify suspension of deportation. . . S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25. (Footnote not in original.) United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489; United States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F. 2d 371. Cf. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345. Petitioners would clearly be ineligible for suspension under the 1952 Act. See n. 3, supra. The statute provides: “If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection for more than six months, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. These reports shall be submitted on the 1st and 15th day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session. If during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it favors the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings. If prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a ease is reported, the Congress does not pass such a concurrent resolution, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien in the manner provided by law. ...” 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 155 (c).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FORD MOTOR CO. (CHICAGO STAMPING PLANT) v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 77-1806. Argued February 28, 1979 Decided May 14, 1979 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, RehNquist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 503. BlacK-müN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 504. Theophil C. Kammholz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Stanley R. Strauss and William J. Rooney. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and John S. Irving. John A. Fillion argued the cause for respondent United Automobile Workers Local 588. With him on the brief were M. Jay Whitman, Irving M. Friedman, and Jerome Schur P. Kevin Connelly filed a brief for the National Automatic Merchandising Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. J. Albert Woll, Robert Mayer, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question in this case is whether prices for in-plant cafeteria and vending machine food and beverages are “terms and conditions of employment” subject to mandatory collective bargaining under §§ 8 (a)(5) and 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act. 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5) and 158 (d). I Petitioner, Ford Motor Co., operates an automotive parts stamping plant in Chicago Heights, Ill., employing 3,600 hourly rated production employees. These employees are represented in collective bargaining with Ford by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, and by its administrative component, Local 588, a respondent here. For many years, Ford has undertaken to provide in-plant food services to its Chicago Heights employees. These services, which include both cafeterias and vending machines, are managed by an independent caterer, ARA Services, Inc. Under its contract with Ford, ARA furnishes the food, management, machines, and personnel in exchange for reimbursement of all direct costs and a 9% surcharge on net receipts. Ford has the right to review and approve the quality, quantity, and price of the food served. Over the years, Ford and the Union have negotiated about food services. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found: “Since 1967, the local contract has included provisions dealing with vending and cafeteria services. The contracts have covered the staffing of service lines, adequate cafeteria supervision, restocking and repairing vending machines, and menu variety. The 1974 local agreement also states, 'the Company recognized its continuing responsibility for the satisfactory performance of the caterer and for the expeditious handling of complaints concerned with such performance.’ ” Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant), 230 N. L. R. B. 716 (1977), enf’d, 571 F. 2d 993 (CA7 1978). Ford, however, has always refused to bargain about the prices of food and beverages served in its in-plant facilities. On February 6, 1976, Ford notified the Union that cafeteria and vending machine prices would be increased shortly by unspecified amounts. The Union requested bargaining over both price and services and also asked for information relevant to Ford’s involvement in food services in order to assist bargaining. These requests were refused by Ford, which took the position that food prices and services are not terms or conditions of employment subject to mandatory bargaining. The Union then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging a refusal to bargain contrary to § 8 (a) (5). The Board sustained the charge, ordering Ford to bargain on both food prices and services and to supply the Union with the relevant information requested. Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant), supra. In doing so, the Board reaffirmed its position, expressed in several prior cases, that prices of in-plant-supplied food and beverages are generally mandatory bargaining subjects, a position that had not been accepted by reviewing courts. The Board also noted that the circumstances of this case made it a particularly strong one for invoking the duty to bargain. The case came before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Ford’s petition for review and the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. That court, while adhering to its prior decision in NLRB v. Ladish Co., 538 F. 2d 1267 (1976), which had refused enforcement of a Board order to bargain about in-plant food prices, enforced the Board’s order here because, “under the facts and circumstances of this case, in-plant cafeteria and vending machine food prices and services materially and significantly affect and have an impact upon terms and conditions of employment and therefore are mandatory subjects of bargaining.” 571 F. 2d, at 1000. The court was particularly influenced by the lack of reasonable eating alternatives for employees, declaring that “[t]he food one must pay for and eat as a captive customer within the employer’s plant can be viewed as a physical dimension of one’s working environment.” Ibid. Because of the importance of the issue and the apparent conflict between the decision below and decisions of other Circuits, see n. 6, supra, we granted certiorari. 439 U. S. 891 (1978). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforcing the Board’s order to bargain. II The Board has consistently held that in-plant food prices are among those terms and conditions of employment defined in § 8 (d) and about which the employer and union must bargain under §§8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3). See n. 6, supra. Because it is evident that Congress assigned to the Board the primary task of construing these provisions in the course of adjudicating charges of unfair refusals to bargain and because the “classification of bargaining subjects as ‘terms or conditions of employment’ is a matter concerning which the Board has special expertise,” Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, 685-686 (1965), its judgment as to what is a mandatory bargaining subject is entitled to considerable deference. Section 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as originally enacted, declared it an unfair practice for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 453. Although the Act did not purport to define the subjects of collective bargaining, § 9 (a) made the union selected by a majority in a bargaining unit the exclusive representative of the employees for bargaining about “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” Under these provisions, the Board was left with the task of identifying on a case-by-case basis those “other conditions of employment” over which management was required to bargain. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the National Labor Relations Act to obligate unions as well as management to bargain; and § 8 (d) explicitly defined the duty of both sides to bargain as the obligation to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. .. .” 61 Stat. 142, now codified at 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). The original House bill had contained a specific listing of the issues subject to mandatory bargaining, H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (11) (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23, 49 (1947), but this attempt to “strait-jacke[t]” and to “limit narrowly the subject matters appropriate for collective bargaining,” id., at 71 (minority report); see also 93 Cong. Rec. 3446-3447 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Klein), was rejected in conference in favor of the more general language adopted by the Senate and now appearing in § 8 (d). S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8 (d) (1947); see 93 Cong. Rec. 6444 (1947) (summary report of Sen. Taft); cf. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 34 (1947). It is thus evident that Congress made a conscious decision to continue its delegation to the Board of the primary responsibility of marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the statutory duty to bargain. This case, therefore, is one of those situations in which we should “recognize without hesitation the primary function and responsibility of the Board . . . ,” NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 499 (1960), which is that “of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life ... and of ‘[appraising] carefully the interests of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases’ from its special understanding of ‘the actualities of industrial relations.’ ” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963), quoting NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1958). Of course, the judgment of the Board is subject to judicial review; but if its construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978). In the past we have refused enforcement of Board orders where they had “no reasonable basis in law,” either because the proper legal standard was not applied or because the Board applied the correct standard but failed to give the plain language of the standard its ordinary meaning. Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 166 (1971). We have also parted company with the Board’s interpretation where it was “fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act” and an attempt to usurp “major policy decisions properly made by Congress.” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 318 (1965). Similarly, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents, supra, at 499, we could not accept the Board’s application of the Act where we were convinced that the Board was moving “into a new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to it.” The Board is vulnerable on none of these grounds in this case. Construing and applying the duty to bargain and the language of § 8 (d), “other terms and conditions of employment,” are tasks lying at the heart of the Board’s function. With all due respect to the Courts of Appeals that have held otherwise, we conclude that the Board’s consistent view that in-plant food prices and services are mandatory bargaining subjects is not an unreasonable or unprincipled construction of the statute and that it should be accepted and enforced. It is not suggested by petitioner that an employee should work a full 8-hour shift without stopping to eat. It reasonably follows that the availability of food during working hours and the conditions under which it is to be consumed are matters of deep concern to workers, and one need not strain to consider them to be among those “conditions” of employment that should be subject to the mutual duty to bargain. By the same token, where the employer has chosen, apparently in his own interest, to make available a system of in-plant feeding facilities for his employees, the prices at which food is offered and other aspects of this service may reasonably be considered among those subjects about which management and union must bargain. The terms and conditions under which food is available on the job are plainly germane to the “working environment,” Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Furthermore, the company is not in the business of selling food to its employees, and the establishment of in-plant food prices is not among those “managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.” Id., at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Board is in no sense attempting to permit the Union to usurp managerial decisionmaking; nor is it seeking to regulate an area from which Congress intended to exclude it. Including within § 8 (d) the prices of in-plant-supplied food and beverages would also serve the ends of the National Labor Relations Act. “The object of this Act was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, but rather to insure that employers and their employees could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.” H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99, 103 (1970). As illustrated by the facts of this case, substantial disputes can arise over the pricing of in-plant-supplied food and beverages. National labor policy contemplates that areas of common dispute between employers and employees be funneled into collective bargaining. The assumption is that this is preferable to allowing recurring disputes to fester outside the negotiation process until strikes or other forms of economic warfare occur. The trend of industrial practice supports this conclusion. In response to increasing employee concern over the issue, many contracts are now being negotiated that contain provisions concerning in-plant food services. In this case, as already noted, local agreements between Ford and the Union have contained detailed provisions about nonprice aspects of in-plant food services for several years. Although not conclusive, current industrial practice is highly relevant in construing the phrase "terms and conditions of employment.” III Ford nevertheless argues against classifying food prices and services as mandatory bargaining subjects because they do not “vitally affect” the terms and conditions of employment within the meaning of the standard assertedly established by Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S., at 176, and because they are trivial matters over which neither party should be required to bargain. There is no merit to either of these aguments. First, Ford has misconstrued Pittsburgh Plate Glass. That case made it clear that while § 8 (d) normally reaches “only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees[,] matters involving individuals outside the employment relationship ... are not wholly excluded.” 404 U. S., at 178. In such instances, as in Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959), and Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964), the test is not whether the “third-party concern is antagonistic to or compatible with the interests of bargaining-unit employees, but whether it vitally affects the ‘terms and conditions’ of their employment.” 404 U. S., at 179. Here, however, the matter of in-plant food prices and services is an aspect of the relationship between Ford and its own employees. No third-party interest is directly implicated, and the standard of Pittsburgh Plate Glass has no application. As for the argument that in-plant food prices and service are too trivial to qualify as mandatory subjects, the Board has a contrary view, and we have no basis for rejecting it. It is also clear that the bargaining-unit employees in this case considered the matter far from trivial since they pressed an unsuccessful boycott to secure a voice in setting food prices. They evidently felt, and common sense also tells us, that even minor increases in the cost of meals can amount to a substantial sum of money over time. In any event, we accept the Board’s view that in-plant food prices and service are conditions of employment and are subject to the duty to bargain. Ford also argues that the Board’s position will result in unnecessary disruption because any small change in price or service will trigger the obligation to bargain. The problem, it is said, will be particularly acute in situations where several unions are involved, possibly requiring endless rounds of negotiations over issues as minor as the price of a cup of coffee or a soft drink. These concerns have been thought exaggerated by the Board. Its position in this case, as in all past cases involving the same issue, is that it is sufficient compliance with the statutory mandate if management honors a specific union request for bargaining about changes that have been made or are to be made. Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant), 230 N. L. R. B., at 718; Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N. L. R. B. 1080, 1081, enf'd, 369 F. 2d 891 (CA4 1966), rev’d en banc, 387 F. 2d 542 (1967). The Board apparently assumes that, as a practical matter, requests to bargain will not be lightly made. Moreover, problems created by constantly shifting food prices can be anticipated and provided for in the collective-bargaining agreement. Furthermore, if it is true that disputes over food prices are likely to be frequent and intense, it follows that more, not less, collective bargaining is the remedy. This is the assumption of national labor policy, and it is soundly supported by both reason and experience. Finally, Ford asserts that to require it to engage in bargaining over in-plant food service prices would be futile because those prices are set by a third-party supplier, ARA. It is true that ARA sets vending machine and cafeteria prices, but under Ford’s contract with ARA, Ford retains the right to review and control food services and prices. In any event, an employer can always affect prices by initiating or altering a subsidy to the third-party supplier such as that provided by Ford in this case, and will typically have the right to change suppliers at some point in the future. To this extent the employer holds future, if not present, leverage over in-plant food services and prices. We affirm, therefore, the Court of Appeals’ judgment upholding the Board’s determination in this case that in-plant food services and prices are “terms and conditions of employment” subject to mandatory bargaining under §§ 8 (a) (5) and 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act. So ordered. The National Labor Relation Board’s order at issue here directed petitioner to bargain with respondent Union “with respect to food services and changes in food prices in [petitioner’s in-plant] vending machines and cafeteria. . . .” Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant), 230 N. L. R. B. 716, 719 (1977), enf’d, 571 F. 2d 993 (CA7 1978). The duty to bargain over nonprice aspects of in-plant food services is thus also at issue here. The Board’s order also obligated petitioner to supply respondent Union with the information necessary for bargaining. 230 N. L. R. B., at 719. It seems agreed that if food prices and service are mandatory bargaining subjects, the order to furnish information should stand. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U. S. 301, 303 (1979). The relevant provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are as follows: “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a). “(d) For the purposes of this section, to- bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... “Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. . ..” As amended, 61 Stat. 140,142,143. As originally enacted, the Wagner Act did not define the subjects of §8 (a)(5)’s obligation to bargain, although §9 (a), which was contained in the Wagner Act, made reference to “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” Section 8 (d) was added by the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act in 1947, and expressly defined the scope of the duty to bargain as including “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” The relevant details of this development are discussed infra, at 495-496. It is difficult for employees to eat away from the plant during their shifts. The lunch period is 30 minutes, and the few restaurants in the vicinity are all over a mile away, in an area heavily saturated with industrial plants employing thousands of workers. As a result, very few of the 3,600 workers leave the plant during the lunch period. Two 22-minute rest breaks are also provided during the shifts, but employees are not permitted to leave the plant then. Some workers bring food to work. No refrigerated storage facilities are provided, however, and spoilage and vermin are a problem, particularly in the summer. If receipts exceed ARA's cost plus the 9% surcharge, Ford is entitled to the excess. If revenues do not meet the costs of the operation plus the surcharge, the company is obligated to pay ARA up to $52,000 a year. In recent years, deficits have occurred often. In meeting the deficits, Ford has thereby subsidized employee meals and indirectly influenced the price of the food sold. The Union also began a boycott of food services in which more than half of the employees participated. The boycott ended slightly more than three months later without any reductions in prices. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N. L. R. B. 1080, 1081, enf d, 369 F. 2d 891 (CA4 1966), rev’d en banc, 387 F. 2d 542 (1967); McCall Corp., 172 N. L. R. B. 540 (1968), enf. denied, 432 F. 2d 187 (CA4 1970); Package Machinery Co., 191 N. L. R. B. 268 (1971), enf. denied, 457 F. 2d 936 (CA1 1972); Ladish Co., 219 N. L. R. B. 354 (1975), enf. denied, 538 F. 2d 1267 (CA7 1976). See Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant), 230 N. L. R. B., at 717-718, n. 11: “We note that the instant case, on its facts, is in many respects a stronger case than Ladish for adhering to our position. Unlike Ladish, where the respondent had no input on prices, the Respondent in this case retains influence over cafeteria and vending machine prices by its right to review prices and its leverage of the subsidy agreement. In addition, there also exists the possibility for the Respondent to make a profit on the food service operation. Also, since 1967, the parties in this case have bargained over in-plant food services. No such bargaining history was present in Ladish. Moreover, in Ladish, the court implied that ‘brown-bagging’ is a viable alternative to purchasing lunch from the commercial food service. However, in this case, employees have complained about spoilage of food stored in their lockers until lunch, as well as unsanitary conditions in the locker room (wherein the Respondent has found it necessary on occasion to exterminate). Additionally, the employees have apparently been so concerned with the food pricing that over half of them participated in a boycott of the Respondent’s food service operations. There was no such labor strife involved in Ladish. Lastly, in Ladish the employees were represented by seven unions. The court therein projected that each time the food prices were raised 'the Company could be compelled to engage in seven rounds of negotiations.’ 538 F. 2d at 1272. This fact, the court declared, ‘provides a good example of a situation in which bargaining could be both disruptive of stable relations and economically wasteful.’ Id. In the instant case, however, the employees are represented by a single union. While we adhere to the view that the number of unions representing employees at a single plant is not a factor in resolving this issue, we nevertheless note that, even in the court’s view, there is no potential for conflicting union demands in this case.” The Report declared: “The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors. What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in the first instance to employers and trade unions, and in the second place, to any administrative agency skilled in the field and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of industrial practices and traditions in each industry or area of the country, subject to review by the courts. It cannot and should not be straitjacketed by legislative enactment.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1947) (minority report). See also Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 178 (1971) (“Section 8 (d) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for mandatory bargaining”); East Bay Union of Machinists v. NLRB, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 198, 201, 322 F. 2d 411, 414 (1963) (Burger, J.) (“The use of this language was a reflection of the congressional awareness that the act covered a wide variety of industrial and commercial activity and a recognition that collective bargaining must be kept flexible without precise delineation of what subjects were covered so that the Act could be administered to meet changing conditions”), aff’d sub nom. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964). We should not be understood as holding that whether in-plant food services are to be provided where such services do not already exist is a mandatory bargaining subject. That issue is not involved here. See, e. g., 2 Bureau of National Affairs, Collective Bargaining (Negotiation and Contracts) 95:421-95:424 (1976). See also the following arbitration decisions construing collective-bargaining agreements to cover the cost of employer-supplied food as a condition of employment: Universal Form Clamp Co., 68 Lab. Arb. 1223 (Miller, 1977) (cost of coffee); Hilton Hotels Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 1267, 1270-1272 (Hanlon, 1964) (cost and type of meals); Greater Los Angeles Zoo Assn., 60 Lab. Arb. 838 (Christopher, 1973) (employer may not discontinue practice of providing free meals to zoo food venders when contract provided that there would be no reduction of employee benefits); Alpena General Hospital, 50 Lab. Arb. 48 (Jones, 1967), and Lutheran Medical Center, 44 Lab. Arb. 107 (Wolf, 1964) (free meals are working condition). A survey conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs’ Personnel Policies Forum found that 54% of the responding companies provided food services for employees using a lunchroom with vending machines; 43% of the companies provided cafeterias; and 15% provided vending machines with snackbar service. BNA, Labor Policy and Practice Series (Personnel Management) 245:201-245:204 (1976). The National Industrial Conference Board in 1964 reported that 47% of the manufacturing companies that responded to a survey provided cafeteria services, and 55% of the companies subsidized the operation. Only 8% of the companies reported that they were trying to operate the cafeterias at a profit. NICB, Personnel Practices in Factory and Office: Manufacturing, Personnel Policy Study No. 194, pp. 76-77 (1964). Cf. Fisher, Operating Your Firm’s Dining Area — Profitably, Administrative Management, Oct. 1966, pp. 66-67; Scheer, The Company Cafeteria, 45 Personnel J. 85-86 (1966); Feeding the Big Captive Customers, Business Week, Oct. 27, 1975, pp. 46-54. Although the decision below by the Seventh Circuit was the first to uphold the Board's order to bargain about the prices of in-plant-supplied food services, other aspects of food services have been found to be covered by §8(d). These include improvement in lunchroom equipment and supplies, Preston Products Co., 158 N. L. R. B. 322 (1966), aff’d in relevant part, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 196, 392 F. 2d 801 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U. S. 906 (1968); coffeebreak scheduling and service of free coffee, Missourian Pub. Co., 216 N. L. R. B. 175, 180 (1975); D & C Textile Corp., 189 N. L. R. B. 769, 771, 783 (1971); Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 N. L. R. B. 452, 455 (1957); free meal policy, O’Land, Inc., d/b/a Ramada Inn South, 206 N. L. R. B. 210, 214-215 (1973); cancellation of catering truck service, Bralco Metals, Inc., 214 N. L. R. B. 143, 146-150 (1974); meal areas, Hasty Print, Inc., d/b/a Walker Color Graphics, 227 N. L. R. B. 455, 461 (1976); and cleanup of lunchroom areas by employees, Cosmo Graphics, Inc., 217 N. L. R. B. 1061, 1066 (1975). And, where no in-plant facilities exist, employers are still obligated to bargain about meal hours and coffee breaks. See, e. g., Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S., at 222 (Stewart, J., concurring) ; Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U. S. 676, 691 (1965). “While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to industrial bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of including a particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining. Labor Board v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 408. Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process.” Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 211. This factor is essentially irrelevant to the determination in this case. The definition of a mandatory collective-bargaining subject does not depend on the number of unions within the bargaining unit. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 156 N. L. R. B., at 1089; McCall Corp., 172 N. L. R. B., at 547. See, e. g., Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 211 (“The Act was framed with an awareness that refusals to confer and negotiate had been one of the most prolific causes of industrial strife”) ; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 369 F. 2d, at 895 (“The underlying philosophy of the Labor Act is that discussion of issues between labor and management serves as a valuable prophylactic by removing grievances, real or fancied, and tends to improve and stabilize labor relations”); see also Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1412 (1958): “Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed position either because new facts are brought to light or because the strengths and weaknesses of the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes the parties hit upon some novel compromise of an issue which has been thrashed over and over. Much is gained even by giving each side a better picture of the strength of the other’s convictions. The cost is so slight that the potential gains easily justify legal compulsion to engage in the discussion.” In-plant food services provided by third parties are not unlike other kinds of benefits, such as health insurance, implicating outside suppliers. In each case, the employer contracts with a third party to provide a benefit to employees and, during the term of the contract, is unable to change the price at which that benefit is available to the employee except by employee subsidies.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

W. Kevin HUGHES, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al., Petitioners v. TALEN ENERGY MARKETING, LLC, fka PPL Energyplus, LLC, et al. CPV Maryland, LLC, Petitioner v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL Energyplus, LLC, et al. Nos. 14-614 14-623. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 24, 2016. Decided April 19, 2016. Scott H. Strauss, Washington, DC, for Petitioners in No. 14-614. Clifton S. Elgarten, Washington, DC, for Petitioner in No. 14-623. Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Ann O'Connell, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondents. Paul D. Clement, Erin E. Murphy, Edmund G. LaCour Jr., Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, Tamara Linde, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, PSEG Services Corp., Newark, NJ, Shannen W. Coffin, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, DC, David Musselman, Associate General Counsel, Essential Power, LLC, Princeton, NJ, Jesse A. Dillon, Assistant General Counsel, Talen Energy Corp., Allentown, PA, David L. Meyer, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Clifton S. Elgarten, Larry F. Eisenstat, Richard Lehfeldt, Jennifer N. Waters, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner CPV Maryland, LLC. James A. Feldman, Washington, DC, Scott H. Strauss, Peter J. Hopkins, Jeffrey A. Schwarz, Spiegel & McDiarmid LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioners in No. 14-614. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Power Act (FPA), 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., vests in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity in the interstate market. FERC's regulatory scheme includes an auction-based market mechanism to ensure wholesale rates that are just and reasonable. FERC's scheme, in Maryland's view, provided insufficient incentive for new electricity generation in the State. Maryland therefore enacted its own regulatory program. Maryland's program provides subsidies, through state-mandated contracts, to a new generator, but conditions receipt of those subsidies on the new generator selling capacity into a FERC-regulated wholesale auction. In a suit initiated by competitors of Maryland's new electricity generator, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland's scheme impermissibly intrudes upon the wholesale electricity market, a domain Congress reserved to FERC alone. We affirm the Fourth Circuit's judgment. I A Under the FPA, FERC has exclusive authority to regulate "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." § 824(b)(1). A wholesale sale is defined as a "sale of electric energy to any person for resale." § 824(d). The FPA assigns to FERC responsibility for ensuring that "[a]ll rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission ... shall be just and reasonable." § 824d(a). See also § 824e(a) (if a rate or charge is found to be unjust or unreasonable, "the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate"). "But the law places beyond FERC's power, and leaves to the States alone, the regulation of 'any other sale'-most notably, any retail sale-of electricity." FERC v. Electric Power Supply Assn., 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 760, 766, 193 L.Ed.2d 661 (2016) (EPSA ) (quoting § 824(b) ). The States' reserved authority includes control over in-state "facilities used for the generation of electric energy." § 824(b)(1) ; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) ("Need for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and services, are areas that have been characteristically governed by the States."). "Since the FPA's passage, electricity has increasingly become a competitive interstate business, and FERC's role has evolved accordingly." EPSA, 577 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 768. Until relatively recently, most state energy markets were vertically integrated monopolies-i.e., one entity, often a state utility, controlled electricity generation, transmission, and sale to retail consumers. Over the past few decades, many States, including Maryland, have deregulated their energy markets. In deregulated markets, the organizations that deliver electricity to retail consumers-often called "load serving entities" (LSEs)-purchase that electricity at wholesale from independent power generators. To ensure reliable transmission of electricity from independent generators to LSEs, FERC has charged nonprofit entities, called Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs), with managing certain segments of the electricity grid. Interstate wholesale transactions in deregulated markets typically occur through two mechanisms. The first is bilateral contracting: LSEs sign agreements with generators to purchase a certain amount of electricity at a certain rate over a certain period of time. After the parties have agreed to contract terms, FERC may review the rate for reasonableness. See Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 546-548, 128 S.Ct. 2733, 171 L.Ed.2d 607 (2008) (Because rates set through good-faith arm's-length negotiation are presumed reasonable, "FERC may abrogate a valid contract only if it harms the public interest."). Second, RTOs and ISOs administer a number of competitive wholesale auctions: for example, a "same-day auction" for immediate delivery of electricity to LSEs facing a sudden spike in demand; a "next-day auction" to satisfy LSEs' anticipated near-term demand; and a "capacity auction" to ensure the availability of an adequate supply of power at some point far in the future. These cases involve the capacity auction administered by PJM Interconnection (PJM), an RTO that oversees the electricity grid in all or parts of 13 mid-Atlantic and Midwestern States and the District of Columbia. The PJM capacity auction functions as follows. PJM predicts electricity demand three years ahead of time, and assigns a share of that demand to each participating LSE. Owners of capacity to produce electricity in three years' time bid to sell that capacity to PJM at proposed rates. PJM accepts bids, beginning with the lowest proposed rate, until it has purchased enough capacity to satisfy projected demand. No matter what rate they listed in their original bids, all accepted capacity sellers receive the highest accepted rate, which is called the "clearing price." LSEs then must purchase from PJM, at the clearing price, enough electricity to satisfy their PJM-assigned share of overall projected demand. The capacity auction serves to identify need for new generation: A high clearing price in the capacity auction encourages new generators to enter the market, increasing supply and thereby lowering the clearing price in same-day and next-day auctions three years' hence; a low clearing price discourages new entry and encourages retirement of existing high-cost generators. The auction is designed to accommodate long-term bilateral contracts for capacity. If an LSE has acquired a certain amount of capacity through a long-term bilateral contract with a generator, the LSE-not the generator-is considered the owner of that capacity for purposes of the auction. The LSE sells that capacity into the auction, where it counts toward the LSE's assigned share of PJM-projected demand, thereby reducing the net costs of the LSE's required capacity purchases from PJM. LSEs generally bid their capacity into the auction at a price of $0, thus guaranteeing that the capacity will clear at any price. Such bidders are called "price takers." Because the fixed costs of building generating facilities often vastly exceed the variable costs of producing electricity, many generators also function as price takers. FERC extensively regulates the structure of the PJM capacity auction to ensure that it efficiently balances supply and demand, producing a just and reasonable clearing price. See EPSA, 577 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 769 (the clearing price is "the price an efficient market would produce"). Two FERC rules are particularly relevant to these cases. First, the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) requires new generators to bid capacity into the auction at or above a price specified by PJM, unless those generators can prove that their actual costs fall below the MOPR price. Once a new generator clears the auction at the MOPR price, PJM deems that generator an efficient entrant and exempts it from the MOPR going forward, allowing it to bid its capacity into the auction at any price it elects, including $0. Second, the New Entry Price Adjustment (NEPA) guarantees new generators, under certain circumstances, a stable capacity price for their first three years in the market. The NEPA's guarantee eliminates, for three years, the risk that the new generator's entry into the auction might so decrease the clearing price as to prevent that generator from recovering its costs. B Around 2009, Maryland electricity regulators became concerned that the PJM capacity auction was failing to encourage development of sufficient new in-state generation. Because Maryland sits in a particularly congested part of the PJM grid, importing electricity from other parts of the grid into the State is often difficult. To address this perceived supply shortfall, Maryland regulators proposed that FERC extend the duration of the NEPA from three years to ten. FERC rejected the proposal. PJM, 126 FERC ¶ 61,275 (2009). "[G]iving new suppliers longer payments and assurances unavailable to existing suppliers," FERC reasoned, would improperly favor new generation over existing generation, throwing the auction's market-based price-setting mechanism out of balance. Ibid. See also PJM, 128 FERC ¶ 61,157 (2009) (order on petition for rehearing) ("Both new entry and retention of existing efficient capacity are necessary to ensure reliability and both should receive the same price so that the price signals are not skewed in favor of new entry."). Shortly after FERC rejected Maryland's NEPA proposal, the Maryland Public Service Commission promulgated the Generation Order at issue here. Under the order, Maryland solicited proposals from various companies for construction of a new gas-fired power plant at a particular location, and accepted the proposal of petitioner CPV Maryland, LLC (CPV). Maryland then required LSEs to enter into a 20-year pricing contract (the parties refer to this contract as a "contract for differences") with CPV at a rate CPV specified in its accepted proposal. Unlike a traditional bilateral contract for capacity, the contract for differences does not transfer ownership of capacity from CPV to the LSEs. Instead, CPV sells its capacity on the PJM market, but Maryland's program guarantees CPV the contract price rather than the auction clearing price. If CPV's capacity clears the PJM capacity auction and the clearing price falls below the price guaranteed in the contract for differences, Maryland LSEs pay CPV the difference between the contract price and the clearing price. The LSEs then pass the costs of these required payments along to Maryland consumers in the form of higher retail prices. If CPV's capacity clears the auction and the clearing price exceeds the price guaranteed in the contract for differences, CPV pays the LSEs the difference between the contract price and the clearing price, and the LSEs then pass the savings along to consumers in the form of lower retail prices. Because CPV sells its capacity exclusively in the PJM auction market, CPV receives no payment from Maryland LSEs or PJM if its capacity fails to clear the auction. But CPV is guaranteed a certain rate if its capacity does clear, so the contract's terms encourage CPV to bid its capacity into the auction at the lowest possible price. Prior to enactment of the Maryland program, PJM had exempted new state-supported generation from the MOPR, allowing such generation to bid capacity into the auction at $0 without first clearing at the MOPR price. Responding to a complaint filed by incumbent generators in the Maryland region who objected to Maryland's program (and the similar New Jersey program), FERC eliminated this exemption. PJM, 135 FERC ¶ 61,022 (2011). See also 137 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2011) (order on petition for rehearing) ("Our intent is not to pass judgment on state and local policies and objectives with regard to the development of new capacity resources, or unreasonably interfere with those objectives. We are forced to act, however, when subsidized entry supported by one state's or locality's policies has the effect of disrupting the competitive price signals that PJM's [capacity auction] is designed to produce, and that PJM as a whole, including other states, rely on to attract sufficient capacity."); New Jersey Bd. of Pub. Util. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 79-80 (C.A.3 2014) (upholding FERC's elimination of the state-supported generation exemption). In the first year CPV bid capacity from its new plant into the PJM capacity auction, that capacity cleared the auction at the MOPR rate, so CPV was thereafter eligible to function as a price taker. In addition to seeking the elimination of the state-supported generation exemption, incumbent generators-respondents here-brought suit in the District of Maryland against members of the Maryland Public Service Commission in their official capacities. The incumbent generators sought a declaratory judgment that Maryland's program violates the Supremacy Clause by setting a wholesale rate for electricity and by interfering with FERC's capacity-auction policies. CPV intervened as a defendant. After a six-day bench trial, the District Court issued a declaratory judgment holding that Maryland's program improperly sets the rate CPV receives for interstate wholesale capacity sales to PJM. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F.Supp.2d 790, 840 (Md.2013). "While Maryland may retain traditional state authority to regulate the development, location, and type of power plants within its borders," the District Court explained, "the scope of Maryland's power is necessarily limited by FERC's exclusive authority to set wholesale energy and capacity prices." Id., at 829. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Relying on this Court's decision in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 370, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988), the Fourth Circuit observed that state laws are preempted when they "den[y] full effect to the rates set by FERC, even though [they do] not seek to tamper with the actual terms of an interstate transaction." PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 476 (2014). Maryland's program, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, "functionally sets the rate that CPV receives for its sales in the PJM auction," "a FERC-approved market mechanism." Id., at 476-477. "[B]y adopting terms and prices set by Maryland, not those sanctioned by FERC," the Fourth Circuit concluded, Maryland's program "strikes at the heart of the agency's statutory power." Id., at 478. The Fourth Circuit cautioned that it "need not express an opinion on other state efforts to encourage new generation, such as direct subsidies or tax rebates, that may or may not differ in important ways from the Maryland initiative." Ibid . The Fourth Circuit then held that Maryland's program impermissibly conflicts with FERC policies. Maryland's program, the Fourth Circuit determined, "has the potential to seriously distort the PJM auction's price signals," undermining the incentive structure FERC has approved for construction of new generation. Ibid. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit explained, Maryland's program "conflicts with NEPA" by providing a 20-year price guarantee to a new entrant-even though FERC refused Maryland's request to extend the duration of the NEPA past three years. Id., at 479. We granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 356, 193 L.Ed.2d 288 (2015), and now affirm. II The Supremacy Clause makes the laws of the United States "the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Put simply, federal law preempts contrary state law. "Our inquiry into the scope of a [federal] statute's pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case." Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state law is preempted where "Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law," Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 509, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 103 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989), as well as "where, under the circumstances of a particular case, the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the Fourth Circuit's judgment that Maryland's program sets an interstate wholesale rate, contravening the FPA's division of authority between state and federal regulators. As earlier recounted, see supra, at 1292, the FPA allocates to FERC exclusive jurisdiction over "rates and charges ... received ... for or in connection with" interstate wholesale sales. § 824d(a). Exercising this authority, FERC has approved the PJM capacity auction as the sole ratesetting mechanism for sales of capacity to PJM, and has deemed the clearing price per se just and reasonable. Doubting FERC's judgment, Maryland-through the contract for differences-requires CPV to participate in the PJM capacity auction, but guarantees CPV a rate distinct from the clearing price for its interstate sales of capacity to PJM. By adjusting an interstate wholesale rate, Maryland's program invades FERC's regulatory turf. See EPSA, 577 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 780 ("The FPA leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales or for regulation that would indirectly achieve the same result." (internal quotation marks omitted)). That Maryland was attempting to encourage construction of new in-state generation does not save its program. States, of course, may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally affect areas within FERC's domain. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1591, 1599, 191 L.Ed.2d 511 (2015) (whether the Natural Gas Act (NGA) preempts a particular state law turns on "the target at which the state law aims "). But States may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate, through regulatory means that intrude on FERC's authority over interstate wholesale rates, as Maryland has done here. See ibid. (distinguishing between "measures aimed directly at interstate purchasers and wholesalers for resale, and those aimed at subjects left to the States to regulate" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The problem we have identified with Maryland's program mirrors the problems we identified in Mississippi Power & Light and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 106 S.Ct. 2349, 90 L.Ed.2d 943 (1986). In each of those cases, a State determined that FERC had failed to ensure the reasonableness of a wholesale rate, and the State therefore prevented a utility from recovering-through retail rates-the full cost of wholesale purchases. See Mississippi Power & Light, 487 U.S., at 360-364, 108 S.Ct. 2428 ; Nantahala, 476 U.S., at 956-962, 106 S.Ct. 2349. This Court invalidated the States' attempts to second-guess the reasonableness of interstate wholesale rates. " 'Once FERC sets such a rate,' " we observed in Mississippi Power & Light, " 'a State may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale rates are unreasonable. A State must rather give effect to Congress' desire to give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority.' " 487 U.S., at 373, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (quoting Nantahala, 476 U.S., at 966, 106 S.Ct. 2349 ). True, Maryland's program does not prevent a utility from recovering through retail sales a cost FERC mandated it incur-Maryland instead guarantees CPV a certain rate for capacity sales to PJM regardless of the clearing price. But Mississippi Power & Light and Nantahala make clear that States interfere with FERC's authority by disregarding interstate wholesale rates FERC has deemed just and reasonable, even when States exercise their traditional authority over retail rates or, as here, in-state generation. The contract for differences, Maryland and CPV respond, is indistinguishable from traditional bilateral contracts for capacity, which FERC has long accommodated in the auction. See supra, at 1293 - 1294, and n. 3. But the contract at issue here differs from traditional bilateral contracts in this significant respect: The contract for differences does not transfer ownership of capacity from one party to another outside the auction. Instead, the contract for differences operates within the auction; it mandates that LSEs and CPV exchange money based on the cost of CPV's capacity sales to PJM. Notably, because the contract for differences does not contemplate the sale of capacity outside the auction, Maryland and CPV took the position, until the Fourth Circuit issued its decision, that the rate in the contract for differences is not subject to FERC's reasonableness review. See § 824(b)(1) (FERC has jurisdiction over contracts for "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce." (emphasis added)). Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland's program only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC. We therefore need not and do not address the permissibility of various other measures States might employ to encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures "untethered to a generator's wholesale market participation." Brief for Respondents 40. So long as a State does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction, the State's program would not suffer from the fatal defect that renders Maryland's program unacceptable. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed. For example, if four power plants bid to sell capacity at, respectively, $10/unit, $20/unit, $30/unit, and $40/unit, and the first three plants provide enough capacity to satisfy projected demand, PJM will purchase capacity only from those three plants, each of which will receive $30/unit, the clearing price. Because PJM operates the electricity grid in a very large region of the country, PJM divides its overall grid into geographic subregions and makes adjustments to the clearing price to reflect operating conditions in those subregions. For instance, PJM may pay a higher rate in or near areas where transmission-line congestion limits the amount of electricity that can be imported from other areas. The elevated clearing price might encourage a company to site a new power plant in a subregion where the need for local generation is great rather than elsewhere in PJM's grid. To take a simplified example, assume an LSE has signed a long-term bilateral contract with a generator to purchase 50 units of electricity annually at a price of $40/unit (total annual cost: $2,000). In a given year when the auction clearing price is $50/unit, assume PJM requires the LSE to purchase 100 units of electricity to satisfy its share of projected demand. The LSE bids the 50 units of capacity it already owns into the PJM auction, and PJM pays the LSE $2,500 for those 50 units. Although the LSE then must pay PJM $5,000 for the 100 units it must purchase to satisfy projected demand, the net cost to the LSE of auction participation is only $2,500. Note that the effective price the LSE pays for 50 of the 100 units it must purchase from PJM-the amount purchased through the long-term contract-is the contract price, not the clearing price. That is, the LSE pays the utility $2,000 for 50 units of capacity, receives $2,500 from PJM after selling that capacity into the auction, and then pays $2,500 to PJM to purchase 50 units of capacity, resulting in a net cost of $2,000-the contract price-for those 50 units. The LSE, of course, must pay the full clearing price-$50/unit-for the other 50 units it is obliged to purchase to satisfy its full share of projected demand. New Jersey implemented a similar program around the same time. The duration of the price guarantee for the New Jersey program is 15 years rather than Maryland's 20. Two simplified examples illustrate how Maryland's program interacts with the PJM capacity auction. First, consider a hypothetical situation where the clearing price falls below the price guaranteed in the contract for differences. Assume that CPV's plant produces 10,000 units of electricity a year, and that the 20-year price guaranteed under the contract is $30/unit. Assume further that, in a given year during the duration of the price guarantee, the clearing price is $20/unit, and CPV's capacity clears the auction. CPV receives payments from Maryland LSEs of $10/unit, or $100,000, and payments from PJM of $20/unit, or $200,000. The rate CPV receives from the capacity auction is therefore $30/unit-the contract price-not $20/unit-the clearing price. Under PJM auction rules, Maryland LSEs then must purchase from PJM, at the clearing price of $20/unit, enough capacity to satisfy their assigned shares of anticipated demand. Assume that PJM requires Maryland LSEs to purchase 40,000 units of capacity. Total capacity-auction expenses for Maryland LSEs would therefore include both the payment to CPV ($100,000) and the full cost of purchasing capacity from PJM ($800,000), or $900,000. Absent Maryland's program, the LSEs' capacity-auction expenses would have included only the total cost of capacity purchases from PJM, or $800,000. Now assume instead that the clearing price in a given year is $40/unit, which exceeds the $30/unit contract price, and that CPV's capacity clears the auction. CPV receives payments from PJM of $40/unit, or $400,000. CPV then must pay Maryland LSEs the difference between the contract price and the clearing price-in this case, $10/unit, or $100,000. The rate CPV receives from the capacity auction is therefore the contract price-$30/unit-the same price CPV received in the above example. Maryland LSEs then must purchase from PJM, at the clearing price of $40/unit, enough capacity to satisfy their share of anticipated demand. Assume that PJM again requires Maryland LSEs to purchase 40,000 units of capacity. Total capacity-auction expenses for Maryland LSEs would therefore include the full cost of capacity purchases from PJM ($1,600,000), minus the payment from CPV ($100,000), or $1,500,000. Absent Maryland's program, the LSEs would have had to pay $1,600,000 to PJM without receiving any offsetting payments from CPV. Because neither CPV nor Maryland has challenged whether plaintiffs may seek declaratory relief under the Supremacy Clause, the Court assumes without deciding that they may. See Brief for Public Utility Law Project of New York, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 21 (arguing that the incumbent generators should have been required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit). Respondents also raised arguments under the Dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court rejected those arguments, PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F.Supp.2d 790, 841-855 (Md.2013), the Fourth Circuit did not address them, and they are irrelevant at this stage. For the same reason, the Third Circuit found New Jersey's similar program preempted. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 246 (2014). According to Maryland and CPV, the payments guaranteed under Maryland's program are consideration for CPV's compliance with various state-imposed conditions, i.e., the requirements that CPV build a certain type of generator, at a particular location, that would produce a certain amount of electricity over a particular period of time. The payments, Maryland and CPV continue, are therefore separate from the rate CPV receives for its wholesale sales of capacity to PJM. But because the payments are conditioned on CPV's capacity clearing the auction-and, accordingly, on CPV selling that capacity to PJM-the payments are certainly "received ... in connection with" interstate wholesale sales to PJM. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). Although Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1591, 191 L.Ed.2d 511 (2015), involved the NGA rather than the FPA, the relevant provisions of the two statutes are analogous. This Court has routinely relied on NGA cases in determining the scope of the FPA, and vice versa. See, e.g., id., at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1601-1602 (discussing FPA cases while determining the preemptive scope of the NGA). Maryland's program, Maryland and CPV assert, is consistent with federal law because FERC has accommodated the program by eliminating the MOPR's state-supported generation exception. Even assuming that this change has prevented Maryland's program from distorting the auction's price signals, however-a point the parties dispute-Maryland cannot regulate in a domain Congress assigned to FERC and then require FERC to accommodate Maryland's intrusion. See Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 518, 109 S.Ct. 1262, 103 L.Ed.2d 509 (1989) ("The NGA does not require FERC to regulate around a state rule the only purpose of which is to influence purchasing decisions of interstate pipelines, however that rule is labeled."). Our opinion does not call into question whether generators and LSEs may enter into long-term financial hedging contracts based on the auction clearing price. Such contracts, also frequently termed contracts for differences, do not involve state action to the same degree as Maryland's program, which compels private actors (LSEs) to enter into contracts for differences-like it or not-with a generator that must sell its capacity to PJM through the auction. Because the reasons we have set out suffice to invalidate Maryland's program, we do not resolve whether, as the incumbent generators also assert, Maryland's program is preempted because it counteracts FERC's refusal to extend the NEPA's duration, or because it interferes with the capacity auction's price signals. * * *

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PETERS v. HOBBY et al. No. 376. Argued April 19, 1955. Decided June 6, 1955. Thurman Arnold and Paul A. Porter argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were Abe Fortas and Milton V. Freeman. Assistant Attorney General Burger argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General Rankin, Samuel D. Slade and Benjamin Forman. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Joseph A. Fanelli and Leo F. Lightner for the Engineers and Scientists of America; Herbert Monte Levy and Morris L. Ernst for the American Civil Liberties Union; and Arthur J. Goldberg, Thomas E. Harris and Joseph L. Ranh, Jr. for the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was instituted by petitioner in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The principal relief sought is a declaration that petitioner’s removal and debarment from federal employment were invalid. Prior to trial, the District Court granted the respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The judgment was affirmed, one judge dissenting, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, relying on its decision in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 P. 2d 46, sustained here by an equally divided vote, 341 U. S. 918. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 882, because the case appeared to present the same constitutional question left unresolved by this Court’s action in Bailey v. Richardson, supra. I. The basic facts are undisputed. Petitioner is a professor of medicine, specializing in the study of metabolism, at Yale University. For several years prior to 1953, because of his eminence in the field of medical science, he was employed as a Special Consultant in the United States Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency. On April 10, 1953, the functions of the Federal Security Agency were transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, headed by respondent Hobby. Petitioner’s duties required his presence in Washington from four to ten days each year, when called upon by the Surgeon General, to render advice concerning proposals to grant federal assistance to various medical research institutions. This work was not of a confidential or sensitive character and did not entail access to classified material. Petitioner was compensated at a specified per diem rate for days actually worked. At the time of his removal, petitioner was employed under an appointment expiring on December 31, 1953. On March 21, 1947, Executive Order 9835 was issued by the President. It provided that the head of each department and agency in the Executive Branch of the Government “shall be personally responsible for an effective program to assure that disloyal civilian officers or employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency.” Toward that end, the Order directed the establishment within each department or agency of one or more loyalty boards “for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising within such department or agency and making recommendations with respect to the removal of any officer or employee ... on grounds relating to loyalty . . . .” The order also provided for the establishment of a central Loyalty Review Board in the Civil Service Commission. The Board, in addition to various supervisory functions, was authorized “to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal ... by the loyalty board of any department or agency . . . The standard for removal prescribed by the Order was whether, “on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States.” This standard was amended on April 28, 1951. As amended, the standard to be applied was whether, “on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States.” In January 1949, Joseph E. McElvain, Chairman of the Board of Inquiry on Employee Loyalty of the Federal Security Agency, notified petitioner that derogatory information relating to his loyalty had been received. Accompanying McElvain’s letter was a detailed interrogatory relating to petitioner’s associations and affiliations. Petitioner promptly completed the form and returned it. Shortly thereafter, McElvain advised petitioner that the Agency Board had determined that no reasonable grounds existed for belief that petitioner was disloyal. In May 1951, following the amendment of the removal standard prescribed by Executive Order 9835, the Executive Secretary of the Loyalty Review Board advised McElvain that petitioner’s case should be reopened and readjudicated pursuant to the amended standard. Three months later, the Acting Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board informed McElvain that a panel of the Loyalty Review Board had considered petitioner’s case and had recommended that it be remanded to the Agency Board for a hearing. Acting on the Loyalty Review Board’s recommendation, McElvain sent petitioner a letter of charges. Sixteen charges were specified, relating to alleged membership in the Communist Party, sponsorship of certain petitions, affiliation with various organizations, and alleged association with Communists and Communist sympathizers. In his reply, made under oath, petitioner denied that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party and set forth information concerning the other charges. On April 1 and 2, 1952, the Agency Board conducted a hearing on petitioner’s case in New Haven, Connecticut. The sources of the information as to the facts bearing on the charges were not identified or made available to petitioner’s counsel for cross-examination. The identity of one or more of the informants furnishing such information, but not of all the informants, was known to the Board. The only evidence adduced at the hearing was presented by petitioner. He testified under oath that he had never been a member of the Communist Party and also testified concerning the other charges against him. He did not refuse to answer any question directed to him. Petitioner’s testimony was supported by the testimony of eighteen other witnesses and the affidavits and statements of some forty additional persons. On May 23, 1952, McElvain notified petitioner that the Agency Board had determined that, on all the evidence, there was no reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s loyalty. Thereafter, on April 6, 1953, petitioner was advised by the Loyalty Review Board that it had determined to conduct a “post-audit” of the Agency Board’s determination and, to this end, “hold a hearing and reach its own decision.” The hearing was held on May 12, 1953, in New Haven, before a panel of the Board consisting of respondents Hessey, Amen, and King. Once again, as at the previous hearing, the only evidence adduced was presented by petitioner. In his own testimony, petitioner denied membership in the Communist Party, discussed his political beliefs and his motives for engaging in the activities and associations which were the subject of the charges, and answered all questions put to him by the Board. In support of petitioner’s testimony, five witnesses stated their long acquaintance with petitioner and their firm conviction of petitioner’s loyalty. In addition to this evidence, the record before the Board contained information supplied by informants whose identity was not disclosed to petitioner. The identity of one or more, but not all, of these informants was known to the Board. The information given by such informants had not been given under oath. The record also contained the evidence adduced by petitioner at the previous hearing. On this record, the Board determined that “on all the evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Peters’ loyalty to the Government of the United States.” By letter of May 22, 1953, the Chairman of the Board advised petitioner of the Board’s finding. The letter further stated that respondent Hobby had been notified of the decision and that petitioner had “been barred from the Federal service for a period of three years from May 18, 1953, and any and all pending applications or existing eligibilities are cancelled.” The order of debarment was made by the Board on behalf of the Civil Service Commission, composed of respondents Young, Moore, and Lawton. Following his removal and after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a rehearing, petitioner brought the instant suit, naming each of the respondents as a defendant. II. In his complaint, petitioner contends that the action taken against him was “in violation of Executive Order 9835 and the Constitution of the United States . . . .” In support of his contention that the action violated the Executive Order, he makes the allegation, among others, that the Loyalty Review Board “exercised power beyond its power 'to make advisory recommendations ... to the head of the . . . agency’, as defined by Executive Order 9835, Part III, § 1a . . . .” On the constitutional level, petitioner complains chiefly of the denial of any opportunity to confront and cross-examine his secret accusers. He alleges that his removal and debarment deprived him “of liberty and property without due process of law in that they branded him as a person disloyal to his country, arbitrarily, without basis in fact, and without a fair procedure and hearing.” In addition, he alleges that “The imposition of the penalty of ineligibility for government service constituted a violation of the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws by punishing the plaintiff by declaring him ineligible to serve the Government without a judicial trial or a fair administrative hearing . . . .” Finally, petitioner alleges that his removal and debarment, solely on the basis of his political opinions, violated his right to freedom of speech. In this Court, petitioner urges us to decide the case on the constitutional issues. These issues, if reached by the Court, would obviously present serious and far-reaching problems in reconciling fundamental constitutional guarantees with the procedures used to determine the loyalty of government personnel. Compare Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123. And note this Court’s division in Bailey v. Richardson, supra. We find, however, that the case can be decided without reaching the constitutional issues. From a very early date, this Court has declined to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 553. See Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129, 136. Applying this rule to the instant case, we must at the outset determine whether petitioner’s removal and debarment were effected in accord with Executive Order 9835. On consideration of this question, we conclude that the Loyalty Review Board’s action was so patently in violation of the Executive Order — in fact, beyond the Board’s delegated jurisdiction under the Order — that the constitutionality of the Order itself does not come into issue. The power of the Loyalty Review Board to adjudicate individual cases is set forth specifically in § 1a of Part III of the Order: “The Board shall have authority to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency and to make advisory recommendations thereon to the head of the employing department or agency. Such cases may be referred to the Board either by the employing department or agency, or by the officer or employee concerned.” Similarly, § 3 of Part II, which prescribes the procedures to be followed in loyalty cases under the Order, provides: “A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board shall be subject to appeal by the officer or employee affected, prior to his removal, to the head of the employing department or agency . . . and the decision of the department or agency concerned shall be subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, for an advisory recommendation.” The authority thus conferred on the Loyalty Review Board was limited to “cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency . . . .” And, even as to these cases, the Loyalty Review Board was denied any power to undertake review on its own motion ; only the employee recommended for dismissal, or his department or agency, could refer such a case to the Loyalty Review Board. In petitioner's case, the Board failed to respect either of these limitations. Petitioner had been twice cleared by the Agency Board and hence did not fall in the category of “persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency.” Moreover, petitioner’s case was never referred to the Loyalty Review Board by petitioner or the Agency. Instead, the Loyalty Review Board, acting solely on its own motion, undertook to “hold a hearing and reach its own decision.” On both grounds, the Board’s action was plainly beyond its jurisdiction unless such action was authorized by some other provision in the Order. Section 1 of Part III also provides : “b. The Board shall make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this order, deemed necessary to implement statutes and Executive orders relating to employee loyalty. “c. The Loyalty Review Board shall also: “(1) Advise all departments and agencies on all problems relating to employee loyalty. “(2) Disseminate information pertinent to employee loyalty programs. “(3) Coordinate the employee loyalty policies and procedures of the several departments and agencies. “(4) Make reports and submit recommendations to the Civil Service Commission for transmission to the President from time to time as may be necessary to the maintenance of the employee loyalty program.” Acting under subsection (b), the Board promulgated detailed regulations, effective December 14, 1947, elaborating its powers under the Order. The regulations distinguished between two types of proceedings in individual cases. The first dealt with appeals from adverse decisions. The second, described in Regulation 14, claimed for the Board a very different function. As amended on January 22, 1952, Regulation 14 provided: “Post-audit and review oj files, (a) The Board, or an executive committee of the Board, shall, as deemed necessary from time to time, cause post-audits to be made of the files on loyalty cases decided by the employing department or agency, or by a regional loyalty board. “(b) The Board or an executive committee of the Board, or a duly constituted panel of the Board, shall have the right, in its discretion to call up for review any case decided by any department or agency loyalty board or regional loyalty board, or by any head of an employing department or agency, even though no appeal has been taken. Any such review shall be made by a panel of the Board, and the panel, whether or not a hearing has been held in the case, may affirm the procedural method followed and the action taken, or remand the case with appropriate instructions to the agency or regional loyalty board concerned for hearing or for such further action or procedure as the panel may determine. “(c) If a panel reviews a record on post-audit and reaches the conclusion that the determination made below does not fully recognize that it is of ‘vital importance’ as set forth in Executive Order 9835 ‘that persons employed in the Federal service be of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States/ then the panel may call up the case for a hearing, and after such hearing may affirm or reverse the original determination or decision. Nevertheless, it must always be remembered that while it is important that maximum protection be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, equal protection must be afforded loyal.employees from unfounded accusations of disloyalty.” In undertaking to “hold a hearing and reach its own decision” in petitioner’s case, the Board relied on Regulation 14 as the source of its authority. This regulation, however, is valid only if it is “not inconsistent with the provisions of this order.” The Board’s “post-audit” function, when used to survey the operation of the loyalty program and to insure a uniformity of procedures in the various loyalty boards, might well be justified under the Board’s powers to “Advise all departments and agencies on all problems relating to employee loyalty” and “Coordinate the employee loyalty policies and procedures of the several departments and agencies.” But the regulation did not restrict the “post-audit” function to advice and coordination. Rather, it purported to allow the Board “to call up for review any case . . . even though no appeal has been taken” and to hold a new hearing and “after such hearing [to] affirm or reverse the original determination or decision.” The Board thus sought to do by regulation precisely what it was not permitted to do under the Order. Although the Order limited the Board’s jurisdiction to appeals from adverse rulings, the regulation asserted authority over appeals from favorable rulings as well; and although the Order limited the Board’s jurisdiction to appeals referred to the Board by the employee or his department or agency, the regulation asserted authority in the Board to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion. To this extent the regulation must fall. See, e. g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U. S. 607, 616-618, and Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284, 296-297. Our interpretation of the language of the Order is confirmed by The Report of the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, released by the President on March 22, 1947, simultaneously with the Order. Four months before, the Commission had been established “to inquire into the standards, procedures, and organizational provisions for (a) the investigation of persons who are employed by the United States Government or are applicants for such employment, and (b) the removal or disqualification from employment of any disloyal or subversive person.” In conducting its investigation, the Commission sought suggestions from 50 selected government agencies. The replies revealed general agreement “that the employing agency be responsible for the removal of its own employees.” But a substantial number of the replies indicated: “(1) that there should be established an independent over-all centralized authority acting solely for and on behalf of the President in the matter of the removal of disloyal employees; or (2) that the original hearing in loyalty cases should be within the employing agency, subject to a right of appeal to a centralized agency established with a power to review de novo; or (3) that the overall agency be established with advisory powers only.” Of these three proposals, the first was flatly rejected by the Commission, which instead urged the establishment of a centralized agency combining elements of the second and third. The Commission thought it “imperative that the head of each department or agency be solely responsible for his own loyalty program.” On the other hand, “so that the loyalty procedures operative in each of the departments and agencies may be properly coordinated . . . ,” the Commission recognized “that a central review board should be created with definite advisory responsibilities in connection with the loyalty program.” These “advisory responsibilities” were envisaged as “similar to those of a clearing house.” But, in addition, the board was to be authorized to review decisions adverse to employees, when referred to the board by the employee or the employing agency. Nowhere in the report was it even remotely suggested that the board was to have general jurisdiction to adjudicate individual cases; on the contrary, as already noted, the Commission expressly disapproved such a proposal. The Commission’s recommendations, with only slight changes in language, were adopted in the provisions of the Order designating the functions of the Loyalty Review Board. While loyalty proceedings may not involve the imposition of criminal sanctions, the limitation on the Board’s review power to adverse determinations was in keeping with the deeply rooted principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable while a verdict of acquittal is not. This safeguard was one of the few, and perhaps one of the most important, afforded an accused employee under the Order. Its effect was to leave the initial determination of his loyalty to his co-workers in the department — to his peers, as it were — who knew most about his character and his actions and his duties. He was thus assured that his fate would not be decided by political appointees who perhaps might be more vulnerable to the pressures of heated public opinion. To sanction the abrogation of this safeguard through Regulation 14, in the face of the Order’s language and the Commission’s report, would be to sanction administrative lawlessness. Agencies, whether created by statute or Executive Order, must of course be free to give reasonable scope to the terms conferring their authority. But they are not free to ignore plain limitations on that authority. Compare United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390, 398. It is urged, however, that the President’s failure to express his disapproval of Regulation 14 must be deemed to constitute acquiescence in it. From this, it is contended that the President thus impliedly expanded the Loyalty Review Board’s powers under the Order. We cannot indulge in such fanciful speculation. Nothing short of explicit Presidential action could justify a conclusion that the limitations on the Board’s powers had been eliminated. No such action by the President has been brought to our attention. There is, in fact, no evidence that the President even knew of the Board’s practice prior to April 27, 1953, three weeks after the Board had notified petitioner of its intention to “hold a hearing and reach its own decision.” And knowledge of the practice can hardly be imputed to him in view of the relatively small number of cases — only 20 — in which the Board reversed favorable determinations over its 6-year life. On April 27, 1953, the President issued Executive Order 10450, revoking Executive Order 9835 and establishing a new loyalty program. Executive Order 10450 by its own terms did not take effect until 30 days later on May 27, 1953. Although petitioner’s case was heard and determined by the Loyalty Review Board during this 30-day period and hence was not subject to Executive Order 10450, the Government contends that § 11 evidences knowledge and approval of Regulation 14. Section 11, however, did no more than recognize that cases under Regulation 14 might be pending on the effective date and authorize their determination thereafter. And, even as to these cases, § 11 did not authorize the Board to recommend dismissal; at most the Board could remand the cases to the departments or agencies for reconsideration. With respect to cases determined prior to the effective date — such as petitioner’s — § 11 surely affords no basis for divining a Presidential intention to authorize the Board to disregard its previously, defined jurisdictional boundaries. Particularly is this so where, as here, substantial rights affecting the lives and property of citizens are at stake. This Court has recognized that “a badge of infamy” attaches to a public employee found disloyal. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191. The power asserted by the Board to impose such a badge on petitioner cannot be supported on so tenuous a theory as that pressed upon us. Nor was the adjudication of petitioner’s case, on its own motion and despite a favorable determination by the Agency Board, the only unwarranted assumption of power by the Loyalty Review Board. In cancelling petitioner’s eligibility from “the Federal service” for a period of three years, the Board purported to act under Civil Service Rule V, § 5.101 (a), which bars an employee from “the competitive service within 3 years after a final determination that he is disqualified for Federal employment because of a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty . . . .” The Board’s order of debarment, however, was not limited to “the competitive service” but extended to all federal employ-merit. And although such a “final determination” could be made only by the employing agency, the Board did not wait for respondent Hobby to act on its recommendation. Petitioner’s debarment was made effective on May 18,1953, four days before the Chairman of the Board wrote petitioner of the Board’s determination and nearly four weeks before the Department took action to remove petitioner from his position. The Board’s haste can be understood only in terms of its announced intention to deprive agencies of all discretion to determine whether the Board’s recommendations should be accepted. IV. There only remains for consideration the question of relief. Initially petitioner is entitled to a declaratory judgment that his removal and debarment were invalid. He is further entitled to an order directing the respondent members of the Civil Service Commission to expunge from its records the Loyalty Review Board’s finding that there is a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s loyalty and to expunge from its records any ruling that petitioner is barred from federal employment by reason of that finding. His prayer for reinstatement, however, cannot be granted, since it appears that the term of petitioner’s appointment would have expired on December 31, 1953, wholly apart from his removal on loyalty grounds. The judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court for entry of a decree in conformity with this opinion. Reversed. 12 Fed. Reg. 1935. Executive Order 10241,16 Fed. Reg. 3690. Authority for such action was purportedly based on Regulation 14 of the regulations of the Loyalty Review Board. 17 Fed. Reg. 631. Three of the five — a former President of Yale University, a former dean of the Yale Medical School, and a federal circuit judge — had given similar testimony at the previous hearing. Authority for the order of debarment was purportedly based on Civil Service Rule V, § 5.101 (a), 5 CFR (1954 Supp.) § 5.101 (a). The question of the Board's jurisdiction was, on request of the Court, argued and briefed. Compare Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129, 132. 13 Fed. Reg. 253 et seq. Id., at 255, 5 CFR § 210.9. 13 Fed. Reg. 255. 17 Fed. Reg. 631. Regulation 14 had previously been amended on December 17, 1948. 13 Fed. Reg. 9366, 5 CFR § 210.14. Executive Order 9806, 11 Fed. Reg. 13863. The Commission was composed of officials of the Civil Service Commission and the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, War, and Navy. The Report of the President’s Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty (1947) 14. Id., at 15. Id., at 26. Id., at 27. Id., at 26. Id., at 35-36. See Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1953), 29. See the Commission’s report, supra, note 12, at 30: "The standards must be specific enough to assure that innocent employees will not fall within the purview of the disloyalty criteria. Every mature consideration was invoked by the Commission to afford maximum protection to the government from disloyal employees while safeguarding the individual employee with a maximum protection from ill-advised accusations of disloyalty.” As of June 30, 1953, the Board had undertaken in only 58 cases to "hold a hearing and reach its own decision” despite a favorable determination below. Annual Reports of the Civil Service Commission: 1948 (p. 18), 1949 (p. 37), 1950 (pp. 33-34), 1951 (p. 36), 1952 (p. 56), 1953 (p. 31). Of these 58 cases, 20 resulted in reversal of the favorable determination. 1953 Report, p. 31, n. 1. Of these 20 cases, 12 — including petitioner’s — arose in the fiscal year immediately preceding June 30, 1953,. Id., at 31. In the remaining 38 cases — those in which the Board did not reverse the favorable determination — either the Board affirmed the favorable determination or the employee resigned prior to the scheduled hearing. Thus in the 1953 fiscal year, of the 22 hearings scheduled, 8 resulted in affirmance and 2 were cancelled because of resignation. Ibid. 18 Fed. Reg. 2489. Section 11 provides in pertinent part: “On and after the effective date of this order the Loyalty Review Board established by Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall not accept agency findings for review, upon appeal or otherwise. Appeals pending before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be heard to final determination in accordance with the provisions of the said Executive Order No. 9835, as amended. Agency determinations favorable to the officer or employee concerned pending before the Loyalty Review Board on such date shall be acted upon by such Board, and whenever the Board is not in agreement with such favorable determination the case shall be remanded to the department or agency concerned for determination in accordance with the standards and procedures established pursuant to this order.” Italics added. 5 CFR (1954 Supp.) §5.101 (a). Approximately 15% of all federal employees are excepted from “the competitive service.” 1954 Annual Report, United States Civil Service Commission, p. 10. Petitioner himself was not employed in “the competitive service.” His position was classified in “Schedule A,” an exempt category. 5 CFR §6.101 (n); 5 CFR §6.1 (d). On December 17, 1948, the Board issued the following directive, entitled “Legal effect of advisory recommendations,” to the departments and agencies covered by the Order: “The President expects that loyalty policies, procedures, and standards will be uniformly applied in the adjudication of loyalty cases by the several agencies, and the responsibility for coordinating the program and assuring uniformity has been placed in the Loyalty Review Board. The recommendations of the Civil Service Commission in cases of employees covered by section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 are mandatory, and the loyalty of persons not covered by section 14 should be judged by the same standards. Therefore, if uniformity is to be attained it is necessary that the head of an agency follow the recommendation of the Loyalty Review Board in all cases.” (Italics added.) 13 Fed. Reg. 9372, 5 CFR § 220.4 (d). See Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (1953), 54-55. Compare Kutcher v. Gray, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 266, 199 F. 2d 783.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JONES v. FLOWERS et al. No. 04-1477. Argued January 17, 2006 Decided April 26, 2006 Michael T Kirkpatrick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Brian Wolfinan. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Commissioner of State Lands was Virginia A. Seitz. A. J. Kelly filed a brief for respondent Flowers. James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Michael Jay Singer, and Susan Maxson Lyons. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). We granted certiorari to determine whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the owner and returned undelivered, the government must take additional reasonable steps to provide notice before taking the owner’s property. I In 1967, petitioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717 North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in the house with his wife until they separated in 1993. Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and his wife continued to live in the North Bryan Street house. Jones paid his mortgage each month for 30 years, and the mortgage company paid Jones’ property taxes. After Jones paid off his mortgage in 1997, the property taxes went unpaid, and the property was certified as delinquent. In April 2000, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commissioner of State Lands (Commissioner), attempted to notify Jones of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address. See Ark. Code Ann. §26-37-301 (1997). The packet of information stated that unless Jones redeemed the property, it would be subject to public sale two years later on April 17, 2002. See ibid. Nobody was home to sign for the letter, and nobody appeared at the post office to retrieve the letter within the next 15 days. The post office returned the unopened packet to the Commissioner marked “'unclaimed.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 3. Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. No bids were submitted, which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of the property. See § 26-37-202(b). Several months later, respondent Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. The Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street address, attempting to notify him that his house would be sold to Flowers if he did not pay his taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also returned to the Commissioner marked “unclaimed.” Pet. for Cert. 3. Flowers purchased the house, which the parties stipulated in the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for $21,042.15. Record 224. Immediately after the 30-day period for postsale redemption passed, see § 26-37-202(e), Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the property. The notice was served on Jones’ daughter, who contacted Jones and notified him of the tax sale. Id., at 11 (Exh. B). Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commissioner’s failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of Jones’ right to redeem resulted in the taking of his property without due process. The Commissioner and Flowers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two unclaimed letters sent by the Commissioner were a constitutionally adequate attempt at notice, and Jones filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner and Flowers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a-13a. It concluded that the Arkansas tax sale statute, which set forth the notice procedure followed by the Commissioner, complied with constitutional due process requirements. Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 359 Ark. 443, 198 S. W. 3d 520 (2004). The court noted our precedent stating that due process does not require actual notice, see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held that attempting to provide notice by certified mail satisfied due process in the circumstances presented, 359 Ark., at 453-454, 198 S. W. 3d, at 526-527. We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. 1165 (2005), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts concerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered. Compare, e. g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F. 3d 231, 236 (CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, the County was required to use ‘reasonably diligent efforts’ to ascertain Akey’s correct address”), and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N. Y. 2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e reject the view that the enforcing officer’s obligation is always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed in the tax roll, even where the notice is returned as undeliverable”), with Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium Assn., 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N. W. 2d 536, 541 (2000) (per curiam) (“The fact that one of the mailings was returned by the post office as undeliverable does not impose on the state the obligation to undertake an investigation to see if a new address ... could be located”). We hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps were available to the State. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court. II A Due process does not require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his property. Dusenbery, supra, at 170. Rather, we have stated that due process requires the government to provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. The Commissioner argues that once the State provided notice reasonably calculated to apprise Jones of the impending tax sale by mailing him a certified letter, due process was satisfied. The Arkansas statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice, the Commissioner continues, because it provides for notice by certified mail to an address that the property owner is responsible for keeping up to date. See Ark. Code Ann. §26-35-705 (1997). The Commissioner notes this Court’s ample precedent condoning notice by mail, see, e. g., Dusenbery, supra, at 169; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane, supra, at 318-319, and adds that the Arkansas scheme exceeds constitutional requirements by requiring the Commissioner to use certified mail. Brief for Respondent Commissioner 14-15. It is true that this Court has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent. See, e. g., Dusenbery, supra, at 168-169; Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. In each of these cases, the government attempted to provide notice and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry, and we stated that “[t]he reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.” Id., at 315; see also Dusenbery, supra, at 170. But we have never addressed whether due process entails further responsibility when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and we have explained that the “notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions.” Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956). The question presented is whether such knowledge on the government’s part is a “circumstance and condition” that varies the “notice required.” The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most have decided that when the government learns its attempt at notice has failed, due process requires the government to do something more before real property may be sold in a tax sale. See, e. g., Plemons v. Gale, 396 F. 3d 569, 576 (CA4 2005); Akey, supra, at 236; Hamilton v. Renewed Hope, Inc., 277 Ga. 465, 468, 589 S. E. 2d 81, 85 (2003); Kennedy, supra, at 9, 789 N. E. 2d, at 611; Malone v. Robinson, 614 A. 2d 33, 38 (D. C. App. 1992) (per curiam); St. George Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 326 Md. 90, 103, 603 A. 2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P. 2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989); Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P. 2d 778, 780-783 (Alaska 1986); Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P. 2d 404, 408 (1985); Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa. 288, 296, 489 A. 2d 1334, 1338-1339 (1985). But see Smith, 463 Mich., at 429, 617 N. W. 2d, at 541; Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 23, 576 N. W. 2d 535, 541-542; Elizondo v. Read, 588 N. E. 2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlantic City v. Block C-11, Lot 11, 74 N. J. 34, 39-40, 376 A. 2d 926, 928 (1977). Many States already require in their statutes that the government do more than simply mail notice to delinquent owners, either at the outset or as a followup measure if initial mailed notice is ineffective. In Mullane, we stated that “when notice is a person’s due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,” 339 U. S., at 315, and that assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the “interest of the State” against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” id,., at 314. Our leading cases on notice have evaluated the adequacy of notice given to beneficiaries of a common trust fund, Mullane, supra; a mortgagee, Mennonite, 462 U. S. 791; owners of seized cash and automobiles, Dusenbery, 534 U. S. 161; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); creditors of an estate, Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S. 478; and tenants living in public housing, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982). In this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice prior to the State extinguishing a property owner’s interest in a home. We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers, handed them to the postman, and then watched as the departing postman accidentally dropped the letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner’s office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again. No one “desirous of actually informing” the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters disappeared and say “I tried.” Failure to follow up. would be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when delivered to the postman. By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is practicable to do so. See Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d 1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This is especially true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house. Although the State may have made a reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was “no better off than if the notice had never been sent.” Malone, 614 A. 2d, at 37. Deciding to take no further action is not what someone “desirous of actually informing” Jones would do; such a person would take further reasonable steps if any were available. In prior cases, we have required the government to consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner’s home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner was in prison. 409 U. S., at 40. In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956), we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate when town officials knew that the property owner was incompetent and without a guardian’s protection. Id., at 146-147. The Commissioner points out that in these cases, the State was aware of such information before it calculated how best to provide notice. But it is difficult to explain why due process would have settled for something less if the government had learned after notice was sent, but before the taking occurred, that the property owner was in prison or was incompetent. Under Robinson and Covey, the government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the government’s part to take additional steps to effect notice. That knowledge was one of the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case,” Mullane, supra, at 314-315, that the Court took into account in determining whether constitutional requirements were met. It should similarly be taken into account in assessing the adequacy of notice in.this case. The dissent dismisses the State’s knowledge that its notice was ineffective as “learned long after the fact,” post, at 246, n. 5 (opinion of Thomas, J.), but the notice letter was promptly returned to the State two to three weeks after it was sent, and the Arkansas statutory regime precludes the State from taking the property for two years while the property owner may exercise his right to redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. §26-37-301 (Supp. 2005). It is certainly true, as the Commissioner and Solicitor General contend, that the failure of notice in a specific case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice; in that sense, the constitutionality of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc. But if a feature of the State’s chosen procedure is that it promptly provides additional information to the government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the government does with that information in assessing the adequacy of the chosen procedure. After all, the State knew ex ante that it would promptly learn whether its effort to effect notice through certified mail had succeeded. It would not be inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken in notice cases to ask, with respect to a procedure under which telephone calls were placed to owners, what the State did when no one answered. Asking what the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed is not substantively different. The Commissioner has three further arguments for why reasonable followup measures were not required in this case. First, notice was sent to an address that Jones provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 (1997). Second, “after failing to receive a property tax bill and pay property taxes, a property holder is on inquiry-notice that his property is subject to governmental taking.” Brief for Respondent Commissioner 18-19. Third, Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands he left his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy. None of these contentions relieves the State of its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice. The Commissioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address updated forfeits his right to constitutionally sufficient notice, and we agree. Id., at 19; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 5 (“ ‘[A] party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its own interests does not relieve the State of its constitutional obligation’ ” (quoting Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 799)). In Robinson, we noted that Illinois law required each vehicle owner to register his address with the secretary of state, and that the State’s vehicle forfeiture scheme provided for notice by mail to the address listed in the secretary’s records. See 409 U. S., at 38, n. 1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95½, §3-405 (1971), and ch. 38, §36-1 (1969)). But we found that the State had not provided constitutionally sufficient notice, despite having followed its reasonably calculated scheme, because it knew that Robinson could not be reached at his address of record. 409 U. S., at 39-40. Although Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-705 provides strong support for the Commissioner’s argument that mailing a certified letter to Jones at 717 North Bryan Street was reasonably calculated to reach him, it does not alter the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s position that he must do nothing more when the notice is promptly returned “unclaimed.” As for the Commissioner’s inquiry notice argument, the common knowledge that property may become subject to government taking when taxes are not paid does not excuse the government from complying with its constitutional obligation of notice before taking private property. We have previously stated the opposite: An interested party’s “knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.” Mennonite, supra, at 800. It is at least as widely known that arrestees have the right to remain silent, and that anything they say may be used against them, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),] has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture”), but that knowledge does not excuse a police failure to provide Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a delinquent taxpayer the right to settle accounts with the State and redeem his property, so Jones’ failure to pay his taxes in a timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequate notice. Finally, the Commissioner reminds us of a statement from Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves his property in the hands of one who will inform him if his interest is in jeopardy. 339 U. S., at 316. But in this passage, Justice Jackson writes of “libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel!,] or entry upon real estate in the name of law” — such “seizures]” of property, he concluded, “may reasonably be expected to come promptly to the owner’s attention.” Ibid. An occupant, however, is not charged with acting as the owner’s agent in all respects, and it is quite a leap from Justice Jackson’s examples to conclude that it is an obligation of tenancy to follow up with certified mail of unknown content addressed to the owner. In fact, the State makes it impossible for the occupant to learn why the Commissioner is writing the owner, because an occupant cannot call for a certified letter without first obtaining the owner’s signature. For all the occupant knows, the Commissioner of State Lands might write to certain residents about a variety of matters he finds important, such as state parks or highway construction; it would by no means be obvious to an occupant observing a certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner is in danger of losing his property. In any event, there is no record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Bryan Street. Jones should have been more diligent with respect to his property, no question. People must pay their taxes, and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax delinquency by taking their property. But before forcing a citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking. U. S. Const., Arndt. 14; Mennonite, supra, at 799. B In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones had not received notice that he was about to lose his property, the State did — nothing. For the reasons stated, we conclude the State should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The question remains whether there were any such available steps. While “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt,” Greene, 456 U. S., at 455, n. 9, if there were no reasonable additional steps the government could have taken upon return of the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing. We think there were several reasonable steps the State could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response to new information depends upon what the new information reveals. The return of the certified letter marked “unclaimed” meant either that Jones still lived at 717 North Bryan Street, but was not home when the postman called and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or that Jones no longer resided at that address. One reasonable step primarily addressed to the former possibility would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail, so that a signature was not required. The Commissioner says that use of certified mail makes actual notice more likely, because requiring the recipient’s signature protects against misdelivery. But that is only true, of course, when someone is home to sign for the letter, or to inform the mail carrier that he has arrived at the wrong address. Otherwise, “[certified mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail,” United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual § 503.3.2.1 (Mar. 16, 2006), and the use of certified mail might make actual notice less likely in some cases — the letter cannot be left like regular mail to be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time. Following up with regular mail might also increase the chances of actual notice to Jones if— as it turned out — he had moved. Even occupants who ignored certified mail notice slips addressed to the owner (if any had been left) might scrawl the owner’s new address on the notice packet and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or notify Jones directly. Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the possibility that Jones had moved as well as that he had simply not retrieved the certified letter, would have been to post notice on the front door, or to address otherwise undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Most States that explicitly outline additional procedures in their tax sale statutes require just such steps. See n. 2, supra. Either approach would increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified that he was about to lose his property, given the failure of a letter deliverable only to the owner in person. That is clear in the case of an owner who still resided at the premises. It is also true in the case of an owner who has moved: Occupants who might disregard a certified mail slip not addressed to them are less likely to ignore posted notice, and a letter addressed to them (even as “occupant”) might be opened and read. In either case, there is a significant chance the occupants will alert the owner, if only because a change in ownership could well affect their own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned of the State’s effort to sell his house when he was alerted by one of the occupants — his daughter — after she was served with an unlawful detainer notice. Jones believes that the Commissioner should have searched for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook and other government records such as income tax rolls. We do not believe the government was required to go this far. As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones’ mail marked “unclaimed” did not necessarily mean that 717 North Bryan Street was an incorrect address; it merely informed the Commissioner that no one appeared to sign for the mail before the designated date on which it would be returned to the sender. An open-ended search for a new address — . especially when the State obligates the taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax collector, see Ark. Code Ann. §26-35-705 (1997) — imposes burdens on the State significantly greater than the several relatively easy options outlined above. The Commissioner complains about the burden of even those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Arkansas’ current requirement that notice to homestead owners be accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned, § 26-37-301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact that Arkansas transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or the tax sale purchaser, §26-37-104(a). The Commissioner has offered no estimate of how many notice letters are returned, and no facts to support the dissent’s assertion that the Commissioner must now physically locate “tens of thousands of properties every year.” Post, at 248. Citing our decision in Greene v. Lindsey, the Solicitor General adds that posted notice could be taken down by children or vandals. But in Greene, we noted that outside the specific facts of that case, posting notice on real property is “a singularly appropriate and effective way of ensuring that a person ... is actually apprised of proceedings against him.” 456 U. S., at 452-453. Successfully providing notice is often the most efficient way to collect unpaid taxes, see Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 800, n. 5 (more effective notice may ease burden on State if recipient arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to tax sale); Tr. of Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent properties in Arkansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency), but rather than taking relatively easy additional steps to effect notice, the State undertook the burden and expense of purchasing a newspaper advertisement, conducting an auction, and then negotiating a private sale of the property to Flowers. The Solicitor General argues that requiring further effort when the government learns that notice was not delivered will cause the government to favor modes of providing notice that do not generate additional information — for example, starting (and stopping) with regular mail instead of certified mail. We find this unlikely, as we have no doubt that the government repeatedly finds itself being asked to prove that notice was sent and received. Using certified mail provides the State with documentation of personal delivery and protection against false claims that notice was never received. That added security, however, comes at a price — the State also learns when notice has not been received. We conclude that, under the circumstances presented, the State cannot simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and sell the owner’s property — any more than it could ignore the information that the owner in Robinson was in jail, or that the owner in Covey was incompetent. Though the Commissioner argues that followup measures are not constitutionally required, he reminds us that the State did make some attempt to follow up with Jones by publishing notice in the newspaper a few weeks before the public sale. Several decades ago, this Court observed that “[cjhance alone” brings a person’s attention to “an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper,” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315, and that notice by publication is adequate only where “it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning,” id., at 317. Following up by publication was not constitutionally adequate under the circumstances presented here because, as we have explained, it was possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impending tax sale. The dissent forcefully articulates some basic principles about constitutionally required notice, principles from which we have no intention to depart. In particular, we disclaim any “new rule” that is “contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane.” Post, at 244. In Dusenbery, the Government was aware that someone at the prison had signed for the prisoner’s notice letter, and we determined that this attempt at notice was adequate, despite the fact that the State could have made notice more likely by requiring the prisoner to sign for the letter himself. 534 U. S., at 171. In this case, of course, the notice letter was returned to the Commissioner, informing him that his attempt at notice had failed. As for Mullane, it directs that “when notice is a person’s due .. . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” 339 U. S., at 315. Mindful of the dissent’s concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, that someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was in danger of losing his house would do more when the attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed, and there was more that reasonably could be done. As noted, “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of service that the [government] should adopt.” Greene, supra, at 455, n. 9. In prior cases finding notice inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the State’s notice statute. See, e. g., Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S., at 490-491; Robinson, 409 U. S., at 40; Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U. S. 208, 213-214 (1962); Walker, 352 U. S., at 116; Covey, 351 U. S., at 146-147. The State can determine how to proceed in response to our conclusion that notice was inadequate here, and the States have taken a variety of approaches to the present question. See n. 2, supra. It suffices for present purposes that we are confident that additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to employ before taking Jones’ property. * * * There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be less than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it needs. The same cannot be said for the State’s efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice before the State takes action against them. In this case, the State is exerting extraordinary power against a property owner — taking and selling a house he owns. It is not too much to insist that the State do a bit more to attempt to let him know about it when the notice letter addressed to him is returned unclaimed. The Commissioner’s effort to provide notice to Jones of an impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to satisfy due process given the circumstances of this case. The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Most Courts of Appeals have also concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Government to take further reasonable steps in the property forfeiture context. See, e. g., United States v. Ritchie, 342 F. 3d 903, 911 (CA9 2003); Foehl v. United States, 238 F. 3d 474, 480 (CA3 2001); Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d 1334, 1337-1338 (CADC 1998); Torres v. $36,256.80 U. S. Currency, 25 F. 3d 1154, 1161 (CA2 1994); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F. 3d 657, 660 (CA5 1996); United States v. Rodgers, 108 F. 3d 1247, 1252-1253 (CA10 1997); see also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F. 3d 287, 291 (CA7 2000) (declining to adopt a per se rule that only examines notice at the time it is sent, but also declining to impose an affirmative duty to seek out claimants in every case where notice is returned undelivered). But see Madewell v. Downs, 68 F. 3d 1030, 1047 (CA8 1995); Sarit v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 987 F. 2d 10, 14-15 (CA1 1993). Many States require that notice be given to the occupants of the property as a matter of course. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 3704.7 (West Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 48-4-45(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2005); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §§200/21-75(a), 200/22-10, 200/22-15 (West 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, §1073 (1990); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. §14-836(b)(4)(i)(2) (Lexis 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §211.78i(3) (West 2005); Minn. Stat. §281.23, subd. 6 (2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§15-18-212(1)(a), (2)(a) (2005); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §57-28-04(3) (Lexis 2005); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A) (West Supp. 2006); S. D. Codified Laws §10-25-5 (2004); Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1351(2)(a) (Lexis 2004); Wis. Stat. §75.12(1) (2003-2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B) (1997-2005). Some States require that notice be posted on the property or at the property owner’s last known address either at the outset, see Del. Code Ann., Tit. 9, §§8724, 8772 (1989 and Supp. 2004); Ga. Code Ann. §48-4-78(d) (Supp. 2005); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §246-56 (2003); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. § 14-836(b)(6) (Lexis 2001); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A), or as a followup measure when personal service cannot be accomplished or certified mail is returned, see Fla. Stat. § 197.522(2)(a) (2003); Minn. Stat. §281.23, subd. 6; S. C. Code Ann. § 12-51-40(c) (Supp. 2005). And a few States require a diligent inquiry to find a property owner’s correct address when mailed notice is returned. See Miss. Code Ann. §27-43-3 (1973-2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 361.595(3)(b) (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, § 5860.607a (Purdon 1990); R. I. Gen. Laws §44-9-25.1 (2005). See also 26 U. S. C. § 6335(a) (requiring the Internal Revenue Service to make a reasonable attempt to personally serve notice on a delinquent taxpayer before relying upon notice by certified mail); 28 U. S. C. § 3203(g)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (requiring written notice to tenants of real property subject to sale under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990); 12 U. S. C. §3758(2)(A)(iii) (requiring written notice to occupants before foreclosure by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development); § 3758(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that notice be posted on the property if occupants are unknown).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FREYTAG et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 90-762. Argued April 23, 1991 Decided June 27, 1991 Kathleen M. Sullivan argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Brian Stuart Koukoutchos and Richard J. Sideman. Deputy Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Stephen J. Marzen, Gary R. Allen, and Steven W. Parks Erwin N. Griswold, pro se, and Patricia A. Dunn filed a brief of ami-cus curiae. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The leading Framers of our Constitution viewed the principle of separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just government. James Madison put it this way: “No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.” The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In this litigation, we must decide whether the authority that Congress has granted the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court to appoint special trial judges transgresses our structure of separated powers. We answer that inquiry in the negative. r — i By the Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 951, 83 Stat. 730, 26 U. S. C. § 7441, Congress “established, under article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court.” It also empowered the Tax Court to appoint commissioners to assist its judges. § 958, 83 Stat. 734. By the Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 464(a), 98 Stat. 824, the title “commissioner” was changed to “special trial judge.” By § 463(a) of that Act, 98 Stat. 824, and by § 1556(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 2754, Congress authorized the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to appoint and assign these special trial judges to hear certain specifically described proceedings and “any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate.” 26 U. S. C. §§ 7443A(a) and (b). The Tax Court presently consists of 19 judges appointed to 15-year terms by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. §§ 7443(a), (b), and (e). H This complex litigation began with determinations of federal income tax deficiencies against the several petitioners, who had deducted on their returns approximately $1.5 billion in losses allegedly realized in a tax shelter scheme. When petitioners sought review in the Tax Court in March 1982, their cases were assigned to Tax Court Judge Richard C. Wilbur. Trial began in 1984. Judge Wilbur became ill in November 1985, and the Chief Judge of the Tax Court assigned Special Trial Judge Carleton D. Powell to preside over the trial as evidentiary referee, with the proceedings videotaped. App. 2. When Judge Wilbur’s illness forced his retirement and assumption of senior status effective April 1, 1986, the cases were reassigned, with petitioners’ specified consent, Brief for Petitioners 8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 10, to Judge Powell for preparation of written findings and an opinion. App. 8, 12-14. The judge concluded that petitioners’ tax shelter scheme consisted of sham transactions and that peti- HH tioners owed additional taxes. The Chief Judge adopted Judge Powell’s opinion as that of the Tax Court. 89 T. C. 849 (1987). Petitioners took an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It affirmed. 904 F. 2d 1011 (1990). Petitioners did not argue to the Court of Appeals, nor do they argue here, that the Tax Court is not a legitimate body. Rather, they contended that the assignment of cases as complex as theirs to a special trial judge was not authorized by § 7443A, and that this violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Court of Appeals ruled that because the question of the Special Trial Judge’s authority was “in essence, an attack upon the subject matter jurisdiction of the special trial judge, it may be raised for the first time on appeal.” 904 F. 2d, at 1015 (footnote omitted). The court then went on to reject petitioners’ claims on the merits. It concluded that the Code authorized the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to assign a special trial judge to hear petitioners’ cases and that petitioners had waived any constitutional challenge to this appointment by consenting to a trial before Judge Powell. Id., at 1015, n. 9. We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 1066 (1991), to resolve the important questions the litigation raises about the Constitution’s structural separation of powers. h — l ► — ( Section 7443A(b) of the Internal Revenue Code specifically authorizes the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to assign four categories of cases to special trial judges: “(1) any declaratory judgment proceeding,” “(2) any proceeding under section 7463,” “(3) any proceeding” in which the deficiency or claimed overpayment does not exceed $10,000, and “(4) any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate.” In the first three categories, the Chief Judge may assign the special trial judge not only to hear and report on a case but also to decide it. §7443A(c). In the fourth category, the Chief Judge may authorize the special trial judge only to hear the case and prepare proposed findings and an opinion. The actual decision then is rendered by a regular judge of the Tax Court. Petitioners argue that adjudication by the Special Trial Judge in this litigation exceeded the bounds of the statutory authority that Congress has conferred upon the Tax Court. Despite what they concede to be the “sweeping language” of subsection (b)(4), Brief for Petitioners 6, petitioners claim that Congress intended special trial judges to preside over only the comparatively narrow and minor matters covered by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The plain language of § 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge’s assignment of petitioners’ cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U. S. 184, 190 (1991). Subsection (b)(4) could not be more clear. It states that the Chief Judge may assign “any other proceeding” to a special trial judge for duties short of “mak[ing] the decision.” The subsection’s text contains no limiting term that restricts its reach to cases that are minor, simple, or narrow, as petitioners urge. We have stated that courts “are not at liberty to create an exception where Congress has declined to do so.” Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). Nothing in the legislative history contradicts the broad sweep of subsection (b)(4)’s language. In proposing to authorize the Chief Judge to assign “any other proceeding” to the special trial judges, the Committee on Ways and Means stated that it intended “to clarify” that any other proceeding could be assigned to special trial judges “so long as a Tax Court judge must enter the decision.” H. R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt. 2, p. 1568 (1984). The Report goes on to explain: “A technical change is made to allow the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to assign any proceeding to a special trial judge for hearing and to writé proposed opinions, subject to review and final decision by a Tax Court judge, regardless of the amount in issue. However, special trial judges will not be authorized to enter decisions in this latter category of cases.” Ibid. The Conference Report “follows the House Bill,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1127 (1984), and, like the House Report, indicates that Congress knowingly removed the jurisdictional requirement of a maximum amount in dispute in order to expand the authority of special trial judges to hear, but not to decide, cases covered by subsection (b)(4). Petitioners appear not to appreciate the distinction between the special trial judges’ authority to hear cases and prepare proposed findings and opinions under subsection (b)(4) and their lack of authority actually to decide those cases, which is reserved exclusively for judges of the Tax Court. Because they do not distinguish between hearing a case and deciding it, petitioners advance two arguments that, it seems to us, miss the mark. Petitioners first argue that the legislative history notes that the amendment to what is now § 7443A was merely a “technical” change and cannot be read to transfer dispositive power to special trial judges. Petitioners are correct that the 1984 amendment neither transferred decisional power nor altered the substantive duties of the special trial judges. Congress has limited the authority of special trial judges to enter decisions to the narrow category of cases set forth in subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The scope of the special trial judges’ authority to hear and decide cases, however, has little, if any, relevance to the category of cases that the special trial judges may hear but not decide. Since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1943, § 503, 58 Stat. 72, the Tax Court has possessed authority to appoint commissioners to assist it in particular cases. Special trial judges and their predecessors, the commissioners, have been authorized for almost a half century to hear any case before the Tax Court in the discretion of its Chief Judge. In practice, before 1984, special trial judges often heard and reported on large and complex cases. Accordingly, when Congress adopted subsection (b)(4), it codified the Chief Judge’s discretion to assign cases like petitioners’ to a special trial judge for hearing and preparation of a report. The 1984 amendment was “technical” in light of the historical development of the special trial judges’ role; the technical nature of the amendment, however, does not alter the wide-ranging effect of the statutory text’s grant of authority to the Chief Judge to assign “any other proceeding” within the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to a special trial judge. Petitioners also argue that the phrase “any other proceeding” is a general grant of authority to fill unintended gaps left by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). Reading subsection (b)(4) as a catchall provision, petitioners argue that its meaning must be limited to cases involving a small amount of money because any other interpretation would render the limitations imposed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3) a nullity. In support of this argument, petitioners rely on this Court’s decision in Gomez v. United States, 490 U. S. 858 (1989). We held in Gomez that the Federal Magistrates Act’s general grant of authority allowing magistrates to “be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 636(b)(3), did not permit a magistrate to supervise juror voir dire in a felony trial over a defendant’s objection. In so holding, we explained: “When a statute creates an office to which it assigns specific duties, those duties outline the attributes of the office. Any additional duties performed pursuant to a general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the specified duties.” 490 U. S., at 864. In the Magistrates Act, the list of specifically enumerated duties followed the general grant of authority and provided the outlines for the scope of the general grant. Unlike the Magistrates Act, §7443A explicitly distinguishes between the categories of cases enumerated in subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3), which are declaratory judgment proceedings and cases involving $10,000 or less, and the category of “any other proceeding” found in subsection (b)(4). The lesser authority exercised by special trial judges in proceedings under subsection (b)(4) also prevents that subsection from serving as a grant of general authority to fill any gaps left in the three preceding subsections. Special trial judges may hear and decide declaratory judgment proceedings and the limited-amount cases. A special trial judge, however, cannot render the final decision of the Tax Court in a case assigned under subsection (b)(4). If the cases that special trial judges may hear, but not decide, under subsection (b)(4) are limited to the same kind of cases they could hear and decide under the three preceding subsections, then subsection (b)(4) would be superfluous. Our cases consistently have expressed “a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment.” Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 562 (1990). See also Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 201 (1991). The scope of subsection (b)(4) must be greater than that of subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). We conclude that subsection (b)(4) permits the Chief Judge to assign any Tax Court proceeding, regardless of complexity or amount, to a special trial judge for hearing and the preparation of proposed findings and written opinion. The statute’s language, structure, and history permit no other conclusion. IV This construction of § 7443A raises a constitutional issue to which we now must turn. Petitioners submit that if subsection (b)(4) permits a special trial judge to preside over the trial of any Tax Court case, then the statute violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, §2, cl. 2. According to petitioners, a special trial judge is an “Office[r]” of the United States who must be appointed in compliance with the Clause. The Clause reads: “He [the President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Thus, the Constitution limits congressional discretion to vest power to appoint “inferior Officers” to three sources: “the President alone,” “the Heads of Departments,” and “the Courts of Law.” Petitioners argue that a special trial judge is an “inferior Office[r],” and also contend that the Chief Judge of the Tax Court does not fall within any of the Constitution’s three repositories of the appointment power. A We first address the Commissioner’s argument that petitioners have waived their right to challenge the constitutional propriety of § 7443A. The Commissioner contends that petitioners waived this right not only by failing to raise a timely objection to the assignment of their cases to a special trial judge, but also by consenting to the assignment. The roots of the separation-of-powers concept embedded in the Appointments Clause are structural and political. Our separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally focuses on the danger of one branch’s aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 382 (1989). The Appointments Clause not only guards against this encroachment but also preserves another aspect of the Constitution’s structural integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment power. The Commissioner correctly notes that petitioners gave their consent to trial before the Special Trial Judge. This Court in the past, however, has exercised its discretion to consider nonjurisdictional claims that had not been raised below. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62, 71-72 (1968); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 535-536 (1962); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 556-560 (1941). Glidden expressly included Appointments Clause objections to judicial officers in the category of nonjurisdictional structural constitutional objections that could be considered on appeal whether or not they were ruled upon below: "And in Lamar v. United States, 241 U. S. 103, 117-118, the claim that an intercircuit assignment . . . usurped the presidential appointing power under Art. II, § 2, was heard here and determined upon its merits, despite the fact that it had not been raised in the District Court or in the Court of Appeals or even in this Court until the filing of a supplemental brief upon a second request for review.” Glidden, 370 U. S., at 536 (Harlan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Like the Court in Glidden, we are faced with a constitutional challenge that is neither frivolous nor disingenuous. The alleged defect in the appointment of the Special Trial Judge goes to the validity of the Tax Court proceeding that is the basis for this litigation. It is true that, as a general matter, a litigant must raise all issues and objections at trial. But the disruption to sound appellate process entailed by entertaining objections not raised below does not always overcome what Justice Harlan called “the strong interest of the federal judiciary in maintaining the constitutional plan of separation of powers.” Ibid. We conclude that this is one of those rare cases in which we should exercise our discretion to hear petitioners’ challenge to the constitutional authority of the Special Trial Judge. In reaching this conclusion, we note that we are not persuaded by the Commissioner’s request that this Court defer to the Executive Branch’s decision that there has been no legislative encroachment on Presidential prerogatives under the Appointments Clause in connection with §7443A. According to the Commissioner, the structural interests implicated in this litigation are those of the Executive Branch, which can be expected to look out for itself. It is claimed, accordingly, that there is no need for this Court to be concerned about protecting the separation-of-powers interests at stake here. We are not persuaded by this approach. The Commissioner, we believe, is in error when he assumes that the interest at stake is the Executive’s own appointment power. The structural principles embodied in the Appointments Clause do not speak only, or even primarily, of Executive prerogatives simply because they are located in Article II. The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint. Because it articulates a limiting principle, the Appointments Clause does not always serve the Executive’s interests. For example, the Clause forbids Congress to grant the appointment power to inappropriate members of the Executive Branch. Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural protection. “The assent of the Executive to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial review.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 942, n. 13 (1983). The structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire Republic. B We turn to another preliminary issue in petitioners’ Appointments Clause challenge. Petitioners argue that a special trial judge is an “inferior Office[r]” of the United States. If we disagree, and conclude that a special trial judge is only an employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such “lesser functionaries” need not be selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 126, n. 162 (1976). The Commissioner, in contrast to petitioners, argues that a special trial judge assigned under § 7443A(b)(4) acts only as an aide to the Tax Court judge responsible for deciding the case. The special trial judge, as the Commissioner characterizes his work, does no more than assist the Tax Court judge in taking the evidence and preparing the proposed findings and opinion. Thus, the Commissioner concludes, special trial judges acting pursuant to § 7443A(b)(4) are employees rather than “Officers of the United States.” “[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United States/ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of [Article II].” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 126. The two courts that have addressed the issue have held that special trial judges are “inferior Officers.” The Tax Court so concluded in First Western Govt. Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 94 T. C. 549, 557-559 (1990), and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F. 2d 975, 985 (1991), agreed. Both courts considered the degree of authority exercised by the special trial judges to be so “significant” that it was inconsistent with the classifications of “lesser functionaries” or employees. Cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 352-353 (1931) (United States commissioners are inferior officers). We agree with the Tax Court and the Second Circuit that a special trial judge is an “inferior Office[r]” whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. The Commissioner reasons that special trial judges may be deemed employees in subsection (b)(4) cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision. But this argument ignores the significance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess. The office of special trial judge is “established by Law,” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute. See Burnap v. United States, 252 U. S. 512, 516-517 (1920); United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508, 511-512 (1879). These characteristics distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute. Furthermore, special trial judges perform more than ministerial tasks. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant discretion. Even if the duties of special trial judges under subsection (b)(4) were not as significant as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be unchanged. Under §§7443A(b)(l), (2), and (3), and (c), the Chief Judge may assign special trial judges to render the decisions of the Tax Court in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases. The Commissioner concedes that in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3), special trial judges act as inferior officers who exercise independent authority. But the Commissioner urges that petitioners may not rely on the extensive power wielded by the special trial judges in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases because petitioners lack standing to assert the rights of taxpayers whose cases are assigned to special trial judges under subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). This standing argument seems to us to be beside the point. Special trial judges are not inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties under § 7443A, but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities. The fact that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution. If a special trial judge is an inferior officer for purposes of subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3), he is an inferior officer within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and he must be properly appointed. C Having concluded that the special trial judges are “inferior Officers,” we consider the substantive aspect of petitioners’ Appointments Clause challenge. The principle of separation of powers is embedded in the Appointments Clause. Its relevant language bears repeating: “[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Congress clearly vested the Chief Judge of the Tax Court with the power to appoint special trial judges. An important fact about the appointment in this case should not be overlooked. This case does not involve an “interbranch” appointment. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 675-677 (1988). However one might classify the Chief Judge of the Tax Court, there surely is nothing incongruous about giving him the authority to appoint the clerk or an assistant judge for that court. See id., at 676. We do not consider here an appointment by some officer of inferior officers in, for example, the Department of Commerce or Department of State. The appointment in this case is so obviously appropriate that petitioners’ burden of persuading us that it violates the Appointments Clause is indeed heavy. Although petitioners bear a heavy burden, their challenge is a serious one. Despite Congress’ authority to create offices and to provide for the method of appointment to those offices, “Congress’ power ... is inevitably bounded by the express language of Article II, cl. 2, and unless the method it provides comports with the latter, the holders of those offices will not be ‘Officers of the United States.’” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 138-139 (discussing Congress’ power under the Necessary and Proper Clause). The “manipulation of official appointments” had long been one of the American revolutionary generation’s greatest grievances against executive power, see G. Wood, The Creation of The American Republic 1776-1787, p. 79 (1969) (Wood), because “the power of appointment to offices” was deemed “the most insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism.” Id., at 143. Those who framed our Constitution addressed these concerns by carefully husbanding the appointment power to limit its diffusion. Although the debate on the Appointments Clause was brief, the sparse record indicates the Framers’ determination to limit the distribution of the power of appointment. The Constitutional Convention rejected Madison’s complaint that the Appointments Clause did “not go far enough if it be necessary at all”: Madison argued that “Superior Officers below Heads of Departments ought in some cases to have the appointment of the lesser offices.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 627-628 (M. Farrand rev. 1966). The Framers understood, however, that by limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people. Thus, the Clause bespeaks a principle of limitation by dividing the power to appoint the principal federal officers — ambassadors, ministers, heads of departments, and judges — between the Executive and Legislative Branches. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 129-131. Even with respect to “inferior Officers,” the Clause allows Congress only limited authority to devolve appointment power on the President, his heads of departments, and the courts of law. With this concern in mind, we repeat petitioners’ central challenge: Can the Chief Judge of the Tax Court constitutionally be vested by Congress with the power to appoint? The Appointments Clause names the possible repositories for the appointment power. It is beyond question in this litigation that Congress did not intend to grant to the President the power to appoint special trial judges. We therefore are left with three other possibilities. First, as the Commissioner urges, the Tax Court could be treated as a department with the Chief Judge as its head. Second, as the amicus suggests, the Tax Court could be considered one of “the Courts of Law.” Third, we could agree with petitioners that the Tax Court is neither a “Departmen[t]” nor a “Cour[t] of Law.” Should we agree with petitioners, it would follow that the appointment power could not be vested in the Chief Judge of the Tax Court. We first consider the Commissioner’s argument. According to the Commissioner, the Tax Court is a department because for 45 years before Congress designated that court as a “court of record” under Article I, see § 7441, the body was an independent agency (the predecessor Board of Tax Appeals) within the Executive Branch. Furthermore, the Commissioner argues that §7441 simply changed the status of the Tax Court within that branch. It did not remove the body to a different branch or change its substantive duties. The Commissioner “readily” acknowledges that “the Tax Court’s fit within the Executive Branch may not be a perfect one.” Brief for Respondent 41. But he argues that the Tax Court must fall within one of the three branches and that the Executive Branch provides its best home. The reasoning of the Commissioner may be summarized as follows: (1) The Tax Court must fit into one of the three branches; (2) it does not fit into either the Legislative Branch or the Judicial Branch; (3) at one time it was an independent agency and therefore it must fit into the Executive Branch; and (4) every component of the Executive Branch is a department. We cannot accept the Commissioner’s assumption that every part of the Executive Branch is a department, the head of which is eligible to receive the appointment power. The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from distributing power too widely by limiting the actors in whom Congress may vest the power to appoint. The Clause reflects our Framers’ conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic government. Given the inexorable presence of the administrative state, a holding that every organ in the Executive Branch is a department would multiply indefinitely the number of actors eligible to appoint. The Framers recognized the dangers posed by an excessively diffuse appointment power and rejected efforts to expand that power. See Wood 79-80. So do we. For the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to qualify as a “Hea[d] of [a] Department],” the Commissioner must demonstrate not only that the Tax Court is a part of the Executive Branch but also that it is a department. We are not so persuaded. This Court for more than a century has held that the term “Department” refers only to “ ‘a part or division of the executive government, as the Department of State, or of the Treasury,’ ” expressly “creat[ed]” and “giv[en] . . . the name of a department” by Congress. Germaine, 99 U. S., at 510-511. See also Burnap, 252 U. S., at 515 (“The term head of a Department means . . . the Secretary in charge of a great division of the executive branch of the Government, like the State, Treasury, and War, who is a member of the Cabinet”). Accordingly, the term “Heads of Departments” does not embrace “inferior commissioners and bureau officers.” Germaine, 99 U. S., at 511. Confining the term “Heads of Departments” in the Appointments Clause to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments constrains the distribution of the appointment power just as the Commissioner’s interpretation, in contrast, would diffuse it. The Cabinet-level departments are limited in number and easily identified. Their heads are subject to the exercise of political oversight and share the President’s accountability to the people. Such a limiting construction also ensures that we interpret that term in the Appointments Clause consistently with its interpretation in other constitutional provisions. In Ger-maine, see 99 U. S., at 511, this Court noted that the phrase “Heads of Departments” in the Appointments Clause must be read in conjunction with the Opinion Clause of Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Opinion Clause provides that the President “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the Executive Departments,” and Germaine limited the meaning of “Executive Department” to the Cabinet members. The phrase “executive departments” also appears in § 4 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which empowers the Vice President, together with a majority of the “principal officers of the executive departments,” to declare the President “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” The Amendment was ratified February 10, 1967, and its language, of course, does not control our interpretation of a prior constitutional provision, such as the Appointments Clause. Nevertheless, it is instructive that the hearings on the Twenty-fifth Amendment confirm that the term “department” refers to. Cabinet-level entities: “[O]nly officials of Cabinet rank should participate in the decision as to whether presidential inability exists. . . . The intent ... is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executive departments named in 5 U. S. C. 1 [now codified as § 101], or any executive department established in the future, generally considered to comprise the President’s Cabinet, would participate . . . in determining inability.” H. R. Rep. No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). Even if we were not persuaded that the Commissioner’s view threatened to diffuse the appointment power and was contrary to the meaning of “Department” in the Constitution, we still could not accept his treatment of the intent of Congress, which enacted legislation in 1969 with the express purpose of “making the Tax Court an Article I court rather than an executive agency.” S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 303 (1969). Congress deemed it “anomalous to continue to classify” the Tax Court with executive agencies, id., at 302, and questioned whether it was “appropriate for one executive agency [the pre-1969 tribunal] to be sitting in judgment on the determinations of another executive agency [the IRS].” Ibid. Treating the Tax Court as a “Department” and its Chief Judge as its “Hea[d]” would defy the purpose of the Appointments Clause, the meaning of the Constitution’s text, and the clear intent of Congress to transform the Tax Court into an Article I legislative court. The Tax Court is not a “Departmen[t].” Having so concluded, we now must determine whether it is one of the “Courts of Law,” as amicus suggests. Petitioners and the Commissioner both take the position that the Tax Court cannot be a “Cour[t] of Law” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause because, they say, that term is limited to Article III courts. The text of the Clause does not limit the “Courts of Law” to those courts established under Article III of the Constitution. The Appointments Clause does not provide that Congress can vest appointment power only in “one supreme Court” and other courts established under Article III, or only in tribunals that exercise broad common-law jurisdiction. Petitioners argue that Article IPs reference to the “Courts of Law” must be limited to Article III courts because Article III courts are the only courts mentioned in the Constitution. It of course is true that the Constitution “nowhere makes reference to ‘legislative courts.’” See Glidden, 370 U. S., at 543. But petitioners’ argument fails nevertheless. We agree with petitioners that the Constitution’s terms are illuminated by their cognate provisions. This analytic method contributed to our conclusion that the Tax Court could not be a department. Petitioners, however, underestimate the importance of this Court’s time-honored reading of the Constitution as giving Congress wide discretion to assign the task of adjudication in cases arising under federal law to legislative tribunals. See, e. g., American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 546 (1828) (the judicial power of the United States is not limited to the judicial power defined under Article III and may be exercised by legislative courts); Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 565-567 (1933) (same). Our cases involving non-Article III tribunals have held that these courts exercise the judicial power of the United States. In both Canter and Williams, this Court rejected arguments similar to the literalistic one now advanced by petitioners, that only Article III courts could exercise the judicial power because the term “judicial Power” appears only in Article III. In Williams, this Court explained that the power exercised by some non-Article III tribunals is judicial power: “The Court of Claims . . . undoubtedly . . . exercises judicial power, but the question still remains — and is the vital question — whether it is the judicial power defined by Art. Ill of the Constitution. “That judicial power apart from that article may be conferred by Congress upon legislative courts ... is plainly apparent from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. Canter . . . dealing with the territorial courts. . . . [T]he legislative courts possess and exercise judicial power . . . although not conferred in virtue of the third article of the Constitution.” 289 U. S., at 565-566. We cannot hold that an Article I court, such as the Court of Claims in Williams or the Territorial Court of Florida in Canter, can exercise the judicial power of the United States and yet cannot be one of the “Courts of Law.” Nothing in Buckley v. Valeo contradicts this conclusion. While this Court in Buckley paraphrased the Appointments Clause to allow the appointment of inferior officers “by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary,” 424 U. S., at 132, we did not hold that “Courts of Law” consist only of the Article III judiciary. The appointment authority of the “Courts of Law” was not before this Court in Buckley. Instead, we were concerned with whether the appointment of Federal Elections Commissioners by Congress was constitutional under the Appointments Clause. The narrow construction urged by petitioners and the Commissioner also would undermine longstanding practice. “[F]rom the earliest days of the Republic,” see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 64 (1982), Congress provided for the creation of legislative courts and authorized those courts to appoint clerks, who were inferior officers. See, e. g., In re Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (1839). Congress’ consistent interpretation of the Appointments Clause evinces a clear congressional understanding that Article I courts could be given the power to appoint. Because “‘traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the Constitution,” Mistretta, 488 U. S., at 401, quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion), this longstanding interpretation provides evidence that Article I courts are not precluded from being “Courts of Law” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. Having concluded that an Article I court, which exercises judicial power, can be a “Cour[t] of Law” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, we now examine the Tax Court’s functions to define its constitutional status and its role in the constitutional scheme. See Williams, 289 U. S., at 563-567. The Tax Court exercises judicial, rather than executive, legislative, or administrative, power. It was established by Congress to interpret and apply the Internal Revenue Code in disputes between taxpayers and the Government. By resolving these disputes, the court exercises a portion of the judicial power of the United States. The Tax Court exercises judicial power to the exclusion of any other function. It is neither advocate nor rulemaker. As an adjudicative body, it construes statutes passed by Congress and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service. It does not make political decisions. The Tax Court’s function and role in the federal judicial scheme closely resemble those of the federal district courts, which indisputably are “Courts of Law.” Furthermore, the Tax Court exercises its judicial power in much the same way as the federal district courts exercise theirs. It has authority to punish contempts by fine or imprisonment, 26 U. S. C. § 7456(c); to grant certain injunctive relief, § 6213(a); to order the Secretary of the Treasury to refund an overpayment determined by the court, § 6512(b)(2); and to subpoena and examine witnesses, order production of documents, and administer oaths, § 7456(a). All these powers are quintessentially judicial in nature. The Tax Court remains independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches. Its decisions are not subject to review by either the Congress or the President. Nor has Congress made Tax Court decisions subject to review in the federal district courts. Rather, like the judgments of the district courts, the decisions of the Tax Court are appealable only to the regional United States courts of appeals, with ultimate review in this Court. The courts of appeals, moreover, review those decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” § 7482(a). This standard of review contrasts with the standard applied to agency rulemaking by the courts of appeals under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43-44 (1983). The Tax Court’s exclusively judicial role distinguishes it from other non-Article III tribunals that perform multiple functions and provides the limit on the diffusion of appointment power that the Constitution demands. Moreover, since the early 1800’s, Congress regularly granted non-Article III territorial courts the authority to appoint their own clerks of court, who, as of at least 1839, were “inferior Officers” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. See In re Hen-nen, 13 Pet., at 258. Including Article I courts, such as the Tax Court, that exercise judicial power and perform exclusively judicial functions among the “Courts of Law” does not significantly expand the universe of actors eligible to receive the appointment power. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. At oral argument, counsel for petitioners described the litigation in this way: “This is a tax case with implications for up to 3,000 taxpayers and a billion and a half in alleged tax deficiencies, and it involved one of the longest trials below in the tax court’s history — 14 weeks of evidence, complex financial testimony, 9,000 pages of transcripts, 3,000-plus exhibits.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. Counsel also stated petitioners’ primary position: “In other words, just to put our point succinctly, Congress did not and could not have intended special trial judges in large, complex, multiparty, multimillion dollar tax shelter eases — alleged tax shelter cases such as this one — Congress did not and could not have intended such eases to be in effect decided by the autonomous actions of a special trial judge. ” Id., at 17. Petitioners place some emphasis on the facts that Special Trial Judge Powell filed his proposed findings and opinion with the Tax Court on October 21, 1987; that on that day the Chief Judge issued an order reassigning the litigation to himself for disposition, App. 15; and that on that same day the Chief Judge adopted the opinion of Judge Powell. Brief for Petitioners 8-9. Indeed, the opinion, including its appendix, covers 44 pages in the Tax Court Reports. At oral argument, however, counsel observed that Judge Powell “sometime in the preceding 4 months had filed a report with the Chief Judge of the tax court.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. In any event, this chronology does not appear to us to be at all significant. The Chief Judge had the duty to review the work of the Special Trial Judge, and there is nothing in the record disclosing how much time he devoted to the task. As Chief Judge he was aware of the presence of the several cases in the court and the magnitude of the litigation. The burden of proof as to any negative inference to be drawn from the time factor rests on petitioners. We are not inclined to assume “rubber stamp” activity on the part of the Chief Judge. Petitioners also argue that the deferential standard with which Tax Court Rule 183 requires a Tax Court judge to review the factual findings of a special trial judge allows the latter not only to hear a case but effectively to resolve it. This point is not relevant to our grant of certiorari, which concerned the question whether the assignment of petitioners’ cases to a special trial judge was authorized by 26 U. S. C. § 7443A(b)(4). Accordingly, we say no more about this new argument than to note that under § 7443A(c) a special trial judge has no authority to decide a case assigned under subsection (b)(4). Because the language of the Twenty-fifth Amendment does not bind our interpretation of the Appointments Clause, the fact that the Amendment strictly limits the term “department” to those departments named in 5 U. S. C. § 101 does not provide a similar limitation on the term “De-partmen[t]” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. We do not address here any question involving an appointment of an inferior officer by the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Commissioner has not been consistent in this position. Indeed, when the present litigation was in the Fifth Circuit, the Government advocated that the Tax Court is one of the “Courts of Law.” Brief for Appellee in No. 89-4436 et al., pp. 47-51. It abandoned that position in the later case of Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, 930 F. 2d 975 (CA2 1991), and there urged that the Tax Court was a “Department.” Brief for Appellee in No. 89-4436 et al., pp. 34-48.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD et al. v. AMERICAN AIR TRANSPORT, INC. et al. No. 126. Certificate dismissed October 20, 1952. Solicitor General Perlman and Emory T. Nunneley, Jr. for the Civil Aeronautics Board. Per Curiam. The certificate is dismissed. Labor Board v. White Swan Co., 313 U. S. 23 (1941); Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 298 U. S. 160 (1936); White v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 367 (1931); United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 168 U. S. 505 (1897). The Civil Aeronautics Board has applied to this Court for an order requiring the Court of Appeals to send up the entire record. To grant such an application would bring “the entire matter in controversy” before the Court for decision. 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (3). Since the certificate must be dismissed, the Court should not exercise its discretionary power to bring up “the entire matter in controversy” for review. See Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 248 U. S. 178 (1918). Perhaps the Court of Appeals may now wish to hear this case en banc to resolve the deadlock indicated in the certificate and give full review to the entire case. This Court does not normally review orders of administrative agencies in the first instance; and the Court does not desire to take any action at this time which might foreclose the possibility of such review in the Court of Appeals. For these reasons the Board’s application is denied. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GENERAL PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE HOLDERS OF OPTION WARRANTS OF THE UNITED CORPORATION v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION et al. No. 184. Argued December 2, 1953. Decided January 4, 1954. John Mulford argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Henry S. Drinker, Thomas Reath and M. Quinn Shaughnessy. William H. Timbers argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission, respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern and Alexander Cohen. Richard Joyce Smith argued the cause and filed a brief for the United Corporation, respondent. Randolph Phillips, respondent, argued the cause pro se. Joseph B. Hyman was with him on the brief for Downing et al., respondents. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The United Corporation is a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U. S. C. § 79 et seq. Section 11 (b) of that Act requires each holding company, with exceptions not material here, to limit the operations of the holding-company system of which it is a part to a single integrated public-utility system and to businesses reasonably incidental or economically necessary or appropriate to that system. Section 11 (e) allows a registered holding company to submit a plan to the Commission which will enable it to comply with § 11 (b). United controlled, directly or indirectly, various gas and electric utility companies in the East. It submitted a plan to the Commission which, it claimed, would complete its compliance with § 11 (b). The Commission rejected United’s plan. 13 S. E. C. 854, 898-899. The Commission, however, withheld issuance of a dissolution order so as to afford United an opportunity to comply with the Act by divesting itself of control over its subsidiaries and by transforming itself into an investment company. Id., p. 899. The Commission accordingly directed that United cease to be a holding company and limit its corporate structure to a single class of stock, namely, common stock. No review of that order was sought. Thereafter United retired its preference stock by exchanging it for underlying portfolio securities and for cash. Other portfolio securities were disposed of through market sales and dividend distributions. As of December 31, 1950, United had outstanding 14,529,491.5 shares of common stock, and option warrants entitling the holders to purchase 3,732,059 shares of common stock at any time at a price of $27.50 per share. As of December 31, 1950, United’s assets consisted approximately of $57,000,000 of securities and $2,000,000 in cash and government bonds, which was equivalent to $4.12 per share of common stock. The securities, which consisted of common stocks of utility operating and holding companies, included 11.9 percent of the voting stock of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 28.3 percent of South Jersey Gas Co., 5.8 percent of the United Gas Improvement Co., 5.5 percent of the Columbia Gas System, Inc., and voting stocks of other companies in amounts less than 5 percent of the total outstanding. United submitted a further plan which provided in essential part as follows: First. The sale by United of all of its South Jersey common stock and of sufficient amounts of its stock-holdings in the other utility companies so that within one year its resultant holdings would not exceed 4.9 percent of the voting stock of any of those companies. Second. An offer to United’s stockholders who wanted to withdraw from the company. Holders of 100 or more shares of United’s common stock were offered common stock of Niagara Mohawk that United had in its portfolio ; holders of smaller blocks of United’s common stock were offered cash. These offers were on a voluntary basis. Third. Cancellation of the option warrants without any compensation to the holders. Fourth. Amendments to the charter and bylaws of United (without a vote of stockholders) to provide for cumulative voting in the election of directors and a 50 percent quorum at stockholders meetings. The Commission approved the plan with modifications not material to the issues presented in this case. Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 10614, 10643. First. The method of transforming United from a holding company into an investment company was approved. Second. Offers to those stockholders who wanted to withdraw from the enterprise were held to be fair both to them and to those who chose to remain as investors in United. Third. The holders of the option warrants were denied any participation in the reorganization on the ground that there was no reasonable expectation that the market price of the common stock would increase to the extent needed to give the warrants a recognizable value and that continuance of the warrants would be inherently deceptive to investors and perpetuate useless and unnecessary complexities in the corporate structure. Fourth. The changes as respects cumulative voting and quorum requirements were approved. The Commission in its order of approval stated that the provisions of the plan relating to the cancellation of the warrants and the amendment of the charter and bylaws would not be operative “until an appropriate United States District Court shall, upon application thereto, enter an order enforcing said provisions.” Holding Company Act Release No. 10643, p. 3. No such provision was made as respects the other provisions of the plan. Some of the common stockholders thereupon filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under § 24 (a) of the Act. They challenged the First and Second provisions of the plan, which we have described above. They also asked that the Third and Fourth provisions, the ones which were made subject to approval by the District Court, be approved by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner in this Court is a protective committee representing holders of the option warrants. It moved to intervene in the review proceedings in the Court of Appeals, claiming that forfeiture of the warrants was not justified. The Commission and United opposed the intervention on the ground that by reason of the Commission’s order and § 11 (e) of the Act only the District Court had jurisdiction to review the provisions of the plan respecting the elimination of the warrants and the amendments to the charter and bylaws. The Court of Appeals allowed petitioner to intervene. It held that so long as the Commission had not applied to a District Court under § 11 (e) to enforce a plan, the Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction on petition of an aggrieved person under § 24 (a) to review the entire plan, including those provisions which the Commission made enforceable by the District Court. The Court of Appeals further held that if it affirmed or modified an order of the Commission approving a plan and the Commission thereafter applied to the District Court to obtain enforcement, the District Court would have no function except to enforce, since the ruling by the Court of Appeals on the fairness of the plan would be binding on the District Court. Accordingly the Court of Appeals reviewed the entire plan, found it fair and equitable in all respects, and affirmed the Commission’s order. 92 U. S. App. D. C. 172, 203 F. 2d 611. The case is here on certiorari limited to the question of jurisdiction. 346 U. S. 810. The question is not whether there is judicial review of orders of the Commission. The question is which orders are reviewable in the District Court, which in the Court of Appeals. The first reading of the Act may leave the impression that there is conflict between § 24 (a) and § 11 (e). Section 24 (a) gives review in the Court of Appeals of “an order” of the Commission and grants the Court of Appeals “exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order, in whole or in part.” This is clearly broad enough to include an order of the Commission under § 11 respecting a plan of a holding company seeking compliance with § 11 (b). Section 11 (e), however, provides in some instances for review of such plans on application by the Commission to the District Court. Moreover, the Commission by virtue of § 18 (f) may apply to the District Court for enforcement of any of its orders where it appears that someone is about to commit a violation. We are tendered several alternatives: 1. That the Court of Appeals having first acquired jurisdiction can and should review the entire plan. 2. That the District Court can and should review all phases of the plan in an enforcement proceeding and, pending application for enforcement, no review of any phase of the plan should be entertained by the Court of Appeals. 3. That a so-called split review is permissible where as here the Commission has reserved for enforcement proceedings in the District Court only certain provisions of the plan, the Court of Appeals being restricted under § 24 (a) to those not so reserved. We have concluded that the so-called split review is permissible under the circumstances here present and that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 24 (a) to review all questions tendered it, except those pertaining to the elimination of the option warrants and the amendments to the charter and bylaws. In result we affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals on the jurisdictional question to which we restricted the grant of the petition for certiorari. It should be noted to begin with that the Act marks out two paths to compliance by a registered holding company with the requirements of the Act. One is the procedure under § 11 (b) whereby the Commission by order may require that designated steps be taken by the holding company. Failing that, the Commission may apply to a District Court for enforcement of its orders under § 11 (d). See Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 134 F. 2d 747. We are not concerned here with that method of bringing holding companies into compliance with the Act. We deal here with the second method of compliance — the voluntary reorganization which the company itself submits under the broad discretion Congress left to management to determine how to bring their systems into compliance with the Act. Our problem starts under § 11 (e) with the provision that a holding company “may . . . submit a plan to the Commission for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets, or for other action . . . enabling such company ... to comply with the provisions of subsection (b).” We turn then to problems involved in the efforts of registered holding companies voluntarily to meet the requirements of the Act. The Congress contemplated that under this Act some holding companies might satisfy the requirements of § 11 by divesting themselves of control and converting themselves into investment companies. See S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13. If in anticipation of that step a holding company desired to give its security holders an opportunity to withdraw from the enterprise and with the approval of the Commission made them an offer to exchange their securities for securities in its portfolio, there would be no doubt that the fairness of that offer would be reviewable by the Court of Appeals under § 24 (a) on petition of. a security holder. Two cases drawn from United’s program of compliance with the Act are illustrative. After the Commission ordered United to simplify its capital structure and cease to be a holding company, United proposed a plan for eliminating its preference stock by making an offer to exchange on a voluntary basis securities of subsidiaries and cash for the preference stock. The Commission approved; and review of that plan was had in the Court of Appeals under the procedure of § 24 (a) of the Act. Phillips v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 153 F. 2d 27. Later United proposed the pro rata distribution of shares of a subsidiary to holders of its common stock. The Commission approved; and review of that plan was had under § 24 (a) in the Court of Appeals. Phillips v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 185 F. 2d 746. If, therefore, United had offered its common stockholders cash or portfolio securities for their common stock and had put the offer in a separate plan, not making it physically a part of a more comprehensive plan, and the Commission had approved the exchange, there can be no doubt that that plan could have been reviewed by the Court of Appeals under § 24 (a). We are unable to see why the mere fact that the offer is not in isolation but one of several proposals joined together for presentation to the Commission and approved by the Commission at the time it approves the other proposals should make a difference for purposes of judicial review. Mr. Justice Rutledge writing for the Court in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U. S. 96, pointed out that the difference between § 11 (e) and § 24 (a) is not essentially in the scope of judicial review. Rather, it is in the function which the two systems of review perform. As he said, § 11 (e) serves “to mobilize the judicial authority in carrying out the policies of the Act.” Id., p. 125. The full import of that statement can be understood only if § 11 (e) and the functions it performs are appreciated. Section 11 (e) applies to a plan which a holding company submits to the Commission for purposes of complying with the Act. In other words, it applies to what traditionally has been known in the field of business and finance as voluntary reorganizations, that is to say, reorganizations designed by the management, not those imposed on a company from without. The holding company proposes the voluntary reorganization; the Commission, after hearing, approves, if it finds the plan “necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan.” If § 11 (e) ended there, it would be plain that judicial review would be had either under § 24 (a) on a petition by an “aggrieved” person or under § 18 (f) if and when the Commission brought an action to enforce compliance with its order approving a plan. Section 11 (e), however, has its own enforcement procedure, somewhat peculiarly worded. It gives a registered holding company the standing to ask that the enforcement machinery of the Act be placed behind its voluntary plan of reorganization. Section 11 (e) provides, “The Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (f) of section 18, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan.” (Italics added.) The Commission may or may not accede to the company’s suggestion. Section 11 (e) does not make it mandatory for the Commission to do so. It only says that the Commission “may” do so. That implies the exercise of discretion. The company might request, as here, that only some of the terms and provisions of a plan be submitted to the enforcement proceedings of the Act; or it might ask that each and every proposal be so treated. The Commission might refuse the request or it might grant it in whole or in part. The considerations governing the exercise of the Commission’s discretion would embrace a variety of factors. It may be necessary to eliminate one class of stock; an exchange on a voluntary basis may not be possible because some security holders object. Therefore a compulsory retirement of the stock may be necessary. One step in United’s program of compliance involved that procedure, as is shown by In re United Corp., 82 F. Supp. 196. United proposed a plan for the compulsory retirement of preference stock; the Commission approved and applied to the District Court for enforcement. An enforcement decree on one phase of a voluntary plan of reorganization may be an appropriate and convenient means (if not a necessary one) to modify a certificate of incorporation. Thus in Delaware the corporation statute directs the Secretary of State to accept a decree of a federal court enforcing a provision of a plan which modifies, alters, or repeals the bylaws of a Delaware corporation or amends its certificate of incorporation. 8 Del. Code Ann., 1953, § 245. Illustrations could be multiplied. But those we have given indicate that a holding company may not be able to carry through without some degree of compulsion all phases of the voluntary plan it submits, that it may need the force of a judicial decree behind the Commission’s order in order to put through its reorganization. On the other hand, the holding company might conclude that market conditions were so favorable, its own financial situation so strong, the terms of the voluntary reorganization so attractive that it would need no help from any source to effectuate the plan, once the Commission approved. That is the reason Congress left the choice — the right to ask for enforcement help — to the holding company. Conceivably the Commission might refuse to give the help requested unless other phases of the plan were also put through enforcement proceedings. That conclusion might be reached where the several aspects of the plan were so closely and intimately related one to the other that the fairness of one turned on the fairness of the other. No such issue arises here, for the question whether the common stockholders who want to withdraw from United have been offered enough Niagara Mohawk stock or enough cash has nothing to do either with the elimination of the option warrants or the changes in the charter and bylaws to govern stockholders who do not withdraw from the enterprise. We have said enough to indicate some of the considerations confronting the Commission when it decides, in connection with a voluntary reorganization plan under § 11 (e), whether it will “mobilize the judicial authority in carrying out the policies of the Act,” to use the words of Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Central-Illinois Corp. case, supra. The Commission may send only one provision of a plan of voluntary reorganization into enforcement proceedings and let all others go the route of § 24 (a) should an aggrieved person desire to take them there. Here as in other fields (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 194) the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly for the administrative agency. See American Power Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 U. S. 90, 112. We cannot say that the Commission abused its discretion in the present case, for, as we have already observed, the amendments of the charter and bylaws and the fairness of the elimination of the option warrants have no apparent relevancy to the manner in which the common stockholders, who sought review in the Circuit Court under § 24 (a), say they have been treated. It may be, as some argue, that it would be a better scheme to have all or none of a plan go into enforcement proceedings under § 11 (e). If the entire plan were presented in the enforcement proceedings, all parties would be notified and heard at one time. But Congress in its wisdom has provided differently. The problem relates, as we have said, only to voluntary reorganizations, that is to plans submitted by the companies themselves to bring their operations into compliance with the Act. The history of voluntary recapitalizations, readjustments, and reorganizations may well have suggested that the litigious issues would not be numerous, that overall judicial review of the total plan need not be made mandatory, that only select phases and aspects of voluntary reorganization need be put through enforcement proceedings. Certainly one who has an isolated point of objection, whose protest relates only to a single phase of a plan has an advantage in the review accorded him by § 24 (a). He can bring suit in the Court of Appeals in the circuit where he resides or has his principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia. He can sue at once in his own bailiwick and not have to await institution of an enforcement proceeding perhaps in some faraway place. He can have a hearing on his own personal grievance without running the risk that his case may be lost in the large shuffle of an enforcement proceeding where many parties and many interests are involved. There is nothing strange or irrational in routing the common stockholders in this case to the Court of Appeals and the option warrant holders to the District Court. Each will have his day in court. Nothing that one court does will impinge on the other. Each court will be performing a different function. Whether a better procedure could be devised is not for us to determine. It is sufficient that the procedure indicated is permissible under the Act, and that the Commission in selecting certain phases of a plan for submission to enforcement proceedings did not, to borrow a phrase from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, lose “sight of the law.” We accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals in taking jurisdiction over the controversy insofar as it related (1) to the sale by United of its holdings and (2) to the offers it made to its stockholders who wanted to withdraw. We reverse the Court of Appeals in taking jurisdiction over the provisions of the voluntary plan of reorganization which the Commission in its order made operative on enforcement by the District Court. So ordered. Section 11 (b) places on the Commission the duty to require registered holding companies and their subsidiaries not only to limit, with specified exceptions, their operations to a single integrated public-utility system but also to simplify their capital structures. Section 24 (a) provides: “Any person or party aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission under this title may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of appeals of the United States within any circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon any member of the Commission, or upon any officer thereof designated by the Commission for that purpose, and thereupon the Commission shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the record upon which the order complained of was entered. Upon the filing of such transcript such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order, in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission or unless there were reasonable grounds for failure so to do. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If application is made to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Commission may modify its findings as to the facts by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file with the court such modified or new findings, which, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of the original order. The judgment and decree of the court affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 28, secs. 346 and 347).” Section 11 (e) provides: “In accordance with such rules and regulations or order as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers, any registered holding company or any subsidiary company of a registered holding company may, at any time after January 1, 1936, submit a plan to the Commission for the divestment of control, securities, or other assets, or for other action by such company or any subsidiary company thereof for the purpose of enabling such company or any subsidiary company thereof to comply with the provisions of subsection (b). If, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission shall find such plan, as submitted or as modified, necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan, the Commission shall make a,n order approving such plan; and the Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (f) of section 18, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan. If, upon any such application, the court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall approve such plan as fair and equitable and as appropriate to effectuate the provisions of section 11, the court as a court of equity may, to such extent as it deems necessary for the purpose of carrying out the terms and provisions of such plan, take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of the company or companies and the assets thereof, wherever located; and the court shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee, and the court may constitute and appoint the Commission as sole trustee, to hold or administer, under the direction of the court and in accordance with the plan theretofore approved by the court and the Commission, the assets so possessed.” Section 18 (f) provides: “Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title, or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the [district court of the United States for] the District of Columbia, or the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this title or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices to the Attorney General, who, in his discretion, may institute the appropriate criminal proceedings under this title.” In speaking of plans of voluntary reorganization under § 11 (e) the Court in Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 134 F. 2d 747, 751, said: “If the plan is one which can be carried out by the sole action of the parties thereto no further proceedings are needed. If not, the subsection authorizes the Commission, at the request of the company proposing the plan, to make application to a district court to enforce and carry out the plan. In this proceeding the court, if it finds the plan fair, equitable and appropriate, may direct it to be carried out, taking possession of the company and its assets if necessary to that end. . . . “It will thus be seen that the congressional purpose is to leave open to the holding companies a broad area of discretion in determining just how they are to bring their systems into compliance with the required standards. . . . “It is obvious that in many cases the desired result may be reached in more than one way. Congress evidently intended to permit the Commission to leave to the company involved the initiative in suggesting from among the available alternative methods that one which it deems most appropriate. This seems clear in the light of the fact that under section 11 (e) the company is not restricted to proposing a plan of compliance which it is in a position to carry out itself but it may also propose a plan affecting the rights of third persons which it may, through the Commission, request a court to enforce against the opposition of those third persons. It is only if the company does not propose a plan which the Commission and the court approve that the Commission under section 11 (d) itself may propose and seek enforcement of a plan against the opposition of the company.” See In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 151 F. 2d 326, 331.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. JONES, RECEIVER. NO. 135. Argued February 2-3, 1949. Decided April 18, 1949. Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Morison, Stanley M. Silverberg, Samuel D. Slade, Morton Liftin, Arne C. Wiprud and Daniel W. Knowlton. Moultrie Hitt argued the cause and filed a brief for Jones, Receiver. Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court. This controversy began in 1931, when respondent’s predecessors as receivers of the Georgia & Florida Railroad filed an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission for a reexamination of rates then applicable to it for transporting the mails. Since then, in one form or another, the dispute has found its way back and forth through the Commission and the courts, finally to come here now for the second time. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226. Through all these years the carrier and the Commission have been at odds over whether the railroad is entitled to an increase in the rates prescribed for its service for the period beginning April 1, 1931, and ending, as covered by the present suit, February 28, 1938. The case is now here on certiorari to the Court of Claims, 335 U. S. 883, which has rendered a judgment awarding respondent $186,707.06 as increased compensation due for the years 1931 to 1938, Griffin v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 330, contrary to the findings and orders of the Commission denying any increase beyond the amounts already paid for that service under the rates fixed by it. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 192 I. C. C. 779; id., 214 I. C. C. 66. I. A statement of the background and course of the litigation will aid in understanding the rather complicated problems presented, both on the merits and affecting jurisdiction. In 1916 Congress enacted the Railway Mail Pay Act. 39 U. S. C. §§ 523-568. This embodied a comprehensive scheme for regulating transportation of the mails by railroad common carriers. Such carriers were required to transport the mails pursuant to the Act’s provisions. These included that the carriers should be compensated at “fair and reasonable rates” to be fixed and determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rates were to be established only after notice and hearing. But after six months from the entry of a rate order the Postmaster General or a carrier was authorized to apply for a reexamination of the order. 39 U. S. C. §§ 541, 542, 544-554. The Commission was authorized to prescribe “the method or methods by weight, or space, or both, or otherwise, for ascertaining such rate,” 39 U. S. C. § 542, and for the same purpose “to make such classification of carriers as may be just and reasonable and, where just and equitable, fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.” 39 U. S. C. § 549. Other sections specify and define four classes of service, namely, full railway post-office car service, apartment service, storage-car service and closed-pouch service. 39 U. S. C. §§ 525-530. Only apartment service and closed-pouch service are involved in this case. On December 23, 1919, after extended investigation and hearings, the Commission entered its first general mail rate order. Railway-Mail Pay, 56 I. C. C. 1. This adopted the space basis for determining “fair and reasonable rates.” On July 10, 1928, in proceedings for reexamination the Commission granted a general increase of 15% over the preexisting rates. Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. 675. The Georgia & Florida Railroad accepted these general rates until April 1, 1931. At that time it applied to the Commission for a reexamination of the rates as applied to itself. The application was heard and determined by Division 5. On May 10,1933, the Commission denied any increase, holding the general rates established by the order of July 10, 1928, fair and reasonable as applied to this carrier. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 192 I. C. C. 779. This order is in substance, though not technically, the one now involved. After the Commission had denied reconsideration, the railroad sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to set aside the Commission’s order. A special three-judge court was convened, cf. the Urgent Deficiencies Act, former 28 U. S. C. §§ 41 (28), 47; held the order unlawful; and remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. This decree was filed on January 23, 1935. Thereupon the full Commission conducted further hearings and in a report filed February 4, 1936, again found the rates previously fixed to be fair and reasonable in their application to the Georgia & Florida Railroad. The order therefore denied any increase. Railway Mail Pay, Georgia & Florida R. Co., 214 I. C. C. 66. Again the carrier resorted to the District Court, filing a supplemental bill. And again that court, composed of the same three judges, held the Commission’s order unlawful in a decree filed on February 23, 1937. The Government appealed directly to this Court, which, in United States v. Griffin, supra, held that the order was not of a type reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. Accordingly, on February 28, 1938, the District Court’s judgment was reversed with directions to dismiss the bill and without determination of the cause on the merits. After nearly four years the receivers renewed the litigation by filing this suit in the Court of Claims. The amended petition sets forth in some detail the history of the previous stages of controversy before the Commission and the courts. The carrier’s basic claims on the merits are substantially the same as in those proceedings. They are, in effect, (1) that the Commission’s orders denying any increase are confiscatory, in that the rates prescribed by the general rate order of July 10, 1928, and continued in effect specifically as to this carrier by the orders of May 10, 1933, and February 4, 1936, do not afford just compensation under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that they do not provide for payment of the cost of the service rendered plus a reasonable return upon invested capital allocated to that service; and (2) that the Commission’s orders do not afford the “fair and reasonable” compensation required by the Railway Mail Pay Act. Both claims rest upon attacks made on the Commission’s findings as being unsupported by the evidence before it and on its conclusions as being contrary to that evidence. To sustain jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, respondent rests upon § 145 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 250, now 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and upon statements made in part Fourth of the opinion in United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. at 238. II. Although the Railway Mail Pay Act contains no explicit provision for judicial review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing rates of pay for transporting the mails pursuant to authorizations of the Postmaster General for such service, it had been thought, until the decision in United States v. Griffin, supra, that such orders were of the kind reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act. The effect of that decision, however, was to rule out such orders as those now in question from the jurisdiction conferred by the latter Act. While the “negative order” basis for the Court’s ruling is no longer effective, Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, the alternative grounding remains in full force. 303 U. S. at 234. Since the very orders now in issue were involved in the Griffin case, it is settled that the railroad or its receivers had no recourse to a district court, under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, for securing review of the Commission’s orders or relief of the type now sought. The Court in the Griffin case, however, was not content to rest merely with this negative jurisdictional ruling. In part Fourth of the opinion the Court went on to say that its ruling did not “preclude every character of judicial review.” 303 U. S. at 238. The opinion then suggested three possible other methods, two in the Court of Claims and one in the district courts. Without doubt it was due to these suggestions that respondent’s predecessors chose to bring this suit in the Court of Claims. The language in which the suggestions were made has assumed such importance, in view of the problems raised by the receivers’ choice in following them, that it seems wise here to quote in full what the Court said: “If the Commission makes the appropriate finding of reasonable compensation but fails, because of an alleged error of law, to order payment of the full amount which the railroad believes is payable under the finding, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of an action for the balance, as the claim asserted is one founded upon a law of Congress. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 603. Compare United States v. New York Central R. Co., 279 U. S. 73, affirming 65 Ct. Cl. 115, 121. And since railway mail service is compulsory, the Court of Claims would, under the general provisions of the Tucker Act, have jurisdiction also of an action for additional compensation if an order is confiscatory. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645; North American Transportation & Trading Co. v. United States, 253 U. S. 330, 333; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16. Moreover, as district courts have jurisdiction of every suit at law or in equity ‘arising under the postal laws' 28 U. S. C., § 41 (6), suit would lie under their general jurisdiction if the Commission is alleged to have acted in excess of its authority, or otherwise illegally. Compare Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 288, 289.” 303 U. S. at 238. Respondent and the Court of Claims are at odds over whether the carrier’s claims now asserted fall under the first or the second class of cases of which this Court said the Court of Claims would have jurisdiction. Respondent insists, both in the complaint and in the brief filed here, that his claim is grounded on the basis that the Commission’s orders are confiscatory and have the effect of depriving the carrier of its property and services without just compensation due under the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, the Court of Claims expressly disclaims that it was exercising any jurisdiction over constitutional matters. This was done in denying the carrier’s claim to interest on the award. In the court’s view therefore the jurisdiction which it was exerting fell within the first class of cases stated in the Griffin opinion to be within the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, namely, where the Commission makes the appropriate finding of reasonable compensation but fails, because of an alleged error of law, to order payment of the full amount the carrier believes payable under the finding. The Government, however, insists that the Court of Claims did not exercise jurisdiction under this category. It disputes that the court “gave effect,” as the court stated, to the Commission’s order or ordered payment of any balance due under the Commission’s finding. Rather, the Government urges, the court flouted that order, substituted its own judgment for the Commission’s concerning the appropriate order to be entered, and in effect entered a wholly new and different order from that made by the Commission, together with a money judgment giving its own view effect. Ordinarily it would be sufficient for us to take the Court of Claims at its word and accept its stated view of the nature of the jurisdiction it was exerting. But the three differing views of its action taken by itself, by the Government, and by the respondent, together with the difficulties each raises on the record for disposing of the cause, compel us to examine those claims. If, as the court asserts, it was “giving effect” to the Commission’s order and doing so without substituting its own judgment for the Commission’s as to what was a “fair and reasonable rate,” there should be little difficulty in sustaining the jurisdiction; that is, unless respondent is right in his contention that the Court was called upon to and, notwithstanding its disclaimer, in fact did adjudicate his claim for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In that event and on the assumption that the award was proper on the merits, reversal would be required in order that the court might make appropriate allowance for interest. On the other hand, if the Government is correct in the view that the court did not give effect to the Commission’s order, but instead disregarded that order and substituted its own judgment for the Commission’s concerning what constituted a “fair and reasonable rate,” the question arises whether the Griffin statements were intended to give that power to the Court of Claims under either category of jurisdiction the opinion said that court might have. III. The Railway Mail Pay Act gives the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive jurisdiction to determine “fair and reasonable rates.” The Urgent Deficiencies Act provided for judicial review of the Commission’s rate orders in “cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend” such orders. No power was given the reviewing court to revise them when found invalid, or to render judgment for any amount thought to be due under such a revision. It would be strange, indeed anomalous in the extreme, if this Court by its Griffin pronouncements intended to confer on the Court of Claims, by implication in the cases there held not reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, a broader, more conclusive and final power of judicial review than that Act expressly provided for like orders within its purview. The assumption is hardly tenable that Congress intended such a result when it enacted the Railway Mail Pay Act or the Urgent Deficiencies Act or both. Congress in no instance has expressly empowered the Court of Claims to review rate orders of the Commission, either to set them aside or to render a money judgment for additional amounts found due upon a determination of an order’s invalidity. To infer such an intention would be contrary not only in spirit to the limitations Congress has placed upon review of such orders wherever expressly provided, but also to the whole history and practice of Congress in conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims. Thus, when these very orders were twice before the district court, under the assumption that it had jurisdiction, that court found the orders invalid. But in each instance it remanded the cause to the Commission for further proceedings; there was no attempt to render a money judgment for the carrier. Necessarily this restraint reflected the jurisdictional limitations placed upon the court by the Urgent Deficiencies Act. But those limitations themselves reflected another policy, quite apart from and in addition to that giving effect to the constitutional limitations of Article III. The limitations exemplify settled congressional policy concerning the relations of rate-making bodies and reviewing courts. Not only is rate making essentially legislative in the first instance. The policy of judicial restraint is one having regard for the expertise of special agencies charged with performing the rate-making function and for the inherent actual, as well as legal, disability of courts to execute that function. Such doctrines or policies as those of “primary jurisdiction” and exhaustion of administrative remedies lie at the very root of the problem. And this is as true of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, which is not restricted by Article III, as it is of courts so limited. Hardly can it be conceived therefore that Congress would have provided expressly for review of the Commission’s rate-making orders by the Court of Claims; or that, if it had done so, it would have authorized a money judgment for such amount as that court in its own judgment considered the rate should have produced. It is equally significant, we think, that when the three-judge district court twice set aside the Commission’s order it did so on grounds substantially similar to those used by the Court of Claims in this case for holding the order invalid. In other words, what the district court did by way of examining the orders on their merits, factual as well as legal, the Court of Claims has done in this case. Indeed, it has gone much further, since it has rendered a money judgment for the carrier covering the period 1931-1938, having the effect in the particular circumstances of a new and final order. IV. A full understanding of the Commission’s orders and of the effects of the action taken regarding them, both by the three-judge district court and by the Court of Claims, can be had only by reading and comparing the reports and opinions. The limitations of space prevent summarizing their content here in substantial detail. But the gist of the controversy between the Commission and the courts may be indicated. We note, to begin with, that the court awarded to the respondent $186,707.06, or some 87 per cent more than the amount allowable under the Commission’s orders. This in itself shows the wide discrepancy between the Commission’s view and the court’s concerning the amount of a “fair and reasonable rate.” Moreover, the Commission’s task in fixing that rate was both gigantic and complex. It was authorized to make classification of carriers where “just and reasonable” and, “where just and equitable,” to “fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.” 39 U. S. C. § 549. That authority of course was not to be ignored in applying the requirement for compensation of carriers at “fair and reasonable rates.” 39 U. S. C. § 542. The two were not entirely separate, but were merely different prongs of the same fork. In its first general rate proceeding the Commission classified the nation’s carriers, for mail-pay compensation purposes, placing the Georgia & Florida Railroad in Class I. It also decided generally upon the space basis as an appropriate method of determining fair and reasonable compensation. 56 I. C. C. 1. Railroad accounting, however, does not, and concededly cannot, accurately reflect actual operating costs of each type of service rendered, or the proportionate amounts of capital employed in rendering each service. The Commission therefore sought a method or methods for making such allocations tentatively as the initial stage of performing its rate-making function. This required, first, segregating freight service from passenger train service; then dividing the latter into three categories: passenger service proper (including baggage service), express service, and mail service. The problem arose both in the proceedings culminating in the first general rate order, 56 I. C. C. 1, and in those resulting in the general rate increase of 1928. 1441. C. C. 675. In the latter the initial separation of total operating expenses between freight and passenger services was made on the basis of the Commission’s rules governing such separation on large steam railways. Id. at 685-688. But, for determining the cost of service in respect to the further allocation and apportionment of passenger-train service among its three components, the Commission, having determined upon the space basis for this initial stage in fixing “fair and reasonable rates,” was faced with the problem of what should be done with unused space. That problem presents the crux of this case, as it did of the Commission’s action. In the proceedings leading to the 1928 order, three general plans were given primary consideration for distributing space. They are described in the report last cited. See id. at 681, 689. In general they were alike in allocating full-car space to the service it performed. But they differed widely in allocating unused space in so-called combination cars and mixed cars. Without going into further detail here, suffice it to say that Plan 3 allocated the largest amounts of unused space to passenger and express service and correspondingly the smallest amount to mail service; Plan 2, more nearly approximating the carrier’s proposals, worked out in inverse proportions; and Plan 1 lay between the two. See 144 I. C. C. at 681, 689. The differences in results following from use of the various plans were highly significant, making the difference between net return and net deficit, or deficits of different sizes, depending upon which plan was used. In each plan after the ultimate space ratios were determined by complicated statistical studies, they were applied to total passenger-train service expense to determine expense ratios for the three constituent services. And those expense ratios were also used to apportion investment in road and equipment assigned to passenger-train service. The Commission rejected Plan 3 because, it said, that plan had departed from the car-operating unit which it had adopted for making space allocations. 144 I. C. C. 689-691. While not specifically eliminating Plan 1 from consideration for purposes of comparison, the Commission primarily rested its allocations of space for purposes of tentative or preliminary apportionment of costs and capital on Plan 2. Id. at 691. In utilizing the ratios derived from using Plan 2, however, the Commission expressly stated: “In connection with the cost studies under any of the plans for dividing the train space, it should be borne in mind that in computations of this character where the direct allocations are relatively small and the great bulk of expenses and investment are necessarily divided, subdivided, apportioned, and reapportioned upon various theories and assump tions, the results can not be accepted as an accurate ascertainment of the costs of service. At best, they are approximations to be given such weight as seems proper in view of all the circumstances under which they have been obtained and the theories underlying the assumptions and the various steps in the computations.” 144 I. C. C. at 691-692. (Emphasis added.) The Commission proceeded to consider the results obtained by the use of the Plan 2 formula in the light of other circumstances and considerations deemed relevant, including comparison with results obtained upon the basis of the total equated 60-foot-car miles (see 144 I. C. C. at 692), the fact that there was no such incentive to limit the amount of space utilized for passenger, baggage and express services as existed in the case of mail service, id. at 693, and other factors. The Commission then concluded: “Giving consideration to all the figures based upon the respective cost studies; to the fact that none of these figures except those in the carriers’ exhibits, includes any charge against the passenger-train service for its proportion of the cost of handling nonrevenue freight; giving special weight to the figures based on the plan for the division of train space followed in the original proceeding and subsequent reexaminations; and making allowance for weaknesses of theories and methods, an increase of 15 per cent in mail revenues for the carriers as a whole in this group is justified.” 144 I. C. C. at 695. (Emphasis added.) This increase, very much smaller than a use of the results obtained by unqualified application of Plan 2 would have produced, resulted in general rates of 14.5 cents per mile of service in a “15-foot apartment car” and 4.5 cents per mile of service in a “3-foot closed-pouch service space.” Those rates became applicable to the Georgia & Florida Railroad, were accepted by it from 1928 to 1931, and are the rates now in question. In this suit and in the prior proceedings since 1931, no attack has been made on the validity of these rates as general rates applicable to Class I carriers. But the 1931 proceedings challenged their validity as applied to this particular carrier. This has been the bone of contention throughout the subsequent phases of controversy. When in 1931 the carrier’s application for reexamination was filed, the Commission by its Division 5 first proceeded to make a cost study of the railroad’s individual operations, conducted along the same lines as the cost studies in its general rate hearings. A test period of 28 days from September 28 to October 25, 1931, was selected for obtaining space and other data. Space ratios were determined on the data secured, applied to expenses, and the resulting expense ratios used to apportion investment, all under Plan 2. After adjustments made to reflect the year’s operations for 1931, the Plan 2 formula worked out to show a net operating deficit for mail service of $4,945, which, together with a return of 5.75 per cent on the capital allocated by the formula to mail service, brought the carrier’s claim for increased compensation for that year to $31,227. 192 I. C. C. 779, 781. To meet this, an increase of 87.40 per cent would have been necessary. As in the general rate investigations and for the same reasons, the Division was unwilling to rest exclusively upon the results obtained by the computations under Plan 2, and went on to consider other factors which it deemed relevant in determining the fairness and reasonableness of the rates. It found that of the three component services in passenger-train service, “the mail service makes the best showing with respect to revenue.” The Division further pointed out that in the period 1929 to 1931, mail revenues had been more stable than revenues from other passenger-train services, passenger service proper having decreased 67 per cent, express service 64 per cent, and mail service 12 per cent. Consideration also was given to the special facts shown relating to use of unused space. Pointing out that the carrier’s claim was based on the special cost study and the fact that “because of its low traffic density and low earnings per mile of road, it is not comparable with many class I roads which receive the same rates of pay,” the Division reiterated that “The cost study is not considered to be an accurate ascertainment of the actual cost of service. It is an approximation to be given such weight as seems proper in view of all the circumstances. See Railway Mail Pay, supra.” 192 I. C. C. at 783. It then concluded: “The comparison of mail revenue with other revenue received for services in passenger-train operations shows that mail with relation to the other services is bearing its fair share of the expenses of operation and is contributing relatively more than the other services for the space furnished. Applicant receives the same rates as those received by other roads for the same kind of service. Many of these other roads are, as applicant points out, roads which are very much larger and which have greater traffic and lower unit operating costs. On the other hand many are in much the same situation as the applicant in respect of passenger-train operations. The data submitted fail to justify giving the applicant rates higher than those now paid other railway common carriers for like service. “We find that the rates of pay now received by applicant for the transportation of mail, established in Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. 675, for railroads over 100 miles in length, are fair and reasonable. The application for increased compensation is denied.” Ibid. When the cause was returned to the Commission by the Georgia District Court in 1935, the full Commission reopened the proceeding and held a further hearing at which further evidence was received. In remanding the cause the district court had stressed the computed finding under Plan 2 that “The distribution of expense upon the space ratios shows that the operating ratio for mail service was 102.79” or, as the court added, “that for every dollar applicants received for transporting mails they expended one dollar and 2.79 cents.” The court then asserted that other considerations taken into account by Division 5 “do not refute or impair the fact that the compensation allowed this railroad for the transportation of mail does not equal the cost of so doing.” Counsel for the carrier stressed this before the Commission as “an adjudication” that the previous rates of pay were “totally inadequate.” But the Commission rejected the apparent district court inference that abandonment of mail service would save the carrier money: “Considering the character of the expenses included in the study it is clear that no such saving could be made. The importance of the operating-ratio figure has been overemphasized. Relative costs derived from a series of studies of expenditures for operations common to a number of services cannot be converted into absolute costs by using a single-figure relation derived from such studies.” 214 I. C. C. at 69. The Commission then again repeated its insistence that cost computed under such a formula as Plan 2 “is a hypothetical cost and not an actual cost,” ibid.; that in other mail-pay proceedings consideration had been given to other factors; and, again taking such factors into account, concluded upon the augmented record that the rates then applicable to the carrier were fair and reasonable. 214 I. C. C. at 70-76. On return of the cause, the district court disclaimed entertaining the view “that the hypothetical cost is ‘necessarily conclusive.’ ” Rather, the court said, “It is merely the fairest method that has been devised.” It held inapplicable to the carrier the considerations utilized by the Commission to qualify the results computed by the cost formula, such as “comparisons with compensation received from other services in passenger train cars”; and “comparisons per car-mile and per car-foot mile of the computed cost of mail service and the revenue from authorized mail service with the computed cost of corresponding units in passenger-train service as a whole.” The court accordingly again found the Commission’s order unlawful and remanded the cause to it a second time for further proceedings. It is obvious, from the foregoing account, that the basic difference between the Commission and the district court lay in whether the Commission’s statistical and mathematical computations under Plan 2 alone should be taken as determinative of costs and thus of fair and reasonable rates or whether those computations were rightly taken by the Commission as merely tentative estimates or approximations, applicable in the initial stage of rate determination, but subject to qualification by comparison with results obtained under other plans and, in the final stage, by consideration of other factors found pertinent in the Commission’s judgment. This is exactly the question which was crucial in the judgment rendered by the Court of Claims. In its opinion, much more extended than either of those rendered by the district court, it said: “Under finding 16 herein, it is shown that the Interstate Commerce Commission found and determined that plaintiff would require an increase in its mail revenue of 87.4% in order to secure for itself, under Plan 2 adopted by the Commission, a return of 5.75% theretofore fixed by the Commission, on its investments in road and equipment engaged in mail traffic. . . . The Commission has, by its use of Plan No. 2, adjudged it to be a fair and reasonable basis. And out of that basis there has been ascertained, by formulae prescribed by the Commission, what is the fair and reasonable compensation for plaintiffs’ carriage of the mails beginning the first of April 1931, and ending at the close of February 1938. Fair and reasonable compensation cannot be both a deficit and the amount of $186,707.06 so found. It is, we conclude, the latter.” 110 Ct. Cl. at 366-367, 369. (Emphasis added.) The court then quoted the Commission’s concluding language in 192 I. C. C. 779, 783, set out above in the text, and said: “We are of the opinion that the 'approximation’ [Plan 2] should be given greater weight than the Commission affords it, because, as we have said, and the Commission in effect admits, there is no such thing as certainty in actual cost. Approximate, or as it is called, 'computed’ cost must be relied upon, and as a matter of law must be decisive. There is no alternative, at least no satisfying alternative. Of course there were other methods of computing cost, but the Commission, put to the choice, selected Plan No. 2.” 110 Ct. Cl. at 370. Then followed rejection of the factors considered by the Commission in qualifying the computations obtained under Plan 2 as “not convincing or even persuasive.” Id. at 372. According to the court: “It was for the Commission to demonstrate that the general rates prescribed gave the plaintiffs a fair and reasonable return. This the Commission failed to do. More than that, the Commission has by its findings, using its adopted plan and its own methods as applied to plaintiffs’ circumstances, proved that plaintiffs have been underpaid $186,707.06 in fair and reasonable compensation for the period in question.” Ibid. In view of these groundings, the court’s decision tied the Commission exclusively and finally to the results which it had obtained by using Plan 2 in the initial stage of the rate-making process. It rejected the Commission’s repeated assertion, in both the general rate hearings and the special hearings given this carrier, that the cost studies under Plan 2 (or any other such plan) could not be taken as an accurate ascertainment of actual costs of service and should be given only such weight as seemed proper in view of all the circumstances. The court likewise rejected as “not convincing or even persuasive” the numerous factors the Commission considered not only proper, but highly important to be taken into account in qualifying the computed results under Plan 2. In doing all this the court substituted its own judgment for the Commission’s concerning the relevance of facts to be taken into account in fixing a fair and reasonable rate; the weight to be given to those facts, including the computations under Plan 2 as well as the other facts utilized to check and qualify them; and the burden of proof on the whole case. In the latter respect the court disregarded not only the general rule which gives administrative determinations in such matters presumptive weight, but also the effect of the statute itself. As has been noted the Railway Mail Pay Act expressly authorized the Commission to classify carriers and “where just and equitable, fix general rates applicable to all carriers in the same classification.” 39 U. S. C. § 649. While this general authority did not preclude examination of the general rate’s application to a particular carrier, it gave that rate prima jade validity as to all within the classification. Indeed, contrary to the court’s holding that the Commission could not consider rates paid to other carriers or their effects, the statute required the Commission to take those rates into account. Ibid. The burden of proof was therefore clearly upon the carrier to show that the general rate was unfair and unreasonable as applied to it and not, as the court held, upon the Commission to show that that rate as applied was fair and reasonable. We cannot say that the Commission acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in respect to its use of Plan 2 or of the factors used in checking the plan’s results and qualifying them. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, Plan 2 was never intended or accepted by the Commission as furnishing a final and exclusive basis for fixing rates. Certainly it was not arbitrary or unreasonable to use such a plan, which proceeded step by step upon “various theories and assumptions,” as merely a preliminary and wholly tentative step in the process of rate making; or to check its results against those produced by other such plans differing in detail of theories and assumptions employed; or to qualify the computations by the factors which the Commission took into account in the final stages of judgment. In holding the initial formula conclusive, the court has disregarded the Commission’s informed contrary judgment in matters committed to its special competence. This the court did in the guise of “giving effect” to the Commission’s “finding,” namely, its preliminary computations under Plan 2, and by disregarding all else the Commission took into account as “error of law.” The “finding” was in fact no finding at all, but only a preliminary figure. And the matters thrown out as “error of law” were matters of fact and expert judgment, not legal questions. We think the carrier has not sustained its burden of showing that the Commission acted arbitrarily or unreasonably and we conclude that the general rates fixed by its 1928 order are, upon the record made, fair and reasonable as applied to the Georgia & Florida Railroad. But for the matter of jurisdiction, this determination would end the case. But the question of jurisdiction remains and is important. Moreover, the determination on the merits is relevant to its disposition. V. In sustaining its jurisdiction, the Court of Claims stated: “As the Supreme Court has said, this Court has jurisdiction to render judgment of recovery for an amount sufficient to constitute fair and reasonable compensation under the facts as found by the Commission, unpaid through failure of the Commission, because of an error of law, to order payment thereof.” 110 Ct. Cl. at 366. (Emphasis added.) That language on its face seems fully in accord with the Griffin pronouncement. As will be recalled, it was: “If the Commission makes the appropriate finding of reasonable compensation but fails, because of an alleged error of law, to order payment of the full amount which the railroad believes is payable under the finding, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of an action for the balance, as the claim asserted is one founded upon a law of Congress.” (Emphasis added.) On its face this language does not authorize revision of the Commission's findings or of the rate it prescribes by the Court of Claims. The claim of which it is said to have jurisdiction is one for “the full amount which the railroad believes is payable under the finding,” some part of which the Commission has failed to order paid by reason of an error of law. There was no intimation of authority for the court to reexamine the facts or to substitute its own judgment concerning the facts to be considered or the weight to be given them in determining the rate. True, the wording reads “appropriate” finding. But we cannot construe that single word to mean that this Court intended the Court of Claims to reopen the entire question of the order's appropriateness and substitute its own judgment, either on the record made before the Commission or on independent evidence, for the Commission’s findings and conclusions on that question. Such a construction is sustained by none of the cases cited in the Griffin opinion to support the statement and is directly contrary to previous decisions by the Court of Claims with reference to its power to review such orders of the Commission. Moreover, to conceive the Griffin statement as sanctioning the broad authority-assumed by the court would be, for reasons already stated, to give it by implication a jurisdiction which Congress has never expressly conferred. We think the Griffin language contemplated a much narrower jurisdiction. The purpose was, in our judgment, to indicate that review might be had of the carrier’s claim whenever it does not run in the teeth of the Commission’s findings or order or seek revision of that order. In other words, the claim must be one consistent with the Commission’s order fixing the rate, but asserting underpayment by reason of some error of law in its application which would not require the Commission’s further consideration for fixing a new rate. This view is consistent with all of the authorities cited in Griffin to sustain the first category of jurisdiction said to reside in the Court of Claims. It is the view we think this Court meant to be taken. As we have pointed out, however, here the Court of Claims, though asserting the contrary, has not “given effect” to the rate order, but in the guise of finding “error of law” has set it aside, together with the Commission’s findings; has substituted “findings” of its own; and has made, in effect, a new order by its judgment. It follows, in our view of what was intended by the Griffin statement, that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction in this case, since it involves no such “error of law” as that statement contemplated, but relates only to questions essentially of fact going to the order’s appropriateness on the merits. The case is wholly unlike Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 603; United States v. New York Central R. Co., 279 U. S. 73, and other cases cited in the Griffin opinion. The same result would follow if, contrary to the Court of Claims’ disclaimer, the suit could be regarded as one for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, as respondent insists it was. For the reasons already stated, respondent has not shown that the Commission’s order was confiscatory in its effects. Moreover, jurisdiction-ally speaking, none of the cases cited by the Griffin opinion to sustain the second category of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims involved any problem of reviewing rate orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. All related to questions of compensation resulting from takings of private property for public use, in which the only questions determined were the value of the property taken or that value coupled with the right to interest on the award. While respondent contends that the effect of the Commission’s order here has been to deprive it of its property without just compensation and justifies the Court of Claims’ award on that basis, the court did not so ground its decision and, as we have said, respondent has not made out any such case. Moreover, in view of the fact that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction only to render a money judgment against the United States and none to remand to the Commission for further consideration a rate order which it might find confiscatory, we do not think the Griffin ruling can be taken to have contemplated that upon such a finding, made after reviewing the Commission’s order on the merits, the Court of Claims could foreclose the Commission from further consideration of the order and render final judgment for the amount by which it had found the order confiscatory. This not only would short-circuit the Commission in the rate-making process, but would involve substituting the court’s judgment for the Commission’s as to the amount of any new rate which might be fixed. Consequently, we do not think this case falls within either category of jurisdiction indicated by the Griffin statement as possibly available in the Court of Claims. There remains the third remedy suggested in the Griffin opinion, namely, by suit in the district court as one at law or in equity “arising under the postal laws,” former 28 U. S. C. § 41 (6) (cf. present 28 U. S. C. § 1339), where the Commission is alleged to have acted, in excess of its authority, or otherwise illegally. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to consider whether this remedy would have been available to respondent, since it has not been followed. However, notwithstanding some obvious difficulties in making district court jurisdiction available for review in such a proceeding as this, that jurisdiction possesses one outstanding advantage over review in the Court of Claims. It is that the district courts are not confined, as is the Court of Claims, to rendering a money judgment by way of relief against the United States. Under their general equity jurisdiction they would have power, on finding a rate order invalid, whether as confiscatory or as not complying with the statute, to remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings. In this respect the review afforded and the relief given would more nearly approximate that given by the Urgent Deficiencies Act in similar cases reviewable under its terms. Since the Griffin case was decided, Congress has adopted the so-called Administrative Procedure Act, which by § 10, entitled “Judicial Review,” provides: “Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion— “(a) . . . Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. “(b) . . . The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction. ...” 5 U. S. C. § 1009. This provision, we think, adds force to the suggestion made in the Griffin case concerning the jurisdiction of the district courts in relation to review of rate orders like those now in question. Such review under the equity or declaratory jurisdiction of those courts would seem to afford a remedy consonant with § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and also more nearly like that afforded by the Urgent Deficiencies Act, though without its expediting features. The relief afforded, unlike that required in the Court of Claims, could thus be limited to setting aside or enjoining the Commission’s order and remanding the cause to it for further consideration, as is done in like cases reviewable by three-judge courts. Consistently with that jurisdiction also the review could be confined to the record made before the Commission rather than one compiled by independent evidence not presented to the Commission or considered by it. These suggestions, as we have said, are not strictly necessary for disposition of this case. But we think them appropriate in order to prevent a recurrence in the future and in other cases of long and chiefly jurisdictional litigation such as this cause has involved with profit to no one. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Claims with instructions to dismiss it. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The present receiver, Alfred W. Jones, was substituted as respondent in No. 135 by order of this Court dated December 6, 1948. 335 U. S. 883. He is referred to as “respondent” in this opinion, although he is also the petitioner in No. 198. Full railway post-office car service involves service in which an entire car of specified length and equipment is authorized. Apartment-car service involves authorized use of thirty- or fifteen-foot apartments partitioned off from the remaining portion of the car. Closed-pouch service involves handling by railroad employees where full or apartment railway post-office cars are not authorized and where space authorizations are for units of seven feet and three feet in space, unenclosed, on both sides of the car. See note 6. The amended petition and the brief assign both grounds. Nevertheless, respondent insists that his case is in fact grounded upon the constitutional basis. Indeed, so strongly does respondent insist upon this point of view that, without challenging the award or its amount, except for the disallowance of interest, he has sought and we granted certiorari in No. 198, in effect to have the judgment of the Court of Claims grounded solely on the Fifth Amendment footing as the basis for establishing his claim of accrued interest. See note 7 infra. As has been stated, the Court of Claims, accepting jurisdiction, rendered judgment for the respondent for $186,707.06. Its determination was based upon the various reports of the Commission above cited, although evidence was received by the court’s commissioner which was not before the Interstate Commerce Commission. He made extensive special findings of fact based in part upon this evidence which were adopted by the court and filed, together with its opinion. 110 Ct. Cl. 330. Both the Government and the respondent applied for certiorari and both petitions were granted. See note 4. This was in brief that Congress could not be assumed to have made the extraordinary remedy of the Urgent Deficiencies Act applicable to such orders as the one here involved, since “There is no wide public interest in its speedy determination”; “no danger of temporarily interrupting the mail service through the improvident issue of an injunction by a single judge”; and “only the method or amount of payments currently to be made would be affected.” The opinion, quoting the Court of Claims’ language in an earlier railway mail pay case, New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 115, 128-129, affirmed 279 U. S. 73, stated: “ ‘We do not think the plaintiff can have judgment for interest on the deferred payments. We are not determining just compensation but are giving effect to an authorized order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In such case the statute forbids the allowance of interest. Sec. 177, Judicial Code, as amended.’ ” 110 Ct. Cl. at 373. Cf. notes 10 and 29 infra. See note 7. See the cases cited at note 26 infra. Cf. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13. See the cases cited at note 27 infra. Which, among other things, forbid non-District of Columbia courts created pursuant to that Article to exercise legislative functions such as rate making. Cf. Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., 261 U. S. 428; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; cf. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 139; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41. See 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251. United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 463-464 (and cf. concurring opinion, id. at 465); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-52. See Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L. J. 981; 44 Mich. L. Rev. 1035. See the authorities cited at note 27 infra. The opinions of the three-judge court rendered when this controversy was twice before it are not reported. Class I included all railroads of more than 100 miles in length. At the general rate hearings the Georgia & Florida Railroad was represented by representatives of another class and seems to have contended that it should be classified with or treated as though it were a member of that class. But no question concerning its classification has been made in the proceedings begun in 1931 or afterward. See note 2. Combination cars include space separated by partitions into “apartments,” cf. note 2, with each apartment devoted exclusively to a different use. Mixed cars contain no partitions or “apartments,” but are used for several different services, e. g., baggage, express and mail-pouch services. See note 2; 144 I. C. C. at 679. See Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. at 688-689. Plan 3, the Commission said in that general rate proceeding, would result in a “net railway operating income from mail of $18,759,056 instead of a deficit of $1,104,744 under plan 2, and a net income of $12,844,643 under plan 1,” id. at 689, giving a net return under Plan 3 of 5.94 per cent but requiring an increased rate of 26.48 per cent under Plan 2 and of 7.43 per cent under Plan 1 to meet the computed deficits and give a net return of 5.75 per cent on the invested capital allocated to mail. The report continued: “The total mail revenue of $35,728 for the year 1931 on a space ratio of 12.96 was only $594 less than the total revenue from passenger service proper, including baggage, and miscellaneous service, with a space ratio of 80.35 .... The distribution of expense upon the space ratios shows that the operating ratio for mail service was 102.79 as compared with 630.41 for passenger proper, including baggage, etc., and 249.67 for express.” 1921. C. C. at 781-782. See note 21. “In other mail-pay proceedings, in which space authorized and paid for was found to be the space that should be charged to mail in cost studies similar to that here, consideration was given to other factors as well, such as the amount and character of the unused space reported as operated (Railway Mail Pay, 85 I. C. C. 157, 170, 123 I. C. C. 33, 39); the actual space occupied by mail, as distinguished from authorized space, determined by the mail load carried, based upon a count of bags and of packages outside of bags, and, in some instances, by the weight (Railway Mail Pay, 95 I. C. C. 493, 500, 511, 120 I. C. C. 439, 446); comparisons with compensation received from other services in passenger-train ears (Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. 675, 706); comparisons with freight rates (Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. 675, 705, 151 I. C. C. 734, 742); comparisons per car-mile and per ear-foot mile of the computed cost of mail service and the revenue from authorized mail service with the computed cost of corresponding units in passenger-train service as a whole (Railway Mail Pay, 144 I. C. C. 675, 699); and the character of the service performed in connection with transporting the mail (Railway Mail Pay, 56 I. C. C. 1, 8, Electric Railway Mail Pay, 58 I. C. C. 455, 464, 98 I. C. C. 737, 755).” 214 I. C. C. at 69-70. It is to be recalled that the expense ratios based upon the space ratios accepted under Plan 2 were applied also to capital allocated to passenger-train service to apportion that capital among the three component services making up passenger-train service. See, e. g., Shields v. Utah Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 184-185. Cf. Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565, 568-569. Cited in the text, 303 U. S. at 238, were Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 271 U. S. 603, upholding the Court of Claims’ view on demurrer that Congress, in enacting 39 U. S. C. § 536, not only intended to but had power to provide that land-grant railroads were to receive only 80% of whatever mail pay rate the Commission should set not only for mere transportation of mail (e. g., closed-pouch space) but for space in which postal employees sorted mail (e. g., apartment mail-cars), and United States v. New York Central R. Co., 279 U. S. 73, affirming the Court of Claims’ conclusion that the Commission had power to make mail rate revisions applicable as of the date of the carrier’s request for reexamination of rates rather than as of the date of the Commission order raising the rate. Court of Claims mail pay decisions cited in a footnote, 303 U. S. at 238, n. 10, included: Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 585; Nevada County N. G. R. Co. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 327; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. United States, 72 Ct. Cl. 407; Macon, D. & S. R. Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 251; 79 Ct. Cl. 298. In each of these cases the claimant carrier recovered compensation in excess of that allowed it by the Postmaster General, but in each case the dispute centered around the meaning of a Commission rate order or the Commission’s power to enter the order made; in none was there any challenge to the rate itself: Thus, in the first Chicago & E. I. R. Co. case, supra, the question was whether the Commission had, in accordance with 39 U. S. C. § 535, ordered compensation for the return to their departure points of mail storage ears. In the second Chicago & E. I. R. Co. case, supra, the question was whether “closed-pouch space” was a “lesser unit” within the meaning of a rate order setting compensation for a “storage car or lesser unit.” The Nevada County N. G. R. Co. case, supra, was a companion to New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 115, affirmed 279 U. S. 73, holding that the Commission had power to order a rate increase effective as of the date of the application for such increase. Similarly, the two opinions in Macon, D. & S. R. Co., supra, held that the Commission had power retroactively to reclassify the claimant carrier in a higher compensation bracket as of a date prior to the carrier’s application for reclassification so as to impose on the United States liability for additional compensation from that retroactively determined date of reclassification. With the prefatory admonition, “Compare,” the Griffin footnote, 303 U. S. at 238 n. 10, cited two other Court of Claims railway mail pay decisions, Pere Marquette R. Co. v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 538, and New Jersey & N. Y. R. Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 243: these decisions held the court powerless to fix mail pay rates or classifications, both functions being found to be within the exclusive purview of the Commission. See note 27 infra. In Pere Marquette R. Co. v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl. 538, the carrier sought compensation for mail car space furnished by the carrier where that space was neither authorized by the Post Office Department nor in fact used for mail transportation, and where the Commission had not ordered compensation; the Court of Claims said, id. at 545, in dismissing the petition: “The act of July 28, 1916, clearly intended that all questions of the compensation to be paid railroad companies for carrying the mails should be determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The commission having acted within the scope of its authority, having fixed the reasonable compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled, this court can not review the action of the commission and undertake to fix a different compensation from that arrived at by the commission. If the plaintiff has performed any service which the commission has failed to provide for in its order fixing compensation, then the plaintiff’s remedy is before the Interstate Commerce Commission and not in this court.” In New Jersey & N. Y. R. Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 243, the Court of Claims dismissed a claim for compensation based on a classification which had been denied the carrier by the Commission; the dismissal was grounded on the proposition that “This court has no jurisdiction to classify railroads or to fix the compensation for the carrying of the mails.” 80 Ct. Cl. at 248. Of the cases allowing money judgments for compensation, discussed in note 26 swpra, the court observed that there “the recovery in this court merely carried into effect the Commission’s determination, that is to say, this court did not undertake to make a classification or to fix a rate of compensation.” 80 Ct. Cl. at 248. Cf. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 382, 391. “And since railway mail service is compulsory, the Court of Claims would, under the general provisions of the Tucker Act, have jurisdiction also of an action for additional compensation if an order is confiscatory. United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645; North American Transportation & Trading Co. v. United States, 253 U. S. 330, 333; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16.” 303 U. S. at 238. As to interest compare the Great Falls case with the Jacobs case, both cited in note 28. Our attention has not been called to attacks on railway mail rate orders based on this grant of jurisdiction; but it may be noted that district court suits to enjoin the Postmaster General’s fraud orders are commonplace. See, e. g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U. S. 490, 492, n. 2. 5 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1011. See Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 444, n. 4. Cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 227; Shields v. Utah Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 185.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ST. REGIS PAPER CO. v. UNITED STATES. No. 47. Argued November 9, 1961. Decided December 11, 1961. Horace R. Lamb argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Kirkpatrick, Daniel M. Friedman, Lionel Kestenbaum and Richard A. Solomon. Mb. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Pursuant to § 6 (b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Commission issued orders directing the petitioner and corporations acquired by it to submit various reports. Petitioner failed to furnish all of the requested information, and the United States at the request of the Commission brought the present suit in the District Court seeking (1) a mandatory injunction to compel compliance with all of the orders and (2) statutory forfeiture of $100 for every day petitioner was in default of those orders directed specifically to it. The District Court found that some of the requests were unenforceable because of vagueness and that others had been answered either specifically or by reference to materials previously furnished. Petitioner was directed to answer the remaining items, including those calling for file copies of census reports. However, because some of the requests were too vague to be enforced, the District Court did not award the statutory forfeitures. 181 F. Supp. 862. The Court of Appeals affirmed insofar as the District Court ordered compliance, but reversed that portion of the decision refusing to award the statutory forfeitures. 285 F. 2d 607. We granted a limited writ of certiorari because of a conflict in the circuits on the question of compulsory production of the copies of census reports and the general importance of certain other questions in the administration of the investigatory provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 365 U. S. 857. On motion of petitioner, we also granted a stay tolling the further running and accumulation of forfeitures awaiting our decision. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that it cannot lawfully be required to produce copies of statutory reports made by it to the Census Bureau because of their confidential nature. The remainder of the inquiries found enforceable by the District Court are not now contested by the petitioner. As to the forfeitures, petitioner advances several arguments: (1) The statutory forfeiture of § 10 is not applicable because it applies only to a failure to furnish “reports” while the inquiries directed to petitioner called for answers to specific questions; (2) No forfeitures can be imposed because the orders were only partially enforceable; and (3) It is a denial of due process to assess penalties for failure to obey orders during a time petitioner was without remedy to test their validity. I. The controversy culminating in this litigation had its inception in September 1956. At that time the Commission requested petitioner to furnish voluntarily information concerning certain of its corporate acquisitions to enable the Commission to determine whether there had been any violations of the antitrust laws. A year later, having failed to obtain the bulk of the requests, the Commission served a subpoena duces tecum on petitioner. It covered somewhat the same information as was previously requested but, in addition, required similar data concerning three more corporate acquisitions effected in the interim. In due time petitioner fully complied with the subpoena, and the hearing before the Examiner was concluded. After reviewing the material, however, the Commission found that it needed additional information and in June 1958 requested petitioner’s counsel to furnish it. A running exchange of correspondence between petitioner’s counsel and the Commission’s staff followed. Counsel contended, inter alia, that no additional information was needed and requested a statement of necessity therefor. Upon counsel’s insistence, three separate levels of authority in the Commission, from the local attorney in New York City to the Director of the Bureau of Investigation in Washington, explained the need for the information, advised that the request therefor had been fully authorized and requested petitioner to comply therewith. This discussion continued for over six months during which time petitioner furnished only two documents of the many requested. On January 6, 1959, the Commission instigated a formal investigation of the acquisitions made by petitioner during the preceding five years. Pursuant to this investigation the Commission issued six orders requiring the filing within 30 days of “special reports” which were to contain specified information and documents. On motion of petitioner, the Commission temporarily suspended these orders while it considered petitioner’s motion that they be vacated. On May 6, 1959, the motion to vacate was denied, and petitioner was directed to comply by May 28, 1959. On June 4, 1959, the Commission broadened its investigation to cover two corporate acquisitions by petitioner occurring after the instigation of the formal investigation. Accordingly three more orders requiring “special reports” were issued. Upon petitioner’s failure to comply with either set of orders, notices of default were served on June 20, 1959, and July 24,1959, respectively. This complaint was filed on September 15, 1959, three years after the inquiry was opened. The complaint sought a mandatory injunction which would compel petitioner to file with the Commission the “special reports” sought by all nine orders. However, forfeitures were claimed only for petitioner’s failure to respond to orders numbered 1 and 7, which were directed specifically to petitioner. The other seven orders had been directed to corporations acquired by petitioner rather than to it. II. Among the items ordered enforced and with which the petitioner still refuses to comply are requests for file copies of certain reports previously made to the Census Bureau. The petitioner claims each of these to be confidential. There is a conflict between the Courts of Appeal on the point. Here both the District Court and the Court of Appeals have held these file copies not restricted, and with this conclusion we agree. Petitioner’s claim is based on §§8 and 9 (a) of the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. §§8-9 (a), and assurances of confidentiality by the Government. It can be noted immediately that § 8 does not in any way support petitioner’s position. This section grants the Secretary of Commerce the discretion to furnish to named authorities data taken from information furnished the Census Bureau on censuses of population, agriculture and housing. Subsection (c) thereof provides that when the Secretary furnishes such data it shall “[i]n no case” be used by the recipient “to the detriment of the persons to whom such information relates.” Not only has the Commission not been furnished any information by the Secretary, but the information involved does not relate to the particular censuses covered by the section, and so this section is clearly inapplicable here. The prohibitions of § 9 (a) apply to the Secretary, and other -officers and employees of the Department of Commerce. Each of them is prohibited from using the information supplied for other than statistical purposes; and from making any publication thereof wherein the name or identity of those furnishing information is revealed; and, finally, from permitting anyone outside of the employ of the Department of Commerce to “examine the individual reports” filed. The form of the report provided by the Census Bureau is marked “Confidential” and in addition states that “[ijt cannot be used for purposes of taxation, investigation or regulation.” The Bureau also furnishes the reporting corporations a copy of this form, such as the one involved here. The copies are marked “Keep this copy for your files,” and the Bureau is said to have advised reporting companies that they are confidential. It also appears that a Presidential Proclamation admonished reporting companies that “[t]he Census has nothing to do . . . with the enforcement of any national, state, or local law or ordinance. There need be no fear that any disclosure will be made regarding any individual person or his affairs. For the due protection of the rights and interests of the persons furnishing information every employee of the Census Bureau is prohibited, under heavy penalty, from disclosing any information which may thus come to his knowledge.” Petitioner also relies upon an opinion of the Attorney General, 36 Op. Atty. Gen. 362 (1930). Similar contentions were considered by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Dilger, 276 F. 2d 739 (1960), where it was held that these “assurances of confidentiality and protection constitute a pledge of good faith on the part of the Congress, the President and the Department of Commerce. . . . The United States has given its word and. should be permitted to keep it.” 276 F. 2d, at 744. It concludes that since the Commission cannot obtain the original it should not be permitted “to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly.” Id., at 743. The Solicitor General contends that for the purposes of this case petitioner has waived the point by voluntarily submitting like data to the Commission during its investigation herein. We cannot agree. Reaching the merits of the issue he points out that the government agencies are at loggerheads on the problem, the Department of Commerce, Census Bureau and the Bureau of the Budget believe that the copies are not subject to legal process, while the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which filed this suit, contend to the contrary. The Solicitor General, “fully recognizing the delicate balance of opposing considerations,” has concluded “on balance” that the copies are not subject to compulsive production. As has been noted, we do not agree. As we have seen, the prohibitions against disclosure contained in § 9 run only against the officials receiving such information and do not purport to generally clothe census information with secrecy. The Solicitor General admits that “literally construed” the restrictions of the statute go no further. But he insists that since the purpose of the statute is to encourage the free and full submission of statistical data to the Bureau, this can be accomplished only through the creation of a confidential relationship which will extend the privilege to the petitioner and like reporting companies. We do not believe that the language of the President, supra, gives the statute the meaning claimed for it; nor can the legend on the Census Bureau forms or its advice to reporting companies extend the coverage of the Act. Cf. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 39-40 (1947); United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 70 (1940); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 225-227 (1940). We fully realize the importance to the public of the submission of free and full reports to the Census Bureau, but we cannot rewrite the Census Act. It does not require petitioner to keep a copy of its report nor does it grant copies of the report not in the hands of the Census Bureau an immunity from legal process. Ours is the duty to avoid a construction that would suppress otherwise competent evidence unless the statute, strictly construed, requires such a result. That this statute does not do. Congress did not prohibit the use of the reports per se but merely restricted their use while in the hands of those persons receiving them, i. e., the government officials. Indeed, when Congress has intended like reports not to be subject to compulsory process it has said so. See 45 U. S. C. § 41, 49 U. S. C. § 320 (f). Moreover, although tax returns, like these census reports, are made confidential within the government bureau, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 6103, 7213 (a), copies in the hands of the taxpayer are held subject to discovery. Likewise the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 1905, prohibits federal employees generally from disclosing trade secrets and other business data received in the course of their official duties, but the same information is obtainable from the reporting company’s files or personnel by judicial process. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that though petitioner furnishes the required reports to the Census Bureau it is not relieved from furnishing the same information to the Federal Trade Commission. This is made certain by an Act of Congress specifically providing that nothing in the Census Act “shall be deemed to revoke or impair the authority of any other Federal agency with respect to the collection or release of information.’* 13 U. S. C. § 132. It appears, therefore, that through the use of special reports the Commission could require the petitioner to supply the identical information from its files. Hence by securing the retained file copy the Commission is merely obtaining in a form already prepared that information which it has the power to require petitioner to furnish from its records. III. Petitioner next claims that the orders required “answers in writing to specific questions” under § 6 (b) as distinguished from the “special reports” also authorized by that section, but that the forfeiture provision of § 10 penalizing the failure to file “any annual or special reports” does not include the phrase “answers in writing to specific questions” and is, therefore, inapplicable. We do not agree. The Commission contends that its orders here in fact called for information in the nature of “special reports,” and it so designated each of the nine orders at the time of their issuance. Examination of the orders by no means proves the Commission to be in error, for it appears that practically all of the requests called for the furnishing of statistical or like information, details of organization and operation, specific documents, etc. As the Court of Appeals stated, “the cumulative effect of all the questions is substantially that of a request for a report.” 285 F. 2d, at 615. While this is true, it cannot be denied that in many instances specific information was requested and “answers in writing to specific questions” were contemplated. But this does not disqualify the materials from being special reports, for the statutory reference to “answers in writing to specific questions” merely elaborates the power to require special reports. The source of the Commission’s power, as we have noted, is § 6 (b), see note 1, supra, which authorizes the Commission to order corporations to file “annual or special, or both annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific questions.” Since the forfeiture provision of § 10, see note 3, supra, only refers to “any annual or special report,” petitioner argues that forfeiture is inapplicable to a corporation failing to give “answers in writing to specific questions,” which it contends is a separate power quite distinct from the power to order reports. But if this is true there would be no penalty where a corporation deliberately refused to comply with a lawful Commission order to answer specific questions, for the only penalty available against corporations is the forfeiture provision. Thus a corporation that refused to file an annual or special report would be subject to a $100 per day forfeiture. An individual under subpoena who refused to appear and testify or supply documents would be subject to a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 and/or a jail sentence up to three years. But under petitioner’s interpretation of the Act there would be no penalty whatsoever where a corporation deliberately failed to file answers to specific questions. The only remedy would be a mandatory injunction to force it to do so. We cannot attribute such an anomaly to Congress. Rather we would assume that in placing the phrase “answers in writing to specific questions” in § 6 (b) Congress was merely explicating what the Commission might require a corporation to include in an annual or special report. Moreover, the legislative history of the Act does not support petitioner’s theory that the phrase “answers in writing to specific questions” refers to a separate power of the Commission. Both the House and Senate bills dealing with the Federal Trade Commission (or Interstate Trade Commission, as it was called in the House) had provisions enabling the Commission to order annual and special reports, but neither mentioned answers to specific questions. The House Committee Report on the original House version of the Act stated: “The commission, under this section, [later 6 (b)] may also require such special reports as it may deem advisable. By this means, if the ordinary data furnished by a corporation does not adequately disclose its organization, financial condition, business practices, or relation to other corporations, there can be obtained by a special report such additional information as the commission may deem necessary.” H. R. Rep. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4. The phrase “answers in writing to specific questions” first appeared in the Conference Report, but the report by the House Managers explaining the modifications of the House bill did not mention it (although it discussed some other changes in the annual and special report provisions of the House bill). H. R. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. Similarly, the explanation of the Conference Report by the Senate Managers in debate makes it clear that the changes made in conference were of the nature of new, clarifying phraseology (with two exceptions not relevant here). 51 Cong. Rec. 14768-14769. If the conference had intended to give the Commission a separate, new power which was not included in either the House or Senate bill, surely there would be some mention of it in the reports by the managers. Finally, it should be noted that a construction of the statute which empowers the Commission to particularize its requests for annual and special reports with specific questions will tend to avoid objections of vagueness. The requests directed to petitioner which were not particularized-items 1(h); 3 (j), (k); 5 (j), (k); 6(j); 7 (j); 8 (j); and 11 (a)-(l) of the first order; and item 5 of the seventh order — were struck down by the District Court as unenforceable. Such general requests for reports without specificity place the reporting company in a difficult position, leading to expensive and time-consuming litigation as well as frustrating the Commission’s attempt to obtain information. IV. The District Court held that since the Commission orders were “partially defective,” petitioner had a valid reason for challenging them, and therefore no forfeitures accrued. Petitioner supports this holding by asserting that many of the items included in the Commission’s orders were held unenforceable by the District Court, and that under Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 214 (1951), forfeiture should not be imposed for noncompliance with substantially defective orders. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that forfeiture had occurred and that the daily penalty began to run 30 days after the notice of default on the first set of the Commission’s orders. We agree with the Court of Appeals and conclude that the single daily penalty runs until the date of our stay, February 7, 1961. Petitioner’s figures relative to the percentage of defective inquiries are based on analysis of all nine orders. However, the suit for forfeiture was brought only in respect to the two orders directed to petitioner, and we will restrict our consideration to the 134 inquiries included therein. Prior to the judgment 63 of these items remained unanswered. The trial judge struck 10 of them as unenforceable, leaving 53 which he ordered to be answered. However, whether one takes the above figures, or those of the petitioner asserting that only 37% of the questions were enforced by the trial court, or the Government’s claim that two-thirds of the questions were valid and unanswered at the time of the suit, this case need not go off on a mathematical formula. The record fully supports the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that this is not “a case involving single oversight or an honest mistake in a good faith attempt to comply with the Commission’s order.” 285 F. 2d, at 614. Nor, as the concurring opinion found, is it a case of “such extensive invalidity that there is no longer an intelligible requirement” for a report. 285 F. 2d, at 616. Petitioner asserts that even partial invalidity of the order prevents the application of the forfeiture provision, arguing that the case is controlled by the rule in Bowman Dairy Co., supra. In that case the Court concluded that “one should not be held in contempt under a subpoena that is part good and part bad.” 341 U. S., at 221. But that rule cannot be considered apart from its facts. There the defendant could not appeal from the contested order, but was able to challenge it only by disobeying and appealing the contempt conviction. It was in review of that conviction — the defendant’s first opportunity to review the validity of the order — that this Court held that its partial invalidity barred the punishment. Here petitioner might have delayed accrual of the forfeitures pending determination of the merits or obtained a separate judicial determination of the validity of the orders before the penalties began to accrue, as we point out infra. Rather than attempting such procedures it defied large parts of the orders. It cannot now be heard to complain because such defiance was in error. Petitioner also contends that the trial court, after finding the orders partially invalid, should have stricken them and required the Commission to issue new ones if it wished to proceed with the inquiry. We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that § 6 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 241, 5 U. S. C. § 1005 (c), authorized the procedure the court followed, i. e., ordering partial compliance. That section directs the court to sustain “any such subpena or similar process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law . . .” Nor do we see any substance to the further contention that in directing partial compliance the trial judge treated those items found enforceable as subpoenas and therefore subject solely to contempt action. The various requests were severable, and the court’s order was not in substitution of the Commission’s orders but merely an enforcement of them, in accordance with § 9 of the F. T. C. A. authorizing the court to compel obedience to lawful Commission orders. Finally, petitioner argues that the case should have been remanded to the trial court for determination of whether the forfeiture should apply. However, once the Court of Appeals held that the default was within the forfeiture provision of § 10, its penalties accrued, and there was nothing remaining open for decision that required a remand to the District Court. V. Petitioner’s final point is that to impose the forfeitures will deprive it of property without due process of law. This argument is based on the premise that the orders of the Commission were not judicially reviewable except at the risk of paying daily forfeitures accumulating throughout the period of noncompliance, including the period of judicial review. We need not consider this point at length for it appears that petitioner did not try to obtain judicial review prior to the commencement of this action by the Government, nor did petitioner seek a stay once the litigation had begun. This inaction was in part based upon petitioner’s reliance on Federal Trade Comm’n v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927). This reliance was misplaced. In that case an injunction was sought against the Commission restraining it from enforcing certain orders issued under the same section of the Act involved here. The Commission, however, had not issued any notice of default on the orders, as was done here, nor had the orders been forwarded to the Attorney General for enforcement. This Court properly held an injunction would not lie since the subjects of the reports could not suffer any injury or penalty at that point in the investigation. As Chief Justice Taft said, “Until the Attorney General acts, the defendants can not suffer, and when he does act, they can promptly answer and have full opportunity to contest the legality of any prejudicial proceeding against them.” 274 U. S., at 174. Upon the commencement of the action by the Government, petitioner might have then sought a stay, as it did when the decision went against it in the Court of Appeals. Moreover, after the entry of the notices of default by the Commission, petitioner might have itself sought relief before the § 10 forfeitures began to accrue instead of waiting for the Attorney General to sue for their collection. As was said in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 654 (1950), “we are not prepared to say that courts would be powerless” to act where such orders appear suspect and ruinous penalties would be sustained pending a good faith test of their validity. There the record did not present and the Court did not determine “whether the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, or general equitable powers of the courts would afford a remedy if there were shown to be a wrong, or what the consequences would be if no chance is given for a test of reasonable objections to such an order.” Similarly, as this matter comes here now, the petitioner has pursued none of these remedies, and we could not therefore say that it had “no chance” to prevent the running of the forfeiture pending a test of the validity of the orders. Cf. United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U. S. 33, 37 (1952); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 310 (1937). We note, however, that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, provides that “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court . . . may declare the rights . . . of any interested party seeking such declaration . . . .” This appears sufficient to meet petitioner’s needs. This Court cannot forgive statutory penalties once they legally attach and, finding no grounds upon which we can strike them down, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. “The commission shall also have power— “(b) To require, by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce, excepting banks, and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, or any class of them, or any of them, respectively, to file with the commission in such form as the commission may prescribe annual or special, or both annual and special, reports or answers in writing to specific questions, furnishing to the commission such information as it may require as to the organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations, partnerships, and individuals of the respective corporations filing such reports or answers in writing. Such reports and answers shall be made under oath, or otherwise, as the commission may prescribe, and shall be filed with the commission within such reasonable period as the commission may prescribe, unless additional time be granted in any case by the commission.” 38 Stat. 721, 15 U. S. C. §46 (b). Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that “[u]pon the application of the Attorney General of the United States, at the request of the commission, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus commanding any person or corporation to comply with the provisions of this Act or any order of the commission made in pursuance thereof.” 38 Stat. 722, 15 U. S. C. § 49. Section 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides: “That any person who shall neglect or refuse to attend and testify, or to answer any lawful inquiry, or to produce documentary evidence, if in his power to do so, in obedience to the subpoena or lawful requirement of the commission, shall be guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both such fine -and imprisonment. “Any person who shall willfully make, or cause to be made, any false entry or statement of fact in any report required to be made under this Act, or who shall willfully make, or cause to be made, any false entry in any account, record, or memorandum kept by any corporation subject to said sections, or who shall willfully neglect or fail to make, or to cause to be made, full, true, and correct entries in such accounts, records, or memoranda of all facts and transactions appertaining to the business of such corporation, or who shall willfully remove out of the jurisdiction of the United States, or willfully mutilate, alter, or by any other means falsify any documentary evidence of such corporation, or who shall willfully refuse to submit to the commission or to any of its authorized agents, for the purpose of inspection and taking copies, any documentary evidence of such corporation in his possession or within his control, shall be deemed guilty of an offense against the United States, and shall be subject, upon conviction in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, to a fine of not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000, or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both such fine and imprisonment. “If any corporation required by this Act to file any annual or special report shall fail so to do within the time fixed by the commission for filing the same, and such failure shall continue for thirty days after notice of such default, the corporation shall forfeit to the United States the sum of $100 for each and every day of the continuance of such failure, which forfeiture shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the United States brought in the district where the corporation has its principal office or in any district in which it shall do business. It shall be the duty of the various United States attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, to prosecute for the recovery of forfeitures. The costs and expenses of such prosecution shall be paid out of the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of the United States. “Any officer or employee of the commission who shall make public any information obtained by the commission without its authority, unless directed by a court, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” 38 Stat. 723, 15 U. S. C. § 50. Compare Federal Trade Comm’n v. Dilger, 276 F. 2d 739 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1960), with United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 285 F. 2d 607 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1960). “Information as confidential; exception. “(a) Neither the Secretary, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of Commerce or bureau or agency thereof, may, except as provided in section 8 of this title— “(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or “(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular establishment or individual under this title can be identified; or “(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Department or bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports.” 13 U. S. C. § 9 (a). “CONFIDENTIAL. — This report is required by Act of Congress, approved August 31, 1954, (13 U. S. C. 131 and 224). Your report is confidential and only sworn Census employees will have access to it. It cannot be used for purposes of taxation, investigation or regulation.” Proclamation by President Hoover, November 22, 1929, 46 Stat. 3011, 3012. “That neither said report nor any report of said investigation nor any part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in said report or investigation.” 36 Stat. 351, 45 U. S. C. § 41. “ (f) No report by any motor carrier of any accident arising in the course of the operations of such carrier, made pursuant to any requirement of the Commission, and no report by the Commission of any investigation of any such accident, shall be admitted as evidence, or used for any other purpose, in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or investigation.’' 49 U. S. C. §320 (f). E. g., United States v. O’Mara, 122 F. Supp. 399 (D. C. D. C. 1954). Contra, O’Connell v. Olsen & Ugelstadt, 10 F. R. D. 142, 143 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1949). “Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment.” 18 U. S. C. § 1905. The second set of orders was merely supplementary, so only a single daily penalty accrued. Petitioner unsuccessfully moved in the Court of Appeals for a postponement of the effective date of the Commission’s orders. Coming when it did, however, we cannot say that such denial was an abuse of discretion. Cf. Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926). Furthermore, a short while thereafter we stayed the accumulation of further penalties when the petition for writ of certiorari was granted. If petitioner had unsuccessfully sought a stay in the District Court, a different question might have been presented. That action, after final judgment, could have been reviewed both in the Court of Appeals and here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. BLUMER No. 00-952. Argued December 3, 2001 Decided February 20, 2002 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 498. Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General. Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Ranter, Bruce G. Forrest, Alex Azar II, Sheree R. Kanner, Henry R. Goldberg, Carole F. Kagan, and David R. Smith. Mitchell Hagopian argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Eva Shiffrin and Sarah Orr. Thomas C. Fox filed a brief for the American Health Care Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP et al. by Rochelle Bobroff, Bruce Vignery, and Michael Schuster; for the Ohio State Bar Association et al. by William J. Browning, Eugene Whetzel, Rene H. Reixach, and A. Frank Johns; for SeniorLAW/Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., by Carol J. Wessels; and for the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Elder Law Section by Sara Buscher and Barbara J. Becker. A brief of amicus curiae was filed for the Medicaid agencies of 14 States by Charles A Miller, joined by the Attorneys General of their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, John J. Farmer of New Jersey, Wayne K. Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires interpretation of the “spousal impoverishment” provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA or Act), 102 Stat. 754, 42 U. S. C. § 1396r-5 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), a complex set of instructions made part of the federal Medicaid statute. The spousal impoverishment provisions permit a spouse living at home (called the “community spouse”) to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse (the “institutionalized spouse”) is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The Act shelters from diminution a standard amount of assets (called the “community spouse resource allowance,” “CSRA,” or “resource allowance”). The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, i. e., to shelter assets in excess of the standard resource allowance, Wisconsin, like a majority of other States, uses an “income-first” method. Under that method, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse, which the MCCA expressly permits, will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Respondent Irene Blumer, whose Medicaid eligibility was delayed by the application of petitioner Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services’ income-first method, challenges that method as inconsistent with the MCCA provision governing upward revision of the community spouse resource allowance, § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) (1994 ed.). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld her challenge. We reverse that court’s judgment. Neither the text of § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) nor the structure of the MCCA, we conclude, forbids Wisconsin’s chosen approach. Consistent with the position adopted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, we hold that the income-first method represents a permissible interpretation of the Act. I A The federal Medicaid program provides funding to States that reimburse needy persons for the cost of medical care. See Social Security Act, tit. XIX, as added, 79 Stat. 343, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). “Each participating State develops a plan containing reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance” within boundaries set by the Medicaid statute and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); § 1396a(a)(17) (1994 ed.). In formulating those standards, States must “provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant.” § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). Because spouses typically possess assets and income jointly and bear financial responsibility for each other, Medicaid eligibility determinations for married applicants have resisted simple solutions. See, e.g., id., at 44-48. Until 1989, the year the MCCA took effect, States generally considered the income of either spouse to be “available” to the other. We upheld this approach in Gray Panthers, observing that “from the beginning of the Medicaid program, Congress authorized States to presume spousal support.” Id., at 44; see id., at 45 (quoting passage from S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 78 (1965), including statement that “it is proper to expect spouses to support each other”). Similarly, assets held jointly by the couple were commonly deemed “available” in full to the institutionalized spouse. At the same time, States generally did not treat resources held individually by the community spouse as available to the institutionalized spouse. Accordingly, assets titled solely in the name of the community spouse often escaped consideration in determining the institutionalized spouse’s Medicaid eligibility. See H. R. Rep. No. 100-105, pt. 2, pp. 66-67 (1987). As Congress later found when it enacted the MCCA in 1988, these existing practices for determining, a married applicant’s income and resources produced unintended consequences. Many community spouses were left destitute by the drain on the couple’s assets necessary to qualify the institutionalized spouse for Medicaid and by the diminution of the couple’s income posteligibility to reduce the amount payable by Medicaid for institutional care. See id., at 66-68. Conversely, couples with ample means could qualify for assistance when their assets were held solely in the community spouse’s name. In the MCCA, Congress sought to protect community spouses from “pauperization” while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining Medicaid assistance. See id., at 65 (bill seeks to “end th[e] pauperization” of the community spouse “by assuring that the community spouse has a sufficient — but not excessive — amount of income and resources available”). To achieve this aim, Congress installed a set of intricate and interlocking requirements with which States must comply in allocating a couple’s income and resources. Income allocation is governed by §§1396r-5(b) and (d). Covering any month in which “an institutionalized spouse is in the institution,” § 1396r-5(b)(l) provides that “no income of the community spouse shall be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.” The community spouse’s income is thus preserved for that spouse and does not affect the determination whether the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. In general, such income is also disregarded in calculating the amount Medicaid will pay for the institutionalized spouse’s care after eligibility is established. Other provisions specifically address income allocation in the period after the institutionalized spouse becomes Medicaid eligible. Section 1396r-5(b)(2)(A) prescribes, as a main rule, that if payment of income is made solely in the name of one spouse, that income is treated as available only to the named spouse (the “name-on-the-check” rule). Section 1396r-5(d) provides a number of exceptions to that main rule designed to ensure that the community spouse and other dependents have income sufficient to meet basic needs. Among the exceptions, § 1396r-5(d)(3) establishes for the community spouse a “minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance,” or MMMNA. The MMMNA is calculated by multiplying the federal poverty level for a couple by a percentage set by the State. Since 1992, that percentage must be at least 150%, §§ 1396r-5(d)(3)(A)-(B), but the resulting MMMNA may not exceed $1,500 per month in 1988 dollars ($2,175 in 2001 dollars), §§ 1396r-5(d)(3)(C), (g). If the income of the community spouse determined under § 1396r-5(b)(2), which states the “name-on-the-check” rule, is insufficient to yield income equal to or above the MMMNA, § 1396r-5(d)(l)(B) comes into play. Under that provision, the amount of the shortfall is “deducted” from the income of the institutionalized spouse — reducing the amount of income that would otherwise be considered available for the institutionalized spouse’s care — so long as that income is actually made available to the community spouse. The amount thus reallocated from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse is called the “community spouse monthly income allowance,” or CSMIA, § 1396r-5(d)(l)(B). The provision for this allowance ensures that income transferred from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse to meet the latter’s basic needs is not also considered available for the former’s care. As a result, Medicaid will pay a greater portion of the institutionalized spouse’s medical expenses than it would absent the CSMIA provision. Resource allocation is controlled by §§ 1396r-5(c) and (f). For purposes of establishing the institutionalized spouse’s Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple’s assets is reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. §1396r-5(c)(2). To determine that reserved amount (the CSRA), the total of all of the couple’s resources (whether owned jointly or separately) is calculated as of the time the institutionalized spouse’s institutionalization commenced; half of that total is then allocated to each spouse (the “spousal share”). § 1396r-5(c)(l)(A). The spousal share allocated to the community spouse qualifies as the CSRA, subject to a ceiling of $60,000 indexed for inflation (in 2001, the ceiling was $87,000) and a floor, set by the State, between $12,000 and $60,000 (also indexed for inflation; in 2001, the amounts were $17,400 and $87,000). §§ 1396r-5(c)(2)(B), (f)(2)(A), (g). The CSRA is considered unavailable to the institutionalized spouse in the eligibility determination, but all resources above the CSRA (excluding a small sum set aside as a personal allowance for the institutionalized spouse, currently $2,000, see 20 CFR §416.1205 (2001)) must be spent before eligibility can be achieved. § 1396r-5(c)(2). The MCCA provides for a “fair hearing” mechanism through which a couple may challenge the State’s determination of a number of elements that affect eligibility for, or the extent of assistance provided under, Medicaid. §§1396r-5(e). The dispute in this case centers on § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C), which allows a couple to request a higher CSRA. That section provides in relevant part: “If either . . . spouse establishes that the [CSRA] (in relation to the amount of income generated by such an allowance) is inadequate to raise the community spouse’s income to the [MMMNA], there shall be substituted, for the [CSRA] under subsection (f)(2) of this section, an amount adequate to provide [the MMMNA].” If the couple succeeds in obtaining a higher CSRA, the institutionalized spouse may reserve additional resources for posteligibility transfer to the community spouse. The enhanced CSRA will reduce the resources the statute deems available for the payment of medical expenses; accordingly, the institutionalized spouse will become eligible for Medicaid sooner. In allocating income and resources between spouses for purposes of § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C), the States have employed two divergent methods: an “income-first” method, used by most States; and a “resources-first” method, preferred by the others. The two methods differ in their construction of the term “community spouse’s income” in subsection (e)(2)(C). Under the income-first method, “community spouse’s income” is defined to include not only the community spouse’s actual income at the time of the § 1396r-5(e) fair hearing, but also a potential posteligibility income transfer from the institutionalized spouse — the CSMIA authorized by § 1396r-5(d)(1)(B), see supra, at 481-482. Thus, only if the community spouse’s preeligibility income plus the CSMIA will fall below the MMMNA may the couple reserve a greater portion of assets through an enhanced CSRA. . The resources-first method, by contrast, excludes the CSMIA from consideration. “Community spouse’s income” under that approach includes only income actually received by the community spouse at the time of the § 1396r-5(e) hearing, not any anticipated posteligibility income transfer from the institutionalized spouse pursuant to § 1396r-5(d)(l)(B). If the community spouse’s income so defined will fall below the MMMNA, the CSRA will be raised to reserve additional assets sufficient to generate income meeting the shortfall, whether or not the CSMIA could also accomplish that task. In sum, the income-first method, because it takes account of the potential CSMIA, makes it less likely that the CSRA will be increased; it therefore tends to require couples to expend additional resources before the institutionalized spouse becomes Medicaid eligible. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has issued several statements supporting the income-first method. Initially, the Secretary interpreted the MCCA as requiring state hearing officers to use that method. See HCFA, Chicago Regional State Letter No. 51-93 (Dec. 1993), App. to Pet. for Cert. 78a-83a. More recently, the Secretary has concluded that the Act permits both income-first and “some other reasonable interpretation of the law.” HCFA, Chicago Regional State Letter No. 22-94, p. 2 (July 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a. The Secretary has circulated for comment a proposed rule “allowing] States the threshold choice of using either the income-first or resources-first method when determining whether the community spouse has sufficient income to meet minimum monthly maintenance needs.” 66 Fed. Reg. 46763, 46765 (2001). The proposed rule details the Secretary’s reasons for concluding that the Act does not “clearly requir[e] the use of either [method] to the exclusion of the other.” Id., at 46767. Accordingly, “in view of the cooperative federalism considerations embodied in the Medicaid program,” id., at 46765, the Secretary found it appropriate to “leave to States the decision as to which alternative to use,” id., at 46767. B The facts of this case illustrate the operation of the Act and the different consequences of the income-first and resources-first. approaches. Irene Blumer was admitted to a Wisconsin nursing home in 1994 and applied for Medicaid assistance in 1996 through her husband Burnett. In accord with § 1396r-5(c), the Green County Department of Human Services (County) determined that as of Irene’s institutionalization in 1994, the couple’s resources amounted to $145,644. Dividing this amount evenly between the Blumers, the County attributed $72,822 to each spouse. Burnett was allocated this $72,822 share as his CSRA, and Irene was entitled to reserve a personal allowance of $2,000, 20 CFR §416.1205 (2001). Combining these sums, the County determined that the Blumers could retain $74,822 in assets. The County next found that, as of the date of Irene’s application, the Blumers’ resources had been reduced from $145,644 to $89,335. That amount exceeded by $14,513 the couple’s resource eligibility threshold. The County accordingly concluded that Irene would not be eligible for Medicaid until the couple’s assets were spent down to the $74,822 limit. Seeking to obtain a higher CSRA, Irene requested a hearing. For purposes of the hearing, Burnett’s monthly income amounted to $1,639, consisting of $1,015 in Social Security benefits, $309 from an annuity, and $315 generated by the assets protected in his CSRA. Irene argued that because Burnett’s monthly income fell below the applicable MMMNA of $1,727, the examiner was obliged to increase his CSRA, thereby protecting additional assets capable of covering the income shortfall. Excluding Irene’s $2,000 personal allowance, the Blumers’ total remaining assets exceeded Burnett’s $72,822 standard CSRA, as just noted, by $14,513, an amount generating roughly $63 in monthly income. Attributing that income to Burnett would have raised his monthly income to $1,702, still $25 short of the MMMNA. Thus, had the hearing officer applied the resources-first method — addressing Burnett’s income shortfall by first reserving additional assets for his benefit — the examiner would have increased Burnett’s CSRA to encompass all of the Blumers’ remaining available resources, and Irene would have become immediately eligible for Medicaid. The remaining $25 deficit in Burnett’s income could then have been covered posteligi-bility by a monthly transfer of income (or CSMIA) from Irene, who at the time of the hearing received $927 per month in Social Security and $336 from a pension. Wisconsin, however, has adopted the income-first rule by statute: “If either spouse establishes at a fair hearing that the community spouse resource allowance determined under sub. (6)(b) without a fair hearing does not generate enough income to raise the community spouse’s income to the [MMMNA]..., the department shall establish an amount to be used under sub. (6)(b)3. that results in a community spouse resource allowance that generates enough income to raise the community spouse’s income to the [MMMNA] .... Except in exceptional cases which would result in financial duress for the community spouse, the department may not establish an amount to be used under sub. (6)(b)3. unless the institutionalized spouse makes available to the community spouse the maximum monthly income allowance permitted under sub. a)(b).” Wis. Stat. §49.455(8)(d) (1999-2000) (emphasis added). Applying this rule, the hearing examiner concluded that he was without authority to increase Burnett’s CSRA: The difference between Burnett’s monthly income and the MMMNA could be erased if, after achieving eligibility, Irene made available to Burnett $88 per month from her own income. This, the examiner concluded, Irene would be able to do; accordingly, there was no need to reserve additional assets for Burnett, and no acceleration in Irene’s Medicaid eligibility. The following table illustrates the differences between the income-first and resources-first methods as applied to the Blumers: The hearing examiner’s determination was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Green County. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, reversed. Concluding that the MCCA unambiguously mandates the resources-first method, the Wisconsin appellate court declared that the State’s income-first statute impermissibly conflicts with federal law. 2000 WI App. 150, 237 Wis. 2d 810, 615 N. W. 2d 647. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, holding the income-first method impermissible and the resources-first method required, accords with the position adopted by Ohio intermediate appellate courts. See, e. g., Kimnach v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 96 Ohio App. 3d 640, 647, 645 N. E. 2d 825, 829-830 (1994), appeal not allowed, 71 Ohio St. 3d 1447, 644 N. E. 2d 409 (1995). Most courts to consider the issue, however, including the highest courts of New York and Massachusetts, as well as two Federal Courts of Appeals, have upheld the Secretary’s view that the Act permits the income-first method. See Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F. 3d 801, 805 (CA3), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 870 (1999); Chambers v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 145 F. 3d 793, 801 (CA6), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 964 (1998); Golf v. New York State Div. of Soc. Servs., 91 N. Y. 2d 656, 662, 697 N. E. 2d 555, 558 (1998); Thomas v. Commissioner of Div. of Medical Assistance, 425 Mass. 738, 746, 682 N. E. 2d 874, 879 (1997). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 533 U. S. 927 (2001), and now reverse the judgment of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. II The question presented is whether the income-first prescription of the Wisconsin statute, requiring that potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse be considered part of the “community spouse’s income” for purposes of determining whether a higher CSRA is necessary, conflicts with the MCCA. The answer to that question, the parties agree, turns on whether the words “community spouse’s income” in § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) may be interpreted to include potential, posteligibility transfers of income from the institutionalized spouse permitted by § 1396r-5(d)(l)(B). In line with the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2000 WI App. 150, ¶ 20, but in conflict with the weight of lower court authority, see, e. g., Cleary, 167 F. 3d, at 807; Chambers, 145 F. 3d, at 802, Blumer first argues that the plain meaning of the term “community spouse’s income” unambiguously precludes the income-first method. She does not dispute that a monthly allowance regularly transferred from one spouse to the other could qualify as “income” under any relevant definition, but instead focuses on the modifier “community spouse’s,” contending that “[b]y choosing the possessive . . . Congress clearly expressed its intent that the income possessed by the community spouse” is the relevant measure. Brief for Respondent 16. We disagree. Congress’ use of the possessive case does not demand construction of “community spouse’s income” to mean only income actually possessed by, rather than available or attributable to, the community spouse; to the contrary, the . use of the possessive is often indeterminate. See J. Taylor, Possessives in English: An Exploration in Cognitive Grammar 2 (1996) (“[T]he entity denoted by a possessor nominal does not necessarily possess (in the everyday, legalistic sense of the term) the entity denoted by the possessee.”); see also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 739 (1996) (questioning characterization of a statutory term as unambiguous when its meaning has generated a division of opinion in the lower courts). Blumer maintains as well that the “design of the Act as a whole” precludes use of the income-first method. K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988). She relies heavily, as did the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2000 WI App. 150, ¶¶ 21-23, on the Act’s distinction between rules governing the initial Medicaid eligibility determination and those that apply posteligibility to the extent-of-assistance calculation. See Brief for Respondent 17-18. Blumer notes that the (e)(2)(C) hearing to obtain an enhanced CSRA occurs only at the time an eligibility assessment is conducted, while no CSMIA income is transferred until after eligibility has been achieved, see supra, at 481-482. This sequence, she contends, shows that Congress intended the CSRA enhancement and the CSMIA to operate at discrete stages: The former remedies a shortfall in the income possessed by the community spouse prior to eligibility, while the latter provides further relief posteligibility if the previous CSRA enhancement proves inadequate. See Brief for Respondent 18. Because the Wisconsin statute requires imputation of the CSMIA to the community spouse before additional assets may be reserved, Blumer concludes, the statute reverses the priority established by the MCCA. In accord with the Secretary, we do not agree that Congress circumscribed the (e)(2)(C) hearing in the manner Blumer urges. Although that hearing is conducted pre-eligibility, its purpose is to anticipate the posteligibility financial situation of the couple. The procedure seeks to project what the community spouse’s income will be when the institutionalized spouse becomes eligible. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 (officer conducting (e)(2)(C) hearing makes a calculation that “concerns the post eligibility period”; question is will “the at-home spouse . . . have sufficient income in the post eligibility period, or does the resource allowance need to be jacked up in order to provide that additional income”). The hearing officer must measure that projected income against the MMMNA, a standard ■ that, like the CSMIA, is operative only posteligibility. §§ 1396r~5(b)(2), (d)(3). In short, if the (e)(2)(C) hearing is properly comprehended as a preeligibility projection of the couple’s posteligibility situation, as we think it is, we do not count it unreasonable for a State to include in its estimation of the “community spouse’s income” in that posteligibility period an income transfer that may then occur. Blumer’s skewed view of the (e)(2)(C) hearing also underlies the contention, advanced at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-10, that the income-first method renders meaningless the Act’s key prohibition against deeming income of the community spouse available to the institutionalized one. § 1396r-5(b)(l). According to this argument, including the CSMIA as part of the “community spouse’s income” under subsection (e)(2)(C) effectively converts some income of the institutionalized spouse into income of the community spouse. And prior to eligibility, the argument continues, all of the institutionalized spouse’s income is considered available for medical expenses. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 CFR §435.120 (2000). Thus, the theory concludes, under income-first the CSMIA would, as a logical matter, be considered both “community spouse’s income” and “available” for the institutionalized spouse’s medical expenses in clear contravention of subsection (b)(1). This argument confuses the inclusion of a projected CSMIA in the preeligibility calculation of the community spouse’s posteligibility income with the actual transfer of income contemplated by the CSMIA provision. The (e)(2)(C) hearing is, again, simply a projection of the state of affairs that will exist posteligibility. The theoretical incorporation of a CSMIA into the community spouse’s future income at that hearing has no effect on the preeligibility allocation of income between the spouses. A CSMIA becomes part of the community spouse’s income only when it is in fact transferred to that spouse, § 1396r-5(d)(l)(B), which may not occur until “[a]fter [the] institutionalized spouse is determined ... to be eligible.” § 1396r-5(d)(l). At that point, the actual CSMIA is deducted from the institutionalized spouse’s income, ibid., and is no longer available for medical expenses. Thus, at all times the rule of subsection (b)(1) is honored, for at no time is any income of the community spouse simultaneously deemed available to the institutionalized spouse. Far from precluding Wisconsin’s chosen approach, the MCCA’s design offers affirmative support for the permissibility of the income-first method, Subsection (b)(1), prohibiting attribution of the community spouse’s income to the institutionalized spouse, has no counterpart running in the opposite direction. Indeed, the Act specifically provides for a transfer of income from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse through the CSMIA. § 1396r-5(d)(l)(B). Mindful of the Medicaid program’s background principle that “it is proper to expect spouses to support each other,” Gray Panthers, 453 U. S., at 45 (quoting S. Rep. No. 404, pt. 1, at 78) (internal quotation marks omitted), we are satisfied that a State reasonably interprets the MCCA by anticipating the CSMIA in the (e)(2)(C) hearing. We further note that subsection (e), governing fair hearings in general, is not limited to a redetermination of the CSRA. It also permits a hearing if the couple is dissatisfied with: “(i) the [CSMIA]; “(ii) the amount of monthly income otherwise available to the community spouse ...; “(iii) the computation of the spousal share of resources under subsection (c)(1) of this section; [and] “(iv) the attribution of resources under subsection (c)(2) of this section.” § 1396r-5(e)(2)(A). Given that the CSMIA itself may be adjusted in a fair hearing under subsection (e)(2)(A)(i), we cannot conclude that the States are forbidden to consider the projected CSMIA in the related hearing, authorized by subsection (e)(2)(A)(v), to increase the CSRA. Accord, Cleary, 167 F. 3d, at 810. H-1 HH We thus hold that the income-first method is a permissible means of implementing the Act. The parties here have not also disputed the permissibility of the resources-first approach. We therefore do not definitively resolve that matter, although we note that the leeway for state choices urged by both Wisconsin and the United States is characteristic of Medicaid. The Medicaid statute, in which the MCCA is implanted, is designed to advance cooperative federalism. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 308 (1980). When interpreting other statutes so structured, we have not been reluctant to leave a range of permissible choices to the States, at least where the superintending federal agency has concluded that such latitude is consistent with the statute’s aims. In Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 429 (1977), for example, we upheld a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare affording the States discretion in the implementation of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) unemployed parent program. The challenged regulation allowed States to cover or exclude from coverage persons whose unemployment resulted from participation in a labor dispute or whose conduct would disqualify them for benefits under the State’s compensation law. Noting that the AFDC program involved the “concept of cooperative federalism,” id., at 431, we concluded that the Secretary had the authority to “recognize some local options in determining . . . eligibility,” id., at 430. Similarly, in Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U. S. 368 (1987), a plurality of this Court concluded that Virginia’s policy of treating personal injury awards as income rather than resources under the AFDC program was reasonable and consistent with federal law, see id., at 377-381. The superintending federal agency, the plurality pointed out, had for many years permitted Virginia’s choice while allowing other States to treat such awards as resources. Id., at 378. The Secretary of Health and Human Services, who possesses the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue here, § 1396a(a)(17), has preliminarily determined that the MCCA permits both the income-first and resources-first methods. See 66 Fed. Reg. 46763, 46767 (2001); HCFA, Chicago Regional State Letter No. 22-94, at 2, App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a. In a recently proposed rule, the Secretary declared that “in the spirit of Federalism,” the Federal Government “should leave to States the decision as to which alternative [income-first or resources-first] to use.” 66 Fed. Reg. 46768, 46767 (2001). The Secretary’s position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U. S. 504, 512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary’s “significant expertise” particularly appropriate in the ¡context of “a complex and highly technical regulatory program” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gray Panthers, 453 U. S., at 43-44 (Secretary granted “exceptionally broad authority” under the Medicaid statute). As Blumer acknowledges, Brief for Respondent 31-32, the MCCA affords large discretion to the States on two related variables: the level of the MMMNA accorded the community spouse, § 1396r-5(d)(3), see supra, at 481, and the amount of assets the couple is permitted to retain, § 1396r-5(f)(2)(A), see supra, at 482-483. Nothing in the Act indicates to us that similar latitude is inappropriate with respect to the application of subsection (e)(2)(C). Eliminating the discretion to choose income-first would hinder a State’s efforts to “strik[e] its own balance” in the implementation of the Act. Lukhard, 481 U. S., at 383. States that currently allocate limited funds through the income-first approach would have little choice but to offset the greater expense of the resources-first method by reducing the MMMNA or the standard CSRA. Such an alteration would benefit couples seeking Medicaid who possess significant resources — “not ... a lot of people” by Blumer’s own account, Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 — while offering nothing to, and perhaps disadvantaging, those who do not, couples for whom the other variables provide the primary protection against spousal impoverishment. Blumer would thus have us conclude that Congress pushed States toward altering standards that affect every person covered by the MCCA in order to install, without any increased spending, a resources-first rule that affects only those whose assets exceed the formula resources allowance. We perceive nothing in the Act contradicting the Secretary’s conclusion that such a result is unnecessary and unwarranted. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Secretary has delegated his rulemaking power to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), see Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority for the Dept, of Health and Human Services, Pt. F, 46 Fed. Reg. 13262-13263 (1981), now called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, see 66 Fed. Reg. 35437 (2001). We nevertheless refer throughout this opinion to the Secretary as the entity charged with interpretive authority. The State must also provide for an “excess shelter allowance” if necessary to cover, inter alia, unusually high rent or mortgage payments. §§ 1396r-5(d)(3)(A)(ii), (d)(4). Either spouse may request a hearing to seek a higher MMMNA for the community spouse; such an increase will be allowed if the couple establishes “exceptional circumstances resulting in significant financial duress.” § 1396r-5(e)(2)(B). The Act excludes from the definition of “resources” the couple’s home,. one automobile, personal belongings, and certain other forms of property. §§ 1382b(a) (1994 ed. and Supp. V), 1396r-5(c)(5) (1994 ed.). Once the institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible, “no resources [gained by] the community spouse shall be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.” § 1396r-5(c)(4). As the United States points out, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8, n. 4, the MCCA technically defines the CSRA as only a portion of the assets protected for the benefit of the community spouse. Under § 1396r-5(f)(2), the CSRA denotes the amount by which the community spouse’s “spousal share” of the couple’s resources falls below the resource allowance set by the State pursuant to § 1396r-5(f)(2)(A). Assets covering this shortfall are automatically excluded from consideration in the eligibility determination and transferred to the community spouse after eligibility is achieved. §§ 1396r-5(f)(l), (2). We observe, however, that the parties here, like the court below, refer to the CSRA as the total resources the community spouse is permitted to retain, an amount generally equal to the spousal share. See Brief for Petitioner 7, n. 6; Brief for Respondent 5; 2000 WI App. 150, ¶ 10, 237 Wis. 2d 810, 816, ¶ 10, 615 N. W. 2d 647, 650, ¶ 10. The Secretary of Health and Human Services employs the same broad definition: According to the Secretary, the CSRA means “the amount of a couple’s combined jointly and separately-owned resources . . . allocated to the community spouse and considered unavailable to the institutionalized spouse when determining his or her eligibility for Medicaid.”. 66 Fed. Reg. 46763, 46768 (2001). We adhere to this common understanding of the CSRA throughout this opinion. Comments on the proposed rule were to be submitted by November 6, 2001. As the Government related at oral argument, however, the Secretary fears that comments have not reached the agency due to the disruption of the Nation’s postal system in October and November 2001. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-17. It remains unclear when the Secretary will take further action on the proposed rule. See 66 Fed. Reg. 61625 (2001). Wisconsin sets the CSRA floor at $50,000. Wis. Stat. § 49.455(6)(b)lm (1999-2001). Because Burnett’s $72,822 spousal share exceeded that amount but fell below the federally imposed ceiling, which was then $79,020 ($60,000 indexed for inflation to 1996), the spousal share became his CSRA. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The hearing examiner incorrectly calculated Burnett’s relevant monthly income to be $1,702, mistakenly attributing to him all of the $378 in income generated by the full $87,355 in the couple's remaining available resources, rather than the $315 yielded by the $72,822 in assets reserved in his CSRA. See id., at 25a; Tr. 8 (Apr. 29, 1997). Although the error does not affect our decision, we use the correct figures (rounded to the nearest dollar) for illustrative purposes. That the hearing must occur preeligibiiity is dictated by the mechanics of the process; in order to preserve the assets, if any, that will be necessary for the community spouse’s support in the posteligibility period, a couple must know in advance what resources it need not and should not expend before the institutionalized spouse becomes Medicaid eligible. Taking issue with this characterization of the (e)(2)(C) hearing, the dissent emphasizes the Wisconsin statute’s prescription that no CSRA enhancement will be allowed “unless the institutionalized spouse makes available to the community spouse the maximum monthly income allowance permitted,” post, at 503 (quoting Wis. Stat. §49.455(8)(d) (1993-1994)) (emphasis supplied by dissent). Only by omitting essential language from the Wisconsin provision can the dissent construe the statute as “requir-ting] a preeligibility transfer of income from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse,” post, at 503 (emphasis added). The state statute in fact provides that the CSRA may not be enhanced “unless the institutionalized spouse makes available to the community spouse the maximum monthly income allowance permitted under sub. U)(b).” Wis. Stat. § 49.455(8)(d) (emphasis added). Subsection (4)(b) is substantially identical to § 1396r-5(d)(l), the very provision of the MCCA that the dissent finds in conflict with § 49.455(8)(d). Like § 1396r-5(d)(l), subsection (4)(b) directs that any income transfer from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse may occur only “after [the] institutionalized spouse is determined ... to be eligible.” Wis. Stat. §49.455(4)(b) (1999-2000). Because subsection (4)(b) of the Wisconsin statute therefore would not “permit” a preeligibility income transfer from the institutionalized spouse, §49.455(8)(d) by its terms does not do so either. In drawing a contrary inference based on an incomplete reading, the dissent, not the Court, “neglects to consider the text of the state statute in issue,” post, at 502. Blumer also contends that § 1396r-5(a)(3) forbids the income-first method because that provision expressly leaves in place the existing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program rules for determining what constitutes income and resources, including the standards and methods used in such determinations. See Brief for Respondent 19-22. In particular, Blumer emphasizes that subsection (a)(3) imposes the SSI requirement, codified at § 1396a(r)(2)(B), that States may not adopt income-assessment standards that reduce the number of people eligible for SSL See id., at 21. As Wisconsin points out, however, the issue carved out by § 1396r-5(a)(3) — what qualifies as income or resources — is not implicated by this case. Reply Brief 5; see supra, at 490. At issue here is the different question, governed entirely by the MCCA, of whether money that is indisputably “income” may be attributed to the community spouse. According to the dissent, anticipating the CSMIA in this manner effectively “mandates an income transfer that Congress left optional,” post, at 503-504. The dissent presumably means that the CSMIA, once projected as part of the “community spouse’s income” in the (e)(2)(C) hearing, must in fact be transferred posteligibility lest the community spouse receive income below the statutorily guaranteed MMMNA. As this case illustrates, however, application of the resources-first method may yield the same situation. If the hearing examiner had granted Irene’s request to increase Burnett’s CSRA without regard to a potential CSMIA, Burnett’s income would still have fallen $25 short of the MMMNA, see supra, at 486-487. A posteligibility income transfer in' that amount would therefore have been “mandatory” as the dissent understands that term, post, at 504. Thus, the dissent’s issue is not with the income-first method, but rather with the friction between Congress’ decision to guarantee a minimum level of income for the community spouse and its failure to mandate the transfer of income necessary in many cases to realize that guarantee. Similarly, in faulting the income-first method for the possibility that its projections may prove inaccurate, see ibid., the dissent attacks a problem inherent in the design of the Act itself. As long as the (e)(2)(C) hearing is conducted preeligibility, see supra, at 491, n. 9, the hearing examiner must inevitably make predictions, and those predictions “may not ultimately come to fruition,” post, at 504. Under the resources-first method, just as under income-first, the examiner must decide whether to enhance the CSRA based on speculation about the community spouse’s income in the posteligibility period. If that income diminishes unexpectedly, the community spouse may be left without the level of income that the examiner “predicted” at the (e)(2)(C) hearing, and on the basis of which the examiner denied a CSRA enhancement. Blumer argues that § 1396r-5(a)(l) divests the Secretary of the authority granted under § 1396a(a)(17) to prescribe standards governing the allocation of income and resources for Medicaid purposes. See Brief for Respondent 39. Subsection (a)(1) states that the eligibility provisions of the MCCA “supersede any other provision of this subchapter (including sections 1396a(a)(17) and I396a(f) of this title) which is inconsistent with them,” but says nothing about the regulatory authority of the Secretary under § 1396a(a)(17). We have long noted Congress’ delegation of extremely broad regulatory authority to the Secretary in the Medicaid area, see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 43 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977), and we will not conclude that Congress implicitly withdrew that authority here. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 505, the Secretary has never wavered from his position that the income-first method represents at least a permissible interpretation of the Act. See HCFA, Chicago Regional State Letter No. 51-93 (Dec. 1993), App. to Pet. for Cert. 78a-83a; HCFA, Chicago Regional State Letter No. 22-94, p. 2 (July 1994), App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a; 66 Fed. Reg. 46763, 46765 (2001).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT et al. No. 08-1498. Argued February 23, 2010 Decided June 21, 2010 Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 40. David D. Cole argued the cause for petitioners in No. 09-89 and respondents in No. 08-1498. With him on the briefs were Shayana Kadidal, Jules Lobel, Richard G. Taranto, Carol Sobel, Paul Hoffman, and Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran. Solicitor General Kagan argued the cause for respondents in No. 09-89 and petitioners in No. 08-1498. With her on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Katyal, Jeffrey B. Wall, and Douglas N. Letter. Together with No. 09-89, Humanitarian Law Project et al. v. Holder, Attorney General, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 08-1498 were filed for the Anti-Defamation League by David M. Raim, Steven M. Freeman, Michael Lieberman, and Steven C. Sheinberg; for the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law by Michael Y. Scudder, Jr., and Anthony S. Barkow; and for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence et al. by John C. Eastman, Edwin Meese III, and David B. Rivkin, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 08-1498 and affirmance in No. 09-89 were filed for Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues by Bradford A. Berenson and Peter Margulies; and for Major General John D. Altenburg, U. S. Army (Ret.) et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 08-1498 and reversal in No. 09-89 were filed for the Carter Center et al. by Melissa Goodman, Steven R. Shapiro, and Jameel Jaffer; and for Victims of the McCarthy Era by John A. Freedman, Sara K. Pildis, and Stephen F. Rohde. Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both eases for Academic Researchers et al. by Burt Neuborne, Elizabeth Goitein, David Udell, and Sidney S. Rosdeitcher; and for the Constitution Project et al. by David M. Gossett, Sharon Bradford Franklin, and John W. Whitehead. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress has prohibited the provision of “material support or resources” to certain foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity. 18 U. S. C. § 2339B(a)(l). That prohibition is based on a finding that the specified organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18 U. S. C. §2339B (Findings and Purpose). The plaintiffs in this litigation seek to provide support to two such organizations. Plaintiffs claim that they seek to facilitate only the lawful, nonviolent purposes of those groups, and that applying the material-support law to prevent them from doing so violates the Constitution. In particular, they claim that the statute is too vague, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that it infringes their rights to freedom of speech and association, in violation of the First Amendment. We conclude that the material-support statute is constitutional as applied to the particular activities plaintiffs have told us they wish to pursue. We do not, however, address the resolution of more difficult cases that may arise under the statute in the future. I This litigation concerns 18 U. S. C. § 2339B, which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” Congress has amended the definition of “material support or resources” periodically, but at present it is defined as follows: “[T]he term “material support or resources’ means any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” § 2339A(b)(l); see also § 2339B(g)(4). The authority to designate an entity a “foreign terrorist organization” rests with the Secretary of State. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). She may, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, so designate an organization upon finding that it is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” or “terrorism,” and thereby “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” §§ 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). “‘[N]ational security’ means the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.” § 1189(d)(2). An entity designated a foreign terrorist organization may seek review of that designation before the D. C. Circuit within 30 days of that designation. § 1189(e)(1). In 1997, the Secretary of State designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist organizations. See 62 Fed. Reg. 52650. Two of those groups are the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (also known as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The PKK is an organization founded in 1974 with, the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180-1181 (CD Cal. 1998); Brief for Petitioners in No. 08-1498, p. 6 (hereinafter Brief for Government). The LTTE is an organization founded in 1976 for the purpose of creating an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1182; Brief for Government 6. The District Court in this action found that the PKK and LTTE engage in political and humanitarian activities. See 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180-1182. The Government has presented evidence that both groups have also committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of which have harmed American citizens. See App. 128-133. The LTTE sought judicial review of its designation as a foreign terrorist organization; the D. C. Circuit upheld that designation. See People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 182 F. 3d 17, 18-19, 25 (1999). The PKK did not challenge its designation. 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180. Plaintiffs in this litigation are two U. S. citizens and six domestic organizations: the Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) (a human rights organization with consultative status to the United Nations); Ralph Fertig (the HLP’s president, and a retired Administrative Law Judge); Nagalingam Jeyalingam (a Tamil physician, born in Sri Lanka and a naturalized U. S. citizen); and five nonprofit groups dedicated to the interests of persons of Tamil descent. Brief for Petitioners in No. 09-89, pp. ii, 10 (hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffs); App. 48. In 1998, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the material-support statute, § 2339B. Plaintiffs claimed that they wished to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of the PKK and LTTE in the form of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy, but that they could not do so for fear of prosecution under §2339B. 9 F. Supp. 2d, at 1180-1184. As relevant here, plaintiffs claimed that the material-support statute was unconstitutional on two grounds: First, it violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association under the First Amendment, because it criminalized their provision of material support to the PKK and LTTE, without requiring the Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those organizations. Id., at 1184. Second, plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id., at 1184-1185. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted in part. The District Court held that plaintiffs had not established a probability of success on their First Amendment speech and association claims. See id., at 1196-1197. But the court held that plaintiffs had established a probability of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the statutory terms “personnel” and “training” in the definition of “material support” were impermissibly vague. See id., at 1204. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 205 F. 3d 1130, 1138 (CA9 2000). The court rejected plaintiffs’ speech and association claims, including their claim that § 2339B violated the First Amendment in barring them from contributing money to the PKK and LTTE. See id., at 1133-1136. But the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the terms “personnel” and “training” were vague because it was “easy to imagine protected expression that falls within the bounds” of those terms. Id., at 1138; see id., at 1137. With the preliminary injunction issue decided, the action returned to the District Court, and the parties moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court entered a permanent injunction against applying to plaintiffs the bans on “personnel” and “training” support. See No. CV-98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 WL 36105333 (CD Cal., Oct. 2, 2001). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 352 F. 3d 382 (CA9 2003). Meanwhile, in 2001, Congress amended the definition of “material support or resources” to add the term “expert advice or assistance.” Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT), § 805(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 377. In 2003, plaintiffs filed a second action challenging the constitutionality of that term as applied to them. 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1192 (CD Cal. 2004). In that action, the Government argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that their preenforcement claims were not ripe. Id., at 1194. The District Court held that plaintiffs’ claims were justiciable because plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated a “genuine threat of imminent prosecution,” id., at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted), and because § 2339B had the potential to chill plaintiffs’ protected expression, see id., at 1197-1198. On the merits, the District Court held that the term “expert advice or assistance” was impermissibly vague. Id., at 1201. The District Court rejected, however, plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims that the new term was substantially overbroad and criminalized associational speech. See id., at 1202, 1203. The parties cross-appealed. While the cross-appeals were pending, the Ninth Circuit granted en banc rehearing of the panel’s 2003 decision in plaintiffs’ first action (involving the terms “personnel” and “training”). See 382 F. 3d 1154, 1155 (2004). The en banc court heard reargument on December 14, 2004. See 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (CD Cal. 2005). Three days later, Congress again amended §2339B and the definition of “material support or resources.” Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), §6603, 118 Stat. 3762-3764. In IRTPA, Congress clarified the mental state necessary to violate § 2339B, requiring knowledge of the foreign group’s designation as a terrorist organization or the group’s commission of terrorist acts. §2339B(a)(l). Congress also added the term “service” to the definition of “material support or resources,” § 2339A(b)(l), and defined “training” to mean “instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge,” § 2339A(b)(2). It also defined “expert advice or assistance” to mean “advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.” § 2339A(b)(3). Finally, IRTPA clarified the scope of the term “personnel” by providing: “No person may be prosecuted under [§2339B] in connection with the term ‘personnel’ unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization. Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.” §2339B(h). Shortly after Congress enacted IRTPA, the en banc Court of Appeals issued an order in plaintiffs’ first action. 393 F. 3d 902, 903 (CA9 2004). The en banc court affirmed the rejection of plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims for the reasons set out in the Ninth Circuit’s panel decision in 2000. See ibid. In light of IRTPA, however, the en banc court vacated the panel’s 2003 judgment with respect to vagueness, and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit panel assigned to the cross-appeals in plaintiffs’ second action (relating to “expert advice or assistance”) also remanded in light of IRTPA. See 380 F. Supp. 2d, at 1139. The District Court consolidated the two actions on remand. See ibid. The court also allowed plaintiffs to challenge the new term “service.” See id., at 1151, n. 24. The parties moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted partial relief to plaintiffs on vagueness grounds. See id., at 1156. The Court of Appeals affirmed once more. 552 F. 3d 916, 933 (CA9 2009). The court first rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the material-support statute would violate due process unless it were read to require a specific intent to further the illegal ends of a foreign terrorist organization. See id., at 926-927. The Ninth Circuit also held that the statute was not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See id., at 931-932. As for vagueness, the Court of Appeals noted that plaintiffs had not raised a “facial vagueness challenge.” Id., at 929, n. 6. The court held that, as applied to plaintiffs, the terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance” (when derived from “other specialized knowledge”), and “service” were vague because they “continue [d] to cover constitutionally protected advocacy,” but the term “personnel” was not vague because it “no longer criminalize[d] pure speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id., at 929-931. The Government petitioned for certiorari, and plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-petition. We granted both petitions. 557 U. S. 966 (2009). II Given the complicated 12-year history of this litigation, we pause to clarify the questions before us. Plaintiffs challenge § 2339B’s prohibition on four types of material support— “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.” They raise three constitutional claims. First, plaintiffs claim that § 2339B violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because these four statutory terms are impermissibly vague. Second, plaintiffs claim that §2339B violates their freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Third, plaintiffs claim that §2339B violates their First Amendment freedom of association. Plaintiffs do not challenge the above statutory terms in all their applications. Rather, plaintiffs claim that §2339B is invalid to the extent it prohibits them from engaging in certain specified activities. See Brief for Plaintiffs 16-17, n. 10. With respect to the HLP and Judge Fertig, those activities are: (1) “train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes”; (2) “engaging] in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey”; and (3) “teach[ing] PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1; see 380 F. Supp. 2d, at 1136. With respect to the other plaintiffs, those activities are: (1) “train[ing] members of [the] LTTE to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international bodies”; (2) “offering] their legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government”; and (3) “engag[ing] in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1; see 380 F. Supp. 2d, at 1137. Plaintiffs also state that “the LTTE was recently defeated militarily in Sri Lanka,” so “[m]uch of the support the Tamil organizations and Dr. Jeyalingam sought to provide is now moot.” Brief for Plaintiffs 11, n. 5. Plaintiffs thus seek only to support the LTTE “as a political organization outside Sri Lanka advocating for the rights of Tamils.” Ibid. Counsel for plaintiffs specifically stated at oral argument that plaintiffs no longer seek to teach the LTTE how to present claims for tsunami-related aid, because the LTTE now “has no role in Sri Lanka.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 63. For that reason, helping the LTTE negotiate a peace agreement with Sri Lanka appears to be moot as well. Thus, we do not consider the application of § 2339B to those activities here. One last point. Plaintiffs seek preenforcement review of a criminal statute. Before addressing the merits, we must be sure that this is a justiciable case or controversy under Article III. We conclude that it is: Plaintiffs face “a credible threat of prosecution” and “should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 128-129 (2007). Plaintiffs claim that they provided support to the PKK and LTTE before the enactment of § 2339B and that they would provide similar support again if the statute’s allegedly unconstitutional bar were lifted. See 309 F. Supp. 2d, at 1197. The Government tells us that it has charged about 150 persons with violating § 2339B, and that several of those prosecutions involved the enforcement of the statutory terms at issue here. See Brief for Government 5. The Government has not argued to this Court that plaintiffs will not be prosecuted if they do what they say they wish to do. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 57-58. See Babbitt, supra, at 302. See also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U. S. 229, 234, 248-249 (2010) (considering an as-applied preenforcement challenge brought under the First Amendment). Based on these considerations, we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are suitable for judicial review (as one might hope after 12 years of litigation). Ill Plaintiffs claim, as a threshold matter, that we should affirm the Court of Appeals without reaching any issues of constitutional law. They contend that we should interpret the material-support statute, when applied to speech, to require proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist organization’s illegal activities. That interpretation, they say, would end the litigation because plaintiffs’ proposed activities consist of speech, but plaintiffs do not intend to further unlawful conduct by the PKK or LTTE. We reject plaintiffs’ interpretation of §2339B because it is inconsistent with the text of the statute. Section 2339B(a)(l) prohibits “knowingly” providing material support. It then specifically describes the type of knowledge that is required: “To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . , that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity ... , or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism ....” Ibid. Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities. Plaintiffs’ interpretation is also untenable in light of the sections immediately surrounding § 2339B, both of which do refer to intent to further terrorist activity. See § 2339A(a) (establishing criminal penalties for one who “provides material support or resources . . . knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of” statutes prohibiting violent terrorist acts); § 23390(a)(1) (setting criminal penalties for one who “unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds with the intention that such funds be used, or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” other unlawful acts). Congress enacted §2339A in 1994 and §2339C in 2002. See § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 2022 (§ 2339A); § 202(a), 116 Stat. 724 (§ 2339C). Yet Congress did not import the intent language of those provisions into §2339B, either when it enacted §2339B in 1996, or when it clarified § 2339B’s knowledge requirement in 2004. Finally, plaintiffs give the- game away when they argue that a specific intent requirement should apply only when the material-support statute applies to speech. There is no basis whatever in the text of § 2339B to read the same provisions in that statute as requiring intent in some circumstances but not others. It is therefore clear that plaintiffs are asking us not to interpret § 2339B, but to revise it. “Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute.” Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 211 (1961). Scales is the case on which plaintiffs most heavily rely, but it is readily distinguishable. That case involved the Smith Act, which prohibited membership in a group advocating the violent overthrow of the government. The Court held that a person could not be convicted under the statute unless he had knowledge of the group’s illegal advocacy and a specific intent to bring about violent overthrow. Id., at 220-222, 229. This action is different: Section 2339B does not criminalize mere membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization. It instead prohibits providing “material support” to such a group. See infra, at 26, 39. Nothing about Scales suggests the need for a specific intent requirement in such a case. The Court in Scales, moreover, relied on both statutory text and precedent that had interpreted closely related provisions of the Smith Act to require specific intent. 367 U. S., at 209, 221-222. Plaintiffs point to nothing similar here. We cannot avoid the constitutional issues in this litigation through plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation of § 2339B. IV We turn to the question whether the material-support statute, as applied to plaintiffs, is impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. “A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standard-less that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008). We consider whether a statute is vague as applied to the particular facts at issue, for “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 495 (1982). We have said that when a statute “interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply.” Id., at 499. “But 'perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.’” Williams, supra, at 304 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 794 (1989)). The Court of Appeals did not adhere to these principles. Instead, the lower court merged plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge with their First Amendment claims, holding that portions of the material-support statute were unconstitutionally vague because they applied to protected speech — regardless of whether those applications were clear. The court stated that, even if persons of ordinary intelligence understood the scope of the term “training,” that term would “remai[n] impermissibly vague” because it could “be read to encompass speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment.” 552 F. 3d, at 929. It also found “service” and a portion of “expert advice or assistance” to be vague because those terms covered protected speech. Id., at 929-930. Further, in spite of its own statement that it was not addressing a “facial vagueness challenge,” id., at 929, n. 6, the Court of Appeals considered the statute’s application to facts not before it. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Government’s statement that §2339B would bar filing an amicus brief in support of a foreign terrorist organization— which plaintiffs have not told us they wish to do, and which the Ninth Circuit did not say plaintiffs wished to do — to conclude that the statute barred protected advocacy and was therefore vague. See id., at 930. By deciding how the statute applied in hypothetical circumstances, the Court of Appeals’ discussion of vagueness seemed to incorporate elements of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. See id., at 929-930 (finding it “easy to imagine” protected expression that would be barred by §2339B (internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 930 (referring to both vagueness and overbreadth). In both of these respects, the Court of Appeals contravened the rule that “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Hoffman Estates, supra, at 495. That rule makes no exception for conduct in the form of speech. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 755-757 (1974). Thus, even to the extent a heightened vagueness standard applies, a plaintiff whose speech is clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for lack of notice. And he certainly cannot do so based on the speech of others. Such a plaintiff may have a valid overbreadth claim under the First Amendment, but our precedents make clear that a Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge does not turn on whether a law applies to a substantial amount of protected expression. See Williams, supra, at 304; Hoffman Estates, supra, at 494-495, 497. Otherwise the doctrines would be substantially redundant. Under a proper analysis, plaintiffs’ claims of vagueness lack merit. Plaintiffs do not argue that the material-support statute grants too much enforcement discretion to the Government. We therefore address only whether the statute “provide[s] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 304. As a general matter, the statutory terms at issue here are quite different from the sorts of terms that we have previously declared to be vague. We have in the past “struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to whether the defendant’s conduct was ‘annoying’ or ‘indecent’ — wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.” Id., at 306; see also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, n. 1 (1972) (holding vague an ordinance that punished “vagrants,” defined to include “[r]ogues and vagabonds,” “persons who use juggling,” and “common night walkers” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Applying the statutory terms in this action — “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” — does not require similarly untethered, subjective judgments. Congress also took care to add narrowing definitions to the material-support statute over time. These definitions increased the clarity of the statute’s terms. See § 2339A(b)(2) (“ ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge”); §2339A(b)(3) (“‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge”); §2339B(h) (clarifying the scope of “personnel”). And the knowledge requirement of the statute further reduces any potential for vagueness, as we have held with respect to other statutes containing a similar requirement. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703, 732 (2000); Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U. S. 513, 523, 526 (1994); see also Hoffman Estates, supra, at 499. Of course, the scope of the material-support statute may not be clear in every application. But the dispositive point here is that the statutory terms are clear in their application to plaintiffs’ proposed conduct, which means that plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge must fail. Even assuming that a heightened standard applies because the material-support statute potentially implicates speech, the statutory terms are not vague as applied to plaintiffs. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,114-115 (1972) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a criminal law that implicated First Amendment activities); Scales, 367 U. S., at 223 (same). Most of the activities in which plaintiffs seek to engage readily fall within the scope of the terms “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” Plaintiffs want to “train members of [the] PKK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes,” and “teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that instruction on resolving disputes through international law falls within the statute’s definition of “training” because it imparts a “specific skill,” not “general knowledge.” §2339A(b)(2). Plaintiffs’ activities also fall comfortably within the scope of “expert advice or assistance”: A reasonable person would recognize that teaching the PKK how to petition for humanitarian relief before the United Nations involves advice derived from, as the statute puts it, “specialized knowledge.” § 2339A(b)(3). In fact, plaintiffs themselves have repeatedly used the terms “training” and “expert advice” throughout this litigation to describe their own proposed activities, demonstrating that these common terms readily and naturally cover plaintiffs’ conduct. See, e. g., Brief for Plaintiffs 10, 11; App. 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 80, 81, 98, 99, 106, 107, 117. Plaintiffs respond by pointing to hypothetical situations designed to test the limits of “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” They argue that the statutory definitions of these terms use words of degree — like “specific,” “general,” and “specialized” — and that it is difficult to apply those definitions in particular cases. See Brief for Plaintiffs 27 (debating whether teaching a course on geography would constitute training); id., at 29. And they cite Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U. S. 1030 (1991), in which we found vague a state bar rule providing that a lawyer in a criminal case, when speaking to the press, “may state without elaboration . . . the general nature of the . . . defense.” Id., at 1048 (internal quotation marks omitted). Whatever force these arguments might have in the abstract, they are beside the point here. Plaintiffs do not propose to teach a course on geography, and cannot seek refuge in imaginary cases that straddle the boundary between “specific skills” and “general knowledge.” See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S., at 756. We emphasized this point in Scales, holding that even if there might be theoretical doubts regarding the distinction between “active” and “nominal” membership in an organization — also terms of degree — the defendant’s vagueness challenge failed because his “case presented] no such problem.” 367 U. S., at 223. Gentile was different. There the asserted vagueness in a state bar rule was directly implicated by the facts before the Court: Counsel had reason to suppose that his particular statements to the press would not violate the rule, yet he was disciplined nonetheless. See 501 U. S., at 1049-1051. We did not suggest that counsel could escape discipline on vagueness grounds if his own speech were plainly prohibited. Plaintiffs also contend that they want to engage in “political advocacy” on behalf of Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka. 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. They are concerned that such advocacy might be regarded as “material support” in the form of providing “personnel” or “service[s],” and assert that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because they cannot tell. As for “personnel,” Congress enacted a limiting definition in IRTPA that answers plaintiffs’ vagueness concerns. Providing material support that constitutes “personnel” is defined as knowingly providing a person “to work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or otherwise direct the operation of that organization.” §2339B(h). The statute makes clear that “personnel” does not cover independent advocacy: “Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and control.” Ibid. “[Sjervice” similarly refers to concerted activity, not independent advocacy. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (1993) (defining “service” to mean “the performance of work commanded or paid for by another: a servant’s duty: attendance on a superior”; or “an act done for the benefit or at the command of another”). Context confirms that ordinary meaning here. The statute prohibits providing a service “to a foreign terrorist organization.” §2339B(a)(l) (emphasis added). The use of the word “to” indicates a connection between the service and the foreign group. We think a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that independently advocating for a cause is different from providing a service to a group that is advocating for that cause. Moreover, if independent activity in support of a terrorist group could be characterized as a “service,” the statute’s specific exclusion of independent activity in the definition of “personnel” would not make sense. Congress would not have prohibited under “service” what it specifically exempted from prohibition under “personnel.” The other types of material support listed in the statute, including “lodging,” “weapons,” “explosives,” and “transportation,” § 2339A(b)(l), are not forms of support that could be provided independently of a foreign terrorist organization. We interpret “service” along the same lines. Thus, any independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish to engage is not prohibited by § 2339B. On the other hand, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the term “service” to cover advocacy performed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization. Plaintiffs argue that this construction of the statute poses difficult questions of exactly how much direction or coordination is necessary for an activity to constitute a “service.” See Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 09-89, p. 14 (hereinafter Reply Brief for Plaintiffs) (“Would any communication with any member be sufficient? With a leader? Must the ‘relationship’ have any formal elements, such as an employment or contractual relationship? What about a relationship through an intermediary?”). The problem with these questions is that they are entirely hypothetical. Plaintiffs have not provided any specific articulation of the degree to which they seek to coordinate their advocacy with the PKK and LTTE. They have instead described the form of their intended advocacy only in the most general terms. See, e. g., Brief for Plaintiffs 10-11 (plaintiffs “would like, among other things, to offer their services to advocate on behalf of the rights of the Kurdish people and the PKK before the United Nations and the United States Congress” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); App. 59 (plaintiffs would like to “write and distribute publications supportive of the PKK and the cause of Kurdish liberation” and “advocate for the freedom of political prisoners in Turkey”). Deciding whether activities described at such a level of generality would constitute prohibited “service^]” under the statute would require “sheer speculation” — which means that plaintiffs cannot prevail in their preenforcement challenge. See Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 454 (2008). It is apparent with respect to these claims that “gradations of fact or charge would make a difference as to criminal liability,” and so “adjudication of the reach and constitutionality of [the statute] must await a concrete fact situation.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 20 (1965). V A We next consider whether the material-support statute, as applied to plaintiffs, violates the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Both plaintiffs and the Government take extreme positions on this question. Plaintiffs claim that Congress has banned their “pure political speech.” E. g., Brief for Plaintiffs 2, 25, 43. It has not. Under the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say anything they wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about the PKK and LTTE, the Governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, and international law. They may advocate before the United Nations. As the Government states: “The statute does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind.” Brief for Government 13. Section 2339B also “does not prevent [plaintiffs] from becoming members of the PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on them for doing so.” Id., at 60. Congress has not, therefore, sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of “pure political speech.” Rather, Congress has prohibited “material support,” which most often does not take the form of speech at all. And when it does, the statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations. For its part, the Government takes the foregoing too far, claiming that the only thing truly at issue in this litigation is conduct, not speech. Section 2339B is directed at the fact of plaintiffs’ interaction with the PKK and LTTE, the Government contends, and only incidentally burdens their expression. The Government argues that the proper standard of review is therefore the one set out in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). In that case, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a conviction under a generally applicable prohibition on destroying draft cards, even though O’Brien had burned his card in protest against the draft. See id., at 370, 376, 382. In so doing, we applied what we have since called “intermediate scrutiny,” under which a “content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 189 (1997) (citing O'Brien, supra, at 377). The Government is wrong that the only thing actually at issue in this litigation is conduct, and therefore wrong to argue that O’Brien provides the correct standard of review. O’Brien does not provide the applicable standard for reviewing a content-based regulation of speech, see R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 385-386 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 403, 406-407 (1989), and § 2339B regulates speech on the basis of its content. Plaintiffs want to speak to the PKK and LTTE, and whether they may do so under § 2339B depends on what they say. If plaintiffs’ speech to those groups imparts a “specific skill” or communicates advice derived from “specialized knowledge” — for example, training on the use of international law or advice on petitioning the United Nations — then it is barred. See Brief for Government 33-34. On the other hand, plaintiffs’ speech is not barred if it imparts only general or unspecialized knowledge. See id., at 32. The Government argues that §2339B should nonetheless receive intermediate scrutiny because it generally functions as a regulation of conduct. That argument runs headlong into a number of our precedents, most prominently Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). Cohen also involved a generally applicable regulation of conduct, barring breaches of the peace. See id., at 16. But when Cohen was convicted for wearing a jacket bearing an epithet, we did not apply O’Brien. See 403 U. S., at 16, 18. Instead, we recognized that the generally applicable law was directed at Cohen because of what his speech communicated — he violated the breach of the peace statute because of the offensive content of his particular message. We accordingly applied more rigorous scrutiny and reversed his conviction. See id., at 18-19, 26. This suit falls into the same category. The law here may be described as directed at conduct, as the law in Cohen was directed at breaches of the peace, but as applied to plaintiffs the conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message. As we explained in Texas v. Johnson: “If the [Government’s] regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. If it is, then we are outside of O’Brien’s test, and we must [apply] a more demanding standard.” 491 U. S., at 403 (citation omitted). B The First Amendment issue before us is more refined than either plaintiffs or the Government would have it. It is not whether the Government may prohibit pure political speech, or may prohibit material support in the form of conduct. It is instead whether the Government may prohibit what plaintiffs want to do — provide material support to the PKK and LTTE in the form of speech. Everyone agrees that the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order. See Brief for Plaintiffs 51. Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the ban on material support, applied to what they wish to do, is not “necessary to further that interest.” Ibid. The objective of combating terrorism does not justify prohibiting their speech, plaintiffs argue, because their support will advance only the legitimate activities of the designated terrorist organizations, not their terrorism. Id., at 51-52. Whether foreign terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of their legitimate activities from support of terrorism is an empirical question. When it enacted § 2339B in 1996, Congress made specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by international terrorism. See AEDPA §§ 301(a)(1)-(7), 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18 U. S. C. §2339B (Findings and Purpose). One of those findings explicitly rejects plaintiffs’ contention that their support would not further the terrorist activities of the PKK and LTTE: “[Fjoreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” § 301(a)(7) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that the reference to “any contribution” in this finding meant only monetary support. There is no reason to read the finding to be so limited, particularly because Congress expressly prohibited so much more than monetary support in §2339B. Congress’s use of the term “contribution” is best read to reflect a determination that any form of material support furnished “to” a foreign terrorist organization should be barred, which is precisely what the material-support statute does. Indeed, when Congress enacted §2339B, Congress simultaneously removed an exception that had existed in § 2339A(a) (1994 ed.) for the provision of material support in the form of “humanitarian assistance to persons not directly involved in” terrorist activity. AEDPA §323, 110 Stat. 1255; 205 F. 3d, at 1136. That repeal demonstrates that Congress considered and rejected the view that ostensibly peaceful aid would have no harmful effects. We are convinced that Congress was justified in rejecting that view. The PKK and LTTE are deadly groups. “The PKK’s insurgency has claimed more than 22,000 lives.” Declaration of Kenneth R. McKune, App. 128, ¶ 5 (hereinafter McKune Affidavit). The LTTE has engaged in extensive suicide bombings and political assassinations, including killings of the Sri Lankan President, Security Minister, and Deputy Defense Minister. Id., at 130-132; Brief for Government 6-7. “On January 31, 1996, the LTTE exploded a truck bomb filled with an estimated 1,000 pounds of explosives at the Central Bank in Colombo, killing 100 people and injuring more than 1,400. This bombing was the most deadly terrorist incident in the world in 1996.” McKune Affidavit, App. 131, ¶ 6.h. It is not difficult to conclude as Congress did that the “tain[t]” of such violent activities is so great that working in coordination with or at the command of the PKK and LTTE serves to legitimize and further their terrorist means. AEDPA § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247. Material support meant to “promot[e] peaceable, lawful conduct,” Brief for Plaintiffs 51, can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways. “Material support” is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups — legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds — all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks. “Terrorist organizations do not maintain organizational ‘firewalls’ that would prevent or deter . . . sharing and commingling of support and benefits.” McKune Affidavit, App. 135, ¶ 11. “[Ijnvestigators have revealed how terrorist groups systematically conceal their activities behind charitable, social, and political fronts.” M. Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad 2-3 (2006). “Indeed, some designated foreign terrorist organizations use social and political components to recruit personnel to carry out terrorist operations, and to provide support to criminal terrorists and their families in aid of such operations.” MeKune Affidavit, App. 135, ¶ 11; Levitt, supra, at 2 (“Muddying the waters between its political activism, good works, and terrorist attacks, Hamas is able to use its overt political and charitable organizations as a financial and logistical support network for its terrorist operations”). Money is fungible, and “[w]hen foreign terrorist organizations that have a dual structure raise funds, they highlight the civilian and humanitarian ends to which such moneys could be put.” MeKune Affidavit, App. 134, ¶ 9. But “there is reason to believe that foreign terrorist organizations do not maintain legitimate financial firewalls between those funds raised for civil, nonviolent activities, and those ultimately used to support violent, terrorist operations.” Id., at 135, ¶ 12. Thus, “[fjunds raised ostensibly for charitable purposes have in the past been redirected by some terrorist groups to fund the purchase of arms and explosives.” Id., at 134, ¶ 10. See also Brief for Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae 19-29 (describing fundraising activities by the PKK, LTTE, and Hamas); Regan v. Wald, 468 U. S. 222, 243 (1984) (upholding President’s decision to impose travel ban to Cuba “to curtail the flow of hard currency to Cuba— currency that could then be used in support of Cuban adventurism”). There is evidence that the PKK and LTTE, in particular, have not “respected the line between humanitarian and violent activities.” MeKune Affidavit, App. 135, ¶ 13 (discussing PKK); see id., at 134 (LTTE). The dissent argues that there is “no natural stopping place” for the proposition that aiding a foreign terrorist organization’s lawful activity promotes the terrorist organization as a whole. Post, at 49. But Congress has settled on just such a natural stopping place: The statute reaches only material support coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist organization. Independent advocacy that might be viewed as promoting the group’s legitimacy is not covered. See supra, at 25-28. Providing foreign terrorist groups with material support in any form also furthers terrorism by straining the United States’ relationships with its allies and undermining cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist attacks. We see no reason to question Congress’s finding that “international cooperation is required for an effective response to terrorism, as demonstrated by the numerous multilateral conventions in force providing universal prosecutive jurisdiction over persons involved in a variety of terrorist acts, including hostage taking, murder of an internationally protected person, and aircraft piracy and sabotage.” AEDPA § 301(a)(5), 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18 U. S. C. §2339B (Findings and Purpose). The material-support statute furthers this international effort by prohibiting aid for foreign terrorist groups that harm the United States’ partners abroad: “A number of designated foreign terrorist organizations have attacked moderate governments with which the United States has vigorously endeavored to maintain close and friendly relations,” and those attacks “threaten [the] social, economic and political stability” of such governments. McKune Affidavit, App. 137, ¶ 16. “[0]ther foreign terrorist organizations attack our NATO allies, thereby implicating important and sensitive multilateral security arrangements . ” Ibid. For example, the Republic of Turkey — a fellow member of NATO — is defending itself against a violent insurgency waged by the PKK. Brief for Government 6; App. 128. That nation and our other allies would react sharply to Americans furnishing material support to foreign groups like the PKK, and would hardly be mollified by the explanation that the support was meant only to further those groups’ “legitimate” activities. From Turkey’s perspective, there likely are no such activities. See 352 F. 3d, at 389 (observing that Turkey prohibits membership in the PKK and prosecutes those who provide support to that group, regardless of whether the support is directed to lawful activities). C In analyzing whether it is possible in practice to distinguish material support for a foreign terrorist group’s violent activities and its nonviolent activities, we do not rely exclusively on our own inferences drawn from the record evidence. We have before us an affidavit stating the Executive Branch’s conclusion on that question. The State Department informs us that “[t]he experience and analysis of the U. S. government agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly suppor[t]” Congress’s finding that all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism. McKune Affidavit, App. 133, ¶ 8. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 24-25 (2008) (looking to similar affidavits to support according weight to national security claims). In the Executive’s view: “Given the purposes, organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions — regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist activities.” McKune Affidavit, App. 133, ¶ 8. That evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is entitled to deference. This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign affairs. The PKK and LTTE have committed terrorist acts against American citizens abroad, and the material-support statute addresses acute foreign policy concerns involving relationships with our Nation’s allies. See id., at 128-133, 137. We have noted that “neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 797 (2008). It is vital in this context “not to substitute . . . our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 68 (1981). See Wald, 468 U. S., at 242; Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 292 (1981). Our precedents, old and new, make clear that concerns of national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role. We do not defer to the Government’s reading of the First Amendment, even when such interests are at stake. We are one with the dissent that the Government’s “authority and expertise in these matters do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individuals.” Post, at 61. But when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, “the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked,” Rostker, supra, at 65, and respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate. One reason for that respect is that national security and foreign policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess. The dissent slights these real constraints in demanding hard proof — with “detail,” “specific facts,” and “specific evidence” — that plaintiffs’ proposed activities will support terrorist attacks. See post, at 48, 55, 62. That would be a dangerous requirement. In this context, conclusions must often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence, and that reality affects what we may reasonably insist on from the Government. The material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive measure — it criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur. The Government, when seeking to prevent imminent harms in the context of international affairs and national security, is not required to conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we grant weight to its empirical conclusions. See Zemel, 381 U. S., at 17 (“[Bjecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, . . . Congress . . . must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas”). This context is different from that in decisions like Cohen. In that case, the application of the statute turned on the offensiveness of the speech at issue. Observing that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” we invalidated Cohen’s conviction in part because we concluded that “governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area.” 403 U. S., at 25. In this litigation, by contrast, Congress and the Executive are uniquely positioned to make principled distinctions between activities that will further terrorist conduct and undermine United States foreign policy, and those that will not. We also find it significant that Congress has been conscious of its own responsibility to consider how its actions may implicate constitutional concerns. First, §2339B only applies to designated foreign terrorist organizations. There is, and always has been, a limited number of those organizations designated by the Executive Branch, see, e. g., 74 Fed. Reg. 29742 (2009); 62 Fed. Reg. 52650 (1997), and any groups so designated may seek judicial review of the designation. Second, in response to the lower courts’ holdings in this litigation, Congress added clarity to the statute by providing narrowing definitions of the terms “training,” “personnel,” and “expert advice or assistance,” as well as an explanation of the knowledge required to violate § 2339B. Third, in effectuating its stated intent not to abridge First Amendment rights, see § 2339B(i), Congress has also displayed a careful balancing of interests in creating limited exceptions to the ban on material support. The definition of material support, for example, excludes medicine and religious materials. See § 2339A(b)(l). In this area perhaps more than any other, the Legislature’s superior capacity for weighing competing interests means that “we must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress.” Rostker, supra, at 68. Finally, and most importantly, Congress has avoided any restriction on independent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups. At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree with the considered judgment of Congress and the Executive that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization — even seemingly benign support — bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization. That judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and we have persuasive evidence before us to sustain it. Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at stake, the political branches have adequately substantiated their determination that, to serve the Government’s interest in preventing terrorism, it was necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form of training, expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even if the supporters meant to promote only the groups’ nonviolent ends. We turn to the particular speech plaintiffs propose to undertake. First, plaintiffs propose to “train members of [the] PICK on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. Congress can, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit this direct training. It is wholly foreseeable that the PKK could use the “specific skill[s]” that plaintiffs propose to impart, § 2339A(b)(2), as part of a broader strategy to promote terrorism. The PKK could, for example, pursue peaceful negotiation as a means of buying time to recover from short-term setbacks, lulling opponents into complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks. See generally A. Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence 286-295 (2007) (describing the PKKs suspension of armed struggle and subsequent return to violence). A foreign terrorist organization introduced to the structures of the international legal system might use the information to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt. This possibility is real, not remote. Second, plaintiffs propose to “teach PKK members how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief.” 552. F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. The Government acts within First Amendment strictures in banning this proposed speech because it teaches the organization how to acquire “relief,” which plaintiffs never define with any specificity, and which could readily include monetary aid. See Brief for Plaintiffs 10-11, 16-17, n. 10; App. 58-59, 80-81. Indeed, earlier in this litigation, plaintiffs sought to teach the LTTE “to present claims for tsunami-related aid to mediators and international bodies,” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1, which naturally included monetary relief. Money is fungible, supra, at 31, and Congress logically concluded that money a terrorist group such as the PKK obtains using the techniques plaintiffs propose to teach could be redirected to funding the group’s violent activities. Finally, plaintiffs propose to “engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey,” and “engage in political advocacy on behalf of Tamils who live in Sri Lanka.” 552 F. 3d, at 921, n. 1. As explained above, supra, at 25, plaintiffs do not specify their expected level of coordination with the PKK or LTTE or suggest what exactly their “advocacy” would consist of. Plaintiffs’ proposals are phrased at such a high level of generality that they cannot prevail in this preenforcement challenge. See supra, at 25; Grange, 552 U. S., at 454; Zemel, 381 U. S., at 20. In responding to the foregoing, the dissent fails to address the real dangers at stake. It instead considers only the possible benefits of plaintiffs’ proposed activities in the abstract. See post, at 52-54. The dissent seems unwilling to entertain the prospect that training and advising a designated foreign terrorist organization on how to take advantage of international entities might benefit that organization in a way that facilitates its terrorist activities. In the dissent’s world, such training is all to the good. Congress and the Executive, however, have concluded that we live in a different world: one in which the designated foreign terrorist organizations “are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.” AEDPA § 301(a)(7). One in which, for example, “the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was forced to close a Kurdish refugee camp in northern Iraq because the camp had come under the control of the PKK, and the PKK had failed to respect its 'neutral and humanitarian nature.’” McKune Affidavit, App. 135-136, ¶ 13. Training and advice on how to work with the United Nations could readily have helped the PKK in its efforts to use the United Nations camp as a base for terrorist activities. If only good can come from training our adversaries in international dispute resolution, presumably it would have been unconstitutional to prevent American citizens from training the Japanese Government on using international organizations and mechanisms to resolve disputes during World War II. It would, under the dissent’s reasoning, have been contrary to our commitment to resolving disputes through “ 'deliberative forces,’ ” post, at 52 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), for Congress to conclude that assisting Japan on that front might facilitate its war effort more generally. That view is not one the First Amendment requires us to embrace. All this is not to say that any future applications of the material-support statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment scrutiny. It is also not to say that any other statute relating to speech and terrorism would satisfy the First Amendment. In particular, we in no way suggest that a regulation of independent speech would pass constitutional muster, even if the Government were to show that such speech benefits foreign terrorist organizations. We also do not suggest that Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic organizations. We simply hold that, in prohibiting the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist groups, §2339B does not violate the freedom of speech. VI Plaintiffs’ final claim is that the material-support statute violates their freedom of association under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs argue that the statute criminalizes the mere fact of their associating with the PKK and LTTE, thereby running afoul of decisions like De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937), and cases in which we have overturned sanctions for joining the Communist Party, see, e. g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). The Court of Appeals correctly rejected this claim because the statute does not penalize mere association with a foreign terrorist organization. As the Ninth Circuit put it: “The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the group. . . . What [§ 2339B] prohibits is the act of giving material support . . . .” 205 F. 3d, at 1133. Plaintiffs want to do the latter. Our decisions scrutinizing penalties on simple association or assembly are therefore in-apposite. See, e. g., Robel, supra, at 262 (“It is precisely because th[e] statute sweeps indiscriminately across all types of association with Communist-action groups, without regard to the quality and degree of membership, that it runs afoul of the First Amendment”); De Jonge, supra, at 362. Plaintiffs also argue that the material-support statute burdens their freedom of association because it prevents them from providing support to designated foreign terrorist organizations, but not to other groups. See Brief for Plaintiffs 56; Reply Brief for Plaintiffs 37-38. Any burden on plaintiffs’ freedom of association in this regard is justified for the same reasons that we have denied plaintiffs’ free speech challenge. It would be strange if the Constitution permitted Congress to prohibit certain forms of speech that constitute material support, but did not permit Congress to prohibit that support only to particularly dangerous and lawless foreign organizations. Congress is not required to ban material support to every group or none at all. ^ ‡ ‡ The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims that the people of the United States ordained and established that charter of government in part to “provide for the common defence.” As Madison explained, “[sjecurity against foreign danger is ... an avowed and essential object of the American Union.” The Federalist No. 41, p. 269 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). We hold that, in regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the limitations of the First and Fifth Amendments. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In full, 18 U. S. C. § 2339B(a)(l) provides: “Unlawful conduct.— Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization..., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity..., or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism . . . .” The terms “terrorist activity” and “terrorism” are defined in 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) and 22 U. S. C. § 2656f(d)(2), respectively. At the time plaintiffs first filed suit, 18 U. S. C. §2339B(a) (2000 ed.) provided: “Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1207 (CD Cal. 1998). And 18 U. S. C. § 2339A(b) (2000 ed.) defined “material support or resources” to mean “currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons,' lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.” The dissent would interpret the statute along the same lines as the plaintiffs, to prohibit speech and association “only when the defendant knows or intends that those activities will assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist actions.” Post, at 56 (opinion of Breyer, J.). According to the dissent, this interpretation is “fairly possible” and adopting it would avoid constitutional concerns. Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent’s interpretation of § 2339B fails for essentially the same reasons as plaintiffs’. Congress explained what “knowingly” means in §2339B, and it did not choose the dissent’s interpretation of that term. In fact, the dissent proposes a mental-state requirement indistinguishable from the one Congress adopted in §§ 2339A and 2339C, even though Congress used markedly different language in § 2339B. The dissent also analyzes the statute as if it prohibited “[p]eaeeful political advocacy” or “pure speech and association,” without more. Post, at 48, 56. Section 2339B does not do that, and we do not address the constitutionality of any such prohibitions. The dissent’s claim that our decision is inconsistent with this Court’s cases analyzing those sorts of restrictions, post, at 50-51, is accordingly unfounded. The Government suggests in passing that, to the extent plaintiffs’ activities constitute speech, that speech is wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. The Government briefly analogizes speech coordinated with foreign terrorist organizations to speech effecting a crime, like the words that constitute a conspiracy. Brief for Government 46; Reply Brief for Government 31-32, and n. 8. See, e. g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498, 502 (1949). We do not consider any such argument because the Government does not develop it: The Government’s submission is that applying § 2339B to plaintiffs triggers intermediate First Amendment scrutiny — not that it triggers no First Amendment scrutiny at all. The dissent also contends that the particular sort of material support plaintiffs seek to provide cannot be diverted to terrorist activities, in the same direct way as funds or goods. Post, at 47-48. This contention misses the point. Both common sense and the evidence submitted by the Government make clear that material support of a terrorist group’s lawful activities facilitates the group’s ability to attract “funds,” “financing,” and “goods” that will further its terrorist acts. See McKune Affidavit, App. 134-136.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SLODOV v. UNITED STATES No. 76-1835. Argued February 22, 1978 Decided May 22, 1978 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 260. White, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 261. Bennet Kleinman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Laurence Glaser. Deputy Solicitor General Barnett argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Stuart A. Smith, and William A. Friedlander. Me. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, an orthodontist by profession, on January 31, 1969, purchased the stock and assumed the management of three corporations engaged in the food vending business. The corporations were indebted at the time of the purchase for approximately $250,000 of taxes, including federal wage and Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes withheld from employees’ wages prior to January 31. The sums withheld had not been paid over when due, however, but had been dissipated by the previous management before petitioner acquired the businesses. After petitioner assumed control, the corporations acquired funds sufficient to pay the taxes, but petitioner used the funds to pay employees’ wages, rent, suppliers, and other creditors, and to meet other day-to-day expenses incurred in operating the businesses. The question to be decided is whether, in these circumstances, petitioner is personally liable under § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 6672 — which imposes personal liability for taxes on “[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof . . .” — for the corporations’ unpaid taxes withheld from wages prior to his assumption of control. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that petitioner was personally liable under § 6672 for the unpaid taxes. 552 F. 2d 159 (1977). We granted certiorari. 434 U. S. 817 (1977). We reverse. I — I The case arose from the filing by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of a claim for the taxes in a proceeding instituted by petitioner in July 1969 for a real property arrangement under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act. The facts determined after hearing by the bankruptcy judge, 74-2 USTC ¶ 9719 (ND Ohio 1974), are not challenged. Petitioner purchased and assumed managerial control of the Tas-Tee Catering, Tas-Tee Vending, and Charles Corporations on January 31, 1969. When he bought the stock, petitioner understood, and the purchase agreement reflected, that the corporations had an outstanding obligation for taxes in the amount of $250,000 due for payment on January 31, including withheld employee wage and FICA taxes (hereinafter trust-fund taxes). During the purchase negotiations, the sellers represented to petitioner that balances in the various corporate checking accounts were sufficient to pay these taxes as well as bills due other creditors. Relying on the representation, petitioner, on Saturday, February 1, sent four checks to the IRS in payment of the taxes. On Monday, February 3, petitioner discovered that the accounts were overdrawn and stopped payment on the checks. Thus, at the time that petitioner assumed control, the corporations had no liquid assets, and whatever trust-fund taxes had been collected prior to petitioner’s assumption of control had been dissipated. Petitioner immediately advised the IRS that the corporations had no funds with which to pay the taxes, and solicited guidance concerning how the corporations should proceed. App. 36. There was evidence that IRS officials advised petitioner that they had no objection to his continuing operations so long as current tax obligations were met, and that petitioner agreed to do so and to endeavor to pay the arrearages as soon as possible. Tr. 37-38. The IRS never represented that it would hold petitioner harmless under § 6672 for the back taxes, however. To continue operations, petitioner deposited personal funds in the corporate acount, and, to obtain inventory, agreed with certain suppliers to pay cash upon delivery. During petitioner’s tenure, from January 31 to July 15, 1969, the corporations’ gross receipts approximated $130,000 per week for the first few months but declined thereafter. The corporations “established a system of segregating funds for payment of withheld taxes and did, in fact, pay withheld taxes during the period February 1, 1969, to July 15, 1969.” App. 30. The bankruptcy judge found, and the IRS concedes, that the $249,212 in taxes paid during this period was approximately sufficient to defray current tax obligations. No taxes owing for periods prior to February 1, were paid, however, and in July 1969 the corporations terminated operations and filed for bankruptcy. II Several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code require third persons to collect taxes from the taxpayer. Among the more important are 26 U. S. C. §§ 3102 (a) and 3402 (a) (1970 ed. and Supp. V) which respectively require deduction from wages paid to employees of the employees’ share of FICA taxes, and the withholding tax on wages applicable to individual income taxes. The withheld sums are commonly referred to as “trust fund taxes,” reflecting the Code’s provision that such withholdings or collections are deemed to be a “special fund in trust for the United States.” 26 U. S. C. § 7601 (a). There is no general requirement that the withheld sums be segregated from the employer’s general funds, however, or that they be deposited in a separate bank account until required to be paid to the Treasury. Because the Code requires the employer to collect taxes as wages are paid, § 3102 (a), while requiring payment of such taxes only quarterly, the funds accumulated during the quarter can be a tempting source of ready cash to a failing corporation beleaguered by creditors. Once net wages are paid to the employee, the taxes withheld are credited to the employee regardless of whether they are paid by the employer, so that the IRS has recourse only against the employer for their payment. An employer who fails to pay taxes withheld from its employees’ wages is, of course, liable, for the taxes which should have been paid, §§ 3102 (b) and 3403. The IRS has several means at its disposal to effect payment of the taxes so withheld. First, once it has been determined that an employer has been inexcusably delinquent, the IRS, upon giving hand-delivered notice, may require the employer, thereafter, and until further notice, to deposit withheld taxes in a special bank trust account within two banking days after collection, to be retained there until required to be paid to the Treasury at the quarter’s end. § 7512. Second, with respect to trust funds past due prior to any such notification, the amount collected or withheld “shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States [and] [t]he amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose.” 26 U. S. C. § 7501. Thus there is made applicable to employment taxes withheld but not paid the full range of collection methods available for the collection of taxes generally. After assessment, notice, and demand, the IRS may, therefore, create a lien upon the property of the employer, § 6321, and levy, distrain, and sell the employer’s property in satisfaction. §§ 6331 to 6344 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Third, penalties may be assessed against the delinquent employer. Section 6656 of the Code imposes a penalty of 5 % of the underpayment of any tax required to be deposited, and 26 U. S. C. §§ 7202 and 7215 provide criminal penalties respectively for willful failure to “collect or truthfully account for and pay over” trust-fund taxes, and for failure to comply with the requirements of § 7512, discussed supra, regarding special accounting requirements upon notice by the Secretary. Finally, as in this case, the officers or employees of the employer responsible for effectuating the collection and payment of trust-fund taxes who willfully fail to do so are made personally liable to a “penalty” equal to the amount of the delinquent taxes. Section 6672 provides, inter alia: “Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. . . .” Section 6671 (b) defines “person,” for purposes of § 6672, as including “an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.” Also, § 7202 of the Code, which tracks the wording of § 6672, makes a violation punishable as a felony subject to a fine of $10,000, and imprisonment for 5 years. Thus, an employer-official or other employee responsible for collecting and paying taxes who willfully fails to do so is subject to both a civil penalty equivalent to 100% of the taxes not collected or paid, and to a felony conviction. Only the application to petitioner of the civil penalty provision, § 6672, is at issue in this case. Ill When the same individual or individuals who caused the delinquency in any tax quarter are also the “responsible persons” at the time the Government’s efforts to collect from the employer have failed, and it seeks recourse against the “responsible employees,” see IRS Policy Statement P-5-60, IRS Manual, MT 1218-56 (Feb. 25, 1976), there is no question that § 6672 is applicable to them. It is the situation that arises when there has been a change of control of the employer enterprise, here corporations, prior to the expiration of a tax quarter, or at a time when a tax delinquency for past quarters already exists that creates the question for our decision. In this case, petitioner assumed control at a time when a delinquency existed for unpaid trust-fund taxes, while the specific funds withheld but not paid had been dissipated by predecessor officers and when the corporations had no liquid assets with which to pay the overdue taxes. A Petitioner concedes that he was subject to personal liability under § 6672 as a person responsible for the collection, accounting, and payment of employment taxes required to be withheld between January 31, 1969, when he assumed control of the corporations, and July 15, 1969, when he resigned. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. His contention is that he was not, however, a responsible person within § 6672 with respect to taxes withheld prior to his assumption of control and that § 6672 consequently imposed no duty upon him to pay the taxes collected by his predecessors. Petitioner argues that this construction of § 6672 follows necessarily from the statute’s limitation of personal liability to “[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for and pay over any tax imposed by this title,” who willfully fails to discharge those responsibilities (emphasis added). He argues that since the obligations are phrased in the conjunctive, a person can be subject to the section only if all three duties — (1) to collect, (2) truthfully account for, and (3) pay over — were applicable to him with respect to the tax dollars in question. See McCullough v. United States, 462 F. 2d 588 (CA5 1972). On the other hand, as the Government argues, the language could be construed as describing, in terms of their general responsibilities, the persons potentially liable under the statute, without regard to whether those persons were in a position to perform all of the duties with respect to the specific tax dollars in question. Although neither construction is inconsistent with the language of the statute, we reject petitioner’s as inconsistent with its purpose. Sections 6672 and 7202 were designed to assure compliance by the employer with its obligation to withhold and pay the sums withheld, by subjecting the employer’s officials responsible for the employer’s decisions regarding withholding and payment to civil and criminal penalties for the employer’s delinquency. If § 6672 were given petitioner’s construction, the penalties easily could be evaded by changes in officials’ responsibilities prior to the expiration of any quarter. Because the duty to pay over the tax arises only at the quarter’s end, a “responsible person” who willfully failed to collect taxes would escape personal liability for that failure simply by resigning his position, and transferring to another the deci-sionmaking responsibility prior to the quarter’s end. Ob-versely, a “responsible person” assuming control prior to the quarter’s end could, without incurring personal liability under § 6672, willfully dissipate the trust funds collected and segregated by his predecessor. That this result, obviously at odds with the statute’s purpose to assure payment of withheld taxes, was not intended is buttressed by the history of the provision. The predecessor of § 6672, § 1308 (c), Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1143, provided, inter alia: “Any person who willfully refuses to pay, collect, or truly account for and pay over [taxes enumerated in § 1308 (a)] shall ... be liable to a penalty of the amount of the tax evaded or not paid, collected, or accounted for and paid over . . . .” The statute remained unchanged in this respect until 1954 when the successor section to § 1308 (c) was revised to its present form. Both before and after the 1954 revision the “person” potentially liable under the statute was defined in a separate provision, § 1308 (d), succeeded by present § 6671 (b), as, including “an officer or employee of a corporation or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.” When, in 1954, Congress added' the phrase modifying “person”'— “Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title” — it was not seeking further to describe the class of persons defined in § 6671 (b) upon whom fell the responsibility for collecting taxes, but was attempting to clarify the type of tax to which the penalty section was applicable. Since under the 1954 amendment the penalty would otherwise be applicable to “any tax imposed by this title,” the phrase modifying “person” was necessary to insure that the penalty provided by that section would be read as applicable only to failure to pay taxes which require collection, that is, third-party taxes, and not failure to pay “any tax imposed by this title,” which, of course, would include direct taxes such as employer FICA and income taxes. As both the House and Senate Committees expressed it, “the application of this penalty is limited only to the collected or withheld taxes which are imposed on some person other than the person who is required to collect, account for and pay over, the tax.” Thus, by adding the phrase modifying “person,” Congress was attempting to clarify the type of tax to which the penalty section was applicable, perhaps inartfully, by reference to the duty of the person required to collect them. This view is supported by the fact that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a regulation shortly after the amendment, limiting the application of the § 6672 penalty to third-party taxes. 22 Fed. Reg. 9148 (1957), now codified as Treas. Reg. § 301.6672-1, 26 CFR § 301.6672-1 (1977). We conclude therefore that the phrase “[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title” was meant to limit § 6672 to persons responsible for collection of third-party taxes and not to limit it to those persons in a position to perform all three of the enumerated duties with respect to the tax dollars in question. We turn then to the Government’s contention that petitioner was subject to personal liability under § 6672 when during the period in which he was a responsible person, the corporations generated gross receipts sufficient to pay the back taxes, but used the funds for other purposes. B Although at the time petitioner became a responsible person the trust-fund taxes had been dissipated and the corporations had no liquid assets, the Government contends that § 6672 imposed civil liability upon petitioner because sums received from sales in carrying on the businesses after January 31, 1969, were impressed with a trust in favor of the United States for the satisfaction of overdue employment taxes, and petitioner’s willful use of those funds to pay creditors other than the United States, violated the obligation to “pay over" imposed by § 6672. The Government does not argue that the statute requires a “responsible person” to liquidate corporate assets to pay the back taxes upon assuming control, however; it argues only that a trust was impressed on all cash received by the corporations. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 28-29, 30-31, 32. We think that that construction of § 6672 would not advance the statute’s purpose and, moreover, is inconsistent with the context and legislative history of the provision and its relation to the Code’s priority rule applicable to collection of back taxes. (1) The Government argues that its construction of the statute is necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose to assure collection and payment of taxes. Although that construction might in this case garner tax dollars otherwise uncollectible, its long-term effect arguably would more likely frustrate than aid the IRS’s collection efforts. At the time petitioner assumed control, the corporations owed back taxes, were overdue on their supplier accounts, and had no cash. To the extent that the corporations had assets unencumbered by liens superior to a tax lien, the IRS could satisfy its claim by levy and sale. But as will often be the case, the corporations here apparently did not have such assets. The Government admits that in such circumstances, the IRS’s practice is to be “flexible,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 28, 32, 48, and does not insist that the corporation discontinue operations, thereby substituting for certain loss at least the potential of recovering back taxes if the corporation makes a financial recovery. It argues nevertheless that the “responsible person” renders himself personally liable to the § 6672 penalty by using gross receipts to purchase inventory or pay wages, or even by using personal funds for those purposes, so long as any third-party employment tax bill remains unpaid. Thus, although it is in the IRS’s interest to encourage the responsible person to continue operation with the hope of receiving payment of the back taxes, if the attempt fails and the taxes remain unpaid, the IRS insists that the § 6672 personal-liability penalty attached upon payment of the first dollar to a supplier. The practical effect of that construction of the statute would be that a well-counseled person contemplating assuming control of a financially beleaguered corporation owing back employment taxes would recognize that he could do so without incurring personal civil and criminal penalties only if there were available sufficient borrowed or personal funds fully to pay all back employment taxes before doing any business. If that course is unattractive or unavailable ,o the corporation, the Government will be remitted to its claim in bankruptcy. When an immediate filing for bankruptcy means a total loss, the Government understandably, as it did here, does not discourage the corporation from continuing to operate so long as current taxes are paid. As soon as the corporation embarks upon that course, however, the “responsible person” is potentially liable to heavy civil and criminal penalties not for doing anything which compromised the Government’s collection efforts, but for doing what the Government regards as maximizing its chances for recovery. As construed by the Government, § 6672 would merely discourage changes of ownership and management of financially troubled corporations and the infusion of equity or debt funding which might accompany it without encouraging employer compliance with tax obligations or facilitating collection of back taxes. Thus, recovery of employer taxes would likely be limited to the situation in which the prospective purchaser or management official is ignorant of § 6672. (2) As noted in the previous section, § 6672 as construed by the Government would, in effect, make the responsible person assuming control of a business a guarantor for payment of the delinquent taxes simply by undertaking to continue operation of the business. That construction is precluded by the history and context of § 6672 and cognate provisions of the Code. Section 6672 cannot be read as imposing upon the responsible person an absolute duty to “pay over” amounts which should have been collected and withheld. The fact that the provision imposes a “penalty” and is violated only by a “willful failure” is itself strong evidence that it was not intended to impose liability without personal fault. Congress, moreover, has not made corporate officers personally liable for the corporation’s tax obligations generally, and § 6672 therefore should be construed in a way which respects that policy choice. The Government’s concession — that § 6672 does not impose a duty on the responsible officer to use personal funds or even to liquidate corporate assets to satisfy the tax obligations- — ■ recognizes that the “pay over” requirement does not impose an absolute duty on the responsible person to pay back taxes. Recognizing that the statute cannot be construed to impose liability without fault, the Government characterizes petitioner’s use of gross receipts for payment of operating expenses as a breach of trust, arguing that a trust was impressed on all after-acquired cash. Nothing whatever in § 6672 or its legislative history suggests that the effect of the requirement to “pay over” was to impress a trust on the corporation’s after-acquired cash, however. Moreover, the history of a related section, 26 U. S. C. § 7501, makes clear that it was not. Section 7501 of the Code provides, inter alia, that the “amount of tax . . . collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States [which] shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose.” This section was enacted in 1934. Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 607, 48 Stat. 768, 26 U. S. C. § 3661 (1952 ed.). The provision was added to H. R. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., by the Senate Finance Committee, which explained: “Under existing law the liability of the person collecting and withholding the taxes to pay over the amount is merely a debt, and he cannot be treated as a trustee or proceeded against by distraint. Section [607] of the bill as reported impresses the amount of taxes withheld or collected with a trust and makes applicable for the enforcement of the Government’s claim the administrative provisions for assessment and collection of taxes.” S. Rep. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 53 (1934). Since the very reason for adding § 7501 was, as the Senate Report states, that “the liability of the person collecting and withholding the taxes ... is merely a debt” (emphasis added), § 6672, whose predecessor section was enacted in 1919 while the debt concept prevailed, hardly could have been intended to impose a trust on after-acquired cash. We further reject the argument that § 7501, whose trust concept may be viewed as having modified the duty imposed under § 6672, can be construed as establishing a fiduciary obligation to pay over after-acquired cash unrelated to the withholding taxes. The language of § 7501 limits the trust to "the amount of the taxes withheld or collected.” (Emphasis added.) Comparing that language with § 6672, which imposes liability for a willful failure to collect as well as failure to pay over, makes clear that under § 7501 there must be a nexus between the funds collected and the trust created. That construction is consistent with the accepted principle of trust law requiring tracing of misappropriated trust funds into the trustee’s estate in order for an impressed trust to arise. See D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 424-425 (1973). Finally, for the reasons discussed in the next section, a construction of § 7501 or § 6672 as imposing a trust on all after-acquired corporate funds without regard to the interests of others in those funds would conflict with the priority rules applicable to the collection of back taxes. (3) We developed in Part II, supra, that the Code affords the IRS several means to collect back taxes, including levy, distraint, and sale. But the IRS is not given the power to levy on property in the hands of the taxpayer beyond the extent of the taxpayer’s interest in the property, and the Code specifically subordinates tax liens to the interests of certain others in the property, generally including those with a perfected security interest in the property. For example, the Code and established decisional principles subordinate the tax lien to perfected security interests arising before the filing of the tax lien, to certain perfected security interests in certain collateral, including inventory, arising after the tax lien filing when pursuant to a security agreement entered into before the filing, and to collateral which is the subject of a purchase-money mortgage regardless of whether the agreement was entered into before or after filing of the tax lien. As a consequence, secured parties often will have interests in certain proceeds superior to the tax lien, and it is unlikely, moreover, that corporations in the position of those involved here could continue in operation without making some payments to secured creditors under the terms of security agreements. Those payments may well take the form of cash or accounts receivable, which like other property may be subject to a security interest, when, for example, the security agreement covers the proceeds of inventory the purchase of which is financed by the secured party, or the security agreement requires the debtor to make payments under a purchase-money mortgage by assigning accounts receivable which are the proceeds of inventory financed by the mortgage. Thus, although the IRS is powerless to attach assets in which a secured party has a superior interest, it would impose a penalty under § 6672 if the responsible person fails to divert the secured party’s proceeds to the Treasury without regard to whether the secured party’s interests are superior to those of the Government. Surely Congress did not intend § 6672 to hammer the responsible person with the threat of heavy civil and criminal penalties to pay over proceeds in which the Code does not assert a priority interest. IV We hold that a "responsible person” under § 6672 may violate the “pay over” requirement of that statute by willfully failing to pay over trust funds collected prior to his accession to control when at the time he assumed control the corporation has funds impressed with a trust under § 7501, but that § 7501 does not impress a trust on after-acquired funds, and that the responsible person consequently does not violate § 6672 by willfully using employer funds for purposes other than satisfaction of the trust-fund tax claims of the United States when at the time he assumed control there were no funds with which to satisfy the tax obligation and the funds thereafter generated are not directly traceable to collected taxes referred to by that statute. That portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the Government’s cross-appeal holding petitioner liable under § 6672 for wage withholding and FICA taxes required to be collected from employees’ wages prior to January 31,1969, is Reversed. In the Court of Appeals, petitioner appealed from a decision of the District Court holding him liable for withholding taxes for the period February 1 to July 15, 1969. The Court of Appeals -reversed, 552 F. 2d, at 161-163, and review of that holding was not sought here. Only the decision on the Government's cross-appeal holding petitioner liable for withholding taxes collected prior to January 31 is before us. Id., at 163-165. See Treas. Regs. §§ 31.6011 (a)-l (a) (1) and 31.6011 (a)-4, 26 CFR §§31.6011 (a)-1 (a)(1) and 31.6011 (a)-4 (1977), regarding return filing requirements. Treasury Reg. § 31.6151 (a), 26 CFR § 31.6151 (a) (1977), requires that the tax be paid when the return is due for filing. Treasury Reg. § 31.6011 (a)-5, 26 CFR § 31.6011 (a)-5 (1977), provides that monthly returns may be required in lieu of quarterly returns at the direction of the District Director. See also 26 U. S. C. §7512 (b). See United States v. Sotelo, post, at 277-278, n. 10. See Moore v. United States, 465 F, 2d 514, 517 (CA5 1972); Dillard v. Patterson, 326 F. 2d 302, 304 (CA5 1963); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 201 F. 2d 118, 120 (CA10 1952). This at the least is the administrative practice. See Brief for United States 10-11. Assessment is made by recording the liability of the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury, 26 U. S. C. § 6203, and notice of the assessment and demand for payment generally are required to be made within 60 days of the assessment. 26 U. S. C. § 6303 (a). Section 7202 provides: “Any person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” The cases which have been decided under § 6672 generally refer to the "person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title” by the shorthand phrase “responsible person.” We use that phrase without necessarily adopting any of the constructions placed upon it in the decisions. Petitioner argues that his construction of the statute is consistent with imposition of § 6672 liability upon a “responsible person” removed before the end of the quarter, explaining that in such case § 6672 liability would attach because “[w]hile the taxpayer was removed as a responsible officer before the time payment was required to be made, he nevertheless came under the requirement of making the payment when he collected the taxes.” Brief for Petitioner 9 (emphasis in original). “All three elements required to charge the taxpayer with the penalty . . . did in fact converge.” Ibid. If that is so, we fail to see why all three elements did not “converge” when petitioner assumed control. In both circumstances liability is asserted under the statute as to a person not in a position to fulfill each of the duties with respect to the specific tax dollars in question. Moreover, apart from any illogic from which that argument suffers, it is highly dubious that Congress intended the words of the statute to create the almost metaplwsical distinction suggested by petitioner’s argument between a choate duty to perform all three functions upon one in control at the start of a tax quarter and an inchoate duty as to one assuming control in mid-quarter. Although petitioner argues that neither § 6672 nor any other provision of the Code imposes liability in this situation, he suggested at oral argument that liability might lie under ordinary trust principles. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 20-21. As introduced in the House, H. R. 12863, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1308 (1918), § 1308 was a re-enactment of existing law. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1004, 40 Stat. 325-326. The Senate Finance Committee completely rewrote the section, adding the major penalty provisions which have since continuously existed in the Code. The Committee Reports do not shed any light on the problem at hand, however. Between 1918 and 1954, the only change in § 1308 (c), other than renumbering in the various Codes, see n. 11, infra, was that effected by the Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §1017 (d), 43 Stat. 344, which changed the word “refuses” in the 1918 Act to “fails,” and which in § 1017 (b), the predecessor of Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7202, changed the penalty from a misdemeanor to a felony. Under the 1939 Code, the successor provisions to § 1308 (c) were separately codified with each of the third-party collection taxes to which they were applicable. 26 U. S. C. § 2557 (b) (4) (1952 ed.) (narcotics) ; 26 U. S. C. §2707 (a) (1952 ed.) (firearms); 26 U. S. C. §1821 (a)(3) (1952 ed.) (documents); 26 U. S. C. § 1718 (c) (1952 ed.) (admissions and dues). S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 596 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A420 (1954). The complete text of the Senate Report’s discussion of §6672 is as follows: “This section is identical with that of the House bill. “This section is similar to certain sections of existing law which prescribe a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, not collected, or not accounted for and paid over, in the case of willful failure to collect, or to truthfully account for and pay over, any tax imposed by this title, or willful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat such tax. However, the application of this penalty is limited only to the collected or withhéld taxes which are imposed on some person other than the person who is required to collect, account for and pay over, the tax. Under existing law this penalty is not applicable in any case in which the additions to the tax in the case of delinquency or fraud are applicable. Under this section the additions to the tax provided by section 6653, relating to negligence or fraud, shall not be applied for any offense to which this section is applicable.” (Emphasis added.) The House Report is nearly identical. See Rubin v. United States, 380 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (WD Pa. 1974), aff’d, 515 F. 2d 507 (CA3 1975); Louisville Credit Men’s Assn., Inc. v. United States, 73-2 USTC ¶ 9740 (ED Ky. 1970); Tiffany v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 700 (NJ 1963). See, e. g., Sorenson v. United States, 521 F. 2d 325, 327 (CA9 1975). The court reasoned that payment of creditors from personal funds is a willful failure to pay because when personal funds are used for corporate purposes they become corporate funds, and any payment of them to creditors other than the United States is an unlawful preference. That reasoning was unnecessary to the result reached in the case, however. The responsible person there had used personal funds to pay net wages to employees. The finding of liability therefore could have been founded on the failure to collect and withhold taxes as wages were paid. Cf. 26 U. S. C. § 3505. Indeed, the IRS’s policy is to augment the personal liability of the responsible person by earmarking the taxes he collects and pays from current wages first to the past due direct corporate employment tax, that is, the employer’s share of FICA taxes, thus rendering him liable for trust-fund taxes he thought were paid, but which the Government does not credit as paid. This policy prevails unless the Government is notified in writing that the taxes are to be credited solely to current employment taxes. When payment results from enforced collection methods, however, the IRS nevertheless refuses to honor the designation. IRS Policy Statement P-5-60, IRS Manual, MT 1218-56 (Feb. 25, 1976). There might be eases in which a person would undertake to continue operations knowing of the risk of personal liability, but confident that the prospects for profitability make that risk acceptable. The fact that such risk-taking might occur in marginal cases would not, however, justify a construction of the statute as requiring the risk when to impose it does not further the overall deterrent and tax collection goals of the statute. Section 7501 provides: “(a) General rule. “Whenever any person, is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any other person and to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. The amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose. “(b) Penalties. “For penalties applicable to violations of this section, see sections 6672 and 7202.” Although the Government primarily relies upon § 6672, it suggests that liability would attach under § 7501, as well, for a breach of the trust established by that section. Brief for United States 18 n. 6. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that § 7501 is applicable only to employers, since the applicable definitional section, 26 U. S. C. §7701 (a)(1), defines “person” as “construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation,” while that applicable to § 6672 defines “person” as including “an officer or employee of a corporation . . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 6671 (b). Since we do not decide whether § 7501 establishes a basis of liability applicable to responsible persons independent of § 6672, we need not address these contentions. We decide only that § 7501 properly may be regarded as informing the scope of the duty imposed by § 6672. Section 6321 provides that the lien shall be applicable to “all property and rights to the property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” (Emphasis added.) We have held that the extent of the tax debtor’s interest in the property is determined by state law, and that the lien cannot attach when the debtor has no interest. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U. S. 509 (1960); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U. S. 522 (1960). The basic priority rules for tax liens are established by 26 U. S, C. § 6323, which, in addition to subordinating the federal tax lien to certain perfected security interests, makes superior to the lien, interests of persons who, without actual knowledge of the lien, acquire interests in personal property purchased from retail dealers in the ordinary course of trade, personal property (less than $250) purchased in casual sales, securities, motor vehicles, and real property by virtue of a lien for certain local real property and special assessment taxes, or for mechanic’s hens. §§ 6323 (b)(1) to (7). Section 6323 (a) provides: “The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary.” Section 6323 (c) provides that a tax lien is subordinate to a security interest which came into existence after the tax lien filing but which is a “commercial transactions financing agreement. . . protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation.” §§ 6323 (c) (1) (A) (i) and (c)(1)(B). (A commercial transactions financing agreement includes accounts receivable and inventory, § 6323 (c)(2)(C).) The local law applicable is, in 49 States and the District of Columbia, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); and 26 U. S. C. § 6323, as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125, was in large part adopted in order- to “conform the lien provisions of the internal revenue laws to the concepts developed in [the] Uniform Commercial Code.” H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966). Under the UCC, a perfected security interest is superior to a judgment lien creditor's claim in the property, see UCC §§ 9-301, 9-312. Perfection of a security interest in inventory or accounts receivable occurs only when a financing statement is filed, UCC § 9-302, and when it has attached. UCC § 9-303 (1). Attachment requires an agreement, value given by the secured party, and that the debtor have rights in the collateral. UCC § 9-204. Thus when a security agreement exists and filing has occurred prior to the filing of a tax lien to secure advances made after the tax filing, perfection is, at the least, achieved when the secured party makes the advance. When that occurs after the tax lien has been filed, § 6323 (d) protects the secured party from the federal tax lien if the advance is made not later than 45 days after the filing of the tax lien or upon receipt of actual notice of the tax lien filing, whichever is sooner. For a more detailed explanation of these provisions see Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1403-1413 (1968). Decisional law has long established that a purchase-money mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged property is superior to antecedent liens prior in time, see United States v. New Orleans R. Co,, 12 Wall. 362 (1871), and, therefore, a federal tax lien is subordinate to a purchase-money mortgagee’s interest notwithstanding that the agreement is made and the security interest arises after notice of the tax lien, The purchase-money mortgage priority is based upon recognition that the mortgagee’s interest merely reflects his contribution of property to the taxpayer’s estate and therefore does not prejudice creditors who are prior in time. In enacting the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Congress intended to preserve this priority, H. R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1966), and the IRS has since formally accepted that position. Rev. Rul. 68-57, 68-1 Cum. Bull. 553; see also IRS General Counsel’s Op. No. 13-60, 7 CCH 1961 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 6307 (1960). A security interest in accounts may be perfected by filing, UCC § 9-302, while a security interest ill cash, except as hereafter noted, can be perfected only by possession. UCC §9-304 (1). When the secured party perfects a security interest in inventory and proceeds, the security interest in accounts which are proceeds is continuously perfected. UCC § 9-306 (3) (a). The identifiable cash proceeds are also perfected, but only for a 10-day period. UCC § 9-306 (3). The basis for the dissent's contrary construction is that “it is difficult to comprehend why the United States should be precluded from looking to what is probably its best source, the flow of funds coming into business entities, merely because a change in ownership or management has occurred subsequent to the time when the amounts in question were withheld from employees.” Post, at 262. We agree that the employer’s liability is unaffected by changes in management, and the Government may, under various Code provisions, enforce its lien against any employer asset including the flow of incoming cash. But that does not answer the question before us which is whether § 6672 imposes a penalty on a responsible person for failing to pay over withheld taxes when those taxes had been dissipated before he acceded to control.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LANE v. PENA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al. No. 95-365. Argued April 15, 1996 Decided June 20, 1996 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 200. Walter A. Smith, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Daniel B. Kohrman, Audrey J. Anderson, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Steven R. Shapiro. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Barbara C■ Biddle, and Christine N. Kohl. Linda D. Kilb, Arlene B. Mayerson, and Patricia Shiu filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Michael A. Greene and Jerry W. Lee filed a brief for the American Diabetes Association as amicus curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U. S. C. § 791 et seq. (Act or Rehabilitation Act), prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of disability “under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency.” 29 U. S. C. § 794(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The question presented in this case is whether Congress has waived the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against awards of monetary damages for violations of this provision. I The United States Merchant Marine Academy is a federal service academy that trains students to serve as commercial merchant marine officers and as commissioned officers in the United States Armed Forces. The Academy is administered by the Maritime Administration, an organization within the Department of Transportation. Petitioner James Griffin Lane entered the Academy as a first-year student in July 1991 after meeting the Academy’s requirements for appointment, including passing a physical examination conducted by the Department of Defense. During his first year at the Academy, however, Lane was diagnosed by a private physician as having diabetes mellitus. Lane reported the diagnosis to the Academy’s Chief Medical Officer. The Academy’s Physical Examination Review Board conducted a hearing in September 1992 to determine Lane’s “medical suitability” to continue at the Academy, following which the Board reported to the Superintendent of the Academy that Lane suffered from insulin-dependent diabetes. In December 1992, Lane was separated from the Academy on the ground that his diabetes was a “disqualifying condition,” rendering him ineligible to be commissioned for service in the Navy/Merchant Marine Reserve Program or as a Naval Reserve Officer. After unsuccessfully challenging his separation before the Maritime Administrator, Lane brought suit in Federal District Court against the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and other defendants, alleging that his separation from the Academy violated § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794(a). He sought reinstatement to the Academy, compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Lane, concluding that his separation from the Academy solely on the basis of his diabetes violated the Act. The court ordered Lane reinstated to the Academy, and the Government did not dispute the propriety of this injunctive relief. The Government did, however, dispute the propriety of a compensatory damages award, claiming that the United States was protected against a damages suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The District Court disagreed; it ruled that Lane was entitled to a compensatory damages award against the Government for its violation of § 504(a), but deferred resolution of the specific amount of damages due. 867 F. Supp. 1050 (DC 1994). Shortly thereafter, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in Dorsey v. United States Dept. of Labor, 41 F. 3d 1551 (1994), that the Act did not waive the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages for violations of § 504(a). The court denied compensatory damages based on the absence, in any statutory text, of an “unequivocal expression” of congressional intent to waive the Government’s immunity as to monetary damages, and this Court’s instruction that waivers of sovereign immunity may not be implied, see, e. g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). In light of Dorsey, the District Court vacated its prior order to the extent that it awarded damages to Lane and held that Lane was not entitled to a compensatory damages award against the Federal Government. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-6a. Lane appealed. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit first rejected Lane’s request for initial en banc review to reconsider Dorsey, then granted the Government’s motion for summary affirmance. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a. We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1036 (1996), to resolve the disagreement in the Courts of Appeals on the important question whether Congress has waived the Federal Government’s immunity against monetary damages awards for violations of § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare, e. g., Dorsey, supra, at 1554-1555, with J L. v. Social Security Admin., 971 F. 2d 260 (CA9 1992), and Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F. 2d 780 (CA9 1991). II Section 504(a) of the Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 29 U. S. C. § 794(a). Section 505(a)(2) of the Act describes the remedies available for a violation of § 504(a): “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under [§ 504].” § 794a(a)(2). Because Title VI provides for monetary damages awards, see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60, 70 (1992) (noting that “a clear majority” of the Court confirmed in Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582 (1983), that damages are available under Title VI for intentional violations thereof), Lane reads §§ 504(a) and 505(a)(2) together to establish a waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards for violations of § 504(a) committed by Executive agencies. While Lane’s analysis has superficial appeal, it overlooks one critical requirement firmly grounded in our precedents: A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, see, e. g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33-34, 37 (1992), and will not be implied, Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, at 95. Moreover, a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 531 (1995) (when confronted with a purported waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity, the Court will “constru[e] ambiguities in favor of immunity”); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 318 (1986); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 161 (1981) (“[Limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied”). To sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims. Nordic Village, 503 U. S., at 34. A statute’s legislative history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text; “the ‘unequivocal expression’ of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.” Id., at 37. The clarity of expression necessary to establish a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages for violations of § 504 is lacking in the text of the relevant provisions. The language of § 505(a)(2), the remedies provision, is telling. In that section, Congress decreed that the remedies available for violations of Title VI would be similarly available for violations of § 504(a) “by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance.” 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2). This provision makes no mention whatsoever of “program[s] or activities] conducted by any Executive agency,” the plainly more far-reaching language Congress employed in § 504(a) itself. Whatever might be said about the somewhat curious structure of the liability and remedy provisions, it cannot be disputed that a reference to “Federal providers] ” of financial assistance in § 505(a)(2) does not, without more, establish that Congress has waived the Federal Government’s immunity against monetary damages awards beyond the narrow category of § 504(a) violations committed by federal funding agencies acting as such — that is, by “Federal provider[s].” The lack of clarity in § 505(a)(2)’s “Federal provider” provision is underscored by the precision with which Congress has waived the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity from compensatory damages claims for violations of §501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 791, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment decisions by the Federal Government. In § 505(a)(1), Congress expressly waived the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against certain remedies for violations of § 501: “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [which allows monetary damages] . . . shall be available, with respect to any complaint under section 501 of this Act, to any employee or applicant for employment aggrieved by the final disposition of such complaint, or by the failure to take final action on such complaint.” 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(1). Section 505(a)(1)’s broad language — “any complaint under section 501” — suggests by comparison with § 505(a)(2) that Congress did not intend to treat all § 504(a) defendants alike with regard to remedies. Had Congress wished to make Title VI remedies available broadly for all § 504(a) violations, it could easily have used language in § 505(a)(2) that is as sweeping as the “any complaint” language contained in § 505(a)(1). But our analysis need not end there. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made perfectly plain that compensatory damages would be available for certain violations of §501 by the Federal Government (as well as other §501 defendants), subject to express limitations: “In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in ... section 794a(a)(1) of title 29 [which applies to violations of § 501 by the Federal Government] . . . against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) under section 791 of title 29 and the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29, or who violated the requirements of section 791 of title 29 or the regulations implementing section 791 of title 29 concerning the provision of a reasonable accommodation,... the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section . . . from the respondent.” Rev. Stat. § 1977A, as added, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(2). The Act’s attorney’s fee provision makes a similar point. Section 505(b) provides that, “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 29 U. S. C. §794a(b). This provision likewise illustrates Congress’ ability to craft a clear waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against particular remedies for violations of the Act. The clarity of these provisions is in sharp contrast to the waiver Lane seeks to tease out of §§504 and 505(a)(2) of the Act. Lane insists nonetheless that § 505(a)(2) compels a result in his favor, arguing that the Department of Transportation is a “Federal provider” within the meaning of § 505(a)(2) and thus is liable for a compensatory damages award regardless of our resolution of the broader sovereign immunity question. Reply Brief for Petitioner 8-9. We disagree. The Department of Transportation, whatever its other activities, is not a “Federal provider” of financial assistance with respect to the Merchant Marine Academy, which the Department itself administers through the Maritime Administration. At oral argument, Lane’s counsel effectively conceded as much. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (acknowledging that the Department of Transportation is not a federal provider with respect to the Academy “because of this Court’s decision in [Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U. S. 597, 612 (1986)], which indicates that funds that are actually provided to an entity that the Federal Government manages itself, which is what DOT does here . . . for the Merchant Marine Academy,” do not render the agency a “Federal provider”). Lane argues that §505(a)(2)’s reference to “Federal provider^] ” is not limited by the text of the provision itself to the funding activities of those providers, but instead reaches “any act” of an agency that serves as a “Federal provider” in any context. Reply Brief for Petitioner 9, and n. 11. In light of our established practice of construing waivers of sovereign immunity narrowly in favor of the sovereign, however, we decline Lane’s invitation to read the statutory language so broadly. Lane next encourages us to look not only at the language of the liability and remedies provisions but at the larger statutory scheme, from which he would discern congressional intent to “level the playing field” by subjecting the Federal Government to the same remedies as any and all other § 504(a) defendants. A statutory scheme that would subject the Federal Government to awards of injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and monetary damages when it acts as a “Federal provider,” but would not subject it to monetary damages awards when, and only when, a federal Executive agency itself commits a violation of § 504(a), Lane posits, is so illogical as to foreclose the conclusion that Congress intended to create such a scheme. The statutory scheme on which Lane hinges his argument is admittedly somewhat bewildering. But the lack of perfect correlation in the various provisions does not indicate, as Lane suggests, that the reading proposed by the Government is entirely irrational. It is plain that Congress is free to waive the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against liability without waiving its immunity from monetary damages awards. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) illustrates this nicely. Under the provisions of the APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,” is expressly authorized to bring “[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.” 5 U. S. C. § 702 (emphasis added). In any event, Lane’s “equal treatment” argument largely misses the crucial point that, when it comes to an award of money damages, sovereign immunity places the Federal Government on an entirely different footing than private parties. Petitioner’s reliance on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), then, is misplaced. In Ftank-lin, we held only that the implied private right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 supports a claim for monetary damages. “[A]bsent clear direction to the contrary by Congress,” we stated, “the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.” Id., at 70-71. Franklin, however, involved an action against nonfederal defendants under Title IX. Although the Government does not contest the propriety of the injunctive relief Lane obtained, the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity prohibits wholesale application of Franklin to actions against the Government to enforce § 504(a). As the Government puts it, “[w]here a cause of action is authorized against the federal government, the available remedies are not those that are 'appropriate/ but only those for which sovereign immunity has been expressly waived.” Brief for Respondents 28. And Lane’s “equal treatment” argument falters as well on a point previously discussed: Section 505(a)(2) itself indicates congressional intent to treat federal Executive agencies differently from other § 504(a) defendants for purposes of remedies. See supra, at 192-193. The existence of the § 505(a) (2) remedies provision brings this case outside the “general rule” we discussed in Franklin: This is not a case in which “a right of action exists to enforce a federal right and Congress is silent on the question of remedies.” 503 U. S., at 69. Title IX, the statute at issue in Franklin, made no mention of available remedies. Id., at 71. The Rehabilitation Act, by sharp contrast, contains a provision labeled “Remedies and attorney fees,” § 505. Congress has thus spoken to the question of remedies in § 505(a)(2), the only “remedies” provision directly addressed to §504 violations, and has done so in a way that suggests that it did not in fact intend to waive the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards for Executive agencies’ violations of § 504(a). Given the existence of a statutory provision that is directed precisely to the remedies available for violations of § 504, it would be a curious application of our sovereign immunity jurisprudence to conclude, as the dissent appears to do, see post, at 209-210, that the lack of clear reference to Executive agencies in any express remedies provision indicates congressional intent to subject the Federal Government to monetary damages. Ill Even if §§ 504(a) and 505(a)(2) together do not establish the requisite unequivocal waiver of immunity, Lane insists, the “equalization” provision contained in § 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,100 Stat. 1846,42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7, reveals congressional intent to equalize the remedies available against all defendants for § 504(a) violations. Section 1003 was enacted in response to our decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985), where we held that Congress had not unmistakably expressed its intent to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Rehabilitation Act, and that the States accordingly were not “subject to suit in federal court by litigants seeking retroactive monetary relief under §504.” Id., at 235. By enacting §1003, Congress sought to provide the sort of unequivocal waiver that our precedents demand. That section provides: “(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment... from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance. “(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d-7(a). The “public entities” to which § 1003 refers, Lane concludes, must include the federal Executive agencies named in § 504(a), and those agencies must be subject to the same remedies under § 504(a), including monetary damages, as are priváte entities. Although Lane’s argument is not without some force, § 1003 ultimately cannot bear the weight Lane would assign it. The equalization provision is susceptible of at least two interpretations other than the across-the-board leveling of liability and remedies that Lane proposes. Under the first such interpretation, as proposed by the Government, the “public . . . entities]” to which the statute refers are “the non-federal public entities receiving federal financial assistance that are covered by” each of the statutes to which § 1003(a)(1) refers: The Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, Title IX, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. Brief for Respondents 22. The Government’s suggestion is a plausible one: that § 1003(a)(2) refers to municipal hospitals, local school districts, and the like, which are unquestionably subject to each of the Acts listed in § 1003(a)(1). Section 504 alone among the listed Acts, however, extends its coverage to “program[s] or activities] conducted by any Executive agency.” Section 1003 is also open to a second interpretation, one similar to the “leveling” interpretation suggested by petitioner: By reference to “public or private entities],” Congress meant only to subject the States to the scope of remedies available against either public or private §504 defendants, whatever the lesser (or perhaps the greater) of those remedies might be. Lane’s reading of the statute— one that would suggest that all § 504(a) defendants, including the States, are subject to precisely the same remedies for violations of that provision — would effectively read out of the statute the very language on which he seeks to rely. That is, if the same remedies are available against all governmental and nongovernmental defendants under § 504(a), the “public or private” language is entirely superfluous. Congress could have achieved the result Lane suggests simply by subjecting States to the same remedies available against “every other entity,” without further elaboration. The fact that § 1003(a)(2) itself separately mentions public and private entities suggests that there is a distinction to be made in terms of the remedies available against the two classes of defendants. Although neither of these conceivable readings of § 1003(a)(2) is entirely satisfactory, their existence points up a fact fatal to Lane’s argument: Section 1003(a) is not so free from ambiguity that we can comfortably conclude, based thereon, that Congress intended to subject the Federal Government to awards of monetary damages for violations of § 504(a) of the Act. Given the care with which Congress responded to our decision in Atascadero by crafting an unambiguous waiver of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1003, it would be ironic indeed to conclude that that same provision “unequivocally” establishes a waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against monetary damages awards by means of an admittedly ambiguous reference to “public . . . entities]” in the remedies provision attached to the unambiguous waiver of the States’ sovereign immunity. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. BORDEN CO. No. 106. Argued January 19, 1966. Decided March 23, 1966. Robert B. Hummel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Daniel M. Friedman, Gerald Kadish and James Mcl. Henderson. John E. F. Wood argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Kent V. Lukingbeal, Robert C. Johnston, Philip S. Campbell and C. Brien Dillon. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Borden Company, respondent here, produces and sells evaporated milk under the Borden name, a nationally advertised brand. At the same time Borden packs and markets evaporated milk under various private brands owned by its customers. This milk is physically and chemically identical with the milk it distributes under its own brand but is sold at both the wholesale and retail level at prices regularly below those obtained for the Borden brand milk. The Federal Trade Commission found the milk sold under the Borden and the private labels to be of like grade and quality as required for the applicability of § 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, held the price differential to be discriminatory within the meaning of the section, ascertained the requisite adverse effect on commerce, rejected Borden’s claim of cost justification and consequently issued a cease-and-desist order. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission’s order on the sole ground that as a matter of law, the customer label milk was not of the same grade and quality as the milk sold under the Borden brand. 339 F. 2d 133. Because of the importance of this issue, which bears on the reach and coverage of the Robinson-Patman Act, we granted certiorari. 382 U. S. 807. We now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for the determination of the remaining issues raised by respondent Borden in that court. Cf. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 542. The position of Borden and of the Court of Appeals is that the determination of like grade and quality, which is a threshold finding essential to the applicability of § 2 (a), may not be based solely on the physical properties of the products without regard to the brand names they bear and the relative public acceptance these brands enjoy — “consideration should be given to all commercially significant distinctions which affect market value, whether they be physical or promotional.” 339 F. 2d, at 137. Here, because the milk bearing the Borden brand regularly sold at a higher price than did the milk with a buyer’s label, the court considered the products to be “commercially” different and hence of different “grade” for the purposes of § 2 (a), even though they were physically identical and of equal quality. Although a mere difference in brand would not in itself demonstrate a difference in grade, decided consumer preference for one brand over another, reflected in the willingness to pay a higher price for the well-known brand, was, in the view of the Court of Appeals, sufficient to differentiate chemically identical products and to place the price differential beyond the reach of § 2 (a). We reject this construction of § 2 (a), as did both the examiner and the Commission in this case. The Commission’s view is that labels do not differentiate products for the purpose of determining grade or quality, even though the one label may have more customer appeal and command a higher price in the marketplace from a substantial segment of the public. That this is the Commission’s long-standing interpretation of the present Act, as well as of § 2 of the Clayton Act before its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act, may be gathered from the Commission’s decisions dating back to 1936. Whitaker Cable Corp., 51 F. T. C. 958 (1955); Page Dairy Co., 50 F. T. C. 395 (1953); United States Rubber Co., 46 F. T. C. 998 (1950); United States Rubber Co., 28 F. T. C. 1489 (1939); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F. T. C. 303 (1938); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F. T. C. 232 (1936). These views of the agency are entitled to respect, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385, 391, and represent a more reasonable construction of the statute than that offered by the Court of Appeals. Obviously there is nothing in the language of the statute indicating that grade, as distinguished from quality, is not to be determined by the characteristics of the product itself, but by consumer preferences, brand acceptability or what customers think of it and are willing to pay for it. Moreover, what legislative history there is concerning this question supports the Commission's construction of the statute rather than that of the Court of Appeals. During the 1936 hearings on the proposed amendments to § 2 of the Clayton Act, the attention of the Congress was specifically called to the question of the applicability of § 2 to the practice of a manufacturer selling his product under his nationally advertised brand at a different price than he charged when the product was sold under a private label. Because it was feared that the Act would require the elimination of such price differentials, Hearings on H. R. 4995 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 355, and because private brands “would [thus] be put out of business by the nationally advertised brands,” it was suggested that the proposed § 2 (a) be amended so as to apply only to sales of commodities of “like grade, quality and brand.” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 421. There was strong objection to the amendment and it was not adopted by the Committee. The rejection of this amendment assumes particular significance since it was pointed out in the hearings that the legality of price differentials between proprietary and private brands was then pending before the Federal Trade Commission in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F. T. C. 232. By the time the Committee Report was written, the Commission had decided Goodyear. The report quoted from the decision and interpreted it as holding that Goodyear had violated the Act because “at no time did it offer to its own dealers prices on Goodyear brands of tires which were comparable to prices at which respondent was selling tires of equal or comparable quality to Sears, Roebuck & Co.” H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4. During the debates on the bill, Representative Pat-man, one of the bill’s sponsors, was asked about the private label issue. His brief response is wholly consistent with the Commission’s interpretation of § 2 (a), 80 Cong. Rec. 8115: “Mr. TAYLOR of South Carolina. There has grown up a practice on the part of manufacturers of making certain brands of goods for particular chain stores. Is there anything in this bill calculated to remedy that situation? “Mr. PATMAN. ... I have not time to discuss that feature, but the bill will protect the independents in that way, because they will have to sell to the independents at the same price for the same product where they put the same quality of merchandise in a package, and this will remedy the situation to which the gentleman refers. “Mr. TAYLOR of South Carolina. Irrespective of the brand. “Mr. PATMAN. Yes; so long as it is the same quality. . . .” The Commission’s construction of the statute also appears to us to further the purpose and policy of the Robinson-Patman Act. Subject to specified exceptions and defenses, § 2 (a) proscribes unequal treatment of different customers' in comparable transactions, but only if there is the requisite effect upon competition, actual or potential. But if the transactions are deemed to involve goods of disparate grade or quality, the section has no application at all and the Commission never reaches either the issue of discrimination or that of anticompeti-tive impact. We doubt that Congress intended to foreclose these inquiries in situations where a single seller markets the identical product under several different brands, whether his own, his customers’ or both. Such transactions are too laden with potential discrimination and adverse competitive effect to be excluded from the reach of § 2 (a) by permitting a difference in grade to be established by the label alone or by the label and its consumer appeal. If two products, physically identical but differently branded, are to be deemed of different grade because the seller regularly and successfully markets some quantity of both at different prices, the seller could, as far as § 2 (a) is concerned, make either product available to some customers and deny it to others, however discriminatory this might be and however damaging to competition. Those who were offered only one of the two products would be barred from competing for those customers who want or might buy the other. The retailer who was permitted to buy and sell only the more expensive brand would have no chance to sell to those who always buy the cheaper product or to convince others, by experience or otherwise, of the fact which he and all other dealers already know — that the cheaper product is actually identical with that carrying the more expensive label. The seller, to escape the Act, would have only to succeed in selling some unspecified amount of each product to some unspecified portion of his customers, however large or small the price differential might be. The seller’s pricing and branding policy, by being successful, would apparently validate itself by creating a difference in “grade” and thus taking itself beyond the purview of the Act. Our holding neither ignores the economic realities of the marketplace nor denies that some labels will command a higher price than others, at least from some portion of the public. But it does mean that “the economic factors inherent in brand names and national advertising should not be considered in the jurisdictional inquiry under the statutory ‘like grade and quality’ test.” Report of The Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 158 (1955). And it does mean that transactions like those involved in this case may be examined by the Commission under §2 (a). The Commission will determine, subject to judicial review, whether the differential under attack is discriminatory within the meaning of the Act, whether competition may be injured, and whether the differential is cost-justified or is defensible as a good-faith effort to meet the price of a competitor. “[TJangible consumer preferences as between branded and unbranded commodities should receive due legal recognition in the more flexible ‘injury’ and ‘cost justification’ provisions of the statute.” Id., at 159. This, we think, is precisely what Congress intended. The arguments for exempting private brand selling from § 2 (a) are, therefore, more appropriately addressed to the Congress than to this Court. The Court of Appeals suggested that the Commission’s views of like grade and quality for the purposes of § 2 (a) cannot be squared with its rulings in cases where a seller presents the defense under § 2 (b) that he is in good faith meeting the equally low price of a competitor. In those cases, it is said, the Commission has given full recognition to the significance of the higher prices commanded by the nationally advertised brand “in holding that a seller who reduces the price of his premium product to the level of his non-premium competitors is not merely meeting competition, but undercutting it.” 339 F. 2d, at 138. The Commission, on the other hand, sees no inconsistency between its present decision and its § 2 (b) cases. In its view, the issue under § 2 (b) of whether a seller’s lower price is a good-faith meeting of competition involves considerations different from those presented by the jurisdictional question of “like grade and quality” under § 2 (a). We need not resolve these contrary positions. The issue we have here relates to § 2 (a), not to § 2 (b), and we think the Commission has resolved it correctly. The § 2 (b) cases are not now before us and we do not venture to decide them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. T, . , , T, , It is so ordered. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a) (1964 ed.), provides in pertinent part: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered A proviso to §2 of the original Clayton Act excepted price discrimination “on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold . . . .” 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The commentators are somewhat divided on the dispute involved in this case. Supporting the Commission’s view are the Report of The Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 158 (1955); Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act 39 (2d ed. 1959); Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 27 (1938); Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 31, 463-464 (1959); Seidman, Price Discrimination Cases, reprinted in 2 Hoffmann's Antitrust Law and Techniques 409, 424-428 (1963). Contrary views are expressed by a minority of the Attorney General’s Committee; in Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 75 (1962); and in Cassady & Grether, The Proper Interpretation of “Like Grade and Quality” within the Meaning of Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 241 (1957). Mr. H. B. Teegarden, who was then counsel to the United States Wholesale Grocers Association, and who apparently played a large part in drafting the bill, Hearings on H. R. 4995 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9, supplemented his oral testimony with a letter addressed in part to the proposed amendment: “To amend the bill by inserting ‘and brands/ after the words ‘commodities of like grade and quality/ as suggested by Judge Watkins, although it may seem harmless at first sight, is a specious suggestion that would destroy entirely the efficacy of the bill against larger buyers. So amended, the bill would impose no limitation whatever upon price differentials, except as between different purchasers of the same brand. But where goods are put up under a private brand, there can only be one purchaser, namely the one for whom the brand is designed. Neither Kroger nor any independent could use an A. & P. private brand of canned fruit, for example; and to so amend the bill would leave every manufacturer free to put up his standard goods under a private brand for a particular purchaser and give him any price discount or discriminations that he might demand. “Under the Patman bill as it stands, manufacturers are still free to put up their products under private brands; but if they do so for one purchaser under his private brand, then they must be ready to do so on the same terms, relative to their comparative costs, for a competing purchaser under his private brand; and unless that equality of treatment is required and assured, the discriminations at which the bill is aimed cannot be suppressed.” Id., 2d Sess., at 469. Borden argues that it spends large sums to ensure the high quality of its Borden brand milk on customers’ shelves, inferring that there really is a difference between its'own milk and the milk sold under private labels, at least by the time it reaches the consumer. Of course, if Borden could prove this difference, it is unlikely that the case would be here. The findings are to the contrary in this case and we write on the premise that the two products are physically the same at the time of consumer purchase. Borden’s extra expenses in connection with its own milk are more relevant to the cost justification issue than to the question we have before us. The market acceptability test would hardly stop with insulating from inquiry the price differential between proprietary and private label sales. That test would also immunize from the Act sales at different prices of the same product under two different producer-owned labels, the one being less advertised and having less market acceptability than the other. And if it is “consumer preferences,” dissenting opinion, p. 648, which create the difference in grade or quality, why should not Borden be able to discriminate between two purchasers of private label milk, as long as one label commands a higher price from consumers than the other and hence is of a different grade and quality? In this context perhaps the market acceptability test would be refined to preclude this differential on the grounds that Borden’s customer, as distinguished from the consumer, will not pay more than his competitor for private label milk and therefore the milk sold by Borden under one private brand is really of the same grade and quality as the milk sold under the other brand even though ultimate consumers will pay more for one than the other. Taking this approach, if Borden packed for one wholesale customer under two private labels, one having more consumer appeal than the other because of the customer’s own advertising program, Borden must sell both brands at the same price it charges other private label customers because all such milk is of the same grade and quality. At the same time, the customer buying from Borden under two labels could himself sell one label at a reduced price without inquiry under § 2 (a) because the milk in one container is no longer of the same grade arid quality as that in the other, although both the milk and the containers came from Borden. Such an approach would obviously focus not on consumer preference as determinative of grade and quality but on who spent the advertising money that created the preference — Borden’s customer, not Borden, created the preference and hence the milk is of the same grade and quality in Borden’s hands but not in its customer’s. The dissent would exempt the effective advertiser from the Act. We think Congress intended to remit him to his defenses under the Act, including that of cost justification. This is not, of course, a helpful suggestion to those who thinP the congressional remedy would be “very difficult if not impossible” and who thus prefer the more “reasonable approach” through the courts. See Cassady & Grether, supra, n. 3, at 277. Section 2 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b) (1964 ed.), provides as follows: “Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.” The Court of Appeals relied upon Callaway Mills Co., sub nom. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, 1963-1965, ¶ 16,800; Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F. T. C. 277 (1957); Standard Oil Co., 49 F. T. C. 923 (1953); and Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F. T. C. 351 (1948). Borden adds Gerber Products Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers Co., 160 F. Supp. 916 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1958).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CASS v. UNITED STATES No. 73-604. Argued April 16, 1974 Decided May 28, 1974 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and BreNNAn, Stewaet, Marshall, BlackmuN, Powell, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 84. Arthur B. Hanson argued the cause for petitioner in No. 73-604. With him on the briefs was Charles A. Smith. William A. Dougherty, by appointment of the Court, 416 U. S. 934, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in No. 73-5661. William L. Patton argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jajje, Robert E. Kopp, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer. Together with No. 73-5661, Adams et al. v. Secretary of the Navy et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Kevin M. Forde filed a brief for John N. O’Meara as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress has provided in 10 U. S. C. § 687 (a) that an otherwise eligible member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces, who is involuntarily released from active duty, “and who has completed, immediately before his release, at least five years of continuous active duty, is entitled to a readjustment payment computed by multiplying his years of active service ... by two months’ basic pay of the grade in which he is serving at the time of his release.” It is further provided that “[f]or the purposes of this subsection— ... (2) a part of a year that is six months'or more is counted as a whole year, and a part of a year that is less than six months is disregarded . . . We must decide whether the “rounding” provision set forth in § 687 (a)(2) is to be applied in determining eligibility for readjustment pay, as well as in computing the amount of readjustment pay to which an eligible reservist is entitled, so that involuntarily released reservists who have completed four years and six months or more, but less than five years, of continuous active duty prior to their release are nonetheless entitled to a readjustment payment. The Court of Appeals held that the rounding clause applied only to computation of readjustment payments, 483 F. 2d 220 (CA9 1973), contrary to the earlier decision of the Court of Claims that the rounding provision is applicable in determining eligibility for, as well as computation of, readjustment payments under § 687. Schmid v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 780, 436 F. 2d 987, cert. denied, 404 U. S. 951 (1971). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 414 U. S. 1128 (1974), and now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Each petitioner had served continuously for more than four years and six months, but less than five years, when notified that he would be honorably but involuntarily released from active duty in the Reserves. In No. 73-604, petitioner Cass, a captain in the Army Reserve, was in fact released from active duty before completing five years of service, and when the Army denied his request for readjustment pay, he brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, which granted relief on the authority of the Court of Claims’ decision in Schmid, supra. In No. 73-5661, petitioners Adams, Steneman, and Youngquist, captains in the Marine Corps Reserve, brought separate actions in the Central District of California, prior to their release, seeking a modification of their release orders to provide for readjustment pay. The District Court subsequently held that they were entitled to readjustment pay based on active service of more than four and one-half years. The Government’s appeals from the decisions of the two District Courts were consolidated, and the Court of Appeals reversed each, holding that the statute and its legislative history make clear that readjustment pay is not to be provided to reservists involuntarily released from active duty with less than five full years of continuous service. Petitioners assert to the contrary that the language of § 687 (a) unambiguously establishes that four and one-half years of continuous active service qualifies an involuntarily released reservist for readjustment benefits, that the legislative history of the rounding provision should therefore not be considered in resolving the issue, and that even if the legislative history is considered, it supports the construction urged by petitioners as much as that contended for by the Government. We are unpersuaded by these arguments, however. The statute sets out both the eligibility requirements for entitlement to readjustment pay and the method of computing the amount of the applicable payment in the same sentence. Entitlement is based, in part, on the completion, immediately before the involuntary release of a reservist, of “at least five years of continuous active duty,” and the payment is to be computed by multiplying the reservist’s “years of active service” by two months’ basic pay of the grade in which he is serving when released. Because the rounding provision expressly provides that it is to be applied for “purposes of this subsection,” petitioners contend that the provision modifies the term “year” whenever that term appears in the subsection, i. e., to determine whether a reservist has completed five years of service to be eligible for readjustment benefits, as well as to determine the number of years of service to use as a multiplier in computing the amount of readjustment pay owed.. This is so plainly true, petitioners contend, that resort to legislative history is unnecessary and improper. Our view is to the contrary. The rounding provision is arguably subject to the interpretation given it by petitioners, but did Congress intend that provision to override its explicit requirement of “at least” five years of service? We think the answer to that question is sufficiently doubtful to warrant our resort to extrinsic aids to determine the intent of Congress, which, of course, is the controlling consideration in resolving the issue before us. Moreover, the Court has previously stated that “[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination/ ” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534; 543-544 (1940); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479 (1943). Such aid is available in this case and we decline to ignore the clearly relevant history of § 687 (a). Certain reservists involuntarily released from active duty are granted lump-sum readjustment pay to help them readjust to civilian life and to encourage qualified reservists to remain on active duty for extended periods. Readjustment pay was first provided by the Act of July 9, 1956, 70 Stat. 517, which conditioned entitlement on the completion immediately prior to release of “at least five years of continuous active duty.” It also provided that “[f]or the purposes of computing the amount of readjustment payment (1) a part of a year that is six months or more is counted as a whole year, and a part of a year that is less than six months is disregarded . . . .” Ibid. As first introduced and passed by the House, however, the bill provided, as the codified version does now, that “[f]or the purposes of this subsection” the six-month rounding provision would apply. H. R. Rep. No. 1960, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1956); 102 Cong. Rec. 10120 (June 12, 1956). It was nonetheless made clear by the debate in the House prior to passage that five years was to be the minimum eligibility requirement. The Senate, focusing on a letter from the Comptroller General to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee suggesting that the language be clarified to ensure that five years was to be the minimum period necessary to qualify for a readjustment payment, amended the bill to reflect this more clearly, id., at 11333-11334 (June 29, 1956), and the House readily concurred the same day in the Senate amendments to the bill as the final language of the 1956 Act, id., at 11503-11504. The Act was amended in June 1962, primarily to raise the amount of readjustment benefits paid to involuntarily released reservists to equal the amount provided as severance pay to involuntarily released regular officers, but it retained the explicit language specifying the use of the rounding provision for "purposes of computing the amount of the readjustment payment,” 76 Stat. 120, and there was no discussion in the congressional reports suggesting any modification of this language. Less than three months later, however, the present language was adopted as part of a measure codifying “recent military laws.” Act of Sept. 7, 1962, 76 Stat. 506. The committee reports accompanying the codification proposal make plain that no change in the eligibility requirements for readjustment pay was intended by the enacted change in phraseology. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained the purpose of the proposal as follows: “This bill, as amended, is not. intended to make any substantive change in existing law. Its purpose is to bring up to date title 10 of the United States Code, by incorporating the provisions of a number of public laws that were passed while the bill to enact title 10 into law was still pending in the Congress, and to transfer to title 10,' provisions now in other parts of the code.” S. Rep. No. 1876, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1962). The same limited purpose was expressed by the House' Judiciary Committee, which further explained that “[s]ome changes in style and form have been made to conform the provisions to the style and form of title 10, but these changes do not affect the substance.” H. R. Rep. No. 1401, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1962). These congressional comments, combined with the fact that no consideration of any change in eligibility standards appears in either the cited committee reports or in the proceedings leading to adoption of the codification bill by the House, 108 Cong. Rec. 4435-4441 (1962), and by the Senate, 108 Cong. Rec. 17088-17089 (1962), conclusively demonstrate that Congress did not reduce the minimum period of qualifying service for entitlement to readjustment benefits from five to four and one-half years when it substituted the words in the codified version of § 687 (a) for the unambiguous language of the prior substantive enactments. We are unpersuaded by petitioners’ claim that the codified version is nevertheless to be accepted as correctly expressing the will of Congress and as a mere unexplained version of the language of prior law, see Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U. S. 527, 529-530 (1942); United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 513 (1880). Here the meaning of the predecessor statute is clear and quite different from the meaning petitioners would ascribe to the codified law; and the revisers expressly stated that changes in language resulting from the codification were to have no substantive effect. Fourco Class Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1957); United States v. Cook, 384 U. S. 257, 260 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 815-816 (1966). The Court of Claims in the Schmid case, 193 Ct. Cl. 780, 436 F. 2d 987 (1971), thought that in codifying § 687 (a), Congress restored the original language of the 1956 House bill, which it knew had been interpreted by the Comptroller General as reducing the minimum eligibility requirement to four years, six months. Id., at 787, 436 F. 2d, at 991. But the codification language was accompanied by no reference to the 1956 legislation or to the views then expressed by the Comptroller General. What is more, it is plain that the language of the original 1956 bill was itself not intended to set the minimum eligibility period at less than five years. The codification, if construed as petitioners would have it, would not represent a “return” to the original intent of Congress. It is also significant that there is no hint of any consideration of what such a change would cost or how it would affect the goals of the readjustment pay provisions, contrary to the careful attention these matters received when benefits under the readjustment pay statute were raised in 1962. As Judge Nichols commented in dissenting from the decision in Schmid: “In resolving ambiguity, we must allow ourselves some recognition of the existence of sheer inadvertence in the legislative process.” Id., at 789, 436 F. 2d, at 992. Finally, we cannot agree with the contention that a change in minimum eligibility from five to four and one-half years should not be considered a “substantive change” because once a reservist must re-enlist beyond the initial enlistment term of four years, the purpose of the readjustment benefit scheme as an inducement to extended service is satisfied. Not only is the selection of the particular minimum term of eligibility a peculiarly legislative task dependent upon substantive judgment, but the very fact that such a change involves a substantially greater expenditure of funds places this sort of revision into the substantive realm. We thus conclude that the rounding provision of § 687 (a)(2) is applicable only in the determination of how much readjustment pay an otherwise qualified reservist is authorized, and that such a reservist must serve a minimum of five full years of continuous active duty before he is involuntarily released in order to be eligible for readjustment benefits. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas, agreeing with the Court of Claims in Schmid v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 780, 436 F. 2d 987, would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In full, 10 U. S. C. §687 (a) provides: "§ 687. Non-Regulars: readjustment payment upon involuntary release from active duty. “(a) Except for members covered by subsection (b), a member of a reserve component or a member of the Army or the Air Force without component who is released from active duty involuntarily, or because he was not accepted for an additional tour of active duty for which he volunteered after he had completed a tour of active duty, and who has completed, immediately before his release, at least five years of continuous active duty, is entitled to a readjustment payment computed by multiplying his years of active service (other than in time of war or of national emergency declared by Congress after June 28, 1962), but not more than eighteen, by two months’ basic pay of the grade in which he is serving at the time of his release. However, a member who is released from active duty because his performance of duty has fallen below standards prescribed by the Secretary concerned, or because his retention on active duty is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security, is entitled to a readjustment payment computed on the basis of one-half of one month’s basic pay of the grade in which the member is serving at the time of his release from active duty. A person covered by this subsection may not be paid more than two years’ basic pay of the grade in which he is serving at the time of his release or $15,000, whichever amount is the lesser. For the purposes of this subsection — ' “(1) a period of active duty is continuous if it is not interrupted by a break in service of more than 30 days; “(2) a part of a year that is six months or more is counted as a whole year, and a part of a year that is less than six months is disregarded; and “(3) a period for which the member concerned has received readjustment pay under another provision of law may not be included.” The District Court had earlier granted petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting their involuntary release without readjustment pay. As a result, these petitioners had each served more than five years on active duty by the time the decision awarding them readjustment benefits was rendered. In deciding they were entitled to readjustment pay, however, the District Court expressly disclaimed any reliance on the fact that they actually served more than five years, since they were permitted to do so only under the compulsion of the court’s preliminary injunction. The injunction was dissolved as moot in the wake of the award of readjustment pay. The Court of Appeals also held that the injunction granted in favor of petitioners in No. 73-5661, see n. 2, supra, was improperly issued and could not be relied upon to support eligibility for readjustment benefits. 483 F. 2d 220, 222 (CA9 1973). That ruling is not challenged in this Court. Petitioners rely on cases suggesting that recourse to legislative materials is unwarranted when the meaning of statutory language is clear and unequivocal. E. g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61 (1949); Helvering v. City Bank Co., 296 U. S. 85, 89 (1935); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77, 83 (1932). In the first two of. these eases, though finding the language to be construed this clear, the Court nonetheless did look at the legislative history of the statutory provisions to be interpreted. A majority of the Court of Claims in Schmid v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 780, 436 F. 2d 987 (1971), though they also examined the legislative history, found it clear from the language of § 687 (a) that the rounding provision should apply to both eligibility and computation determinations, whereas the Court of Appeals in these cases thought it clear that the minimum five-year eligibility clause is “not subject to the interpretation given it by the court in Schmid.” 483 F. 2d, at 222. Obviously there is room for reasonable dispute over the construction of § 687 (a) based on the statutory language alone. Petitioners tender other arguments, apart from that founded on the consistent use of the word “years,” to demonstrate that, read in its statutory context, the rounding provision in § 687 (a) was plainly intended to establish the minimum qualifying term of service at four years, six months, but none of them overcomes the ambiguity created by the direct establishment of “at least five years” of service as a qualification for readjustment benefits. Thus, it is argued that § 687 (a) (3) excludes from the determination of both eligibility and the amount of benefits payable “a period for which the member concerned has received readjustment pay under another provision of law,” and given the grammatical structure of § 687 (a), n. 1, supra, that the rounding rule in subsection (2) must be applied for the same purposes as the “prior period exclusion” rule of subsection (3). The Government asserts that the underlying premise that subsection (3) applies for both purposes is erroneous. As was the case with the rounding provision before codification, see text infra, the prior period exclusion was expressly to be applied only “[f]or the purposes of computing the amount of the readjustment payment.” Act of June 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 120. Furthermore, the current Department of Defense Military Pay and Allowances Entitlements Manual § 40414 (b) (Jan. 1, 1967) still excludes such prior service only for computing the amount of readjustment pay due, not for determining entitlement. The Government suggests, therefore, that if §§ 687 (a) (2) and (3) are to be construed as applicable for the same purpose, that purpose is only for computation. Manifestly, the parties’ dispute over the applicability of subsection (3) does not resolve the issue of when subsection (2) is to apply; it merely restates the problem. Petitioners also rely on 10 U. S. C. § 6330, which expressly applies a like rounding rule both to determine eligibility for transfer to the Fleet Reserve and, thereby, for retainer pay, by enlisted members of the Navy and Marine Corps, and to compute the amount of retainer pay due. The pertinent portions of § 6330 provide as follows: “§6330. Enlisted members: transfer to Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve; retainer pay. "(b) An enlisted member of the Regular Navy or the Naval Reserve who has completed 20 or more years of active service in the armed forces may, at his request, be transferred to the Fleet Reserve. An enlisted member of the Regular Marine Corps or the Marine Corps Reserve who has completed 20 or more years of active service in the armed forces may, at his request, be transferred to the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. “(c) Each member who is transferred to the Fleet Reserve or the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve under this section is entitled when not on active duty, to'retainer pay at the rate of 2% percent of the basic pay that he received at the time of transfer multiplied by the number of years of active service in the armed forces . . . . “(d) For the purposes of subsections (b) and (c), a part of a year that is six months or more is counted as a whole year and a part of a year that is less than six months is disregarded. A completed minority enlistment is counted as four years of active service, and an enlistment terminated within three months before the end of the term of enlistment is counted as active service for the full term.” It is readily apparent that the rounding provision of § 687 (a) (2) contains an ambiguity not present in the more explicit language of § 6330 (d). Nor does the particular rounding provision in § 6330 indicate any legislative custom in this context that should control the construction of § 687 (a). At most, § 6330 indicates that the construction of § 687 (a) proffered by petitioners could fit within the structure of Title 10, not that the section must be so construed. The sponsor of the legislation, Representative Brooks, engaged in the following dialogue and explanation: “Mr. BROOKS of Louisiana. . . . We started with 5 years because we estimate that the average individual who stays 5 years in the service has in view making a career of that service. After he has gone a long way toward making a career of the service and when we take that opportunity away from him and turn him back to civilian life, we feel that there should be some sort of readjustment. “Mr. GROSS. The minimum, then, is 5 years; is that correct? “Mr. BROOKS of Louisiana. That is correct. The reason for the 5 years, of course, is that a 3-year enlistment would require a reenlistment, or ... a man who is in for 4 years will have to reenlist for an extended period. After he completes the first enlistment I think he intends to stay in the service and this encourages him to stay in the service as long as the service needs him.” 102 Cong. Rec. 10118-10119 (1956). The Comptroller General’s letter was contained in the Senate Report and provides in pertinent part as follows: “Although the language of subsection (a) of the bill seems to indicate that a minimum of 5 years’ continuous active duty as an officer or warrant officer is necessary to qualify for a readjustment payment, the last sentence of that subsection appears to reduce the minimum qualifying service to 4 years and 6 months. Presumably the provision authorizing the counting of 6 months or more as a whole year was intended to apply only for the purpose of computing the amount of a lump-sum payment and not the quantum of qualifying service. If so, the language should be clarified, perhaps somewhat as follows: “ ‘For the purpose of computing the amount of the readjustment payment a fractional part of a year amounting to 6 months [or 183 days] or more shall be counted as a whole year and a shorter period shall be disregarded.’ ” S. Rep. No. 2288, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1956). The Report itself explains that the amended provision in the bill was designed to limit the application of the rounding formula “to years used in the computation of readjustment pay and not for years to establish the 5-year minimum of substantially continuous active duty that is required to qualify for readjustment payments.” Id,., at 2. See H. R. Rep. No. 1007, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. Rep. No. 1096, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). N. 8, supra. The codification bill had been referred in both the House and the Senate to the Judiciary Committees, unlike the earlier substantive consideration of the bills establishing and amending the readjustment pay provisions by the Armed Services Committees of the respective chambers of Congress. See n. 7, supra. See n. 6, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RYAN v. UNITED STATES. No. 12. Argued October 14, 1964. Decided November 23, 1964. William R. Bagby argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jones, Joseph M. Howard and Norman Sepenuk. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. In August 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Whelan issued a summons to taxpayer Ryan ordering him to pro-ducé his books for the years 1942 through 1953 inclusive. Ryan appeared but refused to produce the records, claiming that because tax liability for those years was long since barred except for fraud, the agent had no right to examine the records unless he could show grounds for suspecting fraud. The Government then instituted an enforcement proceeding in a federal district court pursuant to § 7402 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The complaint alleged that on the basis of estimated net worth calculations the agent' strongly suspected fraud, and that examination of the records for the years in question was relevant and material in determining its existence. The taxpayer answered, putting the question of probable cause in issue, and, in addition, stating that he had not received the letter required by § 7605 (b) informing him that the Secretary or his delegate had determined the examination to be necessary. At the hearing the District Judge clearly indicated his opinion that the Government need not show probable cause for suspecting fraud, and ordered Ryan to produce those records which he had available. Although the hearing confirmed Ryan’s assertion that no “necessity letter” had been sent to him, the judge made no mention of this, probably because counsel did not press the point. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 320 F. 2d 500, on the theory that no full-scale showing of probable cause need be made. Except for the records relating to the year 1945, which appeared to have been once previously examined, the court ruled that no necessity letter was required by § 7605 (b) because the Government had made no previous examination of those years.! We granted certiorari, 376 U. S.. 904, on the only issue raised by petitioner, whether the Government must show probable cause for its examination of the records. On that issue we sustain the judgment of the Court oT Appeals for the reasons given in United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Golderg concur in the result, because they believe that through the testimony of Internal Revenue Agent Whelan a sufficient showing was made that the Government was not proceeding capriciously in this case. Me. Justice Douglas dissents for the reasons given in his separate opinion in United States v. Powell, ante, p. 59. I. R. C., § 6501. See United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48, at p. 49, note 2. See id., at p. 52, note 10. See id., at p. 52. The propriety of the court’s interpretation of the necessity letter requirement of § 7605 (b) is, therefore, not before us. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S. 40, 48.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TULLY et al. v. GRIFFIN, INC. No. 75-831. Argued October 4, 1976 Decided November 9, 1976 Thomas P. Zolezzi, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants.. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Ruth Kessler Tochj Solicitor General. R. Paul Wickes argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was John H. Williams II. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether New York provides a "plain, speedy and efficient” remedy to an out-of-state corporation that seeks to challenge New York’s assessment of sales taxes against it. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont held that New York does not provide such a remedy, and issued a preliminary injunction restraining the collection of the New York taxes. 404 F. Supp. 738. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal, 424 U. S. 907. I The appellee, Griffin, Inc., is a Vermont corporation that operates a furniture store in Arlington, Vt., six miles from the New York-Vermont border. It advertises on radio and television and in newspapers that serve the Albany-Schenectady-Troy area of New York, and makes substantial sales at its place of business to customers from that State. It regularly delivers furniture to the New York buyers in its own trucks, and its employees also enter New York on occasion to repair furniture it has sold. In February 1973, the New York Department of Taxation and Finance determined that Griffin was “doing business” in New York and thus was required to collect state and local sales taxes from its New York customers. The Department sent a tax examiner to Vermont to audit Griffin’s records, but Griffin refused its consent. Little more happened until March 1975, when the Department reaffirmed its position and advised Griffin that another tax examiner would soon be dispatched for an audit. Griffin responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, alleging generally that any assessment, levy, or collection of sales taxes against it would violate the Commerce, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and asking for injunctive relief. A three-judge court was convened. After Griffin again denied the tax examiner access to its records, the Department issued a “Notice of Determination and Demand for Payment of Sales and Use Taxes Due.” This assessment, by necessity only an estimate, demanded that Griffin pay $218,085.37 in back taxes, interest, and penalties. Griffin moved in the federal court for a preliminary injunction to prevent steps from being taken to collect the taxes and to stay the running of the 90-day period in which it could contest the amount shown in the Notice of Determination. The defendant New York tax officials filed a cross-motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that suit was barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341, which provides: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” The District Court rejected this defense, ruling that New York law does not provide Griffin “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” In reaching this conclusion, the federal court considered first the availability under New York law of direct review of the Notice of Determination. Under New York Tax Law § 1138 (a), a taxpayer has 90 days from the receipt of a notice of determination to apply for a hearing before the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission’s decision after the hearing is judicially reviewable “for error, illegality or unconstitutionality or any other reason whatsoever” in a proceeding under Art. 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules. Before a taxpayer may seek Art. 78 review, however, he must either prepay or post a bond for the amount of the assessment. The court found that Griffin lacked the means to do this. Although the assessment was only a gross estimate, the court assumed that the amount would not be changed unless Griffin submitted to an audit. It ruled that Griffin should not be required to “tur[n] over its books and records to a state whose authority it claims is invalid,” and further questioned whether a New York court would entertain an Art. 78 proceeding if Griffin refused to be audited. 404 F. Supp., at 743-745. The District Court then considered the availability of declaratory relief under § 3001 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules. It viewed this possible avenue of relief as insufficiently “plain, speedy and efficient” because N. Y. Tax Law § 1140 on its face seems to limit review of sales tax liability to the Art. 78 procedure discussed above. Although the court took note of substantial federal and New York case law holding that New York’s administrative review proceedings are not in fact exclusive where a plaintiff claims that a tax is unconstitutional, the court concluded that the issue was “cloak [ed] ... in some uncertainty.” Even if Griffin could get declaratory relief, the court held, its contacts with New York were so “minimal” that “it seems unfair to make Griffin litigate in an unfamiliar forum.” Finally, the court expressed “reservations” about Griffin’s ability to get a preliminary injunction pending a New York court’s decision in a declaratory judgment suit. 404 F. Supp., at 745-747. On the basis of this reasoning the District Court granted Griffin preliminary injunctive relief. II A federal district court is under an equitable duty to refrain from interfering with a State’s collection of its revenue except in cases where an asserted federal right might otherwise be lost. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 622-623; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-299; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525-526. This policy of restraint has long been reflected and confirmed in the congressional c&mmand of 28 U. S. C. § 1341 that no injunction may issue against the collection of a state tax where state law provides a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” As the Court has frequently had occasion to note, the statute has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations. “Interference with state internal economy and administration is inseparable from assaults in the federal courts on the validity of state taxation, and necessarily attends injunctions, interlocutory or final, restraining collection of state taxes. These are the considerations of moment which have persuaded federal courts of equity to deny relief to the taxpayer — especially when the state, acting within its constitutional authority, has set up its own adequate procedure for securing to the taxpayer the recovery of an illegally exacted tax.” Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, supra, at 298. See also Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463; Hillsborough v. Cromwell, supra, at 622-623; Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, at 525-526. These principles do not lose their force, and a State’s remedy does not become “inefficient,” merely because a taxpayer must travel across a state line in order to resist or challenge the taxes sought to be imposed. If New York provides an otherwise adequate remedy, the mere fact that Griffin must go to New York to invoke it does not jeopardize its ability to assert its rights. To accept the District Court’s holding that it would be “unfair” to make Griffin litigate in New York would undermine much of the force of 28 U. S. C. § 1341. We turn then to the basic inquiry — whether under New York law there is a “plain, speedy and efficient” way for Griffin to press its constitutional claims while preserving the right to challenge the amount of tax due. This Court answered the first part of that question by its summary judgment of affirmance three years ago in Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Gallman, 414 U. S. 802. In that case, the New York Tax Commission had assessed state alcoholic beverage, tobacco, and sales taxes against two New York companies that sold cigarettes and liquor to persons about to leave the State to enter Canada. The companies brought suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the assessment of the taxes against them violated the Commerce and Import-Export Clauses of the Constitution. The three-judge District Court held that 28 U. S. C. § 1341 required dismissal of the action. AmmexChamplain Corp. v. Gallman, 72 Civ. 306 (NDNY, Mar. 15, 1973) (unreported). The court held that “[t]here is ample authority that a declaratory judgment action may be employed to challenge imposition of a tax. . . . Accordingly, Ammex may present its arguments in the state supreme court and seek a declaratory judgment from .that court that application of these taxes to Ammex’s export operations is unconstitutional.” The correctness of that holding was placed squarely before us by the Jurisdictional Statement that the appellants filed in this Court in the Ammex case. This Court’s affirmance of the District Court’s judgment is therefore a controlling precedent, unless and until re-examined by this Court. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 343-345. Since, however, it was a summary affirmance, it is not here “of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671. But having now had a full opportunity to consider the issue after briefing and argument, we adhere to our judgment in the Ammex case. The District Court’s ruling in that case was fully supported by New York decisional law. Despite the provisions of its taxing statutes that provide that judicial review of an administrative determination shall be a taxpayer’s only remedy, the New York courts have consistently held that other procedures, including an action for a declaratory judgment, may be used when the claim is that the tax is unconstitutional. Slater v. Gallman, 38 N. Y. 2d 1, 4, 339 N. E. 2d 863, 864 (1976); In re First Nat. City Bank v. City of New York Finance Admin., 36 N. Y. 2d 87, 92-93, 324 N. E. 2d 861, 864 (1975); Richfield Oil Corp. v. City of Syracuse, 287 N. Y. 234, 239, 39 N. E. 2d 219, 221 (1942); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198, 206, 11 N. E. 2d 728, 731-732 (1937) ; Hospital TV Sys., Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 41 App. Div. 2d 576, 339 N. Y. S. 2d 603 (1973). Thus, we remain fully persuaded that the District Court’s holding in Ammex was correct, announced as it was by three New York federal judges “who are familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law and practice,” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346 n. 10, quoting Hillsborough v. Cromwell, supra, at 630, quoting Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237. It also seems clear that under New York law Griffin can fully preserve its right to challenge the amount of tax due while litigating its constitutional claim that no tax at all can validly be assessed against it. Griffin, in other words, need not accept as binding the Tax Commission’s rough estimate of its sales tax liability as a price of challenging the constitutionality of the tax. The New York Attorney General in his brief and in oral argument has represented to this Court that Griffin can obtain a preliminary injunction in state court that will toll the running of the 90-day period within which Griffin may challenge the amount of the assessment at an administrative hearing. Moreover, we have no reason to believe that a New York court, acting sua sponte, would question its ability to award preliminary relief in a proper case. The District Court cited no New York authority for its “reservations” on this score, and we have found none. To the contrary, a New York statute speaks of the availability of a preliminary injunction “in any action” where certain conditions are met. N. Y. Civ. Prac. § 6301 (McKinney 1963). There are New York cases suggesting that courts may award preliminary relief in declaratory judgment actions jn general, see, e. g., In re Public Serv. Comm’n v. Norton, 304 N. Y. 522, 529, 109 N. E. 2d 705, 708 (1952); Opoliner v. Joint Queensview Housing Enterp., Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 1076, 206 N. Y. S. 2d 681 (1960), and several New York courts have done so in cases involving the collection of taxes. See, e. g., Stacy v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 181, 368 N. Y. S. 2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (sales tax); Glen Cove Theatres, Inc. v. City of Glen Cove, 231 N. Y. S. 2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. City of New York, supra, at 206, 11 N. E. 2d, at 731-732 (permanent injunction approved in declaratory judgment action challenging imposition of sales tax). Although we have held that uncertainty concerning a State’s remedy may make it less than “plain” under 28 U. S. C. § 1341, see Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S., at 625, these New York precedents convincingly demonstrate that Griffin’s fears about the availability of such preliminary relief are unfounded. Since New York provides a “plain, speedy and efficient” means for the redress of Griffin’s constitutional claims, the District Court should not have granted injunctive relief. Its judgment granting Griffin’s motion for a preliminary injunction is- vacated, and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. It is so ordered. The Department later withdrew this initial Notice of Determination and issued another demanding payment of $298,580.59. See N. Y. Tax Law § 1138 (a) (McKinney 1975). New York Tax Law § 1138 (a) (McKinney 1975) provides: “(a) If a return required by this article is not filed, or if a return when filed is incorrect or insufficient, the amount of tax due shall be determined by the tax commission from such information as may be available. If necessary, the tax may be estimated on the basis of external indices, such as stock on hand, purchases, rental paid, number of rooms, location, scale of rents or charges, comparable rents or charges, type of accommodations and service, number of employees or other factors. Notice of such determination shall be given to the person liable for the collection or payment of the tax. Such determination shall finally and irrevocably fix the tax unless the person against whom it is assessed, within ninety days after giving of notice of such determination, shall apply to the tax commission for a hearing, or unless the tax commission of its own motion shall redetermine the same. After such hearing the tax commission shall give notice of its determination to the person against whom the tax is assessed. The determination of the tax commission shall be reviewable for error, illegality or uneonstitutionality or any other reason whatsoever by a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules if application therefor is made to the supreme court within four months after the giving of the notice of such determination. A proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules shall not be instituted unless the amount of any tax sought to be reviewed, with-penalties and interest thereon, if any, shall be first deposited with the tax commission and there shall be filed with the tax commission an undertaking, issued by a surety company authorized to transact business in this state and approved by the superintendent of insurance of this state as to solvency and responsibility, in such amount as a justice of the supreme court shall approve to the effect that if such proceeding be dismissed or the tax confirmed the petitioner will pay all costs and charges which may accrue in the prosecution of the proceeding, or at the option of the applicant such undertaking filed with the tax commission may be in a sum sufficient to cover the taxes, penalties and interest thereon stated in such determination plus the costs and charges which may accrue against it in the prosecution of the proceeding, in which event the applicant shall not be required to deposit such taxes, penalties and interest as a condition precedent to the application.” N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law, Art. 78, § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1963). New York Civ. Prac. Law §3001 (McKinney 1974) provides: “The supreme court may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. . . .” New York Law § 1140 (McKinney 1975) provides: “The remedies provided by sections eleven hundred thirty-eight and eleven hundred thirty-nine shall be exclusive remedies available to any person for the review of tax liability imposed by this article; and no determination or proposed determination of tax or determination on any application for refund shall be enjoined or reviewed by any action for declaratory judgment, an action for money had and received, or by any action or proceeding other than a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.” Although acknowledging a New York court’s power to issue a preliminary injunction in these circumstances, the Attorney General remains free, of course, to oppose the granting of such relief in any particular case. As we conclude that Griffin has an adequate remedy in a suit for a declaratory judgment, we need not decide whether judicial review under N. Y. Civ. Prac. Art. 78 would also be “plain, speedy and efficient.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILLIAMSON et al. v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., et al. No. 08-1314. Argued November 3, 2010 Decided February 23, 2011 Martin N. Buchanan argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were David J. Bennion, David R. Lira, and Allison M. Zieve. William M. Jay argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Katyal, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Paul M. Geier, Peter J. Plocki, Lloyd S. Guerci, and Timothy H. Goodman. Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Maureen E. Mahoney, J. Scott Bal-lenger, Shawn W. Murphy, Charles S. Kim, Erika Z. Jones, Dan Himmelfarb, Mark V. Berry, and Malcolm E. Wheeler. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., of California, Peter J. Nickles of the District of Columbia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Tom Miller of Iowa, Steve Six of Kansas, Jaynes D. “Buddy” Caldwell of Louisiana, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Steve Bullock of Montana, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Michael A. Delaney of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Richard Cordray of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Darrell V McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, J. B. Van Hollen of Wisconsin, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyoming; for the American Association for Justice by Jeffrey R. White; for the Constitutional Accountability Center by Douglas T. Kendall and Elizabeth B. Wydra; and for Public Justice, P. C., by Matthew W. H. Wes-sler, Leslie A Brueckner, and Arthur H. Bryant. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers et al. by Paul D. Clement and Jeffrey S. Buc-holtz; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Alan Untereiner, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for DRI — The Voice of the Defense Bar by Mary Massaron Ross and Hilary Ann Ballentine; for the Grocery Manufacturers Association et al. by Robert 22. Gasaway, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, and Tracy K. Gene-sen; for the Juvenile Products Manufacturers Association by H. Christopher Bartolomucci; and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr., and Leon F. DeJulius, Jr. Larry E. Coben filed a brief for the Attorneys Information Exchange Group as amicus curiae. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (1989 version) requires, among other things, that auto manufacturers install seatbelts on the rear seats of passenger vehicles. They must install lap-and-shoulder belts on seats next to a vehicle's doors or frames. But they have a choice about what to install on rear inner seats (say, middle seats or those next to a minivan’s aisle). There they can install either (1) simple lap belts or (2) lap-and-shoulder belts. 54 Fed. Reg. 46257-46258 (1989); 49 CFR § 571.208 (1993), promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 80 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1988 ed.) (recodified without substantive change at 49 U. S. C. § 30101 et seq. (2006 ed.)). The question presented here is whether this federal regulation pre-empts a state tort suit that, if successful, would deny manufacturers a choice of belts for rear inner seats by imposing tort liability upon those who choose to install a simple lap belt. We conclude that providing manufacturers with this seatbelt choice is not a significant objective of the federal regulation. Consequently, the regulation does not pre-empt the state tort suit. I In 2002, the Williamson family, riding in their 1993 Mazda minivan, was struck head on by another vehicle. Thanh Williamson was sitting in a rear aisle seat, wearing a lap belt; she died in the accident. Delbert and Alexa Williamson were wearing lap-and-shoulder belts; they survived. They, along with Thanh’s estate, subsequently brought this California tort suit against Mazda. They claimed that Mazda should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts on rear aisle seats, and that Thanh died because Mazda equipped her seat with a lap belt instead. The California trial court dismissed this tort claim on the basis of the pleadings. And the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The appeals court noted that in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000), this Court considered whether a different portion of (an older version of) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208) — a portion that required installation of passive restraint devices — pre-empted a state tort suit that sought to hold an auto manufacturer liable for failure to install a particular kind of passive restraint, namely, airbags. We found that the federal regulation intended to assure manufacturers that they would retain a choice of installing any of several different passive restraint devices. And the regulation sought to assure them that they would not have to exercise this choice in favor of airbags. For that reason we thought that the federal regulation pre-empted a state tort suit that, by premising tort liability on a failure to install airbags, would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice that the federal regulation had assured them. Id., at 874-875. The court saw considerable similarity between this case and Geier. The federal regulation at issue here gives manufacturers a choice among two different kinds of seatbelts for rear inner seats. And a state lawsuit that premises tort liability on a failure to install a particular kind of seatbelt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, would in effect deprive the manufacturer of that choice. The court concluded that, as in Geier, the federal regulation pre-empts the state tort suit. 167 Cal. App. 4th 905, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (2008). The Williamsons sought certiorari. And we granted cer-tiorari in light of the fact that several courts have interpreted Geier as indicating that FMVSS 208 pre-empts state tort suits claiming that manufacturers should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts, not lap belts, on rear inner seats. Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F. 3d 227 (CA5 2007); Roland v. General Motors Corp., 881 N. E. 2d 722 (Ind. App. 2008); Heinricher v. Volvo Car Corp., 61 Mass. App. 313, 809 N. E. 2d 1094 (2004). II In Geier, we considered a portion of an earlier (1984) version of FMVSS 208. That regulation required manufacturers to equip their vehicles with passive restraint systems, thereby providing occupants with automatic accident protection. 49 Fed. Reg. 28983 (1984). But that regulation also gave manufacturers a choice among several different passive restraint systems, including airbags and automatic seatbelts. Id., at 28996. The question before the Court was whether the Act, together with the regulation, pre-empted a state tort suit that would have held a manufacturer liable for not installing airbags. 529 U. S., at 865. By requiring manufacturers to install airbags (in order to avoid tort liability) the tort suit would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice among passive restraint systems that the federal regulation gave them. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[SJtate laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes"). We divided this basic pre-emption question into three subsidiary questions. 529 U. S., at 867. First, we asked whether the statute’s express pre-emption provision preempted the state tort suit. That statutory clause says that “no State” may “establish, or . . . continue in effect. .. any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance” of a motor vehicle or item of equipment “which is not identical to the Federal standard.” 15 U. S. C. § 1392(d) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). We had previously held that a word somewhat similar to “standard,” namely, “requirements” (found in a similar statute), included within its scope state “common-law duties,” such as duties created by state tort law. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 502-503 (1996) (plurality opinion); id., at 503-505 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 509-512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But we'nonetheless held that the state tort suit in question fell outside the scope of this particular pre-emption clause. That is primarily because the statute also contains a saving clause, which says that “[cjompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.” 15 U. S. C. §1397(k) (emphasis added). Since tort law is ordinarily “common law,” we held that “the presence of the saving clause” makes clear that Congress intended state tort suits to fall outside the scope of the express pre-emption clause. Geier, 529 U. S., at 868. Second, we asked the converse question: The saving clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause. Id., at 869. But does it do more? Does it foreclose or limit “the operation of ordinary preemption principles insofar as those principles instruct us to read” federal statutes as pre-empting state laws (including state common-law standards) that “actually conflict” with the federal statutes (or related regulations)? Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that the saving clause does not foreclose or limit the operation of “ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent.” Id., at 874. These two holdings apply directly to the case before us. We here consider (1) the same statute, 15 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq.; (2) a later version of the same regulation, FMVSS 208; and (3) a somewhat similar claim that a state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation. In light of Geier, the statute’s express pre-emption clause cannot pre-empt the common-law tort action; but neither can the statute’s saving clause foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary conflict pre-emption principles. We consequently turn our attention to Geier’s third subsidiary question, whether, in fact, the state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation. Ill Under ordinary conflict pre-emption principles a state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of a federal law is pre-empted. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See ibid. (federal statute can pre-empt a state statute); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504 (1992) (federal statute can pre-empt a state tort suit); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) (federal regulation can pre-empt a state statute); Geier, supra (federal regulation can pre-empt a state tort suit). In Geier, we found that the state law stood as an “ ‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment” of a significant federal regulatory objective, namely, the maintenance of manufacturer choice. 529 U. S., at 886. We must decide whether the same is true here. A At the heart of Geier lies our determination that giving auto manufacturers a choice among different kinds of passive restraint devices was a significant objective of the federal regulation. We reached this conclusion on the basis of our examination of the regulation, including its history, the promulgating agency’s contemporaneous explanation of its objectives, and the agency’s current views of the regulation’s pre-emptive effect. The history showed that the Department of Transportation (DOT) had long thought it important to leave manufacturers with a choice. In 1967, DOT required manufacturers to install manual seat belts. Id., at 875; 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (1967). Because many car occupants did not “buckle up,” DOT began to require passive protection, such as airbags or automatic seatbelts, but without “favor[ing]” or “expecting]” the use of airbags. Geier, supra, at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted); 35 Fed. Reg. 16927 (1970). DOT subsequently approved the use of ignition interlocks, which froze the ignition until the occupant buckled the belt, as a substitute for passive restraints. Geier, supra, at 876; 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972). But the interlock devices were unpopular with the public, and Congress soon forbade the agency to make them a means of compliance. Geier, supra, at 876; Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, § 109, 88 Stat. 1482 (previously codified at 15 U. S. C. § 1410b (1988 ed.)). DOT then temporarily switched to the use of demonstration projects, but later it returned to mandating passive restraints, again leaving manufacturers with a choice of systems. Geier, supra, at 876-877; see 49 Fed. Reg. 28962. DOT’s contemporaneous explanation of its 1984 regulation made clear that manufacturer choice was an important means for achieving its basic objectives. The 1984 regulation gradually phased in passive restraint requirements, initially requiring manufacturers to equip only 10% of their new fleets with passive restraints. DOT explained that it intended its phasing period partly to give manufacturers time to improve airbag technology and to develop “other, better” passive restraint systems. Geier, 529 U. S., at 879. DOT further explained that it had rejected an '“all airbag’” system. Ibid. It was worried that requiring airbags in most or all vehicles would cause a public backlash, like the backlash against interlock devices. Ibid. DOT also had concerns about the safety of airbags, for they could injure out-of-place occupants, particularly children. Id., at 877-878. And, given the cost of airbags, vehicle owners might not replace them when necessary, leaving occupants without passive protection. Ibid. The regulation therefore “deliberately sought variety — a mix of several different passive restraint systems.” Id., at 878. DOT hoped that this mix would lead to better information about the devices’ comparative effectiveness and to the eventual development of “alternative, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems.” Id., at 879. Finally, the Solicitor General told us that a tort suit that insisted upon use of airbags, as opposed to other federally permissible passive restraint systems, would “stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of these objectives.” Id., at 883 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., O. T. 1999, No. 98-1811, pp. 25-26 (hereinafter United States Brief in Geier); internal quotation marks omitted). And we gave weight to the Solicitor General’s view in light of the fact that it “ ‘embodie[d] the Secretary’s policy judgment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car.’ ” 529 U. S., at 881 (quoting United States Brief in Geier 25-26). Taken together, this history, the agency’s contemporaneous explanation, and the Government’s current understanding of the regulation convinced us that manufacturer choice was an important regulatory objective. And since the tort suit stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of that objective, we found the tort suit pre-empted. B We turn now to the present case. Like the regulation in Geier, the regulation here leaves the manufacturer with a choice. And, like the tort suit in Geier, the tort suit here would restrict that choice. But unlike Geier, we do not believe here that choice is a significant regulatory objective. We concede that the history of the regulation before us resembles the history of airbags to some degree. In 1984, DOT rejected a regulation that would have required the use of lap-and-shoulder belts in rear seats. 49 Fed. Reg. 15241. Nonetheless, by 1989 when DOT promulgated the present regulation, it had “concluded that several factors had changed.” 54 Fed. Reg. 46258. DOT then required manufacturers to install a particular kind of belt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, for rear outer seats. In respect to rear inner seats, it retained manufacturer choice as to which kind of belt to install. But its 1989 reasons for retaining that choice differed considerably from its 1984 reasons for permitting manufacturers a choice in respect to airbags. DOT here was not concerned about consumer acceptance; it was convinced that lap-and-shoulder belts would increase safety; it did not fear additional safety risks arising from use of those belts; it had no interest in ensuring a mix of devices; and, though it was concerned about additional costs, that concern was diminishing. In respect to consumer acceptance, DOT wrote that if “people who are familiar with and in the habit of wearing lap/shoulder belts in the front seat find lap/shoulder belts in the rear seat, it stands to reason that they would be more likely to wear those belts when riding in the rear seat.” 53 Fed. Reg. 47983 (1988). In respect to safety, DOT wrote that, because an increasing number of rear seat passengers wore seatbelts, rear seat lap-and-shoulder belts would have “progressively greater actual safety benefits.” 54 Fed. Reg. 46257. It added: “[S]tudies of occupant protection from 1968 forward show that the lap-only safety belts installed in rear seating positions are effective in reducing the risk of death and injury. . . . However, the agency believes that rear-seat lap/shoulder safety belts would be even more effective.” Ibid. Five years earlier, DOT had expressed concern that lap- and-shoulder belts might negatively impact child safety by interfering with the use of certain child car seats that relied upon a tether. But by 1989, DOT found that car-seat designs “had shifted away” from tethers. 53 Fed. Reg. 47983. And rear lap-and-shoulder belts could therefore offer safety benefits for children old enough to use them without diminishing the safety of smaller children in car seats. Id., at 47988-47989 (“[T]he agency believes that this proposal for rear seat lap/shoulder belts would offer benefits for children riding in some types of booster seats, would have no positive or negative effects on children riding in most designs of car seats and children that are too small to use shoulder belts, and would offer older children the same incremental safety protection [as adults]”). Nor did DOT seek to use its regulation to spur the development of alternative kinds of rear aisle or middle seat safety devices. See 54 Fed. Reg. 46257. Why then did DOT not require lap-and-shoulder belts in these seats? We have found some indication that it thought use of lap-and-shoulder belts in rear aisle seats could cause “entry and exit problems for occupants of seating positions to the rear” by “stretching] the shoulder belt across the aisleway,” id., at 46258. However, DOT encouraged manufacturers to address this issue through innovation: “[I]n those cases where manufacturers are able to design and install lap/shoulder belts at seating positions adjacent to aisleways without interfering with the aisle-way’s purpose of allowing access to more rearward seating positions[, the agency] encourages the manufacturers to do so.” Ibid. And there is little indication that DOT considered this matter a significant safety concern. Cf. Letter from Philip R. Recht, Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., to Roger Matoba (Dec. 28, 1994), App. to Reply Brief for Petitioners 2 (“With respect to your concerns about the safety of shoulder safety belts which cross an aisle, I note that such belts do not in fact prevent rearward passengers from exiting the vehicle. Such passengers may . . . g[o] under or over the belt. They may also move the belt aside”). The more important reason why DOT did not require lap- and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats was that it thought that this requirement would not be cost effective. The agency explained that it would be significantly more expensive for-manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder belts in rear middle and aisle seats than in seats next to the car doors. 54 Fed. Reg. 46258. But that fact — the fact that DOT made a negative judgment about cost-effectiveness— cannot by itself show that DOT sought to forbid common-law tort suits in which a judge or jury might reach a different conclusion. For one thing, DOT did not believe that costs would remain frozen. Rather it pointed out that costs were falling as manufacturers were “voluntarily equipping more and more of their vehicles with rear seat lap/shoulder belts.” Ibid. For another thing, many, perhaps most, federal safety regulations embody some kind of cost-effectiveness judgment. While an agency could base a decision to pre-empt on its cost-effectiveness judgment, we are satisfied that the rulemaking record at issue here discloses no such preemptive intent. And to infer from the mere existence of such a cost-effectiveness judgment that the federal agency intends to bar States from imposing stricter standards would treat all such federal standards as if they were maximum standards, eliminating the possibility that the federal agency seeks only to set forth a minimum standard potentially supplemented through state tort law. We cannot reconcile this consequence with a statutory saving clause that foresees the likelihood of a continued meaningful role for state tort law. Supra, at 328-329. Finally, the Solicitor General tells us that DOT’S regulation does not pre-empt this tort suit. As in Geier, “the agency’s own views should make a difference.” 529 U. S., at 883. “Congress has delegated to DOT authority to implement the statute; the subject matter is technical; and the relevant history and background are complex and extensive. The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.” Ibid. There is “no reason to suspect that the Solicitor General’s representation of DOT’S views reflects anything other than ‘the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter.’” Id., at 884 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 462 (1997)). Neither has DOT expressed inconsistent views on this subject. In Geier, the Solicitor General pointed out that “state tort law does not conflict with a federal ‘minimum standard’ merely because state law imposes a more stringent requirement.” United States Brief in Geier 21 (citation omitted). And the Solicitor General explained that a standard giving manufacturers “multiple options for the design of” a device would not pre-empt a suit claiming that a manufacturer should have chosen one particular option, where “the Secretary did not determine that the availability of options was necessary to promote safety.” Id., at 22; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Wood v. General Motors Corp., O. T. 1989, No. 89-46, p. 15. This last statement describes the present case. In Geier, then, the regulation’s history, the agency’s contemporaneous explanation, and its consistently held interpretive views indicated that the regulation sought to maintain manufacturer choice in order to further significant regulatory objectives. Here, these same considerations indicate the contrary. We consequently conclude that, even though the state tort suit may restrict the manufacturer’s choice, it does not “stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment . . . of the full purposes and objectives” of federal law. Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Thus, the regulation does not pre-empt this tort action. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN et al. v. CHICAGO RIVER & INDIANA RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 313. Argued February 26, 1957. Decided March 25, 1957. William C. Wines argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was John J. Naughton. Walter J. Cummings, Jr. argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Kenneth F. Burgess, Marvin A. Jersild and Wayne M. Hoffman. Clarence E. Weisell and Harold N. McLaughlin filed a brief for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr. and Richard R. Lyman filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners. John H. Morse and William J. Hickey filed a brief for the American Short Line Railroad Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to interpret that provision of the Railway Labor Act which created the National Railroad Adjustment Board for the resolution of minor grievances in the event that the parties were unable to settle them by negotiation. The ultimate question is whether a railway labor organization can resort to a strike over matters pending before the Adjustment Board. The Chicago River and Indiana Railroad Company operates the switching and yard facilities at the Chicago stockyards. A segment of the employees of the River Road were represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. A collective bargaining agreement between the Brotherhood and the River Road was in existence throughout the period covered by this case. The present disagreement arises from an accumulation of twenty-one grievances of members of the Brotherhood against the carrier. Nineteen of these were claims for additional compensation, one was a claim for reinstatement to a higher position, and one was for reinstatement in the employ of the carrier. When negotiations failed, the Brotherhood called a strike. Because of the serious nature of the impending work stoppage, the National Mediation Board proffered its services. The mediator was unsuccessful, and upon his withdrawal, the River Road submitted the controversy to the Adjustment Board. The Brotherhood promptly issued a strike call for four days later. The River Road then sought relief from a District Court. Because of the threatened irreparable injury to the carrier, its employees and the 600 industries and 27 railroads served by it, the complaint prayed for a preliminary injunction, and ultimately a permanent injunction, against a strike by the Brotherhood over the grievances pending before the Adjustment Board. A temporary restraining order was issued, but that order was vacated and the complaint dismissed upon the finding by the district judge that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was applicable and that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 229 F. 2d 926. A permanent injunction was accordingly entered by the District Court and affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. We granted certiorari in order to resolve an important question concerning interpretation and application of the Railway Labor Act. 352 U. S. 865. The grievances for which redress is sought by the Brotherhood are admittedly “minor disputes” as that phrase is known in the parlance of the Railway Labor Act. These are controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation, generally involving only one employee. § 2, Sixth. They may be contrasted with “major disputes” which result when there is disagreement in the bargaining process for a new contract. § 2, Seventh. See Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 722-724. The first step toward settlement of either kind of dispute is negotiation and conference between the parties. Section 3, First (i), provides that— “The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes . . . .” If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the section continues— “. . . but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the [National Railroad] Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.” Section 3, First (m), declares that— “The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board . . . shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute . . . .” This language is unequivocal. Congress has set up a tribunal to handle minor disputes which have not been resolved by the parties themselves. Awards of this Board are “final and binding upon both parties.” And either side may submit the dispute to the Board. The Brotherhood suggests that we read the Act to mean only that an Adjustment Board has been organized and that the parties are free to make use of its procedures if they wish to; but that there is no compulsion on either side to allow the Board to settle a dispute if an alternative remedy, such as resort to economic duress, seems more desirable. Such an interpretation would render meaningless those provisions in the Act which allow one side to submit a dispute to the Board, whose decision shall be final and binding on both sides. If the Brotherhood is correct, the Adjustment Board could act only if the union and the carrier were amenable to its doing so. The .language of § 3, First, reads otherwise and should be literally applied in the absence of a clear showing of a contrary or qualified intention of Congress. Legislative history of the provisions creating the National Railroad Adjustment Board reinforces the literal interpretation of the Act. The present law is a composite of two major pieces of legislation. Most of the basic framework was adopted in 1926. In 1934, after eight years of experience, the statute was amended, and in that amendment the Adjustment Board was born. The distinction between “major disputes” and “minor disputes” was found in the 1926 statute. Above the level of negotiation and conference, each was to follow a separate procedure. Section 3, First, of that Act called upon carriers or groups of carriers and their employees to agree to the formation of boards of adjustment, composed equally of representatives of labor and management, to resolve the “minor disputes.” If this step were unsuccessful, these disputes along with the “major disputes” became a function of the Board of Mediation, predecessor of the National Mediation Board. The obvious lack of any compulsion toward a settlement of disputes was a basic characteristic of the Act and proved to be a major weakness in the procedures for handling “minor disputes.” As stated in the Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, after hearings on the 1934 amendment: “In many instances . . . the carriers and the employees have been unable to reach agreements to establish such boards [of adjustment].” H. R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3. This was not the only weakness, however. “Many thousands of these [minpr] disputes have been considered by boards established under the Railway Labor Act; but the boards have been unable to reach a majority decision, and so the proceedings have been deadlocked.” Ibid. This condition was in marked contrast to the declared purpose of the 1926 Act “. . . to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of . . . agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.” § 2, First. The Report continued: “These unadjusted disputes have become so numerous that on several occasions the employees have resorted to the issuance of strike ballots and threatened to interrupt interstate commerce in order to secure an adjustment. This has made it necessary for the President of the United States to intervene and establish an emergency board .to investigate the controversies. This condition should be corrected in the interest of industrial peace and of uninterrupted transportation service.” Ibid. The means chosen to correct this situation are the present provisions of § 3, First, concerning the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The Board was set up by Congress, making it unnecessary for the parties to agree to establish their own boards. In case of a deadlock on the Adjustment Board, which continued the policy of equal representation of labor and management, the appropriate division is allowed to select a neutral referee to sit with them and break the tie. If the division cannot agree even on a referee, the Act provides that one shall be appointed by the National Mediation Board. Thus was the machinery built for the disposition of minor grievances. The change was made with the full concurrence of the national railway labor organizations. Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation and principal draftsman of the 1934 bill, complimented the unions on conceding the right to strike over “minor disputes” in favor of the procedures of the Adjustment Board: “The willingness of the employees to agree to such a provision is, in my judgment, a very important .concession and one of which full advantage should be taken in the public interest. I regard it as, perhaps, the most important part of the bill.” Asked if the Act made it a matter of discretion whether disputes would be submitted to the Adjustment Board, he replied in the negative. It was, he said, a matter of duty— “. . . and it is my understanding that the employees in the case of these minor grievances — and that is all that can be dealt with by the adjustment board — are entirely agreeable to those provisions of the law. “I think that is a very important concession on their part. . . . [T]his law is in effect an agreement on the part of the parties to arbitrate all of these minor disputes.” The chief spokesman for the railway labor organizations was George M. Harrison. He appeared as chairman of the legislative committee of the Railway Labor Executives’ Association before both the House of Representatives and the Senate Committees. This Association comprised the twenty-one standard railway labor groups, including the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. He testified before the House Committee: “So, out of all of that experience and recognizing the character of the services given to the people of this country by our industry and ho.w essential it is to the welfare of the country, these organizations have come to the conclusion that in respect to these minor-grievance cases that grow out of the interpretation and/or application of the contracts already made that they can very well permit those disputes to be decided, ... by an adjustment board.” Later, before the Senate Committee, he declared: “Grievances are instituted against railroad officers’ actions, and we are willing to take our chances with this national board because we believe, out of our experience, that the national board is the best and most efficient method of getting a determination of these many controversies that arise on these railroads between the officers and the employees. “These railway labor organizations have always opposed compulsory determination of their controversies. . . . [W]e are now ready to concede that we can risk having our grievances go to a board and get them determined, and that is a contribution that these organizations are willing to make.” The voice of labor was not unanimous in this concession. The representative of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters vehemently objected to the adoption of § 3, First. “We are unalterably opposed to paragraph M, . . . [which] brings about compulsory arbitration and prevents the use of the only weapon in the hands of organized labor. We believe that a very dangerous precedent would be established with the passage of this paragraph, and to the best of our knowledge it is the first time that any such measure has been enacted by the Congress of the United States.’.’ This record is convincing that there was general understanding between both the supporters and the opponents of the 1934 amendment that the provisions dealing with the Adjustment Board were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field. Our reading of the Act is therefore confirmed, not rebutted, by the legislative history. The only question which remains is whether the federal courts can compel compliance with the provisions of the Act to the extent of enjoining a union from striking to defeat the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. The Brotherhood contends that the Norris-LaGuardia Act has withdrawn the power of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. That limitation-, it is urged, applies with full force to all railway labor disputes as well as labor controversies in other industries. We hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read alone in matters dealing with railway labor disputes. There must be an accommodation of that statute and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved. We think that the purposes of these Acts are reconcilable. In adopting the Railway Labor Act, Congress endeavored to bring about stable relationships between labor and management in this most important national industry. It found from the experience between 1926 and 1934 that the failure of voluntary machinery to resolve a large number of minor disputes called for a strengthening of the Act to provide an effective agency, in which both sides participated, for the final adjustment of such controversies. Accumulation of these disputes had resulted in the aggregate being serious enough to threaten disruption of transportation. Hence, with the full consent of the brotherhoods, the 1934 amendment became law. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, on the other hand, was designed primarily to protect working men in the exercise of organized, economic power, which is vital to collective bargaining. The Act aimed to correct existing abuses of the injunctive remedy in labor disputes. Federal courts had been drawn into the field under the guise either of enforcing federal statutes, principally the Sherman Act, or through diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In the latter cases, the courts employed principles of federal law frequently at variance with the concepts of labor law in the States where they sat. Congress acted to prevent the injunctions of the federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the competing economic forces of labor and capital. Rep. LaGuardia, during the floor debates on the 1932 Act, recognized that the machinery of the Railway Labor Act. channeled these economic forces, in matters dealing with railway labor, into special processes intended to compromise them. Such controversies, therefore, are not the same as those in which the injunction strips labor of its primary weapon without substituting any reasonable alternative. In prior cases involving railway labor disputes, this Court has authorized the use of injunctive relief to vindicate the processes of the Railway Labor Act. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, was an action by the union to enjoin compliance with the Act’s provisions for certification of a bargaining representative. The question raised was whether a federal court could issue an injunction in a labor dispute. The Court held: “It suffices to say that the Norris-LaGuardia Act can affect the present decree only so far as its provisions are found not to conflict with those of § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act, authorizing the relief which has been granted. Such provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Id., at 563. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768, and other similar eases, the Court held that the specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. “Our conclusion is that the District Court has jurisdiction and power to issue necessary injunctive orders [to enforce compliance with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act] notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Id,., at 774. This is a clear situation for the application of that principle. The Brotherhood has cited several cases in which it has been held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s ban on federal injunctions is not lifted because the conduct of the union is unlawful under some other statute. We believe that these are inapposite to this case. None involved the need to accommodate two statutes, when both were adopted as a part of a pattern of labor legislation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188. The relationship of labor and management in the railroad industry has developed on a pattern different from other industries. The fundamental premises and principles of the Railway Labor Act are not the same as those which form the basis of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. It is one of those differences which underlies the controversy in this case. In addition to the importance of the question, there was a conflict in the decisions of the Courts of Appeals. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia R. Co., 229 F. 2d 901, decided by the Fifth Circuit, came to a conclusion contrary to that of the Seventh Circuit in this case. Certiorari had been granted in both cases, 352 U. S. 865, but we dismissed the writ in the Central of Georgia controversy upon a suggestion of mootness. 352 U. S. 995. 45 U. S. C. § 152, Sixth. 45 U. S. C. § 152, Seventh. 45 U. S. C. § 153, First (i). 45 U. S. C. §153, First (m). The Brotherhood does not discuss this interpretation in the event that the union had referred the dispute to the Adjustment Board, as is normally the case in grievance disputes, and the carrier was recalcitrant. It is to be doubted that the Brotherhood would support allowing carriers the same right to defeat the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board that it claims for itself. The statutory language, however, would support no distinction. 44 Stat. 577. 48 Stat. 1185. 44 Stat. 578-579. 44 Stat. 577-578. Section 2, Second, authorizes carriers or groups of carriers and their employees to agree to the establishment of system, group or regional boards of adjustment similar to those in the 1926 Act. These boards can have jurisdiction co-extensive with that of the National Board, but the existence of the latter insures against accumulation of disputes through ineffectiveness of the local boards. “Minor disputes” were eliminated from the functions of the Mediation Board by the 1934 amendment. However, that Board can still become involved in a “minor dispute” case if “any labor emergency is found by it to exist at any time.” § 5, First, 45 U. S. C. § 155, First. Such was the fact in this case when the threatened strike presented an emergency situation. The Mediation Board enters these cases solely on its own motion, however. It cannot be called into the dispute by either or both of the parties or by an employee or group of employees as is true for disputes not within the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. Hearings before House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 47. Id., at 58, 60. Id., at 81-82. Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, 35. Hearings before House of Representatives Committee, supra, note 15, at 118. 47 Stat. 70, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115. 75 Cong. Rec. 5499, 5503-5504. The Adjustment Board cannot entertain a case on its own motion. Its processes must be invoked by one or both of the parties. In this case, the River Road filed the grievances with the Board before seeking an injunction. Cf. the exhaustion of remedies provision in § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 29 U. S. C. § 108. Graham v. Brotherhood of L. F. & E., 338 U. S. 232; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of L. F. & E., 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192. See also Rolfes v. Dwellingham, 198 F. 24 591. The Norris-LaGuardia Act has been held to prevent the issuance of an injunction in a railway labor case involving a “major dispute.” Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50. In such a case, of course, the Railway Labor Act does not provide a process for a final decision like that of the Adjustment Board in a “minor dispute” ease. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91; East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 163 F. 2d 10; cf. W. L. Mead, Inc., v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 217 F. 2d 6; In re Third Avenue Transit Corp., 192 F. 2d 971; Carter v. Herrin Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 131 F. 2d 557; Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. 2d 948.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEW YORK CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al. v. SNEAD No. 75-805. Decided April 26, 1976 Per Curiam. A three-judge District Court was convened in response to appellee’s complaint alleging that N. Y. Civil Service Law § 72 (1969), governing leave of absence for mentally unfit civil service employees, denied her the procedural due process guaranteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Joined as defendants in her action, which sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, were the appellants Civil Service Commission of the State of New York and its members, and the city of New York. The District Court sustained appéllee’s federal constitutional claims, and enjoined the defendants from taking any action under the challenged statutory provision, and also ordered that appellee be reinstated in her civil service position and given backpay by the city of New York. The city has not appealed from the judgments. Appellee, in addition to the previously described allegations, also asserted in her complaint that the city of New York in suspending her had not followed the procedures set forth in § 72. She particularly alleged that the doctor who examined her had not been selected in the manner prescribed by that statute. Appellants have not denied this allegation and, indeed, now acknowledge that the state law was not followed. The record therefore now establishes that the statutory procedure which appellee challenged has not been applied to her. It follows that she may have had a claim under state law against the city of New York; she may indeed have had a claim against the city of New York based on the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason of the procedure which the city in fact followed in suspending her. Since the city has not appealed, we have no occasion to consider any aspect of her claim against it, other than to say that neither of the claims just described would authorize the convening of the three-judge District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 2281. Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246, 253 (1941). “In so far as it is alleged that the assessments are void because unauthorized by the Arizona statute, the injunction sought is obviously not upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the state statute as tested by the Federal Constitution.” Ex parte Bransford, 310 U. S. 354, 358 (1940). Stripped of these related contentions, appellee’s claim against appellant state Civil Service Commission amounts to a request for a determination of the constitutionality of a statute which, while administered by the Commission has never in fact been properly applied by the Commission or indeed by the city of New York to her. Since the record now makes it clear that she has no standing to assert such a challenge, her complaint as to the constitutionality of § 72 should be dismissed. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974). Appellee asserted no claim against appellant Civil Service Commission and its members other than her constitutional claim. On their appeal, therefore, the judgment of the District Court as to them is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss ap-pellee’s complaint insofar as it sought relief against them. So ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun would affirm without hearing oral argument.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES OF CRAWFORD COUNTY, INC., et al. No. 83-56. Argued February 27, 1984 Decided May 21, 1984 Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Carolyn F. Corwin, William Ranter, and Richard A. Olderman. Raymond G. Hasley argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Brian W. Ashbaugh Jack N. Goodman filed a brief for the National Association for Home Care et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Under what is recognized for present purposes as an incorrect interpretation of rather complex federal regulations, during 1975, 1976, and 1977 respondent received and expended $71,480 in federal funds to provide health care services to Medicare beneficiaries to which it was not entitled. The question presented is whether the Government is estopped from recovering those funds because respondent relied on the express authorization of a responsible Government agent in making the expenditures. Under the Medicare program, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395-1395vv, providers of health care services are reimbursed for the reasonable cost of services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). § 1395x(v)(l)(A). Providers receive interim payments at least monthly covering the cost of services they have rendered. §1395g(a). Congress recognized, however, that these interim payments would not always correctly reflect the amount of reimbursable costs, and accordingly instructed the Secretary to develop mechanisms for making appropriate retroactive adjustments when reimbursement is found to be inadequate or excessive. § 1395x(v)(l)(A)(ii). Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Secretary requires providers to submit annual cost reports which are then audited to determine actual costs. 42 CFR §§405.454, 405.1803 (1982). The Secretary may reopen any reimbursement determination within a 3-year period and make appropriate adjustments. §405.1885. The Act also permits a provider to elect to receive reimbursement through a “fiscal intermediary.” 42 U. S. C. §1395h; 42 CFR §421.103 (1982). If the intermediary the provider has nominated meets the Secretary’s requirements, the Secretary then enters into an agreement with the intermediary to have it perform those administrative responsibilities she assigns it. §§421.5, 421.110. These duties include receipt, disbursement, and accounting for funds used in making Medicare payments, auditing the records of providers in order to ensure payments have been proper, resolving disputes over cost reimbursement, reviewing and reconsidering payments to providers, and recovering over-payments to providers. §§421.100(b), (c), (e), (f), 421.120(e). The fiscal intermediary must also “serve as a center for, and communicate to providers, any information or instructions furnished to it by the Secretary, and serve as a channel of communication from providers to the Secretary.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395h(a)(2)(A). Respondent Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. (hereafter respondent), is a nonprofit corporation. In 1966 it entered into a contract with petitioner’s predecessor, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to provide home health care services to individuals eligible for benefits under Part A of the Medicare program, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395c to 1395Í-2. Under the contract, respondent received reimbursement through a fiscal intermediary, the Travelers Insurance Cos. (Travelers). In 1973 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 87 Stat. 839, codified, as amended, at 29 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and repealed, Pub. L. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1357, authorizing the use of federal funds to provide training and job opportunities for economically disadvantaged persons. In 1975 respondent began participating in the program, which reimbursed it for the salaries and fringe benefits paid to certain of its employees. CETA funds made it possible for respondent to take on additional personnel and to provide additional home health care services. To prevent what would be in effect double reimbursement of providers’ costs, one of the regulations concerning reasonable costs reimbursable under the Medicare program indicates that grants received by a provider in order to pay specific operating costs must be subtracted from the reasonable costs for which the provider may receive reimbursement. After obtaining a CETA grant, respondent’s administrator contacted Travelers to ask whether the salaries of its CETA-funded employees who provided services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits were reimbursable as reasonable costs under Medicare. Travelers’ Medicare manager orally advised respondent that the CETA funds were “seed money” within the meaning of § 612.2 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual, which is defined as “[g]rants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies,” and therefore, even though the CETA employees’ salaries constituted specific operating costs paid by a federal grant, they were reimbursable under the Medicare program. Relying on Travelers’ advice, respondent included costs for which it was receiving CETA reimbursement in its cost reports, and received reimbursement for those sums amounting to $7,694, $32,460, and $31,326 in fiscal 1975, 1976, and 1977, respectively. On several occasions during this period, respondent requested and received from Travelers oral verification of the propriety of this treatment. With these additional funds, respondent expanded its annual number of home health care visits from approximately 4,000 in 1974 to over 81,000 in the next three years. Its annual budget increased during that period from about $200,000 to about $900,000. It is undisputed that correct administrative practice required Travelers to refer respondent’s inquiry to the Department of Health and Human Services for a definitive answer. However, Travelers did not do this until August 7, 1977, when a written request for instructions was finally submitted to the Philadelphia office of the Department’s Bureau of Health Insurance. Travelers was then formally advised that the CETA funds were not “seed money” and therefore had to be subtracted from respondent’s Medicare reimbursement. On October 7,1977, Travelers formally notified respondent of this determination. Travelers then reopened respondent’s cost reports for the preceding three years and recomputed respondent’s reimbursable costs, determining that respondent had been overpaid a total of $71,480. In May 1978 Travelers made a formal demand for repayment of the disputed amount. Respondent filed suit and obtained temporary injunctive relief against the Secretary and Travelers; in November 1979, the parties entered into a stipulation providing that the Secretary would postpone any attempts at recoupment and that the civil action would be stayed pending the outcome of administrative review. Thereafter, the Secretary’s Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) conducted a hearing and issued a written opinion rejecting the position that CETA funds were “seed money.” The PRRB found, however, that the Secretary’s right to recoup the 1975 overpayment was barred because Travelers had not given respondent a written notice of reopening within the 3-year limitations period; thus, the amount in dispute was reduced to approximately $63,800. On April 10,1980, respondent filed a complaint in the District Court seeking review of the administrative determination. The District Court consolidated that case with the equitable action that had been filed about two years earlier. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of the Secretary, accepting the PRRB’s view of the Secretary’s regulations and rejecting respondent’s claim that the Secretary ought to be estopped to deny that the CETA grants were “seed money” because of the representations of her agent, Travelers. The District Court held that it was unreasonable for respondent to believe it could be in effect twice reimbursed for a given expense. The Court of Appeals reversed, reaching only the estoppel question. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. v. Califano, 698 F. 2d 615 (CA3 1983). It held that the Government may be estopped by the “affirmative misconduct” of its agents and that Travelers’ erroneous advice coupled with its failure to refer the question to the Secretary constituted such misconduct. It rejected as “clearly erroneous” the District Court’s finding that it was unreasonable for respondent to rely on Travelers’ advice, concluding instead that respondent acted reasonably because the relevant regulation had no clear meaning and respondent had no source other, than Travelers to which it could turn for advice. HH Estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases. While a hallmark of the doctrine is its flexible application, certain principles are tolerably clear: “If one person makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act . . . the first person is not entitled “(b) to regain property or its value that the other acquired by the act, if the other in reliance upon the misrepresentation and before discovery of the truth has so changed his position that it would be unjust to deprive him of that which he thus acquired.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §894(1) (1979). Thus, the party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its adversary’s conduct “in such a manner as to change his position for the worse,” and that reliance must have been reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did not know nor should it have known that its adversary’s conduct was misleading. See Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 124-125 (1935). HH When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant. Petitioner urges us to expand this principle into a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the Government. We have left the issue open in the past, and do so again today. Though the arguments the Government advances for the rule are substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government. But however heavy the burden might be when an estoppel is asserted against the Government, the private party surely cannot prevail without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of an estoppel are present. We are unpersuaded that that has been done in this case with respect to either respondent’s change in position or its reliance on Travelers’ advice. Ill To analyze the nature of a private party’s detrimental change in position, we must identify the manner in which reliance on the Government’s misconduct has caused the private citizen to change his position for the worse. In this case the consequences of the Government’s misconduct were not entirely adverse. Respondent did receive an immediate benefit as a result of the double reimbursement. Its detriment is the inability to retain money that it should never have received in the first place. Thus, this is not a case in which the respondent has lost any legal right, either vested or contingent, or suffered any adverse change in its status. When a private party is deprived of something to which it was entitled of right, it has surely suffered a detrimental change in its position. Here respondent lost no rights but merely was induced to do something which could be corrected at a later time. There is no doubt that respondent will be adversely affected by the Government’s recoupment of the funds that it has already spent. It will surely have to curtail its operations and may even be forced to seek relief from its debts through bankruptcy. However, there is no finding as to the extent of the likely curtailment in the volume of services provided by respondent, much less that respondent will reduce its activities below the level that obtained when it was first advised that the double reimbursement was proper. Respondent may need an extended period of repayment or other modifications in the recoupment process if it is to continue to operate, but questions concerning the Government’s method of enforcing collection are not before us. The question is whether the Government has entirely forfeited its right to the money. A for-profit corporation could hardly base an estoppel on the fact that the Government wrongfully allowed it the interest-free use of taxpayers’ money for a period of two or three years, enabling it to expand its operation. No more can respondent claim any right to expand its services to levels greater than those it would have provided had the error never occurred. Curtailment of operation does not justify an estoppel when — by respondent’s own account — the expansion of its operation was achieved through unlawful access to governmental funds. And even if there will be a reduction below the service provided by respondent prior to its receipt of CETA funds, the record does not foreclose the possibility that the aggregate advantages to the community stemming from respondent’s use of the money have more than offset the actual hardship associated with now being required to restore these funds. Respondent cannot raise an estoppel without proving that it will be significantly worse off than if it had never obtained the CETA funds in question. > H-i Justice Holmes wrote: Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.” Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 141, 143 (1920). This observation has its greatest force when a private party seeks to spend the Government’s money. Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous regard for the requirements of law; respondent could expect no less than to be held to the most demanding standards in its quest for public funds. This is consistent with the general rule that those who deal with the Government are expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to law. As a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement. Since it also had elected to receive reimbursement through Travelers, it also was acquainted with the nature of and limitations on the role of a fiscal intermediary. When the question arose concerning respondent’s CETA funds, respondent’s own action in consulting Travelers demonstrates the necessity for it to have obtained an interpretation of the applicable regulations; respondent indisputably knew that this was a doubtful question not clearly covered by existing policy statements. The fact that Travelers’ advice was erroneous is, in itself, insufficient to raise an estoppel, as is the fact that the Secretary had not anticipated this problem and made a clear resolution available to respondent. There is simply no requirement that the Government anticipate every problem that may arise in the administration of a complex program such as Medicare; neither can it be expected to ensure that every bit of informal advice given by its agents in the course of such a program will be sufficiently reliable to justify expenditure of sums of money as substantial as those spent by respondent. Nor was the advice given under circumstances that should have induced respondent’s reliance. As a recipient of public funds well acquainted with the role of a fiscal intermediary, respondent knew Travelers only acted as a conduit; it could not resolve policy questions. The relevant statute, regulations, and Reimbursement Manual, with which respondent should have been and was acquainted, made that perfectly clear. Yet respondent made no attempt to have the question resolved by the Secretary; it was satisfied with the policy judgment of a mere conduit. The appropriateness of respondent’s reliance is further undermined because the advice it received from Travelers was oral. It is not merely the possibility of fraud that undermines our confidence in the reliability of official action that is not confirmed or evidenced by a written instrument. Written advice, like a written judicial opinion, requires its author to reflect about the nature of the advice that is given to the citizen, and subjects that advice to the possibility of review, criticism, and reexamination. The necessity for ensuring that governmental agents stay within the lawful scope of their authority, and that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous exactitude, argues strongly for the conclusion that an estoppel cannot be erected on the basis of the oral advice that underlay respondent’s cost reports. That is especially true when a complex program such as Medicare is involved, in which the need for written records is manifest. In sum, the regulations governing the cost reimbursement provisions of Medicare should and did put respondent on ample notice of the care with which its cost reports must be prepared, and the care which would be taken to review them within the relevant 3-year period. Yet respondent prepared those reports on the basis of an oral policy judgment by an official who, it should have known, was not in the business of making policy. That is not the kind of reasonable reliance that would even give rise to an estoppel against a private party. It therefore cannot estop the Government. Thus, assuming estoppel can ever be appropriately applied against the Government, it cannot be said that the detriment respondent faces is so severe or has been imposed in such an unfair way that petitioner ought to be estopped from enforcing the law in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Congress also authorized petitioner to adjust interim payments on account of previous overpayments or underpayments. § 1395g(a). “(a) Principle. Unrestricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments should not be deducted from operating costs in computing reimbursable cost. Grants, gifts, or endowment income designated by a donor for paying specific operating costs should be deducted from the particular operating cost or group of costs. “(b) Definitions — (1) Unrestricted grants, gifts, income from. endowment. Unrestricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments are funds, cash or otherwise, given to a provider without restriction by the donor as to their use. “(2) Designated or restricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments. Designated or restricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments are funds, cash or otherwise, which must be used only for the specific purpose designated by the donor. This does not refer to unrestricted grants, gifts, or income from endowments which have been restricted for a specific purpose by the provider. “(c) Application. (1) Unrestricted funds, cash or otherwise, are generally the property of the provider to be used in any manner its management deems appropriate and should not be deducted from operating costs. It would be inequitable to require providers to use the unrestricted funds to reduce the payments for care. The use of these funds is generally a means of recovering costs which are not otherwise recoverable. “(2) Donor-restricted funds which are designated for paying certain hospital operating expenses should apply and serve to reduce these costs or group of costs and benefit all patients who use services covered by the donation. If such costs are not reduced, the provider would secure reimbursement for the same expense twice; it would be reimbursed through the donor-restricted contributions as well as from patients and third-party payers including the title XVIII health insurance program.” 42 CFR § 405.423 (1982) (emphasis supplied). “Seed Money Grants. — Grants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies are generally referred to as ‘seed money’ grants. ‘Seed money’ grants are not deducted from costs in computing allowable costs. These grants are usually made to cover specific operating costs or group[s] of costs for services for a stated period of time. During this time, the provider will develop sufficient patient caseloads to enable continued self-sustaining operation with funds received from Medicare reimbursement as well as from funds received from other patients or other third-party payers.” Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, HIM-15, Pt. I, §612.2 (Aug. 1968), reproduced in 1 CCH, Medicare & Medicaid Guide ¶ 5461 (1983). Presumably because CETA program participants provided services to some individuals not eligible for Medicare benefits, the aggregate amount of CETA reimbursements was substantially larger than the portion for which Medicare reimbursement was claimed. The total amount of reimbursement respondent received in CETA funds was $16,555, $53,952, and $81,118 in 1975, 1976, and 1977, respectively. From its review of the record the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had consulted Travelers and was advised that the CETA grants qualified as “seed money” on five separate occasions. However, the District Court made no finding as to the number of times that this advice was requested and received. The Board also found that the required written notice for 1976 had not been served on respondent, but noted that the Secretary still had time to comply with the notice requirement for that year. A timely notice for 1976 was thereafter served on respondent. The District Court also held that Travelers was not independently liable to respondent for its incorrect advice. See also Restatement (Second) of Agency §8B (1958). 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 805, p. 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941); see also id., §812. “The truth concerning these material facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, not only at the time of the conduct which amounts to a representation or concealment, but also at the time when that conduct is acted upon by him. If, at the time when he acted, such party had knowledge of the truth, or had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could acquire the knowledge so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by not using those means, he cannot claim to have been misled by relying upon the representation or concealment.” Id., §810, at 219 (footnote omitted). See, e. g., INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 383 (1947). See INS v. Miranda, 459 U. S. 14, 19 (1982) (per curiam); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S. 785, 788 (1981) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 315 (1961). In fact, at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm a private party as a result of governmental deception. See United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U. S. 655, 670-675 (1973) (criminal defendant may assert as a defense that the Government led him to believe that its conduct was legal); Moser v. United States, 341 U. S. 41 (1951) (applicant cannot be deemed to waive right to citizenship on the basis of a form he signed when he was misled as to the effect signing would have on his rights). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 178-180 (1979); Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 (1971); Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, 42 (1873). This principle also underlies the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 295 (1974); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 807-808 (1973) (plurality opinion); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 203 (1947). See generally St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (“Our Government should not by picayunish haggling over the scope of its promise, permit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction, the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in dealing with their government”); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S., at 387-388 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should turn square corners. But there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way street”); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 53, 57 (CA9 1970) (“To say to these appellants, ‘The joke is on you. You shouldn’t have trusted us,’ is hardly worthy of our great government”); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859) (“Men naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so, and they ought not to suffer for it”). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154-155 (1972). This case is, therefore, plainly distinguishable from Moser v. United States, 341 U. S. 41 (1951), in which the petitioner “was led to believe that he would not thereby lose his rights to citizenship.” Id., at 46. See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S., at 789 (per curiam). See United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60, 70 (1940); Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575 (1921); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279, 291 (1902); Hart v. United States, 95 U. S. 316 (1877). See also Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180 (1957). Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority.” Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S., at 384. See United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 39-40 (1947); United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S., at 70; United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 31-32 (1940); Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U. S. 120, 123-124 (1935); Utah v. United States, 284 U. S. 534, 545-546 (1932); Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting Club v. United States, 260 U. S. 561, 564 (1923); Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S., at 579; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409 (1917); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U. S., at 291; Hart v. United States, 95 U. S., at 318-319; Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 274 (1869); Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 366 (1813). See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U. S., at 789-790 (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 314-315 (1961). See INS v. Miranda, 459 U. S. 14 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5 (1973) (per curiam). See generally Schweiker v. Hansen, supra. Under the law of agency, a principal may be bound by the acts of an agent only if that agent acted with actual or apparent authority. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 145, 159 (1958). Travelers had neither with respect to the interpretation of the regulations in question. See also id., § 141, Comment b (principal may be estopped to deny lack of actual or apparent authority only when it negligently leads third parties to believe authority exists). The Court of Appeals believed that respondent did all it could have done since it was unable to deal with the Secretary directly. However, that belief, even if accurate, would not make respondent’s reliance on Travelers’ policy judgment any more reasonable. Moreover, given the role of Travelers as a conduit for information, it is far from clear that had respondent specifically requested that Travelers pass on its question to the Department, Travelers would not have been under a duty to do so. Even if there were no such duty, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Travelers would have been unwilling to honor such a request.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JARECKI, FORMER COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al. v. G. D. SEARLE & CO. No. 151. Argued March 21, 1961. Decided June 12, 1961. Wayne G. Barnett argued the cause for petitioners in No. 151 and for respondent in No. 169. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorneys General Rice and Ober-dorfer, Acting Assistant Attorneys General Sellers and Heffron, Harry Marselli and Norman H. Wolfe. Isaac M. Barnett argued the cause for petitioner in No. 169. With him on the brief was David Saperstein. Walter J. Cummings, Jr. argued the cause for respondent in No. 151. With him on the brief was Edwin C. Austin. Together with No. 169, Polaroid Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued March 21-22, 1961. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present problems in the interpretation of § 456 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, a section of the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1137. The Act, which is intended to tax at high rates unusually high profits earned during the Korean War, imposes a tax on profits in excess of an amount deemed to represent the taxpayer’s normal profits. Recognizing, however, that some profits otherwise subject to tax under this scheme might stem from causes other than the inflated wartime economy, Congress enacted § 456. This section grants relief in certain cases of “abnormal income” as defined in § 456 (a) by allocating some of this income to years other than those in which it was received for purposes of computing the tax. The dispute in these cases is whether income from the sales of certain new products falls within the statutory definition of “abnormal income.” Taxpayers claim that the income from the sales of their products is income resulting from “discovery.” They claim it is therefore “abnormal income” within the class defined by § 456 (a) (2) (B) as “Income resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting, or any combination of the foregoing, extending over a period of more than 12 months.” Taxpayer in No. 151 is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and marketing of drugs. As a result of research extending for more than 12 months, it produced two new drugs, “Banthine,” used in the treatment of peptic ulcers, and “Dramamine,” for relief from motion sickness. Taxpayer received patents on both drugs, and it asserts that both were new products and not merely improvements on pre-existing compounds. Taxpayer received income from the sale of “Banthine” and “Dramamine” in the years 1950 through 1952. It paid its tax without claiming relief under § 456, and then claimed a refund. On denial of its claim, taxpayer filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. It held that “discovery” might include the preparation of new products and that the case must be remanded for a trial on the issue of whether taxpayer’s drugs “were actually discoveries.” 274 F. 2d 129,131. Taxpayer in No. 169 is the inventor and producer of the “Polaroid Land Process,” a camera and film which produce a photograph in 60 seconds, and the “Polaroid 3-D Synthetic Polarizer,” a device incorporated in the “viewers” through which audiences watched the three dimensional motion pictures in vogue some years ago. These inventions, each the product of more than 12 months’ research, are novel, according to taxpayer, and each has been patented. The Polaroid Land equipment was the subject of 238 patents by the end of 1958, and taxpayer characterizes this invention as “revolutionary.” Its production was a new departure in the business of taxpayer, which had hitherto been engaged primarily in manufacturing and selling such optical products as polarizing sunglasses, visors and camera filters. In its returns for 1951 through 1953 taxpayer utilized the provisions of § 456 in computing its tax on income from the sales of its photographic equipment and 3-D polarizers. The Commissioner determined that § 456 was not applicable, and the Tax Court upheld his determination of a deficiency. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that taxpayer’s inventions were not “discoveries” and its income from their sale not “abnormal income.” 278 F. 2d 148. We granted certiorari in each case to resolve the conflict between the decisions of the First and Seventh Circuits. 364 U. S. 812, 813. I. For present purposes we accept, as did the First Circuit, taxpayers’ assertions of the novelty of their products. But we also agree with that court that taxpayers’ inventions are not “discoveries” as that word is used in § 456 (a) (2) (B) and that income from sales of the new products may not receive the special treatment provided by § 456. We look first to the face of the statute. “Discovery” is a word usable in many contexts and with various shades of meaning. Here, however, it does not stand alone, but gathers meaning from the words around it. These words strongly suggest that a precise and narrow application was intended in § 456. The three words in conjunction, “exploration,” “discovery” and “prospecting,” all describe income-producing activity in the oil and gas and mining industries, but it is difficult to conceive of any other industry to which they all apply. Certainly the development and manufacture of drugs and cameras are not such industries. The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress. See, e. g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 708-709. The application of the maxim here leads to the conclusion that “discovery” in § 456 means only the discovery of mineral resources. When we examine further the construction of §456 (a)(2) and compare subparagraphs (B) and (C), it becomes unmistakably clear that “discovery” was not meant to include the development of patentable products. If “discovery” were so wide in scope, there would be no need for the provision in subparagraph (C) for “Income from the sale of patents, formulae, or processes.” All of this income, under taxpayers’ reading of “discovery,” would also be income “resulting from . . . discovery” within subparagraph (B). To borrow the homely metaphor of Judge Aldrich in the First Circuit, “If there is a big hole in the fence for the big cat, need there be a small hole for the small one?” The statute admits a reasonable construction which gives effect to all of its provisions. In these circumstances we will not adopt a strained reading which renders one part a mere redundancy. See, e. g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539. Taxpayers assert that it is the “ordinary meaning” of “discovery” which must govern. We find ample evidence both on the face of the statute and, as we shall show, in its legislative history that a technical usage was intended. But even if we were without such evidence we should find it difficult to believe that Congress intended to apply the layman’s meaning of “discovery” to describe the products of research. To do so would lead to the necessity of drawing a line between things found and things made, for in ordinary present-day usage things revealed are discoveries, but new fabrications are inventions. It would appear senseless for Congress to adopt this usage, to provide relief for income from discoveries and yet make no provision for income from inventions. Perhaps in the patent law “discovery” has the uncommonly wide meaning taxpayers suggest, but the fields of patents and taxation are each lores unto themselves, and the usage in the patent law (which is by no means entirely in taxpayers’ favor) is unpersuasive here. All the evidence is to the effect that Congress did not intend to introduce the difficult distinction between inventions and discoveries into the excess profits tax law. The relevant legislative history fortifies the conclusions to which the words of the statute lead us. The word “discovery” has been used for many years in the tax laws, and has always been used with the limited meaning of the finding of mineral deposits. In the Revenue Act of 1918, enacting one of the earliest excess profits tax laws, a limit was placed on the excess profits tax on income from “a bona fide sale of mines, oil or gas wells, or any interest therein, where the principal value of the property has been demonstrated by prospecting or exploration and discovery work done by the taxpayer.” Revenue Act of 1918, § 337, 40 Stat. 1096. An identical limitation was imposed on the income tax levied under that Act, and the same usage of “discovery” obtained in the allowance of depletion deductions. The limitation on the income tax on the proceeds of the sale of mineral deposits was re-enacted without significant change in the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924, 1926, 1928, 1932, 1936 and 1938. It remains in the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as § 105 and has been carried forward as § 632 of the 1954 Code. In each re-enactment “discovery” is linked with “exploration” and “prospecting,” and in each the word is restrictively applied to extractive industries. A correspondingly narrow use of “discovery” has continued since 1918 in the depletion allowance sections and appears in § 114 (b) (2) of the 1939 Code. In the more than 30 years preceding the enactment of the section here at issue, during which time “discovery” was used and re-used in successive taxing statutes, the .word developed into a term of art of precise and limited meaning. The Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 975, made specific mention of more types of “abnormal income” qualifying for relief than did the earlier excess profits tax statutes, but there is no indication that it worked any transformation in the meaning of “discovery.”- Section 721, 54 Stat. 986, as amended, 55 Stat. 21, classified six types of “abnormal income.” Among them was the following, at § 721 (a) (2) (C): “Income resulting from exploration, discovery, prospecting, research, or development of tangible property, patents, formulae, or processes, or any combination of the foregoing, extending over a period of more than 12 months.” This was the first time specific provision was made for income from invention, relief in cases of such income having previously been obtainable, if at all, only under the “general relief” provisions, of the earlier Acts. It is instructive that the formula “exploration, discovery, or prospecting” was not considered broad enough to cover invention and that the words “research” and “development” were added to cover that source of income. Plainly, “discovery” retained in the World War II excess profits Act the limited meaning which it had had in the previous Acts and which it continued to have in the income tax provisions of the then-current code. The relief provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950, which we here construe, were modeled in part on § 721 of the World War II Act, but were different in significant respects. In the classifications of income in the new § 456, Congress gave separate treatment to income from discovery of minerals and income from invention. It provided relief in subparagraph (B) for “Income resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting,” but provided in subparagraph (C) only for “Income from the sale of patents, formulae, or processes.” (Emphasis added.) Subparagraph (C) does not encompass all income from inventions. It does not cover income from the sale of products made under a new patent, the sort of income at issue here. Taxpayers assert that the income from their inventions is, realistically speaking, as “abnormal” in their businesses as the discovery of a new mine would be in the business of a prospector. Their income is within the spirit of § 456, they say, and should be held to be within the letter of subparagraph (B). It is clear, however, that Congress, while it may have recognized the abnormal nature of this sort of income, chose deliberately to deny relief for it and to limit relief in cases of research and development to that provided in subparagraph (C). The relief provisions of the World War II Act had been intended to provide “flexible rules,” and their application had often been an uncertain affair. In administering § 721 the Commissioner often faced the difficult task of separating income which was the product of “research, or development” from that resulting merely from improved management or sales efforts." The difficulty of distinction led the Tax Court to hold that the distinction must be made “by exercising common sense and judgment,” and that “It is entirely possible that the allocation made by one person would never match that made by another.” Ramsey Accessories Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 482, 489. Congress in 1950 recognized the delay and uncertainty caused by the element of administrative discretion in this and other sections and set about drafting an excess profits tax law on the principle that “subjective judgments . . . should be avoided in the new law.” H. R. Rep. No. 3142, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 20. This principle was expressly followed in the drafting of § 456. Thb Senate Committee reported on § 456 as follows: “The equivalent provision in the World War II law (sec. 721) also permitted adjustments with reference to certain other types of income, particularly that resulting from the sale of tangible property arising out of research and development which extended over a period of more than 12 months. This provision in the old law was a potential loophole of major dimensions. Because there appeared to be no means of restricting such an adjustment to truly meritorious cases other than by the introduction of a large degree of administrative discretion of the type required by the general relief clause of the World War II law (sec. 722), and because the need for a reallocation of such income seemed to be materially less than for' the other classes of income described above, the bill omits this item from the list of abnormal types of income for which a reallocation can be made.” S. Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 14. The House Committee Report was virtually identical. H. R. Rep. No. 3142, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 13. Taxpayers recognize, as they must, that Congress intended its change in language to limit the kinds of income eligible for relief. They say, however, that not all income from research and development was excluded. That which comes from inventions not merely patentable but also sufficiently revolutionary to be called “genuine discoveries” is still within the protection of § 456. We find it impossible to believe that an amendment designed to eliminate uncertainty and administrative discretion would introduce into the law — without a congressional word of warning or explanation — a distinction as vague, as dependent upon nuances of scientific opinion, and as unprecedented as that urged by taxpayers. II. Taxpayers have another argument, which the First Circuit rejected and which the Seventh Circuit did not reach. Paragraph (1) of § 456 (a) defines “abnormal income” as “income of any class described in paragraph (2)” which meets certain requirements. Paragraph (2) lists four classes of income and provides in its concluding sentence: “The classification of income of any class not described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, shall be subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” Taxpayers argue that even if the income here at issue was not provided for under any of the subparagraphs of paragraph (2), it is nevertheless included within this final sentence and is hence eligible for relief. We need not decide the precise effect of the sentence relied on. In light of the clear purpose of Congress in enacting § 456 to cut down not only the amount of administrative discretion which had prevailed under the predecessor section but also the scope of available relief, the power of the Secretary to extend relief far beyond the four corners of the statute may be doubted. It is sufficient to note that, unlike its predecessor (which made relief available for all “abnormal income,” whether or not specified in a particular class), § 456 applies only to those classes specified in §456 (a)(2). Section 456 does not apply in terms to all abnormal income and contains no indication that the Secretary should create administrative classifications embracing all such income. And even if the sentence relied on gives the Secretary power to expand the classes of abnormal income somewhat beyond the four enumerated in the statute, he has clearly not done so here. The regulations specifically provide that “Income from the sale of tangible property arising out of research and development which extended over a period of more than 12 months is not included in the list of abnormal types of income to which section 456 is applicable, and such income may not constitute a class of income for purposes of that section.” This specific exclusion is clearly in furtherance of the purpose of Congress in deleting “research” and “development” income from its classification of abnormal income. The Commissioner, effecting the will of Congress, has barred relief for the type of income here at issue. The last sentence of the regulation, on which taxpayers also rely, does not aid them. It provides merely that “research” and “development” income is eligible for relief if it is properly includible in a class of income to which § 456 otherwise applies. As we have held, however, taxpayers’ income does not fall within any such class. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit must be reversed and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. It is so ordered. See H. R. Rep. No. 3142, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2; S. Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2. Section 456 (a) provides in part: “(a) DEFINITIONS. — For the purposes of this section— “(1) Abnormal income. — The term ‘abnormal income’ means income of any class described in paragraph (2) includible in the gross income of the taxpayer for any taxable year under this subchapter if it is abnormal for the taxpayer to derive income of such class, or, if the taxpayer normally derives income of such class but the amount of such income of such class includible in the gross income of the taxable year is in excess of 115 per centum of the average amount of the gross income of the same class for the four previous taxable years, or, if the taxpayer was not in existence for four previous taxable years, the taxable years during which the taxpayer was in existence. “(2) Separate classes of income. — Each of the following sub-paragraphs shall be held to describe a separate class of income: “(A) Income arising out of a claim, award, judgment, or decree, or interest on any of the foregoing; or “(B) Income resulting from exploration, discovery, or prospecting, or any combination of the foregoing, extending over a period of more than 12 months; or “(C) Income from the sale of patents, formulae, or processes, or any combination of the foregoing, developed over a period of more than 12 months; or “(D) Income includible in gross income for the taxable year rather than for a different taxable year by reason of a change in the taxpayer’s method of accounting. “All the income which is classifiable in more than one of such subparagraphs shall be classified under the one which the taxpayer irrevocably elects. The classification of income of any class not described in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, shall be subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” In lay terms, Polaroid’s photographic equipment and Searle’s drugs are probably better called inventions than discoveries. Webster’s New International Dictionary, Unabridged (2d ed.) p. 745, makes this distinction: “One discovers what existed before, but had remained unknown; one invents by forming combinations which are either entirely new, or which attain their end by means unknown before; as, Columbus discovered America; Newton discovered the law of gravitation; Edison invented the phonograph The United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 gives Congress the power to secure to “Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.” While the terms “discover” and “discovery” are used throughout the patent statutes, they seem generally to appear with “invent” and “invention” as if the terms have separate meanings. See, e. g., 35 U. S. C. §101: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter .. . may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” And see Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co. (Telephone Cases), 126 U. S. 1, 532-533. This section was re-enacted by the Revenue Act of 1921, § 337, 42 Stat. 277. Revenue Act of 1918, §211 (b), 40 Stat. 1064. Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 214 (a) (10), 234 (a) (9), 40 Stat. 1067, 1078, providing “That in the ease of mines, oil and gas wells, discovered by the taxpayer . . . where the fair market value of the property is materially disproportionate to the cost, the depletion allowance shall be based upon the fair market value of the property at the date of discovery . . . .” Revenue Act of 1921, §211 (b), 42 Stat. 237; Revenue Act of 1924, §211 (b), 43 Stat. 267; Revenue Act of 1926, §211 (b), 44 Stat. 23; Revenue Act of 1928, § 102 (a), 45 Stat. 812; Revenue Act of 1932, §102 (a), 47 Stat. 192; Revenue Act of 1936, §105, 49 Stat. 1678; Revenue Act of 1938, § 105, 52 Stat. 484. Revenue Act of 1921, §§214 (a) (10), 234 (a)(9), 42 Stat. 241, 256; Revenue Act of 1924, §204 (c), 43 Stat. 260; Revenue Act of 1926, § 204 (c) (1), 44 Stat. 16; Revenue Act of 1928, § 114 (b) (2), 45 Stat. 821; Revenue Act of 1932, § 114 (b) (2), 47 Stat. 202; Revenue Act of 1934, §114 (b)(2), 48 Stat. 710; Revenue Act of 1936, § 114 (b) (2), 49 Stat. 1686; Revenue Act of 1938, § 114 (b) (2), 52 Stat. 495. Section 327 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1093, gave the Commissioner power to grant relief in any case in which “the tax . . . would, owing to abnormal conditions affecting the capital or income of the corporation, work upon the corporation an exceptional hardship . . . Section 721 of the World War II law classified specific types of abnormal income for purposes of computing the tax, and, while it provided relief for all abnormal income of whatever class, was not considered a “general relief” section. I. R. C. of 1939, §§ 105, 114 (b) (2). It "was expressly provided by § 728 of the World War II excess profits tax statute, 54 Stat. 989, that the words used in that statute should have the same meaning as when used in the income tax chapter of the Code. H. R. Rep. No. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2. The “general relief” section of the World War II Act, § 722, 54 Stat. 986, as amended, 55 Stat. 23, 701, 56 Stat. 914, 57 Stat. 56, 601, 58 Stat. 55, provided for adjustments in the computation of base period income if the taxpayer established, among other things, “what would be a fair and just amount representing normal earnings” during the base period. In fact, the Committee reports state that “Adjustments . . . [under § 456] are limited to income arising out of” the four classes specified in subparagraphs (A) through (D). H. R. Rep. No. 3142, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 13; S. Rep. No. 2679, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 14. Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, § 721, 54 Stat. 986, as amended, 55 Stat. 21. Section 721 (a)(1) defines “abnormal income” as “income of any class includible in the gross income of the taxpayer ... .” Treas. Reg. 130, §40.456-2 (b) (1951), as amended, T. D. 6026, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 235: “Other income, not within a class described in subparagraphs (A)-(D) of section 456 (a)(2), to which section 456 is applicable may be grouped by the taxpayer, subject to approval by the Commissioner on the examination of the taxpayer’s return, in such classes similar to those specified in subparagraphs (A)-(D) of section 456 (a) (2) as are reasonable in a business of the type which the taxpayer conducts, and as are appropriate in the light of the taxpayer’s business experience and accounting practice. Income from the sale of tangible property arising out of research and development which extended over a period of more than 12 months is not included in the list of abnormal types of income to which section 456 is applicable, and such income may not constitute a class of income for purposes of that section. However, section 456 is applicable to such income if the income is otherwise properly includi-ble within a class of income to which such section is applicable for example, the class described in section 456 (a) (2) (D).”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ANDERSON, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. GREEN et al. No. 94-197. Argued January 17, 1995 Decided February 22, 1995 Theodore Garelis, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland III, Assistant Attorney General, Dennis Eckhart, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Andrea Lynn Hoch, Deputy Attorney General. Kathleen M. Sullivan argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Sarah E. Kurtz, Hope G. Nakamura, Peter H Reid, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Grace A. Galligher, and Steven Shapiro. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Minnesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Robert A. Marks of Hawaii, and Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Anthony T. Caso, and Deborah J. La Fetra; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and David A. Price. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bar Association by George E. Bushnell, Jr., Paul M. Smith, and Marc Goldman; for Catholic Charities U. S. A. et al. by Daniel Marcus; for Law Professors by Jonathan D. Varat; for the National Welfare Rights and Reform Union by Timothy J. Casey and Christopher D. Lamb; and for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Martha F. Davis and Deborah A. Ellis. William Perry Pendley filed a brief for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae. Per Curiam. Under Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., the Federal Government partially reimburses States for welfare programs that either comply with all federal prescriptions or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 42 U. S. C. § 1315. California seeks to change its AFDC program by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in California, to the benefits paid in the State from which they came. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. §11450.03 (West Supp. 1994). Green and other new residents who receive AFDC benefits challenged the constitutionality of this California statute in a federal court action; they maintain that the payment differential between new and long-term residents burdens interstate migration and thus violates the right to travel recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and its progeny. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California enjoined the payment differential, 811 F. Supp. 516, 523 (1993), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 26 F. 3d 95 (1994). We granted California’s petition for certiorari. Post, p. 922. We now find, however, that no justiciable controversy is before us, because the case in its current posture is not ripe. The California statute provides that the payment differential shall not take effect absent receipt by the State of an HHS waiver. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 11450.03(b) (West Supp. 1994). HHS originally granted a waiver, which was in effect when the District Court and Court of Appeals ruled. But “ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing,” and “it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the [decision, under review] that must govern.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 140 (1974). After the Court of Appeals ruled in this case, it vacated the HHS waiver in a separate proceeding, concluding that the Secretary had not adequately considered objections to California’s program. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d 1057, 1073-1076 (CA9 1994). The Secretary did not seek this Court’s review of the Beno decision. California acknowledges that even if it prevails here, the payment differential will not take effect. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-6. Absent favorable action by HHS on a renewed application for a waiver, California will continue to treat Green and others similarly situated the same way it treats long-term California residents. The parties have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 (1969) (per curiam) (after this Court noted probable jurisdiction, Colorado Legislature reduced to two months challenged six-month residency requirement for voting in Presidential elections; revival of controversy consequently became too speculative to warrant Court’s passing on substantive issues). In view of the impediment to dispositive adjudication, we direct the vacation of prior judgments in this case. As we explained earlier this Term, in deciding whether to disturb prior judgments in a case rendered nonjusticiable, we have inquired, pivotally, “whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the [nonjusticiability] by voluntary action.” U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, ante, at 25. Unlike settlement, see ibid., or a losing party’s decision to forgo appeal, see Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 83 (1987), California’s loss of the federal approval necessary to implement its program was not voluntary. Vacatur is appropriate, therefore, to “clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and [to] eliminat[e] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance.” United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 40 (1950). Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is vacated, and the ease is remanded to that court with directions to order the vacation of the District Court’s judgment and the dismissal of the case. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. CEMENT INSTITUTE et al. NO. 23. Argued October 20-21,1947. Decided April 26, 1948. Charles H. Weston and Walter B. Wooden argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Son-nett, Robert G. Seaks, Philip Elman and W. T. Kelley. William, J. Donovan argued the cause for the Cement Institute et al., respondents in Nos. 23, 24 and 34. With him on the brief were George S. Leisure, Breck P. McAl-lister, James R. Withrow, Jr., Henry Herrick Bond, Ira C. Werle, Robert E. McKean, F. Carroll Taylor, James F. Oates, Jr., Russell J. Burt, A. O. Dawson, George W. Jaques, George Nebolsine, Harry Scherr, Horace G. Hitchcock, Paul Brown, J. T. Stokely, C. Alfred Capen, Edward D. Lyman, William M. Robinson, Charles H. Smith and Emil H. Molthan. Thomas J. McFadden and Francis A. Brick were also of counsel. Herbert W. Clark argued the cause for the Calaveras Cement Co. et al., respondents in Nos. 24 and 26. With him on the brief were Walter C. Fox, Jr., Marshall P. Madison, Robert H. Gerdes, William J. Donovan, George S. Leisure and Edward D. Lyman. Edward A. Zimmerman argued the cause for respondent in No. 25. With him on the brief were H. W. Norman and W. R. Engelhardt. A. K. Shipe was also of counsel. Charles Wright, Jr. argued the cause for respondent in No. 27. With him on the brief was Laurence A. Mas-selink. Herbert S. Little argued the cause for respondent in No. 28. With him on the brief was F. A. LeSourd. S. Harold Shefelman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 29. Pierce Works argued the cause for respondent in No. 30. With him on the brief was Louis W. Myers. Nathan L. Miller argued the cause for the Universal Atlas Cement Co., respondent in No. 31. With him on the brief were Roger M. Blough and John H. Hersh-berger. Alex W. Davis argued the cause for respondent in No. 32. With him on the brief was Robert B. Murphey. No appearance for respondents in No. 33. Thurlow M. Gordon and Neil C. Head filed a brief for the General Electric Co., as amicus curiae, supporting respondents in Nos. 23, 24 and 34. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to review the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which, with one judge dissenting, vacated and set aside a cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Commission against the respondents. 157 F. 2d 533. Those respondents are: The Cement Institute, an unincorporated trade association composed of 74 corporations which manufacture, sell and distribute cement; the 74 corporate members of the Institute; and 21 individuals who are associated with the Institute. It took three years for a trial examiner to hear the evidence which consists of about 49,000 pages of oral testimony and 50,000 pages of exhibits. Even the findings and conclusions of the Commission cover 176 pages. The briefs with accompanying appendixes submitted by the parties contain more than 4,000 pages. The legal questions raised by the Commission and by the different respondents are many and varied. Some contentions are urged by all respondents and can be jointly considered. Others require separate treatment. In order to keep our opinion within reasonable limits, we must restrict our record references to the minimum consistent with an adequate consideration of the legal questions we discuss. The proceedings were begun by a Commission complaint of two counts. The first charged that certain alleged conduct set out at length constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 38 Stat. 719, 15 U. S. C. § 45. The core of the charge was that the respondents had restrained and hindered competition in the sale and distribution of cement by means of a combination among themselves made effective through mutual understanding or agreement to employ a multiple basing point system of pricing. It was alleged that this system resulted in the quotation of identical terms of sale and identical prices for cement by the respondents at any given point in the United States. This system had worked so successfully, it was further charged, that for many years prior to the filing of the complaint, all cement buyers throughout the nation, with rare exceptions, had been unable to purchase cement for delivery in any given locality from any one of the respondents at a lower price or on more favorable terms than from any of the other respondents. The second count of the complaint, resting chiefly on the same allegations of fact set out in Count I, charged that the multiple basing point system of sales resulted in systematic price discriminations between the customers of each respondent. These discriminations were made, it was alleged, with the purpose of destroying competition in price between the various respondents in violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526. That section, with certain conditions which need not here be set out, makes it “unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, . . . either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 13. Resting upon its findings, the Commission ordered that respondents cease and desist from “carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy” to do a number of things, 37 F. T. C. 87, 258-262, all of which things, the Commission argues, had to be restrained in order effectively to restore individual freedom of action among the separate units in the cement industry. Certain contentions with reference to the order will later require a more detailed discussion of its terms. For the present it is sufficient to say that, if the order stands, its terms are broad enough to bar respondents from acting in concert to sell cement on a basing point delivered price plan which so eliminates competition that respondents’ prices are always identical at any given point in the United States. We shall not now detail the numerous contentions urged against the order’s validity. A statement of these contentions can best await the separate consideration we give them. Jurisdiction. — At the very beginning we are met with a challenge to the Commission’s jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and to act on it. This contention is pressed by respondent Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. and is relied upon by other respondents. Count I of the complaint is drawn under the provision in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which declares that “Unfair methods of competition . . . are hereby declared unlawful.” Marquette contends that the facts alleged in Count I do not constitute “an unfair method of competition” within the meaning of § 5. Its argument runs this way: Count I in reality charges a combination to restrain trade. Such a combination constitutes an offense under § 1 of the Sherman Act which outlaws “Every . . . combination ... in restraint of trade.” 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1. Section 4 of the Sherman Act provides that the Attorney General shall institute suits under the Act on behalf of the United States, and that the federal district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such suits. Hence, continue respondents, the Commission, whose jurisdiction is limited to “unfair methods of competition,” is without power to institute proceedings or to issue an order with regard to the combination in restraint of trade charged in Count I. Marquette then argues that since the fact allegations of Count I are the chief reliance for the charge in Count II, this latter count also must be interpreted as charging a violation of the Sherman Act. Assuming, without deciding, that the conduct charged in each count constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act, we hold that the Commission does have jurisdiction to conclude that such conduct may also be an unfair method of competition and hence constitute a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. As early as 1920 this Court considered it an “unfair method of competition” to engage in practices “against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427. In 1922, the Court in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, sustained a cease and desist order against a resale price maintenance plan because such a plan “necessarily constitutes a scheme which restrains the natural flow of commerce and the freedom of competition in the channels of interstate trade which it has been the purpose of all the anti-trust acts to maintain.” Id. at 454. The Court, in holding that the scheme before it constituted an unfair method of competition, noted that the conduct in question was practically identical with that previously declared unlawful in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, and United States v. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85, the latter a suit brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Again in 1926 this Court sustained a Commission unfair-method-of-competition order against defendants who had engaged in a price-fixing combination, a plain violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn., 273 U. S. 52. In 1941 we reiterated that certain conduct of a combination found to conflict with the policy of the Sherman Act could be suppressed by the Commission as an unfair method of competition. Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 312 U. S. 457, 465. The Commission’s order was sustained in the Fashion Originators’ case not only because the prohibited conduct violated the Clayton Act but also because the Commission’s findings brought the “combination in its entirety well within the inhibition of the policies declared by the Sherman Act itself.” In other cases this Court has pointed out many reasons which support interpretation of the language “unfair methods of competition” in § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as including violations of the Sherman Act. Thus it appears that soon after its creation the Commission began to interpret the prohibitions of § 5 as including those restraints of trade which also were outlawed by the Sherman Act, and that this Court has consistently approved that interpretation of the Act. Despite this long and consistent administrative and judicial construction of § 5, we are urged to hold that these prior interpretations were wrong and that the term “unfair methods of competition” should not be construed as embracing any conduct within the ambit of the Sherman Act. In support of this contention, Marquette chiefly relies upon its reading of the legislative history of the Commission Act. We have given careful consideration to this contention because of the earnestness with which it is pressed. Marquette points to particular statements of some of the Act’s sponsors which, taken out of their context, might lend faint support to its contention that Congress did not intend the Commission to concern itself with conduct then punishable under the Sherman Act. But on the whole the Act’s legislative history shows a strong congressional purpose not only to continue enforcement of the Sherman Act by the Department of Justice and the federal district courts but also to supplement that enforcement through the administrative process of the new Trade Commission. Far from being regarded as a rival of the Justice Department and the district courts in dissolving combinations in restraint of trade, the new Commission was envisioned as an aid to them and was specifically authorized to assist them in the drafting of appropriate decrees in antitrust litigation. All of the committee reports and the statements of those in charge of the Trade Commission Act reveal an abiding purpose to vest both the Commission and the courts with adequate powers to hit at every trade practice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained competition or might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its incipient stages. These congressional purposes are revealed in the legislative history cited below, most of which is referred to in respondents’ briefs. We can conceive of no greater obstacle this Court could create to the fulfillment of these congressional purposes than to inject into every Trade Commission proceeding brought under § 5 and into every Sherman Act suit brought by the Justice Department a possible jurisdictional question. We adhere to our former rulings. The Commission has jurisdiction to declare that conduct tending to restrain trade is an unfair method of competition even though the selfsame conduct may also violate the Sherman Act. There is a related jurisdictional argument pressed by Marquette which may be disposed of at this time. While review of the Commission’s order was pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Attorney General filed a civil action in the Federal District Court for Denver, Colorado, to restrain the Cement Institute, Marquette and 88 other cement companies, including all of the present respondents, from violating § 1 of the Sherman Act. Much of the evidence before the Commission in this proceeding might also be relevant in that case, which, we are informed, has not thus far been brought to trial. Marquette urges that the Commission proceeding should now be dismissed because it is contrary to the public interest to force respondents to defend both a Commission proceeding and a Sherman Act suit based largely on the same alleged misconduct. We find nothing to justify a holding that the filing of a Sherman Act suit by the Attorney General requires the termination of these Federal Trade Commission proceedings. In the first place, although all conduct violative of the Sherman Act may likewise come within the unfair trade practice prohibitions of the Trade Commission Act, the converse is not necessarily true. It has long been recognized that there are many unfair methods of competition that do not assume the proportions of Sherman Act violations. Federal Trade Comm’n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427. Hence a conclusion that respondents’ conduct constituted an unfair method of competition does not necessarily mean that their same activities would also be found to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. In the second place, the fact that the same conduct may constitute a violation of both acts in nowise requires us to dismiss this Commission proceeding. Just as the Sherman Act itself permits the Attorney General to bring simultaneous civil and criminal suits against a defendant based on the same misconduct, so the Sherman Act and the Trade Commission Act provide the Government with cumulative remedies against activity detrimental to competition. Both the legislative history of the Trade Commission Act and its specific language indicate a congressional purpose, not to confine each of these proceedings within narrow, mutually exclusive limits, but rather to permit the simultaneous use of both types of proceedings. Marquette’s objections to the Commission’s jurisdiction are overruled. Objections to Commission’s Jurisdiction by Certain Respondents on Ground That They Were Not Engaged in Interstate Commerce. — One other challenge to the Commission’s jurisdiction is specially raised by Northwestern Portland and Superior Portland. The Commission found that “Northwestern Portland makes no sales or shipments outside the State of Washington,” and that “Superior Portland, with few exceptions, makes sales and shipments outside the State of Washington only to Alaska.” These two respondents contend that, since they did not engage in interstate commerce and since § 5 of the Trade Commission Act applies only to unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce, the Commission was without jurisdiction to enter an order against them under Count I of the complaint. For this contention they chiefly rely on Federal Trade Comm’n v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349. They also argue that for the same reason the Commission lacked jurisdiction to enforce against them the price discrimination charge in Count II of the complaint. We cannot sustain this contention. The charge against these respondents was not that they, apart from the other respondents, had engaged in unfair methods of competition and price discriminations simply by making intrastate sales. Instead, the charge was, as supported by the Commission’s findings, that these respondents in combination with others agreed to maintain a delivered price system in order to eliminate price competition in the sale of cement in interstate commerce. The combination, as found, includes the Institute and cement companies located in many different states. The Commission has further found that “In general, said corporate respondents have maintained, and now maintain, a constant course of trade and commerce in cement among and between the several States of the United States.” The fact that one or two of the numerous participants in the combination happen to be selling only within the borders of a single state is not controlling in determining the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction. The important factor is that the concerted action of all of the parties to the combination is essential in order to make wholly effective the restraint of commerce among the states. The Commission would be rendered helpless to stop unfair methods of competition in the form of interstate combinations and conspiracies if its jurisdiction could be defeated on a mere showing that each conspirator had carefully confined his illegal activities within the borders of a single state. We hold that the Commission did have jurisdiction to make an order against Superior Portland and Northwestern Portland. The Multiple Basing Point Delivered Price System.— Since the multiple basing point delivered price system of fixing prices and terms of cement sales is the nub of this controversy, it will be helpful at this preliminary stage to point out in general what it is and how it works. A brief reference to the distinctive characteristics of “factory” or “mill prices” and “delivered prices” is of importance to an understanding of the basing point delivered price system here involved. Goods may be sold and delivered to customers at the seller’s mill or warehouse door or may be sold free on board (f. o. b.) trucks or railroad cars immediately adjacent to the seller’s mill or warehouse. In either event the actual cost of the goods to the purchaser is, broadly speaking, the seller’s “mill price” plus the purchaser’s cost of transportation. However, if the seller fixes a price at which he undertakes to deliver goods to the purchaser where they are to be used, the cost to the purchaser is the “delivered price.” A seller who makes the “mill price” identical for all purchasers of like amount and quality simply delivers his goods at the same place (his mill) and for the same price (price at the mill). He thus receives for all f. o. b. mill sales an identical net amount of money for like goods from all customers. But a “delivered price” system creates complications which may result in a seller’s receiving different net returns from the sale of like goods. The cost of transporting 500 miles is almost always more than the cost of transporting 100 miles. Consequently if customers 100 and 500 miles away pay the same “delivered price,” the seller’s net return is less from the more distant customer. This difference in the producer’s net return from sales to customers in different localities under a “delivered price” system is an important element in the charge under Count I of the complaint and is the crux of Count II. The best known early example of a basing point price system was called “Pittsburgh plus.” It related to the price of steel. The Pittsburgh price was the base price, Pittsburgh being therefore called a price basing point. In order for the system to work, sales had to be made only at delivered prices. Under this system the delivered price of steel from anywhere in the United States to a point of delivery anywhere in the United States was in general the Pittsburgh price plus the railroad freight rate from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery. Take Chicago, Illinois, as an illustration of the operation and consequences of the system. A Chicago steel producer was not free to sell his steel at cost plus a reasonable profit. He must sell it at the Pittsburgh price plus the railroad freight rate from Pittsburgh to the point of delivery. Chicago steel customers were by this pricing plan thus arbitrarily required to pay for Chicago produced steel the Pittsburgh base price plus what it would have cost to ship the steel by rail from Pittsburgh to Chicago had it been shipped. The theoretical cost of this fictitious shipment became known as “phantom freight.” But had it been economically possible under this plan for a Chicago producer to ship his steel to Pittsburgh, his “delivered price” would have been merely the Pittsburgh price, although he actually would have been required to pay the freight from Chicago to Pittsburgh. Thus the “delivered price” under these latter circumstances required a Chicago (non-basing point) producer to “absorb” freight costs. That is, such a seller’s net returns became smaller and smaller as his deliveries approached closer and closer to the basing point. Several results obviously flow from use of a single basing point system such as “Pittsburgh plus” originally was. One is that the “delivered prices” of all producers in every locality where deliveries are made are always the same regardless of the producers’ different freight costs. Another is that sales made by a non-base mill for delivery at different localities result in net receipts to the seller which vary in amounts equivalent to the “phantom freight” included in, or the “freight absorption” taken from the “delivered price.” As commonly employed by respondents, the basing point system is not single but multiple. That is, instead of one basing point, like that in “Pittsburgh plus,” a number of basing point localities are used. In the multiple basing point system, just as in the single basing point system, freight absorption or phantom freight is an element of the delivered price on all sales not governed by a basing point actually located at the seller’s mill. And all sellers quote identical delivered prices in any given locality regardless of their different costs of production and their different freight expenses. Thus the multiple and single systems function in the same general manner and produce the same consequences — identity of prices and diversity of net returns. Such differences as there are in matters here pertinent are therefore differences of degree only. Alleged Bias of the Commission. — One year after the taking of testimony had been concluded and while these proceedings were still pending before the Commission, the respondent Marquette asked the Commission to disqualify itself from passing upon the issues involved. Marquette charged that the Commission had previously prejudged the issues, was “prejudiced and biased against the Portland cement industry generally,” and that the industry and Marquette in particular could not receive a fair hearing from the Commission. After hearing oral argument the Commission refused to disqualify itself. This contention, repeated here, was also urged and rejected in the Circuit Court of Appeals one year before that court reviewed the merits of the Commission’s order. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 147 F. 2d 589. Marquette introduced numerous exhibits intended to support its charges. In the main these exhibits were copies of the Commission’s reports made to Congress or to the President, as required by § 6 of the Trade Commission Act. 15 U. S. C. § 46. These reports, as well as the testimony given by members of the Commission before congressional committees, make it clear that long before the filing of this complaint the members of the Commission at that time, or at least some of them, were of the opinion that the operation of the multiple basing point system as they had studied it was the equivalent of a price fixing restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. We therefore decide this contention, as did the Circuit Court of Appeals, on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result of its prior official investigations. But we also agree with that court’s holding that this belief did not disqualify the Commission. In the first place, the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents’ basing point practices. Here, in contrast to the Commission’s investigations, members of the cement industry were legally authorized participants in the hearings. They produced evidence — volumes of it. They were free to point out to the Commission by testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and by arguments, conditions of the trade practices under attack which they thought kept these practices within the range of legally permissible business activities. Moreover, Marquette’s position, if sustained, would to a large extent defeat the congressional purposes which prompted passage of the Trade Commission Act. Had the entire membership of the Commission disqualified in the proceedings against these respondents, this complaint could not have been acted upon by the Commission or by any other government agency. Congress has provided for no such contingency. It has not directed that the Commission disqualify itself under any circumstances, has not provided for substitute commissioners should any of its members disqualify, and has not authorized any other government agency to hold hearings, make findings, and issue cease and desist orders in proceedings against unfair trade practices. Yet if Marquette is right, the Commission, by making studies and filing reports in obedience to congressional command, completely immunized the practices investigated, even though they are “unfair,” from any cease and desist order by the Commission or any other governmental agency. There is no warrant in the Act for reaching a conclusion which would thus frustrate its purposes. If the Commission’s opinions expressed in congressionally required reports would bar its members from acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would appear that opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them from ever passing on another. See Morgan v. United States, 313 U. S. 409, 421. Thus experience acquired from their work as commissioners would be a handicap instead of an advantage. Such was not the intendment of Congress. For Congress acted on a committee report stating: “It is manifestly desirable that the terms of the commissioners shall be long enough to give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes from experience.” Report of Committee on Interstate Commerce, No. 597, June 13, 1914, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11. Marquette also seems to argue that it was a denial of due process for the Commission to act in these proceedings after having expressed the view that industry-wide use of the basing point system was illegal. A number of cases are cited as giving support to this contention. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, is among them. But it provides no support for the contention. In that case Tumey had been convicted of a criminal offense, fined, and committed to jail by a judge who had a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching his conclusion to convict. A criminal conviction by such a tribunal was held to violate procedural due process. But the Court there pointed out that most matters relating to judicial disqualification did not rise to a constitutional level. Id. at 523. Neither the Tumey decision nor any other decision of this Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in a case after he had expressed an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, judges frequently try the same case more than once and decide identical issues each time, although these issues involve questions both of law and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court. The Commission properly refused to disqualify itself. We thus need not review the additional holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals that Marquette’s objection on the ground of the alleged bias of the Commission was filed too late in the proceedings before that agency to warrant consideration. Alleged Errors in re Introduction of Evidence. — The complaint before the Commission, filed July 2, 1937, alleged that respondents had maintained an illegal combination for “more than 8 years last past.” In the Circuit Court of Appeals and in this Court the Government treated its case on the basis that the combination began in August, 1929, when the respondent Cement Institute was organized. The Government introduced much evidence over respondents’ objections, however, which showed the activities of the cement industry for many years prior to 1929, some of it as far back as 1902. It also introduced evidence as to respondents’ activities from 1933 to May 27, 1935, much of which related to the preparation and administration of the NRA Code for the cement industry pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195, held invalid by this Court May 27, 1935, in Schechter Poultry Cory. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495. All of the testimony to which objection was made related to the initiation, development, and carrying on of the basing point practices. Respondents contend that the pre-1929 evidence, especially that prior to 1919, is patently inadmissible with reference to a 1929 combination, many of whose alleged members were non-existent in 1919. They also urge that evidence of activities during the NRA period was improperly admitted because § 5 of Title I of the NRA provided that any action taken in compliance with the code provisions of an industry should be “exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States.” And some of the NRA period testimony relating to basing point practices did involve references to code provisions. The Government contends that evidence of both the pre-1929 and the NRA period activities of members of the cement industry tends to show a continuous course of concerted efforts on the part of the industry, or at least most of it, to utilize the basing point system as a means to fix uniform terms and prices at which cement would be sold, and that the Commission had properly so regarded this evidence. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that the Commission had erroneously considered both the NRA period evidence and the pre-1929 evidence in making its findings of the existence of a combination among respondents. We conclude that both types of evidence were admissible for the purpose of showing the existence of a continuing combination among respondents to utilize the basing point pricing system. The Commission did not make its findings of post-1929 combination, in whole or in part, on the premise that any of respondents’ pre-1929 or NRA code activities were illegal. The consideration given these activities by the Commission was well within the established judicial rule of evidence that testimony of prior or subsequent transactions, which for some reason are barred from forming the basis for a suit, may nevertheless be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particular transactions under scrutiny. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 46-47; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 43-44. Here the trade practices of an entire industry were under consideration. Respondents, on the one hand, insisted that the multiple basing point delivered price system represented a natural evolution of business practices adopted by the different cement companies, not in concert, but separately in response to customers’ needs and demands. That the separately adopted business practices produced uniform terms and conditions of sale in all localities was, so the respondents contended, nothing but an inevitable result of long-continued competition. On the other hand, the Government contended that, despite shifts in ownership of individual cement companies, what had taken place from 1902 to the date the complaint was filed showed continued concerted action on the part of all cement producers to develop and improve the basing point system so that it would automatically eliminate competition. In the Government’s view the Institute when formed in 1929 simply took up the old practices for the old purpose and aided its member companies to carry it straight on through and beyond the NRA period. See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 156 F. 2d 899, 906. Furthermore, administrative agencies like the Federal Trade Commission have never been restricted by the rigid rules of evidence. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44. And of course rules which bar certain types of evidence in criminal or quasi-criminal cases are not controlling in proceedings like this, where the effect of the Commission’s order is not to punish or to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct but to ban specific practices for the future in accordance with the general mandate of Congress. The foregoing likewise largely answers respondents’ contention that there was error in the admission of a letter written by one Treanor in 1934 to the chairman of the NRA code authority for the cement industry. Treanor, who died prior to the filing of the complaint, was at the time president of one of the respondent companies and also an active trustee of the Institute. In the letter he stated among other things that the cement industry was one “above all others that cannot stand free competition, that must systematically restrain competition or be ruined.” This statement was made as part of his criticism of the cement industry’s publicity campaign in defense of the basing point system. The relevance of this statement indicating this Institute official’s informed judgment is obvious. That it might be only his conclusion does not render the statement inadmissible in this administrative proceeding. All contentions in regard to the introduction of testimony have been considered. None of them justify refusal to enforce this order. The Old Cement Case. — This Court’s opinion in Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, known as the Old Cement case, is relied on by the respondents in almost every contention they present. We think it has little relevance, if any at all, to the issues in this case. In that case the United States brought an action in the District Court to enjoin an alleged combination to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. The respondents were the Cement Manufacturers Protective Association, four of its officers, and nineteen cement manufacturers. The District Court held hearings, made findings of fact, and issued an injunction against those respondents. This Court, with three justices dissenting, reversed upon a review of the evidence. It did so because the Government did not charge and the record did not show “any agreement or understanding between the defendants placing limitations on either prices or production,” or any agreement to utilize the basing point system as a means of fixing prices. The Court said “But here the Government does not rely upon agreement or understanding, and this record wholly fails to establish, either directly or by inference, any concerted action other than that involved in the gathering and dissemination of pertinent information with respect to the sale and distribution of cement to which we have referred; and it fails to show any effect on price and production except such as would naturally flow from the dissemination of that information in the trade and its natural influence on individual action.” Id. at 606. In the Old Cement case and in Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, decided the same day, the Court’s attention was focused on the rights of a trade association, despite the Sherman Act, openly to gather and disseminate statistics and information as to production costs, output, past prices, merchandise on hand, specific job contracts, freight rates, etc., so long as the Association did these things without attempts to foster agreements or concerted action with reference to prices, production, or terms of sale. Such associations were declared guiltless of violating the Sherman Act, because “in fact, no prohibited concert of action was found.” Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 735. The Court’s holding in the Old Cement case would not have been inconsistent with a judgment sustaining the Commission’s order here, even had the two cases been before this Court the same day. The issues in the present Commission proceedings are quite different from those in the Old Cement case, although many of . the trade practices shown here were also shown there. In the first place, unlike the Old Cement case, the Commission does here specifically charge a combination to utilize the basing point system as a means to bring about uniform prices and terms of sale. And here the Commission has focused attention on this issue, having introduced evidence on the issue which covers thousands of pages. Furthermore, unlike the trial court in the Old Cement case, the Commission has specifically found the existence of a combination among respondents to employ the basing point system for the purpose of selling at identical prices. In the second place, individual conduct, or concerted conduct, which falls short of being a Sherman Act violation may as a matter of law constitute an "unfair method of competition” prohibited by the Trade Commission Act. A major purpose of that Act, as we have frequently said, was to enable the Commission to restrain practices as “unfair” which, although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions would, most likely do so if left unrestrained. The Commission and the courts were to determine what conduct, even though it might then be short of a Sherman Act violation, was an “unfair method of competition.” This general language was deliberately left to the “commission and the courts” for definition because it was thought that “There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field”; that consequently, a definition that fitted practices known to lead towards an unlawful restraint of trade today would not fit tomorrow’s new inventions in the field; and that for Congress to try to keep its precise definitions abreast of this course of conduct would be an “endless task.” See Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304, 310-312, and congressional committee reports there quoted. These marked differences between what a court must decide in a Sherman Act proceeding and the duty of the Commission in determining whether conduct is to be classified as an unfair method of competition are enough in and of themselves to make the Old Cement decision wholly inapplicable to our problem in reviewing the findings in this case. That basic problem is whether the Commission made findings of concerted action, whether those findings are supported by evidence, and if so whether the findings are adequate as a matter of law to sustain the Commission’s conclusion that the multiple basing point system as practiced constitutes an “unfair method of competition,” because it either restrains free competition or is an incipient menace to it. Findings and Evidence. — It is strongly urged that the Commission failed to find, as charged in both counts of the complaint, that the respondents had by combination, agreements, or understandings among themselves utilized the multiple basing point delivered price system as a restraint to accomplish uniform prices and terms of sale. A subsidiary contention is that assuming the Commission did so find, there is no substantial evidence to support such a finding. We think that adequate findings of combination were made and that the findings have support in the evidence. The Commission’s findings of fact set out at great length and with painstaking detail numerous concerted activities carried on in order to make the multiple basing point system work in such way that competition in quality, price and terms of sale of cement would be nonexistent, and that uniform prices, job contracts, discounts, and terms of sale would be continuously maintained. The Commission found that many of these activities were carried on by the Cement Institute, the industry’s unincorporated trade association, and that in other instances the activities were under the immediate control of groups of respondents. Among the collective methods used to accomplish these purposes, according to the findings, were boycotts; discharge of uncooperative employees; organized opposition to the erection of new cement plants; selling cement in a recalcitrant price cutter’s sales territory at a price so low that the recalcitrant was forced to adhere to the established basing point prices; discouraging the shipment of cement by truck or barge; and preparing and distributing freight rate books which provided respondents with similar figures to use as actual or “phantom” freight factors, thus guaranteeing that their delivered prices (base prices plus freight factors) would be identical on all sales whether made to individual purchasers under open bids or to governmental agencies under sealed bids. These are but a few of the many activities of respondents which the Commission found to have been done in combination to reduce or destroy price competition in cement. After having made these detailed findings of concerted action, the Commission followed them by a general finding that “the capacity, tendency, and effect of the combination maintained by the respondents herein in the manner aforesaid ... is to . . . promote and maintain their multiple basing-point delivered-price system and obstruct and defeat any form of competition which threatens or tends to threaten the continued use and maintenance of said system and the uniformity of prices created and maintained by its use.” The Commission then concluded that “The aforesaid combination and acts and practices of respondents pursuant thereto and in connection therewith, as hereinabove found, under the conditions and circumstances set forth, constitute unfair methods of competition in commerce within the intent and meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” And the Commission’s cease and desist order prohibited respondents “from entering into, continuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy between and among any two or more of said respondents . . to do certain things there enumerated. “The Commission concludes from the evidence of record and therefore finds that the capacity, tendency, and effect of the combination maintained by the respondents herein in the manner aforesaid and the acts and practices performed thereunder and in connection therewith by said respondents, as set out herein, has been and is to hinder, lessen, restrain, and suppress competition in the sale and distribution of cement in, among, and between the several States of the United States; to deprive purchasers of cement, both private and governmental, of the benefits of competition in price; to systematically maintain artificial and monopolistic methods and prices in the sale and distribution of cement, including common rate factors used and useful in the pricing of cement; to prevent purchasers from utilizing motortrucks or water carriers for the transportation of cement and from obtaining benefits which might accrue from the use of such transportation agencies; to require that purchases of cement be made on a delivered price basis, and to prevent and defeat efforts of purchasers to avoid this requirement; frequently to deprive agencies of the Federal Government of the benefits of all or a part of the lower land-grant rates available to such purchasers; to require certain agencies of the Federal Government to purchase their requirements of cement through dealers at higher prices than are available in direct purchases from manufacturers; to establish and maintain an agreed classification of customers who may purchase cement from manufacturers thereof; to maintain uniform terms and conditions of sale; to hinder and obstruct the sale of imported cement through restraints upon those who deal in such cement; and otherwise to promote and maintain their multiple basing-point delivered-price system and obstruct and defeat any form of competition which threatens or tends to threaten the continued use and maintenance of said system and the uniformity of prices created and maintained by its use.” 37 F.T.C. at 257-258. Thus we have a complaint which charged collective action by respondents designed to maintain a sales tech-mque that restrained competition, detailed findings of collective activities by groups of respondents to achieve that end, then a general finding that respondents maintained the combination, and finally an order prohibiting the continuance of the combination. It seems impossible to conceive that anyone reading these findings in their entirety could doubt that the Commission found that respondents collectively maintained a multiple basing point delivered price system for the purpose of suppressing competition in cement sales. The findings are sufficient. The contention that they are not is without substance. Disposition of this question brings us to the related contention that there was no substantial evidence to support the findings. We might well dispose of the contention as this Court dismissed a like one with reference to evidence and findings in a civil suit brought under the Sherman Act in Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 601: “After a hearing of extraordinary length, in which no pertinent fact was permitted to escape consideration, the trial court subjected the evidence to a thorough and acute analysis which has left but slight room for debate over matters of fact. Our examination of the record discloses no reason for overruling the court’s findings in any matter essential to our decision.” In this case, which involves the evidence and findings of the Federal Trade Commission, we likewise see no reason for upsetting the essential findings of the Commission. Neither do we find it necessary to refer to all the voluminous testimony in this record which tends to support the Commission’s findings. Although there is much more evidence to which reference could be made, we think that the following facts shown by evidence in the record, some of which are in dispute, are sufficient to warrant the Commission’s finding of concerted action. When the Commission rendered its decision there were about 80 cement manufacturing companies in the United States operating about 150 mills. Ten companies controlled more than half of the mills and there were substantial corporate affiliations among many of the others. This concentration of productive capacity made concerted action far less difficult than it would otherwise have been. The belief is prevalent in the industry that because of the standardized nature of cement, among other reasons, price competition is wholly unsuited to it. That belief is historic. It has resulted in concerted activities to devise means and measures to do away with competition in the industry. Out of those activities came the multiple basing point delivered price system. Evidence shows it to be a handy instrument to bring about elimination of any kind of price competition. The use of the multiple basing point delivered price system by the cement producers has been coincident with a situation whereby for many years, with rare exceptions, cement has been offered for sale in every given locality at identical prices and terms by all producers. Thousands of secret sealed bids have been received by public agencies which corresponded in prices of cement down to a fractional part of a penny. Occasionally foreign cement has been imported, and cement dealers have sold it below the delivered price of the domestic product. Dealers who persisted in selling foreign cement were boycotted by the domestic producers. Officers of the Institute took the lead in securing pledges by producers not to permit sales f. o. b. mill to purchasers who furnished their own trucks, a practice regarded as seriously disruptive of the entire delivered price structure of the industry. During the depression in the 1930’s, slow business prompted some producers to deviate from the prices fixed by the delivered price system. Meetings were held by other producers; an effective plan was devised to punish the recalcitrants and bring them into line. The plan was simple but successful. Other producers made the recalcitrant’s plant an involuntary base point. The base price was driven down with relatively insignificant losses to the producers who imposed the punitive basing point, but with heavy losses to the recalcitrant who had to make all its sales on this basis. In one instance, where a producer had made a low public bid, a punitive base point price was put on its plant and cement was reduced 100 per barrel; further reductions quickly followed until the base price at which this recalcitrant had to sell its cement dropped to 750 per barrel, scarcely one-half of its former base price of $1.45. Within six weeks after the base price hit 750 capitulation occurred and the recalcitrant joined a portland cement association. Cement in that locality then bounced back to $1.15, later to $1.35, and finally to $1.75. The foregoing are but illustrations of the practices shown to have been utilized to maintain the basing point price system. Respondents offered testimony that cement is a standardized product, that “cement is cement,” that no differences existed in quality or usefulness, and that purchasers demanded delivered price quotations because of the high cost of transportation from mill to dealer. There was evidence, however, that the Institute and its members had, in the interest of eliminating competition, suppressed information as to the variations in quality that sometimes exist in different cements. Respondents introduced the testimony of economists to the effect that competition alone could lead to the evolution of a multiple basing point system of uniform delivered prices and terms of sale for an industry with a standardized product and with relatively high freight costs. These economists testified that for the above reasons no inferences of collusion, agreement, or understanding could be drawn from the admitted fact that cement prices of all United States producers had for many years almost invariably been the same in every given locality in the country. There was also considerable testimony by other economic experts that the multiple basing point system of delivered prices as employed by respondents contravened accepted economic principles and could only have been maintained through collusion. The Commission did not adopt the views of the economists produced by the respondents. It decided that even though competition might tend to drive the price of standardized products to a uniform level, such a tendency alone could not account for the almost perfect identity in prices, discounts, and cement containers which had prevailed for so long a time in the cement industry. The Commission held that the uniformity and absence of competition in the industry were the results of understandings or agreements entered into or carried out by concert of the Institute and the other respondents. It may possibly be true, as respondents’ economists testified, that cement producers will, without agreement express or implied and without understanding explicit or tacit, always and at all times (for such has been substantially the case here) charge for their cement precisely, to the fractional part of a penny, the price their competitors charge. Certainly it runs counter to what many people have believed, namely, that without agreement, prices will vary — that the desire to sell will sometimes be so strong that a seller will be willing to lower his prices and take his chances. We therefore hold that the Commission was not compelled to accept the views of respondents’ economist-witnesses that active competition was bound to produce uniform cement prices. The Commission was authorized to find understanding, express or implied, from evidence that the industry’s Institute actively worked, in cooperation with various of its members, to maintain the multiple basing point delivered price system; that this pricing system is calculated to produce, and has produced, uniform prices and terms of sale throughout the country; and that all of the respondents have sold their cement substantially in accord with the pattern required by the multiple basing point system. Some of the respondents contend that particularly as to them crucial findings of participation by them in collective action to eliminate price competition and to bring about uniformity of cement prices are without testimonial support. On this ground they seek to have the proceedings dismissed as to them even though there may be adequate evidence to sustain the Commission’s findings and order as to other respondents. The Commission rejected their contentions; the Circuit Court of Appeals did not consider them in its opinion. Those respondents whose individual contentions in this respect deserve special mention are central and southern California cement companies; Superior Portland Cement Company and Northwestern Portland Cement Company, both of the State of Washington; Huron Portland Cement Company, which does business in the Great Lakes region; and Marquette Cement Manufacturing Company with plants in Illinois and Missouri. These companies support their separate contentions for particularized consideration by pointing out among other things that there was record evidence which showed differences between many of their sales methods and those practiced by other respondents. Each says that there was no direct evidence to connect it with all of the practices found to have been used by the Institute and other respondents to achieve delivered price uniformity. The record does show such differences as those suggested. It is correct to say, therefore, that the sales practices of these particular respondents, and perhaps of other respondents as well, were not at all times precisely like the sales practices of all or any of the others. For example, the Commission found that in 1929 all of the central California mills became basing points. There was evidence that the Institute’s rate books did not extend to the states in which some of the California companies did business. The Commission found that “In southern California the basing-point system of pricing is modified by an elaborate system of zone prices applicable in certain areas,” that the California system does not require separate calculations to determine the delivered price at each destination, but that complete price lists were published by the companies showing delivered prices at substantially all delivery points. Northwestern and Superior assert that among other distinctive practices of theirs, they were willing to and did bid for government contracts on a mill price rather than a delivered price basis. Huron points out that it permitted the use of trucks to deliver cement, which practice, far from being consistent with the plan of others to maintain the basing point delivered price formulas, was frowned on by the Institute and others as endangering the success of the plan. Marquette emphasizes that it did not follow all the practices used to carry out the anti-competition plan, and urges that although the Commission rightly found that it had upon occasion undercut its competitors, it erroneously found that its admitted abandonment of price cutting was due to the combined pressure of other respondents, including the Institute. What these particular respondents emphasize does serve to underscore certain findings which show that some respondents were more active and influential in the combination than were others, and that some companies probably unwillingly abandoned competitive practices and entered into the combination. But none of the distinctions mentioned, or any other differences relied on by these particular respondents, justifies a holding that there was no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings that they cooperated with all the others to achieve the ultimate objective of all — the elimination of price competition in the sale of cement. These respondents’ special contentions only illustrate that the Commission was called upon to resolve factual issues as to each of them in the light of whatever relevant differences in their practices were shown by the evidence. For aside from the testimony indicating the differences in their individual sales practices, there was abundant evidence as to common practices of these respondents and the others on the basis of which the Commission was justified in finding cooperative conduct among all to achieve delivered price uniformity. The evidence commonly applicable to these and the other respondents showed that all were members of the Institute and that the officers of some of these particular respondents were or had been officers of the Institute. We have already sustained findings that the Institute was organized to maintain the multiple basing point system as one of the “customs and usages” of the industry and that it participated in numerous activities intended to eliminate price competition through the collective efforts of the respondents. Evidence before the Commission also showed that the delivered prices of these respondents, like those of all the other respondents, were, with rare exceptions, identical with the delivered prices of all their competitors. Furthermore, there was evidence that all of these respondents, including those who sold cement on a zone basis in sections of southern California, employed the multiple basing point delivered price system on a portion of their sales. Our conclusion is that there was evidence to support the Commission’s findings that all of the respondents, including the California companies, Northwestern Portland and Superior Portland, Huron and Marquette, cooperated in carrying out the objectives of the basing point delivered price system. Unfair Methods of Competition. — We sustain the Commission’s holding that concerted maintenance of the basing point delivered price system is an unfair method of competition prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. In so doing we give great weight to the Commission’s conclusion, as this Court has done in other cases. Federal Trade Comm’n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304, 314; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn., 273 U. S. 52, 63. In the Kep-pel case the Court called attention to the express intention of Congress to create an agency whose membership would at all times be experienced, so that its conclusions would be the result of an expertness coming from experience. We are persuaded that the Commission’s long and close examination of the questions it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of its statutory duty. The kind of specialized knowledge Congress wanted its agency to have was an expertness that would fit it to stop at the threshold every unfair trade practice — that kind of practice which, if left alone, “destroys competition and establishes monopoly.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 647, 650. And see Federal Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 316 U. S. 149, 152. We cannot say that the Commission is wrong in concluding that the delivered-price system as here used provides an effective instrument which, if left free for use of the respondents, would result in complete destruction of competition and the establishment of monopoly in the cement industry. That the basing point price system may lend itself to industry-wide anti-competitive practices is illustrated in the following among other cases: United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553. We uphold the Commission’s conclusion that the basing point delivered price system employed by respondents is an unfair trade practice which the Trade Commission may suppress. The Price Discrimination Charge in Count Two. — The Commission found that respondents’ combination to use the multiple basing point delivered price system had effected systematic price discrimination in violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13. Section 2 (a) of that Act declares it to “be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .” Section 2 (b) provides that proof of discrimination in price (selling the same kind of goods cheaper to one purchaser than to another) makes out a prima facie case of violation, but permits the seller to rebut “the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor . . . The Commission held that the varying mill nets received by respondents on sales between customers in different localities constituted a “discrimination in price between different purchasers” within the prohibition of § 2 (a), and that the effect of this discrimination was the substantial lessening of competition between respondents. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Commission on this count. It agreed that respondents’ prices were unlawful insofar as they involved the collection of phantom freight, but it held that prices involving only freight absorption came within the “good faith” proviso of § 2 (b). The respondents contend that the differences in their net returns from sales in different localities which result from use of the multiple basing point delivered price system are not price discriminations within the meaning of § 2 (a). If held that these net return differences are price discriminations prohibited by § 2 (a), they contend that the discriminations were justified under § 2 (b) because “made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.” Practically all the arguments presented by respondents in support of their contentions were considered by this Court and rejected in 1945 in Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, and in the related case of Federal Trade Comm’n v. Staley Co., 324 U. S. 746. As stated in the Corn Products opinion at 730, certiorari was granted in those two cases because the “questions involved” were “of importance in the administration of the Clayton Act in view of the widespread use of basing point price systems.” For this reason the questions there raised were given thorough consideration. Consequently, we see no s reason for again reviewing the questions that were there decided. In the Corn Products case the Court, in holding illegal a single basing point system, specifically reserved decision upon the legality under the Clayton Act of a multiple basing point price system, but only in view of the “good faith” proviso of § 2 (b), and referred at that point to the companion Staley opinion. 324 U. S. at 735. The latter case held that a seller could not justify the adoption of a competitor's basing point price system under § 2 (b) as a good faith attempt to meet the latter’s equally low price. Thus the combined effect of the two cases was to forbid the adoption for sales purposes of any basing point pricing system. It is true that the Commission’s complaint in the Corn Products and Staley cases simply charged the individual respondents with discrimination in price through use of a basing point price system, and did not, as here, allege a conspiracy or combination to use that system. But the holdings in those two cases that § 2 forbids a basing point price system are equally controlling here, where the use of such a system is found to have been the result of a combination. Respondents deny, however, that the Corn Products and Staley cases passed on the questions they here urge. Corn Products Co. was engaged in the manufacture and sale of glucose. It had two plants, one in Chicago, one in Kansas City. Both plants sold “only at delivered prices, computed by adding to a base price at Chicago the published freight tariff from Chicago to the several points of delivery, even though deliveries are in fact made from their factory at Kansas City as well as from their Chicago factory.” 324 U. S. at 729. This price system we held resulted in Corn Products Co. receiving from different purchasers different net amounts corresponding to differences in the amounts of phantom freight collected or of actual freight charges absorbed. We further held that “price discriminations are necessarily involved where the price basing point is distant from the point of production,” because in such situations prices “usually include an item of unearned or phantom freight or require the absorption of freight with the consequent variations in the seller’s net factory prices. Since such freight differentials bear no relation to the actual cost of delivery, they are systematic discriminations prohibited by § 2 (a), whenever they have the defined effect upon competition.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Staley, supra at 750-751. This was a direct holding that a pricing system involving both phantom freight and freight absorption violates § 2 (a) if under that system prices are computed for products actually shipped from one locality on the fiction that they were shipped from another. This Court made the holding despite arguments, which are now repeated here, that in passing the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress manifested its purpose to sanction such pricing systems; that this Court had approved the system in Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, and in Cement Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U. S. 588; and that there was no discrimination under this system between buyers at the same point of delivery. Respondents attempt to distinguish their multiple basing point pricing system from those previously held unlawful by pointing out that in some situations their system involves neither phantom freight nor freight absorption ; for example, sales by a base mill at its base price plus actual freight from the mill to the point of delivery involve neither phantom freight nor freight absorption. But the Corn Products pricing system which was condemned by this Court related to a base mill, that at Chicago, as well as to a non-base mill, at Kansas City. The Court did not permit this fact to relieve the pricing system from application of § 2, or to require any modification of the Commission’s order. So here, we could not require the Commission to attempt to distinguish between sales made by a base mill involving actual freight costs and all other sales made by both base and non-base mills, when all mills adhere to a common pricing system. Section 2 (b) permits a single company to sell one customer at a lower price than it sells to another if the price is “made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.” But this does not mean that § 2 (b) permits a seller to use a sales system which constantly results in his getting more money for like goods from some customers than he does from others. We held to the contrary in the Staley case. There we said that the Act “speaks only of the seller’s ‘lower’ price and of that only to the extent that it is made ‘in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.’ The Act thus places emphasis on individual competitive situations, rather than upon a general system of competition.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Staley, supra at 753. Each of the respondents, whether all its mills were basing points or not, sold some cement at prices determined by the basing point formula and governed by other base mills. Thus, all respondents to this extent adopted a discriminatory pricing system condemned by § 2. As this in itself was evidence of the employment of the multiple basing point system by the respondents as a practice rather than as a good faith effort to meet “individual competitive situations,” we think the Federal Trade Commission correctly concluded that the use of this cement basing point system violated the Act. Nor can we discern under these circumstances any distinction between the “good faith” proviso as applied to a situation involving only phantom freight and one involving only freight absorption. Neither comes within its terms. We hold that the Commission properly concluded that respondents’ pricing system results in price discrimina-tions. Its finding that the discriminations substantially lessened competition between respondents and that they were not made in good faith to meet a competitor’s price are supported by evidence. Accordingly, the Commission was justified in issuing a cease and desist order against a continuation of the unlawful discriminatory pricing system. The Order. — There are several objections to the Commission’s cease and desist order. We consider the objections, having in mind that the language of its prohibitions should be clear and precise in order that they may be understood by those against whom they are directed. See Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675, 685. But we also have in mind that the Commission has a wide discretion generally in the choice of remedies to cope with trade problems entrusted to it by the Commission Act. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 327 U. S. 608, 611-613. There is a special reason, however, why courts should not lightly modify the Commission’s orders made in efforts to safeguard a competitive economy. Congress when it passed the Trade Commission Act felt that courts needed the assistance of men trained to combat monopolistic practices in the framing of judicial decrees in antitrust litigation. Congress envisioned a commission trained in this type of work by experience in carrying out the functions imposed upon it. To this end it provided in § 7 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 47, that courts might, if it should be concluded that the Government was entitled to a decree in an antitrust case, refer that case “to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree therein.” The Court could then adopt or reject such a report. In the present proceeding the Commission has exhibited the familiarity with the competitive problems before it which Congress originally anticipated the Commission would achieve from its experience. The order it has prepared is we think clear and comprehensive. At the same time the prohibitions in the order forbid no activities except those which if continued would directly aid in perpetuating the same old unlawful practices. Nor do we find merit to the charges of surplusage in the order’s terms. Most of the objections to the order appear to rest on the premise that its terms will bar an individual cement producer from selling cement at delivered prices such that its net return from one customer will be less than from another, even if the particular sale be made in good faith to meet the lower price of a competitor. The Commission disclaims that the order can possibly be so understood. Nor do we so understand it. As we read the order, all of its separate prohibiting paragraphs and sub-paragraphs, which need not here be set out, are modified and limited by a preamble. This preamble directs that all of the respondents “do forthwith cease and desist from entering into, continuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any planned common course of action, understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy between and among any two or more of said respondents, or between any one or more of said respondents and others not parties hereto, to do or perform any of the following things . . . Then follow the prohibitory sentences. It is thus apparent that the order by its terms is directed solely at concerted, not individual activity on the part of the respondents. Respondents have objected to the phrase “planned common course of action” in the preamble. The objection is twofold; first, that it adds nothing to the words that immediately follow it; and second, that if it does add anything, “the Commission should be required to state what this novel phrase means in this order and what it adds to the four words.” It seems quite clear to us what the phrase means. It is merely an emphatic statement that the Commission is prohibiting concerted action — planned concerted action. The Commission chose a phrase perhaps more readily understood by businessmen than the accompanying legal words of like import. Then there is objection to that phrase in the preamble which would prevent respondents, or any of them, from doing the prohibited things with “others not parties hereto.” We see no merit in this objection. The Commission has found that the cement producers have from time to time secured the aid of others outside the industry who are not parties to this proceeding in carrying out their program for preserving the basing point pricing system as an instrument to suppress competition. Moreover, there will very likely be changes in the present ownership of cement mills, and the construction of new mills in the future may be reasonably anticipated. In view of these facts, the Commission was authorized to make its order broad enough effectively to restrain respondents from combining with others as well as among themselves. One other specific objection to the order will be noted. Paragraph 1 prohibits respondents from “quoting or selling cement pursuant to or in accordance with any other plan or system which results in identical price quotations or prices for cement at points of quotation or sale or to particular purchasers by respondents using such plan or system, or which prevents purchasers from finding any advantage in price in dealing with one or more of the respondents against any of the other respondents.” This paragraph like all the others in the order is limited by the preamble which refers to concerted conduct in accordance with agreement or planned common course of action. The paragraph is merely designed to forbid respondents from acting in harmony to bring about national uniformity in whatever fashion they may seek by collective action to achieve that result. We think that no one would find ambiguity in this language who concluded in good faith to abandon the old practices. There is little difference in effect between paragraph 1 to which objection is here raised and paragraph 5 which was sustained as proper in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech-Nut Pkg. Co., 257 U. S. 441, 456 (1922), one of the first Trade Commission cases to come before this Court. Paragraph 5 in the Beech-Nut case read: “. . . by utilizing any other equivalent cooperative means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company.” Many other arguments have been presented by respondents. All have been examined, but we find them without merit. The Commission’s order should not have been set aside by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Its judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enforce the order. _ . , 7 Itzsso ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The Commission dismissed the proceedings without prejudice against respondent Castalia Portland Cement Co., which went into bankruptcy. Respondent Valley Forge Cement Co. is associated with the Institute only by reason of its affiliation with a member company. Federal Trade Comm’n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304, 310; Federal Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 649-650; see also United States Alkali Assn. v. United States, 325 U. S. 196, and see Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 142 F. 2d 321, 326-327, and cases there cited, among the numerous Circuit Courts of Appeals cases on the same subject. “The Commission had issued up to October, 1939 a total of 267 orders to cease and desist in cases involving cooperation, conspiracy or combination.” Beer, Federal Trade Law and Practice, 94 (1942). Other writers have also commented on the recognition by the Commission and courts that unfair methods of competition include violations of the Sherman Act. Handler, Unfair Competition and the Federal Trade Commission, 8 G. W. L. Rev., 399, 416-417, 419. Montague, The Commission’s Jurisdiction Over Practices in Restraint of Trade: A Large-scale Method of Mass Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 8 G. W. L. Rev. 365; Miller, Unfair Competition, Chapter XI (1941); Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission, a Study in Administrative Law and Procedure, 22-28 (1924); Beer, Federal Trade Law and Practice, 93 et seq. (1942). Section 7 of the Act empowered the Commission, upon the request of the district courts, to serve as a master in chancery in framing appropriate decrees in antitrust suits brought by the Attorney General. Section 6 (c) authorized the Commission to investigate compliance with antitrust decrees upon application of the Attorney General and to report its findings and recommendations to him. 38 Stat. 722,15 U. S. C. §§ 47,46. 51 Cong. Rec. 11083, 11104, 11528-11533, 12146, 12622-12623, 12733-12734, 12787, 13311-13312, 14251, 14460, 14926, 14929; H. R. Rep. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1914); H. R. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914); Sen. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1914). See Ramsay Co. v. Bill Posters Assn., 260 U. S. 501, 511; Stevens Co. v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 311 U. S. 255, 260-261; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293, 297-298. This was not true as to steel produced and shipped from Birmingham, Alabama. Under the system Birmingham steel had to be sold at the Pittsburgh price plus an arbitrary addition of $5 per ton. There were also other minor variations from the system as here described. See United States Steel Corp. et al., 8 F. T. C. 1. A base mill selling cement for delivery at a point outside the area in which its base price governs, and inside the area where another base mill's lower delivered price governs, adopts the latter’s lower delivered price. The first base mill thus absorbs freight and becomes as to such sales a non-base mill. The Commission in its findings explained how the multiple basing point system affects a seller’s net return on sales in different localities and how the delivered price is determined at any particular point. “Substantially all sales of cement by the corporate respondents are made on the basis of a delivered price; that is, at a price determined by the location at which actual delivery of the cement is made to the purchaser. In determining the delivered price which will be charged for cement at any given location, respondents use a multiple basing-point system. The formula used to make this system operative is that the delivered price at any location shall be the lowest! combination of base price plus all-rail freight. Thus, if mill Aj has a base price of $1.50 per barrel, its delivered price at each location where it sells cement will be $1.50 per barrel plus the all-rail freight from its mill to the point of delivery, except that when a sale is made for delivery at a location at which the combination of the base price plus all-rail freight from another mill is a lower figure, mill A uses this lower combination so that its delivered price at such location will be the same as the delivered price of the other mill. At all locations where the base price of mill A plus freight is the lowest combination, mill A recovers $1.50 net at the mill, and at locations where the combination of base price plus freight of another mill is lower, mill A shrinks its mill net sufficiently to equal that price. Under these conditions it is obvious that the highest mill net which can be recovered by mill A is $1.50 per barrel, and on sales where it has been necessary to shrink its mill net in order to match the delivered price of another mill, its net recovery at the mill is less than $1.50.” 37 F. T. C. at 147-148. Marquette in support of its motion to disqualify the Commission urged that the Department of Justice and the Commission had concurrent power or jurisdiction to enforce the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 147 F. 2d at 593. “Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs.” The Commission is not a court. It can render no judgment, civil or criminal. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 25; and see Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 307. We need not here determine what protection was afforded respondents by the exemption from the antitrust laws conferred by the Act later held unconstitutional. Nor Seed we decide whether this provision also exempted respondents from the unfair methods of competition provisions of the Trade Commission Act. The Government does not press either contention here. Paragraph 26 of the Findings is as follows: The following is one among many of the Commission’s findings as to the identity of sealed bids: An abstract of the bids for 6,000 barrels of cement to the United States Engineer Office at Tucumcari, New Mexico, opened April 23, 1936, shows the following: Name of Bidder Price per Bbl. Name of Bidder Price per Bbl. Monarch . $3.286854 Oklahoma. $3.286854 Ash Grove. 3.286854 Consolidated . 3.286854 Lehigh . 3.286854 Trinity . 3.286854 Southwestern. 3.286854 Lone Star. 3.286854 U. S. Portland Cement Co. 3.286854 Universal . 3.286854 Colorado . 3.286854 All bids subject to 100 per barrel discount for payment in 15 days. (Com. Ex. 175-A.) See 157 F. 2d at 576. See Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 600: “The fact that, because sugar is a standardized commodity, there is a strong tendency to uniformity of price, makes it the more important that such opportunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired.” It is enough to warrant a finding of a “combination” within the meaning of the Sherman Act, if there is evidence that persons, with knowledge that concerted action was contemplated and invited, give adherence to and then participate in a scheme. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 226-227; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 275; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 722-723; United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 393-394. See United States Maltsters Assn. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 152 F. 2d 161, 164: “We are of the view that the Commission’s findings that a price fixing agreement existed must be accepted. Any other conclusion would do violence to common sense and the realities of the situation. The fact that petitioners utilized a system which enabled them to deliver malt at every point of destination at exactly the same price is a persuasive circumstance in itself. Especially is this so when it is considered that petitioners’ plants are located in four different states and that the barley from which the malt is manufactured is procured from eight or nine different states.” See also Milk & Ice Cream, Can Institute v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 152 F. 2d 478, 481; Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 156 F. 2d 899, 907. For example, there was evidence which showed that Huron’s officials participated in meetings held in connection with another respondent’s practices deemed inimical to the policy of non-competition. As a result of that meeting the offending company agreed that it would “play the game 100%”; that it would not countenance “chiseling”; that it would not knowingly invade territory of its competitors, or “tear down the price structure.” While we hold that the Commission’s findings of combination were supported by evidence, that does not mean that existence of a “combination” is an indispensable ingredient of an “unfair method of competition” under the Trade Commission Act. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 455. In speaking of the authority granted the Commission to aid the courts in drafting antitrust decrees, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce said: “These powers, partly administrative and partly quasi judicial, are of great importance and will bring both to the Attorney General and to the court the aid of special expert experience and training in matters regarding which neither the Department of Justice nor the courts can be expected to be proficient. “With the exception of the Knight case, the Supreme Court has never failed to condemn and to break up any organization formed in violation of the Sherman law which has been brought to its attention; but the decrees of the court, while declaring the law satisfactorily as to the dissolution of the combinations, have apparently failed in many instances in their accomplishment simply because the courts and the Department of Justice have lacked the expert knowledge and experience necessary to be applied to the dissolution of the combinations and the reassembling of the divided elements in harmony with the ¿spirit of the law.” Sen. Rep. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1914).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNIVERSAL CAMERA CORP. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 40. Argued November 6-7, 1950. Decided February 26, 1951. By special leave of Court, Frederick R. Livingston, pro hac vice,.argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was James S. Hays. Mozart 0. Ratner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, David P. Findlihg and Bernard Dunau. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. The essential issue raised by this case and its companion, Labor Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., post, p. 498, is the effect of the Administrative Procedure Act and the legislation colloquially known as the Taft-Hartley Act on the duty of Courts of Appeals when called upon to review orders of the National Labor Relations Board. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted enforcement of an order directing, in the main, that petitioner reinstate with back pay an employee found to have been discharged because he gave testimony under the Wagner Act and cease and desist from discriminating against any employee who files charges or gives testimony under that Act. The court below, Judge Swan dissenting, decreed full enforcement of the order. 179 F. 2d 749. Because the views of that court regarding the effect of the new legislation on the relation between the Board and the Courts of Appeals in the enforcement of the Board’s orders conflicted with those of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit we brought both cases here. 339 U. S. 951 and 339 U. S. 962. The clash of opinion obviously required settlement by this Court. I. Want of certainty in judicial review of Labor Board decisions partly reflects the intractability of any formula to furnish definiteness of content for all the impalpable factors involved in judicial review. But in part doubts as to the nature of the reviewing power and uncertainties in its application derive from history, and to that extent an elucidation of this history may clear them away. The Wagner Act provided: “The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.” Act of July 5, 1935, § 10 (e), 49 Stat. 449, 454, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). This Court read “evidence” to mean “substantial evidence,” Washington, V. & M. Coach Co. v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 142, and we said that “[substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229. Accordingly, it “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. ... it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300. The very smoothness of the “substantial evidence” formula as the standard for reviewing the evidentiary validity of the Board’s findings established its currency. But the inevitably variant applications of the standard to conflicting evidence soon brought contrariety of views and in due course bred criticism. Even though the whole record may have been canvassed in order to determine whether the evidentiary foundation of a determination by the Board was “substantial,” the phrasing of this Court’s process of review readily lent itself to the notion that it was enough that the evidence supporting the Board’s result was “substantial” when considered by itself. It is fair to say that by imperceptible steps regard for the fact-finding function of the Board led to the assumption that the requirements of the Wagner Act were met when the reviewing court could find in the record evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the Board’s findings. Compare Labor Board v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206; Labor Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U. S. 318; and see Labor Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105. This is not to say that every member of this Court was consciously guided by this view or that the Court ever explicitly avowed this practice as doctrine. What matters is that the belief justifiably arose that the Court had so construed the obligation to review. Criticism of so contracted a reviewing power reinforced dissatisfaction felt in various quarters with the Board’s administration of the Wagner Act in the years preceding the war. The scheme of the Act was attacked as an inherently unfair fusion of the functions of prosecutor and judge. Accusations of partisan bias were not wanting. The “irresponsible admission and weighing of hearsay, opinion, and emotional speculation in place of factual evidence” was said to be a “serious menace.” No doubt some, perhaps even much, of the criticism was baseless and some surely was reckless. What is here relevant, however, is the climate of opinion thereby generated and its effect on Congress. Protests against “shocking injustices” and intimations of judicial “abdication” with which some courts granted enforcement of the Board’s orders stimulated pressures for legislative relief from alleged administrative excesses. The strength of these pressures was reflected in the passage in 1940 of the Walter-Logan Bill. It was vetoed by President Roosevelt, partly because it imposed unduly rigid limitations on the administrative process, and partly because of the investigation into the actual operation of the administrative process then being conducted by an experienced committee appointed by the Attorney General. It is worth noting that despite its aim to tighten control over administrative determinations of fact, the Walter-Logan Bill contented itself with the conventional formula that an agency’s decision could be set aside if “the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.” The final report of the Attorney General’s Committee was submitted in January, 1941. The majority concluded that “[dissatisfaction with the existing standards as to the scope of judicial review derives largely from dissatisfaction with the fact-finding procedures now employed by the administrative bodies.” Departure from the “substantial evidence” test, it thought, would either create unnecessary uncertainty or transfer to courts the responsibility for ascertaining and assaying matters the significance of which lies outside judicial competence. Accordingly, it recommended against legislation embodying a general scheme of judicial review. Three members of the Committee registered a dissent. Their view was that the "present system or lack of system of judicial review” led to inconsistency and uncertainty. They reported that under a "prevalent” interpretation of the "substantial evidence” rule “if what is called ‘substantial evidence’ is found anywhere in the record to support conclusions of fact, the courts are said to be obliged to sustain the decision without reference to how heavily the countervailing evidence may preponderate — unless indeed the stage of arbitrary decision is reached. Under this interpretation, the courts need to read only one side of the case and, if they find any evidence there, the administrative action is to be sustained and the record to the contrary is to be ignored.” Their view led them to recommend that Congress enact principles of review applicable to all agencies not excepted by unique characteristics. One of these principles was expressed by the formula that judicial review could extend to “findings, inferences, or conclusions of fact unsupported, upon the whole record, by substantial evidence.” So far as the history of this movement for enlarged review reveals, the phrase “upon the whole record” makes its first appearance in this recommendation of the minority of the Attorney General’s Committee. This evidence of the close relationship between the phrase and the criticism out of which it arose is important, for the substance of this formula for judicial review found its way into the statute books when Congress with unquestioning — we might even say uncritical — unanimity enacted the Administrative Procedure Act. One is tempted to say “uncritical” because the legislative history of that Act hardly speaks with that clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to enforce its true will. On the one hand, the sponsors of the legislation indicated that they were reaffirming the prevailing “substantial evidence” test. But with equal clarity they expressed disapproval of the manner in which the courts were applying their own standard. The committee reports of both houses refer to the practice of agencies to rely upon “suspicion, surmise, implications, or plainly incredible evidence,” and indicate that courts are to exact higher standards “in the exercise of their independent judgment” and on consideration of “the whole record.” Similar dissatisfaction with too restricted application of the “substantial evidence” test is reflected in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. The bill as reported to the House provided that the “findings of the Board as to the facts shall be conclusive unless it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court either (1) that the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, or (2) that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.” The bill left the House with this provision. Early committee prints in the Senate provided for review by “weight of the evidence” or “clearly erroneous” standards. But, as the Senate Committee Report relates, “it was finally decided to conform the statute to the corresponding section of the Administrative Procedure Act where the substantial evidence test prevails. In order to clarify any ambiguity in that statute, however, the committee inserted the words ‘questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole . . . .’ ” This phraseology was adopted by the Senate. The House conferees agreed. They reported to the House: “It is believed that the provisions of the conference agreement relating to the courts’ reviewing power will be adequate to preclude such decisions as those in N. L. R. B. v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp. (316 U. S. 105) and in the Wilson, Columbia Products, Union Pacific Stages, Hearst, Republic Aviation, and Le Tourneau, etc. cases, supra, without unduly burdening the courts.” The Senate version became the law. It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And it expressed its mood not merely by oratory but by legislation. As legislation that mood must be respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application. Enforcement of such broad standards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is not for us to question that Congress may assume such qualities in the federal judiciary. From the legislative story we have summarized, two concrete conclusions do emerge. One is the identity of aim of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act regarding the proof with which the Labor Board must support a decision. The other is that now Congress has left no room for doubt as to the kind of scrutiny which a Court of Appeals must give the record before the Board to satisfy itself that the Board’s order rests on adequate proof. It would be mischievous word-playing to find that the scope of review under the Taft-Hartley Act is any different from that under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Senate Committee which reported the review clause of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly indicated that the two standards were to conform in this regard, and the wording of the two Acts is for purposes of judicial administration identical. And so we hold that the standard of proof specifically required of the Labor Board by the Taft-Hartley Act is the same as that to be exacted by courts reviewing every administrative action subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Whether or not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality of evidence supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis of evidence which in and of itself justified it, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the new legislation definitively precludes such a theory of review and bars its practice. The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement in both statutes that courts consider the whole record. Committee reports and the adoption in the Administrative Procedure Act of the minority views of the Attorney General’s Committee demonstrate that to enjoin such a duty on the reviewing court was one of the important purposes of the movement which eventuated in that enactment. To be sure, the requirement for canvassing “the whole record” in order to ascertain substantiality does not furnish a calculus of value by which a reviewing court can assess the evidence. Nor was it intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view. There remains, then, the question whether enactment of these two statutes has altered the scope of review other than to require that substantiality be determined in the light of all that the record relevantly presents. A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot be too often repeated that judges are not automata. The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its work. Since the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old. There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot escape, in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms. Whatever changes were made by the Administrative Procedure and Taft-Hartley Acts are clearly within this area where precise definition is impossible. Retention of the familiar “substantial evidence” terminology indicates that no drastic reversal of attitude was intended. But a standard leaving an unavoidable margin for individual judgment does not leave the judicial judgment at large even though the phrasing of the standard does not wholly fence it in. The legislative history of these Acts demonstrates a purpose to impose on courts a responsibility which has not always been recognized. Of course it is a statute and not a committee report which we are interpreting. But the fair interpretation of a statute is often “the art of proliferating a purpose,” Brooklyn National Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F. 2d 450, 451, revealed more by the demonstrable forces that produced it than by its precise phrasing. The adoption in these statutes of the judicially-constructed “substantial evidence” test was a response to pressures for stricter and more uniform practice, not a reflection of approval of all existing practices. To find the change so elusive that it cannot be precisely defined does not mean it may be ignored. We should fail in our duty to effectuate the will of Congress if we denied recognition to expressed Congressional disapproval of the finality accorded to Labor Board findings by some decisions of this and lower courts, or even of the atmosphere which may have favored those decisions. We conclude, therefore, that the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act direct that courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Bo'ard decisions than some courts have shown in the past. Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That responsibility is not less real because it is limited to enforcing the requirement that evidence appear substantial when viewed, on the record as a whole, by courts invested with the authority and enjoying the prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The' Board’s findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes the Board’s decision from being justified, by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both. From this it follows that enactment of these statutes does not require every Court of Appeals to alter its practice. Some — perhaps a majority — have always applied the attitude reflected in this legislation. To explore whether a particular court should or should not alter its practice would only divert attention from the application of the standard now prescribed to a futile inquiry into the nature of the test formerly used by a particular court. Our power to review the correctness of application of the present standard ought seldom to be called into action. Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied. II. Our disagreement with the view of the court below that the scope of review of Labor Board decisions is unaltered by recent legislation does not of itself, as we have noted, require reversal of its decision. The court may have applied a standard of review which satisfies the present Congressional requirement. The decision of the Court of Appeals is assailed on two grounds. It is said (1) that the court erred in holding that it was barred from taking into account the report of the examiner on questions of fact insofar as that report was rejected by the Board, and (2) that the Board’s order was not supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, even apart from the validity of the court’s refusal to consider the rejected portions of the examiner’s report. The latter contention is easily met. It is true that two of the earlier decisions of the court below were among those disapproved by Congress. But this disapproval, we have seen, may well have been caused by unintended intimations of judicial phrasing. And in any event, it is clear from the court’s opinion in this case that it in fact did consider the “record as a whole,” and did not deem itself merely the judicial echo of the Board’s conclusion. The testimony of the company’s witnesses was inconsistent, and there was clear evidence that the complaining employee had been discharged by an officer who was at one time influenced against him because of his appearance at the Board hearing. On such a record we could not say that it would be error to grant enforcement. The first contention, however, raises serious questions to which we now turn. III. The Court of Appeals deemed itself bound by the Board's rejection of the examiner’s findings because the court considered these findings not “as unassailable as a master’s.” 179 F. 2d at 752. They are not. Section 10 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides that “If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact . . . 61 Stat. 147, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (c). The responsibility for decision thus placed on the Board is wholly inconsistent with the notion that it has power to reverse an examiner’s findings only when they are “clearly erroneous.” Such a limitation would make so drastic a departure from prior administrative practice that explicitness would be required. The Court of Appeals concluded from this premise “that, although the Board would be wrong in totally disregarding his findings, it is practically impossible for a court, upon review of those findings which the Board itself substitutes, to consider the Board’s reversal as a factor in the court’s own decision. This we say, because we cannot find any middle ground between doing that and treating such a reversal as error, whenever it would be such, if done by a judge to a master in equity.” 179 F. 2d at 753. Much as we respect the logical acumen of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, we do not find ourselves pinioned between the horns of his dilemma. We are aware that to give the examiner’s findings less finality than a master’s and yet entitle them to consideration in striking the account, is to introduce another and an unruly factor into the judgmatical process of review. But we ought not to fashion an exclusionary rule merely to reduce the number of imponderables to be considered by reviewing courts. The Taft-Hartley Act provides that “The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.” 61 Stat. 148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160 (e). Surely an examiner’s report is as much a part of the record as the complaint or the testimony. According to the Administrative Procedure Act, “All decisions (including initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall become a part of the record . . . .” § 8 (b), 60 Stat. 242, 5 U. S. C. § 1007 (b). We found that this Act’s provision for judicial review has the same meaning as that in the Taft-Hartley Act. The similarity of the two statutes in language and purpose also requires that the definition of “record” found in the Administrative Procedure Act be construed to be applicable as well to the term “record” as used in the Taft-Hartley Act. It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the plain language of the statutes directs a reviewing court to determine the substantiality of evidence on the record including the examiner’s report. The conclusion is confirmed by the indications in the legislative history that enhancement of the status and function of the trial examiner was one of the important purposes of the movement for administrative reform. This aim was set forth by the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure: “In general, the relationship upon appeal between the hearing commissioner and the agency ought to a considerable extent to be that of trial court to appellate court. Conclusions, interpretations, law, and policy should, of course, be open to full review. On the other hand, on matters which the hearing commissioner, having heard the evidence and seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the agency should be reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown.” Apparently it was the Committee’s opinion that these recommendations should not be obligatory. For the bill which accompanied the Final Report required only that hearing officers make an initial decision which would become final in the absence of further agency action, and that agencies which differed on the facts from their examiners give reasons and record citations supporting their conclusion. This proposal was further moderated by the Administrative Procedure Act. It permits agencies to use examiners to record testimony but not to evaluate it, and contains the rather obscure provision that an agency which reviews an examiner’s report has “all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision.” But this refusal to make mandatory the recommendations of the Attorney General’s Committee should not be construed as a repudiation of them. Nothing in the statutes suggests that the Labor Board should not be influenced by the examiner’s opportunity to observe the witnesses he hears and sees and the Board does not. Nothing suggests that reviewing courts should not give to the examiner’s report such probative force as it intrinsically commands. To the contrary, § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act contains detailed provisions designed to maintain high standards of independence and competence in examiners. Section 10 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act requires that examiners "shall issue ... a proposed report, together with a recommended order.” Both statutes thus evince a purpose to increase the importance of the role of examiners in the administrative process. High standards of public administration counsel that we attribute to the Labor Board’s examiners both due regard for the responsibility which Congress imposes on them and the competence to discharge it. The committee reports also make it clear that the sponsors of the legislation thought the statutes gave significance to the findings of examiners. Thus, the Senate Committee responsible for the Administrative Procedure Act explained in its report that examiners’ decisions “would be of consequence, for example, to the extent that material facts in any case depend on the determination of credibility of witnesses as shown by their demeanor or conduct at the hearing.” The House Report reflects the same attitude; and the Senate Committee Report on the Taft-Hartley Act likewise indicates regard for the responsibility devolving on the examiner. We do not require that the examiner’s findings be given more weight than in reason and in the light of judicial experience they deserve. The “substantial evidence” standard is not modified in any way when the Board and its examiner disagree. We intend only to recognize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board’s than when he has reached the same conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case. To give it this significance does not seem to us materially more difficult than to heed the other factors which in sum determine whether evidence is “substantial.” The direction in which the law moves is often a guide for decision of particular cases, and here it serves to confirm our conclusion. However halting its progress, the trend in litigation is toward a rational inquiry into truth, in which the tribunal considers everything “logically probative of some matter requiring to be proved.” Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 530; Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371. This Court has refused to accept assumptions of fact which are demonstrably false, United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272, even when agreed to by the parties, Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281. Machinery for discovery of evidence has been strengthened; the boundaries of judicial notice have been slowly but perceptibly enlarged. It would reverse this process for courts to deny examiners’ findings the probative force they would have in the conduct of affairs outside a courtroom. We therefore remand the cause to the Court of Appeals. On reconsideration of the record it should accord the findings of the trial examiner the relevance that they reasonably command in answering the comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting the Board’s order is substantial. But the court need not limit its reexamination of the case to the effect of that report on its decision. We leave it free to grant or deny enforcement as it thinks the principles expressed in this opinion dictate. Judgment vacated and cause remanded. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas concur with parts I and II of this opinion but as to part III agree with the opinion of the court below, 179 F. 2d 749, 753. Labor Board v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 180 F. 2d 731, affirmed, post, p. 498. The Courts of Appeals of five circuits have agreed with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that no material change was made in the reviewing power. Eastern Coal Corp. v. Labor Board, 176 F. 2d 131, 134-36 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Labor Board v. La Salle Steel Co., 178 F. 2d 829, 833-834 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Labor Board v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 323, 325-326 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Labor Board v. Continental Oil Co., 179 F. 2d 552, 555 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Labor Board v. Booker, 180 F. 2d 727, 729 (C. A. 5th Cir.); but see Labor Board v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 167 F. 2d 212, 213 (C. A. 5th Cir.). See the testimony of Dean Stason before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1941. Hearings on S. 674, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1355-1360. See, for example, the remarks of Laird Bell, then Chairman of the Committee on Administrative Law of the Chicago Bar Association, writing in 1940 in the American Bar Association Journal. 26 A. B. A. J. 552. See Gall, The Current Labor Problem: The View of Industry, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 381, 382. This charge was made by the majority of the Special Committee of the House appointed in 1939 to investigate the National Labor Relations Board. H. R. Rep. No. 1902, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 76. Professor Gellhorn and Mr. Linfield reached the conclusion in 1939 after an extended investigation that “the denunciations find no support in fact.” Gellhorn and Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations, 39 Col. L. Rev. 339, 394. See also Millis and Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 66-75. Wilson & Co. v. Labor Board, 126 F. 2d 114, 117. In Labor Board v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F. 2d 885, 887, Judge Learned Hand said, “We understand the law to be that the decision of the Board upon that issue is for all practical purposes not open to us at all; certainly not after we have once decided that there was 'substantial’ evidence that the ‘disestablished’ union was immediately preceded by a period during which there was a ‘dominated’ union. . . . “[W]e recognize how momentous may be such an abdication of any power of review ....’’ 86 Cong. Rec. 13942-13943, reprinted as H. R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. S. 915, H. R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (a). Final Report, 92. Referring to proposals to enlarge the scope of review to permit inquiry whether the findings are supported by the weight of the evidence, the majority said: “Assuming that such a change may be desirable with respect to special administrative determinations, there is serious objection to its adoption for general application. “In the first place there is the question of how much change, if any, the amendment would produce. The respect that courts have for the judgments of specialized tribunals which have carefully considered the problems and the evidence cannot be legislated away. The line between ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘weight of evidence’ is not easily drawn — particularly when the court is confined to a written record, has a limited amount of time, and has no opportunity further to question witnesses on testimony which seems hazy or leaves some lingering doubts unanswered. ‘Substantial evidence’ may well be equivalent to the ‘weight of evidence’ when a tribunal in which one has confidence and which had greater opportunities for accurate determination has already so decided. “In the second place the wisdom of a general change to review of the 'weight of evidence’ is questionable. If the change would require the courts to determine independently which way the evidence preponderates, administrative tribunals would be turned into little more than media for transmission of the evidence to the courts. It would destroy the values of adjudication of fact by experts or specialists in the field involved. It would divide the responsibility for administrative adjudications.” Final Report, 91-92. Id., 210-211. The minority enumerated four “existing deficiencies” in judicial review. These were (1) “the haphazard, uncertain, and variable results of the present system or lack of system of judicial review,” (2) the interpretation permitting substantiality to be determined without taking into account conflicting evidence, (3) the failure of existing formulas “to take account of differences between the various types of fact determinations,” and (4) the practice of determining standards of review by “case-to-case procedure of the courts.” They recommended that “Until Congress finds it practicable to examine into the situation of particular agencies, it should provide more definitely by general legislation for both the availability and scope of judicial review in order to reduce uncertainty and variability. As the Committee recognizes in its report, there are several principal subjects of judicial review— including constitutional questions, statutory interpretation, procedure, and the support of findings of fact by adequate evidence. The last of these should, obviously we think, mean support of all findings of fact, including inferences and conclusion of fact, upon the whole record. Such a legislative provision should, however, be qualified by a direction to the courts to respect the experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and discretionary authority of each agency. We have framed such a provision in the appendix to this statement.” Id., 210-212. The text of the recommended provision is as follows: “(e) Scope of review. — As to the findings, conclusions, and decisions in any case, the reviewing court, regardless of the form of the review proceeding, shall consider and decide so far as necessary to its decision and where raised by the parties, all relevant questions of: (1) constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (2) the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) the lawfulness and adequacy of procedure; (4) findings, inferences, or conclusions of fact unsupported, upon the whole record, by substantial evidence; and (5) administrative action otherwise arbitrary or capricious. Provided, however, That upon such review due weight shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and legislative policy of the agency involved as well as the discretionary authority conferred upon it.” Id., 246-247. 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. The form finally adopted reads as follows: “Sec. 10. Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or . (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion— “(e) Scope op review. — So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject "to the requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” 60 Stat. 243-244, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e). (Italics ours.) In the form in which the bill was originally presented to Congress, clause (B) (5) read, “unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence upon the whole agency record as reviewed by the court in any case subject to the requirements of sections 7 and 8.” H. R. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., quoted in S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, 160. References to competency and materiality of evidence were deleted and the final sentence added by the Senate Committee. S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28; S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 39-40, 214. No reason was given for the deletion. A statement of the Attorney General appended to the Senate Report explained that the bill “is intended to embody the law as declared, for example, in Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (305 U. S. 197).” Section 10 (e) of Appendix B to S. Rep. No. 752, supra, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 230. Mr. McFarland, then Chairman of the American Bar Association Committee on Administrative Law, testified before the House Judiciary Committee to the same effect. Id., 85-86. The following quotation from the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee indicates the position of the sponsors. “The ‘substantial evidence’ rule set forth in section 10 (e) is exceedingly important. As a matter of language, substantial evidence would seem to be an adequate expression of law. The difficulty comes about in the practice of agencies to rely upon (and of courts to tacitly approve) something less — to rely upon suspicion, surmise, implications, or plainly incredible evidence. It will be the duty of the courts to determine in the final analysis and in the exercise of their independent judgment, whether on the whole record the evidence in a given instance is sufficiently substantial to support a finding, conclusion, or other agency action as a matter of law. In the first instance, however, it will be the function of the agency to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it acts — and the proper performance of its public duties will require it to undertake this inquiry in a careful and dispassionate manner. Should these objectives of the bill as worded fail, supplemental legislation will be required.” S. Rep. No. 752, swpra, 30-31. The House Committee Report is to substantially the same effect. H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 45. The reports are reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 216-217, 279. See also the response of Senator McCarran in debate, to the effect that the bill changed the “rule” that courts were “powerless to interfere” when there “was no probative evidence.” Id., 322. And see the comment of Congressman Springer, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, id., 376. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 141 et seq. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 10 (e), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 71. The history of the evolution of the Senate provision was given by Senator Morse. 93 Cong. Rec. 5108, reprinted in 2 Legislative History 1504-1505. The prints were not approved by the Committee. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st-Sess. 26-27, reprinted in 1 Legislative History 432-433. The Committee did not explain what the ambiguity might be; and it is to be noted that the phrase it italicized is indistinguishable in content from the requirement of § 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act that “the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party . . . .” Senator Taft gave this explanation to the Senate of the meaning of the section: “In the first place, the evidence must be substantial; in the second place, it must still look substantial when viewed in the light of the entire record. That does not go so far as saying that a decision can be reversed on the weight of the evidence. It does not go quite so far as the power given to a circuit court of appeals to review a district-court decision, but it goes a great deal further than the present law, and gives the court greater opportunity to reverse an obviously unjust decision on the part of the National Labor Relations Board.” 93 Cong. Rec. 3839, reprinted in 2 Legislative History 1014. H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, reprinted in 1 Legislative History 560. In Labor Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105, 107, we reversed a judgment refusing to enforce a Board order because “upon an examination of the record we cannot say that the findings of fact of the Board are without support in the evidence.” The sufficiency of evidence to support findings of fact is not involved in the three other decisions of this Court to which reference was made. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111; Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board and Labor Board v. Le Tourneau Co., 324 U. S. 793. The language used by the court offers a probable explanation for including two of the decisions of Courts of Appeals. In Wilson & Co. v. Labor Board, 126 F. 2d 114, 117, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sustained a finding that the employer dominated a company union after stating that it had “recognized (or tried to) that findings must be sustained, even when they are contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and we have ignored, or at least endeavored to ignore, the shocking injustices which such findings, opposed to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, produce.” Labor Board v. Columbia Products Corp., 141 F. 2d 687, 688, is a per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustaining a finding of discriminatory discharge. The court said of the Board’s decision on a question of fact, “Though it may strain our credulity, if it does not quite break it down, we must accept it . . . .” The reason for disapproval of Labor Board v. Union Pacific Stages, 99 F. 2d 153, is not apparent. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit there enforced the portion of the Board’s order directing the company to disavow a policy of discrimination against union members, on the ground that there appeared “to be evidence, although disputed,” that some company officials had discouraged employees from joining. 99 F. 2d at 179. The bulk of the lengthy opinion, however, is devoted to a discussion of the facts to support the court’s conclusion that the Board’s findings of discriminatory discharges should not be sustained. Labor Board v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F. 2d 885; Labor Board v. Columbia Products Corp., 141 F. 2d 687. See notes 8 and 22, supra. Rule 53 (e) (2), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., gives finality to the findings of a master unless they are clearly erroneous. The court’s ruling excluding from consideration disagreement between the Board and the examiner was in apparent conflict with the views of three other circuits. Labor Board v. Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F. 2d 721, 724 (C. A. 6th Cir.); A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 117 F. 2d 868, 878 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Wilson & Co. v. Labor Board, 123 F. 2d 411, 418 (C. A. 8th Cir.); cf. International Assn. of Machinists v. Labor Board, 71 App. D. C. 175, 180, 110 F. 2d 29, 34 (C. A. D. C. Cir.). Final Report, 51. §§308 (1) and 309 (2) of the proposed bill, quoted in Final Report, 200, 201. §8 (a), 60 Stat. 242, 5 U. S. C. § 1007 (a). The quoted provision did not appear in the bill in the form in which it was introduced into the Senate. S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7. It was added by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Committee published its reasons for modifying the earlier draft, but gave no explanation for this particular change. See S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 32-33. It is likely that the sentence was intended to embody a clause in the draft prepared by the Attorney General’s Committee, which provided that on review of a case decided initially by an examiner an agency should have jurisdiction to remand or to “affirm, reverse, modify, or set aside in whole or in part the decision of the hearing commissioner, or itself to make any finding which in its judgment is proper upon the record.” §309 (2), Final Report, 201. The substance of this recommendation was included in bills introduced into the House. H. R. 184, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., § 309 (2), and H. R. 339, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., §7 (c), both quoted in S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 138, 143. Salaries of trial examiners range from $7,600 to $10,750 per year. See Appendix to the Budget of the United States Government for the fiscal year ending June 30,1952, p. 47. S. Rep. No. 752, supra, 24, reproduced in S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 210. H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 272-273. The House Report added that “In a broad sense the agencies’ reviewing powers are to be compared with that of courts under section 10 (e) of the bill.” The language of the statute offers no support for this statement. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, quoted in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 415.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. CAMPAIGN CLEAN WATER, INC. No. 73-1378. Argued November 12, 1974 Decided February 18, 1975 Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hills, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Edmund W. Kitch, William L. Patton, Robert E. Kopp, Eloise E. Davies, and David M. Cohen. W. Thomas Jacks argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Alan B. Morrison. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, pro se, Robert H. O’Brien, Senior Assist-ant Attorney General, and Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General, for the Attorney General of California; by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman and Charles Alpert, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Michigan; by Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, Byron E. Starns, Deputy Attorney General, Peter W. Sipkins, Solicitor General, and Eldon G. Kaul, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard P. Fahey, and David E. Northrop, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; by John L. Hill, Attorney General, Larry F. York, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and Theodore L. Priebe, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, John C. Danforth, Attorney General, and Robert M. Lindholm, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, Larry Derryberry, Attorney General, and Paul C. Duncan, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Tern Miller, Attorney General, and Curt T. Schneider, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, for the States of Texas, Wisconsin, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Kansas; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, Gerald L. Baliles, Deputy Attorney General, and James E. Ryan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Martin J. Durkan and James B. McCabe, Special Assistant Attorneys General of Washington, and Israel Packel, Attorney General, and James R. Adams, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, for the State of Washington and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., for the Center for Governmental Responsibility. Pee Curiam. On January 15, 1973, respondent filed a complaint in the District Court seeking to compel the petitioner, as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to allot among the States the full sums authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 by § 207 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as added by the Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 839, 33 U. S. C. § 1287 (1970 ed., Supp. II), for federal grants to municipalities for construction of publicly owned waste treatment works. Although conceding in the trial court that the Administrator had a measure of discretion in making the allotments authorized by § 205 of the Act, 86 Stat. 837, 33 U. S. C. § 1285 (1970 ed., Supp. III), respondent asserted that the Administrator had abused his discretion by allotting only 45% of the sums authorized to be appropriated by § 207. In sustaining respondent’s position, the District Court rejected the holding by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in City of New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (1973), that the Administrator has no discretion to allot less than the full amounts authorized by the Act. The Court of Appeals proceeded on the premise that there was discretion to control or delay allotments but concluded that further proceedings were essential to determine whether the Administrator’s discretion had been abused. The Administrator petitioned for certiorari, asserting that the exercise of his discretion to allot funds under § 205 is not subject to judicial review. We granted certiorari, 416 U. S. 969 (1974), and heard the case with Train v. City of New York, ante, p. 35. We held in Train v. City of New York that the Administrator has no authority under § 205 to allot less than the full amounts sought to be appropriated under § 207. Because that holding is at odds with the premise underlying the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with the opinion in Train v. City of New York. So ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. The petition also asserted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity foreclosed ordering the Administrator to allot funds that he had withheld in the course of exercising his discretion under the Act. In light of Train v. City of New York, ante, p. 35, and our disposition of the instant case, we need not address this question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. INTERNATIONAL RICE MILLING CO., INC. et al. No. 313. Argued February 27, 1951. Decided June 4, 1951. David P. Findling argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Mozart G. Ratner and Bernard Dunau. Conrad Meyer, III argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Herman Phleger, Gregory A. Harrison and Marion B. Plant filed a brief for the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Me. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a union violated § 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, under the following circumstances: Although not certified or recognized as the representative of the employees of a certain mill engaged in interstate commerce, the agents of the union picketed the mill with the object of securing recognition of the unión as the collective bargaining representative of the mill employees. In the course of their picketing, the agents sought to influence, or in the language of the statute they “encouraged,” two men in charge of a truck of a neutral customer of the mill to refuse, in the course of their employment, to go to the mill for an order of goods. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that such conduct did not violate § 8 (bj (4). This case was heard here with No. 393, Labor Board v. Denver Building Trades Council, post, p. 675; No. 108, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, post, p. 694; and No. 85, Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board, post, p. 707. Its facts, however, distinguish it from those cases. This review is confined to the single incident described in the complaint issued by the Acting Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 201, A. F. L., herein called the union. The complaint originally was based upon four charges made against the union by several rice mills engaged in interstate commerce near the center of the Louisiana rice industry. The mills included the International Rice Milling Company, Inc., which gives its name to this proceeding, and the Kaplan Rice Mills, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, which operated the mill at Kaplan, Louisiana, where the incident now before us occurred. The complaint charged that the union or its agents, by their conduct toward two employees of a neutral customer of the Kaplan Rice Mills, engaged in an unfair labor practice contrary to § 8 (b) (4). The Board, with one member not participating, adopted the findings and conclusions of its trial examiner as to the facts but disagreed with his recommendation that those facts constituted a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) or (B). The Board dismissed the complaint but attached the trial examiner’s intermediate report to its decision. 84 N. L. R. B. 360. The Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. 183 F. 2d 21. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the principle involved and because of the conflicting views of several circuits as to the meaning of § 8 (b) (4). 340 U. S. 902. The findings adopted by the Board show that the incident before us occurred at the union’s picket line near the Kaplan Mill in October, 1947. The pickets generally carried signs, one being “This job is unfair to” the union. The goal of the pickets was recognition of the union as the collective bargaining representative of the mill employees, but none of those employees took part in the picketing. Late one afternoon two employees of The Sales and Service House, which was a customer of the mill, came in a truck to the Kaplan Mill to obtain rice or bran for their employer. The union had no grievance against the customer and the latter was a neutral in the dispute between the union and the mill. The pickets formed a line across the road and walked toward the truck. When the truck stopped, the pickets told its occupants there was a strike on and that the truck would have to go back. Those on the truck agreed, went back to the highway and stopped. There one got out and went to the mill across the street. At that time a vice president of the Kaplan Mill came out and asked whether the truck was on its way to the mill and whether its occupants wanted to get the order they came for. The man on the truck explained that he was not the driver and that he would have to see the driver. On the driver’s return, the truck proceeded, with the vice president, to the mill by a short detour. The pickets ran toward the truck and threw stones at it. The truck entered the mill, but the findings do not disclose whether the articles sought there were obtained. The Board adopted the finding that “the stopping of the Sales House truck drivers and the use of force in connection with the stoppage were within the 'scope of the employment’ of the pickets as agents of the respondent [union] and that such activities are attributable to the respondent.” 84 N. L. R. B. 360, 372. The most that can be concluded from the foregoing, to establish a violation of § 8 (b) (4), is that the union, in the course of picketing the Kaplan Mill, did encourage two employees of a neutral customer to turn back from an intended trip to the mill and thus to refuse, in the course of their employment, to transport articles or perform certain services for their employer. We may assume, without the necessity of adopting the Board’s findings to that effect, that the objects of such conduct on the part of the union and its agents were (1) to force Kaplan’s customer to cease handling, transporting or otherwise dealing in products of the mill or to cease doing business with Kaplan, at that time and place, and (2) to add to the pressure on Kaplan to recognize the union as the bargaining representative of the mill employees. A sufficient answer to this claimed violation of the section is that the union’s picketing and its encouragement of the men on the truck did not amount to such an inducement or encouragement to “concerted” activity as the section proscribes. While each case must be considered in the light of its surrounding circumstances, yet the applicable proscriptions of § 8 (b) (4) are expressly limited to the inducement or encouragement of concerted conduct by the employees of the neutral employer. That language contemplates inducement or encouragement to some concert of action greater than is evidenced by the pickets’ request to a driver of a single truck to discontinue a pending trip to a picketed mill. There was no attempt by the union to induce any action by the employees of the neutral customer which would be more widespread than that already described. There were no inducements or encouragements applied elsewhere than on the picket line. The limitation of the complaint to an incident in the geographically restricted area near the mill is significant, although not necessarily conclusive. The picketing was directed at the Kaplan employees and at their employer in a manner traditional in labor disputes. Clearly, that, in itself, was not proscribed by § 8 (b) (4). Insofar as the union’s efforts were directed beyond that and toward the employees of anyone other than Kaplan, there is no suggestion that the union sought concerted conduct by such other employees. Such efforts also fall short of the proscriptions in § 8 (b) (4). In this case, therefore, we need not determine the specific objects toward which a union’s encouragement of concerted conduct must be directed in order to amount to an unfair labor practice under subsection (A) or (B) of § 8 (b) (4). A union’s inducements or encouragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers only as they happen to approach the picketed place of business generally are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees. Generally, therefore, such actions do not come within the proscription of § 8 (b) (4), and they do not here. In the instant case the violence on the picket line is not material. The complaint was not based upon that violence, as such. To reach it, the complaint more properly would have relied upon § 8 (b) (1) (A) or would have addressed itself to local authorities. The substitution of violent coercion in place of peaceful persuasion would not in itself bring the complained-of conduct into conflict with § 8 (b) (4). It is the object of union encouragement that is proscribed by that section, rather than the means adopted to make it felt. That Congress did not seek, by § 8 (b) (4), to interfere with the ordinary strike has been indicated recently by this Court. This is emphasized in § 13 as follows: “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” 61 Stat. 151, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 163. By § 13, Congress has made it clear that § 8 (b) (4), and all other parts of the Act which otherwise might be read so as to interfere with, impede or diminish the union’s traditional right to strike, may be so read only if such interference, impediment or diminution is “specifically provided for” in the Act. No such specific provision in § 8 (b) (4) reaches the incident here. The material legislative history supports this view. On the single issue before us, we sustain the action of the Board and the judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is Reversed. “Sec. 8. . . . “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “ (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work: Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act; . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 61 Stat. 140-142, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158(b) (4). The above provisions, together with those of § 303, 61 Stat. 158, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 187, have been referred to by Congress and the courts as the “secondary boycott sections” of the Act. While the complaint charged no unfair labor practice on the part of the union in its relations with employees of the Kaplan Mill, it did charge that the union also violated § 8 (b) (4) (A) by its conduct in inducing and encouraging employees of two neutral railroads to engage in a concerted refusal, in the course of their employment, to transport or otherwise handle articles shipped to or from some of the respective mills, including the Kaplan Mill. Not only did the encouragement of concerted action which was alleged in that charge differ substantially from the conduct which is before us but the Board found that the railroad employees were not employees within the meaning of § 8 (b) (4). 84 N. L. R. B. 360. The Court of Appeals held to the contrary and remanded the charge for further proceedings. 183 F. 2d 21, 24-26. The Board, however, does not seek a review of that order. It is not charged here that the union or its agents themselves engaged in a strike or concerted activity for an object proscribed by §8 (b) (4). “Sec. 8. . . . “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: 61 Stat. 140-141, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 158 (b) (1) (A). “Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .” 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 157. “. . . The Labor Management Relations Act declared it to be an unfair labor practice for a union to induce or engage in a strike or concerted refusal to work where an object thereof is any of certain enumerated ones. § 8 (b) (4) .... While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal — even if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property.” International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 253. In this Act “Congress safeguarded the exercise by employees of 'concerted activities’ and expressly recognized the right to strike.” International Union v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 457; see also, Amal gamated Assn. of Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383, 389, 404; United Electrical & Machine Workers, 85 N. L. R. B. 417, 418; Oil Workers International Union, 84 N. L. R. B. 315, 318-320. See also, the protection given to the right to engage in concerted activities by § 7 of the Act, note 4, supra. As to both §§13 and 7, see International Union v. Wisconsin Board, supra, at 258-264. The character of the problem of reconciliation of the right to strike with the limitations expressed in § 8 (b) (4) is not unlike that which confronted the Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, 806: “The result of all this is that we have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.” Senator Taft, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and floor manager for the bill in the Senate, said: “So far as the bill is concerned, we have proceeded on the theory that there is a right to strike and that labor peace must be based on free collective bargaining. We have done nothing to outlaw strikes for basic wages, hours, and working conditions after proper opportunity for mediation.” 93 Cong. Rec. 3835. Similar statements by Senator Taft appear at 93 Cong. Rec. 3838, 4198, 4867, 6446, 7537. Several other members of the Committee expressed like views: Senator Ellender at -93 Cong. Rec. 4131-4132; Senator Ball at 4834, 4838, 7529-7530; Senator Aiken at 4860; and Senator Morse at 4864,4871-4873. See also, “the primary strike for recognition (without a Board certification) is not proscribed.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. 1) 22, and see H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43. In discussing the effect of § 8 (b) (4), and in showing its application only to circumstances other than those involved in this case, Senator Taft said further: “The Senator will find a great many decisions . . . which hold that under the common law a secondary boycott is unlawful. . . . under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott or any other kind of a strike, no matter how unlawful it may have been at common law. All this provision of the bill [§8 (b) (4)] does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4198.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SIMS v. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY No. 98-9537. Argued March 28, 2000 — Decided June 5, 2000 Thomas, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II-A, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 112. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scaua and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 114. Sarah H. Bohr argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Chantal J. Harrington, Gary R. Parvin, and Jon C. Dubin. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for. respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, William Kanter, and Robert D. Kamenshine Rochelle Bobroff, Michael Schuster, and Robert E. Rains filed a brief for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II-A, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B, in which Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join. A person whose claim for Social Security benefits is denied by an administrative law judge (ALJ) must in most cases, before seeking judicial review of that denial, request that the Social Security Appeals Council review his claim. The question is whether a claimant pursuing judicial review has waived any issues that he did not include in that request. We hold that he has not. I In 1994, petitioner Juatassa Sims filed applications for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, 42 U. S. C. §401 et seq., and for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of that Act, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U. S. C. § 1881 et seq. She alleged disability from a variety of ailments, including degenerative joint diseases and carpal tunnel syndrome. After a state agency denied her claims, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security ALJ. See generally Heckler v. Day, 467 U. S. 104, 106-107 (1984) (describing stages of review of elaims for Social Security benefits). The ALJ, in 1996, also denied her elaims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a “disability,” as defined in the Act. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 423(d) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) and 1382e(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. Ill); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521, 524-526 (1990). Petitioner then requested that the Social Security Appeals Council review her elaims. A claimant may request such review by completing a one-page form provided by the Social Security Administration (SSA) — Form HA-520 — or “by any other writing specifically requesting review.” 20 CFR § 422.205(a) (1999). Petitioner, through counsel, chose the latter option, submitting to the Council a letter arguing that the ALJ had erred in several ways in analyzing the evidence. The Council denied review. Next, petitioner filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. She contended that (1) the ALJ had made selective use of the record; (2) the questions the ALJ had posed to a vocational expert to determine petitioner’s ability to work were defective because they omitted several of petitioner’s ailments; and (3) in light of certain peculiarities in the medical evidence, the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination. The District Court rejected all of these contentions. App. 74-84. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 200 F. 3d 229 (1998). That court affirmed on the merits with regard to petitioner’s first contention. With regard to the second and third contentions, it concluded that, under its decision in Paul v. Shalala, 29 F. 3d 208, 210 (1994), it lacked jurisdiction because petitioner had not raised those contentions in her request for review by the Appeals Council. We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 1018 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over whether a Social Security claimant waives judicial review of an issue if he fails to exhaust that issue by presenting it to the Appeals Council in his request for review. Compare Paul, supra, at 210; James v. Chafer, 96 F. 3d 1341, 1343-1344 (CA10 1996), with Harwood v. Apfel, 186 F. 3d 1039, 1042-1043 (CA81999); Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F. 3d 561, 563-564 (CA7 1999). II A The Social Security Act provides that “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,... may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action” in federal district court. 42 U. S. C. § 405(g). But the Act does not define “final decision,” instead leaving.it to the SSA to give meaning to that term through regulations. See § 405(a); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 766 (1975). SSA regulations provide that, if the Appeals Council grants review of a claim, then the decision that the Council issues is the Commissioner’s final decision. But if, as here, the Council denies the request for review, the ALJ’s opinion becomes the final decision. See 20 CFR §§404.900(a)(4)-(5), 404.955, 404.981, 422.210(a) (1999). If a claimant fails to request review from the Council, there is no final decision and, as a result, no judicial review in most cases. See § 404.900(b); Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 482-483 (1986). In administrative-law parlance, such a claimant may not obtain judicial review because he has failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Salfi, supra, at 765-766. The Commissioner rightly concedes that petitioner exhausted administrative remedies by requesting review by the Council. Petitioner thus obtained a final decision, and nothing in § 405(g) or the regulations implementing it bars judicial review of her claims. Nevertheless, the Commissioner contends that we should require issue exhaustion in addition to exhaustion of remedies. That is, he contends that a Social Security claimant, to obtain judicial review of an issue, not only must obtain a final decision on his claim for benefits, but also must specify that issue in his request for review by the Council. (Whether a claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ is not before us.) The Commissioner argues, in particular, that an issue-exhaustion requirement is “an important corollary” of any requirement of exhaustion of remedies. Brief for Respondent 18. We think that this is not necessarily so and that the corollary is particularly unwarranted in this case. Initially, we note that requirements of administrative issue exhaustion are largely creatures of statute. Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 184 F. 3d 409, 412 (CADC 1998). Our eases addressing issue exhaustion reflect this fact. For example, in Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U. S. 645 (1982), we held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review objections not raised before the National Labor Relations Board. We so held because a statute provided that “ ‘[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board... shall be considered by the court.” Id., at 665 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 160(e) (1982 ed.)). Our decision in FPC v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U. S. 492, 497-498 (1955), followed similar reasoning. See also United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 36, n. 6 (1952) (collecting statutes); Washington Assn, for Television and Children v. FCC, 712 F. 2d 677, 681-682, and n. 6 (CADC 1983) (interpreting issue-exhaustion requirement in 47 U. S. C. § 405 (1982 ed.) and collecting statutes). Here, the Commissioner does not contend that any statute requires issue exhaustion in the request for review. Similarly, it is common for an agency's regulations to require issue exhaustion in administrative appeals. See, e. g., 20 CFR § 802.211(a) (1999) (petition for review to Benefits Review Board must “lis[t] the specific issues to be considered on appeal”). And when regulations do so, courts reviewing agency action regularly ensure against the bypassing of that requirement by refusing to consider unexhausted issues. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States Dept. of Labor, 795 F. 2d 375, 378 (CA4 1986); Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. FTC, 676 F. 2d 385, 398, n. 26 (CA9 1982). Yet, SSA regulations do not require issue exhaustion. (Although the question is not before us, we think it likely that the Commissioner could adopt a regulation that did require issue exhaustion.) It is true that we have imposed an issue-exhaustion requirement even in the absence of a statute or regulation. But the reason we have done so does not apply here. The basis for a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement is an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts. As the Court explained in Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941): “Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below. For our procedural scheme contemplates that parties shall come to issue in the trial forum vested with authority to determine questions of fact. This is essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues which the trial tribunal is alone competent to decide; it is equally essential in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence. And the basic reasons which support this general principle applicable to trial courts make it equally desirable that parties should have an opportunity to offer evidence on the general issues involved in the less formal proceedings before administrative agencies entrusted with the responsibility of fact finding.” Id., at 556. As we further explained in L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, courts require administrative issue exhaustion “as a general rule” because it is usually “appropriate under [an agency’s] practice” for “contestants in an adversary proceeding” before it to develop fully all issues there. 344 U. S., at 36-37. (We also spoke favorably of issue exhaustion in Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 154-155 (1946), without relying on any statute or regulation, but in that case the waived issue had not been raised before the District Court, see id., at 149, 155.) But, as Hormel and L. A. Tucker Truck Lines suggest, the desirability of a court imposing a requirement of issue exhaustion depends on the degree to which the analogy to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative proceeding. Cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193 (1969) (application of doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies “requires an understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved”); Salfi, 422 U. S., at 765 (same). Where the parties are expected to develop the issues in an adversarial administrative proceeding, it seems to us that the rationale for requiring issue exhaustion is at its greatest. Hormel, L. A. Tucker Truck Linee, and Aragon each involved an adversarial proceeding. See Hormel, supra, at 554, 556; L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, supra, at 36; Aragon v. Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska, 149 F. 2d 447, 449-452 (CA9 1945), aff’d in part and reVd in part, 329 U. S. 143 (1946). (In Hormel, we allowed an exception to the issue-exhaustion requirement. 312 U. S., at 560.) Where, by contrast, an administrative proceeding is not adversarial, we think the reasons for a court to require issue exhaustion are much weaker. More generally, we have observed that “it is well settled that there are wide differences between administrative agencies and courts,” Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U. S. 344, 351 (1983), and we have thus warned against reflexively “assimilating] the relation of . . . administrative bodies and the courts to the relationship between lower and upper courts,” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 144 (1940). B The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more pronounced than in Social Security proceedings. Although “[m]any agency systems of adjudication are based to a significant extent on the judicial model of decisionmaking,” 2 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §9.10, p. 103 (3d ed. 1994), the SSA is “[pjerhaps the best example of an agency” that is not, B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 469-470 (4th ed. 1994). See id., at 470 (“The most important of [the SSA’s modifications of the judicial model] is the replacement of normal adversary procedure by... the ‘investigatory model’ ” (quoting Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267,1290 (1975))). Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 400-401 (1971), and the Council’s review is similarly broad. The Commissioner has no representative before the ALJ to oppose the claim for benefits, and we have found no indication that he opposes claimants before the Council. See generally Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1289,1301-1305,1325-1329 (1997). The regulations make this nature of SSA proceedings quite clear. They expressly provide that the SSA “eon-duct[s] the administrative review process in an informal, nonadversary manner.” 20 CFR § 404.900(b) (1999). They permit — bu.t do not require — the filing of a brief with the Council (even when the Council grants review), §404.975, and the Council’s review is plenary unless it states otherwise, § 404.976(a). See also § 404.900(b) (“[W]e will consider at each step of the review process any information you present as well as all the information in our records”). The Commissioner’s involvement in the Appeals Council’s decision whether to grant review appears to be not as a litigant opposing the claimant, but rather just as an adviser to the Council regarding which cases are good candidates for the Council to review pursuant to its authority to review a case sua sponte. See §§404.969(b)-(e); Perales, supra, at 403. The regulations further make clear that the Council will “evaluate the entire record,” including “new and material evidence,” in determining whether to grant review. § 404.970(b). Similarly, the notice of decision that ALJ’s provide unsuccessful claimants informs them that if they request review, the Council will “consider all of [the ALJ’s] decision, even the parts with which you may agree,” and that the Council might review the decision “even if you do not ask it to do so.” App. 25-27. Finally, Form HA-520, which the Commissioner considers adequate for the Council’s purposes in determining whether to review a case, see § 422.205(a), provides only three lines for the request for review, and a notice accompanying the form estimates that it will take only 10 minutes to “read the instructions, gather the necessary facts and fill out the form.” The form therefore strongly suggests that the Council does not depend much, if at all, on claimants to identify issues for review. Given that a large portion of Social Security claimants either have no representation at all or are represented by non-attorneys, see Dubin, supra, at 1294, n. 29, the lack of such dependence is entirely understandable. Thus, the Hormel analogy to judicial proceedings is at its weakest in this area. The adversarial development of issues by the parties — the “eom[ing] to issue,” 812 U. S., at 556— on which that analogy depends simply does not exist. The Council, not the claimant, has primary responsibility for identifying and developing the issues. We therefore agree with the Eighth Circuit that “the general rule [of issue exhaustion] makes little sense in this particular context.” Harwood, 186 P. 3d, at 1042. Accordingly, we hold that a judicially created issue-exhaustion requirement is inappropriate. Claimants who exhaust administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues in a request for review by the Appeals Council in order to preserve judicial review of those issues. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. We agree with the parties that, even were a court-imposed issue-exhaustion requirement proper, the Fifth Circuit erred in treating it as jurisdictional. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 819, 328 (1976). Part 404 of 20 CFR (1999) applies to Title II of the Act. The regulations governing Title XVI, which can be found at 20 CFR pt. 416 (1999), are, as relevant here, not materially different. We will therefore omit references to the latter regulations.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Juan ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA, Petitioner v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General. No. 16-54. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 27, 2017. Decided May 30, 2017. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner. Allon Kedem, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Michael Carlin, Law Office of Michael Carlin PLLC, Ann Arbor, MI, Jeffrey L. Fisher, David T. Goldberg, Pamela S. Karlan, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Jayashri Srikantiah, Immigrants' Rights Clinic, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner. Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Allon Kedem, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, John W. Blakeley, Patrick J. Glen, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, provides that "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony after admission" to the United States may be removed from the country by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the many crimes that constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA is "sexual abuse of a minor." § 1101(a)(43)(A). A conviction for sexual abuse of a minor is an aggravated felony regardless of whether it is for a "violation of Federal or State law." § 1101(a)(43). The INA does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor. We must decide whether a conviction under a state statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and a 17-year-old qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA. We hold that it does not. I Petitioner Juan Esquivel-Quintana is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pleaded no contest in the Superior Court of California to a statutory rape offense: "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator," Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 261.5(c) (West 2014); see also § 261.5(a) ("Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor"). For purposes of that offense, California defines "minor" as "a person under the age of 18 years." Ibid. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against petitioner based on that conviction. An Immigration Judge concluded that the conviction qualified as "sexual abuse of a minor," 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A), and ordered petitioner removed to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissed his appeal. 26 I. & N. Dec. 469 (2015). "[F]or a statutory rape offense involving a 16- or 17-year-old victim" to qualify as " 'sexual abuse of a minor,' " it reasoned, "the statute must require a meaningful age difference between the victim and the perpetrator." Id., at 477. In its view, the 3-year age difference required by Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) was meaningful. Id., at 477. Accordingly, the Board concluded that petitioner's crime of conviction was an aggravated felony, making him removable under the INA. Ibid. A divided Court of Appeals denied Esquivel-Quintana's petition for review, deferring to the Board's interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 810 F.3d 1019 (C.A.6 2016) ; see also id., at 1027 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted certiorari, 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 368, 196 L.Ed.2d 283 (2016), and now reverse. II Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) makes aliens removable based on the nature of their convictions, not based on their actual conduct. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1980, 1986-1987, 192 L.Ed.2d 60 (2015). Accordingly, to determine whether an alien's conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under that section, we "employ a categorical approach by looking to the statute ... of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime." Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483, 132 S.Ct. 1166, 182 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) ; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (applying the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), to the INA). Under that approach, we ask whether " 'the state statute defining the crime of conviction' categorically fits within the 'generic' federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony." Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, supra, at 186, 127 S.Ct. 815 ). In other words, we presume that the state conviction "rested upon ... the least of th[e] acts" criminalized by the statute, and then we determine whether that conduct would fall within the federal definition of the crime. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) ; see also Moncrieffe, supra, at 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678 (focusing "on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state statute"). Petitioner's state conviction is thus an "aggravated felony" under the INA only if the least of the acts criminalized by the state statute falls within the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. A Because Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c) criminalizes "unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator" and defines a minor as someone under age 18, the conduct criminalized under this provision would be, at a minimum, consensual sexual intercourse between a victim who is almost 18 and a perpetrator who just turned 21. Regardless of the actual facts of petitioner's crime, we must presume that his conviction was based on acts that were no more criminal than that. If those acts do not constitute sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, then petitioner was not convicted of an aggravated felony and is not, on that basis, removable. Petitioner concedes that sexual abuse of a minor under the INA includes some statutory rape offenses. But he argues that a statutory rape offense based solely on the partners' ages (like the one here) is " 'abuse' " "only when the younger partner is under 16." Reply Brief 2. Because the California statute criminalizes sexual intercourse when the victim is up to 17 years old, petitioner contends that it does not categorically qualify as sexual abuse of a minor. B We agree with petitioner that, in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16. Because the California statute at issue in this case does not categorically fall within that definition, a conviction pursuant to it is not an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(A). We begin, as always, with the text. 1 Section 1101(a)(43)(A) does not expressly define sexual abuse of a minor, so we interpret that phrase using the normal tools of statutory interpretation. "Our analysis begins with the language of the statute." Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) ; see also Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 53, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006) ("The everyday understanding of" the term used in § 1101"should count for a lot here, for the statutes in play do not define the term, and so remit us to regular usage to see what Congress probably meant"). Congress added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA in 1996, as part of a comprehensive immigration reform act. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 321(a)(i), 110 Stat. 3009-627. At that time, the ordinary meaning of "sexual abuse" included "the engaging in sexual contact with a person who is below a specified age or who is incapable of giving consent because of age or mental or physical incapacity." Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law 454 (1996). By providing that the abuse must be "of a minor," the INA focuses on age, rather than mental or physical incapacity. Accordingly, to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor, the statute of conviction must prohibit certain sexual acts based at least in part on the age of the victim. Statutory rape laws are one example of this category of crimes. Those laws generally provide that an older person may not engage in sexual intercourse with a younger person under a specified age, known as the "age of consent." See id., at 20 (defining "age of consent" as "the age at which a person is deemed competent by law to give consent esp. to sexual intercourse" and cross-referencing "statutory rape"). Many laws also require an age differential between the two partners. Although the age of consent for statutory rape purposes varies by jurisdiction, see infra, at 1571, reliable dictionaries provide evidence that the "generic" age-in 1996 and today-is 16. See B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 38 (2d ed. 1995) ("Age of consent, usu[ally] 16, denotes the age when one is legally capable of agreeing ... to sexual intercourse" and cross-referencing "statutory rape"); Black's Law Dictionary 73 (10th ed. 2014) (noting that the age of consent is "usu[ally] defined by statute as 16 years"). 2 Relying on a different dictionary (and "sparse" legislative history), the Government suggests an alternative " 'everyday understanding' " of "sexual abuse of a minor." Brief for Respondent 16-17 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990)). Around the time sexual abuse of a minor was added to the INA's list of aggravated felonies, that dictionary defined "[s]exual abuse" as "[i]llegal sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance," and defined "[m]inor" as "[a]n infant or person who is under the age of legal competence," which in "most states" was "18." Id., at 997, 1375. " 'Sexual abuse of a minor,' " the Government accordingly contends, "most naturally connotes conduct that (1) is illegal, (2) involves sexual activity, and (3) is directed at a person younger than 18 years old." Brief for Respondent 17. We are not persuaded that the generic federal offense corresponds to the Government's definition. First, the Government's proposed definition is flatly inconsistent with the definition of sexual abuse contained in the very dictionary on which it relies; the Government's proposed definition does not require that the act be performed "by a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance ." Black's Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). In any event, as we explain below, offenses predicated on a special relationship of trust between the victim and offender are not at issue here and frequently have a different age requirement than the general age of consent. Second, in the context of statutory rape, the prepositional phrase "of a minor" naturally refers not to the age of legal competence (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to a contract, for example), but to the age of consent (when a person is legally capable of agreeing to sexual intercourse). Third, the Government's definition turns the categorical approach on its head by defining the generic federal offense of sexual abuse of a minor as whatever is illegal under the particular law of the State where the defendant was convicted. Under the Government's preferred approach, there is no "generic" definition at all. See Taylor, 495 U.S., at 591, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (requiring "a clear indication that ... Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses"); id., at 592, 110 S.Ct. 2143 ("We think that 'burglary' in § 924(e) must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States' criminal codes"). C The structure of the INA, a related federal statute, and evidence from state criminal codes confirm that, for a statutory rape offense to qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA based solely on the age of the participants, the victim must be younger than 16. 1 Surrounding provisions of the INA guide our interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012). This offense is listed in the INA as an "aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). "An 'aggravated' offense is one 'made worse or more serious by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime.' " Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 574, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 75 (9th ed. 2009)). Moreover, the INA lists sexual abuse of a minor in the same subparagraph as "murder" and "rape," § 1101(a)(43)(A) -among the most heinous crimes it defines as aggravated felonies. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The structure of the INA therefore suggests that sexual abuse of a minor encompasses only especially egregious felonies. A closely related federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2243, provides further evidence that the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor incorporates an age of consent of 16, at least in the context of statutory rape offenses predicated solely on the age of the participants. Cf. Leocal, 543 U.S., at 12-13, n. 9, 125 S.Ct. 377 (concluding that Congress' treatment of 18 U.S.C. § 16 in an Act passed "just nine months earlier" provided "stron [g] suppor[t]" for our interpretation of § 16 as incorporated into the INA); Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007). Section 2243, which criminalizes "[s]exual abuse of a minor or ward," contains the only definition of that phrase in the United States Code. As originally enacted in 1986, § 2243 proscribed engaging in a "sexual act" with a person between the ages of 12 and 16 if the perpetrator was at least four years older than the victim. In 1996, Congress expanded § 2243 to include victims who were younger than 12, thereby protecting anyone under the age of 16. § 2243(a) ; see also § 2241(c). Congress did this in the same omnibus law that added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA, which suggests that Congress understood that phrase to cover victims under age 16. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, §§ 121(7), 321,110 Stat. 3009-31, 3009-627. Petitioner does not contend that the definition in § 2243(a) must be imported wholesale into the INA, Brief for Petitioner 17, and we do not do so. One reason is that the INA does not cross-reference § 2243(a), whereas many other aggravated felonies in the INA are defined by cross-reference to other provisions of the United States Code, see, e.g., § 1101(a)(43)(H) ("an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202 of Title 18 (relating to the demand for or receipt of ransom)"). Another is that § 2243(a) requires a 4-year age difference between the perpetrator and the victim. Combining that element with a 16-year age of consent would categorically exclude the statutory rape laws of most States. See Brief for Respondent 34-35; cf. Taylor, 495 U.S., at 594, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (declining to "constru[e] 'burglary' to mean common-law burglary," because that "would come close to nullifying that term's effect in the statute," since "few of the crimes now generally recognized as burglaries would fall within the common-law definition"). Accordingly, we rely on § 2243(a) for evidence of the meaning of sexual abuse of a minor, but not as providing the complete or exclusive definition. 2 As in other cases where we have applied the categorical approach, we look to state criminal codes for additional evidence about the generic meaning of sexual abuse of a minor. See Taylor, 495 U.S., at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (interpreting " 'burglary' " under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 according to "the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States"); Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S., at 190, 127 S.Ct. 815 (interpreting "theft" in the INA in the same manner). When "sexual abuse of a minor" was added to the INA in 1996, thirty-one States and the District of Columbia set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses that hinged solely on the age of the participants. As for the other States, one set the age of consent at 14; two set the age of consent at 15; six set the age of consent at 17; and the remaining ten, including California, set the age of consent at 18. See Appendix, infra ; cf. ALI, Model Penal Code § 213.3(1)(a) (1980) (in the absence of a special relationship, setting the default age of consent at 16 for the crime of "[c]orruption of [m]inors"). A significant majority of jurisdictions thus set the age of consent at 16 for statutory rape offenses predicated exclusively on the age of the participants. Many jurisdictions set a different age of consent for offenses that include an element apart from the age of the participants, such as offenses that focus on whether the perpetrator is in some special relationship of trust with the victim. That was true in the two States that had offenses labeled "sexual abuse of a minor" in 1996. See Alaska Stat. § 11.41.438 (1996) (age of consent for third-degree "sexual abuse of a minor" was 16 generally but 18 where "the offender occupie[d] a position of authority in relation to the victim"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 254(1) (1983), as amended by 1995 Me. Laws p. 123 (age of consent for "[s]exual abuse of minors" was 16 generally but 18 where the victim was "a student" and the offender was "a teacher, employee or other official in the ... school ... in which the student [was] enrolled"). And that is true in four of the five jurisdictions that have offenses titled "sexual abuse of a minor" today. Compare, e.g., D.C. Code §§ 22-3001 (2012), 22-3008 (2016 Cum. Supp.) (age of consent is 16 in the absence of a significant relationship) with § 22-3009.01 (age of consent is 18 where the offender "is in a significant relationship" with the victim); see also Brief for Respondent 31 (listing statutes with that title). Accordingly, the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor may include a different age of consent where the perpetrator and victim are in a significant relationship of trust. As relevant to this case, however, the general consensus from state criminal codes points to the same generic definition as dictionaries and federal law: Where sexual intercourse is abusive solely because of the ages of the participants, the victim must be younger than 16. D The laws of many States and of the Federal Government include a minimum age differential (in addition to an age of consent) in defining statutory rape. We need not and do not decide whether the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) includes an additional element of that kind. Petitioner has "show[n] something special about California's version of the doctrine"-that the age of consent is 18, rather than 16-and needs no more to prevail. Duenas-Alvarez, supra, at 191, 127 S.Ct. 815. Absent some special relationship of trust, consensual sexual conduct involving a younger partner who is at least 16 years of age does not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, regardless of the age differential between the two participants. We leave for another day whether the generic offense requires a particular age differential between the victim and the perpetrator, and whether the generic offense encompasses sexual intercourse involving victims over the age of 16 that is abusive because of the nature of the relationship between the participants. III Finally, petitioner and the Government debate whether the Board's interpretation of sexual abuse of a minor is entitled to deference under Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. Petitioner argues that any ambiguity in the meaning of this phrase must be resolved in favor of the alien under the rule of lenity. See Brief for Petitioner 41-45. The Government responds that ambiguities should be resolved by deferring to the Board's interpretation. See Brief for Respondent 45-53. We have no need to resolve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case because the statute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses the Board's interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity nor Chevron applies. * * * We hold that in the context of statutory rape offenses focused solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" under § 1101(a)(43)(A) requires the age of the victim to be less than 16. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX These tables list offenses criminalizing sexual intercourse solely because of the age of the participants. The tables are organized according to the statutory age of consent as of September 30, 1996-the date "sexual abuse of a minor" was added to the INA. 14 Years Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-730(1)(b) (1993) 15 Years Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-403(1)(e) (1997) South Carolina S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(2) (1985) 16 Years Alabama Ala. Code §§ 13A-6-62(a)(1), 13A-6-70(c)(1) (1994) Alaska Alaska Stat. § 11.41.436(a)(1) (1996) Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-106(a), 5-14-107(a) (1997) Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-71(a)(1) (1995) Delaware Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 773(2) (1995) District of Columbia D. C. Code §§ 22-4101(3), 22-4108 (1996) Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-3(a) (1996) Indiana 1998 Ind. Acts § 8, p. 774 Iowa Iowa Code § 709.4(2) (1987), as amended by 1994 Iowa Acts p. 290 Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3504(a)(1) (1995) Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 510.020(3)(a), 510.060(1)(b) (Lexis 1990) Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 254(1) (1983), as amended by 1995 Me. Laws p. 123 Maryland Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §§ 464B(a)(4), (5), 464C(a)(2), (3) (1996) Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 265, § 23 (1992) Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520d(1)(a) (1991), as amended by 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 393 Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 609.344.1(b) (1996) Montana Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-5-501(1)(b)(iii), 45-5-503(3)(a) (1995) Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1) (1994 Cum. Supp.) Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.364(3), 200.368 (1997) New Hampshire N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A:3(II) (1986) New Jersey N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2(c)(5) (West 1995) North Carolina N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-27.7A (1998 Cum. Supp.) Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.04(A) (Lexis 1996) Oklahoma Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 1111(A)(1) (1983), as amended by 1995 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 22, § 1, p. 119 Pennsylvania 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3122.1, added by 1995 Pa. Laws 985, § 5, p. 987 Rhode Island R. I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1994) South Dakota S. D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1(5) (1998) Utah 1983 Utah Laws ch. 88, § 16 Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 3252(a)(3) (1998) Washington Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.079 (1994) West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 61-8B-2(c)(1), 61-8B-5(a)(2) (Lexis 1997) Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (1997) 17 Years Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §§ 5/12-15(b)-(c), 5/12-16(d) (West 1996) Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:80(A)(1) (West 1986), as amended by 1995 La. Acts no. 241, p. 670 Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.034 (1994) New Mexico N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(F), as amended by 1995 N. M. Laws ch. 159, p. 1414 New York N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§ 130.05(3)(a), 130.20(1), 130.25(2) (West 1998) Texas Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.011(a)(2), (c)(1) (West 1994) 18 Years Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1405(A) (1989) California Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 261.5(a) (West Supp. 1998) Florida Fla. Stat. § 794.05(1) (1991) Idaho Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6101(1) (Supp. 1996) Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-67 (Supp. 1993) North Dakota N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1-20-05 (Supp. 1983); § 14-10-01 (1997) Oregon Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.315(1), 163.435(1), 163.445(1) (1997) Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506(a) (Supp. 1996) Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-371 (1996) Wisconsin Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01(1), 948.09 (1993-1994) Where a state statute contains several different crimes that are described separately, we employ what is known as the "modified categorical approach." See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 187, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that approach, which is not at issue here, the court may review the charging documents, jury instructions, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and similar sources to determine the actual crime of which the alien was convicted. See ibid. To eliminate a redundancy, Congress later amended § 2243(a) to revert to the pre-1996 language. See Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998, § 301(b), 112 Stat. 2979. That amendment does not change Congress' understanding in 1996, when it added sexual abuse of a minor to the INA. The Government notes that this sort of multijurisdictional analysis can "be useful insofar as it helps shed light on the 'common understanding and meaning' of the federal provision being interpreted," but that it is not required by the categorical approach. Brief for Respondent 23-25 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 45, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) ). We agree. In this case, state criminal codes aid our interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor" by offering useful context.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HILLSBORO NATIONAL BANK v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 81-485. Argued November 1, 1982 Decided March 7, 1983 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, II, and IV of which Brennan, J., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 403. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 403. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 422. Harvey B. Stephens argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-485. With him on the briefs were Mark H. Ferguson and Robert A. Stuart. James Silhasek argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 81-930. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for the United States in No. 81-930 and respondent in No. 81-485. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Archer, Stuart A. Smith, GaryR. Allen, Jay W. Miller, and David I. Pincus. Together with No. 81-930, United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., on cer-tiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 81-930 were filed by Jack R. White and Steven W. Bacon for Ameron, Inc.; and by Arthur A. Armstrong, pro se. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated cases present the question of the applicability of the tax benefit rule to two corporate tax situations: the repayment to the shareholders of taxes for which they were liable but that were originally paid by the corporation; and the distribution of expensed assets in a corporate liquidation. We conclude that, unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code prevents it, the tax benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when events occur that are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction. Our examination of the provisions granting the deductions and governing the liquidation in these cases leads us to hold that the rule requires the recognition of income in the case of the liquidation but not in the case of the tax refund. I In No. 81-485, Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, the petitioner, Hillsboro National Bank, is an incorporated bank doing business in Illinois. Until 1970, Illinois imposed a property tax on shares held in incorporated banks. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §557 (1971). Banks, required to retain earnings sufficient to cover the taxes, § 558, customarily paid the taxes for the shareholders. Under § 164(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 164(e), the bank was allowed a deduction for the amount of the tax, but the shareholders were not. In 1970, Illinois amended its Constitution to prohibit ad valorem taxation of personal property owned by individuals, and the amendment was challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Illinois courts held the amendment unconstitutional in Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. v. Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d 137, 273 N. E. 2d 592 (1971). We granted certiorari, 405 U. S. 1039 (1972), and, pending disposition of the case here, Illinois enacted a statute providing for the collection of the disputed taxes and the placement of the receipts in escrow. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, ¶ 676.01 (1979). Hillsboro paid the taxes for its shareholders in 1972, taking the deduction permitted by § 164(e), and the authorities placed the receipts in escrow. This Court upheld the state constitutional amendment in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356 (1973). Accordingly, in 1973 the County Treasurer refunded the amounts in escrow that were attributable to shares held by individuals, along with accrued interest. The Illinois courts held that the refunds belonged to the shareholders rather than to the banks. See Bank & Trust Co. of Arlington Heights v. Cullerton, 25 Ill. App. 3d 721, 726, 324 N. E. 2d 29, 32 (1975) (alternative holding); Lincoln National Bank v. Cullerton, 18 Ill. App. 3d 953, 310 N. E. 2d 845 (1974). Without consulting Hillsboro, the Treasurer refunded the amounts directly to the individual shareholders. On its return for 1973, Hillsboro recognized no income from this sequence of events. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency against Hillsboro, requiring it to include as income the amount paid its shareholders from the escrow. Hillsboro sought a redetermi-nation in the Tax Court, which held that the refund of the taxes, but not the payment of accrued interest, was includible in Hillsboro’s income. On appeal, relying on its earlier decision in First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614 F. 2d 1142 (1980), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 641 F. 2d 529, 531 (1981). In No. 81-930, United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., the respondent, Bliss Dairy, Inc., was a closely held corporation engaged in the business of operating a dairy. As a cash basis taxpayer, in the taxable year ending June 30, 1973, it deducted upon purchase the full cost of the cattle feed purchased for use in its operations, as permitted by § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 162. A substantial portion of the feed was still on hand at the end of the taxable year. On July 2, 1973, two days into the next taxable year, Bliss adopted a plan of liquidation, and, during the month of July, it distributed its assets, including the remaining cattle feed, to the shareholders. Relying on §336, which shields the corporation from the recognition of gain on the distribution of property to its shareholders on liquidation, Bliss reported no income on the transaction. The shareholders continued to operate the dairy business in noncorporate form. They filed an election under § 333 to limit the gain recognized by them on the liquidation, and they therefore calculated their basis in the assets received in the distribution as pro-' vided in § 334(c). Under that provision, their basis in the assets was their basis in their stock in the liquidated corporation, decreased by the amount of money received, and increased by the amount of gain recognized on the transaction. They then allocated that total basis over the assets, as provided in the regulations, Treas. Reg. §1.334-2, 26 CFR § 1.334-2 (1982), presumably taking a basis greater than zero in the feed, although the amount of the shareholders’ basis is not in the record. They in turn deducted their basis in the feed as an expense of doing business under § 162. On audit, the Commissioner challenged the corporation’s treatment of the transaction, asserting that Bliss should have taken into income the value of the grain distributed to the shareholders. He therefore increased Bliss’ income by $60,000. Bliss paid the resulting assessment and sued for a refund in the District Court for the District of Arizona, where it was stipulated that the grain had a value of $56,565, see Pretrial Order, at 3. Relying on Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F. 2d 837 (CA9 1963), the District Court rendered a judgment in favor of Bliss. While recognizing authority to the contrary, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F. 2d 378 (CA6 1978), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 909 (1979), the Court of Appeals saw South Lake Farms as controlling and affirmed. 645 F. 2d 19 (CA9 1981) (per curiam). “If— “(1) property was acquired by a shareholder in the liquidation of a corporation in cancellation or redemption of stock, and “(2) with respect to such acquisition— “(A) gain was realized, but “(B) as the result of an election made by the shareholder under section 333, the extent to which gain was recognized was determined under section 333, “then the basis shall be the same as the basis of such stock cancelled or redeemed in the liquidation, decreased in the amount of any money received by the shareholder, and increased in the amount of gain recognized to him.” The Government in each case relies solely on the tax benefit rule — a judicially developed principle that allays some of the inflexibilities of the annual accounting system. An annual accounting system is a practical necessity if the federal income tax is to produce revenue ascertainable and payable at regular intervals. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 365 (1931). Nevertheless, strict adherence to an annual accounting system would create transactional inequities. Often an apparently completed transaction will reopen unexpectedly in a subsequent tax year, rendering the initial reporting improper. For instance, if a taxpayer held a note that became apparently uncollectible early in the taxable year, but the debtor made an unexpected financial recovery before the close of the year and paid the debt, the transaction would have no tax consequences for the taxpayer, for the repayment of the principal would be recovery of capital. If, however, the debtor’s financial recovery and the resulting repayment took place after the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer would have a deduction for the apparently bad debt in the first year under § 166(a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 166(a). Without the tax benefit rule, the repayment in the second year, representing a return of capital, would not be taxable. The second transaction, then, although economically identical to the first, could, because of the differences in accounting, yield drastically different tax consequences. The Government, by allowing a deduction that it could not have known to be improper at the time, would be foreclosed from recouping any of the tax saved because of the improper deduction. Recognizing and seeking to avoid the possible distortions of income, the courts have long required the taxpayer to recognize the repayment in the second year as income. See, e. g., Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 338 (1939), aff’d sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 60 (CA7), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 658 (1940); South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Commis sioner, 26 B. T. A. 1429 (1932); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 Harv. L. Rev., 129, 176, 178, and n. 172 (1943) (hereinafter Plumb). The taxpayers and the Government in these eases propose different formulations of the tax benefit rule. The taxpayers contend that the rule requires the inclusion of amounts recovered in later years, and they do not view the events in these cases as “recoveries.” The Government, on the other hand, urges that the tax benefit rule requires the inclusion of amounts previously deducted if later events are inconsistent with the deductions; it insists that no “recovery” is necessary to the application of the rule. Further, it asserts that the events in these cases are inconsistent with the deductions taken by the taxpayers. We are not in complete agreement with either view. An examination of the purpose and accepted applications of the tax benefit rule reveals that a “recovery” will not always be necessary to invoke the tax benefit rule. The purpose of the rule is not simply to tax “recoveries.” On the contrary, it is to approximate the results produced by a tax system based on transactional rather than annual accounting. See generally Bittker & Kanner 270; Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate Liquidations and Contributions to Capital: Recent Developments, 56 Notre Dame Law. 215, 221, 232, (1980); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 Tax L. Rev. 329 (1948) (hereinafter Tye). It has long been accepted that a taxpayer using accrual accounting who accrues and deducts an expense in a tax year before it becomes payable and who for some reason eventually does not have to pay the liability must then take into income the amount of the expense earlier deducted. See, e. g., Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 456 F. 2d 622 (CA5 1972) (per curiam); Bear Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 430 F. 2d 152 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 1021 (1971); Haynsworth v. Commissioner, 68 T. C. 703 (1977), affirmance order, 609 F. 2d 1007 (CA5 1979); G. M. Standifer Construction Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 184, 186-187 (1934), petition for review dism’d, 78 F. 2d 285 (CA9 1935). The bookkeeping entry canceling the liability, though it increases the balance sheet net worth of the taxpayer, does not fit within any ordinary definition of “recovery.” Thus, the taxpayers’ formulation of the rule neither serves the purposes of the rule nor accurately reflects the cases that establish the rule. Further, the taxpayers’ proposal would introduce an undesirable formalism into the application of the tax benefit rule. Lower courts have been able to stretch the definition of “recovery” to include a great variety of events. For instance, in cases of corporate liquidations, courts have viewed the corporation’s receipt of its own stock as a “recovery,” reasoning that, even though the instant that the corporation receives the stock it becomes worthless, the stock has value as it is turned over to the corporation, and that ephemeral value represents a recovery for the corporation. See, e. g., Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F. 2d, at 382 (alternative holding). Or, payment to another party may be imputed to the taxpayer, giving rise to a recovery. See First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614 F. 2d, at 1146 (alternative holding). Imposition of a requirement that there be a recovery would, in many cases, simply require the Government to cast its argument in different and unnatural terminology, without adding anything to the analysis. The basic purpose of the tax benefit rule is to achieve rough transactional parity in tax, see n. 12, supra, and to protect the Government and the taxpayer from the adverse effects of reporting a transaction on the basis of assumptions that an event in a subsequent year proves to have been erroneous. Such an event, unforeseen at the time of an earlier deduction, may in many cases require the application of the tax benefit rule. We do not, however, agree that this consequence invariably follows. Not every unforeseen event will require the taxpayer to report income in the amount of his earlier deduction. On the contrary, the tax benefit rule will “cancel out” an earlier deduction only when a careful examination shows that the later event is indeed fundamentally inconsistent with the premise on which the deduction was initially based. That is, if that event had occurred within the same taxable year, it would have foreclosed the deduction. In some cases, a subsequent recovery by the taxpayer will be the only event that would be fundamentally inconsistent with the provision granting the deduction. In such a case, only actual recovery by the taxpayer would justify application of the tax benefit rule. For example, if a calendar-year taxpayer made a rental payment on December 15 for a 30-day lease deductible in the current year under § 162(a)(3), see Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(l), 26 CFR § 1.461-l(a)(l) (1982); e. g., Zaninovich v. Commissioner, 616 F. 2d 429 (CA9 1980), the tax benefit rule would not require the recognition of income if the leased premises were destroyed by fire on January 10. The resulting inability of the taxpayer to occupy the building would be an event not fundamentally inconsistent with his prior deduction as an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162(a). The loss is attributable to the business and therefore is consistent with the deduction of the rental payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense. On the other hand, had the premises not burned and, in January, the taxpayer decided to use them to house his family rather than to continue the operation of his business, he would have converted the leasehold to personal use. This would be an event fundamentally inconsistent with the business use on which the deduction was based. In the case of the fire, only if the lessor — by virtue of some provision in the lease — had refunded the rental payment would the taxpayer be required under the tax benefit rule to recognize income on the subsequent destruction of the building. In other words, the subsequent recovery of the previously deducted rental payment would be the only event inconsistent with the provision allowing the deduction. It therefore is evident that the tax benefit rule must be applied on a case-by-case basis. A court must consider the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of the purpose and function of the provisions granting the deductions. When the later event takes place in the context of a nonrecognition provision of the Code, there will be an inherent tension between the tax benefit rule and the nonrecognition provision. See Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 601 F. 2d 734, 742 (CA5 1979); id., at 751 (Rubin, J., dissenting); cf. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 (1943) (tension between exclusion of gifts from income and treatment of cancellation of indebtedness as income). We cannot resolve that tension with a blanket rule that the tax benefit rule will always prevail. Instead, we must focus on the particular provisions of the Code at issue in any case. The formulation that we endorse today follows clearly from the long development of the tax benefit rule. Justice Stevens’ assertion that there is no suggestion in the early cases or from the early commentators that the rule could ever be applied in any case that did not involve a physical recovery, post, at 406-408, is incorrect. The early cases frequently framed the rule in terms consistent with our view and irreconcilable with that of the dissent. See Barnett v. Com missioner, 39 B. T. A. 864, 867 (1939) (“Finally, the present case is analogous to a number of others, where . . . [w]hen some event occurs which is inconsistent with a deduction taken in a prior year, adjustment may have to be made by reporting a balancing item in income for the year in which the change occurs”) (emphasis added); Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A., at 341 (“When recovery or some other event which is inconsistent with what has been done in the past occurs, adjustment must be made in reporting income for the year in which the change occurs”) (emphasis added); South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A., at 1432 (“[W]hen an adjustment occurs which is inconsistent with what has been done in the past in the determination of tax liability, the adjustment should be reflected in reporting income for the year in which it occurs”) (emphasis added). The reliance of the dissent on the early commentators is equally misplaced, for the articles cited in the dissent, like the early cases, often stated the rule in terms of inconsistent events. Finally, Justice Stevens’ dissent relies heavily on the codification in § 111 of the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, which requires the taxpayer to include in income only the amount of the deduction that gave rise to a tax benefit, see n. 12, supra. That provision does, as the dissent observes, speak of a “recovery.” By its terms, it only applies to bad debts, taxes, and delinquency amounts. Yet this Court has held, Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 505-506 (1943), and it has always been accepted since, that § 111 does not limit the application of the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule. On the contrary, it lists a few applications and represents a general endorsement of the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule to other situations within the inclusionary part of the rule. The failure to mention inconsistent events in § 111 no more suggests that they do not trigger the application of the tax benefit rule than the failure to mention the recovery of a capital loss suggests that it does not, see Dobson, supra. Justice Stevens also suggests that we err in recognizing transactional equity as the reason for the tax benefit rule. It is difficult to understand why even the clearest recovery should be taxed if not for the concern with transactional equity, see supra, at 377. Nor does the concern with transactional equity entail a change in our approach to the annual accounting system. Although the tax system relies basically on annual accounting, see Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S., at 365, the tax benefit rule eliminates some of the distortions that would otherwise arise from such a system. See, e. g., Bittker & Kanner 268-270; Tye 350; Plumb 178, and n. 172. The limited nature of the rule and its effect on the annual accounting principle bears repetition: only if the occurrence of the event in the earlier year would have resulted in the disallowance of the deduction can the Commissioner require a compensating recognition of income when the event occurs in the later year. Our approach today is consistent with our decision in Nash v. United States, 398 U. S. 1 (1970). There, we rejected the Government’s argument that the tax benefit rule required a taxpayer who incorporated a partnership under § 351 to include in income the amount of the bad debt reserve of the partnership. The Government’s theory was that, although § 351 provides that there will be no gain or loss on the transfer of assets to a controlled corporation in such a situation, the partnership had taken bad debt deductions to create the reserve, see § 166(c), and when the partnership terminated, it no longer needed the bad debt reserve. We noted that the receivables were transferred to the corporation along with the bad debt reserve. Id,., at 5, and n. 5. Not only was there no “recovery,” id., at 4, but there was no inconsistent event of any kind. That the fair market value of the receivables was equal to the face amount less the bad debt reserve, ibid., reflected that the reserve, and the deductions that constituted it, were still an accurate estimate of the debts that would ultimately prove uncollectible, and the deduction was therefore completely consistent with the later transfer of the receivables to the incorporated business. See Citizens’ Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 798 (Del. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 462 F. 2d 751 (CA3 1972); Rev. Rul. 78-279, 1978-2 Cum. Bull. 135; Rev. Rul. 78-278, 1978-2 Cum. Bull. 134; see generally O’Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 Tax L. Rev. 215, 219-221 (1972). In the cases currently before us, then, we must undertake an examination of the particular provisions of the Code that govern these transactions to determine whether the deductions taken by the taxpayers were actually inconsistent with later events and whether specific nonrecognition provisions prevail over the principle of the tax benefit rule. I — I » — I In Hillsboro, the key provision is § 164(e). That section grants the corporation a deduction for taxes imposed on its shareholders but paid by the corporation. It also denies the shareholders any deduction for the tax. In this case, the Commissioner has argued that the refund of the taxes by the State to the shareholders is the equivalent of the payment of a dividend from Hillsboro to its shareholders. If Hillsboro does not recognize income in the amount of the earlier deduction, it will have deducted a dividend. Since the general structure of the corporate tax provisions does not permit deduction of dividends, the Commissioner concludes that the payment to the shareholders must be inconsistent with the original deduction and therefore requires the inclusion of the amount of the taxes as income under the tax benefit rule. In evaluating this argument, it is instructive to consider what the tax consequences of the payment of a shareholder tax by the corporation would be without § 164(e) and compare them to the consequences under § 164(e). Without § 164(e), the corporation would not be entitled to a deduction, for the tax is not imposed on it. See Treas. Reg. §1.164-l(a), 26 CFR §1.164-l(a) (1982); Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 322 U. S. 526, 527-530 (1944). If the corporation has earnings and profits, the shareholder would have to recognize income in the amount of the taxes, because a payment by a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders is a constructive dividend. See §§ 301(c), 316(a); e. g., Ireland v. United States, 621 F. 2d 731, 735 (CA5 1980); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶7.05 (4th ed. 1979). The shareholder, however, would be entitled to a deduction since the constructive dividend is used to satisfy his tax liability. § 164(a)(2). Thus, for the shareholder, the transaction would be a wash: he would recognize the amount of the tax as income, but he would have an offsetting deduction for the tax. For the corporation, there would be no tax consequences, for the payment of a dividend gives rise to neither income nor a deduction. 26 U. S. C. §311(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Under § 164(e), the economics of the transaction of course remain unchanged: the corporation is still satisfying a liability of the shareholder and is therefore paying a constructive dividend. The tax consequences are, however, significantly different, at least for the corporation. The transaction is still a wash for the shareholder; although § 164(e) denies him the deduction to which he would otherwise be entitled, he need not recognize income on the constructive dividend, Treas. Reg. § 1.164-7, 26 CFR § 1.164-7 (1982). But the corporation is entitled to a deduction that would not otherwise be available. In other words, the only effect of § 164(e) is to permit the corporation to deduct a dividend. Thus, we cannot agree with the Commissioner that, simply because the events here give rise to a deductible dividend, they cannot be consistent with the deduction. In at least some circumstances, a deductible dividend is within the contemplation of the Code. The question we must answer is whether § 164(e) permits a deductible dividend in these circumstances — when the money, though initially paid into the state treasury, ultimately reaches the shareholder — or whether the deductible dividend is available, as the Commissioner urges, only when the money remains in the state treasury, as properly assessed and collected tax revenue. Rephrased, our question now is whether Congress, in granting this special favor to corporations that paid dividends by satisfying the liability of their shareholders, was concerned with the reason the money was paid out by the corporation or with the use to which it was ultimately put. Since § 164(e) represents a break with the usual rules governing corporate distributions, the structure of the Code does not provide any guidance on the reach of the provision. This Court has described the provision as “prompted by the plight of various banking corporations which paid and voluntarily absorbed the burden of certain local taxes imposed upon their shareholders, but were not permitted to deduct those payments from gross income.” Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, supra, at 531 (footnote omitted). The section, in substantially similar form, has been part of the Code since the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227. The provision was added by the Senate, but its Committee Report merely mentions the deduction without discussing it, see S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1921). The only discussion of the provision appears to be that between Dr. T. S. Adams and Senator Smoot at the Senate hearings. Dr. Adams’ statement explains why the States imposed the property tax on the shareholders and collected it from the banks, but it does not cast much light on the reason for the deduction. Hearings on H. R. 8245 before the Committee on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 250-251 (1921) (statement of Dr. T. S. Adams, tax advisor, Treasury Department). Senator Smoot’s response, however, is more revealing: “I have been a director in a bank ... for over 20 years. They have paid that tax ever since I have owned a share of stock in the bank. ... I know nothing about it. I do not take 1 cent of credit for deductions, and the banks are entitled to it. They pay it out.” Id., at 251 (emphasis added). The payment by the corporations of a liability that Congress knew was not a tax imposed on them gave rise to the entitlement to a deduction; Congress was unconcerned that the corporations took a deduction for amounts that did not satisfy their tax liability. It apparently perceived the shareholders and the corporations as independent of one another, each “know[ing] nothing about” the payments by the other. In those circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended that the corporation have no deduction if the State turned the tax revenues over to these independent parties. We conclude that the purpose of § 164(e) was to provide relief for corporations making these payments, and the focus of Congress was on the act of payment rather than on the ultimate use of the funds by the State. As long as the payment itself was not negated by a refund to the corporation, the change in character of the funds in the hands of the State does not require the corporation to recognize income, and we reverse the judgment below. I — I The problem in Bliss is more complicated. Bliss took a deduction under § 162(a), so we must begin by examining that provision. Section 162(a) permits a deduction for the “ordinary and necessary expenses” of carrying on a trade or business. The deduction is predicated on the consumption of the asset in the trade or business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3, 26 CFR §1.162-3 (1982) (“Taxpayers . . . should include in expenses the charges for materials and supplies only in the amount that they are actually consumed and used in operation in the taxable year . . .”) (emphasis added). If the taxpayer later sells the asset rather than consuming it in furtherance of his trade or business, it is quite clear that he would lose his deduction, for the basis of the asset would be zero, see, e. g., Spitalny v. United States, 430 F. 2d 195 (CA9 1970), so he would recognize the full amount of the proceeds on sale as gain. See §§ 1001(a), (c). In general, if the taxpayer converts the expensed asset to some other, non-business use, that action is inconsistent with his earlier deduction, and the tax benefit rule would require inclusion in income of the amount of the unwarranted deduction. That nonbusiness use is inconsistent with a deduction for an ordinary and necessary business expense is clear from an examination of the Code. While § 162(a) permits a deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses, §262 explicitly denies a deduction for personal expenses. In the 1916 Act, the two provisions were a single section. See §5(a)(First), 39 Stat. 756. The provision has been uniformly interpreted as providing a deduction only for those expenses attributable to the business of the taxpayer. See, e. g., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145 (1928); Hearings on Proposed Revision of Revenue Laws before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 54 (1938) (“a taxpayer should be granted a reasonable deduction for the direct expenses he has incurred in connection with his income”) (emphasis added); see generally, 1 Bittker, supra n. 9, ¶20.2. Thus, if a corporation turns expensed assets to the analog of personal consumption, as Bliss did here — distribution to shareholders — it would seem that it should take into income the amount of the earlier deduction. That conclusion, however, does not resolve this case, for the distribution by Bliss to its shareholders is governed by a provision of the Code that specifically shields the taxpayer from recognition of gain — § 336. We must therefore proceed to inquire whether this is the sort of gain that goes unrecognized under § 336. Our examination of the background of § 336 and its place within the framework of tax law convinces us that it does not prevent the application of the tax benefit rule. Section 336 was enacted as part of the 1954 Code. It codified the doctrine of General Utilities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200, 206 (1935), that a corporation does not recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders. Before the enactment of the statutory provision, the rule was expressed in the regulations, which provided that the corporation would not recognize gain or loss, “however [the assets] may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their acquisition.” Treas. Regs. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953) (emphasis added). The Senate Report recognized this regulation as the source of the new §336, S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 258 (1954). The House Report explained its version of the provision: “Thus, the fact that the property distributed has appreciated or depreciated in value over its adjusted basis to the distributing corporation will in no way alter the application of subsection (a) [providing nonrecognition].” H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A90 (1954) (emphasis added). This background indicates that the real concern of the provision is to prevent recognition of market appreciation that has not been realized by an arm’s-length transfer to an unrelated party rather than to shield all types of income that might arise from the disposition of an asset. Despite the breadth of the nonrecognition language in § 336, the rule of nonrecognition clearly is not without exception. For instance, § 336 does not bar the recapture under § 1245 and § 1250 of excessive depreciation taken on distributed assets. §§ 1245(a), 1250(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(b), 1.1250-l(c)(2), 26 CFR §§ 1.1245-6(b), 1.1250-l(c)(2) (1982). Even in the absence of countervailing statutory provisions, courts have never read the command of nonrecognition in § 336 as absolute. The “assignment of income” doctrine has always applied to distributions in liquidation. See, e. g., Siegel v. United States, 464 F. 2d 891 (CA9 1972), cert. dism’d, 410 U. S. 918 (1973); Williamson v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 279, 292 F. 2d 524 (1961); see also Idaho First National Bank v. United States, 265 F. 2d 6 (CA9 1959) (decided before General Utilities codified in §336). That judicial doctrine prevents taxpayers from avoiding taxation by shifting income from the person or entity that earns it to someone who pays taxes at a lower rate. Since income recognized by the corporation is subject to the corporate tax and is again taxed at the individual level upon distribution to the shareholder, shifting of income from a corporation to a shareholder can be particularly attractive: it eliminates one level of taxation. Responding to that incentive, corporations have attempted to distribute to shareholders fully performed contracts or accounts receivable and then to invoke § 336 to avoid taxation on the income. In spite of the language of nonrecognition, the courts have applied the assignment-of-income doctrine and required the corporation to recognize the income. Section 336, then, clearly does not shield the taxpayer from recognition of all income on the distribution. Next, we look to a companion provision — § 337, which governs sales of assets followed by distribution of the proceeds in liquidation. It uses essentially the same broad language to shield the corporation from the recognition of gain on the sale of the assets. The similarity in language alone would make the construction of § 337 relevant in interpreting § 336. In addition, the function of the two provisions reveals that they should be construed in tandem. Section 337 was enacted in response to the distinction created by United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U. S. 451 (1950), and Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945). Under those cases, a corporation that liquidated by distributing appreciated assets to its shareholders recognized no income, as now provided in § 336, even though its shareholders might sell the assets shortly after the distribution. See Cumberland. If the corporation sold the assets, though, it would recognize income on the sale, and a sale by the shareholders after distribution in kind might be attributed to the corporation. See Court Holding. To eliminate the necessarily formalistic distinctions and the uncertainties created by Court Holding and Cumberland, Congress enacted § 337, permitting the corporation to adopt a plan of liquidation, sell its assets without recognizing gain or loss at the corporate level, and distribute the proceeds to the shareholders. The very purpose of § 337 was to create the same consequences as §336. See Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F. 2d 110 (CA6 1973); S. Rep. No. 1622, supra, at 258. There are some specific differences between the two provisions, largely aimed at governing the period during which the liquidating corporation sells its assets, a problem that does not arise when the corporation distributes its assets to its shareholders. For instance, § 337 does not shield the income produced by the sale of inventory in the ordinary course of business; that income will be taxed at the corporate level before distribution of the proceeds to the shareholders. See § 337(b). These differences indicate that Congress did not intend to allow corporations to escape taxation on business income earned while carrying on business in the corporate form; what it did intend to shield was market appreciation. The question whether § 337 protects the corporation from recognizing income because of unwarranted deductions has arisen frequently, and the rule is now well established that the tax benefit rule overrides the nonrecognition provision. Connery v. United States, 460 F. 2d 1130 (CA3 1972); Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F. 2d 1283 (CA10), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 958 (1969); Krajeck v. United States, 75-1 USTC ¶9492 (ND 1975); S. E. Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423 (Ark. 1970); Anders v. United States, 199 Ct. Cl. 1, 462 F. 2d 1147, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064 (1972); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T. C. 663 (1975); Rev. Rul. 61-214, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 60; Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate Liquidations: Recent Developments, 56 Notre Dame Law. 215, 221 (1980); Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets in Corporate Liquidations, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1636, 1638-39 (1982); cf. Spitalny v. United States, 430 F. 2d 195 (CA9 1970) (when deduction and liquidation occur within a single year, though tax benefit rule does not apply, principle does). Congress has recently undertaken major revisions of the Code, see Economic Recovery-Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, and has made changes in the liquidation provisions, e. g., Pub. L. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2904 (amending § 337); Pub. L. 95-628, 92 Stat. 3628 (same), but it did not act to change this longstanding, universally accepted rule. If the construction of the language in § 337 as permitting recognition in these circumstances has the acquiescence of Congress, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978), we must conclude that Congress intended the same construction of the same language in the parallel provision in § 336. Thus, the legislative history of §336, the application of other general rules of tax law, and the construction of the identical language in § 337 all indicate that § 336 does not permit a liquidating corporation to avoid the tax benefit rule. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that, on liquidation, Bliss must include in income the amount of the unwarranted deduction. V Bliss paid the assessment on an increase of $60,000 in its taxable income. In the District Court, the parties stipulated that the value of the grain was $56,565, but the record does not show what the original cost of the grain was or what portion of it remained at the time of liquidation. The proper increase in taxable income is the portion of the cost of the grain attributable to the amount on hand at the time of liquidation. In Bliss, then, we remand for a determination of that amount. In Hillsboro, the taxpayer sought a redetermination in the Tax Court rather than paying the tax, so no further proceedings are necessary, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. Section 164(e) provides: “Where a corporation pays a tax imposed on a shareholder on his interest as a shareholder, and where the shareholder does not reimburse the corporation, then— “(1) the deduction allowed by subsection (a) shall be allowed to the corporation; and “(2) no deduction shall be allowed the shareholder for such tax.” Subsection (a) provides, in part: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following taxes shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year within which paid or accrued: “(2) State and local personal property taxes.” Although the returns of the shareholders of the bank are not before us, the Commissioner explained that they were required to recognize the refund as income. See 641 F. 2d 529, 533, and n. 4 (CA7 1981) (Pell, J., dissenting). Section 162(a) provides in relevant part: “There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . Section 336 provides: “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 453B (relating to disposition of installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation.” 26 U. S. C. §336 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Section 333 provides, in relevant part: “(a) In the case of property distributed in complete liquidation of a domestic corporation . . . , if— “(1) the liquidation is made in pursuance of a plan of liquidation adopted, and “(2) the distribution is in complete cancellation or redemption of all the stock, and the transfer of all the property under the liquidation occurs within some one calendar month, “then in the case of each qualified electing shareholder . . . gain on the shares owned by him at the time of the adoption of the plan of liquidation shall be recognized only to the extent provided in subsections (e) and (f). “(e) In the case of a qualified electing shareholder other than a corporation— “(1) there shall be recognized, and treated as a dividend, so much of the gain as is not in excess of his ratable share of the earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28,1913, such earnings and profits to be determined as of the close of the month in which the transfer in liquidation occurred under subsection (a)(2), but without diminution by reason of distributions made during such month; but by including in the computation .thereof all amounts accrued up to the date on which the transfer of all the property under the liquidation is completed; and “(2) there shall be recognized, and treated as short-term or long-term capital gain, as the case may be, so much of the remainder of the gain as is not in excess of the amount by which the value of that portion of the assets received by him which consists of money, or of stock or securities acquired by the corporation after December 31, 1953, exceeds his ratable share of such earnings and profits.” Section 334(c) provides: In No. 81-485, the Solicitor General represents the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, while in No. 81-930, he represents the United States. We refer to the Commissioner and the United States collectively as “the Government.” Although the rule originated in the courts, it has the implicit approval of Congress, which enacted 26 U. S. C. § 111 as a limitation on the rule. See n. 12, infra. A rule analogous to the tax benefit rule protects the taxpayer who is required to report income received in one year under claim of right that he later ends up repaying. Under that rule, he is allowed a deduction in the subsequent year. See generally 26 U. S. C. § 1341; 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 6.3 (1981). When the event proving the deduction improper occurs after the close of the taxable year, even if the statute of limitations has not run, the Commissioner’s proper remedy is to invoke the tax benefit rule and require inclusion in the later year rather than to reopen the earlier year. See Lexmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T. C. 185 (1953); South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 1429, 1432 (1932); 1 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 7.34 (J. Doheny rev. ed. 1981); Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 265, 266 (1978) (hereinafter Bittker & Kanner). Much of Justice Blackmun’s dissent takes issue with this well-settled rule. The inclusion of the income in the year of the deductions by amending the returns for that year is not before us in these cases, for none of the parties has suggested such a result, no doubt because the rule is so settled. It is not at all clear what would happen on the remand that Justice Blackmun desires. Neither taxpayer has ever sought to file an amended return. The statute of limitations has now run on the years to which the dissent would attribute the income, § 6501(a), and we have no indication in the record that the Government has held those years open for any other reason. Even if the question were before us, we could not accept the view of Justice Blackmun’s dissent. It is, of course, true that the tax benefit rule is not a precise way of dealing with the transactional inequities that occur as a result of the annual accounting system, post, at 423, 426. See n. 12, infra. Justice Blackmun’s approach, however, does not eliminate the problem; it only multiplies the number of rules. If the statute of limitations has run on the earlier year, the dissent recognizes that the rule that we now apply must apply. Post, at 425. Thus, under the proposed scheme, the only difference is that, if the inconsistent event fortuitously occurs between the end of the year of the deduction and the running of the statute of limitations, the Commissioner must reopen the earlier year or permit an amended return even though it is settled that the acceptance of such a return after the date for filing a return is not covered by statute but within the discretion of the Commissioner. See, e. g., Koch v. Alexander, 561 F. 2d 1115 (CA4 1977) (per curiam); Miskovsky v. United States, 414 F. 2d 954 (CA3 1969). In any other situation, the income must be recognized in the later year. Surely a single rule covering all situations would be preferable to several rules that do not alleviate any of the disadvantages of the single rule. A second flaw in Justice Blackmun’s approach lies in his assertion that the practice he proposes is like any correction made after audit. Changes on audit reflect the proper tax treatment of items under the facts as they were known at the end of the taxable year. The tax benefit rule is addressed to a different problem — that of events that occur after the close of the taxable year. In any event, whatever the merits of amending the return of the year of the improper deduction might originally have been, we think it too late in the day to change the rule. Neither the judicial origins of the rule nor the subsequent codification permits the approach suggested by Justice Blackmun. The dissent suggests that the reason that the early cases expounding the tax benefit rule required inclusion in the later year was that the statute of limitations barred adjustment in the earlier year. Post, at 423-424, n. That suggestion simply does not reflect the cases cited. In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931), the judgment of the Court of Appeals reflected Justice Blackmun’s approach, holding that the amount recovered in the later year was not income in that year but that the taxpayer had to amend its returns for the years of the deductions. Id., at 362. This Court reversed, stating: “That the recovery made by respondent in 1920 was gross income for that year . . . cannot, we think, be doubted.” Id., at 363. (Emphasis added.) Neither does Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U. S. 278 (1953), a case dealing with income received under claim of right, provide any support for this novel theory. On the contrary, the Court’s discussion of the statute of limitations, cited by the dissent, in context, is as follows: “A rule which required that the adjustment be made in the earlier year of receipt instead of the later year of repayment would generally be unfavorable to taxpayers, for the statute of limitations would frequently bar any adjustment of the tax liability for the earlier year. Congress has enacted an annual accounting system under which income is counted up at the end of each year. It would be disruptive of an orderly collection of the revenue to rule that the accounting must be done over again to reflect events occurring after the year for which the accounting is made, and would violate the spirit of the annual accounting system.” Id., at 284-285 (footnote omitted). Even the earliest cases, then, reflect the currently accepted view of the tax benefit rule. Further, § 111, the partial codification of the tax benefit rule, see n. 8, supra, contradicts Justice Blackmun’s view. It provides that gross income for a year does not include a specified portion of a recovery of amounts earlier deducted, implying that the remainder of the recovery is to be included in gross income for that year. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (1964); S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 79 (1942). Even if the judicial origins of the rule supported Justice Black-mun, we would still be obliged to bow to the will of Congress. As the rule developed, a number of theories supported taxation in the later year. One explained that the taxpayer who had taken the deduction “consented” to “return” it if events proved him not entitled to it, e. g., Philadelphia National Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923, 925 (ED Pa. 1942), while another explained that the deduction offset income in the earlier year, which became “latent” income that might be recaptured, e. g., National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 875, 876-877 (CA91940); Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Related Problems, 20 Taxes 473, 476 (1942). Still a third view maintained that the later recognition of income was a balancing entry. E. g., South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 1429, 1431 (1932). All these views reflected that the initial accounting for the item must be corrected to present a true picture of income. While annual accounting precludes reopening the earlier year, it does not prevent a less precise correction — far superior to none — in the current year, analogous to the practice of financial accountants. See W. Meigs, A. Mosich, C. Johnson, & T. Keller, Intermediate Accounting 109 (3d ed. 1974). This concern with more accurate measurement of income underlies the tax benefit rule and always has. Even this rule did not create complete transactional equivalence. In the second version of the transaction discussed in the text, the taxpayer might have realized no benefit from the deduction, if, for instance, he had no taxable income for that year. Application of the tax benefit rule as originally developed would require the taxpayer to recognize income on the repayment, so that the net result of the collection of the principal amount of the debt would be recognition of income. Similarly, the tax rates might change between the two years, so that a deduction and an inclusion, though equal in amount, would not produce exactly offsetting tax consequences. Congress enacted § 111 to deal with part of this problem. Although a change in the rates may still lead to differences in taxes due, see Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 659, 381 F. 2d 399 (1967), § 111 provides that the taxpayer can exclude from income the amount that did not give rise to some tax benefit. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 505-506 (1943). This exclusionary rule and the inclusionary rule described in the text are generally known together as the tax benefit rule. It is the inclusionary aspect of the rule with which we are currently concerned. See, e. g., Bittker & Kanner 267; cf. Zysman, Income Derived from the Recovery of Deductions, 19 Taxes 29, 30 (1941) (We are “not concerned with a theoretical or pure economic concept of income, but with gross income within the meaning of the statute”). Although Justice Stevens insists that this situation falls within the standard meaning of “recovery,” it does so only in the sense that an increase in balance sheet net worth is to be considered a recovery. Post, at 416-417, n. 26. But in Bliss, Justice Stevens asserts that there is no recovery. There, the corporation’s balance sheet shows zero as the historic cost of the grain on hand, because the corporation expensed the asset upon acquisition. At the date of liquidation, the historic cost of the grain on hand was in fact greater than zero, and an accurate balance sheet would have reflected an asset account balance greater than zero. The necessary adjustment thus reflects an increase in balance sheet net worth. Despite Justice Stevens’ assertion that Tennessee-Carolina was wrong, post, at 417, n. 26, the case fits what seems to be his definition of a recovery — an enhancement of the taxpayer’s wealth — for the corporation in Tennessee-Carolina received stock worth more than the balance sheet book value of its assets. See n. 13, supra. Thus we disagree with the assertion that the recovery rule is a bright-line rule easily applied. Justice Stevens accuses us of creating confusion at this point in the analysis by requiring the courts to distinguish “inconsistent events” from “fundamentally inconsistent events.” Post, at 418. That line is not the line we draw; rather, we draw the line between merely unexpected events and inconsistent events. This approach differs from that proposed by the Government in that the Government has not attempted to explain why two events are inconsistent. Apparently, in the Government’s view, any unexpected event is inconsistent with an earlier deduction. That view we cannot accept. Justice Stevens apparently disagrees with this rule, for, although he concurs in the result in Hillsboro, he asserts that the events there would have resulted in denial of the deduction had they all occurred in one year. Post, at 418. We find it difficult to believe that Congress placed such a premium on having a transaction straddle two tax years. Justice Stevens questions whether this amount was properly deductible under § 162(a)(3) and seems to suggest that if it was, Congress meant the deduction to be irrevocable. Post, at 415-416, n. 25. It is clear that § 162(a)(3) permits the deduction of prepaid expenses that will benefit the taxpayer for a short time into the next taxable year, as in our example, rather than benefiting the taxpayer substantially beyond the taxable year. See generally 1 B. Bittker, supra n. 9, ¶ 20.4.1. The dissent’s view that the preferable approach is to scrutinize the deduction more carefully in the year it is taken ignores two basic problems. First, reasons unrelated to the certainty that the taxpayer will eventually consume the asset as expected often enter into the decision when to allow the deduction. For instance, the desire to save taxpayers the burden of careful allocation of relatively small expenditures favors the allowance of the entire deduction in a single year of some business expenditures attributable to operations after the close of the taxable year. See generally ibid. Second, we simply cannot predict the future, no matter how carefully we scrutinize the deduction in the earlier year. For instance, in the case of the bad debt that is eventually repaid, we already require that the debt be apparently worthless in the year of deduction, see § 166(a)(1), but we often find that the future does not conform to earlier perceptions, and the taxpayer collects the debt. Then, “the deductions are practical necessities due to our inability to read the future, and the inclusion of the recovery in income is necessary to offset the deduction.” South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A., at 1432. The loss is properly attributable to the business because the acceptance of the risk of loss is a reasonable business judgment that the courts ordinarily will not question. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 113 (1933); 1 B. Bittker, supra n. 9, ¶20.3.2. See 1 B. Bittker, supra n. 9, ¶ 20.2.2 (“[F]ood and shelter are quintessential nondeductible personal expenses”). See also infra, at 395-396. An unreserved endorsement of the Government’s formulation might dictate the results in a broad range of cases not before us. See, e. g., Brief for United States in No. 81-930 and for Respondent in No. 81-485, p. 20; Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 81-485, p. 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. For instance, the Government’s position implies that an individual proprietor who makes a gift of an expensed asset must recognize the amount of the expense as income, but cf. Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F. 2d 331, 335 (CA5 1954). See generally 2A J. Rabkin & M. Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 6.01(3) (1982) (discussing Commissioner’s treatment of gifts of expensed assets). Similarly, the Government’s view suggests the conclusion that one who dies and leaves an expensed asset to his heirs would, in his last return, recognize income in the amount of the earlier deduction. Our decision in the cases before us now, however, will not determine the outcome in these other situations; it will only demonstrate the proper analysis. Those cases will require consideration of the treatment of gifts and legacies as well as §§ 1245(b)(1), (2), and 1250(d)(1), (2), which are a partial codification of the tax benefit rule, see O’Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 Tax L. Rev. 215, 216 (1972), and which exempt dispositions by gift and transfers at death from the operation of the general depreciation recapture rules. Although there may be an inconsistent event in the personal use of an expensed asset, that event occurs in the context of a nonrecognition rule, see, e. g., Campbell v. Prothro, supra, at 336; 1 B. Bittker, supra n. 9, ¶ 5.21, and resolution of these cases would require a determination whether the nonrecognition rule or the tax benefit rule prevails. Justice Stevens’ attempt to discount the explicit statement in Estate of Block that inconsistent events would trigger the recognition of income, post, at 408, n. 9, is singularly unpersuasive. The Board of Tax Appeals used the word “recovery” later in the opinion because it was faced with a recovery in that case, not because it meant to repudiate hastily its discussion in the same opinion of the general rule. Similarly, the mere assertion that the broad formulation in Barnett followed a discussion of a Treasury Regulation, post, at 408, n. 10, does not support the view of the dissent that the concept of inconsistent events represents a break with the early eases. “The rule requiring taxation of income from the recovery or cancellation of items previously deducted is a remedial expedient, designed to prevent the unjust enrichment of a taxpayer and to offset the benefit derived from a deduction to which, in the light of subsequent events, the taxpayer was not entitled.” Plumb 176 (emphasis added). See also id., at 131, 178. “In a few words, the basic idea of the Tax Benefit Rule is this: If a taxpayer has derived a benefit from a deduction by reducing his taxable income in the year of deduction, he must declare as taxable income any recovery or other change of his status which — ex nunc — makes the original deduction seem unjustified.” Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Related Problems, 20 Taxes 473 (1942) (emphasis added). One author saw his subject — the recovery of deductions — as an example of the broader rule: “Sometimes a subsequent event reveals the income or deductions as reported by the taxpayer to be erroneous. Thus the unexpected recovery of a portion of an amount lost and already deducted reduces the loss as originally determined. There are even cases in which items apparently finally and accurately determined have to be adjusted on account of a subsequent event.” Zysman, Income Derived from the Recovery of Deductions, 19 Taxes 29 (1941) (emphasis added). See, e. g., Bittker & Kanner 266; Tye 330; Plumb 144-145. Justice Stevens seems to fear that our approach to the annual accounting system is inconsistent with Sanford & Brooks in a way that will vest new power in the tax collector to ignore the annual accounting system. The fear is unfounded. In Sanford & Brooks, a taxpayer who had incurred a net loss on a long-term contract managed to recoup the loss in a lawsuit in a later year. The earlier net losses on the contract contributed to net losses for the business in most of the tax years during the performance of the contract. The Court rejected the taxpayer’s contention that it should be able to exclude the award on the theory that the award offset the earlier net losses. This adherence to the annual accounting system is perfectly consistent with the approach we follow in the cases now before us. In situations implicating the tax benefit rule or the analogous doctrine permitting the taxpayer to take a deduction when income recognized earlier under a claim of right must be repaid, see n. 9, supra, the problem is that the taxpayer has mischaracterized some event. Either he has recognized income that eventually turns out not to be income, or he has taken a deduction that eventually turns out not to be a deduction. Neither of these problems arose in Sanford & Brooks. Instead, the problem there was that the taxpayer had properly deducted expenditures and was properly recognizing income but thought that the two should have been matched in the same year. The tax benefit rule does not permit the Commissioner or the taxpayer to rematch properly recognized income with properly deducted expenses; it merely permits a balancing entry when an apparently proper expense turns out to be improper. Justice Stevens attempts to read our prior cases as somehow inconsistent with our approach here. Nash is the only case in which we have dealt with the inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, and, as we have established, there was neither a recovery nor an inconsistent event in that case. In Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943), we considered the exclusionary aspect of the rule. That case involved a recovery that was clearly inconsistent with the deduction, and the only question was whether the deduction had created a benefit. The references to “recovery” in the opinion describe the case before the Court. They do not in any way impose general requirements for inclusion, as the dissent seems to suggest. It is worth noting that a holding requiring no recognition of income is not, as Justice Blackmun’s dissent suggests, a conclusion that the tax benefit rule “has no application to the situation presented.” Post, at 422. As a general principle of tax law, the rule of course applies; it simply does not require the recognition of income. The Commissioner asserts also that Hillsboro deducted the taxes as a contested liability under § 461(f), and that the legislative history of § 461(f) shows that Congress intended that the tax benefit rule apply if a taxpayer successfully contested a liability deducted under § 461(f). We do not view this argument as in any way separate from the Commissioner’s argument under § 164(e). Section 461(f) does not grant deductions of its own force; the expenditure must qualify as deductible in character under some other section. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(a)(l)(iv), 26 CFR § 1.461-2(a)(l)(iv) (1982). If the expenditure does qualify independently as deductible, but, because it is contested, it lacks the certainty otherwise required for deduction, § 461(f) grants the deduction, on the condition that the tax benefit rule will apply. But for the tax benefit rule to apply, there must be some event that is inconsistent with the provision granting the deduction. The question here then remains whether the deduction is appropriate under § 164(e) or whether later events are inconsistent with that deduction. There would be an exception for a shareholder who had not yet earned $200 in interest and dividend income from his stock holdings in this and other corporations during the taxable year. He would be able to exclude up to $200 received in dividend and interest income for the year. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 116(a)(1), (b) (1976 ed., Supp. V). At the time of the Hillsboro transaction, the exclusion was $100. See 26 U. S. C. § 116(a). Dr. Adams testified repeatedly that the banks paid the tax “voluntarily.” Hearings on H. R. 8245 before the Committee on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 250 (1921). Our examination of the legislative history thus leads us to reject Justice Blackmun’s unsupported suggestion that Congress focused on the payment of a tax. Post, at 422. The theory he suggests leads to the conclusion that, even if the State had not refunded the taxes, the bank would not have been entitled to the deduction, because it had not paid a “tax.” It is difficult to believe that the Congress that acted to alleviate “the plight of various banking corporations which paid and voluntarily absorbed the burden,” Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 322 U. S. 526, 531 (1944), intended the result suggested by the dissent. “Paying the dividend was the enjoyment of [the corporate] income. A body corporate can be said to enjoy its income in no other way.” Williamson v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 279, 289, 292 F. 2d 524, 530 (1961). Justice Stevens’ dissent takes issue with this conclusion, characterizing the situation as identical to that in Nash v. United States, 398 U. S. 1 (1970), which he explains as a case in which we held that, although “a business asset matching a prior deduction. . . would not be used up . . . until it had passed to a different taxpayer,” the transfer did not require the recognition of income. Post, at 415. What is misleading in this description is its failure to recognize that in Nash the prior deduction was reflected in the asset transferred because of the contra-asset account: uncollectible accounts. That contra-asset diminished the asset, see generally W. Meigs, A. Mosich, C. Johnson, & T. Keller, Intermediate Accounting 140-141 (3d ed. 1974), and was inseparable from it. Therefore, the transfer of the notes did not establish that they were worth their face value, and there was no inconsistent event. In Bliss, the taxpayers took a deduction for an expense and credited the asset account. Unlike the debit to the expense account in Nash, the debit to the expense account did not reflect any economic decrease in the value of the asset. When the taxpayers transferred the asset, it became clear that the economic decrease would not take place in the hands of Bliss — and possibly never would occur. To see the difference more clearly, consider the views of a third party contemplating purchasing the asset on hand in Nash and one contemplating purchasing the asset on hand in Bliss. In Nash, the purchaser would be willing to pay only the face amount of the receivables less the amount in the contra-asset account — the amount earlier deducted by the taxpayer— because that is all the purchaser could expect to realize on them. In other words, the deduction reflected a real decrease in the value of the asset. In Bliss, on the other hand, the purchaser would be happy to pay the value of the grain, undiminished by the expense deducted by the taxpayer. The deduction and the asset remain separable, and the taxpayer can transfer one without netting out the other. We are aware that Congress considered but failed to enact a bill amending §§ 1245 and 1250 to cover any deduction of the purchase price of property. H. R. 10936, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). That bill would have settled the question here, since it is clear that § 1245 overrides § 336. § 1245(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-6(b), 26 CFR § 1.1245-6(b) (1982). The failure to enact the bill does not suggest that Congress intended that deductions under § 162 not be subject to recapture. Both the House and Senate Committees reported favorably on the bill, S. Rep. No. 94-1346 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1350 (1976), the House passed it, and Congress adjourned without any action by the Senate. See Calendars of the United States House of Representatives and History of Legislation 174 (Final ed. 1977). The Reports suggest that Congress focused on disposition by sale and thought the income subject to recapture in any event, but possibly at capital gains rather than ordinary income rates. S. Rep. No. 94-1346, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 94-1350, supra, at 2. Given this background, we cannot draw any inference from the failure to enact the amendment. For instance, a taxpayer cannot avoid recognizing the interest income on bonds that he owns by clipping the coupons and giving them to another party. See, e. g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930). Indeed, the legislative history of § 336 compels such a result. Section 336 arose out of the same provision in the House bill as did § 311, which provides for nonrecognition of gain on nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property, and the Senate comment on § 311 explicitly provides for the application of the assignment-of-income doctrine. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 247 (1954). In relevant part, § 337 provides: “(a) If within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period. “(b) (1) For purposes of subsection (a), the term ‘property’ does not include— “(A) stock in trade of the corporation, or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the corporation if on hand at the close of the taxable year, and property held by the corporation primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or business, “(B) installment obligations acquired in respect of the sale or exchange (without regard to whether such sale or exchange occurred before, on, or after the date of the adoption of the plan referred to in subsection (a)) of stock in trade or other property described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and “(C) installment obligations acquired in respect of property (other than property described in subparagraph (A)) sold or exchanged before the date of the adoption of such plan of liquidation. “(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, if substantially all of the property described in subparagraph (A) of such paragraph (1) which is attributable to a trade or business of the corporation is, in accordance with this section, sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction, then for purposes of subsection (a) the term ‘property’ includes— “(A) such property so sold or exchanged, and “(B) installment obligations acquired in respect of such sale or exchange. “(c) (1) This section shall not apply to any sale or exchange— “(A) made by a collapsible corporation (as defined in section 341(b)), or “(B) following the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, if section 333 applies with respect to such liquidation.” Some commentators have argued that the correct measure of the income that Bliss should include is the lesser of the amount it deducted or the basis that the shareholders will take in the asset. See Feld, The Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B. U. L. Rev. 443, 463-464 (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 106. Since Bliss has not suggested that, if there is an amount taken into income, it should be less than the amount previously deducted, we need not address the point. As Justice Stevens observes, post, at 419, n. 29, we do not resolve this question. His perception of ambiguities elsewhere in our discussion of the amount recognized as income is simply inaccurate. Our discussion of the tax consequences on the sale of an expensed asset, supra, at 395, does not suggest that the entire amount of proceeds on sale is attributable to the tax benefit rule. Instead, we illustrated that the basis rules automatically lead to inclusion of the amount attributable to the operation of the tax benefit rule. That is, the proceeds will equal the cost plus any appreciation (or less any decrease in value). The appreciation would be recognized as gain (or the decrease as loss) in the ordinary sale, regardless of whether the taxpayer had expensed the asset upon acquisition. The reduction of the basis to zero when the item is expensed ensures that if it is sold rather than consumed the unwarranted deduction will be included in income along with any appreciation, and it is this amount that the tax benefit rule requires to be recognized as income.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WISCONSIN v. CONSTANTINEAU No. 95. Argued December 10, 1970 Decided January 19, 1971 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which HarlaN, BrenNAN, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 439. Blach, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Black-mun, J., joined, post, p. 443. Benjamin Southwick, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and Robert D. Martinson, Assistant Attorney General. & A. Schapiro argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee is an adult resident of Hartford) Wis. She brought suit in a federal district court in Wisconsin to have a Wisconsin statute declared unconstitutional. • A three-judge court was convened, 28 U. S. C. § 2281. That court, by a divided vote, held the Act unconstitutional, 302 F. Supp. 861, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 985. The Act, Wis. Stat. § 176.26 (1967), provides that designated persons may in writing forbid the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to one who “by excessive drinking” produces described conditions or exhibits speci-’ fied traits, such as exposing himself or family “to want” or becoming “dangerous to the peace” of the community. The chief of police of Hartford, without notice or hearing to appellee, caused to be posted a notice in all retail liquor outlets in Hartford that sales, or gifts of liquors to appellee were forbidden for one year. Thereupon this suit was brought against the chief of police claiming damages and asking for injunctive relief. The State of Wisconsin intervened as a defendant on the injunctive phase of the case and that was the only issue tried and decided, the three-judge court holding the Act unconstitutional on its face and enjoining its enforcement, The court said: “In ‘posting’ an individual, the particular city official or spouse is doing more than denying him the ability to purchase alcoholic beverages within the city limits. In essence, he is giving notice to the public that he has found the particular individual’s behavior to fall within one of the categories., enumerated in the statutes. It would be naive not-to recognize that such ‘posting’ or characterization of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule, and it is our opinion that procedural due process requires that before one acting pursuant to State statute can make such a quasi-judicial determination, the individual involved must be given notice of the intent to post and an opportunity to present his side of the matter.” 302 F. Supp., at 864. We have no doubt as to the power of a State to deal. with the evils described in the Act. The police power of the States over intoxicating liquors was extremely broad even prior to the Twenty-first Amendment. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304. The only issue present here is whether the label or characterization given a person by “posting,” though a mark of serious illness to some, is to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. We agree with the District Court that the private interest is such that those requirements of procedural due process must be met. It is significant that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat. We reviewed in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896, the nature of the various “private interest^]” that have fallen on one side or the other of the line. See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 339-342. Generalizations are hazardous as some state and federal administrative procedures are summary by reason of necessity or history. Yet certainly where the State attaches “a badge of infamy” to the citizen, due process comes into play. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191. “[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal .conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. “Posting” under the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading one. Under the Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no process at all. This appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may have been the victim of an official’s caprice. Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be prevented. It is suggested that the three-judge court should have stayed its hand while the aggrieved person repaired to the state courts to obtain a construction of the Act or relief from it. The fact that Wisconsin does not raise the point does not, of course, mean that it lacks merit. Yet the suggestion is not in keeping with the precedents. Congress could, of course, have routed all federal constitutional questions through the state court systems, saving to this Court the final say when it came to .review of the state court judgments. But our First Congress resolved differently and created the federal court system and in time granted the federal courts various heads of jurisdiction, which today involve most federal constitutional rights. Once that jurisdiction was granted, the federal courts resolved those questions even when they were enmeshed with state law questions. In 1941 we gave vigor to the so-called abstention doctrine in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496. In that ease an authoritative resolution of a knotty state law question might end the litigation and not give rise to any federal constitutional claim. Id., at 501. We, therefore, directed the District Court to retain the suit pending a determination by a state court of the underlying state law question. We applied the abstention doctriné most recently in Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., ante, p. 41, where a relatively new Puerto Rican statute, which had not been authoritatively construed by the Commonwealth’s courts, “might be judicially confined to a more narrow ambit which would avoid all constitutional questions.” We ordered the federal courts to stay their hands until the Puerto Rican courts had spoken. Speaking of Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82, we noted that the “three-judge federal court should not have proceeded to strike down ah Alaská law which, if construed by the Alaska Supreme Court, might be so confined as not to have any constitutional infirmity.” Ante, at 43. But the abstention rule only applies where “the issue of state law is uncertain.” Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 534. Thus our abstention cases have dealt with unresolved questions of state law which only a state tribunal could authoritatively construe. Reetz v. Bozanich, supra; City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639. . In the present case the Wisconsin Act does not contain any provision whatsoever for notice and hearing. There is no ambiguity in' the state statute. There are no provisions which could fairly be taken to mean that notice and hearing might be given under some circumstances or under some construction but not under others. The Act on its face gives the chief of police the power to do what he did to the appellee. Hence the naked question, uncomplicated by an unresolved state law, is whether that Act on its face is unconstitutional. As we said in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 251, abstention should not be ordered merely to await an attempt to vindicate the claim in a state court. Where there is no ambiguity in thé state statute, the federal court should not abstain but should proceed to decide the federal constitutional claim, id., at 250-251. We would negate the history of the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the federal district courts, if we held the federal court should stay its hand and not decide the question before the state courts decided it. Affirmed. 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person .... (3) To redress; the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” ' Section 176.26 reads as follows: “(1) When any person shall by excessive drinking of intoxicating liquors, or fermented malt beverages misspend, waste or lessen his estate so as to expose himself or family to want, or the town, city, village or county to which he belongs to liability'for the support of himself- or family, or so as thereby to injure his health, endanger the loss thereof, or to endanger the personal safety and comfort of his family or any member thereof, or the safety of any other person, or the security of the property of any other person, or when any person shall, on account of the use of intoxicating liquors or fermented malt beverages, become dangerous to the peace of any community, the wife of such person, the supervisors of such town, the mayor, chief of police or aldermen of such city, the trustees of such village, the county superintendent of the-poor of such county, the chairman of the county board of supervisors of such eounty, the district attorney of such county or any of them, may, in writing signed by her, him or them, forbid all persons knowingly to sell or give away to such person any intoxicating liquors or fermented malt beverages, for the space of one year and in like manner may forbid the selling, furnishing, or giving away of any such liquors or fermented malt beverages, knowingly to such person by any person in any town, city or village to which such person may resort for the same. A copy of said writing so signed shall be personally served upon the person so intended to be prohibited from obtaining .any such liquor or beverage. “(2) And the wife of such person, the supervisors of any town, the aldermen of any city, the trustees of any village, the county superintendent of the poor of such county, the mayor of any city, the chairman of the county board of supervisors of such county, the district attorney or sheriff of such county, may, by a notice made and signed as aforesaid, in like manner forbid all persons in such town, city or village, to sell or give away intoxicating liquors or drinks or fermented malt beverages to any person given to the excessive- use of such liquors, drinks or beverages, specifying such person, and such notice shall have the same force and effect when such specified person is a nonresident as is herein provided when such specified person is a resident of said town, city or village.” Section 176.28 makes the sale or gift of liquor to such a person a misdemeanor. The first Judiciary Act is in 1 Stat. 73. 28 U. ,S. C. § 1343 (3) involved in the present case came into the statutes in ,1871., 17 Stat. 13. In 1875 Congress enlarged federal jurisdiction by authorizing the “federal question” jurisdiction presently contained 5n ,28 U. S. C. § 1331. See 18 Stat. 470. We recently reviewed this history in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 245-248. See n. 4, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

S&E CONTRACTORS, INC. v. UNITED STATES No. 70-88. Argued October 21, 1971 Reargued March 20, 1972— Decided April 24, 1972 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 19. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 23. Rehnquist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Geoffrey Creyke, Jr., reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John P. Wiese. Irving Jaffe reargued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Gray, Samuel Huntington, and Walter H. Fleischer. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Edward L. Wright, Beverly C. Moore, F. Trowbridge vom Baur, Overton A. Currie, Marshall J. Doke, Jr., Gilbert A. Cuneo, George M. Coburn, Eldon H. Crowell, and John A. McWhorter for the American Bar Association, and by Harold C. Petrowits, pro se. Me. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether the Department of Justice may challenge the finality of a contract disputes decision made by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in favor of its contractor, where the contract provides that the decision of AEC shall be “final and conclusive.” Section 1 of the Wunderlich Act leaves open for contest a claim that “is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Moreover, 41 U. S. C. § 322, provides that “[n]o government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.” The Department of Justice challenged the settlement made by the AEC on two grounds, (1) that the decision was “not supported by substantial evidence” and (2) that it was “erroneous as a matter of law.” But the disputes clause in the contract says that the decision of the AEC is “final and conclusive,” unless a court determines that the award is vulnerable under §§ 1 and 2 of the Act. There is no federal statute which submits disputes of this character to review by one or more administrative agencies, where as here there is no charge of fraud or bad faith. Nor is there a statute which enables another federal agency to contest in court the validity of the decision of the AEC, absent fraud or bad faith. In plain lay language the question then is whether, absent fraud or bad faith, the contractor can rely on the ruling of the federal agency with which it made the contract or can be forced to go through still another tier of federal review. We hold that absent fraud or bad faith the federal agency’s settlement under the disputes clause is binding on the Government; that there is not another tier of administrative review; and that, save for fraud or bad faith, the decision of AEC is “final and conclusive,” it being for these purposes the Federal Government. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims. I On August 4, 1961, petitioner contracted with the AEC to build a testing facility at the National Reactor Test Station in Idaho. The work was completed and accepted by the AEC on June 29, 1962. Because of various changes in contract specifications and difficulties in meeting performance schedules, petitioner submitted a series of claims to the contracting officer for resolution under the standard disputes clause contained in the contract, asking for equitable modifications of the contract and additional compensation. On August 8 and November 8, 1962, the contracting officer approved some of the claims and disapproved others, and the petitioner sought review of the adverse decisions with the AEC. Since it did not then have a contract appeals board, the Commission referred petitioner’s appeal to a hearing examiner, before whom an adversary hearing was held. On June 26, 1963, the examiner decided in favor of eight of petitioner’s claims and remanded the dispute to the contracting officer for negotiations to determine the exact amount due petitioner. 2 A. E. C. 631. The contracting officer then sought review of this decision by the Commission. See 10 CER § 2.760 (Jan. 1, 1963). The Commission declined to review four of the claims, 2 A. E. C. 738, which had the effect of sustaining the examiner’s decision on them. 10 CFR § 2.762 (a) (Jan. 1, 1963). Included within this group was the examiner’s determination that amounts due petitioner could not be retained to offset claims allegedly owed by petitioner to other contractors and other agencies of government. The Commission modified the examiner’s decision on three of the remaining claims and reversed him on the last, which petitioner has since abandoned. It “remanded to the contracting officer with instructions to proceed to final settlement or decision in accordance with the decision of the hearing examiner dated June 26, 1963, as modified by [its] order of November 14, 1963, and by [that] decision.” 2 A. E. C. 860, 856. On March 6, 1964, prior to the AEC’s final ruling but after it had upheld the examiner’s decision on the “re-tainage” claim, a certifying officer of the Commission requested the opinion of the General Accounting Office on whether a voucher for the retainage claim could be certified for payment. Jurisdiction for the Comptroller General’s review was purportedly founded upon 31 U. S. C. § 82d. After some 33 months of what amounted to a plenary review of the proceedings before the examiner, the Comptroller General concluded that the voucher could not be certified for payment. 46 Comp. Gen. 441. On March 27, 1967, the AEC wrote petitioner, saying, “The Atomic Energy Commission’s view is that S&E Contractors, Inc. has exhausted its administrative recourse to the Commission. The Commission will take no action, in connection with the claims, inconsistent with the views expressed by the Comptroller General . . . .” The petitioner then brought this action in the Court of Claims seeking a judgment of $1.95 million and an order remanding the case for negotiations on the time extension to which it claimed it was entitled under the AEC’s original decision. The defenses tendered raised no issue of any fraud or bad faith of the contractor against the United States. On cross-motions for summary judgment, a commissioner of the Court of Claims ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that the General Accounting Office lacked authority to review the decision of the AEC and that the AEC’s refusal to follow its own decisions favorable to petitioner was a breach of the disputes clause of the contract. On review by the Court of Claims, however, that decision was reversed by a four-to-three vote. While the majority acknowledged “that the Comptroller General effectively stopped payment of the claims,” it did not pass upon the legality of that action. 193 Ct. Cl. 335, 340, 433 P. 2d 1373, 1375. Reasoning, instead, that the Wunder-lich Act allowed both the Department of Justice and contractors an equal right to judicial review of administrative decisions and that the AEC’s refusal to abide by its earlier decision was a permissible means of obtaining this review, it remanded petitioner’s claims “to the commissioner for his consideration and report on the various claims under Wunderlich Act standards.” Id., at 351, 433 F. 2d, at 1381. The Commissioner did not base his opinion on any issue of fraud or bad faith of the contractor against the United States, nor did the Court of Claims. The case is now here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted. 402 U. S. 971. Petitioner argues that neither the text nor the legislative history of the Wunderlich Act supports the right of the United States to seek judicial review of an administrative decision on a contractual dispute, that the General Accounting Office was without statutory or contractual authority to overturn the AEC’s decision, and that the AEC should not be allowed to abandon after some 33 months its own decision that had been made in petitioner’s favor. In response, the Solicitor General contends that the Wunderlich Act does give the Department of Justice the right of judicial review of contract decisions made by federal administrative agencies and that the Department of Justice is free to assert whatever defenses it desires in the Court of Claims without regard to the earlier actions of the federal contracting agency. II The disputes clause included in Government contracts is intended, absent fraud or bad faith, to provide a quick and efficient administrative remedy and to avoid “vexatious and expensive and, to the contractor oftentimes, ruinous litigation.” Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398, 401 (1878). The contractor has ceded his right to seek immediate judicial redress for his grievances and has contractually bound himself to “proceed diligently with the performance of the contract” during the disputes process. The purpose of avoiding “vexatious litigation” would not be served, however, by substituting the action of officials acting in derogation of the contract. The result in some cases might be sheer disaster. In the present case nearly a decade has passed since petitioner completed the performance of a contract under which the only agency empowered to act determined that it was entitled to payment. To postpone payment for such a period is to sanction precisely the sort of “vexatious litigation” which the disputes process was designed to avoid. 5 The American Bar Association, as amicus curiae, notes “that the contractor’s consent to permit a specific representative of the Government to decide disputes — the Commission — should not be read as permitting any different representative of the Government to 'veto’ decisions rendered by the Commission which are in favor of the contractor.” Here, petitioner contracted with the United States acting through the AEC and it was exclusively with this Commission that the administrative resolution of disputes rested. Disputes initially were to be resolved between the contractor and the contracting officer and, if a settlement satisfactory to the contractor could be reached at that level, no review would lie. See United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U. S. 323; United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U. S. 321. By the disputes clause the decision of the AEC is “final and conclusive” unless “a court of competent jurisdiction” decides otherwise for the enumerated reasons. Neither the Wunderlich Act nor the disputes clause empowers any other administrative agency to have a veto of the AEC’s “final” decision or authority to review it. Nor does any other Act of Congress, except where fraud or bad faith is involved, give any other part of the Executive Branch authority to submit the matter to any court for determination. In other words, we cannot infer that by some legerdemain the disputes clause submitted the dispute to further administrative challenge or approval, and did not mean what it says when it made the AEC’s decision “final and conclusive.” See United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., supra, at 326. Kipps, The Right of the Government to Have Judicial Review of a Board of Contract Appeals Decision Made Under the Disputes Clause, 2 Pub. Contract L. J. 286 (1969); Schultz, Wunderlich Revisited: New Limits on Judicial Review of Administrative Determination of Government Contract Disputes, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 115, 132-133 (1964). A citizen has the right to expect fair dealing from his government, see VitareUi v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535, and this entails in the present context treating the government as a unit rather than as an amalgam of separate entities. Here, the AEC spoke for the United States and its decision, absent fraud or bad faith, should be honored. Cf. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138. Since the AEC withheld payment solely because of the views of the Comptroller General and since he had been given no authority to function as another tier of administrative review, there was no valid reason for the AEC not to settle with petitioner according to its earlier decision. For that purpose the AEC was the United States. Cf. Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U. S. 446, 449. The cases deny review by the Comptroller General of administrative disputes clause decisions as “without legal authority” absent fraud or overreaching. E. g., McShain Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Ct. 405, 409 (1936). In James Graham Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 715 (ND Cal. 1950), for example, the contracting agency had determined that the contractor was entitled to reimbursement for certain expenditures under two cost-plus-fee contracts, but the Comptroller General refused payment. While the court noted the “extensive and broad” powers of the Comptroller General, it held that, absent instances of “fraud or overreaching,” where the Comptroller General’s power was founded upon specific statutory provisions such as 41 U. S. C. § 53, he had no “authority to determine the propriety of contract payments” approved by the contracting agency. 91 F. Supp., at 716. Accordingly, summary judgment was entered by the court, which said, “Since the Navy Department has determined that plaintiff contractor is entitled to the payment sought, this Court must adjudge accordingly.” Id., at 717. Congress contemplated giving the General Accounting Office such powers and, indeed, the Senate twice passed— in the form of the McCarran bill — a provision which would have allowed the Comptroller to review disputes decisions to determine if they were “fraudulent, grossly erroneous, so mistaken as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” S. 24, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). “If enacted, it would [have] invest [ed] the GAO with the power — which it has never had — to upset an administrative decision which it [found] 'grossly erroneous’ or 'not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.’ ” Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legislative Battle over the Wunderlich Case, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 243 (1953). The House of Representatives rejected this provision, however, and the Wunderlich Act was ultimately passed in its present form. We cannot, therefore, construe it to give the Comptroller General powers which Congress has plainly denied. It is suggested, however, that the Comptroller General’s power is not one of review over the AEC decision but is merely the power “to force the contractor to bring suit and thus to obtain judicial review for the Government.” The disputes clause, however, sets forth the administrative means for resolving contractual disputes. Under the present contract the AEC is the final administrative arbiter of such claims and nowhere is there a provision for oversight by the Comptroller General. The Comptroller General, however, conducted a 33-month de novo review of the AEC proceedings; he blocked the payment to which the AEC determined petitioner was entitled; and he placed upon petitioner the burden of going to the Court of Claims to receive that payment. That action by the Comptroller General was a form of additional administrative oversight foreclosed by the disputes clause. Ill A majority of the Court of Claims held “that the Government has the right to the same extent as the contractor to seek judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on a contract claim.” 193 Ct. Cl., at 346, 433 F. 2d, at 1378. The Solicitor General adopts this view and sees in the Attorney General’s obligation to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States, 28 U. S. C. §§ 516, 519, the power to overturn decisions of coordinate offices of the Executive Department. The Attorney General has the duty to “conduct . . . litigation in which the United States, an .agency, or officer thereof is a party,” 28 U. S. C. § 516, and to “supervise all [such] litigation,” 28 U. S. C. § 519. That power is pervasive but it does not appear how under the Wunderlich Act it gives the Department of Justice the right to appeal from a decision of the Atomic Energy Commission. Normally, where the responsibility for rendering a decision is vested in a coordinate branch of Government, the duty of the Department of Justice is to implement that decision and not to repudiate it. See 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 67, 68 (1937); 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 149, 150 (1934); 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 524, 529 (1905); 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 93, 96 (1903); 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 711, 713 (1894); 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 270, 272 (1891); 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 332, 333 (1882). Indeed, this view of the role of the Department of Justice may be traced back to William Wirt, the first of our Attorneys General to keep detailed records of his tenure in office. “Wirt it was who first recorded the propositions that the Attorney General does not decide questions of fact, that the Attorney General does not sit as an arbitrator in disputes between the government departments and private individuals nor as a reviewing officer to hear appeals from the decisions of public officers . . . H. Cummings & C. McFarland, Federal Justice 84 (1937) (footnotes omitted). The power to appeal to the Court of Claims a decision of the federal agency under a disputes clause in a contract which the agency is authorized to make is not to be found in the Wunderlich Act and its underlying legislative history. That Act was designed to overturn our decision in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U. S. 98 (1951), which had closed the courthouse doors to certain citizens aggrieved by administrative action amounting to something less than fraud. See S. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. It should not be construed to require a citizen to perform the Herculean task of beheading the Hydra in order to obtain justice from his Government. We are reluctant to construe a statute enacted to free citizens from a form of administrative tyranny so as to subject them to additional bureaucratic oversight, where there is no evidence of fraud or overreaching. In-this connection, it should be noted that committee reports accompanying the Wunderlich Act indicate that judicial review was provided so that contractors would not inflate their bids to take into account the uncertainties of administrative action. This objective would be ill served if Government contractors — having won a favorable decision before the agencies with whom they contracted— had also to run the gantlet of the General Accounting Office and the Department of Justice. IV A contractor’s fraud is of course a wholly different genus than the case now before us. Even where the contractor has obtained a judgment and the time for review of it has expired, fraud on an administrative agency or on the court enforcing the agency action is ground for setting aside the judgment. “[S"Jetting aside the judgment to permit a new trial, altering the terms of the judgment, or restraining the beneficiaries of the judgment from taking any benefit whatever from it,” Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U. S. 238, 245, are the usual forms of relief which have been granted. Patents obtained with unclean hands and contracts that are based on those patents are similarly tainted and will not be enforced. Precision Co. v. Automotive Co., 324 U. S. 806. Contracts with the United States — like patents — are matters concerning far more than the interest of the adverse parties; they entail the public interest: “[WJhere a suit in equity concerns the public interest as well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumes even wider and more significant proportions. For if an equity court properly uses the maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression but averts an injury to the public.” Id., at 815. Congress has made elaborate provisions for dealing with fraudulent claims of contractors. Where the Comptroller General is convinced “that any settlement was induced by fraud,” he is directed to “certify ... all the facts ... to the Department of Justice, to the Administrator of General Services, and to the contracting agency concerned.” 58 Stat. 664, as amended, 41 U. S. C. §116 (b). The Administrator of General Services is also given broad powers of investigation and he is directed to give the Department of Justice “any information received by him indicating any fraudulent practices, for appropriate action.” 41 U. S. C. § 118 (d). Moreover, whenever “any contracting agency or the Administrator of General Services believes that any settlement was induced by fraud,” the facts shall be reported to the Department of Justice. 41 U. S. C. § 118 (e). And the Department of Justice is given broad powers to act. Ibid. In addition, Congress has imposed severe penalties on contractors who commit fraudulent acts and it has given the federal courts power to hear and determine such cases. 41 U. S. C. § 119. Broad, flexible civil remedies are also provided against those who “use or engage in ... an agreement, combination, or conspiracy to use or engage in or to cause to be used or engaged in, any fraudulent trick, scheme, or device, for the purpose of securing or obtaining, or aiding to secure or obtain, for any person any payment, property, or other benefits from the United States or any Federal agency in connection with the procurement, transfer, or disposition of property . . . .” 63 Stat. 392, 40 U. S. C. § 489 (b). As to the Court of Claims, 28 U. S. C. § 2514 provides that: “A claim against the United States shall be forfeited to the United States by any person who corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance thereof. “In such cases the Court of Claims shall specifically find such fraud or attempt and render judgment of forfeiture.” These statutory provisions show that, apart from the inherent power of courts to deal with fraud, the Department of Justice indubitably has standing to appear or intervene at any time in any appropriate court to restrain enforcement of contracts with the United States based on fraud. See, e. g., United States v. Hougham, 364 U. S. 310 (1960); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148 (1956); United States v. Dinerstein, 362 F. 2d 852 (CA2 1966). So far as the Wunderlich Act is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the administrative agency deciding this dispute is the AEC or the AEC’s board of contract appeals. It was common in the beginning to give final authority over the resolution of disputes under a Government contract to the designated contracting officer, save for “fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment.” Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S., at 402. Later came the present boards of contract appeals. Boards of contract appeals within the respective agencies today are common. They are not statutory creations but are established by administrative regulations. S. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Operation and Effectiveness of Government Boards of Contract Appeals 20-21. Their decisions “constitute administrative adjudication in its purest sense.” Id., at 21. As noted, the AEC has had a board of contract appeals since 1964. Boards of contract appeals were in effect long before the Wunderlich Act and that explains why the Act provides for review “of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board.” 41 U. S. C. § 321 (emphasis added). We held in United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, that even where the decision on review in the Court of Claims is that of a board of contract appeals, the review must be on the administrative record and that no trial de novo may be held. That decision led to proposals in Congress that, in effect, rulings of contract appeals boards be denied finality. S. Doc. No. 99, supra, at 25-26 and n. 70. But Congress has not taken that step. Some have urged that where a decision of a board of contract appeals is involved, the United States should have standing to appeal to the Court of Claims. Id., at 159. But our leading authority on these problems, Professor Harold C. Petrowitz, who wrote S. Doc. No. 99, supra, observed, “This has never been done, and the procedure may appear anomalous in view of the relatively close relationship between boards and the agencies they serve.” Ibid. However serious the problem may be and whatever its dimensions, it is obviously one for the Congress to resolve, not for us to resolve within the limits of the Wunderlich Act. This case does not involve the situation where an administrative agency, upon timely petition for rehearing or prompt sua sponte reconsideration, determines that its earlier decision was wrong and, for that reason, refuses to abide by it. The AEC has not, to this day, repudiated the merits of its decisions in favor of petitioner. Nor, to repeat, is this a case of a fraud of a contractor against the United States. This is simply an instance where a contractor successfully resolved its disputes with the agency with which it had contracted and to whom that power had been delegated. The fruits of petitioner’s labors were frustrated, however, by the intermeddling of another agency without power to act and, when petitioner sought enforcement of its rights in court, still another agency of the Government entered and sought to disavow the decision made here by the AEC. If the General Accounting Office or the Department of Justice is to be an ombudsman reviewing each and every decision rendered by the coordinate branches of the Government, that mandate should come from Congress, not from this Court. The judgment of the Court of Claims is Reversed. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Wunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81, provides: “No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, That any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.” 41 U. S. C. § 321. “No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.” 41 U. S. C. § 322. The contract provided: “6. Disputes “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Commission. The decision of the Commission or its duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer’s decision. “(b) This ‘Disputes’ Clause does not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above; Provided, that nothing in this contract shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question of law.” The Atomic Energy Commission Board of Contract Appeals was not established until 1964. See 10 CFR § 3.1 et seq. (Jan. 1, 1971). Volume 55 Stat. 876, 31 U. S. C. § 82d provides: “The liability of certifying officers or employees shall be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as now provided by law with respect to enforcement of the liability of disbursing and other accountable officers; and they shall have the right to apply for and obtain a decision by the Comptroller General on any question of law involved in a payment on any vouchers presented to them for certification.” While the quoted language from paragraph 6 (a) of the contract concerns factual disputes and while questions of law are dealt with in paragraph 6 (b) (see n. 2, supra), there is no reason to believe that the two clauses should not be considered in pari materia or that a different avenue for review should apply to legal questions than to those of fact. Indeed, paragraph 6 (b) speaks of “consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a).” (Emphasis added.) The difference between the two clauses relates only to the standard of reviewability and does not establish separate avenues of review. See n. 2, supra. For certain types of fraud against the Government, Congress has vested the General Accounting Office with investigative powers. In the case of kickbacks by Government contractors, for example, “the General Accounting Office shall have the power to inspect the plants and to audit the books and records of any prime contractor or subcontractor engaged in the performance of a negotiated contract,” 74 Stat. 741, 41 U. S. C. § 53, and criminal penalties are provided if a violation is established. 41 U. S. C. § 54. If the Comptroller General has the broad, roving, investigatory powers that are asserted, specific statutory grants of authority such as this provision relating to kickbacks would be superfluous. It has been said that the Act’s legislative history “has something for everyone.” Kipps, The Right of the Government to Have Judicial Review of a Board of Contract Appeals Decision Made Under the Disputes Clause, 2 Pub. Contract L. J. 286, 295 (1969). Suffice it to say we find the Act’s history at best ambiguous. In construing laws we have been extremely wary of testimony before committee hearings and of debates on the floor of Congress save for precise analyses of statutory phrases by the sponsors of the proposed laws. See generally NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 66 (1964); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 288 (1956); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951); United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 247 U. S. 310, 318 (1918); Omaha & Council Bluffs Street R. Co. v. ICC, 230 U. S. 324, 333 (1913) ; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 318 (1897). The reason is the caveat of Mr. Justice Holmes, “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419. The House Report stated, “A continuation of this situation [created by the Wunderlich decision] will render the performance of Government work less attractive to the responsible industries upon whom the Government must rely for the performance of such work, and will adversely affect the free and competitive nature of such work. It will discourage the more responsible element of every industry from engaging in Government work and will attract more speculative elements whose bids will contain contingent allowances intended to protect them from unconscionable decisions of Government officials rendered during the performance of their contracts.” H. R. Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 4. In a similar vein, the Senate Report on the Senate version of the Wunderlich Act stated, “The impact of this decision on the many business firms who, in a condition of expanding production with respect to the defense of the United States, must deal with many of the Government departments in Government construction and defense materials, was one that could only cause great expense to the United States in that the contractors would be forced to puff up their bids so as to be sure of sufficient funds to provide for unforeseen contingencies.” S. Rep. No. 32, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2. Where the Department of Justice has successfully asserted this defense of fraud, the Court of Claims has disallowed contractors’ claims. See, e. g., Kamen Soap Products Co. v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 619, 124 F. Supp. 608 (1954) (fraudulent preparation of evidence) ; Morris Demolition Corp. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 336 (1943); Jerman v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 540 (1942) (fraudulent invoices); Mervin Contracting Corp. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 81 (1941) (false payroll vouchers); Atlantic Contracting Co. v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 185 (1922) (embezzlement). See n. 3, supra. And see 29 Fed. Reg. 12829 et seq. For other aspects of exhaustion of administrative review of decisions from boards of contract appeals, see United States v. Moorman, 338 U. S. 457; United States v. Grace & Sons, 384 U. S. 424; United States v. Utah Construction Co., 384 U. S. 394. The Court's citation of Mason & Hanger, ante, at 10, is, to say the least, perplexing.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EVANS, GOVERNOR OF IDAHO, et al. v. JEFF D. et al., minors, by and through their next friend, JOHNSON, et al. No. 84-1288. Argued November 13, 1985 Decided April 21, 1986 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Black-mun, JJ., joined, post, p. 743. James Thomas Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John J. McMahon, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Michael De Angelo and James Wickham, Deputy Attorneys General. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Kathryn A. Oberly, John F. Cordes, and Douglas Letter. William T. Coleman, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Aaron S. Bayer, Howard A. Belodoff, and Charles Johnson III. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Ellen Janos and Carl Valvo, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama, Harold Brown, Attorney General of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, and Anthony Ching, Solicitor General, John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, John Van de Kam/p, Attorney General of California, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Charles M. Oberly, Attorney General of Delaware, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Richard G. Opper, Attorney General of Guam, Corinne Watanabe, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, David L. Armstrong, Attorney General of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, James E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General of Mississippi, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, Stephen E. Merrill, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Nicholas Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Michael Turpén, Attorney General of Oklahoma, David Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Leroy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Hector Rivera-Cruz, Attorney General of Puerto Rico, Arlene Violet, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, William J. Broaddus, Attorney General of Virginia, Victor G. Schneider, Acting Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Charlie Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Fol-lette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and A. G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the City of New York by Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Leonard Koemer, and Paul T. Rephen; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and J. Phillip Jordan; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Committee on Legal Assistance of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Allan L. Gropper; and for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Julius LeVonne Chambers, Charles Stephen Ralston, Steven L. Winter, E. Richard Larson, Burt Neubome, James Robertson, Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Norman J. Chachkin, Kalman Finkel, Helaine M. Barnett, and John E. Kirklin. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act) provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee” in enumerated civil rights actions. 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. In Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122 (1980), we held that fees may be assessed against state officials after a case has been settled by the entry of a consent decree. In this case, we consider the question whether attorney’s fees must be assessed when the case has been settled by a consent decree granting prospective relief to the plaintiff class but providing that the defendants shall not pay any part of the prevailing party’s fees or costs. We hold that the District Court has the power, in its sound discretion, to refuse to award fees. I The petitioners are the Governor and other public officials of the State of Idaho responsible for the education and treatment of children who suffer from emotional and mental handicaps. Respondents are a class of such children who have been or will be placed in petitioners’ care. On August 4, 1980, respondents commenced this action by filing a complaint against petitioners in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. The factual allegations in the complaint described deficiencies in both the educational programs and the health care services provided respondents. These deficiencies allegedly violated the United States Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, four federal statutes, and certain provisions of the Idaho Code. The complaint prayed for injunctive relief and for an award of costs and attorney’s fees, but it did not seek damages. On the day the complaint was filed, the District Court entered two orders, one granting the respondents leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and a second appointing Charles Johnson as their next friend for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting the action. At that time Johnson was employed by the Idaho Legal Aid Society, Inc., a private, nonprofit corporation that provides free legal services to qualified low-income persons. Because the Idaho Legal Aid Society is prohibited from representing clients who are capable of paying their own fees, it made no agreement requiring any of the respondents to pay for the costs of litigation or the legal services it provided through Johnson. Moreover, the special character of both the class and its attorney-client relationship with Johnson explains why it did not enter into any agreement covering the various contingencies that might arise during the course of settlement negotiations of a class action of this kind. Shortly after petitioners filed their answer, and before substantial work had been done on the case, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. They were able to reach agreement concerning that part of the complaint relating to educational services with relative ease and, on October 14, 1981, entered into a stipulation disposing of that part of the case. The stipulation provided that, each party would bear its “own attorney’s fees and costs thus far incurred.” App. 54. The District Court promptly entered an order approving the partial settlement. Negotiations concerning the treatment claims broke down, however, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Although the District Court dismissed several of respondents’ claims, it held that the federal constitutional claims raised genuine issues of fact to be resolved at trial. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to the entry of a class certification order, engaged in discovery, and otherwise prepared to try the case in the spring of 1988. In March 1983, one week before trial, petitioners presented respondents with a new settlement proposal. As respondents themselves characterize it, the proposal “offered virtually all of the injunctive relief [they] had sought in their complaint.” Brief for Respondents 5. See App. 89. The Court of Appeals agreed with this characterization, and further noted that the proposed relief was “more than the district court in earlier hearings had indicated it was willing to grant.” 748 F. 2d 648, 650 (CA9 1984). As was true of the earlier partial settlement, however, petitioners’ offer included a provision for a waiver by respondents of any claim to fees or costs. Originally, this waiver was unacceptable to the Idaho Legal Aid Society, which had instructed Johnson to reject any settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees, but Johnson ultimately determined that his ethical obligation to his clients mandated acceptance of the proposal. The parties conditioned the waiver on approval by the District Court. After the stipulation was signed, Johnson filed a written motion requesting the District Court to approve the settlement “except for the provision on costs and attorney’s fees,” and to allow respondents to present a bill of costs and fees for consideration by the court. App. 87. At the oral argument on that motion, Johnson contended that petitioners’ offer had exploited his ethical duty to his clients — that he was “forced,” by an offer giving his clients “the best result [they] could have gotten in this court or any other court,” to waive his attorney’s fees. The District Court, however, evaluated the waiver in the context of the entire settlement and rejected the ethical underpinnings of Johnson’s argument. Explaining that although petitioners were “not willing to concede that they were obligated to [make the changes in their practices required by the stipulation], . . . they were willing to do them as long as their costs were outlined and they didn’t face additional costs,” it concluded that “it doesn’t violate any ethical considerations for an attorney to give up his attorney fees in the interest of getting a better bargain for his client[s].” Id., at 93. Accordingly, the District Court approved the settlement and denied the motion to submit a costs bill. When respondents appealed from the order denying attorney’s fees and costs, petitioners filed a motion requesting the District Court to suspend or stay their obligation to comply with the substantive terms of the settlement. Because the District Court regarded the fee waiver as a material term of the complete settlement, it granted the motion. The Court of Appeals, however, granted two emergency motions for stays requiring enforcement of the substantive terms of the consent decree pending the appeal. More dramatically, after ordering preliminary relief, it invalidated the fee waiver and left standing the remainder of the settlement; it then instructed the District Court to “make its own determination of the fees that are reasonable” and remanded for that limited purpose. 743 F. 2d, at 652. In explaining its holding, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives the court the power to approve the terms of all settlements of class actions, and that the strong federal policy embodied in the Fees Act normally requires an award of fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights actions, including those who have prevailed through settlement. The court added that “[w]hen attorney’s fees are negotiated as part of a class action settlement, a conflict frequently exists between the class lawyers’ interest in compensation and the class members’ interest in relief.” 743 F. 2d, at 651-652. “To avoid this conflict,” the Court of Appeals relied on Circuit precedent which had “disapproved simultaneous negotiation of settlements and attorney’s fees” absent a showing of “unusual circumstances.” Id., at 652. In this case, the Court of Appeals found no such “unusual circumstances” and therefore held that an agreement on fees “should not have been a part of the settlement of the claims of the class.” Ibid. It concluded: “The historical background of both Rule 23 and section 1988, as well as our experience since their enactment, compel the conclusion that a stipulated waiver of all attorney’s fees obtained solely as a condition for obtaining relief for the class should not be accepted by the court.” Ibid. The importance of the question decided by the Court of Appeals, together with the conflict between its decision and the decisions of other Courts of Appeals, led us to grant certio-rari. 471 U. S. 1098 (1985). We now reverse. HH Í — i The disagreement between the parties and amici as to what exactly is at issue in this case makes it appropriate to put certain aspects of the case to one side in order to state precisely the question that the case does present. To begin with, the Court of Appeals’ decision rested on an erroneous view of the District Court’s power to approve settlements in class actions. Rule 23(e) wisely requires court approval of the terms of any settlement of a class action, but the power to approve or reject a settlement negotiated by the parties before trial does not authorize the court to require the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed. Although changed circumstances may justify a court-ordered modification of a consent decree over the objections of a party after the decree has been entered, and the District Court might have advised petitioners and respondents that it would not approve their proposal unless one or more of its provisions was deleted or modified, Rule 23(e) does not give the court the power, in advance of trial, to modify a proposed consent decree and order its acceptance over either party’s objection. The options available to the District Court were essentially the same as those available to respondents: it could have accepted the proposed settlement; it could have rejected the proposal and postponed the trial to see if a different settlement could be achieved; or it could have decided to try the case. The District Court could not enforce the settlement on the merits and award attorney’s fees anymore than it could, in a situation in which the attorney had negotiated a large fee at the expense of the plaintiff class, preserve the fee award and order greater relief on the merits. The question we must decide, therefore, is whether the District Court had a duty to reject the proposed settlement because it included a waiver of statutorily authorized attorney’s fees. That duty, whether it takes the form of a general prophylactic rule or arises out of the special circumstances of this case, derives ultimately from the Fees Act rather than from the strictures of professional ethics. Although respondents contend that Johnson, as counsel for the class, was faced with an “ethical dilemma” when petitioners offered him relief greater than that which he could reasonably have expected to obtain for his clients at trial (if only he would stipulate to a waiver of the statutory fee award), and although we recognize Johnson’s conflicting interests between pursuing relief for the class and a fee for the Idaho Legal Aid Society, we do not believe that the “dilemma” was an “ethical” one in the sense that Johnson had to choose between conflicting duties under the prevailing norms of professional conduct. Plainly, Johnson had no ethical obligation to seek a statutory fee award. His ethical duty was to serve his clients loyally and competently. Since the proposal to settle the merits was more favorable than the probable outcome of the trial, Johnson’s decision to recommend acceptance was consistent with the highest standards of our profession. The District Court, therefore, correctly concluded that approval of the settlement involved no breach of ethics in this case. The defect, if any, in the negotiated fee waiver must be traced not to the rules of ethics but to the Fees Act. Following this tack, respondents argue that the statute must be construed to forbid a fee waiver that is the product of “coercion.” They submit that a “coercive waiver” results when the defendant in a civil rights action (1) offers a settlement on the merits of equal or greater value than that which plaintiffs could reasonably expect to achieve at trial but (2) conditions the offer on a waiver of plaintiffs’ statutory eligibility for attorney’s fees. Such an offer, they claim, exploits the ethical obligation of plaintiffs’ counsel to recommend settlement in order to avoid defendant’s statutory liability for its opponents’ fees and costs. The question this case presents, then, is whether the Fees Act requires a district court to disapprove a stipulation seeking to settle a civil rights class action under Rule 23 when the offered relief equals or exceeds the probable outcome at trial but is expressly conditioned on waiver of statutory eligibility for attorney’s fees. For reasons set out below, we are not persuaded that Congress has commanded that all such settlements must be rejected by the District Court. Moreover, on the facts of record in this case, we are satisfied that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by approving the fee waiver. Ill The text of the Fees Act provides no support for the proposition that Congress intended to ban all fee waivers offered in connection with substantial relief on the merits. On the contrary, the language of the Act, as well as its legislative history, indicates that Congress bestowed on the “prevailing party” (generally plaintiffs) a statutory eligibility for a discretionary award of attorney’s fees in specified civil rights actions. It did not prevent the party from waiving this eligibility anymore than it legislated against assignment of this right to an attorney, such as effectively occurred here. Instead, Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision as “an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain” compliance with civil rights laws, S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976), to further the same general purpose — promotion of respect for civil rights — that led it to provide damages and injunctive relief. The statute and its legislative history nowhere suggest that Congress intended to forbid all waivers of attorney’s fees — even those insisted upon by a civil rights plaintiff in exchange for some other relief to which he is indisputably not entitled — anymore than it intended to bar a concession on damages to secure broader injunctive relief. Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that Congress expected fee shifting to attract competent counsel to represent citizens deprived of their civil rights, it neither bestowed fee awards upon attorneys nor rendered them nonwaivable or nonnegotiable; instead, it added them to the arsenal of remedies available to combat violations of civil rights, a goal not invariably inconsistent with conditioning settlement on the merits on a waiver of statutory attorney’s fees. In fact, we believe that a general proscription against negotiated waiver of attorney’s fees in exchange for a settlement on the merits would itself impede vindication of civil rights, at least in some cases, by reducing the attractiveness of settlement. Of particular relevance in this regard is our recent decision in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S. 1 (1985). In that case, which admittedly was not a class action and therefore did not implicate the court’s approval power under Rule 23(e), we specifically considered and rejected the contention that civil rights actions should be treated differently from other civil actions for purposes of settlement. As The Chief Justice explained in his opinion for the Court, the settlement of litigation provides benefits for civil rights plaintiffs as well as defendants and is consistent with the purposes of the Fees Act: “There is no evidence, however, that Congress, in considering § 1988, had any thought that civil rights claims were to be on any different footing from other civil claims insofar as settlement is concerned. Indeed, Congress made clear its concern that civil rights plaintiffs not be penalized for ‘helping to lessen docket congestion’ by settling their cases out of court. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra, at 7. “. . . Some plaintiffs will receive compensation in settlement where, on trial, they might not have recovered, or would have recovered less than what was offered. And, even for those who would prevail at trial, settlement will provide them with compensation at an earlier date without the burdens, stress, and time of litigation. In short, settlements rather than litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants.” 473 U. S., at 10. To promote both settlement and civil rights, we implicitly acknowledged in Marek v. Chesny the possibility of a tradeoff between merits relief and attorney’s fees when we upheld the defendant’s lump-sum offer to settle the entire civil rights action, including any liability for fees and costs. In approving the package offer in Marek v. Chesny we recognized that a rule prohibiting the comprehensive negotiation of all outstanding issues in a pending case might well preclude the settlement of a substantial number of cases: “If defendants are not allowed to make lump-sum offers that would, if accepted, represent their total liability, they would understandably be reluctant to make settlement offers. As the Court of Appeals observed, ‘many a defendant would be unwilling to make a binding settlement offer on terms that left it exposed to liability for attorney’s fees in whatever amount the court might fix on motion of the plaintiff.’ 720 F. 2d, at 477.” Id., at 6-7. See White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U. S. 445, 454, n. 15 (1982) (“In considering whether to enter a negotiated settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from both damages and fees”). Most defendants are unlikely to settle unless the cost of the predicted judgment, discounted by its probability, plus the transaction costs of further litigation, are greater than the cost of the settlement package. If fee waivers cannot be negotiated, the settlement package, must either contain an attorney’s fee component of potentially large and typically uncertain magnitude, or else the parties must agree to have the fee fixed by the court. Although either of these alternatives may well be acceptable in many cases, there surely is a significant number in which neither alternative will be as satisfactory as a decision to try the entire case. The adverse impact of removing attorney’s fees and costs from bargaining might be tolerable if the uncertainty introduced into settlement negotiations were small. But it is not. The defendants’ potential liability for fees in this kind of litigation can be as significant as, and sometimes even more significant than, their potential liability on the merits. This proposition is most dramatically illustrated by the fee awards of district courts in actions seeking only monetary relief. Although it is more difficult to compare fee awards with the cost of injunctive relief, in part because the cost of such relief is seldom reported in written opinions, here too attorney’s fees awarded by district courts have “frequently outrun the economic benefits ultimately obtained by successful litigants.” 122 Cong. Rec. 31472 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Indeed, in this very case “[c]ounsel for defendants view[ed] the risk of an attorney’s fees award as the most significant liability in the case.” Brief for Defendants in Support of Approval of Compromise in Jeff D. v. Evans, No. 80-4091 (D. Idaho), p. 5. Undoubtedly there are many other civil rights actions in which potential liability for attorney’s fees may overshadow the potential cost of relief on the merits and darken prospects for settlement if fees cannot be negotiated. The unpredictability of attorney’s fees may be just as important as their magnitude when a defendant is striving to fix its liability. Unlike a determination of costs, which ordinarily involve smaller outlays and are more susceptible of calculation, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S., at 7, “[tjhere is no precise rule or formula” for determining attorney’s fees, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 436 (1983). Among other considerations, the district court must determine what hours were reasonably expended on what claims, whether that expenditure was reasonable in light of the success obtained, see id., at 436, 440, and what is an appropriate hourly rate for the services rendered. Some District Courts have also considered whether a “multiplier” or other adjustment is appropriate. The consequence of this succession of necessarily judgmental decisions for the ultimate fee award is inescapable: a defendant’s liability for his opponent’s attorney’s fees in a civil rights action cannot be fixed with a sufficient degree of confidence to make defendants indifferent to their exclusion from negotiation. It is therefore not implausible to anticipate that parties to a significant number of civil rights cases will refuse to settle if liability for attorney’s fees remains open, thereby forcing more cases to trial, unnecessarily burdening the judicial system, and disserving civil rights litigants. Respondents’ own waiver of attorney’s fees and costs to obtain settlement of their educational claims is eloquent testimony to the utility of fee waivers in vindicating civil rights claims. We conclude, therefore, that it is not necessary to construe the Fees Act as embodying a general rule prohibiting settlements conditioned on the waiver of fees in order to be faithful to the purposes of that Act. h — i <1 The question remains whether the District Court abused its discretion in this case by approving a settlement which included a complete fee waiver. As noted earlier, Rule 23(e) wisely requires court approval of the terms of any settlement of a class action. The potential conflict among members of the class — in this case, for example, the possible conflict between children primarily interested in better educational programs and those primarily interested in improved health care — fully justifies the requirement of court approval. The Court of Appeals, respondents, and various amici supporting their position, however, suggest that the court’s authority to pass on settlements, typically invoked to ensure fair treatment of class members, must be exercised in accordance with the Fees Act to promote the availability of attorneys in civil rights cases. Specifically, respondents assert that the State of Idaho could not pass a valid statute precluding the payment of attorney’s fees in settlements of civil rights cases to which the Fees Act applies. See Brief for Respondents 24, n. 22. From this they reason that the Fees Act must equally preclude the adoption of a uniform statewide policy that serves the same end, and accordingly contend that a consistent practice of insisting on a fee waiver as a condition of settlement in civil rights litigation is in conflict with the federal statute authorizing fees for prevailing parties, including those who prevail by way of settlement. Remarkably, there seems little disagreement on these points. Petitioners and the amici who support them never suggest that the district court is obligated to place its stamp of approval on every settlement in which the plaintiffs’ attorneys have agreed to a fee waiver. The Solicitor General, for example, has suggested that a fee waiver need not be approved when the defendant had “no realistic defense on the merits,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal 23, n. 9; see id., at 26-27, or if the waiver was part of a “vindictive effort ... to teach counsel that they had better not bring such cases,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. We find it unnecessary to evaluate this argument, however, because the record in this case does not indicate that Idaho has adopted such a statute, policy, or practice. Nor does the record support the narrower proposition that petitioners’ request to waive fees was a vindictive effort to deter attorneys from representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits against Idaho. It is true that a fee waiver was requested and obtained as a part of the early settlement of the education claims, but we do not understand respondents to be challenging that waiver, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32, and they have not offered to prove that petitioners’ tactics in this case merely implemented a routine state policy designed to frustrate the objectives of the Fees Act. Our own examination of the record reveals no such policy. In light of the record, respondents must — to sustain the judgment in their favor — confront the District Court’s finding that the extensive structural relief they obtained constituted an adequate quid pro quo for their waiver of attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals did not overturn this finding. Indeed, even that court did not suggest that the option of rejecting the entire settlement and requiring the parties either to try the case or to attempt to negotiate a different settlement would have served the interests of justice. Only by making the unsupported assumption that the respondent class was entitled to retain the favorable portions of the settlement while rejecting the fee waiver could the Court of Appeals conclude that the District Court had acted unwisely. What the outcome of this settlement illustrates is that the Fees Act has given the victims of civil rights violations a powerful weapon that improves their ability to employ counsel, to obtain access to the courts, and thereafter to vindicate their rights by means of settlement or trial. For aught that appears, it was the “coercive” effect of respondents’ statutory right to seek a fee award that motivated petitioners’ exceptionally generous offer. Whether this weapon might be even more powerful if fee waivers were prohibited in cases like this is another question, but it is in any event a question that Congress is best equipped to answer. Thus far, the Legislature has not commanded that fees be paid whenever a case is settled. Unless it issues such a command, we shall rely primarily on the sound discretion of the district courts to appraise the reasonableness of particular class-action settlements on a case-by-case basis, in the light of all the relevant circumstances. In this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in upholding a fee waiver which secured broad injunctive relief, relief greater than that which plaintiffs could reasonably have expected to achieve at trial. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The number of children in petitioners’ custody, as well as the duration of that custody, fluctuates to a certain degree. Although it appears that only 40 or 50 children are in custody at any one moment, the membership jn respondents’ class is apparently well over 2,000. App. 61. Although Johnson subsequently entered private practice and apparently bore some of the financial burden of the litigation himself, any award of costs or fees would inure to the benefit of Idaho Legal Aid. Brief for Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Consideration of Costs and Attorney Fees in Jeff D. v. Evans, No. 80-4091 (D. Idaho), p. 6. Idaho Legal Aid receives grants under the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2996-2996J, and is not allowed to represent clients who are capable of paying their own legal fees, see § 2996f(b)(l); 45 CFR § 1609 (1984). Petitioners append to their brief on the merits the parties’ correspondence setting forth their respective positions on settlement. Without embarking on a letter-by-letter discussion of the status of the fee waiver in the bargaining, it is clear that petitioners’ proposals uniformly included fee waivers while respondents’ almost always did not. Paragraph 25 of the settlement agreement provides: “Plaintiffs and defendants shall each bear their own costs and attorney’s fees thus far incurred, if so approved by the Court.” App. 104. In addition, the entire settlement agreement was conditioned on the District Court’s approval of the waiver provision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). See nn. 7 and 8, infra. Johnson’s oral presentation to the District Court reads in full as follows: “In other words, an attorney like myself can be put in the position of either negotiating for his client or negotiating for his attorney’s fees, and I think that that is pretty much the situation that occurred in this instance. “I was forced, because of what I perceived to be a result favorable to the plaintiff class, a result that I didn’t want to see jeopardized by a trial or by any other possible problems that might have occurred. And the result is the best result I could have gotten in this court or any other court and it is really a fair and just result in any instance and what should have occurred years earlier and which in fact should have been the case all along. That result I didn’t want to see disturbed on the basis that my attorney’s fees would cause a problem and cause that result to be jeopardized.” App. 90-91. The District Court wrote a letter to respondents’ counsel explaining the conditional nature of petitioners’ settlement offer: “[T]he defendants’ signing of the stipulation was dependent upon the Court’s approval of the finding that it was appropriate to accept a stipulation where plaintiffs waived attorneys fees. . . . The defendants entered into the stipulation only as a compromise matter with the understanding that they would not pay any attorneys fees, and advised the Court that if there were going to be attorneys fees that they wanted to proceed with trial because they did not think they were required to conform to the stipulation legally. Under those circumstances, it would be entirely inappropriate to leave the stipulation in effect. If you effectively challenge the stipulation, the whole stipulation falls and the matter must be tried by the Court. On the other hand, if you do not successfully challenge the stipulation, then the stipulation and stay is in effect. But until the validity of the stipulation is determined, the Court feels it is entirely unfair to enforce it.” Id., at 115-116. See id., at 112. “Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(e). As we held in Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980): “The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees.” See ibid, (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976)). Nor does the fact that the fee award would benefit a legal services corporation justify a refusal to make an award. See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 70-71, n. 9 (1980); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, pp. 5 and 8, n. 16 (1976). That precedent, Mendoza v. United States, 623 F. 2d 1338 (CA9 1980), like the Third Circuit decision in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F. 2d 1015 (1977), which both the Mendoza court and the panel below cited approvingly, instituted a ban on simultaneous negotiations of merits and attorney’s fees issues to prevent attorneys from trading relief benefiting the class for a more generous fee for themselves. See Mendoza v. United States, supra, at 1352-1353; Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F. 2d, at 1020-1021. In neither of those cases had the court rejected a part of the settlement and enforced the remainder. On the question whether it is ever proper to put plaintiff’s counsel to the choice of recommending acceptance of a favorable settlement or pursuing a statutory fee award, the decision of the Ninth Circuit below is in accord with the rule prevailing in the Third Circuit, see Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F. 2d, at 1021 (not recognizing an exception for “unusual circumstances”); cf. El Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Community Corps., 735 F. 2d 98, 101, n. 3 (CA3 1984) (dictum noting applicability of Prandini to fee waivers in holding that such waivers must be explicit), and conflicts with decisions in four other Circuits holding that civil rights plaintiffs are free to waive fee awards as part of an overall settlement, at least in some circumstances, see Moore v. National Assn. of Security Dealers, Inc., 246 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 125, 762 F. 2d 1093, 1104 (1985) (opinion of Mac-Kinnon, J.); id., at 134-135, 762 F. 2d, at 1113-1114 (Wald, J., concurring in judgment); Lazar v. Pierce, 757 F. 2d 435, 438-439 (CAl 1985); Gram v. Bank of Louisiana, 691 F. 2d 728, 730 (CA5 1982) (dictum); Chicano Police Officer’s Assn. v. Stover, 624 F. 2d 127, 132 (CA10 1980). See Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 437 (1976); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U. S. 244, 251 (1968); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U. S. 642, 651 (1961); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932). Cf. Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, 592 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184, Comment a, p. 30 (1981) (“If the performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable [as against public policy] is an essential part of the agreed exchange, . . . the entire agreement [is] unenforceable”); E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.8, p. 361 (1982). Generally speaking, a lawyer is under an ethical obligation to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of his client; he must not allow his own interests, financial or otherwise, to influence his professional advice. ABA, Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-1, 5-2 (as amended 1980); ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(b), 2.1 (as amended 1984). Accordingly, it is argued that an attorney is required to evaluate a settlement offer on the basis of his client’s interest, without considering his own interest in obtaining a fee; upon recommending settlement, he must abide by the client’s decision whether or not to accept the offer, see Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 to EC 7-9; Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a). Even state bar opinions holding it unethical for defendants to request fee waivers in exchange for relief on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims are bottomed ultimately on § 1988. See District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Op. No. 147, reprinted in 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 389, 394-395 (1985); Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association, Op. No. 82-80, p. 1 (1985); id., at 4-5 (dissenting opinion); Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association, Op. No. 80-94, reprinted in 36 Record of N. Y. C. B. A. 507, 508-511 (1981); Grievance Commission of Board of Overseers of the Bar of Maine, Op. No. 17, reprinted in Advisory Opinions of the Grievance Commission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar 69-70 (1983). For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that the bar is not of one mind on this ethical judgment. See Final Subcommittee Report of the Committee on Attorney’s Fees of the Judicial Conference of the United State Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reprinted in 13 Bar Rep. 4, 6 (1984) (declining to adopt flat rule forbidding waivers of statutory fees). Cf. State Bar of Georgia, Op. No. 39, reprinted in 10 Ga. St. Bar News No. 2, p. 5 (1984) (rejecting the reasoning of the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association in the context of lump-sum settlement offers for the reason, among others, that “[t]o force a defendant into proposing a settlement offer wherein plaintiffs!’] statutory attorney fees are not negotiated . . . [means that] meaningful settlement proposals might never be made. Such a situation undeniably ... is inimical to the resolution of disputes between parties”). See Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association, Op. No. 80-94, reprinted in 36 Record of N. Y. C. B. A., at 508 (“Defense counsel thus are in a uniquely favorable position when they condition settlement on the waiver of the statutory fee: they make a demand for a benefit which the plaintiff’s lawyer cannot resist as a matter of ethics and which the plaintiff will not resist due to lack of interest”). Accord, District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Op. No. 147, reprinted in 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep., at 394. The operative language of the Fees Act provides, in its entirety: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977,1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, pp. 6-7 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, pp. 4-5, and n. 4 (1976); 122 Cong. Rec. 35122-35123 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan); id., at 35125 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). This straightforward reading of § 1988 accords with the view held by the majority of the Courts of Appeals. See, e. g., Jonas v. Stack, 758 F. 2d 567, 570, n. 7 (CA11 1985) (“Strict conformity to the language of [§ 1988] would require that the [fee] application be made by the attorney in the name of his client, the prevailing party. We consider this to be the procedure of choice, since it ensures that awards made under the Act compensate their intended beneficiaries”); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 722 F. 2d 1009, 1011 (CA2 1983) (“Under [42 U. S. C. § 1988] it is the prevailing party rather than the lawyer who is entitled to attorney’s fees”); Cooper v. Singer, 719 F. 2d 1496, 1506-1507 (CA10 1983) (distinguishing between client’s and counsel’s entitlement to fees in the course of holding that “if the client’s section 1988 fee award ... is less than the amount owed to the attorney under the contingent fee agreement, then the lawyer will be expected to reduce his fee to the amount awarded by the courts” (emphasis added)); White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 629 F. 2d 697, 703 (CA1 1980) (“[AJward of attorney’s fees goes to ‘prevailing party,’ rather than attorney”), rev’d on other grounds, 455 U. S. 445 (1982). But cf. James v. Home Construction Co. of Mobil Inc., 689 F. 2d 1357, 1358-1359 (CA11 1982) (disagreeing with Smith v. South Side Loan Co., 567 F. 2d 306, 307 (CA5 1978) (“[A]n award [of attorney’s fees] is the right of the party suing not the attorney representing him”), and construing Truth in Lending Act’s mandatory award of attorney’s fees as “creat[ing] a right of action for attorneys to seek fee awards after settlement of the plaintiff’s claim.” 689 F. 2d, at 1359). Judge Wald has described the use of attorney’s fees as a “bargaining chip” useful to plaintiffs as well as defendants. In her opinion concurring in the judgment in Moore v. National Assn. of Security Dealers, Inc., she wrote: “On the other hand, the JeffD. approach probably means that a defendant who is willing to grant immediate prospective relief to a plaintiff case, but would rather gamble on the outcome at trial than pay attorneys’ fees and costs up front, will never settle. In short, removing attorneys’ fees as a ‘bargaining chip’ cuts both ways. It prevents defendants, who in Title VII cases are likely to have greater economic power than plaintiffs, from exploiting that power in a particularly objectionable way; but it also deprives plaintiffs of the use of that chip, even when without it settlement may be impossible and the prospect of winning at trial may be very doubtful. ” 246 U. S. App. D. C., at 133, 762 F. 2d, at 1112. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra, at 1, 9; S. Rep. No. 94-1011, supra, at 2, 6; 122 Cong. Rec. 33313-33314 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Tunney); id., at 33314-33315 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id., at 35128 (remarks of Rep. Seiberling). Indeed, Congress specifically rejected a mandatory fee-shifting provision, see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, swpra, at 3, 5, 8; 122 Cong. Rec. 35123 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan), a proposal which the dissent would virtually reinstate under the guise of carrying out the legislative will. Even proponents of nonwaivable fee awards under § 1988 concede that “one would have to strain principles of statutory interpretation to conclude that Congress intended to utilize fee non-negotiability to achieve the purposes of section 1988.” Calhoun, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of Non-Negotiable Fee Awards under 42 U. S. C. § 1988, 55 U. Colo. L. Rev. 341, 385 (1984). This conclusion is buttressed by Congress’ decision to emulate the “over fifty” fee-shifting provisions that had been successful in enlisting the aid of “private attorneys general” in the prosecution of other federal statutes that had been on the books for decades. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, supra, at 3, 5. Accord, S. Rep. No. 94-1011, supra, at 3. See also 122 Cong. Rec., supra, at 35123 (appendix to remarks of Rep. Drinan) (listing more than 50 fee-shifting statutes). No one has suggested that the purpose of any of those fee-shifting provisions has been frustrated by the absence of a prohibition against fee waivers. It is unrealistic to assume that the defendant’s offer on the merits would be unchanged by redaction of the provision waiving fees. If it were, the defendant’s incentive to settle would be diminished because of the risk that attorney’s fees, when added to the original merits offer, will exceed the discounted value of the expected judgment plus litigation costs. If, as is more likely, the defendant lowered the value of its offer on the merits to provide a cushion against the possibility of a large fee award, the defendant’s offer on the merits will in many cases be less than the amount to which the plaintiff feels himself entitled, thereby inclining him to reject the settlement. Of course, to the extent that the merits offer is somewhere between these two extremes the incentive of both sides to settle is dampened, albeit to a lesser degree with respect to each party. See, e. g., Rivera v. Riverside, 763 F. 2d 1580, 1581-1583 (CA9 1985) (city ordered to pay victorious civil rights plaintiffs $245,456.25 following a trial in which they recovered a total of $33,350 in damages), cert. granted, 474 U. S. 917 (1985); Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F. 2d 262, 269 (CA3 1985) (city ordered to pay some $35,000 in attorney’s fees in a case in which judgment for the plaintiff was entered in the amount of $17,000); Copeland v. Marshall, 205 U. S. App. D. C. 390, 401, 641 F. 2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc) ($160,000 attorney’s fees awarded for obtaining $33,000 judgment); Skoda v. Fontani, 646 F. 2d 1193, 1194 (CA7), on remand, 519 F. Supp. 309, 310 (ND Ill. 1981) ($6,086.12 attorney’s fees awarded to obtain $1 recovery). Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U. S., at 7 ($171,692.47 in claimed attorney’s fees and costs to obtain $60,000 damages judgment). See, e. g., Grendel’s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F. 2d 945, 960 (CA1 1984) (awarding $113,640.85 in fees and expenses for successful challenge to law zoning liquor establishments in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U. S. 116 (1982)). While this Court has identified “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate” as “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at 433, the “product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry,” id., at 434, for “there may be circumstances in which the basic standard of reasonable rates multiplied by reasonably expended hours results in a fee that is either unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 897 (1984). “A district court is expressly empowered to exercise discretion in determining whether an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness.” Id., at 902, n. 19. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S., at 437. The district court’s calculation is thus anything but an arithmetical exercise. The variability in fee awards is discussed in, for example, Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 283-284 (1977); Diamond, The Firestorm over Attorney Fee Awards, 69 A. B. A. J. 1420, 1420 (1983); and National Association of Attorneys General, Report to Congress: Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Feb. 3,1984), reprinted in Hearing on The Legal Fee Equity Act (S. 2802) before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 280-293 (1984). This is the experience of every judge and a majority of the members of a Third Circuit Task Force which concluded that that Circuit’s ban on fee negotiations “tends to discourage settlement in some cases and, on occasion, makes it impossible.” Report of the Third Circuit Task Force: Court Awarded Fees 38 (1985) (footnotes omitted). The Task. Force reasoned: “[Pjreventing agreement on fees at the time settlement of the merits is discussed . . . makes it difficult for the defendant to ascertain precisely what its liability will be, thereby eliminating the very certainty that makes settlement attractive to the defendant. The net effect . . . may be more trials, thus raising the question whether that cost is justifiable inasmuch as the conflict between settling the merits and discussing fees may be more hypothetical than real.” Ibid, (footnotes omitted). Respondents implicitly acknowledge a defendant’s need to fix his total liability when they suggest that the parties to a civil rights action should “exchange information” regarding plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. See, e. g., Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association, Op. No. 82-80, p. 2 (1985); Grievance Commission of Board of Overseers of the Bar of Maine, Op. No. 17, Advisory Opinions of the Grievance Commission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar 70 (1983). If this exchange is confined to time records and customary billing rates, the information provides an insufficient basis for forecasting the fee award for the reasons stated above. If the “exchange” is more in the nature of an “assurance” that attorney’s fees will not exceed a specified amount, the rule against waiving fees to obtain a favorable settlement on the merits is to that extent breached. Apparently, some parties have circumvented the rule against simultaneous negotiation in one Circuit by means of tacit agreements of this kind. See El Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Community Corps., 735 F. 2d, at 101, n. 3 (defendants’ counsel suggest that the Third Circuit’s ban on simultaneous negotiations is “ ‘more honored in the breach’ ”); A. Miller, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions 222 (1980) (“Hence even if agreements on fees are not included in settlements, the net result might be to increase informal agreements among counsel or to encourage withholding agreements on fees from the judge until after the settlement is approved”); Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver of Attorneys’ Fees: Policy, Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 805, n. 90 (1983) (survey of several District Judges serving in the Third Circuit finding exchanges of information being used by plaintiffs’ lawyers to “voluntarily reduce the number of compensable hours claimed as an incentive for defendant to settle”). Finally, if counsel for the plaintiffs are allowed to renege on their informal agreements, the rule against fee waivers will have been vindicated at the expense of future settlements, inasmuch as defendants will be unable to trust assurances made by plaintiffs’ counsel. The Court is unanimous in concluding that the Fees Act should not be interpreted to prohibit all simultaneous negotiations of a defendant’s liability on the merits and his liability for his opponent’s attorney’s fees. See opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting, post, at 762-763, 764-765. We agree that when the parties find such negotiations conducive to settlement, the public interest, as well as that of the parties, is served by simultaneous negotiations. Cf. supra, at 732-734. This reasoning applies not only to individual civil rights actions, but to civil rights class actions as well. Although the dissent would allow simultaneous negotiations, it would require that “whatever fee the parties agree to” be “found by the court to be a ‘reasonable’ one under the Fees Act.” Post, at 754. See post, at 753, n. 6. The dissent’s proposal is imaginative, but not very practical. Of the 10,757 “other civil rights” cases filed in federal court last year — most of which were 42 U. S. C. § 1983 actions for which § 1988 authorizes an award of fees — only 111 sought class relief. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, An Analysis of the Workload of the Federal Courts for the Twelve Month Period Ended June 30, 1985 pp. 281, 555 (1985). Assuming that of the approximately 99% of these civil rights actions that are not class actions, a further 90% would settle rather than go to trial, the dissent’s proposal would require district courts to evaluate the reasonableness of fee agreements in several thousand civil rights cases annually while they make that determination in slightly over 100 civil fights class actions now. Moreover, if this novel procedure really is necessary to carry out the purposes of the Fees Act, presumably it should be applied to all cases arising under federal statutes that provide for fee shifting. But see n. 22, supra. See Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association, Op. No. 80-94, reprinted in 36 Record of N. Y. C. B. A., 507, 510 (1981) (“[T]he long term effect of persistent demands for the waiver of statutory fees is to . . . undermine efforts to make counsel available to those who cannot afford it”). Accord, District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Op. No. 147, reprinted in 113 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 389, 394 (1985). National staff counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union estimates that requests for fee waivers are made in more than half of all civil rights cases litigated. See Winter, Fee Waiver Requests Unethical: Bar Opinion, 68 A. B. A. J. 23 (1982). In this regard, consider the following comment in the Final Subcommittee Report of the Committee on Attorney’s Fees of the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: “Against this background, it was agreed that there were certain situations in which the refusal of defense counsel to proceed except on a package basis was improper. For instance, in a Freedom of Information Act case, where a journalist was the plaintiff and either had a reasonably good case, or had won in the district court and the government was considering appeal, it would be improper for government counsel to offer to release the documents, only if plaintiff’s counsel agreed to waive all attorneys fees. That situation presents a grossly unfair choice to the plaintiff and his/her counsel, and permitting such offers to be made would seriously undermine the purpose of fee shifting provisions. Moreover, it would serve no end other than saving the government money which it would otherwise have to pay, yet any such saving is plainly at odds with the purpose for which the fee shifting statute was enacted.” 13 Bar Rep., at 6. From the declarations of respondents’ counsel in the lower courts, as well as those of the District Court and the Court of Appeals, all of which are quoted in Part I, supra, we understand the District Court’s approval of the stipulation settling the health services claims to have rested on the determination that the provision waiving attorney’s fees and costs was fair to the class— i. e., the fee waiver was exchanged for injunctive relief of equivalent value. We are cognizant of the possibility that decisions by individual clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish lawyers’ expectations of statutory fees in civil rights cases. If this occurred, the pool of lawyers willing to represent plaintiffs in such cases might shrink, constricting the “effective access to the judicial process” for persons with civil rights grievances which the Fees Act was intended to provide. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). That the “tyranny of small decisions” may operate in this fashion is not to say that there is any reason or documentation to support such a concern at the present time. Comment on this issue is therefore premature at this juncture. We believe, however, that as a practical matter the likelihood of this circumstance arising is remote. See Moore v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., 246 U. S. App. D. C., at 133, n. 1, 762 F. 2d, at 1112, n. 1 (Wald, J., concurring in judgment). “Each negotiation, like each litigant, is unique; reasonableness can only be determined by looking at the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the stage at which the settlement is effective, the substantiality of the relief obtained on the merits, and the explanations of the parties as to why they did what they did.” Id., at 134, 762 F. 2d, at 1113 (Wald, J., concurring in judgment). See also the following comment in the opinion of the Final Subcommittee Report of the Committee on Attorney’s Fees of the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: “[T]he purpose of such settlement offers is not, in most cases, to create an attorney-client conflict, nor to punish or deter plaintiffs’ attorneys from taking on fee shifting cases. Generally speaking, the reason that defendants make such offers is to limit their total exposure. “The key in these situations is whether the defendant’s offer is reasonable in light of all the circumstances, including the chances of success on the merits and the risk of possible exposure in damages and attorneys fees. And in making such determinations, the legitimate interest of the fee shifting provisions must be balanced against the legitimate interest of the defendant, whether a governmental agency or private party, in making an offer which will fix liability with considerable certainty. This balancing approach applies regardless of whether the issue is phrased in terms of the right of the defendant to make a lump sum settlement offer, or the right to refuse to pay fees to the plaintiff’s attorney while providing some measure of relief to the client. In both situations, the inquiry is the same and can be decided only on a case by case basis, assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.” 13 Bar Report, at 6. Although the record in this case does not provide us with any information concerning the amount of money that had been expended on costs, it is appropriate to note that costs other than fees may also be a significant item in class-action litigation. For example, in Moore v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, Inc., supra, the class representative’s liability for costs amounted to over $30,000 at the time she decided that her best interests would be served by a settlement. 246 U. S. App. D. C., at 116-117, 762 F. 2d, at 1095, 1096, and n. 2 (opinion of MacKinnon, J.). The interest in recovering costs already expended by a class representative may justify a refusal to accept a settlement including only prospective relief and, conversely, the interest in avoiding the additional expenditures associated with continuing the litigation may also justify accepting an otherwise doubtful settlement.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner v. SW GENERAL, INC., dba Southwest Ambulance No. 15-1251. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Nov. 7, 2016. Decided March 21, 2017. Ian H. Gershengorn, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo, Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda J. Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, DC, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant, Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney, General, Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas N. Letter, Scott R. McIntosh, Benjamin M. Shultz, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Shay Dvoretzky, Emily J. Kennedy, Stephen J. Petrany, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Article II of the Constitution requires that the President obtain "the Advice and Consent of the Senate" before appointing "Officers of the United States." § 2, cl. 2. Given this provision, the responsibilities of an office requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation-known as a "PAS" office-may go unperformed if a vacancy arises and the President and Senate cannot promptly agree on a replacement. Congress has long accounted for this reality by authorizing the President to direct certain officials to temporarily carry out the duties of a vacant PAS office in an acting capacity, without Senate confirmation. The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et seq., is the latest version of that authorization. Section 3345(a) of the FVRA authorizes three classes of Government officials to become acting officers. The general rule is that the first assistant to a vacant office shall become the acting officer. The President may override that default rule by directing either a person serving in a different PAS office or a senior employee within the relevant agency to become the acting officer instead. The FVRA, however, prohibits certain persons from serving as acting officers if the President has nominated them to fill the vacant office permanently. The question presented is whether that limitation applies only to first assistants who have automatically assumed acting duties, or whether it also applies to PAS officers and senior employees serving as acting officers at the President's behest. We hold that it applies to all three categories of acting officers. I A The Senate's advice and consent power is a critical "structural safeguard [ ] of the constitutional scheme." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997). The Framers envisioned it as "an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President" and a guard against "the appointment of unfit characters ... from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." The Federalist No. 76, p. 457 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The constitutional process of Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, however, can take time: The President may not promptly settle on a nominee to fill an office; the Senate may be unable, or unwilling, to speedily confirm the nominee once submitted. Yet neither may desire to see the duties of the vacant office go unperformed in the interim. Since President Washington's first term, Congress has given the President limited authority to appoint acting officials to temporarily perform the functions of a vacant PAS office without first obtaining Senate approval. The earliest statutes authorized the appointment of "any person or persons" to fill specific vacancies in the Departments of State, Treasury, and War. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 37, § 8, 1 Stat. 281. Congress at first allowed acting officers to serve until the permanent officeholder could resume his duties or a successor was appointed, ibid., but soon imposed a six-month limit on acting service, Act of Feb. 13, 1795, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 415. Congress revisited the issue in the 1860s, ultimately passing the Vacancies Act of 1868. The Vacancies Act expanded the number of PAS offices that the President could fill with acting officers. Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168; see also Act of Feb. 20, 1863, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 656. With that expansion came new constraints. The authority to appoint "any person or persons" as an acting officer gave way to a default rule that the "first or sole assistant ... shall" perform that function, with an exception allowing the President to instead fill the post with a person already serving in a PAS office. 15 Stat. 168. And rather than six months of acting service, the Vacancies Act generally authorized only ten days. Ibid. That narrow window of acting service was later lengthened to 30 days. Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 113, 26 Stat. 733. During the 1970s and 1980s, interbranch conflict arose over the Vacancies Act. The Department of Justice took the position that, in many instances, the head of an executive agency had independent authority apart from the Vacancies Act to temporarily fill vacant offices. The Comptroller General disagreed, arguing that the Act was the exclusive authority for temporarily filling vacancies in executive agencies. See M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The New Vacancies Act: Congress Acts to Protect the Senate's Confirmation Prerogative 2-4 (1998) (Rosenberg). Congress then amended the Vacancies Act to clarify that it applies to such agencies, while at the same time lengthening the term of permissible acting service to 120 days, with a tolling period while a nomination is pending. Id., at 3; see Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act, § 7, 102 Stat. 988. But tensions did not ease. By 1998, approximately 20 percent of PAS offices in executive agencies were occupied by "temporary designees, most of whom had served beyond the 120-day limitation period ... without presidential submissions of nominations." Rosenberg 1. These acting officers filled high-level positions, sometimes in obvious contravention of the Senate's wishes. One, for instance, was brought in from outside Government to serve as Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, immediately after the Senate refused to confirm him for that very office. Ibid. ; see M. Rosenberg, Congressional Research Service, Validity of Designation of Bill Lann Lee as Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights 1-3 (1998). Perceiving a threat to the Senate's advice and consent power, see Rosenberg 6, Congress acted again. In 1998, it replaced the Vacancies Act with the FVRA. Section 3345(a) of the FVRA permits three categories of Government officials to perform acting service in a vacant PAS office. Subsection (a)(1) prescribes a general rule: If a person serving in a PAS office dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform his duties, the first assistant to that office "shall perform" the office's "functions and duties ... temporarily in an acting capacity." The next two paragraphs of § 3345(a) identify alternatives. Subsection (a)(2) provides that "notwithstanding paragraph (1)," the President "may direct a person" who already serves in a PAS office to "perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity." Subsection (a)(3) adds that "notwithstanding paragraph (1)," the President "may direct" a person to perform acting duties if the person served in a senior position in the relevant agency for at least 90 days in the 365-day period preceding the vacancy. Section 3345 also makes certain individuals ineligible for acting service. Subsection (b)(1) states: "Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section" if the President nominates him for the vacant PAS office and, during the 365-day period preceding the vacancy, the individual "did not serve in the position of first assistant" to that office or "served in [that] position ... for less than 90 days." Subsection (b)(2) creates an exception to this prohibition, providing that "[p]aragraph (1) shall not apply to any person" serving in a first assistant position that itself requires the Senate's advice and consent. Other sections of the FVRA establish time limits on acting service and penalties for noncompliance. In most cases, the statute permits acting service for "210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs"; tolls that time limit while a nomination is pending; and starts a new 210-day clock if the nomination is "rejected, withdrawn, or returned." §§ 3346(a)-(b)(1). Upon a second nomination, the time limit tolls once more, and an acting officer can serve an additional 210 days if the second nomination proves unsuccessful. § 3346(b)(2). The FVRA ensures compliance by providing that, in general, "any function or duty of a vacant office" performed by a person not properly serving under the statute "shall have no force or effect." § 3348(d). B The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is charged with administering the National Labor Relations Act. By statute, its general counsel must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). In June 2010, the NLRB's general counsel-who had been serving with Senate confirmation-resigned. The President directed Lafe Solomon to serve temporarily as the NLRB's acting general counsel, citing the FVRA as the basis for the appointment. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to L. Solomon (June 18, 2010). Solomon satisfied the requirements for acting service under subsection (a)(3) of the FVRA because he had spent the previous ten years in the senior position of Director of the NLRB's Office of Representation Appeals. The President had bigger plans for Solomon than acting service. On January 5, 2011, he nominated Solomon to serve as the NLRB's general counsel on a permanent basis. The Senate had other ideas. That body did not act upon the nomination during the 112th Congress, so it was returned to the President when the legislative session expired. 159 Cong. Rec. S17 (Jan. 3, 2013). The President resubmitted Solomon's name for consideration in the spring of 2013, id., at S3884 (May 23, 2013), but to no avail. The President ultimately withdrew Solomon's nomination and put forward a new candidate, whom the Senate confirmed on October 29, 2013. Id., at S7635. Throughout this entire period, Solomon served as the NLRB's acting general counsel. Solomon's responsibilities included exercising "final authority" to issue complaints alleging unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160(b). In January 2013, an NLRB Regional Director, exercising authority on Solomon's behalf, issued a complaint alleging that respondent SW General, Inc.-a company that provides ambulance services-had improperly failed to pay certain bonuses to long-term employees. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and the NLRB agreed. 360 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (2014). SW General filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. It argued that the unfair labor practices complaint was invalid because, under subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA, Solomon could not legally perform the duties of general counsel after having been nominated to fill that position. The NLRB defended Solomon's actions. It contended that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under subsection (a)(1), not to acting officers who, like Solomon, serve under (a)(2) or (a)(3). The Court of Appeals granted SW General's petition for review and vacated the Board's order. It reasoned that "the text of subsection (b)(1) squarely supports" the conclusion that the provision's restriction on nominees serving as acting officers "applies to all acting officers, no matter whether they serve pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3)." 796 F.3d 67, 78 (C.A.D.C.2015). As a result, Solomon became "ineligible to serve as Acting General Counsel once the President nominated him to be General Counsel." Id., at 72. We granted certiorari, 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2489, 195 L.Ed.2d 822 (2016), and now affirm. II Subsection (b)(1) of the FVRA prevents a person who has been nominated for a vacant PAS office from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity. In full, it states: "(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section, if- (A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve, such person- (i) did not serve in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer; or (ii) served in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer for less than 90 days; and (B) the President submits a nomination of such person to the Senate for appointment to such office." Subsection (b)(2) adds that "[p]aragraph (1) shall not apply" to a person serving in a first assistant position that itself requires the advice and consent of the Senate. We conclude that the prohibition in subsection (b)(1) applies to anyone performing acting service under the FVRA. It is not, as the Board contends, limited to first assistants performing acting service under subsection (a)(1). The text of the prohibition extends to any "person" who serves "as an acting officer ... under this section," not just to "first assistants" serving under subsection (a)(1). The phrase "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" does not limit the reach of (b)(1), but instead clarifies that the prohibition applies even when it conflicts with the default rule that first assistants shall perform acting duties. A 1 Our analysis of subsection (b)(1) begins with its text. Subsection (b)(1) applies to any "person" and prohibits service "as an acting officer for an office under this section." The key words are "person" and "section." They clearly indicate that (b)(1) applies to all acting officers under § 3345, regardless of the means of appointment. Start with "person." The word has a naturally expansive meaning that can encompass anyone who performs acting duties under the FVRA. See Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312, 98 S.Ct. 584, 54 L.Ed.2d 563 (1978). Important as they may be, first assistants are not the only "person [s]" of the bunch. Now add "under this section." The language clarifies that subsection (b)(1) applies to all persons serving under § 3345. Congress often drafts statutes with hierarchical schemes-section, subsection, paragraph, and on down the line. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60-61, 125 S.Ct. 460, 160 L.Ed.2d 389 (2004) ; L. Filson, The Legislative Drafter's Desk Reference 222 (1992). Congress used that structure in the FVRA and relied on it to make precise cross-references. When Congress wanted to refer only to a particular subsection or paragraph, it said so. See, e.g., § 3346(a)(2) ( "subsection (b)"); § 3346(b)(2) ("paragraph (1)"). But in (b)(1) Congress referred to the entire section- § 3345 -which subsumes all of the ways a person may become an acting officer. The rest of the FVRA uses the pairing of "person" and "section" the same way. Section 3346, for example, specifies how long "the person serving as an acting officer as described under section 3345 may serve in the office." (Emphasis added.) And § 3348(d)(1) describes the consequences of noncompliance with the FVRA by referring to the actions "taken by any person who is not acting under section 3345, 3346, or 3347." (Emphasis added.) No one disputes that both provisions apply to anyone serving as an acting officer under the FVRA, not just first assistants serving under subsection (a)(1). Had Congress intended subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants acting under (a)(1), it could easily have chosen clearer language. Replacing "person" with "first assistant" would have done the trick. So too would replacing "under this section" with "under subsection (a)(1)." "The fact that [Congress] did not adopt [either] readily available and apparent alternative strongly supports" the conclusion that subsection (b)(1) applies to any acting officer appointed under any provision within § 3345. Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 188, 128 S.Ct. 782, 169 L.Ed.2d 652 (2008). The dependent clause at the beginning of subsection (b)(1)-"[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)"-confirms that the prohibition on acting service applies even when it conflicts with the default rule that the first assistant shall perform acting duties. The ordinary meaning of "notwithstanding" is "in spite of," or "without prevention or obstruction from or by." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1986); Black's Law Dictionary 1091 (7th ed. 1999) ("Despite; in spite of"). In statutes, the word "shows which provision prevails in the event of a clash." A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 126-127 (2012). Subsection (a)(1) sets the rule that first assistants "shall perform" the vacant office's "functions and duties ... in an acting capacity." But the "notwithstanding" clause in subsection (b)(1) means that, even if a first assistant is serving as an acting officer under this statutory mandate, he must cease that service if the President nominates him to fill the vacant PAS office. That subsection (b)(1) also applies to acting officers serving at the President's behest is already clear from the broad text of the independent clause-they are all "person[s]" serving "under this section." 2 The Board takes a different view of the phrase "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)." It begins by noting that § 3345(a) uses three different subsections to "create three separate paths for becoming an acting official." Reply Brief 2. The prohibition in subsection (b)(1), the Board continues, "applies '[n]otwithstanding' only one of these subsections-'subsection (a)(1).' " Ibid. In the Board's view, singling out subsection (a)(1) carries a negative implication: that "Congress did not intend Subsection (b)(1) to override the alternative mechanisms for acting service in Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)." Id., at 3. We disagree. The Board relies on the "interpretive canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 'expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned.' " Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) ). If a sign at the entrance to a zoo says "come see the elephant, lion, hippo, and giraffe," and a temporary sign is added saying "the giraffe is sick," you would reasonably assume that the others are in good health. "The force of any negative implication, however, depends on context." Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013). The expressio unius canon applies only when "circumstances support[ ] a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded." Echazabal, 536 U.S., at 81, 122 S.Ct. 2045. A "notwithstanding" clause does not naturally give rise to such an inference; it just shows which of two or more provisions prevails in the event of a conflict. Such a clause confirms rather than constrains breadth. Singling out one potential conflict might suggest that Congress thought the conflict was particularly difficult to resolve, or was quite likely to arise. But doing so generally does not imply anything about other, unaddressed conflicts, much less that they should be resolved in the opposite manner. Suppose a radio station announces: "We play your favorite hits from the '60s, '70s, and '80s. Notwithstanding the fact that we play hits from the '60s, we do not play music by British bands." You would not tune in expecting to hear the 1970s British band "The Clash" any more than the 1960s "Beatles." The station, after all, has announced that "we do not play music by British bands." The "notwithstanding" clause just establishes that this applies even to music from the '60s, when British bands were prominently featured on the charts. No one, however, would think the station singled out the '60s to convey implicitly that its categorical statement "we do not play music by British bands" actually did not apply to the '70s and '80s. Drawing a negative inference from the "notwithstanding" clause in subsection (b)(1) is similarly inapt. Without that clause, subsection (b)(1) plainly would apply to all persons serving as acting officers under § 3345(a). Adding "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" makes sense because (a)(1) conflicts with (b)(1) in a unique manner. The former is mandatory and self-executing: The first assistant "shall perform" acting duties. The latter, by contrast, speaks to who "may not" be an acting officer. So if a vacancy arises and the President nominates the first assistant to fill the position, (a)(1) says the first assistant "shall perform" the duties of that office in an acting capacity while the nomination is pending, and (b)(1) says he "may not." The "notwithstanding" clause clarifies that the language of (a)(1) does not prevail if that conflict occurs. Compare the mandatory language of subsection (a)(1) to (a)(2) and (a)(3). People appointed under those provisions are just as much acting officers as first assistants who assume the role. But there is no freestanding directive that they perform acting duties; subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) just say that the President "may direct" them to do so. The natural inference, then, is that Congress left these provisions out of the "notwithstanding" clause because they are different from subsection (a)(1), not to exempt from the broad prohibition in subsection (b)(1) those officers serving under (a)(2) and (a)(3). Indeed, "notwithstanding" is used the same way in other parts of § 3345. Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) are each preceded by the phrase "notwithstanding paragraph (1)." The phrase recognizes that subsection (a)(1) is unique, and resolves the potential conflict between the mandatory "shall perform" in that provision and the permissive "may direct" in (a)(2) and (a)(3). But it implies nothing about other potential conflicts that may arise in the statutory scheme. In subsection (b)(1), it works the same way: The "notwithstanding" clause simply shows that (b)(1) overrides (a)(1), and nothing more. Step back from the Board's focus on "notwithstanding" and another problem appears: Its interpretation of subsection (b)(1) makes a mess of (b)(2). Subsection (b)(2) specifies that (b)(1) "shall not apply to any person" if (A) that person "is serving as the first assistant"; (B) the first assistant position is itself a PAS office; and (C) "the Senate has approved the appointment of such person" to that office. The Board's interpretation makes the first requirement superfluous, a result we typically try to avoid. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ("It is ... a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)). If subsection (b)(1) applied only to first assistants, there would be no need to state the requirement in (b)(2)(A) that "such person is serving as the first assistant." The Board proposes that Congress did so for clarity, but the same could be said of most superfluous language. The Board and the dissent counter that applying the prohibition in subsection (b)(1) to anyone performing acting service under § 3345(a) has its own problem: Doing so would also require applying it to § 3345(c)(1), which "would nullify" that provision. Reply Brief 9. The dissent deems this "no way to read a statute." Post, at 952. We agree, and it is not the way we read it. Under our reading, subsection (b)(1) has no effect on (c)(1). Subsection (b)(1) addresses nominations generally, prohibiting any person who has been nominated to fill any vacant office from performing that office's duties in an acting capacity. Subsection (c)(1) speaks to a specific nomination scenario: When a person is "nominated by the President for reappointment for an additional term to the same office ... without a break in service." In this particular situation, the FVRA authorizes the nominee "to continue to serve in that office." § 3345(c). "[I]t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general." RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645, 132 S.Ct. 2065, 182 L.Ed.2d 967 (2012). The general prohibition on acting service by nominees yields to the more specific authorization allowing officers up for reappointment to remain at their posts. Applying subsection (b)(1) to § 3345(a) hardly compels a different result. The text of subsection (b)(1) is clear: Subject to one narrow exception, it prohibits anyone who has been nominated to fill a vacant PAS office from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity, regardless of whether the acting officer was appointed under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). It is not limited to first assistants who automatically assume acting duties under (a)(1). B The Board contends that legislative history, purpose, and post-enactment practice uniformly show that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants. The text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 436, 196 L.Ed.2d 340 (2016). In any event, the Board's evidence is not compelling. The Board argues that subsection (b)(1) was designed to serve a specific purpose: preventing the President from having his nominee serve as an acting officer by making him first assistant after (or right before) a vacancy arises. Brief for Petitioner 38. The original draft of the FVRA authorized first assistants and PAS officers to perform acting service. Subsection (b) of that draft provided that if a first assistant was nominated to fill the vacant office, he could not perform that office's duties in an acting capacity unless he had been the first assistant for at least 180 days before the vacancy. Several Senators thought the FVRA too restrictive. They asked to add senior agency officials to the list of potential acting officers and to shorten the 180-day length-of-service requirement in subsection (b). Their requests, the Board says, were granted; the final version of the FVRA included subsection (a)(3) for senior employees and shortened the length-of-service requirement to 90 days. There was no intent to extend the prohibition in subsection (b) beyond first assistants. Id., at 45-46. The glitch in this argument is of course the text of subsection (b)(1). Congress did amend the statute to allow senior employees to become acting officers under subsection (a)(3). The only substantive change that was requested in (b) was to reduce the length-of-service requirement. Congress could have done that with a few tweaks to the original version of subsection (b). Instead, Congress went further: It also removed language that expressly limited subsection (b) to first assistants. And it added a provision-subsection (b)(2)-that makes sense only if (b)(1) applies to all acting officers. In short, Congress took a provision that explicitly applied only to first assistants and turned it into one that applies to all acting officers. The Board protests that Congress would not have expanded the prohibition on nominees serving as acting officers after Senators asked to give the President more flexibility. See Brief for Petitioner 45-46. That certain Senators made specific demands, however, does not mean that they got exactly what they wanted. Passing a law often requires compromise, where even the most firm public demands bend to competing interests. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93-94, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002). What Congress ultimately agrees on is the text that it enacts, not the preferences expressed by certain legislators. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) ("[I]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."). Compromise is precisely what happened here: "[A] period of intense negotiations" took place after Senators demanded changes to the original draft of the FVRA, and the final bill was "a compromise measure." Rosenberg 9. The legislation as passed did expand the pool of individuals the President could appoint as acting officers, by adding senior employees in subsection (a)(3). But it also expanded the scope of the limitation on acting service in (b)(1), by dropping the language making (b)(1) applicable only to first assistants. The Board contends that this compromise must not have happened because Senator Thompson, one of the sponsors of the FVRA, said that subsection (b)(1) "applies only when the acting officer is the first assistant, and not when the acting officer is designated by the President pursuant to §§ 3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3)." 144 Cong. Rec. 27496 (1998). But Senator Byrd-the very next speaker-offered a contradictory account: A nominee may not "serve as an acting officer" if "he is not the first assistant" or "has been the first assistant for less than 90 ... days, and has not been confirmed for the position." Id., at 27498. This is a good example of why floor statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history. See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) ("Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language."). Finally, the Board supports its interpretation with post-enactment practice. It notes that the Office of Legal Counsel and the Government Accountability Office have issued guidance construing subsection (b)(1) to apply only to first assistants. And three Presidents have, without congressional objection, submitted the nominations of 112 individuals who were serving as acting officers under subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3). The Board contends that this "historical practice" is entitled to "significant weight" because the FVRA "concern[s] the allocation of power between two elected branches of Government." Brief for Petitioner 49 (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2559, 189 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) ; internal quotation marks omitted). "[H]istorical practice" is too grand a title for the Board's evidence. The FVRA was not enacted until 1998, and the 112 nominations that the Board cites make up less than two percent of the thousands of nominations to positions in executive agencies that the Senate has considered in the years since its passage. Even the guidance documents the Board cites paid the matter little attention; both made conclusory statements about subsection (b)(1), with no analysis. In this context, Congress's failure to speak up does not fairly imply that it has acquiesced in the Board's interpretation. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185, n. 21, 90 S.Ct. 314, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969) ; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). The Senate may not have noticed that certain nominees were serving as acting officers in violation of the FVRA, or it may have chosen not to reject a qualified candidate just to make a point about compliance with the statute. Either is at least as plausible as the theory that the Legislature's inaction reflects considered acceptance of the Executive's practice. Our decision in Noel Canning -the chief opinion on which the Board relies-is a sharp contrast. That case dealt with the President's constitutional authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, an issue that has attracted intense attention and written analysis from Presidents, Attorneys General, and the Senate. 573 U.S., at ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2567-2573. The voluminous historical record dated back to "the beginning of the Republic," and included "thousands of intra-session recess appointments." Id., at ----, ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2560, 2562. That the chronicle of the Recess Appointments Clause weighed heavily in Noel Canning offers no support to the Board here. III Applying the FVRA to this case is straightforward. Solomon was appointed as acting general counsel under subsection (a)(3). Once the President submitted his nomination to fill that position in a permanent capacity, subsection (b)(1) prohibited him from continuing his acting service. This does not mean that the duties of general counsel to the NLRB needed to go unperformed; the President could have appointed another person to serve as the acting officer in Solomon's place. And he had a wide array of individuals to choose from: any one of the approximately 250 senior NLRB employees or the hundreds of individuals in PAS positions throughout the Government. The President, however, did not do so, and Solomon's continued service violated the FVRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. APPENDIX Section 3345 of the FVRA provides: "(a) If an officer of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office- (1) the first assistant to the office of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 3346 ; (2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 3346 ; or (3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer or employee of such Executive agency to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity, subject to the time limitations of section 3346, if- (A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the applicable officer, the officer or employee served in a position in such agency for not less than 90 days; and (B) the rate of pay for the position described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General Schedule. (b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section, if- (A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve, such person- (i) did not serve in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer; or (ii) served in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer for less than 90 days; and (B) the President submits a nomination of such person to the Senate for appointment to such office. (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any person if- (A) such person is serving as the first assistant to the office of an officer described under subsection (a); (B) the office of such first assistant is an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and (C) the Senate has approved the appointment of such person to such office. (c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer who is nominated by the President for reappointment for an office in an Executive department without a break in service, to continue to serve in that office subject to the time limitations in section 3346, until such time as the Senate has acted to confirm or reject the nomination, notwithstanding adjournment sine die. (2) For purposes of this section and sections 3346, 3347, 3348, 3349, 3349a, and 3349d, the expiration of a term of office is an inability to perform the functions and duties of such office." A senior position is one that has a rate of pay equal to or greater than the minimum rate "for a position at GS-15 of the General Schedule." 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(3)(B). The FVRA exempts "the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board" from the general rule that actions taken in violation of the FVRA are void ab initio. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(e)(1). The Court of Appeals "assume[d] that section 3348(e)(1) renders the actions of an improperly serving Acting General Counsel voidable " and rejected the Board's argument against voiding Solomon's actions. 796 F.3d, at 79-82. The Board did not seek certiorari on this issue, so we do not consider it. In addition, the unfair labor practice complaint in this case was issued after the Senate had returned Solomon's nomination the first time but before the President had renominated him to the same position. In the proceedings below, the Board did not argue that this timing made any difference, and the court assumed it had no bearing on the proper application of the FVRA to this case. Id., at 72, n. 3. We proceed on the same assumption.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTH CAROLINA v. NORTH CAROLINA No. 138, Orig. Argued October 13, 2009 — Decided January 20, 2010 Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 276. David C. Frederick argued the cause for plaintiff. With him on the briefs were Henry Dargan McMaster, Attorney-General of South Carolina, John W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Robert D. Cook, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, T. Parkin Hunter and Leigh Childs Cantey, Assistant Attorneys General, Scott H. Angstreich, Scott K. Attaway, and Michael K. Gottlieb. Eric D. Miller argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. On the brief were then-Acting Solicitor General Kneedler, Acting Assistant Attorney General Cruden, William M. Jay, and K. Jack Haugrud. H. Christopher Bartolomucci argued the cause for the intervention movants. With him on the brief for the City of Charlotte were James T. Banks, Adam J. Siegel, Parker D. Thomson, DeWitt F. McCarley, and H. Michael Boyd. Thomas C. Goldstein, Troy D. Cahill, James W. Sheedy, and Susan E. Driscoll filed a brief for the Catawba River Water Supply Project. Carter G. Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, and Garry S. Rice filed a brief for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC. Christopher G. Browning, Jr., argued the cause for defendant. With him on the brief were Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, James C. Gulick, J. Allen Jernigan, Marc D. Bernstein, and Jennie W. Hauser. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of South Carolina brought this original action against the State of North Carolina, seeking an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River. We appointed a Special Master and referred the matter to her, together with the motions of three nonstate entities seeking to intervene in the dispute as parties. South Carolina opposed the motions. After holding a hearing, the Special Master granted the motions and, upon South Carolina’s request, memorialized the reasons for her decision in a First Interim Report. South Carolina then presented exceptions, and we set the matter for argument. Two of the three proposed intervenors have satisfied the standard for intervention in original actions that we articulated nearly 60 years ago in New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369 (1953) (per curiam). Accordingly, we overrule South Carolina’s exceptions with respect to the Catawba River Water Supply Project (hereinafter CRWSP) and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (hereinafter Duke Energy), but we sustain South Carolina’s exception with respect to the city of Charlotte, North Carolina (hereinafter Charlotte). I A We granted leave for South Carolina to file its complaint in this matter two years ago. South Carolina v. North Carolina, 552 U. S. 804 (2007). The gravamen of the complaint is that North Carolina has authorized upstream transfers of water from the Catawba River basin that exceed North Carolina’s equitable share of the river. It has done so, according to the complaint, pursuant to a North Carolina statute that requires any person seeking to transfer more than 2 million gallons of water per day (mgd) from the Catawba River basin to obtain a permit from the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143-215.22L(a)(1) (Lexis 2007); § 143-215.22G(1)(h). Through that agency, the complaint alleges, North Carolina has issued at least two such permits, one to Charlotte for the transfer of up to 33 mgd, and one to the North Carolina cities of Concord and Kannapolis for the transfer of 10 mgd. In addition, the complaint alleges, North Carolina’s permitting statute “grandfathers” a 5 mgd transfer by the CRWSP, and “implicitly authorize[s]” an unknown number of transfers of less than 2 mgd. Complaint ¶¶ 18, 21, 22. South Carolina claims that the net effect of these upstream transfers is to deprive South Carolina of its equitable share of the Catawba River’s water, particularly during periods of drought or low river flow. South Carolina seeks relief in the form of a decree that equitably apportions the Catawba River between the two States, enjoins North Carolina from authorizing transfers of water from the Catawba River exceeding that State’s equitable share, and declares North Carolina’s permitting statute invalid to the extent it is used to authorize transfers of water from the Catawba River that exceed North Carolina’s equitable share. See generally Complaint, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-3. The complaint does not specify a minimum flow of water that would satisfy South Carolina’s equitable needs, but it does offer a point of reference. In a recent “multistakeholder negotiation process” involving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (hereinafter FERC), Duke Energy, and various groups from both States, it was agreed, according to the complaint, that South Carolina should receive from the Catawba River a continuous flow of water of no less than 1,100 cubic feet per second, or about 711 mgd. Complaint ¶ 14. This negotiated figure may prove unattainable. According to the complaint, natural conditions and periodic fluctuations have caused the Catawba River’s flow to fall below 1,100 cubic feet per second. Duke Energy, which generates hydroelectric power from a series of reservoirs on the Catawba River, developed a model to estimate the river’s flow if the river were not impounded. Id., ¶¶8, 16. The complaint notes that according to Duke Energy’s model, the Catawba River — even in its natural state — often would not deliver into South Carolina a minimum average daily flow of 1,100 cubic feet per second. Id., ¶ 16; App. to Motion of State of South Carolina for Leave To File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support of its Motion for Leave To File Complaint 18. South Carolina contends that North Carolina’s authorization of large transfers of water from the Catawba River basin has exacerbated these conditions. Shortly after we granted leave to file the complaint, two of the entities named in the complaint — the CRWSP and Duke Energy — filed motions for leave to intervene as parties. The CRWSP sought leave to intervene as a party-defendant, asserting its interest as a “riparian user of the Catawba River” and claiming that this interest was not adequately represented because of the CRWSP’s “interstate nature.” Motion of CRWSP for Leave To Intervene and Brief in Support of Motion 8, 9. Specifically, the CRWSP noted that it is a bistate entity that is jointly owned and regulated by, and supplies water to, North Carolina’s Union County and South Carolina’s Lancaster County. Id., at 9. Duke Energy sought leave to intervene and file an answer, asserting an interest as the operator of 11 dams and reservoirs on the Catawba River that control the river’s flow, as the holder of a 50-year license governing Duke Energy’s hydroelectric power operations, and as the entity that orchestrated the multistakeholder negotiation process culminating in a Comprehensive Relicensing Agreement (CRA) signed by 70 entities from both States in 2006. Duke Energy’s Motion and Brief in Support of Motion To Intervene and File Answer, and Answer 2, 5. This CRA set forth the terms under which Duke Energy has applied to renew its FERC license, id., at 5, and Duke Energy asserted that neither State would represent its “particular amalgam of federal, state and private interests,” id., at 14. South Carolina opposed both motions, and we referred them to the Special Master. 552 U. S. 1160 (2008). One month later, a third entity named in the complaint, the city of Charlotte, also sought leave to intervene as a party-defendant. In its brief, Charlotte asserted an interest, both as the holder of a permit authorizing the transfer of 33 mgd from the Catawba River basin — the largest single transfer identified in the complaint — and as the potential source of the 10 mgd transfer approved for the cities of Concord and Kannapolis. Motion for Leave To Intervene of City of Charlotte, North Carolina, and Brief in Support of Motion 5, 7. Charlotte argued that North Carolina could not represent the city’s interests effectively because the State was dutybound to represent the interests of all North Carolina users of the Catawba River’s water, including users whose interests were not aligned with Charlotte’s. Id., at 17. South Carolina also opposed Charlotte’s motion, and we referred it to the Special Master. 552 U. S. 1254 (2008). B The Special Master held a hearing and issued an order granting all three motions for leave to intervene. At South Carolina’s request, the Special Master set forth her findings and decision as a First Interim Report, and it is this Report to which South Carolina now presents exceptions. The Special Master recognized that this Court has exercised jurisdiction over nonstate parties in original actions between two or more States. She also recognized that in New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369, the Court considered the “appropriate standard” for a nonstate entity’s motion to intervene in an original action. First Interim Report of Special Master, O. T. 2008, No. 138, Orig., p. 12 (First Interim Rept.). But in attempting to give context to our standard, she looked beyond intervention and considered original actions in which the Court has allowed nonstate entities to be named as defendants by the complaining State. From those examples, the Special Master “distilled the following rule” governing motions to intervene in original actions by non-state entities: “Although the Court’s original jurisdiction presumptively is reserved for disputes between sovereign states over sovereign matters, non-state entities may become parties to such original disputes in appropriate and compelling circumstances, such as where the non-state entity is the instrumentality authorized to carry out the wrongful conduct or injury for which the complaining state seeks relief, where the non-state entity has an independent property interest that is directly implicated by the original dispute or is a substantial factor in the dispute, where the non-state entity otherwise has a ‘direct stake’ in the outcome of the action within the meaning of the Court’s cases discussed above, or where, together with one or more of the above circumstances, the presence of the non-state entity would advance the 'full exposition’ of the issues.” Id., at 20-21. Applying this broad rule, the Special Master found that each proposed intervenor had a sufficiently compelling interest to justify intervention. The Special Master rejected South Carolina’s proposal to limit intervention to the remedy phase of this litigation and recommended that this Court grant the motions to intervene. II A Participation by nonstate parties in actions arising under our original jurisdiction is not a new development. Article III, § 2, of the Constitution expressly contemplates suits “between a State and Citizens of another State” as falling within our original jurisdiction, see, e. g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dall. 402 (1792), and for more than two centuries the Court has exercised that jurisdiction over nonstate parties in suits between two or more States, see New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1 (1799); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 224-225 (1901). Nonstate entities have even participated as parties in disputes between States, such as the one before us now, where the States were seeking equitable apportionment of water resources. See, e. g., Arizona v. California, 460 U. S. 605, 608, n. 1 (1988); Texas v. New Mexico, 343 U. S. 932 (1952); New Jersey v. City of New York, 279 U. S. 823 (1929) (per curiam). It is, thus, not a novel proposition to accord party status to a citizen in an original action between States. This Court likewise has granted leave, under appropriate circumstances, for nonstate entities to intervene as parties in original actions between States for nearly 90 years. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 745, n. 21 (1981). In Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 581, 598 (1922), a boundary dispute that threatened to erupt in armed hostilities, the Court allowed individual and corporate citizens to intervene to protect their rights in contested land. See, e. g., Oklahoma v. Texas, 254 U. S. 609 (1920). More recently, the Court has allowed a municipality to intervene in a sovereign boundary dispute, see Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U. S. 465, 466 (1976) (per curiam), and has permitted private corporations to intervene in an original action challenging a State’s imposition of a tax that burdened interstate commerce and contravened the Supremacy Clause, see Maryland v. Louisiana, supra, at 745, n. 21; In this case, the Special Master crafted a rule of intervention that accounts for the full compass of our precedents. But a compelling reason for allowing citizens to participate in one original action is not necessarily a compelling reason for allowing citizens to intervene in all original actions. We therefore decline to adopt the Special Master’s proposed rule. As the Special Master acknowledged, the Court in New Jersey v. New York, supra, set down the “appropriate standard” for intervention in original actions by nonstate entities. First Interim Rept. 12. We believe the standard that we applied in that case applies equally well here. In 1929, the State of New Jersey sued the State of New York and city of New York for their diversion of the Delaware River’s headwaters. 345 U. S., at 370. The Court granted the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania leave to intervene and, in 1931, entered a decree enjoining certain diversions of water by the State of New York and the city of New York. Id., at 371. In 1952, the city of New York moved to modify the decree, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania filed oppositions. After the Court referred the matter to a Special Master, the city of Philadelphia sought leave to intervene on the basis of its use of the Delaware River’s water. Id., at 371-372. This Court denied Philadelphia leave to intervene. Pennsylvania had intervened pro interesse suo “to protect the rights and interests of Philadelphia and Eastern Pennsylvania in the Delaware River.” Id., at 374; see also New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342 (1931). In view of Pennsylvania’s participation, the Court wrote that when a State is “a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest,” it is parens patriae and “ ‘must be deemed to represent all [of] its citizens.’” 345 U. S., at 372-373 (quoting Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163, 173-174 (1930)). This principle serves the twin purposes of ensuring that due respect is given to “sovereign dignity” and providing “a working rule for good judicial administration.” 345 U. S., at 373. The Court, thus, set forth the following standard governing intervention in an original action by a nonstate entity: “An intervenor whose state is already a party should have the burden of showing some compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly represented by the state.” Ibid. On several subsequent occasions the Court has reaffirmed this “general rule.” See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1995); United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 538 (1973) (per curiam); Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 97 (1972). We acknowledge that the standard for intervention in original actions by nonstate entities is high — and appropriately so. Such actions tax the limited resources of this Court by requiring us “awkwardly to play the role of factfinder” and diverting our attention from our “primary responsibility as an appellate tribunal.” Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 498 (1971); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 762 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In order to ensure that original actions do not assume the “dimensions of ordinary class actions,” New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S., at 373, we exercise our original jurisdiction “sparingly” and retain “substantial discretion” to decide whether a particular claim requires “an original forum in this Court,” Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U. S. 73, 76 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Respect for state sovereignty also calls for a high threshold to intervention by nonstate parties in a sovereign dispute committed to this Court’s original jurisdiction. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1251, this Court exercises “original and exclusive” jurisdiction to resolve controversies between States that, if arising among independent nations, “would be settled by treaty or by force.” Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 98 (1907). This Court has described its original jurisdiction as “delicate and grave,” Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 1, 15 (1900), and has guarded against its use as a forum in which “a state might be judicially impeached on matters of policy by its own subjects,” New Jersey v. New York, supra, at 373. In its sovereign capacity, a State represents the interests of its citizens in an original action, the disposition of which binds the citizens. Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, at 22; New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S., at 372-373. A respect for sovereign dignity, therefore, counsels in favor of restraint in allowing nonstate entities to intervene in such disputes. See ibid.; accord, United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 643 (1892) (“[Exclusive jurisdiction was given to this court, because it best comported with the dignity of a State, that a ease in which it was a party should be determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation”). That the standard for intervention in original actions by nonstate entities is high, however, does not mean that it is insurmountable. Indeed, as the Special Master correctly recognized, our practice long has been to allow such intervention in compelling circumstances. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S., at 581. Over the “strong objections” of three States, for example, the Court allowed Indian tribes to intervene in a sovereign dispute concerning the equitable apportionment of the Colorado River. Arizona v. California, 460 U. S., at 613. The Court did so notwithstanding the Tribes’ simultaneous representation by the United States. Id., at 608-609, 612. And in a boundary dispute among Texas, Louisiana, and the United States, the Court allowed the city of Port Arthur, Texas, to intervene for the purpose of protecting its interests in islands in which the United States claimed title. Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U. S., at 466; Texas v. Louisiana, 416 U. S. 965 (1974). In both of these examples, the Court found compelling interests that warranted allowing nonstate entities to intervene in original actions in which the intervenors were nominally represented by sovereign parties. B 1 Applying the standard of New Jersey v. New York, supra, here, we conclude that the CRWSP has demonstrated a sufficiently compelling interest that is unlike the interests of other citizens of the States. The CRWSP is an unusual municipal entity, established as a joint venture with the encouragement of regulatory authorities in both States and designed to serve the increasing water needs of Union County, North Carolina, and Lancaster County, South Carolina. It has an advisory board consisting of representatives from both counties, (¿raws its revenues from its bistate sales, and operates infrastructure and assets that are owned by both counties as tenants-in-common. We are told that approximately 100,000 individuals in each State receive their water from the CRWSP and that “roughly half” of the CRWSP’s total withdrawals of water from the Catawba River go to South Carolina consumers. Reply of CRWSP to Exceptions of South Carolina to First Interim Report of Special Master 22 (hereinafter CRWSP Reply). It is difficult to conceive of a more purely bistate entity. In addition, the CRWSP relies upon authority granted by both States to draw water from the Catawba River and transfer that water from the Catawba River basin. The CRWSP draws all of its water from an intake located below the Lake Wylie dam in South Carolina. South Carolina licensed the CRWSP to withdraw a total of 100 mgd from the Catawba River and issued a certificate to the CRWSP in 1989 authorizing up to 20 mgd to be transferred out of the Catawba River basin. Id., at 6-7; Answer to Bill of Complaint ¶ 21. Lancaster County currently uses approximately 2 mgd of this amount, Union County uses approximately 5 mgd, and the remaining 18 mgd are not used at this time. CRWSP Reply 7. The CRWSP pumps Union County’s allocation across the state border pursuant to a parallel certificate issued by North Carolina authorizing a 5 mgd transfer, ibid., and the complaint specifically identifies this transfer as contributing to South Carolina’s harm, Complaint ¶21. Thus, the CRWSP’s activities depend upon authority conferred by both States. On these facts, we think it is clear that the CRWSP has carried its burden of showing a compelling interest in the outcome of this litigation that distinguishes the CRWSP from all other citizens of the party States. See New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S., at 373. Apart from its interest as a user of the Catawba River’s water, the CRWSP has made a $30 million investment in its plant and infrastructure, with each participating county incurring approximately half of this cost as debt. Each county is responsible for one-half of the CRWSP’s cost of operations, and the venture is designed to break even from year to year. Any disruption to the CRWSP’s operations would increase — not lessen — the difficulty of our task in achieving a “just and equitable” allocation in this dispute. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 618 (1945). We believe that the CRWSP has shown a compelling interest in protecting the viability of its operations, which are premised on a fine balance between the joint venture’s two participating counties. We are further persuaded that neither State can properly represent the interests of the CRWSP in this litigation. See New Jersey v. New York, supra, at 373. The complaint attributes a portion of the total water transfers that have harmed South Carolina to the CRWSP, yet North Carolina expressly states that it “cannot represent the interests of the joint venture.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. A moment’s reflection reveals why this is so. In this dispute, as in all disputes over limited resources, each State maximizes its equitable share of the Catawba River’s water only by arguing that the other State’s equitable share must be reduced. See, e. g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U. S. 176, 186-187 (1982). It is thus likely that North Carolina, in response to South Carolina’s demand for a greater share of the Catawba River’s water, will take the position that downstream users — such as Lancaster County — should receive less water. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 52 (“From North Carolina’s perspective, South Carolina is receiving much more water under this negotiated agreement than they could ever hope to achieve in an equitable apportionment action”). The stresses that this litigation would place upon the CRWSP threaten to upset the fine balance on which the joint venture is premised, and neither State has sufficient interest in maintaining that balance to represent the full scope of the CRWSP’s interests. Accordingly, we believe that the CRWSP should be allowed to intervene to represent its own compelling interests in this litigation. We thus overrule South Carolina’s exception. 2 We conclude, as well, that Duke Energy has demonstrated powerful interests that likely will shape the outcome of this litigation. To place these interests in context, it is instructive to consider the “flexible” process by which we arrive at a “ ‘just and equitable’ apportionment” of an interstate stream. Colorado v. New Mexico, supra, at 183. We do not approach the task in formulaic fashion, New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S., at 343, but we consider “all relevant factors,” including, but not limited to: “ ‘physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.’ ” Colorado v. New Mexico, supra, at 183 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, at 618). In performing this task, there is no substitute for “ ‘the exercise of an informed judgment,’” Colorado v. New Mexico, supra, at 183, and we will not hesitate to seek out the most relevant information from the source best situated to provide it. See Maryland, v. Louisiana, 451 U. S., at 745, n. 21 (allowing intervention of private pipeline companies “in the interest of a full exposition of the issues”). With these considerations in mind, we turn to Duke Energy’s asserted interests. Duke Energy operates 11 dams and reservoirs in both States that generate electricity for the region and control the flow of the river. The complaint itself acknowledges the relationship between river flow and Duke Energy's operations, noting that a severe drought that ended in 2002 forced Duke Energy to “reduce dramatically” its hydroelectric power generation from the Catawba River. Complaint ¶ 17(c). It is likely that any equitable apportionment of the river will need to take into account the amount of water that Duke Energy needs to sustain its operations and provide electricity to the region, thus giving Duke Energy a strong interest in the outcome of this litigation. See Colorado v. New Mexico, supra, at 188 (noting the appropriateness of considering “the balance of harm and benefit that might result” from a State’s proposed diversion of a river). There is, moreover, no other similarly situated entity on the Catawba River, setting Duke Energy’s interests apart from the class of all other citizens of the States. See New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S., at 373. Just as important, Duke Energy has a unique and compelling interest in protecting the terms of its existing FERC license and the CRA that forms the basis of Duke Energy’s pending renewal application. Through its dams, Duke Energy controls the flow of the Catawba River under the terms of its 50-year FERC license, which regulates the very subject matter in dispute: the river’s minimum flow into South Carolina. See Order Issuing License (Major), Duke Power Co., Project No. 2232, 20 F. P. C. 360, 371-372 (1958) (Arts. 31 and 32). The CRA, likewise, represents the full consensus of 70 parties from both States regarding the appropriate minimum continuous flow of Catawba River water into South Carolina under a variety of natural conditions and, in times of drought, the conservation measures to be taken by entities that withdraw water from the Catawba River. These factors undeniably are relevant to any “just and equitable apportionment” of the Catawba River, see Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U. S., at 183, and we are likely to consider them in reaching our ultimate disposition of this case. Thus, we find that Duke Energy has carried its burden of showing unique and compelling interests. We also have little difficulty in concluding that neither State sufficiently represents these compelling interests. Neither State has signed the CRA or expressed an intention to defend its terms. To the contrary, North Carolina has expressed an intention to seek its modification. Tr. of Oral Arg. 51-52. Given the importance of Duke Energy’s interests and their relevance to our ultimate decision, we believe these interests should be represented by a party in this action, and we find that neither State is situated to do so properly. We believe that Duke Energy should be permitted to represent its own interests. For these reasons, we agree with the Special Master that Duke Energy should be permitted to intervene, and we overrule South Carolina’s exception in that regard. 3 We conclude, however, that Charlotte has not carried its burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action. Charlotte is a municipality of North Carolina, and for purposes of this litigation, its transfers of water from the Catawba River basin constitute part of North Carolina’s equitable share. While it is true that the complaint names Charlotte as an entity authorized by North Carolina to carry out a large transfer of water from the Catawba River basin, the complaint does not seek relief against Charlotte directly. Rather, the complaint seeks relief against all North Carolina-authorized transfers of water from the Catawba River basin, “past or future,” in excess of North Carolina’s equitable share. Complaint, Prayer for Relief ¶2. Charlotte, therefore, occupies a class of affected North Carolina users of water, and the magnitude of Charlotte’s authorized transfer does not distinguish it in kind from other members of the class. See New Jersey v. New York, supra, at 373, and n. (noting that Philadelphia represented half of Pennsylvania’s citizens in the watershed). Nor does Charlotte represent interstate interests that fall on both sides of this dispute, as the CRWSP does, such that the viability of Charlotte’s operations in the face of this litigation is called into question. Its interest is solely as a user of North Carolina’s share of the Catawba River’s water. Charlotte’s interest falls squarely within the category of interests with respect to which a State must be deemed to represent all of its citizens. As we recognized in New Jersey v. New York, a State’s sovereign interest in ensuring an equitable share of an interstate river’s water is precisely the type of interest that the State, as parens patriae, represents on behalf of its citizens. See also United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S., at 539; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S., at 616. That is why, in New Jersey v. New York, supra, we required that a proposed intervenor show a compelling interest “in his own right,” distinct from the collective interest of “all other citizens and creatures of the state,” whose interest the State presumptively represents in matters of sovereign policy. Id., at 373. We conclude that Charlotte has not carried that burden. Thus, respect for “sovereign dignity” requires us to recognize that North Carolina properly represents Charlotte in this dispute over a matter of uniquely sovereign interest. See ibid. North Carolina’s own statements only reinforce this conclusion. North Carolina has said that it will defend Charlotte’s authorized 33 mgd transfer. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53. The State expressly disagrees with Charlotte’s assertion that the city’s interest is not adequately represented by the State. Brief for State of North Carolina in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Exceptions 22. Indeed, in response to Charlotte’s motion to intervene, North Carolina wrote the following: “[T]he State must represent the interests of every person that uses water from the North Carolina portion of the Catawba River basin. In fact, the State has a particular concern for its political subdivisions, such as Charlotte, which actually operate the infrastructure to provide water to the State’s citizens.... The State has every reason to defend the [transfers] that it has authorized for the benefit of its citizens. The State cannot agree with any implication that because it represents all of the users of water in North Carolina it cannot, or will not[,] represent the interests of Charlotte in this litigation initiated by South Carolina.” Brief for State of North Carolina in Response to City of Charlotte’s Motion for Leave To Intervene and File Answer 1-2, ¶ 1. These statements are consistent with North Carolina’s role as parens patriae, and we see no reason that North Carolina cannot represent Charlotte’s interest in this sovereign dispute. See New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S., at 374 (noting that Philadelphia’s interest “is invariably served by the Commonwealth’s position”). Because we are not persuaded that Charlotte’s interest is sufficiently unique and not properly represented by North Carolina to require the city’s intervention as a party in this litigation, we sustain South Carolina’s exception. III We thus overrule South Carolina’s exceptions to the Special Master’s First Interim Report with respect to the CRWSP and Duke Energy, but we sustain South Carolina’s exception with respect to Charlotte. It is so ordered. The license was issued in 1958 to Duke Energy’s predecessor by the Federal Power Commission, a predecessor of the FERC. For convenience, we will refer to Duke Energy’s “FERC license” herein. Charlotte also asserted an interest in protecting the terms of the CRA, to which Charlotte was a signatory but to which North Carolina, which has conflicting duties under § 401 of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 877, as added, 33 U. S. C. § 1341, was not. North Carolina opposed this argument, and the Special Master did not rely on it in recommending that Charlotte’s motion to intervene should be granted. As Charlotte does not reassert this argument here, we do not consider it. The Chief Justice argues against drawing conclusions from the intervention that we allowed in Oklahoma v. Texas, 254 U. S. 609 (1920). See post, at 283 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). But the circumstances surrounding that dispute fit the “'model case’ ” for invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction, post, at 277, and counsel against inferring from our precedents, as The Chief Justice does with respect to equitable apportionment actions, a rule against nonstate intervention in such “weighty controversies,” ibid. Accordingly, we need not decide South Carolina’s first exception to the Special Master’s conclusion that intervention is proper “whenever the movant is the 'instrumentality’ authorized to engage in conduct alleged to harm the plaintiff State, has an ‘independent property interest’ at issue in the action, or otherwise has a 'direct stake’ in the outcome of the action.” Exceptions of State of South Carolina to First Interim Report of Special Master and Brief in Support of Exceptions i. South Carolina has not invoked the Eleventh Amendment as a basis for opposing intervention. It has noted, however, that the proposed intervenors’ claims are, in effect, against South Carolina, and thus has reserved the right to argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars particular forms of relief sought by the proposed intervenors. As in New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369, 372 (1953) (per curiam), we express no view whether the Eleventh Amendment is implicated where a nonstate entity seeks to intervene as a defendant in an original action over a State’s objection. As a further complication, we are told, Lancaster County has an obligation to provide water service to certain customers in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. CRWSP Reply 6. Thus, South Carolina may not be interested in protecting all uses of Lancaster County’s share of the CRWSP’s water. This additional intermingling of state interests further supports our conclusion that neither State adequately represents the CRWSP’s inherently bistate interests. Duke Energy is operating under a temporary extension of its 50-year FERC license, which expired in 2008, and the CRA represents Duke Energy’s investment in a new 50-year license. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 does not require a contrary result. This Court’s Rule 17.2 allows the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to be taken as “guides” to procedure in original actions. See Arizona v. California, 460 U. S. 605, 614 (1983). Even if we were to look to the standard for intervention of right in civil matters, Charlotte would not be entitled to intervene in this dispute because an existing party — North Carolina — adequately represents Charlotte’s interest. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). To the extent that the standard for permissive intervention may be an appropriate guide when a movant presents a sufficiently “important but ancillary concern,” see Arizona, supra, at 614-616, we find no such concern here. North Carolina’s adequate representation of Charlotte and the heightened standard for intervention in original actions, see New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S., at 373, persuade us not to apply the standard for permissive intervention set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1)(B).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE HENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTCHESTER COUNTY, et al. v. ROWLEY, BY HER PARENTS, ROWLEY et ux. No. 80-1002. Argued March 23, 1982 Decided June 28, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 210. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 212. Raymond G. Kuntz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert D. Stone, Jean M. Coon, Paul E. Sherman, Jr., and Donald O. Meserve. Michael A. Chatoff argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Elliott Schulder argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Walter W. Barnett, and Louise A. Lerner. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Charles S. Sims for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Jane Bloom Yohalem, Norman S.Rosenberg, Daniel Yohalem, and Marian Wright Edelman for the Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States et al.; by Ralph J. Moore, Jr., and Franklin D. Kramer for the Maryland Advocacy Unit for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc., et al.; by Marc Charmatz, Janet Stotland, and Joseph Blum for the National Association of the Deaf et al; by Minna J. Kotkin and Barry Felder for the New York State Commission on the Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, Protection and Advocacy System; and by Michael A. Rebell for the United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Inc., et al. Norman H. Gross, Gwendolyn H. Gregory, Thomas A. Shannon, and August W. Steinhilber filed a brief for the National School Boards Association et al. as amici curiae. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals and the District Court misconstrued the requirements imposed by Congress upon States which receive federal funds under the Education of the Handicapped Act. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped children, and conditions such funding upon a State’s compliance with extensive goals and procedures. The Act represents an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children, and was passed in response to Congress’ perception that a majority of handicapped children in the United States “were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’” H. R. Rep. No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975) (H. R. Rep.). The Act’s .evolution and major provisions shed light on the question of statutory interpretation which is at the heart of this case. Congress first addressed the problem of educating the handicapped in 1966 when it amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to establish a grant program “for the purpose of assisting the States in the initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects . . . for the education of handicapped children.” Pub. L. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204. That program was repealed in 1970 by the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175, Part B of which established a grant program similar in purpose to the repealed legislation. Neither the 1966 nor the 1970 legislation contained specific guidelines for state use of the grant money; both were aimed primarily at stimulating the States to develop educational resources and to train personnel for educating the handicapped. Dissatisfied with the progress being made under these earlier enactments, and spurred by two District Court decisions holding that handicapped children should be given access to a public education, Congress in 1974 greatly increased federal funding for education of the handicapped and for the first time required recipient States to adopt “a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children.” Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974 statute). The 1974 statute was recognized as an interim measure only, adopted “in order to give the Congress an additional year in which to study what if any additional Federal assistance [was] required to enable the States to meet the needs of handicapped children.” H. R. Rep., at 4. The ensuing year of study produced the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. In order to qualify for federal financial assistance under the Act, a State must demonstrate that it “has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education.” 20 U. S. C. §1412(1). That policy must be reflected in a state plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Education, § 1413, which describes in detail the goals, programs, and timetables under which the State intends to educate handicapped children within its borders. §§ 1412, 1413. States receiving money under the Act must provide education to the handicapped by priority, first “to handicapped children who are not receiving an education” and second “to handicapped children . . . with the most severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate education,” § 1412(3), and “to the maximum extent appropriate” must educate handicapped children “with children who are not handicapped.” § 1412(5). The Act broadly defines “handicapped children” to include “mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, [and] other health impaired children, [and] children with specific learning disabilities.” § 1401(1). The “free appropriate public education” required by the Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an “individualized educational program” (IEP). § 1401(18). The IEP, which is prepared at a meeting between a qualified representative of the local educational agency, the child’s teacher, the child’s parents or guardian, and, where appropriate, the child, consists of a written document containing “(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.” § 1401(19). Local or regional educational agencies must review, and where appropriate revise, each child’s IEP at least annually. § 1414(a)(5). See also § 1413(a)(ll). In addition to the state plan and the IEP already described, the Act imposes extensive procedural requirements upon States receiving federal funds under its provisions. Parents or guardians of handicapped children must be notified of any proposed change in “the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” and must be permitted to bring a complaint about “any matter relating to” such evaluation and education. §§ 1415(b)(1)(D) and (E). Complaints brought by parents or guardians must be resolved at “an impartial due process hearing,” and appeal to the state educational agency must be provided if the initial hearing is held at the local or regional level. §§ 1415(b)(2) and (c). Thereafter, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision” of the state administrative hearing has “the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint. . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy.” § 1415(e)(2). Thus, although the Act leaves to the States the primary responsibility for developing and executing educational programs for handicapped children, it imposes significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility. Compliance is assured by provisions permitting the withholding of federal funds upon determination that a participating state or local agency has failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act, §§ 1414(b)(2)(A), 1416, and by the provision for judicial review. At present, all States except New Mexico receive federal funds under the portions of the Act at issue today. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, II This case arose in connection with the education of Amy Rowley, a deaf student at the Furnace Woods School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Peekskill, N. Y. Amy has minimal residual hearing and is an excellent lipreader. During the year before she began attending Furnace Woods, a meeting between her parents and school administrators resulted in a decision to place her in a regular kindergarten class in order to determine what supplemental services would be necessary to her education. Several members of the school administration prepared for Amy's arrival by attending a course in sign-language interpretation, and a teletype machine was installed in the principal's office to facilitate communication with her parents who are also deaf. At the end of the trial period it was determined that Amy should remain in the kindergarten class, but that she should be provided with an FM hearing aid which would amplify words spoken into a -wireless receiver by the teacher or fellow students during certain classroom activities. Amy successfully completed her kindergarten year. As required by the Act, an IEP was prepared for Amy during the fall of her first-grade year. The IEP provided that Amy should be educated in a regular classroom at Furnace Woods, should continue to use the FM hearing aid, and should receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each week. The Rowleys agreed with parts of the IEP but insisted that Amy also be provided a qualified sign-language interpreter in all her academic classes in lieu of the assistance proposed in other parts of the IEP. Such an interpreter had been placed in Amy’s kindergarten class for a 2-week experimental period, but the interpreter had reported that Amy did not need his services at that time. The school administrators likewise concluded that Amy did not need such an interpreter in her first-grade classroom. They reached this conclusion after consulting the school district’s Committee on the Handicapped, which had received expert evidence from Amy’s parents on the importance of a sign-language interpreter, received testimony from Amy’s teacher and other persons familiar with her academic and social progress, and visited a class for the deaf. When their request for an interpreter was denied, the Rowleys demanded and received a hearing before an independent examiner. After receiving evidence from both sides, the examiner agreed with the administrators’ determination that an interpreter was not necessary because “Amy was achieving educationally, academically, and socially” without such assistance. App. to Pet. for Cert. F-22. The examiner’s decision was affirmed on appeal by the New York Commissioner of Education on the basis of substantial evidence in the record. Id., at E-4. Pursuant to the Act’s provision for judicial review, the Rowleys then brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the administrators’ denial of the sign-language interpreter constituted a denial of the “free appropriate public education” guaranteed by the Act. The District Court found that Amy “is a remarkably well-adjusted child” who interacts and communicates well with her classmates and has “developed an extraordinary rapport” with her teachers. 483 F. Supp. 528, 531 (1980). It also found that “she performs better than the average child in her class and is advancing easily from grade to grade,” id., at 534, but “that she understands considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not deaf” and thus “is not learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she would without her handicap,” id., at 532. This disparity between Amy’s achievement and her potential led the court to decide that she was not receiving a “free appropriate pub-lie education,” which the court defined as “an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.” Id., at 534. According to the District Court, such a standard “requires that the potential of the handicapped child be measured and compared to his or her performance, and that the resulting differential or ‘shortfall’ be compared to the shortfall experienced by non-handicapped children.” Ibid. The District Court’s definition arose from its assumption that the responsibility for “giv[ing] content to the requirement of an ‘appropriate education’ ” had “been left entirely to the [federal] courts and the hearing officers.” Id., at 533. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals “agree[d] with the [District [C]ourt’s conclusions of law,” and held that its “findings of fact [were] not clearly erroneous.” 632 F. 2d 945, 947 (1980). We granted certiorari to review the lower courts’ interpretation of the Act. 454 U. S. 961 (1981). Such review requires us to consider two questions: What is meant by the Act’s requirement of a “free appropriate public education”? And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by 20 U. S. C. §1415? We consider these questions separately. III A This is the first case in which this Court has been called upon to interpret any provision of the Act. As noted previously, the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he Act itself does not define ‘appropriate education,’” 483 F. Supp., at 533, but leaves “to the courts and the hearing officers” the responsibility of “giv[ing] content to the requirement of an‘appropriate education.’” Ibid. See also 632 F. 2d, at 947. Petitioners contend that the definition of the phrase “free appropriate public education” used by the courts below overlooks the definition of that phrase actually found in the Act. Respondents agree that the Act defines “free appropriate public education,” but contend that the statutory definition is not “functional” and thus “offers judges no guidance in their consideration of controversies involving ‘the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education.’” Brief for Respondents 28. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of respondents, states that “[ajlthough the Act includes definitions of a ‘free appropriate public education’ and other related terms, the statutory definitions do not adequately explain what is meant by ‘appropriate.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. We are loath to conclude that Congress failed to offer any assistance in defining the meaning of the principal substantive phrase used in the Act. It is beyond dispute that, contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Act does expressly define “free appropriate public education”: “The term ‘free appropriate public education’ means special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.” § 1401(18) (emphasis added). “Special education,” as referred to in this definition, means “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.” §1401(16). “Related services” are defined as “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.” §1401(17). Like many statutory definitions, this one tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is scarcely a reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent. Whether or not the definition is a “functional” one, as respondents contend it is not, it is the principal tool which Congress has given us for parsing the critical phrase of the Act. We think more must be made of it than either respondents or the United States seems willing to admit. According to the definitions contained in the Act, a “free appropriate public education” consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child “to benefit” from the instruction. Almost as a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public expense and under public supervision, meet the State’s educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State’s regular education, and comport with the child’s IEP. Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a “free appropriate public education” as defined by the Act. Other portions of the statute also shed light upon congressional intent. Congress found that of the roughly eight million handicapped children in the United States at the time of enactment, one million were “excluded entirely from the public school system” and more than half were receiving an inappropriate education. 89 Stat. 774, note following § 1401. In addition, as mentioned in Part I, the Act requires States to extend educational services first to those children who are receiving no education and second to those children who are receiving an “inadequate education.” §1412(3). When these express statutory findings and priorities are read together with the Act’s extensive procedural requirements and its definition of “free appropriate public education,” the face of the statute evinces a congressional intent to bring previously excluded handicapped children into the public education systems of the States and to require the States to adopt procedures which would result in individualized consideration of and instruction for each child. Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children. Certainly the language of the statute contains no requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts — that States maximize the potential of handicapped children “commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.” 483 F. Supp., at 534. That standard was expounded by the District Court without reference to the statutory definitions or even to the legislative history of the Act. Although we find the statutory definition of “free appropriate public education” to be helpful in our interpretation of the Act, there remains the question of whether the legislative history indicates a congressional intent that such education meet some additional substantive standard. For an answer, we turn to that history. B (i) As suggested in Part I, federal support for education of the handicapped is a fairly recent development. Before passage of the Act some States had passed laws to improve the educational services afforded handicapped children, but many of these children were excluded completely from any form of public education or were left to fend for themselves in classrooms designed for education of their nonhandicapped peers. As previously noted, the House Report begins by emphasizing this exclusion and misplacement, noting that millions of handicapped children “were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’” H. R. Rep., at 2. See also S. Rep., at 8. One of the Act’s two principal sponsors in the Senate urged its passage in similar terms: “While much progress has been made in the last few years, we can take no solace in that progress until all handicapped children are, in fact, receiving an education. The most recent statistics provided by the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimate that . . . 1.75 million handicapped children do not receive any educational services, and 2.5 million handicapped children are not receiving an appropriate education.” 121 Cong. Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). This concern, stressed repeatedly throughout the legislative history, confirms the impression conveyed by the language of the statute: By passing the Act, Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide such access to public education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful. Indeed, Congress expressly “recognize[d] that in many instances the process of providing special education and related services to handicapped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome.” S. Rep., at 11. Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside. Both the House and the Senate Reports attribute the impetus for the Act and its predecessors to two federal-court judgments rendered in 1971 and 1972. As the Senate Report states, passage of the Act “followed a series of landmark court cases establishing in law the right to education for all handicapped children.” S. Rep., at 6. The first case, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971) and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972) (PARC), was a suit on behalf of retarded children challenging the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which acted to exclude them from public education and training. The case ended in a consent decree which enjoined the State from “denying] to any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and training.” 334 F. Supp., at 1258 (emphasis added). PARC was followed by Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), a case in which the plaintiff handicapped children had been excluded from the District of Columbia public schools. The court’s judgment, quoted in S. Rep., at 6, provided that “no [handicapped] child eligible for a publicly supported education in the District of Columbia public schools shall be excluded from a regular school assignment by a Rule, policy, or practice of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia or its agents unless such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educational services suited to the child’s needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child’s status, progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternative.” 348 F. Supp., at 878 (emphasis added). Mills and PARC both held that handicapped children must be given access to an adequate, publicly supported education. Neither case purports to require any particular substantive level of education. Rather, like the language of the Act, the cases set forth extensive procedures to be followed in formulating personalized educational programs for handicapped children. See 848 F. Supp., at 878-883; 334 F. Supp., at 1258-1267. The fact that both PARC and Mills are discussed at length in the legislative Reports suggests that the principles which they established are the principles which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act. Indeed, immediately after discussing these cases the Senate Report describes the 1974 statute as having “incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases.” S. Rep., at 8. Those principles in turn became the basis of the Act, which itself was designed to effectuate the purposes of the 1974 statute. H. R. Rep., at 5. That the Act imposes no clear obligation upon recipient States beyond the requirement that handicapped children receive some form of specialized education is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Congress, in explaining the need for the Act, equated an “appropriate education” to the receipt of some specialized educational services. The Senate Report states: “[T]he most recent statistics provided by the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimate that of the more than 8 million children . . . with handicapping conditions requiring special education and related services, only 3.9 million such children are receiving an appropriate education.” S. Rep., at 8. This statement, which reveals Congress’ view that 3.9 million handicapped children were “receiving an appropriate education” in 1975, is followed immediately in the Senate Report by a table showing that 3.9 million handicapped children were “served” in 1975 and a slightly larger number were “unserved.” A similar statement and table appear in the House Report. H. R. Rep., at 11-12. It is evident from the legislative history that the characterization of handicapped children as “served” referred to children who were receiving some form of specialized educational services from the States, and that the characterization of children as “unserved” referred to those who were receiving no specialized educational services. For example, a letter sent to the United States Commissioner of Education by the House Committee on Education and Labor, signed by two key sponsors of the Act in the House, asked the Commissioner to identify the number of handicapped “children served” in each State. The letter asked for statistics on the number of children “being served” in various types of “special education program[s]” and the number of children who were not “receiving educational services.” Hearings on S. 6 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 205-207 (1975). Similarly, Senator Randolph, one of the Act’s principal sponsors in the Senate, noted that roughly one-half of the handicapped children in the United States “are receiving special educational services.” Id., at 1. By characterizing the 3.9 million handicapped children who were “served” as children who were “receiving an appropriate education,” the Senate and House Reports unmistakably disclose Congress’ perception of the type of education required by the Act: an “appropriate education” is provided when personalized educational services are provided. (Ü) Respondents contend that “the goal of the Act is to provide each handicapped child with an equal educational opportunity.” Brief for Respondents 35. We think, however, that the requirement that a State provide specialized educational services to handicapped children generates no additional requirement that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child’s potential “commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.” Respondents and the United States correctly note that Congress sought “to provide assistance to the States in carrying out their responsibilities under . . . the Constitution of the United States to provide equal protection of the laws.” S. Rep., at 13. But we do not think that such statements imply a congressional intent to achieve strict equality of opportunity or services. The educational opportunities provided by our public school systems undoubtedly differ from student to student, depending upon a myriad of factors that might affect a particular student’s ability to assimilate information presented in the classroom. The requirement that States provide “equal” educational opportunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons. Similarly, furnishing handicapped children with only such services as are available to nonhandicapped children would in all probability fall short of the statutory requirement of “free appropriate public education”; to require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential is, we think, further than Congress intended to go. Thus to speak in terms of “equal” services in one instance gives less than what is required by the Act and in another instance more. The theme of the Act is “free appropriate public education,” a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word “equal” whether one is speaking of opportunities or services. The legislative conception of the requirements of equal protection was undoubtedly informed by the two District Court decisions referred to above. But cases such as Mills and PARC held simply that handicapped children may not be excluded entirely from public education. In Mills, the District Court said: “If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom.” 348 F. Supp., at 876. The PARC court used similar language, saying “[i]t is the commonwealth’s obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child’s capacity . . . .” 334 F. Supp., at 1260. The right of access to free public education enunciated by these cases is significantly different from any notion of absolute equality of opportunity regardless of capacity. To the extent that Congress might have looked further than these cases which are mentioned in the legislative history, at the time of enactment of the Act this Court had held at least twice that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require States to expend equal financial resources on the education of each child. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (ND Ill. 1968), aff’d sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 322 (1969). In explaining the need for federal legislation, the House Report noted that “no congressional legislation has required a precise guarantee for handicapped children, i. e. a basic floor of opportunity that would bring into compliance all school districts with the constitutional right of equal protection with respect to handicapped children.” H. R. Rep., at 14. Assuming that the Act was designed to fill the need identified in the House Report — that is, to provide a “basic floor of opportunity” consistent with equal protection — neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than equal access. Therefore, Congress’ desire to provide specialized educational services, even in furtherance of “equality,” cannot be read as imposing any particular substantive educational standard upon the States. The District Court and the Court of Appeals thus erred when they held that the Act requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Desirable though that goal might be, it is not the standard that Congress imposed upon States which receive funding under the Act. Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free public education. (iii) Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a “free appropriate public education” is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education. The statutory definition of “free appropriate public education,” in addition to requiring that States provide each child with “specially designed instruction,” expressly requires the provision of “such . . . supportive services ... as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education.” § 1401(17) (emphasis added). We therefore conclude that the “basic floor of opportunity” provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child. The determination of when handicapped children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act presents a more difficult problem. The Act requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will*differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite variations in between. One child may have little difficulty competing successfully in an academic setting with nonhandicapped children while another child may encounter great difficulty in acquiring even the most basic of self-maintenance skills. We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our analysis to that situation. The Act requires participating States to educate handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible. When that “mainstreaming” preference of the Act has been met and a child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the system itself monitors the educational progress of the child. Regular examinations are administered, grades are awarded, and yearly advancement to higher grade levels is permitted for those children who attain an adequate knowledge of the course material. The grading and advancement system thus constitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit. Children who graduate from our public school systems are considered by our society to have been “educated” at least to the grade level they have completed, and access to an “education” for handicapped children is precisely what Congress sought to provide in the Act. C When the language of the Act and its legislative history are considered together, the requirements imposed by Congress become tolerably clear. Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child with a “free appropriate public education,” we hold that it satisfies this requirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State’s educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the State’s regular education, and must comport with the child’s IEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personalized instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the requirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the public education system, should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade. IV A As mentioned in Part I, the Act permits “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision” of the state administrative hearings “to bring a civil action” in “any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy.” § 1415(e)(2). The complaint, and therefore the civil action, may concern “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” § 1415(b)(1)(E). In reviewing the complaint, the Act provides that a court “shall receive the record of the [state] administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” § 1415(e)(2). The parties disagree sharply over the meaning of these provisions, petitioners contending that courts are given only limited authority to review for state compliance with the Act’s procedural requirements and no power to review the substance of the state program, and respondents contending that the Act requires courts to exercise de novo review over state educational decisions and policies. We find petitioners’ contention unpersuasive, for Congress expressly rejected provisions that would have so severely restricted the role of reviewing courts. In substituting the current language of the statute for language that would have made state administrative findings conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, the Conference Committee explained that courts were to make “independent decisions] based on a preponderance of the evidence.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455, p. 50 (1975). See also 121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). But although we find that this grant of authority is broader than claimed by petitioners, we think the fact that it is found in § 1415, which is entitled “Procedural safeguards,” is not without significance. When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in § 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, see, e. g., §§ 1415(a)-(d), as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard. We think that the congressional emphasis upon full participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP, as well as the requirements that state and local plans be submitted to the Secretary for approval, demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP. Thus the provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the “preponderance of the evidence” is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review. The very importance which Congress has attached to compliance with certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP would be frustrated if a court were permitted simply to set state decisions at nought. The fact that § 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court “receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings” carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these proceedings. And we find nothing in the Act to suggest that merely because Congress was rather sketchy in establishing substantive requirements, as opposed to procedural requirements for the preparation of an IEP, it intended that reviewing courts should have a free hand to impose substantive standards of review which cannot be derived from the Act itself. In short, the statutory authorization to grant “such relief as the court determines is appropriate” cannot be read without reference to the obligations, largely procedural in nature, which are imposed upon recipient States by Congress. Therefore, a court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2) is twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more. B In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. The Act expressly charges States with the responsibility of “acquiring and disseminating to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped children significant information derived from educational research, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising educational practices and materials.” § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State’s choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). We previously have cautioned that courts lack the “specialized knowledge and experience” necessary to resolve “persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 42. We think that Congress shared that view when it passed the Act. As already demonstrated, Congress’ intention was not that the Act displace the primacy of States in the field of education, but that States receive funds to assist them in extending their educational systems to the handicapped. Therefore, once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States. V Entrusting a child’s education to state and local agencies does not leave the child without protection. Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for parental involvement in the development of state plans and policies, supra, at 182-183, and n. 6, and in the formulation of the child’s individual educational program. As the Senate Report states: “The Committee recognizes that in many instances the process of providing special education and related services to handicapped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome. By changing the language [of the provision relating to individualized educational programs] to emphasize the process of parent and child involvement and to provide a written record of reasonable expectations, the Committee intends to clarify that such individualized planning conferences are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that appropriate services are provided to a handicapped child.” S. Rep., at 11-12. See also S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-445, p. 30 (1975); 34 CFR §300.345 (1981). As this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the Act. VI Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the District Court. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found that petitioners had failed to comply with the procedures of the Act, and the findings of neither court would support a conclusion that Amy’s educational program failed to comply with the substantive requirements of the Act. On the contrary, the District Court found that the “evidence firmly establishes that Amy is receiving an ‘adequate’ education, since she performs better than the average child in her class and is advancing easily from grade to grade.” 483 F. Supp., at 534. In light of this finding, and of the fact that Amy was receiving personalized instruction and related services calculated by the Furnace Woods school administrators to meet her educational needs, the lower courts should not have concluded that the Act requires the provision of a sign-language interpreter. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. See S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 5 (1975) (S. Rep.); H. R. Rep., at 2-8. Two cases, Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), and Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (ED Pa. 1971) and 343 F. Supp. 279 (1972), were later identified as the most prominent of the cases contributing to Congress’ enactment of the Act and the statutes which preceded it. H. R. Rep., at 3-4. Both decisions are discussed in Part III of this opinion. All functions of the Commissioner of Education, formerly an officer in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, were transferred to the Secretary of Education in 1979 when Congress passed the Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U. S. C. §3401 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). See 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Despite this preference for “mainstreaming” handicapped children— educating them with nonhandicapped children — Congress recognized that regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education of many handicapped children. The Act expressly acknowledges that “the nature or severity of the handicap [may be] such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” § 1412(5). The Act thus provides for the education of some handicapped children in separate classes or institutional settings. See ibid.; § 1413(a)(4). In addition to covering a wide variety of handicapping conditions, the Act requires special educational services for children “regardless of the severity of their handicap.” §§ 1412(2)(C), 1414(a)(1)(A). The requirements that parents be permitted to file complaints regarding their child’s education, and be present when the child’s IEP is formulated, represent only two examples of Congress’ effort to maximize parental involvement in the education of each handicapped child. In addition, the Act requires that parents be permitted “to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and ... to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child.” § 1415(b)(1)(A). See also §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(4). State educational policies and the state plan submitted to the Secretary of Education must be formulated in “consultation with individuals involved in or concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handicapped individuals and parents or guardians of handicapped children.” § 1412(7). See also § 1412(2)(E). Local agencies, which receive funds under the Act by applying to the state agency, must submit applications which assure that they have developed procedures for “the participation and consultation of the parents or guardian[s] of [handicapped] children” in local educational programs, § 1414(a)(l)(C)(iii), and the application itself, along with “all pertinent documents related to such application,” must be made “available to parents, guardians, and other members of the general public.” § 1414(a)(4). “Any party” to a state or local administrative hearing must “be accorded (1) the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of handicapped children, (2) the right to present evidence and confront, cross examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, (3) the right to a written or electronic verbatim record of such hearing, and (4) the right to written findings of fact and decisions.” § 1415(d). For reasons that are not revealed in the record, the District Court concluded that “[t]he Act itself does not define ‘appropriate education.’ ” 483 F. Supp., at 533. In fact, the Act expressly defines the phrase “free appropriate public education,” see § 1401(18), to which the District Court was referring. See 483 F. Supp., at 533. After overlooking the statutory definition, the District Court sought guidance not from regulations interpreting the Act, but from regulations promulgated under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 483 F. Supp., at 533, citing 45 CFR § 84.33(b). The IEP which respondents challenged in the District Court was created for the 1978-1979 school year. Petitioners contend that the District Court erred in reviewing that IEP after the school year had ended and before the school administrators were able to develop another IEP for subsequent years. We disagree. Judicial review invariably takes more than nine months to complete, not to mention the time consumed during the preceding state administrative hearings. The District Court thus correctly ruled that it retained jurisdiction to grant relief because the alleged deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review. 483 F. Supp. 536, 538 (1980). See Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 482 (1982); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975). Examples of “related services” identified in the Act are “speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only.” § 1401(17). The dissent, finding that “the standard of the courts below seems . . . to reflect the congressional purpose” of the Act, post, at 218, concludes that our answer to this question “is not a satisfactory one.” Post, at 216. Presumably, the dissent also agrees with the District Court’s conclusion that “it has been left entirely to the courts and the hearing officers to give content to the requirement of an ‘appropriate education.’” 483 F. Supp., at 533. It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed. Indeed, the dissent clearly characterizes the requirement of an “appropriate education” as open-ended, noting that “if there are limits not evident from the face of the statute on what may be considered an ‘appropriate education,’ they must be found in the purpose of the statute or its legislative history.” Post, at 213. Not only are we unable to find any suggestion from the face of the statute that the requirement of an “appropriate education” was to be limitless, but we also view the dissent’s approach as contrary to the fundamental proposition that Congress, when exercising its spending power, can impose no burden upon the States unless it does so unambiguously. See infra, at 204, n. 26. No one can doubt that this would have been an easier case if Congress had seen fit to provide a more comprehensive statutory definition of the phrase “free appropriate public education.” But Congress did not do so, and “our problem is to construe what Congress has written. After all, Congress expresses its purpose by words. It is for us to ascertain — neither to add nor to subtract, neither to delete nor to distort.” 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951). We would be less than faithful to our obligation to construe what Congress has written if in this case we were to disregard the statutory language and legislative history of the Act by concluding that Congress had imposed upon the States a burden of unspecified proportions and weight, to be revealed only through case-by-case adjudication in the courts. See H. R. Rep., at 10; Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 110, 119 (1976). See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (“all too often, our handicapped citizens have been denied the opportunity to receive an adequate education”); id., at 19502 (remarks of Sen. Cranston) (millions of handicapped “children . . . are largely excluded from the educational opportunities that we give to our other children”); id., at 23708 (remarks of Rep. Mink) (“handicapped children . . . are denied access to public schools because of a lack of trained personnel”). Similarly, the Senate Report states that it was an “[ijncreased awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children and landmark court decisions establishing the right to education for handicapped children [that] pointed to the necessity of an expanded federal fiscal role.” S. Rep., at 5. See also H. R. Rep., at 2-3. The only substantive standard which can be implied from these cases comports with the standard implicit in the Act. PARC states that each child must receive “access to a free public program of education and training appropriate to his learning capacities,” 334 F. Supp., at 1258 (emphasis added), and that further state action is required when it appears that “the needs of the mentally retarded child are not being adequately served,” id., at 1266. (Emphasis added.) Mills also speaks in terms of “adequate” educational services, 348 F. Supp., at 878, and sets a realistic standard of providing some educational services to each child when every need cannot be met. “If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the ‘exceptional’ or handicapped child than on the normal child.” Id., at 876. Like the Act, PARC required the State to “identify, locate, [and] evaluate” handicapped children, 334 F. Supp., at 1267, to create for each child an individual educational program, id., at 1265, and to hold a hearing “on any change in educational assignment,” id., at 1266. Mills also required the preparation of an individual educational program for each child. In addition, Mills permitted the child’s parents to inspect records relevant to the child’s education, to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child, to object to the IEP and receive a hearing before an independent hearing officer, to be represented by counsel at the hearing, and to have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, all of which are also permitted by the Act. 348 F. Supp., at 879-881. Like the Act, Mills also required that the education of handicapped children be conducted pursuant to an overall plan prepared by the District of Columbia, and established a policy of educating handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible. Ibid. See S. Rep., at 6-7; H. R. Rep., at 3-4. The 1974 statute “incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases,” by “add[ing] important new provisions to the Education of the Handicapped Act which require the States to: establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children; provide procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children; establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with children who are not handicapped;. . . and, establish procedures to insure that testing and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of classification and placement of handicapped children will be selected and administered so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory.” S. Rep., at 8. The House Report explains that the Act simply incorporated these purposes of the 1974 statute: the Act was intended “primarily to amend . . . the Education of the Handicapped Act in order to provide permanent authorization and a comprehensive mechanism which will insure that those provisions enacted during the 93rd Congress [the 1974 statute] will result in maximum benefits for handicapped children and their families.” H. R. Rep., at 5. Thus, the 1974 statute’s purpose of providing handicapped children access to a public education became the purpose of the Act. These statistics appear repeatedly throughout the legislative history of the Act, demonstrating a virtual consensus among legislators that 3.9 million handicapped children were receiving an appropriate education in 1975. See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 19504 (remarks of Sen. Schweicker); id., at 23702 (remarks of Rep. Madden); ibid, (remarks of Rep. Brademas); id., at 23709 (remarks of Rep. Minish); id., at 37024 (remarks of Rep. Brademas); id., at 37027 (remarks of Rep. Gude); id., at 37417 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 37420 (remarks of Sen. Hathaway). Senator Randolph stated: “[0]nly 55 percent of the school-aged handicapped children and 22 percent of the pre-school-aged handicapped children are receiving special educational services.” Hearings on S. 6 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1975). Although the figures differ slightly in various parts of the legislative history, the general thrust of congressional calculations was that roughly one-half of the handicapped children in the United States were not receiving specialized educational services, and thus were not “served.” See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (“only 50 percent of the Nation’s handicapped children received proper education services”); id., at 19504 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (“[a]lmost 3 million handicapped children, while in school, receive none of the special services that they require in order to make education a meaningful experience”); id., at 23706 (remarks of Rep. Quie) (“only 55 percent [of handicapped children] were receiving a public education”); id., at 23709 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi) (“[o]ver 3 million [handicapped] children in this country are receiving either below par education or none at all”). Statements similar to those appearing in the text, which equate “served” as it appears in the Senate Report to “receiving special educational services,” appear throughout the legislative history. See, e. g., id., at 19492 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 19494 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 19496 (remarks of Sen. Stone); id., at 19504-19505 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 23703 (remarks of Rep. Brademas); Hearings on H. R. 7217 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 91, 150, 153 (1975); Hearings on H. R. 4199 before the Select Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 130, 139 (1973). See also 34 CFR §300.343 (1981). In seeking to read more into the Act than its language or legislative history will permit, the United States focuses upon the word “appropriate,” arguing that “the statutory definitions do not adequately explain what [it means].” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. Whatever Congress meant by an “appropriate” education, it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education. The term as used in reference to educating the handicapped appears to have originated in the PARC decision, where the District Court required that handicapped children be provided with “education and training appropriate to [their] learning capacities.” 334 F. Supp., at 1258. The word appears again in the Mills decision, the District Court at one point referring to the need for “an appropriate educational program,” 348 F. Supp., at 879, and at another point speaking of a “suitable publicly-supported education,” id., at 878. Both cases also refer to the need for an “adequate” education. See 334 F. Supp., at 1266; 348 F. Supp., at 878. The use of “appropriate” in the language of the Act, although by no means definitive, suggests that Congress used the word as much to describe the settings in which handicapped children should be educated as to prescribe the substantive content or supportive services of their education. For example, § 1412(5) requires that handicapped children be educated in classrooms with nonhandicapped children “to the maximum extent appropriate.” Similarly, §1401(19) provides that, “whenever appropriate,” handicapped children should attend and participate in the meeting at which their IEP is drafted. In addition, the definition of “free appropriate public education” itself states that instruction given handicapped children should be at an “appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school” level. § 1401(18)(C). The Act’s use of the word “appropriate" thus seems to reflect Congress’ recognition that some settings simply are not suitable environments for the participation of some handicapped children. At the very least, these statutory uses of the word refute the contention that Congress used “appropriate” as a term of art which concisely expresses the standard found by the lower courts. See also 121 Cong. Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 19504 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). This view is supported by the congressional intention, frequently expressed in the legislative history, that handicapped children be enabled to achieve a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency. After referring to statistics showing that many handicapped children were excluded from public education, the Senate Report states: “The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on society.” S. Rep., at 9. See also H. R. Rep., at 11. Similarly, one of the principal Senate sponsors of the Act stated that “providing appropriate educational services now means that many of these individuals will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they will not have to depend on subsistence payments from public funds.” 121 Cong. Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See also id., at 25541 (remarks of Rep. Harkin); id., at 37024-37025 (remarks of Rep. Brademas); id., at 37027 (remarks of Rep. Gude); id., at 37410 (remarks of Sen. Randolph); id., at 37416 (remarks of Sen. Williams). The desire to provide handicapped children with an attainable degree of personal independence obviously anticipated that state educational programs would confer educational benefits upon such children. But at the same time, the goal of achieving some degree of self-sufficiency in most cases is a good deal more modest than the potential-maximizing goal adopted by the lower courts. Despite its frequent mention, we cannot conclude, as did the dissent in the Court of Appeals, that self-sufficiency was itself the substantive standard which Congress imposed upon the States. Because many mildly handicapped children will achieve self-sufficiency without state assistance while personal independence for the severely handicapped may be an unreachable goal, “self-sufficiency” as a substantive standard is at once an inadequate protection and an overly demanding requirement. We thus view these references in the legislative history as evidence of Congress’ intention that the services provided handicapped children be educationally beneficial, whatever the nature or severity of their handicap. Title 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5) requires that participating States establish “procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” We do not hold today that every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public school system is automatically receiving a “free appropriate public education.” In this case, however, we find Amy’s academic progress, when considered with the special services and professional consideration accorded by the Furnace Woods school administrators, to be dispositive. In defending the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals, respondents and the United States rely upon isolated statements in the legislative history concerning the achievement of maximum potential, see H. R. Rep., at 13, as support for their contention that Congress intended to impose greater substantive requirements than we have found. These statements, however, are too thin a reed on which to base an interpretation of the Act which disregards both its language and the balance of its legislative history. “Passing references and isolated phrases are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history.” Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U. S. 595, 600 (1982). Moreover, even were we to agree that these statements evince a congressional intent to maximize each child’s potential, we could not hold that Congress had successfully imposed that burden upon the States. “[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’. . . Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) (footnote omitted). As already demonstrated, the Act and its history impose no requirements on the States like those imposed by the District Comb and the Court of Appeals. A fortiori Congress has not done so unambiguously, as required in the valid exercise of its spending power. This inquiry will require a court not only to satisfy itself that the State has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act, but also to determine that the State has created an IEP for the child in question which conforms with the requirements of § 1401(19). When the handicapped child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important factor in determining educational benefit. See Part III, supra. In this ease, for example, both the state hearing officer and the District Court were presented with evidence as to the best method for educating the deaf, a question long debated among scholars. See Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 58 Wash. U. L. Q. 213, 229 (1980). The District Court accepted the testimony of respondents’ experts that there was “a trend supported by studies showing the greater degree of success of students brought up in deaf households using [the method of communication used by the Rowleys].” 483 F. Supp., at 535. It is clear that Congress was aware of the States’ traditional role in the formulation and execution of educational policy. “Historically, the States have had the primary responsibility for the education of children at the elementary and secondary level.” 121 Cong. Rec. 19498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 898 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities”). In addition to providing for extensive parental involvement in the formulation of state and local policies, as well as the preparation of individual educational programs, the Act ensures that States will receive the advice of experts in the field of educating handicapped children. As a condition for receiving federal funds under the Act, States must create “an advisory panel, appointed by the Governor or any other official authorized under State law to make such appointments, composed of individuals involved in or concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handicapped individuals, teachers, parents or guardians of handicapped children, State and local education officials, and administrators of programs for handicapped children, which (A) advises the State educational agency of unmet needs within the State in the education of handicapped children, [and] (B) comments publicly on any rules or regulations proposed for issuance by the State regarding the education of handicapped children.” § 1413(a)(12). Because the District Court declined to reach respondents’ contention that petitioners had failed to comply with the Act’s procedural requirements in developing Amy’s IEP, 483 F. Supp., at 533, n. 8, the case must be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALBERTSON et al. v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 3. Argued October 18, 1965. Decided November 15, 1965. John J. Abt argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Joseph Forer. Kevin T. Maroney argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Nathan Lewin, George B. Searls and Lee B. Anderson. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Osmond K. Fraenkel for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by Ernest Goodman for the National Lawyers Guild. MR. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Communist Party of the United States of America failed to register with the Attorney General as required by the order of the Subversive Activities Control Board sustained in Communist Party of the United States v. SACB, 367 U. S. I. Accordingly, no list of Party members was filed as required by § 7 (d) (4) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993-994, 50 U. S. C. § 786 (d)(4) (1964 ed.). Sections 8(a) and (c) of the Act provide that, in that circumstance, each member of the organization must register and file a registration statement; in default thereof, § 13 (a) authorizes the Attorney General to petition the Board for an order requiring the member to register. The Attorney General invoked § 13 (a) against petitioners, and the Board, after evidentiary hearings, determined that petitioners were Party members and ordered each of them to register pursuant to §§ 8 (a) and (c). Review of the orders was sought by petitioners in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under § 14 (a). The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 332 F. 2d 317. We granted certiorari, 381 U. S. 910. We reverse. I. Petitioners address several constitutional challenges to the validity of the orders, but we consider only the contention that the orders violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders without deciding the privilege issue, expressing the view that under our decision in Communist Party, 367 U. S., at 105-110, the issue was not ripe for adjudication and would be ripe only in a prosecution for failure to register if the petitioners did not register. 118 U. S. App. D. C., at 121-123, 332 F. 2d, at 321-323. We disagree. In Communist Party the Party asserted the privilege on behalf of unnamed officers — those obliged to register the Party and those obliged “to register for” the Party if it failed to do so. The self-incrimination claim asserted on behalf of the latter officers was held premature because the Party might choose to register and thus the duty of those officers might never arise. Here, in contrast, the contingencies upon which the members’ duty to register arises have already matured; the Party did not register within 30 days after the order to register became final and the requisite 60 days since the order became final have elapsed. As to the officers obliged to register the Party, Communist Party held that the self-incrimination claim asserted on their behalf was not ripe for adjudication because it was not known whether they would ever claim the privilege or whether the claim, if asserted, would be honored by the Attorney General. But with respect to the orders in this case, addressed to named individuals, both these contingencies are foreclosed. Petitioners asserted the privilege in their answers to the Attorney General’s petitions; they did not testify at the Board hearings; they again asserted the privilege in the review proceedings in the Court of Appeals. In each instance the "Attorney General rejected their claims. Thus, the considerations which led the Court -in Communist Party to hold that the claims on behalf of unnamed officers were premature are not present in this case. There are other reasons for holding that petitioners’ self-incrimination claims are ripe for decision. Specific orders requiring petitioners to register have been issued. The Attorney General has promulgated regulations requiring that registration shall be accomplished on Form IS-52a and that the accompanying registration statement shall be a completed Form IS-52, 28 CFR §§ 11.206, 11.207, and petitioners risk very heavy penalties if they fail to register by completing and filing these forms. Under § 15 (a)(2) of the Act, 64 Stat. 1002, 50 U. S. C. §794(a)(2), for example, each day of failure to register constitutes a separate offense punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. Petitioners must either register without a decision on the merits of their privilege claims, or fail to register and risk onerous and rapidly mounting penalties while awaiting the Government’s pleasure whether to initiate a prosecution against them. To ask, in these circumstances, that petitioners await such a prosecution for an adjudication of their self-incrimination claims is, in effect, to contend that they should be denied the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege intended to relieve claimants of the necessity of making a choice between incriminating themselves and risking serious punishments for refusing to do so. Indeed the Government concedes in its brief in this Court that the Court of Appeals’ holding of prematurity was erroneous insofar as petitioners’ claims of privilege relate to the Board’s power to compel the act of registration and the submission of an accompanying registration statement. The brief candidly acknowledges that, since § 14 (b) provides for judicial review of a Board order to register, petitioners’ claims in that regard, like any other contention that an order is invalid, may be heard and determined by the reviewing court — thus distinguishing orders that are not similarly reviewable, see Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323. Nevertheless, the Government argues that petitioners’ claims are premature insofar as they relate to “any particular inquiry” on Forms IS-52a and IS-52. Two contingencies are hypothesized in support of this contention: (1) that the Attorney General might alter the present forms or (2) that he might accept less than fully completed forms. The distinction upon which this argument is predicated is illusory. Neither the statute nor the regulations draw any distinction between the act of registering and the submission of a registration statement, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the answering of the inquiries demanded by the forms; the statute and regulations contemplate rather that the questions asked on the forms are to be fully and completely answered. Morever, the contingencies hypothesized are irrelevant. Petitioners are obliged to register and to submit registration forms in accordance with presently existing regulations; the mere contingency that the Attorney General might revise the regulations at some future time does not render premature their challenge to the existing requirements. Nor can these requirements be viewed as requiring that petitioners answer — at the risk of criminal prosecution for error — only those items which will not incriminate petitioners; full compliance is required. Finally, the Government’s argument would do violence to the congressional scheme. The penalties are incurred only upon failure to register as required by final orders and, under § 14 (b), orders become final upon completion of judicial review. In so providing, Congress plainly manifested an intention to afford alleged members, prior to criminal prosecution for failure to register, an adjudication of all, not just some, of the claims addressed to the validity of the Board’s registration orders. We therefore proceed to a determination of the merits of petitioners’ self-incrimination claims. II. The risks of incrimination which the petitioners take in registering are obvious. Form IS-52a requires an admission of membership in the Communist Party. Such an admission of membership may be used to prosecute the registrant under the membership clause of the Smith Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2385 (1964 ed.), or under § 4 (a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 991, 50 U. S. C. § 783 (a) (1964 ed.), to mention only two federal criminal statutes. Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 211. Accordingly, we have held that mere association with the Communist Party presents sufficient threat of prosecution to support a claim of privilege. Patricia Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159; Irving Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 332; Brunner v. United States, 343 U. S. 918; Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155. These cases involved questions to witnesses on the witness stand, but if the admission cannot be compelled in oral testimony, we do not see how compulsion in writing makes a difference for constitutional purposes. Cf. New York ex rel. Ferguson v. Reardon, 197 N. Y. 236, 243-244, 90 N. E. 829, 832. It follows that the requirement to accomplish registration by completing and filing Form IS-52a is inconsistent with the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause. The statutory scheme, in providing that registration “shall be accompanied” by a registration statement, clearly implies that there is a duty to file Form IS-52, the registration statement, only if there is an enforceable obligation to accomplish registration by completing and filing Form IS-52a. Yet, even if the statute and regulations required petitioners to complete and file Form IS-52 without regard to the validity of the order to register on Form IS-52a, the requirement to complete and file Form IS-52 would also invade the privilege. Like the admission of Party membership demanded by Form IS-52a, the information called for by Form IS-52— the organization of which the registrant is a member, his aliases, place and date of birth, a list of offices held in the organization and duties thereof — might be used as evidence in or at least supply investigatory leads to a criminal prosecution. The Government, relying on United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, argues that petitioners might answer some questions and appropriately claim the privilege on the form as to others, but cannot fail to submit a registration statement altogether. Apart from our conclusion that nothing in the Act or regulations permits less than literal and full compliance with the requirements of the form, the reliance on Sulli van is misplaced. Sullivan upheld a conviction for failure to file an income tax return on the theory that “[i]f the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all.” 274 U. S., at 263. That declaration was based on the view, first, that a self-incrimination claim against every question on the tax return, or based on the mere submission of the return, would be virtually frivolous, and second, that to honor the claim of privilege not asserted at the time the return was due would make the taxpayer rather than a tribunal the final arbiter of the merits of the claim. But neither reason applies here. A tribunal, the Board, had an opportunity to pass upon the petitioners’ self-incrimination claims; and since, unlike a tax return, the pervasive effect of the information called for by Form IS-52 is incriminatory, their claims are substantial and far from frivolous. In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime. III. Section 4 (f) of the Act, the purported immunity provision, does not save the registration orders from petitioners’ Fifth Amendment challenge. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, decided in 1892, the Court held “that no [immunity] statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have'the effect of supplanting the privilege . . . ,” and that such a statute is valid only if it supplies “a complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard . . .” by affording “absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates.” Id., at 585-586. Measured by these standards, the immunity granted by § 4 (f) is not complete. See Scales v. United States, 367 U. S., at 206-219. It does not preclude any use of the information called for by Form IS-52, either as evidence or as an investigatory lead. With regard to the act of registering on Form IS-52a, § 4 (f) provides only that the admission of Party membership thus required shall not per se constitute a violation of §§ 4 (a) and (c) or any other criminal statute, or “be received in evidence” against a registrant in any criminal prosecution; it does not preclude the use of the admission as an investigatory lead, a usé which is barred by the privilege. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., at 564-565, 585. The Government does not contend that the shortcoming of § 4 (f) is remedied in regard to information called for on the registration statement, Form IS-52. With respect to Form IS-52a, however, the argument is made that, since an order to register is preceded by a Board finding of Party membership, the admission of membership required on that form would be of no investigatory value and thus is not “incriminatory” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. On this view the incompleteness of the § 4 (f) grant of immunity would be rendered immaterial and the admission of Party membership could be compelled without violating the privilege. We disagree. The judgment as to whether a disclosure would be “incriminatory” has never been made dependent on an assessment of the information possessed by the Government at the time of interrogation; the protection of the privilege would be seriously impaired if the right to invoke it was dependent on such an assessment, with all its uncertainties. The threat to the privilege is no less present where it is proposed that this assessment be made in order to remedy a shortcoming in a statutory grant of immunity. The representation that the information demanded is of no utility is belied by the fact that the failure to make the disclosure is so severely sanctioned; and permitting the incompleteness of § 4 (f) to be cured by such a representation would render illusory the Counselman requirement that a statute, in order to supplant the privilege, must provide “complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the Board’s orders are set aside. It is so ordered. The judgment of conviction of the Party for failure to register was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the case remanded for a new trial. Communist Party of the United States v. United States, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 61, 331 F. 2d 807. Under this section the registration statement which accompanies the registration of a Communist-action organization is required to include "the name and last-known address of each individual who was a member of the organization at any time during the period of twelve full calendar months preceding the filing of such statement.” Sections 8(a) and (c), 64 Stat. 995, 50 U. S. C. §§ 787 (a) and (c) (1964 ed.), provide: “(a) Any individual who is or becomes a member of any organization concerning which (1) there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register under section 786 (a) of this title as a Communist-action organization, (2) more than thirty days have elapsed since such order has become final, and (3) such organization is not registered under section 786 of this title as a Communist-action organization, shall within sixty days after said order has become final, or within thirty days after becoming a member of such organization, whichever is later, register with the Attorney General as a member of such organization. “(c) The registration made by any individual under subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be accompanied by a registration statement to be prepared and filed in such manner and form, and containing such information, as the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe.” Section 13 (a), 64 Stat. 998, 50 U. S. C. § 792 (a) (1964 ed.), provides: “Whenever the Attorney General shall have reason to believe that . . . any individual who has not registered under section 787 of this title is in fact required to register under such section, he shall file with the Board and serve upon such . . . individual a petition for an order requiring such . . . individual to register pursuant to such subsection or section, as the case may be. Each such petition shall be verified under oath, and shall contain a statement of the facts upon which the Attorney General relies in support of his prayer for the issuance of such order.” Section 14 (a), 64 Stat. 1001, 50 U. S. C. §793 (a) (1964 ed.), provides: “The party aggrieved by any order entered by the Board . . . may obtain a review of such order by filing in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, within sixty days from the date of service upon it of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the Board be set aside. . . . Upon the filing of such petition the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall have power to affirm or set aside the order of the Board .... The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by the preponderance of the evidence, shall be conclusive. . . . The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari . . . .” The Government’s opposition to the petition for certiorari suggested that the case is moot as to petitioner Albertson by reason of his alleged expulsion from the Party. Albertson, however, challenges the suggestion of mootness. There is no occasion to decide the question since, in any event, we must reach the merits of the issues in respect of an identical order issued against petitioner Proctor. Petitioners’ other challenges assailed the Act and registration orders as denying substantive due process (because they allegedly serve no governmental purpose), as abridging First Amendment freedoms, as violating procedural due process and constituting bills of attainder (because they made the Board’s 1953 determination that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization conclusive upon petitioners), and finally, as denying petitioners the safeguards of grand jury indictment, judicial trial and trial by jury. The regulations governing Party registration pursuant, to § 7 (d), 50 U. S. C. § 786 (d), are 28 CFR §§ 11.200 and 11.201, and the forms are IS-51a. and IS — 51. The regulation governing officers obliged by §7 (h), 50 U. S. C. §786 (h) “to register for” the Party if it failed to register is 28 CFR § 11.205. See Communist Party, 367 U. S., at 105-110. Copies of Form IS-52a and Form IS-52 are reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion. The case was argued orally by both sides on the premise that the penalty for failure to complete arid file Form IS-52 constituted a separate offense punishable by fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years, or both, but that each day of failure to file the form did not constitute a separate offense. We have no occasion, however, to decide the question, and intimate no view upon it. See § 15 (b), 50 U. S. C. § 794 (b). Section 4 (f), 64 Stat. 992, 50 U. S. C. §783 (f) provides: “Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization by any person shall constitute per se a violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or of any other criminal statute. The fact of the registration of any person under section 787 or section 788 of this title as an officer or member of any Communist organization shall not be received in evidence against such person in any prosecution for any alleged violation of subsection (a) or subsection (c) of this section or for any alleged violation of any other criminal statute.” The legislative history includes several expressions of doubt that the immunity granted was coextensive with the privilege. See S. Rep. No. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, pp. 12-13 (Sen. Kilgore) (Minority Report); 96 Cong. Rec. 14479 (Sen. Humphrey); 96 Cong. Rec. 15199 and 15554 (Sen. Kefauver); see also 96 Cong. Rec. 13739-13740 (Rep. Celler), dealing with a more modified immunity grant in H. R. 9400. See generally Scales v. United States, 307 U. S., at 212-219 (Court opinion), 282-287 (dissenting opinion).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

14 PENN PLAZA LLC et al. v. PYETT et al. No. 07-581. Argued December 1, 2008 Decided April 1, 2009 Paul Salvatore argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Edward A. Brill, Charles S. Sims, Mark D. Harris, Brian S. Rauch, lan C. Schaefer, James F. Berg, and Howard Rothschild. David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jeffrey L. Kreisberg, Michael F. Sturley, and Lynn E. Blais. Curtis E. Gannon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Acting Assistant Attorney General Becker, Dennis J. Dimsey, Ronald S. Cooper, and Lorraine C. Davis Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Samuel Estreicher and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Rae T. Vann. Briefs of amici curia;e urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Jonathan P. Hiatt, James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Matthew D. Slater, Michael Byars, Andrew Weaver, and Michael Foreman; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Kathleen Phair Barnard, Jeffrey L. Needle, Laurie A. McCann, and Deborah Zuckerman; for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., by Raymond J. La Jeunesse, Jr.; and for the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ, by Larry Engelstein. Matthew W. Finkin, Barry Winograd, and James Oldham filed a brief for the National Academy of Arbitrators as amicus curiae. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., is enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this Court’s decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), forbids enforcement of such arbitration provisions. We disagree and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I Respondents are members of the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ (Union). Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, as amended, the Union is the exclusive bargaining representative of employees within the building-services industry in New York City, which includes building cleaners, porters, and doorpersons. See 29 U. S. C. § 159(a). In this role, the Union has exclusive authority to bargain on behalf of its members over their “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” Ibid. Since the 193G’s, the Union has engaged in industrywide collective bargaining with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. (RAB), a multiemployer bargaining association for the New York City real-estate industry. The agreement between the Union and the RAB is embodied in their Collective Bargaining Agreement for Contractors and Building Owners (CBA). The CBA requires Union members to submit all claims of employment discrimination to binding arbitration under the CBA’s grievance and dispute resolution procedures: “30. NO DISCRIMINATION “There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code, ... or any other similar laws, rules or regulations. AH such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure (Articles V and VI) as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. Petitioner 14 Penn Plaza LLC is a member of the RAB. It owns and operates the New York City office building where, prior to August 2003, respondents worked as night lobby watchmen and in other similar capacities. Respondents were directly employed by petitioner Temco Service Industries, Inc. (Temco), a maintenance service and cleaning contractor. In August 2003, with the Union’s consent, 14 Penn Plaza engaged Spartan Security, a unionized security services contractor and affiliate of Temco, to provide licensed security guards to staff the lobby and entrances of its building. Because this rendered respondents’ lobby services unnecessary, Temco reassigned them to jobs as night porters and light-duty cleaners in other locations in the building. Respondents contend that these reassignments led to a loss in income, caused them emotional distress, and were otherwise less desirable than their former positions. At respondents’ request, the Union filed grievances challenging the reassignments. The grievances alleged that petitioners: (1) violated the CBA’s ban on workplace discrimination by reassigning respondents on account of their age; (2) violated seniority rules by failing to promote one of the respondents to a handyman position; and (3) failed to equitably rotate overtime. After failing to obtain relief on any of these claims through the grievance process, the Union requested arbitration under the CBA. After the initial arbitration hearing, the Union withdrew the first set of respondents’ grievances — the age-discrimination claims — from arbitration. Because it had consented to the contract for new security personnel at 14 Penn Plaza, the Union believed that it could not legitimately object to respondents’ reassignments as discriminatory. But the Union continued to arbitrate the seniority and overtime claims, and, after several hearings, the claims were denied. In May 2004, while the arbitration was ongoing but after the Union withdrew the age-discrimination claims, respondents filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that petitioners had violated their rights under the ADEA. Approximately one month later, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, which explained that the agency’s “‘review of the evidence . . . fail[ed] to indicate that a violation ha[d] occurred,’ ” and notified each respondent of his right to sue. Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co., 498 F. 3d 88, 91 (CA2 2007). Respondents thereafter filed suit against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that their reassignment violated the ADEA and state and local laws prohibiting age discrimination. Petitioners filed a motion to compel arbitration of respondents’ claims pursuant to §§ 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §§ 3, 4. The District Court denied the motion because under Second Circuit precedent, “even a clear and unmistakable union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain federal and state statutory claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. Respondents immediately appealed the ruling under §16 of the FAA, which authorizes an interlocutory appeal of “an order . . . refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title” or “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed.” 9 U. S. C. §§16(a)(l)(AMB). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 498 F. 3d 88. According to the Court of Appeals, it could not compel arbitration of the dispute because Gardner-Denver, which “remains good law,” held “that a collective bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers’ rights to a judicial forum for causes of action created by Congress.” 498 F. 3d, at 92, 91, n. 3 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S., at 49-51). The Court of Appeals observed that the Gardner-Denver decision was in tension with this Court’s more recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20 (1991), which “held that an individual employee who had agreed individually to waive his right to a federal forum could be compelled to arbitrate a federal age discrimination claim.” 498 F. 3d, at 91, n. 3 (citing Gilmer, supra, at 33-35; emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals also noted that this Court previously declined to resolve this tension in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U. S. 70, 82 (1998), where the waiver at issue was not “clear and unmistakable.” 498 F. 3d, at 91, n. 3. The Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile Gardner-Denver and Gilmer by holding that arbitration provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement, “which purport to waive employees’ rights to a federal forum with respect to statutory claims, are unenforceable.” 498 F. 3d, at 93-94. As a result, an individual employee would be free to choose compulsory arbitration under Gilmer, but a labor union could not collectively bargain for arbitration on behalf of its members. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1178 (2008), to address the issue left unresolved in Wright, which continues to divide the Courts of Appeals, and now reverse. II A The NLRA governs federal labor-relations law. As permitted by that statute, respondents designated the Union as their “exclusive representative] ... for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” 29 U. S. C. § 159(a). As the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative, the Union “enjoys broad authority ... in the negotiation and administration of [the] collective bargaining contract.” Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735, 739 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this broad authority “is accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and duty of fair representation.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 342 (1964). The employer has a corresponding duty under the NLRA to bargain in good faith “with the representatives of his employees” on wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(5); see also § 158(d). In this instance, the Union and the RAB, negotiating on behalf of 14 Penn Plaza, collectively bargained in good faith and agreed that employment-related discrimination claims, including claims brought under the ADEA, would be resolved in arbitration. This freely negotiated term between the Union and the RAB easily qualifies as a “conditio[n] of employment” that is subject to mandatory bargaining under § 159(a). See Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U. S. 190, 199 (1991) (“[A]rrangements for arbitration of disputes are a term or condition of employment and a mandatory subject of bargaining”); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 578 (1960) (“[Arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself”); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 455 (1957) (“Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike”). The decision to fashion a collective-bargaining agreement to require arbitration of employment-discrimination claims is no different from the many other decisions made by parties in designing grievance machinery. Respondents, however, contend that the arbitration clause here is outside the permissible scope of the collective-bargaining process because it affects the “employees’ individual, non-economic statutory rights.” Brief for Respondents 22; see also post, at 281-283 (Souter, J., dissenting). We disagree. Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 123 (2001) (“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts”). As in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the employer. Courts generally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange. “Judicial nullification of contractual concessions ... is contrary to what the Court has recognized as one of the fundamental policies of the National Labor Relations Act — freedom of contract.” NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U. S. 322, 328 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As a result, the CBA’s arbitration provision must be honored unless the ADEA itself removes this particular class of grievances from the NLRA’s broad sweep. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 (1985). It does not. This Court has squarely held that the ADEA does not preclude arbitration of claims brought under the statute. See Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 26-33. In Gilmer, the Court explained that “[although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, ‘[hjaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.’ ” Id., at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 628). And “[i]f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by the ADEA to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.” 500 U. S., at 29 (internal quotation marks and some brackets omitted). The Court determined that “nothing in the text of the ADEA or its legislative history explicitly precludes arbitration.” Id., at 26-27. The Court also concluded that arbitrating ADEA disputes would not undermine the statute’s “remedial and deterrent function.” Id., at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the end, the employee’s “generalized attacks” on “the adequacy of arbitration procedures” were “insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims,” id., at 30, because there was no evidence that “Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act,” id., at 35. The Gilmer Court’s interpretation of the ADEA fully applies in the collective-bargaining context. Nothing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative. This Court has required only that an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims be “explicitly stated” in the collective-bargaining agreement. Wright, 525 U. S., at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CBA under review here meets that obligation. Respondents incorrectly counter that an individual employee must personally “waive” a “[substantive] right” to proceed in court for a waiver to be “knowing and voluntary” under the ADEA. 29 U. S. C. § 626(f)(1). As explained below, however, the agreement to arbitrate ADEA claims is not the waiver of a “substantive right” as that term is employed in the ADEA. Wright, supra, at 80; see infra, at 265-266. Indeed, if the “right” referred to in § 626(f)(1) included the prospective waiver of the right to bring an ADEA claim in court, even a waiver signed by an individual employee would be invalid as the statute also prevents individuals from “waiving] rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed.” § 626(f)(1)(C). Examination of the two federal statutes at issue in this ease, therefore, yields a straightforward answer to the question presented: The NLRA provided the Union and the RAB with statutory authority to collectively bargain for arbitration of workplace discrimination claims, and Congress did not terminate that authority with respect to federal age-discrimination claims in the ADEA. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which was freely negotiated by the Union and the RAB, and which clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbitrate the age-discrimination claims at issue in this appeal. Congress has chosen to allow arbitration of ADEA claims. The Judiciary must respect that choice. B The CBA’s arbitration provision is also fully enforceable under the Gardner-Denver line of cases. Respondents interpret Gardner-Denver and its progeny to hold that “a union cannot waive an employee’s right to a judicial forum under the federal antidiscrimination statutes” because “allowing the union to waive this right would substitute the union’s interests for the employee’s antidiscrimination rights.” Brief for Respondents 12. The “combination of union control over the process and inherent conflict of interest with respect to discrimination claims,” they argue, “provided the foundation for the Court’s holding [in Gardner-Denver] that arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement could not preclude an individual employee’s right to bring a lawsuit in court to vindicate a statutory discrimination claim.” Id., at 15. We disagree. 1 The holding of Gardner-Denver is not as broad as respondents suggest. The employee in that case was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that prohibited “discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry” and that guaranteed that “[n]o employee will be discharged ... except for just cause.” 415 U. S., at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). The agreement also included a “multistep grievance procedure” that culminated in compulsory arbitration for any “differences aris[ing] between the Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement” and “any trouble aris[ing] in the plant.” Id., at 40-41 (internal quotation marks omitted). The employee was discharged for allegedly producing too many defective parts while working for the respondent as a drill operator. He filed a grievance with his union claiming that he was “ ‘unjustly discharged’ ” in violation of the “ ‘just cause’” provision within the collective-bargaining agreement. Id., at 39, 42. Then at the final prearbitration step of the grievance process, the employee added a claim that he was discharged because of his race. Id., at 38-42. The arbitrator ultimately ruled that the employee had been “ ‘discharged for just cause,’ ” but “made no reference to [the] claim of racial discrimination.” Id., at 42. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the employee filed a claim in Federal District Court, alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court issued a decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which granted summary judgment to the employer because it concluded that “the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to [the employee].” Id., at 43. In the District Court’s view, “having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement,” the employee was “bound by the arbitral decision” and precluded from suing his employer on any other grounds, such as a statutory claim under Title VII. Ibid. This Court reversed the judgment on the narrow ground that the arbitration was not preclusive because the collective-bargaining agreement did not cover statutory claims. As a result, the lower courts erred in relying on the “doctrine of election of remedies” to bar the employee’s Title VII claim. Id., at 49. “That doctrine, which refers to situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or factually inconsistent” with each other, did not apply to the employee’s dual pursuit of arbitration and a Title VII discrimination claim in district court. Ibid. The employee’s collective-bargaining agreement did not mandate arbitration of statutory antidiscrimination claims. Id., at 49-50. “As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s task is to effectuate the intent of the parties.” Id., at 53. Because the collective-bargaining agreement gave the arbitrator “authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights,” his decision could not prevent the employee from bringing the Title VII claim in federal court “regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII.” Id., at 53-54; see also id., at 50. The Court also explained that the employee had not waived his right to pursue his Title VII claim in federal court by participating in an arbitration that was premised on the same underlying facts as the Title VII claim. See id., at 52. Thus, whether the legal theory of preclusion advanced by the employer rested on “the doctrines of election of remedies” or was recast “as resting instead on the doctrine of equitable estoppel and on themes of res judicata and collateral estoppel,” id., at 49, n. 10 (internal quotation marks omitted), it could not prevail in light of the collective-bargaining agreement’s failure to address arbitration of Title VII claims. See id., at 46, n. 6 (“[W]e hold that the federal policy favoring arbitration does not establish that an arbitrator’s resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory claim under Title VII” (emphasis added)). The Court’s decisions following Gardner-Denver have not broadened its holding to make it applicable to the facts of this case. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728 (1981), the Court considered “whether an employee may bring an action in federal district court, alleging a violation of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,... after having unsuccessfully submitted a wage claim based on the same underlying facts to a joint grievance committee pursuant to the provisions of his union’s collective-bargaining agreement.” Id., at 729-730. The Court held that the unsuccessful arbitration did not preclude the federal lawsuit. Like the collective-bargaining agreement in Gardner-Denver, the arbitration provision under review in Barrentine did not expressly reference the statutory claim at issue. See 450 U. S., at 731, n. 5. The Court thus reiterated that an “arbitrator’s power is both derived from, and limited by, the collective-bargaining agreement” and “[h]is task is limited to construing the meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement so as to effectuate the collective intent of the parties.” Id., at 744. McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U. S. 284 (1984), was decided along similar lines. The question presented in that case was “whether a federal court may accord preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration award in a case brought under [42 U. S. C. § 1983].” Id., at 285. The Court declined to fashion such a rule, again explaining that “because an arbitrator’s authority derives solely from the contract, Barren-tine, supra, at 744, an arbitrator may not have the authority to enforce § 1983” when that provision is left unaddressed by the arbitration agreement. Id., at 290. Accordingly, as in both Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, the Court’s decision in McDonald hinged on the scope of the collective-bargaining agreement and the arbitrator’s parallel mandate. The facts underlying Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald reveal the narrow scope of the legal rule arising from that trilogy of decisions. Summarizing those opinions in Gilmer, this Court made clear that the Gardner-Denver line of cases “did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.” 500 U. S., at 35. Those decisions instead “involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory, claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions.” Ibid.; see also Wright, 525 U. S., at 76; Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 127, n. 21 (1994). Gardner-Denver and its progeny thus do not control the outcome where, as is the case here, the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and contractual discrimination claims. 2 We recognize that apart from their narrow holdings, the Gardner-Denver line of cases included broad dicta that were highly critical of the use of arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights. That skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned. First, the Court in Gardner-Denver erroneously assumed that an agreement to submit statutory discrimination claims to arbitration was tantamount to a waiver of those rights. See 415 U. S., at 51 (“[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII” (emphasis added)). For this reason, the Court stated, “the rights conferred [by Title VII] can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.” Ibid.; see also id., at 56 (“[W]e have long recognized that The choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated’ ” (quoting U. S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U. S. 351, 359-360 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring))). The Court was correct in concluding that federal antidiscrimination rights may not be prospectively waived, see 29 U. S. C. § 626(f)(1)(C); see supra, at 259, but it confused an agreement to arbitrate those statutory claims with a prospective waiver of the substantive right. The decision to resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the first instance. See Gilmer, supra, at 26 (‘“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U. S., at 628)). This “Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.” Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U. S., at 123. The suggestion in Gardner-Denver that the decision to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims was tantamount to a substantive waiver of those rights, therefore, reveals a distorted understanding of the compromise made when an employee agrees to compulsory arbitration. In this respect, Gardner-Denver is a direct descendant of the Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), which held that an agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 was unenforceable. See id., at 438. The Court subsequently overruled Wilko and, in so doing, characterized the decision as “pervaded by . . . ‘the old judicial hostility to arbitration.’” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 480 (1989). The Court added: “To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.” Id., at 481; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 626-627 (“[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution”). The timeworn “mistrust of the arbitral process” harbored by the Court in Gardner-Denver thus weighs against reliance on anything more than its core holding. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 231-232 (1987); see also Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 34, n. 5 (reiterating that Gardner-Denver’s view of arbitration “has been undermined by [the Court’s] recent arbitration decisions”). Indeed, in light of the “radical change, over two decades, in the Court’s receptivity to arbitration,” Wright, 525 U. S., at 77, reliance on any judicial decision similarly littered with Wilko’s overt hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements would be ill advised. Second, Gardner-Denver mistakenly suggested that certain features of arbitration made it a forum “well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,” but “a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII.” 415 U. S., at 56. According to the Court, the “factfinding process in arbitration” is “not equivalent to judicial factfinding” and the “informality of arbitral procedure . . . makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.” Id., at 57, 58. The Court also questioned the competence of arbitrators to decide federal statutory claims. See id., at 57 (“[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land”); Barrentine, 450 U. S., at 743 (“Although an arbitrator may be competent to resolve many preliminary factual questions, such as whether the employee ‘punched in’ when he said he did, he may lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue whether an employee’s right to a minimum wage or to overtime pay under the statute has been violated”). In the Court’s view, “the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts.” Gardner-Denver, supra, at 57; see also McDonald, 466 U. S., at 290 (“An arbitrator may not . . . have the expertise required to resolve the complex legal questions that arise in § 1983 actions”). These misconceptions have been corrected. For example, the Court has “recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision” and that “there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law.” McMahon, supra, at 232; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U. S., at 634 (“We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators”). An arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends with equal force to discrimination claims brought under the ADEA. Moreover, the recognition that arbitration procedures are more streamlined than federal litigation is not a basis for finding the forum somehow inadequate; the relative informality of arbitration is one of the chief reasons that parties select arbitration. Parties “trad[e] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” Id., at 628. In any event, “[i]t is unlikely . .. that age discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have found to be arbitrable, such as [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] and antitrust claims.” Gilmer, supra, at 31. At bottom, objections centered on the nature of arbitration do not offer a credible basis for discrediting the choice of that forum to resolve statutory antidiscrimination claims. Third, the Court in Gardner-Denver raised in a footnote a “further concern” regarding “the union’s exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented.” 415 U. S., at 58, n. 19. The Court suggested that in arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining process, a union may subordinate the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit. Ibid.; see also McDonald, supra, at 291 (“The union’s interests and those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a result, the union may present the employee’s grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic choices, than would the employee”); see also Barrentine, supra, at 742; post, at 284, n. 4 (Souter, J., dissenting). We cannot rely on this judicial policy concern as a source of authority for introducing a qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its text. Absent a constitutional barrier, “it is not for us to substitute our view of . . . policy for the legislation which has been passed by Congress.” Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 52 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress is fully equipped “to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 627. Until Congress amends the ADEA to meet the conflict-of-interest concern identified in the Gardner-Denver dicta, and seized on by respondents here, there is “no reason to color the lens through which the arbitration clause is read” simply because of an alleged conflict of interest between a union and its members. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 628. This is a “battl[e] that should be fought among the political branches and the industry. Those parties should not seek to amend the statute by appeal to the Judicial Branch.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 462 (2002). The conflict-of-interest argument also proves too much. Labor unions certainly balance the economic interests of some employees against the needs of the larger work force as they negotiate collective-bargaining agreements and implement them on a daily basis. But this attribute of organized labor does not justify singling out an arbitration provision for disfavored treatment. This “principle of majority rule” to which respondents object is in fact the central premise of the NLRA. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U. S. 50, 62 (1975). “In establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority.” Ibid, (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 338 (1953) (“The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected”); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rychlik, 352 U. S. 480, 498 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It was Congress’ verdict that the benefits of organized labor outweigh the sacrifice of individual liberty that this system necessarily demands. Respondents’ argument that they were deprived of the right to pursue their ADEA claims in federal court by a labor union with a conflict of interest is therefore unsustainable; it amounts to a collateral attack on the NLRA. In any event, Congress has accounted for this conflict of interest in several ways. As indicated above, the NLRA has been interpreted to impose a “duty of fair representation” on labor unions, which a union breaches “when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Marquez v. Screen Actors, 525 U. S. 33, 44 (1998). This duty extends to “challenges leveled not only at a union’s contract administration and enforcement efforts but at its negotiation activities as well.” Beck, 487 U. S., at 743 (citation omitted). Thus, a union is subject to liability under the NLRA if it illegally discriminates against older workers in either the formation or governance of the collective-bargaining agreement, such as by deciding not to pursue a grievance on behalf of one of its members for discriminatory reasons. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 177 (1967) (describing the duty of fair representation as the “statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct” (emphasis added)). Respondents in fact brought a fair representation suit against the Union based on its withdrawal of support for their age-discrimination claims. See n. 2, supra. Given this avenue that Congress has made available to redress a union’s violation of its duty to its members, it is particularly inappropriate to ask this Court to impose an artificial limitation on the collective-bargaining process. In addition, a union is subject to liability under the ADEA if the union itself discriminates against its members on the basis of age. See 29 U. S. C. § 623(d); see also 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1575-1581 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that a labor union may be held jointly liable with an employer under federal antidiscrimination laws for discriminating in the formation of a collective-bargaining agreement, knowingly acquiescing in the employer’s discrimination, or inducing the employer to discriminate); cf. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 669 (1987). Union members may also file age-discrimination claims with the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board, which may then seek judicial intervention under this Court’s precedent. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U. S. 279, 295-296 (2002). In sum, Congress has provided remedies for the situation where a labor union is less than vigorous in defense of its members’ claims of discrimination under the ADEA. Ill Finally, respondents offer a series of arguments contending that the particular CBA at issue here does not clearly and unmistakably require them to arbitrate their ADEA claims. See Brief for Respondents 44-47. But respondents did not raise these contract-based arguments in the District Court or the Court of Appeals. To the contrary, respondents acknowledged on appeal that the CBA provision requiring arbitration of their federal antidiscrimination statutory claims “is sufficiently explicit” in precluding their federal lawsuit. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees in No. 06-3047-cv(L) etc. (CA2), p. 9. In light of respondents’ litigating position, both lower courts assumed that the CBA's arbitration clause clearly applied to respondents and proceeded to decide the question left unresolved in Wright. We granted review of the question presented on that understanding. “Without cross-petitioning for certiorari, a prevailing party may, of course, ‘defend its judgment on any ground properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected, or even considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals.’ ” Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 38-39 (1989) (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 476, n. 20 (1979)). But this Court will affirm on grounds that have “‘not been raised below . . . “only in exceptional cases.” ’ ” Nordberg, supra, at 39 (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 468-469, n. 12 (1983)). This is not an “exceptional case.” As a result, we find that respondents’ alternative arguments for affirmance have been forfeited. See, e. g., Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338, 360 (2007); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 56, n. 4 (2002). We will not resurrect them on respondents’ behalf. Respondents also argue that the CBA operates as a substantive waiver of their ADEA rights because it not only precludes a federal lawsuit, but also allows the Union to block arbitration of these claims. Brief for Respondents 28-30. Petitioners contest this characterization of the CBA, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 23-27, and offer record evidence suggesting that the Union has allowed respondents to continue with the arbitration even though the Union has declined to participate, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. But not only does this question require resolution of contested factual allegations, it was not fully briefed to this or any court and is not fairly encompassed within the question presented, see this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). Thus, although a substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U. S., at 637, and n. 19; Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 29, we are not positioned to resolve in the first instance whether the CBA allows the Union to prevent respondents from “effectively vindicating” their “federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum,” Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U. S. 79, 90 (2000). Resolution of this question at this juncture would be particularly inappropriate in light of our hesitation to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of speculation. See id., at 91. IV We hold that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Article V establishes the grievance process, which applies to all claims regardless of whether they are subject to arbitration under the CBA. Article VI establishes the procedures for arbitration and postarbitration judicial review, and, in particular, provides that the arbitrator “shall... decide all differences arising between the parties as to interpretation, application or performance of any part of this Agreement and such other issues as the parties are expressly required to arbitrate before him under the terms of this Agreement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43a-47a. Respondents also filed a “hybrid” lawsuit against the Union and petitioners under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 185, see also DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151, 164-165 (1983), alleging that the Union breached its “duty of fair representation” under the NLRA by withdrawing support for the age-discrimination claims during the arbitration and that petitioners breached the CBA by reassigning respondents. Respondents later voluntarily dismissed this suit with prejudice. Petitioners also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The District Court denied the motion, holding that respondents had sufficiently alleged an ADEA claim by claiming that they “were over the age of 40,... they were reassigned to positions which led to substantial losses in income, and . . . their replacements were both younger and had less seniority at the building.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a (footnote omitted). Petitioners have not appealed that ruling. Compare, e. g., Rogers v. New York Univ., 220 F. 3d 73, 75 (CA2 2000) (per curiam); O’Brien v. Agawam, 350 F. 3d 279, 285 (CA1 2003); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F. 3d 811, 824 (CA6 2003); Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 288 F. 3d 313, 317 (CA7 2002), with, e. g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Massey, 373 F. 3d 530, 533 (CA4 2004). Justice Souter claims that this understanding is “impossible to square with our conclusion in [Alexander v.] Gardner-Denver [Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974),] that ‘Title VII... stands on plainly different ground’ from ‘statutory rights related to collective activity’: ‘it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual’s right to equal employment opportunities.’ ” Post, at 282 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Gardner-Denver, supra, at 51). As explained below, however, Justice Souter repeats the key analytical mistake made in Gardner-Denver’s dicta by equating the decision to arbitrate Title VII and ADEA claims to a decision to forgo these substantive guarantees against workplace discrimination. See infra, at 265-267. The right to a judicial forum is not the nonwaivable “substantive” right protected by the ADEA. See infra, at 259. Thus, although Title VII and ADEA rights may well stand on “different ground” than statutory rights that protect “majoritarian processes,” Gardner-Denver, supra, at 51, the voluntary decision to collectively bargain for arbitration does not deny those statutory antidiscrimination rights the full protection they are due. Respondents’ contention that § 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1081, note following 42 U.S.C. §1981 (2000 ed.), precludes the enforcement of this arbitration agreement also is misplaced. See Brief for Respondents 31-32. Section 118 expresses Congress’ support for alternative dispute resolution: “Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under” the ADEA. 105 Stat. 1081, note following 42 U. S C. § 1981. Respondents argue that the legislative history actually signals Congress’ intent to preclude arbitration waivers in the collective-bargaining context. In particular, respondents point to a House Report that, in spite of the statute’s plain language, interprets § 118 to support their position. See H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, p. 97 (1991) (“[A]ny agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration ... in the context of a collective bargaining agreement. . . does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974)”). But the legislative history miseharacterizes the holding of Gardner-Denver, which does not prohibit collective bargaining for arbitration of ADEA claims. See infra, at 260-264. Moreover, reading the legislative history in the manner suggested by respondents would create a direct conflict with the statutory text, which encourages the use of arbitration for dispute resolution without imposing any constraints on collective bargaining. In such a contest, the text must prevail. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 147-148 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear”). Justice Souter’s reliance on Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U. S. 70 (1998), to support its view of Gardner-Denver is misplaced. See post, at 281, 283. Wright identified the “tension” between the two lines of cases represented by Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, but found “it unnecessary to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver, since it [was] apparent... on the facts and arguments presented . . . that no such waiver [had] occurred.” 525 U. S., at 76-77. And although his dissent describes Wrights characterization of Gardner-Denver as “raising a ‘seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees’ federal forum rights,’ ” post, at 283 (quoting Wright, 525 U. S., at 80), it wrenches the statement out of context: “Although [the right to a judicial forum] is not a substantive right, see Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 26, and whether or not Gardner-Denver’s, seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees’ federal forum rights survives Gilmer, Gardner-Denver at least stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA,” id., at 80 (emphasis added). Wright therefore neither endorsed Gardner-Denver’s, broad language nor suggested a particular result in this case. Because today’s decision does not contradict the holding of Gardner-Denver, we need not resolve the stare decisis concerns raised by the dissenting opinions. See post, at 280-281, 285-286 (opinion of Souter, J.); post, at 275-277 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But given the development of this Court’s arbitration jurisprudence in the intervening years, see infra, at 266-269, Gardner-Denver would appear to be a strong candidate for overruling if the dissents’ broad view of its holding, see post, at 282-283 (opinion of Souter, J.), were correct. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989) (explaining that it is appropriate to overrule a decision where there “has been [an] intervening development of the law” such that the earlier “decision [is] irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies”). Justice Stevens suggests that the Court is displacing its “earlier determination of the relevant provisions’ meaning” based on a “preference for arbitration.” Post, at 275. But his criticism lacks any basis. We are not revisiting a settled issue or disregarding an earlier determination; the Court is simply deciding the question identified in Wright as unresolved. See supra, at 255; see also infra, at 272-273. And, contrary to Justice Stevens’ accusation, it is the Court’s fidelity to the ADEA’s text — not an alleged preference for arbitration — that dictates the answer to the question presented. As Gilmer explained, nothing in the text of Title VII or the ADEA precludes contractual arbitration, see supra, at 258, and Justice Stevens has never suggested otherwise. Rather, he has always contended that permitting the “compulsory arbitration” of employment-discrimination claims conflicts with his perception of “the congressional purpose animating the ADEA.” Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id., at 42 (“Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Gilmer Court did not adopt Justice Stevens’ personal view of the purposes underlying the ADEA, for good reason: That view is not embodied within the statute’s text. Accordingly, it is not the statutory text that Justice Stevens has sought to vindicate — it is instead his own “preference” for mandatory judicial review, which he disguises as a search for congressional purpose. This Court is not empowered to incorporate such a preference into the text of a federal statute. See infra, at 270. It is for this reason, and not because of a “policy favoring arbitration,” see post, at 274, 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting), that the Court overturned Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953). And it is why we disavow the antiarbitration dicta of Gardner-Denver and its progeny today. Moreover, an arbitrator’s decision as to whether a unionized employee has been discriminated against on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA remains subject to judicial review under the FA A. 9 U. S. C. § 10(a). “[Although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.” Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 232 (1987).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHRISTENSEN et al. v. HARRIS COUNTY et al. No. 98-1167. Argued February 23, 2000 Decided May 1, 2000 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connok, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in which Soalza, J., joined except as to Part III. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 589. Scaiza, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 589. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 592. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 596. Michael T. Leibig argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard H. Cobb and Murray E. Malakoff. ■ Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Allen H. Feldman, and Edward D. Sieger. Michael P Fleming argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael A. Stafford, Bruce S, Powers, and William John Bux Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Deborah Greenfield, James B. Coppess, and Laurence Gold; for the International Association of Fire Fighters by Thomas A. Woodley; and for the National Association of Police Organizations by Stephen R. McSpadden. Jeffrey A Hollingsworth filed a brief for Spokane Valley Fire Protection District No. 1 as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. Ill), States and their political subdivisions may compensate their employees for overtime by granting them compensatory time or “comp time,” which entitles them to take time off work with full pay. §207(o). If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer is obligated to pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. §§ 207(o)(3)-(4). Fearing the fiscal consequences of having to pay for accrued compensatory time, Harris County adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued compensatory time. Employees of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department sued, claiming that the FLSA prohibits such a policy. The Court of Appeals rejected their claim. Finding that nothing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits an employer from compelling the use of compensatory time, we affirm. I A The FLSA generally provides that hourly employees who work in excess of 40 hours per week must be compensated for the excess hours at a rate not less than 114 times their regular hourly wage. § 207(a)(1). Although this requirement did not initially apply to public-sector employers, Congress amended the FLSA to subject States and their political subdivisions to its constraints, at first on a limited basis, see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 831 (extending the FLSA to certain categories of state and local employees), and then more broadly, see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, §§ 6(a)(l)-(2), 88 Stat. 58-59 (extending the FLSA to all state and local employees, save elected officials and their staffs). States and their political subdivisions, however, did not feel the foil force of this latter extension until our decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985), which overruled our holding in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), that the FLSA could not constitutionally restrain traditional governmental functions. In the months following Garcia, Congress acted to mitigate the effects of applying the FLSA to States and their political subdivisions, passing the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787. See generally Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U. S. 22, 26 (1993). Those amendments permit States and their political subdivisions to compensate employees for overtime by granting them compensatory time at a rate of 114 hours for every hour worked. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(o)(l). To provide this form of compensation, the employer must arrive at an agreement or understanding with employees that compensatory time will be granted instead of cash compensation. §207(o)(2); 29 CFR §553.23 (1999). The FLSA expressly regulates some aspects of accrual and preservation of compensatory time. For example, the FLSA provides that an employer must honor an employee’s request to use compensatory time within a “reasonable period” of time following the request, so long as the use of the compensatory time would not “unduly disrupt” the employer’s operations. §2Q7(o)(5); 29 CFR §553.25 (1999). The FLSA also caps the number of compensatory time hours that an employee may accrue. After an employee reaches that maximum, the employer must pay cash compensation for additional overtime hours worked. §207(o)(3)(A). In addition, the FLSA permits the employer at any time to cancel or “cash out” accrued compensatory time hours by paying the employee cash compensation for unused compensatory time. § 207(o)(3)(B); 29 CFR § 553.26(a) (1999). And the FLSA entitles the employee to cash payment for any accrued compensatory time remaining upon the termination of employment. § 207(o)(4). B Petitioners are 127 deputy sheriffs employed by respondents Harris County, Texas, and its sheriff, Tommy B. Thomas (collectively, Harris County). It is undisputed that each of the petitioners individually agreed to accept compensatory time, in lieu of cash, as compensation for overtime. As petitioners accumulated compensatory time, Harris County became concerned that it lacked the resources to pay monetary compensation to employees who worked overtime after reaching the statutory cap on compensatory time accrual and to employees who left their jobs with sizable reserves of accrued time. As a result, the county began looking for a way to reduce accumulated compensatory time. It wrote to the United States Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, asking “whether the Sheriff may schedule non-exempt employees to use or take compensatory time.” Brief for Petitioners 18-19. The Acting Administrator of the Division replied: “[I]t is our position that a public employer may schedule its nonexempt employees to use their accrued FLSA compensatory time as directed if the prior agreement specifically provides such a provision .... “Absent such an agreement, it is our position that neither the statute nor the regulations permit an employer to require an employee to use accrued compensatory time.” Opinion Letter from Dept, of Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (Sept. 14, 1992), 1992 WL 845100 (Opinion Letter). After receiving the letter, Harris County implemented a policy under which the employees’ supervisor sets a .maximum number of compensatory hours that may be accumulated. When an employee’s stock of hours approaches that maximum, the employee is advised of the maximum and is asked to take steps to reduce accumulated compensatory time. If the employee does not do so voluntarily, a supervisor may order the employee to use his compensatory time at specified times. Petitioners sued, claiming that the county’s policy violates the FLSA because §207(o)(5) — which requires that an employer reasonably accommodate employee requests to use compensatory time — provides the exclusive means of utilizing accrued time in the absence of an agreement or understanding permitting some other method. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment for petitioners and entering a declaratory judgment that the county’s policy violated the FLSA. Moreau v. Harris County, 945 F. Supp. 1067 (SD Tex. 1996). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the FLSA did not speak to the issue and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing its compensatory time policy. Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F. 3d 241 (1998). Judge Dennis concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that the employer could not compel the employee to use compensatory time unless the employee agreed to such an arrangement in advance. Id., at 247-251. We granted certiorari because the Courts of Appeals are divided on the issue. 528 U. S. 926 (1999). II Both parties, and the United States as amicus curiae, concede that nothing in the FLSA expressly prohibits a State or subdivision thereof from compelling employees to utilize accrued compensatory time. Petitioners and the United States, however, contend that the FLSA implicitly prohibits such a practice in the absence of an agreement or understanding authorizing compelled use. Title 29 U. S. C. § 207(o)(5) provides: “An employee ... “(A) who has accrued compensatory time off... , and “(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, “shall be permitted by the employee’s employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.” Petitioners and the United States rely upon the canon ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius, contending that the express grant of control to employees to use compensatory time, subject to the limitation regarding undue disruptions of workplace operations, implies that all other methods of spending compensatory time are precluded. We find this reading unpersuasive. We accept the proposition that “[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode.” Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269, 270 (1872). But that canon does not resolve this case in petitioners’ favor. The “thing to be done” as defined by §207(o)(5) is not the expenditure of compensatory time, as petitioners would have it. Instead, § 207(o)(5) is more properly read as a minimal guarantee that an employee will be able to make some use of compensatory time when he requests to use it. As such, the proper expressio unius inference is that an employer may not, at least in the absence of an agreement, deny an employee’s request to use compensatory time for a reason other than that provided in § 207(o)(5). The canon’s application simply does not prohibit an employer from telling an employee to take the benefits of compensatory time by scheduling time off work with full pay. In other words, viewed in the context of the overall statutory scheme, §207(o)(5) is better read not as setting forth the exclusive method by which compensatory time can be used, but as setting up a safeguard to ensure that an employee will receive timely compensation for working overtime. Section 207(o)(5) guarantees that, at the very minimum, an employee will get to use his compensatory time (i. e., take time off work with full pay) unless doing so would disrupt the employer’s operations. And it is precisely this concern over ensuring that employees can timely “liquidate” compensatory time that the Secretary of Labor identified in her own regulations governing §207(o)(5): “Compensatory time cannot be used as a means to avoid statutory overtime compensation. An employee has the right to use compensatory time earned and must not be coerced to accept more compensatory time than an employer can realistically and in good faith expect to be able to grant within a reasonable period of his or her making a request for use of such time.” 29 CFR § 553.25(b) (1999). This reading is confirmed by nearby provisions of the FLSA that reflect a similar concern for ensuring that the employee receive some timely benefit for overtime work. For example, §207(o)(3)(A) provides that workers may not accrue more than 240 or 480 hours of compensatory time, depending upon the nature of the job. See also § 207(o)(2)(B) (conditioning the employer’s ability to provide compensatory time upon the employee not accruing compensatory time in excess of the § 207(o)(3)(A) limits). Section 207(o)(3)(A) helps guarantee that employees only accrue amounts of compensatory time that they can reasonably use. After all, an employer does not need §207(o)(3)(A)’s protection; it is free at any time to reduce the number of hours accrued by exchanging them for cash payment, §2G7(o)(3)(B), or by halting the accrual of compensatory time by paying cash compensation for overtime work, 29 CFR § 553.26(a) (1999). Thus, § 207(o)(3)(A), like §207(o)(5), reflects a concern that employees receive some timely benefit in exchange for overtime work. Moreover, on petitioners’ view, the compensatory time exception enacted by Congress in the wake of Garcia would become a nullity when employees who refuse to use compensatory time reach the statutory máximums on accrual. Petitioners’ position would convert §207(o)(3)(A)’s shield into a sword, forcing employers to pay cash compensation instead of providing compensatory time to employees who work overtime. At bottom, we think the better reading of §207(o)(5) is that it imposes a restriction upon an employer’s efforts to -prohibit the use of compensatory time when employees request to do so; that provision says nothing about restricting an employer’s efforts to require employees to use compensatory time. Because the statute is silent on this issue and because Harris County’s policy is entirely compatible with § 207(o)(5), petitioners cannot, as they are required to do by 29 U. S. C. § 216(b), prove that Harris County has violated §207. Our interpretation of §207(o)(5) — one that does not prohibit employers from forcing employees to use compensatory time — finds support in two other features of the FLSA. First, employers remain free under the FLSA to decrease the number of hours that employees work. An employer may tell the employee to take off an afternoon, a day, or even an entire week. Cf. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 739 (1981) (“[T]he FLSA was designed ... to ensure that each employee covered by the Act. . . would be protected from the evil of overwork . . .” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). Second, the FLSA explicitly permits an employer to cash out accumulated compensatory time by paying the employee his regular hourly wage for each hour accrued. §207(o)(3)(B); 29 CFR § 553.27(a) (1999). Thus, under the FLSA an employer is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The compelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case merely involves doing both of these steps at once. It would make little sense to interpret §207(o)(5) to make the combination of the two steps unlawful when each independently is lawful. III In an attempt to avoid the conclusion that the FLSA does not prohibit compelled use of compensatory time, petitioners and the United States contend that we should defer to the Department of Labor’s opinion letter, which takes the position that an employer may compel the use of compensatory time only if the employee has agreed in advance to such a practice. Specifically, they argue that the agency opinion letter is entitled to deference under our decision in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, we held that a court must give effect to an agency’s regulation containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Id., at 842-844. Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters — like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law— do not warrant Chevron-style deference. See, e. g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal agency guideline, which is not “subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedure] Act, including public notice and comment,” entitled only to “some deference” (internal quotation marks omitted)); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 256-258 (1991) (interpretative guidelines do not receive Chevron deference); Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991) (interpretative rules and enforcement guidelines are “not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary’s delegated lawmaking powers”). See generally 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5 (3d ed. 1994). Instead, interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are “entitled to respect” under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the “power to persuade,” ibid. See Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at 256-258. As explained above, we find unpersuasive the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue in this case. Of course, the framework of deference set forth in Chevron does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regulation. But in this case the Department of Labor’s regulation does not address the issue of compelled compensatory time. The regulation provides only that “[t]he agreement or understanding [between the employer and employee] may include other provisions governing the preservation, use, or cashing out of compensatory time so long as these provisions are consistent with [§207(o)].” 29 CFR § 553.23(a)(2) (1999) (emphasis added). Nothing in the regulation even arguably requires that an employer’s compelled use policy must be included in an agreement. The text of the regulation itself indicates that its command is permissive, not mandatory. Seeking to overcome the regulation’s obvious meaning, the United States asserts that the agency’s opinion letter interpreting the regulation should be given deference under our decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997). In Auer, we held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference. Id., at 461. See also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410 (1945). But Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. The regulation in this case, however, is not ambiguous — it is plainly permissive. To defer to the agency’s position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation. Because the regulation is not ambiguous on the issue of compelled compensatory time, Auer deference is unwarranted. * * * As we have noted, no relevant statutory provision expressly or implicitly prohibits Harris County from pursuing its policy of forcing employees to utilize their compensatory time. In its opinion letter siding with the petitioners, the Department of Labor opined that "it is our position that neither the statute nor the regulations permit an employer to require an employee to use accrued compensatory time.” Opinion Letter (emphasis added). But this view is exactly backwards. Unless the FLSA prohibits respondents from adopting its policy, petitioners cannot show that Harris County has violated the FLSA. And the FLSA contains no such prohibition. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Such an agreement or understanding need not be formally reached and memorialized in writing, but instead can be arrived at informally, such as when an employee works overtime knowing that the employer rewards overtime with compensatory time. See 29 CFR § 553.23(c)(1) (1999). Compare, e. g., Collins v. Lobdell, 188 F. 3d 1124, 1129-1130 (CA9 1999) (upholding employer’s policy compelling compensatory time use), with Heaton v. Moore, 43 F. 3d 1176, 1180-1181 (CA8 1994) (striking down policy compelling compensatory time use), cert. denied sub nom. Schriro v. Heaton, 515 U. S. 1104 (1995). We granted certiorari on the question “‘[w]hether a public agency governed by the compensatory time provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. §207(o), may, absent a preexisting agreement, require its employees to use accrued compensatory time?’ ” 528 U. S. 926, 927 (1999). As such, we decide this case on the assumption that no agreement or understanding exists between the employer and employees on the issue of compelled use of compensatory time. Justice Stevens asserts that the parties never make this argument. See post, at 593, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). Although the United States and petitioners fail to make their arguments in Latin, we believe a fair reading of the briefs reveals reliance upon the expressio unius canon. See Brief for United States as Amieus Curiae 16 (“Congress . . . identified only one circumstance in which an employer may exercise some measure of control: when an employee requests the use of compensatory time, the employer must allow such use within a reasonable period of time except where the use would ‘unduly disrupt’ the employer’s operations. 29 U. S. C. 207(o)(5). If Congress had intended for employers to exercise unilateral control over the use of compensatory time in other respects as well, it presumably would have so provided”); Reply Brief for Petitioners 4-6 (contending that the FLSA explicitly provides methods for reducing compensatory time and thus other means may not be used). Justice Stevens does not dispute this argument. In fact, he expressly endorses half of it. See post, at 594, 595 (employer free to cash out compensatory time). Instead, Justice Stevens claims that we “stumblfe]” by failing to identify “the relevant general rule” that employees have “a statutory right to compensation for overtime work payable in cash.” Post, at 592. We fail to do so only because the general rule is not relevant to this case. Both parties to this case agreed that compensatory time would be provided in lieu of cash and thus § 207(a)’s general requirement of cash compensation is supplanted. Petitioners and the United States do assert that the requirement of cash compensation is relevant by analogy. They claim that an employer cannot compel compensatory time use because compensatory time should be treated like employee cash in the bank — that is, under the exclusive control of the employee. But this analogy is wholly inapt under the very terms of the FLSA. The FLSA grants significant control to the employer over accrued compensatory time. For example, the employer is free to buy out compensatory time at any time by providing cash compensation. §207(o)(3)(B); 29 CFR ' § 553.27(a) (1999). Additionally, an employer is free to deny any request to use compensatory time when such use would unduly disrupt the employer’s operations. §207(o)(5)(B); 29 CFR § 553.25(d) (1999). The cash analogy is therefore directly undermined by unambiguous provisions of the statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ESTATE OF DONNELLY et al. No. 104. Argued January 12, 1970 Decided March 23, 1970 Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Walters, Joseph J. Connolly, and Crombie J. D. Garrett. Daniel N. Pevos argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1950, a tax liability of approximately $26,000 was assessed against the taxpayer Donnelly, a resident of Michigan. Upon assessment, a statutory lien was created in favor of the United States “upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal” belonging to the taxpayer. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 3670. Under § 3672 of the 1939 Code, such a lien could become effective against subsequent purchasers of Donnelly’s property in either of two ways: (1) by filing notice of the lien in the state office in which filing of such notice was authorized by state law; or (2) if filing in a state office was not authorized by state law, by filing notice of the lien in the United States District Court for the district in which the property was located. A Michigan statute purported to authorize the filing of federal tax lien notices with the county register of deeds. However, the Michigan statute expressly required that notices of federal tax liens upon real property contain “a description of the land upon which a lien is claimed.” The standard tax lien notice form used by the Treasury Department made no provision for such a description, but was rather a blanket notice covering all property of the taxpayer in the county. The Department had taken the position that § 3672 permitted state law to dictate the place for filing the notice of lien, but not the form or content of the notice. Accordingly, the Department, believing that state law did not “authorize” filing of the standard federal notice with the register of deeds, filed its notice of lien on Donnelly’s property in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Eastern District includes the land involved in the case, which was held by Donnelly and his wife as tenants by the entirety. The question is whether the filing in federal court gave the United States priority against a subsequent good-faith purchaser of Donnelly’s land. The Department did not collect in full on Donnelly’s tax liability nor did it foreclose its lien on any of his property. Rather, between 1950 and his death in 1963, it obtained waivers from him of the statute of limitations on the assessed liability, the last of which extended the time for collection to December 31, 1966. In the meantime, Donnelly’s wife died and he became fee owner of the Livingston County land. Shortly thereafter, in August 1960, he sold the land to respondents Mr. and Mrs. Carlson, who are the real parties in interest in this case. An abstract of title, prepared for the Carlsons by the Livingston County abstract office, disclosed no tax liens affecting real property owned by Donnelly; the same abstract, however, disclaimed any examination of court records, state or federal. The United States concedes that the Carlsons had no actual notice of the lien on Donnelly’s land. After the Carlsons purchased the land, this Court decided in United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U. S. 291 (1961), that the Department had been right in maintaining that it did not have to conform its lien notices to the Michigan requirement that such notices must contain a description of the land upon which the lien is claimed. Thus, this Court held, the state law did not “authorize” state filing of federal lien notices, and the filing of a notice in the appropriate federal district court was sufficient to give the lien priority against subsequent purchasers. In 1966, just before the last statutory waiver executed by Donnelly expired, the United States brought suit in federal court to foreclose its tax lien on the Livingston County property, now owned by the Carlsons. The District Court held that Union Central, supra, was distinguishable, and in any event should not be applied retroactively against a person making a good-faith purchase before its date of decision, and granted summary judgment for the Carlsons. 295 F. Supp. 557 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1967). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the opinion of the District Court. 406 F. 2d 1065 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1969). We granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 814 (1969), to consider the apparent conflict with our decision in Union Central, supra, and we reverse. The District Court distinguished Union Central on the ground that “an attempt had been made in [that case] to file notice with the Register of Deeds in 1954, which had been refused by the Register of Deeds pursuant to a Michigan Attorney General opinion rendered in 1953, which ruled that federal tax lien notices not containing a description of the property are not entitled to be recorded. In the instant case, there had been no attempt to file with the Register of Deeds.” 295 F. Supp., at 559. The attempted distinction is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, nothing in this Court's opinion in Union Central or in the record of that case indicates that any attempt was made to file the notice of lien with the register of deeds. Second, whether or not such an attempt was made, state law barred the local office from accepting the federal lien notice, which lacked the description of the land explicitly required by the state statute. The presence or absence of the legally futile act of tendering the noncomplying lien notice to the register of deeds could not be a factor determinative of the priority to be granted the federal lien. Further, the District Court held that when the Carl-sons purchased Donnelly's land in 1960, they were entitled to rely on the law as it appeared at that time. As the court saw it, the prevailing interpretation of the federal statute in Michigan, stated in Youngblood v. United States, 141 F. 2d 912 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1944), required the Treasury Department to file a complying notice of lien with the register of deeds in order to gain priority against subsequent purchasers. Conceding that this Court rejected the Youngblood interpretation in its Union Central decision in 1961, the District Court nevertheless concluded that Union Central should not be applied retroactively to give the 1950 federal lien priority over the Carlsons’ 1960 good-faith purchase of the same land, and thus to upset the Carlsons’ allegedly justifiable expectation of unclouded title. In its retroactivity determination, the District Court relied largely on this Court’s decision in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940). The petitioner in that case had taken advantage of a federal statute that permitted readjustment of municipal debt, amounting to a reduction of that debt, upon a finding by a district court that the readjustment plan was fair and equitable and upon approval of the plan by holders of two-thirds of the outstanding indebtedness. The respondents, holders of bonds issued by the petitioner, had been parties to that action, had raised no constitutional challenge to the statute, and had not appealed the final decree of the District Court approving the plan. Subsequently, in an unrelated proceeding, the statute was declared unconstitutional. Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513 (1936). The respondents then brought suit on the original bonds, which had been canceled by the original decree, claiming that a decree obtained under an unconstitutional statute could not support a plea of res judicata. This Court held that res judicata barred the new action, stressing the fact that the respondents had not raised the constitutional claim in the original action. The Court noted generally that the actual existence of a statute, prior to determination of its unconstitutionality “is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. . . . Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.” 308 U. S., at 374. The District Court here found that this Court’s decision in Union Central amounted to an invalidation of the Michigan statute providing for local filing of federal tax lien notices, and that the Carlsons had justifiably relied upon the state statute, prior to its invalidation, in purchasing Donnelly’s property without first searching the records of the federal court. Quoting the above language from Chicot County the court held that the Carlsons’ reliance on the subsequently invalidated statute was sufficient to give them priority over the earlier filed tax lien. In our view, Chicot County does not support failure to apply Union Central here. In the first place, the Union Central decision did not invalidate any statute, state or federal. It merely construed § 3672, in accordance with the clear language of the statute, to authorize the filing of tax lien notices in federal court where the state law failed to provide for local filing. It determined, as the courts and other authorities who had considered the question had all agreed, that Michigan law did not authorize the filing of the standard federal lien notice, which lacked the description of the land required by the Michigan filing statute. Finally it held, in accordance with the will of Congress as expressed in the 1942 amendment to § 3672 and the accompanying legislative history, that state law imposing more onerous requirements of content on lien notices than federal law did not “authorize” state filing within the meaning of the federal statute. Thus, the Carlsons did not rely on any statute subsequently declared unconstitutional by this Court. The most that can be said is that they may have failed to search for notices of tax lien in the federal court on the basis of a construction of § 3672 given by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Youngblood v. United States, supra. However, the Youngblood construction, which the Government never accepted and which it could not seek to have reviewed in this Court because the judgment in that case rested on independent grounds, cannot be sufficient to deprive the Government of the fruits of following what under the statute was the proper filing procedure. Further, in Chicot County the petitioner did not merely rely on a federal statute later declared unconstitutional, but on a final judgment rendered in his favor in a proceeding in which the respondent did not even raise the constitutional issue. The analogous situation would be presented here only if the Carlsons had, before the decision in Union Central, obtained a decree of quiet title to their property in a proceeding to which the United States was a party and in which the United States had not raised the issue of the priority of its lien under § 3672. In short, this case lacks the element of res judicata — reliance by a party on a final judgment rendered in his favor — which was the decisive factor in Chicot County. Acts of Congress are generally to be applied uniformly throughout the country from the date of their effectiveness onward. Generally the United States, like other parties, is entitled to adhere to what it believes to be the correct interpretation of a statute, and to reap the benefits of that adherence if it proves to be correct, except where bound to the contrary by a final judgment in a particular case. Deviant rulings by circuit courts of appeals, particularly in apparent dictum, cannot generally provide the “justified reliance” necessary to warrant withholding retroactive application of a decision construing a statute as Congress intended it. In rare cases, decisions construing federal statutes might be denied full retroactive effect, as for instance where this Court overrules its own construction of a statute, cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S. 13, 25 (1964), but this is not such a case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided: “Sec. 3670. Property Subject to Lien. “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to such tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 26 U. S. C. § 3670 (1940 ed.). “Sec. 3672. Validity Against Mortgagees, Pledgees, Purchasers, and Judgment Creditors. not be “(a) Invalidity of Lien Without Notice. — Such lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector— the “(1) Under State or Territorial laws. — In the office in which the filing of such notice is authorized by the law of the State or Territory in which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by law authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State or Territory; or clerk an “(2) With -Clerk oj District Court. — In the office of the clerk of United States district court for the judicial district in which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has not by law authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State or Territory . . . ." 26 U. S. C. § 3672 (1946 ed.). Michigan Public Acts, 1923, as Public Acts, 1925, No. 13, repealed by Michigan Public Acts, 1956, No. 107; provided in pertinent part: for “Sec. 1. That whenever the collector of internal revenue for any district in the United States, or any tax collecting officers of the United States having charge of the collection of any tax payable to the United States, shall desire to acquire a lien in favor of the United States for any tax payable to the United States against any property real or personal, within the state of Michigan pursuant to section three thousand one hundred eighty-six of the revised statutes of the United States, he is hereby authorized to file a notice of lien, setting forth the name and the residence or business address of such taxpayer, the nature and the amount of such assessment, and a description of the land upon which a lien is claimed, in the office of the register of deeds in and for the county or counties in Michigan in which such property subject to such lien is situated; and such register of deeds shall, upon receiving a filing fee of fifty cents for such notice, file and index the same . . . .” Nor is it significant that the lien notice here was filed in "i£)50, before the Michigan Attorney General’s opinion referred to by the District Court (opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan, No. 1709, September 10, 1953), whereas the fifing in Union Central came in 1954, after that opinion was rendered. The Attorney General’s opinion merely declared what was already the law of Michigan. In Youngblood, the United States sought an order in the nature of a writ of mandamus to compel a county register of deeds in Michigan to accept and file a standard federal lien notice, which lacked the description of the encumbered land required by the state statute. The Court of Appeals held that the order should not issue, first, because United States district courts lack jurisdiction to issue original writs of mandamus or orders in the nature of mandamus; and second, because the law of Michigan clearly provided in terms that in order to be filed with the register of deeds, a federal tax lien notice had to contain a description of the land. The court went on, in apparent dictum, to confirm its earlier holding in United States v. Maniaci, 116 F. 2d 935 (1940), aff'g 36 F. Supp. 293 (D. C. W. D. Mich. 1939), that §3672 required the United States to file in the local office hen notices conforming to the state law requirements as to content. In delivering this apparent dictum, the Court of Appeals ignored the clear legislative history, summarized in this Court’s Union Central decision, 368 U. S., at 295-296, which showed that in enacting the 1942 amendment to § 3672, Congress had meant to disapprove the Maniaci holding. The Carlsons have raised additional defenses to the foreclosure suit brought by the United States, but as these defenses were not considered by the District Court or the Court of Appeals, we do not rule on them here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF MONROE et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 97-122. Decided November 17, 1997 Per Curiam. The United States claims the city of Monroe, Georgia, did not seek preclearance for majority voting in mayoral elections, as required by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. The Government seeks to enjoin majority voting and to require Monroe to return to the plurality system it had once used. A three-judge District Court for the Middle District of Georgia agreed with the Government and granted summary judgment. 962 P. Supp. 1501 (1997). The District Court rejected Monroe’s claim that the Attorney General’s preelearance of a 1968 statewide law encompassed Monroe’s adoption of a majority system. On Monroe’s motion, this Court stayed enforcement of the judgment. 521 U. S. 1138 (1997). The ease is now on appeal, and the judgment must be reversed. I The parties agree upon the facts. Until 1966, Monroe’s city charter did not specify whether a candidate needed a plurality or a majority vote to win a mayoral election. In practice, the city used plurality voting in its elections until 1966 and majority voting thereafter. In 1966, the General Assembly of Georgia amended the city’s charter to require majority voting in mayoral elections. 1966 Ga. Laws 2459. Because Monroe is a jurisdiction covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the change had to be preeleared. Georgia or Monroe could have sought preelearance by submitting the change to the Attorney General or seeking a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Neither did, so the 1966 charter amendment was not precleared. In 1968, the General Assembly passed a comprehensive Municipal Election Code (1968 code), which is still in force today. The statute applies to Monroe and all other municipalities in Georgia. Section 34A-1407(a) of the 1968 code has two sentences. The first sentence sets forth a rule of deference to municipal charters: “If the municipal charter . . . provides that a candidate may be nominated or elected by a plurality . . . , such provision shall prevail.” The second sentence lays down a state-law default rule for all other cities: “Otherwise, no candidate shall be ... elected ... [without] a majority of the votes east....” Georgia Municipal Election Code, §34A-1407(a) (1968 code section or § 34A-1407(a)), 1968 Ga. Laws 977, as amended, Ga. Code Ann. § 21-3-407(a) (1993). Georgia submitted the 1968 code to the Attorney General for preclearance. Its cover letter stated: “ Tn view of the variety of laws which heretofore existed, no effort will be made herein to set forth the prior laws superseded by the Municipal Election Code.’” 962 F. Supp., at 1505. The letter then listed the majority-vote provision as a significant change, noting: “ ‘Whether the majority or plurality rule is in effect in the municipal election will depend upon how the municipality’s charter is written at present or may be written in [the] future ....’” Ibid. The Attorney General objected to other provisions of the 1968 code but did not object to §34A-1407(a), so it was, and is, preeleared. The United States does not dispute this conclusion, nor does it claim Georgia’s submission was misleading, ambiguous, or otherwise defective. In 1971, the revision of Monroe’s charter. 1971 Ga. Laws 3227. The 1971 charter made explicit provision, for majority voting. Neither Georgia nor Monroe sought to preclear the revisions to the charter. In 1990, roe’s charter and carried forward the majority-vote requirement. This time, Monroe sent the 1990 charter to the Attorney General for preclearanee, but the cover letter did not mention the majority-vote provision. The Attorney General objected to it nevertheless, interpreting the submission as effecting a change from plurality to majority voting. The Government filed suit against Monroe and city officials in 1994 and prevailed in the District Court. 1 — Í J — 1 The 1968 code must be the centerpiece of this case, for it defers where city charters are specific and provides a default rule where they are not. If a city charter requires plurality voting, the deference rule in the first sentence of the 1968 code section allows the municipal charter provision to take effect. Monroe, however, does not have and has not had a plurality-vote provision in its charter. The first sentence simply does not apply here because no charter provision triggers its rule of deference to municipal law. Thus, the second sentence’s default rule of state law governs, requiring Monroe to use majority voting. Since the Attorney General pre-cleared the default rule, Monroe may implement it. The District Court reached a contrary conclusion, relying on a single footnote in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 169-170, n. 6 (1980). As the District Court put it: “The [RomeJ Court’s rationale focused squarely on the notion that [Georgia’s] submission of the 1968 Statewide Code did not put before the Attorney General the propriety of changes in the voting practices of individual cities.” 962 F. Supp., at 1513. The court’s reliance on the footnote was misplaced. Unlike this ease, which concerns the default rule in the second sentence of the 1968 code section, the City of Rome footnote concerned the deference rule in the first sentence. Rome’s pre-1966 charter had an explicit requirement of plurality voting. When the General Assembly amended Rome’s charter to provide for majority voting, no one sought to preclear this or other changes. “Rome [later] argue[d] that the Attorney General, in preclearing the 1968 Code, [had] thereby approved by reference the City’s 1966 Charter amendments.” City of Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 221, 233 (DC 1979), aff’d, 446 U. S. 156 (1980); see also 472 F. Supp., at 233 (“Rome argues that its Charter, having been amended in 1966 to provide for majority voting, did not provide for plurality voting in 1968, and that therefore the 1968 Code mandated majority voting”). submission This of the 1968 code did not submit Rome’s 1966 charter for pre-clearance “in an unambiguous and recordable manner.” 446 U. S., at 170, n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Georgia’s submission of the 1968 code “informed the Attorney General only of [Georgia’s] decision to defer to local charters and ordinances regarding majority voting” should a city choose to include a voting provision in its charter as permitted by the deference rule. Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). Georgia’s submission of the 1968 code did not give the Attorney General “an adequate opportunity to determine the purpose of [Rome’s 1966] electoral changes and whether they will adversely affect minority voting.” Id., at 169, n. 6. not even Indeed, arguably constitute a request for preclearan.ce of the 1966 change to Rome’s charter. Given that the unpreeleared charter amendment was a nullity as a matter of federal law, the 1968 code did not change the law in Rome. Rather, it deferred to the plurality-vote requirement in the pre-1966 charter. In this case, however, the 1968 code is what changed the law in Monroe. Accordingly, unless the Attorney General’s preclearanee of the code was a nullity, there has been no violation of the Voting Rights Act. the In short, submission of the 1968 code to validate the 1966 municipal electoral changes. City of Rome, in discussing the “decision to defer to local charters,” recognized that the case arose under the rule of deference to municipal law. This rule of deference would not have been interpreted to effect a change in the law, and so it did not put the Attorney General on notice of Rome’s shift to majority voting. Because municipal law was dispositive under the first sentence of the 1968 code section, City of Rome said nothing about the state-law default rule of majority voting in the second sentence. The instant case, in contrast, is controlled by the default rule of state law set forth in the second sentence. Monroe’s pre-1966 charter, unlike Rome’s, did not require plurality voting and so could not trigger the rule of deference to municipal law in the first sentence. Thus Monroe, unlike Rome, does not need to breathe life into its invalid 1966 charter to circumvent the rule of deference. After one disregards Monroe’s invalid 1966 and 1971 charters, the state-law default rule mandates majority voting. Cases, such as this one, arising under the default rule satisfy all of the preelearance requirements in City of Rome. The Government does not dispute that Georgia submitted the state-law default rule to the Attorney General in an “unambiguous and recordable manner.” The submission, furthermore, gave the Attorney General “an adequate-opportunity to determine the purpose of the [default-rule] electoral changes and whether they will adversely affect minority voting.” In consequence, by preclearing the 1968 code the Attorney General approved the state-law default rule. The controlling default rule having been precleared, Monroe may cohduet elections under its auspices. Because the 1968 code disposes of the case on this undisputed factual record, the Court need not address appellants’ other contentions. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HANCOCK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY v. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. No. 74-220. Argued January 13, 1976 Decided June 7, 1976 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blacrmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart and RehNquist, JJ., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 199. David D. Beals, Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ed W. Hancock, Attorney General, pro se, and David C. Short, Assistant Attorney. General. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Johnson, Deputy Solic itor General Randolph, Jacques B. Gelin, Robert L. Klar-quist, Robert H. Marquis, Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., and Beauchamp E. Brogan. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by William J. Baxley, Attorney General, and Henry H. Caddell and Frederick S. Middleton III, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Alabama; by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirsho-witz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip Weinberg and Richard G. Berger, Assistant Attorneys General for the State of New York; by John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Texas; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and J. Thomas Steger, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; and by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Robert H. O’Brien and Carl Boronkay, Assistant Attorneys General, and Nicholas C. Yost, Roderick Walston, Daniel Taaffe, and C. Foster Knight, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California et al., joined by Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, and Robert E. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Georgia. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision in this case is whether a State whose federally approved implementation plan forbids an air contaminant source to operate without a state permit may require existing federally owned or operated installations to secure such a permit. The case presents an issue of statutory construction requiring examination of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1857 et seq., and its legislative history in light of established constitutional principles governing the determination of whether and the extent to which federal installations have been subjected to state regulation. The specific question is whether obtaining a permit to operate is among those “requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution” with which existing federal facilities must comply under § 118 of the Clean Air Act. I Last Term in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U. S. 60 (1975), we reviewed the development of federal air pollution legislation through the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Amendments) and observed that although the Amendments “sharply increased federal authority and responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution,” they “explicitly preserved the principle” that “ ‘[e]ach State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State id., at 64, quoting from § 107 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1678, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-2 (a). Consistently with this principle, the Amendments required that within nine months after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards required by § 109 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1679, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-4 (a), for certain air pollutants, each State submit to the EPA a plan by which it would implement and maintain those standards within its territory. § 110 (a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1680, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5 (a)(1).' See 40 CFR pt. 51 (1975). The EPA was required to approve each State’s implementation plan as long as it was adopted after public hearings and satisfied the conditions specified in § 110(a) (2). For existing sources the State must propose “emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations” necessary to meet the air quality standards. §110(a)(2)(B). As we observed in Train, supra, at 78-79, given the EPA’s nationwide air quality standards, the State is to adopt a plan setting “the specific rules to which operators of pollution sources are subject, and which if enforced should result in ambient air which meets the national standards. “[The EPA] is relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be met. . . . The Act gives [the EPA] no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of § 110 (a) (2). . . . Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of emission limitations is compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.” (Footnote omitted.) Along with increasing federal authority and “taking a stick to the States” by requiring them to implement the federal standards promulgated pursuant to that authority, Congress also intended the Amendments “to strengthen the strictures against air pollution by federal facilities.” Before 1970, § 111 (a) of the Clean Air Act simply declared “the intent of Congress” to be that federal installations “shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with the interests of the United States and within any available appropriations, cooperate with” federal and state air pollution control authorities “in preventing and controlling the pollution of the air in any area insofar as the discharge of any matter from or by such” federal installation “may cause or contribute to pollution of the air in such area.” Experience with performance by federal sources of air pollution under this voluntary scheme led the Congress to conclude that admonishing federal agencies to prevent and control air pollution was inadequate, because “ [instead of exercising leadership in controlling or eliminating air pollution” “Federal agencies have been notoriously laggard in abating pollution.” Both to provide the leadership to private industry and to abate violations of air pollution standards by federal facilities, in 1970 Congress added § 118 to the Clean Air Act. The first sentence of the section provides: “Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857f. The remainder of § 118 authorizes the President, upon a determination that it is “in the paramount interest of the United States to do so” and subject to several limitations, to exempt certain federal emission sources from “compliance with such a requirement.” After enactment of § 118 there is no longer any question whether federal installations must comply with established air pollution control and abatement measures. The question has become how their compliance is to be enforced. II In February 1972, Kentucky submitted its implementation plan to the EPA. On May 31, 1972, the plan was approved by the Administrator in relevant part. Chapter 7 of the plan included Kentucky Air Pollution Control Commission (Commission) Regulation No. AP-1, §5(1), which provides: “No person shall construct, modify, use, operate, or maintain an air contaminant source or maintain or allow physical conditions to exist on property owned by or subject to the control of such person, resulting in the presence of air contaminants in the atmosphere, unless a permit therefor has been issued by the Commission and is currently in effect.” An applicant for a permit must complete a form supplied by the Commission and, “when specifically requested by the Commission, include an analysis of the characteristics, properties, and volume of the air contaminants based upon source or stack samples of the air contaminants taken under normal operating conditions.” The process of review of the application may include hearings. Permits are denied if the applicant does not supply the “information required or deemed necessary by the Commission to enable it to act upon the permit application,” or when “the air contaminant source will prevent or interfere with the attainment or maintenance of state or federal air quality standards.” When granted, a permit may be “subject to such terms and conditions set forth and embodied in the permit as the Commission shall deem necessary to insure compliance with its standards.” Once issued, a permit may be revoked or modified for failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the permit, with emission standards applicable to the air contaminant source, or with the ambient air standards for the area in which the air contaminant source is located. Reg. AP-1, § 5 (5), CA App. 122. Soon after the implementation plan was approved, a Commission official wrote to numerous officials responsible for various Kentucky facilities of the United States Army, of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) requesting that they apply for and obtain permits as requested by the EPA-approved plan. The responses to these requests were to the effect that federally owned or operated facilities located in Kentucky were not required to secure an operating permit. Each response, however, either offered to or did supply the information and data requested on the standard permit application form. The Commission continued to press the federal officials to apply for operating permits. In October 1972, the Regional Administrator of the EPA sent a letter to the operators of all federal facilities in the region, including those to which the Kentucky officials had addressed their requests, and to the Commission. Setting forth EPA policy and the agency’s interpretation of § 118 of the Clean Air Act, the Regional Administrator stated: “It is clear that Section 118 .. . requires Federal facilities to meet state air quality standards and emission limitations and to comply with deadlines established in the approved state air implementation plans.” App. 57. To aid the States in accomplishing these objections, wrote the Administrator, each federal facility should develop a' compliance schedule and should provide “reasonable and specific” data requested by the State. Id., at 58. On the question whether federal facilities must apply for state permits, the letter reiterated the EPA position that although “Federal agencies are [not] required to apply for state operating permits . . . [o]ur aim is to encourage Federal agencies to provide the states with all the information required to assess compliance of pollution sources with standards, emission and discharge limitations and the needs for additional abatement measures.” Ibid. Kentucky then brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Army, TVA, and AEC facilities to secure operating permits. Kentucky also named several EPA officials as defendants and asked the District Court to order them to commence appropriate actions under § 113 of the Clean Air Act, directing the Army, the TVA, and the AEC facilities to comply with the provisions of Regulation AP-1, § 5 (l). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ordered the complaint dismissed. Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362 F. Supp. 360 (1973). The Court of Appeals affirmed, 497 F. 2d 1172 (CA6 1974). Like the District Court, 362 F. Supp., at 363 n. 3, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether the federal installations were in compliance with Kentucky’s emission limitations or had adopted adequate compliance schedules, for it was Kentucky’s position that notwithstanding possible compliance “the Kentucky Plan is so formulated that the State cannot meet its primary responsibility under the Clean Air Act without the use of permits.” 497 F. 2d, at 1174^-1175. After examining § 118 and its purposes in relation to other provisions of the Clean Air Act, the court concluded: “We do not believe the congressional scheme for accomplishment of these purposes included subjection of federal agencies to state or local permit requirements. Congress did commit the United States to compliance with air quality and emission standards, and it is undisputed in this record that the federal facilities in Kentucky have cooperated with the Commission toward this end.” 497 F. 2d, at 1177. We granted Kentucky’s petition for certiorari, 420 U. S. 971 (1975), to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals, and now affirm. Ill It is a seminal principle of our law “that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by them.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 426 (1819). From this principle is deduced the corollary that “[i]t is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence.” Id., at 427. The effect of this corollary, which derives from the Supremacy Clause and is exemplified in the Plenary Powers Clause giving Congress exclusive legislative authority over federal enclaves purchased with the consent of a State, is “that the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state.” As Mr. Justice Holmes put it in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51, 57 (1920): “[T]he immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them . . . .” Taken with the “old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign” “without a clear expression or implication to that effect,” this immunity means that where “Congress does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities or property subject to regulation,” “the federal function must be left free” of regulation. Particular deference should be accorded that “old and well-known rule” where, as here, the rights and privileges of the Federal Government at stake not only find their origin in the Constitution, but are to be divested in favor of and subjected to regulation by a subordinate sovereign. Because of the fundamental importance of the principles shielding federal installations and activities from regulation by the States, an authorization of state regulation is found only when and to the extent there is “a clear congressional mandate,” “specific congressional action” that makes this authorization of state regulation “clear and unambiguous.” Neither the Supremacy Clause nor the Plenary Powers Clause bars all state regulation which may touch the activities of the Federal Government. See Penn Dairies v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U. S. 261 (1943); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 9 (1941), and cases cited. “Here, however, the State places a prohibition on the Federal Government.” The permit requirement is not intended simply to regulate the amount of pollutants which the federal installations may discharge. Without a permit, an air contaminant source is forbidden to operate even if it is in compliance with every other state measure respecting air pollution control and abatement. It is clear from the record that prohibiting operation of the air contaminant sources for which the State seeks to require permits, App. 14-17, is tantamount to prohibiting operation of the federal installations on which they are located. Id., at 89-93. Kentucky, like the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F. 2d 1238, 1247-1248 (1974), finds in § 118 a sufficient congressional authorization to the States, not only to establish the amount of pollutants a federal installation may discharge, but also to condition operation of federal installations on securing a state permit. We disagree because we are not convinced that Congress intended to subject federal agencies to state permits. We are unable to find in § 118, on its face or in relation to the Clean Air Act as a whole, or to derive from the legislative history of the Amendments any clear and unambiguous declaration by the Congress that federal installations may not perform their activities unless a state official issues a permit. Nor can congressional intention to submit federal activity to state control be implied from the claim that under Kentucky’s EPA-approved implementation plan it is only through the permit system that compliance schedules and other requirements may be administratively enforced against federal installations. IV The parties rightly agree that § 118 obligates federal installations to conform to state air pollution standards or limitations and compliance schedules. With the enactment of the Amendments in 1970 came the end of the era in which it was enough for federal facilities to volunteer their cooperation with federal and state officials. In Kentucky’s view that era has been replaced by one in which federal installations are not only required to limit their air pollutant emissions to the same extent as their nonfederal neighbors, but also, subject only to case-by-case Presidential exemption, to submit themselves completely to the state regime by which the necessary information to promulgate emission limitations and compliance schedules is gathered and by which collection of that information and enforcement of the emission limitations and compliance schedules are accomplished. Respondents (hereafter sometimes EPA) take the position that the Congress has not gone so far. While federal and nonfederal installations are governed by the same emission standards, standards which the States have the primary responsibility to develop, the EPA maintains that the authority to compel federal installations to provide necessary information to the States and to conform to state standards necessary to carry out the federal policy to control and regulate air pollution has not been extended to the States. Analysis must begin with § 118. Although the language of this provision is notable for what it states in comparison with its predecessor, it is also notable for what it does not state. It does not provide that federal installations “shall comply with all federal, state, interstate, and local requirements to the same extent as any other person.” Nor does it state that federal installations “shall comply with all requirements of the applicable state implementation plan.” Section 118 states only to what extent — the same as any person— federal installations must comply with applicable state requirements; it does not identify the applicable requirements. There is agreement that § 118 obligates existing federal installations to join nonfederal sources in abating air pollution, that comparable federal and nonfederal sources are expected to achieve the same levels of performance in abating air pollution, and that those levels of performance are set by the States. Given agreement that § 118 makes it the duty of federal facilities to comply with state-established air quality and emission standards, the question is, as the Fifth Circuit put it in another case, “whether Congress intended that the enforcement mechanisms of federally approved state implementation plans, in this case permit systems, would be” available to the States to enforce that duty. Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F. 2d, at 1247. In the case before us the Court of Appeals concluded that federal installations were obligated to comply with state substantive requirements, as opposed to state procedural requirements, 497 F. 2d, at 1177, but Kentucky rejects the distinction between procedural and substantive requirements, saying that whatever is required by a state implementation plan is a “requirement” under § 118. The heart of the argument that the requirement that all air contaminant sources secure an operating permit is a “requirement respecting control and abatement of air pollution” is that Congress necessarily implied the power to enforce from the conceded authority to develop and set emission standards. Under Kentucky’s EPA-approved implementation plan, the permit requirement “is the mechanism through which [it] is able to compel the production of data concerning air contaminant sources, including the ability to prescribe the monitoring techniques to be employed, and it is the only mechanism which allows [it] to develop and review a source’s compliance schedule and insure that schedule is followed.” When a State is without administrative means of implementing and enforcing its standards against federal sources, a duty to comply with those standards is said to be utterly meaningless. The difficulty with this position is threefold. First, it assumes that only the States are empowered to enforce federal installations’ compliance with the standards. Second, it assumes the Congress intended to grant the States such authority over the operation of federal installations. Third, it unduly disregards the substantial change in the responsibilities of federal air contaminant sources under § 118 in comparison with 42 U. S. C. § 1857f (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), supra, at 171. Contrary to Kentucky’s contention that Congress necessarily intended to subject federal facilities to the enforcement mechanisms of state implementation plans, our study of the Clean Air Act not only discloses no clear declaration or implication of congressional intention to submit federal installations to that degree of state regulation and control but also reveals significant indications that in preserving a State’s “primary responsibility for assuring air quality within [its] entire geographic area” the Congress did not intend to extend that responsibility by subjecting federal installations to such authority. The Clean Air Act, as amended, does not expressly provide for a permit system as part of a State’s implementation plan. It is true that virtually every State has adopted a form of permit system much like that adopted by Kentucky, see 40 CFR pt. 52 (1975), as a means of gathering information to determine what emission standards to set and compliance schedules to approve and of assuring compliance with them. Also, only an implementation plan enabling a State to meet these— and other — objectives can be approved by the EPA. Nonetheless we find in the 1970 Amendments several firm indications that the Congress intended to treat emission standards and compliance schedules — those requirements which when met work the actual reduction of air pollut-. ant discharge — differently from administrative and enforcement methods and devices — those provisions by which the States were to establish and enforce emission standards, compliance schedules, and the like. This is so in spite of the absence of any definition of the word “requirements” or of the phrase “requirements respecting control and abatement of air pollution.” In § 110 (e) (1) (A), for example, the EPA is authorized to extend for two years a State’s three-year deadline for attaining a national primary air quality standard if, upon timely application, it is determined that an emission source is unable to meet “the requirements of such plan which implement such primary standard because the necessary technology” is unavailable. 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5 (e)(1)(A). Although compiling the information necessary for a permit may require familiarity with technology, it is plain that the “requirements” to which this section refers are those for which technologically adequate industrial processes might not be available. Section 110 (e) (2) (A) necessarily contemplates the same meaning of “requirements,” that is, emission standards and compliance schedules, as does § 110 (f) which provides for one-year postponement of the application of “requirements” to sources the continued operation of which is “essential to national security or to the public health.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-5 (f)(1) (D). See Train, 421 U. S., at 80-84. Stronger indications that the term “requirements” as used in § 118 does not embrace every measure incorporated in a State’s implementation limitations and cona-pliance schedules appear in the emergence of § 118 from the House bill and Senate amendment from which it was derived. The House bill provided that federal installations “shall comply with applicable Federal, State, interstate, and local emission standards.” The House Report stated that this “legislation directs Federal agencies in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches to comply with applicable Federal, State, interstate, and local emission standards.” The Senate amendment provided that federal agencies “shall provide leadership in carrying out the policy and purposes of this Act and shall comply with the requirements of this Act in the same manner as any person . . . The Senate Report stated that this provision “requires that Federal facilities meet the emission standards necessary to achieve ambient air quality standards as well as those established in other sections of Title I.” Thus while the House bill spoke of “emission standards,” the Senate amendment, like § 118 as enacted, spoke of “requirements.” In accommodating the different language in the two bills and formulating what is now § 118, the Conference Committee simply combined the House and Senate provisions. If, as Kentucky argues, the Conference Committee in taking the Senate language of “requirements” meant thereby to subject federal facilities to enforcement measures obviously not embraced in the language of the House bill, it is remarkable that it made no reference to its having reconciled this difference in favor of extending state regulation over federal installations. Given the interchangeable use of “emission standards” and “emission requirements” in the Senate amendment, see n. 52, supra, the predominance of the language of the Senate version in § 118 as enacted, and the absence of any mention of disagreement between the two bills, it is moré probable that the Conference Committee intended only that federal installations comply with emission standards and compliance schedules than that its intention was to empower a State to require federal installations to comply with every measure in its implementation plan. See Alabama v. Seeber, 502 P. 2d, at 1247. The impression that Congress intended only that federal agencies comply with emission limitations and standards is strengthened by the Conference Report, which stated in full: “The House bill and the Senate amendment declared that Federal departments and agencies should comply with applicable standards of air quality and emissions. “The conference substitute modifies the House provision to require that the President rather than the Administrator be responsible for assuring compliance by Federal agencies.” This examination of § 118 and the central phrase “requirements respecting control or abatement of air pollution,” discloses a regime of divided responsibility for the mobilization of federal installations in the effort to abate air pollution. Kentucky agrees but persists in its contention that existing federal sources have been subjected to state regulation by differing on where that division places authority to enforce compliance by existing federal facilities — “ 'sources with respect to which state implementation plans establish the criteria for enforcement.’ ” For such — existing—sources, Kentucky maintains, the States are granted primary enforcement authority while “ 'the responsibility and authority for enforcement ... is granted to EPA in those instances (i. e., new sources and hazardous pollutants) where EPA establishes the criteria.’ ” Perhaps we could agree if the issue were not whether there is a clear and unambiguous congressional authorization for the regulatory authority petitioner seeks, for as the Fifth Circuit has said, such a “scheme is a reasonable one.” Alabama v. Seeber, supra, at 1244. But that is the issue, and the implications Kentucky draws from its evaluation of the manner in which the Congress divided responsibility for regulation of new sources and of hazardous air pollutants do not persuade us. In drawing on the manner in which the Clean Air Act has divided the authority to regulate new sources of air pollutants and the emission of hazardous air pollutants in comparison with existing air pollutant sources, Kentucky makes two separate though related arguments. The first is that when Congress wanted to exempt federal facilities from compliance with a state requirement, it did so by express exclusionary language. Thus § 111 (c)(1) authorizes the Administrator to delegate to a State “any authority he has under this Act to implement and enforce” new-source standards of performance — with which new sources owned or operated by the United States must comply (§111 (b)(4)) — '“except with respect to new sources owned or operated by the United States.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-6 (c)(1). Section 114 (b) (1) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1688, is to the same effect respecting inspections, monitoring, and entry of an emission source. 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-9 (b) (1). Similarly, §112 (d)(1) authorizes the Administrator, upon finding that a State’s plan to enforce emission standards for hazardous pollutants is adequate to the task, to delegate to that State “any authority he has under this Act to implement and enforce such standards (except with respect to stationary sources owned or operated by the United States).” 42 U. S. C. § 1857o-7 (d)(1). The argument that these specific exemptions of federal facilities from state enforcement and implementation methods are necessary only because § 118 has, as a general matter, subjected federal installations to all state requirements fails on several counts. First, as we have demonstrated, by itself § 118 does not have the effect petitioner claims. Second, the relevant portions of §§111, 112, and 114 assume that the Administrator possesses the authority to enforce and implement the respective requirements against sources owned or operated by the United States. See §§111 (c)(2), 112(d)(2), and 114(b)(2). Third, just as in providing for Presidential exemptions in § 118 Congress separated the requirements of §§111 and 112 from other requirements, Congress naturally treated the submission of federal installations to state regulation under §§111, 112, and 114 separately from general provisions for meeting ambient air quality standards under § 110 implementation plans devised by the States and approved by the EPA. A State must promulgate an implementation plan. § 110 (a). The delegation provisions of §§ 111, 112, and 114, on the other hand, are permissive, providing that “[e]ach State may develop and submit to the Administrator a procedure” to carry out the section. (Emphasis added.) Kentucky’s second argument is that the manner in which Congress differentiated treatment of new sources and existing sources in §§ 111 and 114 clearly implies that existing federal sources were to be subject to the enforcement provisions of a State’s implementation plan. The implication is said to arise from the different nature of the control required for the two types of installations. The difference is explained as follows: For existing sources the first step for a State is to determine the general quality of air in the relevant air quality region and then to compute the amounts of pollution attributable to each source. Next, appropriate emission standards necessary to meet the national ambient air quality standards must be assigned to the various sources, followed by determining the compliance schedule by which each installation will achieve the assigned standards by the attainment date prescribed in the Act. To carry out this process of gathering information and coordinating control throughout the State, it is said to be necessary for the States to have ready administrative authority over all sources, federal and nonfederal. This administrative authority, concededly a major part of an implementation plan as to nonfederal sources, must therefore have been intended to extend to federal sources as well. In contrast, controlling “new sources” is described as a straightforward task. This is because “standards of performance” for such sources, which are established in light of technologically feasible emission controls and not in relation to ambient air quality standards are set by the EPA for various categories of sources and are uniform throughout the Nation. A comprehensive enforcement mechanism to develop and coordinate application of these standards is unnecessary, especially because all new sources must be in compliance before operation begins, § 111 (e). The Congress is said, therefore, to have exempted new federal installations from state enforcement of federally promulgated standards of performance because it was unnecessary to submit those installations to the same kind of coordinated control to which existing sources had been submitted. The Act itself belies this contention. It recognizes that a “new source,” even one in full compliance with applicable standards of performance, may hinder or prevent attainment or maintenance of air quality standards within the air quality region in which it is located, and requires a state implementation plan to include procedures for averting such problems. See §§110 (a) (2) CD), (a)(4). The arguments respecting the federal new-source exception in § 114 also fail to bear the weight they must carry if Kentucky is to prevail. Section 114 provides for the establishment of various means by which to collect information “[f]or the purpose (i) of developing or assisting in the development of any implementation plan under section 110 or 111 (d), any standard of performance under section 111, or any emission standard under section 112, [or] (ii) of determining whether any person is in violation of any such standard or any requirement of such a plan . . . 84 Stat. 1687, as added, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-9 (a). Unlike §§111 and 112, § 114 is doubly permissive. First, although the Administrator “shall” publish § 111 new-source standards of performance and § 112 hazardous air-pollutant-emission standards, under § 114 (a) the Administrator “may,” but need not, require operators of emission sources to keep records, to make reports, to install, use, and maintain monitoring equipment, and to sample its emissions. Second, as with §§111 and 112, the States “may” develop procedures to carry out the section. That Congress provided for this slight possibility that existing federal sources would be obliged to conform to state procedures for carrying out § 114 in addition to emission standards and compliance schedules scarcely implies, as petitioner suggests, that Congress . intended existing federal sources to comply with all state regulatory measures, not only emission standards and compliance schedules. Rather than exempting new federal sources from an obligation to which they would otherwise have been subject, Congress may as well have been extending the obligation to conform to state § 114 regulatory procedures to existing — but not to new — federal sources which would not otherwise have been thought subject to such regulation. Finally, we reject the argument that § 304 of the Clean Air Act, reveals congressional intention to grant the States authority to subject existing federal sources to the enforcement mechanisms of their enforcement plan. The section provides in part: “(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf— “(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation . . . 42 U. S. C. §1857h-2. Section 302 (e) includes a “State” in the definition of a “person,” 42 U. S. C. § 1857h (e), and § 304 (f) provides: “For purposes of this section, the term 'emission standard or limitation under this Act’ means — -(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation, standard of performance or emission standard . . . which is in effect under this Act (including a requirement applicable by reason of section 118) or under an applicable implementation plan.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857h-2 (f). Although it is argued that § 304 was not intended to permit a State to sue violators under the Act, we agree with the EPA that § 304 is the only means provided by the Act for the States to remedy noncompliance by federal facilities with § 118. That § 304 was so intended is plain from both the language of § 304(f) and the legislative origins of § 304. The Senate version of § 118 provided that a State “in which any Federal property, facility, or activity is located may seek to enforce the provisions of this section pursuant to section 304 of this Act.” When the Conference Committee eliminated this subsection from the Senate amendment, it retained the definition of “person,” which included a “State” in § 302 (e), and added § 304 (f) with the parenthetical phrase “including a requirement applicable by reason of section 118.” This made clear that § 118 was to be enforced through § 304, and § 304 is the only provision in the Act for state enforcement of the duties of a federal installation under § 118. In short, § 118 establishes the duty of federal installations to comply with state “requirements,” and § 304 provides the means of enforcing that duty in federal court. In light of this close relationship between the two sections, we find it significant that § 304 (f) extends the enforcement power only to “a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation, standard of performance or emission standard/' and not to all state implementation measures. Thus circumscribed, the scope of the § 304 power to enforce § 118 strongly suggests that § 118 duties themselves are similarly limited, for it seems most unlikely that in providing that a State might bring suit i'n district court to enforce the duties of federal installations under § 118, the Congress would not make all of those duties enforceable in district court. Yet this is exactly what Kentucky argues, saying: “There can be no explanation for the existence of Section 118 if it imposes no obligations other than those imposed under Section 304.” The argument is defective on another count. Even if, standing alone, § 304 could be read to require federal facilities to comply with the matters within § 304 (f), the assumption that the two sections independently impose duties on federal installations conflicts with the legislative history. Section 304 (a) was first extended to apply to federal sources of pollution in Conference, at the same point at which the express provision for enforcement authority over federal installations was removed from § 118. Given this relationship between the two measures, we cannot credit the argument that § 118 was intended to impose on federal installations any broader duty to comply with state implementation measures than specified in § 304. The absence in § 304 of any express provision for enforcing state permit requirements in federal court is therefore too substantial an indication that congressional understanding was that the "requirements” federal facilities are obliged to meet under § 118 did not include permit requirements to be overcome by assertions to the contrary. V In view of the undoubted congressional awareness of the requirement of clear language to bind the United States, our conclusion is that with respect to subjecting federal installations to state permit requirements, the Clean Air Act does not satisfy the traditional requirement that such intention be evinced with satisfactory clarity. Should this nevertheless be the desire of Congress, it need only amend the Act to make its intention manifest. Absent such amendment, we can only conclude that to' the extent it considered the matter in enacting § 118 Congress has fashioned a compromise which, while requiring federal installations to abate their pollution to the same extent as any other air contaminant source and under standards which the States have prescribed, stopped short of subjecting federal installations to state control. This conclusion does not mean that we are persuaded that the States are as able to administer their implementation plans as they would be if they possessed the degree of authority over federal installations urged here, although, as Kentucky acknowledged at oral argument, the EPA, acting under the impetus of Executive Order No. 11752, 3 CFR 380 (1974), has promulgated guidelines for compliance by federal agencies with stationary source air pollution standards, 40 Fed. Reg. 20664 (1975), which will lead to federal agencies’ entering “consent agreements which are exactly identical in every respect to what a compliance schedule would have been.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissent. They agree substantially with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F. 2d 1238, and they would reverse the judgment before us on the grounds set out in that opinion. In EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, post, p. 200, also decided this day, we consider a closely related issue under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV). As renumbered and amended, 84 Stat. 1689, 42 U. S. C. § 1857f. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971). See 40 CFR pt. 50 (1975). Title 40 CFR § 50.1 (e) (1975) defines “ambient air” as “that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the general public has access.” The EPA is guided in compiling a fist of air pollutants by § 108 (a) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1678, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-3 (a). The range of a State’s initiative in meeting its primary responsibility to assure air quality is somewhat greater for existing sources of air pollution, such as those involved in this case, than for “new sources.” See infra, at 190-194. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U. S. 60, 64 (1975). Brief for Respondents 27. As amended, 81 Stat. 499, 42 U. S. C. § 1857f (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V). Congress first called on federal agencies to cooperate with efforts to reduce air pollution in 1959, Pub. L. 86-365, 73 Stat. 646. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1146, p. 4 (1970), 2 Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Comm. Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), p. 894 (1974) (hereafter Leg. Hist.). S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p. 37 (1970), 1 Leg. Hist. 437. The full text of § 118 appears at n. 41, infra. 37 Fed. Reg. 10842, 10868-10869 (1972). Approval of the plan was later vacated because the EPA had not given interested persons an opportunity to participate in its consideration of the plan. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F. 2d 162 (CA6 1973). After resubmission to the EPA and publication as a proposed rule-making, 39 Fed. Reg. 10277 (1974), the plan was approved with an exception not pertinent here. Id., at 29357. Pet. for Cert. 46a. Although §5 (1) does not explicitly apply to federal facilities, the definition of “person” in § 2 (32) of the Regulation includes any “government agency ... or other entity whatsoever.” App. in No. 73-2099 (CA6), p. Ill (hereafter CA App.). The applicability of § 5 (1) to federal facilities as a matter of Kentucky law has not been disputed. Reg. AP-1 §§ 5 (2) (a), (c), CA App. 120. See generally Reg. AP-10, CA App. 209-227. Reg. AP-1, § 5 (2) (c), CA App. 120. Id., §5 (3) (a), CA App. 121. Id., § 5 (4), CA App. 121. The Army facilities are the United States Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Campbell, and the Lexington and Blue Grass Activities, Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot. Two TVA facilities are involved, the Shawnee and Paradise Power Plants. The AEC facility is the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant for the production of enriched uranium, operated under contract by the Union Carbide Corp. Since the Commission initiated its efforts to secure a permit application from the AEC or its contractor, the Energy Research and Development Administration has succeeded to the AEC's responsibility for the Paducah plant. Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233; see 40 Fed. Reg. 3242, 3250 (1975). Fort Campbell officials, for example, after asserting that “current Department of the Army regulations do not allow us to apply for such a permit,” submitted “pertinent information on our heating plants which appear to be covered by your regulations” and asked to be “advise[d] if any further information is desired.” App. 48. TVA officials likewise disclaimed any duty to apply for a permit but submitted “the same emission data and other information for [TVA] power plants which your permit application forms are designed to elicit from applicants who are required to secure permits in order to continue their operations.” For the Commission's convenience, the TVA supplied the information on the Commission’s own permit forms. Id., at 52. In addition to § 118, the letter referred to Executive Order No. 11507, 3 CFR 889 (1966-1970 Comp.), which antedates the Amendments, as a policy source. This Order, cited in the complaint, has been superseded by Executive Order No. 11752, 3 CFR 380 (1974). See infra, at 199. The letter explained to the federal officials that the EPA’s “advice on this matter, at this time, is to provide the data specifically requested by the states so they may make a determination as to: (1) the facilities compliance with the approved state air implementation plans and (2) the abatement action facilities must take in order to meet implementation plan requirements. “We recommend that each Federal facility under your jurisdiction which has an air pollution discharge should initiate immediate discussion, if it has not already been accomplished, with the respective states, regarding development of a compliance schedule as required by their implementation plan. This compliance schedule should include the standards or emission limitations which must be met, the abatement equipment to be constructed, corrective measures to be taken, and the timetable for taking these actions in order to meet established implementation plan deadlines. Your agency will be obligated under the compliance schedule to conduct monitoring and to keep operating records. Whenever a state makes a reasonable and specific request to review operating records, we recommend that your agency adopt an open-door policy by providing the requested data.” App. 57-58. The suit was brought by the Attorney General without the concurrence of the Commission. The District Court’s ruling that Kentucky law permitted the Attorney General to sue without a request from the Commission is not challenged here. Section 113, as added, 84 Stat. 1686, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-8, empowers the EPA Administrator, upon finding that any person is in violation of an applicable provision of an implementation plan or that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread as to appear to result from ineffective state enforcement and upon giving notice, to commence appropriate action either by issuing an order to any person requiring compliance with the plan’s requirements or by bringing a civil action under § 113 (b) in district court. The District Court and the Court of Appeals both ruled that, even if federal facilities were obligated to secure operating permits, the Administrator’s duty to proceed under § 113 was discretionary. The decision not to commence actions under § 113 was therefore unreviewable. 6 U. S. C. § 701 (a) (2); § 304 (a) (2) of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U. S. C. § 1857h-2 (a) (2). Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to reach this alternative ground for judgment in favor of the EPA respondents. After the petition was filed, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit concluded that § 118 does require federal facilities to secure a state operating permit and to comply with state “enforcement mechanisms.” Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F. 2d 1238 (1974), cert. pending, No. 74-851. See also California v. Stastny, 382 F. Supp. 222 (CD Cal. 1972). Art. VI, cl. 2. Art. I, §8, cl. 17: “[The Congress shall have Power to] exercise exclusive Legislative] . . . Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .” Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943) (footnote omitted). United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 268, 272 (1947) (footnote omitted). See United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 263 (1874); United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840). United States v. Wittek, 337 U. S. 346, 359 (1949) (footnote omitted). Mayo v. United States, supra, at 447, 448 (footnote omitted). Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110, 122 (1954). Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 263 (1963). California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board v. EPA, 511 F. 2d 963, 968 (CA9 1975), rev’d on other grounds, post, p. 200. California Pub. Util. Comm’n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 544 (1958). Title 40 CFR § 51.1 (p) (1975) defines “compliance schedule” as “the date or dates by which a source or category of sources is required to comply with specific emission limitations contained in an implementation plan and with any increments of progress toward such compliance.” Basically a compliance schedule is a means by which a State phases in attainment with the ultimate emission limitations that must be achieved. See Train, 421 U. S., at 68-69. “Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control 'and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to such requirements. The President may exempt any emission source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to do so, except that no exemption may be granted from section 111, and an exemption from section 112 may be granted only in accordance with section 112 (c). No such exemption shall be granted due to lack of appropriation unless the President shall have specifically requested such appropriation as a part of the budgetary process and the Congress shall have failed to make available such requested appropriation. Any exemption shall be for a period not in excess of one year, but additional exemptions may be granted for periods of not to exceed one year upon the President’s making a new determination. The President shall report each January to the Congress all exemptions from the requirements of this section granted during the preceding calendar year, together with his reason for granting each such exemption.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857f. See 42 U. S. C. § 1857f (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), supra, at 171. Brief for Petitioner 21 (emphasis added). Id., at 30. Several States which have filed briefs as amici curiae join Kentucky in recognizing that the issue is whether a State may enforce its emission limitations against a federal installation. See Brief for Alabama as Amicus Curiae 4, 5, 37-38; Brief for California as Amicus Curiae 9. Although use of a permit system may have been “encouraged” by the EPA as its “preferred approach,” see Train, 421 U. S., at 68-69, the EPA has never made a permit system to control emissions from existing stationary sources a mandatory part of an implementation plan. The closest the EPA has come to this was a provision in a proposed rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 6680, 6682 (1971), later eliminated, id., at 15486, that might have been interpreted to mean that an implementation plan must include a system requiring permits for the construction and operation of modifications to existing sources that would be modified before the Administrator promulgated proposed standards of performance for new sources under § 111 of the Clean Air Act. Compare 42 U. S. C. §§ 1857c-6 (a)(2), (b), with 36 Fed. Reg. 6682 (1971), proposing 42 CFR §420.11 (a)(4). Among the eight conditions, §§ 110 (a) (2) (A)-(H), each implementation plan must meet are: “(A)(i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air quality standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as expeditiously as practicable but (subject to subsection (e)) in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such plan (or any revision thereof to take account of a revised primary standard); and (ii) in the ease of a plan implementing a national secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies a reasonable time at which such secondary standard will be attained; “(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of . . . primary or secondary standard [s], including, but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls; [and] “(C) it includes provision for establishment and operation of appropriate devices, methods, systems, and procedures necessary to (i) monitor, compile, and analyze data on ambient air quality and, (ii) upon request, make such data available to the Administrator . . . .” The phrase “requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution” also appears in § 116 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1689, 42 U. S. C. § 1857d-l. That section provides that, with certain exceptions pre-empting state regulation of moving sources, “nothing in this Act shall preclude or deny the right of any State ... to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation plan or under section 111 or 112, such State . . . may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan or section.” (Emphasis added.) Although the meaning of the italicized phrase in this section, which was added by the Conference Committee, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, p. 48 (1970), 1 Leg. Hist. 198, is not entirely clear, it seems plain that as employed in § 116 the phrase is not synonymous with “emission standards and limitations.” As the Fifth Circuit observed in Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F. 2d, at 1245, the use of “‘or’ in §116 is clearly disjunctive.” Yet it is agreed that, as used in § 118, the phrase does embrace such standards and limitations; indeed the EPA argues the two are synonymous. It is suggested by an amicus that it is logical to read § 116 to mean that a “ ‘standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants’ is a subcategory of the broader class of ‘requirement [s] respecting control or abatement of air pollution.’ ” Brief for Alabama as Amicus Curiae 20. To the contrary, from § 116 it appears more logical to conclude that “standards” and “requirements” are separate categories which, together, compose all measures which a State is not denied the right to adopt or enforce. Unlike Kentucky and the Fifth Circuit, Alabama v. Seeber, supra, at 1245-1246, which conclude that use of the phrase in § 116 elucidates its scope and meaning in § 118, we are unable to draw from § 116 any support for the position that Congress affirmatively declared that federal installations must secure state permits. To reaffirm, as does § 116, a State’s inherent right as a general matter to employ permits in the exercise of its police power in the area of air pollution control may mean that the Federal Government has not pre-empted the area from state regulation, but does not constitute the kind of clear and unambiguous authorization necessary to subject federal installations and activities to state enforcement. Provision in § 118 for Presidential exemption on a case-by-case basis and in the “paramount interest of the United States” from compliance with emission standards or compliance schedules does not clearly imply that federal installations are otherwise subject to the enforcement mechanisms of a state implementation plan. H. R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §10 (§ 111) (1970), 2 Leg. Hist. 938 (emphasis added). H. R. Rep. No. 91-1146, supra, n. 11, at 4, 2 Leg. Hist. 894 (emphasis added). S. 4358, 91st Cong, 2d Sess, §7 (§118 (a)) (1970), 1 Leg. Hist. 573 (emphasis added). S. Rep. No. 91-1196, supra, n. 12, at 23, 1 Leg. Hist. 423 (emphasis added). Throughout the Senate amendment and in the Report the terms “requirements,” “emission requirements,” and “emission standards” were used interchangeably. Compare proposed § 118 (a) (“requirements”) and the Report (“emission standards”) with proposed § 111 (a) (2) (D) (“emission requirements”), 1 Leg. Hist. 545. For example, only the Senate amendment equated the federal installation’s duty to comply with “requirements” to any person’s duty, a feature of § 118 as enacted. Similarly, only the Senate amendment, in § 118 (b) (1 Leg. Hist. 574), provided that a State might sue in federal court to enforce the provisions of § 118 (a). H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, supra, at 55, 1 Leg. Hist. 205. That provision was incorporated in the Amendments in § 304 (a), through the definition of “person” retained in §302 (e), as added, 77 Stat. 400, 42 U. S. C. § 1857h (e). H. R. Conf. Rep. 91-1783, supra, at 48, 1 Leg. Hist. 198. We are not persuaded by the argument that reference to the President’s replacing the EPA Administrator as the one “responsible for assuring compliance by Federal agencies” only implicates the President’s power to “exempt any emission source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with ... a requirement.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857L Both the House and Senate Reports referred quite plainly to the power to exempt and to make exceptions when referring to the President’s (or the Administrator’s) power to act in the paramount interest of the United States on a case-by-case basis. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, supra, at 23, 1 Leg. Hist. 423; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1146, supra, at 15, 2 Leg. Hist. 905. Thus, reference in the Conference Report to the President’s authority to assure compliance merely expresses what is implied by the very grant of authority to exempt some federal sources — the authority, as to those installations subject to Presidential . control, to enforce in the first instance the new regimen of federal compliance with primarily state formulated and administered implementation plans rests in the Federal Government, not in the States. Brief for Petitioner 33, quoting Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F. 2d, at 1244. Ibid. Regulation of “new sources” of air pollutants, by EPA-promulgated “standards of performance” (see infra, n. 59), is provided for in § 111 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1683, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-6. Regulation of “hazardous air pollutants” is provided for in § 112 of the Clean Air Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1685, 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-7. Section 111 (a)(1) defines a “standard of performance” to be “a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.” 42 U. S. C. § 1857c-6 (a) (1). S: 4358, §7 (§ 118(b)), 1 Leg. Hist. 574. See n. 53, supra. Reply Brief for Petitioner 15-16. The House bill included no provision for suit in federal court. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1783, supra, at 55, 1 Leg. Hist. 205. The Senate amendment did provide for suit in district court “to require the enforcement of, the provisions of this Act including any applicable schedule or timetable of compliance, emission requirement, standard of performance, emission standard, or prohibition established pursuant to this Act . . . against any person, including, but not limited to, a governmental instrumentality or agency . . . .” S. 4358, §9 (§304 (a)(1)), 1 Leg. Hist. 704. Because the Senate amendment retained previously enacted § 302 (e) of the Clean Air Act, see n. 53, supra, defining “person” as “an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, and political subdivision of a State,” it is clear, as the Senate Report confirms, that in the Senate amendment it was only by virtue of § 118 that a State could sue a federal facility for enforcement in district court under §304. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, supra, at 37, 1 Leg. Hist. 437. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 273. The Senate Committee on Public Works has recently reported such legislation. See S. Rep. No. 94-717 (1976). Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL & ORNAMENTAL IRONWORKERS, LOCAL 480, AFL-CIO No. 83-1202. Decided May 14, 1984 Per Curiam. This case presents the question whether the Court of Appeals may modify an award of backpay by the National Labor Relations Board on the grounds that the Board failed promptly to specify the amounts of the award. As the decision of the Court of Appeals apparently is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and reverse. I Respondent, Local 480 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL-CIO, operates a hiring hall for construction workers in northern New Jersey. The lengthy procedural history of the present case begins in May 1978 with the Board’s finding that the Local had violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A) and (2), by discriminating against nonmembers in its hiring hall referral practices. The Board ordered the Local to compensate the five charging parties and other “similarly situated” employees for earnings lost because of discrimination. Ironworkers, Local 480, 235 N. L. R. B. 1511 (1978). The lost earnings were to be calculated according to a formula established by the Board. On May 11, 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted enforcement of the Board’s order. 598 F. 2d 611. The Board then began preparation of a backpay specification. To identify employees who had been subject to discrimination, the Board’s Regional Office employed the General Services Administration to conduct a computer analysis of respondent’s records. The computer was to perform the laborious task of comparing the sign-up dates and qualifications of nonunion members with those of all union members who had been referred ahead of them. Until October 1980, the union slowed the process by refusing to permit photocopying of relevant records. Preparation of the backpay specification was further delayed when the Regional Office in February 1981 discovered a substantial computer error that would require that the entire analysis be performed again at great expense to the Board. After settlement negotiations proved fruitless, the Board authorized reanalysis of the computer data. In April 1982, as no backpay specification yet had issued, the Local filed a motion seeking relief from that part of the Court of Appeals order of May 11, 1979, that directed back-pay for nonmember applicants “similarly situated” to the five charging parties. The Local urged that the lengthy delay in issuance of the specification demonstrated that the Board’s order would be impossible to implement. Further, the Local contended that it had ceased discriminatory activity, that no “similarly situated” workers had come forward to allege discrimination, and that the Board’s delay in resolving the case had impaired the Local’s operations. The Court of Appeals on May 13, 1982, denied the motion “without prejudice to renew such motion after 90 days.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a-8a. The Local renewed the motion on September 29, 1982. The General Counsel at that time estimated that the backpay specifications for similarly situated discriminatees would be completed by April 1983. The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the Board to enter its formal backpay specification by December 31, 1982. To comply with this order, the Board set about preparing a separate list of employees who had suffered discrimination at respondent’s hiring hall. In estimating the amount of backpay due to each employee, it was necessary for the Board to obtain information as to earnings that was available only from the Ironworkers Pension and Welfare Fund. The Fund refused to provide the Board with this information without a subpoena or court order. Uncertain that such litigation successfully could be concluded in time to meet the deadline set by court order, the Board prepared a specification based upon projections from records of earnings that it had available. The Board submitted its Specification and Notice of Hearing on December 21, 1982, and set the case for May 16,1983. The Board later obtained the Fund’s earnings records pursuant to an investigatory subpoena and revised its specification to incorporate complete information on actual earnings. The revision decreased by one-fourth the Local’s liability. On February 25,1983, respondent filed its third motion for relief from the original backpay judgment, requesting the court to require backpay only for named parties or to terminate the proceedings altogether. The Local contended that the Board’s specification of December 21, 1982, because it was not based upon actual earnings, was inconsistent with the Board’s rules and with the Board’s original backpay order. Further, the Local argued that the specification was “punitive” because the total liability exceeded the Local’s ability to pay. On July 27,1983, the Court of Appeals modified the Board’s order to require that the Local tender back-pay only to the charging parties and only as calculated by the backpay specification of December 21, 1982. II The Court of Appeals gave as its justification for modifying the Board’s order “the length of time that elapsed since the entry of [the court’s] original judgment.” App. to Pet. for Cert. la. It is well established, however, that the Court of Appeals may not refuse to enforce a backpay order merely because of the Board’s delay subsequent to that order in formulating a backpay specification. NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S. 258 (1969). The present case in some respects differs from Rutter-Rex. In Rutter-Rex, the Court of Appeals cut off the accrual of backpay at an earlier date than had the Board. Id., at 263. In the present case, the Court of Appeals has limited the class of employees to whom backpay may be awarded and has prohibited the Board from amending its backpay specification as the Board’s regulations would permit, see 29 CFR § 102.57 (1983). Nonetheless, the principle of Rutter-Rex remains applicable: “[T]he Board is not required to place the consequences of its own delay, even if inordinate, upon wronged employees. . . .” 396 U. S., at 265. By restricting the beneficiaries of the Board’s remedy and abridging procedures lawfully established by the Board for determining the amount of backpay, the order under review punishes employees for the Board’s nonfeasance. This Rutter-Rex forbids. It is not entirely clear that the order of the Court of Appeals was premised simply upon the Board’s delay. The text of the order only hints at the court’s reasoning. Respondent had argued before the Court of Appeals that the Board’s long delay further demonstrated the impossibility of identifying the employees who had been subject to discrimination and of performing the calculations required by the Board’s backpay formula. Respondent also had contended that the Board’s specification of December 21, 1982, showed that the Board’s order was “punitive” and “confiscatory.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. We do not consider whether the Court of Appeals on these grounds may modify its original judgment enforcing the Board's order. Nor do we foreclose challenges that might be raised to the conduct or outcome of the supplemental backpay proceedings. But as it appears that the Court of Appeals may have rested the judgment under review simply upon the failure of the Board to act promptly, that judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Marshall dissents from this opinion deciding this case without briefing on the merits or oral argument. Section 158(b) prohibits various unfair labor practices by labor organizations. That subsection provides in pertinent part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . . . .” “(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” Section 158(a)(3) prohibits “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” Section 157, as relevant here, protects the right to refrain from union activity. A 1972 consent decree generally obligates respondent Local to refer applicants to jobs in order of registration at the hiring hall. The Local unlawfully discriminated in favor of its own members by referring them for steward positions instead of equally qualified and previously registered nonmembers. Under the formula, “the overall earnings of all applicants, members and nonmembers, seeking employment through [the] referral system would be divided by the total number of ironworkers who worked out of the hiring hall, taking into account the net earnings of the individual discriminatees during the relevant period.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a-22a. The Board prepares a backpay specification after issuance of an unfair labor practice order that awards backpay. The specification shows in detail how backpay is computed and serves to initiate supplemental administrative proceedings by giving notice of the amount allegedly due. See generally 29 CFR §§ 102.52-102.59 (1983). The analysis was further complicated by the Board’s decision to consolidate the backpay specification for the present case with those for four similar cases of discrimination by other New Jersey locals of the International Ironworkers Association. The court’s order stated: “[A]fter a review of the various orders entered in this matter, and the length of time that elapsed since the entry of the original judgment of this Court, it is ordered that: “1. Any backpay specifications not made by December 31, 1982, are hereby barred and are not to be considered. See order of court dated December 1, 1982. “2. Payment in full by the Union of any claims asserted on behalf of [the charging parties] shall be considered compliance with paragraph 1 of this order.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-2a. Such a result is anomalous where there is some suggestion, as in the present case, that the wrongdoing union or employer itself contributed to delay by obstructing the Board’s processes. Yet, we must acknowledge that one must be sympathetic to respondent union’s loss of patience with what appears to be the Board’s serious delay. This case also differs from Rutter-Rex in that the Court of Appeals here had issued an order that set a deadline for entry of a formal backpay specification. Rutter-Rex recognized the power of the courts of appeals to compel Board action that has been “unreasonably delayed.” 396 U. S., at 266, and n. 3. Cf. Silverman v. NLRB, 543 F. 2d 428 (CA2 1976) (order mandating timely completion of backpay proceedings). In the present case, however, the Board complied with the court’s deadline. Nor does it appear that the Board, by subsequently amending the specification, came into noncompliance. The Court of Appeals order of December 1,1982, did not limit in any way the authority of the Board to amend the specifications during the course of backpay proceedings. It was sufficient that the specification initiated these proceedings.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EVANS et al. v. CORNMAN et al. No. 236. Argued January 22, 1970 Decided June 15, 1970 Robert F. Sweeney, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and George W. Liebmann and Henry R. Lord, Assistant Attorneys General. Richard Schifter argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Howard J. Thomas. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, and Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Marshall, announced by Mr. Justice Stewart. Appellees live on the grounds of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal reservation or enclave located within the geographical boundaries of Montgomery County in the State of Maryland. In October 1968, the Permanent Board of Registry of Montgomery County announced that persons living on NIH grounds did not meet the residency requirement of Art. 1, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution. Accordingly, such persons were not qualified to vote in Maryland elections, and the names of those previously registered would be removed from the county’s voter rolls. Appellees then instituted the present suit against the members of the Permanent Board, requesting that a three-judge Federal District Court be convened to enjoin as unconstitutional this application of the Maryland voter residency law. After the District Court issued a temporary restraining order so that appellees who had previously registered could vote in the November 1968 general election, the case was considered on the pleadings and stipulations of fact. The District Court issued the requested permanent injunction, holding that to deny appellees the right to vote was to deny them the equal protection of the laws. Cornman v. Dawson, 295 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md. 1969). Thereafter, a motion by the present appellants to intervene as additional defendants was granted, and a direct appeal was prosecuted to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction, 396 U. S. 812 (1969), and we affirm. Under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered to “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” NIH, a medical research facility owned and operated by the United States Government, is one of the places subject to that congressional power. The facility commenced operation more than 30 years ago, when land was purchased and residential buildings were built to allow scientists and doctors to live near their work. It did not become a federal reservation, however, until 1953 when the State of Maryland ceded jurisdiction over the property to the United States. Before that time, persons who resided on NIH grounds could register and vote in Montgomery County; they continued to do so, apparently without question, for another 15 years. In 1963, however, in a case involving residents of another federal enclave, Royer v. Board of Election Supervisors, 231 Md. 561, 191 A. 2d 446, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a resident of a federal reservation is not “a resident of the State” within the meaning of that term in Art. 1, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution, the provision that governs voter qualifications. It was the Royer decision that prompted the action of the election officials in the present case. Appellants rely heavily on it and urge simply that persons who live on NIH grounds are residents of the enclave, not residents of the State of Maryland. Maryland may, of course, require that “all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 96 (1965). “But if they are in fact residents, with the intention of making [the State] their home indefinitely, they, as all other qualified residents, have a right to an equal opportunity for political representation.” Id., at 94. What was said in Carrington, rejecting in another context a different artificial gloss on a residency requirement, is applicable here as well. Appellees clearly live within the geographical boundaries of the State of Maryland, and they are treated as state residents in the census and in determining congressional apportionment. They are not residents of Maryland only if the NIH grounds ceased to be a part of Maryland when the enclave was created. However, that “fiction of a state within a state” was specifically rejected by this Court in Howard v. Commis sioners of Louisville, 344 U. S. 624, 627 (1953), and it cannot be resurrected here to deny appellees the right to vote. Appellants argue that even if appellees are residents of Maryland, the State may constitutionally structure its election laws so as to deny them the right to vote. This Court has, of course, recognized that the States “have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.” Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U. S. 45, 50 (1959). At the same time, however, there can be no doubt at this date that “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966); see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968). Moreover, the right to vote, as the citizen’s link to his laws and government, is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964). And before that right can be restricted, the purpose of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet close constitutional scrutiny. The sole interest or purpose asserted by appellants to justify the limitation on the vote in the present case is essentially to insure that only those citizens who are primarily or substantially interested in or affected by electoral decisions have a voice in making them. Without deciding the question, we have assumed that such an interest could be sufficiently compelling to justify limitations on the suffrage, at least with regard to some elections. See Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621, 632 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701, 704 (1969). However, it is clear that such a claim cannot lightly be accepted. This Court has held that a State may not dilute a person’s vote to give weight to other interests, see, e. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and a lesser rule could hardly be applicable to a complete denial of the vote. See Kramer v. Union School District, supra, at 626-627. All too often, lack of a “substantial interest” might mean no more than a different interest, and “ ‘[fjencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.” Carrington v. Rash, supra, at 94. According to appellants, NIH residents are substantially less interested in Maryland affairs than other residents of the State because the Constitution vests “exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” over federal enclaves to Congress. Appellants cite decisions dating back to Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. 580 (1841), and Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1870), denying enclave residents the right to vote on the ground that the State has no jurisdiction over them. We need not consider, however, whether these early cases would meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the relationship between federal enclaves and the States in which they are located has changed considerably since they were decided. As the District Court noted, Congress has now permitted the States to extend important aspects of state powers over federal areas. While it is true that federal enclaves are still subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction and Congress could restrict as well as extend the powers of the States within their bounds, see Offutt Housing Co. v. Sarpy County, 351 U. S. 253 (1956), whether appellees are sufficiently disinterested in electoral decisions that they may be denied the vote depends on their actual interest today, not on what it may be sometime in the future. Appellants do not deny that there are numerous and vital ways in which NIH residents are affected by electoral decisions. Thus, if elected representatives enact new state criminal laws or sanctions or make changes in those presently in effect, the changes apply equally to persons on NIH grounds. Under the Federal Assimila-tive Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 13, “acts not punishable by any enactment of Congress are punishable by the then effective laws of the State in which the enclave is situated.” United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U. S. 286, 287 (1958). Further, appellees are as concerned with state spending and taxing decisions as other Maryland residents, for Congress has permitted the States to levy and collect their income, gasoline, sales, and use taxes— the major sources of state revenues — on federal enclaves. See 4 U. S. C. §§ 104-110. State unemployment laws and workmen’s compensation laws likewise apply to persons who live and work in federal areas. See 26 U. S. C. § 3305 (d); 40 U. S. C. § 290. Appellees are required to register their automobiles in Maryland and obtain drivers’ permits and license plates from the State; they are subject to the process and jurisdiction of state courts; they themselves can resort to those courts in divorce and child adoption proceedings; and they send their children to Maryland public schools. All of these factors led the District Court to “conclude that on balance the [appellees] are treated by the State of Maryland as state residents to such an extent that it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the State to deny them the right to vote.” 295 F. Supp., at 659. Appellants resist that conclusion, arguing that NIH residents do not pay the real property taxes that constitute a large part of the revenues for local school budgets. However, Maryland does not purport to exclude from the polls all persons living on tax-exempt property, and it could not constitutionally do so. Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra; see Kramer v. Union School District, supra. Of the other differences asserted between Maryland residents who live on federal enclaves and those who do not, most are far more theoretical than real. In any case, these differences, along with whatever others may exist, do not come close to establishing that degree of disinterest in electoral decisions that might justify a total exclusion from the franchise. In their day-to-day affairs, residents of the NIH grounds are just as interested in and connected with electoral- decisions as they were prior to 1953 when the area came under federal jurisdiction and as are their neighbors who live off the enclave. In nearly every election, federal, state, and local, for offices from the Presidency to the school board, and on the entire variety of other ballot propositions, appellees have a stake equal to that of other Maryland residents. As the District Court concluded, they are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect that stake by exercising the equal right to vote. The judgment is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Of the 12 appellees, 10 were registered to vote in Maryland prior to the commencement of this suit. The other two had sought to register but were not allowed to because they lived on NIH grounds. See Md. Ann. Code, Art. 96, § 34. In addition to the Royer decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, there are a number of other state court rulings to the same effect. See, e. g., Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P. 2d 946 (1940); Arledge v. Mabry, 52 N. M. 303, 197 P. 2d 884 (1948); McMahon v. Polk, 10 S. D. 296, 73 N. W. 77 (1897); State ex rel. Lyle v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334, 97 S. W. 299 (1906). At the same time, however, there is a contrary line of recent state decisions granting enclave residents the right to vote. See Arapajolu v. McMenamin, 113 Cal. App. 2d 824, 249 P. 2d 318 (1952); Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P. 2d 612 (1960); Adams v. Londeree, 139 W. Va. 748, 83 S. E. 2d 127 (1954). Except for a lessee’s interest in property leased from the United States, see 10 U. S. C. §2667 (e), Congress has not provided that the States may apply their property taxes to federal enclaves. At the same time, all, or virtually all, enclave real property is owned by the United States and is otherwise exempt from state property taxes. To compensate for this exemption, Congress has provided that increased amounts of federal-aid-to-education funds be paid with respect to federal employees living on federal property. See 20 U. S. C. §§ 236-244, 631-645. Thus, if there were severance or personal property taxes applicable to residents of Montgomery County (which there are not), they could not be collected on the enclave. Similarly, appellees are exempt from service in the State’s unorganized militia (which has apparently never been called up) and from compulsory education laws. Appellants state that a myriad of state regulatory and licensing provisions are not enforceable on the enclave, but no instance of a practical effect on appellees is cited. See also Chicago & Pacific R. Co. v. McClinn, 114 U. S, 542 (1885); Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94 (1940). Perhaps the most real of the differences is that crimes committed on NIH grounds where appellees live, while defined by state law, may only be prosecuted in federal court by federal authorities, whereas the same acts would be prosecuted by state authorities in state courts if they occurred off the enclave. If this difference lessens appellees’ interest in state law enforcement and policy at all, it certainly does not do so substantially. All Maryland residents, including appellees, undoubtedly have an interest in state laws and how they are enforced throughout the entire State.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FROZEN FOOD EXPRESS v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 158. Argued March 7, 1956. Decided April 23, 1956. Carl L. Phinney argued the cause and filed a brief for Frozen Food Express, appellant in No. 158 and appellee in Nos. 159, 160 and 161. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant in No. 159 and appellee in No. 158. With him on the brief was Leo H. Pou. David G. Macdonald argued the cause for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al., appellants in No. 160. With him on the brief were Francis W. Mclnerny, Peter T. Beardsley, Clarence D. Todd and Dale C. Dillon. Charles P. Reynolds and Carl Helmetag, Jr. submitted on brief for the Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co. et al., appellants in No. 161. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., grants the Commission pervasive control over motor carriers. Common carriers and contract carriers by motor vehicle, subject to that part of the Act, must have a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a permit issued by the Commission. §§ 206 (a), 209 (a). The Commission has powers of investigation to determine if a motor carrier has complied with the Act; and it has authority to issue an order compelling compliance. § 204 (c). These requirements for a certificate or permit are not, however, applicable to “motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation.” §203 (b)(6). The controversy in these cases centers around this “agricultural” exemption. After an investigation instituted on its own motion, the Commission issued an order that specified commodities are not “agricultural” within the meaning of § 203 (b)(6). The hearing to determine the meaning and application of the term “agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)” as used in § 203 (b)(6) was held before an examiner. It was a public hearing at which various governmental officials and agencies and various producers, shippers, and carriers appeared and presented evidence. The Commission’s decision was in the form of a report and order. 52 M. C. C. 511. The report, which concerns various groups of commodities, covers 71 pages of the printed record. The findings list those commodities that the Commission finds are exempted under § 203 (b) (6) and those that are not. The order of the Commission incorporates the “findings” and states that the proceeding “be, and it is hereby-discontinued.” Frozen Food Express, the plaintiff, is a motor carrier transporting numerous commodities which the Commission ruled were nonexempt under § 203 (b)(6) but which the carrier claims are “agricultural commodities.” Plaintiff, who was not a party to the administrative proceeding, instituted suit before a three-judge District Court (28 U. S. C. § 2325) to enjoin the order of the Commission and have it set aside, naming the United States and the Commission as defendants. 28 U. S. C. § 1336; 49 Stat. 550, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 305 (g); 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a common carrier by motor vehicle, holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity which authorizes it to transport certain commodities between designated points and places; that plaintiff is transporting, in addition to those commodities, commodities which are exempt under § 203 (b) (6) and for which plaintiff has sought no authority from the Commission; that the Commission in its order has held the latter commodities nonexempt and accordingly has deprived it of the right granted by the statute; that the order of the Commission classifying certain commodities as nonexempt is unlawful; and that the Commission threatens to enjoin transportation of the commodities' which plaintiff claims are exempt. The Secretary of Agriculture intervened, supporting plaintiff’s position on some of the commodities. Other interveners are trucking associations and railroads which support the Commission. The United States as a defendant supports the Commission on some of its findings and opposes it on others. The District Court, being of the view that .the case was controlled by United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, dismissed the action, saying that the “order” of the Commission was not subject to judicial review. 128 F. Supp. 374. The cases are here by appeal. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253, 2101 (b). We disagree with the District Court. We do not think United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., supra, is controlling here. In that case the “order” held nonreviewable was a valuation of a carrier’s property made by the Commission. The Court held that the “order” was no more than a report of an investigation which might never be the basis of a proceeding before the Commission or a court. Mr. Justice Brandéis, speaking for the Court, said: “The so-called order here complained of is one which does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, any thing; which does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any power or facility; which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal; which does not change the carrier’s existing or future status or condition; which does not determine any right or obligation. This so-called order is merely the formal record of conclusions reached after a study of data collected in the course of extensive research conducted by the Commission, through its employees. It is the exercise solely of the function of investigation. . . .” 273 U. S. 309-310. The situation here is quite different. The determination by the Commission that a commodity is not an exempt agricultural product has an immediate and practical impact on carriers who are transporting the commodities, and on shippers as well. The “order” of the Commission warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties. §222 (a). Where unauthorized operations occur, the Commission may proceed administratively and issue a cease and desist order. § 204 (c). Such orders of the Commission are enforceable by the courts. § 222 (b). And wilful violation of a cease and desist order is ground for revocation of a certificate or permit. § 212. The determination made by the Commission is not therefore abstract, theoretical, or academic. Cf. El Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U. S. 12, 18-19. The “order” of the Commission which classifies commodities as exempt or nonexempt is, indeed, the basis for carriers in ordering and arranging their affairs. Cf. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 132. Carriers who are without the appropriate certificate or permit, because they believe they carry exempt commodities, run civil and criminal risks. A carrier authorized to carry specified commodities and dependent on exempt articles for its return load may lose its right to operate at all, if it does not respect the Commission’s “order.” Carriers and shippers alike are told that they are or are not free to bargain for rates, that they must or must not pay the filed charges. The “order” of the Commission is in substance a “declaratory” one, see 60 Stat. 240, 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (d), which touches vital interests of carriers and shippers alike and sets the standard for shaping the manner in which an important segment of the trucking business will be done. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407. The consequences we have summarized are not conjectural. The Commission itself places this interpretation on its action and argues, contrary to its position in the Los Angeles Case, supra, for finality of the order. We conclude that the issues raised in the complaint are justiciable and that the District Court should adjudicate the merits. „ 7 „ 7 Reversed. Exempted carriers are also not subject to the provisions concerning rates and charges, §§ 217, 218, nor to the requirements concerning bodily injury and property damage insurance. § 215.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALLEGHANY CORPORATION v. BRESWICK & CO. et al. No. 616. Decided January 27, 1958. Whitney North Seymour, David Hartfield, Jr. and Edward K. Wheeler for appellant in No. 616. Harold H. Levin, Joseph M. Proskauer, Marvin E. Frankel and Allen L. Feinstein for appellants in No. 617. Robert W. Ginnane for appellant in No. 618. Edward M. Garlock filed a motion for Baker, Weeks & Co. et al. for leave to join in the Jurisdictional Statements and Applications for Summary Reversal filed by appellants in Nos. 616 and 617. George Brussel, Jr. for Breswick & Co. et al., appellees. Together with No. 617, Gruss et al. v. Breswick & Co. et al., and No. 618, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Breswick & Co. et al., also on appeals from the same Court. Per Curiam. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for consideration by that court of the only claim that was left open at this Court’s prior disposition of this litigation, to wit, whether “the preferred stock issue as approved by the [Interstate Commerce] Commission was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.” Alleghany Cory. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U. S. 151, 175.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HUNT v. McNAIR, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, et al. No. 71-1523. Argued February 21, 1973 — Decided June 25, 1973 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, BlackmuN, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. BreNnan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 749. ■ Robert McC. Figg, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Thomas B. Bryant, Jr. Huger Sinkler argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Theodore B. Guerard George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles R. Parker and Lewis M. Popper, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, a South Carolina taxpayer, brought this action to challenge the South Carolina Educational Facilities Authority Act (the Act), S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41 et seq. (Supp. 1971), as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment insofar as it authorizes a proposed financing transaction involving the issuance of revenue bonds for the benefit of the Baptist College at Charleston (the College). The trial court’s denial of relief was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. 255 S. C. 71, 177 S. E. 2d 362 (1970). This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the intervening decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v. DiCenso, and Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). 403 U. S. 945 (1971). On remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina adhered to its earlier position. 258 S. C. 97, 187 S. E. 2d 645 (1972). We affirm. I We begin by setting out the general structure of the Act. The Act established an Educational Facilities Authority (the Authority), the purpose of which is “to assist institutions for higher education in the construction, financing and refinancing of projects . . . ,” S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.4 (Supp. 1971), primarily through the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the terms of the Act, a project may encompass buildings, facilities, site preparation, and related items, but may not include “any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship nor any facility which is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity for any religious denomination.” S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.2 (b) (Supp. 1971). Correspondingly, the Authority is accorded certain powers over the project, including the powers to determine the fees to be charged for the use of the project and to establish regulations for its use. See infra, at 747-749. While revenue bonds to be used in connection with a project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quite explicit that the bonds shall not be obligations of the State, directly or indirectly: “Revenue bonds issued under the provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to constitute a debt or liability of the State or of any political subdivision thereof or a pledge of the faith and credit of the State or of any such political subdivision, but shall be payable solely from the funds herein provided therefor from revenues. All such revenue bonds shall contain on the face thereof a statement to the effect that neither the State of South Carolina nor the Authority shall be obligated to pay the same or the interest thereon except from revenues of the project or the portion thereof for which they are issued and that neither the faith and credit nor the taxing power of the State of South Carolina or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged to the payment of the principal of or the interest on such bonds. The issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions of this chapter shall not directly or indirectly or contingently obligate the State or any political subdivision thereof to levy or to pledge any form of taxation whatever therefor or to make any appropriation for their payment.” S. C. Code Ann. §22-41.10 (Supp. 1971). Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority must be paid from the revenues of the various projects in which it participates, S. C. Code Ann. § 22-41.5 (Supp. 1971), none of the general revenues of South Carolina is used to support a project. On January 6, 1970, the College submitted to the Authority for preliminary approval an application for the issuance of revenue bonds. Under the proposal, the Authority would issue the bonds and make the proceeds available to the College for use in connection with a portion of its campus to be designated a project (the Project) within the meaning of. the Act. In return, the College would convey the Project, without cost, to the Authority, which would then lease the property so conveyed back to the College. After payment in full of the bonds, the Project would be reconveyed to the College. The Authority granted preliminary approval on January 16, 1970, 255 S. C., at 76, 177 S. E. 2d, at 365. In its present form, the application requests the issuance of revenue bonds totaling $1,250,000, of which $1,050,000 would be applied to refund short-term financing of capital improvements and $200,000 would be applied to the completion of dining hall facilities. The advantage of financing educational institutions through a state-created authority derives from relevant provisions of federal and South Carolina state income tax laws which provide in effect that the interest on such bonds is not subject to income taxation. The income-tax-exempt status of the interest enables the Authority, as an instrumentality of the State, to market the bonds at a significantly lower rate of interest than the educational institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed the money by conventional private financing. Because the College’s application to the Authority was a preliminary one, the details of the financing arrangement have not yet been fully worked out. But Rules and Regulations adopted by the Authority govern certain of its aspects. See Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix C, pp. 47-51. Every lease agreement between the Authority and an institution must contain a' clause “obligating the Institution that neither the leased land, nor the facility located thereon, shall be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship, or in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any religious denomination.” 258 S. C., at 101, 187 S. E. 2d, at 647. To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, and any reconveyance to the College must contain a restriction against use for sectarian purposes. The Rules further provide that simultaneously with the execution of the lease agreement, the Authority and the trustee bank would enter into a Trust Indenture which would create, for the benefit of the bondholders, a foreclosable mortgage lien on the Project property including a mortgage on the “right, title and interest of the Authority in and to the Lease Agreement.” Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix C, p. 50. Our consideration of appellant’s Establishment Clause claim extends only to the proposal as approved preliminarily with such additions as are contemplated by the Act, the Rules, and the decisions of the courts below. II As we reaffirm today in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, post, p. 756, the principles which govern our consideration of challenges to statutes as violative of the Establishment Clause are three: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 612-613. With full recognition that these are no more than helpful signposts, we consider the present statute and the proposed transaction in terms of the three “tests”: purpose, effect, and entanglement. A The purpose of the statute is manifestly a secular one. The benefits of the Act are available to all institutions of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not having a religious affiliation. While a legislature’s declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything other than a good-faith statement of purpose: “It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the people of the State, the increase of their commerce, welfare and prosperity and the improvement of their health and living conditions it is essential that this and future generations of youth be given the fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that institutions for higher education within the State be provided with appropriate additional means to assist such youth in achieving the required levels of learning and development of their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the purpose of this chapter to provide a measure of assistance and an alternative method to enable institutions for higher education in the State to provide the facilities and structures which are sorely needed to accomplish the purposes of this chapter, all to the public benefit and good, to the extent and manner provided herein.” S. C. Code Ann. § 22.41 (Supp.1971). The College and other private institutions of higher education provide these benefits to the State. As of the academic year 1969-1970, there were 1,548 students enrolled in the College, in addition to approximately 600 night students. Of these students, 95% are residents of South Carolina who are thereby receiving a college education without financial support from the State of South Carolina. B To identify “primary effect,” we narrow our focus from the statute as a whole to the only transaction presently before us. Whatever may be its initial appeal, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation has consistently been rejected. E. g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). Stated another way, the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends. Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting. In Tilton v. Richardson, supra, the Court refused to strike down a direct federal grant to four colleges and universities in Connecticut. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, for the plurality, concluded that despite some institutional rhetoric, none of the four colleges was pervasively sectarian, but held open that possibility for future cases: “Individual projects can be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with respect to particular recipients and some evidence is then presented to show that the institution does in fact possess these characteristics.” Id., at 682. Appellant has introduced no evidence in the present case placing the College in such a category. It is true that the members of the College Board of Trustees are elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention, that the approval of the Convention is required for certain financial transactions, and that the charter of the College may be amended only by the Convention. But it was likewise true of the institutions involved in Tilton that they were “governed by Catholic religious organizations.” Id., at 686. What little there is in the record concerning the College establishes that there are no religious qualifications for faculty membership or student admission, and that only 60% of the College student body is Baptist, a percentage roughly equivalent to the percentage of Baptists in that area of South Carolina. 255 S. C., at 85, 177 S. E. 2d, at 369. On the record in this case there is no basis to conclude that the College’s operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education. Nor can we conclude that the proposed transaction will place the Authority in the position of providing aid to the religious as opposed to the secular activities of the College. The scope of the Authority’s power to assist institutions of higher education extends only to “projects,” and the Act specifically states that a project “shall not include” any buildings or facilities used for religious purposes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that all of the proposed financing and refinancing relates to buildings and facilities within a properly delimited project. It is not at all clear from the record that the portion of the campus to be conveyed by the College to the Authority and leased back is the same as that being financed, but in any event it too must be part of the Project and subject to the same prohibition against use for religious purposes. In addition, as we have indicated, every lease agreement must contain a clause forbidding religious use and another allowing inspections to enforce the agreement. For these reasons, we are satisfied that implementation of the proposal will not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. C The final question posed by this case is whether under the arrangement there would be an unconstitutional degree of entanglement between the State and the College. Appellant argues that the Authority would become involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting the project to insure that it is not being used for religious purposes and by participating in the management decisions of the College. The Court’s opinion in Lemon and the plurality opinion in Tilton are grounded on the proposition that the degree of entanglement arising from inspection of facilities as to use varies in large measure with the extent to which religion permeates the institution. In finding excessive entanglement, the Court in Lemon relied on the “substantial religious character of these church-related” elementary schools. 403 U. S., at 616. Mr. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the plurality in Tilton placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the federal aid there approved would be spent in a college setting: “Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education.” 403 U. S., at 687. Although Mr. Justice White saw no such clear distinction, he concurred in the judgment, stating: “It is enough for me that . . . the Federal Government [is] financing a separable secular function of overriding importance in order to sustain the legislation here challenged.” 403 U. S., at 664. A majority of the Court in Tilton, then, concluded that on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not threaten excessive entanglement. As we have indicated above, there is no evidence here to demonstrate that the College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrination than were the colleges and universities involved in Tilton. A closer issue under our precedents is presented by the contention that the Authority could become deeply involved in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions of the College. The Authority is empowered by the Act: “(g) [generally, to fix and revise from time to time and charge and collect rates, rents, fees and charges for the use of and for the services furnished or to be furnished by a project or any portion thereof and to contract with any person, partnership, association or corporation or other body public or private in respect thereof; “(h) [t] o establish rules and regulations for the use of a project or any portion thereof and to designate a participating institution for higher education as its agent to establish rules and regulations for the use of a project undertaken for such participating institution for higher education. . . S. C. Code Ann. §22-41.4 (Supp. 1971). These powers are sweeping ones, and were there a realistic likelihood that they would be exercised in their full detail, the entanglement problems with the proposed transaction would not be insignificant. As the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out, 258 S. C., at 107, 187 S. E. 2d, at 651, the Act was patterned closely after the South Carolina Industrial Revenue Bond Act, and perhaps for this reason appears to confer unnecessarily broad power and responsibility on the Authority. The opinion of that court, however, reflects a narrow interpretation of the practical operation of these powers: “Counsel for plaintiff argues that the broad language of the Act causes the State, of necessity, to become excessively involved in the operation, management and administration of the College. We do not so construe the Act. . . . [T]he basic function of the Authority is to see . . . that fees are charged sufficient to meet the bond payments.” Id., at 108, 187 S. E. 2d, at 651. As we read the College’s proposal, the Lease Agreement between the Authority and the College will place on the College the responsibility for making the detailed decisions regarding the government of the campus and the fees to be charged for particular services. Specifically, the proposal states that the Lease Agreement “will unconditionally obligate the College (a) to pay sufficient rentals to meet the principal and interest requirements as they become due on such bonds, [and] (b) to impose an adequate schedule of charges and fees in order to provide adequate revenues with which to operate and maintain the said facilities and to make the rental payments . . . .” App. 18. In short, under the proposed Lease Agreement, neither the Authority nor a trustee bank would be justified in taking action unless the College fails to make the prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its obligations. Only if the College refused to meet rental payments or was unable to do so would the Authority or the trustee be obligated to take further action. In that event, the Authority or trustee might either foreclose on the mortgage or take a hand in the setting of rules, charges, and fees. It may be argued that only the former would be consistent with the Establishment Clause, but we do not now have that situation before us. Ill This case comes to us as an action for injunctive and declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the Act as applied to a proposed — rather than an actual— issuance of revenue bonds. The specific provisions of the Act under which the bonds will be issued, the Rules and Regulations of the Authority, and the College’s proposal — all as interpreted by the South Carolina Supreme Court — confine the scope of the assistance to the secular aspects of this liberal arts college and do not foreshadow excessive entanglement between the State and religion. Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the court below that the Act is constitutional as interpreted and applied in this case. Affirmed. At various points during this litigation, appellant has made reference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, but has made no arguments specifically addressed to violations of that Clause except insofar as this Court’s approach to cases involving the Religion Clauses represents an interaction of the two Clauses. As originally submitted by the College and approved by the Authority, the proposal called for the issuance of “not exceeding $3,500,000 of revenue bonds . . . .” 255 S. C. 71, 75, 177 S. E. 2d 362, 364. As indicated by a stipulation of counsel in this Court, the College subsequently secured a bank loan in the amount of $2,500000 and now proposes the issuance of only $1,250,000 in revenue bonds under the Act, the proceeds to be used: “(i) to repay in full the College’s Current Fund for the balance (approximately $250,000) advanced to the College’s Plant Fund as aforesaid; (ii) to refund outstanding short-term loans in the amount of $800,000 whose proceeds were to pay off indebtedness incurred for capital improvements, and (iii) to finance the completion of the dining hall facilities at a cost of approximately $200,000.” App. 49. (Emphasis in original.) Gross income for federal income tax purposes does not include interest on “the obligations of a State, a Territory; or a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing . . . .” 26 U. S. C. §103 (a)(1). For state income tax purposes, gross income does not include interest “upon obligations of the United States or its possessions or of this State or any political subdivision thereof S. C. Code Ann. § 65-253 (4) (Supp. 1971). Rule 4 relating to the Lease Agreement provides in part that: “If the Lease Agreement contains a provision permitting the Institution to repurchase the project upon payment of the bonds, then in such instance the Lease Agreement shall provide that the Deed of reconveyance from the Authority to the Institution shall be made subject to the condition that so long as the Institution, or any voluntary grantee of the Institution, shall own the leased premises, or any part thereof, that no facility thereon, financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of the bonds, shall be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious worship, or used in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity of any religious denomination.” 258 S. C. 97, 101-102, 187 S. E. 2d 645, 647-648. The Rule goes on to allow the institution to remove this option in the case of involuntary sales: “The condition may provide, at the option of the Institution, that if the leased premises shall become the subject of an involuntary judicial sale, as a result of any foreclosure of any mortgage, or sale pursuant to any order of any court, that the title to be vested in any purchaser at such judicial sale, other than the Institution, shall be in fee simple and shall be free of the condition applicable to the Institution or any voluntary grantee thereof.” 258 S. C., at 102, 187 S. E. 2d, at 648. See n. 6, infra. In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), this Court commented on the importance of the role of private education in this country: “Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgments that have preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition that private education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience.” Id., at 247. Appellant also takes issue with the Authority’s rule allowing a purchaser at an involuntary sale to take title free of restrictions as to religious use. See n. 4, supra. Appellant’s reliance on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), in this respect is misplaced. There, the Court struck down a provision under which the church-related colleges would have unrestricted use of a federally financed project after 20 years. In the present case, by contrast, the restriction against religious use is lifted, not as to the institution seeking the assistance of the Authority nor as to voluntary transferees, but only as to a purchaser at a judicial sale. Because some other religious institution bidding for the property at a judicial sale could purchase the property only by outbidding all other prospective purchasers, there is only a speculative possibility that the absence of a use limitation would ever afford aid to religion. Even in such an event, the acquiring religious institution presumably would have had to pay the then fair value of the property. The “state aid” involved in this case is of a very special sort. We have here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan, no reimbursement by a State for expenditures made by a parochial school or college, and no extending or committing of a State’s credit. Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) through which educational institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and the security of their own property upon more favorable interest terms than otherwise would be available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental service.” Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N. J. 523, 530-531, 267 A. 2d 503, 506-507 (1970). The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the opinion below, described the role of the State as that of a “mere conduit.” 258 S. C., at 107, 187 S. E. 2d, at 650. Because we conclude that the primary effect of the assistance afforded here is neither to advance nor to inhibit religion under Lemon and Tilton, we need not decide whether, as appellees argue, Brief for Appellees 14, the importance of the tax exemption in the South Carolina scheme brings the present case under Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), where this Court upheld a local property tax exemption which included religious institutions. Although the record in this case is abbreviated and not free from ambiguity, the burden rests on appellant to show the extent to which the College is church related, cf. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S., at 248, and he has failed to show more than a formalistic church relationship. As Tilton established, formal denominational control over a liberal arts college does not render all aid to the institution a violation of the Establishment Clause. So far as the record here is concerned, there is no showing that the College places any special emphasis on Baptist denominational or any other sectarian type of education. As noted above, both the faculty and the student body are open to persons of any (or no) religious affiliation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MOORE et al. v. SIMS et ux. No. 78-6. Argued February 26, 1979 — Decided June 11, 1979 RehNQtjist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 435. David H. Young, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Bickerstaff, Kathryn A. Reed, and Ann Clarke Snell, Assistant Attorneys General. Windell E. Cooper Porter argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Robert L. Byrd and Martin J. Grimm. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Catherine P. Mitchell and Martin A. Schwartz for Community Action for Legal Services, Inc., et al.; by Gary B. Thomas, Robert B. O’Keefe, and Steven D. Ross for East Texas Legal Services, Inc.; and by Stefan Rosenzweig and Jeanette Ganousis for Wanda Dixie et al. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 2 of the Texas Family Code was enacted in 1973 and first went into effect on January 1, 1974. It was amended substantially in the following year. The Title defines the contours of the parent-child relationship and the permissible areas and modes of state intervention. This suit presents the first broad constitutional challenge to interrelated parts of that statutory scheme. It raises novel constitutional questions of the correlative rights and duties of parents, children, and the State in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. This litigation, involving suspected instances of child abuse, was initiated by state authorities in the Texas state courts in 1976. The state proceedings, however, were enjoined by the three-judge District Court below, which went on to find various parts of Title 2 unconstitutional on their face or as applied. We noted probable jurisdiction. 439 U. S. 925 (1978). This appeal first raises the question whether in light of the pending state proceedings, the Federal District Court should have exercised its jurisdiction. We conclude that it should not have done so and accordingly reverse and remand with instructions that the complaint be dismissed. I The appellees in this case, husband and wife and their three minor children, seek a declaration that parts of Title 2 of the Texas Family Code unconstitutionally infringe family integrity. The state-court litigation was precipitated by school authorities who reported to the Texas Department of Human Resources (formerly the State Department of Public Welfare) on March 25, 1976, that a child, Paul Sims, suffered from physical injuries apparently inflicted or aggravated by his father on a visit to the Osborne Elementary School in Houston, Tex. To protect the Sims children and to investigate the extent of any injuries, the Texas Department of Human Resources (hereinafter Department) on the same day took temporary custody of all three Sims children, who were in the school, and had them examined by a physician. The doctor found that the children were battered, and Paul was hospitalized for 11 days. On the day that it took custody of the children, the Department decided to institute a suit for emergency protection of the children under § 17.02 of the Texas Family Code. The suit was filed in the Harris County Juvenile Court on March 26, 1976, the day after the children were removed from the school. Pursuant to § 17.04 of the Texas Code, the Juvenile Court Judge entered an emergency ex parte order which gave temporary custody of the children to the Department. Five days later, the appellees appeared in court and moved to modify the ex parte order, the proper procedure for terminating the Department’s temporary custody. A hearing on such a motion is required under Texas law, but the Juvenile Court Judge was temporarily unavailable and the court clerk returned the motion to appellees’ attorney. Rather than renew the motion or appeal the emergency order, appellees filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the same Harris County court. A hearing on that petition was held on April 5, 1976, and on that date the Juvenile Court Judge concluded that venue was properly in neighboring Montgomery County, where the children were residents, and he transferred the proceedings to that county. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann., Tit. 2, § 11.04 (a) (1975). At the judge’s direction, see § 17.05 (b) (2) (Supp. 1978-1979), the Department filed a “Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship” as authorized by § 11.02, which was also transferred to Montgomery County. In addition, the judge issued a temporary restraining order continuing the Department’s temporary custody of the children. The appellees then had actual knowledge that the action had been moved to Montgomery County. There is no indication that any effort was made to expedite the hearing in that county; the appellees did not request an early hearing from state trial or appellate courts. Nor did they appeal the temporary order. See In re Stuart, 544 S. W. 2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). Instead, on April 19, 1976, they filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and thereby initiated two months of procedural maneuvers in both the state and federal courts. On April 20, a temporary restraining order was denied appel-lees by the District Court. A hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction was ultimately set for May 5. When the Department received notice of the federal proceeding on April 22, the pending state proceedings were suspended. On May 4, however, one day before the scheduled federal hearing, the Simses returned to the state-court system, moving to file an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. The motion was denied for want of jurisdiction. The next day, the Federal District Court held that the temporary orders issued by the state court had expired and that the children had to be returned to their parents, although the Department was not enjoined from pursuing a new action in state court. The court noted that it was requesting a three-judge court to consider appellees’ constitutional challenge to Title 2. On May 14, the Department did file a new § 11.02 suit in Montgomery County, and the state court issued a show-cause order and writ of attachment ordering that Paul Sims be delivered to the temporary custody of his grandparents. The court set the show-cause hearing for May 21, but the Simses could not be found for purposes of service and the hearing was reset for June 21. The Simses countered by filing in the United States District Court a second application for a temporary restraining order addressed to the Montgomery County Juvenile Court, which was granted on May 21. The three-judge court on June 7 entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the Department and other defendants from filing or prosecuting any state suit under the challenged state statutes until a final determination by the three-judge court. That determination was made on October 12, 1977, and is the subject of this appeal. After concluding that abstention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), was unwarranted because the litigation was “multifaceted,” involved custody of children, and was the product of procedural confusion in the state courts, the District Court addressed the merits of the due process challenges. It surveyed virtually every aspect of child-abuse proceedings in Texas. Sims v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1189-1195. Since we conclude that it should never have embarked on this survey we do not recount it here. II Appellants argue that the Federal District Court should have abstained in this case under the principles of Younger v. Harris, supra. The Younger doctrine, which counsels federal-court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 69 (1971). That policy was first articulated with reference to state criminal proceedings, but as we recognized in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975), the basic concern — that threat to our federal system posed by displacement of state courts by those of the National Government — is also fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved. As was the case in Huffman, the State here was a party to the state proceedings, and the temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse context is, like the public nuisance statute involved in Huffman, “in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes.” Id., at 604. The existence of these conditions, or the presence of such other vital concerns as enforcement of contempt proceedings, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977), or the vindication of “important state policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of [public assistance] programs,” Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 444 (1977), determines the applicability of Younger-Huffman principles as a bar to the institution of a later federal action. In Huffman, we noted those well-established circumstances where the federal court need not stay its hand in the face of pending state proceedings. “Younger, and its civil counterpart which we apply today, do of course allow intervention in those cases where the District Court properly finds that the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the challenged statute is ‘ “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” ’ ” 420 U. S., at 611. The District Court, however, did not rely expressly on these established exceptions to the Younger doctrine in finding that abstention was inappropriate in this case. Rather, it concluded that Younger abstention was not warranted because the action taken by the State of Texas in this case is “multifaceted”; “there is no single state proceeding to which the plaintiffs may look for relief on constitutional or any other grounds.” 438 F. Supp., at 1187. “Many of the challenged actions taken by the state do not and will not involve any judicial proceeding. Certainly as to these, there is no pending state civil litigation about which even to consider abstention.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The court specifically alluded to the allegations regarding the Child Abuse and Neglect Report and Inquiry System (CANRIS), id., at 1187 n. 5, that is, the appellees’ challenge on constitutional grounds to the State’s computerized collection and dissemination of child-abuse information where that information is not the product of a judicial determination of abuse or neglect. The meaning of the District Court’s reference to this litigation as “multifaceted” is unclear, but two possible interpretations suggest themselves. Under established principles of equity, the exercise of equitable powers is inappropriate if there is an adequate remedy at law. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 164 (1943). Restated in the abstention context, the federal court should not exert jurisdiction if the plaintiffs “had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings.” Juidice v. Vail, supra, at 337 (emphasis in original); see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 577 (1973). The pertinent issue is whether appellees’ constitutional claims could have been raised in the pending state proceedings. The District Court’s reference to the child-abuse reporting system reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of the inquiry. That the Department’s suit does not necessarily implicate CANRIS is not determinative. The question is whether that challenge can be raised in the pending state proceedings subject to conventional limits on justici-ability. On this point, Texas law is apparently as accommodating as the federal forum. Certainly, abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims. There are also intimations in the District Court’s opinion that its decision to exert jurisdiction was influenced by a broader and novel consideration — the breadth of appellees’ challenge to Title 2. Thus, the District Court suggests that the more sweeping the challenge the more inappropriate is abstention, and thereby inverts traditional abstention reasoning. The breadth of a challenge to a complex state statutory scheme has traditionally militated in favor of abstention, not against it. This is evident in a number of distinct but related lines of abstention cases which, although articulated in different ways, reflect the same sensitivity to the primacy of the State in the interpretation of its own laws and the-.cost to our federal system of government inherent in federal-court interpretation and subsequent invalidation of parts of an integrated statutory framework. “The entire statutory scheme by which Texas attempts to deal with the problem of child abuse has been challenged and should be viewed as an integrated whole. This court will not consider part of the scheme and abstain from another part. To do so would seriously jeopardize any hope for an effective statutory scheme and, in the name of comity and federalism, do violence to the state functions those principles seek to protect.” 438 F. Supp., at 1187. The earliest abstention cases were rooted in notions of equity. In Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 498 (1941), the Court observed that the dispute before it implicated “a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open.” The Court found the “resources of equity” sufficient to accommodate an adjustment which would avoid “the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication” and obviate the need for a federal court to interpret state law without the benefit of an authoritative interpretation by a state court. Id., at 500. Thus evolved the doctrine of Pullman abstention: that a federal action should be stayed pending determination in state court of state-law issues central to the constitutional dispute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion for the Court observed: “The history of equity jurisdiction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of the injunction. There have been as many and as variegated applications of this supple principle, as the situations that have brought it into play. ... New public interests have a higher claim on the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of the criminal law, Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240; Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89; or the administration of a specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176; or the final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state, Gilchrist v. Interborough Co., 279 U. S. 159 . . . .” Ibid. There are three distinct considerations that counsel abstention when broad-based challenges are made to state statutes, and it is common to see each figure in an abstention decision; for the broader the challenge, the more evident each consideration becomes. There is first the Pullman concern: that a federal court will be forced to interpret state law without the benefit of state-court consideration and therefore under circumstances where a constitutional determination is predicated on a reading of the statute that is not binding on state courts and may be discredited at any time — thus essentially rendering the federal-court decision advisory and the litigation underlying it meaningless. Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 401-402 (1941); and Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 459-461 (1945). These dangers increase with the breadth of the challenge. The second consideration is the need for a concrete case or controversy — a concern also obviously enhanced by the scope of the challenge. That is demonstrated by the instant case. For example, appellees challenge § 11.15 of the Texas Family-Code which provides that the standard of proof in any suit affecting the parent-child relationship shall be the “preponderance of the evidence.” The District Court held that in any proceeding involving parental rights, the State must bear as a matter of federal constitutional law a burden of “clear and convincing” evidence. Yet no proceeding was pursued in this case to the point where the standard could be applied, and consequently appellees can point to no injury in fact. A second illustration is the challenge to statutorily authorized pre-seizure investigative procedures: there was apparently no preseizure investigation in this case. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra, at 461; Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 245-246 (1952). The final concern prompted by broad facial attacks on state statutes is the threat to our federal system of government posed by “the needless obstruction to the domestic policy of the states by forestalling state action in construing and applying its own statutes.” Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra, at 471. “The seriousness of federal judicial interference with state civil functions has long been recognized by this Court. We have consistently required that when federal courts are confronted with requests for such relief, they should abide by standards of restraint that go well beyond those of private equity jurisprudence.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S., at 603. State courts are the principal expositors of state law. Almost every constitutional challenge — and particularly one as far ranging as that involved in this case — offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional problem and intelligently mediate federal constitutional concerns and state interests. When federal courts disrupt that process of mediation while interjecting themselves in such disputes, they prevent the informed evolution of state policy by state tribunals. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S., at 445. The price exacted in terms of comity would only be outweighed if state courts were not competent to adjudicate federal constitutional claims — a postulate we have repeatedly and emphatically rejected. Huffman, supra, at 610-611. In sum, the only pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims, and Texas law appears to raise no procedural barriers. Nor do appellees seriously argue to the contrary. Rather, they contend that because they were not granted a hearing at the time that they thought they were entitled to one, there was no practical opportunity to present their federal claims. Thus, the issue as posed by appellees is whether the conduct of the state judiciary was such that it in fact denied appellees an opportunity to be heard that was theirs in theory. That claim is related to the District Court’s second theory why Younger abstention was not warranted in this case. The District Court framed this “second independent basis for the inapplicability of Younger principles” as follows: “[W]e note that the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge is directed primarily at the legality of the children’s seizure and detention for a 42-day period without a hearing. It is clear that because this issue cannot be raised as a defense in the normal course of the pending judicial proceeding, abstention would be inappropriate. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 108 n. 9 . . . (1975). The denial of custody of the children pending any hearing regardless of the result of the hearing, is in itself sufficient to prevent the application of Younger.” 438 F. Supp., at 1187. The reliance on Gerstein is misplaced. That case involved a challenge to pretrial restraint on the basis of a prosecutor’s information alone, without the benefit of a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer. This Court held that the District Court properly found that the action was not barred by Younger because the injunction was not addressed to a state proceeding and therefore would not interfere with the criminal prosecutions themselves. “The order to hold prelim - inary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 108 n. 9 (1975). Here the injunction did address the state proceeding and it was not necessary to obtain the release of the children, for they had already been placed in the custody of their parents pursuant to a federal-court order. This Court has addressed the Younger doctrine on a number of occasions since Gerstein. In Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S., at 336-337, we noted that the teaching of Gerstein was that the federal plaintiff must have an opportunity to press his claim in the state courts and, as noted above, the appellees have not shown that state procedural law barred presentation of their claims — in fact Texas' law seems clearly to the contrary. As for the argument that the delay in affording the parents a hearing in state court made Younger abstention inappropriate, we cannot distinguish this argument from conventional claims of bad faith and other sources of great, immediate, and irreparable harm if the federal court does not intervene — traditional circumstances where a federal court need not stay its hand. We simply cannot agree that the conduct of the state authorities in this case evinces bad faith; and we do not read the District Court as expressly so finding. That there was confusion is undeniable. It is evident in the uncertainty regarding the effective period of a temporary order under § 11.11 and regarding the propriety of entering that order when venue was in Montgomery County. But confusion is not bad faith, and in this case confusion was the predictable byproduct of a new statutory scheme. The question would be a much closer one had appellees diligently sought a hearing in Montgomery County after the Harris County action was transferred or had they pursued their appellate remedies. Once it is determined that there is no bad faith, there remain only limited grounds for not applying Younger. The District Court did not find, nor could it have found, “harassment.” Nor could it credibly be claimed that Title 2 is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S., at 402, quoted in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 53-54. The District Court placed some reliance on the observation in Younger that there may be other “extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.” Id., at 53. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 85 (1971); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 230-231 (1972). The most extensive explanation of those “extraordinary circumstances” that might constitute great, immediate, and irreparable harm is that in Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U. S. 117 (1975). Although its discussion is with reference to state criminal proceedings, it is fully applicable in this context as well. “Only if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ render the state court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process. The very nature of ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in state criminal proceedings. But whatever else is required, such circumstances must be ‘extraordinary’ in the sense of creating an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation.” Id., at 124-125. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S., at 442 n. 7. To gauge whether such extraordinary circumstances exist in this case, we must view the situation at the time the state proceedings were enjoined. On May 21, when the District Court granted a temporary restraining order, and on June 7, when the three-judge court entered a preliminary injunction enjoining appellants from filing or prosecuting any state suit under the challenged state statutes until the District Court had finally determined the questions at issue, the two adult appellees had already successfully obtained possession of their minor children by means of the federal-court order of May 5. The District Court’s order of that date did not enjoin the Department from instituting a new suit in state court, and such a suit was instituted in Montgomery County on May 14., The Montgomery County action was entitled a “Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship,” and the Department’s petition related the documented child abuse and prayed that a writ of attachment issue to protect the minor child, Paul Sims. The state court issued a writ pursuant to § 11.11 directing that Paul Sims be placed in the temporary custody of his grandparents, appointing a guardian ad litem, and setting a hearing to show cause for May 21. The record indicates that appellees absented themselves from home, work, and school, thereby impeding the attachment and service of the show-cause order, and does not indicate that the actual physical custody of Paul Sims was ever surrendered by appellees pursuant to the Montgomery County court writ. It is in this posture that one must consider the propriety of the District Court’s injunction barring further state proceedings. Paul Sims was within the custody of his parents, and a specific date had been set for the show-cause hearing regarding the writ of attachment, at which time the parents could press their objections. Unless we were to hold that every attachment issued to protect a child creates great, immediate, and irreparable harm warranting federal-court intervention, we are hard pressed to conclude that with the state proceedings in this posture federal intervention was warranted. Perhaps anticipating this logic, the District Court in this case concluded that “[t]he denial of custody of the children pending any hearing regardless of the result of the hearing, is in itself sufficient to prevent the application of Younger,” 438 F. Supp., at 1187. Presumably, this conclusion was prompted by the District Court’s observation that “the constitutional issues raised by the plaintiffs reach the application of due process in an area of the greatest importance to our society, the family.” Ibid. But the District Court again inverts traditional abstention logic when it states that because the interests involved are important, abstention is inappropriate. Family relations are a traditional area of state concern. This was recognized by the District Court when it noted the “compelling state interest in quickly and effectively removing the victims of child abuse from their parents.” Id., at 1189. We are unwilling to conclude that state processes are unequal to the task of accommodating the various interests and deciding the constitutional questions that may arise in child-welfare litigation. We reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with instructions that the complaint be dismissed. It is so ordered. Although it is not clear that the children were nominal parties in all of the proceedings in the state courts, for ease of reference all of those actions will be referred to as actions by the appellees. Chapter 17 of Title 2 of the Texas Family Code provides for suits for protection of children in emergencies. Section 17.01 states: “An authorized representative of the State Department of Public Welfare, a law-enforcement officer, or a juvenile probation officer may take possession of a child to protect him from an immediate danger to his health or physical safety and deliver him to any court having jurisdiction of suits under this subtitle, whether or not the court has continuing jurisdiction under Section 11.05 of this code. The child shall be delivered immediately to the court.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann., Tit. 2, § 17.01 (Supp. 1978-1979). These emergency seizures are to be followed by hearings provided for in § 17.02 (1975): “Unless the child is taken into possession pursuant to a temporary order entered by a court under Section 11.11 of this code, the officer or representative shall file a petition in the court immediately on delivery of the child to the court, and a hearing shall be held to provide for the temporary care or protection of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann., Tit. 2, § 1704 (1975): “On a showing that the child is apparently without support and is dependent on society for protection, or that the child is in immediate danger of physical or emotional injury, the court may make any appropriate order for the care and protection of the child and may appoint a temporary managing conservator for the child.” § 17.05 (Supp. 1978-1979): “(a) An order issued under Section 17.04 of this code expires at the end of the 10-day period following the date of the order, on the restoration of the child to the possession of its parent, guardian, or conservator, or on the issuance of ex parte temporary orders in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship under this subtitle, whichever occurs first. “(b) If the child is not restored to the possession of its parent, guardian, or conservator, the court shall: “(1) order such restoration or possession; or “(2) direct the filing of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship in the appropriate court with regard to continuing jurisdiction.” § 17.06 (1975): “On the motion of a parent, managing conservator, or guardian of the person of the child, and notice to those persons involved in the original emergency hearing, the court shall conduct a hearing and may modify any emergency order made under this chapter if found to be in the best interest of the child.” Emergency orders are apparently appealable under Texas law. See § 17.07 (1975); In re R. E. W., 545 S. W. 2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). In issuing this temporary order, the Harris County Juvenile Court relied on Tex. Fam. Code Ann., Tit. 2, § 11.11 (1975 and Supp. 1978-1979), which authorizes a court in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship to make “any temporary order for the safety and welfare of the child.” The parties in this litigation disagree whether the Juvenile Court Judge had jurisdiction to enter that order. This is one of a number of ambiguous state-law questions in this case. Another is the period for which such a temporary order may remain in effect. Suits affecting the parent-child relationship are authorized by § 11.02 (1975). These suits are the vehicles by which the State brings about any change in the parent-child relationship. There is testimony in the record that a hearing had been set in Montgomery County for May 8, 1976. Defendant’s Exhibit # 1A, Sworn Statement of Rex Downing 65-66. Therefore, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, we do not remotely-suggest “that every pending proceeding between a State and a federal plaintiff justifies abstention unless one of the exceptions to Younger applies.” Post, at 435-436. Section 11.02 (b) of Title 2 provides: “(b) One or more matters covered by this subtitle may be determined in the suit. The court, on its own motion, may require the parties to replead in order that any issue affecting the parent-child relationship may be determined in the suit.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann., Tit. 2, § 11.02 (b) (1975). As one Texas commentator has noted, § 11.02 (b) vests “a broad range of powers and duties on district courts in cases in which minors appear before the court.” Smith, Draftmen’s Commentary to Title 2 of the Texas Family Code, 5 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 389, 393 (1974). He notes that this section adopts the liberal approach to joinder of claims and remedies found in Tex. Rule Civ. Proc. 51. Section 11.14, which describes the hearing in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, fortifies that view. It states: “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, proceedings shall be as in civil cases generally.” Texas Rule Civ. Proc. 51 is modeled on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 18 and provides in relevant part that “[t]he plaintiff in his petition or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party.” Thus, Texas procedural law has long encouraged joinder of claims in civil actions. See, e. g., Texas Gauze Mills v. Goatley, 119 S. W. 2d 887, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Blair v. Gay, 33 Tex. 157, 165 (1870). In a very recent case, In re R. E. W., 545 S. W. 2d 573 (1976), the Texas Court of Civil Appeals has indicated that under Title 2 the full range of constitutional challenges is cognizable in the emergency-removal proceedings and in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. Id., at 575. Therefore, this is not a case like Hernandez v. Finley, 471 F. Supp. 516 (ND Ill. 1978), summarily aff’d sub nom. Quern v. Hernandez, 440 U. S. 951 (1979), where the three-judge court found, after our remand in Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977), that the applicable state procedures did not permit the defendant to raise a constitutional challenge. Thus, we cannot agree with the dissenters’ characterization of the claims raised below as being as unrelated as child abuse and traffic violations. As the District Court properly perceived it, this action is a comprehensive attack on an integrated statutory structure best suited to resolution in one forum. Our disagreement with the District Court is with its choice of forum. Likewise, there is little in our case law or sound judicial administration to commend the suggestion that Younger should have been invoked with respect to some of the claims in this case and others should have been left to the federal forum. Post, at 443. Given the interrelated nature of the claims, such a bifurcation would result in the duplicative litigation and lack of state-court interpretation of an integrated statutory framework that this Court, in Trainor v. Hernandez, supra, at 445, identified as central concerns underlying the Younger doctrine. The dissenters’ additional argument that a constitutional attack on state procedures automatically vitiates the adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffman line of cases is reiteration of a theme sounded and rejected in prior cases. See Trainor v. Hernandez, supra, at 469-470 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 339-340 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The District Court focused on psychiatric examinations, although there is no evidence that there was any examination of this nature administered to the Sims children before or after the temporary removal. Sims v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1191. The proposition that claims must be cognizable “as a defense” in the ongoing state proceeding, as put forward by our dissenting Brethren, post, at 436-437, converts a doctrine with substantive content into a mere semantical joust. There is no magic in the term “defense” when used in connection with the Younger doctrine if the word “defense” is intended to be used as a term of art. We do not here deal with the long-past niceties which distinguished among “defense,” “counterclaims,” “setoffs,” “recoup-ments,” and the like. As we stated in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S., at 337: “Here it is abundantly clear that appellees had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings. No more is required to invoke Younger abstention. . . . Appellees need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings . . . and their failure to avail themselves of such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate.” (Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) In their brief, appellees argue that there was no adequate remedy at state law because their “every effort, to obtain judicial relief in State court was either frustrated or denied.” Brief for Appellees 25. During oral argument, counsel for appellees responded to a request for justification of federal-court involvement in this case by stating that appellees did not believe that there was a state action pending below. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. Counsel did not argue that the perceived deficiency in the state proceedings was the product of a procedural bar to appellees’ constitutional claims. The dissenters’ concern that requiring appellees to raise their challenges to the Texas Family Code in the pending proceeding will complicate and delay resolution of the merits of the State’s claims would clearly be misplaced if the dissent were correct in its characterization of the bulk of appellees’ claims as analogous to “a traffic violation” as far as their relation to the pending state proceeding is concerned. Appellees could simply obtain a resolution of the pending proceeding and then file their separate action. They are certainly not required to pursue “an unwise and impractical course of litigation.” Post, at 440. Nor is there reason to believe that consolidating all of these claims in federal court or litigating simultaneously in two different courts would prove more expeditious, wise, or practical.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS v. BURDINE No. 79-1764. Argued December 9, 1980 Decided March 4, 1981 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gregory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioner. With him on the brief were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorney General, and Paul R. Gavia. Hubert L. Gill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to address again the nature of the evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The narrow question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed. I Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers. When hired, respondent possessed several years’ experience in employment training. She was promoted to Field Services Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in November of that year, and respondent was assigned additional duties. Although she applied for the supervisor’s position of Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months. PSC was funded completely by the United States Department of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned about inefficiencies at PSC. In February 1973, the Department notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller, that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC’s reforming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a complete reorganization of the PSC staff. After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired a male from another division of the agency as Project Director. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired respondent along with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as the only professional employee in the division. It is undisputed that respondent had maintained her application for the position of Project Director and had requested to remain with TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division of the agency. She received the exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the subsequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and responsibility commensurate with what she would have received had she been appointed Project Director. Respondent filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Department of Labor were based on consultation among trusted advisers and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that the three individuals terminated did not work well together, and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would improve PSC’s efficiency. The court accepted this explanation as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were prompted by gender discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part. 608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District Court’s “implicit evidentiary finding” that the male hired as Project Director was better qualified for that position than respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the District Court’s finding that respondent was not discriminated against when she was not promoted. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court’s finding that Fuller’s testimony sufficiently had rebutted respondent’s prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action and that- the defendant also must prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that Fuller’s testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay. Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the burden of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpretations of our precedents adopted by other Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari. 447 U. S. 920 (1980). We now vacate the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remand for application of the correct standard. II In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment. First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id., at 802. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 804. The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in light of the plaintiff’s ultimate and intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1978); id., at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the burden of persuasion “never shifts”). The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question. The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a proponderence of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358, and n. 44 (1977). As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff’s evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant’s evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions. The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason wí ■ not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 804-805. Ill In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex, the Court of Appeals adhered to two rules it had developed to elaborate the defendant’s burden of proof. First, the defendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed. 608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden, the defendant “must prove that those he hired . . . were somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words, comparative evidence is needed.” 608 F. 2d, at 567 (emphasis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332, 339-340 (CA5 1975). A The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that “the employer’s burden is satisfied if he simply ‘explains what he has done’ or ‘productes] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.’ ” 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id., at 28, 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the ground that the case held only that the defendant did not have the burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of our other eases. We have stated consistently that the employee’s prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. The Court of Appeals would require the defendant to introduce evidence which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden of production. The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant apparently because it feared that “[i]f an employer need only articulate — not prove — a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legitimate, reasons for his actions.” Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., supra, at 1255 (emphasis in original). We do not believe, however, that limiting the defendant’s evidentiary obligation to a burden of production will unduly hinder the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the defendant’s explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific. Supra, at 255. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003, 1011-1012, n. 5 (CA1 1979). This obligation arises both from the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie ease and from the requirement that the plaintiff be afforded “a full and fair opportunity” to demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless. retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit by the plaintiff’s access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s investigatory files concerning her complaint. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U. S. 590 (1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination. B The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff’s task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not treated equally. 411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeals’ rule would require the employer to show that the plaintiff’s objective qualifications were inferior to those of the person selected. If it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has discriminated. The court’s procedural rule harbors a substantive error. Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based upon race, sex, and national origin. “The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and . . . neutral employment and personnel decisions.” McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII, however, does not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). The statute was not intended to “diminish traditional management prerogatives.” Id., at 207. It does not require the employer to restructure his employment practices to maximize the number of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577-578 (1978). The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as requiring the employer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever that person’s objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that th employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at 1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 1980). IV In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the respondent and that the person retained in her stead had superior objective qualifications for the position. When the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Among the problems identified were overstaffing, lack of fiscal control, poor bookkeeping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lack of a full-time Project Director. Letter of March 20, 1973, from Charles Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App. 38-40. See id., at 39. The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court’s judgment that petitioner did not violate Title YII’s equal pay provision, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h), but that decision is not challenged here. See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980); Jackson v. U. S. Steel Corp., 624 F. 2d 436 (CA3 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003 (CA1 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F. 2d 655 (CA8 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-276. We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected classes. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1977). In McDonnell Douglas, supra, we described an appropriate model for a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show: .. “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” 411 U. S., at 802. We added, however, that this standard is not inflexible, as “[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in differing factual situations.” Id., at 802, n. 13. In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent has proved a prima facie case. She showed that she was a qualified woman who sought an available position, but the position was left open for several months before she finally was rejected in favor of a male, Walz, who had been under her supervision. The phrase "prima facie case” not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff’s burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use “prima facie case” in the former sense. This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. “The word 'presumption’ properly used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden.” F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, p. 255 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). See Fed. Rule Evid. 301. See generally 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2491 (3d ed. 1940). Cf. J. Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law 185-186 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden of production helps the judge determine whether the litigants have created an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. In a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie ease is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel. See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 346 (1898). In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff’s initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff’s initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant’s explanation. The court reviewed the defendant’s evidence and explained its deficiency: “Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning Burdine and Walz. Fuller merely testified that he discharged and retained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recommendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the position he was retained to do. Fuller failed to specify any objective criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain Walz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the program and that there had been some friction within the department that might be alleviated by Burdine’s discharge. Nothing in the record indicates whether he examined Walz’ ability to work well with others. This court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of ‘qualification’ and ‘prior work record’ insufficient absent data that will allow a true comparison of the individuals hired and rejected.” 608 F. 2d, at 568. Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard to the evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not reviewing the District Court’s finding of no intentional discrimination under the “clearly erroneous” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a). Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by McDonnell Douglas.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MITCHELL et al., MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, v. COHEN. NO. 130. Argued January 6,1948. Decided March 8, 1948. Herbert A. Bergson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Paul A. Sweeney and Oscar H. Davis. Gerhard A. Gesell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. The problem here is whether temporary members of the Volunteer Port Security Force of the Coast Guard Reserve are entitled to veterans’ preference in federal employment by virtue of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944. Pursuant to § 207 of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 1941, approximately 70,000 persons were enrolled as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. The Reserve was a military organization established as a component part of the Coast Guard “to enable that service to perform such extraordinary duties as may be necessitated by emergency conditions.” The Coast Guard, in turn, was created as a military service and constitutes “a branch of the land and naval forces of the United States.” On November 1, 1941, the President directed that the Coast Guard operate as part of the Navy subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy. Of the various classifications of temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve, the largest was known as the Volunteer Port Security Force. Service therein was purely voluntary and was devoted to such activities as the patrol and guarding of harbors, waterfronts, docks, bridges, ships and industrial shore establishments. The members of this force took the oath of allegiance required of the regular members of the Coast Guard. They were enrolled “for the duration of the war upon the completion of which you will be disenrolled unless the period of your enrollment is sooner terminated by Coast Guard authority.” In actual practice, however, the members were usually permitted to leave the Force at any time by making a request to the commanding officer of the unit to which they were assigned. They were given a “Certificate of Disenrollment” upon severance from the Force, honorable discharges and mustering-out pay not being provided. Members of the Volunteer Port Security Force were obligated to be on active duty “only as directed by competent authority for a minimum of 12 hours per week.” It does not appear that their active duty exceeded that amount to any substantial degree. Because of the small number of hours of service, most members were able to continue their regular civilian employment with little or no interference. They could not be transferred from the cities in which they lived without their consent. Efforts were made by the Coast Guard to assign the 12-hour weekly duty periods to fit the convenience of the members. And many of them were disenrolled at their own request upon representations that their duty assignments conflicted with their civilian employment. They could also be excused from duty if they found it temporarily inconvenient. These members performed their duties without pay. In most cases, however, they received an allowance for uniforms; and in some instances they received food or subsistence allowance while on active duty. Military status attached to them only during periods when they were actually engaged on active duty or en route to and from such duty. While on active duty they wore their uniforms, were subject to the usual Coast Guard discipline and were vested with the same authority as members of the regular Coast Guard of similar rank. At all times the members of the Volunteer Port Security Force remained subject to the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. They were required to register and were liable for induction into the regular armed forces. In fact, many of them did enlist or were drafted into those forces, thereby necessitating their disenrollment as temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. If illness or disease occurred while on duty, they were accorded the same hospital treatment as members of the regular Coast Guard. But if they were injured or killed in the line of duty, they were entitled only to the benefits prescribed by law for civilian employees of the United States. Moreover, they were ineligible for the benefits of National Service Life Insurance. Respondent Cohen enrolled on April 13, 1944, as a member of the Volunteer Port Security Force and was assigned to duty with the Captain of the Port, Washington, D. C. He performed his part-time duties without compensation and without interruption to his regular employment as a civilian economist in the War Department. He was disenrolled on September 5, 1945, having served on active duty on 58 days for a total service of 398 hours. Respondent Hubickey was enrolled in the Force on October 18, 1944, and was assigned to duty with the Captain of the Port, Philadelphia, Pa. He too performed his part-time duties without compensation and without interference with his regular work as a civilian naval architect in the Navy Department. On September 30, 1945, he was disenrolled, having served on active duty on 32 days for a total service of 250 hours. On April 4, 1944, before the passage of the Veterans’ Preference Act, the Civil Service Commission had ruled that the duties performed by those enrolled in the Volunteer Port Security Force entitled them to veterans’ preference in federal employment under the then existing preference laws. But on November 4, 1944, after the enactment of the statute in question and pursuant to a recommendation of the Acting Secretary of the Navy, the Commission changed this ruling and decided that such duties did not entitle one to veterans’ preference under the terms of the statute. The two respondents were denied veterans’ preference in their government employment in accordance with the Commission’s second ruling. Due to general reductions in force, respondent Cohen was discharged from the War Department and respondent Hubickey was notified that he would be discharged from the Navy Department. They then brought these actions to compel the members of the Commission to classify them as preference eligibles; •they also asked the court to adjudge and declare them entitled to the status of preference eligibles under the provisions of the Veterans’ Preference Act. The District Court granted summary judgments in their favor. 69 F. Supp. 54. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one justice dissenting. 160 F. 2d 915. We brought the cases here on certiorari, the problem raised being one of importance in the administration of the Veterans’ Preference Act. The pertinent portion of the Veterans’ Preference Act is to be found near the end of § 2. That establishes preference in government employment for “those ex-servicemen and women who have served on active duty in any branch of the armed forces of the United States, during any war, . . . and have been separated therefrom under honorable conditions.” Respondents claim that their service with the Volunteer Port Security Force brings them squarely within this statutory provision, hence entitling them to veterans’ preference. It is undisputed, of course, that they did serve part-time on active duty in a branch of the armed forces of the United States during World War II and that they were separated therefrom under honorable conditions. The crucial question is whether they thereby are “ex-servicemen” within the meaning of this particular statute. On that score, respondents urge that this term must be given its ordinary and literal meaning so as to refer to all those who performed military service. The length or continuity of active duty and the presence or absence of compensation become immaterial from respondents’ point of view; the mere performance of some type of military service is thought to be sufficient. Since respondents concededly did perform military service while on intermittent active duty with the Volunteer Port Security Force, the conclusion is reached that they are “ex-servicemen” within the contemplation of this statute. Resort to the legislative history and other secondary sources is said to be unwarranted, so clear and obvious is the meaning of that term. In our opinion, however, the term “ex-servicemen” has no single, precise definition which permits us to read and apply that term without help from the context in which it appears and the purpose for which it was inserted in the statute. Ex-servicemen are indeed those who have performed military service. And they may include those who have served on active duty only part-time and without compensation. But this designation may also be confined to a more definite and narrow class of individuals who performed military service, to those whose full time and efforts were at the disposal of military authorities and whose compensation included military pay and allowances. Such ex-servicemen are those who completely disassociated themselves from their civilian status and their civilian employment during the period of their military service, suffering in many cases financial hardship and separation from home and family. They formed the great bulk of the regular armed forces during World War II. In the popular mind, they were typified by the full-fledged soldier, sailor, marine or coast guardsman. Our problem, of course, is whether Congress used the term “ex-servicemen” in the broad or narrow sense when it enacted the Veterans' Preference Act. And the answer to that problem is to be determined by an examination of the statutory scheme rather than by reliance upon dictionary definitions. The Veterans’ Preference Act was enacted in 1944 to aid in the readjustment and rehabilitation of World War II veterans. It was felt that the problems of these returning veterans were particularly acute and merited special consideration. Their normal employment and mode of life had been seriously disrupted by their service in the armed forces and it was thought that they could not be expected to resume their regular activities without reemployment and rehabilitation aids. The Federal Government, in its capacity as an employer, determined to take the lead in such a program. The Veterans’ Preference Act was accordingly adopted, creating special preference and protection for returning veterans at every stage of federal employment. Throughout the legislative reports and debates leading to the birth of this statute is evident a consistent desire to help only those who had sacrificed their normal pursuits and surroundings to aid in the struggle to which this nation had dedicated itself. It was the veterans or ex-servicemen who had been completely divorced from their civilian employment by reason of their full-time service with the armed forces who were the objects of Congressional solicitude. Reemployment and rehabilitation were considered to be necessary only as to them. There is nothing to indicate that the legislative mind in this instance was directed toward granting special benefits or rewards to those who performed military service without interference with their normal employment and mode of life. As to them, assistance in reemployment and rehabilitation was thought unnecessary. Their civilian employment status remained unchanged by reason of their military service. And since their civilian life was substantially unaltered, there was no problem of aiding their readjustment back to such a life. Indeed, to have given them preference rights solely because of their part-time military service would have been inconsistent with the professed aims of the statutory framers. Such preference would have diluted the benefits conferred on those ex-servicemen who had made full-scale sacrifices; and it would have been inequitable to the many civilians who also had participated voluntarily in essential war and defense activities but who had not been directly connected with a branch of the armed forces. It is true that § 2 of the Act establishes preference eligibility for the unmarried widows of deceased ex-servicemen despite the fact that these widows may have continued their normal civilian employment during the war. But the preference rights thereby granted are derivative in nature. They are conferred on the widows because of the dislocation and severance from civil life which their deceased husbands suffered while performing full-time military duties and in partial substitution for the loss in family earning power occasioned by their husbands’ deaths. Congress felt that this was one way of expressing the moral obligation and the debt of gratitude which this nation was thought to owe these widows. Such a provision certainly affords no basis for widening the concept of “ex-servicemen” beyond that which we have indicated. The widows of ex-servicemen are in a special category which cannot be compared, in terms of sacrifice or need for reemployment and rehabilitation, with any group of individuals who performed part-time military duties. In the light of the very clear purpose which Congress had in mind in adopting the Veterans’ Preference Act, we are constrained to define the term “ex-servicemen,” for the purposes of this particular statute, as relating only to those who performed military service on full-time active duty with military pay and allowances, thereby dislocating the fabric of their normal economic and social life. It thus becomes obvious that respondents’ service with the Volunteer Port Security Force of the Coast Guard Reserve cannot qualify them as “ex-servicemen” entitled to veterans’ preference under this enactment. They continued their normal civilian employment with the War Department and the Navy Department during the war, employment which suffered as little as possible from their military service; they served on active duty for only relatively short periods each week and could be disenrolled at their own request; they received no military pay and very few allowances; they could not be transferred away from their homes without their consent. They were therefore able to retain the essential elements of their civilian life. As to them, there was no problem of reemployment or rehabilitation caused by their military service. They are not among the “ex-servicemen” whom Congress desired to assist by means of the Veterans’ Preference Act. One other matter remains. Respondents claim, and the Court of Appeals held, that they acquired vested preference rights under § 18 of the Act. In pertinent part, § 18 provides that “this Act shall not be construed to take away from any preference eligible any rights heretofore granted to, or possessed by, him under any existing law, Executive order, civil-service rule or regulation, of any department of the Government or officer thereof.” It is said that the Civil Service Commission’s ruling of April 4, 1944, extending preference rights under the then existing laws to those who had performed service with the Volunteer Port Security Force, gave respondents vested rights which were preserved by § 18 when the Veterans’ Preference Act was subsequently enacted. This contention is without substance. Veterans’ preference rights by their very nature do not accrue until one has become a veteran through separation from the armed forces. On June 27,1944, when the Veterans’ Preference Act became law, neither of the respondents had as yet disenrolled from the Volunteer Port Security Force. In fact, respondent Hubickey had not even enrolled by that date. Thus they could not be classed as veterans or ex-servicemen, whatever definition be given those terms, on June 27, 1944, and they could not have earned any veterans’ preference rights prior to that date. The Commission’s ruling of April 4, 1944, did no more than inform respondents that they would be entitled to veterans’ preference upon disenrollment, provided such ruling was lawful and still in effect. It did not purport to give them preference rights as of April 4, 1944, or to cause those rights to accrue before disenrollment. Since they did not possess and had not been granted any such rights under prior law, respondents were completely unaffected by the provisions of § 18. That section was primarily designed to perpetuate preferences granted earlier to veterans who had served in the armed forces during peacetime and who were then in government employment or on civil-service registers. Respondents were obviously not veterans of that type. Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. 58 Stat. 387, 5 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 851. 55 Stat. 9, 12, as amended, 14 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 307. § 201 of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 9,11, as amended, 14 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 301. 55 Stat. 585,14U.S. C. § 1. Executive Order No. 8929,6 Fed. Reg. 5581. The other classifications were: (1) Full-time active duty with military pay and allowances; (2) Pilots without pay and allowances other than for uniforms, but paid by their own companies; (3) Officers of Great Lakes vessels without pay and allowances other than for uniforms, but paid by their own companies; (4) Coast Guard police without pay and allowances; (5) Civil Service employees of the Coast Guard enrolled for full-time active duty without pay other than compensation for their civilian positions. From the form entitled “Temporary Member of Coast Guard Reserve — Enrollment and Active Duty Assignment.” Ibid. It also appears from this form that those mentioned in classifications (2) and (5) in footnote 6, supra, were subject to call at all times. Apparently the other classifications, including the Volunteer Port Security Force, were not subject to such a call. Circular Letter No. 4145 to Regional Directors and Division Chiefs of the Commission. This provided that active duty performed by temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve, whether full-time, part-time, or intermittently, either with or without pay, including Government employees enrolled without pay other than the compensation of their civilian positions, constituted active duty, as distinguished from training duty and entitled the member performing such duty to preference benefits under the then existing preference laws. Departmental Circular No. 508 to Heads of Departments and Independent Establishments. This modified the earlier ruling and provided that only those temporary Coast Guard Reservists performing full-time duty with pay and allowances at shore stations or aboard Coast Guard vessels were entitled to preference under the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944. Respondents point out that the word “serviceman” is defined as “One who has performed military service.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed. (1942). “I believe that the Federal Government, functioning in its capacity as an employer, should take the lead in assuring those who are in the armed services that when they return special consideration will be given to them in their efforts to obtain employment. It is absolutely impossible to take millions of our young men out of their normal pursuits for the purpose of fighting to preserve the Nation, and then expect them to resume their normal activities without having any special consideration shown them. “The problems of readjustment will be difficult for all of us. They will be particularly difficult for those who have spent months and even years at the battle fronts all over the world. Surely a grateful nation will want to express its gratitude in deeds as well as in words.” Letter from the President to Rep. Ramspeck, quoted in H. R. Rep. No. 1289,78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5. H. R. Rep. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 907, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.; 90 Cong. Rec. 3501-3507. The House report stated (p. 3): “Private employers and corporations, as well as State, county, and municipal governments, have been urged through the selective-service law and otherwise to afford reemployment to veterans when they leave the armed forces. Your committee feels that the Federal Government should set the pace, and that this proposal is an essentia] part of the reemployment and rehabilitation program.” The Senate report stated (p. 1): “The committee believes that in view of the fact that members of the armed forces rapidly are being returned to civilian life, the bill should be enacted without delay.” The same observations apply to the provision in § 2 giving veterans’ preference to the wives of ex-servicemen who have a service-connected disability and who themselves have been unable to qualify for any civil-service appointment. See also 62 Stat. 3, extending veterans’ preference benefits to the widowed mothers of deceased or permanently and totally disabled ex-servicemen. H. R. Rep. No. 697, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 480,80th Cong., 1st Sess. The view we take of this matter coincides with that expressed by the supporters of H. R. 1389, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. That bill, as amended, proposed to change § 2 of the Veterans’ Preference Act by providing that “ ‘active duty’ in any branch of the armed forces of the United States shall mean active full-time duty with military pay and allowances in any branch of the armed forces during any campaign or expedition (for which a campaign badge has been authorized).” Hearings were held before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. The bill was unanimously reported out by the committee, H. R. Rep. No. 465, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., and was adopted by voice vote by the House of Representatives, 93 Cong. Rec. 7315— 7318. A unanimous Senate Committee on Civil Service also reported the bill favorably, S. Rep. No. 396, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., but the Senate adjourned without considering the bill. The proponents of the bill and the two committees considered it as a clarification of the original Congressional intent as to the meaning of “ex-servicemen.” It was stated that the country owes a debt of gratitude to the temporary Coast Guard Reservists, “but they are not to be classed as ex-servicemen, who were actually uprooted from their civilian occupations and subjected to the rigors of full-time military training and combat. It is to the latter group that Congress intended to provide employment preference in Government service.” 93 Cong. Rec. 7315. The need for clarification of § 2 was said to be the confusion created by the lower court decisions in the instant cases. See S. Rep. No. 907, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. The Veterans’ Preference Act does not grant benefits to future peacetime veterans.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WIRL TELEVISION CORP. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 242. Decided October 20, 1958. Timothy W. Swain for petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Warren E. Baker and Richard A. Solomon for the United States and the Federal Communications Commission, respondents. James A. McKenna, Jr. and Vernon L. Wilkinson for the American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., respondent. Jack P. Blume for the West Central Broadcasting Co., respondent. Per Curiam. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action in the light of the matter called to this Court’s attention on page 7 of the Solicitor General’s brief in No. 235, Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States et al., ante, p. 49. [For dissent of Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 50.]

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. RUIZ et ux. No. 72-1052. Argued November 5-6, 1973— Decided February 20, 1974 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Harry R. Sachse argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Johnson, Edmund B. Clark, and Carl Strass. Winton D. Woods, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Lindsay E. Brew. Jerry C. Straus filed a brief for the Arapahoe Tribe of Wyoming et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lee J. Sclar and Bruce B. Greene for the California Indian Legal Services, and by David H. Getches for the Native American Rights Fund. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a narrow but important issue in the administration of the federal general assistance program for needy Indians: Are general assistance benefits available only to those Indians living on reservations in the United States (or in areas regulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Alaska and Oklahoma), and are they thus unavailable to Indians (outside Alaska and Oklahoma) living off, although near, a reservation? The United States District Court for the District of Arizona answered this question favorably to petitioner, the Secretary of the Interior, when, without opinion and on cross-motions for summary judgment, it dismissed the respondents’ complaint. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed. 462 F. 2d 818 (CA9 1972). We granted certiorari because of the significance of the issue and because of the vigorous assertion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was inconsistent with long-established policy of the Secretary and of the Bureau. 411 U. S. 947 (1973). I The pertinent facts are agreed upon, although, as to some, the petitioner Secretary denies knowledge but does not dispute them. App. 45-48. The respondents, Ramon Ruiz and his wife, Anita, are Papago Indians and United States citizens. In 1940 they left the Papago Reservation in Arizona to seek employment 15 miles away at the Phelps-Dodge copper mines at Ajo. Mr. Ruiz found work there, and they settled in a community at Ajo called the “Indian Village” and populated almost entirely by Papagos. Practically all the land and most of the homes in the Village are owned or rented by Phelps-Dodge. The Ruizes have lived in Ajo continuously since 1940 and have been in their present residence since 1947. A minor daughter lives with them. They speak and understand the Papago language but only limited English. Apart from Mr. Ruiz’ employment with Phelps-Dodge, they have not been assimilated into the dominant culture, and they appear to have maintained a close tie with the nearby reservation. In July 1967, 27 years after the Ruizes moved to Ajo, the mine where he worked was shut down by a strike. It remained closed until the following March. While the strike was in progress, Mr. Ruiz’ sole income was a $15 per week striker’s benefit paid by the union. He sought welfare assistance from the State of Arizona but this was denied because of the State’s apparent policy that striking workers are not eligible for general assistance or emergency relief. On December 11, 1967, Mr. Ruiz applied for general assistance benefits from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). He was immediately notified by letter that he was ineligible for general assistance because of the provision (in effect since 1952) in 66 Indian Affairs Manual 3.1.4 (1965) that eligibility is limited to Indians living “on reservations” and in jurisdictions under the BIA in Alaska and Oklahoma. An appeal to the Superintendent of the Papago Indian Agency was unsuccessful. A further appeal to the Phoenix Area Director of the BIA led to a hearing, but this, too, proved unsuccessful. The sole ground for the denial of general assistance benefits was that the Ruizes resided outside the boundaries of the Papago Reservation. The respondents then instituted the present purported class action against the Secretary, claiming, as a matter of statutory interpretation, entitlement to the general assistance for which they had applied, and also challenging the eligibility provision as a violation of Fifth Amendment due process and of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court’s summary judgment for the Secretary was on the ground that the Manual’s residency limitation was inconsistent with the broad language of the Snyder Act, 25 U. S. C. § 13, “that Congress intended general assistance benefits to be available to all Indians, including those in the position” of the Ruizes, 462 F. 2d, at 821, and that subsequent actions of Congress in appropriating funds for the BIA general assistance program did not serve to ratify the imposed limitation. The dissent took the position that the Secretary’s policy was within the broad discretionary authority delegated to the Secretary by Congress with respect to the allocation of limited funds. II The Snyder Act, 42 Stat. 208, 25 U. S. C. § 13, approved November 2, 1921, provides the underlying congressional authority for most BIA activities including, in particular and importantly, the general assistance program. Prior to the Act, there was no such general authorization. As a result, appropriation requests made by the House Committee on Indian Affairs were frequently stricken on the House floor by point-of-order objections. See H. R. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. Rep. No. 294, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); 61 Cong. Rec. 4659-4672 (1921). The Snyder Act was designed to remedy this situation. It is comprehensively worded for the apparent purpose of avoiding these point-of-order motions to strike. Since the passage of the Act, the BIA has presented its budget requests without further interruption of that kind and Congress has enacted appropriation bills annually in response to the requests. The appropriation legislation at issue here, Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968, Pub. L. 90-28, 81 Stat. 59, 60 (1967), recited: “BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS “Education and Welfare Services “For expenses necessary to provide education and welfare services for Indians, either directly or in cooperation with States and other organizations, including payment (in advance or from date of admission), of care, tuition, assistance, and other expenses of Indians in boarding homes, institutions, or schools; grants and other assistance to needy Indians; maintenance of law and order, and payment of rewards for information or evidence concerning violations of law on Indian reservations or lands; and operation of Indian arts and crafts shops; $126,478,000.” This wording, except for the amount, is identical to that employed in similar legislation for prior fiscal years and, indeed, for subsequent ones. It is to be noted that neither the language of the Snyder Act nor that of the Appropriations Act imposes any geographical limitation on the availability of general assistance benefits and does not prescribe eligibility requirements or the details of any program. Instead, the Snyder Act states that the BIA (under the supervision of the Secretary) “shall direct, supervise, and expend ... for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States” for the stated purposes including, as the two purposes first described, “[g]eneral support” and “relief of distress.” This is broadly phrased material and obviously is intended to include all BIA activities. The general assistance program is designed by the BIA to provide direct financial aid to needy Indians where other channels of relief, federal, state, and tribal, are not available. Benefits generally are paid on a scale equivalent to the State’s welfare payments. Any Indian, whether living on a reservation or elsewhere, may be eligible for benefits under the various social security programs in which his State participates and no limitation may be placed on social security benefits because of an Indian claimant’s residence on a reservation. In the formal budget request submitted to Congress by the BIA for fiscal 1968, the program was described as follows: “General assistance will be provided to needy Indians on reservations who are not eligible for public assistance under the Social Security Act . . . and for whom such assistance is not available from established welfare agencies or through tribal resources.” Hearings on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1968 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 777-778 (1967), and Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 695 (1967). III We are confronted, therefore, with the issues whether the geographical limitation placed on general assistance eligibility by the BIA is consistent with congressional intent and the meaning of the applicable statutes, or, to phrase it somewhat differently, whether the congressional appropriations are properly limited by the BIA’s restrictions, and, if so, whether the limitation withstands constitutional analysis. On the initial question, the Secretary argues, first, that the Snyder Act is merely an enabling act with no definition of the scope of the general assistance program, that the Appropriation Act did not provide for off-reservation Indian welfare (other than in Oklahoma and Alaska), and that Congress did not intend to expand the program beyond that presented to it by the BIA request. Secondly, he points to the “on reservations” limitation in the Manual and suggests that Congress was well acquainted with that limitation, and that, by legislating in the light of the Manual's limiting provision, its appropriation amounted to a ratification of the BIA’s definitive practice. He notes that, in recent years, Congress has twice rejected proposals that clearly would have provided off-reservation general assistance for Indians. Thus, it is said, Congress has appropriated no funds for general assistance for off-reservation Indians and, as a practical matter, the Secretary is unable to provide such a program. The Court of Appeals placed primary reliance on the Snyder Act’s provision for assistance to “the Indians throughout” the United States. It concluded that the Act envisioned no geographical limitations on Indian programs and that, absent a clear congressional ratification of such a policy, the Secretary was powerless to shrink the coverage down to some lesser group of Indian beneficiaries. Although we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and its reversal of the judgment of the District Court, we reach its result on a narrower ground. We need not approach the issue in terms of whether Congress intended for all Indians, regardless of residence and of the degree of assimilation, to be covered by the general assistance program. We need only ascertain the intent of Congress with respect to those Indian claimants in the case before us. The question, so limited, is whether Congress intended-to exclude from the general assistance program these respondents and their class, who are full-blooded, unassimilated Indians living in an Indian community near their native reservation, and who maintain close economic and social ties with that reservation. Except for formal residence outside the physical boundaries of the Papago Reservation, the respondents, as has been conceded, meet all other requirements for the general assistance program. IV There is, of course, some force in the Secretary’s argument and in the facts that the BIA’s budget requests consistently contained “on reservations” general assistance language and that there was testimony before successive appropriations subcommittees to the effect that assistance of this kind was customarily so restricted. Nonetheless, our examination of this and other material leads us to a conclusion contrary to that urged by the Secretary. A. In actual practice, general assistance clearly has not been limited to reservation Indians. Indeed, the Manual’s provision, see n. 6, supra, so heavily relied upon by the Secretary, itself provides that general assistance is available to nonreservation Indians in Alaska and Oklahoma. The rationale proffered for this is: “The situation of Indians in Alaska and Oklahoma has historically been unique. Much of Oklahoma was once set aside as an Indian Territory, and though most of the reservations have been abolished, there remains a large area of concentrated Indian population with tribal organization, living on land held in trust by the United States .... A similar situation of large concentrations of native Americans, with few reservations and substantial separate legislation prevails in Alaska .... The responsibilities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in these jurisdictions are substantially similar to the Bureau’s responsibilities on the reservations.” Brief for Petitioner 21. While this exception is not necessarily irrational, it definitely demonstrates that the limitation in the budget requests is not rigidly followed by the BIA, inasmuch as most off-reservation Indians in the two named States are regarded as eligible for general assistance funds. If, as the Secretary urges, we are to assume that Congress has been aware of the Manual’s provision, Congress was just as clearly on notice that the words “on reservations” did not possess their literal meaning in that context. Surely, some of the reasons for the Alaska-Oklahoma exception are equally applicable to Indians of the Ruiz class. B. There was testimony in several of the hearings that the BIA, in fact, was not limiting general assistance to those within reservation boundaries and, on more than one occasion, Congress was notified that exceptions were being made where they were deemed appropriate. Notwithstanding the Manual, at least three categories of off-reservation Indians outside Alaska and Oklahoma have been treated as eligible for general assistance. The first is the Indian who relocates in the city through the BIA relocation program and who then is eligible for general assistance for the period of time required for him, under state law, to establish residence in the new location. The second evidently is the Indian from the Turtle Mountain Reservation in North Dakota who lives on trust land near but apart from that reservation. The third appears to be the Indian residing in Rapid City, South' Dakota. In addition, although not controlling, it is not irrelevant that the “on reservations” limitation in the budget requests has never appeared in the final appropriation bills. C. Even more important is the fact that, for many years, to and including the appropriation year at issue, the BIA itself made continual representations to the appropriations subcommittees that nonurban Indians living “near” a reservation were eligible for BIA services. Although, to be sure, several passages in the legislative history and the formal budget requests have defined eligibility in terms of Indians living “on reservations,” the BIA, not infrequently, has indicated that living “on or near” a reservation equates with living “on” it. An early example of this appears at the fiscal 1948 Senate Hearing. The following colloquy between Senator McCarran and Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman is one of the stronger statements made to Congress concerning the BIA’s policy of limiting general assistance to reservation Indians and yet, within this very dialogue, relied on explicitly by the Secretary, is an indication that “on reservations” is not given a rigid interpretation: “Senator McCarran. I have one question right there. “Do these items address themselves to reservation Indians or nonreservation Indians, or both? “Take, for instance, this welfare administration fund, $87,786. Is that given to reservation Indians, nonreservation Indians alike? “Mr. Zimmerman. No, sir; it is not. “Senator McCarran. To whom is it given? “Mr. Zimmerman. This money goes to reservation Indians. “Senator McCarran. Entirely? “Mr. Zimmerman. Yes. “Senator McCarran. Now, in my State, for instance, you have in the outskirts of Reno and again on the outskirts of Battle Mountain small Indian villages. Do they get anything in the way of relief? “Mr. Zimmerman. Those town colonies are treated as reservations. “Senator McCarran. You regard them as reservations? “Mr. Zimmerman. Yes; some of them are. “Senator McCarran. Is the colony outside of the city of Reno a reservation? “Mr. Zimmerman. For certain purposes the courts have held that it is a reservation. “Senator McCarran. Do they own the land? “Mr. Zimmerman. Yes; the Federal Government owns the land. “Senator McCarran. The Federal Government owns the land? “Mr. Zimmerman. Yes, sir. “Senator McCarran. They build their houses on it or the Federal Government? “Mr. Zimmerman. They build their own houses. “Senator McCarran. But those Indians do receive the benefits? “Mr. Zimmerman. They would be eligible; yes, sir.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1948, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 598-599 (1947). The interchangeability of “on” and “on or near” appears more directly in later years. In the relocation services section of the BIA’s budget justification for fiscal 1959 it is stated: “It is estimated that within the continental United States there are approximately 400,000 members of Indian tribes and bands. Of this number, approximately 300,000 live on or adjacent to reservations for which the Bureau assumes some responsibility. On most of the Indian reservations there is a surplus of population in proportion to reservation resources. Opportunities for self-support on or near these reservations are wholly inadequate and the increasing surplus population is faced with the alternative of moving away from the reservation or remaining to live in privation or dependent, partially or wholly, upon some form of public assistance.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1959, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 288 (1958) (emphasis supplied). The relocation program is covered by the welfare appropriation. It is designed to provide short-term assistance to the needy Indian who leaves the reservation area and thereby disqualifies himself for the general assistance program. By describing the Indians who “live on or adjacent to reservations” as those entitled to relocation services when they depart, the BIA in effect was telling Congress that “moving away from the reservation” was a possibility even though the Indian lives only “adjacent to”, the reservation, and it would seem to follow that the Indian living “adjacent to” the reservation was also eligible for general assistance. At the fiscal 1962 hearing, Congressman Fenton inquired of Assistant Commissioner Gifford as to the Indian population in the United States. She replied: “We have no absolute figure. Our best estimate of Indians on the reservations right now is about 375,000, I think. That is a figure we are using. Of course, there are Indians off of the reservations, and we do not have this count too clearly. However, for those we consider our direct responsibility on the reservations- “Mr. Fenton. To whom we contribute? “Miss Gifford. Yes we believe it is about 375,000.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 205-206 (1961). The foregoing statement by the Assistant Commissioner, of course, is not in itself particularly revealing on the issue that confronts us. As can be seen from subsequent hearings, however, the stated figure includes Indians “on or near the reservations” and is not restricted to Indians who live “on.” Also, this “on or near” group, in contrast to those who live “off” the reservation, are within the group for whom the BIA assumed “direct responsibility.” Obviously, one can never be certain whether this expanded reading of “on” is the result of the BIA’s desire, when seeking appropriations, to represent its jurisdiction and function somewhat more broadly than it actually was, or whether it reflects actual policy. The “on or near” representations continued to be made to Congress. At the fiscal 1963 House hearing, Congressmen questioned Commissioner Nash, Associate Commissioner Officer, and Assistant Commissioner Gifford as to the Indian population served by the BIA: “Mr. Denton. How many Indians are there at the present time? “Miss Gifford. You mean the total population? “Mr. Denton. Yes. “Miss Gifford. We estimate that the total population on or near the reservations that we serve is 380,000. “Mr. Denton. I expect there is no way you could tell how many Indians there are off the reservations. “Mr. Nash. Well, we can take the total census figure for the Indian population and subtract those that are listed as living on or near the reservations, and this gives us a figure of 172,000 off the reservations; 380,000 on or near the reservations, including Alaska. “Mr. Kirwan. What did you say was on the reservation? “Mr. Nash. 380,000. “Mr. Officer. We are citing our figure of 380,000 to include those Indians who live in the reservation vicinity and are eligible to receive our services, as well as the Indians and other Alaska natives. The total of Alaska natives is 43,000. When we subtract that from 380,000, we have 337,000 Indians who live on or near reservations outside Alaska. Now if we are going to be concerned only with those who live on reservations, then we have that figure of 285,000, which was in our press release. “Mr. Kirwan. We want to clear that up. The press release emphasizes the 285,000 on the reservation. Now we have the figure on the reservation and those who live near the reservation. That is the point we want to clear. “Mr. Officer. The 380,000 are those who live on or near reservations plus the natives of Alaska. “Mr. Denton. That does include Eskimos? “Mr. Officer. Yes, sir. “Mr. Denton. What do you do in places like Oklahoma, where the Indians live ‘checkerboard'? “Mr. Officer. It is for that reason that we cite figures of Indians living on or near reservations; because we have a number of situations similar to those in Oklahoma, where you don't have a well-defined reservation boundary.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1963, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 352-354 (1962) (emphasis supplied). It is interesting to note that the Subcommittee was advised that Alaska and Oklahoma Indians are subsumed in the “on or near” category rather than placed in the pure “on” group, and, admittedly, they are entitled to general assistance. The figures stated also indicate that the number quoted the preceding year by Miss Gifford as the number “on the reservation” actually referred to those “on or near.” A nearly identical dialogue occurred in 1964 at the Senate Subcommittee: “Senator Bible. How many Indians do you have under your jurisdiction? “Mr. Nash. 380,000. “Senator Bible. How many nonreservation Indians do you have? Are those just reservation Indians? “Mr. Nash. These are on or near. This would not include, for example, Indians living in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Denver, Minneapolis, unless they were brought there as part of our vocational training or relocation programs. “Senator Bible. What is the total Indian population in the United States? “Mr. Nash. The 1960 census counted 552,000. Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. “Chairman Hayden. Are these full-bloods or halfs? “Mr. Nash. The census does not make an inquiry as to full or half. They merely say, 'Are you an Indian?’ 'Are you known as an Eskimo?’ “Senator Bible. Following the Chairman’s question, where does your jurisdiction rest in that regard? Do you have a measuring stick? “Mr. Nash. No, sir. Our basis for providing services to an Indian is primarily on real estate. That is, we service those individuals who reside on trust or restricted land, or so close to it that the program of the reservation would be affected by services not performed for that person.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1965, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 227-228 (1964) (emphasis supplied). The now-familiar BIA representations appear again at the House hearing for fiscal 1967: “Mr. Denton. How many Indians are there on the reservations and how many are under the Indian Bureau’s supervision? “Mr. Nash. We recognize what we call the Federal Indian Service population at 380,000. “Mr. Denton. Are they on reservations? “Mr. Nash. This is on and near. The figure on the reservation is somewhat smaller, but this is the figure which is of those who are on reservations, are living on trust lands, have titles which are alienated, restricted against aliens, or are village communities in Alaska, Oklahoma, or are so near to reservations that they are dependent upon the facilities provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for their major community services. “Mr. Denton. What is the total Indian population? “Mr. Nash. The 1960 census counted 552,000. It would be from there up, because there are a good many people who- “Mr. Denton. And 380,000 are on the reservations, so about 170,000 are not under the Government's care. “Mr. Nash. That is correct.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 370-371 (1966) (emphasis supplied). At the hearing for fiscal 1968, the appropriation year directly at issue, Commissioner Bennett made like representations to the Senate Subcommittee. These could have led Congress to believe that there are only two relevant classes of Indians so far as non-land-related BIA services are concerned, those living “off” the reservation and those living “on or near”: “Senator Bible. . . . Mr. Commissioner, and I am sorry because you may have covered this in earlier questioning, but what is the total Indian population under your jurisdiction at the present time? “Mr. Bennett. The total Indian population under our jurisdiction at the present time is 380,000. These are on or near reservations and comprise our service population based on the 1960 census. “Senator Bible. How many Indians do we have in the United States who are not under your jurisdiction and are not your responsibility? “Mr. Bennett. Based on the 1960 census again the figure is about 170,000. These are people who moved away from the residential areas and generally have become a part of other communities.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1968, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 819 (1967) (emphasis supplied). Another recurring representation made by the BIA throughout the annual hearings is that whenever it was asked about those Indians who were outside the agency’s service area, that is, “off” the reservations, the answer would refer to Indians who had left the reservations and moved to urban areas or who had attempted to be assimilated by the general population. Certainly, none of the references to those outside the service area seem appropriately applied to Indians of the Ruiz class. During the fiscal 1950 Senate hearing, when the question arose as to the status of Indians who had left the reservation, Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman stated: “Frankly, it has not been considered the obligation of the Indian Service in the years past to police Indians after they have established themselves in Phoenix or Flagstaff or Grand Forks, or wherever it may be.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1950, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 483 (1949). At the fiscal 1952 hearing, the following exchange between Senator Young and Commissioner Myer gives some indication of what Congress had in mind with respect to Indian beneficiaries “leaving the reservation”: “Senator Young. ... Is it true that, if an Indian leaves North Dakota to go out to the State of Washington to work, and if he runs out of work and runs out of money out there, ... he is eligible for relief only if he is back on the reservation? “Mr. Myer. No. If he has established residence, he is as eligible as anyone. I do not know what the situation is in the State of Washington, but some States would require a 2-year residence; some do not. “Senator Young. Why could not an Indian get relief back there as well as on the reservation? “Mr. Myer. That presents a problem that is a matter of very basic policy. That is a matter of whether or not we are going to extend our services to Indians wherever they are and follow them around the United States as they leave the reservation with the type of service we are providing on the reservation.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1952, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 372 (1951). The following representation by Acting Commissioner Crow to the House Subcommittee in 1961 seems to indicate that general assistance, although tied to residence, is concerned with those Indians who have not been assimilated: “The Bureau provides services and assists the states in furnishing services to Indians in the United States, including the natives of Alaska, in the fields of human and natural resources. This includes among other things programs of education, welfare, law and order, and the protection, development, and management of trust property. Services are, in general, limited to those arising out of our relationship regarding trust property and to those Indian people who reside on trust or restricted land. Funds are not included in these estimates for furnishing services to Indian people who have established themselves in the general society.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 98 (1961). In the fiscal 1964 hearings, Commissioner Nash made the following statements indicating that “leaving the reservation” meant something far different from moving 15 miles to a nonurban Indian village while still maintaining close ties with the native reservation: “The 1960 census showed 552,000 Indians, Eskimos and all others, all people defined as 'Indians’ by the census. This would include those who have left reservations, gone to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Chicago, because they simply answered to the census taker, 'Yes, I am an Indian,’ when they asked. We do not pretend to follow those people with services wherever they go. “. . . We have a need for services for 380,000 people. This includes those who are living directly on the reservations, and those who are living very dose, so that the way in which they live affects reservations programs.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 889 (1963) (emphasis supplied). See also Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 295-300 (1966). It apparently was not until 1971, four years after the appropriation for fiscal 1968, that anyone in Congress seriously questioned the BIA as to its precise policy concerning the “off-on” dichotomy. The following dialogue between Senator Bible, long a member of the Senate Subcommittee, and Commissioner Bruce is instructive: “Senator Bible. . . . What rule do you use to determine who is under your jurisdiction? Who is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs? “Mr. Bruce. American Indians living on reservations, one-fourth degree blood or more living in the United States and Alaska. “Senator Bible. One-fourth degree or more is one of the qualifications. They must also live on a reservation? “Mr. Bruce. On or near. “Senator Bible. What does the word 'near’ mean? “Mr. Bruce. It is very difficult to define. Near reservation would be a nearby community. “Senator Bible. Well, half a mile, 1 mile, 5 miles, 100 yards? I am just trying to find out what your jurisdiction is. You have some responsibilities. Now what are you responsible for? “Mr. Bruce. They vary and that is why it is difficult to answer specifically. “Senator Bible. Well, give me the variables then. From 100 yards up to 10 miles? “Is that defined in a statute anywhere? If I was to become the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, God forbid, how would I know who I had jurisdiction over? They must make some determination. “Mr. Bruce. There is a definition for Oklahoma, and Alaska. “Senator Bible. What do your lawyers tell you? . . . Can you go into the heart of Manhattan and find some Indian with one-fourth degree of Indian blood? Do you have jurisdiction over him in the heart of Manhattan? “Mr. Bruce. No, sir; not over Manhattan. “Senator Bible. Well, if not over Manhattan, how about New York State? How about Troy or Syracuse or Rochester? “Senator Bible. ... I am just trying to get the record straight to see what your responsibility is for Indians beyond the reservation. I think we are clear for the Indians on the reservation.” At this point a recess was taken and the Commissioner w;as instructed to present the Committee with a more precise breakdown. The dialogue continued: “Senator Bible. Do you have a breakdown for the Indians on the reservations and the number beyond Indian reservations? Can you give me figures on that? “Mr. Bruce. Yes. “Senator Bible. All right. What are they? “Mr. Bruce. 477,000 on or near. “Senator Bible. 477,000 on or near, and we still don’t know what near is ... . “Now on or near. Beyond the 477,000 Indians on reservations or near a reservation, you have no further jurisdiction over Indians? “Mr. Bruce. That is right. “Senator Bible. That is your total responsibility? “Mr. Bruce. That is our total responsibility. “Senator Bible. Of the money that is in this budget, the $408 million, how much of that will be expended within the reservations and how much beyond the reservations? “Mr. Bruce. Our total budget is to be spent for the benefit of reservation Indians. “Senator Bible. You are still tripping me up on that on or near business. I wish you would define that.” [At this point there was an exchange as to whether BIA services' extend to Indians living in Chicago and other urban areas.] “Senator Bible. . . . Now how many urban Indians do we have? “Mr. Bruce. We are talking about more than 250,000. “Senator Bible. 250,000? “Mr. Bruce. Yes. “Senator Bible. That is over and above the 477,458? “Mr. Bruce. That is right. “Senator Bible. And these are the difficulties that you have encountered in also a rather lengthy resume of some of the services that you perform for them as to your responsibility for the 250,000. “Where do you find these 250,000 nonreservation Indians? “Mr. Bruce. Living in urban cities — Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Denver, Minneapolis.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1972, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 751-756 (1971). Although most of these passages refer to the BIA’s overall jurisdiction and not to the scope of the general assistance program, there is nothing to indicate that general assistance would not be made available for all within the service area. Unlike programs such as law enforcement and land projects, géneral assistance is not tied inherently or logically to the physical boundaries of the reservation. And programs, such as relocation, that explicitly extend beyond the reservation are not limited to “on or near.” So it is difficult to ascertain precisely what relevance the “on or near” category would have if it did not relate to programs such as general assistance. Nowhere in the hearings had the BIA ever indicated which non-land-oriented programs are available to those “on” as opposed to those “on or near,” and the only conclusion that is to be drawn from the representations to Congress is that those Indians who fit the “on or near” category are eligible for all BIA services not directly tied to the physical boundaries. Thus, the usual practice of the BIA has been to represent to Congress that “on or near” is the equivalent of “on” for purposes of welfare service eligibility, and that the successive budget requests were for a universe of Indians living “on or near” and not just for those living directly “on.” In addition, the BIA has continually treated persons “off” the reservations as not “on or near.” In the light of this rather consistent legislative history, it is understandable that the Secretary now argues that general assistance has not been available to those “off” the reservation. We do not accept the argument, however, that the history indicates that general assistance was thereby restricted to those within the physical boundaries. To the contrary, that history clearly shows that Congress was led to believe that the programs were being made available to those unassimilated needy Indians living near the reservation as well as to those living “on.” Certainly, a fair reading of the congressional proceedings up to and including the fiscal 1968 hearing can lead only to the conclusion that Indians situated near the reservation, such as the Ruizes, were covered by the authorization. D. Wholly aside from this appropriation subcommittee legislative history, the Secretary suggests that Congress, each year since 1952, appropriated only in accord with the “on reservations” limitation contained in the BIA Manual. By legislating annually “in the light of [this] clear provision,” the Secretary argues, Congress implicitly ratified the BIA policy. This argument, also, is not convincing. The limitation has not been published in the Federal Register or in the Code of Federal Regulations, and there is nothing in the legislative history to show.that the Manual's provision was brought to the subcommittees’ attention, let alone to the entire Congress. To assume that Congress was aware of this provision, contained only in an internally circulated BIA document, would be most strained. But, even assuming that Congress was fully cognizant of the Manual’s limitation when the 1958 appropriation was made, the language of geographic restriction in the Manual must be considered in conjunction with the representations consistently made. There is no reason to assume that Congress did not equate the “on reservations” language with the “on or near” category that continuously was described as the service area. In the light of the Manual’s particular inclusion of Oklahoma and Alaska off-reservation Indians, it would seem that this interpretation of the provision would have been the logical one for anyone in Congress, who in fact was aware of it, to accept. V A. Having found that the congressional appropriation was intended to cover welfare services at least to those Indians residing “on or near” the reservation, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary is without power to create reasonable classifications and eligibility requirements in order to allocate the limited funds available to him for this purpose. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). Thus, if there were only enough funds appropriated to provide meaningfully for 10,000 needy Indian beneficiaries and the entire class of eligible beneficiaries numbered 20,000, it would be incumbent upon the BIA to develop an eligibility standard to deal with this problem, and the standard, if rational and proper, might leave some of the class otherwise encompassed by the appropriation without benefits. But in such a case the agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to assure that it is being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries. Assuming, arguendo, that the Secretary rationally could limit the “on or near” appropriation to include only the smaller class of Indians who lived directly “on” the reservation plus those in Alaska and Oklahoma, the question that remains is whether this has been validly accomplished. The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. In the area of Indian affairs, the Executive has long been empowered to promulgate rules and policies, and the power has been given explicitly to the Secretary and his delegates at the BIA. This agency power to make rules that affect substantial individual rights and obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent with the governing legislation, FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726 (1973); Dixon v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965); Brannan v. Stark, 342 U. S. 451 (1952), but also to employ procedures that conform to the law. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion). No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a particular decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the dispenser of the funds. The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to provide, inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations. See generally S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1945); H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 21-23 (1946). That Act states in pertinent part: “Each Agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public— (D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.” 5 U. S. C. §552 (a)(1). The sanction added in 1967 by Pub. L. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, provides: “Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely, notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.” Ibid. In the instant case the BIA itself has recognized the necessity of formally publishing its substantive policies and has placed itself under the structure of the APA procedures. The 1968 introduction to the Manual reads: “Code of Federal Regulations: Directives which relate to the public, including Indians, are published in the Federal Register and codified in 25 Code of Federal Regulations (25 CFR). These directives inform the public of privileges and benefits available ; eligibility qualifications, requirements and procedures; and of appeal rights and procedures. They are published in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Director of the Federal Register and the Administrative Procedure Act as amended. . . . “Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual: Policies, procedures, and instructions which do not relate to the public but are required to govern the operations of the Bureau are published in the Bureau of Indian Affairs Manual.” 0 BIAM 1.2. Unlike numerous other programs authorized by the Snyder Act and funded by the annual appropriations, the BIA has chosen not to publish its eligibility requirements for general assistance in the Federal Register or in the CFR. This continues to the present time. The only official manifestation of this alleged policy of restricting general assistance to those directly on the reservations is the material in the Manual which is, by BIA’s own admission, solely an internal-operations brochure intended to cover policies that “do not relate to the public.” Indeed, at oral argument the Government conceded that for this to be a “real legislative rule,” itself endowed with the force of law, it should be published in the Federal Register. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required. Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363, 388 (1957); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535, 539-540 (1959). The BIA, by its Manual, has declared that all directives that “inform the public of privileges and benefits available” and of “eligibility requirements” are among those to be published. The requirement that, in order to receive general assistance, an Indian must reside directly “on” a reservation is clearly an important substantive policy that fits within this class of directives. Before the BIA may extinguish the entitlement of these otherwise eligible beneficiaries, it must comply, at a minimum, with its own internal procedures. The Secretary has presented no reason why the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act could not or should not have been met. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202 (1947). The BIA itself has not attempted to defend its rule as a valid exercise of its “legislative power,” but rather depends on the argument that Congress itself has not appropriated funds for Indians not directly on the reservations. The conscious choice of the Secretary not to treat this extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians, as a legislative-type rule, renders it ineffective so far as extinguishing rights of those otherwise within the class of beneficiaries contemplated by Congress is concerned. The overriding duty of our Federal Government to deal fairly with Indians wherever located has been recognized by this Court on many occasions. See, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942); Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705 (1943). Particularly here, where the BIA has continually represented to Congress, when seeking funds, that Indians living near reservations are within the service area, it is essential that the legitimate expectation of these needy Indians not be extinguished by what amounts to an unpublished ad hoc determination of the agency that was not promulgated in accordance with its own procedures, to say nothing of those of the Administrative Procedure Act. The denial of benefits to these respondents under such circumstances is inconsistent with “the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.” Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S., at 296; see Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1 (1956). Before benefits may be denied to these otherwise entitled Indians, the BIA must first promulgate eligibility requirements according to established procedures. B. Even assuming the lack of binding effect of the BIA policy, the Secretary argues that the residential restriction in the Manual is a longstanding interpretation of the Snyder Act by the agency best suited to do this, and that deference is due its interpretation. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 433-434 (1971). The thrust of this argument is not that the regulation itself has created the “on” and “near” distinction, but that Congress has intended to provide general assistance only to those directly on reservations, and that the Manual's provision is simply an interpretation of congressional intent. As we have already noted, however, the BIA, through its own practices and representations, has led Congress to believe that these appropriations covered Indians “on or near” the reservations, and it is too late now to argue that the words “on reservations” in the Manual mean something different from “on or near” when, in fact, the two have been continuously equated by the BIA to Congress. We have recognized previously that the weight of an administrative interpretation will depend, among other things, upon “its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements” of an agency. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). See generally 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 5.03-5.06 (1958 ed. and Supp. 1970). In this instance the BIA’s somewhat inconsistent posture belies its present assertion. In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent with the congressional purpose. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U. S. 86 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). It is evident to us that Congress did not itself intend to limit its authorization to only those Indians directly on, in contrast to those “near,” the reservation, and that, therefore, the BIA's interpretation must fail. We emphasize that our holding does not, as was suggested at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 3, 5, and in the Brief for Petitioner 2, make general assistance available to all Indians “throughout the country.” Even respondents do not claim this much. Brief for Respondents 23; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. The appropriation, as we see it, was for Indians “on or near” the reservation. This is broad enough, we hold, to include the Ruizes who live where they found employment in an Indian community only a few miles from their reservation, who maintain their close economic and social ties with that reservation, and who are unassimilated. The parameter of their class will be determined, to the extent necessary, by the District Court on remand of the case. Whether other persons qualify for general assistance will be left to cases that arise in the future. In view of our disposition of the statutory issue, we do not reach the respondents’ constitutional arguments. We intimate no views as to them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Papago Indian Reservation was established by Executive Orders Nos. 2300 and 2524, S. Doc. No. 53, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1008 and 1005, promulgated January 14, 1916, and February 1, 1917, respectively. Later adjustments therein appear to have been effected by the Act of June 28, 1926, 44 Stat. 775; by the Act of Feb. 21, 1931, 46 Stat. 1202; by the Act of July 28, 1937, 50 Stat. 536, 25 U. S. C. §§ 463a-463c; and by the Act of June 13, 1939, 53 Stat. 819. See also the Act of June 18, 1934, § 3, 48 Stat. 984; the Act of May 27, 1955, 69 Stat. 67; and 25 U. S. C. § 463. See Papago Tribe v. United States, 19 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 394, 433-434 (1968). Ajo is located within the borders of the Papago aboriginal tribal land. The Indian Claims Commission has found that this land was taken from the Papagos by the United States. Id., at 422-423, 426. The following material in the record indicates the close ties retained by the Ajo Indians with the Papago Reservation: “[M]any of the Papagos [in the Indian Village at Ajo] still maintain and frequently visit homes on the reservation. Many still have cattle there and some even farm there. During the summer many wives and children spend long periods of time living on the reservation. Many of the miners attend reservation dances and other ceremonies, driving to the reservation after work ends in the afternoon and returning early the next morning to Ajo. Some miners still vote in the district elections on the reservation and many seek medical care there. Through the years many of the miners who have either been fired or laid off have returned to the reservation. Thus even some of the most ‘acculturated’ Ajo Indians still maintain very close ties to the reservation. . . . “During the prolonged strike of copper miners these ties were frequently strengthened and even extended. During this time of crisis, the members of the Indian Community often used the reservation as a place of refuge and occasionally as a source of food, money, and medical care.” Affidavit of Larry R. Stucki, submitted in support of the respondents’ motion for summary judgment. App. 84, 86-87. As to the Ruizes in particular, it is said: “[T]he whole family returned to South Komelik [on the reservation] during the whole month of August, 1967, and . . . they returned to South Komelik once or twice a month during the remainder of the strike, staying in Ajo only because one child, Mary Ann, was still attending school there. “Ramon Ruiz . . . still maintained his home in South Komelik and ... he planned to return there in 4 years when he retires. He had never thought of Ajo as being his real home. His poor command of the English language, in spite of having lived in Ajo for 28 years, tended to confirm this. His son did much of the talking and interpreted for his father frequently .... [W]hen the Ruiz[es’] other son was killed in military service in Viet Nam, funeral services were held by the family in the church in Sells [on the reservation], “. . . The siren song of the reservation, in most cases, prevents the complete severance of the umbilical cord to the homeland of these people.” Id., at 87. Mr. Ruiz so stated at the hearing referred to, injra, before the BIA Area Director. App. 11, 16. Mrs. Ruiz at the same hearing stated that she worked about eight hours a week for $1 an hour. App. 19. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-233.A.4 (Supp. 1971-1972) reflecting the amendment by Laws 1962, c. 117, § 23. See also Graham, v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Striking workers, however, are eligible for the State’s Surplus Commodities Distribution Program. Mr. Ruiz was certified under this program for two successive 90-day periods. App. 49-50. The Manual provides in pertinent part: “3.1 General Assistance. “.1 Purpose. The purpose of the general assistance program is to provide necessary financial assistance to needy Indian families and persons living on reservations under the jurisdiction of this Bureau and in jurisdictions under the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Alaska and Oklahoma. “A Eligibility Conditions. “A. Residence. Eligibility for general assistance is limited to Indians living on reservations and in jurisdictions under the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Alaska and Oklahoma.” The Snyder Act reads in full as follows: “The Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States for the following purposes: “General support and civilization, including education. “For relief of distress and conservation of health. “For industrial assistance and advancement and general administration of Indian property. “For extension, improvement, operation, and maintenance of existing Indian irrigation systems and for development of water supplies. “For the enlargement, extension, improvement and repair of the buildings and grounds of existing plants and projects. “For the employment of inspectors, supervisors, superintendents, clerks, field matrons, farmers, physicians, Indian police, Indian judges, and other employees. “For the suppression of traffic in intoxicating liquor and deleterious drugs. “For the purchase of horse-drawn and motor-propelled passenger-carrying vehicles for official use. “And for general and incidental expenses in connection with the administration of Indian affairs.” See, for example, the Appropriations Act for fiscal 1967, Pub. L. 89-435, 80 Stat. 170, 171 (1966); the Act for fiscal 1966, Pub. L. 89-52, 79 Stat. 174, 175 (1965); and the Act for fiscal 1965, Pub. L. 88-356, 78 Stat. 273, 274 (1964). See the Appropriations Act for fiscal 1969, Pub. L. 90-425, 82 Stat. 425, 427 (1968); the Act for fiscal 1970, Pub. L. 91-98, 83 Stat. 147, 148 (1969); the Act for fiscal 1971, Pub. L. 91-361, 84 Stat. 669, 670 (1970); the Act for fiscal 1972, Pub. L. 92-76, 85 Stat. 229, 230 (1971); the Act for fiscal 1973, Pub. L. 92-369, 86 Stat. 508, 509 (1972); and the Act for fiscal 1974, Pub. L. 93-120, 87 Stat. 429, 430-431 (1973). A critic of the Act (who also represented the Ruizes in the administrative proceedings) describes it as follows: “The Synder Act is a familiar and somewhat distressing occurrence in the history of Indian affairs. As in other instances, Congress enacted a very general measure and left the rest up to the Secretary of the Interior and the BIA. The result is that the structure of the welfare system is the BIA’s own creation. The regulatory scheme is contained in the departmental manual which remains inaccessible except to a few social workers and persistent attorneys.” Wolf, Needed: A System of Income Maintenance for Indians, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 597, 607-608 (1968) (footnote omitted). See, for example, 42 U. S. C. § 1352 (b) (2). An Indian thus is entitled to social security and state welfare benefits equally with other citizens of the State. State ex rel. Williams v. Kamp, 106 Mont. 444, 449, 78 P. 2d 585, 587 (1938); U. S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 287, 516 (1958); Wolf, n. 10, supra, at 599. Hearings on the Department of the Interior and/or related agencies appropriations before subcommittees of the Senate or House Committee on Appropriations will be hereinafter merely identified as to branch of Congress, fiscal year, and number and session of Congress. The hearings for the preceding four years disclose identically worded requests. House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 255 (1966), and Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 267 (1966); House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 747-748 (1965), and Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 653 (1965); House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1965, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 775 (1964); Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1965, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 148 (1964); House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 844 (1963), and Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 70 (1963). The BIA’s limitation in practice surfaced at many hearings. See, for example, the testimony of Assistant Commissioner Gifford in 1959: “I believe the question comes up concerning Indians living off the reservation and who are in need not for these categories but for other types of assistance. In many cases the States and counties say that those Indians ought to be the responsibility of the Bureau of Indian Affairs; that they do not have sufficient funds to take care of them. We have never included in our request for welfare appropriations funds to take care of the needs of those Indians living off the reservation.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 801 (1959) (emphasis supplied). See also Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1959, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 291 (1958); Senate Hearings,, Fiscal Year 1952, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 372 (1951); Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1950, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 592 (1949); Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1948, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 598-599 (1947); Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1942, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 160-162, 465-466 (1941). The bills referred to were H. R. 9621, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), and H. R. 6279, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Each provided that benefits would be available to all Indians in certain named States, and that the Government would reimburse the State for a percentage of the latter’s contribution under the several categorical assistance programs. The failure of these bills can be ascribed just as easily, of course, to the rather arbitrary selection of States, to the specific percentage designated, or to a reluctance to provide for all Indians (rural or urban, assimilated or nonassimi-lated), as to the increase over the lesser group then being serviced. See United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962); Order of Railway Conductors v. Swan, 329 U. S. 520, 529 (1947). See, for example, Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 302 (1966) (statement of Commissioner Nash); Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1959, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 293 (1958) (statement of Deputy Commissioner Greenwood). House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1961, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 508-510 (1960) (statement of Commissioner Emmons); Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1967, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 298-301 (1966). Identical language, apart from the population figures, appeared in later BIA budget requests. See, for example, House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1962, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 116 (1961). The next year the Commissioner made the following statement as to the scope of the BIA service area: “We have a need for services for 380,000 people. This includes those who are living directly on the reservations, and those who are living very close, so that the way in which they live affects reservations programs. They move back and forth, et cetera. We call this our ‘Federal service to Indian population’ and it is larger this year than last.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1964, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 889 (1963) (emphasis supplied). In the formal budget presented for fiscal 1966 the Commissioner introduced his statement with the following representation: “We are a modern service bureau, serving about 380,000 Indian persons and Alaska natives who live on or near reservations in 25 States. The services we perform are basically of three types.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Cong., 1st Sess,, 637 (1965) (emphasis supplied). The third type there described consisted of welfare programs. The following year the Commissioner introduced his budget request with this statement: “We are a modern service Bureau, serving as many as 400,000 Indians and Alaskan natives who live on or near reservations— people who find themselves isolated from the mainstream of American life — existing in poverty. In keeping with the general governmental policy of attacking the causes of poverty and the lack of salable skills, the objective of the Bureau of Indian Affairs is to coordinate Federal programs and programs of State and local agencies which will improve educational, economic, social and political opportunities of Indians.” House Hearings, Fiscal Year 1969, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 575 (1968); Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1969, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 368 (1968) (emphasis supplied). The following additional information was supplied: ‘‘Population data “The statistical figure given for Indians living on and adjacent to reservations is based upon residence, and includes the following groups. The figures are for March 1970; “(a) 306,900 Indians resident within Federal reservation boundaries, excluding Alaska and Oklahoma, which are discussed below. “(b) 32,600 Indians resident nearby, who may receive services because of their proximity and mobility. For example, Indians working in nearby towns frequently maintain close contact with reservation people and affairs; they may visit the reservation or return temporarily or permanently. Other Indians live on public domain allotments outside the reservation boundaries. The distance of such places is not spelled out, but depends on the extent of contact. Distant members of the tribe are not counted, although they may be carried on the tribal roll or the tribal census. See also comments below on the Navajo area. “(c) 81,200 Indians resident in former reservation areas of Okla- • homa. (This includes Osage, which has some attributes of a reservation.) “ (d) 56,800 Alaska natives resident in Alaska. This includes Aleuts, and Eskimos as well as Indians.” Senate Hearings, Fiscal Year 1972, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 752-753 (1971). See n. 3, supra. Beginning with the fiscal 1973 hearings, there appeared a wide outpouring for BIA assistance for urban Indians. In the Appropriations Committee Report to the Senate for fiscal 1973, submitted by Senator Bible, the following language appears, indicating the Senate’s earlier understanding that although the BIA program did not cover urban Indians, it did cover those “on or near” the reservations: “The Committee directs that the Secretary prepare a plan to assure Bureau of Indian Affairs type services to all Indians in the United States — rather than just to those living 'on or near reservations.’” S. Rep. No. 92-921, p. 6 (1972). This conception as to the BIA’s jurisdiction seems not to have been limited to Congress. Curiously enough, in the application, filed with this Court, for an extension of time within which to file the petition for certiorari in this case, the Solicitor General thus described the litigation: “The court of appeals has held in this case that Indian welfare benefits administered by the Department of the Interior under the Snyder Act of 1921, 25 U. S. C. 13, must be provided not only to Indians living on or near reservations, as has been the practice of the Department of the Interior for many years, but must also be made available to Indians residing anywhere in the country” (emphasis supplied). “The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for the settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs.” 25 U. S. C. § 9. This provision relates back to the Act of June 30, 1834, § 17, 4 Stat. 738. “The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian relations.” 25 U. S. C. § 2. This relates back to the Act of July 9, 1832, § 1, 4 Stat. 564. The Snyder Act provides: “The Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, shall direct, supervise, and expend such moneys as Congress may from time to time appropriate . . . 25 U. S. C. § 13. The House report accompanying this provision stated: “An added incentive for agencies to publish the necessary details about their official activities in the Federal Register is the provision that no person shall be 'adversely affected' by material required to be published — or incorporated by reference — in the Federal Register but not so published.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1966). See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1965); S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1964). Title 25 CFR (1973), on the subject of “Indians,” contains regulations and sets forth eligibility requirements for law-and-order programs (pt. 11); care of Indian children in contract schools (pt. 22); federal schools for Indians (pt. 31); administration of educational loans, grants and other assistance for higher education (pt. 32); enrollment of Indians in public schools (pt. 33); administration of a program of vocational training for adult Indians (pt. 34).; and general credit to Indians (pt. 91). The only reference to welfare activities is Subchapter D, entitled “Social Welfare” and comprising pts. 21 and 22. Part 21 relates to the program under which the Commissioner “may negotiate with State, territory, county or other Federal welfare agencies for such agencies to provide welfare services as contemplated” by 25 U. S. C. § 452. The regulations state that the program applies to “Indians residing within a particular State within the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or on trust or restricted lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” 25 CFR § 21.1 (1973). But see 25 U, S. C. § 309 and 25 CFR § 34.3, where vocational training for adult Indians is also made available “to additional Indians who reside near reservations in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior when the failure to provide the services would have a direct effect upon Bureau programs within the reservation boundaries” (emphasis supplied). See also 25 CFR § 31.1. The phrase “within the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,” when read in conjunction with the BIA’s declared jurisdiction before Congress, would seem to include Indians living “near” the reservations. In any event, the cited regulations do not deal with the general assistance program. There is nothing in the Code indicating that a general assistance program exists, to say nothing of the absence of eligibility criteria.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al. No. 05-1120. Argued November 29, 2006 Decided April 2, 2007 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 535. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 549. James R. Milkey, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, Lisa Heinzerling, Special Assistant Attorney General, and William L. Pardee and Carol Iancu, Assistant Attorneys General, Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General of New Jersey, Michael Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, and Scott Pasternack, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Ralph S. Tyler, City Solicitor of Baltimore, and William Phelan, Jr., Joseph Mendelson III, John M. Stanton, David Doniger, David Bookbinder, and Howard Fox, and by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Marc N. Melnick and Nicholas Stern, Deputy Attorneys General, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Kimberly Massicotte and Matthew Levin, Assistant Attorneys General, Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, Donna Murasky, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Matthew J. Dunn and Gerald T. Karr, Assistant Attorneys General, G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General of Maine, Gerald D. Reid, Assistant Attorney General, Stuart Rabner, Attorney General of New Jersey, Stefanie A. Brand, Kevin P. Auerbacher, and Lisa Morelli, Deputy Attorneys General, Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico, Stuart M. Bluestone, Deputy Attorney General, Stephen R. Ferris and Judith Ann Moore, Assistant Attorneys General, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, Caitlin J. Halligan, Solicitor General, Peter Lehner and J. Jared Snyder, Assistant Attorneys General, Hardy Myers, Attorney General of Oregon, Philip Schradle, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Richard Whitman, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Trida K. Jedele, Special Assistant Attorney General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, Kevin O. Leske, Assistant Attorney General, Rob McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, Leslie R. Seffern, Assistant Attorney General, Jay D. Geek, Deputy Solicitor General, and Mala,etasi M. Togafau, Attorney General of American Samoa. Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for the federal respondent were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wooldridge, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Malcolm L. Stewart, Jon M. Lipshultz, and Carol S. Holmes. Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, filed a brief for respondent State of Michigan. With him on the brief were Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Alan F. Hoffman and Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorneys General, and the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective States as follows: David W. Márquez, Attorney General of Alaska, Phil Kline, Attorney General of Kansas, David W. Davies, Deputy Attorney General, Jon C. Bruning, Attorney General of Nebraska, David D. Cookson, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, Natalee J. Hart, Assistant Attorney General, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General of North Dakota, Lyle Witham, Assistant Attorney General, Jim Petro, Attorney General of Ohio, Dale T. Vitale, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General of South Dakota, Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Karen W. Kornell and Jane Atwood, Assistant Attorneys General, and Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, and Fred G. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General. Theodore B. Olson, Miguel A. Estrada, David Debold, Matthew D. McGill, Kenneth W. Starr, Stuart A. C. Drake, Andrew B. Clubok, and Ashley C. Parrish filed a brief for respondent Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers et al. Russell S. Frye, Leslie A. Hulse, Richard Wasserstrom, Harry M. Ng, Ralph J. Colleli, Jr., Nick Goldstein, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, Robin S. Conrad, and John L. Wittenborn filed a brief for respondent C02 Litigation Group. Norman W Fichthorn and Allison D. Wood filed a brief for respondent Utility Air Regulatory Group. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Arizona et al. by Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, Paula S. Bickett, Chief Counsel, Joseph P. Mikitish, Assistant Attorney General, and Amy J. Wildermuth, and by Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Mike Hatch, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Peggy A Lautenschlager, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Thomas J. Dawson, Assistant Attorney General; for the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council et al. by Frances M. Raskin; for Aspen Skiing Co. by Edward T, Ramey and Blain D. Myhre; for Calpine Corp. by Richard E. Ayres; for the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A. et al. by Fran M. Layton; for Ocean and Coastal Conservation Interests by Patrick A Parenteau; for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Timothy J. Dowling; for Wildlife Conservation Interests by John F. Kostyack; for Madeleine K. Albright by Kathleen M. Sullivan; for Climate Scientist David Battisti et al. by Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Stephanie Tai, and John C. Dernbach; and for Former EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner et al. by Deborah A Sivas, Michael C. Davis, and Barry S. Neuman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Peter S. Glaser; for Climatologist and Scientist Sallie Bahúnas et al. by Sam Kazman, Hans Bader, and Christopher C. Horner; for William J. Baumol et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Russell R. Eggert, and Erika Z. Jones; for Ernest L. Daman et al. by Martin S. Kaufman; and for William H. Taft IV by Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Delaware by Carl C. Danberg, Attorney General, Lawrence Lewis, State Solicitor, and Kevin Maloney, Robert Phillips, and Valerie Csizmadia, Deputy Attorneys General; for the Cato Institute et al. by Timothy Lynch; for Entergy Corp. by Elise N. Zoli, U. Gwyn Williams, Kevin P. Martin, and Chuck D. Barlow; for the North Coast Rivers Alliance et al. by Stephan C. Volker; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper; for the Union for Jobs and the Environment by Scott H. Segal, Jason B. Hutt, and Shelby J. Kelley; for Robert H. Bork et al. by David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A Casey, and Darin R. Bartram; and for Jerome B. Carr by Albert Auburn. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected heat. It is therefore a species — the most important species — of a “greenhouse gas.” Calling global warming “the most pressing environmental challenge of our time,” a group of States, local governments, and private organizations alleged in a petition for certiorari that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide. Specifically, petitioners asked us to answer two questions concerning the meaning of § 202(a)(1) of the Act: whether EPA has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles; and if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are consistent with the statute. In response, EPA, supported by . 10 intervening States and six trade associations, correctly argued that we may not address those two questions unless at least one petitioner has standing to invoke our jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the serious character of that jurisdictional argument and the absence of any conflicting decisions construing § 202(a)(1), the unusual importance of the underlying issue persuaded us to grant the writ. 548 U. S. 903 (2006). I Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, as added by Pub. L. 89-272, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 992, and as amended by, inter alia, 84 Stat. 1690 and 91 Stat. 791, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), provides: “The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare .. . .” The Act defines “air pollutant” to include “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” § 7602(g). “Welfare” is also defined broadly: among other things, it includes “effects on . . . weather . . . and climate.” § 7602(h). When Congress enacted these provisions, the study of climate change was in its infancy. In 1959, shortly after the U. S. Weather Bureau began monitoring atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, an observatory in Mauna Loa, Hawaii, recorded a mean level of 316 parts per million. This was well above the highest carbon dioxide concentration — no more than 300 parts per million — revealed in the 420,000-year-old ice-core record. By the time Congress drafted § 202(a)(1) in 1970, carbon dioxide levels had reached 325 parts per million. In the late 1970’s, the Federal Government began devoting serious attention to the possibility that carbon dioxide emissions associated with human activity could provoke climate change. In 1978, Congress enacted the National Climate Program Act, 92 Stat. 601, which required the President to establish a program to “assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to natural and man-induced climate processes and their implications,” id., § 3. . President Carter, in turn, asked the National Research Council, the working arm of the National Academy of Sciences, to investigate the subject. The Council’s response was unequivocal: “If carbon dioxide continues to increase, the study group finds no reason to doubt that climate changes will result and no reason to believe that these changes will be negligible. ... A wait- and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too late.” Congress next addressed the issue in 1987, when it enacted the Global Climate Protection Act, Title XI of Pub. L. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1407, note following 15 U. S. C. § 2901. Finding that “manmade pollution — the release of carbon dioxide, chlorofluoroearbons, methane, and other trace gases into the atmosphere — may be producing a long-term and substantial increase in the average temperature on Earth,” §1102(1), 101 Stat. 1408, Congress directed EPA to propose to Congress a “coordinated national policy on global climate change,” § 1103(b), and ordered the Secretary of State to work “through the channels of multilateral diplomacy” and coordinate diplomatic efforts to combat global warming, § 1103(c). Congress emphasized that “ongoing pollution and deforestation may be contributing now to an irreversible process” and that “[njecessary actions must be identified and implemented in time to protect the climate.” § 1102(4). Meanwhile, the scientific understanding of climate change progressed. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a multinational scientific body organized under the auspices of the United Nations, published its first comprehensive report on the topic. Drawing on expert opinions from across the globe, the IPCC concluded that “emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of . . . greenhouse gases [which] will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface.” Responding to the IPCC report, the United Nations convened the “Earth Summit” in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. The first President Bush attended and signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a nonbinding agreement among 154 nations to reduce atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases for the purpose of “preventing] dangerous anthropogenic [i. e., human-induced] interference with the [Earth’s] climate system.” S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, Art. 2, p. 5,1771 U. N. T. S. 107 (1992). The Senate unanimously ratified the treaty. Some five years later — after the IPCC issued a second comprehensive report in 1995 concluding that “[t]he balance of evidence suggests there is a discernible human influence on global climate” — the UNFCCC signatories met in Kyoto, Japan, and adopted a protocol that assigned mandatory targets for industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Because those targets did not apply to developing and heavily polluting nations such as China and India, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution expressing its sense that the United States should not enter into the Kyoto Protocol. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25, 1997) (as passed). President Clinton did not submit the protocol to the Senate for ratification. II On October 20, 1999, a group of 19 private organizations filed a rulemaking petition asking EPA to regulate “greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.” App. 5. Petitioners maintained that 1998 was the “warmest year on record”; that carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are “heat trapping greenhouse gases”; that greenhouse gas emissions have significantly accelerated climate change; and that the IPCC’s 1995 report warned that “carbon dioxide remains the most important contributor to [manmade] forcing of climate change.” Id., at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). The petition further alleged that climate change will have serious adverse effects on human health and the environment. Id., at 22-35. As to EPA’s statutory authority, the petition observed that the Agency itself had already confirmed that it had the power to regulate carbon dioxide. See id., at 18, n. 21. In 1998, Jonathan Z. Cannon, then EPA’s general counsel, prepared a legal opinion concluding that “C02 emissions are within the scope of EPA’s authority to regulate,” even as he recognized that EPA had so far declined to exercise that authority. Id., at 54 (memorandum to Carol M. Browner, Administrator (Apr. 10,1998) (hereinafter Cannon memorandum)). Cannon’s successor, Gary S. Guzy, reiterated that opinion before a congressional committee just two weeks before the rulemaking petition was filed. See id., at 61. Fifteen months after the petition's submission, EPA requested public comment on “all the issues raised in [the] petition,” adding a “particular” request for comments on “any scientific, technical, legal, economic or other aspect of these issues that may be relevant to EPA’s consideration of this petition.” 66 Fed. Reg. 7486, 7487 (2001). EPA received more than 50,000 comments over the next five months. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52924 (2003). Before the close of the comment period, the White House sought “assistance in identifying the areas in the science of climate change where there are the greatest certainties and uncertainties” from the National Research Council, asking for a response “as soon as possible.” App. 213. The result was a 2001 report titled Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions (NRC Report), which, drawing heavily on the 1995 IPCC report, concluded that “[greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising.” NRC Report 1. On September 8, 2003, EPA entered an order denying the rulemaking petition. 68 Fed. Reg. 52922. The Agency gave two reasons for its decision: (1) that contrary to the opinions of its former general counsels, the Clean Air Act does not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change, see id., at 52925-52929; and (2) that even if the Agency had the authority to set greenhouse gas emission standards, it would be unwise to do so at this time, id., at 52929-52931. In concluding that it lacked statutory authority over greenhouse gases, EPA observed that Congress “was well aware of the global climate change issue when it last comprehensively amended the [Clean Air Act] in 1990,” yet it declined to adopt a proposed amendment establishing binding emissions limitations. Id., at 52926. Congress instead chose to authorize further investigation into climate change. Ibid, (citing §§ 103(g) and 602(e) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2652, 2703, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7403(g)(1) and 7671a(e)). EPA further reasoned that Congress’ “specially tailored solutions to global atmospheric issues,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52926 — in particular, its 1990 enactment of a comprehensive scheme to regulate pollutants that depleted the ozone layer, see Title VI, 104 Stat. 2649, 42 U. S. C. §§7671-7671q — counseled against reading the general authorization of § 202(a)(1) to confer regulatory authority over greenhouse gases. EPA stated that it was “urged on in this view,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52928, by this Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 (2000). In that case, relying on “tobacco[’s] unique political history,” id., at 159, we invalidated the Food and Drug Administration’s reliance on its general authority to regulate drugs as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over an “industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy,” ibid. EPA reasoned that climate change had its own “political history”: Congress designed the original Clean Air Act to address local air pollutants rather than a substance that “is fairly consistent in its concentration throughout the world’s atmosphere,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52927; declined in 1990 to enact proposed amendments to force EPA to set carbon dioxide emission standards for motor vehicles, ibid, (citing H. R. 5966, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)); and addressed global climate change in other legislation, 68 Fed. Reg. 52927. Because of this political history, and because imposing emission limitations on greenhouse gases would have even greater economic and political repercussions than regulating tobacco, EPA was persuaded that it lacked the power to do so. Id., at 52928. In essence, EPA concluded that climate change was so important that unless Congress spoke with exacting specificity, it could not have meant the Agency to address it. Having reached that conclusion, EPA believed it followed that greenhouse gases cannot be “air pollutants” within the meaning of the Act. See ibid. (“It follows from this conclusion, that [greenhouse gases], as such, are not air pollutants under the [Clean Air Act’s] regulatory provisions . . . ”). The Agency bolstered this conclusion by explaining that if carbon dioxide were an air pollutant, the only feasible method of reducing tailpipe emissions would be to improve fuel economy. But because Congress has already created detailed mandatory fuel economy standards subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) administration, the Agency concluded that EPA regulation would either conflict with those standards or be superfluous. Id., at 52929. Even assuming that it had authority over greenhouse gases, EPA explained in detail why it would refuse to exercise that authority. The Agency began by recognizing that the concentration of greenhouse gases has dramatically increased as a result of human activities, and acknowledged the attendant increase in global surface air temperatures. Id., at 52930. EPA nevertheless gave controlling importance to the NRC Report’s statement that a causal link between the two “‘cannot be unequivocally established.’” Ibid, (quoting NRC Report 17). Given that residual uncertainty, EPA concluded that regulating greenhouse gas emissions would be unwise. 68 Fed. Reg. 52930. The Agency furthermore characterized any EPA regulation of motor-vehicle emissions as a “piecemeal approach” to climate change, id., at 52931, and stated that such regulation would conflict with the President’s “comprehensive approach” to the problem, ibid. That approach involves additional support for technological innovation, the creation of nonregulatory programs to encourage voluntary private-sector reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, and further research on climate change — not actual regulation. Id., at 52932-52933. According to EPA, unilateral EPA regulation of motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper the President’s ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Id., at 52931. III Petitioners, now joined by intervenor States and local governments, sought review of EPA’s order in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Although each of the three judges on the panel wrote a separate opinion, two judges agreed “that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rule making.” 415 F. 3d 50, 58 (2005). The court therefore denied the petition for review. In his opinion announcing the court’s judgment, Judge Randolph avoided a definitive ruling as to petitioners’ standing, id., at 56, reasoning that it was permissible to proceed to the merits because the standing and the merits inquiries “overlapped],” ibid. Assuming without deciding that the statute authorized the EPA Administrator to regulate greenhouse gas emissions that “in his judgment” may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1), Judge Randolph concluded that the exercise of that judgment need not be based solely on scientific evidence, but may also be informed by the sort of policy judgments that motivate congressional action. 415 F. 3d, at 58. Given that framework, it was reasonable for EPA to base its decision on scientific uncertainty as well as on other factors, including the concern that unilateral regulation of U. S. motor-vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from other countries. Ibid. Judge Sentelle wrote separately because he believed petitioners failed to “demonstrate] the element of injury necessary to establish standing under Article III.” Id., at 59 (opinion dissenting in part and concurring in judgment). In his view, they had alleged that global warming is “harmful to humanity at large,” but could not allege “particularized injuries” to themselves. Id., at 60 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 562 (1992)). While he dissented on standing, however, he accepted the contrary view as the law of the case and joined Judge Randolph’s judgment on the merits as the closest to that which he preferred. 415 F. 3d, at 60-61. Judge Tatel dissented. Emphasizing that EPA nowhere challenged the factual basis of petitioners’ affidavits, id., at 66, he concluded that at least Massachusetts had “satisfied each element of Article III standing — injury, causation, and redressability,” id., at 64. In Judge Tatel’s view, the “‘substantial probability,’” id., at 66, that projected rises in sea level would lead to serious loss of coastal property was a “far cry” from the kind of generalized harm insufficient to ground Article III jurisdiction. Id., at 65. He found that petitioners’ affidavits more than adequately supported the conclusion that EPA’s failure to curb greenhouse gas emissions contributed to the sea level changes that threatened Massachusetts’ coastal property. Ibid. As to redressability, he observed that one of petitioners’ experts, a former EPA climatologist, stated that “ ‘[achievable reductions in emissions of C02 and other [greenhouse gases] from U. S. motor vehicles would... delay and moderate many of the adverse impacts of global warming.’” Ibid, (quoting declaration of Michael MacCracken, former Executive Director, U. S. Global Change Research Program ¶50 (hereinafter MacCracken Deck), available in 2 Petitioners’ Standing Appendix in No. 03-1361 etc. (CADC), p. 209 (Stdg. App.)). He further noted that the one-time director of EPA’s motor-vehicle pollution control efforts stated in an affidavit that enforceable emission standards would lead to the development of new technologies that “‘would gradually be mandated by other countries around the world.’ ” 415 F. 3d, at 66 (quoting declaration of Michael Walsh ¶¶ 7-8, 10, Stdg. App. 309-310, 311). On the merits, Judge Tatel explained at length why he believed the text of the statute provided EPA with authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and why its policy concerns did not justify its refusal to exercise that authority. 415 F. 3d, at 67-82. IV Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Those two words confine “the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968). It is therefore familiar learning that no justiciable “controversy” exists when parties seek adjudication of a political question, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849), when they ask for an advisory opinion, Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681,700, n. 33 (1997), or when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308 (1893). This case suffers from none of these defects. The parties’ dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute, a question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court. Congress has moreover authorized this type of challenge to EPA action. See 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1). That authorization is of critical importance to the standing inquiry: “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). “In exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.” Ibid. We will not, therefore, “entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.” Id., at 581. EPA maintains that because greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread harm, the doctrine of standing presents an insuperable jurisdictional obstacle. We do not agree. At bottom, “the gist of the question of standing” is whether petitioners have “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). As Justice Kennedy explained in his Lujan concurrence: “While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is not just an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that the legal questions presented ... will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” 504 U. S., at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted). To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan holds that a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury. See id., at 560-561. However, a litigant to whom Congress has “accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,” id., at 572, n. 7 — here, the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld, § 7607(b)(1) — “can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy,” ibid. When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant. Ibid.; see also Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F. 3d 89, 94-95 (CADC 2002) (“A [litigant] who alleges a deprivation of a procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove that if he had received the procedure the substantive result would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that the procedural step was connected to the substantive result”). Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the petition for review. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (2006). We stress here, as did Judge Tatel below, the special position and interest of Massachusetts. It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual. Well before the creation of the modern administrative state, we recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction. As Justice Holmes explained in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907), a case in which Georgia sought to protect its citizens from air pollution originating outside its borders: “The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of gwcm-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.” Just as Georgia’s independent interest “in all the earth and air within its domain” supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999) (observing that in the federal system, the States “are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty”). That Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the “territory alleged to be affected” only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power. When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592, 607 (1982) (“One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers”). These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to the “emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1). Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious. § 7607(b)(1). Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis. With that in mind, it is clear that petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both “actual” and “imminent.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is, moreover, a “substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to take steps to reduce that risk. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79 (1978). The Injury The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized. Indeed, the NRC Report itself — which EPA regards as an “objective and independent assessment of the relevant science,” 68 Fed. Reg. 52930 — identifies a number of environmental changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including “the global retreat of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of ice on rivers and lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century relative to the past few thousand years . . . .” NRC Report 16. Petitioners allege that this only hints at the environmental damage yet to come. According to the climate scientist Michael MacCracken, “qualified scientific experts involved in climate change research” have reached a “strong consensus” that global warming threatens (among other things) a precipitate rise in sea levels by the end of the century, MacCraeken Decl. ¶ 5, Stdg. App. 207, “severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems,” id., ¶ 5(d), at 209, a “significant reduction in water storage in winter snowpack in mountainous regions with direct and important economic consequences,” ibid., and an increase in the spread of disease, id., ¶ 28, at 218-219. He also observes that rising ocean temperatures may contribute to the ferocity of hurricanes. Id., ¶¶ 23-25, at 216-217. That these climate-change risks are “widely shared” does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact’”). According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming. MacCracken Decl. ¶ 5(c), Stdg. App. 208. These rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. Id., at 196 (declaration of Paul H. Kirshen ¶ 5), 216 (MacCracken Deck ¶23). Because the Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,” id., at 171 (declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom ¶ 4), it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner. The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of coastal property will be “either permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.” Id., ¶6, at 172. Remediation costs alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Id., ¶ 7, at 172; see also Kirshen Decl. ¶ 12, at 198. Causation EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum, therefore, EPA’s refusal to regulate such emissions “contributes” to Massachusetts’ injuries. EPA nevertheless maintains that its decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so insignificantly to petitioners’ injuries that the Agency cannot be haled into federal court to answer for them. For the same reason, EPA does not believe that any realistic possibility exists that the relief petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy their injuries. That is especially so because predicted increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing nations, particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal domestic decrease. But EPA overstates its case. Its argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955) (“[A] reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind”)- They instead whittle away at them over time, refining their preferred approach as circumstances change and as they develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to proceed. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202 (1947) (“Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations”). That a first step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step conforms to law. And reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly a tentative step. Even leaving aside the other greenhouse gases, the United States transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere — according to the MacCracken affidavit, more than 1.7 billion metric tons in 1999 alone. ¶ 30, Stdg. App. 219. That accounts for more than 6% of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions. Id., at 232 (Oppenheimer Decl. ¶3); see also MacCracken Decl. ¶31, at 220. To put this in perspective: Considering just emissions from the transportation sector, which represent less than one-third of this country's total carbon dioxide emissions, the United States would still rank as the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world, outpaced only by the European Union and China. Judged by any standard, U. S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners, to global warming. The Remedy While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it. See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244, n. 15 (1982) ("[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury”). Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated with manmade climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the (relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially irrelevant. Nor is it dispositive that developing countries such as China and India are poised to increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next century: A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere. We moreover attach considerable significance to EPA’s “agree[ment] with the President that ‘we must address the issue of global climate change,’ ” 68 Fed. Reg. 52929 (quoting remarks announcing Clear Skies and Global Climate Initiatives, 2002 Public Papers of George W. Bush, Vol. 1, Feb. 14, p. 227 (2004)), and to EPA’s ardent support for various voluntary emission-reduction programs, 68 Fed. Reg. 52932. As Judge Tatel observed in dissent below, “EPA would presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions reductions would have no discernable impact on future global warming.” 415 F. 3d, at 66. In sum — at least according to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits — the rise in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to challenge EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition. V The scope of our review of the merits of the statutory issues is narrow. As we have repeated time and again, an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated responsibilities. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). That discretion is at its height when the agency decides not to bring an enforcement action. Therefore, in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985), we held that an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily subject to judicial review. Some debate remains, however, as to the rigor with which we review an agency’s denial of a petition for rulemaking. There are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action. See American Horse Protection Assn., Inc. v. Lyng, 812 F. 2d 1, 3-4 (CADC 1987). In contrast to nonenforeement decisions, agency refusals to initiate rule-making “are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public explanation.” Id., at 4; see also 5 U. S. C. § 555(e). They moreover arise out of denials of petitions for rulemaking which (at least in the circumstances here) the affected party had an undoubted procedural right to file in the first instance. Refusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is “extremely limited” and “highly deferential.” National Customs Brokers & Forwarders Assn. of America, Inc. v. United States, 883 F. 2d 93, 96 (CADC 1989). EPA concluded in its denial of the petition for rulemaking that it lacked authority under 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1) to regulate new vehicle emissions because carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” as that term is defined in § 7602. In the alternative, it concluded that even if it possessed authority, it would decline to do so because regulation would conflict with other administration priorities. As discussed earlier, the Clean Air Act expressly permits review of such an action. § 7607(b)(1). We therefore “may reverse any such action found to be . .. arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” § 7607(d)(9). VI On the merits, the first question is whether § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a “judgment” that such emissions contribute to climate change. We have little trouble concluding that it does. In relevant part, § 202(a)(1) provides that EPA “shall by regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1). Because EPA believes that Congress did not intend it to regulate substances that contribute to climate change, the agency maintains that carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” within the meaning of the provision. The statutory text forecloses EPA’s reading. The Clean Air Act’s sweeping definition of “air pollutant” includes “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air....” § 7602(g) (emphasis added). On its face, the definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word “any.” Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are without a doubt “physical [and] chemical... substance[s] which [are] emitted into . .. the ambient air.” The statute is unambiguous. Rather than relying on statutory text, EPA invokes post-enactment congressional actions and deliberations it views as tantamount to a congressional command to refrain from regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Even if such post-enactment legislative history could shed light on the meaning of an otherwise-unambiguous statute, EPA never identifies any action remotely suggesting that Congress meant to curtail its power to treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants. That subsequent Congresses have eschewed enacting binding emissions limitations to combat global warming tells us nothing about what Congress meant when it amended § 202(a)(1) in 1970 and 1977. And unlike EPA, we have no difficulty reconciling Congress’ various efforts to promote interagency collaboration and research to better understand climate change with the Agency’s pre-existing mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” that may endanger the public welfare. See 42 U. S. C. § 7601(a)(1). Collaboration and research do not conflict with any thoughtful regulatory effort; they complement it. EPA’s reliance on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, is similarly misplaced. In holding that tobacco products are not “drugs” or “devices” subject to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation pursuant to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), see 529 U. S., at 133, we found critical at least two considerations that have no counterpart in this case. First, we thought it unlikely that Congress meant to ban tobacco products, which the FDCA would have required had such products been classified as “drugs” or “devices.” Id., at 135-137. Here, in contrast, EPA jurisdiction would lead to no such extreme measures. EPA would only regulate emissions, and even then, it would have to delay any action “to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance,” § 7521(a)(2). However much a ban on tobacco products clashed with the “common sense” intuition that Congress never meant to remove those products from circulation, Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 133, there is nothing counterintuitive to the notion that EPA can curtail the emission of substances that are putting the global climate out of kilter. Second, in Brown & Williamson we pointed to an unbroken series of congressional enactments that made sense only if adopted “against the backdrop of the FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco.” Id., at 144. We can point to no such enactments here: EPA has not identified any congressional action that conflicts in any way with the regulation of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles. Even if it had, Congress could not have acted against a regulatory “backdrop” of disclaimers of regulatory authority. Prior to the order that provoked this litigation, EPA had never disavowed the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, and in 1998 it in fact affirmed that it had such authority. See App. 54 (Cannon memorandum). There is no reason, much less a compelling reason, to accept EPA’s invitation to read ambiguity into a clear statute. EPA finally argues that it cannot regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles because doing so would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job (according to EPA) that Congress has assigned to DOT. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52929. But that DOT sets mileage standards in no way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental responsibilities. EPA has been charged with protecting the public's “health” and “welfare,” 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1), a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’S mandate to promote energy efficiency. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 2(5), 89 Stat. 874,42 U. S. C. § 6201(5). The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency. While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of “air pollutant,” we hold that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles. VII The alternative basis for EPA’s decision — that even if it does have statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this time — rests on reasoning divorced from the statutory text. While the statute does condition the exercise of EPA’s authority on its formation of a “judgment,” 42 U. S. C. § 7521(a)(1), that judgment must relate to whether an air pollutant “eause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” ibid. Put another way, the use of the word “judgment” is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits. If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the Agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles. Ibid, (stating that “[EPA] shall by regulation prescribe... standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles”). EPA no doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing, content, and coordination of its regulations with those of other agencies. But once EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking, its reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute. Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. Ibid. To the extent that this constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design. EPA has refused to comply with this clear statutory command. Instead, it has offered a laundry list of reasons not to regulate. For example, EPA said that a number of voluntary Executive Branch programs already provide an effective response to the threat of global warming, 68 Fed. Reg. 52932, that regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to negotiate with “key developing nations” to reduce emissions, id., at 52931, and that curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would reflect “an inefficient, piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue,” ibid. Although we have neither the expertise nor the authority to evaluate these policy judgments, it is evident they have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. Still less do they amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a scientific judgment. In particular, while the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws. In the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Congress authorized the State Department — not EPA — to formulate United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to climate. See § 1103(c), 101 Stat. 1409. EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in question here after consultation with the State Department. Congress did direct EPA to consult with other agencies in the formulation of its policies and rules, but the State Department is absent from that list. § 1103(b). Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it would therefore be better not to regulate at this time. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52930-52931. If the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming, EPA must say so. That EPA would prefer not to regulate greenhouse gases because of some residual uncertainty — which, contrary to Justice Scalia’s apparent belief, post, at 553-555, is in fact all that it said, see 68 Fed. Reg. 52929-52930 (“We do not believe ... that it would be either effective or appropriate for EPA to establish [greenhouse gas] standards for motor vehicles at this time” (emphasis added)) — is irrelevant. The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment finding. In short, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore “arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 42 U. S. C. § 7607(d)(9)(A). We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it makes such a finding. Cf. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S., at 843-844. We hold only that EPA must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute. VIII The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Pet. for Cert. 22. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. District of Columbia, American Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore. Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U. S. Public Interest Research Group. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, National Automobile Dealers Association, Engine Manufacturers Association, Truck Manufacturers Association, C02 Litigation Group, and Utility Air Regulatory Group. The 1970 version of § 202(a)(1) used the phrase “which endangers the public health or welfare” rather than the more protective “which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” See § 6(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 1690. Congress amended § 202(a)(1) in 1977 to give its approval to the decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F. 2d 1, 25 (CADC 1976) (en banc), which held that the Clean Air Act “and common sense... demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable.” See § 401(d)(1) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 791; see also H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, p. 49 (1977). The Council on Environmental Quality had issued a report in 1970 concluding that “[m]an may be changing his weather.” Environmental Quality: The First Annual Report 93. Considerable uncertainty remained in those early years, and the issue went largely unmentioned in the congressional debate over the enactment of the Clean Air Act. But see 116 Cong. Rec. 32914 (1970) (statement of Sen. Boggs referring to Council’s conclusion that “[a]ir pollution alters the climate and may produce global changes in temperature”). See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report, pp. 202-203 (2001). By drilling through thick Antarctic ice sheets and extracting “cores,” scientists can examine ice from long ago and extract small samples of ancient air. That air can then be analyzed, yielding estimates of carbon dioxide levels. Ibid. A more dramatic rise was yet to come: In 2006, carbon dioxide levels reached 382 parts per million, see Dept, of Commerce, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, Mauna Loa C02 Monthly Mean Data, http:// www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/co2_mm_mlo.dat (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 29, 2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file), a level thought to exceed the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at any point over the past 20 million years. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technical Summary of Working Group I Report 39 (2001). Climate Research Board, Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment, p. viii (1979). IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment, p. xi (J. Houghton, G. Jenkins, & J. Ephraums eds. 1991). The industrialized countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC undertook to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000. No immediate restrictions were imposed on developing countries, including China and India. They could choose to become Annex I countries when sufficiently developed. IPCC, Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change, p. 4. Alliance for Sustainable Communities; Applied Power Technologies, Inc.; Bio Fuels America; The California Solar Energy Industries Assn.; Clements Environmental Corp.; Environmental Advocates; Environmental and Energy Study Institute; Friends of the Earth; Full Circle Energy Project, Inc.; The Green Party of Rhode Island; Greenpeace USA; International Center for Technology Assessment; Network for Environmental and Economic Responsibility of the United Church of Christ; New Jersey Environmental Watch; New Mexico Solar Energy Assn.; Oregon Environmental Council; Public Citizen; Solar Energy Industries Assn.; The SUN DAY Campaign. See App. 7-11. See 42 U. S. C. § 7607(b)(1) (“A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any... standard under section 7521 of this title ... or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia”). The Chief Justice accuses the Court of misreading Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907), see post, at 537-538 (dissenting opinion), and “devis[ing] a new doctrine of state standing,” post, at 548. But no less an authority than Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System understands Tennessee Copper as a standing decision. R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 290 (5th ed. 2003). Indeed, it devotes an entire section to chronicling the long development of cases permitting States “to litigate as parens patriae to .protect quasi-sovereign interests — i. e., public or governmental interests that concern the state as a whole.” Id., at 289; see, e. g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208,240-241 (1901) (finding federal jurisdiction appropriate not only “in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and interests of a State,” but also when the “substantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the towns and cities of the state” are at stake). Drawing on Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923), and Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U. S. 592 (1982) (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901)), The Chief Justice claims that we “overloo[k] the fact that our cases cast significant doubt on a State’s standing to assert a quasi-sovereign interest . . . against the Federal Government.” Post, at 539. Not so. Mellon itself disavowed any such broad reading when it noted that the Court had been “called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, [and] not quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened." 262 U. S., at 484-485 (emphasis added). In any event, we held in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 447 (1945), that there is a critical difference between allowing a State “to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes” (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do). Massachusetts does not here dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to assert its rights under the Act. See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U. S. 1, 20 (1995) (holding that Wyoming had standing to bring a cross-claim against the United States to vindicate its “ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests which are ‘independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain’ ” (quoting Tennessee Copper, 206 U. S., at 237)). In this regard, MacCracken’s 2004 affidavit — drafted more than a year in advance of Hurricane Katrina — was eerily prescient. Immediately after discussing the “particular concern” that climate change might cause an “increase in the wind speed and peak rate of precipitation of major tropical cyclones (i. e., hurricanes and typhoons),” MacCracken noted that “Hail compaction, sea level rise and recurrent storms are destroying approximately 20-30 square miles of Louisiana wetlands each year. These wetlands serve as a ‘shock absorber’ for storm surges that could inundate New Orleans, significantly enhancing the risk to a major urban population.” ¶¶ 24-25, Stdg. App. 217. “For example, the [Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation] owns, operates and maintains approximately 53 coastal state parks, beaches, reservations, and wildlife sanctuaries. [It] also owns, operates and maintains sporting and recreational facilities in coastal areas, including numerous pools, skating rinks, playgrounds, playing fields, former coastal fortifications, public stages, museums, bike trails, tennis courts, boathouses and boat ramps and landings. Associated with these coastal properties and facilities is a significant amount of infrastructure, which the Commonwealth also owns, operates and maintains, including roads, parkways, stormwater pump stations, pier[s], sea wal[l] revetments and dams.” Hoogeboom Deck ¶ 4, at 171. See also id., at 179 (declaration of Christian Jacqz) (discussing possible loss of roughly 14 acres of land per miles of coastline by 2100); Kirshen Decl. ¶ 10, at 198 (alleging that “[w]hen such a rise in sea level occurs, a 10-year flood will have the magnitude of the present 100-year flood and a 100-year flood will have the magnitude of the present 500-year flood”). In dissent, The Chief Justice dismisses petitioners’ submissions as “conelusory,” presumably because they do not quantify Massachusetts’ land loss with the exactitude he would prefer. Post, at 542. He therefore asserts that the Commonwealth’s injury is “conjectur[al].” See ibid. Yet the likelihood that Massachusetts’ coastline will recede has nothing to do with whether petitioners have determined the precise metes and bounds of their soon-to-be-flooded land. Petitioners maintain that the seas are rising and will continue to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead to the loss of Massachusetts’ sovereign territory. No one, save perhaps the dissenters, disputes those allegations. Our cases require nothing more. See UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2004 and Status of Reporting 14 (2006) (reflecting emissions from Annex I countries); UNFCCC, Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of Initial National Communications from Parties not Included in Annex I to the Convention 7-8 (2005) (reflecting emissions from non-Annex I countries); see also Dept, of Energy, Energy Information Admin., International Energy Annual 2004, H.lco2 World Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2004 (Table), http:// www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablehlco2.xls. See also Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Gliekman, 92 F. 3d 1228, 1234 (CADC 1996) (“The more drastic the injury that government action makes more likely, the lesser the increment in probability to establish standing”); Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F. 2d 328, 329 (CA7 1993) (“[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy — to take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical — provided of course that the relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability”). In his dissent, The Chief Justice expresses disagreement with the Court’s holding in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669,687-688 (1973). He does not, however, disavow this portion of Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court: “Unlike the specific and geographically limited federal action of which the petitioner complained in Sierra Club [v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972)], the challenged agency action in this case is applicable to substantially all of the Nation’s railroads, and thus allegedly has an adverse environmental impact on all the natural resources of the country. Rather than a limited group of persons who used a picturesque valley in California, all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by the environmental groups here. But we have already made it clear that standing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury. Indeed some of the cases on which we relied in Sierra Club demonstrated the patent fact that persons across the Nation could be adversely affected by major governmental actions. To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion.” Ibid, (citations omitted and emphasis added). It is moreover quite wrong to analogize the legal claim advanced by Massachusetts and the other public and private entities who challenge EPA’s parsimonious construction of the Clean Air Act to a mere “lawyer’s game.” See post, at 548. See Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125, 131 (2002) (observing that “‘any’... has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind” (some internal quotation marks omitted)). In dissent,. Justice Scalia maintains that because greenhouse gases permeate the world’s atmosphere rather than a limited area near the earth’s surface, EPA’s exclusion of greenhouse gases from the category of air pollution “agentfe]” is entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). See post, at 558-560. EPA’s distinction, however, finds no support in the text of the statute, which uses the phrase “the ambient air” without distinguishing between atmospheric layers. Moreover, it is a plainly unreasonable reading of a sweeping statutory provision designed to capture “any physical, chemical... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U. S. C. § 7602(g). Justice Scalia does not (and cannot) explain why Congress would define “air pollutant” so carefully and so broadly, yet confer on EPA the authority to narrow that definition whenever expedient by asserting that a particular substance is not an “agent.” At any rate, no party to this dispute contests that greenhouse gases both “ente[r] the ambient air” and tend to warm the atmosphere. They are therefore unquestionably “agent[s]” of air pollution. See United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960) (holding that “the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one”); see also Cobell v. Norton, 428 F. 3d 1070, 1075 (CADC 2005) (“[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight”). See, e. g., National Climate Program Act, §5, 92 Stat. 601, 15 U. S. C. §2901 et seq. (calling for the establishment of a National Climate Program and for additional climate-change research); Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, § 1103, 101 Stat. 1408-1409, note following 15 U. S. C. §2901 (directing EPA and the Secretary of State to “jointly” develop a “coordinated national policy on global climate change” and report to Congress); Global Change Research Act of 1990, Tit. I, 104 Stat. 3097, 15 U. S. C. §§2921-2938 (establishing for the “development and coordination of a comprehensive and integrated United States research program” to aid in “understand[ing] . . . human-induced and natural processes of climate change”); Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4058, 7 U. S. C. §6701 et seq. (directing the Dept, of Agriculture to study the effects of climate change on forestry and agriculture); Energy Policy Act of 1992, §§ 1601-1609, 106 Stat. 2999,42 U. S. C. §§ 13381-13388 (requiring the Secretary of Energy to report on information pertaining to climate change). We are moreover puzzled by EPA’s roundabout argument that because later Congresses chose to address stratospheric ozone pollution in a specific legislative provision, it somehow follows that greenhouse gases cannot be air pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Air Act.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION v. UNITED STATES. No. 288. Argued April 17, 1961. Decided June 19, 1961. Fleming Bomar argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Joseph E. McAndrews. Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox and Harry Baum. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. In this suit for refund of federal income taxes the petitioner, American Automobile Association, seeks determination of its tax liability for the years 1952 and 1953. Returns filed for its taxable calendar years were prepared on the basis of the same accrual method of accounting as was used in keeping its books. The Association reported as gross income only that portion of the total prepaid annual membership dues, actually received or collected in the calendar year, which ratably corresponded with the number of membership months covered by those dues and occurring within the same taxable calendar year. The balance was reserved for ratable monthly accrual over the remaining membership period in the following calendar year as deferred or unearned income reflecting an estimated future service expense to members. The Commissioner contends that petitioner should have reported in its gross income for each year the entire amount of membership dues actually received in the taxable calendar year without regard to expected future service expense in the subsequent year. The sole point at issue, therefore, is in what year the prepaid dues are taxable as income. In auditing the Association’s returns for the years 1952 through 1954, the Commissioner, in the exercise of his discretion under § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, determined not to accept the taxpayer’s accounting system. As a result, adjustments were made for those years principally by adding to gross income for each taxable year the amount of prepaid dues which the Association had received but not recognized as income, and subtracting from gross income amounts recognized in the year although actually received in the prior year. A net operating loss claimed for 1954 and corresponding carry-back deductions were greatly reduced, and tax deficiencies were assessed for 1952 and 1953. Petitioner paid the deficiencies and its timely claim for refund was denied. Suit to recover was instituted in the Court of Claims, but the court sustained the Commissioner,-Ct. Cl.-, 181 F. Supp. 255. Recognizing a conflict between the decision below and that in Bressner Radio, Inc., v. Commissioner, 267 F. 2d 520, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 813. We have concluded that for tax purposes the dues must be included as income in the calendar year of their actual receipt. The Association is a national automobile club organized as a nonstock membership corporation with its principal office in Washington, D. C. It provides a variety of services to the members of affiliated local automobile clubs and those of ten clubs which taxpayer itself directly operates as divisions, but such services are rendered solely upon a member's demand. Its income is derived primarily from dues paid one year in advance by members of the clubs. Memberships may commence or be renewed in any month of the year. For many years, the association has employed an accrual method of accounting and the calendar year as its taxable year. It is admitted that for its purposes the method used is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles. The membership dues, as received, were deposited in the Association’s bank accounts without restriction as to their use for any of its corporate purposes. However, for the Association’s own accounting purposes, the dues were treated •in its books as income received ratably over the 12-month membership period. The portions thereof ratably attributable to membership months occurring beyond the year of receipt, i. e., in a second calendar year, were reflected in the Association’s books at the close of the first year as unearned or deferred income. Certain operating expenses were chargeable as prepaid membership cost and deducted ratably over the same periods of time as those over which dues were recognized as income. The Court of Claims bottomed its opinion on Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180 (1957), finding that “the method of treatment of prepaid automobile club membership dues employed [by the Association here was,] ... for Federal income tax purposes, ‘purely artificial.’ ” 181 F. Supp. 255, 258. It accepted that case as “a rejection by the Supreme Court of the accounting method advanced by plaintiff in the case at bar.” Ibid. The Association does not deny that its accounting system is substantially identical to that used by the petitioner in Michigan. It maintains, however, that Michigan does not control this case because of a difference in proof, i. e., that in this case the record contains expert accounting testimony indicating that the system used was in accord with generally accepted accounting principles; that its proof of cost of member service was detailed; and that the correlation between that cost and the period of time over which the dues were credited as income was shown and justified by proof of experience. The holding of Michigan, however, that the system of accounting was “purely artificial” was based upon the finding that “substantially all services are performed only upon a member’s demand and the taxpayer’s performance was not related to fixed dates after the tax year.” 353 U. S. 180, 189, note 20. That is also true here. As the Association’s own accounting expert testified: “You are dealing with a group or pool. Any pooling or risk situation, particular members may in a particular year require very little of a specific service that is rendered to certain other members. I wouldn’t know what the experience on that would be, but I would think it would be rather irregular between individual members. ... I am buying the availability of services, the protection .... Frankly, the irregularity of the actual furnishing of the maps and helping you out when you run out of gasoline and so on, I frankly don’t think that has a blessed thing to do with the over-all accounting.” It may be true that to the accountant the actual incidence of cost in serving an individual member in exchange for his individual dues is inconsequential, or, from the viewpoint of commercial accounting, unessential to determination and disclosure of the overall financial condition of the Association. That “irregularity,” however, is highly relevant to the clarity of an accounting system which defers receipt, as earned income, of dues to a taxable period in which no, some, or all the services paid for by those dues may or may not be rendered. The Code exacts its revenue from the individual member’s dues which, no one disputes, constitute income. When their receipt as earned income is recognized ratably over two calendar years, without regard to correspondingly fixed individual expense or performance justification, but consistently with overall experience, their accounting doubtless presents a rather accurate image of the total financial structure, but fails to respect the criteria of annual tax accounting and may be rejected by the Commissioner. The Association further contends that the findings of the court below support its position. We think not. The Court of Claims’ only finding as to the accounting system itself is as follows: “22. The method of accounting employed by plaintiff during the years in issue has been used regularly by plaintiff since 1931 and is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles and practices and was, prior to the adverse determination by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, customarily and generally employed in the motor club field.” This is only to say that in performing the function of business accounting the method employed by the Association “is in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting principles and practices.” It is not to hold that for income tax purposes it so clearly reflects income as to be binding on the Treasury. Likewise, other findings merely reflecting statistical computations of average monthly cost per member on a group or pool basis are without determinate significance to our decision that the federal revenue cannot, without legislative consent and over objection of the Commissioner, be made to depend upon average experience in rendering performance and turning a profit. Indeed, such tabulations themselves demonstrate the inadequacy from an income tax standpoint of the pro rata method of allocating each year’s membership dues in equal monthly installments not in fact related to the expenses incurred. Not only did individually incurred expenses actually vary from month to month, but even the average expense varied — recognition of income nonetheless remaining ratably constant. Although the findings below seem to indicate that it would produce substantially the same result as that of the system of ratable monthly recognition actually employed, we consider similarly unsatisfactory, from an income tax standpoint, allocation of monthly dues to gross monthly income to the extent of actual service expenditures for the same month computed on a group or pool basis. In addition, the Association’s election in 1954 to change its monthly recognition formula to one which treats one-half of the dues as income in the year of receipt and the other half as income received in the subsequent year, without regard to month of payment, only more clearly indicates the artificiality of its method, at least so far as controlling tax purposes are concerned. Moreover, the Association realized that the findings of the Court of Claims were not alone sufficient for its purposes. In its petition for rehearing below, petitioner specifically asked that they be amended and enlarged, especially as to No. 22 set out above. Rehearing and amendment were denied. Whether or not the Court’s judgment in Michigan controls our disposition of this case, there are other considerations requiring our affirmance. They concern the action of the Congress with respect to its own positive and express statutory authorization of employment of such sound commercial accounting practices in reporting taxable income. In 1954 the Congress found dissatisfaction in the fact that “as a result of court decisions and rulings, there have developed many divergencies between the computation of income for tax purposes and income for business purposes as computed under generally accepted accounting principles. The areas of difference are confined almost entirely to questions of when certain types of revenue and expenses should be taken into account in arriving at net income.” House Ways and Means Committee Report, H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48. As a result, it introduced into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 452 and § 462, which specifically permitted essentially the same practice as was employed by the Association here. Only one year later, however, in June 1955, the Congress repealed these sections retroactively. It appears that in this action Congress first overruled the long administrative practice of the Commissioner and holdings of the courts in disallowing such deferral of income for tax purposes and then within a year reversed its own action. This repeal, we believe, confirms our view that the method used by the Association could be rejected by the Commissioner. While the claim is made that Congress did not “intend to disturb prior law as it affected permissible accrual accounting provisions for tax purposes,” H. R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, the cold fact is that it repealed the only law incontestably permitting the practice upon which the Association depends. To say that, as to taxpayers using such systems, Congress was merely declaring existing law when it adopted § 452 in 1954, and that it was merely restoring unaffected the same prior law when it repealed the new section in 1955 for good reason, is a contradiction in itself, “varnishing nonsense with the charm of sound.” Instead of constituting a merely dupli-cative creation, the fact is that § 452 for the first time specifically declared petitioner’s system of accounting to be acceptable for income tax purposes, and overruled the long-standing position of the Commissioner and courts to the contrary. And the repeal of the section the following year, upon insistence by the Treasury that the proposed endorsement of such tax accounting would have a disastrous impact on the Government’s revenue, was just as clearly a mandate from the Congress that petitioner’s system was not acceptable for tax purposes. To interpret its careful consideration of the problem otherwise is to accuse the Congress of engaging in sciamachy. We are further confirmed in this view by consideration of the even more recent action of the Congress in 1958, subsequent to the decision in Michigan, supra. In that year § 455 was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. It permits publishers to defer receipt as income of prepaid subscriptions of newspapers, magazines and periodicals. An effort was made in the Senate to add a provision in § 455 which would extend its coverage to prepaid automobile club membership dues. However, in conference the House Conferees refused to accept this amendment. Senator Byrd explained the rejection of the amendment to the Senate (104 Cong. Rec., Part 14, p. 17744): “It was the position of the House conferees that this matter of prepaid dues and fees received by nonprofit service organizations was a part of the entire subject dealing with the treatment of prepaid income and that such subject should be left for study of this entire problem. . . It appears, therefore, that, pending its own further study, Congress has given publishers but denied automobile clubs the very relief that the Association seeks in this Court. To recapitulate, it appears that Congress has long been aware of the problem this case presents. In 1954 it enacted § 452 and § 462, but quickly repealed them. Since that time Congress has authorized the desired accounting only in the instance of prepaid subscription income, which, as was pointed out in Michigan, is ratably earned by performance on “publication dates after the tax year.” 353 U. S. 180, 189, note 20. It has refused to enlarge § 455 to include prepaid membership dues. At the very least, this background indicates congressional recognition of the complications inherent in the problem and its seriousness to the general revenue. We must leave to the Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event, must have wide ramifications. The Committees of the Congress have standing committees expertly grounded in tax problems, with jurisdiction covering the whole field of taxation and facilities for studying considerations of policy as between the various taxpayers and the necessities of the general revenues. The validity of the long-established policy of the Court in deferring, where possible, to congressional procedures in the tax field is clearly indicated in this case. Finding only that, in light of existing provisions not specifically authorizing it, the exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in rejecting the Association’s accounting system was not unsound, we need not anticipate what will be the product of further “study of this entire problem.” Affirmed. A taxpayer’s “net income shall be computed ... in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books . . . but ... if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. . . .” 63 Stat. 24, 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 41. See also the similar provision in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. (1958 ed.) § 446. These generally include furnishing road maps, routing, tour books, etc.; emergency road service through contracts with local garages; bail bond protection; personal automobile accident insurance and theft protection; and, in some of its divisions, motor license procurement, brake and headlight adjustment service, notarial duties and advice in the prosecution of small claims. In 1952 and 1953 dues collected in any month were accounted as income to the extent of one-twenty-fourth for that month (on the assumption that the mean date of receipt was the middle of the month), one-twelfth for each of the next eleven months, and again one-twenty-fourth in the anniversary month. In 1954, however, guided by its own statistical average experience, the Association changed its system so as to more simply reach almost the same result by charging to year of receipt, without regard to month of receipt, one-half of the entire dues payment and deferring the balance to the following year. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F. 2d 697, and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F. 2d 722, may be distinguished from the present case on the same grounds which made them distinguishable in Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, 189, note 20. The Hearing Commissioner of the Court of Claims had specifically found as fact that petitioner's “method of accounting . . . clearly reflected its net income for such years.” The court, however, did not adopt that finding. See note 2, supra. 26 U. S. C. (1952 ed., Supp. II) §§452, 462, repealed, 69 Stat. 134 (1955). The Senate Report included this language: “Under the 1939 Code, regardless of the method of accounting . . . amounts are includible in gross income by the recipient not later than the time of receipt if they are subject to free and unrestricted use by the taxpayer even though the payments are for goods or services to be provided by the taxpayer at a future time.” S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 301. 26 U. S. C. (1958 ed.) §455. An unsuccessful attempt to induce congressional action on this problem was made last year, see H. R. 11266, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., which passed the House August 24, 1960, 106 Cong. Rec. 17482, but failed to draw any action by the Senate before adjournment. An identical bill is currently pending, see H. R. 929, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., and H. R. Rep. No. 381 accompanying the bill and recommending its passage. Under that measure the taxpayer’s liability to its members “shall be deemed to exist ratably over the period . . . that such services are required to be rendered, or . . . privileges . . . made available.” (Emphasis added.) The Eighty-fourth Congress started the study of “legislation dealing with prepaid income and reserves for estimated expenses . . . .” S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6. In 1955 it was estimated that transitional loss of revenue under § 452 and § 462, repealed that year, would total in excess of a billion dollars. H. R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. That this impact on the revenue continues to be an important factor in congressional consideration of the problem is indicated by the observation of the House Committee on Ways and Means that a “transitional rule” is necessary “to minimize the initial revenue impact” of the measure currently pending. H. R. Rep. No. 381, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. That the system used by petitioner here is, perhaps, presently not uncommon may be indicated by the fact that during this Term alone several cases involving similar systems have reached this Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FAIR ASSESSMENT IN REAL ESTATE ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. v. McNARY et al. No. 80-427. Argued October 5, 1981 Decided December 1, 1981 Rkhnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 117. David J. Newburger argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Susan Spiegel, Steve Voss-meyer, and James P. Gamble. Thomas W. Wehrle argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents McNary et al. was Andrew J. Minardi. John Ashcroft and Michael L. Boicourt filed a brief for respondents Williams et al. John J. Enright, William J. Costello, Eugene L. Griffin, and Michael F. Baccash filed a brief for the International Association of Assessing Officers as amicus curiae. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In this action we are required to reconcile two somewhat intermittent and conflicting lines of authority as to whether a damages action may be brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 to redress the allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that such suits were barred by both 28 U. S. C. § 1841 (Tax Injunction Act) and the principle of comity, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court sitting en banc. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals, 450 U. S. 1039, and we now affirm. Before setting forth the facts, we think that a description of the past and at times divergent decisions of this Court may shed light upon the proper disposition of this case. I This Court, even before the enactment of §1983, recognized the important and sensitive nature of state tax systems and the need for federal-court restraint when deciding cases that affect such systems. As Justice Field wrote for the Court shortly before the enactment of § 1983: “It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public.” Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871). After this Court conclusively decided that federal courts may enjoin state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional state law, Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), Congress also recognized that the autonomy and fiscal stability of the States survive best when state tax systems are not subject to scrutiny in federal courts. Thus, in 1937 Congress provided: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (hereinafter § 1341 or Act). This legislation, and the decisions of this Court which preceded it, reflect the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state governments that is essential to “Our Federalism,” particularly in the area of state taxation. See, e. g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even after enactment of § 1341 it was upon this comity that we relied in holding that federal courts, in exercising the discretion that attends requests for equitable relief, may not even render declaratory judgments as to the constitutionality of state tax laws. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943). Contrasted with this statute and line of cases are our holdings with respect to 42 U. S. C. §1983. In 1871, shortly after Justice Field wrote of the vital and vulnerable nature of state tax systems, Congress enacted § 1983 with its familiar language: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Obviously § 1983 cut a broad swath. By its terms it gave a federal cause of action to prisoners, taxpayers, or anyone else who was able to prove that his constitutional or federal rights had been denied by any State. In addition, the statute made no mention of any requirement that state remedies be exhausted before resort to the federal courts could be had under 28 U. S. C. § 1343. The combined effect of this newly created federal cause of action and the absence of an express exhaustion requirement was not immediately realized. It was not until our decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), that § 1983 was held to authorize immediate resort to a federal court whenever state actions allegedly infringed constitutional rights: “Although the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.” 365 U. S., at 183. The immediacy of federal relief under § 1983 was reemphasized in McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963), where the Court stated: “It is immaterial whether [the state official’s] conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Such claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.” Id., at 674 (citation and footnote omitted). And in the unargued per curiam opinion of Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971), the Court concluded that “[petitioners were . . . entitled to have their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts, not subject . . . to exhaustion requirements.” Id., at 251. See also Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 472-473 (1974). Thus, we have two divergent lines of authority respecting access to federal courts for adjudication of the constitutionality of state laws. Both cannot govern this case. On one hand, § 1341, with its antecedent basis in the comity principle of Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, and Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, supra, bars at least federal injunctive challenges to state tax laws. Added to this authority is our decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, supra, holding that declaratory judgments are barred on the basis of comity. On the other hand is the doctrine originating in Monroe v. Pape, supra, that comity does not apply where § 1983 is involved, and that a litigant challenging the constitutionality of any state action may proceed directly to federal court. With this divergence of views in mind, we turn now to the facts of this case, a § 1983 challenge to the administration of state tax laws which implicates both lines of authority. We hold that at least as to such actions, which is all we need decide here, the principle of comity controls. I — » HH Petitioner Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association is a nonprofit corporation formed by taxpayers in St. Louis County (County) to promote equitable enforcement of property tax laws in Missouri. Petitioners J. David and Lynn F. Cassilly own real property with recent improvements in the County. Petitioners filed suit under § 1983 alleging that respondents, the County’s Tax Assessors, Supervisors, and Director of Revenue, and three members of the Missouri State Tax Commission, had deprived them of equal protection and due process of law by unequal taxation of real property. The complaint focuses on two specific practices by respondents. First, petitioners allege that County properties with new improvements are assessed at approximately 3354% of their current market value, while properties without new improvements are assessed at approximately 22% of their current market value. This disparity allegedly results from respondents’ failure to reassess old property on a regular basis, the last general reassessment having occurred in 1960. Second, petitioners allege that property owners who successfully appeal their property assessments, as did the Cassillys in 1977, are specifically targeted for reassessment the next year. Petitioners have previously sought some relief from respondents’ assessments in state proceedings. In 1975, petitioner David Cassilly and others brought an action in which the State Circuit Court ordered respondent Antonio to reassess all real property in the County. On direct appeal, however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the State Tax Commission, not the Circuit Court, should supervise the reassessment process. State ex rel. Cassilly v. Riney, 576 S. W. 2d 325 (1979) (en banc). In 1977, the Cassillys appealed the tax assessed on their home to the County Board of Equalization and received a reduction in assessed value from 3314% to 29%. When their home was again assessed at 3314% in 1978, the Cassillys once more appealed to the Board of Equalization. That appeal was pending at the commencement of this litigation. The Cassillys brought this §1983 action in federal court seeking actual damages in the amount of overassessments from 1975 to 1979, and punitive damages of $75,000 from each respondent. Petitioner Fair Assessment sought actual damages in the amount of expenses incurred in efforts to obtain equitable property assessments for its members. As in all other § 1983 actions, the award of such damages would first require a federal-court declaration that respondents, in administering the state tax, violated petitioners’ constitutional rights. Ill As indicated by our discussion in Part I, § 1341 and our comity cases have thus far barred federal courts from granting injunctive and declaratory relief in state tax cases. Because we decide today that the principle of comity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, we do not decide whether that Act, standing alone, would require such a result. The correctness of the result in this case is demonstrated by an examination of the pre-Act decisions of this Court, the legislative history of the Act, our post-Act decision in the Great Lakes case, and more recent recognition of the principles of federalism. A Prior to enactment of § 1341, virtually all federal cases challenging state taxation sought equitable relief. Consequently, federal-court restraint in state tax matters was based upon the traditional doctrine that courts of equity will stay their hand when remedies at law are plain, adequate, and complete. See, e. g., Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913); Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276 (1909). Even with this basis in equity law, these cases recognized that the doctrine of equitable restraint was of “notable application,” Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 281, and carried “peculiar force,” Matthews, supra, at 525, in suits challenging the constitutionality of state tax laws. Such restraint was particularly appropriate because of the delicate balance between the federal authority and state governments, and the concomitant respect that should be accorded state tax laws in federal court. As the Court in Matthews explained: “The reason for this guiding principle [of equitable restraint] is of peculiar force in cases where the suit, like the present one, is brought to enjoin the collection of a state tax in courts of a different, though paramount sovereignty. The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.” 284 U. S., at 525. Thus, in 1909 we could state that “[a]n examination of the decisions of this court shows that a proper reluctance to interfere by prevention with the fiscal operations of the state governments has caused it to refrain from so doing in all cases where the Federal rights of the persons could otherwise be preserved unimpaired.” Boise Artesian Water Co., supra, at 282. B This policy of equitable restraint based on notions of comity did not completely clear the federal courts of state tax cases. Indeed, the Senate Report on the bill that was to become § 1341 referred to “[t]he existing practice of the Federal courts in entertaining tax-injunction suits against State officers . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). An examination of the cases of that era demonstrates, however, that this practice resulted not from a repudiation of the principle of comity, but from federal-court determinations that available state remedies did not adequately protect the federal rights asserted. See, e. g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 242 (1936); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. 2d 145 (CA5), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936). See also Note, Federal Court Interference with the Assessment and Collection of State Taxes, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 783, n. 13 (1946); Note, The Tax Injunction Act and Suits for Monetary Relief, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 736, 744, and nn. 40, 41 (1979). Congress’ response to this practice of the federal courts— enactment of § 1341 — was motivated in large part by comity concerns. As we said of the Act just last Term: “The statute ‘has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.’ Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. [68,] 73 [(1976)]. This last consideration was the principal motivating force behind the Act: this legislation was first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes. 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone) . . . .” Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 522 (1981) (footnote omitted). Neither the legislative history of the Act nor that of its precursor, 28 U. S. C. § 1342, suggests that Congress intended that federal-court deference in state tax matters be limited to the actions enumerated in those sections. See H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 1415 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). Thus, the principle of comity which predated the Act was not restricted by its passage. C The post-Act vitality of the comity principle is perhaps best demonstrated by our decision in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943). Several Louisiana taxpayers brought an action in Federal District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the state tax law as applied to them was unconstitutional and void. Although § 1341 was raised as a possible bar to the suit, as it has been raised in this case, “we [found] it unnecessary to inquire whether the words of the statute may be so construed as to prohibit a declaration by federal courts concerning the invalidity of a state tax.” 319 U. S., at 299. Instead, “we [were] of the opinion that those considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional cases, require[d] a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure.” Ibid. Those considerations were, of course, principles of federalism: “ ‘The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it.’ ... Interference with state internal economy and administration is inseparable from assaults in the federal courts on the validity of state taxation, and necessarily attends injunctions, interlocutory or final, restraining collection of state taxes. These are the considerations of moment which have persuaded federal courts of equity to deny relief to the taxpayer . . . .” Id., at 298 (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S., at 525). The Court’s reliance in Great Lakes upon the necessity of federal-court respect for state taxing schemes demonstrates not only the post-Act vitality of the comity principle, but also its applicability to actions seeking a remedy other than in-junctive relief. The focus was not on the specific form of relief requested, but on the fact that “in every practical sense [it] operate[d] to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation [was] ended.” 319 U. S., at 299. As will be seen below, the relief sought in this case would have a similarly disruptive effect. D The principle of comity has been recognized and relied upon by this Court in several recent cases dealing with matters other than state taxes. Its fullest articulation was given in the now familiar language of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), a case in which we held that traditional principles of equitable restraint bar federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions except under extraordinary circumstances: “Th[e] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in separate ways. . . . [T]he concept [represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, ‘Our Federalism,’ born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.” Id., at 44-45. The principles of federalism recognized in Younger have not been limited to federal-court interference in state criminal proceedings, but have been extended to some state civil actions. E. g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975). Although these modern expressions of comity have been limited in their application to federal cases which seek to enjoin state judicial proceedings, a limitation which we do not abandon here, they illustrate the principles that bar petitioners’ suit under § 1983. As we said in Rosewell, swpra, “the reasons supporting federal noninterference [with state taxation] are just as compelling today as they were in 1937.” 450 U. S., at 527. As will be seen in the next part, petitioners’ § 1983 action would be no less disruptive of Missouri’s tax system than would the historic equitable efforts to enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts which were early held barred by considerations of comity. IV In arguments primarily addressed to the applicability of the Act, petitioners contend that damages actions are inherently less disruptive of state tax systems than injunctions or declaratory judgments, and therefore should not be barred by prior decisions of this Court. Petitioners emphasize that their § 1983 claim seeks recovery from individual state officers, not from state coffers, and that the doctrine of qualified immunity will protect such officers’ good-faith actions and will thus avoid chilling their administration of the Missouri tax scheme. We disagree. Petitioners will not recover damages under § 1983 unless a district court first determines that respondents’ administration of the County tax system violated petitioners’ constitutional rights. In effect, the district court must first enter a declaratory judgment like that barred in Great Lakes. We are convinced that such a determination would be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by principles of comity. Moreover, the intrusiveness of such §1983 actions would be exacerbated by the nonexhaustion doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). Taxpayers such as petitioners would be able to invoke federal judgments without first permitting the State to rectify any alleged impropriety. In addition to the intrusiveness of the judgment, the very maintenance of the suit itself would intrude on the enforcement of the state scheme. As the District Court in this case stated: “To allow such suits would cause disruption of the states’ revenue collection systems equal to that caused by anticipatory relief. State tax collection officials could be summoned into federal court to defend their assessments against claims for refunds as well as prayers for punitive damages, merely on the assertion that the tax collected was willfully and maliciously discriminatory against a certain type of property. Allowance of such claims would result in this Court being a source of appellate review of all state property tax classifications.” 478 F. Supp. 1231, 1233-1234 (1979). This intrusion, although undoubtedly present in every § 1983 claim, is particularly highlighted by the facts of this case. Defendants are not one or two isolated administrators, but virtually every key tax official in St. Louis County. They include the County Executive, the Director of Revenue, the Tax Assessor, and three supervising members of the State Tax Commission. In addition, the actions challenged in the complaint — unequal assessment of new and old property and retaliatory assessment of property belonging to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization — may well be the result of policies or practicalities beyond the control of any individual officer. For example, failure annually to reassess old property may well result from a practical allocation of limited resources. In addition, according to respondents’ attorney at oral argument, Missouri law requires that all property, including property which belongs to those who successfully appeal to the Board of Equalization, be assessed at 3314% of market value. Thus, a judicial determination of official liability for the acts complained of, even though necessarily based upon a finding of bad faith, would have an undeniable chilling effect upon the actions of all County officers governed by the same practicalities or required to implement the same policies. There is little doubt that such officials, faced with the prospect of personal liability to numerous taxpayers, not to mention the assessment of attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. §1988, would promptly cease the conduct found to have infringed petitioners’ constitutional rights, whether or not those officials were acting in good faith. In short, petitioners’ action would “in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes . . . ,” Great Lakes, 319 U. S., at 299, a form of federal-court interference previously rejected by this Court on principles of federalism. Y This case is therefore controlled by principles articulated even before enactment of § 1983 and followed in later decisions such as Matthews and Great Lakes. The recovery of damages under the Civil Rights Act first requires a “declaration” or determination of the unconstitutionality of a state tax scheme that would halt its operation. And damages actions, no less than actions for an injunction, would hale state officers into federal court every time a taxpayer alleged the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim. We consider such interference to be contrary to “[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts.” Matthews, 284 U. S., at 525. Therefore, despite the ready access to federal courts provided by Monroe and its progeny, we hold that taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of the state decisions in this Court. See Huffman v. Pursue, Inc., 420 U. S., at 605; Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, at 526. The adequacy of available Missouri remedies is not at issue in this case. The District Court expressly found “that [petitioners] have means to rectify what they consider an unjust situation through the state’s own processes,” 478 F. Supp., at 1234, and petitioners do not contest this finding. In addition, the Missouri Supreme Court has expressly held that plaintiffs such as petitioners may assert a § 1983 claim in state court. See, e. g., Stafford v. Muster, 582 S. W. 2d 670, 681 (1979); Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co., 576 S. W. 2d 310 (1978). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 478 F. Supp. 1231 (1979), aff’d, 622 F. 2d 415 (1980). Compare Fulton Market Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F. 2d 1071 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1121 (1979), with Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, supra; Ludwin v. City of Cambridge, 592 F. 2d 606 (CA1 1979); and Bland v. McHann, 463 F. 2d 21 (CA5 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 966 (1973). We held in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979), that 28 U. S. C. § 1343, the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, was narrower in scope than the latter. Because there can be no doubt that a claim of denial of due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, which these petitioners asserted, would come under the narrower construction of § 1343 adopted by the Court in Chapman, supra, it is unnecessary to pursue here the difference between § 1983 and § 1343. The result we reach today was foreshadowed by our decision last Term in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503 (1981), wherein we stated that “even where the Tax Injunction Act would not bar federal-court interference in state tax administration, principles of federal equity may nevertheless counsel the withholding of relief. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 301 (1943).” Id., at 525-526, n. 33. We need not decide in this case whether the comity spoken of would also bar a claim under § 1983 which requires no scrutiny whatever of state tax assessment practices, such as a facial attack on tax laws colorably claimed to be discriminatory as to race. Of course, the Court had not yet broadly interpreted the Civil Rights Act to permit federal damages actions for state violations of constitutional rights, brought prior to exhaustion of state remedies. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). The closest pre-Act case to a federal damages action was a suit for refund of state taxes allegedly assessed in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. First National Bank v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U. S. 450 (1924). Consistent with the federal-court deference for state tax matters of which we speak today, the Court held that the action was barred by the parties’ failure to exhaust their available state remedies. Id., at 456. Although declaratory actions were available before 1937, they were seldom used. See Note, Federal Declaratory Judgments on the Validity of State Taxes, 50 Yale L. J. 927, 929-930, and n. 14 (1941). Justice BRENNAN has cogently explained the reasons behind federal-court deference for state tax administration: “The special reasons justifying the policy of federal noninterference with state tax collection are obvious. The procedures for mass assessment and collection of state taxes and for administration and adjudication of taxpayers’ disputes with tax officials are generally complex and necessarily designed to operate according to established rules. State tax agencies are organized to discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the state procedures. If federal declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 0ther federal courts have reached this same conclusion. For example, in Advertiser Co. v. Wallace, 446 F. Supp. 677, 680 (MD Ala. 1978), the court concluded that “[although perhaps less coercive than anticipatory relief and less intrusive than a refund, the damage award plaintiff seeks, especially its request for punitive damages, still is designed to deter collection of the taxes now being assessed by defendants.” And the court in Evangelical Catholic Communion, Inc. v. Thomas, 373 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (Vt. 1973), correctly stated: “It is elementary that constitutional rights must be found to have been abridged in order for damages to be recovered in a civil rights action. Thus the plaintiffs in this action cannot recover damages without a determination by this court that the taxation of their Newbury property was effected in violation of their constitutional rights. If we were to make such a determination, we would, in effect, be issuing a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the tax levied on the plaintiffs. As the court is prohibited from issuing such a declaratory judgment, . . . the court is also precluded as a matter of law from adjudicating the plaintiffs’ damages claims.” We discern no significant difference, for purposes of the principles recognized in this case, between remedies which are “plain, adequate, and complete,” as that phrase has been used in articulating the doctrine of equitable restraint, and those which are “plain, speedy and efficient,” within the meaning of §1341. See, e. g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 73-74 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 622-623 (1946); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S., at 297-299; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S., at 525-526. Both phrases refer to the obvious precept that plaintiffs seeking protection of federal rights in federal courts should be remitted to their state remedies if their federal rights will not thereby be lost. Numerous federal decisions have treated the adequacy of state remedies, and it is to that body of law that federal courts should look in seeking to determine the occasions for the comity spoken of today.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RICHFIELD OIL CORP. v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. No. 46. Argued October 24, 1946. Decided November 25, 1946. Norman S. Sterry argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Robert E. Paradise. John L. Nourse, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is here on appeal from the Supreme Court of California which sustained a California tax against the claim that it was repugnant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States. Judicial Code § 237, 28 U. S. C. §§ 344 (a), 861a. Appellant is engaged in producing and selling oil and oil products in California. It entered into a contract with the New Zealand Government for the sale of oil. The price was f. o. b. Los Angeles, payment in London. Delivery was “to the order of the Naval Secretary, Navy Office, Wellington, into N. Z. Naval tank steamer R. F. A. ‘Nucula’ at Los Angeles, California.” The oil was to be consigned to the Naval-Officer-In-Charge, Auckland, New Zealand. Appellant carried the oil by pipe line from its refinery in California to storage tanks at the harbor where the Nucula appeared to receive the oil. When the Nucula had docked and was ready to receive the oil, appellant pumped it from the storage tanks into the vessel. Customary shipping documents were given the master, including a bill of lading which designated appellant as shipper and consigned the oil to the designated naval officer in Auckland. Payment of the price was made in London. The oil was transported to Auckland, no portion of it being used or consumed in the United States. Appellant filed with the Collector of Customs a shipper’s export declaration. It did not collect, nor attempt to do so, any sales tax from the purchaser. Appellee assessed a retail sales tax against appellant measured by the gross receipts from the transaction. The tax was paid under protest, a claim for refund was filed asserting that the levy of the tax violated the provisions of Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, and this suit was brought to obtain a refund. The California Supreme Court, one justice dissenting, first allowed a recovery on that ground. 155 P. 2d 1. After a rehearing it reversed its position and held the tax constitutional, two justices dissenting. 27 Cal. 2d 150, 163 P. 2d 1. I. We are met at the outset with the question whether the judgment of the California Supreme Court is a “final judgment” within the meaning of the Judicial Code § 237, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a). The case was tried on the pleadings and stipulated facts, a jury having been waived. The trial court found for appellant. The Supreme Court ordered that the judgment “be and the same is hereby reversed.” The argument is that under California law where a judgment has been reversed without directions, there is a new trial; that on a new trial appellant might amend its complaint and produce other evidence; and that if a new trial were had, new or different findings of fact might be made. See Erlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. 2d 547, 61 P. 2d 756. The designation given the judgment by state practice is not controlling. Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 268. The question is whether it can be said that “there is nothing more to be decided” (Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 118), that there has been “an effective determination of the litigation.” Market Street Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U. S. 548, 551; see Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 123-24. That question will be resolved not only by an examination of the entire record (Clark v. Williard, supra) but, where necessary, by resort to the local law to determine what effect the judgment has under the state rules of practice. Brady v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 302 U. S. 678; Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 319 U. S. 777. See Boskey, Finality of State Court Judgments under the Federal Judicial Code, 43 Col. L. Rev. 1002, 1005. This suit is brought under the California Retail Sales Tax Act, § 23 and § 31, which prescribes the sole remedy for challenging the tax. The procedure prescribed is payment of the tax, the filing of a claim for refund which sets forth “the specific grounds upon which the claim is founded,” Cal. Stats. 1941, pp. 1328,1329, and, in case the claim is denied, the institution of a suit within ninety days “on the grounds set forth in such claim.” Cal. Stats. 1939, pp. 2184, 2185. The claim thus frames and restricts the issues for the litigation. Although the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court without direction, its decision controls the disposition of the case. See Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 223 P. 974; Bank of America v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 2d 697, 128 P. 2d 357. Since the facts have been stipulated and the Supreme Court of California has passed on the issues which control the litigation, we take it that there is nothing more to be decided. The jurisdictional objection is thus without merit. See Gulf Refining Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 125, 136. II. We turn then to the merits. Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.” The Supreme Court of California held that this provision did not bar the tax because the delivery of the oil which resulted in the passage of title occurred prior to the commencement of the exportation. The court suggested, and the appellee concedes, that a different result might follow if the oil had been delivered to a common carrier; “for then it would have been placed in the hands of an instrumentality whose sole purpose is to export goods, thus indelibly characterizing the process as a part of exportation.” 27 Cal. 2d p. 153, 163 P. 2d p. 3. The court, in reaching the conclusion that the tax was constitutional, rested in part on our recent decisions (particularly McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33; Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U. S. 62; International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340) which sustained the levy of certain state taxes against the claim that they violated the Commerce Clause. The court concluded that if this had been an interstate transaction, it would have been subject to the tax. It saw no greater limitation on the power of the States under Article I, Section 10, Clause 2, than this Court has found to exist under the Commerce Clause. We do not pursue the inquiry as to the validity of the tax under the Commerce Clause. For we are of the view that whatever might be the result of that inquiry, the tax is unconstitutional under Article I, Section 10, Clause 2. , The two constitutional provisions, while related, are not coterminous. To be sure, a state tax has at times been held unconstitutional both under the Import-Export Clause and under the Commerce Clause. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292. But there are important differences between the two. The invalidity of one derives from the prohibition of taxation on the import or export; the validity of the other turns nowise on whether the article was, or had ever been, an import or export. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 665-66, and cases cited. Moreover, the Commerce Clause is cast, not in terms of a prohibition against taxes, but in terms of a power on the part of Congress to regulate commerce. It is well established that the Commerce Clause is a limitation upon the power of the States, even in absence of action by Congress. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373. But the scope of the limitation has been determined by the Court in an effort to maintain an area of trade free from state interference and at the same time to make interstate commerce pay its way. As recently stated in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra, p. 48, the law under the Commerce Clause has been fashioned by the Court in an effort “to reconcile competing constitutional demands, that commerce between the states shall not be unduly impeded by state action, and that the power to lay taxes for the support of state government shall not be unduly curtailed.” That accommodation has been made by upholding taxes designed to make interstate commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government from which it receives benefits (see e. g. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Reve nue, 303 U. S. 250, 254-55, and cases cited; McOoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., supra) and by invalidating those which discriminate against interstate commerce, which impose a levy for the privilege of doing it, which place an undue burden on it. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307; Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416. It seems clear that we cannot write any such qualifications into the Import-Export Clause. It prohibits every State from laying “any” tax on imports or exports without the consent of Congress. Only one exception is created— “except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws.” The fact of a single exception suggests that no other qualification of the absolute prohibition was intended. It would entail a substantial revision of the Import-Export Clause to substitute for the prohibition against “any” tax a prohibition against “any discriminatory” tax. As we shall see, the question as to what is exportation is somewhat entwined with the question as to what is interstate commerce. But the two clauses, though complementary, serve different ends. And the limitations of one cannot be read into the other. It is suggested, however, that the history of the Import-Export Clause shows that it was designed to prevent discriminatory taxes and not to preclude the levy of general taxes applicable alike to all goods. Support for that is found in the fact that this provision was defended in the Convention and later in the debates on the ground that it protected the inland States from levies by the coastal States through the taxation of exports. Yet that function was only a phase of a larger design. The Import-Export Clause was considered in connection with Article I, Section 9, Clause 5, which provides that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.” The purpose was to withhold from Congress the power to tax exports, and to deprive any State of the power except with the consent of Congress and even then, it seems, to require the net proceeds to be paid into the federal treasury. A proposal was made to prohibit the States “from taxing the produce of other States exported from their har-bours.” But that suggestion was not followed. The language adopted was supported by Madison “as preventing all State imposts.” The qualified interpretation urged upon us has therefore no substantial support in the history of the Import-Export Clause. Moreover, to infer qualifications does not comport with the standards for expounding the Constitution. As stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, “it would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.” For, as Chief Justice Taney said in Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570-71: “In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood. No word in the instrument, therefore, can be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning . . .” We cannot, therefore, read the prohibition against “any” tax on exports as containing an implied qualification. The questions remain whether we have here an export within the meaning of the constitutional provision and, if so, whether this tax was a prohibited impost upon it. The requirement that foreign commerce be involved (Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 136) is met, for con-cededly the oil was sold for shipment abroad. The question whether at the time the tax accrued the oil was an export presents a different problem. There are few decisions of the Court under Article I, Section 10, Clause 2, which illuminate the problem. In Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, Louisiana taxed coal held in that State for sale. After the tax was assessed some of the coal was sold for export. The Court held that the coal when taxed was not an export, saying, pp. 629-30: “When taxed it was not held with the intent or for the purpose of exportation, but with the intent and for the purpose of sale there, in New Orleans. A duty on exports must either be a duty levied on goods as a condition, or by reason of their exportation, or, at least, a direct tax or duty on goods which are intended for exportation. Whether the last would be a duty on exports, it is not necessary to determine. But certainly, where a general tax is laid on all property alike, it cannot be construed as a duty on exports when falling upon goods not then intended for exportation, though they should happen to be exported after-wards.” In Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, the Court had before it a case under the Commerce Clause. Logs, cut in New Hampshire, were being held on a river there for transportation to Maine. New Hampshire’s non-discriminatory tax on them was sustained. What the Court said concerning commerce is what we deem to be the correct principle governing exports: “. . . goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey.” P. 527. That view has been followed in cases involving Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution, which, as we have noted, prohibits Congress from laying any tax on “Articles exported from any State.” In Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504, the Court sustained a federal excise tax on manufactured tobacco. The tax was laid upon the goods before they left the factory. The Court said, p. 507, “They were not in course of exportation; they might never be exported; whether they would be or not would depend altogether on the will of the manufacturer.” The same result was reached in Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, where a federal manufacturing tax on filled cheese was sustained against the claim that it was a tax levied by Congress on exports. The cheese was manufactured under contract for export. The Court said, “The true construction of the constitutional provision is that no burden by way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly situated. The exemption attaches to the export and not to the article before its exportation.” P. 427. That line has been marked by other decisions under Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution. Thus a federal stamp tax on a foreign bill of lading is a tax on exports, since it is the equivalent of a direct tax on the articles included in the bill of lading. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283. The same is true of federal stamp taxes on charter parties made exclusively for the carriage of cargo in foreign commerce, United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1, 17, for a tax on those charter parties is “in substance a tax on the exportation; and a tax on the exportation is a tax on the exports.” The same is likewise true of federal stamp taxes on policies insuring exports against maritime risks. Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19. The Court stated, p. 27: “The rise in rates for insurance as immediately affects exporting as an increase in freight rates, and the taxation of policies insuring cargoes during their transit to foreign ports is as much a burden on exporting as if it were laid on the charter parties, the bills of lading, or the goods themselves. Such taxation does not deal with preliminaries, or with distinct or separable subjects; the tax falls upon the exporting process.” Closer in point is Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66. It involved a federal tax on baseball bats and balls sold by the manufacturer. A Venezuelan firm ordered a New York commission house to buy a quantity of bats and balls for their account. The New York commission house' placed the order with the manufacturer instructing it to deliver the packages to an exporting carrier in New York for shipment to Venezuela. The goods were delivered to the carrier and an export bill of lading was issued. In due course the goods were transported to Venezuela. The issue, as stated by the Court, p. 68, was “whether the sale was a step in exportation.” The Court pointed out that the goods would not have been exempt from tax while they were “in process of manufacture” though they were intended for export but that they would be exempt “after they had been loaded upon the vessel for Venezuela and the bill of lading issued.” The question was whether the “export had begun.” After noting that title passed when the goods were delivered into the carrier’s hands, the Court stated, pp. 69-70: “The very act that passed the title and that would have incurred the tax had the transaction been domestic, committed the goods to the carrier that was to take them across the sea, for the purpose of export and with the direction to the foreign port upon the goods. The expected and accomplished effect of the act was to start them for that port. The fact that further acts were to be done before the goods would get to sea does not matter so long as they were only the regular steps to the contemplated result.” The circumstance that title was in the New York commission house and that it might change its mind and retain the goods for its own use was dismissed by the statement that “Theoretical possibilities may be left out of account.” P. 70. The Court concluded that if exportation was put at a later point, exports would not receive “the liberal protection that hitherto they have received.” P. 70. This line of cases was summarized in Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 228, as construing the constitutional prohibition against federal taxation of exports so as to give “immunity to the process of exportation and to the transactions and documents embraced in that process. . . . Only on that construction can the constitutional safeguard be maintained.” The fact that delivery to a common carrier for export gave the sale immunity in Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, supra, is seized upon as stating a rule that the process of exportation has not started until such delivery has been made. And cases like Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, are relied upon as indicating that delivery to the purchaser is not sufficient. That case arose under the Commerce Clause. Mississippi was upheld in its effort to tax a distributor or wholesaler who purchased gasoline and later took it to Louisiana for sale. The Court said, p. 395, that although the course of business indicated the likely destination of the oil, it was “in the hands of the purchaser to do with as it liked, and there was nothing that in any way committed it to sending the oil to Louisiana except its own wishes.” The Court held, therefore, that the tax was not on goods moving in interstate commerce. But it added, p. 396, “Dramatic circumstances, such as a great universal stream of grain from the State of purchase to a market elsewhere, may affect the legal conclusion by showing the manifest certainty of the destination and exhibiting grounds of policy that are absent here.” The certainty that the goods are headed to sea and that the process of exportation has started may normally be best evidenced by the fact that they have been delivered to a common carrier for that purpose. But the same degree of certainty may exist though no common carrier is involved. The present case is an excellent illustration. The foreign purchaser furnished the ship to carry the oil abroad. Delivery was made into the hold of the vessel from the vendor’s tanks located at the dock. That delivery marked the commencement of the movement of the oil abroad. It is true, as the Supreme Court of California observed, that at the time of the delivery the vessel was in California waters and was not bound for its destination until it started to move from the port. But when the oil was pumped into the hold of the vessel, it passed into the control of a foreign purchaser and there was nothing equivocal in the transaction which created even a probability that the oil would be diverted to domestic use. It would not be clearer that the oil had started upon its export journey had it been delivered to a common carrier at an inland point. The means of shipment are unimportant so long as the certainty of the foreign destination is plain. It seems clear under the decisions which we have reviewed involving Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the Constitution that the commencement of the export would occur no later than the delivery of the oil into the vessel. As the meaning of “export” is the same under that Clause and the Import-Export Clause (see Brown v. Maryland, supra, p. 445; Turpin v. Burgess, supra, p. 506), the same result follows here. It is argued, however, that the present tax is not an impost within the meaning of the Import-Export Clause. The tax is measured by the gross receipts of retail sales and is levied on retailers “For the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail.” Cal. Stats. 1935, p. 1253. The retailers are authorized to collect the tax from the consumers. Cal. Stats. 1933, p. 2602. And a sale is “any transfer of title or possession . . . in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property, for a consideration.” Cal. Stats. 1935, p. 1256. The California Supreme Court held that the tax is an excise tax for the privilege of conducting a retail business measured by the gross receipts from sales; that it is not laid upon the consumer and does not become a tax on the sale or because of the sale. 27 Cal. 2d p. 152,163 P. 2d p. 2. That construction, being a matter of state law, is binding on us. But it is not determinative of the question whether the tax deprives the taxpayer of a federal right. That issue turns not on the characterization which the state has given the tax, but on its operation and effect. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 231. Appellee concedes that the prohibition of the Import-Export Clause would be violated if the goods were taxed as exports or because of their exportation, or if the process of exportation were itself taxed. We perceive, however, no difference in substance between any tax so labeled and the present tax. The California Supreme Court conceded that the delivery of the oil “resulted in the passage of title, and the completion of the sale, and the taxable incident.” 27 Cal. 2d p. 153, 163 P. 2d pp. 2-3. The incident which gave rise to the accrual of the tax was a step in the export process. Moreover, Brown v. Maryland, supra, rejected an argument that while a State could not tax imports, it could tax the privilege of selling imports. Chief Justice Marshall stated, p. 444: “All must perceive, that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale, is a tax on the article itself. It is true, the State may tax occupations generally, but this tax must be paid by those who employ the individual, or is a tax on his business. The lawyer, the physician, or the mechanic, must either charge more on the article in which he deals, or the thing itself is taxed through his person. This the State has a right to do, because no constitutional prohibition extends to it. So, a tax on the occupation of an importer is, in like manner, a tax on importation. It must add to the price of the article, and be paid by the consumer, or by the importer himself, in like manner as a direct duty on the article itself would be made. This the State has not a right to do, because it is prohibited by the constitution.” The same reasoning was applied to exports, p. 445: “The States are forbidden to lay a duty on exports, and the United States are forbidden to lay a tax or duty on articles exported from any State. There is some diversity in language, but none is perceivable in the act which is prohibited. The United States have the same right to tax occupations which is possessed by the States. Now, suppose the United States should require every exporter to take out a license, for which he should pay such tax as Congress might think proper to impose; would government be permitted to shield itself from the just censure to which this attempt to evade the prohibitions of the constitution would expose it, by saying, that this was a tax on the person, not on the article, and that the legislature had a right to tax occupations?” The prohibition contained in the Import-Export Clause against taxation on exports clearly involves more than a mere exemption from taxes laid specifically upon the exported goods themselves. That is true of the constitutional prohibition against federal taxes on exports. United States v. Hvoslef, supra. What was said there (p. 13) is equally applicable here: “If it meant no more than that, the obstructions to exportation which it was the purpose to prevent could readily be set up by legislation nominally conforming to the constitutional restriction but in effect overriding it.” And see Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218. We conclude that the tax which California has exacted from appellant is an impost upon an export within the meaning of Article I, Section 10, Clause 2, and is therefore unconstitutional. Reversed. Mr. Justice Murphy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. In California a valid stipulation is binding upon the parties. McGuire v. Baird, 9 Cal. 2d 353, 70 P. 2d 915; Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 14 P. 2d 522; see 23 Cal. Juris. 826. It is available at a second trial unless in terms otherwise limited, Nathan v. Dierssen, 146 Cal. 63, 79 P. 739; Crenshaw v. Smith, 74 A. C. A. 295, 168 P. 2d 752; see 100 A. L. R. 775, and will be controlling at the second trial unless the trial court relieves a party from the stipulation. First National Bank v. Stansbury, 118 Cal. App. 80, 5 P. 2d 13. Relief from a stipulation may be granted in the sound discretion of the trial court in cases where the facts stipulated have changed, there is fraud, mistake of fact, or other special circumstance rendering it unjust to enforce the stipulation. Sacre v. Chalupnik, 188 Cal. 386, 205 P. 449; Back v. Farnsworth, 25 Cal. App. 2d 212, 77 P. 2d 295; Sinnock v. Young, 61 Cal. App. 2d 130, 142 P. 2d 85; see 161 A. L. R. 1163. In the present case there is no intimation in the record or briefs of fraud, excusable neglect, or other ground for relief. Indeed the parties both accept the stipulation as accurate and complete. See 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention (1911), pp. 307, 359-62,442. See particularly Madison’s statement, 3 Elliot’s Debates (2d ed.) p. 483. And see The Federalist No. 42. See 2 Farrand, op. cit., supra, note 2, pp. 305-08, 358-63, 441-42. The consensus of opinion was expressed by Gerry — that “the legislature could not be trusted with such a power. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially, raising one and depressing another part of it.” See 2 Farrand, op. cit., supra, note 2, p. 307. Or as stated by Sherman, “A power to tax exports would shipwreck the whole.” Id., p. 308. This was suggested by Langdon. See 2 Farrand, op. cit., supra, note 2, p. 361. See 2 Farrand, op. cit., supra, note 2, p. 442. See Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U. S. 95.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION et al. v. GRANITE ROCK CO. No. 85-1200. Argued December 2, 1986 Decided March 24, 1987 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Powell and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 594. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, J., joined, post, p. 607. Linus Masouredis, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, N. Gregory Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph Bar-bieri, Deputy Attorney General. Barbara R. Banke argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jess S. Jackson, Burton J. Goldstein, James G. Heisinger, Jr., and Janet A. Econome. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Peter R. Steen-land, Jr., and Anne S. Almy. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Harold M. Brown, Attorney General of Alaska, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Corinne K. A. Watanabe, Attorney General of Hawaii, James il Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, Paul Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico, William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Michael T. Greely, Attorney General of Montana, David B. Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Mark V. Meier-henry, Attorney General of South Dakota, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Archie G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming, and John D. Leshy; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Joyce Holmes Benjamin; and for the Big Sur Foundation et al. by Barry P. Goode and Christopher Berka. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Alaska Miners Association et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett; and for the American Mining Congress by Mary Jane C. Due. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether Forest Service regulations, federal land use statutes and regulations, or the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), pre-empt the California Coastal Commission’s imposition of a permit requirement on operation of an unpatented mining claim in a national forest. I Granite Rock Company is a privately owned firm that mines chemical and pharmaceutical grade white limestone. Under the Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 22 et seq., a private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits. If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on federal land, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant “shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations,” 30 U. S. C. §26, although the United States retains title to the land. The holder of a perfected mining claim may secure a patent to the land by corn-plying with the requirements of the Mining Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, see 43 CFR §3861.1 et seq. (1986), and, upon issuance of the patent, legal title to the land passes to the patent holder. Granite Rock holds unpatented mining claims on federally owned lands on and around Mount Pico Blanco in the Big Sur region of Los Padres National Forest. From 1959 to 1980, Granite Rock removed small samples of limestone from this area for mineral analysis. In 1980, in accordance with federal regulations, see 36 CFR §228.1 et seq. (1986), Granite Rock submitted to the Forest Service a 5-year plan of operations for the removal of substantial amounts of limestone. The plan discussed the location and appearance of the mining operation, including the size and shape of excavations, the location of all access roads, and the storage of any overburden. App. 27-34. The Forest Service prepared an Environmental Assessment of the plan. Id., at 38-53. The Assessment recommended modifications of the plan, and the responsible Forest Service Acting District Ranger approved the plan with the recommended modifications in 1981. Id., at 54. Shortly after Forest Service approval of the modified plan of operations, Granite Rock began to mine. Under the California Coastal Act (CCA), Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §30000 et seq. (West 1986), any person undertaking any development, including mining, in the State’s coastal zone must secure a permit from the California Coastal Commission. §§30106, 30600. According to the CCA, the Coastal Commission exercises the State’s police power and constitutes the State’s coastal zone management program for purposes of the federal CZMA, described infra, at 589-590. In 1983 the Coastal Commission instructed Granite Rock to apply for a coastal development permit for any mining undertaken after the date of the Commission’s letter. Granite Rock immediately filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking to enjoin officials of the Coastal Commission from compelling Granite Rock to comply with the Coastal Commission permit requirement and for declaratory relief under 28 U. S. C. §2201 (1982 ed., Supp. III). Granite Rock alleged that the Coastal Commission permit requirement was preempted by Forest Service regulations, by the Mining Act of 1872, and by the CZMA. Both sides agreed that there were no material facts in dispute. The District Court denied Granite Rock’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. 590 F. Supp. 1361 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 768 F. 2d 1077 (1985). The Court of Appeals held that the Coastal Commission permit requirement was pre-empted by the Mining Act of 1872 and Forest Service regulations. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the statute and regulations do not “go so far as to occupy the field of establishing environmental standards,” specifically noting that Forest Service regulations “recognize that a state may enact environmental regulations in addition to those established by federal agencies,” and that the Forest Service “will apply [the state standards] in exercising its permit authority.” 768 F. 2d, at 1083. However, the Court of Appeals held that “an independent state permit system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine the Forest Service’s own permit authority and thus is preempted.” Ibid. The Coastal Commission appealed to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits, 475 U. S. 1094 (1986). II First we address two jurisdictional issues. In the course of this litigation, Granite Rock’s 5-year plan of operations expired. The controversy between Granite Rock and the Coastal Commission remains a live one, however, for two reasons. First, the Coastal Commission’s 1983 letter instructed Granite Rock that a Coastal Commission permit was required for work undertaken after the date of the letter. App. 22-24. Granite Rock admitted that it has done work after that date. Id., at 83. Because the Coastal Commission asserts that Granite Rock needed a Coastal Commission permit for the work undertaken after the date of the Commission’s letter, the Commission may require “reclamation for the mining that [has] occurred, measures to prevent pollution into the Little Sur River.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. Granite Rock disputes the Coastal Commission’s authority to require reclamation efforts. Second, Granite Rock stated in answer to interrogatories that its “investments and activities regarding its valid and unpatented mining claims require continuing operation beyond the present Plan of Operations,” and that it intended to conduct mining operations on the claim at issue “as long as [Granite Rock] can mine an economically viable and valuable mining deposit under applicable federal laws.” App. 83-84. Therefore it is likely that Granite Rock will submit new plans of operations in the future. Even if future participation by California in the CZMA consistency review process, see infra, at 590-591, or requirements placed on Granite Rock by the Forest Service called for compliance with the conditions of the Coastal Commission’s permit, dispute would continue over whether the Coastal Commission itself, rather than the Federal Government, could enforce the conditions placed on the permit. This controversy is one capable of repetition yet evading review. See Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 285, n. 3 (1986); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333, n. 2 (1972). Accordingly, this case is not moot. The second jurisdictional issue we must consider is whether this case is properly within our authority, under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), to review the decision of a federal court of appeals by appeal if a state statute is “held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States . . . Statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 247 (1984); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 43 (1983). As noted in Silkwood, supra, at 247, “we have consistently distinguished between those cases in which a state statute is expressly struck down” as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and those cases in which “an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute.” This latter group of cases do not fall within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that the particular exercise of the Coastal Commission permit requirement over Granite Rock’s operation in a national forest was pre-empted by federal law. The Court of Appeals did not invalidate any portion of the CCA. In fact, it did not discuss whether the CCA itself actually authorized the imposition of a permit requirement over Granite Rock. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §30008 (West 1986) (limiting jurisdiction over federal lands to that which is “consistent with applicable federal. . . laws”). Accordingly this case is one in which “an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute,” Silkwood, supra, at 247, and not within our § 1254(2) appellate jurisdiction. We therefore treat the jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 2103, and having done so, grant the petition and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I — ( I — I Granite Rock does not argue that the Coastal Commission has placed any particular conditions on the issuance of a permit that conflict with federal statutes or regulations. Indeed, the record does not disclose what conditions the Coastal Commission will place on the issuance of a permit. Rather, Granite Rock argues, as it must given the posture of the case, that there is no possible set of conditions the Coastal Commission could place on its permit that would not conflict with federal law — that any state permit requirement is per se pre-empted. The only issue in this case is this purely facial challenge to the Coastal Commission permit requirement. The Property Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U. S. Const., Art. IV, §3, cl. 2. This Court has “repeatedly observed” that “ ‘[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976), quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29 (1940). Granite Rock suggests that the Property Clause not only invests unlimited power in Congress over the use of federally owned lands, but also exempts federal lands from state regulation whether or not those regulations conflict with federal law. In Kleppe, 426 U. S., at 543, we considered “totally unfounded” the assertion that the Secretary of the Interior had even proposed such an interpretation of the Property Clause. We made clear that “the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws” on federal land so long as those laws do not conflict with federal law. Ibid. The Property Clause itself does not automatically conflict with all state regulation of federal land. Rather, as we explained in Kleppe: “Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause.” Ibid, (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). We agree with Granite Rock that the Property Clause gives Congress plenary power to legislate the use of the federal land on which Granite Rock holds its unpatented mining claim. The question in this case, however, is whether Congress has enacted legislation respecting this federal land that would pre-empt any requirement that Granite Rock obtain a California Coastal Commission permit. To answer this question we follow the pre-emption analysis by which the Court has been guided on numerous occasions: “[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is preempted. [Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, 461 U. S. 190,] 203-204 [(1983)]; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, at 248. A Granite Rock and the United States as amicus have made basically three arguments in support of a finding that any possible state permit requirement would be pre-empted. First, Granite Rock alleges that the Federal Government’s environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests demonstrates an intent to pre-empt any state regulation. Second, Granite Rock and the United States assert that indications that state land use planning over unpatented mining claims in national forests is pre-empted should lead to the conclusion that the Coastal Commission permit requirement is pre-empted. Finally, Granite Rock and the United States assert that the CZMA, by excluding federal lands from its definition of the coastal zone, declared a legislative intent that federal lands be excluded from all state coastal zone regulation. We conclude that these federal statutes and regulations do not, either independently or in combination, justify a facial challenge to the Coastal Commission permit requirement. Granite Rock concedes that the Mining Act of 1872, as originally passed, expressed no legislative intent on the as yet rarely contemplated subject of environmental regulation. Brief for Appellee 31-32. In 1955, however, Congress passed the Multiple Use Mining Act, 69 Stat. 367, 30 U. S. C. §601 et seq., which provided that the Federal Government would retain and manage the surface resources of subsequently located unpatented mining claims. 30 U. S. C. § 612(b). Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to make “rules and regulations” to “regulate [the] occupancy and use” of national forests. 16 U. S. C. §551. Through this delegation of authority, the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service has promulgated regulations so that “use of the surface of National Forest System lands” by those such as Granite Rock, who have un-patented mining claims authorized by the Mining Act of 1872, “shall be conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National Forest System surface resources.” 36 CFR §§228.1, 228.3(d) (1986). It was pursuant to these regulations that the Forest Service approved the Plan of Operations submitted by Granite Rock. If, as Granite Rock claims, it is the federal intent that Granite Rock conduct its mining unhindered by any state environmental regulation, one would expect to find the expression of this intent in these Forest Service regulations. As we explained in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 718 (1985), it is appropriate to expect an administrative regulation to declare any intention to pre-empt state law with some specificity: “[B]ecause agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety of means, ... we can expect that they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of preemption, we will pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to pre-empt.” Upon examination, however, the Forest Service regulations that Granite Rock alleges pre-empt any state permit requirement not only are devoid of any expression of intent to pre-empt state law, but rather appear to assume that those submitting plans of operations will comply with state laws. The regulations explicitly require all operators within the national forests to comply with state air quality standards, 36 CFR §228.8(a) (1986), state water quality standards, § 228.8(b), and state standards for the disposal and treatment of solid wastes, § 228.8(c). The regulations also provide that, pending final approval of the plan of operations, the Forest Service officer with authority to approve plans of operation “will approve such operations as may be necessary for timely compliance with the requirements of Federal and State laws . . . .” § 228.5(b) (emphasis added). Finally, the final subsection of §228.8, “[rjequirements for environmental protection,” provides: “(h) Certification or other approval issued by State agencies or other Federal agencies of compliance with laws and regulations relating to mining operations will be accepted as compliance with similar or parallel requirements of these regulations.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is impossible to divine from these regulations, which expressly contemplate coincident compliance with state law as well as with federal law, an intention to pre-empt all state regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests. Neither Granite Rock nor the United States contends that these Forest Service regulations are inconsistent with their authorizing statutes. Given these Forest Service regulations, it is unsurprising that the Forest Service team that prepared the Environmental Assessment of Granite Rock’s plan of operation, as well as the Forest Service officer that approved the plan of operation, expected compliance with state as well as federal law. The Los Padres National Forest Environmental Assessment of the Granite Rock plan stated that “Granite Rock is responsible for obtaining any necessary permits which may be required by the California Coastal Commission.” App. 46. The Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact issued by the Acting District Ranger accepted Granite Rock’s plan of operation with modifications, stating: “The claimant, in exercising his rights granted by the Mining Law of 1872, shall comply with the regulations of the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The claimant is further responsible for obtaining any necessary permits required by State and/or county laws, regulations and/or ordinance.” Id., at 54. B The second argument proposed by Granite Rock is that federal land management statutes demonstrate a legislative intent to limit States to a purely advisory role in federal land management decisions, and that the Coastal Commission permit requirement is therefore pre-empted as an impermissible state land use regulation. In 1976 two pieces of legislation were passed that called for the development of federal land use management plans affecting unpatented mining claims in national forests. Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management is responsible for managing the mineral resources on federal forest lands; under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 90 Stat. 2949, 16 U. S. C. §§1600-1614 (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), the Forest Service under the Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for the management of the surface impacts of mining on federal forest lands. Granite Rock, as well as the Solicitor General, point to aspects of these statutes indicating a legislative intent to limit States to an advisory role in federal land management decisions. For example, the NFMA directs the Secretary of Agriculture to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the land and resource management planning processes of State and local governments and other Federal agencies,” 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). The FLPMA directs that land use plans developed by the Secretary of the Interior “shall be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent [the Secretary] finds consistent with Federal law,” and calls for the Secretary, “to the extent he finds practical,” to keep apprised of state land use plans, and to “assist in resolving, to the extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and non-Federal Government plans.” 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(9). For purposes of this discussion and without deciding this issue, we may assume that the combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA pre-empts the extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands. The Coastal Commission asserts that it will use permit conditions to impose environmental regulation. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30233 (West 1986) (quality of coastal waters); § 30253(2) (erosion); § 30253(3) (air pollution); § 30240(b) (impact on environmentally sensitive habitat areas). While the CCA gives land use as well as environmental regulatory authority to the Coastal Commission, the state statute also gives the Coastal Commission the ability to limit the requirements it will place on the permit. The CCA declares that the Coastal Commission will “provide maximum state involvement in federal activities allowable under federal law or regulations . . . .” Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30004 (West 1986). Since the state statute does not detail exactly what state standards will and will not apply in connection with various federal activities, the statute must be understood to allow the Coastal Commission to limit the regulations it will impose in those circumstances. In the present case, the Coastal Commission has consistently maintained that it does not seek to prohibit mining of the unpat-ented claim on national forest land. See 768 F. 2d, at 1080 (“The Coastal Commission also argues that the Mining Act does not preempt state environmental regulation of federal land unless the regulation prohibits mining altogether . . .”) (emphasis supplied); 590 F. Supp., at 1373 (“The [Coastal Commission] seeks not to prohibit or Veto,’ but to regulate [Granite Rock’s] mining activity in accordance with the detailed requirements of the CCA. . . . There is no reason to find that the [Coastal Commission] will apply the CCA’s regulations so as to deprive [Granite Rock] of its rights under the Mining Act”); Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in No. C-83-5137 (ND Cal.), pp. 41-42. (“Despite Granite Rock’s characterization of Coastal Act regulation as a ‘veto’ or ban of mining, Granite Rock has not applied for any coastal permit, and the State . . . has not indicated that it would in fact ban such activity. . . . [T]he question presented is merely whether the state can regulate uses rather than 'prohibit them. Put another way, the state is not seeking to determine basic uses of federal land: rather it is seeking to regulate a given mining use so that it is carried out in a more environmentally sensitive and resource-protective fashion”). The line between environmental regulation and land use planning will not always be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a state environmental regulation so severe that a particular land use would become commercially impracticable. However, the core activity described by each phrase is undoubtedly different. Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits. Congress has indicated its understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation as distinct activities. As noted above, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(9) requires that the Secretary of the Interior’s land use plans be consistent with state plans only “to the extent he finds practical.” The immediately preceding subsection, however, requires that the Secretary’s land use plans “provide for compliance with applicable pollution control laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other pollution standards or implementation plans.” § 1712(c)(8). Congress has also illustrated its understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation as distinct activities by delegating the authority to regulate these activities to different agencies. The stated purpose of part 228, subpart A of the Forest Service regulations, 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986), is to “set forth rules and procedures” through which mining on unpatented claims in national forests “shall be conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National Forest System surface resources.” The next sentence of the subsection, however, declares that “[i]t is not the purpose of these regulations to provide for the management of mineral resources; the responsibility for managing such resources is in the Secretary of the Interior.” Congress clearly envisioned that although environmental regulation and land use planning may hypothetically overlap in some instances, these two types of activity would in most cases be capable of differentiation. Considering the legislative understanding of environmental regulation and land use planning as distinct activities, it would be anomalous to maintain that Congress intended any state environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests to be per se pre-empted as an impermissible exercise of state land use planning. Congress’ treatment of environmental regulation and land use planning as generally distinguishable calls for this Court to treat them as distinct, until an actual overlap between the two is demonstrated in a particular case. Granite Rock suggests that the Coastal Commission’s true purpose in enforcing a permit requirement is to prohibit Granite Rock’s mining entirely. By choosing to seek injunc-tive and declaratory relief against the permit requirement before discovering what conditions the Coastal Commission would have placed on the permit, Granite Rock has lost the possibility of making this argument in this litigation. Granite Rock’s case must stand or fall on the question whether any possible set of conditions attached to the Coastal Commission’s permit requirement would be pre-empted. As noted in the previous section, the Forest Service regulations do not indicate a federal intent to pre-empt all state environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests. Whether or not state land use planning over unpatented mining claims in national forests is pre-empted, the Coastal Commission insists that its permit requirement is an exercise of environmental regulation rather than land use planning. In the present posture of this litigation, the Coastal Commission’s identification of a possible set of permit conditions not pre-empted by federal law is sufficient to rebuff Granite Rock’s facial challenge to the permit requirement. This analysis is not altered by the fact that the Coastal Commission chooses to impose its environmental regulation by means of a permit requirement. If the Federal Government occupied the field of environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests — concededly not the case — then state environmental regulation of Granite Rock’s mining activity would be pre-empted, whether or not the regulation was implemented through a permit requirement. Conversely, if reasonable state environmental regulation is not pre-empted, then the use of a permit requirement to impose the state regulation does not create a conflict with federal law where none previously existed. The permit requirement itself is not talismanic. C Granite Rock’s final argument involves the CZMA, 16 U. S. C. §1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), through which financial assistance is provided to States for the development of coastal zone management programs. Section 304(a) of the CZMA, 16 U. S. C. § 1453(1), defines the coastal zone of a State, and specifically excludes from the coastal zone “lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents.” The Department of Commerce, which administers the CZMA, has interpreted § 1453(1) to exclude all federally owned land from the CZMA definition of a State’s coastal zone. 15 CFR § 923.33(a) (1986). Granite Rock argues that the exclusion of “lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents” excludes all federally owned land from the CZMA definition of a State’s coastal zone, and demonstrates a congressional intent to pre-empt any possible Coastal Commission permit requirement as applied to the mining of Granite Rock’s unpatented claim in the national forest land. According to Granite Rock, because Granite Rock mines land owned by the Federal Government, the Coastal Commission’s regulation of Granite Rock’s mining operation must be limited to participation in a consistency review process detailed in the CZMA. Under the CZMA, once a state coastal zone management program has been approved by the Secretary of Commerce for federal administrative grants, “any applicant for a required Federal license or permit to conduct an activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone of that state shall provide in the application ... a certification that the proposed activity complies with the state’s approved program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner consistent with the [state] program.” 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). At the same time, the applicant must provide the State a copy of the certification. The State, after public notice and appropriate hearings, is to notify the federal agency concerned that the State concurs or objects to the certification. If the State fails to notify the federal agency within six months of receiving notification, it is presumed that the State concurs. If the State neither concurs nor is presumed to concur, the federal agency must reject the application, unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that the application is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or is “otherwise necessary in the interest of national security.” Ibid. In order for an activity to be subject to CZMA consistency review, the activity must be on a list that the State provides federal agencies, which describes the type of federal permit and license applications the State wishes to review. 15 CFR §930.53 (1986). If the activity is unlisted, the State must within 30 days of receiving notice of the federal permit application inform the federal agency and federal permit applicant that the proposed activity requires CZMA consistency review. § 930.54. If the State does not provide timely notification, it waives the right to review the unlisted activity. In the present case, it appears that Granite Rock’s proposed mining operations were not listed pursuant to §930.53, and that the Coastal Commission did not timely notify the Forest Service or Granite Rock that Granite Rock’s plan of operations required consistency review. App. 17. Therefore, the Coastal Commission waived its right to consistency review of the 1981-1986 plan of operations. Absent any other expression of congressional intent regarding the pre-emptive effect of the CZMA, we would be required to decide, first, whether unpatented mining claims in national forests were meant to be excluded from the §1453(1) definition of a State’s coastal zone, and, second, whether this exclusion from the coastal zone definition was intended to pre-empt state regulations that were not preempted by any other federal statutes or regulations. Congress has provided several clear statements of its intent regarding the pre-emptive effect of the CZMA; those statements, which indicate that Congress clearly intended the CZMA not to be an independent cause of pre-emption except in cases of actual conflict, end our inquiry. Title 16 U. S. C. § 1456(e)(1) provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed — “(1) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, or rights in the field of planning, development, or control of water resources, submerged lands, or navigable waters; nor to displace, supersede, limit, or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdiction or responsibility of any legally established joint or common agency of two or more states or of two or more states and the Federal Government; nor to limit the authority of Congress to authorize and fund projects. . . .” The Senate Report describes the above section as “a standard clause disclaiming intent to diminish Federal or State authority in the fields affected by the Act,” or “to change interstate agreements.” S. Rep. No. 92-753, p. 20 (1972). The Conference Report stated, “[t]he Conferees also adopted language which would make certain that there is no intent in this legislation to change Federal or state jurisdiction or rights in specified fields, including submerged lands.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1544, p. 14 (1972). While the land at issue here does not appear to fall under the categories listed in 16 U. S. C. § 1456(e)(1), the section and its legislative history demonstrate Congress’ refusal to use the CZMA to alter the balance between state and federal jurisdiction. The clearest statement of congressional intent as to the pre-emptive effect of the CZMA appears in the “Purpose” section of the Senate Report, quoted in full: “[The CZMA] has as its main purpose the encouragement and assistance of States in preparing and implementing management programs to preserve, protect, develop and whenever possible restore the resources of the coastal zone of the United States. The bill authorizes Federal grants-in-aid to coastal states to develop coastal zone management programs. Additionally, it authorizes grants to help coastal states implement these management programs once approved, and States would be aided in the acquisition and operation of estuarine sanctuaries. Through the system of providing grants-in-aid, the States are provided financial incentives to undertake the responsibility for setting up management programs in the coastal zone. There is no attempt to diminish state authority through federal preemption. The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over their coastal zones.” S. Rep. No. 92-753, supra, at 1 (emphasis supplied). Because Congress specifically disclaimed any intention to pre-empt pre-existing state authority in the CZMA, we conclude that even if all federal lands are excluded from the CZMA definition of “coastal zone,” the CZMA does not automatically pre-empt all state regulation of activities on federal lands. IV Granite Rock’s challenge to the California Coastal Commission’s permit requirement was broad and absolute; our rejection of that challenge is correspondingly narrow. Granite Rock argued that any state permit requirement, whatever its conditions, was per se pre-empted by federal law. To defeat Granite Rock’s facial challenge, the Coastal Commission needed merely to identify a possible set of permit conditions not in conflict with federal law. The Coastal Commission alleges that it will use its permit requirement to impose reasonable environmental regulation. Rather than evidencing an intent to pre-empt such state regulation, the Forest Service regulations appear to assume compliance with state laws. Federal land use statutes and regulations, while arguably expressing an intent to pre-empt state land use planning, distinguish environmental regulation from land use planning. Finally, the language and legislative history of the CZMA expressly disclaim an intent to pre-empt state regulation. Following an examination of the “almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant legislation,” post, at 606, Justice Powell concludes that “[i]n view of the Property Clause ... , as well as common sense, federal authority must control . . . .” Ibid. As noted above, the Property Clause gives Congress plenary power over the federal land at issue; however, even within the sphere of the Property Clause, state law is pre-empted only when it conflicts with the operation or objectives of federal law, or when Congress “evidences an intent to occupy a given field,” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S., at 248. The suggestion that traditional pre-emption analysis is inapt in this context can be justified, if at all, only by the assertion that the state regulation in this case would be “duplicative.” The description of the regulation as duplicative, of course, is based on Justice Powell’s conclusions that land use regulation and environmental regulation are indistinguishable, post, at 600-601, and that any state permit requirement, by virtue of being a permit requirement rather than some other form of regulation, would duplicate federal permit requirements, post, at 604-605. Because we disagree with these assertions, see supra, at 587-588, 589, we apply the traditional pre-emption analysis which requires an actual conflict between state and federal law, or a congressional expression of intent to pre-empt, before we will conclude that state regulation is pre-empted. Contrary to the assertion of Justice Powell that the Court today gives States power to impose regulations that “conflict with the views of the Forest Service,” post, at 606, we hold only that the barren record of this facial challenge has not demonstrated any conflict. We do not, of course, approve any future application of the Coastal Commission permit requirement that in fact conflicts with federal law. Neither do we take the course of condemning the permit requirement on the basis of as yet unidentifiable conflicts with the federal scheme. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Coastal Commission also instructed Granite Rock to submit a certification of consistency pursuant to the consistency review process of the CZMA, 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A), described infra, at 590-591. The Commission subsequently admitted that it had waived its right to réview the 1981-1986 plan of operation under the CZMA consistency provision by failing to raise its right to review in a timely manner. App. 17. Although the California Coastal Act requires local governments to adopt Local Coastal Programs, which include a land use plan and zoning ordinance, see Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §§30500, 30512, 30513 (West 1986), no Local Coastal Program permit requirement is involved in this case. The permit at issue in this litigation is issued by the Coastal Commission directly. §§ 30600(a), (c); Tr. of Oral Arg. 52 (“We’re dealing with the second type of permitting, which is by the Coastal Commission itself, not a local government. . . . [T]he Coastal Commission issues permits based upon compliance with the environmental criteria in the Coastal Act itself”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?