Datasets:

ricdomolm

/

lawma-tasks

like 1

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ESTATE OF NOEL et al. No. 503. Argued April 1, 1965. Decided April 29, 1965. John B. Jones, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox and Assistant Attorney General Oherdorjer. Harry Norman Ball argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Edward F. Merrey, Jr. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a federal estate tax case, raising questions under § 2042 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 2042 (2) (1958 ed.), which requires inclusion in the gross estate of a decedent of amounts received by beneficiaries other than the executor from “insurance under policies on the life of the decedent” if the decedent “possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. . . .” The questions presented in this case are whether certain flight insurance policies payable upon the accidental death of the insured were policies “on the life of the decedent” and whether at his death he had reserved any of the “incidents of ownership” in the policies. These issues emerge from the following facts. Respondent Ruth M. Noel drove her husband from their home to New York International Airport where he was to take an airplane to Venezuela. Just before taking off, Mr. Noel signed applications for two round-trip flight insurance policies, aggregating 1125,000 and naming his wife as beneficiary. Mrs. Noel testified that she paid the premiums of $2.50 each on the policies and that her husband then instructed the sales clerk to “give them to my wife. They are hers now, I no longer have anything to do with them.” The clerk gave her the policies, which she kept. Less than three hours later Mr. Noel’s plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean and he and all others aboard were killed. Thereafter the companies paid Mrs. Noel the $125,000 face value of the policies, which was not included in the estate tax return filed by his executors. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the proceeds of the policies should have been included and the Tax Court sustained that determination, holding that the flight accident policies were insurance “on the life of the decedent”; that Mr. Noel had possessed exercisable “incidents of ownership” in the policies at his death; arid that the $125,000 paid to Mrs. Noel as beneficiary was therefore includable in the gross estate. 39 T. C. 466. Although agreeing that decedent’s reserved right to assign the policies and to change the beneficiary amounted to “exercisable incidents of ownership within the meaning of the statute,” the Court of Appeals nevertheless reversed, holding that given “its ordinary, plain and generally accepted meaning,” the statutory phrase “policies on the life of the decedent” does not apply to insurance paid on account of accidental death under policies like those here. 332 F. 2d 950. The court’s reason for drawing the distinction was that under a life insurance contract an insurer “agrees to pay a specified sum upon the occurrence of an inevitable event,” whereas accident insurance covers a risk “which is evitable and not likely to occur.” (Emphasis supplied.) 332 F. 2d, at 952. Because of the importance of an authoritative answer to these questions in the administration of the estate tax laws, we granted certiorari to decide them. 379 U. S. 927. I. In 1929, 36 years ago, the Board of Tax Appeals, predecessor to the Tax Court, held in Ackerman v. Commis sioner, 15 B. T. A. 635, that “amounts received as accident insurance” because of the death of the insured were includable in the estate of the deceased. The Board of Tax Appeals recognized that “there is a distinction between life insurance and accident insurance, the former insuring against death in any event and the latter . . . against death under certain contingencies . . . .” The Court of Appeals in the case now before us considered this distinction between an “inevitable” and an “evitable” event to be of crucial significance under the statute. The Board of Tax Appeals in Ackerman did not, stating “we fail to see why one is not taken out upon the life of the policy-holder as much as the other. In each case the risk assumed by the insurer is the loss of the insured’s life, and the payment of the insurance money is contingent upon the loss of life.” This view of the Board of Tax Appeals is wholly consistent with the language of the statute itself which makes no distinction between “policies on the life of the decedent” which are payable in all events and those •payable only if death comes in a certain way or within a certain time. Even were the statutory language less clear, since the Board of Tax Appeals’ Ackerman case it has been the settled and consistent administrative practice to include insurance proceeds for accidental death under policies like these in the estates of decedents. The Treasury Regulations remain unchanged from the time of the Ackerman decision and from that day to this Congress has never attempted to limit the scope of that decision or the established administrative construction of § 2042 (2), although it has re-enacted that section and amended it in other respects a number of times. We have held in many cases that such a long-standing administrative interpretation, applying to a substantially reenacted statute, is deemed to have received congressional approval and has the effect of law. See, e. g., National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 146; United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459, 466. We hold here that these insurance policies, whether called “flight accident insurance” or “life insurance,” were in effect insurance taken out on the “life of the decedent” within the meaning of § 2042 (2). II. The executors’ second contention is that even if these were policies “on the life of the decedent,” Mrs. Noel owned them completely, and the decedent therefore possessed no exercisable incident of ownership in them at the time of his death so as to make the proceeds includable in his estate. While not clearly spelled out, the contention that the decedent reserved no incident of ownership in the policies rests on three alternative claims: (a) that Mrs. Noel purchased the policies and therefore owned them; (b) that even if her husband owned the policies, he gave them to her, thereby depriving himself of power to assign the policies or to change the beneficiary; and (c) even assuming he had contractual power to assign the policies or make a beneficiary change, this power was illusory as he could not possibly have exercised it in the interval between take-off and the fatal crash in the Atlantic. (a) The contention that Mrs. Noel bought the policies and therefore owned them rests solely on her testimony that she furnished the money for their purchase, intending thereby to preserve her right to continue as beneficiary. Accepting her claim that she supplied the money to buy the policies for her own benefit (which the Tax Court did not decide), what she bought nonetheless were policy contracts containing agreements between her husband and the companies. The contracts themselves granted to Mr. Noel the right either to assign the policies or to change the beneficiary without her consent. Therefore the contracts she bought by their very terms rebut her claim that she became the complete, unconditional owner of the policies with an irrevocable right to remain the beneficiary. (b) The contention that Mr. Noel gave or assigned the policies to her and therefore was without power thereafter to assign them or to change the beneficiary stands no better under these facts. The contract terms provided that these policies could not be assigned nor could the benéficiary be changed without a written endorsement on the policies. No such assignment or change of beneficiary was endorsed on these policies, and consequently the power to assign the policies or change the beneficiary remained in the decedent at the time of his death. (c) Obviously, there was no practical opportunity for the decedent to assign the policies or change the beneficiary between the time he boarded the plane and the time he died. That time was too short and his wife had the policies in her possession at home. These circumstances disabled him for the moment from exercising those “incidents of ownership” over the policies which were undoubtedly his. Death intervened before this temporary disability was removed. But the same could be said about a man owning an ordinary life insurance policy who boarded the plane at the same time or for that matter about any man’s exercise of ownership over his property while aboard an airplane in the three hours before a fatal crash. It would stretch the imagination to think that Congress intended to measure estate tax liability by an individual’s fluctuating, day-by-day, hour-by-hour capacity to dispose of property which he owns. We hold that estate tax liability for policies “with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership” depends on a general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to the owner’s ability to exercise it at a particular moment. Nothing we have said is to be taken as meaning that a policyholder is without power to divest himself of all incidents of ownership over his insurance policies by a proper gift or assignment, so as to bar its inclusion in his gross estate under § 2042 (2). What we do hold is that no such transfer was made of the policies here involved. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, is reversed and the judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. “§ 2042. Proceeds of life insurance. “The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property— “(1) Receivable by the executor. “To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent. “(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries. “To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. . . Section 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1924, which was applicable in Ackerman, provided that the estate should include all proceeds receivable by other beneficiaries “under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life.” 43 Stat. 253, 304r-305. 26 CFR § 20.2042-1 (a) (1). See also Treas. Reg. 105 (1939 Code), §81.25; Treas. Reg. 80 (1934 ed.), Art. 25; Treas. Reg. 70 (1926 ed. and 1929 ed.), Art. 25; Treas. Reg. 68 (1924 ed.), Art. 25; Treas. Reg. 63 (1922 ed.), Art. 27; and Treas. Reg. 37 (1921 ed.), Art. 32. Section 2042 was first enacted as § 402 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097-1098. This section was re-enacted in § 402 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 278-279; in § 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 304r-305, and the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 70-71; and in § 811 (g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BAIRD v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA No. 15. Argued December 8-9, 1969 —Reargued October 14, 1970 Decided February 23, 1971 Black, J., announced the Court’s judgment and delivered an opinion, in which Douglas, BreNNAN, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 9. HarlaN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 34. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 10. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and HarlaN and White, JJ., joined, post, p. 11. Peter D. Baird reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John P. Frank and Paul G. Ulrich. Mark Wilmer reargued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Black announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall join. This is one of two cases now before us from two different States in which applicants have been denied admission to practice law solely because they refused to answer questions about their personal beliefs or their affiliations with organizations that advocate certain ideas about government. Sharp conflicts and close divisions have arisen in this Court concerning the power of States to refuse to permit applicants to practice law in cases where bar examiners have been suspicious about applicants’ loyalties and their views on Communism and revolution. This has been an increasingly divisive and bitter issue for some years, especially since Senator Joseph McCarthy from Wisconsin stirred up anti-Communist feelings and fears by his “investigations” in the early 1950’s. One applicant named Raphael Konigs-berg was denied admission in California and this Court reversed. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U. S. 252 (1957). The State nevertheless denied him admission a second time, and this Court then affirmed by a 5-to-4 decision. 366 U. S. 36 (1961). An applicant named Rudolph Schware was denied admission in New Mexico and this Court reversed, with five Justices agreeing on one opinion, three Justices on another opinion, and one not participating. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957). In another case an applicant named George Anastaplo was denied admission in Illinois on grounds similar to those involved in Konigsberg and Schware, and the denial was affirmed by a 5-to-4 margin. In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S. 82 (1961). See also In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945). With sharp divisions in this Court, our docket and those of the Courts of Appeals have been filled for years with litigation involving inquisitions about beliefs and associations and refusals to let people practice law and hold public or even private jobs solely because public authorities have been suspicious of their ideas. Usually these denials of employment have not been based on any overt acts of misconduct or lawlessness, and the litigation has continued to raise serious questions of alleged violations of the First Amendment and other guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The foregoing cases and others contain thousands of pages of confusing formulas, refined reasonings, and puzzling holdings that touch on the same suspicions and fears about citizenship and loyalty. However we have concluded the best way to handle this case is to narrate its simple facts and then relate them to the 45 words that make up the First Amendment. These are the facts. The petitioner, Sara Baird, graduated from law school at Stanford University in California in 1967. So far as the record shows there is not now and never has been a single mark against her moral character. She has taken the examination prescribed by Arizona, and the answer of the State admits that she satisfactorily passed it. Among the questions she answered was No. 25, which called on her to reveal all organizations with which she had been associated since she reached 16 years of age. This question she answered to the satisfaction of the Arizona Bar Committee. Consequently there is no charge or intimation that Mrs. Baird has not listed the organizations to which she has belonged since becoming 16. In addition, however, she was asked to state whether she had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organization “that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.” When she refused to answer this question, the Committee declined to process her application further or recommend her admission to the bar. The Arizona Supreme Court then denied her petition for an order to the Committee to show cause why she should not be admitted to practice law. We granted certiorari. 394 U. S. 957. In Arizona it is perjury to answer the bar committee’s questions falsely, and perjury is punishable as a felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-561 (1956). In effect this young lady was asked by the State to make a guess as to whether any organization to which she ever belonged “advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.” There may well be provisions of the Federal Constitution other than the First Amendment that would protect an applicant to a state bar from being subjected to a question potentially so hazardous to her liberty. But whether or not there are other provisions that protect her, we think the First Amendment does so here. That Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, forbids any “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .” Mr. Justice Roberts, in referring to the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of religion, said: “Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,— freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940). See also Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160-161 (1939); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943). And we have made it clear that: “This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious activity and institutions alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of conscience.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531 (1945). The protection of the First Amendment also extends to the right of association. As we said in Schneider v. Smith, 390 U. S. 17, 25 (1968): “The First Amendment’s ban against Congress ‘abridging’ freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and to petition, and the ‘associational freedom’. . . that goes with those rights create a preserve where the views of the individual are made inviolate.” See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485-487 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). The First Amendment’s protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 266 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 607 (1967). Similarly, when a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas, as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights protected by the Constitution. Shelton v. Tucker, supra; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U. S. 539 (1963); Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). When a State seeks to inquire about an individual’s beliefs and associations a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, supra, at 546. Of course Arizona has a legitimate interest in determining whether petitioner has the qualities of character and the professional competence requisite to the practice of law. But here petitioner has already supplied the Committee with extensive personal and professional information to assist its determination. By her answers to questions other than No. 25, and her listing of former employers, law school professors, and other references, she has made available to the Committee the information relevant to her fitness to practice law. And whatever justification may be offered, a State may not inquire about a man’s views or associations solely for the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes. Much has been written about the application of the First Amendment to cases where penalties have been imposed on people because of their beliefs. Some of what has been written is reconcilable with what we have said here and some of it is not. Without detailed reference to all prior cases, it is sufficient to say we hold that views and beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law. Clearly Arizona has engaged in such questioning here. The practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and his moral character. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867). This record is wholly barren of one word, sentence, or paragraph that tends to show this lady is not morally and professionally fit to serve honorably and well as a member of the legal profession. It was error not to process her application and not to admit her to the Arizona Bar. The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [For dissenting opinion of Me. Justice Hablan, see post, p. 34.] The other is No. 18, In re Stolar, post, p. 23. See also No. 49, Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, post, p. 154. See, e. g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399 (1958); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967). See the cases cited in n. 2, supra. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); cf. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). App. 18. Question No. 27, App. 18. Response of the Committee on Examinations and Admissions to Order to Show Cause. App. 4. Respondent has argued that even when an applicant has answered Question 25, listing the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16, Question 27 still serves a useful and legitimate function. Respondent urges: “Assume an answer including an organization by name such as ‘The Sons and Daughters of I Will Arise.’ This could truly be a Christian group with religious objectives. But also it could be an organization devoted to the objectives of Lenin, Stalin or any other deceased person whose teachings and objectives were not conducive to the continued security and welfare of our government and way of life.” Brief for Respondent 8. The organizations petitioner listed in response to question 25 were: Church Choir; Girl Scouts; Girls Athletic Association; Young Republicans; Young Democrats; Stanford Law Association; Law School Civil Rights Research Council. Respondent does not state which of these organizations may threaten the security of the Republic. The committee urges that it is entitled to demand an answer to Question 27 because: “Unless we are to conclude that one who truly and sincerely believes in the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence is also qualified to practice law in our Arizona courts, then an answer to this question is indeed appropriate. The Committee again emphasizes that a mere answer of ‘yes’ would not lead to an automatic rejection of the application. It would lead to an investigation and interrogation as to whether or not the applicant presently entertains the view that a violent overthrow of the United States Government is something to be sought after. If the answer to this inquiry was ‘yes’ then indeed we would reject the application and recommend against admission.” (Emphasis added.) Memorandum in Support of Response to Petition for Order to Show Cause, App. 5-6.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MANUFACTURERS NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT, EXECUTOR. No. 350. Argued March 31, 1960. Decided June 13, 1960. Assistant Attorney General Kramer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Daniel M. Friedman, Harry Baum and L. W. Post. Henry I. Armstrong, Jr. argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Louis F. Dahling. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether Section 811 (g) (2) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is constitutional as applied in this case. That section, the “payment of premiums” provision in the 1939 Code, requires inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross estate of an insured where the proceeds are receivable by beneficiaries other than the executor but are attributable to premiums paid by the insured. Inclusion is required regardless of whether the insured retained any policy rights. However, if the insured possessed no “incidents of ownership” after January 10, 1941, the premiums paid by him before that date are excluded in determining the portion of the proceeds for which he paid the premiums. The facts in the case are stipulated. The insured died testate on July 15, 1954. The taxpayer is his executor. On the estate tax return, the taxpayer included, as part of the gross estate, the proceeds of four insurance policies payable to the wife of the insured. These policies were originally issued to the insured, but he divested himself of the policy rights by assigning them to his wife on December 18, 1936. However, he continued to pay the premiums on the policies until he died. After his death, the proceeds were retained by the insurer-for the benefit of the family, pursuant to the provisions of a settlement option selected by the wife. In auditing the return, the Revenue Service determined that only the portion of the proceeds attributable to premiums paid by the insured after January 10, 1941, should be included in his estate. Accordingly, the tax was adjusted and a refund was made. The executor then filed a claim for refund of the rest of the tax attributable to the inclusion of the proceeds. The executor claimed that because the decedent had divested himself of all interest in the policies in 1936, the tax constituted an unapportioned direct tax on property, invalid under Article I, Sections 2 and 9, of the Constitution. However, the Commissioner refused to allow the claim, and the present suit for refund followed. In the District Court, the executor added a claim that the tax is also invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “because it is retroactive and discriminatory in its operation.” The District Court sustained the taxpayer’s contention that, as applied in this case, Section 811 (g)(2)(A) is unconstitutional. It held that because the decedent retained no incidents of ownership in the policies after 1936, “no transfer of the property herein sought to be included in the estate of this decedent occurred at the time of his death.” The court concluded that the tax was therefore a direct tax on the proceeds themselves and could not be levied without apportionment. 175 F. Supp. 291. The Government appealed directly to this Court under Sections 1252 and 2101 of Title 28, and we noted jurisdiction. 361 U. S. 880. The first objection to the tax is that it is a direct tax— that is, that it is not a tax upon a transfer or other taxable event but is, instead, a tax upon property — which Congress cannot exact without apportionment. This argument does not do justice to the evident intent of Congress to tax events, “as distinguished from [their] tangible fruits.” Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 502. From its inception, the estate tax has been a tax on a class of events which Congress has chosen to label, in the provision which actually imposes the tax, “the transfer of the net estate of every decedent.” (Emphasis added.) See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345. If there is any taxable event here which can fairly be said to be a “transfer” under this language in Section 810 of the 1939 Code, the tax is clearly constitutional without apportionment. For such a tax has always “been treated as a duty or excise, because of the particular occasion which gives rise to its levy.” Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 81; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra, at 349. Under the statute, the occasion for the tax is the maturing of the beneficiaries’ right to the proceeds upon the death of the insured. Of course, if the insured possessed no policy rights, there is no transfer of any interest from him at the moment of death. But that fact is not material, for the taxable “transfer,” the maturing of the beneficiaries’ right to the proceeds, is the crucial last step in what Congress can reasonably treat as a testamentary disposition by the insured in favor of the beneficiaries. That disposition, which began with the payment of premiums by the insured, is completed by his death. His death creates a genuine enlargement of the beneficiaries’ rights. It is the “generating source” of the full value of the proceeds. See Schwarz v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2, 6. The maturing of the right to proceeds is therefore an appropriate occasion for taxing the transaction to the estate of the insured. Cf. Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 503, 504. ' There is no inconsistency between such a view of the taxable event and the basic definition of the subject of the tax in Section 810. “Obviously, the word 'transfer' in the statute, or the privilege which may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must ... at least include the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another.” Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 337. It makes no difference that the payment of premiums occurred during the lifetime of the insured and indirectly effected an inter vivos transfer of property to the owner of the policy rights. Congress can properly impose excise taxes on wholly inter vivos gifts. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124. It may impose an estate tax on inter vivos transfers looking toward death. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15. Surely, then, it may impose such a tax on the final step — the maturing of the right to proceeds — in a partly inter vivos transaction completed by death. The question is not whether there has been, in the strict sense of the word, a “transfer” of property owned by the decedent at the time of his death, but whether “the death has brought into being or ripened for the survivor, property rights of such character as to make appropriate the imposition of a tax upon that result . . . .” Tyler v. United States, supra, at 503. Therefore, this tax, laid on the “ripening,” at death, of rights paid for by the decedent, is not a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution. Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, supra; Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340; Tyler v. United States, supra; United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363. Further objections to the statute as applied in this case are predicated on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is said that the statute operates retroactively. But the taxable event — the maturing of the policies at death — occurred long after the enactment of Section 811 (g)(2)(A) in 1942. Moreover, the payment of all but a few of the premiums in question occurred after the effective date of the statute, and those few were paid during the period after January 10, 1941, when regulations gave the insured fair notice of the likely tax consequences. See T. D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 427. Therefore, the statute cannot be said to be retroactive in its impact. It is not material that the policies were purchased and the policy rights were assigned before the statute was enacted. The tax is not laid on the creation or transfer of the policy rights, and it “does not operate retroactively merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came into being prior to the enactment of the tax.” United States v. Jacobs, supra, at 367. The taxpayer argues, however, that the enactment of the statute subjected the insured to a choice between unpleasant alternatives: “[H]e could stop paying the premiums — in which case the policies would be destroyed; or, he could continue paying premiums — in which case they would be included in his estate.” But when he gave away the policy rights, the possibility that he would eventually be faced with that choice was an obvious risk, in view of the administrative history of the “payment of premiums” test. See 1 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, § 10.13. The executor should not complain because his decedent gambled and lost. And, while it may be true that the insured could have avoided the tax only at the price of a loss on an investment already made, that fact alone does not prove that the lawmakers did “a wholly arbitrary thing,” or that they “found equivalence where there was none,” or that they “laid a burden unrelated to priyilege or benefit.” Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 679. Without such a showing, it cannot be held that the tax offends due process. Reversed. MR. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. These provisions were enacted, through amendment of §811 (g), by § 404 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 944. As amended, § 811 provides in pertinent part that: “The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the United States— “(g) Proceeds op Life Insurance.— “(1) Receivable by the executor. — To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent. “(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries. — To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent (A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly by the decedent, in proportion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. . . ." § 404 (c), Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 945. Section 404 (c) provides that: “The amendments made by subsection (a) [see note 1, supra] shall be applicable only to estates of decedents dying after the date of the enactment of this Act [October 21, 1942] ; but in determining the proportion of the premiums or other consideration paid directly or indirectly by the decedent (but not the total premiums paid) the amount so paid by the decedent on or before January 10, 1941, shall be excluded if at no time after such date the decedent possessed an incident of ownership in the policy.” January 10, 1941, was the effective date of a Treasury Regulation, T. D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 427, which provided for use of the “payment of premiums” test under § 811 (g) as it existed prior to the 1942 amendments, see note-1, supra, regardless of whether the decedent retained any incidents of ownership. The regulation also provided, however, that premiums paid by the decedent before its effective date were to be excluded if the decedent did not thereafter possess any incidents of ownership. It should be noted that the “payment of premiums” test was abandoned in the 1954 Code, which reverted to the exclusive use of the “incidents of ownership” test. See 26 U. S. C. § 2042. See note 2, supra. Article I, § 2, provides in pertinent part that: “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . Article I, § 9, provides in pertinent part that: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” This result is in accord with Kohl v. United States, 226 F. 2d 381 (C. A. 7th Cir.), the reasoning of which the District Court “adopted” as its own. As the District Court recognized, Kohl is in conflict with Estate of Loeb v. Commissioner, 261 F. 2d 232 (C. A. 2d Cir.), affirming 29 T. C. 22; Schwarz v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2; cf. Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866; Estate of Baker v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 776. Compare § 201 of the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 777, with § 810 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 120. In the 1954 Code, the word “taxable” was substituted for the word “net” in this provision. 26 U. S. C. § 2001. Our view of the nature of the taxable event here involved makes it unnecessary to discuss United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51, and other similar cases relied on by the District Court. Nor do we find it necessary to consider at length Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, or its progeny. The Court in Frick did not reach the constitutional issue. We do not agree with the holding in Kohl v. United States, 226 F. 2d 381, that T. D. 5032 “transcended” § 811 (g) as it existed in 1941 and that it was therefore “illegal and void.” T. D. 5032, in effect, construed the controlling language in the earlier statute — “taken out by the decedent,” 53 Stat. 122 — as meaning paid for by the insured. Such a construction was clearly not unreasonable.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CLARK et ux. No. 87-1168. Argued November 7, 1988 Decided March 22, 1989 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III of which Scalia, J., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 745. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Rose, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, and Ernest J. Brown. Walter B. Slocombe argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Daniel B. Rosenbaum. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This is the third case in which the Government has asked us to decide that a shareholder’s receipt of a cash payment in exchange for a portion of his stock was taxable as a dividend. In the two earlier cases, Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U. S. 283 (1945), and United States v. Davis, 397 U. S. 301 (1970), we agreed with the Government largely because the transactions involved redemptions of stock by single corporations that did not “result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation.” Id., at 313. In the case we decide today, however, the taxpayer in an arm’s-length transaction exchanged his interest in the acquired corporation for less than 1% of the stock of the acquiring corporation and a substantial cash payment. The taxpayer held no interest in the acquiring corporation prior to the reorganization. Viewing the exchange as a whole, we conclude that the cash payment is not appropriately characterized as a dividend. We accordingly agree with the Tax Court and with the Court of Appeals that the taxpayer is entitled to capital gains treatment of the cash payment. I In determining tax liability under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, gain resulting from the sale or exchange of property is generally treated as capital gain, whereas the receipt of cash dividends is treated as ordinary income. The Code, however, imposes no current tax on certain stock-for-stock exchanges. In particular, § 354(a)(1) provides, subject to various limitations, for nonrecognition of gain resulting from the exchange of stock or securities solely for other stock or securities, provided that the exchange is pursuant to a plan of corporate reorganization and that the stock or securities are those of a party to the reorganization. 26 U. S. C. § 354(a)(1). Under § 356(a)(1) of the Code, if such a stock-for-stock exchange is accompanied by additional consideration in the form of a cash payment or other property — something that tax practitioners refer to as “boot” — “then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.” 26 u! S. C. §356(a)(1). That is, if the shareholder receives boot, he or she must recognize the gain on the exchange up to the value of the boot. Boot is accordingly generally treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of property and is recognized in the current tax year. Section 356(a)(2), which controls the decision in this case, creates an exception to that general rule. It provided in 1979: “If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there shall be treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.” 26 U. S. C. § 356 (a)(2) (1976 ed.). Thus, if the “exchange . . . has the effect of the distribution of a dividend,” the boot must be treated as a dividend and is therefore appropriately taxed as ordinary income to the extent that gain is realized. In contrast, if the exchange does not have “the effect of the distribution of a dividend,” the boot must be treated as a payment in exchange for property and, insofar as gain is realized, accorded capital gains treatment. The question in this case is thus whether the exchange between the taxpayer and the acquiring corporation had “the effect of the distribution of a dividend” within the meaning of § 356(a)(2). The relevant facts are easily summarized. For approximately 15 years prior to April 1979, the taxpayer was the president of Basin Surveys, Inc. (Basin). In January 1978, he became sole shareholder in Basin, a company in which he had invested approximately $85,000. The corporation operated a successful business providing various technical services to the petroleum industry. In 1978, N. L. Industries, Inc. (NL), a publicly owned corporation engaged in the manufacture and supply of petroleum equipment and services, initiated negotiations with the taxpayer regarding the possible acquisition of Basin. On April 3, 1979, after months of negotiations, the taxpayer and NL entered into a contract. The agreement provided for a “triangular merger,” whereby Basin was merged into a wholly owned subsidiary of NL. In exchange for transferring all of the outstanding shares in Basin to NL’s subsidiary, the taxpayer elected to receive 300,000 shares of NL common stock and cash boot of $3,250,000, passing up an alternative offer of 425,000 shares of NL common stock. The 300,000 shares of NL issued to the taxpayer amounted to approximately 0.92% of the outstanding common shares of NL. If the taxpayer had instead accepted the pure stock-for-stock offer, he would have held approximately 1.3% of the outstanding common shares. The Commissioner and the taxpayer agree that the merger at issue qualifies as a reorganization under §§ 368(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(D). Respondents filed a joint federal income tax return for 1979. As required by § 356(a)(1), they reported the cash boot as taxable gain. In calculating the tax owed, respondents characterized the payment as long-term capital gain. The Commissioner on audit disagreed with this characterization. In his view, the payment had “the effect of the distribution of a dividend” and was thus taxable as ordinary income up to $2,319,611, the amount of Basin’s accumulated earnings and profits at the time of the merger. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency of $972,504.74. Respondents petitioned for review in the Tax Court, which, in a reviewed decision, held in their favor. 86 T. C. 138 (1986). The court started from the premise that the question whether the boot payment had “the effect of the distribution of a dividend” turns on the choice between “two judicially articulated tests.” Id., at 140. Under the test advocated by the Commissioner and given voice in Shimberg v. United States, 577 F. 2d 283 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1115 (1979), the boot payment is treated as though it were made in a hypothetical redemption by the acquired corporation (Basin) immediately prior to the reorganization. Under this test, the cash payment received by the taxpayer indisputably would have been treated as a dividend. The second test, urged by the taxpayer and finding support in Wright v. United States, 482 F. 2d 600 (CA8 1973), proposes an alternative hypothetical redemption. Rather than concentrating on the taxpayer’s prereorganization interest in the acquired corporation, this test requires that one imagine a pure stock-for-stoek exchange, followed im'mediately by a postreorganization redemption of a portion of the taxpayer’s shares in the acquiring corporation (NL) in return for a payment in an amount equal to the boot. Under §302 of the Code, which defines when a redemption of stock should be treated as a distribution of dividend, NL’s redemption of 125,000 shares of its stock from the taxpayer in exchange for the $3,250,000 boot payment would have been treated as capital gain. The Tax Court rejected the prereorganization test favored by the Commissioner because it considered it improper “to view the cash payment as an isolated event totally separate from the reorganization.” 86 T. C., at 151. Indeed, it suggested that this test requires that courts make the “determination of dividend equivalency fantasizing that the reorganization does not exist.” Id., at 150 (footnote omitted). The court then acknowledged that a similar criticism could be made of the taxpayer’s contention that the cash payment should be viewed as a postreorganization redemption. It concluded, however, that since it was perfectly clear that the cash payment would not have taken place without the reorganization, it was better to treat the boot “as the equivalent of a redemption in the course of implementing the reorganization,” than “as having occurred prior to and separate from the reorganization” Id., at 152 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 828 F. 2d 221 (1987). Like the Tax Court, it concluded that although “[s]ection 302 does not explicitly apply in the reorganization context,” id., at 223, and although §302 differs from §356 in important respects, id., at 224, it nonetheless provides “the appropriate test for determining whether boot is ordinary income or a capital gain,” id., at 223. Thus, as explicated in § 302(b)(2), if the taxpayer relinquished more than 20% of his corporate control and retained less than 50% of the voting shares after the distribution, the boot would be treated as capital gain. However, as the Court of Appeals recognized, “[bjecause § 302 was designed to deal with a stock redemption by a single corporation, rather than a reorganization involving two companies, the section does not indicate which corporation [the taxpayer] lost interest in.” Id., at 224. Thus, like the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals was left to consider whether the hypothetical redemption should be treated as a prereorganization distribution coming from the acquired corporation or as a postreorganization distribution coming from the acquiring corporation. It concluded: “Based on the language and legislative history of § 356, the change-in-ownership principle of § 302, and the need to review the reorganization as an integrated transaction, we conclude that the boot should be characterized as a post-reorganization stock redemption by N. L. that affected [the taxpayer’s] interest in the new corporation. Because this redemption reduced [the taxpayer’s] N. L. holdings by more than 20%, the boot should be taxed as a capital gain.” Id., at 224-225. This decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is in conflict with the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Shimberg v. United States, 577 F. 2d 283 (1978), in two important respects. In Shimberg, the court concluded that it was inappropriate to apply stock redemption principles in reorganization cases “on a wholesale basis.” Id., at 287; see also ibid., n. 13. In addition, the court adopted the pre-reorganization test, holding that “§ 356(a)(2) requires a determination of whether the distribution would have been taxed as a dividend if made prior to the reorganization or if no reorganization had occurred.” Id., at 288. To resolve this conflict on a question of importance to the administration of the federal tax laws, we granted certiorari. 485 U. S. 933 (1988). II We agree with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the question under § 356(a)(2) whether an “exchange . . . has the effect of the distribution of a dividend” should be answered by examining the effect of the exchange as a whole. We think the language and history of the statute, as well as a commonsense understanding of the economic substance of the transaction at issue, support this approach. The language of § 356(a) strongly supports our understanding that the transaction should be treated as an integrated whole. Section 356(a)(2) asks whether “an exchange is described in paragraph (1)” that “has the effect of the distribution of a dividend.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute does not provide that boot shall be treated as a dividend if its payment has the effect of the distribution of a dividend. Rather, the inquiry turns on whether the “exchange” has that effect. Moreover, paragraph (1), in turn, looks to whether “the property received in the exchange consists not only of property permitted by section 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain but also of other property or money.” (Emphasis supplied.) Again, the statute plainly refers to one integrated transaction and, again, makes clear that we are to look to the character of the exchange as a whole and not simply its component parts. Finally, it is significant that §356 expressly limits the extent to which boot may be taxed to the amount of gain realized in the reorganization. This limitation suggests that Congress intended that boot not be treated in isolation from the overall reorganization. See Levin, Adess, & McGaffey, Boot Distributions in Corporate Reorganizations — Determination of Dividend Equivalency, 30 Tax Lawyer 287, 303 (1977). Our reading of the statute as requiring that the transaction be treated as a unified whole is reinforced by the well-established “step-transaction” doctrine, a doctrine that the Government has applied in related contexts, see, e. g., Rev. Rul. 75-447, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 113, and that we have expressly sanctioned, see Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U. S. 609, 613 (1938); Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331, 334 (1945). Under this doctrine, interrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may not be considered independently of the overall transaction. By thus “linking together all interdependent steps with legal or business significance, rather than taking them in isolation,” federal tax liability may be based “on a realistic view of the entire transaction.” 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶4.3.5, p. 4-52 (1981). Viewing the exchange in this case as an integrated whole, we are unable to accept the Commissioner’s prereorganization analogy. The analogy severs the payment of boot from the context of the reorganization. Indeed, only by straining to abstract the payment of boot from the context of the overall exchange, and thus imagining that Basin made a distribution to the taxpayer independently of NL’s planned acquisition, can we reach the rather counterintuitive conclusion urged by the Commissioner — that the taxpayer suffered no meaningful reduction in his ownership interest as a result of the cash payment. We conclude that such a limited view of the transaction is plainly inconsistent with the statute’s direction that we look to the effect of the entire exchange. The prereorganization analogy is further flawed in that it adopts an overly expansive reading of § 356(a)(2). As the Court of Appeals recognized, adoption of the prereorganization approach would “result in ordinary income treatment in most reorganizations because corporate boot is usually distributed pro rata to the shareholders of the target corporation.” 828 F. 2d, at 227; see also Golub, “Boot” in Reorganizations — The Dividend Equivalency Test of Section 356(a) (2), 58 Taxes 904, 911 (1980); Note, 20 Boston College L. Rev. 601, 612 (1979). Such a reading of the statute would not simply constitute a return to the widely criticized “automatic dividend rule” (at least as to cases involving a pro rata payment to the shareholders of the acquired corporation), see n. 8, supra, but also would be contrary to our standard approach to construing such provisions. The requirement of § 356(a)(2) that boot be treated as dividend in some circumstances is an exception from the general rule authorizing capital gains treatment for boot. In construing provisions such as § 356, in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision. See Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493 (1945) (“To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of the people”). Given that Congress has enacted a general rule that treats boot as capital gain, we should not eviscerate that legislative judgment through an expansive reading of a somewhat ambiguous exception. The postreorganization approach adopted by the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals is, in our view, preferable to the Commissioner’s approach. Most significantly, this approach does a far better job of treating the payment of boot as a component of the overall exchange. Unlike the prereorganization view, this approach acknowledges that there would have been no cash payment absent the exchange and also that, by accepting the cash payment, the taxpayer experienced a meaningful reduction in his potential ownership interest. Once the postreorganization approach is adopted, the result in this case is pellucidly clear. Section 302(a) of the Code provides that if a redemption fits within any one of the four categories set out in § 302(b), the redemption “shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock,” and thus not regarded as a dividend. As the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals correctly determined, the hypothetical postreorganization redemption by NL of a portion of the taxpayer’s shares satisfies at least one of the subsections of § 302(b). In particular, the safe harbor provisions of subsection (b)(2) provide that redemptions in which the taxpayer relinquishes more than 20% of his or her share of the corporation’s voting stock and retains less than 50% of the voting stock after the redemption shall not be treated as distributions of a dividend. See n. 6, supra. Here, we treat the transaction as though NL redeemed 125,000 shares of its common stock (i. e., the number of shares of NL common stock forgone in favor of the boot) in return for a cash payment to the taxpayer of $3,250,000 (i. e., the amount of the boot). As a result of this redemption, the taxpayer’s interest in NL was reduced from 1.3% of the outstanding common stock to 0.9%. See 86 T. C., at 153. Thus, the taxpayer relinquished approximately 29% of his interest in NL and retained less than a 1% voting interest in the corporation after the transaction, easily satisfying the “substantially disproportionate” standards of § 302(b)(2). We accordingly conclude that the boot payment did not have the effect of a dividend and that the payment was properly treated as capital gain. Ill The Commissioner objects to this “recasting [of] the merger transaction into a form different from that entered into by the parties,” Brief for Petitioner 11, and argues that the Court of Appeals’ formal adherence to the principles embodied in §302 forced the court to stretch to “find a redemption to which to apply them, since the merger transaction entered into by the parties did not involve a redemption,” id., at 28. There are a number of sufficient responses to this argument. We think it first worth emphasizing that the Commissioner overstates the extent to which the redemption is imagined. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in Shimberg, “[t]he theory behind tax-free corporate reorganizations is that the transaction is merely ‘a continuance of the proprietary interests in the continuing enterprise under modified corporate form.’ Lewis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F. 2d 646, 648 (CA1 1949); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-l(b). See generally Cohen, Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation, 55 A. B. A. J. 40 (1969).” 577 F. 2d, at 288. As a result, the boot-for-stock transaction can be viewed as a partial repurchase of stock by the continuing corporate enterprise — i. e., as a redemption. It is, of course, true that both the prereorganization and postreorganization analogies are somewhat artificial in that they imagine that the redemption occurred outside the confines of the actual reorganization. However, if forced to choose between the two analogies, the postreorganization view is the less artificial. Although both analogies “recast the merger transaction,” the postreorganization view recognizes that a reorganization has taken place, while the prereorganization approach recasts the transaction to the exclusion of the overall exchange. Moreover, we doubt that abandoning the prereorganization and postreorganization analogies and the principles of § 302 in favor of a less artificial understanding of the transaction would lead to a result different from that reached by the Court of Appeals. Although the statute is admittedly ambiguous and the legislative history sparse, we are persuaded — even without relying on §302 — that Congress did not intend to except reorganizations such as that at issue here from the general rule allowing capital gains treatment for cash boot. 26 U. S. C. § 356(a)(1). The legislative history of § 356(a)(2), although perhaps generally “not illuminating,” Estate of Bedford, 325 U. S., at 290, suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with preventing corporations from “siphon[ing] off” accumulated earnings and profits at a capital gains rate through the ruse of a reorganization. See Golub, 58 Taxes, at 905. This purpose is not served by denying capital gains treatment in a case such as this in which the taxpayer entered into an arm’s-length transaction with a corporation in which he had no prior interest, exchanging his stock in the acquired corporation for less than a 1% interest in the acquiring corporation and a substantial cash boot. Section 356(a)(2) finds its genesis in § 203(d)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1924. See 43 Stat. 257. Although modified slightly over the years, the provisions are in relevant substance identical. The accompanying House Report asserts that §203(d)(2) was designed to “preven[t] evasion.” H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1924). Without further explication, both the House and Senate Reports simply rely on an example to explain, in the words of both Reports, “[t]he necessity for this provision.” Ibid.; S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 (1924). Significantly, the example describes a situation in which there was no change in the stockholders’ relative ownership interests, but merely the creation of a wholly owned subsidiary as a mechanism for making a cash distribution to the shareholders: “Corporation A has capital stock of $100,000, and earnings and profits accumulated since March 1, 1913, of $50,000. If it distributes the $50,000 as a dividend to its stockholders, the amount distributed will be taxed at the full surtax rates. “On the other hand, Corporation A may organize Corporation B, to which it transfers all its assets, the consideration for the transfer being the issuance by B of all its stock and $50,000 in cash to the stockholders of Corporation A in exchange for their stock in Corporation A. Under the existing law, the $50,000 distributed with the stock of Corporation B would be taxed, not as a dividend, but as a capital gain, subject only to the 1214 per cent rate. The effect of such a distribution is obviously the same as if the corporation had declared out as a dividend its $50,000 earnings and profits. If dividends are to be subject to the full surtax rates, then such an amount so distributed should also be subject to the surtax rates and not to the 1214 per cent rate on capital gain.” Ibid.; H. R. Rep. No. 179, at 15. The “effect” of the transaction in this example is to transfer accumulated earnings and profits to the shareholders without altering their respective ownership interests in the continuing enterprise. Of course, this example should not be understood as exhaustive of the proper applications of § 356(a)(2). It is nonetheless noteworthy that neither the example, nor any other legislative source, evinces a congressional intent to tax boot accompanying a transaction that involves a bona fide exchange between unrelated parties in the context of a reorganization as though the payment was in fact a dividend. To the contrary, the purpose of avoiding tax evasion suggests that Congress did not intend to impose an ordinary income tax in such cases. Moreover, the legislative history of § 302 supports this reading of § 356(a)(2) as well. In explaining the “essentially equivalent to a dividend” language of §302 (b)(1) — language that is certainly similar to the “has the effect ... of a dividend” language of § 356(a)(2) — the Senate Finance Committee made clear that the relevant inquiry is “whether or not the transaction by its nature may properly be characterized as a sale of stock . . . .” S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 234 (1954); cf. United States v. Davis, 397 U. S., at 311. Examining the instant transaction in light of the purpose of § 356(a)(2), the boot-for-stock exchange in this case “may properly be characterized as a sale of stock.” Significantly, unlike traditional single corporation redemptions and unlike reorganizations involving commonly owned corporations, there is little risk that the reorganization at issue was used as a ruse to distribute a dividend. Rather, the transaction appears in all respects relevant to the narrow issue before us to have been comparable to an arm’s-length sale by the taxpayer to NL. This conclusion, moreover, is supported by the findings of the Tax Court. The court found that “[t]here is not the slightest evidence that the cash payment was a concealed distribution from BASIN.” 86 T. C., at 155. As the Tax Court further noted, Basin lacked the funds to make such a distribution: “Indeed, it is hard to conceive that such a possibility could even have been considered, for a distribution of that amount was not only far in excess of the accumulated earnings and profits ($2,319,611), but also of the total assets of BASIN ($2,758,069). In fact, only if one takes into account unrealized appreciation in the value of BASIN’s assets, including good will and/or going-concern value, can one possibly arrive at $3,250,000. Such a distribution could only be considered as the equivalent of a complete liquidation of BASIN . . . .” Ibid, In this context, even without relying on § 302 and the post-reorganization analogy, we conclude that the boot is better characterized as a part of the proceeds of a sale of stock than as a proxy for a dividend. As such, the payment qualifies for capital gains treatment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Justice Scalia joins all but Part III of this opinion. Respondent Peggy S. Clark is a party to this action solely because she filed a joint federal income tax return for the year in question with her husband, Donald E. Clark. References to “taxpayer” are to Donald E. Clark. In 1979, the tax year in question, the distinction between long-term capital gain and ordinary income was of considerable importance. Most significantly, § 1202(a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1202(a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), allowed individual taxpayers to deduct 609h of their net capital gain from gross income. Although the importance of the distinction declined dramatically in 1986 with the repeal of § 1202(a), see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 2216, the distinction is still significant in a number of respects. For example, 26 U. S. C. § 1211(b) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) allows individual taxpayers to deduct capital losses to the full extent of their capital gains, but only allows them to offset up to $3,000 of ordinary income insofar as their capital losses exceed their capital gains. Title 26 U. S. C. § 368(a)(1) defines several basic types of corporate reorganizations. They include, in part: “(A) a statutory merger or consolidation; “(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356; “(E) a recapitalization; “(F) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation, however effected . . . .” Section 368(a)(2)(D) provided in 1979: “The acquisition by one corporation, in exchange for stock of a corporation (referred to in this subparagraph as ‘controlling corporation’) which is in control of the acquiring corporation, of substantially all of the properties of another corporation which in the transaction is merged into the acquiring corporation shall not disqualify a transaction under paragraph (1)(A) if (1) such transaction would have qualified under paragraph (1)(A) if the merger had been into the controlling corporation, and (ii) no stock of the acquiring corporation is used in the transaction.” 26 U. S. C. §368(a) (2)(D) (1976 ed.). The parties do not agree as to whether dividend equivalence for the purposes of § 356(a)(2) should be determined with reference to § 302 of the Code, which concerns dividend treatment of redemptions of stock by a single corporation outside the context of a reorganization. Compare Brief for Petitioner 28-30 with Brief for Respondents 18-24. They are in essential agreement, however, about the characteristics of a dividend. Thus, the Commissioner correctly argues that the “basic attribute of a dividend, derived from Sections 301 and 316 of the Code, is a pro rata distribution to shareholders out of corporate earnings and profits. When a distribution is made that is not a formal dividend, ‘the fundamental test of dividend equivalency’ is whether the distribution is proportionate to the shareholders’ stock interests (United States v. Davis, 397 U. S. 301, 306 (1970)).” Brief for Petitioner 7. Citing the same authority, but with different emphasis, the taxpayer argues that “the hallmark of a non-dividend distribution is a ‘meaningful reduction of the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the corporation.’ United States v. Davis, 397 U. S. 301, 313 (1970).’’ Brief for Respondents 5. Under either test, a prereorganization distribution by Basin to the taxpayer would have qualified as a dividend. Because the taxpayer was Basin’s sole shareholder, any distribution necessarily would have been pro rata and would not have resulted in a “meaningful reduction of the [taxpayer’s] proportionate interest in [Basin].” Section 302 provides in relevant part: “(a) General rule “If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of section 317 (b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock. “(b) Redemptions treated as exchanges “(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock “(A) In general “Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder. “(B) Limitation “This paragraph shall not apply unless immediately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote. “(C) Definitions “For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution is substantially disproportionate if— “(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time, “is less than 80 percent of— “(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time. “For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder’s ownership of the common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvoting) after and before redemption also meets the 80 percent requirement of the preceding sentence. ...” As the Tax Court explained, receipt of the cash boot reduced the taxpayer’s potential holdings in NL from 1.3% to 0.92%. 86 T. C. 138, 153 (1986). The taxpayer’s holdings were thus approximately 71% of what they would have been absent the payment. Ibid. This fact, combined with the fact that the taxpayer held less than 50% of the voting stock of NL after the hypothetical redemption, would have qualified the “distribution” as “substantially disproportionate” under § 302(b)(2). The Tax Court stressed that to adopt the prereorganization view “would in effect resurrect the now discredited ‘automatic dividend rule’ ... , at least with respect to pro rata distributions made to an acquired corporation’s shareholders pursuant to a plan of reorganization.” 86 T. C., at 152. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed. 828 F. 2d 221, 226-227 (CA4 1987). The “automatic dividend rule” developed as a result of some imprecise language in our decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U. S. 283 (1945). Although Estate of Bedford involved the recapitalization of a single corporation, the opinion employed broad language, asserting that “a distribution, pursuant to a reorganization, of earnings and profits ‘has the effect of a distribution of a taxable dividend’ within [§ 356(a)(2)].” Id., at 292. The Commissioner read this language as establishing as a matter of law that all payments of boot are to be treated as dividends to the extent of undistributed earnings and profits. See Rev. Rui. 56-220, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 191. Commentators, see, e. g., Darrel, The Scope of Commissioner v. Bedford Estate, 24 Taxes 266 (1946); Shoulson, Boot Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule, 20 Tax L. Rev. 573 (1965), and courts, see, e. g., Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F. 2d 747 (CA2 1956), however, soon came to criticize this rule. The courts have long since retreated from the “automatic dividend rule,” see, e. g., Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 832 (1958), and the Commissioner has followed suit, see Rev. Rui. 74-515, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 1'18. As our decision in this case makes plain, we agree that Estate of Bedford should not be read to require that all payments of boot be treated as dividends. Because the mechanical requirements of subsection (b)(2) are met, we need not decide whether the hypothetical redemption might also qualify for capital gains treatment under the general “not essentially equivalent to a dividend” language of subsection (b)(1). Subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4), which deal with redemptions of all of the shareholder’s stock and with partial liquidations, respectively, are not at issue in this case. The Commissioner maintains that Basin “could have distributed a dividend in the form of its own obligation (see, e. g., I. R. C. § 312(a)(2)) or it could have borrowed funds to distribute a dividend. ” Reply Brief for Petitioner 7. Basin’s financial status, however, is nonetheless strong support for the Tax Court’s conclusion that the cash payment was not a concealed dividend.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BULOVA WATCH CO., INC., v. UNITED STATES. No. 241. Argued March 27, 1961. Decided April 17, 1961. Bernard Weiss argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Acting Assistant Attorney General Heffron, Meyer Rothwacks and A. F. Prescott. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner recovered a judgment in the Court of Claims against the United States for an overpayment of its excess profits taxes for the fiscal year ended March 31, 1942, in the amount of $211,899.28, plus interest thereon “as provided by law.” 143 Ct. Cl. 342, 163 F. Supp. 633. Of the principal sum of the judgment, $150,016.21 was attributable to an unused excess profits credit carry-back from the succeeding year ended March 31, 1943. Acting in accordance with the provisions of § 3771 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the Commissioner computed and allowed statutory interest on the latter sum from June 14, 1945, the date on which petitioner filed its claim for refund, to April 25, 1959 — 30 days prior to issuance of the refund check — in the amount of $124,784.72. Thereafter, petitioner moved the Court of Claims for relief from the Commissioner’s interpretation of the judgment, contending that interest should be computed, under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2411 (a), from the earliest date the overpayment could have been determined (the end of the fiscal year subsequent to the year involved, i. e., March 31, 1943), rather than from the date it filed its claim for refund (June 14, 1945) as provided in § 3771 (e), and that it was thus entitled to the further sum of $51,252.69. The motion was denied, without opinion. Because of the importance of the question involved to the proper administration of the internal revenue laws, and to settle a conflict between the lower federal courts upon the question, we granted certiorari. 364 U. S. 861. The question thus presented is whether the date from which interest accrues on an overpayment of taxes attributable to an unused excess profits credit carry-back is governed by § 3771 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, or by 28 U. S. C. § 2411 (a). Petitioner contends that, because refund of the tax was not awarded administratively but by the “judgment of [a] court,” the date Jrom which interest runs is governed by the provisions of § 2411 (a), and that it is thus entitled to interest from “the date of the payment” on the “overpayment” which, it argues, became ascertainable, and hence should be regarded as made, on March 31, 1943. The Government, on the other hand, contends that § 3771 (e) is a special statute relating exclusively to tax refunds attributable to the carry-back provisions of the internal revenue laws, and hence prevails, as respects the special subject of carry-backs, over the general provisions of § 2411 (a). After a careful review of these and other statutes and their legislative history, we have concluded that the Government is right. Section 3771 (e) of the 1939 Code deals specifically with the subject of interest on tax refunds attributable to the carry-back of a net operating loss or an unused excess profits tax credit, and is “an integral part of the carry-back provision [s]” of the internal revenue laws. Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U. S. 561, 568. It specifically says that “[i]f the Commissioner determines that any part of an overpayment is attributable to . . . [an] unused excess profits credit for a succeeding taxable year, no interest shall be allowed or paid with respect to such part of the overpayment for any period before the filing of a claim for credit or refund of such part of the overpayment or the filing of a petition with the Tax Court, whichever is earlier.” The refund awarded here was solely “attributable to [an] unused excess profits credit for [the] succeeding taxable year.” How, their, can petitioner be entitled to interest “for any period before the filing of a claim for credit or refund”? Petitioner agrees that if its award had been made administratively by the Commissioner or the Tax Court, rather than by the “judgment” of the Court of Claims, interest would not be allowable on the refund for any period prior to the filing of its claim. But it argues that the language of § 2411 (a) — “In any judgment of any court rendered ... for any overpayment in respect of any internal-revenue tax, interest shall be allowed . . . upon the amount of the overpayment, from the date of the payment or collection thereof” — requires the allowance of interest “from the date of the payment or collection” of the tax when recovery is awarded by a District Court or, as here, by the Court of Claims. The effect of petitioner’s contention thus is that Congress has made the starting date of interest in such cases dependent upon the forum selected by the taxpayer. Its argument would mean — in fact, it frankly proceeds on the theory — that a taxpayer, holding a refund claim attributable to an unused excess profits credit, could, by proceeding in a District Court or the Court of Claims, recover interest from the date when a claim for refund could have been filed, yet if he proceeded through the Tax Court he could not recover interest for any period prior to the actual filing of his claim, even though the Tax Court’s final judgments (or orders) are subject to review by the United States Courts of Appeals and ultimately by this Court. In the light of the provisions of § 3771 (e) and its legislative history, it is almost certain that Congress did not intend such an anomalous, nonuniform and discriminatory result. Petitioner further contends that § 2411 (a) is a later enactment than § 3771 (e) and, for that reason, should take precedence over it. We do not believe that § 2411 (a) can fairly be regarded as a later enactment than § 3771 (e), for at the time § 3771 (e) was enacted, in 1942, a predecessor provision of § 2411 (a) had long been on the books. Save for the word “hereby” — of no possible significance — that predecessor provision (§ 177 (b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 284 (b)) was identical with the present §2411 (a). But even if petitioner were correct in concluding that § 2411 (a) is to be regarded as the later enactment, it would not necessarily take precedence over § 3711 (e), for it is familiar law that a specific statute controls over a general one “without regard to priority of enactment.” Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 504, 512. See, e. g., Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208; MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U. S. 102, 107; Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 228-229. Section 3771 (e) specifically fixes the date from which interest shall run on carry-back refunds. It came into the law with the Revenue Act of 1942, which authorized carry-backs. A carry-back is an exceptional relief measure in that it permits a departure from the basic annual accounting rule. The carry-back provisions “were enacted to ameliorate the unduly drastic consequences of taxing income strictly on an annual basis. They were designed to permit a taxpayer to set off its lean years against its lush years, and to strike something like an average taxable income computed over a period longer than one year.” Libson Shops, Inc., v. Koehler, 353 U. S. 382, 386. The significant feature of a carry-back is that it permits an adjustment of an earlier liability upon the basis of subsequent events. It contemplates that the initial tax obligation was not incorrectly or mistakenly imposed but was actually due, but that an adjustment may be made upon the basis of the taxpayer’s gain or loss in the succeeding year or years, and it is evident from the very terms of § 3771 (e) that Congress thought it would be unfair to the Government to require it to pay interest on a claim brought about by such a retroactive adjustment prior to the time when the taxpayer took affirmative steps to bring home to the Commissioner that he is now in position to claim, and claims, a readjustment of his past admittedly correct tax liability. Section 3771 (e) does not, of course, deny interest on carry-back refunds. It only prohibits the accrual of interest prior to the time the taxpayer’s claim therefor is filed with, and thus made known to, the Commissioner. The report of the Senate Finance Committee on the bill that became § 3771 (e) clearly discloses that these were Congress’ purposes in adopting the section. It said: “A taxpayer entitled to a carry-back of a net operating loss or an unused excess profits credit (see sec. 204 of the bill) will not be able to determine the deduction on account of such carry-back until the close of the future taxable year in which he sustains the net operating loss or has the unused excess profits credit. He must therefore file his return and pay his tax without regard to such deduction, and must file a claim for refund at the close of the succeeding taxable year when he is able to determine the amount of such carry-back. Inasmuch as any overpayment resulting from the deduction of such carry-back does not occur, as a practical matter, until the net operating loss or the unused excess profits credit for the future taxable year is determined, and inasmuch as it is desirable to insure promptness in the filing of claims to inform the Commissioner that such deductions have been determined, this section provides that no interest will he allowed with respect to any such overpayment for any period before the claim therefor is filed, or a petition asserting such overpayment is filed with the Board of Tax Appeals, whichever is earlier.” (Emphasis added.) This surely shows Congress’ purpose to deny interest on carry-back refunds for any period prior to the time they could be determined, and also to prevent, through delay in the presentation of claims, the accumulation of interest after that date and prior to the filing of the claim. In providing, in § 6611 (f) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, that overpayments resulting from the carry-back of net operating losses “shall be deemed not to have been made prior to the close of the taxable year in which such net operating loss arises,” Congress recognized that it was making a change from existing law. The relevant Committee Report makes this clear. It said, in pertinent part, that: “Existing law denies interest on an overpayment caused by a carry-back for any period prior to the filing of a claim for credit or refund of such amount (or filing a petition with the Tax Court with respect to such amount). Under this [proposed] section, interest is denied only for the period prior to the close of the taxable year in which the net operating loss arises. This is consistent with the rule for interest on underpayments (see the discussion of sec. 6601).” In the light of the provisions of § 3771 (e) and its clear legislative history, we think it is a special statute relating solely to, and exclusively governing, tax refunds attributable to the carry-back provisions of the internal revenue laws, and hence prevails, as respects the special subject of carry-backs, over the general provisions of § 2411 (a). The judgment of the Court of Claims was therefore correct and must be Affirmed. In Carter v. Liquid Carbonic Pacific Corp., 97 F. 2d 1, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a result contrary to that reached by the Court of Claims in this case. Internal Revenue Code of 1939: “§3771. Interest on Overpayments. “(a) Rate. — Interest shall be allowed and paid upon any overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax at the rate of 6 per centum per annum. “(b) Period. — Such interest shall be allowed and paid as follows: “(1) Credits. — In the case of a credit .... “(2) Refunds. — In' the case of a refund, from the date of the overpayment to a date preceding the date of the refund check by not more than thirty days .... “(e) [as added by §153 (d), Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 798, 847] Claims Based on Carry-Back of Loss or Credit. — If the Commissioner determines that any part of an overpayment is attributable to the inclusion in computing the net operating loss deduction for the taxable year of any part of the net operating loss for a succeeding taxable year or to the inclusion in computing the unused excess profits credit adjustment for the taxable year of any part of the unused excess profits credit for a succeeding taxable year, no interest shall be allowed or paid with respect to such part of the overpayment for any period before the filing of a claim for credit or refund of such part of the overpayment or the filing of a petition with the Tax Court, whichever is earlier.” 28 U. S. C.: “§ 2411 [as amended by § 120, Act of May 24, 1949, c. 139, 63 Stat. 89, 106], Interest. “(a) In any judgment of any court rendered (whether against the United States, a collector or deputy collector of internal revenue, a former collector or deputy collector, or the personal representative in case of death) for any overpayment in respect of any internal-revenue tax, interest shall be allowed at the rate of 6 per centum per annum upon the amount of the overpayment, from the date of the payment or collection thereof to a date preceding the date of the refund cheek by not more than thirty days, such date to be determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner is authorized to tender by check payment of any such judgment, with interest as herein provided, at any time after such judgment becomes final, whether or not a claim for such payment has been duly filed, and such tender shall stop the running of interest, whether or not such refund check is accepted by the judgment creditor.” It will be noted that petitioner stops short of claiming that it is entitled to interest from the date it paid its 1942 excess profits tax. It claims, rather, that interest runs from the end of the succeeding .tax year that gave rise to the carry-back (i. e., March 31, 1943). The Government’s position, on the other hand, is that the interest runs from June 14, 1945, the date on which the refund claim was first presented. Petitioner points to the fact that in Lasky v. Commissioner, 352 U. S. 1027, the Tax Court was held to be an administrative agency. Petitioner does not in fact claim interest from the date it actually paid its excess profits taxes for the year 1942 but, rather, from the end of the succeeding tax year that gave rise to the carry-back, i. e., March 31, 1943. See n. 4. The history of 28 U. S. C. § 2411 (a) and its predecessor provisions goes back to 1911. See § 177 (b) of the Judicial Code, enacted in 1911 (c. 231, 36 Stat. 1141), as amended by the Revenue Act of 1921 (c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, § 1324 (b)), as further amended by the Revenue Act of 1926 (c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, § 1117). Further amendments occurred in 1928 (45 Stat. 791, § 615) and in 1936 (49 Stat. 1648, § 808). The 1948 codification omitted from the Judicial Code all reference to interest on tax overpayments, but, by a correction Act in 1949 (c. 139, 63 Stat. 89, § 120), Congress restored the section to the Judicial Code as §2411 (a). The only difference between § 177 (b) as it stood in 1942, and § 2411 (a) as it stands today, is that the word “hereby” no longer appears. Thus, § 3771 (e) is not only the specific enactment designed to control the subject of interest in carry-back cases, but it is also a later enactment than §2411 (a). S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 123-124. That Congress did not propose to allow interest for any period prior to presentment of the claim is further confirmed by the provisions of § 6 of the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945, c. 340, 59 Stat. 517, amending § 3771 (e). Section 4 of that Act added a new section to the Internal Revenue Code, § 3780, providing for tentative carry-back adjustments. The concurrent amendment of § 3771 (e) specifies that interest shall not start to run prior to the date application is made for the tentative carry-back adjustments. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. A418. Section 6601 (e) provides that if the amount of tax is reduced by a carry-back loss, the reduction shall not affect the interest payable thereon by the taxpayer for the period ending with the close of the year in which the loss arises. Section 292 (c) of the 1939 Code (added by § 6 of the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945, c. 340, 59 Stat. 517) provided: “If any part of a deficiency is determined by the Commissioner to be attributable ... to a carry-back to which an overpayment described in section 3771 (e) . . . in any other tax is attributable ... no interest shall be assessed or paid under subsection (a) [providing that interest is payable on a deficiency from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax] with respect to such part of the deficiency for any period during which interest was not allowed with respect to such overpayment . . .

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FORSHAM et al. v. HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, et al. No. 78-1118. Argued October 31, 1979 Decided March 3, 1980 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 187. Michael R. Sonnenreich argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Neil L. Chayet, Harvey W. Freishtat, and Michael X. Morrell. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel, William Alsup, Richard M. Cooper, and Michael P. Peskoe. Thomas E. Plank, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for respondent Klimt. With him on the brief were Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, and David H. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General. Sheldon Elliot Steinbach and Joseph Anthony Keyes, Jr., filed a brief for the American Council on Education et al. as amici curiae. Mr. Justice Rehnqtjist delivered the opinion of the, Court. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552, empowers federal courts to order an “agency”, to produce “agency records improperly withheld” from an individual requesting access. § 552 (a)(4)(B). We hold here that written data generated, owned, and possessed by a privately controlled organization receiving federal study grants aré not “agency records” within the meaning of the Act when copies of those data have not been obtained by a federal agency subject to the FOIA. Federal participation in the generation of the data by means of a grant from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. (HEW) does not make the private organization a federal “agency” within the terms of the Act. Nor does this federal funding in combination with a federal right of access render the data “agency records” of HEW, which is a federal “agency” under the terms of the Act. I In 1959, a group of private physicians and scientists specializing in the treatment of diabetes formed the University Group Diabetes Program (UGDP). The UGDP conducted a long-term study of the effectiveness of five diabetes treatment regimens. Two of these treatment regimens involved diet control in combination with the administration of either tolbutamide, or phenformin hydrochloride, both “oral hypoglycemic” drugs. The UGDP’s participating physicians were located at 12 clinics nationwide and the study was coordinated at the Coordinating Center of the University of Maryland. The study generated more than 55 million records documenting the treatment of over 1,000 diabetic patients who were monitored for a 5- to 8-year period. In 1970, the TJGDP presented the initial results of its study indicating that the treatment of adult-onset diabetics with tolbutamide increased the risk of death from cardiovascular disease over that present when diabetes was treated by the other methods studied. The TJGDP later expanded these findings to report a similarly increased incidence of heart disease when patients were treated with phenformin hydrochloride. These findings have in turn generated substantial professional debate. The Committee on the Care of the Diabetic (CCD), a national association of physicians involved in the treatment of diabetes mellitus patients, have been among those critical of the TJGDP study. CCD requested the TJGDP to grant it access to the raw data in order to facilitate its review of the TJGDP findings, but TJGDP has declined to comply with that request. CCD therefore sought to obtain the information under the Freedom of Information Act. The essential facts are not in dispute, and we hereafter set forth those relevant to our decision. The TJGDP study has been solely funded by federal grants in the neighborhood of $15 million between 1961 and 1978. These grants were awarded TJGDP by the National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD), a federal agency, pursuant to the Public Health Service Act, 42 U. S. C. § 241 (c). NIAMDD has not only awarded the federal grants to TJGDP, but has exercised a certain amount of supervision over the funded activity. Federal regulations governing supervision of grantees allow for the review of periodic reports submitted by the grantee and on-site visits, and require agency approval of major program or budgetary changes. 45 CFR §§ 74.80-74.85 (1979); 42 CFR § 52.20 (b) (1979). It is undisputed, however, both that the day-to-day administration of grant-supported activities is in the hands of a grantee, and that NIAMDD’s supervision of UGDP conformed to these regulations. The grantee has also retained control of its records: the patient records and raw data generated by UGDP have at all times remained in the possession of that entity, and neither the NIAMDD grants nor related regulations shift ownership of such data to the Federal Government. NIAMDD does, however, have a right of access to the data in order to insure compliance with the grant. 45 CFR § 74.24 (a) (1979). And the Government may obtain permanent custody of the documents upon request. § 74.21 (c). But NIAMDD has not exercised its right either to review or to obtain permanent custody of the data. Although no employees of the NIAMDD have reviewed the UGDP records, the Institute did contract in 1972 with another private grantee, the Biometric Society, for an assessment of the validity of the UGDP study. The Biometric Society was given direct access to the UGDP raw data by the terms of its contract with NIAMDD. The contract with the Biometric Society, however, did not require the Society to seek access to the UGDP raw data, nor did it require that any data actually reviewed be transmitted to the NIAMDD. While the Society did review some UGDP data, it did not submit any raw data reviewed by it to the NIAMDD. The Society issued a report to the Institute in 1974 concluding that the UGDP results were “mixed” but “moderately strong.” An additional connection between the Federal Government and the UGDP study has occurred through the activities of the Food and Drug Administration. After the FDA was apprised of the UGDP results, the agency issued a statement recommending that physicians use tolbutamide in the treatment of diabetes only in limited circumstances. After the UGDP reported finding a similarly higher incidence of cardiovascular disease with the administration of phenformin, the FDA proposed changes in the labeling of these oral hypoglycemic drugs to warn patients of cardiovascular hazards. FDA Drug Bulletin (June 23, 1971). The FDA deferred further action on this labeling proposal, however, until the Biometric Society completed its review of the UGDP study. After the Biometric study was issued, FDA renewed its proposal to require a label warning that oral hypoglyeemics should be used only in cases of adult-onset, stable diabetes that could not be treated adequately by a combination of diet and insulin. The FDA clearly relied on the UGDP study in renewing this position. 40 Fed. Reg. 28587, 28591 (1975). At the time the proposal was published, the FDA invited public comment. In response to criticism of the UGDP study and the Biometric Society’s audit, the FDA conducted its own audit of the UGDP study pursuant to a delegation of NIAMDD’s authority to audit grantee records. In conducting this audit, the FDA examined and copied a small sample of the UGDP raw data. This audit report has been made available for public inspection. 43 Fed. Reg. 52733 (1978). Although this labeling proposal has not yet become final, other FDA regulatory action has been taken. On July 25, 1977, the Secretary of HEW suspended the New Drug Application for phenformin, one of the oral hypoglycemic medications studied by the UGDP. The decision was premised in part on the findings of the UGDP study. See Order of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, July 25, 1977. After the Secretary’s temporary order of suspension was issued, proceedings before the FDA continued. ' The Administrative Law Judge ordered the FDA to produce all UGDP data in its possession. The FDA then produced those portions of the UGDP raw data which the agency had copied, abstracted, or directly transferred to Government' premises during its audit. The ALJ found that the HEW suspension order was supported by the evidence. On November 15,1978, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs affirmed the ALJ’s finding that phenformin was not shown to be safe and ordered it withdrawn from the market. 44 Fed. Reg. 20967 (1979). This decision was not based substantially on the UGDP study. Petitioners had long since initiated a series of FOIA requests seeking access to the UGDP raw data. On August 7, 1975, HEW denied their request for the UGDP data on the grounds that no branch of HEW had ever reviewed or seen the raw data; that the FDA’s proposed relabeling action relied on the UGDP published reports and not on an analysis of the underlying data; that the data were the property of the UGDP, a private group; and that the agencies were not required to acquire and produce those data under the FOIA. The following month petitioners filed this FOIA suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to require HEW to make available all of the raw data compiled by UGDP. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents, holding that HEW properly denied the request on the ground that the patient data did not constitute “agency records” under the FOIA. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same rationale. Forsham v. Califano, 190 U. S. App. D. C. 231, 587 F. 2d 1128 (1978). The court found that although NIAMDD is a federal agency, its grantees are not federal agencies. The court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the UGDP’s records were nevertheless also the federal agency’s records. Although HEW has a right of access to the documents, the court reasoned that this right did not render the documents “agency records” since the FOIA only applies to records which have been “created or obtained ... in the course of doing its work.” Id., at 239, 587 F. 2d, at 1136. The dissenting judge concluded that the UGDP data were “agency records” under the FOIA since the Government had been “significantly involved” in the study through its funding, access to the raw data, and reliance on the study in its regulatory actions. II As we hold in the companion case of Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, ante, p. 136, it must be established that an “agency” has “improperly withheld agency records” for an individual to obtain access to documents through an FOIA action. We hold here that HEW need not produce the requested data because they are not “agency records” within the meaning of the FOIA. In so holding, we reject three separate but related claims of petitioners: (1) the data they seek are “agency records” because they were at least “records” of UGDP, and UGDP in turn received its funds from a federal agency and was subject to some supervision by the agency in its use of those funds; (2) the data they seek are “agency records” because HEW, concededly a federal agency, had sufficient authority under its grant agreement to have obtained the data had it chosen to do so; and (3) the data are “agency records” because they formed the basis for the published reports of UGDP, which in turn were relied upon by the FDA in the actions described above. Congress undoubtedly sought to expand public rights of access to Government information when it enacted the Freedom of Information Act, but that expansion was a finite one. Congress limited access to “agency records,” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(4)(B), but did not provide any definition of “agency records” in that Act. The use of the word “agency” as a modifier demonstrates that Congress contemplated some relationship between an “agency” and the “record” requested under the FOIA. With due regard for the policies and language of the FOIA, we conclude that data generated by a privately controlled organization which has received grant funds from an agency (hereafter grantee), but which data has not at any time been obtained by the agency, are not “agency records” accessible under the FOIA. A We first examine petitioners’ claim that the data were at least records of UGDP, and that the federal funding and supervision of UGDP alone provides the close connection necessary to render its records “agency records” as that term is used in the Freedom of Information Act. Congress did not define “agency record” under the FOIA, but it did define “agency.” The definition of “agency” reveals a great deal about congressional intent as to the availability of records from private grantees under the FOIA, and thus, a great deal about the relevance, of federal funding and supervision to the definitional scope of “agency records.” Congress excluded private grantees from FOIA disclosure obligations by excluding them from the definition of “agency,” an action consistent with its prevalent practice of preserving grantee autonomy. It has, for example, disclaimed any federal property rights in grantee records by virtue of its funding. We cannot agree with petitioners in light of these circumstances that the very federal funding and supervision which Congress found insufficient to make the grantee an agency subject to the FOIA nevertheless makes its records accessible under the same Act. Under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (e) an “agency” is defined as “any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government ... , or any independent regulatory agency.” The legislative history indicates unequivocally that private organizations receiving federal financial assistance grants are not within the definition of “agency.” In their Report, the conferees stated that they did “not intend to include corporations which receive appropriated funds but are neither chartered by the Federal Government nor controlled by it, such as the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.” H. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, pp. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 Source Book 231-232 (Jt. Comm. Print 1975). Through operation of this exclusion, Congress chose not to confer any direct public rights of access to such federally funded project information. This treatment of federal grantees under the FOIA is consistent with congressional treatment of them in other areas of federal law. Grants of federal funds generally do not create a partnership or joint venture with the recipient, nor do they serve to convert the acts of the recipient from private acts to governmental acts absent extensive, detailed, and virtually day-to-day supervision. United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807, 818 (1976). Measured by these standards, the UGDP is not a federal instrumentality or an FOIA agency. Congress could have provided that the records generated by a federally funded grantee were federal property even though the grantee has not been adopted as a federal entity. But Congress has not done so, reflecting the same regard for the autonomy of the grantee’s records as for the grantee itself. Congress expressly requires an agency to use “procurement contracts” when the “principal purpose of the instrument is the acquisition ... of property or services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal Government. . . .” Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977, § 4, 92 Stat. 4, 41 U. S. C. § 503 (1976 ed., Supp. II).. In contrast, “grant agreements” must be used when money is given to a recipient “in order to accomplish a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by Federal statute, rather than acquisition ... of property or services. ...” § 5, 41 U. S. C. § 504 (1976 ed., Supp. II). As in this case, where a grant was used, there is no dispute that the documents created are the property of the recipient, and not the Federal Government. See 45 CFR § 74.133 (1979). The HEW regulations do retain a right to acquire the documents. Those regulations, however, clearly demonstrate that unless and until that right is exercised, the records are only the “records of grantees.” 45 CFR § 74.24 (1979). Therefore, were petitioners to prevail in this action, they would have obtained a right of access to some 55 million documents created, owned, and possessed by a private recipient of federal funds. While this fact itself-is not dispositive of the outcome, it is nonetheless an important consideration when viewed in light of these congressional attempts to maintain the autonomy of federal grantees and their records. The fact that Congress has chosen not to make a federal grantee an “agency” or to vest ownership of the records in the Government does not resolve with mathematical precision the question of whether the granting agency’s funding and supervisory activities nevertheless make the grantee’s records “agency records.” Records of a nonagency certainly could become records of an agency as well. But if Congress found that federal funding and supervision did not justify direct access to the grantee’s records, as it clearly did, we fail to see why we should nevertheless conclude that those identical activities were intended to permit indirect access through an expansive definition of “agency records.” Such a con-elusion would not implement the intent of Congress; it would defeat it. These considerations do not finally conclude the inquiry, for conceivably other facts might indicate that the documents could be “agency records” even though generated by a private grantee. The definition of “agency” and congressional policy towards grantee records indicate, however, that Congress did not intend that grant supervision short of Government control serve as. a sufficient basis to make the private records “agency records” under the Act, and reveal a congressional determination to keep federal grantees free from the direct obligations imposed by the TOLA. In ascertaining the intended expanse of the term “agency records” then, we must, of course, construe the Act with regard both for the congressional purpose of increasing public access to governmental records and for this equally explicit purpose of retaining grantee autonomy. B Petitioners seek to prevail on their second and third theories, even though their first be rejected, by invoking a broad definition of “agency records,” so as to include all documents created by a private grantee to which the Government has access, and which the Government has used.' We do not believe that this broad definition of “agency records,” a term undefined in the FOIA, is supported by either the language of that Act or its legislative history. We instead agree with the opinions of the courts below that Congress contemplated that an agency must first either create or obtain a record as a prerequisite to its becoming an “agency record” within the meaning of the FOIA. While it would be stretching the ordinary meaning of the words to call the data in question here “agency records,” we need not rest our conclusions solely on the “plain language” rule of statutory construction. The use of the term “record” by Congress in two other Acts, and the structure and legislative history of the FOIA alike support the same conclusion. Although Congress has supplied no definition of agency records in the FOIA, it has formulated a definition in other Acts. The Records Disposal Act, in effect at the time Congress enacted, the Freedom of Information Act, provides the following threshold requirement for agency records: “ 'records’ includes all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business. . . 44 U. S. C. § 3301. (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act 23-24 (1967), S. Doc. No. 93-82, pp. 222-223 (1974), concludes that Congress intended this aspect of the Records Act definition to apply to the Freedom of Information Act. The same standard emerges in the Presidential Records Act of 1978. The term “presidential records” is defined as “documentary materials ... created or received by the President. . . .” 44 U. S. C. 1 2201 (2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). (Emphasis added.) While these definitions are not disposi-tive of the proper interpretation of congressional use of the word in the FOIA, it is not insignificant that Congress has associated creation or acquisition with the concept of a governmental record. The text, structure, and legislative history of the FOIA itself reinforce that significance in this case. The only direct reference to a definition of records in the legislative history, of which we are aware, occurred during the Senate hearings leading to the enactment of FOIA. A representative of the Interstate Commerce Commission commented that “[s]ince the word ‘records’ ... is not defined, we assume that it includes all papers which an agency preserves in the performance of its functions.” Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1160 et al. before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 244 (1965). The legislative history of the FOIA abounds with other references to records acquired by an agency. For example, the legislative Reports clarify that confidential information “submitted ... to a Government . . . agency,” “obtained by the Government,” or “given to an agency” otherwise subject to disclosure, was made exempt. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1965), reprinted in Freedom of Information Act Source Book, S. Doc. No. 93-82, p. 44 (Comm. Print 1974); H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in Source Book, at 31. Section 552 (b)(4) provides the strongest structural support for this construction. This section exempts trade secrets and commercial or financial information “obtained from a person.” This exemption was designed to protect confidential information “submitted” by a borrower to a lending agency or “obtained by the Government” through questionnaires or other inquiries, where such information “would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.” S. Rep. No. 813, supra, at 9; H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 10. It is significant that Congress did not include a similar exemption for confidential information contained in records which had never been “obtained from a person.” It is obvious that this omission does not reflect a congressional judgment that records remaining in private control are not similarly deserving of this exemption, but rather a judgment that records which have never passed from private to agency control are not agency records which would require any such exemption. This possessory emphasis is buttressed by similar considerations implicit in the use of the word “withholding” in the statutory framework. See Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, ante, p. 136. The same focus emerges in a congressional amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That Act had provided its own standards for public access to documents generated by the Act. Congress amended the Act to provide: “For purposes of [the FOIA] the term 'records’ includes , all applications, statements, reports, contracts, correspondence, notices, and other documents filed with or otherwise obtained by the Commission pursuant to this chapter or otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) 15 U. S. C. § 78x. We think that the weight this construction lends to our conclusion is overborne neither by an agency’s potential access to the grantee’s information nor by its reliance on that information in carrying out the various duties entrusted to it by Congress. The Freedom of Information Act deals with “agency records,” not information in the abstract. Petitioners place great reliance on the fact that HEW has a right of access to the data, and a right if it so chooses to obtain permanent custody of the UGDP records. 45 CFR §§ 74.24. 74.21 (1979). But in this context the FOIA applies to records which have been in fact obtained, and not to records which merely could have been obtained. To construe the FOIA to embrace the latter class of documents would be to extend the reach of the Act beyond what we believe Congress intended. We rejected a similar argument in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 161-162 (1975), by holding that the FOIA imposes no duty on the agency to create records. By ordering HEW to exercise its right of access, we effectively would be compelling the agency to “create” an agency record since prior to that exercise the record was not a record of the agency. Thus without first establishing that the agency has created or obtained the document, reliance or use is similarly irrelevant. We think the foregoing reasons dispose of all petitioners’ arguments. We therefore conclude that the data petitioners seek are not “agency records” within the meaning of the FOIA. UGDP is not a “federal agency” as that term is defined in the FOIA, and the data petitioners seek have not been created or obtained by a federal agency. Having failed to establish this threshold requirement, petitioners’ FOIA claim must fail, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, dissenting. I agree with the Court that “[rjecords of a nonagency certainly could become records of an agency as well.” Ante, at 181. But the Court does not explain why such a conversion does not occur in this case. Because I believe we should articulate standards under which to analyze such cases and because I believe that under a proper test UGDP’s data should be treated as “agency records,” I dissent. I The Court argues at length that UGDP is not an agency. But whether or not UGDP is an “agency” is simply not at issue in this case. Rather, the only question is whether data generated in the course of this UGDP study are “agency records.” The Court concedes, of course, that the statute itself does not define “agency records.” Therefore, our task is to construe the statutory language consistently with the purposes of FOIA. As detailed in the dissenting opinion below, Forsham v. Califano, 190 U. S. App. D. C. 231, 244-245, 587 F. 2d 1128, 1141-1142 (1978) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), FOIA is a broad enactment meant to open the processes of Government to public inspection. It reflects a finding that if left to themselves agencies would operate in near secrecy. FOIA was, therefore, enacted to provide access to information to enable “an informed electorate,” so “vital to the proper operation of a democracy,” to govern itself. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). Nothing whatever in the legislative history suggests that Congress meant to allow agencies to insulate important steps in decisionmaking on the basis of the technical niceties of who “owns” crucial documents. Where the nexus between the agency and the requested information is close, and where the importance of the information to public understanding of the decisions or the operation of the agency is great, I believe the congressional purposes require us to hold that the information sought is an “agency record” within the meaning of POIA. Admittedly, this test does not establish a bright line, but the evaluation of a calculus of relevant factors is nothing new to the law. The first such factor is the importance of the record to an understanding of Government activities. If, for instance, the significance of the record is limited to understanding the workings of the nonagency, the public has no FOIA-protected interest in access. The weight to be given this factor can be tested by examining the role accorded the material in agency writings and the extent to which the agency reached its conclusions in reliance upon the particular source. Mere materiality of information, standing alone, of course, is not enough. POIA does not give the public any unrestricted right to examine all data relied on by an agency. Congress required that the information constitute an “agency record.” Thus, another necessary factor is'that there be a link between the agency and the record. Nothing in FOIA or its history suggests, however, that the connection must amount to outright possession or creation. Instead, again drawing from the legislative purposes, I believe the link must be such that the agency has treated the record as if it were part of the regulatory process, as if it were in effect a record which exists to serve the regulatory process. Government by secrecy is no less destructive of democracy if it is carried on within agencies or within private organizations serving agencies. The value of the record to the electorate is not affected by whether the relationship between the agency and the private organization is governed formally by a procurement contract, a “joint venture” agreement, or a grant. The existence of this factor can be tested by examining, inter alia, the degree to which the impetus for the creation of the record came from the agency or was developed independently, the degree to which the creation of the record was funded publicly or privately, the extent of governmental supervision of the creation of the record, and the extent of continuing governmental control over the record. II On the facts of this case, I would conclude that UGDP’s raw data are records of HEW. Both HEW and the FDA have taken significant actions in complete reliance on the UGDP study. The FDA has directly endorsed the study’s conclusions and, in reliance thereon, sought mandatory labeling warnings on the drugs criticized by the UGDP. HEW cited the UGDP study as one of its basic sources when it suspended one of the drugs as an immediate hazard. The suggestion that these administrative actions relied solely on the published reports and not on the underlying raw data at issue here is unrealistic. The conclusions can be no stronger or weaker than the data on which they are based. One cannot even begin to evaluate an agency action without access to the raw data on which the conclusions were based, especially in a case such as this where the data are nonduplicable. The importance of the raw data in evaluating derivative conclusions was recognized by the FDA when it employed another independent organization, the Biometric Society, to check UGDP’s work. FDA secured access for the Society to the raw data, and the Society used a sample of the data. This case is set against the background of an intense, often bitter, battle being waged in the medical community over the validity of the UGDP study and the correct treatment regimen for diabetes. By endorsing the UGDP study the Federal Government has aligned itself on one side of the fight and has all but outlawed the regimen recommended by the other side. Petitioners in this case are medical scientists seeking to resolve questions that have been raised about the scientific and statistical methods underlying an agency’s conclusions. This seems to me to be an archetypical instance of the need for public dissemination of the information. Even so, I doubt that the information could be held to be an “agency record” had the Government not been so deeply involved in its creation. Petitioners have argued that the National Institutes of Health, in effect, did create these records. The agency not only completely funded the project’s operation, but initiated the project and took responsibility for developing its research protocol as well. See Forsham v. Califano, 190 U. S. App. D. C., at 251, 587 F. 2d, at 1148 (Bazelon, J., voting for rehearing). They contend further that, beyond the normal level of NIH involvement in its grantees’ studies set out by the Court, ante, at 173, the NIH exercised continuing supervision over this study through a “Policy Advisory Board” as a condition of the grant renewals. Forsham v. Califano, supra. Finally, as the Court also acknowledges, there is no question that the Government has full access to the data under the terms of the grant and under federal regulations. Indeed, if it so chose, the Government could obtain permanent custody of the data merely by requesting it from UGDP. Thus, the data remain with the grantee only at the pleasure of the' Government. In my view the record abundantly establishes that these data were developed with public funds and with Government assistance and, in large part, for governmental purposes. Therefore, I would hold that they are agency records, and I respectfully dissent. Ill I emphasize that the standards I suggest do not mean opening to the public the files of all grantees or of all who submit information to the Government. In many cases grantees’ records should not be treated as agency records. But the Court’s approach must inevitably undermine FOIA’s great purpose of exposing Government to the people. It is unavoidable that as the work of federal agencies mushrooms both in quantity and complexity the agencies must look to outside organizations to assist in governmental tasks. Just as the explosion of federal agencies, which are not directly responsible to the electorate, worked to hide the workings of the Federal Government from voters before enactment of FOIA, S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965), the understandable tendency of agencies to rely on nongovernmental grantees to perform myriad projects distances the electorate from important information by one more step. If the records of such organizations, when drawn directly into the regulatory process, are immune from public inspection, then government by secrecy must surely return. The NIAMDD is one of several Institutes of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). It is authorized by statute to conduct and fund research on diabetes and other diseases. 42 U. S. C. §§ 289a, 289c-1. The NIH are a component of the federal Public Health Service, which is itself a part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, 3 CFR 1023 (1966-1970 Comp.), note Mowing 42 U. S. C. §202, and Reorganization Order of April 1, 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 5426. Petitioners do contend that the federal supervision of the UGDP study was substantial and more extensive than that ordinarily exercised. They do not, however, maintain that there was day-to-day supervision. See infra, at 180, and n. 11. Prior to the FDA’s decision to defer action, petitioners in this case sued the FDA to enjoin the proposed labeling, contesting the validity of the UGDP study. The First Circuit remanded the case to the FDA for exhaustion of administrative remedies. Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F. 2d 410 (1973). The order of the Commissioner discounts reliance on the TJGDP study. The order states that the AU was correct in concluding that from “an evidentiary standpoint” the “lack of availability of underlying data casts considerable doubt on the reliability of the TJGDP conclusions.” 44 Fed. Reg. 20969 (1979). The ALJ did permit reference to the TJGDP study as a basis for expert opinion. The Commissioner concluded that this use of the study was permissible since the data underlying expert opinions need not always be admitted to substantiate the opinions. Nearly 400 published articles were included in the record of the phenformin proceeding and none of the articles was accompanied by the raw data on which they were based. The Commissioner noted that the ALJ referenced the TJGDP study in only one paragraph of his eightr-page summary. The Commissioner concluded that the agency.was not required to submit the TJGDP data since it had not relied upon that data, but only upon the actual study. 21 CFR § 12.85 (1979). Nevertheless, the Commissioner stated that he “reviewed the testimony of the Bureau of Drug’s expert witnesses and [found] that their reliance upon the TJGDP study was not substantial and cannot reasonably be characterized as pivotal to the opinions expressed by those witnesses.” 44 Fed. Reg. 20969 (1979). The denial of . this FOIA request preceded the FDA’s audit of the UGDP data. The court opinion also suggested that a document is an “agency record” if the federal agency has a duty to obtain the record. 190 U. S. App. D. C., at 239, and n. 18, 587 F. 2d, at 1136, and n. 18 (Leventhal, J.). Judge MacKinnon concurred separately to reserve the question of whether or not records which an agency had a duty to obtain were recoverable under the FOIA. We side with Judge MacKinnon on the breadth of the principle necessary to the decision in this case. Id., at 242, 587 F. 2d, at 1139. Petitioners maintain that the FDA has relied on all the raw data through reliance on the report and through reliance on information obtained pursuant to its audit of a sample of the data. The Court of Appeals found, however, that data reviewed by the FDA have been made available to petitioners. Id., at 236, 587 F. 2d, at 1133. As we indicate infra, reliance on a document does not make it an agency record if it has not been created or obtained by a federal agency. Reliance or use may well be relevant, however, to the question of whether a record in the possession of an agency is an “agency record.” See Kissinger, ante, at 157. In § 552 (a) (3) Congress did not use the term “agency records.” That section provides: “[E]ach agency, upon any request for records . . . shall make the records promptly available to any person.” Since the enforcement provision of the Act, §552 (a)(4)(B), refers only to “agency records” it is certain that the disclosure obligations imposed by §552 (a) (3) were only intended to extend to agency records. That limitation is implicit throughout the Act. We use the term “grantee” or “private grantee” to describe private recipients of federal funds not subjected to sufficient Government control to render them federal agencies. We do not suggest, by use of this term, that an organization receiving federal grant funds could never be found to be a federal agency. See infra, at 180, and n. 11. Numerous bills seeking to extend the FOIA to federal grantees have been introduced in each Congress since the 92d, but none has yet been reported .out of committee. See H. R. 11013, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H. R. 1291, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H. R. 1205, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H. R. 3207, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H. R. 1465, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Before characterizing an entity as “federal” for some purpose, this Court has required a threshold showing of substantial federal supervision of the private activities, and not just the exercise of regulatory authority necessary to assure compliance with the goals of the federal grant. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U. S. 807 (1976). While the petitioners emphasize the Government’s interest in monitoring the UGDP’s study, •they do not contend that this supervision is sufficient to render UGDP a satellite federal agency. The funding and supervision indicated by the facts of this case are consistent with the usual grantor-grantee relationship and do not suggest the requisite magnitude of Government control. Orleans, supra, at 815-816. The particular grant agreement in issue similarly confers on the NIAMDD a limited right of access to “records of the grantee.” Nor could this distinction be explained by a hypothetical congressional preference for placing the burdens of production on the agency rather than the private grantee. Although under the petitioners’ construction of the Act the request would have to be made by the agency, the administrative burdens of searching and producing, or providing access, would necessarily accrue substantially to the party in possession, i. e., the private grantee. The definition of “records” under the Records Disposal Act further requires that records made or received by the agency also be “preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency ... as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in them.” Government documents made or received by an agency that are not appropriate for preservation are referred to as “nonrecord materials.” 41 CFR § 101-11.401-3 (d) (1979). It has not been settled whether the FOIA definition of agency records extends to “nonrecord materials.” We need not reach that question since the documents sought by petitioners do not meet the threshold requirement that they be “made or received” by a federal agency. It is interesting to note that the witness expressed concern that such an “all-expansive meaning” necessitated clear categorical exemptions. We certainly do not indicate, however, that physical possession, or initial creation, is by itself always sufficient. See Kissinger, ante, at 157. We need not categorize what agency conduct is necessary to support a finding that it has “obtained” documents, since an unexercised right of access clearly does not satisfy this requirement. Government access to documents clearly could not be the central component of the definition of agency records contemplated by Congress since the Federal Government has access to near astronomical numbers of private documents. A mere sampling of access statutes includes: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 7602, 26 U. S. C. § 7602 (taxpayers or potential taxpayers); 15 U. S. C. §§ 78q, 78u (persons subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) ; 29 U. S. C. § 657 (each employer subject to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970). Even if the Court were to accept petitioners’ argument that only contractual access should give rise to “agency record” status, a limitation which does not appear readily supportable, the class of documents subject to FOIA disclosure would still be staggering. The record in this case indicates that NIAMDD alone has some 18,000 research grants outstanding. The Court suggests that if a federal grant created a partnership or joint venture between the agency and the grantee, the grantee might become an agency and, thus, its records might become agency records. Ante, at 180. Likewise, the Court might reach a different result where the agency has chosen to buy data through a procurement contract instead of a grant. Ibid. But neither of these is an instance involving records of a nonagency. In the first the grantee becomes an agency, and in the second the records do not belong to the nonagency. Therefore, the Court surely overstates the fact in saying that Congress “clearly” found that federal funding and supervision are not relevant to whether direct access to grantee’s records is justified, ante, at 181, and the Court does not explain why Congress’ silence “reflect[s] the same regard for the autonomy of the grantee’s records as for the grantee itself,” ante, at 180. Moreover, nothing whatever is cited in the legislative history to support the Court’s claim that the “purpose of retaining grantee autonomy” was “equally explicit” as a purpose of FOIA as was increasing public access to governmental records. Ante, at 182. I find the Court’s references to other statutes unenlightening. The Records Disposal Act and Presidential Records Act of 1978 are properly limited to records created or received because the agencies or the Executive cannot physically dispose of what they do not possess. These Acts are aimed at monitoring the physical destruction of agency documents and settling claims of ownership of Presidential documents. The agencies and the Executive cannot destroy or take for private use what they have never possessed. As for the “structural” argument drawn from 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) (4), I cannot imagine that trade secrets or commercial information not submitted to the Government would have been created or used for governmental purposes or with governmental funds. In short, the Government would have no claim of any kind on the information if it had not been submitted. FOIA was enacted because agencies had turned the predecessor statute on its head, transforming a public information statute into a secrecy statute. H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in Freedom of Information Act Source Book, S. Doc. No. 93-82, pp. 22, 25-27 (Comm. Print 1974). The Court offers no manageable standards of any kind. No guidance is given to the decisionmaker as to how to determine at what point a relationship' between an agency and another organization ripens into a "joint venture.” And, of course, we are given no key to guide the determination of what nonageney records “become records of an agency as well.” Ante, at 181. The Court, by insisting on analyzing petitioners’ contentions separately, never addresses the full, combined force of the arguments. It is only in combination that the various factors alluded to by petitioners tell the full story of governmental reliance on and involvement with the data and, thus, the importance to the success of Congress’ FOIA scheme of disclosing this information. See Note, The Definition of “Agency Records” Under the Freedom of Information Act, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 1093, 1106-1114 (1979). Certainly the agency cannot control the legal consequences simply by the label it attaches to a relationship. One former UGDP investigator has challenged the scientific honesty of the research coordinator, who is also the current custodian of the raw data. Because the case comes to us on affirmance of the grant of respondents’ motion for summary judgment, we must accept petitioners’ version of any disputed facts. Thus, for instance, we are not free to de-emphasize the extent of federal supervision of the UGDP study alleged by petitioners.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. DRIVERS, CHAUFFEURS, HELPERS, LOCAL UNION No. 639, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. No. 34. Argued January 14, 1960. Decided March 28, 1960. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Stuart Rothman, Thomas J. McDermott and Norton J. Come. Herbert S. Thatcher argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was David Previant. MR. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether peaceful picketing by a union, which does not represent a majority of the employees, to compel immediate recognition as the employees’ exclusive bargaining agent, is conduct of the union “to restrain or coerce” the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7, and thus an unfair labor practice under §8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. Curtis Bros., Inc., has a retail store and a warehouse in Washington, D. C., in which it carries on a moving, warehousing and retail furniture business. In 1953 respondent Teamsters Local 639 was certified by the National Labor Relations Board, following a Board-conducted election, to be the exclusive representative of the Company’s drivers, helpers, warehousemen and furniture finishers. However, when the Local called a strike over contract terms in February 1954 only nine of 21 employees in the unit left their jobs and Curtis Bros, replaced the nine with new employees. The strike continued but the Local gradually lost membership, and when after a year Curtis Bros, petitioned the Board to conduct another election, the Local wrote the Board that it did not claim to represent a majority of the employees. The Board nevertheless ordered another election, 114 N. L. R. B. 116, which was held in October 1955, and the then employees of the unit voted 28 to one in favor of “no union.” A month after the election, in November 1955, the Local withdrew a picket line which had been maintained before the employees’ entrance to the warehouse during the period from February 1954. However, picketing at the customers’ entrance to the retail store was continued, but limited to not more than two pickets at any time. The pickets were orderly at all times and made no attempt to prevent anyone from entering the store. They simply patrolled before the entrance carrying signs reading on one side, “Curtis Bros, employs nonunion drivers, helpers, warehousemen and etc. Unfair to Teamsters Union No. 639 AFL,” and on the other side, “Teamsters Union No. 639 AFL wants employes of Curtis Bros, to join them to gain union wages, hours, and working conditions.” After this picketing continued for about six months, Curtis Bros, made it the subject of an unfair labor practice charge against the Local for alleged violation of §8 (b)(1)(A). A complaint issued which alleged, in substance, that the picketing was activity to “restrain or coerce” the employees in the exercise of § 7 rights, and thus an unfair labor practice under §8 (b)(1)(A), because it was “recognition al” picketing, that is, picketing designed to induce Curtis Bros, to recognize the Local as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees, although the union did not represent a majority of the employees. The Trial Examiner recommended that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the Local’s peaceful picketing, even if “recognitional,” was not conduct to “restrain or coerce.” The Board, one member disssent-ing, disagreed and entered a cease-and-desist order, 119 N. L. R. B. 232. On review at the instance of the Local, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by a divided court, set aside the Board’s order, holding that §8 (b)(1)(A) “is inapplicable to peaceful picketing, whether 'organizational’ or ‘recogni-tional’ in nature . . . .” 107 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 43, 274 F. 2d 551, 552. Because of the importance of the question in the administration of the Act, we. granted certiorari. 359 U. S. 965. After we granted certiorari, the Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which, among other things, adds a new § 8 (b)(7) to the National Labor Relations Act. It was stated by the Board on oral argument that if this case arose under the 1959 Act, the Board might have proceeded against the Local under § 8 (b) (7). This does not, however, relegate this litigation to the status of an unimportant controversy over the meaning of a statute which has been significantly changed. For the Board contends that new § 8 (b) (7) does not displace § 8 (b) (1) (A) but merely “supplements the power already conferred by Section 8 (b)(1)(A).” It argues that the Board may proceed against peaceful “recognitional” picketing conducted by a minority union in more situations than are specified in § 8 (b)(7) and without regard to the limitations of |8 (b)(7)(C). Basic to the right guaranteed to employees in § 7 to form, join or assist labor organizations, is the right to engage in concerted activities to persuade other employees to join for their mutual aid and protection. Indeed, even before the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, and the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449, this Court recognized a right in unions to “use all lawful propaganda to enlarge their membership.” American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209. However, the Taft-Hartley Act added another right of employees also guaranteed protection, namely, the right to refrain from joining a union, except as that right might be affected by an agreement authorized in §8 (a)(3). Thus tension exists between the two rights of employees protected by § 7— their right to form, join or assist labor organizations, and their right to refrain from doing so. This tension is necessarily quite real when a union employs economic weapons to organize employees who do not want to join the union. The Board held here that peaceful picketing is not lawfully employed as an economic weapon to further self-organization if its objective is “recogni-tional.” The Board stated: “Because the object of the Union’s picketing in this case was to force the Company to commit an act prohibited by the statute itself [that is, to recognize and contract with the Local although it was not the chosen representative of a majority of the Curtis Bros, employees] and directly to deprive the employees of a right expressly guaranteed to them by the same Act, there is no occasion here to balance conflicting interests or rights.” 119 N. L. R. B. 232, 238. It therefore found no justification for the threat to the employees’ job security which was thought to be inherent in the economic pressure directed against the employer by the picketing. It was this threat which was said to taint peaceful picketing as unlawful conduct to “restrain or coerce” which the Board might forbid. We first consider § 8 (b) (1) (A) in the light of § 13, as amended, which provides, in substance, that the Taft-Hartley Act shall not be taken as restricting or expanding either the right to strike or the limitations or qualifications on that right, as these were understood prior to 1947, unless “specifically provided for” in the Act itself. The Wagner Act conferred upon the Board wide authority to protect strikers from employer retaliation. However, the Court and the Board fashioned the doctrine that the Board should deny reinstatement to strikers who engaged in strikes which were conducted in an unlawful manner or for an unlawful objective. See for example Southern S. S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31; Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240; Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332; and American News Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1302. These are the “limitations or qualifications” on the right to strike referred to in § 13. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28. The Board makes no claim that prior to 1947 it was authorized, because of any “limitation” or “qualification,” to issue a cease-and-desist order against peaceful “recogni-tional” picketing; indeed the full protections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act extended to peaceful picketing by minority unions for recognition. See Fur Workers Union No. 21238 v. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72, 308 U. S. 522, per curiam affirming 70 App. D. C. 122, 105 F. 2d 1; Lauf v. Skinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323. Therefore, since the Board’s order in this case against peaceful picketing would obviously “impede” the right to strike, it can only be sustained if such power is “specifically provided for” in § 8 (b) (1) (A), as added by the Taft-Hartley Act. To be sure, § 13 does not require that the authority for the Board action be spelled out in so many words. Rather, since the Board does not contend that §8 (b)(1)(A) embodies one of the “limitations or qualifications” on the right to strike, § 13 declares a rule of construction which cautions against an expansive reading of that section which would adversely affect the right to strike, unless the congressional purpose to give it that meaning persuasively appears either from the structure or history of the statute. Therefore, § 13 is a command of Congress to the courts to resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an interpretation of § 8 (b)(1)(A) which safeguards the right to strike as understood prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. The Board asserts that the very general standard in § 8 (b)(1)(A) vests power in the Board to sit in judgment upon, and to condemn, a minority union’s resort to a specific economic weapon, here peaceful picketing. The structure of § 8 (b), which defines unfair labor practices, hardly supports the Board’s claims.. Earlier this Term we pointed out that “Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions.” Labor Board v. Insurance Agents’ International Union, 361 U. S. 477, 498. We referred to § 8 (b) (4) as illustrative of the congressional practice. In the context of a union’s striking to promote enlarged membership, Congress there explicitly prohibited a union’s resort to the secondary boycott, to the strike to force employers or self-employed persons to join unions, and, very pertinent here, to the “recognitional” strike where another union is certified. Plainly if the Board's interpretation is sustained, §8 (b)(1)(A) largely overlaps at least this last-mentioned prohibition, namely § 8 (b)(4)(C), to the extent of making it almost redundant. But the Court has rejected an argument that a provision of § 8 (b) (4) is a repetition of the prohibitions of § 8 (b)(1) (A). In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 341 U. S. 694, the Court, in holding that a peaceful strike to promote self-organization was proscribed by § 8 (b) (4) (A) if its objective was to “induce or encourage” a secondary boycott, contrasted the language of the two subsections and labeled the words “restrain or coerce” in § 8 (b) (1) (A) a “restricted phrase” to be equated with “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Id., at 701-703. In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing. Therefore, unless there is the clearest indication in the legislative history of §8 (b)(1)(A) supporting the Board’s claim of power under that section, we cannot sustain the Board’s order here. We now turn to an examination of the legislative history. In the comprehensive review of union practices leading up to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, picketing practices were subjected to intensive inquiry by both House and Senate Labor Committees. The Senate bill, as brought to the floor by the Senate Labor Committee regulated organizational activity in specified situations. Proposed § 8 (b)(4) (3), now § 8 (b)(4)(C) of the law, made “recognitional” picketing of a primary employer unlawful only where “another labor organization has been certified as the representative” of his employees. Section 8 (b)(4) (2), now §8 (b)(4)(B), prohibited attempts to force recognition through secondary pressure. However, five members of the Senate Labor Committee, including Senators Taft and Ball, believed that the Senate bill did not go far enough in the regulation of practices employed by unions for organizational purposes. These Senators introduced on the floor a proposed amendment to the Committee bill. The amendment as originally phrased was the counterpart of § 8 (a)(1) applicable to employers; it would have made it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization “to interfere with” as well as “to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 7 ... .” The words “interfere with” were dropped during the debate, but except for this change, the amendment became § 8 (b)(1)(A). The report of supplemental views which announced the five Senators’ intention to propose the amendment identifies the abuses which the section was designed to reach. That report states: “The committee heard many instances of union coercion of employees such as that brought about by threats of reprisal against employees and their families in the course of organizing campaigns; also direct interference by mass picketing and other violence. Some of these acts are illegal under State law, but we see no reason why they should not also constitute unfair labor practices to be investigated by the National Labor Relations Board, and at least deprive the violators of any protection furnished by the Wagner Act.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50. Similar expressions pervaded the Senate debates on the amendment. The note repeatedly sounded is as to the necessity for protecting individual workers from union organizational tactics tinged with violence, duress or reprisal. Senator Ball cited numerous examples of organizing drives characterized by threats against unorganized workers of violence, job reprisals and such repressive assertions as that double initiation fees would be charged those who delayed joining the union. 93 Cong. Rec. 4016-4017. When Senator Ives objected to the words “interfere with” as too broad, Senator Taft insisted that even those words would have a limited application and would reach “reprehensible” practices but not methods of peaceful persuasion. He continued: “Why should a union be able to go to an employee and threaten violence if he does not join the union? Why should a union be able to say to an employee, Tf you do not join this union we will see that you cannot work in the plant’? . . . We know that such things have actually occurred. We know that men have been threatened. There have been many cases in which unions have threatened men or their wives. They have called on them on the telephone and insisted that they sign bargaining cards. They have said to them, 'Sooner or later we are going to organize this plant with a closed shop, and you will be out.’ . . .” 93 Cong. Rec. 4021. It is true that here and there in the record of the debates there are isolated references to instances of conduct which might suggest a broader reach of the amendment. See for example 93 Cong. Rec. 4023-4024. But they appear more as asides in a debate, the central theme of which was not the curtailment of the right peacefully to strike, except as provided in § 8 (b)(4), but the elimination of the use of repressive tactics bordering on violence or involving particularized threats of economic reprisal. The plainest indication negating an intention to restrict the use by unions of methods of peaceful persuasion, including peaceful picketing, is seen in the comments of Senator Taft near the close of the debate. He said: "It seems to me very clear that so long as a union-organizing drive is conducted by persuasion, by propaganda, so long as it has every legitimate purpose, the Board cannot in any way interfere with it. . . 93 Cong. Rec. 4434. “The effect of the pending amendment is that the Board may call the union before them, exactly as it has called the employer, and say, ‘Here are the rules of the game. You must cease and desist from coercing and restraining the employees who want to work from going to work and earning the money which they are entitled to earn.’ The Board may say, ‘You can persuade them; you can put up signs; you can conduct any form of propaganda you want to in order to persuade them, but you cannot, by threat of force or threat of economic reprisal, prevent them from exercising their right to work.’ As I see it, that is the effect of the amendment.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4436. “The Senator says it will slow up organizational drives. It will slow up organizational drives only if they are accompanied by threats and coercion. The cease-and-desist order will be directed against the use of threats and coercion. It will not be directed against the use of propaganda or the use of persuasion, or against the use of any of the other peaceful methods of organizing employees. “Mr. President, I can see nothing in the pending measure which, as suggested by the Senator from Oregon, would in some way outlaw strikes. It would outlaw threats against employees. It would not outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike. It would not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way, conducting peaceful picketing, or employing persuasion. All it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion as would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go to work.” Ibid. This approach in the Senate is in sharp contrast to the House view, which was that picketing should be strictly circumscribed. The House passed a bill imposing drastic limitations upon the right to picket. Section 12 (a)(1) of that bill dealt specifically with the use of force and threats of force, but especially pertinent here are §§ 12 (a)(2) and 12 (a)(3)(C) which went far beyond this. The former would have outlawed all picketing of “an employer’s premises for the purpose of leading persons to believe that there exists a labor dispute involving such employer, in any case in which the employees are not involved in a labor dispute with their employer.” And the latter would have banned picketing “an object of which [was] (i) to compel an employer to recognize for collective bargaining a representative not certified under section 9 . . . or (iii) to compel an employer to violate any law . . . .” H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-49. Plainly the Local’s conduct in the instant case would have been prohibited if the House bill had become law. But the House conferees abandoned the House bill in conference and accepted the Senate proposal. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42. They joined in a Conference Report which stated that “the primary strike for recognition (without a Board certification) was not prohibited.” Id., at 43. This history makes pertinent what the Court said in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93, 99-100: “It is relevant to recall that the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests. This is relevant in that it counsels wariness in finding by construction a broad policy ... as such when, from the words of the statute itself, it is clear that those interested in just such a condemnation were unable to secure its embodiment in enacted law.” Certainly due regard for this admonition quite apart from the caveat in § 13 requires caution against finding in the nonspecific, indeed vague, words, “restrain or coerce” that Congress intended the broad sweep for which the Board contends. We conclude that the Board’s interpretation of § 8 (b) (1) (A) finds support neither in the way Congress structured § 8 (b) nor in the legislative history of § 8 (b)(1) (A). Rather it seems clear, and we hold, that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the Board to regulate peaceful “recognitional” picketing only when it is employed to accomplish objectives specified in § 8 (b) (4); and that. § 8 (b)(1) (A) is a grant of power to the Board limited to authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof — conduct involving more than the general pressures upon persons employed by the affected employers implicit in economic strikes. The Board’s own interpretation for nearly a decade after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act gave § 8 (b)(1)(A) this limited application. See, e. g., National Maritime Union, 78 N. L. R. B. 971, enforcement granted, 175 F. 2d 686; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Watson’s Specialty Store), 80 N. L. R. B. 533, enforcement granted, 181 F. 2d 126, affirmed, 341 U. S. 707; Perry Norvell Co., 80 N. L. R. B. 225; Miami Copper Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 322; Medford Building & Construction Trades Council (Kogap Lumber Industries), 96 N. L. R. B. 165; District 50, United Mine Workers (Tungsten Mining Corp.), 106 N. L. R. B. 903. In Perry Norvell, supra, at 239, the Board declared: “By Section 8(b)(1)(A), Congress sought to fix the rules of the game, to insure that strikes and other organizational activities of employees were conducted peaceably by persuasion and propaganda and not by physical force, or threats of force, or of economic reprisal. In that Section, Congress was aiming at means, not at ends.” The Board dismisses these cases as “dubious precedent.” 119 N. L. R. B., at 246. We think they gave a sounder construction to § 8 (b) (1) (A) than the Board’s construction in the present case. We are confirmed in our view by the action of Congress in passing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. That Act goes beyond the Taft-Hartley Act to legislate a comprehensive code governing organizational strikes and picketing and draws no distinction between “organizational” and “recognitional” picketing. While proscribing peaceful organizational strikes in many situations, it also establishes safeguards against the Board’s interference with legitimate picketing activity. See § 8 (b) (7) (C). Were §8 (b)(1)(A) to have the sweep contended for by the Board, the Board might proceed against peaceful picketing in disregard of these safeguards. To be sure, what Congress did in 1959 does not establish what it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration. Courts may properly take into account the later Act when asked to extend the reach of the earlier Act’s vague language to the limits which, read literally, the words might permit. We avoid the incongruous result implicit in the Board’s construction by reading § 8 (b)(1)(A), which is only one of many interwoven sections in a complex Act, mindful of the manifest purpose of the Congress to fashion a coherent national labor policy. Affirmed. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Stewart, with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Whittaker join. At the time the writ of certiorari was granted in this case, it clearly appeared that there was involved an “important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this court.” See Rule 19, of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. Subsequently, however, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Section 704 (c) of that statute added to the National Labor Relations Act a new provision, § 8 (b)(7), which bans picketing for recognition or organizational purposes where: (A) the employer is lawfully recognizing another labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under § 9 ; (B) within the preceding 12 months a valid election has been conducted; or (C) the picketing has been going on for an unreasonable period of time without a representation petition having been filed. See, ante, p. 277, note 5. This new statutory provision seems squarely to cover the type of conduct involved here, and I would remand this case to the Board for reconsideration in the light of the 1959 legislation, as suggested by the Solicitor General. Section 7, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C.' §158 (b)(1)(A). The nine strikers who had been replaced were not permitted to vote in the election. Cf. §9 (c)(3), as amended by §702 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542, which permits striking employees who have been replaced to vote under certain circumstances. Accord: Labor Board v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 182, 272 F. 2d 85 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Contra: Labor Board v. United Rubber Workers, 269 F. 2d 694 (C. A. 4th Cir.), cert, granted and judgment reversed, post, p. 329. New § 8 (b) (7) provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees: “(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9 (c) of this Act, “(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9 (c) of this Act has been conducted, or “(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9 (e) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 9 (c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract With, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services. “Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b).” 73Stat. 544. The Solicitor General stated in a memorandum filed in this Court on October 21,1959, in another ease — Rubber Workers v. Labor Board, post, p. 329 — with reference to the several cases raising the “so-called Curtis issue,” that the passage of the 1959 Act injected “additional considerations [which] may, in the Court's view, warrant remand . . . to the Board for further examination in the light of” the 1959 Act. However, remand of this case would serve no purpose. After the Solicitor General made the suggestion the Board, on November 17, 1959, considered a case which arose prior to the 1959 Act. The Board, with four of its five members sitting, examined its position as to the scope of § 8 (b) (1) (A) in the light of the 1959 Act and by a vote of three to one decided that the doctrine announced in this, the Curtis Bros., case was in no way affected by the 1959 Act, stating that “[C]ontrary to our dissenting colleague, we believe that the new provisions concerning recognition and/or organizational picketing merely amplify the . . . Section 8 (b) proscriptions. . . .” Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sierra Furniture Co.), 125 N. L. R. B. 159, 162, n. 6. The Board does not rely, as support for its order here under § 8 (b) (1) (A), upon the fact that the Local picketed after the election. In Local 208, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sierra Furniture Co.), 125 N. L. R. B. 159, a like order was issued against peaceful “recognitional” picketing although no election had been held. We agree with the Board that if § 8 (b) (1) (A) confers power on the Board to proceed against such picketing, Congress did not limit its application to picketing following the conduct of an election at which the employees reject the union as their representative. The Board does not say, however, that a union which does not represent a majority of the employees will always violate § 8 (b) (1) (A) if it peacefully pickets an employer to organize his employees, even, as here, if the picketing is carried on after the union has been rejected by the employees in a Board-conducted election. The Board says in its brief that the picketing is “organizational” and not “recognitional” if its purpose is “merely to organize the employees, with a view to demanding recognition in the future should majority support be acquired.” The Board’s view is that, if the picketing is “organizational,” a different question may be presented under § 8 (b) (1) (A) — that in such case its function to balance the competing rights of the union and the employees under § 7 may be invoked, and the picketing found to be privileged because the balance may be struck in favor of “a competing interest which the Act [§ 7] recognizes,” namely, the right to form, join or assist labor organizations. If §8 (b)(1)(A) empowers the Board to proceed against peaceful picketing in any circumstances, the validity of a distinction in coverage between peaceful “organizational” and “recognitional” picketing has been challenged. See Cox, Some Current Problems in Labor Law: An Appraisal, 35 L. R. R. M. 48, 53-57; Bornstein, Organizational Picketing in American Law, 46 Ky. L. J. 25; Isaacson, Organizational Picketing: What is the Law? — Ought the Law to be Changed? 8 Buffalo L. R. 345. New § 8(b) (7) does not make the distinction. Section 13 provides: “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” 61 Stat. 151, 29 U. S. C. § 163. Picketing has been equated with striking for the purposes of § 13. See, e. g., Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665. Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 N. L. R. B. 502. Section 8 (b)(4) provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work: Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any ■employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act.” If peaceful “recognitional” picketing by a minority union may be prohibited under §8 (b)(1)(A) whenever it occurs, the only independent coverage of § 8 (b) (4) (C) would be when a majority union pickets for recognition in the face of another union’s being certified. Although § 8 (b) (4) (C) may cover such a situation, a question which we do not have to decide, any suggestion that it was placed in the statute primarily because of a solicitude for a minority union whose certification is formally unrevoked is without any support in the legislative history. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44; 93 Cong. Rec. 3838. It is not at all clear that these references support the suggested inference. The context in which they appear is that early in the debate Senator Pepper had urged that employees do not need protection from union leaders because these leaders can be controlled through union elections. Senator Taft denied this, and gave one example in which a union which represented some employees in the plant seeking to organize other unwilling employees, “coerced them” by threats to “close down” the plant in which they worked thereby depriving them of their jobs. “The dockmen in that case were not striking for any particular benefit for themselves, but they were striking to coerce the other employees to leave the union of which they were members, and to join the other union — clearly an improper course of action, and clearly a matter which should be restrained by the National Labor Relations Board.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4023. Again, replying to Senator Pepper, Senator Taft cited an instance in which picketing closed a plant for several months. Senator Taft observed, “[c]oercion is not merely against union members; it may be against all employees.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4024. The Conference Report states that § 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Senate version covers “all of the activities which were proscribed in section 12 (a)(1) of the House bill as unlawful concerted activities and some of the activities which were proscribed in the other paragraphs of section 12 (a).” See note 5, supra. The single sentence in a footnote to an opinion joined by but three members of the Board, referred to in note 6 of the Court’s opinion, ante, p. 279, hardly reflects the kind of reconsideration which I have in mind, and certainly does not stand in the way of a more thorough re-examination by the Board.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SKINNER, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al. v. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES’ ASSOCIATION et al. No. 87-1555. Argued November 2, 1988 Decided March 21, 1989 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and in all but portions of Part III of which Stevens, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 634. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 635. Attorney General Thornburgh argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Spears and Cynkar, Lawrence S. Robbins, Leonard Schaitman, Marc Rickman, B. Wayne Vance, S. Mark Lindsey, and Daniel Carey Smith. Lawrence M. Mann argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were W. David Holsberry, Harold A. Ross, and Clinton J. Miller III. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Public Transit Association by Donald T. Bliss; for the Bendiner-Sehle-singer Laboratory et al. by David G. Evans and William J. Judge; for the California Employment Law Council by Victor Schachter; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, Stephen C. Yohay, and Garen E. Dodge; for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation et al. by Erwin N. Griswold; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Anthony T. Caso; for the Private Truck Council of America, Inc., et al. by Peter A. Susser, William H. Borghesani, Jr., G. William Frick, and Alan B. Friedlander; and for Thomas Colley et al. by John G. Kester, John J. Buckley, Jr., Stephen L. Urbanczyk, William C. Sammons, Stanley J. Glod, Charles I. Appier, Thomas L. Bright, Robert W. Katz, William L. Pope, and Bertram D. Fisher. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by James D. Holzhauer, John A. Powell, Stephen R. Shapiro, Harvey Grossman, and Edward M. Chen; and for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by David Silberman and Laurence Gold. Scott D. Raphael filed a brief for the Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association as amicus curiae. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety.” 84 Stat. 971, 45 U. S. C. § 431(a). Finding that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees poses a serious threat to safety, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has promulgated regulations that mandate blood and urine tests of employees who are involved in certain train accidents. The FRA also has adopted regulations that do not require, but do authorize, railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules. The question presented by this case is whether these regulations violate the Fourth Amendment. I A The problem of alcohol use on American railroads is as old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it by carrier rules began at least a century ago. For many years, railroads have prohibited operating employees from possessing alcohol or being intoxicated while on duty and from consuming alcoholic beverages while subject to being called for duty. More recently, these proscriptions have been expanded to forbid possession or use of certain drugs. These restrictions are embodied in “Rule G,” an industry-wide operating rule promulgated by the Association of American Railroads, and are enforced, in various formulations, by virtually every railroad in the country. The customary sanction for Rule G violations is dismissal. In July 1983, the FRA expressed concern that these industry efforts were not adequate to curb alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees. The FRA pointed to evidence indicating that on-the-job intoxication was a significant problem in the railroad industry. The FRA also found, after a review of accident investigation reports, that from 1972 to 1983 “the nation’s railroads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use as a probable cause or contributing factor,” and that these accidents “resulted in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars).” 48 Fed. Reg. 30726 (1983). The FRA further identified “an additional 17 fatalities to operating employees working on or around rail rolling stock that involved alcohol or drugs as a contributing factor.” Ibid. In light of these problems, the FRA solicited comments from interested parties on a various regulatory approaches to the problems of alcohol and drug abuse throughout the Nation’s railroad system. Comments submitted in response to this request indicated that railroads were able to detect a relatively small number of Rule G violations, owing, primarily, to their practice of relying on observation by supervisors and co-workers to enforce the rule. 49 Fed. Reg. 24266-24267 (1984). At the same time, “industry participants . . . confirmed that alcohol and drug use [did] occur on the railroads with unacceptable frequency,” and available information from all sources “suggested] that the problem included] ‘pockets’ of drinking and drug use involving multiple crew members (before and during work), sporadic cases of individuals reporting to work impaired, and repeated drinking and drug use by individual employees who are chemically or psychologically dependent on those substances.” Id., at 24253-24254. “Even without the benefit of regular post-accident testing,” the FRA “identified 34 fatalities, 66 injuries and over $28 million in property damage (in 1983 dollars) that resulted from the errors of alcohol and drug-impaired employees in 45 train accidents and train incidents during the period 1975 through 1983.” Id., at 24254. Some of these accidents resulted in the release of hazardous materials and, in one case, the ensuing pollution required the evacuation of an entire Louisiana community. Id., at 24254, 24259. In view of the obvious safety hazards of drug and alcohol use by railroad employees, the FRA announced in June 1984 its intention to promulgate federal regulations on the subject. B After reviewing further comments from representatives of the railroad industry, labor groups, and the general public, the FRA, in 1985, promulgated regulations addressing the problem of alcohol and drugs on the railroads. The final regulations apply to employees assigned to perform service subject to the Hours of Service Act, ch. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 61 et seq. The regulations prohibit covered employees from using or possessing alcohol or any controlled substance. 49 CFR §219.101(a)(1) (1987). The regulations further prohibit those employees from reporting for covered service while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol, while having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more, or while under the influence of, or impaired by, any controlled substance. §219.101(a)(2). The regulations do not restrict, however, a railroad’s authority to impose an absolute prohibition on the presence of alcohol or any drug in the body fluids of persons in its employ, §219.101(c), and, accordingly, they do not “replace Rule G or render it unenforceable.” 50 Fed. Reg. 31538 (1985). To the extent pertinent here, two subparts of the regulations relate to testing. Subpart C, which is entitled “Post-Accident Toxicological Testing,” is mandatory. It provides that railroads “shall take all practicable steps to assure that all covered employees of the railroad directly involved . . . provide blood and urine samples for toxicological testing by FRA,” § 219.203(a), upon the occurrence of certain specified events. Toxicological testing is required following a “major train accident,” which is defined as any train accident that involves (i) a fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more. §219.201 (a)(1). The railroad has the further duty of collecting blood and urine samples for testing after an “impact accident,” which is defined as a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to railroad property of $50,000 or more. § 219.201(a)(2). Finally, the railroad is also obligated to test after “[a]ny train incident that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad employee.” §219.201(a)(3). After occurrence of an event which activates its duty to test, the railroad must transport all crew members and other covered employees directly involved in the accident or incident to an independent medical facility, where both blood and urine samples must be obtained from each employee. After the samples have been collected, the railroad is required to ship them by prepaid air freight to the FRA laboratory for analysis. § 219.205(d). There, the samples are analyzed using “state-of-the-art equipment and techniques” to detect and measure alcohol and drugs. The FRA proposes to place primary reliance on analysis of blood samples, as blood is “the only available body fluid . . . that can provide a clear indication not only of the presence of alcohol and drugs but also their current impairment effects.” 49 Fed. Reg. 24291 (1984). Urine samples are also necessary, however, because drug traces remain in the urine longer than in blood, and in some cases it will not be possible to transport employees to a medical facility before the time it takes for certain drugs to be eliminated from the bloodstream. In those instances, a “positive urine test, taken with specific information on the pattern of elimination for the particular drug and other information on the behavior of the employee and the circumstances of the accident, may be crucial to the determination of” the cause of an accident. Ibid. The regulations require that the FRA notify employees of the results of the tests and afford them an opportunity to respond in writing before preparation of any final investigative report. See § 219.211(a)(2). Employees who refuse to provide required blood or urine samples may not perform covered service for nine months, but they are entitled to a hearing concerning their refusal to take the test. §219.213. Subpart D of the regulations, which is entitled “Authorization to Test for Cause,” is permissive. It authorizes railroads to require covered employees to submit to breath or urine tests in certain circumstances not addressed by Sub-part C. Breath or urine tests, or both, may be ordered (1) after a reportable accident or incident, where a supervisor has a “reasonable suspicion” that an employee’s acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or severity of the accident or incident, § 219.301(b)(2); or (2) in the event of certain specific rule violations, including noncompliance with a signal and excessive speeding, § 219.301(b)(3). A railroad also may require breath tests where a supervisor has a “reasonable suspicion” that an employee is under the influence of alcohol, based upon specific, personal observations concerning the appearance, behavior, speech, or body odors of the employee. § 219.301(b)(1). Where impairment is suspected, a railroad, in addition, may require urine tests, but only if two supervisors make the appropriate determination, §219.301(c)(2)(i), and, where the supervisors suspect impairment due to a substance other than alcohol, at least one of those supervisors must have received specialized training in detecting the signs of drug intoxication, §219.301(c)(2)(ii). Subpart D further provides that whenever the results of either breath or urine tests are intended for use in a disciplinary proceeding, the employee must be given the opportunity to provide a blood sample for analysis at an independent medical facility. § 219.303(c). If an employee declines to give a blood sample, the railroad may presume impairment, absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, from a positive showing of controlled substance residues in the urine. The railroad must, however, provide detailed notice of this presumption to its employees, and advise them of their right to provide a contemporaneous blood sample. As in the case of samples procured under Subpart C, the regulations set forth procedures for the collection of samples, and require that samples “be analyzed by a method that is reliable within known tolerances.” §219.307(b). C Respondents, the Railway Labor Executives’ Association and various of its member labor organizations, brought the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to enjoin the FRA’s regulations on various statutory and constitutional grounds. In a ruling from the bench, the District Court granted summary judgment in petitioners’ favor. The court concluded that railroad employees “have a valid interest in the integrity of their own bodies” that deserved protection under the Fourth Amendment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. The court held, however, that this interest was outweighed by the competing “public and governmental interest in the . . . promotion of . . . railway safety, safety for employees, and safety for the general public that is involved with the transportation. ” Id., at 52a. The District Court found respondents’ other constitutional and statutory arguments meritless. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Burnley, 839 F. 2d 575 (1988). The court held, first, that tests mandated by a railroad in reliance on the authority conferred by Subpart D involve sufficient Government action to implicate the Fourth Amendment, and that the breath, blood, and urine tests contemplated by the FRA regulations are Fourth Amendment searches. The court also “agre[ed] that the exigencies of testing for the presence of alcohol and drugs in blood, urine or breath require prompt action which precludes obtaining a warrant.” Id., at 583. The court further held that “accommodation of railroad employees’ privacy interest with the significant safety concerns of the government does not require adherence to a probable cause requirement,” and, accordingly, that the legality of the searches contemplated by the FRA regulations depends on their reasonableness under all the circumstances. Id., at 587. The court concluded, however, that particularized suspicion is essential to a finding that toxicological testing of railroad employees is reasonable. Ibid. A requirement of individualized suspicion, the court stated, would impose “no insuperable burden on the government,” id., at 588, and would ensure that the tests are confined to the detection of current impairment, rather than to the discovery of “the metabolites of various drugs, which are not evidence of current intoxication and may remain in the body for days or weeks after the ingestion of the drug.” Id., at 588-589. Except for the provisions authorizing breath and urine tests on a “reasonable suspicion” of drug or alcohol impairment, 49 CFR §§219.301(b)(1) and (c)(2) (1987), the FRA regulations did not require a showing of individualized suspicion, and, accordingly, the court invalidated them. Judge Alarcon dissented. He criticized the majority for “failing] to engage in [a] balancing of interests” and for focusing instead “solely on the degree of impairment of the workers’ privacy interests.” 839 F. 2d, at 597. The dissent would have held that “the government’s compelling need to assure railroad safety by controlling drug use among railway personnel outweighs the need to protect privacy interests.” Id., at 596. We granted the federal parties’ petition for a writ of certio-rari, 486 U. S. 1042 (1988), to consider whether the regulations invalidated by the Court of Appeals violate the Fourth Amendment. We now reverse. II The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653-654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554 (1976). Before we consider whether the tests in question are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we must inquire whether the tests are attributable to the Government or its agents, and whether they amount to searches or seizures. We turn to those matters. A Although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative, the Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113-114 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 487 (1971). See also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). A railroad that complies with the provisions of Subpart C of the regulations does so by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of its acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment. Petitioners contend, however, that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by Subpart D of the regulations, as nothing in Sub-part D compels any testing by private railroads. We are unwilling to conclude, in the context of this facial challenge, that breath and urine tests required by private railroads in reliance on Subpart D will not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Whether a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of the Government’s participation in the private party’s activities, cf. Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (plurality opinion); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32-33 (1927), a question that can only be resolved “in light of all the circumstances,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 487. The fact that the Government has not compelled a private party to perform a search does not, by itself, establish that the search is a private one. Here, specific features of the regulations combine to convince us that the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct. The regulations, including those in Subpart D, pre-empt state laws, rules, or regulations covering the same subject matter, 49 CFR §219.13(a) (1987), and are intended to supersede “any provision of a collective bargaining agreement, or arbitration award construing such an agreement,” 50 Fed. Reg. 31552 (1985). They also confer upon the FRA the right to receive certain biological samples and test results procured by railroads pursuant to Subpart D. §219.11(c). In addition, a railroad may not divest itself of, or otherwise compromise by contract, the authority conferred by Subpart D. As the FRA explained, such “authority ... is conferred for the purpose of promoting the public safety, and a railroad may not shackle itself in a way inconsistent with its duty to promote the public safety.” 50 Fed. Reg. 31552 (1985). Nor is a covered employee free to decline his employer’s request to submit to breath or urine tests under the conditions set forth in Subpart D. See § 219.11(b). An employee who refuses to submit to the tests must be withdrawn from covered service. See 4 App. to Field Manual 18. In light of these provisions, we are unwilling to accept petitioners’ submission that tests conducted by private railroads in reliance on Subpart D will be primarily the result of private initiative. The Government has removed all legal barriers to the testing authorized by Subpart D, and indeed has made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the fruits of such intrusions. In addition, it has mandated that the railroads not bargain away the authority to perform tests granted by Subpart D. These are clear indices of the Government’s encouragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth Amendment. B Our precedents teach that where, as here, the Government seeks to obtain physical evidence from a person, the Fourth Amendment may be relevant at several levels. See, e. g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 8 (1973). The initial detention necessary to procure the evidence may be a seizure of the person, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 294-295 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969), if the detention amounts to a meaningful interference with his freedom of movement. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 215 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, supra, at 113, n. 5. Obtaining and examining the evidence may also be a search, see Cupp v. Murphy, supra, at 295; United States v. Dionisio, supra, at 8, 13-14, if doing so infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, see, e. g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35, 43 (1988); United States v. Jacobsen, supra, at 113. We have long recognized that a “compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 767-768 (1966). See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753, 760 (1985). In light of our society’s concern for the security of one’s person, see, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968), it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests. Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 324-325 (1987). Much the same is true of the breath-testing procedures required under Subpart D of the regulations. Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or “deep lung” breath for chemical analysis, see, e. g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 481 (1984), implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a search, see 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.6(a), p. 463 (1987). See also Burnett v. Anchorage, 806 F. 2d 1447, 1449 (CA9 1986); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F. 2d 1136, 1141 (CA3), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 986 (1986). Unlike the blood-testing procedure at issue in Schmerber, the procedures prescribed by the FRA regulations for collecting and testing urine samples do not entail a surgical intrusion into the body. It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated: “There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.” National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F. 2d 170, 175 (1987). Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment. In view of our conclusion that the collection and subsequent analysis of the requisite biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches, we need not characterize the employer’s antecedent interference with the employee’s freedom of movement as an independent Fourth Amendment seizure. As our precedents indicate, not every governmental interference with an individuál’s freedom of movement raises such constitutional concerns that there is a seizure of the person. See United States v. Dionisio, supra, at 9-11 (grand jury subpoena, though enforceable by contempt, does not effect a seizure of the person); United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 21 (1973) (same). For present purposes, it suffices to note that any limitation on an employee’s freedom of movement that is necessary to obtain the blood, urine, or breath samples contemplated by the regulations must be considered in assessing the intrusiveness of the searches effected by the Government’s testing program. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 707-709 (1983). I — f t — I I — ! A To hold that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the drug and alcohol testing prescribed by the FRA regulations is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 719 (1987) (plurality opinion); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 337 (1985). For the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S., at 768. What is reasonable, of course, “depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531, 537 (1985). Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S., at 654; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976). In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Place, supra, at 701, and n. 2; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 315 (1972). Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. See, e. g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978). We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987), quoting New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context. See, e. g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, at 873 (search of probationer’s home); New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 699-703 (1987) (search of premises of certain highly regulated businesses); O’Connor v. Ortega, supra, at 721-725 (work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices); New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 337-342 (search of student’s property by school officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 558-560 (1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates). The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school, or prison, “likewise presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, at 873-874. The hours of service employees covered by the FRA regulations include persons engaged in handling orders concerning train movements, operating crews, and those engaged in the maintenance and repair of signal systems. 50 Fed. Reg. 31511 (1985). It is undisputed that these and other covered employees are engaged in safety-sensitive tasks. The FRA so found, and respondents conceded the point at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-47. As we have recognized, the whole premise of the Hours of Service Act is that “[t]he length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection [of] life and property necessarily depends.” Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U. S. 612, 619 (1911). See also Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 244 U. S. 336, 342 (1917) (“[I]t must be remembered that the purpose of the act was to prevent the dangers which must necessarily arise to the employee and to the public from continuing men in a dangerous and hazardous business for periods so long as to render them unfit to give that service which is essential to the protection of themselves and those entrusted to their care”). The FRA has prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather “to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.” 49 CFR §219.1(a) (1987). This governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the traveling public and of the employees themselves plainly justifies prohibiting covered employees from using alcohol or drugs on duty, or while subject to being called for duty. This interest also “require[s] and justifies] the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, at 875. The question that remains, then, is whether the Government’s need to monitor compliance with these restrictions justifies the privacy intrusions at issue absent a warrant or individualized suspicion. B An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope. See, e. g., New York v. Burger, supra, at 703; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 9 (1977); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U. S., at 532. A warrant also provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case. See United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 9. In the present context, however, a warrant would do little to further these aims. Both the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the regulations that authorize them, and doubtless are well known to covered employees. Cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316 (1972). Indeed, in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. Cf. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 376 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). We have recognized, moreover, that the government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest when, as here, “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.” Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, supra, at 533. See also New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 340; Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 603 (1981). As the FRA recognized, alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, see 49 Fed. Reg. 24291 (1984), and blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S., at 770-771. Although the metabolites of some drugs remain in the urine for longer periods of time and may enable the FRA to estimate whether the employee was impaired by those drugs at the time of a covered accident, incident, or rule violation, 49 Fed. Reg. 24291 (1984), the delay necessary to procure a warrant nevertheless may result in the destruction of valuable evidence. The Government’s need to rely on private railroads to set the testing process in motion also indicates that insistence on a warrant requirement would impede the achievement of the Government’s objective. Railroad supervisors, like school officials, see New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 339-340, and hospital administrators, see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S., at 722, are not in the business of investigating violations of the criminal laws or enforcing administrative codes, and otherwise have little occasion to become familiar with the intricacies of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures . . . upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.” Ibid. In sum, imposing a warrant requirement in the present context would add little to the assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and in many cases frustrating, the objectives of the Government’s testing program. We do not believe that a warrant is essential to render the intrusions here at issue reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. C Our cases indicate that even a search that may be performed without a warrant must be based, as a general matter, on probable cause to believe that the person to be searched has violated the law. See New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 340. When the balance of interests precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause, we have usually required “some quantum of individualized suspicion” before concluding that a search is reasonable. See, e. g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 560. We made it clear, however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. Id., at 561. In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. We believe this is true of the intrusions in question here. By and large, intrusions on privacy under the FRA regulations are limited. To the extent transportation and like restrictions are necessary to procure the requisite blood, breath, and urine samples for testing, this interference alone is minimal given the employment context in which it takes place. Ordinarily, an employee consents to significant restrictions in his freedom of movement where necessary for his employment, and few are free to come and go as they please during working hours. See, e. g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S., at 218. Any additional interference with a railroad employee’s freedom of movement that occurs in the time it takes to procure a blood, breath, or urine sample for testing cannot, by itself, be said to infringe significant privacy interests. Our decision in Schmerber v. California, supra, indicates that the same is true of the blood tests required by the FRA regulations. In that case, we held that a State could direct that a blood sample be withdrawn from a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated, despite his refusal to consent to the intrusion. We noted that the test was performed in a reasonable manner, as the motorist’s “blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices.” Id., at 771. We said also that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is not significant, since such “tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.” Ibid. Schmerber thus confirmed “society’s judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual’s privacy and bodily integrity.” Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S., at 762. See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 563 (1983) (“The simple blood-alcohol test is . . . safe, painless, and commonplace”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 436 (1957) (“The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life”). The breath tests authorized by Subpart D of the regulations are even less intrusive than the blood tests prescribed by Subpart C. Unlike blood tests, breath tests do not require piercing the skin and may be conducted safely outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment. Further, breath tests reveal the level of alcohol in the employee’s bloodstream and nothing more. Like the blood-testing procedures mandated by Subpart C, which can be used only to ascertain the presence of alcohol or controlled substances in the bloodstream, breath tests reveal no other facts in which the employee has a substantial privacy interest. Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S., at 123; United States v. Place, 462 U. S., at 707. In all the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the administration of a breath test implicates significant privacy concerns. A more difficult question is presented by urine tests. Like breath tests, urine tests are not invasive of the body and, under the regulations, may not be used as an occasion for inquiring into private facts unrelated to alcohol or drug use. We recognize, however, that the procedures for collecting the necessary samples, which require employees to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy, raise concerns not implicated by blood or breath tests. While we would not characterize these additional privacy concerns as minimal in most contexts, we note that the regulations endeavor to reduce the intrusiveness of the collection process. The regulations do not require that samples be furnished under the direct observation of a monitor, despite the desirability of such a procedure to ensure the integrity of the sample. See 50 Fed. Reg. 31555 (1985). See also Field Manual B-15, D-l. The sample is also collected in a medical environment, by personnel unrelated to the railroad employer, and is thus not unlike similar procedures encountered often in the context of a regular physical examination. More importantly, the expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees. This relation between safety and employee fitness was recognized by Congress when it enacted the Hours of Service Act in 1907, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U. S., at 619, and also when it authorized the Secretary to “test. . . railroad facilities, equipment, rolling stock, operations, or persons, as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions” of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970. 45 U. S. C. § 437(a) (emphasis added). It has also been recognized by state governments, and has long been reflected in industry practice, as evidenced by the industry’s promulgation and enforcement of Rule G. Indeed, the FRA found, and the Court of Appeals acknowledged, see 839 F. 2d, at 585, that “most railroads require periodic physical examinations for train and engine employees and certain other employees.” 49 Fed. Reg. 24278 (1984). See also Railway Labor Executives Assn. v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 833 F. 2d 700, 705-706 (CA7 1987); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 802 F. 2d 1016, 1024 (CA8 1986). We do not suggest, of course, that the interest in bodily security enjoyed by those employed in a regulated industry must always be considered minimal. Here, however, the covered employees have long been a principal focus of regulatory concern. As the dissenting judge below noted: “The reason is obvious. An idle locomotive, sitting in the roundhouse, is harmless. It becomes lethal when operated negligently by persons who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” 839 F. 2d, at 593. Though some of the privacy interests implicated by the toxicological testing at issue reasonably might be viewed as significant in other contexts, logic and history show that a diminished expectation of privacy attaches to information relating to the physical condition of covered employees and to this reasonable means of procuring such information. We conclude, therefore, that the testing procedures contemplated by Subparts C and D pose only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees. By contrast, the Government interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion is compelling. Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. Much like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities, see, e. g., Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 844 F. 2d 562, 566 (CA8 1988); Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 111 Wash. 2d 424, 436, 759 P. 2d 427, 433-434 (1988), cert. pending, No. 88-645, employees who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others. An impaired employee, the FRA found, will seldom display any outward “signs detectable by the lay person or, in many cases, even the physician.” 50 Fed. Reg. 31526 (1985). This view finds ample support in the railroad industry’s experience with Rule G, and in the judgment of the courts that have examined analogous testing schemes. See, e. g., Brotherhood of Maintenance Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington Northern R. Co., supra, at 1020. Indeed, while respondents posit that impaired employees might be detected without alcohol or drug testing, the premise of respondents’ lawsuit is that even the occurrence of a major calamity will not give rise to a suspicion of impairment with respect to any particular employee. While no procedure can identify all impaired employees with ease and perfect accuracy, the FRA regulations supply an effective means of deterring employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in the first place. 50 Fed. Reg. 31541 (1985). The railroad industry’s experience with Rule G persuasively shows, and common sense confirms, that the customary dismissal sanction that threatens employees who use drugs or alcohol while on duty cannot serve as an effective deterrent unless violators know that they are likely to be discovered. By ensuring that employees in safety-sensitive positions know they will be tested upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which no employee can predict with certainty, the regulations significantly increase the deterrent effect of the administrative penalties associated with the prohibited conduct, cf. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S., at 876, concomitantly increasing the likelihood that employees will forgo using drugs or alcohol while subject to being called for duty. The testing procedures contemplated by Subpart C also help railroads obtain invaluable information about the causes of major accidents, see 50 Fed. Reg. 31541 (1985), and to take appropriate measures to safeguard the general public. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 510 (1978) (noting that prompt investigation of the causes of a fire may uncover continuing dangers and thereby prevent the fire’s recurrence); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. S. 287, 308 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). Positive test results would point toward drug or alcohol impairment on the part of members of the crew as a possible cause of an accident, and may help to establish whether a particular accident, otherwise not drug related, was made worse by the inability of impaired employees to respond appropriately. Negative test results would likewise furnish invaluable clues, for eliminating drug impairment as a potential cause or contributing factor would help establish the significance of equipment failure, inadequate training, or other potential causes, and suggest a more thorough examination of these alternatives. Tests performed following the rule violations specified in Subpart D likewise can provide valuable information respecting the causes of those transgressions, which the FRA found to involve “the potential for a serious train accident or grave personal injury, or both.” 50 Fed. Reg. 31553 (1985). A requirement of particularized suspicion of drug or alcohol use would seriously impede an employer’s ability to obtain this information, despite its obvious importance. Experience confirms the FRA’s judgment that the scene of a serious rail accident is chaotic. Investigators who arrive at the scene shortly after a major accident has occurred may find it difficult to determine which members of a train crew contributed to its occurrence. Obtaining evidence that might give rise to the suspicion that a particular employee is impaired, a difficult endeavor in the best of circumstances, is most impracticable in the aftermath of a serious accident. While events following the rule violations that activate the testing authority of Subpart D may be less chaotic, objective indicia of impairment are absent in these instances as well. Indeed, any attempt to gather evidence relating to the possible impairment of particular employees likely would result in the loss or deterioration of the evidence furnished by the tests. Cf. Michigan v. Clifford, supra, at 293, n. 4 (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Tyler, supra, at 510. It would be unrealistic, and inimical to the Government’s goal of ensuring safety in rail transportation, to require a showing of individualized suspicion in these circumstances. Without quarreling with the importance of these governmental interests, the Court of Appeals concluded that the postaccident testing regulations were unreasonable because “[b]lood and urine tests intended to establish drug use other than alcohol. . . cannot measure current drug intoxication or degree of impairment.” 839 F. 2d, at 588. The court based its conclusion on its reading of certain academic journals that indicate that the testing of urine can disclose only drug metabolites, which “may remain in the body for days or weeks after the ingestion of the drug.” Id., at 589. We find this analysis flawed for several reasons. As we emphasized in New Jersey v. T. L. O., “it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination [of the point in issue] more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’” 469 U. S., at 345, quoting Fed. Rule Evid. 401. Even if urine test results disclosed nothing more specific than the recent use of controlled substances by a covered employee, this information would provide the basis for further investigative work designed to determine whether the employee used drugs at the relevant times. See Field Manual B-4. The record makes clear, for example, that a positive test result, coupled with known information concerning the pattern of elimination for the particular drug and information that may be gathered from other sources about the employee’s activities, may allow the FRA to reach an informed judgment as to how a particular accident occurred. See supra, at 609-610. More importantly, the Court of Appeals overlooked the FRA’s policy of placing principal reliance on the results of blood tests, which unquestionably can identify very recent drug use, see, e. g., 49 Fed. Reg. 24291 (1984), while relying on urine tests as a secondary source of information designed to guard against the possibility that certain drugs will be eliminated from the bloodstream before a blood sample can be obtained. The court also failed to recognize that the FRA regulations are designed not only to discern impairment but also to deter it. Because the record indicates that blood and urine tests, taken together, are highly effective means of ascertaining on-the-job impairment and of deterring the use of drugs by railroad employees, we believe the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the postaccident testing regulations are not reasonably related to the Government objectives that support them. We conclude that the compelling Government interests served by the FRA’s regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee. In view of our conclusion that, on the present record, the toxicological testing contemplated by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees, the Government’s compelling interests outweigh privacy concerns. IV The possession of unlawful drugs is a criminal offense that the Government may punish, but it is a separate and far more dangerous wrong to perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of those substances. Performing those tasks while impaired by alcohol is, of course, equally dangerous, though consumption of alcohol is legal in most other contexts. The Government may take all necessary and reasonable regulatory steps to prevent or deter that hazardous conduct, and since the gravamen of the evil is performing certain functions while concealing the substance in the body, it may be necessary, as in the case before us, to examine the body or its fluids to accomplish the regulatory purpose. The necessity to perform that regulatory function with respect to railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks, and the reasonableness of the system for doing so, have been established in this case. Alcohol and drug tests conducted in reliance on the authority of Subpart D cannot be viewed as private action outside the reach of the Fourth Amendment. Because the testing procedures mandated or authorized by Subparts C and D ef-feet searches of the person, they must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. In light of the limited discretion exercised by the railroad employers under the regulations, the surpassing safety interests served by toxicological tests in this context, and the diminished expectation of privacy that attaches to information pertaining to the fitness of covered employees, we believe that it is reasonable to conduct such tests in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that any particular employee may be impaired. We hold that the alcohol and drug tests contemplated by Subparts C and D of the FRA’s regulations are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed. It is so ordered. The FRA noted that a 1979 study examining the scope of alcohol abuse on seven major railroads found that “[a]n estimated one out of every eight railroad workers drank at least once while on duty during the study year.” 48 Fed. Reg. 30724 (1983). In addition, “5% of workers reported to work ‘very drunk’ or got ‘very drunk’ on duty at least once in the study year,” and “13% of workers reported to work at least ‘a little drunk’ one or more times during that period.” Ibid. The study also found that 23% of the operating personnel were “problem drinkers,” but that only 4% of these employees “were receiving help through an employee assistance program, and even fewer were handled through disciplinary procedures.” Ibid. The regulations provide a limited exception from testing “if the railroad representative can immediately determine, on the basis of specific information, that the employee had no role in the cause(s) of the accident/ incident.” 49 CFR §219.203(a)(3)(i) (1987). No exception may be made, however, in the case of a “major train accident.” Ibid. In promulgating the regulations, the FRA noted that, while it is sometimes possible to exonerate crew members in other situations calling for testing, it is especially difficult to assess fault and degrees of fault in the aftermath of the more substantial accidents. See 50 Fed. Reg. 31544 (1985). See Federal Railroad Administration, United States Dept, of Transportation Field Manual: Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations B-12 (1986) (Field Manual). Ethyl alcohol is measured by gas chromatography. Ibid. In addition, while drug screens may be conducted by immunoassays or other techniques, “[pjositive drug findings are confirmed by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry.” Ibid. These tests, if properly conducted, identify the presence of alcohol and drugs in the biological samples tested with great accuracy. See, e. g., Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 846 F. 2d 1539, 1542 (CA6 1988); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F. 2d 1139, 1143 (CA3 1988), cert. pending No. 88-66; Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Burnley, 839 F. 2d 575, 580 (CA9 1988) (case below); Everett v. Napper, 833 F. 2d 1507, 1511 (CA11 1987); Jones v. McKenzie, 266 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 88, 833 F. 2d 335, 338 (1987); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F. 2d 170, 176 (CA5 1987), aff’d in pertinent part, post, p. 656; McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F. 2d 1302, 1307 (CA8 1987); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F. 2d 1264, 1266-1267 (CA7), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1029 (1976). See also Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 111 Wash. 2d 424, 434, 759 P. 2d 427, 432-433 (1988), cert. pending, No. 88-645. Taking a blood or urine sample might also be characterized as a Fourth Amendment seizure, since it may be viewed as a meaningful interference with the employee’s possessory interest in his bodily fluids. Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 113 (1984). It is not necessary to our analysis in this case, however, to characterize the taking of blood or urine samples as a seizure of those bodily fluids, for the privacy expectations protected by this characterization are adequately taken into account by our conclusion that such intrusions are searches. The regulations provide that “[e]ach sample provided under [Subpart C] is retained for not less than six months following the date of the accident or incident and may be made available to ... a party in litigation upon service of appropriate compulsory process on the custodian . . . .” 49 CFR § 219.211(d) (1987). The FRA explained, when it promulgated this provision, that it intends to retain such samples primarily “for its own purposes (e. g., to permit reanalysis of a sample if another laboratory reported detection of a substance not tested for in the original procedure). ” 50 Fed. Reg. 31545 (1985). While this provision might be read broadly to authorize the release of biological samples to law enforcement authorities, the record does not disclose that it was intended to be, or actually has been, so used. Indeed, while respondents aver generally that test results might be made available to law enforcement authorities, Brief for Respondents 24, they do not seriously contend that this provision, or any other part of the administrative scheme, was designed as “a ‘pretext’ to enable law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law violations.” New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987). Absent a persuasive showing that the FRA’s testing program is pretextual, we assess the FRA’s scheme in light of its obvious administrative purpose. We leave for another day the question whether routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext, or otherwise impugn the administrative nature of the FRA’s program. Subpart C of the regulations, for example, does not permit the exercise of any discretion in choosing the employees who must submit to testing, except in limited circumstances and then only if warranted by objective criteria. See n. 2, supra. Subpart D, while conferring some discretion to choose those who may be required to submit to testing, also imposes specific constraints on the exercise of that discretion. Covered employees may be required to submit to breath or urine tests only if they have been directly involved in specified rule violations or errors, or if their acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or severity of specified accidents or incidents. To be sure, some discretion necessarily must be used in determining whether an employee’s acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or severity of an event, but this limited assessment of the objective circumstances surrounding the event does not devolve unbridled discretion upon the supervisor in the field. Cf. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 323 (1978). In addition, the regulations contain various safeguards against any possibility that discretion will be abused. A railroad that requires post-accident testing in bad faith, 49 CFR § 219.201(c) (1987), or that willfully imposes a program of authorized testing that does not comply with Subpart D, § 219.9(a)(3), or that otherwise fails to follow the regulations, §219.9 (a)(5), is subject to civil penalties, see pt. 219, App. A, p. 105, in addition to whatever damages may be awarded through the arbitration process. When employees produce the blood and urine samples required by Subpart C, they are asked by medical personnel to complete a form stating whether they have taken any medications during the preceding 30 days. The completed forms are shipped with the samples to the FRA’s laboratory. See Field Manual B-15. This information is used to ascertain whether a positive test result can be explained by the employee’s lawful use of medications. While this procedure permits the Government to learn certain private medical facts that an employee might prefer not to disclose, there is no indication that the Government does not treat this information as confidential, or that it uses the information for any other purpose. Under the circumstances, we do not view this procedure as a significant invasion of privacy. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 602 (1977). See, e. g., Ala. Code § 37-2-85 (1977) (requiring that persons to be employed as dispatchers, engineers, conductors, brakemen, and switchmen be subjected to a “thorough examination” respecting, inter alia, their skill, sobriety, eyesight, and hearing); Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 160:178-160:181 (1979) (prescribing eyesight examination and experience requirements for railroad engineers and conductors); N. Y. R. R. Law § 63 (McKinney 1952) (requiring that all applicants for positions as motormen or gripmen “be subjected to a thorough examination ... as to their habits, physical ability, and intelligence”). See also Nashville, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 98-99 (1888) (noting, in upholding a predecessor of Alabama’s fitness-for-duty statute against a Commerce Clause challenge, that a State may lawfully require railway employees to undergo eye examinations in the interests of safety). Respondents offer a list of “less drastic and equally effective means” of addressing the Government’s concerns, including reliance on the private proscriptions already in force, and training supervisory personnel “to effectively detect employees who are impaired by drug or alcohol use without resort to such intrusive procedures as blood and urine tests.” Brief for Respondents 40-43. We have repeatedly stated, however, that “[t]he reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640, 647 (1983). See also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U. S. 367, 373-374 (1987). It is obvious that “[t]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 556-557, n. 12, because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct “ ‘can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the [government] might have been accomplished. ’ ” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531, 542 (1985), quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 686-687 (1985). Here, the FRA expressly considered various alternatives to its drug-screening program and reasonably found them wanting. At bottom, respondents’ insistence on less drastic alternatives would require us to second-guess the reasonable conclusions drawn by the FRA after years of investigation and study. This we decline to do. The Court of Appeals also expressed concern that the tests might be quite unreliable, and thus unreasonable. 839 F. 2d, at 589. The record compiled by the FRA after years of investigation and study does not support this conclusion. While it is impossible to guarantee that no mistakes will ever be made in isolated cases, respondents have challenged the administrative scheme on its face. We deal therefore with whether the tests contemplated by the regulations can ever be conducted. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 560 (1979). Respondents have provided us with no reason for doubting the FRA’s conclusion that the tests at issue here are accurate in the overwhelming majority of cases.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TRBOVICH v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. No. 71-119. Argued November 18, 1971 Decided January 17, 1972 Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John Silard, Elliott C. Lichtman, Joseph A. Yablonski, and Clarice R. Feldman. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondent Secretary of Labor. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Gray, Harry R. Sachse, Walter H. Fleischer, Raymond D. Battocchi, Richard F. Schubert, George T. Avery, and Beate Bloch. Edward L. Carey, Harrison Combs, Willard P. Owens, Charles L. Widman, and M. E. Boiarsky filed a brief for respondent United Mine Workers of America. Melvin L. Wulf and Sanford Jay Rosen filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Secretary of Labor instituted this action under § 402 (b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1950 (LMRDA), 73 Stat. 534, 29 U. S. C. § 482 (b), to set aside an election of officers of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), held on December 9, 1969. He alleged that the election was held in a manner that violated the LMRDA in numerous respects, and he sought an order requiring a new election to be held under his supervision. Petitioner, a member of the UMWA, filed the initial complaint with the Secretary that eventually led him to file this suit. Petitioner now seeks to intervene in the litigation, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a), in order (1) to urge two additional grounds for setting aside the election, (2) to seek certain specific safeguards with respect to any new election that may be ordered, and (3) to present evidence and argument in support of the Secretary’s challenge to the election. The District Court denied his motion for leave to intervene, on the ground that the LMRDA expressly stripped union members of any right to challenge a union election in the courts, and gave that right exclusively to the Secretary. Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 51 F. R. D. 270 (1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District Court opinion, 77 L. R. R. M. 2496 (CADC 1971). We granted certiorari to determine whether the LMRDA imposes a bar to intervention by union members under Rule 24, in a suit initiated by the Secretary. Post, p. 880. We conclude that it does not, and we remand the case to the District Court with directions to permit intervention. I The LMRDA was the first major attempt of Congress to regulate the internal affairs of labor unions. Having conferred substantial power on labor organizations, Congress began to be concerned about the danger that union leaders would abuse that power, to the detriment of the rank-and-file members. Congress saw the principle of union democracy as one of the most important safeguards against such abuse, and accordingly included in the LMRDA a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of union elections. Title IV of the statute establishes a set of substantive rules governing union elections, LMRDA § 401, 29 U. S. C. § 481, and it provides a comprehensive procedure for enforcing those rules, LMRDA § 402, 29 U. S. C. § 482. Any union member who alleges a violation may initiate the enforcement procedure. He must first exhaust any internal remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of his union. Then he may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who “shall investigate” the complaint. Finally, if the Secretary finds probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, he “shall . . . bring a civil action against the labor organization” in federal district court, to set aside the election if it has already been held, and to direct and supervise a new election. With respect to elections not yet conducted, the statute provides that existing rights and remedies apart from the statute are not affected. But with respect to an election already conducted, “[t]he remedy provided by this subchapter . . . shall be exclusive.” LMRDA §403, 29 U. S. C. §483. The critical statutory provision for present purposes is § 403, 29 U. S. C. § 483, making suit by the Secretary the "exclusive" post-election remedy for a violation of Title IV. This Court has held that § 403 prohibits union members from initiating a private suit to set aside an election. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134, 140 (1964). But in this case, petitioner seeks only to participate in a pending suit that is plainly authorized by the statute; it cannot be said that his claim is defeated by the bare language of the Act. The Secretary, ;relying on legislative history, argues that § 403 should be construed to bar intervention as well as initiation of a suit by the members. In his view the legislative history shows that Congress deliberately chose to exclude union members entirely from any direct participation in judicial enforcement proceedings under Title IV. The Secretary’s argument rests largely on the fact that two alternative proposals figured significantly in the legislative history of Title IV, and each of these rejected bills would have authorized individual union members to bring suit. In the words of the District Court: “We think the fact that Congress considered two alternatives — suit by union members and suit by the Secretary — and then chose the latter alternative and labelled it ‘exclusive’ deprives this Court of jurisdiction to permit the former alternative via the route of intervention.” 51 F. R. D., at 272. That argument misconceives the legislative history and misconstrues the statute. A review of the legislative ''history shows that Congress made suit by the Secretary the exclusive post-election remedy for two principal reasons: (1) to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial interference with their elections, and (2) to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a single election. Title IV as enacted serves these purposes by referring all complaints to the Secretary so that he can screen out frivolous ones, and by consolidating all meritorious complaints in a single proceeding, the Secretary’s suit in federal district court. The alternative proposals were rejected simply because they failed to accomplish these objectives. There is no evidence whatever that Congress was opposed to participation by union members in the litigation, so long as that participation did not interfere with the screening and centralizing functions of the Secretary. The enforcement provisions of Title IV originated in a bill introduced by Senator John Kennedy in 1958. That bill, S. 3751, provided for suit by the Secretary as the exclusive remedy for violation of the rules relating to union elections. Senator Kennedy described the bill as a "modest proposal,” one which would protect union members “without undue interference in the internal affairs of what I believe are essentially private institutions — that is, American trade unions.” 104 Cong. Rec. 7954. The Senate passed an expanded version of the bill, S. 3974, which retained the original enforcement scheme, and reflected a continuing legislative interest in minimizing judicial interference with union elections. See S. Rep. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-15 (1958). That bill was defeated in the House of Representatives, 104 Cong. Rec. 18288, but essentially the same enforcement scheme was retained the following year in S. 1555, the Kennedy-Ervin bill which was ultimately passed by both Houses and enacted into law. In the Senate, the principal advocate of a provision authorizing individual union members to bring suit was Senator Barry Goldwater. He introduced a bill, S. 748, endorsed by the Administration, that would have authorized both the Secretary and the members to file suit to enforce the rules relating to union elections. During the Senate Hearings, a number of witnesses compared the enforcement provisions of the two bills. The primary objection to the provision for member suits in the Goldwater bill was that it might lead to multiple litigation in multiple forums, and thereby impose on the union the severe burden of mounting multiple defenses. A related objection was that the Goldwater bill failed to interpose a screening mechanism between the dissatisfied union member and the courtroom, and thereby imposed on the union the burden of responding to frivolous complaints. Perhaps the most vehement opposition to the Goldwater bill came from the AFL-CIO. Its spokesman, Andrew Biemiller, testified that "[t]he bill would result in placing union officers in a straitjacket since they could be haled into court, virtually without limitation, to defend union policies or programs in suits brought against them by any dissident union member [or] minority group." Hearings on S. 505 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 567 (1959); see also id., at 578-579 (analysis of S. 748 by Arthur J. Goldberg, then special counsel to the AFL-CIO). Multiple litigation and unnecessary harassment, then, were seen as the principal evils of the provision for member suits. And it was precisely those evils that the draftsmen of the Kennedy-Ervin bill sought to avoid. According to Professor Archibald Cox, who was a principal consultant to the draftsmen, the Kennedy proposal made suit by the Secretary the exclusive post-election remedy in order to "centralize control of the proceedings," to adjudicate the validity of an election "once and for all in one forum," and to avoid "unnecessary harassment of the union on one side and . . . friendly suits aimed at foreclosing the Secretary’s action on the other." Id., at 135. Thus, when the Senate Committee reported out the Kennedy-Ervin bill rather than its competitor, it is reasonable to infer that the Committee, and later the Senate, regarded the provision for exclusive enforcement by the Secretary as a device for eliminating frivolous complaints and consolidating meritorious ones. There is no basis whatever for the further conclusion suggested by the Secretary, that the Senate opposed any form of direct participation by union members in Title IV enforcement litigation. The legislative history in the House of Representatives provides even less support for the Secretary’s position. The House initially rejected the Senate bill and passed an alternative authorizing only union members, and not the Secretary, to bring suit to enforce the election title of the bill. H. R. 8342, see H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-17 (1959). Even Senator Goldwater, the leading advocate of member suits, thought the House bill inferior to the Senate bill in this regard, because the matter of election violations was too important to be left exclusively to the vagaries of private enforcement. 105 Cong. Rec. 16489 (comparison of House and Senate bills by Sen. Goldwater). The Conference Committee and the House ultimately adopted the Senate’s enforcement provisions, thereby affirming the need for public enforcement of Title IV. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1959). That action, however, can in no sense be read as a rejection of all forms of private participation in enforcement litigation, since the House at no time considered the possibility that union members might assist the Secretary rather than displace him. With respect to litigation by union members, then, the legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended to prevent members from pressing claims not thought meritorious by the Secretary, and from litigating in forums or at times different from those chosen by the Secretary. Only if intervention would frustrate either of those objectives can the statute fairly be read to prohibit intervention as well as initiation of suits by members. II Intervention by union members in a pending enforcement suit, unlike initiation of a separate suit, subjects the union to relatively little additional burden. The principal intrusion on internal union affairs has already been accomplished, in that the union has already been summoned into court to defend the legality of its election. Intervention in the suit by union members will not subject the union to burdensome multiple litigation, nor will it compel the union to respond to a new and potentially groundless suit. Thus, at least insofar as petitioner seeks only to present evidence and argument in support of the Secretary’s complaint, there is nothing in the language or the history of the LMRDA to prevent such intervention. ^ The question is closer with respect to petitioner’s attempt to add to the Secretary’s complaint two additional grounds for setting aside the union election. These are claims that the Secretary has presumably determined to be without merit. Hence, to require the union to respond to these claims would be to circumvent the screening function assigned by statute to the Secretary. We recognize that it is less burdensome for the union to respond to new claims in the context of the pending suit than it would be to respond to a new and independent complaint. Nevertheless, we think Congress intended to insulate the union from any complaint that did not appear meritorious to both a complaining member and the Secretary. Accordingly, we hold that in a post-election enforcement suit, Title IV imposes no bar to intervention by a union member, so long as that intervention is limited to the claims of illegality presentedy by the Secretary’s complaint. III Finally, the Secretary argues that even if the LMRDA does not bar intervention, petitioner has no right to intervene under the terms of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a). Rule 24 (a)(2) gives one a right to intervene if (1) he claims a sufficient interest in the proceedings, and (2) that interest is not “adequately represented by existing parties.” The Secretary does not contend that petitioner’s interest in this litigation is insufficient; he argues, rather, that any interest petitioner has is adequately represented by the Secretary. The court below did not reach this question, in light of its threshold determination that Rule 24 had no application to the case. Nevertheless, we think it clear that in this case there is sufficient doubt about the adequacy of representation to warrant intervention. The Secretary contends that petitioner’s only legally cognizable interest is the interest of all union members in democratic elections, and he says that interest is identical with the interest represented by the Secretary in Title IV litigation. Hence he argues that petitioner’s interest must be adequately represented unless the court is prepared to find that the Secretary has failed to perform his statutory duty. We disagree. The statute plainly imposes on the Secretary the duty to serve two distinct interests, which are related, but not identical. First, the statute gives the individual union members certain rights against their union, and "the Secretary of Labor in effect becomes the union member’s lawyer" for purposes of enforcing those rights. 104 Cong. Rec. 10947 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). And second, the Secretary has an obligation to protect the "vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union member." Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U. S. 463, 475 (1968). Both functions are important, and they may not always dictate precisely the same approach to the conduct of the litigation. Even if the Secretary is performing his duties, broadly conceived, as well as can be expected, the union member may have a valid complaint about the performance of "his lawyer." Such a complaint, filed by the member who initiated the entire enforcement proceeding, should be regarded as sufficient to warrant relief in the form of intervention under Rule 24 (a) (2). The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to allow limited intervention in accordance with this opinion. So ordered Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The complaint alleged that the Union violated the Act by, inter alia, failing to use secret ballots, permitting campaigning at the polls, denying candidates the right to have observers at polling places and at the counting of ballots, subjecting members to reprisals in connection with their election activities, failing to conduct elections in some locals, and using union assets to promote the candidacy of the incumbents. Petitioner alleged as additional violations of the Act (1) that the Union required members to vote in certain locals, composed entirely of pensioners, which petitioner claims are illegally constituted under the UMWA Constitution; and (2) that the incumbent president improperly influenced the pensioners’ vote by bringing about a pension increase just before the election. Petitioner asks the court to order the Union to disband the pensioner locals, to publish a ruling to the effect that the president breached his fiduciary duty by bringing about the pension increase, and to establish new comprehensive rules to govern future elections. We expedited consideration of this case in view of the fact that the litigation is presently pending in the District Court and it has not been stayed. See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819 (1960). The Goldwater-Administration bill provided that a member could file suit with respect to any violation of the election title unless that claimed violation was the subject of a pending action by the Secretary. It also provided that enforcement suits could be filed in either state or federal courts. The question of member suits was, throughout the debates, intertwined with the question of preserving pre-existing state remedies, since prior to the enactment of the LMRDA the only remedy for illegal election conduct was a member suit in state court. Pre-existing state remedies presented the additional problem, not relevant here, of multiple litigation that was not only inconvenient as a matter of procedure but also in conflict as a matter of substance, for the state remedies related to state-defined rights that were not always identical to the new rights defined in the LMRDA. The debates reflect great concern with the proper relationship between state and federal remedies, and much less concern with the relationship between private and public enforcement. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-22, 101-104 (1959) (majority and minority views); Hearings on H. R. 3540 et al. before a Joint Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, p. 1611 (1959) (analysis of S. 1555 by Sen. Goldwater), reprinted at 105 Cong. Rec. 10102. For the origins and development of the procedural device of intervention, see Moore & Levi, Federal Intervention, 45 Yale L. J. 565 (1936), 47 Yale L. J. 898 (1938); Developments in the Law— Multi-party Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 897-906, 988-992 (1958). The distinction between intervention and initiation is thoughtfully discussed in Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 726-729 (1968). This limitation, however, applies only to the claimed grounds for setting aside the old election, and not to the proposed terms of any new one that may be ordered. For if the court finds merit in the Secretary’s complaint and sets the election aside, then the statute requires the court to direct a new election in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the union, and the requirements of Title IV. Since the court is not limited in this regard to consideration of remedies proposed by the Secretary, there is no reason to prevent the intervenors from assisting the court in fashioning a suitable remedial order. Cf. Hodgson v. Steelworkers, 403 U. S. 333, 344 (White, J., dissenting). Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a): “Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” The requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest “may be” inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as minimal. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 24.09-1 [4] (1969).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARONSON v. QUICK POINT PENCIL CO. No. 77-1413. Argued December 6, 1978 Decided February 28, 1979 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 266. C. Lee Cook, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David C. Bogan, Robert S. Robin, and Robert E. Knechtel. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Barry Grossman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Shene-field, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Stephen M. Shapiro, and Roger B. Andewelt. Ned L. Conley filed a brief for the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the State Bar of Texas as amicus curiae urging reversal. Edward S. Irons and Richard H. Stern filed a brief for Ercon, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Tom Arnold for the American Patent Law Assn.; and by Leonard B. Mackey and Eugene L. Bernard for the Licensing Executives Society (U. S. A.), Inc. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari, 436 U. S. 943, to consider whether federal patent law pre-empts state contract law so as to pre-elude enforcement of a contract to pay royalties to a patent applicant, on sales of articles embodying the putative invention, for so long as the contracting party sells them, if a patent is not granted. (1) In October 1955 the petitioner, Mrs. Jane Aronson, filed an application, Serial No. 542677, for a patent on a new form of keyholder. Although ingenious, the design was so simple that it readily could be copied unless it was protected by patent. In June 1956, while the patent application was pending, Mrs. Aronson negotiated a contract with the respondent, Quick Point Pencil Co., for the manufacture and sale of the keyholder. The contract was embodied in two documents. In the first, a letter from Quick Point to Mrs. Aronson, Quick Point agreed to pay Mrs. Aronson a royalty of 5% of the selling price in return for “the exclusive right to make and sell keyholders of the type shown in your application, Serial No. 542677.” The letter further provided that the parties would consult one another concerning the steps to be taken “[i]n the event of any infringement.” The contract did not require Quick Point to manufacture the keyholder. Mrs. Aronson received a $750 advance on royalties and was entitled to rescind the exclusive license if Quick Point did not sell a million keyholders by the end of 1957. Quick Point retained the right to cancel the agreement whenever “the volume of sales does not meet our expectations.” The duration of the agreement was not otherwise prescribed. A contemporaneous document provided that if Mrs. Aron-son’s patent application was “not allowed within five (5) years, Quick Point Pencil Co. [would] pay . . . two and one half percent (2%%) of sales ... so long as you [Quick Point] continue to sell same.” In June 1961, when Mrs. Aronson had failed to obtain a patent on the keyholder within the five years specified in the agreement, Quick Point asserted its contractual right to reduce royalty payments to 2%% of sales. In September of that year the Board of Patent Appeals issued a final rejection of the application on the ground that the keyholder was not patentable, and Mrs. Aronson did not appeal. Quick Point continued to pay reduced royalties to her for 14 years thereafter. The market was more receptive to the keyholder’s novelty and utility than the Patent Office. By September 1975 Quick Point had made sales in excess of $7 million and paid Mrs. Aronson royalties totaling $203,963.84; sales were continuing to rise. However, while Quick Point was able to pre-empt the market in the earlier years and was long the only manufacturer of the Aronson keyholder, copies began to appear in the late 1960’s. Quick Point’s competitors, of course, were not required to pay royalties for their use of the design. Quick Point’s share of the Aronson keyholder market has declined during the past decade. (2) In November 1975 Quick Point commenced an action in the United States District Court for a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2201, that the royalty agreement was unenforceable. Quick Point asserted that state law which might otherwise make the contract enforceable was preempted by federal patent law. This is the only issue presented to us for decision. Both parties moved for summary judgment on affidavits, exhibits, and stipulations of fact. The District Court concluded that the “language of the agreement is plain, clear and unequivocal and has no relation as to whether or not a patent is ever granted.” Accordingly, it held that the agreement was valid, and that Quick Point was obliged to pay the agreed royalties pursuant to the contract for so long as it manufactured the keyholder. The Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting. 567 F. 2d 757. It held that since the parties contracted with reference to a pending patent application, Mrs. Aronson was estopped from denying that patent law principles governed her contract with Quick Point. Although acknowledging that this Court had never decided the precise issue, the Court of Appeals held that our prior decisions regarding patent licenses compelled the conclusion that Quick Point’s contract with Mrs. Aronson became unenforceable once she failed to obtain a patent. The court held that a continuing obligation to pay royalties would be contrary to “the strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain,” Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653, 674 (1969). The court also observed that if Mrs. Aronson actually had obtained a patent, Quick Point would have escaped its royalty obligations either if the patent were held to be invalid, see ibid., or upon its expiration after 17 years, see Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29 (1964). Accordingly, it concluded that a licensee should be relieved of royalty obligations when the licensor’s efforts to obtain a contemplated patent prove unsuccessful. (3) On this record it is clear that the parties contracted with full awareness of both the pendency of a patent application and the possibility that a patent might not issue. The clause de-escalating the royalty by half in the event no patent issued within five years makes that crystal clear. Quick Point apparently placed a significant value on exploiting the basic novelty of the device, even if no patent issued; its success demonstrates that this judgment was well founded. Assuming, arguendo, that the initial letter and the commitment to pay a 5% royalty was subject to federal patent law, the provision relating to the 2y2% royalty was explicitly independent of federal law. The cases and principles relied on by the Court of Appeals and Quick Point do not bear on a contract that does not rely on a patent, particularly where, as here, the contracting parties agreed expressly as to alternative obligations if no patent should issue. Commercial agreements traditionally are the domain of state law. State law is not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 479 (1974); see Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973). In this as in other fields, the question of whether federal law pre-empts state law “involves a consideration of whether that law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.5 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).” Kewanee Oil Co., supra, at 479. If it does not, state law governs. In Kewanee Oil Co., supra, at 480-481, we reviewed the purposes of the federal patent system. First, patent law seeks to foster and rewaxd invention; second, it promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public. Enforcement of Quick Point's agreement with Mrs. Aronson is not inconsistent with any of these aims. Permitting inventors to make enforceable agreements licensing the use of their inventions in return for royalties provides an additional incentive to invention. Similarly, encouraging Mrs. Aronson to make arrangements for the manufacture of her keyholder furthers the federal policy of disclosure of inventions; these simple devices display the novel idea which they embody wherever they are seen. Quick Point argues that enforcement of such contracts conflicts with the federal policy against withdrawing ideas from the public domain and discourages recourse to the federal patent system by allowing states to extend “perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 232 (1964). We find no merit in this contention. Enforcement of the agreement does not withdraw any idea from the public domain. The design for the keyholder was not in the public domain before Quick Point obtained its license to manufacture it. See Kewanee Oil Co., supra, at 484. In negotiating the agreement, Mrs. Aronson disclosed the design in confidence. Had Quick Point tried to exploit the design in breach of that confidence, it would have risked legal liability. It is equally clear that the design entered the public domain as a result of the manufacture and sale of the keyholders under the contract. Requiring Quick Point to bear the burden of royalties for the use of the design is no more inconsistent with federal patent law than any of the other costs involved in being the first to introduce a new product to the market, such as outlays for research and development, and marketing and promotional expenses. For reasons which Quick Point’s experience with the Aronson keyholder demonstrate, innovative entrepreneurs have usually found such costs to be well wotth paying. Finally, enforcement of this agreement does not discourage anyone from seeking a patent. Mrs. Aronson attempted to obtain a patent for over five years. It is quite true that had she succeeded, she would have received a 5% royalty only on keyholders sold during the 17-year life of the patent. Offsetting the limited terms of royalty payments, she would have received twice as much per dollar of Quick Point’s sales, and both she and Quick Point could have licensed any others who produced the same keyholder. Which course would have produced the greater yield to the contracting parties is a matter of speculation; the parties resolved the uncertainties by their bargain. (4) No decision of this Court relating to patents justifies relieving Quick Point of its contract obligations. We have held that a state may not forbid the copying of an idea in the public domain which does not meet the requirements for federal patent protection. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U. S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., supra. Enforcement of Quick Point’s agreement, however, does not prevent anyone from copying the keyholder. It merely requires Quick Point to pay the consideration which it promised in return for the use of a novel device which enabled it to pre-empt the market. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U. S. 653 (1969), we held that a person licensed to use a patent may challenge the validity of the patent, and that a licensee who establishes that the patent is invalid need not pay the royalties accrued under the licensing agreement subsequent to the issuance of the patent. Both holdings relied on the desirability of encouraging licensees to challenge the validity of patents, to further the strong federal policy that only inventions which meet the rigorous requirements of patentability shall be withdrawn from the public domain. Id., at 670-671, 673-674. Accordingly, neither the holding nor the rationale of Lear controls when no patent has issued, and no ideas have been withdrawn from public use. Enforcement of the royalty agreement here is also consistent with the principles treated in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29 (1964). There, we held that the obligation to pay royalties in return for the use of a patented device may not extend beyond the life of the patent. The principle underlying that holding was simply that the monopoly granted under a patent cannot lawfully be used to “negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.” The Court emphasized that to “use that leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent. . . .” Id., at 33. Here the reduced royalty which is challenged, far from being negotiated “with the leverage” of a patent, rested on the contingency that no patent would issue within five years. No doubt a pending patent application gives the applicant some additional bargaining power for purposes of negotiating a royalty agreement. The pending application allows the inventor to hold out the hope of an exclusive right to exploit the idea, as well as the threat that the other party will be prevented from using the idea for 17 years. However, the amount of leverage arising from a patent application depends on how likely the parties consider it to be that a valid patent will issue. Here, where no patent ever issued, the record is entirely clear that the parties assigned a substantial likelihood to that contingency, since they specifically provided for a reduced royalty in the event no patent issued within five years. This case does not require us to draw the line between what constitutes abuse of a pending application and what does not. It is clear that whatever role the pending application played in the negotiation of the 5% royalty, it played no part in the contract to pay the 2%% royalty indefinitely. Our holding in Kewanee Oil Co. puts to rest the contention that federal law pre-empts and renders unenforceable the contract made by these parties. There we held that state law forbidding the misappropriation of trade secrets was not preempted by federal patent law. We observed: “Certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [patent and trade secret law] are not and never would be in conflict.” 416 U. S., at 484. Enforcement of this royalty agreement is even less offensive to federal patent policies than state law protecting trade secrets. The most commonly accepted definition of trade secrets is restricted to confidential information which is not disclosed in the normal process of exploitation. See Restatement of Torts § 757, Comment b, p. 5 (1939). Accordingly, the exploitation of trade secrets under state law may not satisfy the federal policy in favor of disclosure, whereas disclosure is inescapable in exploiting a device like the Aronson keyholder. Enforcement of these contractual obligations, freely undertaken in arm’s-length negotiation and with no fixed reliance on a patent or a probable patent grant, will “encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.” (Footnote omitted.) 416 U. S., at 485. The device which is the subject of this contract ceased to have any secrecy as soon as it was first marketed, yet when the contract was negotiated the inventiveness and novelty were sufficiently apparent to induce an experienced novelty manufacturer to agree to pay for the opportunity to be first in the market. Federal patent law is not a barrier to such a contract. Reversed. In April 1961, while Mrs. Aronson’s patent application was pending, her husband sought a patent on a different keyholder and made plans to license another company to manufacture it. Quick Point's attorney wrote to the couple that the proposed new license would violate the 1956 agreement. He observed that “your license agreement is in respect of the disclosure of said Jane [Aronson’s] application (not merely in respect of its claims) and that even if no patent is ever granted on the Jane [Aronson] application, Quick Point Pencil Company is obligated to pay royalties in respect of any keyholder manufactured by it in accordance with any disclosure of said application.” (Emphasis added.)

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

O’CONNOR v. DONALDSON No. 74-8. Argued January 15, 1975 — Decided June 26, 1975 Raymond W. Oearey, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for petitioner pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, and Daniel S. Dearing, Special Assistant Attorney General. Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Morton Birnbaum. William F. Hyland, Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph T. Maloney, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., for the American Psychiatric Assn.; by Francis M. Shea, Ralph J. Moore, Jr., John Townsend Rich, James F. Fitzpatrick, Kurt W. Melchior, Harry J. Rubin, Sheridan L. Neimark, and A. L. Zwerdling for the American Association on Mental Deficiency; and by June Resnick German and Alfred Berman for the Committee on Mental Hygiene of the New York State Bar Assn. William J. Brotan, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ruzicho and Barbara J. Rouse, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Ohio as amicus curiae. Me. Justice Stewaet delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly committed to confinement as a mental patient in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in January 1957. He was kept in custody there against his will for nearly 15 years. The petitioner, Dr. J. B. O’Connor, was the hospital’s superintendent during most of this period. Throughout his confinement Donaldson repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, demanded his release, claiming that he was dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, and that, at any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness. Finally, in February 1971, Donaldson brought this lawsuit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that O’Connor, and other members of the hospital staff named as defendants, had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and a codefendant. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 493 F. 2d 507. We granted O’Connor’s petition for certiorari, 419 U. S. 894, because of the important constitutional questions seemingly presented. I Donaldson’s commitment was initiated by his father, who thought that his son was suffering from “delusions.” After hearings before a county judge of Pinellas County, Fla., Donaldson was found to be suffering from “paranoid schizophrenia” and was committed for “care, maintenance, and treatment” pursuant to Florida statutory provisions that have since been repealed. The state law was less than clear in specifying the grounds necessary for commitment, and the record is scanty as to Donaldson’s condition at the time of the judicial hearing. These matters are, however, irrelevant, for this case involves no challenge to the initial commitment, but is focused, instead, upon the nearly 15 years of confinement that followed. The evidence sit the trial showed that the hospital staff had the power to release a patient, not dangerous to himself or others, even if he remained mentally ill and had been lawfully committed. Despite many requests, O’Connor refused to allow that power to be exercised in Donaldson’s case. At the trial, O’Connor indicated that he had believed that Donaldson would have been unable to make a “successful adjustment outside the institution,” but could not recall the basis for that conclusion. O’Connor retired as superintendent shortly before this suit was filed. A few months thereafter, and before the trial, Donaldson secured his release and a judicial restoration of competency, with the support of the hospital staff. The testimony at the trial demonstrated, without contradiction, that Donaldson had posed no danger to others during his long confinement, or indeed at any point in his life. O’Connor himself conceded that he had no personal or secondhand knowledge that Donaldson had ever committed a dangerous act. There was no evidence that Donaldson had ever been suicidal or been thought likely to inflict injury upon himself. One of O’Connor’s codefendants acknowledged that Donaldson could have earned his own living outside the hospital. He had done so for some 14 years before his commitment, and immediately upon his release he secured a responsible job in hotel administration. Furthermore, Donaldson’s frequent requests for release had been supported by responsible persons willing to provide him any care he might need on release. In 1963, for example, a representative of Helping Hands, Inc., a halfway house for mental patients, wrote O’Connor asking him to release Donaldson to its care. The request was accompanied by a supporting letter from the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, which a codefendant conceded was a “good clinic.” O’Connor rejected the offer, replying that Donaldson could be released only to his parents. That rule was apparently of O’Connor’s own making. At the time, Donaldson was 55 years old, and, as O’Connor knew, Donaldson’s parents were too elderly and infirm to take responsibility for him. Moreover, in his continuing correspondence with Donaldson’s parents, O’Connor never informed them of the Helping Hands offer. In addition, on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1968, John Lembcke, a college classmate of Donaldson’s and a longtime family friend, asked O’Connor to release Donaldson to his care. On each occasion O’Connor refused. The record shows that Lembcke was a serious and responsible person, who was willing and able to assume responsibility for Donaldson’s welfare. The evidence showed that Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness. Numerous witnesses, including one of O’Connor’s codefendants, testified that Donaldson had received nothing but custodial care while at the hospital. O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as “milieu therapy.” But witnesses from the hospital staff conceded that, in the context of this case, “milieu therapy” was a euphemism for confinement in the “milieu” of a mental hospital. For substantial periods, Donaldson was simply kept in a large room that housed 60 patients, many of whom were under criminal commitment. Donaldson’s requests for ground privileges, occupational training, and an opportunity to discuss his case with O’Connor or other staff members were repeatedly denied. At the trial, O’Connor’s principal defense was that he had acted in good faith and was therefore immune from any liability for monetary damages. His position, in short, was that state law, which he had believed valid, had authorized indefinite custodial confinement of the “sick,” even if they were not given treatment and their release could harm no one. The trial judge instructed the members of the jury that they should find that O’Connor had violated Donaldson’s constitutional right to liberty if they found that he had “confined [Donaldson] against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness. “Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that [Donaldson] was dangerous to either himself or others.” The trial judge further instructed the jury that O’Con-nor was immune from damages if he “reasonably believed in good faith that detention of [Donaldson] was proper for the length of time he was so confined .... “However, mere good intentions which do not give rise to a reasonable belief that detention is lawfully required cannot justify [Donaldson’s] confinement in the Florida State Hospital.” The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson against O’Connor and a codefendant, and awarded damages of $38,500, including $10,000 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a broad opinion dealing with “the far-reaching question whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to treatment to persons involuntarily civilly committed to state mental hospitals.” 493 F. 2d, at 509. The appellate court held that when, as in Donaldson’s case, the rationale for confinement is that the patient is in need of treatment, the Constitution requires that minimally adequate treatment in fact be provided. Id., at 521. The court further expressed the view that, regardless of the grounds for involuntary civil commitment, a person confined against his will at a state mental institution has “a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.” Id., at 520. Conversely, the court’s opinion implied that it is constitutionally permissible for a State to confine a mentally ill person against his will in order to treat his illness, regardless of whether his illness renders him dangerous to himself or others. See id., at 522-527. II We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case in its present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it, this case raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important question concerning every man’s constitutional right to liberty. The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donaldson had not received treatment. That verdict, based on abundant evidénce, makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a person — to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 736-737; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 509. For the jury found that none of the above grounds for continued confinement was present in Donaldson’s case. Given the jury’s findings, what was left as justification for keeping Donaldson in continued confinement? The fact that state law may have authorized confinement of the harmless mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 720-723; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 248-250. Nor is it enough that Donaldson’s original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, at 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, supra. A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the “mentally ill” can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private community? That the State has a proper interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488-490. May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty. See, e. g., Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24-26; Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615; Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592; cf. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534. In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. Since the jury found, upon ample evidence, that O’Con-nor, as an agent of the State, knowingly did so confine Donaldson, it properly concluded that O’Connor violated Donaldson’s constitutional right to freedom. Ill O’Connor contends that in any event he should not be held personally liable for monetary damages because his decisions were made in “good faith.” Specifically, O’Connor argues that he was acting pursuant to state law which, he believed, authorized confinement of the mentally ill even when their release would not compromise their safety or constitute a danger to others, and that he could not reasonably have been expected to know that the state law as he understood it was constitutionally invalid. A proposed instruction to this effect was rejected by the District Court. The District Court did instruct the jury, without objection, that monetary damages could not be assessed against O’Connor if he had believed reasonably and in good faith that Donaldson’s continued confinement was “proper,” and that punitive damages could be awarded only if O’Connor had acted “maliciously or wantonly or oppressively.” The Court of Appeals approved those instructions. But that court did not consider whether it was error for the trial judge to refuse the additional instruction concerning O’Connor’s claimed reliance on state law as authorization for Donaldson’s continued confinement. Further, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals acted with the benefit of this Court’s most recent decision on the scope of the qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308. Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury is whether O’Connor “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson].” Id., at 322. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247-248; Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 330 (opinion of Powell, J.). For purposes of this question, an official has, of course, no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments. Wood v. Strickland, supra, at 322. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to enable that court to consider, in light of Wood v. Strickland, whether the District Judge’s failure to instruct with regard to the effect of O’Connor’s claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate the instructions as to O’Connor’s liability for compensatory and punitive damages. It is so ordered. Donaldson’s original complaint was filed as a class action on behalf of himself and all of his fellow patients in an entire department of the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. In addition to a damages claim, Donaldson’s complaint also asked for habeas corpus relief ordering his release, as well as the release of all members of the class. Donaldson further sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate psychiatric treatment. After Donaldson’s release and after the District Court dismissed the action as a class suit, Donaldson filed an amended complaint, repeating his claim for compensatory and punitive damages. Although the amended complaint retained the prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief, that request was eliminated from the case prior to trial. See 493 F. 2d 507, 512-513. The judicial commitment proceedings were pursuant to § 394.22 (11) of the State Public Health Code, which provided: “Whenever any person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent requires confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, the said judge shall direct that such person be forthwith delivered to a superintendent of a Florida state hospital, for the mentally ill, after admission has been authorized under regulations approved by the board of commissioners of state institutions, for care, maintenance, and treatment, as provided in sections 394.09, 394.24, 394.25, 394.26 and 394.27, or make such other disposition of him as he may be permitted by law Fla. Laws 1955— 1956 Extra. Sess., c. 31403, § 1, p. 62. Donaldson had been adjudged “incompetent” several days earlier under §394.22 (1), which provided for such a finding as to any person who was “incompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness, drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other mental or physical condition, so that he is incapable of caring for himself or managing his property, or is likely to dissipate or lose his property or become the victim of designing persons, or inflict harm on himself or others Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 831. It would appear that § 394.22 (11) (a) contemplated that involuntary commitment would be imposed only on those “incompetent” persons who “require [d] confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others.” But this is not certain, for § 394.22 (11) (c) provided that the judge could adjudicate the person a “harmless incompetent” and release him to a guardian upon a finding that he did “not require confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others and that treatment in the Florida State Hospital is unnecessary or would be without benefit to such person Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, p. 835 (emphasis added). In this regard, it is noteworthy that Donaldson’s “Order for Delivery of Mentally Incompetent” to the Florida State Hospital provided that he required “confinement or restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, or to insure proper treatment.” (Emphasis added.) At any rate, the Florida commitment statute provided no judicial procedure whereby one still incompetent could secure his release on the ground that he was no longer dangerous to himself or others. Whether the Florida statute provided a “right to treatment” for involuntarily committed patients is also open to dispute. Under §394.22 (11) (a), commitment “to prevent self-injury or violence to others” was “for care, maintenance, and treatment.” Recently Florida has totally revamped its civil commitment law and now provides a statutory right to receive individual medical treatment. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.459 (1973). The sole statutory procedure for release required a judicial reinstatement of a patient’s “mental competency.” Public Health Code §§ 394.22 (15) and (16), Fla. Gen. Laws 1955, c. 29909, § 3, pp. 838-841. But this procedure could be initiated by the hospital staff. Indeed, it was at the staff’s initiative that Donaldson was finally restored to competency, and liberty, almost immediately after O’Connor retired from the superintendency. In addition, witnesses testified that the hospital had always had its own procedure for releasing patients — for “trial visits,” “home visits,” “furloughs,” or “out of state discharges” — even though the patients had not been judicially restored to competency. Those conditional releases often became permanent, and the hospital merely closed its books on the patient. O’Connor did not deny at trial that he had the power to release patients; he conceded that it was his “duty” as superintendent of the hospital “to determine whether that patient having once reached the hospital was in such condition as to request that he be considered for release from the hospital.” There was some evidence that Donaldson, who is a Christian Scientist, on occasion refused to take medication. The trial judge instructed the jury not to award damages for any period of confinement during which Donaldson had declined treatment. At the close of Donaldson’s case in chief, O’Connor moved for a directed verdict on the ground that state law at the time of Donaldson’s confinement authorized institutionalization of the mentally ill even if they posed no danger to themselves or others. This motion was denied. At the close of all the evidence, O’Connor asked that the jury be instructed that "if defendants acted pursuant to a statute which was not declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot be held accountable for such action.” The District Court declined to give this requested instruction. The District Court defined treatment as follows: “You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.” (Emphasis added.) O’Connor argues that this statement suggests that a mental patient has a right to treatment even if confined by reason of dangerousness to himself or others. But this is to take the above paragraph out of context, for it is bracketed by paragraphs making clear the trial judge’s theory that treatment is constitutionally required only if mental illness alone, rather than danger to self or others, is the reason for confinement. If O’Connor had thought the instructions ambiguous on this point, he could have objected to them and requested a clarification. He did not do so. We accordingly have no occasion here to decide whether persons committed on grounds of dangerousness enjoy a “right to treatment.” In pertinent part, the instructions read as follows: “The Plaintiff claims in brief that throughout the period of his hospitalization he was not mentally ill or dangerous to himself or others, and claims further that if he was mentally ill, or if Defendants believed he was mentally ill, Defendants withheld from him the treatment necessary to improve his mental condition. ' “The Defendants claim, in brief, that Plaintiff’s detention was legal and proper, or if his detention was not legal and proper, it was the result of mistake, without malicious intent. “In order to prove his claim under the Civil Rights Act, the burden is upon the Plaintiff in this case to establish by a preponderance of the evidence in this case the following facts: “That the Defendants confined Plaintiff against his will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or dangerous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiving treatment for his alleged mental illness. “[T]hat the Defendants’ acts and conduct deprived the Plaintiff of his Federal Constitutional right not to be denied or deprived of his liberty without due process of law as that phrase is defined and explained in these instructions .... “You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition. “Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification from a constitutional stand-point for continued confinement unless you should also find that the Plaintiff was dangerous either to himself or others.” The trial judge had instructed that punitive damages should be awarded only if “the act or omission of the Defendant or Defendants which proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff was maliciously or wantonly or oppressively done.” Given the jury instructions, see n. 6 supra, it is possible that the jury went so far as to find that O’Connor knew not only that Donaldson was harmless to himself and others but also that he was not mentally ill at all. If it so found, the jury was permitted by the instructions to rule against O’Connor regardless of the nature of the “treatment” provided. If we were to construe the jury’s verdict in that fashion, there would remain no substantial issue in this case: That a wholly sane and innocent person has a constitutional right not to be physically confined by the State when his freedom will pose a danger neither to himself nor to others cannot be seriously doubted. The judge’s instructions used the phrase “dangerous to himself.” Of course, even if there is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is literally “dangerous to himself” if for physical or other reasons he is helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom either through his own efforts or with the aid of willing family members or friends. While it might be argued that the judge’s instructions could have been more detailed on this point, O’Connor raised no objection to them, presumably because the evidence clearly showed that Donaldson was not “dangerous to himself” however broadly that phrase might be defined. O’Connor argues that, despite the jury’s verdict, the Court must assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a “nonjusticiable” question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where “treatment” is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted ground is present. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715. Neither party objected to the jury instruction defining treatment. There is, accordingly, no occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary confinement or, if it can, how much or what kind of treatment would suffice for that purpose. In its present posture this case involves not involuntary treatment but simply involuntary custodial confinement. See n. 5, supra. During his years of confinement, Donaldson unsuccessfully petitioned the state and federal courts for release from the Florida State Hospital on a number of occasions. None of these claims was ever resolved on its merits, and no evidentiary hearings were ever held. O’Connor has not contended that he relied on these unsuccessful court actions as an independent intervening reason for continuing Donaldson’s confinement, and no instructions on this score were requested. Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only the question whether O’Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages for violating Donaldson’s constitutional right to liberty. The jury found, on substantial evidence and under adequate instructions, that O’Connor deprived Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to others and was provided no treatment, of the constitutional right to liberty. Cf. n. 8, supra. That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of Appeals holds that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the only issue to be determined in that court will be whether O’Connor is immune from liability for monetary damages. Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court’s opinion and judgment as the sole law of the case. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PHELPS, RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY v. UNITED STATES No. 74-121. Argued April 16, 1975 Decided May 19, 1975 BreNnan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Dennis E. Quaid argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kevin J. Gillogly and Daniel C. Ahern. Keith A. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, As sistant Attorney General Crampton, and Crombie J. D. Garrett. Me. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Between March and June 1971 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) made assessments of federal taxes in the amount of $140,831.59 against Chicagoland Ideel Cleaners, Inc. Chicagoland failed to pay the taxes after formal demand. Instead, on June 28, 1971, Chicago-land transferred its assets to an assignee for the benefit of creditors. The assignee promptly converted the assets into cash of approximately $38,000. On August 25, 1971, the IRS filed a notice of tax lien respecting the March-June assessments in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of Cook County, Ill., and on the same day served a notice of levy on the assignee. The notice of levy stated that the proceeds in the assignee’s hands “are hereby levied upon and seized for satisfaction” of the taxes, “and demand is hereby made upon you for the [proceeds].” On September 14, 1971, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against Chicagoland. Chicagoland was adjudicated bankrupt and petitioner Phelps was appointed receiver in bankruptcy. Petitioner receiver, on October 19, 1971, filed an application with the Referee in Bankruptcy for an order requiring the assignee, who had not complied with the IRS demand for payment, to turn over to petitioner the $38,000 proceeds from the sale of Chicagoland’s assets. The IRS opposed the application on the ground that “[t]his court of bankruptcy lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application because the United States is entitled to the possession of the moneys now held by [the] assignee of the bankrupt. . . .” The Referee in Bankruptcy rejected the contention, holding that “the assignment . . . passed inalienable title to the assets of Chicagoland ... to the assignee” and therefore “the notice of levy of the Internal Revenue Service is a nullity . . . .” The Referee accordingly entered an order directing the assignee to “surrender and turn over to” petitioner “all sums in his possession . ...” The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on petition for review on behalf of the IRS, approved the Referee’s turnover order. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 495 F. 2d 1283 (1974). The Court of Appeals held: “Since possession of the property resided in the United States as against the [petitioner] receiver, the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction summarily to adjudicate the controversy without the Government’s consent. . . . The United States is now entitled to have its claim adjudicated in a plenary suit. We respectfully decline to follow the contrary holding [of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit] in In re United General Wood Products Corp., 483 F. 2d 975 (9th Cir. 1973).” 495 F. 2d, at 1285-1286. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeals, 419 U. S. 1068 (1974). We agree with the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and affirm its judgment. I The assignee claims no interest in the proceeds of the $38,000. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in In re United General Wood Products Corp., 483 F. 2d 975, 976 (1973), held that that circumstance, without more, subjected property to the bankruptcy court’s summary jurisdiction to enter a turnover order. Wood Products Corp. relied on the statement in Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1924), that constructive possession of the property by the bankruptcy court “exists . . . where the property is held by some other person who makes no claim to it.” That reliance is misplaced. The statement read in the context of the facts of that case and its holding applied only to property in the hands of a nonadverse third person who was not holding it as agent for a bona fide adverse claimant. Taubel itself held that the bankruptcy court had not been given jurisdiction by summary proceedings to avoid a lien created by levy under a judgment of a state court where the sheriff possessed the property for the judgment creditor, and neither he nor the judgment creditor had consented to adjudication of the controversy by the bankruptcy court. Similarly, in this case the United States is a bona fide adverse claimant to the $38,000 proceeds held by the assignee and has not consented to adjudication of its claim by the bankruptcy court. The levy of August 25, 1971, created a custodial relationship between the assignee and the United States and thereby reduced the $38,000 to the United States’ constructive possession. Neither Chicagoland nor the petioner as receiver could assert a claim to the proceeds in that circumstance. For when Chicagoland failed to pay the taxes after assessment and demand, a lien in favor of the United States attached to “all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to [the taxpayer].” 26 U. S. C. § 6321. The assignee took Chicagoland’s property subject to this lien. The lien attached to the proceeds of the sale. See Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. 675, 710 (1831); Loeber v. Leininger, 175 Ill. 484, 51 N. E. 703 (1898). “The lien reattaches to the thing and to whatever is substituted for it. . . . The owner and the lien holder, whose claims have been wrongfully displaced, may follow the proceeds wherever they can distinctly trace them.” Sheppard v. Taylor, supra, at 710. The notice of levy and demand served on the assignee were an authorized means of collecting the taxes from the $38,000 held by him. Title 26 U. S. C. § 6331 (a) provides: “[I]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary ... to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property ... on which there is a [tax] lien . . “[t]he term ‘levy’ . . . includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.” § 6331 (b). Treasury Regulations, 26 CFR § 301.6331-1 (a) (1) (1974), provide that a “[ljevy may be made by serving a notice of levy,” and that levy gave the United States thé right to the proceeds. See United States v. Pittman, 449 F. 2d 623, 627 (CA7 1971). Title 26 U. S. C. § 6332 (a) requires that any person holding property levied upon must surrender it to the Government, or become liable for the tax, § 6332 (c). With surrender, however, any duty owed the taxpayer is extinguished. § 6332 (d). Thus, following the levy of August 26, 1971, actual possession of the $38,000 was held by the assignee on behalf of the United States and “where possession is assertedly held not for the bankrupt, but for others prior to bankruptcy . . . the holder is not subject to summary jurisdiction.” 2 J. Moore & R. Oglebay, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 23.06 [3], pp. 506.2-506.3 (14th ed. 1975); Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97 (1944); Galbraith v. Vallely, 256 U. S. 46 (1921). The receiver’s recourse is limited to a plenary suit under § 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 46. See Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, supra. Petitioner argues, however, that actual possession is necessary to remove the Government’s tax liens from the subordinate priority accorded them under § 67c (3) of the Bankruptcy Act. The argument is without merit. United States v. Eiland, 223 F. 2d 118 (CA4 1955); Rosenblum v. United States, 300 F. 2d 843 (CA1 1962). Section 67c (3) has no bearing on the question of summary jurisdiction; it relates only to the priority that is accorded tax liens on property that has already been determined to be within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction as part of the bankrupt estate. Here we are concerned not with priority of tax liens but with the effect of a tax levy. Historically, service of notice has been sufficient to seize a debt, Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268> 297 (1871), and notice of levy and demand are equivalent to seizure. See, e. g., Sims v. United States, 359 U. S. 108 (1959). The levy, therefore, gave the United States full legal right to the $38,000 levied upon as against the claim of the petitioner receiver. Petitioner’s final contention is that the general restriction on a bankruptcy court’s summary jurisdiction was altered by the enactment in 1938 of § 2a (21) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 11 (a) (21), which grants bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to “[r]equire ... assignees for the benefit of creditors ... to deliver the property in their possession or under their control to the receiver . . . .” This provision, however, was designed to “clarif[y] the jurisdiction of the [bankruptcy] court,” S. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 12 (1938), and was “simply declaratory of prior case law,” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, ¶ 2.78 [3], p. 390.26. Under that case law, an assignee for the benefit of creditors who holds assets as “a mere naked bailee for the creditors ... has no right to retain the possession as against the trustee in bankruptcy.” In re McCrum, 214 F. 207, 209 (CA2 1914). Here the assignee held as custodian for the United States, a bona fide adverse claimant. Galbraith v. Vallely, supra, Affirmed. The grant was limited to the following questions presented in the petition: “1. ‘Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly granted to the United States a priority based upon the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for taxes in violation of and contrary to the priorities for payment of claims established by the Bankruptcy Act?’ “2. ‘Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that service of a Notice of Levy upon an assignee for the benefit of creditors subsequent to the assignment reduced the bankrupt’s property then held by the assignee to the constructive possession of the United States?’ “3. ‘Whether the Court of Appeals incorrectly determined that the Bankruptcy Court lacked summary jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy before it without the consent of the United States?”’ There is a significant difference in the result of a summary adjudication of the tax claim in the bankruptcy court and the result of. its adjudication in a plenary suit: “The difference between a summary and plenary proceeding in this context is not merely a matter of the relative formality of the respective procedures. The consequence of a summary turnover order is to subject the property in question to administration as part of the bankrupt estate. Where the government has a tax lien on the property, the consequence of the turnover is to subordinate that lien to the expenses of administration and priority wage claims. See Section 67c (3) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. [§] 107 (c) (3). In contrast, if the property is not subject to summary turnover, it may be brought into the bankrupt estate only if the receiver is able to defeat the government’s underlying tax claim in a plenary proceeding, i. e., a suit for refund. Thus, in a case where the .underlying tax claim is sound, for the government the difference between a summary and a plenary proceeding is the difference between holding the property subject to prior payment of administrative and priority wage claims and holding it outright.” Brief for United States 19. The unified tax lien was valid against all persons except purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic’s lienors, and judgment lien creditors. 26 U. S. C. § 6323 (a). Petitioner concedes that the assignee did not fall within any of these categories. The Government does not contend that the unfiled lien followed the property into the hands of good-faith purchasers from the assignee. Brief ' for United States 14 n. 6. As indicated in n. 3, supra, an unfiled tax lien is invalid against purchasers. United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51 (1958), is not to the contrary. Bess held that a tax lien effected during an insured’s life against the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy attached after his death to insurance proceeds in the hands of the beneficiary but only in the amount of the cash surrender value. The limitation recognized that the taxpayer in his lifetime could not have realized a larger amount and thus there was no greater “property” or “rights to property” to which the lien could have attached ab initio. Id., at 55-56. The claimant may, however, consent to summary adjudication in the bankruptcy court. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U. S. 97, 99 (1944). The United States refused consent in this case. Section 67c (3) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 107 (c) (3), provides in pertinent part: “Every tax lien on personal property not accompanied by possession shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title ....” Section 64,of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 104, provides in pertinent part: “(a) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be (1) the costs and expenses of administration ... , (2) wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling, or city salesmen . . . .” Petitioner also relies on § 70a (8) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. §110 (a)(8). Section 70a (8) vests the trustee of the bankrupt’s estate “with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition ... to ... property held by an assignee for the benefit of creditors.” Even petitioner argues, however, that Chicago-land on September 1, 1971, had no title to the property conveyed to the assignee. Brief for Petitioner 14. In any event, the prebankruptcy levy displaced any title of Chicagoland, and § 70a (8) is therefore inapplicable.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES v. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD. No. 48. Argued November 17, 1955. Decided April 30, 1956. John J. Abt and Joseph Forer argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Solicitor General Sobeloff argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, Harold D. Kofjsky, Philip R. Monahan and George R. Gallagher. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Osmond K. Fraenkel, Thomas I. Emerson, David L. Weissman and Murray A. Gordon for the National Lawyers Guild; Edward J. Ennis for the American Civil Liberties Union; and Royal W. France for Aydelotte et al. Herbert R. O’Conor, Julius Applebaum, William N. Bonner, Tracy E. Griffm, Clarence Manion, Paul W. Updegraff and Robert W. Upton filed a brief for the American Bar Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is here to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirming an order of the Subversive Activities Control Board that petitioner register with the Attorney General as a “Communist-action” organization, as required by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Title I of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. That Act sets forth a comprehensive plan for regulation of “Communist-action” organizations. Section 2 of the Act describes a world Communist movement directed from abroad and designed to overthrow the Government of the United States by any means available, including violence. Section 7 requires all Communist-action organizations to register as such with the Attorney General. If the Attorney General has reason to believe that an organization, which has not registered, is a Communist-action organization, he is required by § 13 (a) to bring a proceeding to determine that fact before the Subversive Activities Control Board, a five-man board appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and created for the purpose of holding hearings and making such determinations. Section 13 (e) lays down certain standards for judgment by the Board. If the Board finds that an organization is a Communist-action organization, it enters an order requiring the organization to register with the Attorney General. § 13 (g). Section 14 provides the right to file a petition for review of Board action in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, with opportunity for review by this Court upon certiorari. Once an organization registers or there is outstanding a final order of the Board requiring it to register, several consequences follow with respect to the organization and its members, but these need not now be detailed. See §§ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 22, 25. Proceeding under § 13 (a) of this statute, the Attorney General, on November 22, 1950, petitioned the Board for an order directing petitioner to register pursuant to § 7 of the Act. Petitioner sought unsuccessfully by numerous motions before the Board and by proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia — one case is reported at 96 F. Supp. 47 — to attack the validity of, and to abort, the hearing. The hearing began on April 23, 1951, before three members of the Board, later reduced to two, sitting as a hearing panel, and it terminated on July 1, 1952. Proposed findings of fact and briefs were filed by both parties, and oral argument was held before the hearing panel in August 1952. In October 1952 the hearing panel issued a recommended decision that the Board order petitioner to register as a Communist-action organization. Exceptions to the panel's findings were filed by both parties, and oral argument was held before the Board in January 1953. The Board filed its report, which occupies 251 pages of the record in this case, on April 20, 1953. In its report the Board found that there existed a world Communist movement, substantially as described in § 2 of the Act, organized and directed by a foreign government. The Board detailed the history of the Communist Party of the United States and its close relation to the world Communist movement. It then set forth illustrative evidence and made findings with respect to the statutory criteria of § 13 (e) of the Act, which required the Board to consider “the extent to which” the organization met them. The Board found that the conditions set forth in each of the paragraphs were applicable to petitioner. On the basis of these findings the Board concluded that petitioner was a Communist-action organization, as defined by § 3, and ordered it to register as such with the Attorney General. Petitioner brought this order to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for review. While the case was pending, it filed a motion, supported by affidavit, for leave to adduce additional evidence pursuant to § 14 (a) of the Act. The basis of the motion was that the additional material evidence became available to the petitioner subsequent to the administrative proceeding and that this evidence would “establish that the testimony of three of the witnesses for the Attorney General, on which [the Board] relied extensively and heavily in making findings which are of key importance to the order now under review, was false. ... In summary, this evidence will establish that Crouch, Johnson and Matu-sow, all professional informers heretofore employed by the Department of Justice as witnesses in numerous proceedings, have committed perjury, are completely untrustworthy and should be accorded no credence; that at least two of them are now being investigated for perjury by the Department of Justice, and that because their character as professional perjurors [sic] has now been conclusively and publicly demonstrated, the Attorney General has ceased to employ any of them as witnesses.” Petitioner listed a number of witnesses whom it proposed to call to substantiate its claim and also set forth a detailed affidavit in support of its allegations. The Government did not deny these allegations. It filed a “Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence,” signed by the General Counsel to the Board and by officials of the Department of Justice. The memorandum asserted that the hearing should not be reopened for the receipt of evidence merely questioning, as it claimed, the credibility of some witnesses, but not any fact at issue, and it maintained that the findings of the Board were amply supported by evidence apart from the testimony of the three witnesses sought to be discredited. On December 23, 1954, this motion was formally denied by the Court of Appeals without opinion. In its full opinion on the merits, filed the same day, however, the Court of Appeals supported its rejection of petitioner’s motion: “The Party attacks the credibility of the witnesses presented by the Government. In this connection it stresses that some of these witnesses . . . were under charges of false swearing. Full opportunity for cross examination of these witnesses was afforded at the hearing before the Board, and full opportunity was also afforded for the presentation of rebuttal testimony. The evaluation of credibility is primarily a matter for the trier of the facts, and a reviewing court cannot disturb that evaluation unless a manifest error has been made. Moreover the testimony of the witnesses against whom charges are said to have been made was consistent with and supported by masses of other evidence. . . .” 96 U. S. App. D. C. 66, 100, 223 F. 2d 531, 565. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Board. It sustained § 13 (e) against the contention that its standards were vague and irrational. It held that the findings of the Board had been established by a preponderance of the evidence, except that it struck, as not being supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the finding that the secret practices were undertaken for the purpose of promoting the objectives, and concealing the true nature, of petitioner; and it also struck the finding in connection with reporting to a foreign government because the record supported only a finding of reporting by Party leaders “upon occasion,” not a finding which implied a constant, systematic reporting. The court, however, found that the Board’s conclusion was supported by the basic findings which it had affirmed. With respect to petitioner’s other attacks on the constitutional validity of the statute, the court found it necessary to consider some of the so-called “sanction” sections, §§ 5, 6, 10, 11, 22, and 25, as well as § 7, the registration section. It held that they were all constitutional and therefore affirmed the order of the Board. The challenge to the Act on which the order was based plainly raises constitutional questions appropriate for this Court’s consideration, and so we brought the case here. 349 U. S. 943. At the threshold we are, however, confronted by a particular claim that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to return the case to the Board for consideration of the new evidence proffered by petitioner’s motion and affidavit. This non-constitutional issue must be met at the outset, because the case must be decided on a non-constitutional issue, if the record calls for it, without reaching constitutional problems. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331. In considering this non-constitutional issue raised by denial of petitioner’s motion, we must avoid any intimation with respect to the other issues raised by petitioner. We do not so intimate by concluding that the testimony of the three witnesses, against whom the uncontested challenge of perjury was made, was not inconsequential in relation to the issues on which the Board had to pass. No doubt a large part of the record consisted of documentary evidence. However, not only was the human testimony significant but the documentary evidence was also linked to the activities of the petitioner and to the ultimate finding of the Board by human testimony, and such testimony was in part that of these three witnesses. The facts bearing on the issue are not in controversy. The direct testimony of witness Crouch occupied 387 pages of the typewritten transcript; that of Johnson, 163 pages; and that of Matusow, 118 pages. The annotated report of the Board, in which citations to the evidence were made to illustrate the support for its findings, contained 36 references to the testimony of Crouch, 25 references to the testimony of Johnson, and 24 references to the testimony of Matusow. These references were made in support of every finding under the eight criteria of § 13 (e) and it is also not to be assumed that the evidence given by these three witnesses played no role in the Board's findings of fact even when not specifically cited. Testimony, for example, directed toward proving that the Communist Party of the United States was an agency utilized by a foreign government to undermine the loyalty of the armed forces, and to be in a position to paralyze shipping and prevent transportation of soldiers and war supplies through the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the ports of San Francisco and New York in time of war, cannot be deemed insignificant in such a determination as that which the Board made in this proceeding. This is a proceeding under an Act which Congress conceived necessary for “the security of the United States and to the existence of free American institutions . . . .” 64 Stat., at 989. The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332. Therefore, fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted. When uncontested challenge is made that a finding of subversive design by petitioner was in part the product of three perjurious witnesses, it does not remove the taint for a reviewing court to find that there is ample innocent testimony to support the Board’s findings. If these witnesses in fact committed perjury in testifying in other cases on subject matter substantially like that of their testimony in the present proceedings, their testimony in this proceeding is inevitably discredited and the Board’s determination must duly take this fact into account. We cannot pass upon a record containing such challenged testimony. We find it necessary to dispose of the case on the grounds we do, not in order to avoid a constitutional adjudication but because the fair administration of justice requires it. Since reversal is thus demanded, however, we do not reach the constitutional issues. The basis for challenging the testimony was not in existence when the proceedings were concluded before the Board. Petitioner should therefore be given leave to make its allegations before the Board in a proceeding under § 14 (a) of the Act. The issue on which the case must be returned to the Board lies within a narrow compass and the Board has ample scope of discretion in passing upon petitioner’s motion. The purpose of this remand, as is its reason, is to make certain that the Board bases its findings upon untainted evidence. To that end it may hold a hearing to ascertain the truth of petitioner’s allegations, and if the testimony of the three witnesses is discredited, it must not leave that testimony part of the record. Alternatively, the Board may choose to assume the truth of petitioner’s allegations and, without further hearing, expunge the testimony of these witnesses from the record. In either event, the Board must then reconsider its original determination in the light of the record as freed from the challenge that now beclouds it. The case is reversed and remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. A “Communist-action” organization is defined in § 3 of the Act as: “(a) any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative or mission of a foreign government accredited as such by the Department of State) which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement as referred to in section 2 of this title; and “(b) any section, branch, fraction, or cell of any organization defined in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph which has not complied with the registration requirements of this title.” 64 Stat., at 989. The Act also defines and regulates “Communist-front” organizations, but these sections of the Act are not involved in the present proceeding. “In determining whether any organization is a ‘Communist-action organization/ the Board shall take into consideration— “(1) the extent to which its policies are formulated and carried out and its activities performed, pursuant to directives or to effectuate the policies of the foreign government or foreign organization in which is vested, or under the domination or control of which is exercised, the direction and control of the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title; and “ (2) the extent to which its views and policies do not deviate from those of such foreign government or foreign organization; and “(3) the extent to which it receives financial or other aid, directly or indirectly, from or at the direction of such foreign government or foreign organization; and “(4) the extent to which it sends members or representatives to any foreign country for instruction or training in the principles, policies, strategy, or tactics of such world Communist movement; and “(5) the extent to which it reports to such foreign government or foreign organization or to its representatives; and “(6) the extent to which its principal leaders or a substantial number of its members are subject to or recognize the disciplinary power of such foreign government or foreign organization or its representatives; and “(7) the extent to which, for the purpose of concealing foreign direction, domination, or control, or of expediting or promoting its objectives, (i) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts to obtain information as to, its membership (by keeping membership lists in code, by instructing members to refuse to acknowledge membership, or by any other method); (ii) its members refuse to acknowledge membership therein; (iii) it fails to disclose, or resists efforts to obtain information as to, records other than membership lists; (iv) its meetings are secret; and (v) it otherwise operates on a secret basis;- and “(8) the extent to which its principal leaders or a substantial number of its members consider the allegiance they owe to the United States as subordinate to their obligations to such foreign government or foreign organization.” 64 Stat., at 999-1000. Section 14 (a) of the Act provides: “. . .If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board and to be adduced upon the proceeding in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which, if supported by the preponderance of the evidence shall be conclusive, and its recommendations, if any, with respect to action in the matter under consideration. . . .” 64 Stat., at 1001-1002. Judge Bazelon dissented on the ground that the registration provision violated the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination because it compelled the person signing it to identify himself as a Communist Party functionary and because it compelled a listing of officers and members. 96 U. S. App. D. C., at 111, 223 F. 2d, at 576. In this connection the following statement of the Board in its report should be noted: “In making our findings herein, we have considered and weighed all the evidence of record. In weighing [the Attorney General’s] evidence, we have considered that certain of [his] witnesses fall into the category of ‘informers’ and we have scrutinized their testimony accordingly; we have considered and resolved the inconsistencies in the testimony of certain of [the Attorney General’s] witnesses; we have considered the testimony of [the Attorney General’s] witnesses against the background of their various organizational positions and activities in the CPUSA which afforded the sources of their knowledge; and we have had the benefit of the Panel’s observation of their demeanor while testifying. Viewing these considerations in the light of the whole record, we find no basis for disregarding the substance of their testimony.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROSENBERG, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, v. FLEUTI. No. 248. Argued March 26, 1963. Decided June 17, 1963. Philip R. Monahan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and Maurice A. Roberts. Hiram W. Kwan argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the' Court. Respondent Fleuti is a Swiss national who was originally admitted to this country for permanent residence on October 9, 1952, and has been here continuously since except for a visit of “about a couple hours” duration to Ensenada, Mexico, in August 1956. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, of which petitioner Rosenberg is the Los Angeles District Director, sought in April 1959 to deport respondent on the ground that at the time of his return in 1956 he “was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry,” Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241 (a)(1), 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(1). In particular, the Service alleged' that respondent had been “convicted' of a crime involving moral turpitude,” § 212 (a) (9), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (9), before his 1956 return, and had for that reason been excludable when he came back from his brief trip to Mexico. A deportation order issued on that ground, but it was discovered a few months later that the order was invalid, because the crime was a petty offense not of the magnitude encompassed within the statute. The deportation proceedings were thereupon reopened and a new charge was lodged against respondent: that he had been excludable at the time of his 1956 return, as an alien “afflicted with psychopathic personality,” §212 (a)(4), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a)(4), by reason of the fact that he was a homosexual. Deportation was ordered on this ground and Fleuti’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed, whereupon he brought the present action for declaratory judgment and review of the administrative action. It was stipulated that among the issues to be litigated was the question whether § 212 (a) (4) is “unconstitutional as being vague and ambiguous.” The trial court rejected,respondent’s contentions in this regard and in general, and granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the deportation order and enjoined its enforcement, holding that as applied to Fleuti § 212 (a).(4) was unconstitutionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encompassed within the term “psychopathic personality.” 302 F. 2d 652. The Government petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted in order to consider the constitutionality of § 212 (a) (4) as applied to respondent Fleuti. 371 U. S. 859. Upon consideration of the case, however, and in accordance with the long-established principle that “we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable,” Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105; see also Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129; Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U. S. 77; Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U. S. 384, we have concluded that there is a threshold issue of statutory interpretation in the case, the existence of which obviates.decision here as to whether §212 (a)(4) is constitutional. as applied to respondent. That issue is whether Fleuti’s return to the United States from his afternoon trip to Ensenada, Mexico, in August 1956 constituted an “entry” within the meaning of § 101 (a) (13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of. 1952, 66 Stat. 167, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a)(13), such that Fleuti was excludable for a condition existing at that time even though he had been permanently and continuously resident in this country for nearly four years prior thereto. Section 101 (a) (13), which has never been directly construed by this Court in relation to the kind of brief absence from the country that characterizes the present case, reads as follows: “The term ‘entry’ means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process - shall be held to be entitled to such exception.” The question we must consider, more specifically, is whether Fleuti’s short visit to Mexico can possibly be regarded, as a “departure to a foreign port or place . . . [that] was not intended,” within the meaning x»f the-exception to the term “entry” created by the statute. Whether the 1956 return was within that exception is crucial, because Fleuti concededly was not excludable as a “psychopathic personality” at the time of his 1952 entry. The definition of “entry” as applied for various purposes in our immigration laws was evolved judicially, only becoming encased in statutory form with the inclusion of § 101 (a) (13) in the 1952 Act. In the early cases there was developed a judicial definition of “entry” which had harsh consequences for aliens. This viewpoint was expressed most restrictively in United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, in which the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice McReynolds, upheld deportation of an alien who, after 24 years of residence in this country following a lawful entry, was held to be excludable on his return from “a brie^ visit to Cuba,” id., at 423. The Court stated that “the word ‘entry’ . . . includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one.” Id., at 425. Although cases in the lower courts applying the strict re-entry doctrine to aliens who had. left the country for brief visits to Canada or Mexico or elsewhere were numerous, many courts, applied the doctrine in such instances with express reluctance and explicit recognition of its harsh consequences, and there were a few instances in which district judges refused to hold that aliens who had been absent from the country only briefly had made “entries” upon their return. Reaction to the severe effects produced by adherence to the strict definition of “entry” resulted in a substantial inroad being made upon that definition in 1947 by a decision of the Second Circuit and a decision of this Court. The Second Circuit, in an' opinion by Judge Learned Hand, refused to allow a deportation which depended on the alien’s being regarded as having re-entered this country after having taken an overnight sleeper from Buffalo to Detroit on a route lying through Canada. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F. 2d 878. Judge Hand'recognized that the alien “acquiesced in whatever route the railroad might choose to pull the car,” id., at 879, but held that it would be too harsh to impute the carrier’s intent to the alien, there being no showing that the alien knew he would be entering Canada. “Were it otherwise,” Judge Hand went on, “the alien would be subjected without means of protecting himself to the forfeiture of privileges which may be, and often are, of the most grave importance to him.” Ibid. If there were a duty upon aliens to inquire about a carrier’s route, it “would in practice become a trap, whose closing upon them would have no rational relation to anything they could foresee as-significant. We cannot believe that Congress meant to subject those who had acquired a residence, to the sport of chance, when the interests at stake may be so momentous.” Ibid. Concluding, Judge Hand said that if the alien’s return were held to be an “entry” under the circumstances, his “vested interest in his residence” would “be forfeited because of perfectly lawful conduct which he could not possibly have supposed would result in anything of the sort. Caprice in the incidence of punishment is one of the indicia of tyranny, and nothing can be more disingenuous than to say that deportation in these circumstances is not punishment. It is well that we should be free to rid ourselves of those who abuse our hospitality.; but it is more important that the continued enjoyment of that hospitality once granted, shall not be subject to meaningless and irrational hazards.” Ibid. Later the same year this Court, because of a conflict between Di Pasquale and Del Guercio v. Delgadillo, 159 F. 2d 130 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1947), granted certiorari in the latter case and reversed a deportation order affecting an alien who, upon rescue after his intercoastal merchant ship was torpedoed in the Caribbean during World War II, had been taken to Cuba to recuperate for a week before returning to this country. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388. The Court pointed out that it was “the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act,” id., at 391, which put the alien on foreign soil, adding that “[w]e might as well hold that if he had been kidnapped and taken to Cuba, he made a statutory 'entry’ on his voluntary return. Respect for law does not thrive on captious interpretations.” Ibid. Since “[t]he stakes are indeed high and momentous for the alien who has acquired his residence here,” ibid., the Court held that “[w]e will not attribute to Congress a purpose to make his right to remain here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious as those upon which the Immigration Service has here seized. The ha. ards to which we are now asked to subject the alien are too irrational to square with the statutory scheme.” Ibid. The increased protection of returning resident aliens which-was brought about by the Delgadillo decision, both in its result and in its express approval of Di Pasquale, was reflected in at least two subsequent lower-court decisions' prior to the enactment of § 101 (a) (13). In Yukio Chai v. Bonham, 165 F. 2d 207 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1947), the court held that no “entry” had occurred after a ship carrying a resident alien back from seasonal cannery work in Alaska made an unscheduled stop in Vancouver, B. C., and in Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F. 2d 239 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1948), the court held that a resident alien returning from wartime service with the United States Maritime Service during which he had stopped at many foreign ports made no “entry” because all of the movements of the ship to which he had been assigned were pursuant to Navy orders. It was in light of all of these developments in the case law that § 101 (a) (13) was included in the immigration laws with the 1952 revision. As the House and Senate Committee Reports, the relevant material from which is quoted in the margin, make clear, the major congressional concern in codifying the definition of “entry” was with “the status of an alien who has previously entered the United States and resided therein . . . .” This concern was in the direction of ameliorating the harsh results visited upon resident aliens by the rule of United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, supra, as is indicated by the recognition that “the courts have departed from the rigidity of . . . [the earlier] rule,” and the statement that “[t]he bill . . . [gives] due recognition to the judicial precedents.” It must be. recognized, of course, that the only liberalizing decisions to which the Reports referred specifically were Di Pasquale and Delgadillo, and that there is no indication one way or the other in the legislative history of what Congress thought about the problem of resident aliens who leave the country for insignificantly short periods of time. Nevertheless, it requires but brief consideration of the policies underlying §101 (a) (13), and of certain other aspects of the rights of returning resident aliens, to conclude that Congress, in approving the judicial undermining of Volpe, supra, and the relief brought about by the Di Pasquale and Delgadillo decisions, could not have meant to limit the meaning of the exceptions it created in § 101 (a) (13) to the facts of those two cases. The most basic guide to congressional intent as to the reach of the exceptions is the eloquent language of Di Pasquale and Delgadillo themselves, beginning with the recognition that the “interests at stake” for the resident alien are .“momentous,” 158 F. 2d, at 879, and that “[t]he stakes are indeed high and momentous for the alien who has acquired his residence here,” 332 U. S., at 391. This general premise of the two decisions impelled the more general conclusion that “it is . . . important that the continued enjoyment of . . . [our] hospitality once granted, shall not be subject to meaningless and irrational hazards.” 158 F. 2d, at 879. See also Delgadillo, supra, at .391. Coupling these essential principles of the two-decisions explicitly approved by Congress in enacting § 101 (a) (13) with the more general observation, appearing in Delgadillo as well as elsewhere, that “[d]eportation can be the equivalent of banishment or exile,” it is difficult to conceive that Congress meant its approval of the liberalization wrought by Di Pasquale and Delgadillo to be interpreted mechanistically to apply only to cases presenting factual situations identical to what was involved in those two decisions. The idea that the exceptions to § 101 (a) (13) should be read nonrestrictively is given additional credence by the way in which the immigration laws define what constitutes “continuous residence” for an alien wishing to be naturalized. Section 316 of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 242-243, 8 U. S. C. § 1427, which liberalized previous law in some respects, provides that an alien who wishes to seek naturalization does not begin to endanger the five years of “continuous residence” in this country which must precede his application until he remains outside the .country for six months, and does not damage his position by cumulative temporary absences unless they total over half of the five years preceding the filing of his petition for naturalization. This enlightened concept of what constitutes a meaningful interruption of the continuous residence which must support a petition for naturalization, reflecting as it does a congressional judgment that an alien’s status is not necessarily to be endangered by his absence from the country, strengthens the foundation underlying a belief that the exceptions to § 101 (a) (13) should be read to protect resident aliens who are only briefly absent from the country. Of further, although less specific, effect in this regard is this Court’s holding in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, that the returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him, a holding which supports the general proposition that a resident alien who leaves this country is to be regarded as retaining certain basic rights. Given that the congressional protection of returning resident aliens in § 101 (a) (13) is not to be woodenly construed, we turn specifically to construction of the exceptions contained in that section as they relate to resident aliens who leave the country briefly. What we face here is another harsh consequence of the strict “entry” doctrine which, while not governed directly by Delgadillo, nevertheless calls into play the same considerations, pp. 454-456; 458-459, supra, which led to the results specifically approved in the Congressional Committee Reports. It would be as “fortuitous and capricious,” and as “irrational to square with the statutory scheme,” Delgadillo, supra, at 391, to hold that an alien may necessarily be deported because he falls into one of the classes enumerated in § 212 (a) when he returns from “a couple hours” visit to Mexico as it would have been to uphold the order of deportation in Delgadillo: Certainly when an alien like Fleuti who has entered the country lawfully and has acquired a residence here steps across a border and, in effect, steps right back, subjecting him to exclusion for a condition for which he Could not have been deported had he remained in the country seems to be placing him at the mercy of the “sport of chance” and the “meaningless and irrational hazards” to which Judge Hand alluded. Di Pasquale, supra, at 879. In making such a casual trip the alien would seldom be aware that he was possibly walking into a trap, for the insignificance of a brief trip to Mexico or Canada bears little rational relation to the punitive consequence of subsequent excludability. There are, of course, valid policy reasons for saying that an alien wishing to retain his classification as a permanent resident of this country imperils his status by interrupting his residence too frequently or for an overly long period of time, but we discern no rational policy supporting application of a re-entry limitation in all cases in which a resident alien crosses an international border for a short visit. Certainly if that trip is innocent, casual, and brief, it is consistent with all the discernible signs of congressional purpose to hold that ihe “departure '. . . was not intended” within the meapiing and ameliorative intent of the exception to § 101 (a) (13). Congress unquestionably has the power to exclude all classes of undesirable aliens from this country, and the courts are charged with enforcing such exclusion when Congress has directed it, but we do not think Congress intended to exclude aliens long resident in this country after lawful entry who have merely stepped across an international border and returned in “about a couple of hours.” Such a holding would be inconsistent with' the general purpose of Congress in enacting § 101 (a) (13) to ameliorate the severe effects of the strict “entry” doctrine. We conclude, then, that it effectuates congressional purpose to construe the intent exception to § 101 (a) (13) as meaning an intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien’s permanent residence. One major factor relevant to whether such intent can be inferred is, of course, the length of time the alien is absent. Another is the purpose of the visit, for if the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish some object which is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interruption of residence thereby occurring would properly be regarded as meaningful. Still another is whether the alien has to procure any travel documents in order to make his trip, since the need to obtain such items might well cause the alien to consider more fully the implications involved in his leaving the country. Although the operation of these and other possibly relevant factors remains to be developed “by the-gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,” Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, we declare today simply that an innocent, casual, and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country’s borders may not have been “intended” as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to the consequences of an “entry” into' the country on his return. The more civilized application of our immigration laws given recognition by Congress in § 101 (a) (13) and other provisions of the 1952 Act protects the resident alien from unsuspected risks and unintended consequences pf such a wholly innocent action. Respondent here, so'far as appear^ from the record, is among those to be protected. However, because attention waá not'previously focused upon the application of § 101 (a) (13) to the case, the record contains no detailed description or characterization of his trip to Mexico in 1956, except for his testimony that he was gone “about a couple hours,” and that he was “just visiting; taking a trip.” That being the case, we deem it appropriate to remand the case for further consideration of the application of § 101 (a) (13) to this ease in light of our discussion herein. If it is determined that respondent did not “intend” to depart in the sense contemplated by § 101 (a) (13), the deportation order will not stand and adjudication of the constitutional issue reached by the court below will be obviated. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated and the case remanded with directions that the parties be given leave to amend their pleadings to putin issue the question of “entry” in accordance with the foregoing, and for further proceedings consistent herewith. So ordered. Although there is dictum on the point of Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U. S. 691, 698-699, We regard it as not fully considered, since resolution of the issue was not crucial to decision of the case. Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 213. The 1952 Act became effective on December 24, 1952, and Fleuti entered the country for permanent residence on October 9, 1952, a fact which is of significance because §241 (a)(1) of the Act only commands the deportation of aliens “excludable by .the law existing at' the time of such entry ...” Hence, since respondent’s homosexuality did not make him excludable by any law existing at the time of his 1952 entry, it is critical to determine whether his return from a few hours in Mexico in 1956 was an “entry” in the statutory sense. If it was not, the question whether § 212 (a) (4) could constitutionally be applied to him need not be resolved. Previous cases which contain the same general kind of language, but which are distinguishable on their facts, are Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78; Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398; United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U. S. 279; and United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129. The only one of these cases which involved an absence from the country as extremely brief as Fleuti’s is Lewis v. Frick, and in that case deportation was premised on the fact that on his return from the trip in issue the alien had sought to bring a woman into the country for an immoral purpose. 233 U. S., at 297-300. E. g., Ex parte Parianos, 23 F. 2d 918 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1928); United States ex rel. Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F. 2d 57 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1928); Cahan v. Carr, 47 F. 2d 604 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 862; Zurbrick v. Borg, 47 F. 2d 690 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1931); Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F. 2d 307 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1932); Ward v. De Barros, 75 F. 2d 34 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1935); Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F. 2d 580 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 648; Del Castillo v. Carr, 100 F. 2d 338 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1938); United States ex rel. Kowalenski v. Flynn, 17 F. 2d 524 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1927); United States ex rel. Siegel v. Reimer, 23 F. Supp. 643 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.), aff’d, 97 F. 2d 1020 (C. A. 2d Cir. 4938). E. g., Jackson v. Zurbrick, 59 F. 2d 937 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1932) ; Zurbrick v. Woodhead, 90 F. 2d 991 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1937); United States ex rel. Ueberall v. Williams, 187 F. 470 (D. C. S. D. N, Y. 1911); Guimond v. Howes, 9 F. 2d 412 (D. C. D. Maine 1925); Ex parte Piazzola, 18 F. 2d 114 (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1926). In re Michael Bonadino, D. C. W. D. N. Y., unreported, Dec. 20, 1924; United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, 1 F. Supp. 370 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1932); Annello ex rel. Annello v. Ward, 8 F. Supp. 797 (D. C. D. Mass. 1934). It should be pointed out, however, that the Ninth Circuit has, subsequent to the decisions cited in the text, held specifically that length of time outside the country is still irrelevant to the question of “entry.” Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F. 2d 391 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 914; Pimental-Navarro v. Del Guercio, 256 F. 2d 877 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1958). The House and Senate Committee Reports preceding enactment of the bill both contained the following relevant paragraph: “Section 101 (a)(13) defines the term ‘entry.’ Frequent reference is made to the term ‘entry’ in the immigration laws, and many consequences relating to the entry and departure of aliens flow from its use, but the term is not precisely defined in the present law. Normally an entry occurs when the alien crosses the border of the United States and makes a physical entry, and the question of whether an entry has been made is susceptible of a precise determination. However, for- the purposes of determining the effect of a subsequent entry upon the status of an alien who has previously entered the United States and resided therein, the preciseness of the term ‘entry’ has not been found to be as apparent. Earlier judicial constructions of the term in the immigration laws, as set forth in Volpe v. Smith (289 U. S. 422 (1933)), generally held that the term ‘entry’ included any. coming of an alien from a, foreign. country to the United States whether such coming be the first or a subsequent one. More recently, the courts have departed.from the rigidity of that rule and have recognized that an alien does not make an entry upon his return to the United States from a foreign country where he had no intent to leave the United States (Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F. 2d 878 (C. C. A. 2d 1947)), or did not leave the country voluntarily (Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388 (1947)). The bill defines the term ‘entry’ as precisely as practicable, giving due recognition to the judicial precedents. Thus any. coming of an alien from a foreign port or place or an outlying possession into the United States is to be considered an entry, whether voluntary or otherwise, unless the Attorney General is satisfied that the departure of the alien, other than a deportee, from, this country was unintentional or was not voluntary.” H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1952) ; S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952). See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 147; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10; Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, 642-643. Compare Bernard, American Immigration Policy (1950), 296; Gordon, When Does an Alien Enter the United States? 9 Fed. B. J. 248, 250, 258-259 (1948); Hofstein, The Returning Resident Alien, 10 Intra. L. Rev. 271, 273, 280 (1955); Konvitz, Civil Rights in Immigration (1953), 92; Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 Col. L. Rev. 309, 327-329 (1956); Report of the President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, Whom We Shall Welcome (1953), 179-180, 199-200; Note, Rights of Aliens in Exclusion Proceedings, 3 Utah L. Rev. 349, 350 n. 20 (1953); Note, Limitations on Congressional Power to Deport Resident Aliens Excludable as Psychopaths at Time of Entry, 68 Yale L. J. 931,937-938 n. 25 (1959).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION et al. v. COOPER No. 10-1024. Argued November 30, 2011 Decided March 28, 2012 Ajoito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 304. Kagan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Eric J. Feigin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Mark B. Stern. Raymond A. Cardozo argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James M. Wood, James C. Martin, David J. Bird, and Thomas M. Pohl. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the AIDS Foundation of Chicago et al. by Hayley J. Gorenberg and Jon W. Davidson; for the Electronic Privacy Information Center by Marc Rotenberg; and for the National Whistleblower Center by David K. Colapinto and Stephen M. Kohn. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. The Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5 U. S. C. §552a, contains a comprehensive and detailed set of requirements for the management of confidential records held by Executive Branch agencies. If an agency fails to comply with those requirements “in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual,” the Act authorizes the individual to bring a civil action against the agency. § 552a(g)(l)(D). For violations found to be “intentional or willful,” the United States is liable for “actual damages.” § 552a,(g)(4)(A). In this case, we must decide whether the term “actual damages,” as used in the Privacy Act, includes damages for mental or emotional distress. We hold that it does not. I The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to obtain a pilot certificate and medical certificate as a precondition for operating an aircraft. 14 CFR §§ 61.3(a), (c) (2011). Pilots must periodically renew their medical certificates to ensure compliance with FAA medical standards. See § 61.23(d). When applying for renewal, pilots must disclose any illnesses, disabilities, or surgeries they have had, and they must identify any medications they are taking. See 14 CFR pt. 67. Respondent Stanmore Cooper has been a private pilot since 1964. In 1985, he was diagnosed with a human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and began taking antiret-roviral medication. At that time, the FAA did not issue medical certificates to persons with respondent’s condition. Knowing that he would not qualify for renewal of his medical certificate, respondent initially grounded himself and chose not to apply. In 1994, however, he applied for and received a medical certificate, but he did so without disclosing his HIV status or his medication. He renewed his certificate in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, each time intentionally withholding information about his condition. When respondent’s health deteriorated in 1995, he applied for long-term disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. To substantiate his claim, he disclosed his HIV status to the Social Security Administration (SSA), which awarded him benefits for the year from August 1995 to August 1996. In 2002, the Department of Transportation (DOT), the FAA’s parent agency, launched a joint criminal investigation with the SSA, known as “Operation Safe Pilot,” to identify medically unfit individuals who had obtained FAA certifications to fly. The DOT gave the SSA a list of names and other identifying information of 45,000 licensed pilots in northern California. The SSA then compared the list with its own records of benefit recipients and compiled a spreadsheet, which it gave to the DOT. The spreadsheet revealed that respondent had a current medical certificate but had also received disability benefits. After reviewing respondent’s FAA medical file and his SSA disability file, FAA flight surgeons determined in 2005 that the FAA would not have issued a medical certificate to respondent had it known his true medical condition. When investigators confronted respondent with what had been discovered, he admitted that he had intentionally withheld from the FAA information about his HIV status and other relevant medical information. Because of these fraudulent omissions, the FAA revoked respondent’s pilot certificate, and he was indicted on three counts of making false statements to a Government agency, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. Respondent ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of making and delivering a false official writing, in violation of § 1018. He was sentenced to two years of probation and fined $1,000. Claiming that the FAA, DOT, and SSA (hereinafter Government) violated the Privacy Act by sharing his records with one another, respondent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. He alleged that the unlawful disclosure to the DOT of his confidential medical information, including his HIV status, had caused him “humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other severe emotional distress.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 120a. Notably, he did not allege any pecuniary or economic loss. The District Court granted summary judgment against respondent. 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (2008). The court concluded that the Government had violated the Privacy Act and that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the violation was intentional or willful. But the court held that respondent could not recover damages because he alleged only mental and emotional harm, not economic loss.. Finding that the term “actual damages” is “facially ambiguous,” id., at 791, and relying on the sovereign immunity canon, which provides that waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the Government, the court concluded that the Act does not authorize the recovery of damages from the Government for nonpecuniary mental or emotional harm. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. 622 F. 3d 1016, 1024 (2010). The court acknowledged that the term “actual damages” is a “ ‘chameleon’ ” in that “its meaning changes with the specific statute in which it is found.” Id., at 1029. But the court nevertheless held that, as used in the Privacy Act, the term includes damages for mental and emotional distress. Looking to what it described as “[i]ntrinsic” and “[e]xtrinsic” sources, id., at 1028,1031, the court concluded that the meaning of “actual damages” in the Privacy Act is not ambiguous and that “a construction that limits recovery to pecuniary loss” is not “plausible,” id., at 1034. The Government petitioned for rehearing or rehearing en banc, but a divided court denied the petition. Id., at 1019. The Government then petitioned for certiorari, and we granted review. 564 U. S. 1018 (2011). i — I hH Because respondent seeks to recover monetary compensation from the Government for mental and emotional harm, we must decide whether the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act waives the Government’s sovereign immunity with respect to such a recovery. A We have said on many occasions that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed” in statutory text. See, e. g., Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33 (1992); Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). Legislative history cannot supply a waiver that is not clearly evident from the language of the statute. Lane, supra, at 192. Any ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity, United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 531 (1995), so that the Government’s consent to be sued is never enlarged beyond what a fair reading of the text requires, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983) (citing Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927)). Ambiguity exists if there is a plausible interpretation of the statute that would not authorize money damages against the Government. Nordic Village, supra, at 34, 37. The question that confronts us here is not whether Congress has consented to be sued for damages under the Privacy Act. That much is clear from the statute, which expressly authorizes recovery from the Government for “actual damages.” Rather, the question at issue concerns the scope of that waiver. For the same reason that we refuse to enforce a waiver that is not unambiguously expressed in the statute, we also construe any ambiguities in the scope of a waiver in favor of the sovereign. Lane, supra, at 192. Although this canon of interpretation requires an unmistakable statutory expression of congressional intent to waive the Government’s immunity, Congress need not state its intent in any particular way. We have never required that Congress use magic words. To the contrary, we have observed that the sovereign immunity canon “is a tool for interpreting the law” and that it does not “displace] the other traditional tools of statutory construction.” Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U. S. 571, 589 (2008). What we thus require is that the scope of Congress’ waiver be clearly discernable from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive tools. If it is not, then we take the interpretation most favorable to the Government. B The civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act provides that, for any “intentional or willful” refusal or failure to comply with the Act, the United States shall be liable for “actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.” 5 U. S. C. § 552a(g)(4)(A). Because Congress did not define “actual damages,” respondent urges us to rely on the ordinary meaning of the word “actual” as it is defined in standard general-purpose dictionaries. But as the Court of Appeals explained, “actual damages” is a legal term of art, 622 F. 3d. at 1028, and it is a “cardinal rule of statutory construction” that, when Congress employs a term of art, “ ‘it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken,’ ” Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952)). Even as a legal term, however, the meaning of “actual damages” is far from clear. The latest edition of Black’s Law Dictionary available when Congress enacted the Privacy Act defined “actual damages” as “[r]eal, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury, as opposed on the one hand to ‘nominal’ damages, and on the other to ‘exemplary’ or‘punitive’ damages.” Black’s Law Dictionary 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). But this general (and notably circular) definition is of little value here because, as the Court of Appeals accurately observed, the precise meaning of the term “changes with the specific statute in which it is found.” 622 F. 3d, at 1029. The term is sometimes understood to include nonpecuniary harm. Take, for instance, some courts’ interpretations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S. C. § 3613(c), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. A number of courts have construed “actual” damages in the remedial provisions of both statutes to include compensation for mental and emotional distress. See, e. g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F. 2d 634, 636-638 (CA7 1974) (authorizing compensatory damages under the FHA, 42 U. S. C. § 3612, the predecessor to § 3613, for humiliation); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F. 2d 380, 384 (CA10 1973) (stating that damages under the FHA “are not limited to out-of-pocket losses but may include an award for emotional distress and humiliation”); Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Assn., 682 F. 2d 509, 513-514 (CA5 1982) (per curiam) (explaining that, “[e]ven when there are no out-of-pocket expenses, humiliation and mental distress do constitute recoverable elements of damage” under the FCRA); Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F. 2d 829, 834-835 (CA8 1976) (approving an award of damages under the FCRA for “loss of sleep, nervousness, frustration and mental anguish”). In other contexts, however, the term has been used or construed more narrowly to authorize, damages for only pecuniary harm. In the wrongful-death provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), for example, Congress authorized “actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death.” 28 U. S. C. § 2674, ¶2. At least one court has defined “actual damages” in the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U. S. C. § 101(b) (1970 ed.), as “the extent to which the market value of a copyrighted work has been injured or destroyed by an infringement.” Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F. 2d 505, 512 (CA9 1985); see also Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F. 3d 909, 917 (CA9 2002) (holding that “ ‘hurt feelings’ over the nature of the infringement” have no place in the actual damages calculus). And some courts have construed “actual damages” in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78bb(a), to mean “some form of economic loss.” Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F. 2d 460, 464 (CA9 1977); see also Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F. 2d 107, 111 (CA2 1981) (stating that the purpose of § 78bb(a) “is to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss suffered as a result of wrongs committed in violation of the 1934 Act”); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F. 2d 792, 810 (CA5 1970) (noting that the “gist” of an action for damages under the Act is “economic injury”). Because the term “actual damages” has this chameleon-like quality, we cannot rely on any all-purpose definition but must consider the particular context in which the term appears. C The Privacy Act directs agencies to establish safeguards to protect individuals against the disclosure of confidential records “which could result in substantial harm, embarrass-xnent, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual on whom information is maintained.” 5 U. S. C. § 552a(e)(10); see also §2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (stating that the “purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy”). Because the Act serves interests similar to those protected by defamation and privacy torts, there is good reason to infer that Congress relied upon those torts in drafting the Act. In Doe v. Chao, 540 U. S. 614 (2004), we held that the Privacy Act’s remedial provision authorizes plaintiffs to recover a guaranteed minimum award of $1,000 for violations of the Act, but only if they prove at least some “actual damages.” Id., at 620, 627; see § 552a(g)(4)(A). Although we did not address the meaning of “actual damages,” id., at 622, n. 5, 627, n. 12, we observed that the provision “parallels” the remedial scheme for the common-law torts of libel per quod and slander, under which plaintiffs can recover “general damages,” but only if they prove “special harm” (also known as “special damages”), id., at 625; see also 3 Restatement of Torts § 575, Comments a and b (1938) (hereinafter Restatement); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 7.2, pp. 511-513 (1973) (hereinafter Dobbs). “Special damages” are limited to actual pecuniary loss, which must be specially pleaded and proved. 1 D. Haggard, Cooley on Torts §164, p. 580 (4th ed. 1932) (hereinafter Cooley). “General damages,” on the other hand, cover “loss of reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the feelings and the like and need not be alleged in detail and require no proof.” Id., § 164, at 579. This parallel between the Privacy Act and the common-law torts of libel per quod and slander suggests the possibility that Congress intended the term “actual damages” in the Act to mean special damages. The basic idea is that Privacy Act victims, like victims of libel per quod or slander, are barred from any recovery unless they can first show actual— that is, pecuniary or material — harm. Upon showing some pecuniary harm, no matter how slight, they can recover the statutory minimum of $1,000, presumably for any unproven harm. That Congress would choose to use the term “actual damages” instead of “special damages” was not without precedent. The terms had occasionally been used interchangeably. See, e. g., Wetzel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 P. 2d 857, 862 (CA9 1972) (holding that plaintiff could not establish libel per quod because he “did not introduce any valid and sufficient evidence of actual damage”); Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research Corp., 325 F. 2d 761, 765 (CA6 1963) (stating that “libel per quod standing alone without proof of actual damages . . . will not support a verdict for the plaintiff”); M & S Furniture Sales Co. v. Edward J. De Bartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540, 544, 241 A. 2d 126, 128 (1968) (“In the case of words or conduct actionable only per quod, the injurious effect must be established by allegations and proof of special damage and in such cases it is not only necessary to plead and show that the words or actions were defamatory, but it must also appear that such words or conduct caused actual damage”); Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 45 Minn. 303, 47 N. W. 781 (1891) (distinguishing “actual, or, as they are sometimes termed, ‘special/ damages” from “general damages — that is, damages not pecuniary in their' nature”). Any doubt about the plausibility of construing “actual damages” in the Privacy Act synonymously with “special damages” is put to rest by Congress’ refusal to authorize “general damages.” In an uncodified section of the Act, Congress established the Privacy Protection Study Commission to consider, among other things, “whether the Federal Government should be liable for general damages.” § 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907, note following 5 U. S. C. § 552a, p. 84 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). As we explained in Doe, “Congress left the question of general damages ... for another day.” 540 U. S., at 622. Although the Commission later recommended that general damages be allowed, ibid., n. 4, Congress never amended the Act to include them. For that reason, we held that it was “beyond serious doubt” that general damages are not available for violations of the Privacy Act. Id., at 622. By authorizing recovery for “actual” but not for “general” damages, Congress made clear that it viewed those terms as mutually exclusive. .In actions for defamation and related dignitary torts, two categories of compensatory damages are recoverable: general damages and special damages. Cooley § 164, at 579; see also 4 Restatement § 867, Comment d (1939) (noting that damages for interference with privacy “can be awarded in the same way in which general damages are given for defamation”). Because Congress declined to authorize “general damages,” we think it likely that Congress intended “actual damages” in the Privacy Act to mean special damages for proven pecuniary loss. Not surprisingly, this interpretation was accepted by the Privacy Protection Study Commission, an expert body authorized by Congress and highly sensitive to the Act’s goals. The Commission understood “actual damages” in the Act to be “a synonym for special damages as that term is used in defamation cases.” Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 530 (July 1977); see also ibid. (“The legislative history and language of the Act suggest that Congress meant to restrict recovery to specific pecuniary losses until the Commission could weigh the propriety of extending the standard of recovery”). Although we are not bound in any way by the Commission’s report, we think it confirms the reasonableness of interpreting “actual damages” in the unique context of the Privacy Act as the equivalent of special damages. D We do not claim that the contrary reading of the statute accepted by the Court of Appeals and advanced now by respondent is inconceivable. But because the Privacy Act waives, the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity, the question we must answer is whether it is plausible to read the statute, as the Government does, to authorize only damages for economic loss. Nordic Village, 503 U. S., at 34, 37. When waiving the Government’s sovereign immunity, Congress must speak unequivocally. Lane, 518 U. S., at 192. Here, we conclude that it did not. As a consequence, we adopt an interpretation of “actual damages” limited to proven pecuniary or economic harm. To do otherwise would expand the scope of Congress’ sovereign immunity waiver beyond what the statutory text clearly requires. ⅜-H HH ) — I None of respondent’s contrary arguments suffices to overcome the sovereign immunity canon. A Respondent notes that the term “actual damages” has often been defined broadly in common-law cases, and in our own, to include all compensatory damages. See Brief for Respondent 18-25. For example, in Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64 (1876), a patent infringement case, we observed that “[compensatory damages and actual damages mean the same thing.” Ibid. And in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), we wrote that actual injury in the defamation context “is not limited to out-of-pocket loss” and that it customarily includes “impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” Id., at 350. These cases and others cited by respondent stand for the unremarkable point that the term “actual damages” can include nonpecuniary loss. But this generic meaning does not establish with the requisite clarity that the Privacy Act, with its distinctive features, authorizes damages for mental and emotional distress. As we already explained, the term “actual damages” takes on different meanings in different contexts. B Respondent’s stronger argument is that the exclusion of “general damages” from the statute simply means that there can be no recovery for presumed damages. Privacy Act victims can still recover for mental and emotional distress, says respondent, so long as it is proved. See Brief for Respondent 54-56. This argument is flawed because it suggests that ‘proven mental and emotional distress does not count as general damages. The term “general damages” is not limited to compensation for unproven injuries; it includes compensation for proven injuries as well. See 3 Restatement § 621, Comment a (noting that general damages compensate for “harm which ... is proved, or, in the absence of proof, is assumed to have caused to [the plaintiff’s] reputation”). To be sure, specific proof of emotional harm is not required to recover general damages for dignitary torts. Dobbs §7.3, at 529. But it does not follow that general damages cannot be recovered for emotional harm that is actually proved. Aside from the fact that general damages need not be proved, what distinguishes those damages, whether proved or not, from the only other category of compensatory damages available in the relevant common-law suits is the type of harm. In defamation and privacy cases, “the affront to the plaintiff’s dignity and the emotional harm done” are “called general damages, to distinguish them from proof of actual economic harm,” which is called “special damages.” Id., §3.2, at 139; see also supra, at 295-296, 298, and nn. 6, 7, 9. Therefore, the converse of general damages is special damages, not all proven damages, as respondent would have it. Because Congress removed “general damages” from the Act’s remedial provision, it is reasonable to infer that Congress foreclosed recovery for nonpecuniary harm, even if such harm can be proved, and instead waived the Government’s sovereign immunity only with respect to harm com-pensable as special damages. C Looking beyond the Privacy Act’s text, respondent points to the use of the term “actual” damages in the remedial provisions of the PHA, 42 U. S. C. § 3613(c), and the FCRA, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. As previously mentioned, courts have held that “actual” damages within the meaning of these statutes include compensation for mental and emotional distress. Supra, at 292-293. Citing the rule of construction that Congress intends the same language in similar statutes to have the same meaning, see Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam), respondent argues that the Privacy Act should also be interpreted as authorizing damages for mental and emotional distress. See Brief for Respondent 25-32. Assuming for the sake of argument that these lower court decisions are correct, they provide only weak support for respondent’s argument here. Since the term “actual damages” can mean different things in different contexts, statutes other than the Privacy Act provide only limited interpretive aid, and that is especially true here. Neither the FHA nor the FCRA contains text that precisely mirrors the Privacy Act. In neither of those statutes did Congress specifically decline to authorize recovery for general damages as it did in the Privacy Act. Supra, at 297-298. And most importantly, none of the lower court cases interpreting the statutes, which respondent has cited, see Brief for Respondent 29-31, involves the sovereign immunity canon. Respondent also points to the FTCA, but the FTCA’s general liability provision does not even use the term “actual damages.” It instead provides that the “United States shall be liable” for certain tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual” under relevant state law. 28 U. S. C. § 2674, ¶ 1. For that reason alone, the FTCA’s general liability provision is not a reliable source for interpreting the term “actual damages” in the Privacy Act. Nor does the FTCA’s wrongful-death provision — which authorizes “actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death,” §2674, ¶2— prove that Congress understood the term “actual damages” in the Privacy Act to include nonpeeuniary mental and emotional harm. To the contrary, it proves that actual damages can be understood to entail only pecuniary harm depending on the context. Because the FTCA, like the FHA and FCRA, does not share the same text or design as the Privacy Act, it is not a fitting analog for construing the Act. D Finally, respondent argues that excluding damages for mental and emotional harm would lead to absurd results. Persons suffering relatively minor pecuniary loss would be entitled to recover $1,000, while others suffering only severe and debilitating mental or emotional distress would get nothing. See Brief for Respondent 33-35. Contrary to respondent’s suggestion, however, there is nothing absurd about a scheme that limits the Government’s Privacy Act liability to harm that can be substantiated by proof of tangible economic loss. Respondent insists that such a scheme would frustrate the Privacy Act’s remedial purpose, but that ignores the fact that, by deliberately refusing to authorize general damages, Congress intended to cabin relief, not to maximize it. * * * In sum, applying traditional rules of construction, we hold that the Privacy Act does not unequivocally authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress. Accordingly, the Act does not waive the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity from liability for such harms. We therefore reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, dissenting. Congress enacted the Privacy Act. of 1974 for the stated purpose of safeguarding individual privacy against Government invasion. To that end, the Act provides a civil remedy entitling individuals adversely affected by certain agency misconduct to recover “actual damages” sustained as a result of the unlawful action. Today the Court holds that “actual damages” is limited to pecuniary loss. Consequently, individuals can no longer recover what our precedents and common sense understand to be the primary, and often only, damages sustained as a result of an invasion of privacy, namely, mental or emotional distress. That result is at odds with the text, structure, and drafting history of the Act. And it cripples the Act’s core purpose of redressing and deterring violations of privacy interests. I respectfully dissent. I The majority concludes that “actual damages” in the civil-remedies provision of the Privacy Act allows recovery for pecuniary loss alone. But it concedes that its interpretation is not compelled by the plain text of the statute or otherwise required by any other traditional tool of statutory interpretation. And it candidly acknowledges that a contrary reading is not “inconceivable.” Ante, at 299. Yet because it considers its reading of “actual damages” to be “plausible,” the majority contends that the canon of sovereign immunity requires adoption of an interpretation most favorable to the Government. Ibid,. The canon simply cannot bear the weight the majority ascribes it. “The sovereign immunity canon is just that — a canon of construction. It is a tool for interpreting the law, and we have never held that it displaces the other traditional tools of statutory construction.” Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U. S. 571, 589 (2008) (majority opinion of Alito, J.). Here, traditional tools of statutory construction — the statute’s text, structure, drafting history, and purpose — provide a clear answer: The term “actual damages” permits recovery for all injuries established by competent evidence in the record, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, and so encompasses damages for mental and emotional distress. There is no need to seek refuge in a canon of construction, see id., at 589-590 (declining to rely on canon as there is “no ambiguity left for us to construe” after application of “traditional tools of statutory construction,and considerations of stare decisis”), much less one that has been used so haphazardly in the Court’s history, see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (canon is “nothing but a judge-made rule that is sometimes favored and sometimes disfavored” (footnote omitted)) (collecting cases). It bears emphasis that we have said repeatedly that, while “we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver [of sovereign immunity] beyond that which Congress intended,” “[n]either . . . should we assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1979) (emphasis added). See also, e. g., Block v. Neal, 460 U. S. 289, 298 (1983) (“The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the Privacy Act, Congress expressly authorized recovery of “actual damages” for certain intentional or willful agency misconduct. The Court should not “as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a statute designed to limit it.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 69 (1955). H-1 HH A “In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992). The language of the civil-remedies provision of the Privacy Act is clear. At the time Congress drafted the Act, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “actual damages” as “[r]eal, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury” and as “[slynonymous with ‘compensatory damages.’ ” Black’s Law Dictionary 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (hereinafter Black’s). The majority claims this is a “general” and “notably circular” definition, ante, at 292, but it is unclear why. The definition is plain enough: “Actual damages” compensate for actual injury, and thus the term is synonymous with compensatory damages. See Black’s 467 (defining “compensatory damages” as damages that “will compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury”). There is nothing circular about that definition. It is the definition this Court adopted more than a century ago when we recognized. that “[compensatory damages and actual damages mean the same thing; that is, that the damages shall be the result of the injury alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be precisely commensurate with the injury suffered.” Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64 (1876). It is the definition embraced in current legal dictionaries. See Black’s 445 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “actual damages” as “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.— Also termed compensatory damages; tangible damages; real damages” (italics omitted)). And it is the definition that accords with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 22, 571 (2002) (defining “actual” as “existing in fact or reality” and “damages” as “compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by a violation of a legal right”). Thus, both as a term of art and in its plain meaning, “actual damages” connotes compensation for proven injuries or losses. Nothing in the use of that phrase indicates proven injuries need be pecuniary in nature. The majority discards all this on the asserted ground that “the precise meaning of the term ‘changes with the specific statute in which it is found.’” Ante, at 292 (quoting 622 F. 3d 1016,1029 (CA9 2010)). Context, of course, is relevant to statutory interpretation; it may provide clues that Congress did not employ a word or phrase in its ordinary meaning. That well-established interpretive rule cannot, however, render irrelevant — as the majority would have it — the ordinary meaning of “actual damages.” Moreover, the authority the majority cites for its claim that “actual damages” has no fixed meaning undermines— rather than supports — its holding. Each cited authority involves either a statute in which Congress expressly directed that compensation be measured in strictly economic terms, or else a statute (e. g., the Copyright Act of 1909) in which economic loss is the natural and probable consequence of a violation of the defined legal interest. Neither factor is present here. Notably absent from the Privacy Act is any provision so much as hinting that “actual damages” should be limited to economic loss. And while “‘“hurt feelings” over the nature of the [copyright] infringement’ ” may “have no place in the actual damages calculus” under the Copyright Act of 1909, ante, at 293 (quoting in parenthetical Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F. 3d 909, 917 (CA9 2002)), the majority provides no basis for concluding that “hurt feelings” are equally invalid in an Act concerned with safeguarding individual privacy. Thus, while context is no doubt relevant, the majority’s cited authority does little to help its cause in the stated context of this statute. B Indeed, the relevant' statutory context — the substantive provisions whose breach may trigger suit under the civil-remedies provision — only reinforces the ordinary meaning of “actual damages.” Congress established substantive duties in the Act that are expressly designed to prevent agency conduct resulting in intangible harms to the individual. The Act requires agencies to “establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” to ensure against security breaches that could result in “substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual.” 5 U. S. C. § 552a(e)(10). It also requires agencies to “maintain all records” used in making a determination about an individual in a manner that is “reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination.” § 552a(e)(5). Thus an agency violates the terms of the Act if it fails, e. g., to maintain safeguards protecting against “embarrassment”; there is no additional requirement that the pocketbook be implicated. An agency’s intentional or willful violation of those duties triggers liability for “actual damages” under §552a(g)(4) in the event of an adverse impact. §§552a(g) (1)(C)-(D), (g)(4). Adopting a reading of “actual damages” that permits recovery for pecuniary loss alone creates a disconnect between the Act’s substantive and remedial provisions. It allows a swath of Government violations to go unrernedied: A federal agency could intentionally or willfully forgo establishing safeguards to protect against embarrassment and no successful private action could be taken against it for the harm Congress identified. Only an interpretation of “actual damages” that permits recovery for nonpecuniary harms harmonizes the Act’s substantive and remedial provisions. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997) (statutory interpretation must consider “the broader context of the statute as a whole”)- The majority draws a different conclusion from the substantive provisions of the Privacy Act. It (correctly) infers from them that the Act “serves interests similar to those protected by defamation and privacy torts.” Ante, at 295. It then points to our observation in Doe v. Chao, 540 U. S. 614, 625 (2004), that the Act’s civil-remedies provision “parallels” the remedial scheme for the common-law torts of defamation per quod, which permitted recovery of “general damages” (i. e., presumed damages) only if a plaintiff first establishes “special damages” (i. e., monetary loss). Ante, at 295. That “parallel,” the majority concludes, “suggests the possibility that Congress intended the term ‘actual damages’ in the Act to mean special damages.” Ante, at 296. The majority reads too much into Doe. At issue in that case was the question whether the Act’s civil-suit provision authorized recovery of a guaranteed minimum award of $1,000 absent proof of some, “actual damages.” The Court answered in the negative, and in the course of doing so replied to the petitioner’s argument that there was “something peculiar in offering some guaranteed damages . . . only to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual damages.” 540 U. S., at 625. Although the Court cited the Act’s parallels to defamation per quod actions in noting that nothing was “peculiar” about the Act’s' remedial scheme, Doe did not take the further step of deciding that “actual damages” means economic loss alone. Indeed, it expressly reserved that question. Id., at 627, n. 12. The majority, moreover, is wrong to conclude that the Act’s parallels with defamation per quod actions suggest Congress intended “actual damages” to mean “special damages.” Quite the opposite. The fact that Congress “would probably have known about” defamation per quod actions, id., at 625, makes it all the more significant that Congress did not write “special damages” in the civil-remedies provision. This Court is typically not in the business of substituting words we think Congress intended to use for words Congress in fact used. Yet that is precisely what the majority does when it rewrites “actual damages” to mean “special damages.” In sum, the statutory context, and in particular the Act’s substantive provisions, confirms the ordinary meaning of “actual damages.” Although the Act shares parallels with common-law defamation torts, such analogies do not warrant a reading of the phrase that is at odds with the statute’s plain text. C An uncodified provision of the Act, tied to the Act’s drafting history, also reinforces the ordinary meaning of “actual damages.” As the majority notes, prior to reconciliation, the Senate and House bills contained civil-remedies provisions that were different in a critical respect: The Senate bill allowed for the recovery of “actual and general damages,” whereas the House bill allowed for the recovery of “actual damages” alone. In the reconciliation process, the provision for “general damages” was dropped and an uncodified section of the Act was amended to require the newly established Privacy Protection Study Commission to consider, among its other jobs, “whether the Federal Government should be liable for general damages incurred by an individual as the result of a willful or intentional violation of the provisions of sections 552a(g)(1)(C) or (D).” § 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907; see also Doe, 540 U. S., at 622. As the Court explained in Doe, “[t]he deletion of ‘general damages’ from the bill is fairly seen ... as a deliberate elimination of any possibility of imputing harm and awarding presumed damages.” Id., at 623; see also id., at 622, n. 5 (“Congress explicitly rejected the proposal to make presumed damages available for Privacy Act violations”). The elimination of presumed damages from the bill can only reasonably imply that what Congress left behind — “actual damages” — comprised damages that are not presumed, i. e., damages proved by competent evidence in the record. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 349-350 (1974) (distinguishing in defamation context between presumed damages and damages for actual injuries sustained by competent evidence in the record, which include “impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering”); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 262-264 (1978)- (distinguishing between presumed damages and proven damages for mental and emotional distress). Rather than view the deletion of general damages (presumed damages) as leaving the converse (proven damages), the majority supposes that the deletion leaves only a subset of proven damages — those of an economic nature, i. e., “special damages.” Once again, however, the majority’s insistence that “Congress intended ‘actual damages’ in the Privacy Act to mean special damages for proven pecuniary loss,” ante, at 298, finds no basis in the statutory text, see supra, at 311-312. And its response to the conclusion that Congress retained recovery for proven damages when it eliminated presumed damages is singularly unsatisfying. The majority declares such a conclusion “flawed” because “general damages” “includes compensation for proven injuries as well,” so that “what distinguishes [general] damages, whether proved or not, from the only other category of compensatory damages available in the relevant common-law suits is the type of harm” the term éncompasses — which the majority takes to be emotional harm alone. Ante, at 300-301. That assertion is defective on two scores. First, a plaintiff’s ability to present proof of injury in a defamation per se action (and to recover for such proven injury) does not alter the definition of “general damages,” which we already explained in Doe means “presumed damages.” 540 U. S., at 621; see also id., at 623; n. 5, supra. Second, “general damages” is not limited to a “type” of harm. The majority’s contrary assertion that the term permits recovery only for emotional “types” of harm overlooks the fact that “general damages are partly based on the belief that the plaintiff will suffer unprovable pecuniary losses.” Dobbs §7.2, at 514 (emphasis added). It thus was established at common law that in a defamation per se action, “the plaintiff is usually free to prove whatever actual pecuniary loss he can,” and “the jury may be permitted to view the actual pecuniary loss proven as the tip of the iceberg, assume that there is still more unproven, and award damage accordingly.” Ibid. At its core, the majority opinion relies on the following syllogism: The common law employed two terms of art in defamation actions. Because Congress excluded recovery for “general damages,” it must have meant to retain recovery only for “special damages.” That syllogism, of course, ignores that there is another category of damages. It is the very category Congress used in the text of the Privacy Act: “actual damages.” However much Congress may have drawn “‘parallels,’” ante, at 295, between the Act and the common-law tort of defamation, the fact remains that Congress expressly chose not to use the words “special damages.” D I turn finally to the statute’s purpose, for “[a]s in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of th[e] statut[e] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 608 (1979); see also Dolan v. Postal Serv ice, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis”). The purposes of the Privacy Act could not be more explicit, and they are consistent with interpreting “actual damages” according to its ordinary meaning. “The historical context of the Act is important to an understanding of its remedial purposes. In 1974, Congress was concerned with curbing the illegal surveillance and investigation of individuals by federal agencies that had been exposed during the Watergate scandal.” Dept, of Justice, Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, p. 4 (2010). In particular, Congress recognized that “the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technology . . . has greatly magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal information.” § 2(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1896. Identifying the right to privacy as “a personal and fundamental right,” Congress found it “necessary and proper” to enact the Privacy Act “in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal agencies.” §§ 2(a)(4), (5), ibid. Congress explained that the “purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as otherwise provided by law, to,” inter alia, “be subject to civil suit for any damages which occur as a result of willful or intentional action which violates any individual’s rights under this Act.” §2(b)(6), ibid, (emphasis added). That statement is an explicit reference to suits brought under § 552a(g)(4); no other provision speaks to a civil suit based on “willful or intentional” agency misconduct. It signals unmistakably congressional recognition that the civil-remedies provision is integral to realizing the Act’s purposes. ■ Reading “actual damages” to permit recovery for any injury established by competent evidence in the record — pecuniary or not — best effectuates the statute’s basic purpose. Although some privacy invasions no doubt result in economic loss, we have recognized time and again that the primary form of injuries is nonpecuniary, and includes mental distress and personal humiliation. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 385, n. 9 (1967) (“In the ‘right of privacy’ cases the primary damage is the mental distress”); see also Gertz, 418 U. S., at 350 (“[Ajctual injury” in defamatory falsehood cases “is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering”). Accord, 2 Dobbs §7.1(1), at 259 (2d ed. 1993) (privacy is a dignitary interest, and “in a great many of the cases” in which the interest is invaded “the only harm is the affront to the plaintiff’s dignity as a human being, the damage to his self-image, and the resulting mental distress”). That accords with common sense. In interpreting the civil-remedies provision, we must not forget Congress enacted the Privacy Act to protect privacy. The majority's reading of “actual damages” renders the remedial provision impotent in the face of concededly unlawful agency action whenever the injury is solely nonpecuniary. That result is patently at odds with Congress’ stated purpose. The majority, however, does not grapple with the ramifications of its opinion. It acknowledges the suggestion that its holding leads to absurd results as it allows individuals suffering relatively minor pecuniary losses to recover $1,000 while others suffering severe mental anguish to recover nothing. But it concludes that “there is nothing absurd about a scheme that limits the Government’s Privacy Act liability to harm that can be substantiated by proof of tangible economic loss.” Ante, at 303. Perhaps; it is certainly within Congress’ prerogative to enact the statute the majority envisions, namely, one that seeks to safeguard against invasions of privacy without remedying the primary harm that results from invasions of privacy. The problem for the majority is that one looks in vain for any indication in the text of the statute before us that Congress intended such a result. Nowhere in the Privacy Act does Congress so much as hint that it views a $5 hit to the pocketbook as more worthy of remedy than debilitating mental distress, and the majority’s contrary assumption discounts the gravity of emotional harm caused by an invasion of the personal integrity that privacy protects. * * * After today, no . matter how debilitating and substantial the resulting mental anguish,, an individual harmed by a federal agency’s intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act will be left without a remedy unless he or she is able to prove pecuniary harm. That is not the result Congress intended when it enacted an Act with the express purpose of safeguarding individual privacy against Government invasion. And it is not a result remotely suggested by anything in the text, structure, or history of the Act. For those reasons, I respectfully dissent. Respondent eventually applied for recertification as a pilot. After reviewing respondent’s medical records, including information about his HIV diagnosis and treatment, the FAA reissued his pilot certificate and medical certificate. Brief for Respondent 5, n. 1. With certain exceptions, it is unlawful for an agency to disclose a record to another agency without the written consent of the person to whom the record pertains. 5 U. S. C. § 552a(b). One exception to this nondisclosure requirement applies when the head of an agency makes a written request for law enforcement purposes to the agency that maintains the record. See §552a(b)(7). The agencies in this case could easily have shared respondent’s medical records pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Privacy Act, but the District Court concluded that they failed to do so. This narrow usage is reflected in contemporaneous state-court decisions as well. See, e. g., Reist v. Manwiller, 231 Pa. Super. 444, 449, n. 4, 332 A. 2d 518, 520, n. 4 (1974) (explaining that recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is allowed “despite the total absence of physical injury and actual damages”); Nalder v. Crest Corp., 93 Idaho 744, 749, 472 P. 2d 310, 315 (1970) (noting that damages for “mental anguish” due to the wrongful execution of a judgment “are allowable only as an element of punitive but not of. actual damages”). It is also reflected in post-Privaey Act statutes and judicial decisions. See, e. g., 17 U. S. C. § 1009(d)(1)(A)(ii) (defining “actual damages” in the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 as “the royalty payments that should have been paid”); 18 U. S. C. § 2318(e)(3) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (calculating “actual damages” for purposes of a counterfeit labeling statute in terms of financial loss); Guzman v. Western State Bank of Devils Lake, 540 F. 2d 948, 953 (CA8 1976) (stating that compensatory damages in a civil rights suit “can be awarded for emotional and mental distress even though no actual damages are proven”). The dissent criticizes us for noting that the dictionary definition contains an element of circularity. The dissent says that the definition— “‘[ajctual damages' compensate for actual injury” — is “plain enough.” Post, at 306 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). But defining “actual” damages by reference to “actual” injury is hardly helpful when our task is to determine what Congress meant by “actual.” The dissent’s reference to the current version of Black’s Law Dictionary, which provides that “actual damages” can mean “tangible damages,” only highlights the term’s ambiguity. See Black’s Law Dictionary 445 (9th ed. 2009). If “actual damages” can mean “tangible damages,” then it can be construed not to include intangible harm, like mental and emotional distress. Similarly unhelpful is the dissent’s citation to a general-purpose dictionary that defines “actual” as “existing in fact or reality” and “damages” as “compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 22, 571 (2002) (emphasis added). Combining these two lay definitions says nothing about whether compensation for mental and emotional distress is in fact imposed by law. The definitions merely beg the question we are trying to answer. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that “actual damages” has taken on different meanings in different statutes, as our examples amply illustrate. Libel per quod and slander (as opposed to libel and slander per se) apply to a communication that is not defamatory on its face but that is defamatory when coupled with some other extrinsic fact. Dobbs § 7.2, at 512-513. See also 3 Restatement § 575, Comment b (“Special harm ... is harm of a material and generally of a pecuniary nature”); Dobbs § 7.2, at 520 (“Special damages in defamation eases mean pecuniary damages, or at least ‘material loss’ ” (footnote omitted)). Special damages do not include mental or emotional distress. See 3 Restatement § 575, Comment c (“The emotional distress caused to the person slandered by his knowledge that he has been defamed is not special harm and this is so although the distress results in a serious illness”); Dobbs § 7.2, at 520 (“Even under the more modern approach, special damages in defamation eases must be economic in nature, and it is not enough that the plaintiff has suffered harm to reputation, mental anguish or other dignitary harm, unless he has also suffered the loss of something having economic value”). See also id., § 3.2, at 139 (explaining that noneconomic harms “are called general damages”); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 112, p. 761 (4th ed. 1971) (noting that “‘general’ damages may be recovered for the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation, his wounded feelings and humiliation, and resulting physical illness and pain, as well as estimated future damages of the same kind” (footnotes omitted)); 3 Restatement § 621, Comment a (stating that, in actions for defamation, a plaintiff may recover general damages for “impairment of his reputation or, through loss of reputation, to his other interests”). The dissent disregards these precedents as the product of careless imprecision. Post, at 311, n. 6. But just as we assume that Congress did not act carelessly, we should not be so quick to assume that the courts did. The better explanation for these precedents is not that the courts were careless, but that the term “actual damages” has a varied meaning that, depending on the context, can be limited to compensation for only pecuniary harm. See also Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371,382-383,294 A. 2d 326, 332-333 (1972) (“Having admittedly alleged or proven no special damages, the plaintiff here is limited to a recovery of general damages . . . ”); Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 45 N. D. 568, 574, 178 N. W. 792, 794 (1920) (per curiam) (“Generally speaking, there are recognized two classes of damages in libel cases, general damages and special damages”); Winans v. Chapman, 104 Kan. 664, 666, 180 P. 266, 267 (1919) (“Actual damages include both general and special damages”); Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284, 288-289, 38 P. 903, 904 (1894) (explaining that special damages, “as a branch of actual damages[,] may be recovered when actual pecuniary loss has been sustained” and that the “remaining branch of actual damages embraces recovery for loss of reputation, shame, mortification, injury to feelings, etc.”); see generally Dobbs § 7.3, at 531 (“Though the dignitary torts often involve only general damages . . ., they sometimes produce actual pecuniary loss. When this happens, the plaintiff is usually entitled to recover any special damage he can prove ... ”); 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §5.30, p. 470 (1956) (‘When liability for defamation is established, the defendant, in addition to such ‘general’ damages as may be assessed by the jury, is also liable for any special damage which he has sustained”). The dissent advances the same argument. See post, at 312-314. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 3613(e)(1) (stating that “the court may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages”); 15 U. S. C. § 1681n(a)(l) (authorizing “(A) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or. damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000; or (B) . . . actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or $1,000, whichever is greater”); §1681o(a)(1) (authorizing “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure”) with 5 U. S. C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (authorizing “actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000”). Despite its rhetoric, the dissent does not dispute most of the steps in our analysis. For example, although the dissent belittles the sovereign immunity canon, the dissent does not call for its abandonment. See 'post, at 305-306. Nor does the dissent point out any error in our understanding of the canon’s meaning. See ibid. The dissent acknowledges that statutes and judicial opinions sometimes use the term “actual damages” to mean pecuniary harm, see post, at 308, and that determining its meaning in a particular statute requires consideration of context, see ibid. In addition, the dissent concedes — as it must in light of our reasoning in Doe v. Chao, 540 U. S. 614 (2004) — that the common law of defamation has relevance in construing the term “actual damages” in the Privacy Act. See post, at 310-312. The dissent’s argument thus boils down to this: The text and purpose of the Privacy Act make it clear beyond any reasonable dispute that the term “actual damages,” as used in the Act, means compensatory damages for all proven harm and not just damages for pecuniary harm. The dissent reasons that, because the Act seeks to prevent pecuniary and nonpecuni-ary harm, Congress must have intended to authorize the recovery of money damages from the Federal Government for both types of harm. This inference is plausible, but it surely is not unavoidable. The Act deters violations óf its substantive provisions in other ways — for instance, by permitting recovery for economic injury; by imposing criminal sanctions for some violations, see 5 U. S. C. § 552a(i); and possibly by allowing for injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§702, 706; see Doe, supra, at 619, n. 1 (noting that the absence of equitable relief in suits under § 552a(g)(l)(C) or § 552a(g)(l)(D) may be explained by the availability of such relief under the APA). Black’s Law Dictionary also defined “actual damages” as synonymous with “general damages.” Black’s 467. While “general damages” has a specialized meaning of presumed damages in libel and slander cases, see n. 4, infra, it more generally can mean damages that “did in fact result from the wrong, directly and proximately,” Black’s 468. The majority declares the definition circular because “defining ‘actual’ damages by reference to ‘actual’ injury is hardly helpful when our task is to determine what Congress meant by ‘actual.’ ” Ante, at 294, n. 4. “Actual injury,” however, is far from an unhelpful reference. This Court already has recognized in the defamation context that “actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). That accords with the definitions of the terms. See Black’s 53, 924 (defining “actual” as “[r]eal; substantial; existing presently in act, having a valid objective existence as opposed to that which is merely theoretical or possible,” and “injury” as “[a]ny wrong or damage done to another”). See 28 U.S.C. §2674; 17 U.S.C. § 1009(d)(1); 18 U.S.C. §2318(e)(3) (2006 ed., Supp. IV); 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970 ed.); 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (2006 ed., Supp. IV). It bears noting that the Privacy Act does not authorize injunctive relief when a suit is maintained under 5 U. S. C. §§ 552a(g)(l)(C) and (D). Rather, injunctive relief is available under the Act only for a limited category of suits: suits to amend a record and suits for access to a record. See §§ 552a(g)(2), (g)(3). Thus an individual who, like respondent, brings suit under subparagraph (g)(1)(C) or (D) for an intentional or willful violation of the Act will be without a remedy under the majority’s reading of “actual damages.” As the majority notes, “general damages” at common law refers to damages “presumed” to accrue from the violation of the legally protected right. No proof of actual injury was required. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 7.2, p. 513 (1973) (hereinafter Dobbs); Doe, 540 U. S., at 621. “Special damages,” in contrast, “meant monetary loss.” Dobbs §7.2, at 512; Doe, 540 U. S., at 625. Common-law defamation actions falling within the rubric of defamation per se allowed successful plaintiffs to recover “general damages.” See Dobbs § 7.2, at 513; Doe, 540 U. S., at 621. This stood in contrast to actions sounding in defamation per quod, which permitted recovery only if the plaintiff established “special damages.” See Dobbs §7.2, at 512; Doe, 540 U. S., at 625. Even in defamation per quod eases, a plaintiff could recover nonpecuniary injuries upon establishing some pecuniary loss. See Dobbs § 7.2, at 521; Doe, 540 U. S., at 625. See also ante, at 295. The majority cites a collection of lower court opinions that have used “actual damages” in place of “special damages” to note that Congress would not have been alone in using the former term to refer to the latter. Ante, at 297-298. But that a handful of lower courts on occasion have been imprecise in their terminology provides no .basis to assume the Legislature has been equally careless in the text of a statute. There is yet another flaw in the majority’s reasoning. At common law a plaintiff who successfully established “special damages” in an action for defamation per quod could proceed to recover damages for emotional and mental distress. See ante, at 295; n. 5, supra. If “Congress intended the term ‘actual damages’ in the Act to mean special damages,” ante, at 296, then an individual who successfully establishes some pecuniary loss from a violation of the Act — presumably as trivial as the cost of a bottle of Tylenol — should be permitted to recover for emotional and mental distress. The majority, of course, does not accept that result, and its piecemeal embrace of the common law undermines its assertion that Congress intended “special damages” in place of “actual damages.” See S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 303(c)(1) (1974); H. R. 16373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 3 (1974). The majority cites the conclusions of the Privacy Protection Study Commission in support of its interpretation of “actual damages.” The majority rightfully does not claim this piece of postenactment, extratex-tual material is due any deference; nor do I find its unelaborated conclusions persuasive.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McNAMARA v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES No. 87-5840. Argued November 28, 1988 Decided December 6, 1988 James E. Sutherland argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was R. Stephen McNally. Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jerome A. Barron and Sanford N. Katz. Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Steven R. Shapiro, and John A. Powell filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Barker Foundation by E'rwin N. Griswold, Robert C. Gombar, and Glen D. Nager; for the Child by Christian R. Van Deusen and Ted R. Youmans; and for the National Committee for Adoption by Merrill F. Nelson, C. Harold Brown, and William M. Schur. Per Curiam. The appeal is dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

324 LIQUOR CORP., dba YORKSHIRE WINE & SPIRITS v. DUFFY et al. No. 84-2022. Argued November 3, 1986 Decided January 13, 1987 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, post, p. 352. Bertram M. Kantor argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Michael H. Byoioitz and Seymour Howard. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cannon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Harriet S. Shapiro, Catherine G. O’Sullivan, and Andrea Limmer. Christopher Keith Hall, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, 0. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, and Richard G. Liskov, Lloyd Constantine, and August L. Fietkau, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Peerless Importers, Inc., et al. by Lawrence Kill, Steven M. Pesner, Anthony A. Dean, Ralph S. Spritzer, Michael Whiteman, and Jonathan P. Nye; and for Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union Local 1, AFL-CIO, et al. by Victor Feingold. Martin P. Mehler filed a brief for Metropolitan Package Store Association, Inc., et al. as amid curiae. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of New York requires retailers to charge at least 112 percent of the “posted” wholesale price for liquor, but permits wholesalers to sell to retailers at less than the “posted” price. The question presented is whether this pricing system is valid under either the state-action exemption from the antitrust laws or the Twenty-first Amendment. hH <C Wholesalers of liquor in the State of New York must file, or “post,” monthly price schedules with the State Liquor Authority (SLA). N. Y. Aleo. Bev. Cont. Law (ABC Law) §101-b (McKinney 1970 and Supp. 1986). The schedules must report, “with respect to each item,” “the bottle and case price to retailers.” § 101-b(3)(b). The ABC Law itself does not require that the posted case price of an item bear any relation to its posted bottle price. The SLA, however, has promulgated a rule stating that for cases containing 48 or fewer bottles, the posted bottle price multiplied by the number of bottles in a case must exceed the posted case price by a “breakage” surcharge of $1.92. SLA Rule 16.4(e), 9 NYCRR § 65.4(e) (1980). Retailers of liquor may not sell below “cost.” ABC Law, § 101-bb(2). The statute defines “cost” as “the price of such item of liquor to the retailer plus twelve percentum of such price.” § 101-bb(2)(b). “Price,” in turn, is defined as the posted bottle price in effect at the time the retailer sells or offers to sell the item. Ibid. Although the statute defines retail cost in terms of the wholesaler’s posted bottle price, retailers generally purchase liquor by the case. The SLA expressly has authorized wholesalers to reduce, or “post off,” the case price of an item without reducing the posted bottle price of the item. SLA Bulletin 471 (June 29, 1973). By reducing the case price without reducing the bottle price, wholesalers can compel retailers to charge more than 112 percent of the actual wholesale cost. Similarly, because § 101-bb(2)(b) defines “cost!’ in terms of the posted bottle price in effect when the retailer sells or offers to sell the item, wholesalers can sell retailers large quantities in a month when prices are low and then require the retailers to sell at an abnormally high markup by raising the bottle price in succeeding months. The New York retail pricing system thus permits wholesalers to set retail prices, and retail markups, without regard to actual retail costs. New York wholesalers advertise in trade publications that their “post offs” will guarantee retailers large markups, sometimes in excess of 30 percent. App. 32-35. Wholesalers also advertise that buying large quantities while wholesale prices are low will result in extra retail profits after wholesale prices are raised. App. to Juris. Statement 101 A. The effect of this complex of statutory provisions and regulations is to permit wholesalers to maintain retail prices at artificially high levels. B Appellant 324 Liquor Corporation sold two bottles of liquor to SLA investigators in June 1981 for less than 112 percent of the posted bottle price. Because the wholesalers had “posted off” their June 1981 case prices without reducing the posted bottle prices, appellant’s retail prices represented an 18 percent markup over its actual wholesale cost. As a result of this violation, appellant’s license was suspended for 10 days and it forfeited a $1,000 bond. Appellant sought relief from the penalties on the ground that § 101-bb violates § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. A New York Supreme Court denied the petition. 323 Liquor Corp. v. McLaughlin, 119 Misc. 2d 746, 464 N. Y. S. 2d 355 (1983). The Appellate Division reversed. 324 Liquor Corp. v. McLaughlin, 102 App. Div. 2d 607, 478 N. Y. S. 2d 615 (1984). The New York Court of Appeals upheld the validity of § 101-bb and reinstated the penalties. J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d 504, 479 N. E. 2d 779 (1985). The Court of Appeals held that § 101-bb is not immune under the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), because the State does not actively supervise the resale price maintenance system. The court nevertheless concluded that the statute is a proper exercise of powers reserved to the State by the Twenty-first Amendment, because “the State interest in protecting retailers which underlies [the statute] is of sufficient magnitude to override the Federal policy expressed in the antitrust laws.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 522, 479 N. E. 2d, at 789. We noted probable jurisdiction, 475 U. S. 1080 (1986), and we now reverse. t — i In California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), we invalidated a California statute requiring all producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers of wine to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State. Midcal establishes the framework for our analysis of New York’s liquor pricing system. A The “threshold question,” in this case as in Midcal, is whether the State’s pricing system is inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Id., at 102. Section 101-bb imposes a regime of resale price maintenance on all New York liquor retailers. Resale price maintenance has been a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act “since the early years of national antitrust enforcement.” Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 761 (1984). See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co,, 220 U. S. 373, 404-409 (1911). Our recent decisions recognize the possibility that a vertical restraint imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition even as . it reduces intrabrand competition. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 51-52 (1977). Accordingly, we have held that concerted nonprice restrictions imposed by a single manufacturer are to be judged under the rule of reason. Id., at 59. We also have held that a single manufacturer may announce resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., supra, at 761; United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307 (1919). Neither of these qualifications to the per se rule applies in this case. Section 101-bb directly restricts retail prices, and retailers are subject to penalties for failure to adhere to the resale price schedules. The New York statute, moreover, applies to all wholesalers and retailers of liquor. We have noted that industrywide resale price maintenance also may facilitate cartelization. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., supra, at 51, n. 18. Mandatory industrywide resale price fixing is virtually certain to reduce interbrand competition as well as intrabrand competition, because it prevents manufacturers and wholesalers from allowing or requiring retail price competition. The New York statute specifically forbids retailers from reducing the minimum prices set by wholesalers. The antitrust violation in this case is essentially similar to the violation in Midcal. It is true that the wholesalers in Midcal were required to adhere to a single fair trade contract or price schedule for each geographical area. 445 U. S., at 99-100. Midcal therefore involved horizontal as well as vertical price fixing. Although the horizontal restraint in Midcal may have provided an additional reason for invalidating the statute, our decision in Midcal rested on the “vertical control” of wine producers, who held “the power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by wholesalers.” Id., at 103. As we explained in Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654 (1982), the California statute was invalidated because “it mandated resale price maintenance, an activity that has long been regarded as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.” Id., at 659-660 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). We hold that ABC Law § 101-bb is inconsistent with § 1 of the Sherman Act. B In Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), the Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply “to the anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature.” Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 38 (1985). Parker v. Brown rests on principles of federalism and state sovereignty. Under those principles, “an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S., at 351. At the same time, “a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.” Ibid. Our decisions have established a two-part test for determining immunity under Parker v. Brown. “First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.” California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., supra, at 105 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (plurality opinion)). New York’s liquor-pricing system meets the first requirement. The state legislature clearly has adopted a policy of resale price maintenance. Just as clearly, however, New York’s liquor-pricing system is not actively supervised by the State. As in Midcal, the State “simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties.” 445 U. S., at 105. New York “neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules.” Ibid. New York “does not monitor market conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the program.” Id., at 106 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 362 (1977)). Each wholesaler sets its own “posted” prices; the State does not control month-to-month variations in posted prices. Nor does the State supervise the wholesaler’s decision to “post off,” the amount of the “post off,” the corresponding decrease, if any, in the bottle price, or the frequency with which a wholesaler posts off. The State has displaced competition among liquor retailers without substituting an adequate system of regulation. “The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.” 445 U. S., at 106. y — i ) — i i — t Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment reserves to the States the power to regulate, or prohibit entirely, the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquor within their borders. Section 2 “grants the States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” Mid-cal, 445 U. S., at 110. The States’ Twenty-first Amendment powers, though broad, are circumscribed by other provisions of the Constitution. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982) (Establishment Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436 (1971) (procedural due process); Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1964) (Export-Import Clause). Although §2 directly qualifies the federal commerce power, the Court has rejected the view “that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned.” Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 331-332 (1964). Instead, the Court has engaged in a “pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers.” Midcal, supra, at 109. The question in each case is “whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies.” Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691, 714 (1984). A The New York Court of Appeals concluded that § 101-bb “was expressly designed to preserve competition in New York’s retail liquor industry by stabilizing the retail market and protecting the economic position of small liquor retailers.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d, at 520, 479 N. E. 2d, at 788. The Court of Appeals traced the recent history of the State’s regulation of retail liquor prices. In early 1964, the Moreland Commission completed an extensive study of the state laws governing the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. New York State Moreland Comm’n on the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, Report and Recommendations Nos. 1-3 (1964). “The Commission’s major findings were that New York consumers suffered from serious price discrimination when compared to liquor consumers in other States and that a severe lack of competition existed in the New York retail market.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 519, 479 N. E. 2d, at 787. The New York Legislature responded in 1964 by enacting sweeping changes in the ABC Law primarily intended to promote price competition among liquor retailers. Ibid. The 1964 version of § 101-bb prohibited retail sales below cost and defined cost as the bottle price in effect when the retailer sells or offers to sell the item. ABC Law § 101-bb (McKinney 1970). During the years between 1964 and 1971, the number of liquor stores in New York declined. The State Senate Excise Committee investigated the decline and concluded that “the mass of small retailers are unable to compete with the large volume outlets that have emerged.” New York State Legislature, Senate Excise Committee, Final Report 29-30 (Mar. 5, 1971). In 1971 the legislature enacted the current version of ABC Law § 101-bb to “protec[t] the economic position of small liquor retailers.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 520, 479 N. E. 2d, at 788. We agree with the New York Court of Appeals that the purpose of the 12-percent minimum markup is to protect small retailers. We have noted that the 12-percent markup is imposed on the “posted bottle price,” a price that may differ from the actual wholesale price paid by the retailer. See supra, at 339-340. There is no indication in the statute or its legislative history, however, that the purpose of defining cost as “posted bottle price” was to protect small retailers. The New York Legislature first defined cost in terms of posted bottle price in the 1964 amendments to the ABC Law. The purpose of those amendments, as the New York Court of Appeals found, was to increase price competition among liquor retailers. The 1971 amendments simply retained bottle price as the basis of the statutory definition of cost and added 12 percent to reflect the retailer’s overhead and operating expenses. Indeed, the legislative Committee that considered the 1971 amendments concluded that the bottle price definition of cost put small retailers at a slight disadvantage. The Committee noted that “[t]he present definition of ‘cost’ [as] scheduled bottle cost to the retailer does afford some margin of profit to large retailers in particular, and, to a lesser extent, to all retailers who can afford to buy by the case.” New York State Senate Excise Committee, Final Report, supra, at 8-9. The Committee suggested that “consideration be accorded to . . . [r]evision or elimination of. . . ‘post offs’ practices that appear to afford discriminatory advantages to possession of great purchasing power.” Id., at 41. The Committee did not recommend an amendment to this effect because it considered the matter “outside the scope of the directive given to this Committee.” Ibid. In Midcal, we found nothing in the record to suggest that California’s wine-pricing system actually helped sustain small retailers. 445 U. S., at 113. Similarly, in this case the New York Court of Appeals cited no legislative or other findings that either the minimum markup requirement or the “bottle price” definition of cost has been effective in preserving small retail establishments, and made no findings of its own. Our Midcal opinion cites evidence that States with “fair trade laws” not unlike ABC Law § 101-bb actually had higher rates of firm failure, and slower rates of growth of small retail stores, than free trade States in the years between 1956 and 1972. 445 U. S., at 113 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, p. 3 (1975)). The only relevant evidence in the record indicates that the number of retail liquor outlets in New York continued to decline between 1970 and 1979. App. to Juris Statement 99A. We are unwilling to assume on the basis of this record that § 101-bb has the effect of protecting small retailers. In this case, as in Midcal, the State’s unsubstantiated interest in protecting small retailers “simply [is] not of the same stature as the goals of the Sherman Act.” 445 U. S., at 114. New York’s resale price maintenance system directly conflicts with the “familiar and substantial” federal interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws. Id., at 110. “Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular . . . are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). We therefore conclude that the State’s asserted interest in protecting small retailers does not suffice to afford immunity from the Sherman Act. B Appellees finally argue that § 101-bb furthers the State’s interest in promoting temperance. Brief for Appellees 39-44. One would hardly suggest that the New York Legislature set out to promote temperance by increasing the number of retail outlets for liquor. Rather, appellees argue that New York’s pricing system has the effect of raising retail prices, and that higher prices decrease consumption of liquor. The New York Court of Appeals did not find that the statute was intended to promote temperance, or that it does so. On the contrary, that court cited the conclusion of the Moreland Commission that higher prices do not decrease consumption of liquor. J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d, at 521, n. 2, 479 N. E. 2d, at 788, n. 2 (citing Moreland Comm’n Report No. 1, at 3, 17). Of course, we are not bound by findings of the Court of Appeals that undercut powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Midcal, supra, at 111; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945). We nevertheless accord “great weight to the views of the State’s highest court” on state-law matters, Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Midcal, supra, at 111-112. Our review of the record discloses no such exceptional circumstances in this case. We therefore do not reach the question whether New York’s liquor-pricing system could be upheld as an exercise of the State’s power to promote temperance. I — I <1 We conclude that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no immunity for New York’s authorization of private, unsupervised price fixing by liquor wholesalers. We therefore reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 101 — b(3)(b) provides, in part: “No brand of liquor or wine shall be sold to or purchased by a retailer unless a schedule, as provided by this section, is filed with the liquor authority, and is then in effect. Such schedule shall be in writing duly verified, and filed in the number of copies and form as required by the authority, and shall contain, with respect to each item, the exact brand or trade name, capacity of package, nature of contents, age and proof where stated on the label, the number of bottles contained in each case, the bottle and case price to retailers, the net bottle and case price paid by the seller, which prices, in each instance, shall be individual for each item and not in ‘combination’ with any other item, the discounts for quantity, if any, and the discounts for time of payment, if any. Such brand of liquor or wine shall not be sold to retailers except at the price and discounts then in effect unless prior written permission of the authority is granted for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter. Such schedule shall be filed by each manufacturer selling such brand to retailers and by each wholesaler selling such brand to retailers.” Rule 16.4(e), 9 NYCRR § 65.4(e) (1980), provides: “For each item of liquor listed in the schedule of liquor prices to retailers there shall be posted a bottle and a case price. The bottle price multiplied by number of containers in the case must exceed the case price by approximately $1.92 for any case of 48 or fewer containers. The figure is to be reached by adding $1.92 to the case price, dividing by the number of containers in the case, and rounding to the nearest cent. Where more than 48 containers are packed in a case, bottle price shall be computed by dividing the case price by the number of containers in the case, rounding to the nearest cent, and adding one cent. Variations will not be permitted without approval of the authority.” Section 101-bb(2) provides, in part: “No licensee authorized to sell liquor at retail for off-premises consumption shall sell, offer to sell, solicit an order for or advertise any item of liquor at a price which is less than cost. As used in this section, the term: “(b) 'cost' shall mean the price of such item of liquor to the retailer plus twelve percentum of such price, which is declared as a matter of legislative determination to represent the average minimum overhead necessarily incurred in connection with the sale by the retailer of such item of liquor. As used in this paragraph (b) the term “price” shall mean the bottle price to retailers, before any discounts, contained in the applicable schedule filed with the liquor authority pursuant to section one hundred one-b of this chapter by a manufacturer or wholesaler from whom the retailer purchases liquor and which is in effect at the time the retailer sells or offers to sell such item of liquor; except, that where no applicable schedule is in effect the bottle price of the item of liquor shall be computed as the appropriate fraction of the case price of such item, before any discounts, most recently invoiced to the retailer.” Bulletin 471 provides, in part: “Case prices may be posted off for any given month, or months, without an accompanying reduction in bottle prices. The wholesaler is given these choices during the period of a post-off: “1. May elect not to reduce the bottle price, in which case the legal bottle price will be the base for the 12% retail mark-up. “2. May reduce the bottle price to conform with the post-off case price, consistent with Rule 16.4(e), in which ease the reduced bottle price will be the base for the 12% mark-up. “3. May adopt a bottle price any where between the extremes authorized under ‘1’ and ‘2’ above, in which case the reduced bottle price will be the base for the 12% mark-up. “Wholesalers of liquor will note that pursuant to these changes no control is placed on the number of consecutive months during which post-offs may be scheduled.” The Court of Appeals suggested that the liquor-pricing system prevents “temporary price reductions . . . threatening to drive small retailers out of business and consolidating control of the market in the hands of a relatively few mass distributors who could then dictate prices to the ultimate injury of consumers . . . .” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 64 N. Y. 2d 504, 520, 479 N. E. 2d 779, 788 (1985). In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986), we recognized that predatory pricing schemes are “rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” Id., at 589. In this case, the possibility of success is practically nonexistent, because liquor retailers are limited to a single outlet. ABC Law §63.5 (McKinney 1970). In any event, § 101-bb forbids not only predatory pricing, but all price competition among retailers. A simple “minimum markup” statute requiring retailers to charge 112 percent of their actual wholesale cost may satisfy the “active supervision” requirement, and so be exempt from the antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). See Morgan v. Division of Liquor Control, Conn. Dept. of Business Regulation, 664 F. 2d 353 (CA21981) (upholding a simple markup statute). Section 101-bb, however, is not a simple minimum markup statute because it imposes a markup on the “posted bottle price,” a price that may greatly exceed what the retailer actually paid for the liquor. As we have explained, supra, at 339-340, Bulletin 471 permits wholesalers to reduce the case price — the price actually paid by most retailers — without reducing the bottle price. The New York Court of Appeals expressly held that Bulletin 471 “is consistent with Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 101-b(3) which does not mandate any price ratio between scheduled case and bottle prices.” J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 523, 479 N. E. 2d, at 790. We may not “construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State.” O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U. S. 524, 531 (1974). Appellees nevertheless argue that invalidation of Bulletin 471 does not require invalidation of § 101-bb. Appellees contend that § 101-bb does not prevent the SLA from establishing a relationship between case price and bottle price; indeed, Rule 16.4(e) establishes such a relationship. Brief for Appellees 24-25, n. 37. Invalidation of Bulletin 471 alone, however, would not prevent wholesalers from selling large quantities at low prices in one month, and then requiring retailers to charge abnormally high markups by raising bottle prices in subsequent months. See supra, at 340. We cannot accept appellees’ suggestion that such unsupervised price fixing should be tolerated as a reasonable accounting method or as a hedge against inflation. See App. to Juris. Statement 101A (advertising a guaranteed 31.3 percent markup on liquor purchased in August 1984 and sold in September 1984). We thus have no occasion to consider whether a simple minimum markup statute would be entitled to antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. Some States completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. E. g., Va. Code §§4-15, 4-28 (1983). Such comprehensive regulation is immune under Parker v. Broion because the State substitutes its own power for “unfettered business freedom.” See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978). In a concurring opinion, Judge Jasen argued that the State actively supervises the liquor-pricing system. J. A. J. Liquor Store, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, supra, at 526-529, 479 N. E. 2d, at 792-794. Judge Jasen noted that the SLA can respond to market conditions by permitting individual wholesalers to depart from their posted prices, ABC Law § 101 — b(3)(b), and by permitting individual retailers to sell below the statutory definition of “cost,” § 101-bb(3), “for good cause shown.” Bulletin 471 itself was issued by the SLA in response to market conditions. Moreover, the state legislature frequently considers proposals to alter the liquor-pricing system. Neither the “monitoring” by the SLA, nor the periodic reexaminations by the state legislature, exerts any significant control over retail liquor prices or markups. Thus, the State’s involvement does not satisfy the second requirement of Midcal. The same considerations lead us to reject appellees’ contention that there is no “contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U. S. C. § 1. Where “private actors are . . . granted ‘a degree of private regulatory power’ . . . the regulatory scheme may be attacked under § 1” as a “hybrid” restraint. Fisher v. Berkeley, 475 U. S. 260, 268 (1986) (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U. S. 654, 666, n. 1 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1961). Our decisions reflect the principle that the federal antitrust laws pre-empt state laws authorizing or compelling private parties to engage in anticompetitive behavior. See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 346-346 (1904) (plurality opinion); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law ¶209, pp. 60-62 (1978). That principle squarely governs this case. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” The dissenting opinion concedes that “neither the House of Representatives nor the state ratifying conventions deliberated long on the powers conferred on the States by § 2.” Post, at 353. It nevertheless maintains that the Senate debates “clearly demonstrate an intent to confer on States complete and exclusive control over the commerce of liquor.” Post, at 354. We find no such clear demonstration of congressional intent. It is true that Senator Blaine, the Senate sponsor of the Amendment, at one point stated that the purpose of § 2 was “to restore to the States . . . absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors . . . 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933). At another point, however, Senator Blaine appeared to advance a narrower interpretation: “So, to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States, it is proposed to write permanently into the Constitution a prohibition along that line.” Id., at 4141. The dissent also maintains that the behavior of the States following ratification supports the view that States have power to enact laws governing the pricing of liquor free of the strictures of federal antitrust policy. One commentator is quoted as saying that the States adopted “ ‘bold and drastic experiments’” in price control. Post, at 357, quoting De Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage Industry, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 665, 680 (1940). In the next paragraph, however, this writer states that “[b]eeause the experiments came at a time when neither the fair-trade law nor the constitutional law on liquor was settled . . . there is uncertainty as to the validity of much of this legislation.” Ibid. When the Twenty-first Amendment was adopted, it was far from clear that the federal commerce power extended to intrastate retail sales of liquor. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 542-548 (1935) (holding that the commerce power does not extend to intrastate sales of poultry, even when the poultry has been shipped across state lines). The Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 693, moreover, permitted States to authorize agreements prescribing prices for the resale of specified commodities, including liquor. Even after the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act, price control laws were not as universally popular as the dissent implies. In 1940, for example, only 18 of the 45 “wet” States had price stabilization provisions written into their alcoholic beverage statutes, De Ganahl, supra, at 680, while in 17 States the State itself monopolized sales of liquor, Shipman, State Administrative Machinery for Liquor Control, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 600, 601, n. 5 (1940). There is no indication that the purpose of Bulletin 471 is to protect small retailers. The Bulletin states that its purpose is to prevent “a situation during post-off periods which resulted in what became known as a ‘two bottle’ price.” App. to Juris. Statement 71A. Although there is no precise explanation of “two bottle pricing” in the record, the caption of Bulletin 471 is “Unlawful Discrimination and Price Scheduling — Bottle Price During Post-Down.” Ibid. This suggests that the SLA was concerned with ensuring that wholesalers charge the same price to all retailers, and not with the relationship between the retailer’s actual cost and the required markup. We have no occasion in this case to consider whether the State’s interest in protecting small retailers ever could prevail against the federal interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws. It is far from certain that the New York Legislature intended to promote temperance, or that the retail price maintenance system actually decreases consumption. Section 101-bb, like other sections of the ABC Law, recites that it is enacted “for the purpose of fostering and promoting temperance.” ABC Law § 101-bb(1) (McKinney 1970). This statement is not supported by specific findings, or by evidence in the record. In Midcal, we accepted the California Supreme Court’s rejection of a similar declaration of legislative purpose. 445 U. S., at 112-114 (discussing Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 457-459, 579 P. 2d 476, 493-494 (1978)). The legislative Report accompanying § 101-bb does not suggest that the amendment was aimed at decreasing consumption. Rather, the Report focuses on the need to protect small retailers. New York State Legislature, Senate Excise Committee, Final Report 30, 37 (Mar. 1971). The Report does express concern over the increase in liquor consumption during the years between 1964 and 1971. Id., at 16. But the Report recognizes the Moreland Commission’s finding that higher prices do not reduce consumption, and states that “because of the multiplicity of factors involved and lack of data on specifics, the Committee is unable to determine what portion of such increase is attributable to any particular factors.” Id., at 14.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARLSON et al. v. LANDON, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. NO. 35. Argued November 26, 1951. Decided March 10, 1952. John T. McTernan argued the cause and John W. Porter, Ben Margolis, Carol King and A. L. Wirin filed a brief for petitioners in No. 35. John F. Davis argued the cause for petitioner in No. 136 and respondent in No. 35. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney and Beatrice Rosenberg. Carol King argued the cause for respondent in No. 136. With her on the brief was Alan N. Brown. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present a narrow question with several related issues. May the Attorney General, as the executive head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, after taking into custody active alien Communists on warrants, charging either membership in a group that advocates the overthrow by force of this Government or inclusion in sny prohibited classes of aliens, continue them in custody without bail, at his discretion pending determination as to their deportability, under § 23 of the Internal Security Act? Differing views of the Courts of Appeals led us to grant certiorari. 342 U. S. 807, 810. I. Facts. — The four petitioners in case No. 35 were arrested under warrants, issued after the enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950, charging each with being an alien who was a member of the Communist Party of the United States. The warrants directed that they be held in custody, pending determination of deportability. Petitions for habeas corpus were promptly filed alleging that the detention without bond was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment to the-Constitution of the United States, and that § 20 of the Immigration Act, as amended, was also unconstitutional. See note 5, supra. The allegation appears below. Respondent filed returns defending his orders of detention on the ground that there was reasonable cause to believe that petitioners’ release would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States. These returns were countered by petitioners with allégations of their many years’ residence spent in this country without giving basis for fear of action by them inimical to the public'welfare during the pendency of their deportation proceedings, their integration into community life through marriage and family connections, and their meticulous adherence to the terms of previous bail, allowed under a former warrant charging deportability. See note 8, supra. On consideration of these undenied allegations, the trial court determined that the Director had not been shown to have abused his discretion. This order was reversed on the ground that the Director “must state some fact upon which a reasonable person could logically conclude that the denial of bail is required to protect the country or to secure the alleged alien’s presence for deportation should an order to that effect be the result of the hearing.” On rehearing, the Director made allegation, supported by affidavits, that the Service’s dossier of each petitioner contained evidence, indicating to him that each was at the time of arrest a member of the Communist Party of the United States and had since 1930 participated or was then actively participating in the Party’s indoctrination of others to the prejudice of the public interest. There was no denial of these allegations by any of the petitioners, except Hyun, or any assertion that any of them had completely severed all Communist affiliations or connections. As to Hyun the denial was formal and did not include any affidavit denying the facts státed in the Director’s affidavit. As the allegations are set out by the Court of Appeals in the carefully detailed opinion of Circuit Judge Stephens, we refrain from any further restatement here. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s determination that there was substantial evidence to support the discretion exercised in denying bail. Respondent Zydok, in case No. 136, was arrested in August 1949 under a recent warrant charging that he was subject to deportation as an alien with membership in an organization advocating the violent overthrow of the Government. Act of October 16, 1918, as amended, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 137. At that time he was released on $2,000 bail. Later a deportation hearing was held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service but this Court’s decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, necessitated a second deportation hearing. After the effective date, September 23, 1950, of the Internal Security Act of 1950, respondent was again taken into custody by petitioner on the 1949 warrant, pursuant to radiogram direction from the Acting Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization referring to § 20 of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended by § 23 of the Internal Security Act. The respondent was held without bail by petitioner under an order from the Acting Commissioner of Immigration. The rearrest was based on § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which provides for the deportation of aliens who are members of or affiliated with the Communist Party. 8 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 137. Thereupon respondent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Easteni District of Michigan, challenging the validity of his detention without bail. The District Court found that petitioner was an alien and had been and was on arrest a member of the Communist Party. The court determined that there had been no abuse of administrative discretion in refusing bail and denied the petition for habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that in determining denial of bail the Attorney General could not rest on membership alone in the Communist Party but was under the duty to consider also the likelihood that the alien would appear when ordered to do so under the circumstances as developed in the habeas corpus hearing. The court thought the failure of the Attorney General to allow bail was an abuse of discretion. That court agreed that the District Court was correct in finding that Zydok was a member of the Communist Party and had been in 1949 the financial secretary of its Hamtramck Division. The respondent’s testimony justifies thé District Court’s finding set out in the margin. The record shows other information in the files of the Attorney General, such as attendance at closed meetings of the Party and the Michigan State Convention. The opinion succinctly sets out the facts concerning respondent’s integration into American life. We adopt that statement. It was said: “Discretion does not mean decision upon one particular fact or set of facts. It means rather a just and proper decision in view of all the attending circumstances. The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U. S. 1, 9, 22 S. Ct. 731, 46 L. Ed. 1027. There are many circumstances which involve decision.” 187 F. 2d 802, 803. The Court of Appeals concluded.: “We think that a fair consideration of the factors above set out in their aggregate require that appeb. lant should have been granted bail in some reasonable amount. This view is more nearly in accordance with the spirit of our institutions as it relates even to those who seek protection from the laws which they incongruously seek to destroy. See Carlson v. Landon, Dist. Director, 9 Cir., 186 F. 2d 183; United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Director, 2 Cir., 169 F. 2d 747, 752.” Id., at 804. II. The Issues. — Petitioners in No. 35, the Carlson case, and respondent in No. 136, the Zydok case, seek respectively reversal or affirmance principally on the same grounds. It is urged that the denial of bail to each was arbitrary and capricious, a violation of the Fifth Amendment; that where there is no evidence to justify a fear of unavailability for the hearings or for the carrying out of a possible judgment of deportation, denial of bail under the circumstances of these cases is an abuse of discretion and violates a claimed right to reasonable bail secured by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Zydok urges, also, that, there was an abuse .of discretion in rearresting him, when there was no change of circumstances, after his previous release under bond on the same warrant. There are other minor contentions as to irregularities in the proceedings that appear to us immaterial to our cbnsideration of these cases. The basis for the deportation of presently undesirable aliens resident in. the United States is not questioned and requires no reexamination. When legally admitted, they have come at the Nation’s invitation, as visitors or permanent residents, to share with us the opportunities and satisfactions of our land. As such visitors and foreign nationals they are entitled .in their persons and effects to the protection of our laws. So long, however, as aliens fail to obtain and maintain citizenship by naturalization, they remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be permitted to remain within our borders. Changes in world politics and in our internal economy bring legislative adjustments affecting the rights of various. classes of aliens to admission and deportation. The passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 marked such a change of attitude toward alien members- of the Communist Party of the United States. Theretofore there was a provision for the deportation of alien anarchists and other aliens, who are or were members of organizations devoted to the overthrow by force and violence of .the Government of the United States, but the Internal Security Act made Communist membership alone of aliens a sufficient ground for deportation. The reasons for the exercise of power are summarized in Title I of the Internal Security Act. It is sufficient here to print § 2 (15). We have no doubt that the doctrines and practices of Communism clearly enough teach the use of force to achieve political control to give constitutional basis, according to any theory of reasonableness or arbitrariness, for Congress to éxpel known alien Communists under its power to regulate the exclusion, admission and expulsion. of aliens. Congress had before it evidence of resident aliens' leadership in Communist domestic activities sufficient to furnish reasonable ground for action against alien resident Communists. The bar against the admission of Communists cannot be differentiated as a matter of power from that against anarchists upheld unanimously half a century ago in the exclusion of Turner. Since “[i]t is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful,” the fact that petitioners, and respondent Zydok, were made deportable after entry is immaterial. They are deported for what they are now, not for what they were. Otherwise, when an alien once legally became a denizen of this country he could not be deported for any reason of which he had not been forewarned at the time of entry. Mankind is not vouchsafed sufficient foresight to justify requiring a country to permit its continuous occupation in peace 'or war by legally admitted aliens, even though they never violate the laws in effect at their entry. The protection of citizenship is open to those who qualify for its privileges. The lack of a clause in the Constitution specifically empowering such action has never been held to render Congress impotent to deal as a sovereign with resident aliens. TIL Constitutionality. — A. Arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion. — The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers, .“with" such opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit.” This power is, of course, subject to judicial intervention under the “paramount law of the. Constitution.” Deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be punishment. . No jury sits. Ño .judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution. Since deportation is a particularly drastic remedy where aliens have become absorbed into our community life, Congress has been careful to provide for full hearing by the Immigration and Naturalization Service before deportation. Such legislative provision requires that those charged with that responsibility exercise it in a manner consistent with due process. Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of deportation proceedings. Of course purpose to injure could not be imputed generally ■to all aliens subject to deportation, so discretion was placed by the 1950 Act in the Attorney General to detain aliens without bail, as set out in note 5, supra. The change in language seems to have originated in H. R. 10, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Representative Sam Hobbs of Alabama on January 3, 1949. It was intended to clarify the procedure in dealing with deportees and to “expressly authorize the Attorney General, in his discretion, to hold arrested aliens in custody.” The' need for clarification arose from varying interpretations of the authority to grant bail under the former bail provision. Note 31, supra. In Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d 422, 424, the Court of Appeals for ’the ’Sixth Circuit had held that by the earlier provision “Congress intended to grant to the alien a right, and that its failure to follow with some such phrase as 'at the discretion' of the com,-missioner’ vests thé discretion to avail himself of the opportunity afforded in the alien, and not the discretion to allow bail in the commissioner or director.” On the other hand in United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director, 120 F. 2d 762, the Court of. Appeals for the Second Circuit construed the provision to the contrary. It said: “The natural interpretation of the language used, that the alien 'may be released under a bond,’ would indicate that the release is discretionary with the Attorney General; and that appears to be borne out by other provisions of this section,' as well as other-sections of the immigration laws, where the choice of words appears to have significance.” P. 765. In the later case of United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 747, the same court applied its Zapp opinion to explain that the Service’s discretion as to bail was not untrammeled but subject to judicial review. It was in the light of these cases that Congress 'inserted in the bail provisions the phrase “in the discretion of the Attorney General,” the lack of which very phrase the Manoogian case held made bail a right of the detained alien. The present statute does not grant bail as a matter of right. The Government does not urge that the Attorney General’s discretion is not subject to any judicial review, but merely that his discretion can be overturned only on a showing of clear abuse. We proceed on the basis suggested by the Government. It is first to be observed that the language of the reports is emphatic in explaining Congréss’ intention to make the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion presumptively correct and unassailable except for abuse. We think the discretion reposed in the Attorney General is at least as great as that found by the Second Circuit in the Potash case, supra, to be in him under the former bail provision. It can only be overridden where it is clearly shown that it “was without a reasonable foundation.” The four petitioners in the Carlson case were active hi Communist work. In the Zydok case the only evidence is membership, in the Party, attendance at closed sessions and the holding of the office of financial secretary of its Hamtramck Division. This evidence goes beyond unexplained membership and shows a degree, minor perhaps in Zydok’s case, of participation in Communist activities. As the purpose of the Internal Security Act to deport all alien Communists as a menace to the security of the United States is established by the Internal Security Act itself, Title I, § 2, we conclude that the discretion as to bail in the Attorney General was certainly broad enough to justify his detention of all these parties without bail as a menace to the public interest. As all alien Communists are deportable, like Anarchists, because of Congress’ understanding of their attitude toward the use of force and violence in such a constitutional democracy as ours to accomplish their political aims, evidence of membership plus personal activity in supporting and extending the Party’s philosophy concerning violence gives adequate' ground for detention. It cannot be expected that the Government should be required in addition to show specific acts of sabotage or incitement to subversive action. Such an exercise of discretion is well within that heretofore approved in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 541. There is no evidence or contention that all persons arrested as deport-able under § 22 of the Internal Security Act, note 4, supra, for Communist membership are denied bail. In fact, a report filed with this Court by the Department of Justice •in 'this case at our request shows allowance of bail in the large majority of cases. The refusal of bail in these cases is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of power. There is no denial of the due process of the Fifth Amendment under circumstances where there is reasonable apprehension of hurt from aliens charged with a philosophy of violence against this Government. .B. Delegation of Legislative Power. — This leaves for consideration the constitutionality of this delegation of authority. We consider first the objection to the alleged unbridled delegation of legislative power in that the Attorney General is left without standards to determine when to admit to bail and when to detain. It is familiar law that in such ah examination the entire Act is to be looked at and the meaning of the words determined by their surroundings and connections. Congress can only legislate so far. as is reasonable and practicable, and must leave to executive officers the authority to accomplish its purpose. Congress need not make specific standards for each subsidiary executive action in carrying out'a policy. The bail provision applies to many classes of deportable aliens other than those named in the classes listed in § 22 of the Internal Security Act. See note 4, supra. A wide range of discretion in the Attorney General as to bail is required to meet the varying situations arising from the many • aliens in this country. The policy and standards as to what aliens are subject to deportation are, in general, clear and definite. 8 U. S. C. §§ 137 and 155. Specifically when dealing with alien Communists, as in these cases, the legislative standard for deportation is definite. See notes 3 and 4, supra. In carrying out that policy the Attorney General is not left with untrammeled discretion as to bail. Courts review his determination. Hearings are had, and he must justify his refusal of bail by reference to the legislative scheme to eradicate the evils of Communist activity. The legislative judgment of evils calling for the 1950 amendments to deportation legislation is set out in the introductory sections of the Subversive Activities Control Act. So far as .pertinent to these proceedings, the. new legislation was designed to eliminate the subversive activities of resident aliens who seek to inculcate the doctrine of force and violence into the political philosophy of the American people. To this end provision was made for the detention and deportation of certain noncitizens, including merpbers of the Communist Party. When in the judgment of the Attorney General an alien Communist may so conduct himself pending deportation hearings as to aid in carrying out the objectives of the world communist movement, that alien may be detained. Compare Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 515. This is a permissible delegation of legislative power because the-executive judgment is limited by adequate standards. The authority to detain without bail is to be exercised within the framework of the Subversive Activities Control Act to guard against Communist activities pending deportation hearings. Cf. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40. We do not see that such discretion violates the Due Process Clause of-the Fifth Amendment. C. Violation of Eighth Amendment. — The contention is álso advanced that the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, note 9, supra, compels the allowance of bail in a reasonable amount. We have in the preceding sections of .this opinion set out why this'refusal of bail is not an abuse of power; arbitrary or capricious, and why the delegation of discretion to the Attorney General is not unconstitutional. Here we meet the argument that the Constitution requires by the Eighth Amendment, note 9, supra, the same reasonable bail for alien Communists under deportation charges as it accords citizens charged with bailable criminal offenses. Obviously the cases cited by the applicants for habeas corpus fail flatly to Support this argument. We have found none that do. The bail clause was lifted with slight, changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases. It should be noted that the problem of habeas corpus after unusual delay in deportation hearings is not involved in this case. Cf. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 747, 751. IY. Rearrest. — Finally, respondent Zydok argues that his rearrest on the outstanding warrant, after he had once been released, on bail, was improper. The inquiry on habeas- corpus is limited to the propriety of Zydok’s present detention. McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131, 136. While the Attorney General has made a satisfactory showing that he has good cause for detaining Zydok without bail, no order based on a new warrant has been entered. Zydok did not allow the proceedings to run along but objected promptly by habeas corpus to detention under the warrant. It has been said that the rule in criminal cases is that a warrant once executed is exhausted. This guards against precipitate rearrest. Where, however, the rearrest comes after the discovery of error in release, á new wárrant is not necessarily required. State cases have held that an escaped person or one who secured his release by trick may be rearrested without a new warrant. Although a warrant for rearrest is required by statute, when a convicted person is paroled his status on violation of the parole is the same as that of an escaped prisoner. When a prisoner is out on bond he is still under court control, though the bounds of his confinement are enlarged. His bondsmen are his jailers. While the bailsmen may arrest without warrant, the court proceeds under bench warrant to retake a prisoner. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 3143. Although in a civil proceeding for deportation the same branch of government issues and executes the warrant, we think the better practice is to require in those cases also a new warrant. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in the Zydok case will be vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance.with this opinion, with directions to order the release of the respondent Zydok unless within a reasonable time in the discretion of the court he is rearrested under a new warrant. No. 35 is affirmed; No. 136 is vacated. Reorganization Plan No. V, 54 Stat. 1238. Sec. 19 of an Act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States, 39 Stat. 889, February 5, 1917, as amended 8 U. S. C. § 155: “. . . any alien who shall have entered or who shall be found in the United States in violation of this chapter, or in violation of any other law of the United States; . . . shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported. . . .” Act of October 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 137, see note 15, infra: “(c) Aliens who believe in, advise, advocate, or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization, association, society, or group, that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches: (1) the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms of law. . . .” Internal Security Act of 1950, September 23, 1950, § 22, subsection 4 (a), amending the Act of October 16, 1918, see 8 U. S. C. § 137: “Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter, a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 (1) or section 1 (3) of this Act. or ... a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 (2) of this Act, shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the classes of aliens mentioned in this Act, irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States.” Id., § 22: “That any alien who is a member of any one of the following classes shall be excluded from admission into the United States: “(1) Aliens who seek to enter the United .States whether solely, principally, or incidentally, to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or would endanger the welfare or safety of the United States; “ (2) Aliens who, at any time, shall be or shall have been members of any of the following classes: “(A) Aliens who are anarchists; “(B) Aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches, opposition to all organized government; “(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist Party of the United States, (ii) any other totalitarian party of the 'United States, (iii) the Communist Political Association, (iv) the Communist or óther totalitarian party of any State of the United States, of any foreign state; or of any political or geographical subdivision of any foreign state; (v) 'any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party; or (vi) the direct predecessors or successors of any such association or party, regardless of what name such group or organization may have used, may now bear, or may hereafter adopt; “(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches (i) the ■overthrow by force or violence or other unconstitutional means of-the Government of the United States or of all forms of law; .... - “(3) Aliens with respect to whom there is reason-to believe that such aliens would, after entry, be likely to (A) engage in activities which would be prohibited by the laws of the United States relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive to the national security; (B) engage in any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means; or (C) organize, join, affiliate with, or participate in the activities of any organization which is registered or required to be registered under section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.” Internal Security Act of 1950, § 23: “. . . Pending final determination of the deportability of any alien taken into custody under warrant of the Attorney General,' such alien may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be released under bond in the amount of not less than $500, with security approved by the Attorney General; or (3) be released on conditional parole. See § 22 (1), Internal Security Act, note 4, supra. See note 5, supra. Before the passage of the Internal Security Act the four petitioners had been arrested and admitted. to bail on warrants charging membership in groups advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. In our view of the issues now here, these former happenings are immaterial to our consideration of this writ of certiorari. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” “That section 20 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended by section 23 of Public Law 831, 81st Congress (commonly known as Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950) and section 1 of the Act of October 16, 1918 (8 U. S. C. 137), as amended, are, and each of them is, unconstitutional and void in that they deprive persons, including petitioner, of liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that they abridge the freedom of persons, including petitioner, of speech, the press and assembly and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, in violation'of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and in that they purport to authorize indefinite detention of persons, including petitioner, without bond prior to final determination of deportability.” Carlson v. Landon, 186 F. 2d 183, 186; Stevenson v. Landon, 186 F. 2d 190. Id., at 189. 28 U. S. C. § 2248: “The allegations- of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except, to the extent that' the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true.” Carlson v. Landon, 187 F. 2d 991. Quite properly, we think, - no question is raised as to the applicability of the Internal Security Act amendments relating to membership in the Communist Party and allowance of bail, notes 4 and 5, supra, to detention under a warrant based on 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 137 (c), note 3, supra. Cf. Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 987, Title I, § 2. “That the petitioner, while under cross-examination by the Chief Assistant United States Attorney, was a consistently evasive witness and his evasive demeanor in testifying in relation to his communistic activities convinces this Court that he is knowingly and wilfully participating in the Communist movement.” 187 F. 2d at 803: “Appellant was seventeen years.'of age when he arrived in this country from Poland in 1913. Since then he has lived continuously in the State of Michigan. He has been a waiter in an English speaking restaurant in Hamtramck, Mich., for seventeen years and for a great part of that time he was head waiter. He owns his own home in Detroit and has a family consisting of his wife, two sons, a daughter, and five grandchildren. Both sons served in the armed services of the United States in World War II. His children and grandchildren were born in this country and his daughter married here. During World War II while appellant was head waiter in the restaurant he sold about $50,000.00 worth of U. S. War Bonds and during that period he donated blood on seven occasions to the Red Cross for the United States Army. “Before his second arrest and while he was at large on bail he reported regularly to the Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service. The record'fails to disclose that he has violated any law or that he is engaged or is likely to engage in, any subversive activities.” Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 707; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 280; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318; Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521, 528; III Hackworth’s Digest of international Law 725 (1942). For example compare Act of December 17, 1943, 57 Stat. 600, with Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58. See note 4, supra. The extension of the proscription of residence to aliens believing in the overthrow of Government by force or violence has been progressive, as can be readily observed by following the successive enactments of laws to regulate the residence of aliens since the Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 137 and 155. “(15) The Communist movement in the United States is an organization numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined. Awaiting and seeking to advance a moment when the United States may be so far extended by foreign engagements, so far divided in counsel, or so far in industrial or financial straits, that overthro-y of the Government of the United States by force and violence may seem possible of achievement, it seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of schooling and indoctrination. Such preparations by Communist organizations in other countries have aided in supplanting existing governments. The Communist organization in the United States, pursuing its stated objectives, the recent successes of Communist methods in other countries, and the nature and control of the world Communist movement itself, present á clear and present danger to the security of the United States and to the existence of free American institutions, and make it necessary that Congress, in order to provide for the common defense, to preserve the sovereignty of the United States as an independent nation, and' to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, enact appropriate legislation recognizing the existence- of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United States.” I Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, 106, 120, 141, 144, 151; Lenin, Collected Works (1930), Vol. XVIII, pp. 279-280; Lenin, The State and Revolution, August, 1917, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow (1949), 28, 30, 33. Translations furnished indicate the same attitude on the part of Stalin. Collected Works, Vol. I, pp. 131-137, 185-205, 241-246; Vol. Ill, pp. 367-370. And see Leites, The. Operational Code of the Politburo (1950), c. xiii, “Violence.” See also Immigration and Naturalization Systems of the United States, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part 3, Subversives, c. I, B, Alien Control; c. II, C, Deportation of Subversive Aliens. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, Mr. Justice Douglas concurring at 165. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 280. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 39: “[Congress] was, in the exercise of its unquestioned right, only seeking to rid the country of persons who had shown by their career that their continued presence here would not make' for the safety or welfare of society.” See also Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521, 530. Compare Harisiades y. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, decided today. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713-715, 728; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 97; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 231. A claim of citizenship has protection. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 290-291; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 275; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10; Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 231. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86; Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103. The former provision read as follows: “. . . Pending the final disposal of the case of any alien so taken into custody, he may be released under a bond in the penalty of not less than $500 with security approved by the Attorney General, conditioned that such alien shall be produced when required for a hearing or hearings in regard to the charge upon which he has been taken into custody, and for deportation if he shall be found to be unlawfully within'the United States.” 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 156. ' On December 7,1951, at the request of this Court, the Government furnished us a list of the Bail or Detention Status, as of the period just prior to December 7, of deportation cases, involving subversive charges, pending on the date of the enactment of the Internal Security Act, September 23, 1950. The list indicates that the modest bonds or personal recognizances of the far larger part of the aliens remained unchanged after the bond amendment to the Immigration Act. Of those detained without bond on order of the Service, the courts have released all but a f.ew. It is quite clear from the list that detention without-bond, has been the exception. H. R. Rep. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6; S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5. 169 F. 2d at 751: “The discretion of the Attorney General'which we held to exist in the Zapp case is interpreted as one which is to be reasonably exercised upon a consideration pf such factors, among others, as the probability of the alien being found deportable, the seriousness of the charge against him, if proved, the danger to the public safety of his presence within the community, and the alien’s availability for subsequent ' proceedings if enlarged on bail. However, in any consideration of his denial of bail it should always be borne in mind that the court’s opinion as to whether the alien should be admitted to bail can only override that of the Attorney General where the alien makes a clear and convincing showing that the decision against him was without a reasonable foundation.” See U. S. ex rel. Doyle v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 753; U. S. ex rel. Pirinsky v. Shaughnessy, 177 F. 2d 708; U. S. ex rel. De Geronimi v. Shaughnessy, 187 F. 2d 896. (This is the only case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals since the Internal Security Act. It leaves open the question of the reviéwability of the Attorney General’s action under that Act.) The proposed bills at one time contained a provision: .“(f) No alien detained under-any provision of law relating to the exclusión or expulsion of aliens shall, prior to an unreviewable order discharging-him. from custody, be released by any court, on bond or otherwise, except pursuant to the order of a Federal court composed of three judges.” S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3. This was introduced to allow for possible release from custody pending deportation hearings. Id., at p. 9. The clause did not survive. Even though we also take into consideration the factor of probable availability for trial, which we do not think is of great significance in cases involving security from. Communist activities of .alien Communists, the past record of these aliens is far from decisive against the Attorney General’s action . The Internal Security Act made membership sufficient for deportation and set up a procedure that could be carried hut. § 22 (2) (C), note 4, supra, and § 23. Deportation became more likely for alien Communists by these amendments. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 386; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 421: “•The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.” Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43-48; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 286; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476, 486-489; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 249. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 424r-425: “The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct .... These essentials are preserved when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant' data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its statutory command shall be effective. It is no objection that the determination of facts and the" inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework.” Any alien becoming a public charge within five years of entry may be subject to deportation. Likewise any alien sentenced more than once for any crime involving moral turpitude, and certain illegal entrants. See 8 U. S. C. § 155. Approximately 85,000,000 people, citizens and aliens, are said to have crossed our borders in the 1949 fiscal year. Some many times. Five million- aliens are reported to have registered under .the Alien Registration Act of 1940. S. Rep. No. 1515, pp. 630-631, supra, n. 22. See for example § 2 (15), quoted above at note 21. Attention is called to United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 747, 752: “If the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution is considered to have any bearing upon the right to bail in deportation proceedings, and this has been denied, it is our opinion that the provisions of that Amendment and any requirement of the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment will be fully satisfied if the standards of fairness and reasonableness we have set forth regarding the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General are observed.” United States ex rel. Klig v. Shaughnessy, 94 F. Supp. 157, 160: “It is not unappropriate to refer here to the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, one of that series of amendments collectively known as the Bill of Rights, which prohibits the imposition of excessive bail. Certainly, the principle inherent in that amendment applies to deportation- proceedings, whether or- not' such proceedings technically fair within its scope. That principle cannot be reconciled with the government’s denial of bail to these relators under the, circumstances here set forth.” - 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. II, § I (10). Petersdorff, on Bail, 483 et seq. I Annals of Congress 753. 1 Stat. 91, § 33; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 46 (a). Similarly, on appeal from a conviction by the trial court, a defendant is not entitled to bail if he does not present a substantial question. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 46 (a) (2); Bridges v. United States, 184 F. 2d 881, 884; Williamson v. United States, 184 F. 2d 280, 281; Baker v. United States, 139 F. 2d 721. •In England, there was a series of crimes ana situations where the arrested person could “have no other sureties but the four walls ■ of the prison.” Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book IV, 298. See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 158, and cases there cited; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 45. These cases had valid orders entered subsequent to an invalid arrest. See United States ex rel. Heikkinen v. Gordon, 190 F. 2d 16, 19; Doyle v. Russell, 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 300. People ex rel. Wolfe v. Johnson, 230 N. Y. 256, 130 N. E. 286. Voll v. Steele, 141 Ohio St. 293, 47 N. E. 2d 991. Cf. Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261, 96 S. E. 426. Bail once allowed by a' magistrate, pending trial, may not in some instances be refused by a higher court. In re Marshall, 38 Ariz. 424, 300 P. 1011. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S. 193, 196. Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 371. See Dowd v. Cook, 340 U. S. 206; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 45.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOTEL EMPLOYEES LOCAL NO. 255, HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al. v. LEEDOM, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, et al. No. 21. Argued November 10, 1958. Decided November 24, 1958. J. W. Brown argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Ben Oettler and Jonas B. Katz. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Jerome D. Fenton and Thomas J. McDermott. Thomas F. Daly and Charles W. Merritt filed a brief for the American Hotel Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Per Curiam. We believe that dismissal of the representation petition on the sole ground of the Board’s "long standing policy not to exercise jurisdiction over the hotel industry” as a class, is contrary to the principles expressed in Office Employes v. Labor Board, 353 U. S. 313, 318-320 (1957). The judgment is therefore reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VIRGINIA OFFICE FOR PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY v. STEWART, COMMISSIONER, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES, et al. No. 09-529. Argued December 1, 2010 — Decided April 19, 2011 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsbtjrg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 262. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined, post, p. 266. Kagan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Seth M. Galanter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Deanne E. Maynard, Brian R. Matsui, and Paul J. Buckley. Ginger D. Anders argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Katyal, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ravel, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein. E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Solicitor General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, Attorney General, Charles E. James, Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Stephen R. McCullough, and William E. Thro. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AARP et al. by Rochelle Bobroff, Kenneth W. Zeller, Kelly Bagby, and Michael Schuster; for Law Professors by Stephen I. Vladeck, pro se, Charles S. Sims, and Anna G. Kaminska; for the National Disability Rights Network by Susan J. Kohlmann and Marc A. Goldman; and for the Rhode Island Office of the Child Advocate by Joseph J. Mueller and Sydenham B. Alexander III. A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Indiana et al. by Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General, and Heather L. Hagan and Ashley Tatman Harwel, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Bill McCollum of Florida, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, James D. “Buddy" Caldwell of Louisiana, Janet T. Mills of Maine, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Michael A. Delaney of New Hampshire, Paula Dow of New Jersey, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Robert M. McKenna of Washington. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same State. I A The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (DD Act), 114 Stat. 1677, 42 U. S. C. § 15001 et seq., offers States federal money to improve community services, such as medical care and job training, for individuals with developmental disabilities. See §§ 15023(a), 15024. As a condition of that funding, a State must establish a protection and advocacy (P&A) system “to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities.” § 15043(a)(1). The P&A system receives separate federal funds, paid to it directly. § 15042(a) and (b). A second federal law, the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI Act), 100 Stat. 478, 42 U. S. C. § 10801 et seq., increases that separate funding and extends the mission of P&A systems to include the mentally ill. §§10802(2), 10803, 10827. At present, every State accepts funds under these statutes. Under the DD and PAIMI Acts, a P&A system must have certain powers. The system “shall . . . have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect... if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred.” § 15043(a)(2)(B); § 10805(a)(1)(A). Subject to certain statutory requirements, it must be given access to “all records” of individuals who may have been abused, see § 15043(a)(2)(I)(iii)(II); § 10805(a) (4)(B)(iii), as well as “other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation,” § 15043(a)(2)(J)(i). The Acts also require that a P&A system have authority to “pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of” its charges. § 15043(a) (2)(A)(i); see § 10805(a)(1)(B). And in addition to pressing its own rights, a P&A system may “pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on behalf of” those it protects. § 10805(a)(1)(C); see § 15044(b). A participating State is free to appoint either a state agency or a private nonprofit entity as its P&A system. § 15044(a); § 10805(c)(1)(B). But in either case, the designated entity must have certain structural features that ensure its independence from the State’s government. The DD Aet prohibits the Governor from appointing more than one-third of the members of the system’s governing board, § 15044(a)(2), and restricts the State’s ability to impose hiring freezes or other measures that would impair the system’s ability to carry out its mission, § 15043(a)(2)(E). Once a State designates an entity as its P&A system, it may not change its selection without “good cause.” § 15043(a)(4)(A). Virginia is one of just eight States that have designated a government entity as their P&A system. The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy (VOPA) is an “independent state agency.” Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-39.2(A) (Lexis 2009). Its board consists of eleven “nonlegislative citizen members,” of whom only three are appointed by the Governor. § 51.5-39.2(B). The remaining eight are appointed by components of the legislature: five by the Speaker of the House of Delegates, and three by the Senate Committee on Rules. Ibid. VOPA itself nominates candidates for consideration, and the statute instructs the appointing officials that they “shall seriously consider the persons nominated and appoint such persons whenever feasible.” Ibid,. Board members serve for fixed terms and are removable only by a court and only for specified reasons. See § 51.5-39.2(0 and (F); § 24.2-233 and 234 (Lexis 2006). VOPA enjoys authority to litigate free of executive-branch oversight. It operates independently of the Attorney General of Virginia and employs its own lawyers, who are statutorily authorized to sue on VOPA’s behalf. § 51.5-39.2(A); § 2.2-510(5) (Lexis 2008). And Virginia law specifically empowers VOPA to “initiate any proceedings to secure the rights” of disabled individuals. § 51.5-39.2(A). B In 2006, VOPA opened an investigation into the deaths of two patients and injuries to a third at state-run mental hospitals. It asked respondents — state officials in charge of those institutions — to produce any records related to risk-management or mortality reviews conducted by the hospitals with respect to those patients. Respondents refused, asserting that the records were protected by a state-law privilege shielding medical peer-review materials from disclosure. VOPA then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the DD and PAIMI Acts entitled it to the peer-review records, notwithstanding any state-law privilege that might apply. It sought a declaration that respondents’ refusal to produce the records violated the DD and PAIMI Acts, along with an injunction requiring respondents to provide access to the records and refrain in the future from interfering with VOPA’s right of access to them. Respondents moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. In its view, the suit was permitted by the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which normally allows federal courts to award prospective relief against state officials for violations of federal law. Virginia v. Reinhard, 2008 WL 2795940, *6 (ED Va., July 18, 2008). The Court of Appeals reversed. Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 P. 3d 110 (CA4 2009). Believing VOPA’s lawsuit to be an “intramural contest” that “encroaches more severely on the dignity and sovereignty of the states than an Ex parte Young action brought by a private plaintiff,” the Court of Appeals concluded it was not authorized by that case. Id., at 119-120 (internal quotation marks omitted). We granted certiorari. 561 U. S. 1005 (2010). II A Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent. The language of the Eleventh Amendment only eliminates the basis for our judgment in the famous ease of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), which involved a suit against a State by a noncitizen of the State. Since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), however, we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to confirm the structural understanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact, unlimited by Article Ill’s jurisdictional grant. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 779 (1991); see Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984). Our cases hold that the States have retained their traditional immunity from suit, “except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional amendments.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713 (1999). A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 675-676 (1999), and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State. B In Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, we established an important limit on the sovereign-immunity principle. That case involved a challenge to a Minnesota law reducing the freight rates that railroads could charge. A railroad shareholder claimed that the new rates were unconstitutionally confiscatory, and obtained a federal injunction against Edward Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, forbidding him in his official capacity to enforce the state law. Perkins v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 155 F. 445 (CC Minn. 1907). When Young violated the injunction by initiating an enforcement action in state court, the Circuit Court held him in contempt and committed him to federal custody. In his habeas corpus application in this Court, Young challenged his confinement by arguing that Minnesota’s sovereign immunity deprived the federal court of jurisdiction to enjoin him from performing his official duties. We disagreed. We explained that because an unconstitutional legislative enactment is “void,” a state official who enforces that law “comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution,” and therefore is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” 209 U. S., at 159-160. This doctrine has existed alongside our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence for more than a century, accepted as necessary to “permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights.” Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 105. It rests on the premise — less delicately called a “fiction,” id., at 114, n. 25—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes. The doctrine is limited to that precise situation, and does not apply “when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest,’ ” id., at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945)), as when the “‘judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with public administration,’ ” 465 U. S., at 101, n. 11 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963)). C This case requires us to decide how to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine to a suit brought by an independent state agency claiming to possess federal rights. Although we have never encountered such a suit before, we are satisfied that entertaining VOPA’s action is consistent with our precedents and does not offend the distinctive interests protected by sovereign immunity. 1 In Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635 (2002), we held that “[i]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Id., at 645 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521U. S. 261, 296 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). There is no doubt VOPA’s suit satisfies that straightforward inquiry. It alleges that respondents’ refusal to produce the requested medical records violates federal law; and it seeks an injunction requiring the production of the records, which would prospectively abate the alleged violation. Respondents concede that were VOPA a private organization rather than a state agency, the doctrine would permit this action to proceed. We see no reason for a different result here. Although respondents argue that VOPA’s status as a state agency changes the calculus, there is no warrant in our cases for making the validity of an Ex parte Young action turn on the identity of the plaintiff. To be sure, we have been willing to police abuses of the doctrine that threaten to evade sovereign immunity. To do otherwise “would be to adhere to an empty formalism.” Coeur d’Alene Tribe, supra, at 270. But (as the dissent concedes, post, at 273 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)) the limits we have recognized reflect the principle that the “general criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief sought,” Pennhurst, supra, at 107, not who is bringing the lawsuit. Thus, Ex parte Young cannot be used to obtain an injunction requiring the payment of funds from the State’s treasury, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 666 (1974); or an order for specific performance of a State’s contract, see id., at 666-667; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887). Coeur d’Alene Tribe, on which respondents heavily rely, is an application of this principle. There we refused to allow an Indian Tribe to use Ex parte Young to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief establishing its exclusive right to the use and enjoyment of certain submerged lands in Idaho and the invalidity of all state statutes and regulations governing that land. 521 U. S., at 265. We determined that the suit was “the functional equivalent of” “a quiet title suit against Idaho,” would “extinguish ... the State’s control over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory,” and thus was barred by sovereign immunity. Id., at 281, 282. Respondents have advanced no argument that the relief sought in this case threatens any similar invasion of Virginia’s sovereignty. Indeed, they concede that the very injunction VOPA requests could properly be awarded by a federal court at the instance of a private P&A system. 2 Respondents and the dissent argue that entertaining VOPA’s lawsuit in a federal forum would nevertheless infringe Virginia’s sovereign interests because it diminishes the dignity of a State for a federal court to adjudicate a dispute between its components. See Brief for Respondents 23-26; post, at 269-273 (arguing that “‘special sovereignty interests’ ” bar VOPA’s lawsuit (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, supra, at 281)). We disagree. As an initial matter, we do not understand how a State’s stature could be diminished to any greater degree when its own agency polices its officers’ compliance with their federal obligations, than when a private person hales those officers into federal court for that same purpose — something everyone agrees is proper. And in this case, of course, VOPA’s power to sue state officials is a consequence of Virginia’s own decision to establish a public, rather than a private, P&A system. We fail to perceive what Eleventh Amendment indignity is visited on the Commonwealth when, by operation of its own laws, VOPA is admitted to federal court as a plaintiff. But even if it were true that the State’s dignity were offended in some way by the maintenance of this action in federal court, that would not prove respondents’ case. Denial of sovereign immunity, to be sure, offends the dignity of a State; but not every offense to the dignity of a State constitutes a denial of sovereign immunity. The specific indignity against which sovereign immunity protects is the insult to a State of being haled into court without its consent. That effectively occurs, our cases reasonably conclude, when (for example) the object of the suit against a state officer is to reach funds in the state treasury or acquire state lands; it does not occur just because the suit happens to be brought by another state agency. Respondents’ asserted dignitary harm is simply unconnected to the sovereign-immunity interest. The dissent complains that applying Ex parte Young to this lawsuit divides Virginia against itself, since the opposing parties are both creatures of the Commonwealth. Post, at 271-272. Even if that were a distinctive consequence of letting this suit proceed in federal court, it would have nothing to do with the concern of sovereign immunity — whether the suit is against an unconsenting State, rather than against its officers. But it is not a consequence of the federal nature of the forum. The same result will follow if the federal claim is sued upon in state court, as the dissent would require. There also, “[wjhatever the decision in the litigation,... [t]he Commonwealth will win[, a]nd the Commonwealth will lose.” Post, at 272. Nor would sending the matter to state court even avoid the prospect that “a federal judge will resolve which part of the Commonwealth will prevail,” ibid., since the state-court loser could always ask tkis Court to review the matter by certiorari. (Or is that appeal also to be disallowed on grounds of sovereign immunity? But see Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).) And of course precisely the same thing would happen if respondents specifically waived their sovereign immunity objections in tkis very case. Yet no one would contend that despite the waiver, sovereign immunity forbade the suit. So also here: If, by reason of Ex parte Young, there has been no violation of sovereign immunity, the prospect of a federal judge’s resolving VOPA’s dispute with respondents does not make it so. We do not doubt, of course, that there are limits on the Federal Government’s power to affect the internal operations of a State. See, e. g., Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898 (1997) (Congress may not commandeer state officers); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 579 (1911) (Congress may not dictate a State’s capital). But those limits must be found in some textual provision or structural premise of the Constitution. Additional limits cannot be smuggled in under the Eleventh Amendment by barring a suit in federal court that does not. violate the State’s sovereign immunity. 3 A weightier objection, perhaps, is the relative novelty of this lawsuit. Respondents rightly observe that federal courts have not often encountered lawsuits brought by state agencies against other state officials. That does give us pause. Lack of historical precedent can indicate a constitutional infirmity, see, e. g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505-506 (2010), and our sovereign-immunity decisions have traditionally warned against “ ‘anomalous and unheard-of proceedings or suits,’ ” Alden, 527 U. S., at 727 (quoting Hans, 134 U. S., at 18). Novelty, however, is often the consequence of past constitutional doubts, but we have no reason to believe that is the case here. In order to invoke the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, a state agency needs two things: first, a federal right that it possesses against its parent State; and second, authority to sue other state officials to enforce that right, free from any internal veto wielded by the state government. These conditions will rarely coincide — and at least the latter of them cannot exist without the consent of the State that created the agency and defined its powers. See post, at 264 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We are unaware that the necessary conditions have ever presented themselves except in connection with the DD and PAIMI Acts, and the parties have referred us to no examples. Thus, the apparent novelty of this sort of suit does not at all suggest its unconstitutionality. In any event, we are satisfied, for the reasons we have explained, that — novelty notwithstanding — the principles undergirding the Ex parte Young doctrine support its application to actions of this kind. * * # Like the Court of Appeals, we are mindful of the central role autonomous States play in our federal system, and wary of approving new encroachments on their sovereignty. But we conclude no such encroachment is occasioned by straightforwardly applying Ex parte Young to allow this suit. It was Virginia law that created VOPA and gave it the power to sue state officials. In that circumstance, the Eleventh Amendment presents no obstacle to VOPA’s ability to invoke federal jurisdiction on the same terms as any other litigant. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” We have recognized that Congress may abrogate a State’s immunity when it acts under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 59 (1996), but not when it aets under its original Article I authority to regulate commerce, id., at 65-66. The dissent is mistaken when it claims that applying the Verizon Maryland test would mean two of our cases were “wrongly decided.” Post, at 269 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). We discuss the first of those cases, Coeur d’Alene Tribe, below. Infra, at 257. As for the second, Seminole Tribe, supra, it is inapposite. The reason we refused to permit suit to proceed in that case was that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act created an alternative remedial scheme that would be undermined by permitting Ex parte Young suits; Congress, we said, had foreclosed recourse to the doctrine. See Seminole Tribe, supra, at 73-76. Respondents now argue — for the first time in this litigation — that the DD and PAIMI Acts have the same effect here. We reject that suggestion. The fact that the Federal Government can exercise oversight of a federal spending program and even withhold or withdraw funds — which are the chief statutory features respondents point to — does not demonstrate that Congress has “displayed an intent not to provide the ‘more complete and more immediate relief’ that would otherwise be available under Ex parte Young.” Verizon Maryland, 535 U. S., at 647 (quoting Seminole Tribe, supra, at 75). The dissent compares VOPA’s lawsuit to such indignities as “cannibalism” and “patricide,” since it is a greater “affront to someone’s dignity to be sued by a brother than to be sued by a stranger.” Post, at 274. We think the dissent’s principle of familial affront less than universally applicable, even with respect to real families, never mind governmental siblings. Most of us would probably prefer contesting a testamentary disposition with a relative to contesting it with a stranger. And confining one’s child to his room is called grounding, while confining a stranger’s child is called kidnaping. Jurisdiction over this case does not depend on which is the most apt comparison. The dissent accuses us of circular reasoning, because we “wrongly as-sum[e] [that] Virginia knew in advance the answer to the question presented in this case.” Ibid. That would be true if we were relying on the Commonwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity. We are not. We rely upon Ex parte Young. We say that Virginia has only itself to blame for the position in which it finds itself, not because it consented to suit, but because it created a state entity to sue, instead of leaving the task to a private entity. It did not have to know that this would allow suit in federal court. Know or not know, Ex parte Young produces that result. The dissent agrees that because of the ‘“constitutional plan,’” post, at 272, n. 3 (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 30 (1990)), this Court can adjudicate disputes between state agencies without offending sovereign immunity. But explaining away exceptions to its theory does not advance the ball. It has not demonstrated that sovereign immunity has anything at all to say about federal courts’ adjudicating interagency disputes. We have no occasion to pass on other questions of federalism lurking in this case, such as whether the DD or PAIMI Acts are a proper exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers. As Justice Kennedy observes, whether the Acts run afoul of some other constitutional provision (i e., besides the Eleventh Amendment) “cannot be permitted to distort the antecedent question of jurisdiction.” Post, at 265 (concurring opinion). We think greatly exaggerated the dissent’s concern that, “[g]iven the number of state agencies across the country that enjoy independent litigating authority,” today’s decision “could potentially lead to all sorts of litigation in federal courts addressing internal state government disputes.” Post, at 275. Such litigation cannot occur unless the state agency has been given a federal right of its own to vindicate (as VOPA alleges it has been given under the highly unusual statute at issue here).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

W. R. GRACE & CO. v. LOCAL UNION 759, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF THE UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM & PLASTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA No. 81-1314. Argued February 28, 1983 Decided May 31, 1983 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Peter G. Nash argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dixie L. Atwater and Kevin T. O’Reilly. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Wallace. Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Danny E. Cupit, Charles Armstrong, Michael H. Gottesman, and Robert M. Weinberg. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Jeffrey C. McGuiness filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Faced with the prospect of liability for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, petitioner signed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Commission or EEOC) a conciliation agreement that was in conflict with its collective-bargaining agreement with respondent. Petitioner then obtained a court order, later reversed on appeal, that the conciliation agreement should prevail. The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in enforcing an arbitral award of backpay damages against petitioner under the collective-bargaining agreement for layoffs pursuant to the conciliation agreement. I A In October 1973, after a lengthy investigation, the EEOC’s District Director determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that petitioner W. R. Grace and Company (Company) had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 263, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), by discriminating in the hiring of Negroes and women at its Corinth, Miss., plastics manufacturing facility. App. 2. In addition, the Director found that the departmental and plantwide seniority systems, mandated by the Company’s collective-bargaining agreement with respondent Local Union No. 759 (Union), were unlawful because they perpetuated the effects of the Company’s past discrimination. The Company was invited, pursuant to § 706(b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b), to conciliate the dispute. Although the Commission also invited the Union to participate, the Union declined to do so. B A collective-bargaining agreement between petitioner and respondent expired in March 1974, and failed negotiations led to a strike. The Company hired strike replacements, some of whom were women who took Company jobs never before held by women. The strike was settled in May with the signing of a new agreement that continued the plant seniority system specified by the expired agreement. The strikers returned to work, but the Company also retained the strike replacements. The women replacements were assigned to positions in the Corinth plant ahead of men with greater seniority. Specifically, the Company prevented men from exercising the shift preference seniority (to which they were entitled under the collective-bargaining agreement) to obtain positions held by the women strike replacements. The men affected by this action filed grievances under the procedures established by the collective-bargaining agreement. The Company refused to join the ultimate arbitration. Instead, it filed an action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The Company sought an injunction prohibiting arbitration of the grievances while the Company negotiated a conciliation agreement with the Commission. The Union counterclaimed to compel arbitration. Before the District Court took any action, the Company and the Commission signed a conciliation agreement dated December 11, 1974. App. 10. In addition to ratifying the Company’s position with respect to the shift preference dispute, the conciliation agreement provided that in the event of layoffs, the Company would maintain the existing proportion of women in the plant’s bargaining unit. Id., at 15-16. The Company then amended its § 301 complaint to add the Commission as a defendant and to request an injunction barring the arbitration of grievances seeking relief that conflicted with the terms of the conciliation agreement. The Commission cross-claimed against the Union and counterclaimed against the Company for a declaratory judgment that the conciliation agreement prevailed, or, in the alternative, for a declaratory judgment that the seniority provisions were not a bona fide seniority system protected by § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h). While cross-motions for summary judgment were under consideration, the Company laid off employees pursuant to the conciliation agreement. Several men affected by the layoff, who would have been protected under the seniority provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, filed grievances. In November 1975, with the Company still refusing to arbitrate, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Commission and the Company. It held that under Title VII the seniority provisions could be modified to alleviate the effects of past discrimination. Southbridge Plastics Division, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 403 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (1975). The court declared that the terms of the conciliation agreement were binding on all parties and that “all parties . . . shall abide thereby.” App. 44. The Union appealed, and no party sought a stay. With the Union’s appeal pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Company, following the terms of the conciliation agreement, laid off more employees. Again, adversely affected male employees filed grievances. In January 1978, over two years after the District Court’s decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. Southbridge Plastics Division, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 565 F. 2d 913. Applying Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), which was decided after the District Court’s decision, the Court of Appeals held that because the seniority system was not animated by a discriminatory purpose, it was lawful and could not be modified without the Union’s consent. 565 F. 2d, at 916. The court granted the Union’s counterclaim, compelling the Company to arbitrate the grievances. In response to this decision, the Company reinstated the male employees to the positions to which they were entitled under the collective-bargaining agreement. The pending grievances, seeking backpay, then proceeded to arbitration. The first to reach arbitration was that of a male employee who had been demoted while the District Court order was in effect. Arbitrator Anthony J. Sabella, in August 1978, concluded that although the grievant was entitled to an award under the collective-bargaining agreement, it would be inequitable to penalize the Company for conduct that complied with an outstanding court order. App. 45. He thus denied the grievance. Id., at 47. Instead of filing an action to set aside that award, the Union chose to contest Sabella’s reasoning in later arbitrations. C The next grievance to be arbitrated resulted in the award in dispute here. Id., at 48. Arbitrator Gerald A. Barrett was presented with the complaints of two men who had been laid off before, and one man who had been laid off after, the entry of the District Court order. Acknowledging that the Sabella arbitration resolved the same contractual issue, id., at 51, Barrett first considered whether the collective-bargaining agreement required him to follow the Sabella arbitration award. He concluded that it did not. The collective-bargaining agreement limited the arbitrator’s authority, Barrett found, to considering whether the express terms of the contract had been violated. Because Sabella had considered the fairness of enforcing the terms of the contract, he had acted outside his contractually defined jurisdiction. Id., at 55-56. Barrett determined that the finality clause of the collective-bargaining agreement therefore did not require him to follow Sabella’s award. Ibid. Arbitrator Barrett then turned to the grievances before him. The Company did not dispute that it had violated the seniority provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, id., at 56, and Barrett also accepted the Company’s contention that it had acted in good faith in following the conciliation agreement. He found, however, that the collective-bargaining agreement made no exception for good-faith violations of the seniority provisions, and that the Company had acted at its own risk in breaching the agreement. The Company, he held, could not complain that the law ultimately had made this out to be an unfortunate decision. Ibid. In essence, Barrett interpreted the collective-bargaining agreement as providing that the District Court’s order did not extinguish the Company’s liability for its breach. D The Company then instituted another action under § 801 of the Labor Management Relations Act to overturn the award. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi entered summary judgment for the Company, finding that public policy prevented enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement during the period prior to the Court of Appeals’ reversal. App. 58-69. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. 652 F. 2d 1248 (1981). We granted certiorari to decide the important issue of federal labor law that the case presents. 458 U. S. 1105 (1982). II The sole issue before the Court is whether the Barrett award should be enforced. Under well-established standards for the review of labor arbitration awards, a federal court may not overrule an arbitrator’s decision simply because the court believes its own interpretation of the contract would be the better one. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 596 (1960). When the parties include an arbitration clause in their collective-bargaining agreement, they choose to have disputes concerning constructions of the contract resolved by an arbitrator. Unless the arbitral decision does not “dra[w] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” id., at 597, a court is bound to enforce the award and is not entitled to review the merits of the contract dispute. This remains so even when the basis for the arbitrator’s decision may be ambiguous. Id., at 598. Under this standard, the Court of Appeals was correct in enforcing the Barrett award, although it seems to us to have taken a somewhat circuitous route to this result. Barrett’s initial conclusion that he was not bound by the Sabella decision was based on his interpretation of the bargaining agreement’s provisions defining the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and his perceived obligation to give a prior award a preclusive effect. See nn. 4 and 5, supra. Because the authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining, just as is any other contractual provision, the scope of the arbitrator’s authority is itself a question of contract interpretation that the parties have delegated to the arbitrator. Barrett’s conclusions that Sabella acted outside his jurisdiction and that this deprived the Sabella award of precedential force under the contract draw their “essence” from the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. Regardless of what our view might be of the correctness of Barrett’s contractual interpretation, the Company and the Union bargained for that interpretation. A federal court may not second-guess it. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S., at 599. Barrett’s analysis of the merits of the grievances is entitled to the same deference. He found that the collective-bargaining agreement provided no good-faith defense to claims of violations of the seniority provisions, and gave him no authority to weigh in some other fashion the Company’s good faith. Again, although conceivably we could reach a different result were we to interpret the contract ourselves, we cannot say that the award does not draw its essence from the collective-bargaining agreement. III As with any contract, however, a court may not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1948). Barrett’s view of his own jurisdiction precluded his consideration of this question, and, in any event, the question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F. 2d 1345, 1350 (CA9 1977); Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F. 2d 25, 29 (CA2), cert. denied, 373 U. S. 949 (1963); Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 287 (1980). If the contract as interpreted by Barrett violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S., at 35. Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained “by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Muschany v. United States, 324 U. S. 49, 66 (1945). A It is beyond question that obedience to judicial orders is an important public policy. An injunction issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction must be obeyed until the injunction is vacated or withdrawn. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307, 313-314 (1967); United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 293-294 (1947); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 189-190 (1922). A contract provision the performance of which has been enjoined is unenforceable. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 261, 264 (1981). Here, however, enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement as interpreted by Barrett does not compromise this public policy. Given the Company’s desire to reduce its work force, it is undeniable that the Company was faced with a dilemma: it could follow the conciliation agreement as mandated by the District Court and risk liability under the collective-bargaining agreement, or it could follow the bargaining agreement and risk both a contempt citation and Title VII liability. The dilemma, however, was of the Company’s own making. The Company committed itself voluntarily to two conflicting contractual obligations. When the Union attempted to enforce its contractual rights, the Company sought a judicial declaration of its respective obligations under the contracts. During the course of this litigation, before the legal rights were finally determined, the Company again laid off employees and dishonored its contract with the Union. For these acts, the Company incurred liability for breach of contract. In effect, Barrett interpreted the collective-bargaining agreement to allocate to the Company the losses caused by the Company’s decision to follow the District Court order that proved to be erroneous. Even assuming that the District Court’s order was a mandatory injunction, nothing in the collective-bargaining agreement as interpreted by Barrett required the Company to violate that order. Barrett’s award neither mandated layoffs nor required that layoffs be conducted according to the collective-bargaining agreement. The award simply held, retrospectively, that the employees were entitled to damages for the prior breach of the seniority provisions. In this case, the Company actually complied with the District Court’s order, and nothing we say here causes us to believe that it would disobey the order if presented with the same dilemma in the future. Enforcement of Barrett’s award will not create intolerable incentives to disobey court orders. Courts have sufficient contempt powers to protect their injunctions, even if the injunctions are issued erroneously. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U. S., at 315. In addition to contempt sanctions, the Company here was faced with possible Title VII liability if it departed from the conciliation agreement in conducting its layoffs. The Company was cornered by its own actions, and it cannot argue now that liability under the collective-bargaining agreement violates public policy. Nor is placing the Company in this position -with respect to the court order so unfair as to violate public policy. Obeying injunctions often is a costly affair. Because of the Company’s alleged prior discrimination against women, some readjustments and consequent losses were bound to occur. The issue is whether the Company or the Union members should bear the burden of those losses. As interpreted by Barrett, the collective-bargaining agreement placed this unavoidable burden on the Company. By entering into the conflicting conciliation agreement, by seeking a court order to excuse it from performing the collective-bargaining agreement, and by subsequently acting on its mistaken interpretation of its contractual obligations, the Company attempted to shift the loss to its male employees, who shared no responsibility for the sex discrimination. The Company voluntarily assumed its obligations under the collective-bargaining agreement and the arbitrators’ interpretations of it. No public policy is violated by holding the Company to those obligations, which bar the Company’s attempted reallocation of the burden. B Voluntary compliance with Title VII also is an important public policy. Congress intended cooperation and conciliation to be the preferred means of enforcing Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974). Critical to the compliance scheme is the Commission’s role in settling Title VII disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before a Title VII plaintiff or the Commission may bring suit. See § 706(b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(b). Enforcement of the Barrett award will not inappropriately affect this public policy. In this case, although the Company and the Commission agreed to nullify the collective-bargaining agreement’s seniority provisions, the conciliation process did not include the Union. Absent a judicial determination, the Commission, not to mention the Company, cannot alter the collective-bargaining agreement without the Union’s consent. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 44 (Commission’s power to investigate and conciliate does not have coercive legal effect). Permitting such a result would undermine the federal labor policy that parties to a collective-bargaining agreement must have reasonable assurance that their contract will be honored. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502, 509 (1962). Although the ability to abrogate unilaterally the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement might encourage an employer to conciliate with the Commission, the employer’s added incentive to conciliate would be paid for with the union’s contractual rights. Aside from the legality of conferring such power on the Commission and an employer, it would be unlikely to further true conciliation between all interested parties. Although an innocent union might decide to join in Title VII conciliation efforts in order to protect its contractual position, neither the employer nor the Commission would have any incentive to make concessions to the union. The Commission and the employer would know that they could agree without the union’s consent and that their agreement would be enforced. In fact, enforcing the award here should encourage conciliation and true voluntary compliance with federal employment discrimination law. If, as in this case, only the employer faces Title VII liability, the union may enter the conciliation process with the hope of obtaining concessions in exchange for helping the employer avoid a Title VII suit. If, however, both the union and the employer are potentially liable, it would be in their joint interests to work out a means to share the burdens imposed by the Commission’s demands. On this view, the conciliation process of Title VII and the collective-bargaining process complement each other, rather than conflict. IV For the foregoing reasons, the Barrett award is properly to be enforced. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. The Company’s amended complaint, unlike the Commission’s pleadings, did not expressly request a declaratory judgment under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201 and 2202. See App. in Southbridge Plastics Division, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, No. 75-4416 (CA5), pp. 98, 123-124, 129-130. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, viewed the Company’s complaint as seeking a declaration of its obligations under the respective contracts. See 565 F. 2d 913, 915 (1978). The relevant text of the order is as follows: “(1) The terms of the conciliation agreement executed on December 11, 1974, by the plaintiff and the defendant, EEOC, are binding upon all the parties to this action; and “(2) Where the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement executed by the plaintiff and defendant, Local 759, conflict with the provisions of the conciliation agreement executed by the plaintiff and defendant, EEOC, the provisions of the conciliation agreement are controlling and all parties to this action shall abide thereby.” App. 44. Neither the parties nor the District Court nor the Court of Appeals attached significance to this distinction between the grievants. See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae 6, n. 6. Our resolution of the case eliminates any need to consider it. The 1974 collective-bargaining agreement and the succeeding 1977 agreement each defined the arbitrator’s jurisdiction as follows: “The jurisdiction and authority of the Arbitrator of the grievance and his opinion and award shall be confined exclusively to the interpretation and application of the express provision or provisions of this Agreement at issue between the Union and the Company. He shall have no authority to add to, adjust, change, or modify any provision of this Agreement.” Art. IV, §3; App. 19, 31. The finality clause in each of the 1974 and 1977 collective-bargaining agreements provided in relevant part: “The decision of the Arbitrator on the merits of any grievance adjudicated within his jurisdiction and authority as specified in this Agreement shall be final and binding on the aggrieved employee or employees, the Union and the Company.” Art. IV, § 4; App. 20, 32. The 1974 and 1977 collective-bargaining agreements each provided: “If it is determined in the grievance procedure that an employee has been unjustly discharged or suspended the employee shall be reinstated to his former job and shall be compensated at his regular hourly earnings for the time lost less any penalty time decided upon.” Art. IV, § 7(a); App. 21, 32-33. Although the court believed that the validity of the Sabella award was the dispositive issue, 652 F. 2d, at 1252, the Union raised and argued the question whether the Barrett award itself was enforceable. Brief for Appellant in No. 80-3661 (CA5), pp. 18-30. We disagree with the court’s initial premise that the validity of the Sabella award is relevant. Only the enforceability of the Barrett award is at issue. The 1974 and 1977 collective-bargaining agreements each contained a clause that provided: “In the event that any provision of this Agreement is found to be in conflict with any State or Federal Laws now existing or hereinafter enacted, it is agreed that such laws shall supersede the conflicting provisions without affecting the remainder of these provisions.” Art. XIV, § 7; App. 29, 42. Before the Court of Appeals, the Company argued that under this “legality” clause the seniority provision was superseded by the District Court’s determination that the provision was illegal. The Court of Appeals responded that its decision reversing the District Court had retroactive effect because it declared the law as it always had existed. 652 F. 2d, at 1255. It seems to us, however, that the Company’s argument was that the court should interpret the legality clause itself, a privilege not permitted to federal courts in reviewing an arbitral award. We do not decide whether some public policy would be violated by an arbitral award for a breach of seniority provisions ultimately found to be illegal under Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 355-356 (1977). Neither do we decide whether such an award could be enforced in the face of a valid judicial alteration of seniority provisions, pursuant to Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 778-779 (1976), to provide relief to discriminatees under Title VII or other law. See Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 658 F. 2d 694, 695-696 (CA9 1981); EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 633 F. 2d 1232, 1237 (CA6 1980). Although Barrett could have considered the District Court order to cause impossibility of performance and thus to be a defense to the Company’s breach, he did not do so. Impossibility is a doctrine of contract interpretation. See 18 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts §§ 1931-1979 (3d ed. 1978). For the reasons stated in the text, we cannot revise Barrett’s implicit rejection of the impossibility defense. Even if we were to review the issue de novo, moreover, it is far from clear that the defense is available to the Company, whose own actions created the condition of impossibility. See id., § 1939, p. 50; Uniform Commercial Code §2 — 615(a) and Comment 10, 1A U. L. A. 335, 338 (1976); Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F. 2d 255, 265 (CA2 1975). As a threshold matter, we doubt that the District Court in this case ordered specific performance of the conciliation agreement or granted any other type of injunctive relief. That court, in “considering the declaratory relief sought,” 403 F. Supp., at 1187, stated that the issue was “whether the terms of the conciliation agreement override the terms of the bargaining agreement.” Ibid. Both the Company’s amended complaint and the Union’s counterclaim invoked only the cause of action provided by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Although the Commission filed a counterclaim against the Company alleging that the Company had violated Title VII, the Court of Appeals treated the case as a § 301 action. See 565 F. 2d, at 917. See generally Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assn. v. American Airlines, Inc., 573 F. 2d 960, 963 (CA7) (judicial review of Title VII settlement agreement is not review of judgment of Title VII liability after trial), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 876 (1978). Consistent with this view, the court expressly stated that the action was not brought under Title VII, 565 F. 2d, at 917, and refused to remand to permit individual women employees to meet the standards set forth in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). See 565 F. 2d, at 917. Thus, the courts had no occasion to order injunctive relief under Title VII. The decision of the District Court instead seems to be a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the conflicting agreements, and not a mandatory injunction. Given the ambiguity, however, we assume for purposes of decision that the District Court’s order constituted an injunction. Economic necessity is not recognized as a commercial impracticability defense to a breach-of-contract claim. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615, Comment 4, 1A U. L. A. 336 (1976) (increased cost of performance does not constitute impossibility); 18 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1931, pp. 7-8 (3d ed. 1978) (same). Thus, while it may have been economic misfortune for the Company to postpone or forgo its layoff plans, its extant, conflicting, and voluntarily assumed contractual obligations exposed it to liability regardless of the layoff procedure it followed. In order to avoid liability under either contract, the Company, of course, could have accepted the economic losses of forgoing its reduction-in-force plans. This is not to say that in the face of the economic necessity of the layoffs, the Company had no way whatsoever to avoid the injury. Prior to conducting the layoffs, the Company could have requested a stay from the District Court to permit it to follow the collective-bargaining agreement pending review by the Court of Appeals. It was the Company, which had sought the declaration of rights and obligations, and which chose to act before the determination of its respective contractual obligations was final; the Union most likely would have preferred that no layoffs occur at all. Although the Union could have requested a stay, there is no rule requiring a party to ask for prospective relief from a possible contractual breach. The Union justifiably relied on its right to backpay damages. Moreover, the Company, in future contract negotiations, may seek to bargain for a contract provision expressly allocating the loss to its employees in a case such as this one. Compensatory damages may be available to a plaintiff injured by a breach of contract even when specific performance of the contract would violate public policy. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 365, Comment a (1981). This principle is particularly applicable here; since the employees’ Union had no responsibility for the events giving rise to the injunction, and entered into the collective-bargaining agreement ignorant of any illegality, the employees are not precluded from recovery for the breach. Id., § 180, Comment a. A party injured by the issuance of an injunction later determined to be erroneous has no action for damages in the absence of a bond. Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, 437 (1882); Buddy Systems, Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc., 545 F. 2d 1164, 1167-1168 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 903 (1977). Enforcing the Barrett award to compensate the injuries suffered by the male employees does not violate this principle. The only party injured by the injunction itself has been the Company; the proof of this is that if the Company had done nothing at all, see n. 12, supra, the economic loss from failing to reduce the work force would have fallen on the Company. By an independent and voluntary act, the Company shifted this loss to its male employees and thereby caused the injury remedied by the Barrett award.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. BLUE. No. 531. Argued April 21, 1966. Decided May 23, 1966. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Roberts, Nathan Lewin and Joseph M. Howard. Ernest R. Mortenson argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1962 the appellee, Ben Blue, was informed by the Internal Revenue Service that he might be criminally prosecuted for violation of the federal income tax laws. The following year the Service made jeopardy assessments against Blue, his wife, and his wholly owned corporation for tax liability for the years 1958 to 1960 inclusive; the known assets of all three were seized and tax liens recorded. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 6321-6323, 6331, 6861. Statutory notices were then issued giving Blue 90 days within which to file petitions if he wished to contest the proposed deficiencies in the Tax Court, I. R. C. §6213, and Blue filed petitions setting forth his position and alleging errors in the Commissioner’s determination of deficiencies. More than a year later the Government initiated the present criminal case by a six-count indictment charging Blue with wilfully attempting to evade personal income taxes for the years 1958 through 1960 and with filing false returns for his corporation during the same years. I. R. C. §§ 7201, 7206 (1). Blue filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the indictment on several grounds. After a hearing the District Court granted the motion. The court stated orally that because of the jeopardy assessment and Tax Court proceeding Blue “has been compelled and will be compelled to come forward on the same matters as are concerned in this criminal case, to testify against himself . ...” The Government filed a notice of appeal and the case was docketed in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Determining that the District Court had sustained a “motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy” so that a direct appeal lay to this Court, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, 350 F. 2d 267, and we postponed jurisdiction, 382 U. S. 971. We agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and, on the merits, reverse the decision of the District Court. Since Blue had not yet been brought to trial and put in jeopardy when dismissal occurred, see United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 283, our jurisdiction under the statute is secure if the motion sustained by the District Court was a motion in bar. See, supra, n. 2. This in turn depends on “the effect of the ruling sought to be reviewed,” United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 536, and not on how the pleading is styled or on whether it is ultimately sustained on appeal. Like the Court of Appeals, we take the dismissal in this case as a ruling that absent reversal on review future prosecution of Blue on the pending counts is forever barred. While there are slight ambiguities in language, the District Court’s dismissal was grounded in what it found to be past compulsory self-incrimination and in its apparent belief that this mischief could not be undone save by turning back the clock through ending the prosecution. Because the dismissal by its own force would “end the cause and exculpate the defendant,” United States v. Hark, 320 U. S., at 536, rather than merely abate the prosecution on account of some normally curable defect, one requisite of a motion in bar is met. Whether it is a further requisite that the motion introduce “new matter” in the fashion of a plea by way of confession and avoidance need not here be decided. See United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431, 441, 453 (separate opinions disagreeing on this point). For in this instance Blue unquestionably relied on new matter in alleging self-incrimination, so the motion qualifies even under the more stringent definition. Thus under either view of a motion in bar taken in Mersky, this case qualifies for direct review. Our conclusion on the jurisdictional issue is further supported by two analogous decisions of this Court treating claims of statutory immunity as pleas in bar which permitted direct appeal. United States v. Hoffman, 335 U. S. 77; United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424. On the merits of the case, we do not believe that the District Court should have dismissed the indictment. The Government has argued that the statements made by Blue in his Tax Court petitions were no more than successive denials of the alleged underpayments and do not constitute incriminating evidence. The Government has also intimated that by merely providing the occasion for the filing of Blue’s petitions in fulfilling its statutory duty to make jeopardy assessments and send deficiency notices, it ought not be regarded as compelling the taxpayer to incriminate himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. There is no need, however, to consider these or other contentions that may point in the same direction. Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Blue would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits if they were sought to be used against him at trial. While the general common-law practice is to admit evidence despite its illegal origins, this Court in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused’s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338; Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449. Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally obtained evidence assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might advance marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the guilty brought to book. We remand this case to the District Court to proceed on the merits, leaving Blue free to pursue his Fifth Amendment claim through motions to suppress and objections to evidence. It is not entirely clear from Blue’s brief and argument whether he seeks to sustain the dismissal below on other grounds that the District Court did not accept. See, supra, n. 1. Putting to one side jurisdictional difficulties this course might encounter under the direct-review statute, we believe it is fairer to all to regard no other grounds as presented, thus reserving to Blue the opportunity to articulate them plainly and support them by the record. Reversed and remanded. The court stated that it based the dismissal “on that ground alone.” It rejected a claim that the seizure of property and recording of tax liens had prevented Blue from preparing an adequate defense by depleting his resources. It did not expressly consider Blue’s claim that there is an administrative practice of making no assessments in advance of criminal proceedings and that failure to extend the policy to him was a denial of due process. 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed.) provides in part: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: “From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy. “If an appeal shall be taken pursuant to this section to any court of appeals which, in the opinion of such court, should have been taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, such court shall certify the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which shall thereupon have jurisdiction to hear and determine the case to the same extent as if an appeal had been taken directly to that Court.” It does not seem to be contended that tainted evidence was presented to the grand jury; but in any event our precedents indicate this would not be a basis for abating the prosecution pending a new indictment, let alone barring it altogether. See Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359; Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339; 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184a, at 40 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice §2-11, at 31-33 (1962); Friedenthal, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 71, 97-100 (1959).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. TENNESSEE GAS TRANSMISSION CO. et al. No. 48. Argued October 17, 1962. — Decided December 3, 1962 Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for petitioner in No. 48. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Acting Assistant Attorney General Guilfoyle, Morton Hollander, Richard A. Solomon, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Luke R. Lamb and Peter H. Schiff. Charles S. Rhyne argued the cause for petitioner in No. 50. With him on the briefs were David W. Craig, Herzel H. E. Plaine and Edward D. Means, Jr. Harry S. Littman argued the cause for Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., respondent. With him on the briefs were William C. Braden, Jr., Jack Werner and Harold L. Talisman. Brooks E. Smith argued the cause for Manufacturers Light & Heat Co. et al., respondents. With him on the briefs were William Anderson, Alfred A. Green and Herbert W. Bryan. David Stahl, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Herbert E. Squires filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Together with No. 50, Pittsburgh v. Tennessee Oas Transmission Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the authority of the Federal Power Commission after hearing to order an interim rate reduction as well as a refund of amounts collected in excess thereof where a portion of a previously filed increased rate is found unjustified but the remainder of the proceeding is deferred. Respondent Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, a natural gas company, included within its filed increased rate schedule a 7% over-all return on its net investment. In considering this item along with others involved in the filing, including the allocation of the over-all cost of service among its rate zones, the Commission concluded, after a full hearing, that 6% % rather than the filed 7% would be a just and reasonable return. It accordingly required Tennessee Gas to file reduced rates, based on the lower return figure, retroactive to the end of a five-month suspension period, and ordered a refund of the excessive amounts collected since that date. 24 F. P. C. 204. The Court of Appeals, 293 F. 2d 761, found that the 6%% return was just and reasonable. It held, however, by a divided vote, that the Commission erred in ordering an immediate reduction and refund since it had not determined other issues in the proceeding, particularly that of the proper allocation of the over-all costs of the company’s services among its six zones. The latter, the court reasoned, might be determinative of the ultimate question of whether the over-all filed rates in each zone were just and reasonable; therefore, the interim order might result in irretrievable loss to the company. The importance of the question in the administration of the Natural Gas Act led us to grant certiorari, 368 U. S. 974. We have concluded that the issuance of the order was an appropriate exercise of the power granted the Commission by the Act. I. Tennessee Gas does not have a system-wide rate applicable to all services regardless of where performed. It has since the early 1950’s, with Commission approval, divided its extensive pipeline system into six rate zones with rate differentials. The appropriate allocation of its costs of service among these zones and types of customers was not then decided by the Commission nor agreed upon between the parties, but was left for future decision. It was in this posture that in 1959 Tennessee Gas, pursuant to § 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act, filed with the Commission proposed increased rates for its six rate zones. The rates were predicated upon a cost of service which included a claim to a 7 % rate of return on net investment. At the inception of hearings on the reasonableness of the filed rates the Commission, under its § 4 (e) authority, imposed a five-month suspension period on the proposed increase after which the rates became effective subject to refund of any portion not ultimately justified by Tennessee Gas in the proceedings. Hearings commenced on February 2, 1960, and Tennessee Gas presented its evidence on cost of service and rate of return. The Commission staff presented evidence on the latter alone and then proposed that the rate of return issue be treated separately from cost of service and allocation of rates among.zones. At the time of this proposal to the Commission the zone allocation issue was also pending in another docket in a proceeding involving Tennessee Gas. By motion Tennessee Gas requested that the allocation issue be decided simultaneously with that involving the rate of return. On August 5, 1960, this motion was denied, and four days later the Commission issued the interim order under attack here. It found that a 7 Jo return was excessive and that a 6% % rate of return was just and reasonable. This finding was based on the Commission’s determination that Tennessee Gas had failed to justify a rate of return greater than 6%%. Accordingly, the Commission issued an interim order which disallowed the 7% return, required Tennessee Gas to file appropriate lower rates retroactively to the effective date of the increased rates and ordered refunds of the differences collected since that time. Tennessee Gas does not contest the Commission’s determination that a 6%% return on its net investment is just and reasonable. It does contend that to require the refunds prior to a determination of cost allocation among its zones of operation might result in its being unable to realize this return during the refund period. In this connection it points out that the rates as finally determined might, in some of its zones, be above the rates collected less the refund ordered. This would result in Tennessee Gas not being able to recoup a return of 6%% since it would be unable to collect retroactively the higher rates found appropriate in those zones while it would be required to make full refunds in the remaining lower rate zones. The Court of Appeals, in setting aside the Commission’s order of immediate reduction and refund, found that it was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to thus splinter the issues, especially since the cost allocation among zones issue was deemed “ripe for decision,” and a ruling on it was an “essential element in determining whether the filed rates are excessive.” The court also questioned whether a hearing confined to the issue of rate of return was such a “full hearing” as § 4 (e) demands prerequisite to a rate-change and refund order. The Federal Power Commission and the City of Pittsburgh, which is acting in behalf of resident consumers of natural gas, are here in separate cases. Since they raise identical factual and legal issues, we consider the two cases together. II. As all of the respondents admit, there is “no question” as to the Commission's authority to issue interim rate orders. Indeed, such general authority is well established by cases in this Court, Federal Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942); New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923), as well as in the Courts of Appeals. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 236 F. 2d 606 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1956); State Corporation Comm’n of Kansas v. Federal Power Comm’n, 206 F. 2d 690 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1953). It is true that none of these cases involved an undecided cost allocation issue applicable retroactively. However, in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. this Court took pains to point out the fact that “establishment of a rate for a regulated industry often involves two steps of different character, one of which may appropriately precede the other.” 315 U. S., at p. 584. Significantly, that case also involved the issue of a fair rate of return and “the adjustment of a rate schedule . . . so as to eliminate discriminations and unfairness from its details.” Ibid. And the Court specifically found power to order a decrease in rates “without establishing a specific schedule.” It declared that the proviso of § 5 authorized the Commission to “order a decrease where existing rates are unjust ... or are not the lowest reasonable rates.” Finally, the Court concluded that § 16 placed discretion in the Commission to “issue . . . such orders ... as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” Here the Commission took similar action directing Tennessee Gas to file a new schedule which would reflect the prescribed %% reduction in the rate of return and, in addition, to refund under § 4 (e) the amounts collected in excess of the lower, substituted charges reflecting the lawful rate of return. The fact that the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case was initiated under § 5 of the Act and the refund provisions of § 4 (e) were not available was, in our opinion, of no consequence since the hazard of not making a profit remains on the company in each instance. “Discriminations and unfairness” if later found present in Natural Gas Pipeline’s schedule might have caused it losses just as the refunds might here. In addition, an analysis of the policy of the Act clearly indicates that a natural gas company initiating an increase in rates under § 4 (d) assumes the hazards involved in that procedure. It bears the burden of establishing its rate schedule as being “just and reasonable.” In addition, the company can never recoup the income lost when the five-month suspension power of the Commission is exercised under §4(e). The company is also required to refund any sums thereafter collected should it not sustain its burden of proving the reasonableness of an increased rate, and it may suffer further loss when the Commission upon a finding of excessiveness makes adjustments in the rate detail of the company’s filing. In this latter respect a rate for one class or zone of customers may be found by the Commission to be too low, but the company cannot recoup its losses by making retroactive the higher rate subsequently allowed; on the other hand, when another class or zone of customers is found to be subjected to excessive rates and a lower rate is ordered, the company must make refunds to them. The company’s losses in the first instance do not justify its illegal gain in the latter. Such situations are entirely consistent with the policy of the Act and, we are told, occur with frequency. The company having initially filed the rates and either collected an illegal return or failed to collect a sufficient one must, under the theory of the Act, shoulder the hazards incident to its action including not only the refund of any illegal gain but also its losses where its filed rate is found to be inadequate. Nor do we share the doubts of the Court of Appeals concerning the practicalities of the two-step procedure invoked by the Commission. We cannot see how the severance of the two issues left Tennessee Gas without guidance as to “the extent to which individual rates should be reduced, or to whom refunds are due.” 293 F. 2d, at p. 767. The Commission has found that the revised over-all rate schedule should have been calculated on a rate of return of 6%% rather than 7%. As a result the over-all rate was to that extent unlawful and refunds were due across the board to all customers in the Tennessee Gas system. The interim order directed their payment. True, the old and undecided zone rate structure under attack as discriminatory was left in effect by this order and survives a bit longer. But the probabilities present in that situation are more than offset by the certainty of the Commission’s actions in finding the 7% rate unlawful, fixing the 6% % lawful return and giving timely effectiveness, including refunds, to the latter. Perhaps discrimination may later be found in the allocation of cost between some zones, but it would affect only the customers in those zones while the postponement of the interim order here would be of continuing detriment to all customers in all zones. Moreover, if decreased rates and resultant refunds are later found to be necessary in those isolated instances the Commission has the power to so order upon such finding and the individual lawful rates could at that time be fixed. Moreover, the use of the interim order technique is in keeping with the purposes of the Act “to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies . . . ,” Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 610 (1944), and “to underwrite just and reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas . . . .” Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 360 U. S. 378, 388 (1959). Faced with the finding that the rate of return was excessive, the Commission acted properly within its statutory power in issuing the interim order of reduction and refund, since the purpose of the Act is “to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges. . . Id., at p. 388. To do otherwise would have permitted Tennessee Gas to collect the illegal rate for an additional 18 months at a cost of over $16,500,000 to consumers. True, the exaction would have been subject to refund, but experience has shown this to be somewhat illusory in view of the trickling down process necessary to be followed, the incidental cost of which is often borne by the consumer, and in view of the transient nature of our society which often prevents refunds from reaching those to whom they are due. It is, therefore, the duty of the Commission to look at “the backdrop of the practical consequences [resulting] . . . and the purposes of the Act,” Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 364 U. S. 137, 147 (1960), in exercising its discretion under § 16 to issue interim orders and, where refunds are found due, to direct their payment at the earliest possible moment consistent with due process. In so doing under the circumstances here the Commission’s ultimate action in directing the severance and in entering the interim order was not only entirely appropriate but in the best tradition of effective administrative practice. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it set aside the interim order; otherwise it is affirmed. Reversed in part. On motion of the Commission’s staff counsel, the proceeding was divided into two phases: (1) determination of rate of return; (2) determination of other factors, including allocation of rates among zones. 15 U. S. C. § 717c (d) : “Unless the Commission otherwise órders, no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days’ notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published.” 15 U. S. C. § 717c (e): “Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Commission shall have authority ... to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the natural-gas company affected thereby a statement in writing of its reasons for such suspension, may suspend the operation of such schedule and defer the use of such rate, charge, classification, or service, but not for a longer period than five months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect. . . .” In this connection we note the Commission found: “Hearings on the cost allocation issue, severed from the other issues in Docket No. G-11980 by Commission order, were concluded on December 17, 1959, and briefing thereon was concluded on April 11, 1960. Tennessee’s motion for omission of the intermediate decision on that issue is neither timely nor concurred in by the other parties to the proceeding. Further, while we recognize that an early decision on that issue is desirable, the nature and considerable size of the record, indicates that it would be more practicable in the interests of an early decision and in the interest of effective administration of the Natural Gas Act, that the Presiding Examiner, who has available knowledge of that record, should proceed with consideration of the evidence and render decision thereon.” Unreported order of the Commission issued Aug. 5, 1960. Respondents Columbia Gas Companies raise a separate point as to their not being permitted to offer evidence in this case as to cost allocation. We note that they had a full opportunity to do so in another proceeding involving the same parties. This contention, therefore, has no merit. This hearing, insofar as it determined that the rate of return was unreasonable, was to that extent and for the purpose of the interim order the “full hearing” contemplated by the statute, even though it did not at that time dispose of the entire case. 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a): “. . . Provided, however, That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates.” 15 U. S. C. § 717o: “The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter. Among other things, such rules and regulations may define accounting, technical,.and trade terms used in this chapter; and may prescribe the form or forms of all statements, declarations, applications, and reports to be filed with the Commission, the information which they shall contain, and the time within which they shall be filed. Unless a different date is specified therein, rules and regulations of the Commission shall be effective thirty days after publication in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe. Orders of the Commission shall be effective on the date and in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe. For the purposes of its rules and regulations, the Commission may classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or matters. All rules and regulations of the Commission shall be filed with its secretary and shall be kept open in convenient form for public inspection and examination during reasonable business hours. (June 21, 1938, ch. 556, § 16, 52 Stat. 830,)” The cost allocation issue was decided 18 months following the Commission’s decision on rate of return, and substantial issues on the cost-of-service question are still unresolved. If the interim order had not been entered the illegal rate would have been in effect 22 months, with an excessive return of some $20,000,000. In some of the States refunds due unfound former customers remain with the company in separate accounts subject to future order; a larger group escheats such amounts to the State; others permit them to be used in defraying the cost of the refund; a fourth group has no problem regarding transients since refunds are prorated among company customers and credited on future bills; and one State includes all refunds in future rate reductions. While refunds are permissible in cash, most of the States approve plans whereby credits are permitted on future gas bills in proportion to average consumption.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WATTS et al. v. SEWARD SCHOOL BOARD et al. No. 923. Decided May 3, 1965. George Kaufmann for petitioners. George N. Hayes for respondent Seward School Board. Per Curiam. Petitioners Watts and Blue were dismissed from their positions as schoolteachers in Seward, Alaska, on grounds of “immorality,” which under Alaska Statutes 1962, § 14.20.170 was defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Petitioners’ dismissals were upheld by the Alaska Superior Court (Third Judicial District), and on appeal the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. 395 P. 2d 372. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that “[t]he immoral conduct complained of as to the appellant Watts was his holding of private conversations with various teachers in which he solicited their support in an attempt to oust the school superintendent from his job. The allegedly immoral conduct of the appellant Blue was his making of a speech to a labor union at Seward in which he stated, We have been unable to get rid of the [school] Superintendent, so we are going to get rid of the Board/ or words to that effect.” 395 P. 2d, at 374. The Alaska Supreme Court held that this conduct “had a tendency to bring the [petitioners] . . . and the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect,” within the terms of the statute, 395 P. 2d, at 375, and it therefore sustained their dismissals. Petitioners contend that their dismissals for engaging in the conduct here described unconstitutionally infringe their rights to political expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We need not consider petitioners’ contentions at this time, for since their petition for certiorari was filed Alaska has amended its statutes in this area. House Bill 27, adopted by the Alaska Legislature and signed by the Governor on March 31, 1965, now defines “immorality” as grounds for revocation of a teaching certificate, as “the commission of an act which, under the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.” Moreover, Alaska Statutes, Tit. 14, c. 20, have been amended by the addition of a new section which reads: “Sec. 14.20.095. Right to Comment and Criticize Not to be Restricted. No rule or regulation of the commissioner of education, a local school board, or local school administrator may restrict or modify the right of a teacher to engage in comment and criticism outside school hours, relative to school administrators, members of the governing body of any school or school district, any other public official, or any school employee, to the same extent that any private individual may exercise the right.” This Court has held that supervening changes in state law that may be relevant to the disposition of a case may require that the cause be remanded for appropriate action by the state court. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 273 U. S. 126, 131. Cf. Trunkline Gas Co. v. Hardin County, 375 U. S. 8, Accordingly, it is appropriate to allow the Alaska court to consider the effect of the new Alaska statutes upon this case. To that end, the petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alaska is vacated, and this case is remanded to that court for such further consideration as may be deemed appropriate by that court under Alaska law. Vacated and remanded.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BERKOVITZ et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 87-498. Argued April 19, 1988 Decided June 13, 1988 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Ellen M. Viakley argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Gary S. Gildin and Paul R. Friedman. Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, John F. Cordes, William Cole, Thomas Scarlett, and Ann H. Wion. Lloyd N. Cutler, James Robertson, and Ronald J. Greene filed a brief for Lederle Laboratories as amicus curiae. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act), 28 U. S. C. § 2680(a), bars a suit based on the Government’s licensing of an oral polio vaccine and on its subsequent approval of the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public. I On May 10, 1979, Kevan Berkovitz, then a 2-month-old infant, ingested a dose of Orimune, an oral polio vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories. Within one month, he contracted a severe case of polio. The disease left Berkovitz almost completely paralyzed and unable to breathe without the assistance of a respirator. The Communicable Disease Center, an agency of the Federal Government, determined that Berkovitz had contracted polio from the vaccine. Berkovitz, joined by his parents as guardians, subsequently filed suit against the United States in Federal District Court. The complaint alleged that the United States was liable for his injuries under the FTCA, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, because the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS), then a part of the National Institutes of Health, had acted wrongfully in licensing Lederle Laboratories to produce Orimune and because the Bureau of Biologies of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had acted wrongfully in approving release to the public of the particular lot of vaccine containing Berkovitz’s dose. According to petitioners, these actions violated federal law and policy regarding the inspection and approval of polio vaccines. The Government moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the agency actions fell within the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The District Court denied this motion, concluding that neither the licensing of Orimune nor the release of a specific lot of that vaccine to the public was a “discretionary function” within the meaning of the FTCA. Civ. Action No. 84-2893 (WD Pa., Apr. 30, 1986). At the Government’s request, the District Court certified its decision for immediate appeal to the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. 822 F. 2d 1322 (1987). The court initially rejected the Government’s argument that the discretionary function exception bars all claims arising out of the regulatory activities of federal agencies. The court stated that “the discretionary function exception-is inapplicable to non-discretionary regulatory actions,” id., at 1328, and noted that employees of regulatory agencies have no discretion to violate the command of federal statutes or regulations. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, however, the court held that federal law imposed no duties on federal agencies with respect to the licensing of polio virus vaccines or the approval of the distribution of particular vaccine lots to the public. Likening the applicable regulatory scheme to the scheme found to confer discretionary regulatory authority in United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S. 797 (1984), the court concluded that the licensing and release of polio vaccines were wholly discretionary actions and, as such, could not form the basis for suit against the United States. A dissenting judge argued that the relevant statutes and regulations obligated the DBS to require the submission of test data relating to a vaccine from the manufacturer and to deny a license when the test data showed that the vaccine failed to conform with applicable safety standards. Reading the complaint in this case as alleging a failure on the part of the DBS to act in accordance with these directives, the dissenting judge concluded that the discretionary function exception did not bar petitioners’ suit. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 1003 (1988), to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the effect of the discretionary function exception on claims arising from the Government’s regulation of polio vaccines. Compare 822 F. 2d 1322, supra, with Baker v. United States, 817 F. 2d 560, 564-566 (CA9 1987) (holding that discretionary function exception did not bar suit alleging a negligent decision to license a polio vaccine); Loge v. United States, 662 F. 2d 1268, 1272-1273 (CA8 1981) (holding that discretionary function exception did not bar suit alleging negligence in both the licensing of a polio vaccine and the release of a particular vaccine lot). We now reverse the Third Circuit’s judgment. HH J-H The FTGA, 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), generally authorizes suits against the United States for damages “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” The Act includes a number of exceptions to this broad waiver of sovereign immunity. The exception relevant to this case provides that no liability shall lie for “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(a). This exception, as we stated in our most recent opinion on the subject, “marks the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.” United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S., at 808. The determination of whether the discretionary function exception bars a suit against the Government is guided by several established principles. This Court stated in Varig that “it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case.” Id., at 813. In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee. This inquiry is mandated by the language of the exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or choice. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 34 (1953) (stating that the exception protects “the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one’s judgment of the best course”). Thus, the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. And if the employee’s conduct cannot appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect. Cf. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U. S. 292, 296-297 (1988) (recognizing that conduct that is not the product of independent judgment will be unaffected by threat of liability). Moreover, assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. The basis for the discretionary function exception was Congress’ desire to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” United States v. Varig Airlines, supra, at 814. The exception, properly construed, therefore protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. See Dalehite v. United States, supra, at 36 (“Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion”). In sum, the discretionary function exception insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. This Court’s decision in Varig Airlines illustrates these propositions. The two cases resolved in that decision were tort suits by the victims of airplane accidents who alleged that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had acted negligently in certifying certain airplanes for operation. The Court characterized the suits as challenging the FAA’s decision to certify the airplanes without first inspecting them and held that this decision was a discretionary act for which the Government was immune from liability. In reaching this result, the Court carefully reviewed the statutory and regulatory scheme governing the inspection and certification of airplanes. Congress had given the Secretary of Transportation broad authority to establish and implement a program for enforcing compliance with airplane safety standards. In the exercise of that authority, the FAA, as the Secretary’s designee, had devised a system of “spot-checking” airplanes for compliance. This Court first held that the establishment of that system was a discretionary function within the meaning of the FTCA because it represented a policy determination as to how best to “accommodat[e] the goal of air transportation safety and the reality of finite agency resources.” 467 U. S., at 820. The Court then stated that the discretionary function exception also protected “the acts of FAA employees in executing the ‘spot-check’ program” because under this program the employees “were specifically empowered to make policy judgments regarding the degree of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maximize compliance with FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency resources.” Ibid. Thus, the Court held the challenged acts protected from liability because they were within the range of choice accorded by federal policy and law and were the results of policy determinations. In restating and clarifying the scope of the discretionary function exception, we intend specifically to reject the Government’s argument, pressed both in this Court and the Court of Appeals, that the exception precludes liability for any and all acts arising out of the regulatory programs of federal agencies. That argument is rebutted first by the language of the exception, which protects “discretionary” functions, rather than “regulatory” functions. The significance of Congress’ choice of language is supported by the legislative history. ' As this Court previously has indicated, the relevant legislative materials demonstrate that the exception was designed to cover not all acts of regulatory agencies and their employees, but only such acts as are “discretionary” in nature. See Dalehite v. United States, supra, at 33-34. This coverage accords with Congress’ purpose in enacting the exception: to prevent “[j]udicial intervention in . . . the political, social, and economic judgments” of governmental-including regulatory — agencies. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S., at 820. Moreover, this Court twice before has rejected a variant of the Government’s position. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 64-65 (1955) (disapproving argument that FTCA precludes liability for the performance of “uniquely governmental functions”); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 318-319 (1957) (same). And in Varig, we ignored the precise argument the Government makes in this case, focusing instead on the particular nature of the regulatory conduct at issue. To the extent we have not already put the Government’s argument to rest, we do so now. The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment. The question in this case is whether the governmental activities challenged by petitioners are of this discretionary nature. I — I HH HH Petitioners suit raises two broad claims. First, petitioners assert that the DBS violated a federal statute and accompanying regulations in issuing a license to Lederle Laboratories to produce Orimune. Second, petitioners argue that the Bureau of Biologies of the FDA violated federal regulations and policy in approving the release of the particular lot of Orimune that contained Kevan Berkovitz’s dose. We examine each of these broad claims by reviewing the applicable regulatory scheme and petitioners’ specific allegations of agency wrongdoing. Because the decision we review adjudicated a motion to dismiss, we accept all of the factual allegations in petitioners’ complaint as true and ask whether, in these circumstances, dismissal of the complaint was appropriate. A Under federal law, a manufacturer must receive a product license prior to marketing a brand of live oral polio vaccine. See 58 Stat. 702, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 262(a). In order to become eligible for such a license, a manufacturer must first make a sample of the vaccine product. See 42 CFR §73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §601.2 (1987). This process begins with the selection of an original virus strain. The manufacturer grows a seed virus from this strain; the seed virus is then used to produce monopools, portions of which are combined to form the consumer-level product. Federal regulations set forth safety criteria for the original strain, see 42 CFR § 73.110(b)(2) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR § 630.10(b)(2) (1987), the seed virus, see 42 CFR §§ 73.110(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §§630.10(b)(3), (4) (1987), and the vaccine monopools, see 42 CFR §73.114 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §630.16 (1987). Under the regulations, the manufacturer must conduct a variety of tests to measure the safety of the product at each stage of the manufacturing process. See 42 CFR §§73.110, 73.114 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §§630.10, 630.16 (1987). Upon completion of the manufacturing process and the required testing, the manufacturer is required to submit an application for a product license to the DBS. See 42 CFR §73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §601.2 (1987). In addition to this application, the manufacturer must submit data from the tests performed and a sample of the finished product. Ibid. In deciding whether to issue a license, the DBS is required to comply with certain statutory and regulatory provisions. The Public Health Service Act provides: “Licenses for the maintenance of establishments for the propagation or manufacture and preparation of products [including polio vaccines] may be issued only upon a showing that the establishment and the products for which a license is desired meet standards, designed to insure the continued safety, purity, and potency of such products, prescribed in regulations, and licenses for new products may be issued only upon a showing that they meet such standards. All such licenses shall be issued, suspended, and revoked as prescribed by regulations . . . .” §351(d), 58 Stat. 702-703, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 262(d). A regulation similarly provides that “[a] product license shall be issued only upon examination of the product and upon a determination that the product complies with the standards prescribed in the regulations . . . .” 42 CFR § 73.5(a) (Supp. 1964); see 21 CFR § 601.4 (1987). In addition, a regulation states that “[a]n application for license shall not be considered as filed” until the DBS receives the information and data regarding the product that the manufacturer is required to submit. 42 CFR § 73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR § 601.2 (1987). These statutory and regulatory provisions require the DBS, prior to issuing a product license, to receive all data the manufacturer is required to submit, to examine the product, and to make a determination that the product complies with safety standards. Petitioners’ first allegation with regard to the licensing of Orimune is that the DBS issued a product license without first receiving data that the manufacturer must submit showing how the product, at the various stages of the manufacturing process, matched up against regulatory safety standards. See App. 12-13; Brief for Petitioners 5-6. The discretionary function exception does not bar a cause of action based on this allegation. The statute and regulations described above require, as a precondition to licensing, that the DBS receive certain test data from the manufacturer relating to the product’s compliance with regulatory standards. See § 351(d), 58 Stat. 702-703, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 262(d) (providing that a license shall issue “only upon a showing” by the manufacturer); 42 CFR §73.3 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §601.2 (1987) (providing that application for license shall be deemed as filed only upon receipt of relevant test data). The DBS has no discretion to issue a license without first receiving the required test data; to do so would violate a specific statutory and regulatory directive. Accordingly, to the extent that petitioners’ licensing claim is based on a decision of the DBS to issue a license without having received the required test data, the discretionary function exception imposes no bar. Petitioners’ other allegation regarding the licensing of Orimune is difficult to describe with precision. Petitioners contend that the DBS licensed Orimune even though the vaccine did not comply with certain regulatory safety standards. See App. 12; Brief for Petitioners 4-6. This charge may be understood in any of three ways. First, petitioners may mean that the DBS licensed Orimune without first making a determination as to whether the vaccine complied with regulatory standards. Second, petitioners may intend to argue that the DBS specifically found that Orimune failed to comply with certain regulatory standards and nonetheless issued a license for the vaccine’s manufacture. Third, petitioners may concede that the DBS made a determination of compliance, but allege that this determination was incorrect. Neither petitioners’ complaint nor their briefs and argument before this Court make entirely clear their theory of the case. If petitioners aver that the DBS licensed Orimune either without determining whether the vaccine complied with regulatory standards or after determining that the vaccine failed to comply, the discretionary function exception does not bar the claim. Under the scheme governing the DBS’s regulation of polio vaccines, the DBS may not issue a license except upon an examination of the product and a determination that the product complies with all regulatory standards. See 42 CFR § 73.5(a) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §601.4 (1987). The agency has no discretion to deviate from this mandated procedure. Petitioners’ claim, if interpreted as alleging that the DBS licensed Orimune in the absence of a determination that the vaccine complied with regulatory standards, therefore does not challenge a discretionary function. Rather, the claim charges a failure on the part of the agency to perform its clear duty under federal law. When a suit charges an agency with failing to act in accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function exception does not apply. If petitioners’ claim is that the DBS made a determination that Orimune complied with regulatory standards, but that the determination was incorrect, the question of the applicability of the discretionary function exception requires a somewhat different analysis. In that event, the question turns on whether the manner and method of determining compliance with the safety standards at issue involve agency judgment of the kind protected by the discretionary function exception. Petitioners contend that the determination involves the application of objective scientific standards, see Brief for Petitioners 16-17, whereas the Government asserts that the determination incorporates considerable “policy judgment,” Brief for United States 36. In making these assertions, the parties have framed the issue appropriately; application of the discretionary function exception to the claim that the determination of compliance was incorrect hinges on whether the agency officials making that determination permissibly exercise policy choice. The parties, however, have not addressed this question in detail, and they have given us no indication of the way in which the DBS interprets and applies the regulations setting forth the criteria for compliance. Given that these regulations are particularly abstruse, we hesitate to decide the question on the scanty record before us. We therefore leave it to the District Court to decide, if petitioners choose to press this claim, whether agency officials appropriately exercise policy judgment in determining that a vaccine product complies with the relevant safety standards. B The regulatory scheme governing release of vaccine lots is distinct from that governing the issuance of licenses. The former set of regulations places an obligation on manufacturers to examine all vaccine lots prior to distribution to ensure that they comply with regulatory standards. See 21 CFR §610.1 (1978). These regulations, however, do not impose a corresponding duty on the Bureau of Biologies, Although the regulations empower the Bureau to examine any vaccine lot and prevent the distribution of a noncomplying lot, see 21 CFR § 610.2(a) (1978), they do not require the Bureau to take such action in all cases. The regulations generally allow the Bureau to determine the appropriate manner in which to regulate the release of vaccine lots, rather than mandating certain kinds of agency action. The regulatory scheme governing the release of vaccine lots is substantially similar in this respect to the scheme discussed in United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S. 797 (1984). Given this regulatory context, the discretionary function exception bars any claims that challenge the Bureau’s formulation of policy as to the appropriate way in which to regulate the release of vaccine lots. Cf. id., at 819-820 (holding that discretionary function exception barred claim challenging FAA’s decision to establish a spot-checking program). In addition, if the policies and programs formulated by the Bureau allow room for implementing officials to make independent policy judgments, the discretionary function exception protects the acts taken by those officials in the exercise of this discretion. Cf. id., at 820 (holding that discretionary function exception barred claim that employees charged with executing the FAA’s spot-checking program made negligent policy judgments respecting the proper inspection of airplanes). The discretionary function exception, however, does not apply if the acts complained of do not involve the permissible exercise of policy discretion. Thus, if the Bureau’s policy leaves no room for an official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or if the act simply does not involve the exercise of such judgment, the discretionary function exception does not bar a claim that the act was negligent or wrongful. Cf. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S., at 69 (holding that a negligent failure to maintain a lighthouse in good working order subjected the Government to suit under the FTCA even though the initial decision to undertake and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary policy judgment). Viewed in light of these principles, petitioners’ claim regarding the release of the vaccine lot from which Ke'van Berkovitz received his dose survives the Government’s motion to dismiss. Petitioners allege that, under the authority granted by the regulations, the Bureau of Biologies has adopted a policy of testing all vaccine lots for compliance with safety standards and preventing the distribution to the public of any lots that fail to comply. Petitioners further allege that notwithstanding this policy, which allegedly leaves no room for implementing officials to exercise independent policy judgment, employees of the Bureau knowingly approved the release of a lot that did not comply with safety standards. See App. 13; Brief for Petitioners 20 — 21; Reply Brief for Petitioners 15-17. Thus, petitioners’ complaint is directed at a governmental action that allegedly involved no policy discretion. Petitioners, of course, have not proved their factual allegations, but they are not required to do so on a motion to dismiss. If those allegations are correct — that is, if the Bureau’s policy did not allow the official who took the challenged action to release a noncomplying lot on the basis of policy considerations — the discretionary function exception does not bar the claim. Because petitioners may yet show, on the basis of materials obtained in discovery or otherwise, that the conduct challenged here did not involve the permissible exercise of policy discretion, the invocation of the discretionary function exception to dismiss petitioners’ lot release claim was improper. <1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the discretionary function exception required the dismissal of petitioners’ claims respecting the licensing of Orimune and the release of a particular vaccine lot. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Petitioners also sued Lederle Laboratories in a separate civil action. That suit was settled before the instant case was filed. There is currently no dispute in this case as to whether petitioners have stated a claim that falls within this general waiver of immunity. Although the Government raised this issue in its motion to dismiss petitioners’ suit, the District Court found that the complaint stated a claim under the relevant state law, and the Government declined to request certification of this decision for immediate appeal. The decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955), also illuminates the appropriate scope of the discretionary function exception. The plaintiff in that case sued the Government for failing to maintain a lighthouse in good working order. The Court stated that the initial decision to undertake and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary judgment. See id., at 69. The Court held, however, that the failure to maintain the lighthouse in good condition subjected the Government to suit under the FTCA. See ibid. The latter course of conduct did not involve any permissible exercise of policy judgment. The House of Representatives Report on the final version of the FTCA discussed the application of the discretionary function exception to the activities of regulatory agencies by stating that it would preclude application of the Act to “a claim against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, based upon an alleged abuse of discretionary authority by an officer or employee, whether or not negligence is alleged to have been involved. . . . The bill is not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse of discretion. Nor is it desirable or intended that the constitutionality of legislation, or the legality of a rule or regulation should be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort. However, the common-law torts of employees of regulatory agencies would be included within the scope of the bill to the same extent as torts of nonregulatory agencies.” H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). This passage illustrates that Congress intended the discretionary function exception to apply to the discretionary acts of regulators, rather than to all regulatory acts. The Government’s position in this case at times appears to replicate precisely the position expressly rejected in Indian Tomng and Rayonier. See Brief for United States 20 (arguing that Congress intended to preserve immunity for “core governmental function[s]”); id., at 16. The parties to this case also have disputed in their briefs and arguments before this Court the applicability of the discretionary function exception to a claim alleging that the DBS wrongfully chose not to revoke Lederle Laboratories’ license to manufacture Orimune. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court specifically addressed this issue. Moreover, petitioners did not raise the issue in their petition for a writ of certiorari. We accordingly do not consider or decide the question whether the discretionary function exception bars a claim against the Government for failure to revoke a license to manufacture a polio vaccine. The DBS issued a license to Lederle Laboratories to produce Orimune in 1963. The first citation in the text is to the regulation in effect at that time. Where the regulation has remained substantially in the same form, a parallel citation is given to the current regulations. Manufacturers are required to obtain an establishment license in addition to the product license. See 42 CFR §§ 73.2-73.4 (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR 601.1-601.2, 601.10 (1987). Petitioners have not challenged the issuance of an establishment license to Lederle Laboratoriés. In 1972, the DBS was transferred from the National Institutes of Health to the FDA and renamed the Bureau of Biologies. See 37 Fed. Reg. 12865 (1972). In 1984, the Bureau of Biologies was renamed the Office of Biologies Research and Review. See 49 Fed. Reg. 23834 (1984). The regulations have been amended accordingly. Petitioners point to two specific regulatory standards that the product allegedly failed to satisfy. First, petitioners claim that an original virus strain from which the vaccine was made did not comply with the requirement that the strain be “free of harmful effect upon administration in the recommended dosage to at least 100,000 people susceptible to poliomyelitis.” 42 CFR §73.110(b)(2)(i) (Supp. 1964); see 21 CFR § 630.10(b)(2)(i) (1987). Second, petitioners assert that the strain, a seed virus, a vaccine monopool, and the ultimate vaccine product failed to comply with the regulatory scheme’s neurovirulence requirement. See 42 CFR §§ 73.110(b) (2)(ii), 73.110(b)(4), 73.114(b)(1) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR §§ 630.110(b)(2)(ii), 630.110(b)(4), 630.16(b)(1) (1987). Neuro virulence is the capacity of an infectious agent to produce pathologic effects on the central nervous system. In this context, it refers to the vaccine’s ability to cause paralytic poliomyelitis. The neurovirulence of a vaccine product is tested by injecting the product into monkeys. The product meets the neurovirulence criterion only if a specified number of the animals survive and a “comparative analysis” demonstrates that the neurovirulence of the vaccine product “does not exceed” the neurovirulenee of a reference product previously selected by the agency. 42 CFR §73.114(b)(l)(iii) (Supp. 1964); 21 CFR § 630.16(b)(l)(iii) (1987). Even the Government conceded at oral argument that the DBS has no discretion to issue a product license without an examination of the product and a determination that the product complies with regulatory standards. The transcript reads: “QUESTION: [Supposing the DBS] did not make any examination of the application at all, or any determination other than some papers have been filed and I will now issue the license. “Would that comply with the regulation? “[COUNSEL]: No, it would not comply with the regulation. “QUESTION: It would violate a mandatory duty . . . , wouldn’t it? “[COUNSEL]: In the extreme instance you are talking about ... , it would definitely violate that regulation.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 34-35. As noted, see n. 9, supra, the regulatory standards that petitioners claim were not satisfied in this case are the neurovirulence criterion and the requirement that virus strains be free from harmful effect. The question presented is thus whether the determination that a vaccine product complies with each of these regulatory standards involves judgment of the kind that the discretionary function exception protects. The citation is to the regulation in effect at the time Lederle Laboratories released the lot of Orimune containing Kevan Berkovitz’s dose. None of the regulations governing the release of vaccine lots has changed significantly since that time. The current regulations dealing with this subject have the same title and section numbers as the regulations cited in the text. The Government’s own argument before this Court provides some support for petitioners’ allegation regarding the Bureau’s policy. The Government indicated that the Bureau reviews each lot of vaccine and decides whether it complies with safety standards. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. The Government further suggested that if an employee knew that a lot did not comply with these standards, he would have no discretion to approve the release of the lot. See id., at 31-32.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BURLINGTON TRUCK LINES, INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 27. Argued October 15-16, 1962. — Decided December 3, 1962. David Axelrod argued the cause for appellants in No. 27. With him on the briefs were Jack Goodman, Carl L. Steiner, Russell B. James, Starr Thomas and Roland J. Lehman. David D. Weinberg argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant in No. 28. Robert W. Ginanne argued the cause for the United States et al., appellees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, J. William Doolittle, Robert B. Hummel, Elliott H. Moyer and I. K. Hay. J. Max Harding argued the cause for Nebraska Short Line Carriers, Inc., appellee. With him on the brief was Robert A. Nelson. Together with No. 28, General Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 564, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same Court. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. These are direct appeals under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 from the judgment of a three-judge District Court, 194 F. Supp. 31 (S. D. Ill.), which upheld an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 79 M. C. C. 599, granting a motor common carrier application. This Court noted probable jurisdiction because of important questions raised as to the relationship and interplay between remedies available under the Interstate Commerce Act and under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act. 368 U. S. 951. Appellee Nebraska Short Line Carriers, Inc., is a Nebraska corporation, organized in June 1956. All of its stock is owned by 12 motor carriers serving eastern and central Nebraska and interchanging interstate traffic at Omaha and other gateway points with over 20 larger trunk-line carriers, among whom are the appellant carriers, with whom through-route, joint-rate, interline arrangements have been established. Some of the stockholder carriers serve Nebraska communities without other motor carrier or rail service. For some time prior to May 1956, the stockholder carriers had resisted efforts by the Teamsters Union to unionize their operations. Eventually, the union sought to bring economic pressure to bear upon the stockholder carriers by a secondary boycott against their traffic through the larger, unionized, trunk-line carriers upon whom the stockholder carriers were dependent for interchanging traffic to and from points beyond Nebraska. The collective bargaining contract between the trunk-line carriers and the union contained protection of rights or so-called “hot cargo” clauses which reserved to the union and its members “the right to refuse to handle goods from or to any firm or truck” involved in any controversy with the union and provided that it should not be a cause for discharge if an employee of the carrier refused to handle “unfair” goods. In May 1956, some of the stockholder carriers began experiencing difficulties in receiving and delivering freight from and to many of their normal and logical connections at Omaha and, to some extent, at Sioux City, Lincoln, and Grand Island. The difficulty consisted primarily of the refusal on the part of many of the larger carriers to accept interline traffic tendered to them by the stockholder carriers and the refusal to turn over to them inbound traffic routed over their lines or normally turned over to them for delivery to ultimate destinations in Nebraska. The stockholder carriers, shippers, and consignees thus experienced considerable delay, inconvenience, and unforeseen expense in the movement of traffic to and from interior Nebraska points. At the same time, however, some of the larger interlining carriers, particularly appellants Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., and Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, generally maintained normal interline relationships with the stockholder carriers. The stockholder carriers thereupon organized Short Line and on June 22, 1956, Short Line filed an application with the Interstate Commerce Commission for common carrier authority to transport commodities on a regularly scheduled basis between certain Nebraska and Iowa points and points in other States. A further application for operating authority over irregular routes between Omaha and points in 32 different States was filed six months later. The applications were assigned to two different examiners, each of whom recommended that the application before him be denied. The Commission stated that “the pertinent facts are accurately and adequately stated” in the examiners’ reports and adopted the statements as its own (79 M. C. C., at 605, 608), but it concluded that the first application should be granted in part. The Commission found that although service in the area was satisfactory before May 1956, after that date the union-induced boycott of the stockholder carriers caused “a substantial disruption” and “serious inadequacies in the service available.” 79 M. C. C., at 612, 613. Accordingly, it found that grant of Short Line’s application was required by “the present and future public convenience and necessity.” Id., at 613. The Commission declared that it was not attempting to adjudicate a labor dispute or trench upon the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, and it conceded its lack of jurisdiction to look beyond the duties of carriers to the public under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act. Id., at 611. It strongly criticized the carrier appellants for yielding to union secondary boycott demands, however, and it declared that the carriers’ failure to fulfill their duties as common carriers was particularly inexcusable since there had been no violence or imminent threats of danger to property or person. The Commission expressed the opinion that alleged “apprehensions of certain of the organized carriers that any opposition to the demands of the union would have resulted in reprisals against them” were “greatly exaggerated,” and it noted that some of the interlining carriers had successfully continued to deal with the stockholder carriers, with at least one of them encountering no difficulties with its employees when it changed its policy and carried out its statutory duties as a common carrier and interlined with the Short Line carriers. Id., at 612. Finally, the Commission considered the remedy appropriate to the situation. Short Line had applied for operating authority under § 207 (certificates of public convenience and necessity). As the Commission noted, the Act provides other means of correcting deficiencies of service. Section 204 (c) empowers the Commission to order carriers to comply with the transportation laws, and the Commission may act upon complaint or upon its own motion without complaint, in each case after notice and hearing, and sanctions are available to enforce its orders; § 212 (a) empowers the Commission to suspend certificates for failure to comply with duties under the Act. The Commission proceeded to dispose of the remedy problem in the following manner: “We do not agree with those of the parties who insist that the procedure here adopted; namely, the filing of the instant applications under the provisions of section 207 of the act, is in any manner inappropriate. Regardless of the injection of the labor situation into the matter, the instant applications are based upon claimed deficiencies in the motor service available to the shipping public of Nebraska. Where, as here, the existing carriers are shown to have so conducted their operations as to result in serious inadequacies in the service available to a large section of the public, one effective method of correcting the situation is by the granting of authority for sufficient additional service, and, in fact, we' are charged with the duty of procuring such additional facilities as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the national transportation policy. The fact that other remedies are available, such as the suggested filing of complaints by the aggrieved carriers and shippers does not alter the situation or deprive any carrier of the right to follow the course here chosen.” Id., at 613. The Commission therefore granted the application. The protesting carriers and the affected union sought judicial review before a three-judge District Court (28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 1398, 2321-2325), which upheld the order as within the scope of the Commission’s statutory authority, based on adequate findings, and supported by substantial evidence. 194 F. Supp. 31. The court reviewed the evidence and concluded that although there was “no doubt that their [the protesting carriers’] ability to perform service prior to May 195 [6] was adequate,” the record showed that union pressure made it inadequate thereafter. 194 F. Supp., at 45. The court recognized that a cease-and-desist order might have been utilized, but stated that additional certification was also a permissible remedy which was not made unavailable merely because the reason for inadequacy of service was that “existing carriers [were] subordinating their public service obligations to their collective bargaining agreements.” Id., at 54. In regard to the choice of remedy, the court rejected the contention that the passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, which added § 8 (e) to the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 73 Stat. 543, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 158 (e), some four months after the entry of the order, mooted the case by making the union activities in inducing the organized carriers to boycott the Short Line stockholder carriers illegal and therefore unlikely to be resumed. The District Court expressed doubts as to whether § 8 (e) “effectively outlaws 'hot cargo’ clauses,” and maintained that, even if it did, the Commission’s order should still stand. Id., at 58. To the union’s contention that grant of a certificate here injected the Interstate Commerce Commission into the province of the National Labor Relations Board, or at least undercut to some extent the policies of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, the court replied that the union’s failure to organize the employees of the Short Line carriers “effectively destroyed any jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board under the Act of its ereation.” Id., at 59. The case is now before us on direct appeals from this judgment. We have concluded that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the Commission’s order set aside as an improvident exercise of its discretion. The Commission found from the facts of record that the refusals to handle interchange traffic and to accept freight from certain shippers caused a substantial disruption in motor service and serious inadequacies in the service available, despite the efforts of some of the larger trunk-line carriers to maintain normal interline relationships. There was ample evidence to support these findings and we do not disturb them. The difficulty with the order arises in connection with the findings and' conclusions relevant to the choice of remedy. The assumption of the Commission was that the deficiencies of service made either of two remedies available — -additional certification' or entry of a cease-and-desist order — and that it had unlimited discretion to apply either remedy simply because either might be effective. It is unmistakably clear from the opinion of the Commission and from the fact-findings it made or adopted, that the disruption in service resulted solely from refusals to serve, which in turn arose from union pressure applied to obtain union objectives. It is equally clear that absent union pressure there would have been no refusals to serve and that in such normal circumstances the facilities and the services of the existing carriers were adequate. Moreover, the trunk-line carriers were operating below capacity, were in a position and anxious to transport additional traffic, and had been enjoying the previously interlined traffic which the grant would divert to Short Line. In this factual context we may put aside at the outset the authority which the appellees rely upon that holds that additional certification is the normal and permissible way to deal with generalized inadequacy in service. See, e. g., Davidson Transfer Co. v. United States, 42 F. Supp. 215, 219-220 (E. D. Pa.), aff’d, 317 U. S. 587. When, as here, the particular deviations from an otherwise completely adequate service (which has economic need for the traffic) consist solely of illegal and discriminatory refusals to accept or deliver traffic from or to particular carriers or shippers, the powers of the Commission under §§ 204, 212, and 216 bear heavily on the propriety of § 207 relief. And in such a case the choice of the certification remedy may not be automatic ; it must be rational and based upon conscious choice that in the circumstances the public interest in “adequate, economical, and efficient service” outbalances whatever public interest there is in protecting existing carriers’ revenues in order to “foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers” (National Transportation Policy, 49 U. S. C. preceding §§ 1, 301, 901, 1001), and the other opposing interests. There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion. We are not prepared to and the Administrative Procedure Act will not permit us to accept such adjudicatory practice. See Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 327 U. S. 608, 613-614. Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but “unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.” New York v. United States, 342 U. S. 882, 884 (dissenting opinion). “Congress did not purport to transfer its legislative power to the unbounded discretion of the regulatory body.” Federal Communications Comm’n v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U. S. 86, 90. The Commission must exercise its discretion under § 207 (a) within the bounds expressed by the standard of “public convenience and necessity.” Compare id., at 91. And for the courts to determine whether the agency has done so, it must “disclose the basis of its order” and “give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 197. The agency must make findings that support its decision, and those findings must be supported by substantial evidence. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. J-T Transport Co., 368 U. S. 81, 93; United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475, 488-489 ; United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 511. Here the Commission made no findings specifically directed to the choice between two vastly different remedies with vastly different consequences to the carriers and the public. Nor did it articulate any rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. The Commission addressed itself neither to the possible shortcomings of § 204 procedures, to the advantages of certification, nor to the serious objections to the latter. As we shall presently show, these objections are particularly important in the present context and they should have been taken into account. Appellants’ position is and was that the refusals to serve could be terminated through complaint procedures and thus the need for additional service obviated. The Commission was, as indicated, unresponsive to these arguments in its order, deeming that the availability of the other remedy “[did] not alter the situation.” This was error. Commission counsel now attempt to justify the Commission’s “choice” of remedy on the ground that a cease-and-desist order would have been ineffective. The short answer to this attempted justification is that the Commission did not so find. Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196. The courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action; Chenery requires that an agency’s discretionary order be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself: “[A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . is . . . that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action . . . .” Ibid. For the courts to substitute their or counsel’s discretion for that of the Commission is incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review. This is not to deprecate, but to vindicate (see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 197), the administrative process, for the purpose of the rule is to avoid “propel [ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.” 332 U. S., at 196. The second and longer answer to the attempted justification is that there is not substantial evidence of record upon which to base a finding that a cease-and-desist order would have been ineffective. There was every indication at the time that a cease-and-desist order would render the deficiencies in service purely temporary phenomena and would thus be effective in promoting adequate, economical, and efficient service and in fostering sound economic conditions among the carriers affected. It is said that attempted compliance by the unionized carriers might in some way “so aggravate their labor difficulties as to cause a complete cessation of operations.” But this ignores the Commission’s conclusion that carrier apprehensions of teamster reprisals were exaggerated and unwarranted. It further ignores the fact that, as the Commission was aware, the National Labor Relations Board had ordered the union to cease boycotting any of the stockholder carriers by appeals to the employees of any other carrier. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 554, N. L. R. B. 1891. To be sure, the Board had not ordered the union not to make appeals directly to the trunk-line carriers. The union was free to make such appeals, absent inducement of employees, and, as far as the labor laws and the collective agreement were concerned, the employer was free to reject or accede to such requests. But it was precisely at this point that the Sand Door case (Local 1976 v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93) recognized the power of the Commission to enter cease- and-desist orders against the carriers’ violating the transportation law and their tariffs. Thus, as the appellant union argues, there was no reason to have assumed that the ordinary processes of the law were incapable of remedying the situation. But discussion of the effectiveness of cease-and-desist orders in terms of the June 1959 status of hot cargo arrangements is now largely academic: Congress added § 8 (e) to the Act four months after the Commission’s decision in this case and over a year before the District Court sustained the Commission. Under this section Congress declared it to “be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing .in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void. . . In the absence of authoritative judicial interpretation of § 8 (e), however, the District Court was unwilling to attach any significance to the new law in the present case. In this the District Court erred. The plain words of the statute at the very least raised serious questions about the legality of direct union-employer agreements to boycott another employer. Not only would the delinquent interlining carriers in this case be subject to the injunctive and other processes of the National Labor Relations Board if their conduct violated § 8 (e), but the unions themselves would be vulnerable and the pressures which generated the refusals to serve might well be effectively removed. These intervening facts so changed the complexion of the case that (even putting aside the considerations discussed above) the reviewing equity court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, should not have affirmed the order, as it did, but should have vacated it and remanded it to the Commission for further consideration in the light of the changed conditions. See Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364, 373-374; Wabash R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 273 U. S. 126, 130-131; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 506-509. Finally, although we do not wish to fetter the Commission’s expert, discretionary powers by specifically prescribing that cease-and-desist order relief be granted (if, indeed, any relief is still needed) rather than additional certification, nevertheless the Commission should be particularly careful in its choice of remedy, and should have been particularly careful, because of the possible effects of its decision on the functioning of the national labor relations policy. The Commission acts in a most delicate area here, because whatever it does affirmatively (whether it grants a certificate or enters a cease-and-desist order) may have important consequences upon the collective bargaining processes between the union and the employer. The policies of the Interstate Commerce Act and the labor act necessarily must be accommodated, one to the other. Writing before the 1959 amendments to the labor law, this Court said in the Sand Door case: “But it is said that the Board is not enforcing the Interstate Commerce Act or interfering with the Commission’s administration of that statute, but simply interpreting the prohibitions of its own statute in a way consistent with the carrier’s obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act. Because of that Act a carrier cannot effectively consent not to handle the goods of a shipper. . . . But the fact that the carrier’s consent is not effective to relieve him from certain obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act does not necessarily mean that it is ineffective for all purposes, nor should a determination under one statute be mechanically carried over in the interpretation of another statute involving significantly different considerations and legislative purposes.” 357 U. S., at 110. The Court concluded that although “common factors may emerge in the adjudication of these questions” under the two Acts by the two different agencies, nevertheless independent consideration and resolution were possible, the National Labor Relations Board directing itself to consideration of whether the employees violated their duties under § 8 (b) and the Interstate Commerce Commission directing its attention to whether the carrier “may have failed in his obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act.” Implicit in this analysis is a recognition that if either agency is not careful it may trench upon the other’s jurisdiction, and, because of lack of expert competence, contravene the national policy as to transportation or labor relations. In such a context, choice of. the sweeping relief of certification rather than the more precise and narrowly drawn cease-and-desist order remedy was improvident, absent a compelling justification. And the fact that § 8 (e) of the Act now exposes the employer as well as the union to Labor Board injunctive processes only underlines the necessity for careful analysis in fashioning a remedy to terminate unlawful action by delinquent carriers. This is not to say that circumstances can never permit the Commission to authorize additional service to remedy refusals to serve, but the Commission must act with a discriminating awareness of the consequences of its action. It has not done so here. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. The case is remanded to it with instructions to enter an order enjoining, annulling, and setting aside the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The hot cargo clause provided, in pertinent part: “It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be cause for discharge if any employee or employees refuse to go through the picket line of a Union or refuse to handle unfair goods. Nor shall the exercise of any rights permitted by law be a violation of this Agreement. The Union and its members, individually and collectively, reserve the right to refuse to handle goods from or to any firm or truck which is engaged or involved in any controversy with this or any other Union; and reserve the right to refuse to accept freight from or to make pickups from, or deliveries to establishments where picket lines, strikes, walk-outs or lockouts exist. “The term ‘unfair goods’ as used in this Article includes, but is not limited to, any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled, or used by any carrier, whether party to this Agreement or not, at any of whose terminals or places of business there is a controversy between such carrier or its employees on the one hand, and a labor union on the other hand; and such goods or equipment shall continue to be ‘unfair’ while being transported, handled or used by interchanging or succeeding carriers, whether parties to this Agreement or not, until such controversy is settled. “The insistence by any Employer that his employee [s] handle unfair goods or go through a picket line after they have elected not to, and if such refusal has been approved in writing by the responsible officials of the Central States Drivers Council, shall be sufficient cause for an immediate strike of all such Employer’s operations without any need of the Union to go through the grievance procedure herein.” The grant was limited to an Omaha-Chicago and Omaha-Kansas City-St. Louis route, for traffic originating in or destined to Nebraska points. 79 M. C. C., at 606, 614. No appellate review has been sought for the denial of the second application. Apparently, in some instances it was necessary to handle interlined traffic by officials or supervisory personnel when employees refused to touch it. See R. 82. See §§212 (a) (revocation), 222 (a) (fine), 222 (b) (injunction). That the inadequacy in service involved here was first brought to the Commission’s attention by appellee’s application for a certificate in no way, of course, limited the agency’s power to invoke §§204 (c), 212, 222. In this connection the Commission noted that it had refused a grant in a similar case decided concurrently with the present application (Galveston Truck Line Corporation Extension, 79 M. C. C. 619). The Commission stated that the circumstances there were different because the labor difficulties which had led to Commission issuance of a cease-and-desist order against carrier obedience to hot cargo clauses (Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines, Inc., 73 M. C. C. 617; see note 17, infra) had “ceased to exist for some time prior to the hearing, whereas in the instant proceeding such difficulties were of more recent origin and were continuing to be experienced up to and including the time of the hearing.” 79 M. C. C., at 613. But approximately 21 months intervened between the examiner’s report and the Commission’s order, and over two years between hearings and order. During at least 18 months of this time the case appears to have been argued to the Commission, remaining on the docket pending decision. See 73 M. C. C., at 617, n. 1. Compare Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 471-472. -But see National Labor Relations Act, §§ 2 (3), 9; NorrisLaGuardia Act, § 13 (c). There were findings that secondary boycotts were imposed not only against the stockholder carriers but against certain shippers who were engaged in their own labor disputes. The Commission adopted the statements of facts in both recommended reports. 79 M. C. C., at 605, 608. R. 87-89, 95. R. 54. Ibid., R. 95. R. 68-69. And see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Reddish, 368 U. S. 81, 91, where the Court rejected the argument that complaint proceedings must be resorted to before additional operating authority could be had to replace a common carrier service inadequate for the shippers’ particularized physical or economic needs. This case, like the many cases appellees cite in which the Commission granted through-route certification to overcome inadequacy of existing joint-line service (e. g., Penn Ohio New York Exp. Corp. Ext. — N. Y., 27 M. C. C. 269; Malone Freight Lines, Inc., Ext. — Textiles, 61 M. C. C. 501; Dallas & Mavis Fwdg. Co. Ext. — Mont., 64 M. C. C. 511; Braswell Ext. — Calif., 68 M. C. C. 664; Kenosha Corp. Ext. — Kenosha, 72 M. C. C. 289), is clearly inapposite here, where there is nothing inherently wrong with the appellant carriers’ service, either because of its particular nature or because of lack of capacity, infrequency of pickups, delays in delivery, or the like. In this connection it should be noted that certification of Short Line would divert traffic both from delinquent trunk-line carriers and from carriers who did not violate their duties by acceding to the secondary boycott, e. g., Burlington and Santa Fe. See 79 M. C. C., at 603. Section 8 (b), 5 II. S. C. § 1007 (b), provides that all decisions shall “include a statement of . . . findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.” See note l,supresetting forth the relevant provisions,under which the employees reserved the right to refuse to handle hot cargo, but under which the employer was left to his own devices. Cf.note 3, supra. The Court cited with approval the first Galveston case (Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines, Inc., 73 M. C. C. 617), in which the Commission entered a cease-and-desist order against carrier obedience to hot cargo clauses. 357 U. S., at 109-110. The union contends in its brief and we agree that the § 212 (a) complaint procedure, if followed by the stockholder carriers, “would have provided a more adequate remedy” at the time the case was before the Commission in 1956-1959. It is further contended, but we need not consider it here, that the efficacy of a cease-and-desist order is severely limited by the agency’s self-imposed limitation against ordering carriers to cease from diseriminatorily refusing to interline at joint rates. But cf. Dixie Carriers, Inc., v. United States, 351 U. S. 56; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567. The Commission did not find, nor could it have found on this record, that the protesting carriers were likely to refuse to interline with the stockholder carriers except at diseriminatorily higher, combination rates. We do not imply that service deficiencies of the kind found in this record could never justify the issuance of permanent operating authority. A totally different case might be presented if other remedial action by the Commission and the Board proved fruitless, hopelessly time-consuming, or otherwise inadequate to terminate the interruptions in service. Nor do we intend to pass upon the Commission’s discretion under § 210a to provide temporary authority, pending determination of an application for authority or cease-and-desist order, or as an alternative to permanent authority to remedy service deficiencies of the kind present here. See Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 436. For the view of the National Labor Relations Board, see Amalgamated Lithographers of America (Ind.), 130 N. L. R. B. 985; Amalgamated Lithographers of America, 130 N. L. R. B. 968, aff’d, 301 F. 2d 20 (C. A. 5th Cir.); American Feed Co., 129 N. L. R. B. 321. This was, of course, the District Court’s, and not the Commission’s, error.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERNATIONAL LADIES’ GARMENT WORKERS’ UNION, UPPER SOUTH DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO v. QUALITY MANUFACTURING CO. et al. No. 73-765. Argued November 18, 1974 Decided February 19, 1975 Bernard Dunau argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Max Zimny, Bernard Bubenstein, and Bernard P. Jeweler. John E. Jenkins, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Quality Manufacturing Co. Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, Norton J. Gome, and Linda Sher filed a brief for respondent National Labor Relations Board. Jerry Kronenberg and Milton Smith filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. We set this case for argument with No. 73-1363, NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., ante, p. 251, 416 U. S. 968 (1974). The National Labor Relations Board held in this case, as it held in Weingarten, that the denial by respondent employer (hereinafter respondent) of an employee’s request that her union representative be present at an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action, constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8 (a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(1), because it interfered with, restrained, and coerced the individual right of the employee, protected by § 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, “to engage in . . . concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection . . . ,” 195 N. L. R. B. 197 (1972). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Weingarten, that this was an impermissible construction of § 7 and denied enforcement of so much of the Board’s order as directed respondent to cease and desist from requiring an employee requesting such representation to take part in such an interview without that representation if the employee reasonably feared disciplinary action, and also refused enforcement of provisions that directed respondent to offer reinstatement, with backpay, to the employees who were discharged for asserting this right. 481 F. 2d 1018 (1973). We reverse. Respondent, a manufacturer of women’s clothing, discharged Catherine King on October 16, 1969, after she refused to attend an interview with the company president without union representation. That same day, the company discharged shop chairlady Delila Mulford for her persistence in seeking to represent King at the interview, and assistant chairlady Martha Cochran for filing grievances on behalf of King and Mulford. The events leading to the discharges began on October 10, 1969, when Mulford, King, and two other employees met with Lawrence Gerlach, Sr., the company president; Mary Kathryn Gerlach, his wife and company production manager; and Lawrence Gerlach, Jr., their son and general manager, to complain that they were unable to make a satisfactory wage under the piecework system then in effect. The meeting ended on an acrimonious note when Gerlach, Jr., ordered the employees to return to work and told them that they were free to “go elsewhere” if they were dissatisfied with the company. Later that day, Mrs. Gerlach noticed that King had shut off her machine and was speakingHo several other workers who had also stopped their machines. When ordered to resume production, King told Mrs. Gerlach to mind her own business. Thereupon Mrs. Gerlach directed King to report to Gerlach, Sr.’s office. King complied, but on her way to the office asked union chairlady Mulford to accompany her. Gerlach, Sr., met King and Mulford in the anteroom to his office. He told Mulford to return to work, and ordered King into his office alone. Neither woman complied, and King stated that she would not submit to an interview in the absence of her union representative. At this, Gerlach, Sr., told both women to return to their work stations. That Sunday, October 12, Mrs. Gerlach phoned Mulford and told her that she was suspended for two days. The Board found that the suspension was motivated by Mulford’s attempt to represent King at the interview with Gerlach, Sr. 195 N. L. R. B., at 199. On Monday, October 13, when King reported for work her timecard was missing from the rack, indicating under plant practice that she was wanted in the president’s office. Before going to the office, however, King asked assistant chairlady Cochran to accompany her. They were met at the president’s office by Mrs. Gerlach who told Cochran to go directly to work if she wanted to keep her job because the president wanted to take up with King where they left off on Friday. Cochran replied: “Well, Mrs. Gerlach, I’m sorry, but if that’s what you want to talk to her about, that is Union business and she has asked me to represent her.” Gerlach, Sr., told King he would not return her timecard until she met with him alone in his office. King and Cochran then waited outside the president’s office all day, and during this time Cochran’s timecard was also removed from the rack. Again on the morning of October 14, Gerlach, Sr., told King he would not return her timecard until she agreed to meet with him alone. When Cochran asked about her timecard, Gerlach replied that she was suspended for two days for being away from her machine. The Board termed this reason “pretextual,” and found that in fact Cochran’s attempt to represent King was the reason for the suspension. Neither King nor Cochran worked that day. Much the same transpired the next day, but" tins time Mulford, whose two-day suspension had expired, was also present. After King refused to meet in private with Gerlach, Sr., she and Cochran left the plant, and Mulford returned to work. Finally, on October 16, all three women went to the president’s office. Mrs. Gerlach gave Cochran her time-card and she returned to work. Gerlach, Sr., told King if she refused again to meet with him alone she would be fired. King walked out. Mulford then asked if she could return to work, and Gerlach, Sr., replied: “No, you’ve abandoned your job. You’re finished.” Later that same day, Cochran attempted to present grievances on behalf of King, Mulford, and herself to Gerlach, Jr. He stated he was about to leave town and had no time for such things. When she put the list of grievances on his desk, he picked them up and threw them into the wastebasket. He then pulled Cochran's timecard and told her: “You worked this morning, but you're not working this afternoon.” When Cochran asked Gerlach, Sr., if she had been fired he replied: “Just go home. You wanted to draw unemployment now go on and draw it.” The Board found that “[t]here can be no doubt that under the facts and circumstances of this case King had reasonable grounds to believe that disciplinary action might result from the Employer's investigation of her conduct.” 195 N. L. R. B., at 199. King, therefore, had a reasonable basis for desiring union representation, and the Board found that respondent discharged her for insisting on that right. The Board found further that Mulford and Cochran were suspended, and Mulford discharged, because they insisted on representing King at the interview. Since Mulford and Cochran were engaging in a protected concerted activity, the suspensions and Mulford’s discharge violated §8 (a)(1). Finally, the Board determined that respondent discharged Cochran because she sought to file grievances on behalf of King, Mulford, and herself, and that this discharge was in violation of §§ 8 (a) (1) and (3). On these facts, our decision today in No. 73-1363, NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., ante, p. 251, clearly requires reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as enforcement of the Board’s order was denied. The judgment is accordingly reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction to enter a new judgment enforcing the Board’s order in its entirety. It is so ordered. [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Burger, see ante, p. 268.] Mr. Justice Powell, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting. For the reasons stated in my dissent in NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., ante, p. 269,1 dissent. Later that day, Cochran telephoned Gerlach, Sr.’s secretary to learn whether Gerlach wanted her to report to work the next day. The secretary told her: “He said no.” Cochran then asked the secretary to “tell him that he can reach me at my home phone when he needs me.” Cochran was never notified to return to work. The Trial Examiner found, and the Board agreed, that Cochran was discharged, and that she did not abandon her job. 195 N. L. R. B. 197, 199 n. 9. The Court of Appeals enforced that portion of the Board’s order relating to Cochran’s discharge. The court determined that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that she was discharged because she sought to engage in the protected union aetivity of filing grievances on behalf of King, Mulford, and herself. The company has not filed a cross-petition, and that aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision is not before us. Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U. S. 512, 516 (1973); NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U. S. 48, 52 n. 4 (1972); Alaska Ind. Bd. v. Chugach Assn., 356 U. S. 320, 325 (1958). We do not address respondent’s objection that it was denied procedural due process because the Board based its order upon a theory of liability under § 8 (a) (1) allegedly not charged or litigated before the Board. The argument is that respondent participated in the proceedings upon the premise that the issue for decision was whether respondent had decided upon discipline prior to the interview, so as to constitute the interview disciplinary and not investigatory in nature, and had no prior notice that, instead of deciding that question, the Board’s decision would turn upon a finding that the employee had “reasonable grounds to fear . . . discipline” at the interview. But respondent failed to file a petition for reconsideration as permitted by Board Rules and Regulations § 102.48 (d)(1), 29 CFR § 102.48 (d)(1), that provides that any material error in the Board’s decision may be asserted through a motion for “reconsideration, rehearing, or reopening of the record.” Respondent therefore cannot assert its objection on appeal “unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). Respondent did not suggest any “extraordinary circumstances” in either the Court of Appeals or in this Court. The objection therefore may not be considered. NLRB v. Mine Workers, 355 U. S. 453, 463-464 (1958); Glaziers’ Local No. 568 v. NLRB, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 394, 399-400, 408 F. 2d 197, 202-203 (1969).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McDANIEL, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, et al. v. BARRESI et al. No. 420. Argued October 13, 1970 Decided April 20, 1971 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Eugene A. Epting argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. E. Freeman Leverett argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Leonard for the United States, and by Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Alfred L. Evans, Jr., and J. Lee Perry, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Georgia. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to review a state court order enjoining the operation of a school desegregation plan. The action was brought in the Superior Court of Clarke County, Georgia, by parents of children attending public elementary schools in that county. Named as defendants were the Superintendent of Education and members of the Clarke County Board of Education. The trial court denied respondents’ request for an injunction, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, 226 Ga. 456, 175 S. E. 2d 649 (1970). This Court then granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 804 (1970). Beginning in 1963, the Clarke County Board of Education began a voluntary program to desegregate its public schools. The student-assignment plan presently at issue, involving only elementary schools, has been in effect since the start of the 1969 academic year. The plan, adopted by the Board of Education and approved by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, relies primarily upon geographic attendance zones drawn to achieve greater racial balance. Additionally, the pupils in five heavily Negro “pockets” either walk or are transported by bus to schools located in other attendance zones. As a consequence the Negro enrollment of each elementary school in the system varies generally between 20% and 40%, although two schools have a 50% Negro enrollment. The white-Negro ratio of elementary pupils in the system is approximately two to one. Respondents contend in this action that the board’s desegregation plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Title IY of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld both contentions, concluding first that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause “by treating students differently because of their race.” The court concluded also that Title IV prohibited the board from “requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another ... in order to achieve such racial balance . . . .” We reject these contentions. The Clarke County Board of Education, as part of its affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system, properly took into account the race of its elementary school children in drawing attendance lines. To have done otherwise would have severely hampered the board’s ability to deal effectively with the task at hand. School boards that operated dual school systems are “clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968). In this remedial process, steps will almost invariably require that students be assigned “differently because of their race.” See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, ante, p. 1; Youngblood v. Board of Public Instruction, 430 F. 2d 625, 630 (CA5 1970). Any other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes. Nor is the board’s plan barred by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The sections relied upon by respondents (42 U. S. C. §§ 2000c (b), 2000c-6) are directed only at federal officials and are designed simply to foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding the powers of federal officials to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Swann, supra, at 17. Title IV clearly does not restrict state school authorities in the exercise of their discretionary powers to assign students within their school systems. Reversed. It may well be that the Board of Education adopted the present student-assignment plan because of urgings of federal officials and fear of losing federal financial assistance. The state trial court, however, made no findings on these matters. No federal officials are parties in this case. Where the distance between the student's residence and his assigned school is more than 1% miles, free transportation is provided. There is no challenge here to the feasibility of the transportation provisions of the plan. The annual transportation expenses of the present plan are reported in the record to be $11,070 less than the school system spent on transportation during the 1968-1969 school year under dual operation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARLOW et al. v. COLLINS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE, et al. No. 249. Argued November 19, 1969 Decided March 3, 1970 Harold Edgar argued the cause for petitioners pro hac vice. With him on the briefs were Lee A. Albert and Jonathan Weiss. Peter L. Strauss argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Alan S. Rosen-thal, and Norman G. Knopf. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The question to be decided in this case is whether tenant farmers eligible for payments under the upland cotton program enacted as part of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 1194, 7 U. S. C. § 1444 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), have standing to challenge the validity of a certain amended regulation promulgated by the respondent Secretary of Agriculture in 1966. The upland cotton program incorporates a 1938 statute, § 8 (g) of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, 52 Stat. 35 and 205, 16 U. S. C. § 590h (g), thereby permitting participants in the program to assign payments only “as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop.” The regulation of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture in effect until 1966 defined “making a crop” to exclude assignments to secure “the payment of the whole or any part of a cash . . . rent for a farm.”' 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955). Following passage of the 1965 Act, however, and before any payments were made under it, the Secretary deleted the exclusion and amended the regulation expressly to define “making a crop” to include assignments to secure “the payment of cash rent for land used [for planting, cultivating, or harvesting]." 31 Fed. Reg. 2815 (1966). Petitioners, cash-rent tenant farmers suing on behalf of themselves and other farmers similarly situated, filed this action in the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. They sought a declaratory judgment that the amended regulation is invalid and unauthorized by statute, and an injunction prohibiting the respondent federal officials from permitting assignments pursuant to the amended regulation. Their complaint alleged that the petitioners are suffering irreparable injury under the amended regulation, because it provides their landlord “with the opportunity to demand that [they] and all those similarly situated assign the [upland cotton program] benefits in advance as a condition to obtaining a lease to work the land.” As a result, the complaint stated, the tenants are required to obtain financing of all their other farm needs — groceries, clothing, tools, and the like — from the landlord as well, since prior to harvesting the crop they lack cash and any source of credit other than the landlord. He, in turn, the complaint alleges, levies such high prices and rates of interest on these supplies that the tenants’ crop profits are consumed each year in debt payments. Petitioners contend that they can attain á “modest measure of economic independence” if they are able to use their “advance subsidy payments . . . [to] form cooperatives to buy [supplies] at wholesale and reasonable prices in lieu of the excessive prices demanded by [the landlord] of . . . captive consumers with no funds to purchase elsewhere.” Thus, petitioners allege that they suffer injury in fact from the operation of the amended regulation. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that the petitioners “lack standing to maintain this action against these [respondent] governmental officials,” because the latter “have not taken any action which directly invades any legally protected interest of the plaintiffs.” The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, one judge dissenting. 398 F. 2d 398. It held that petitioners lacked standing not only because they alleged no invasion of a legally protected interest but also because petitioners “have not shown us, nor have we found, any provision of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 which either expressly or impliedly gives [petitioners] standing to challenge this administrative regulation or gives the Courts authority to review such administrative action.” Id., at 402. We granted certiorari. 395 U. S. 958. Our decision in Data Processing Service v. Camp, ante, p. 150, leads us to reverse here. First, there is no doubt that in the context of this litigation the tenant farmers, petitioners here, have the personal stake and interest that impart the concrete adverseness required by Article III. Second, the tenant farmers are clearly within the zone of interests protected by the Act. Implicit in the statutory provisions and their legislative history is a congressional intent that the Secretary protect the interests of tenant farmers. Both of the relevant statutes expressly enjoin the Secretary to do so. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 states that “[t]he Secretary shall provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants . . . .” 79 Stat. 1196, 7 U. S. C. § 1444 (d) (10) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Title 7 U. S. C. § 1444 (d) (13) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), as noted earlier, incorporates by reference § 8 (g), as amended, 52 Stat. 35 and 205, 16 U. S. C. § 590h (g). Section 8 (b) of that Act, in turn, provides that “the Secretary shall, as far as practicable, protect the interests of tenants . . . .” 52 Stat. 32, 16 U. S. C. § 590h (b). The legislative history of the “'making a crop” provision, though sparse, similarly , indicates a congressional intent to benefit the tenants. They are persons “aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute” as those words are used in 5 U. S. C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Third, judicial review of the Secretary’s action is not precluded. The Court of Appeals rested its holding on the view that no provision of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 “expressly or impliedly . . . gives the Courts authority to review such administrative action.” 398 F. 2d, at 402. Whether agency action is reviewable often poses difficult questions of congressional intent; and the Court must decide if Congress has in express or implied terms precluded judicial review or committed the challenged action entirely to administrative discretion. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), allows judicial review of agency action except where “(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” The amended regulation here under challenge was promulgated under 16 U. S. C. § 590d (3) which authorizes the Secretary to “prescribe such regulations, as he may deem proper to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” Plainly this provision does not expressly preclude judicial review, nor does any other provision in either the 1938 or 1965 Act. Nor does the authority to promulgate such regulations “as he may deem proper” in § 590d (3) constitute a commitment of the task of defining “making a crop” entirely to the discretionary judgment of the Executive Branch without the intervention of the courts. On the contrary, since the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning of the statutory term, the controversy must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special competence of the Secretary, but by judicial application of canons of statutory construction. See Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U. S. 263, 268-270. “The role of the courts should, in particular, be viewed hospitably where . . . the question sought to be reviewed does not significantly engage the agency’s expertise. ‘[Wjhere the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning of the statutory term’. . . [the controversy] presents issues on which courts, and not [administrators], are relatively more expert.” Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 14 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Therefore the permissive term “as he may deem proper,” by itself, is not to be read as a congressional command which precludes a judicial determination of the correct application of the governing canons. The question then becomes whether nonreviewability can fairly be inferred. As we said in Data Processing Service, preclusion of judicial review of administrative action adjudicating private rights is not lightly to be inferred. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U. S. 184; Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94. Indeed, judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreview-ability an exception which must be demonstrated. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140, we held that “judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” A clear command of the statute will preclude review; and such a command of the statute may be inferred from its purpose. Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297. It is, however, “only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent" that the courts should restrict access to judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 141. The right of judicial review is ordinarily inferred where congressional intent to protect the interests of the class of which the plaintiff is a member can be found; in such cases, unless members of the protected class may have judicial review the statutory objectives might not be realized. See the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258; Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities, supra. We hold that the statutory scheme at issue here is to be read as evincing a congressional intent that petitioners may have judicial review of the Secretary’s action. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and of the District Court are vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for a hearing on the merits. It is so ordered. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by 7 U. S. C. § 1444 (d) (5) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) to pay a farmer in advance of tire growing season up to 50% of the estimated benefits due him. Section 1444 (d) (13) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) authorizes the farmer to assign such benefits subject to the limitations of § 8 (g) added by the 1938 Act, 16 U. S. C. § 590h (g). Section 8 (g) as enacted in 1938 and as it read in 1965 established an exception to the general prohibition against assignment of federal monies in the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U. S. C. § 203. Section 8 (g) provided: “A payment which may be made to a farmer under this section, may be assigned, without discount, by him in writing as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop. Such assignment shall be signed by the farmer and witnessed by a member of the county or other local committee .... Such assignment shall include the statement that the assignment is not made to pay or secure any preexisting indebtedness. This provision shall not authorize any suit against or impose any liability upon the Secretary ... if payment to the farmer is made without regard to the existence of any such assignment.” 52 Stat. 35 and 205, 16 U. S. C. § 590h (g) (emphasis added). Section 8 (g) was amended by 80 Stat. 1167 (1966) to permit assignments not only to finance “making a crop” but also to fund “handling or marketing an agricultural commodity, or performing a conservation practice.” 16 U. S. C. § 590h (g) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955) provided: “Payment may be assigned to finance making a crop. A payment which may be made to a farmer . . . under section 8 of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, may be assigned only as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop for the current crop year. To finance making a crop means (a) to finance the planting, cultivating, or harvesting of a crop, including the purchase of equipment required therefor; (b) to provide food, clothing, and other necessities required by the assignor or persons dependent upon the assignor; or (c) to finance the carrying out of soil or water conservation practices. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to authorize an assignment given to secure the payment of the whole or any part of the purchase price of a farm or the payment of the whole or any part of a cash or fixed commodity rent for a farm.” 32 Fed. Reg. 14921 (1967), 7 CFR § 709.3 (1969) now provides: “Purposes jor which a payment may he assigned. “(a) A payment which may be made to a producer under any program to which this part is applicable may be assigned only as security for cash or advances to finance making a crop,, handling or marketing an agricultural commodity, or performing a conservation practice, for the current crop year. No assignment may be made to secure or pay any preexisting indebtedness of any nature whatsoever. “(b) To finance making a crop means (1) to finance the planting, cultivating, or harvesting of a crop, including the purchase of equipment required therefor and the payment of cash rent for land used therefor, or (2) to provide food, clothing, and other necessities required by the producer or persons dependent upon him. “(c) Nothing contained herein shall be construed to authorize an assignment given to secure the payment of the whole or any part of the purchase price of a farm or the payment of the whole or any part of a fixed commodity rent for a farm.” The respondents, in addition to the Secretary of Agriculture, are the State Executive Director of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service in Alabama, and the administrator of that Service in the U. S. Department of Agriculture. The complaint also included counts against petitioners’ landlord alleging that he acted improperly to deprive them of their right to receive subsidy payments, and, further, that some of the petitioners had been illegally evicted because of their participation in litigation with respect to the cotton program, and, in the case of one petitioner, because of his candidacy for Alabama Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service county committeeman. The District. Court denied the landlord’s motion to dismiss these counts and transferred them for trial to the Southern District of Alabama. That ruling is not before us. The complaint stated that some of the petitioners “were denied the right to work the land” when they refused to execute assignments to their landlord. The complaint also alleged that “[p]laintiffs have been tenant farmers on this land from eleven to sixty-one years . . . and [two of them] have been on this land all their lives.” In connection with the amended regulations, the Secretary issued under § 1444 (d) (10) various rules designed to ensure that tenants receive their fair share of the federal payments. 31 Fed. Reg. 4887-4888; 7 CFR §§ 722.817, 794.3. See the remarks of Representative Fulmer, 82 Cong. Rec. 844 (1937), and of Senator Adams, id., at 1756. The fact that assignments could be made at all indicated a congressional concern for the fanners’ welfare, in light of the general statutory prohibition on assignment of federal claims embodied in the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U. S. C. § 203. This concern was noted in a letter from the Secretary of Agriculture to the President of the Senate in January 1952, in which the Secretary stated that § 8 (g) “was enacted for the purpose of creating additional credit to farmers to assist them in financing farming operations.” S. Rep. No. 1305, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 3.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. BISCEGLIA No. 73-1245. Argued November 11-12, 1974 Decided February 19, 1975 Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assist ant Attorney General Crampton, and Deputy Solicitor General Wallace. William A. Watson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. The American Bankers Assn, filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether the Internal Revenue Service has statutory authority to issue a “John Doe" summons to a bank or other depository to discover the identity of a person who has had bank transactions suggesting the possibility of liability for unpaid taxes. I On November 6 and 16, 1970, the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, Ky., made two separate deposits with the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, each of which included $20,000 in $100 bills. The evidence is undisputed that the $100 bills were “paper thin” and showed signs of severe disintegration which could have been caused by a long period of storage under abnormal conditions. As a result the bills were no longer suitable for circulation and they were destroyed by the Federal Reserve in accord with established procedures. Also in accord with regular Federal Reserve procedures, the Cincinnati Branch reported these facts to the Internal Revenue Service. It is not disputed that a deposit of such a large amount of high denomination currency was out of the ordinary for the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro; for example, in the 11 months preceding the two $20,000 deposits in $100 bills, the Federal Reserve had received only 218 $100 bills from that bank. This fact, together with the uniformly unusual state of deterioration of the $40,000 in $100 bills, caused the Internal Revenue Service to suspect that the transactions relating to those deposits may not have been reported for tax purposes. An agent was therefore assigned to investigate the matter. After interviewing some of the bank’s employees, none of whom could provide him with information regarding the two $20,000 deposits, the agent issued a “John Doe” summons directed to respondent, an executive vice president of the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro. The summons called for production of “[t]hose books and records which will provide information as to the person(s) or firm(s) which deposited, redeemed or otherwise gave to the Commercial Bank $100 bills U. S. Currency which the Commercial Bank sent in two shipments of (200) two hundred each $100 bills to the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank on or about November 6, 1970 and November 16, 1970.” This, of course, was simply the initial step in an investigation which might lead to nothing or might have revealed that there had been a failure to report money on which federal estate, gift, or income taxes were due. Respondent, however, refused to comply with the summons even though he has not seriously argued that compliance would be unduly burdensome. In due course, proceedings were commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to enforce the summons. That court narrowed its scope to require production only of deposit slips showing cash deposits in the amount of $20,000 and deposit slips showing cash deposits of $5,000 or more which involved $100 bills, and restricted it to the period between October 16, 1970, and November 16, 1970. Respondent was ordered to comply with the summons as modified. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7602, pursuant to which the summons had been issued, “presupposes that the [Internal Revenue Service] has already identified the person in whom it is interested as a taxpayer before proceeding.” 486 F. 2d 706, 710. We disagree, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II The statutory framework for this case consists of §§ 7601 and 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provide: “Section 7601. Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects. “(a) General rule. “The Secretary or his delegate shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed. “Section 7602. Examination of books and witnesses. “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax ... or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized— “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to'appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” We begin examination of these sections against the familiar background that our tax structure is based on a system of self-reporting. There is legal compulsion, to be sure, but basically the Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability. Nonetheless, it would be naive to ignore the reality that some persons attempt to outwit the system, and tax evaders are not readily identifiable. Thus, § 7601 gives the Internal Revenue Service a broad mandate to investigate and audit “persons who may be liable” for taxes and § 7602 provides the power to “examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant . . . [and to summon] any person having possession ... of books of account . . . relevant or material to such inquiry.” Of necessity, the investigative authority so provided is not limited to situations in which there is probable cause, in the traditional sense, to believe that a violation of the tax laws exists. United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964). The purpose of the statutes is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such investigations unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are essential to our self-reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records. We recognize that the authority vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all power is subject to abuse. However, the solution is not to restrict that authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system, which seeks to assure that taxpayers pay what Congress has mandated and to prevent dishonest persons from escaping taxation thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers. Substantial protection is afforded by the provision that an Internal Revenue Service summons can be enforced only by the courts. 26 U. S. C. § 7604 (b); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). Once a summons is challenged it must be scrutinized by a court to determine whether it seeks information relevant to a legitimate investigative purpose and is not meant “to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.” United States v. Powell, supra, at 58. The cases show that the federal courts have taken seriously their obligation to apply this standard to fit particular situations, either by refusing enforcement or narrowing the scope of the summons. See, e. g., United States v. Matras, 487 F. 2d 1271 (CA8 1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F. 2d 749, 755 (CA4 1973); United States v. Pritchard, 438 F. 2d 969 (CA5 1971); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F. 2d 129 (CA3 1967). Indeed, the District Judge in this case viewed the demands of the summons as too broad and carefully narrowed them. Finally, we note that the power to summon and inquire in cases such as the instant one is not unprecedented. For example, had respondent been brought before a grand jury under identical circumstances there can be little doubt that he would have been required to testify and produce records or be held in contempt. In Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919), petitioners were summoned to appear before a grand jury. They refused to testify on the ground that the investigation exceeded the authority of the court and grand jury, despite the fact that it was not directed at them. Their subsequent contempt convictions were affirmed by this Court: “[The witness] is not entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct. . . . It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury’s labors, not at the beginning.” Id., at 282. The holding of Blair is not insignificant for our resolution of this case. In United States v. Powell, supra, Mr. Justice Harlan reviewed this Court’s cases dealing with the subpoena power of federal enforcement agencies, and observed: “[T]he Federal Trade Commission . . . ‘has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.’ While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue derives from a different body of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force when the scope of the Commissioner’s power is called in question.” 379 U. S., at 57, quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642-643 (1950). Ill Against this background, we turn to the question whether the summons issued to respondent, as modified by the District Court, was authorized by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Of course, the mere fact that the summons was styled “In the matter of the tax liability of John Doe” is not sufficient ground for denying enforcement. The use of such fictitious names is common in indictments, see, e. g., Baker v. United States, 115 F. 2d 533 (CA8 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 692 (1941), and other types of compulsory process. Indeed, the Courts of Appeals have regularly enforced Internal Revenue Service summonses which did not name a specific taxpayer who was under investigation. E. g., United States v. Carter, 489 F. 2d 413 (CA5 1973); United States v. Turner, 480 F. 2d 272, 279 (CA7 1973); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F. 2d 515 (CA7), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 913 (1964). Respondent undertakes to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved situations in which either a taxpayer was identified or a tax liability was known to exist as to an unidentified taxpayer. However, while they serve to suggest the almost infinite variety of factual situations in which a “John Doe” summons may be necessary, it does not follow that these cases define the limits of the Internal Revenue Service’s power to inquire concerning tax liability. The first question is whether the words of the statute require the restrictive reading given them by the Court of Appeals. Section 7601 permits the Internal Revenue Service to investigate and inquire after “all persons . . . who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax . . . .” To aid in this investigative function, § 7602 authorizes the summoning of “any . . . person” for the taking of testimony and examination of books which may be relevant for “ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability of any person ... or collecting any such liability . . . .” Plainly, this language is inconsistent with an interpretation that would limit the issuance of summonses to investigations which have already focused upon a particular return, a particular named person, or a particular potential tax liability. Moreover, such a reading of the Internal Revenue Service’s summons power ignores the fact that it has a legitimate interest in large or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash. The reasons for that interest are too numerous and too obvious to catalog. Indeed, Congress has recently determined that information regarding transactions with foreign financial institutions and transactions which involve large amounts of money is so likely to be useful to persons responsible for enforcing the tax laws that it must be reported by banks. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 26-40 (1974). It would seem elementary that no meaningful investigation of such events could be conducted if the identity of the persons involved must first be ascertained, and that is not always an easy task. Fiduciaries and other agents are understandably reluctant to disclose information regarding their principals, as respondent was in this case. Moreover, if criminal activity is afoot the persons involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures to cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is unable to issue a summons to determine the identity of such persons, the broad inquiry authorized by § 7601 will be frustrated in this class of cases. Settled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282, 288 (1957); United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 542-544 (1940). No such congressional purpose is discernible in this case. We hold that the Internal Revenue Service was acting within its statutory authority in issuing a summons to respondent for the purpose of identifying the person or persons who deposited 400 decrepit $100 bills with the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro within the space of a*’ few weeks. Further investigation may well reveal that such person or persons have a perfectly innocent explanation for the transactions. It is not unknown for taxpayers to hide large amounts of currency in odd places out of a fear of banks. But on this record the deposits were extraordinary, and no meaningful inquiry can be made until respondent complies with the summons as modified by the District Court. We do not mean to suggest by this holding that respondent’s fears that the § 7602 summons power could be used to conduct “fishing expeditions” into the private affairs of bank depositors are trivial. However, as we have observed in a similar context: “ ‘That the power may be abused, is no ground for denying its existence. It is a limited power, and should be kept within its proper bounds; and, when these are exceeded, a jurisdictional question is presented which is cognizable in the courts.’ ” McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 166 (1927), quoting People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463, 482 (1885). So here, Congress has provided protection from arbitrary or capricious action by placing the federal courts between the Government and the person summoned. The District Court in this case conscientiously discharged its duty to see that a legitimate investigation was being conducted and that the summons was no broader than necessary to achieve its purpose. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to it with directions to affirm the order of the District Court. It is so ordered. The Internal Revenue Service agent testified: “Q. What possible tax effect could this have on the taxpayer if he is determined? “A. Well, it could be anything from nothing at all, a simple explanation, or it could be that this is money that has been secreted away for a period of time as a means of avoiding the tax. “Q. Then you really have not reached first base yet, is that correct? “A. That’s correct.” Respondent also argues that, even if the summons issued in this case was authorized by statute, it violates the Fourth Amendment. This contention was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals. In any event, as narrowed by the District Court the summons is at least as specific as the reporting requirements which were upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge by banks in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 63-70 (1974).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GOLDBERG, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK v. KELLY et al. No. 62. Argued October 13, 1969 Decided March 23, 1970 John J. Loflin, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were J. Lee Rankin and Stanley Buchsbaum. Lee A. Albert argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert Borsody, Martin Qarbus, and David Diamond. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and Robert V. Zener for the United States, and by Victor G. Rosenblum and Daniel Wm. Fessler for the National Institute for Education in Law and Poverty. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision is whether a State that terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient procedural due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This action was brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York by residents of New York City receiving financial aid under the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State’s general Home Relief program. Their complaint alleged that the New York State and New York City officials administering these programs terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing, thereby denying them due process of law. At the time the suits were filed there was no requirement of prior notice or hearing of any kind before termination of financial aid. However, the State and city adopted procedures for notice and hearing after tho suits were brought, and the plaintiffs, appellees here, then challenged the constitutional adequacy of those procedures. The State Commissioner of Social Services amended the State Department of Social Services’ Official Regulations to require that local social services officials proposing to discontinue or suspend a recipient’s financial aid do so according to a procedure that conforms to either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of § 351.26 of the regulations as amended. The City of New York elected to promulgate a local procedure according to subdivision (b). That subdivision, so far as here pertinent, provides that the local procedure must include the giving of notice to the recipient of the reasons for a proposed discontinuance or suspension at least seven days prior to its effective date, with notice also that upon request the recipient may have the proposal reviewed by a local welfare official holding a position superior to that of the supervisor who approved the proposed discontinuance or suspension,' and, further, that the recipient may submit, for purposes of the review, a written statement to demonstrate why his grant should not be discontinued or suspended. The decision by the reviewing official whether to discontinue or suspend aid must be made expeditiously, with written notice of the decision to the recipient. The section further expressly provides that “[assistance shall not be discontinued or suspended prior to the date such notice of decision is sent to the recipient and his representative, if any, or prior to the proposed effective date of discontinuance or suspension, whichever occurs later.” Pursuant to subdivision (b), the New York City Department of Social Services promulgated Procedure No. 68-18. A caseworker who has doubts about the recipient’s continued eligibility must first discuss them with the recipient. If the caseworker concludes that the recipient is no longer eligible, he recommends termination of aid to a unit supervisor. If the latter concurs, he sends the recipient a letter stating the reasons for proposing to terminate aid and notifying him that within seven days he may request that a higher official review the record, and may support the request with a written statement prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or other person. If the reviewing official affirms the determination of ineligibility, aid is stopped immediately and the recipient is informed by letter of the reasons for the action. Appellees’ challenge to this procedure emphasizes the absence of any provisions for the personal appearance of the recipient before the reviewing official, for oral presentation of evidence, and for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. However, the letter does inform the recipient that he may request a post-termination “fair hearing.” This is a proceeding before an independent state hearing officer at which the recipient may appear personally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and have a record made of the hearing. If the recipient prevails at the “fair hearing” he is paid all funds erroneously withheld. HEW Handbook, pt. IV, §§ 6200-6500; 18 NYCRR §§ 84.2-84.23. A recipient whose aid is not restored by a “fair hearing” decision may have judicial review. N. Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules, Art. 78 (1963). The recipient is so notified, 18 NYCRR § 84.16. I The constitutional issue to be decided, therefore, is the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits. The District Court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would satisfy the constitutional command, and rejected the argument of the state and city officials that the combination of the post-termination “fair hearing” with the informal pre-termination review disposed of all due process claims. The court said: “While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without funds or assets. . . . Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of . . . ‘brutal need’ without a prior hearing of some sort is unconscionable, unless overwhelming considerations justify it.” Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900 (1968). The court rejected the argument that the need to protect the public’s tax revenues supplied the requisite “overwhelming consideration.” “Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individual’s overpowering need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance .... While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare benefits, and the fact that there is a later constitutionally fair proceeding does not alter the result.” Id., at 901. Although state officials were party defendants in the action, only the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U. S. 971 (1969), to decide important issues that have been the subject of disagreement in principle between the three-judge court in the present case and that convened in Wheeler v. Montgomery, No. 14, post, p. 280, also decided today. We affirm. Appellant does not contend that procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits. Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are “a ‘privilege' and not a ‘right.’ ” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6 (1969). Relevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); or to denial of a tax exemption, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 613 (1958); or to discharge from public employment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956). The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be “condemned to suffer grievous loss," Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. Accordingly, as we said in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961), “consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 440, 442 (1960). It is true, of course, that some governmental benefits may be administratively terminated without affording the recipient a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. But we agree with the District Court that when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969). For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. Cf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U. S. 235, 239 (1967). Thus the crucial factor in this context — a factor not present in the case of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone else' whose governmental entitlements are ended — is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. Moreover, important governmental interests are promoted by affording recipients a pre-termination evi-dentiary hearing. From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. This perception, against the background of our traditions, has significantly influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to “promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end. Appellant does not challenge the force of these considerations but argues that they are outweighed by countervailing governmental interests in conserving fiscal and administrative resources. These interests, the argument goes, justify the delay of any evidentiary hearing until after discontinuance of the grants. Summary adjudication protects the public fisc by stopping payments promptly upon discovery of reason to believe that a recipient is no longer eligible. Since most terminations are accepted without challenge, summary adjudication also conserves both the fisc and administrative time and energy by reducing the number of evidentiary hearings actually held. We agree with the District Court, however, that these governmental interests are not overriding in the welfare context. The requirement of a prior hearing doubtless involves some greater expense, and the benefits paid to ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, since these recipients are likely to be judgment-proof. But the State is not without weapons to minimize these increased costs. Much of the drain on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures for prompt pre-termination hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities. Indeed, the very provision for a post-termination evidentiary hearing in New York’s Home Relief program is itself cogent evidence that the State recognizes the primacy of the public interest in correct eligibility determinations and therefore in the provision of procedural safeguards. Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State’s interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State’s competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens. As the District Court correctly concluded, “[t]he stakes are simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires, to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal.” 294 F. Supp., at 904-905. II We also agree with the District Court, however, that the pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial. We bear in mind that the statutory “fair hearing” will provide the recipient with a full administrative review. Accordingly, the pre-termination hearing has one function, only: to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department’s grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, a complete record and a comprehensive opinion, which would serve primarily to facilitate judicial review and to guide future decisions, need not be provided at the pre-termination stage. We recognize, too., that both welfare authorities and recipients have an interest in relatively speedy resolution of questions of eligibility, that they are used to dealing with one another informally, and that some welfare departments have very burdensome caseloads. These considerations justify the limitation of the pre-termination hearing to minimum procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the limited nature of the controversies to be resolved. We wish to add that we, no less than the dissenters, recognize the importance of not imposing upon the States or the Federal Government in this developing field of law any procedural requirements beyond those demanded by rudimentary due process. “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). The hearing must be “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). In the present context these principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally. These rights are important in cases such as those before us, where recipients have challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases. We are not prepared to say that the seven-day notice currently provided by New York City is constitutionally insufficient per se, although there may be cases where fairness would require that a longer time be given. Nor do we see any constitutional deficiency in the content or form of the notice. New York employs both a letter and a personal conference with a caseworker to inform a recipient of the precise questions raised about his continued eligibility. Evidently the recipient is told the legal and factual bases for the Department's doubts. This combination is probably the most effective method of communicating with recipients. The city’s procedures presently do not permit recipients to appear personally with or without counsel before the official who finally determines continued eligibility. Thus a recipient is not permitted to present evidence to that official orally, or to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses. These omissions are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard. It is not enough that a welfare recipient may present his position to the decision maker in writing or secondhand through his caseworker. Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker' appears to regard as important. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. The secondhand presentation to the decisionmaker by the caseworker has its own deficiencies; since the caseworker usually gathers the facts upon which the charge of ineligibility rests, the presentation of the recipient’s side of the controversy cannot safely be left to him. Therefore a recipient must be allowed to state his position orally. Informal procedures will suffice; in this context due process does not require a particular order of proof or mode of offering evidence. Cf. HEWJiandbook, pt. IV, § 6400 (a). ^ In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. E. g., ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1913); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U. S. 96, 103-104 (1963). What we said in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, 496-497 (1959), is particularly pertinent here: “Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment .... This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.” Welfare recipients must therefore be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses relied on by the department. “The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68-69 (1932). We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of the recipient. We do not anticipate that this assistance will unduly prolong or otherwise encumber the hearing. Evidently HEW has reached the same conclusion. See 45 CFR § 205.10, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969); 45 CFR § 220.25, 34 Fed. Reg. 13595 (1969). Finally, the decisionmaker’s conclusion as to a recipient’s eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U. S. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288-289 (1924). To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, cf. Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U. S. 48, 57-59 (1922), though his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential. Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 45-46 (1950). We agree with the District Court that prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as a decision maker. He should not, however, have participated in making the determination under review. Affirmed. [For dissenting opinion of Me. Chief Justice Burgee, see post, p. 282.] [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, see post, p. 285.] AFDC was established by the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp. IV). It is a categorical assistance program supported by federal grants-in-aid but administered by the States according to regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See N. Y. Social Welfare Law §§ 343-362 (1966). We considered other aspects of AFDC in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), and in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). Home Relief is a general assistance program financed and administered solely by New York state and local governments. N. Y. Social Welfare Law §§ 157-165 (1966), since July 1, 1967, Social Services Law §§ 157-166. It assists any person unable to support himself or to secure support from other sources. Id., § 158. Two suits were brought and consolidated in the District Court. The named plaintiffs were 20 in number, including intervenors. Fourteen had been or were about to be cut off from AFDC, and six from Home Relief. During the course of this litigation most, though not all, of the plaintiffs either received a “fair hearing” (see infra, at 259-260) or were restored to the rolls without a hearing. However, even in many of the cases where payments have been resumed, the underlying questions of eligibility that resulted in the bringing of this suit have not been resolved. For example, Mrs. Altagracia Guzman alleged that she was in danger of losing AFDC payments for failure to cooperate with the City Department of Social Services in suing her estranged husband. She contended that the departmental policy requiring such cooperation was inapplicable to the facts of her case. The record shows that payments to Mrs. Guzman have not been terminated, but there is no indication that the basic dispute over her duty to cooperate has been resolved, or that the alleged danger of termination has been removed. Home Relief payments to Juan DeJesus were terminated because he refused to accept counseling and rehabilitation for drug addiction. Mr. DeJesus maintains that he does not use drugs. His payments were restored the day after his complaint was filed. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the underlying factual dispute in his case has been settled. 3 The adoption in February 1968 and the amendment in April of Regulation § 351.26 coincided with or followed several revisions by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of its regulations implementing 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (4), which is the provision of the Social Security Act that requires a State to afford a “fair hearing” to any recipient of aid under a federally assisted program before termination of his aid becomes final. This requirement is satisfied by a post-termination “fair hearing” under regulations presently in effect. See HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration (hereafter HEW Handbook), pt. IV, §§ 6200-6400. A new HEW regulation, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969), now scheduled to take effect in July 1970, 34 Fed. Reg. 13595 (1969), would require continuation of AFDC payments until the final decision after a “fair hearing” and would give recipients a right to appointed counsel at “fair hearings.” 45 CFR § 205.10, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969); 45 CFR § 220.25, 34 Fed. Reg. 1356 (1969). For the safeguards specified at such “fair hearings” see HEW Handbook, pt. IV, §§6200-6400. Another recent regulation now in effect requires a local agency administering AFDC to give “advance notice of questions it has about an individual’s eligibility so that a recipient has an opportunity to discuss his situation before receiving formal written notice of reduction in payment or termination of assistance.” Id., pt. IV, §2300 (d)(5). This case presents no issue of the validity or construction of the federal regulations. It is only subdivision (b) of §351.26 of the New York State regulations and implementing procedure 68-18 of New York City that pose the -constitutional question before us. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 641 (1969). Even assuming that the constitutional question might be avoided in the context of AFDC by construction of the Social Security Act or of the present federal regulations thereunder, or by waiting for the new regulations to become effective, the question must be faced and decided in the context of New York’s Home Relief program, to which the procedures also apply. These omissions contrast with the provisions of subdivision (a) of § 351.26, the validity of which is not at issue in this Court. That subdivision also requires written notification to the recipient at least seven days prior to the proposed effective date of the reasons for the proposed discontinuance or suspension. However, the notification must further advise the recipient that if he makes a request therefor he will be afforded an opportunity to appear at a time and place indicated before the official identified in the notice, who will review his case with him and allow him to present such written and oral evidence as the recipient may have to demonstrate why aid should not be discontinued or suspended. The District Court assumed that subdivision (a) would be construed to afford rights of confrontation and cross-examination and a decision based solely on the record. 294 F. Supp. 893, 906-907 (1968). N. Y. Social Welfare Law § 353 (2) (1966) provides for a post-termination “fair hearing” pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (4). See n. 3, supra. Although the District Court noted that HEW had raised some objections to the New York “fair hearing” procedures, 294 F. Supp., at 898 n. 9, these objections are not at issue in this Court. Shortly before this suit was filed, New York State adopted a similar provision for a “fair hearing” in terminations of Home Relief. 18 NYCRR §§ 84.2-84.23. In both AFDC and Home Relief the “fair hearing” must be held within 10 working days of the request, § 84.6, with decision within 12 working days thereafter, § 84.15. It was conceded in oral argument that these time limits are not in fact observed. Current HEW regulations require the States to make full retroactive payments (with federal matching funds) whenever a “fair hearing” results in a reversal of a termination of assistance. HEW Handbook, pt. IV, §§ 6200 (k), 6300 (g), 6500 (a); see 18 NYCRR § 358.8. Under New York State regulations retroactive payments can also be made, with certain limitations, to correct an erroneous termination discovered before a “fair hearing” has been held. 18 NYCRR § 351.27. HEW regulations also authorize, but do not require, the States to continue AFDC payments without loss of federal matching funds pending completion of a “fair hearing.” HEW Handbook, pt. IV, § 6500 (b). The new HEW regulations presently scheduled to become effective July 1, 1970, will supersede all of these provisions. See n. 3, supra. Appellant does not question the recipient’s due process right to evidentiary review after termination. For a general discussion of the provision' of an evidentiary hearing prior to termination, see Comment, The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 112 (1969). It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like “property” than a “gratuity.” Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that “[sjociety today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced.” Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L. J. 1245, 1255 (1965). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964). See also Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926) (right of a certified public accountant to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F. 2d 605 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1964) (right to obtain a retail liquor store license); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d 150 (C. A. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 930 (1961) (right to attend a public college). One Court of Appeals has stated: “In a wide variety of situations, it has long been recognized that where harm to the public is threatened, and the private interest infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an official body can take summary action pending a later hearing.” R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 112 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 47, 299 F. 2d 127, 131, cert. denied, 370 U. S. 911 (1962) (suspension of exemption from stock registration requirement). See also, for example, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vitamin product); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908) (seizure of food not fit for human use); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944) (adoption of wartime price regulations); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 180, 334 F. 2d 570 (1964) (disqualification of a contractor to do business with the Government). In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, supra, at 896, summary dismissal of a public employee was upheld because “[i]n [its] proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government . . . has traditionally exercised unfettered control,” and because the case involved the Government’s “dispatch of its own internal affairs.” Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940). Administrative determination that a person is ineligible for welfare may also render him ineligible for participation in state-financed medical programs. See N. Y. Social Welfare Law § 366 (1966). His impaired adversary position is particularly telling in light of the welfare bureaucracy’s difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility. See Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37 Ford. L. Rev. 604, 610-611 (1969). See, e. g., Reich, supra, n. 8, 74 Yale L. J., at 1255. Due process does not, of course, require two hearings. If, for example, a State simply wishes to continue benefits until after a “fair” hearing there will be no need for a preliminary hearing. This case presents no question requiring our determination whether due process requires only an opportunity for written submission, or an opportunity both for written submission and oral argument, where there are no factual issues in dispute or where the application of the rule of law is not intertwined with factual issues. See FCC v. WJR, 337 U. S. 265, 275-277 (1949). “[T]he prosecution of an appeal demands a degree of security, awareness, tenacity, and ability which few dependent people have.” Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 326, 342 (1966).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LOCAL 926, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, et al. v. JONES No. 81-1574. Argued December 1, 1982 Decided April 4, 1983 .White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell and O’Con-nor, JJ., joined, post, p. 684. Laurence Gold argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Joseph Jacobs, Harris Jacobs, James T. Langford, and George Kaufmann. Elinor Hadley Stillman argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Robert F. Gore argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a state-court action brought by one who is a “supervisor” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act §2(11), 29 U. S. C. §152(11), for interference by a union with his contractual relationships with his employer is pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act). r — H Respondent Robert C. Jones was offered a supervisory-position by the Georgia Power Co. (Company). Jones reported for work on June 12, 1978. By agreement, he took vacation time after his second day on the job and reported for work again on June 20, 1978. On this latter date he was discharged. Jones believed that the Company had been persuaded to discharge him by the union bargaining agent, Local 926 of the International Union of Operating Engineers (Union). The reason for the Union’s hostility, he believed, was his decision years ago to work for a nonunion employer. On June 28, 1978, Jones filed a charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) against the Union, alleging that the Union had “procured” his discharge, “and thereby coerced [the Company] in the selection of its supervisors and bargaining representative, because [Jones] had not been a member in good standing of said labor organization.” Allegedly, this action violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act. App. to Juris. Statement 25a. In a letter dated July 19, 1978, the Regional Director said that further proceedings on respondent’s charge were unwarranted and that he would not issue a complaint. He explained that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Union had caused Jones’ discharge; there was also a lack of evidence indicating that the Union had restrained or coerced the Company in the selection of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining. The Regional Director had instead come to the conclusion that Jones’ discharge had been a part of changes in the Company’s supervisory structure and that the Union had merely participated in discussions regarding the changes. Instead of appealing to the General Counsel, Jones proceeded to state court, suing both the Union and the Company. Count I of his complaint claimed that the Union had interfered with the contract between him and the Company. The allegations were simple. He pleaded that he had been a member of Local 926 from 1969 to 1974, when he resigned from the Union. More recently, the Company had offered him the job of equipment supervisor at one of its plants, and he and the Company had entered into a contract in reliance on which he had terminated his prior employment. The crucial allegation was that petitioner Thomas D. Archer, the business agent and representative of the Union, had “maliciously and with full intent, intimidated and coerced Georgia Power Company, or caused Georgia Power Company to be intimidated and coerced, into breaching its employment contract with the Plaintiff. ” Respondent prayed for a judgment of $80,000 against petitioners, to be composed of $25,000 in lost wages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $5,000 in attorney’s fees, interest, and costs. Count II of his complaint sought relief against the Company and alleged that the Company had breached its employment contract. The Georgia trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the common-law tort action had been pre-empted because the subject matter of the complaint was arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. The court observed that there was no justification for allowing joint federal-state control over the alleged conduct, since the state interest in protecting state citizens from the alleged conduct was insignificant and the risk of interference with the Board’s jurisdiction was substantial. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the case against the Union. 159 Ga. App. 693, 285 S. E. 2d 30 (1981). Following Georgia precedent it considered to be controlling, Sheet Metal Workers International Assn. v. Carter, 133 Ga. App. 872, 212 S. E. 2d 645 (1975), and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Briscoe, 143 Ga. App. 417, 239 S. E. 2d 38 (1977), the State Court of Appeals held the cause of action not pre-empted because Georgia had a deep and abiding interest in protecting its citizens’ contractual rights and because the cause of action, which sounded in tort, was so unrelated to the concerns of the federal labor laws that it would not interfere with the administration of those laws. As an additional reason for not finding preemption, the court stated that the Union’s acts were not even arguably within the ambit of § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, thus purporting to distinguish Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701 (1963). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review, and petitioners appealed. We postponed to the hearing on the merits consideration of our appellate jurisdiction. 456 U. S. 987 (1982). Petitioners now acknowledge that this is not a mandatory appeal. We agree, but, treating the papers as a petition for writ of certio-rari, we grant the petition. Concluding that the Georgia Court of Appeals erred, we reverse. The issue before us “is a variant of a familiar theme.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 239 (1959). The Court has often been asked to determine whether particular state causes of action or regulations may coexist with the comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory arrangements that Congress set up in the NLRA to govern labor-management relations affecting interstate commerce. E. g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180 (1978); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Garmon, supra. Our approach to the pre-emption issue has thus been stated and restated. First, we determine whether the conduct that the State seeks to regulate or to make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Garmon, supra, at 245; see Sears, supra, at 187-190. Although the “Garmon guidelines [are not to be applied] in a literal, mechanical fashion,” Sears, supra, at 188, if the conduct at issue is arguably prohibited or protected otherwise applicable state law and procedures are ordinarily pre-empted. Farmer, supra, at 296. When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct. Garmon, supra, at 243-244. The question of whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the State as a protection to its citizens. See Sears, supra, at 188-189; Farmer, supra, at 297. Not only is this case a variant of a familiar theme, but we have heard this same tune before. In Iron Workers v. Perko, supra, the Court considered whether a common-law tort action for interference with a contract of employment was pre-empted by the NLRA. Perko, a member of the Iron Workers’ Union, was employed at times as a superintendent and at other times as a foreman. While acting as a superintendent, he violated a Union rule, and his membership was suspended in consequence. Union representatives then told Perko’s employer that because of Perko’s transgression Union members would no longer take orders from him. Some weeks thereafter he was discharged on account of his dispute with the Union. We concluded that Perko’s common-law cause of action was pre-empted because it was founded on conduct that for several reasons was arguably within the ambit of §7 or §8. First, Perko was discharged both as a superintendent and a foreman. Even conceding that the position of superintendent was supervisory and beyond the reach of the Act, the foreman’s position was arguably nonsupervisory and covered by the Act. Hence, Perko’s discharge arguably violated the proscription of § 8(b)(1)(A) against a union interfering with the protected rights of employees and that of § 8(b)(2) against causing an employer to discriminate against an employee contrary to § 8(a)(3). Second, the Union arguably violated § 8(b)(1)(A), since causing the discharge of a supervisor might coerce employees, who would fear meeting their supervisor’s fate, into forgoing their § 7 rights to engage in concerted action. Third, the Union’s conduct might also have violated § 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits unions from restraining or coercing “an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.” Perko, we concluded, may well have had sufficient grievance-handling responsibilities to come within the realm of supervisors whose selection the Union could not seek to dictate. Since Jones, unlike Perko, had a job only as a supervisor and not also as an employee, the Union does not rely on the first reason given in Perko for finding the challenged conduct arguably subject to the proscriptions of the Act. It is urged that the other two reasons given in Perko for such a holding are fully applicable here. The Union adds that Jones’ cause of action threatens to punish the workers’ arguably protected conduct in protesting, noncoercively, the selection of people for supervisory positions whether or not they entail collective-bargaining responsibilities. For these reasons, the Union submits that Jones’ state-court action is preempted. We agree. Ill In Perko, the Court thought the Board could reasonably construe § 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the discharge of a supervisor for failure to observe Union rules because the discharge would inevitably tend to coerce nonsupervisory employees to submit to Union regimentation and hence coerce them in the exercise of their § 7 rights. In that event, the Board could also order the Union to reimburse the supervisor for his lost wages. The Board’s subsequent holdings apply a variant of this approach in the construction industry, where it is not unusual for workers to fluctuate, as Perko did, 373 U. S., at 706, between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. In Local Union No. 725, Plumbers, 225 N. L. R. B. 138 (1976), enf’d, 572 F. 2d 550 (CA5 1978), the Union caused the employer to breach a promise to hire the charging party as a supervisor. For two reasons, the Board held that the Union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and was liable to the charging party for backpay. First, it was found that certain employees depending on Union job referrals had learned of the Union’s conduct and were thereby intimidated in the exercise of their rights under the Act. Second, the Board reasoned that “because workers in the construction industry frequently cycle in and out of supervisory jobs, discrimination against [an individual] in his attempt to become a supervisor would carry over to intimidate him once he again became a statutory employee.” See 572 F. 2d, at 552. The Board’s “fluctuating status” approach is arguably applicable to this case. Jones was employed in the construction industry, and, in view of the low-level supervisory position he held, it was not unlikely that he would from time to time serve in a nonsupervisory position. It also is as clear here as it was in Perko that the Union’s conduct was arguably prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(B), which forbids a union to coerce an employer in the choice of his bargaining representative. In Perko, there was some doubt whether Perko was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act; here there is no doubt in that respect. Of course, not every supervisor is a “representative ‘for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances’ ” within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(B), Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U. S. 790, 811, n. 21 (1974). But in this case, Jones was to occupy the position of equipment supervisor; it is enough if in this position he would be authorized or expected to deal with grievances arising under the collective-bargaining agreement, American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U. S. 411, 427, n. 25 (1978); and Jones’ complaint filed with the Regional Director indicated that he would have collective-bargaining responsibilities. It is at least arguable that this was the case; and it was for the Board, not the state courts, to decide whether Jones was the kind of a supervisor who could invoke § 8(b)(1)(B). We thus agree with the Union and the Board that the Union, if it was responsible for Jones’ discharge, arguably coerced the Company in the choice of its collective-bargaining representative. h-4 < For several reasons, none of them sound m our view, the Georgia Court of Appeals thought that the Act did not preempt the cause of action that Jones submitted to the state courts. First, the Court of Appeals may have interpreted the Regional Director’s letter as indicating that the Board lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Jones’ complaint because of Jones’ supervisory status. That is plainly not the case, for the Regional Director’s statement did not decline jurisdiction but addressed the merits of the complaint. See generally Garmon, 359 U. S., at 245-246. Second, the Court of Appeals believed that the Regional Director’s rejection of the complaint for insufficient evidence of a violation satisfied all of the interests of the federal law and cleared the way for a state cause of action. If this position was grounded on the notion that supervisors do not have a cause of action in any circumstances, it is contrary to Board cases and to Perko. If, as seems more likely, the argument is that the complainant adequately submitted his dispute to the Board, it is untenable. Jones did not exhaust his administrative remedies, for he did not appeal to the General Counsel. Beyond that, the Garmon pre-emption doctrine not only mandates the substantive pre-emption by the federal labor law in the areas to which it applies, but also protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board over matters arguably within the reach of the Act. Even if Jones had satisfied ordinary primary-jurisdiction requirements, which he did not, he would not have taken adequate account of the decision of Congress to vest in one administrative agency nationwide jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies within the Act’s purview. Matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide. This implements the congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of the national labor policy. In addition to relying on the reasoning of the Georgia Court of Appeals, Jones argues that there should be no preemption because the state cause of action and the unfair labor practice charge are not sufficiently alike. Jones relies on Sears, Roebuck & Co., where we said that “the critical inquiry” in deciding whether a state claim is pre-empted because the challenged conduct is arguably prohibited by the federal labor laws is “whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to ... or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board.” 436 U. S., at 197. Jones asserts that a § 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice claim is made out only by proving coercion of an employer in the selection of its bargaining representative, whereas, he explains, to make out his state cause of action it need only be shown that the Union caused, either coercively or noncoercively, the employer’s selection of a supervisor. Because federal law does not forbid noncoerced, but union-caused discharges, it is said that the state cause of action is as distinct from the federal unfair labor practice claim as were the causes of action this Court found not preempted in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 (1966); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290 (1977); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra. We reject this argument. First, the argument concedes that the state cause of action is pre-empted to the extent that it covers coercive influence on the employer; and we note that Jones’ complaint in the state court alleged that the Union agent had “intimidated and coerced” Georgia Power into breaching its contract with Jones. Jones thus sought to prove a coerced discharge and breach of contract, the very claim that is concededly pre-empted. Second, permitting state causes of action for noncoercive interference with contractual relationships to go forward in the state courts would continually require the state court to decide in the first instance whether the Union’s conduct was coercive, and hence beyond its power to sanction, or noncoercive, and thus the proper subject of a state suit. Decisions on such questions of federal labor law should be resolved by the Board. Third, even if the Georgia law reaches noncoercive interference with contractual relationships, a fundamental part of such a claim is that the Union actually caused the discharge and hence was responsible for the employer’s breach of contract. Of course, this same crucial element must be proved to make out a § 8(b)(1)(B) case: the discharge must be shown to be the result of Union influence. Even on Jones’ view of the elements of his state-law cause of action, the federal and state claims are thus the same in a fundamental respect, and here the Regional Director had concluded that the Union was not at fault. This was not the case in Sears. There the state-court action was for trespass. It challenged only the location of the Union picketing. The unfair labor practice charge, however, would have focused on whether the picketing had recogni-tional or work reassignment objectives, issues “completely unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had occurred.” 436 U. S., at 198. Permitting the trespass action to go forward accordingly created “no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board’s primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.” Ibid. The same cannot be said here. The Regional Director concluded that the Union had in no way been responsible for Jones’ discharge. That same issue of causation would have been presented for decision had Jones’ case come before the Board, just as the issue would recurringly be at the core of § 8(b)(1)(B) cases. Despite the Regional Director’s determination, and the Board’s undoubted jurisdiction to decide the issue had a complaint issued, Jones sought to relitigate the question in the state courts. The risk of interference with the Board’s jurisdiction is thus obvious and substantial. We thus cannot agree that Jones’ efforts to recover damages from the Union for interference with his contractual relationships with his employer was of only peripheral concern to the federal labor policy. Our decisions in Perko and its companion case, Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690 (1963), refute Jones’ submission. They also foreclose any claim that Jones’ action against the Union for interference with his job is so deeply rooted in local law that Georgia’s interest in enforcing that law overrides the interference with the federal labor law that prosecution of the state action would entail. Beyond this is the proposition, pressed by the Union, that although an employer may not be coerced in its choice of a collective-bargaining agent employees have the protected right to exert noncoercive influence on the choice of low-level supervisors. “[CJourts have generally held over Board protest that employees’ strikes over changes in even low level supervisory personnel are not protected. See Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, [522 F. 2d 1050, 1055 (CA7 1975)]; American Art Clay Co. v. NLRB, [328 F. 2d 88, 90-91 (CA7 1964)]; Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, [325 F. 2d 531, 538-539 (CA5 1963)]. On the other hand, courts have found protected the writing of letters expressing opposition, NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 167 F. 2d 983 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 335 U. S. 845 . . . (1948), or the simple voicing of complaints, NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F. 2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960). By thus examining both the substantive interest and the means of advancing it, courts have balanced more finely the competing interests involved. The result is a general absence of per se rules.” Abilities and Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F. 2d 6, 9 (CA1 1979). Thus, had Jones’ complaint come before the Board, his complaint would arguably have been rejected on the ground that the Union’s conduct in this case was protected activity. Finally, the argument is made that Jones should be permitted to go forward in the state court because he could be awarded punitive damages and attorney’s fees, whereas he would be limited to backpay if his complaint had gone forward before the Board. But such a claim was squarely rejected in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S., at 246-247. The judgment below is accordingly Reversed. A supervisor is defined as follows: “(11) The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.” §2(11), 61 Stat. 138. Supervisors are expressly excluded from the definition of employee in § 2(3), 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Only “employees” are given rights under § 7, 29 U. S. C. § 157, which provides in relevant part: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).” 61 Stat. 140. We refer to Jones as respondent because, as we shall explain, see n. 7, infra, we review this case on writ of certiorari rather than on appeal. Sections 8(a) and 8(b) define certain employer and union practices as unfair labor practices. As pertinent to this case, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b), provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7... or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances; “(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section . . .” Section 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .” The following is the text of the letter: July 19, 1978 Robert C. Jones 2954 Orchard Lane, S. E. Atlanta, Georgia 30354 Re: International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 926 Case 10-CB-2905 Dear Mr. Jones: The above-captioned case charging a violation under Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, has been carefully investigated and considered. As a result of the investigation, it does not appear that further proceedings on the charge are warranted. The Region concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Union caused your discharge or that it restrained or coerced the Employer in the selection of its representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. Rather, it appears that the Employer implemented certain changes in its supervisory structure which included your removal from the project. While the Union did participate in discussions regarding the changes, there was no evidence that it engaged in any unlawful conduct regarding your status as a supervisor. I am, therefore, refusing to issue complaint in this matter. Form NLRB-4938, Procedure for Filing an Appeal, is attached. The appeal period expires at the close of business on August 1, 1978. Very truly yours, /s/ Curtis L. Mack Regional Director App. to Juris. Statement 26a. Appeal to the General Counsel is provided by 29 CFR § 102.19 (1982). Respondent said he “didn’t see much point” in taking such an appeal. App. 105 (deposition of Robert C. Jones, Feb. 20, 1979). The court affirmed the dismissal of the cause of action against the employer. The merits of that decision are not before us. Petitioners initially argued in their jurisdictional statement that they were entitled to a mandatory appeal. They believed that this case fell within 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), which allows parties an appeal as of right when a state statute is challenged in state court as being repugnant to the laws of the United States and the state court upholds the validity of the statute. The Georgia right-to-work law, Ga. Code Ann. § 54-905 (1981), recodified at Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6-24 (1982), was identified as the statute whose validity had been wrongly upheld. Petitioners now acknowledge that the Georgia Court of Appeals did not consider the question of whether the NLRA prohibited Jones’ reliance on the State’s right-to-work law; the court held only that the Georgia common-law tort action for interference with contractual relations was not pre-empted by the national labor laws. Petitioners’ current perception appears correct. Because a common-law cause of action cannot be said to be a “statute” for purposes of § 1257(2), this case is not within our § 1257(2) appellate jurisdiction. The NLRA has been held to pre-empt state law and state causes of action relating to conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited, where it is determined that Congress intended the conduct to be unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces. See Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 140 (1976); Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 260 (1964). This branch of the pre-emption doctrine is not at issue in this case. Since the Board’s decision in Local 725, it has become evident that the Board will not adhere to the general proposition voiced in Perko that the discharge of a supervisor for failure to abide by union rules is alone enough to discourage employees from exercising their § 7 rights. Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N. L. R. B. 402, 404 (1982). The Board asserts, however, that the holding in Local 725, reflecting the peculiarities of the construction industry, survives its later decision. Recognizing that an employer so frequently draws his collective-bargaining representative from the existing pool of supervisors, the Board has held that the Union violates § 8(b)(1)(B) by coercing the choice of a supervisor even without proving that the supervisor in question actually has collective-bargaining authority. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has disagreed with the Board in this respect. NLRB v. Rochester Musicians Assn. Local 66, 514 F. 2d 988, 992 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on the other hand, has not entirely rejected the Board’s position. Newspaper Guild, Erie Newspaper Guild, Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F. 2d 416, 420-422 (1973). In Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, we held that an action for a malicious and injurious libel in the course of a labor dispute, although an unfair practice and prohibited by the Act, was not pre-empted since it was unprotected conduct and since remedying injury to reputation was of only slight concern to the national labor policy and was a matter deeply rooted in state law. For similar reasons, in Farmer v. Carpenters we held that insofar as the state-court suit rested on claims of discriminatory hiring hall referrals and breach of contract, it was pre-empted, but that it was not pre-empted and could go forward insofar as it alleged the outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We deal with Sears, Roebuck & Co. in the text, infra, this page and 683.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HEUBLEIN, INC. v. SOUTH CAROLINA TAX COMMISSION No. 71-879. Argued November 13, 1972 Decided December 18, 1972 MaRshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, Brennan, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 284. Stewart, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Stephen M. Piga argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was W. Croft Jennings, Jr. G. Lewis Argoe, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of South Carolina, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Daniel B. McLeod, Attorney General, and Joe L. Allen, Jr., and John C. Von Lehe, Assistant Attorneys General. Mr. Piga filed a brief for the Distilled Spirits Institute as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, and Ernest J. Brown for the United States, and by William D. Dexter, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, and Eugene F. Corrigan for the Multi-state Tax Commission. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we must determine whether South Carolina may tax the income from local sales of Heublein’s products, consistent with the limitations on the State’s power to tax imposed by 15 U. S. C. § 381 (a). The South Carolina Tax Commission assessed Heublein, Inc., a Connecticut corporation that produces alcoholic beverages, a total of $21,549.50 in taxes on income derived from the sale of its goods in South Carolina. After a hearing before the Tax Commission, Heublein paid the taxes and brought suit to recover them. The Court of Common Pleas held that § 381 (a) protected Heublein from tax liability in South Carolina. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed. 257 S. C. 17, 183 S. E. 2d 710. We noted probable jurisdiction, 405 U. S. 952 (1972), and now affirm. We hold that Heublein’s activities within South Carolina exceed the minimum standards established in 15 U. S. C. § 381 (a), and that South Carolina may, pursuant to an otherwise valid regulatory scheme, compel Heublein to undertake activities that take it beyond the protection of 15' U. S. C. §381 (a). I During the years in question, Heublein had one employee in South Carolina. He maintained an office in his home and a desk at the warehouse of Ben Arnold Co., the local distributor of Heublein’s products. Heublein’s representative briefed Ben Arnold’s salesmen on Heublein’s products, and traveled throughout the State to liquor retailers, telling them of the products and leaving promotional literature with them. Ordinarily, the retailers sent orders directly to Ben Arnold, but occasionally Heublein’s representative transmitted them. Ben Arnold, in turn, placed its orders with Heublein’s home office in Connecticut. Heublein then acknowledged its acceptance of the orders and indicated to Ben Arnold when the goods would be shipped. They were sent by common carrier consigned to Heublein in care of its representative at the premises of Ben Arnold. This arrangement, which served none of Heublein’s business interests, was adopted to conform to the requirements of the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. S. C. Code Ann. §4^1 et seq. (1962 and Supp. 1971). Under that Act, only registered producers of registered brands of alcoholic beverages may ship those brands of alcoholic beverages into the State. §§ 4U134, 4-135. Such producers must have a resident representative who has no direct or indirect interest in a local liquor business. §§ 4-131 (3), 4-139. Shipments of liquor into the State may be made only to the producer in care of its representative. § 4-141. Prior to the shipment, the producer must mail a copy of the invoice showing the quantity and price of the items shipped, and a copy of the bill of lading, to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission. Immediately after accepting delivery, the representative must furnish the Commission a copy of the invoice showing the time and place of delivery. Ibid. When received, the shipment must be stored in a licensed warehouse of the producer, or, after delivery is complete, the shipment may be transferred to a licensed wholesaler. §§4-140, A-141. Before the goods are shipped to a wholesaler, however, the representative must obtain the Commission’s permission to make the transfer. § 4-141. Heublein complied with this regulatory scheme. II Title 15 U. S. C. § 381 (a)(1), on which Heublein relies, provides that no State shall have power to impose a net income tax on income derived within the State from interstate commerce if the recipient of the income confined its business within the State to “the solicitation of orders ... in such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State.” We need not decide whether, as the State urges, the actions of Heublein’s representative in maintaining a local office, meeting with retailers, distributing promotional literature, and personally delivering some orders to the wholesaler, do not fall within the term “solicitation.” Compare Smith Kline & French v. Tax Comm’n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P. 2d 375 (1965), with Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N. J. Super. 22, 262 A. 2d 213, aff’d, 57 N. J. 199, 270 A. 2d 702 (1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U. S. 902 (1971). For here Heublein has done more than just those acts. It sent its products to its local representative who transferred them to a local wholesaler. This transfer occurred within the State and clearly was neither “solicitation” nor the filling of orders “by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State” within the meaning of § 381 (a)(1). Heublein contends, however, that the transfer never would have occurred had not South Carolina required it as a condition of conducting business within the State. Heublein argues that a State may not evade the purpose of § 381 (a) by requiring a firm to do more than solicit business within the State and then taxing the firm for engaging in this compelled additional activity. If we were persuaded that South Carolina has evaded the intent of the statute we would, of course, be reluctant to uphold its actions. But that is not what South Carolina has done here. The legislative history of § 381 shows that Congress had rather limited purposes which are not evaded by South Carolina’s regulation of liquor sales in the manner it has chosen. Congress did not focus on the consequences of its actions for such local regulatory schemes. We therefore will not read the statute as prohibiting the States from adopting such schemes, even when the regulation requires the producer to have more than the minimum contacts with the State for which § 381 provides tax immunity. Such a reading would require us to assume that Congress carefully considered the difficult problems of accommodating the federal interest in an open national economy with local interest in regulating the sale of liquor. The evidence is clear that Congress did not do so. The impetus behind the enactment of § 381 was this Court’s opinion in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450 (1950). There we held that “net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support the same.” 358 U. S., at 452. Congress promptly responded to the “considerable concern and uncertainty” and the “serious apprehension in the commercial community” generated by this decision by enacting Pub. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555, 15 TJ. S. C. § 381, within seven months. In this statute, Congress attempted to allay the apprehension of businessmen that “mere solicitation” would subject them to state taxation. Such apprehension arose because, as businessmen who sought relief from Congress viewed the situation, Northwestern States Portland Cement did not adequately specify what local activities were enough to create a “sufficient nexus” for the exercise of the State’s power to tax. Section 381 was designed to define clearly a lower limit for the exercise of that power. Clarity that would remove uncertainty was Congress’ primary goal. By establishing such a limit, Congress did, of course, implicitly determine that the State’s interest in taxing business activities below that limit was weaker than the national interest in promoting an open economy. But it did not address the questions raised by a requirement, incident to a valid regulatory scheme, that a business undertake activities above the limit as a condition of doing business within the State. Congress recognized, instead, that the accommodation of local and national interests in this area was a delicate matter. The committees reporting the bill to the House and Senate emphasized the difficulty of devising appropriate limitations on state taxing powers. Both Committees called their bills temporary solutions to meet only the most pressing problems created by Northwestern States Portland Cement. More comprehensive legislation could only follow careful study, in the Committees’ view. Congress agreed, and in Title II of Pub. L. 86-272, provided that the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate study the entire problem of state taxation of interstate commerce. Congress, then, did not address in § 381 the problem of taxing a'business when it undertook local activities simply in order to comply with the requirements of a valid regulatory scheme. Such regulation is an important function of local governments in our federal scheme. As we said last Term, “unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the Federal-State balance.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971). Congress of course did not enact in § 381 a statute which a State can deliberately evade by requiring a firm to undertake more than mere solicitation. When a State enacts a regulatory scheme that serves legitimate State purposes other than assuring that the State may tax the firm’s income, it is not evading § 381; it is pursuing permissible ends in a manner that Congress did not address. Thus, if South Carolina’s system of regulating the sale of liquor is valid, § 381 does not prohibit taxation of Heublein’s local sales. Ill South Carolina’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is a long and detailed statute. Requirements that certain records be kept by the manufacturer, the wholesaler, and the retailer pervade the scheme. There must be complete records of the quantities, brands, and prices involved at every stage of each liquor sale. By requiring manufacturers to localize their sales, South Carolina establishes a check on the accuracy of these records. For example, when a manufacturer can transfer its goods to a wholesaler in the State only after it submits an invoice showing the price and after it receives permission for the transfer, it is easier for the State to enforce its requirement that the wholesale price in South Carolina be no higher than that elsewhere in the country. S. C. Code Ann. §4-137.1 (Supp. 1971). The requirement that sales be localized is, unquestionably, reasonably related to the State’s purposes and is not simply an attempt by the State to provide a basis for the taxation of an out-of-state seller’s local sales. Nor does this requirement violate the Commerce Clause. The Twenty-first Amendment, § 2, provides that “[t]he transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” As this Court said in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 330 (1964): “This Court made clear in the early years following the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment that by virtue of its provisions a State is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders.” The requirement that, before engaging in the liquor business in South Carolina, a manufacturer do more than merely solicit sales there, is an appropriate element in the State’s system of regulating the sale of liquor. The regulation in question here is therefore valid, and § 381 (a) does not apply. The judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Blackmun, being of the opinion that the Twenty-first Amendment provides the sole authority for what South Carolina has required of Heublein by its Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and, to that extent, overrides what otherwise would be proscribed by 15 U. S. C. § 381, concurs in the result. Title 15 U. S. C. §381 (a) provides in pertinent part: “No State . . . shall have power to impose ... a net income tax on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person ... are either, or both, of the following: “(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and “(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).” A license tax, which is predicated upon liability for income taxes, was also assessed and paid. S. C. Code Aim. § 65-606 (1962). There is no dispute over the amount for which Heublein is liable under this statute. S. Rep. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. H. R. Rep. No. 936, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 658, supra, n. 3, pp. 2-3: “Persons engaged in interstate commerce are in doubt as to the amount of local activities within a State that will be regarded as forming a sufficient ‘nexus/ that is, connection, with the State to support the imposition of a tax on net income from interstate operations and ‘properly apportioned’ to the State.” That Congress was untroubled by those questions is suggested by its emphasis on the increased overhead and recordkeeping that local taxation of minimal activities would cause. See, e. g., id., at 4; H. R. Rep. No. 936, supra, n. 4, p. 2: “These businesses are concerned not only with the costs of taxation, but also with the inescapable fact that compliance with the diverse tax laws of every jurisdiction in which income is produced will require the maintenance of records for each jurisdiction and the retention of legal counsel and accountants who are familiar with the tax practice of each jurisdiction.” Where a valid regulatory scheme requires that records be kept, the overhead costs about which Congress was concerned might not rise substantially when a state income tax was imposed. South Carolina’s scheme for regulating liquor does little more than require that Heublein keep certain records. H. R. Rep. No. 936, supra, n. 4, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 658, supra, n. 3, pp. 4-5: “Your committee recognizes that the bill it has reported is not a permanent solution to the problem that exists. It was not intended to be. Your committee . . . recognizes that the problem is a complex one which requires extensive and exhaustive study in arriving at a permanent solution fair alike to the States and to the Nation. Your committee believes, however, that the bill it has reported will serve as an effective stopgap or temporary solution while further studies are made of the problem.” This report is published as H. R. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., and H. R. Rep. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. MR. Justice Blackmun, in his separate statement, suggests that § 381 does proscribe what South Carolina has done here, but that the Twenty-first Amendment prohibits such an action by Congress. In his view, to the extent that § 381 prohibits taxing activities undertaken in order to comply with a regulation valid under the Twenty-first Amendment, it is unconstitutional. We prefer to read the statute and its legislative history, ambiguous though they may be, to avoid such a holding. Cf. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916). And, though the relation between the Twenty-first Amendment and the force of the Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional action has occasionally been explored by this Court, we have never squarely determined how that Amendment affects Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951). In upholding a comprehensive scheme of liquor regulation rather similar to South Carolina’s, this Court said: “[The State] has seen fit to permit manufacture of whiskey only upon condition that it be sold to an indicated class of customers and transported in definitely specified ways. These conditions are not unreasonable and are clearly appropriate for effectuating the policy of limiting traffic in order to minimize well-known evils . . . .” Ziffrin, Inc. v. Beeves, 308 U. S. 132, 139 (1939). Cf. Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390 (1941); Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131 (1944).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COX v. UNITED STATES. NO. 66. Argued October 14-15, 1947. Decided November 24, 1947. Hayden C. Covington argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Irving S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman and Robert S. Erdahl. Mr. Justice Reed announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Burton join. These cases present the question of the scope of review of a selective service classification in a trial for absence without leave from a civilian public service camp. Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses who were classified as conscientious objectors despite their claim to classification as ministers of religion. Ministers are exempt from military and other service under the Act. All three petitioners exhausted their remedies in the selective service process and complied with the order of the local board directing them to report to camp. Cox and Thompson were indicted for leaving the camp without permission, and Roisum was indicted for failing to return after proper leave, in violation of § 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 54 Stat. 885, 57 Stat. 597, 50 U. S. C. Appendix §§ 301-318. On their trials petitioners requested directed verdicts, at appropriate times, because the selective service orders were invalid and requested the court to charge the jury that they acquit petitioners if they found that they were ministers of religion and therefore exempt from all service. The trial judge did not grant petitioners’ requests, however, and instructed the juries that they were not to concern themselves with the validity of the classification orders. Petitioners were convicted, and on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals their convictions were affirmed. 157 F. 2d 787. We granted certiorari in order to resolve questions concerning the submission to the jury of evidence, to wit, the files of the local board of the selective service system, as relevant to the charge of violation of selective service orders. 331 U. S. 801. Petitioner Cox registered under the Selective Training and Service Act on October 16, 1940, and in his questionnaire stated that he was 22 years old and had been employed as a truck driver since 1936. The local board classified him IV-F, as not physically fit for service, on January 31, 1941, and on March 10, 1942, changed the classification to I-A. Ten days later Cox filed a request for reclassification as IV-E (conscientious objector), stating that he had become a Jehovah’s Witness in January 1942. The board at first rejected the claim, but on June 12 of the same year granted him the requested classification. Ten days later petitioner first made his claim for total exemption from service, claiming to be a minister of religion; the local board refused the exemption and its action was sustained by the board of appeal. On May 18, 1944, the board ordered Cox to report to camp, and on May 26 he complied and then immediately left camp and did not return. Upon trial Cox’s selective service file was received in evidence. It contained an ordination certificate from the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society stating that Cox was “a duly ordained minister of the Gospel” and that his “entire time” was devoted to missionary work. The file also contained an affidavit of a company servant, Cox’s church superior, dated October 29, 1942, stating that Cox “regularly and customarily serves as a minister by going from house to house and conducting Bible Studies and Bible Talks.” There was also an affidavit by Cox, dated October 28, 1942, stating that he was enrolled in the “Pioneer service” on October 16 and that he was “able to average 150 hours per month to my ministerial duties without secular work.” He added that “my entire time will be devoted to preaching the Gospel as a pioneer.” Cox testified at the trial in October 1944 as to his duties as a minister that he preached from house to house, conducted funerals, and “instructed the Bible” in homes. No evidence was introduced showing the total amount of time Cox had spent in religious activities since October 16, 1942. Nor was there evidence of the secular activities of Cox nor the time employed in them. Although the selective service file was introduced in evidence, and the trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict, it does not appear that the trial judge examined the file to determine whether the action of the local board was arbitrary and capricious or without basis in fact. At that time the lower federal courts interpreted Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, as meaning that no judicial review of any sort could be had of a selective service order. In Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, we held that a limited review could be obtained if the registrant had exhausted his administrative remedies, and the Circuit Court of Appeals in accordance with that decision reviewed the file of Cox and found that the evidence was “substantially in support” of the classification found by the board. Petitioner Thompson also registered on October 16, 1940, claiming exemption as a minister. He stated in his questionnaire that he was 30 years old and that for the past 13 years he had operated a grocery store and had been a minister since August 1, 1940. At first the local board gave him a deferred classification because of dependency, but then changed his classification to IV-E. Thompson appealed to the board of appeal on November 5, 1943, explaining his duties as a minister and presenting a full statement of his argument that as a colporteur he was within the exemption for ministers as interpreted by selective service regulations. He attached an affidavit from the company servant, which stated that Thompson during the preceding twelve months had devoted 519% hours to “field service,” representing time spent in going from house to house, and making “back-calls on the people of good will,” but not including time spent in conducting studies at the “local Kingdom Hall.” Another affidavit from the company servant stated that Thompson was an ordained minister of the Gospel, that he was serving as assistant company servant, and that he was a “School Instructor in a Course in Theocratic Ministry.” Thompson also attached three certificates from the national headquarters of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society which stated that Thompson had been associated with the Society since 1941, that he served as assistant company servant and Theocratic Ministry Instructor, and also as advertising servant and book study conductor. Unlike the other two petitioners, Thompson did not introduce an ordination certification from national headquarters stating that he devoted his entire time as a minister. Thompson also filed a statement signed by twelve Witnesses which stated that they regarded Thompson as an ordained minister of the gospel. No evidence was submitted indicating any change in Thompson’s activities in operating his grocery store. The board of appeal sustained the local board in its classification, the board ordered Thompson to report to camp, and on April 18, 1944, he reported and immediately left. Thompson’s trial followed the same pattern as Cox’s, except that Thompson was not allowed to testify concerning his duties as a minister. Petitioner Roisum also registered on the initial registration day, and filed a questionnaire stating that he was 22 years old, that he had worked for the past 15 years as a farmer, and that he was ordained as a minister in June 1940. Roisum made claim to a minister’s exemption but at the same time submitted an affidavit signed by his father saying that petitioner was necessary to the operation of his father’s farm. In June 1942 Roisum filed a conscientious objector’s form claiming exemption from both combatant and non-combatant military service; this form was apparently filed under misapprehension, since Roisum did not abandon his contention that he should be classified as a minister. In the form he stated that he preached the gospel of the Kingdom at every opportunity. Roisum also enclosed a letter from national headquarters of the Society stating that Roisum had been affiliated with the Society since 1936, that he had been baptized in 1940 and “was appointed direct representative of this organization to perform missionary and evangelistic service in organizing and establishing churches and generally preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God in definitely assigned territory in 1941” and that Roisum devoted his “entire time” to missionary work and was a duly ordained minister. The local board classified Roisum as a conscientious objector to combat service (I-A-O), and Roisum appealed on June 30, 1943. Roisum attached an affidavit from his company servant stating that Roisum was an assistant company servant, a back call servant, and book study conductor, and that by performance of these duties Roisum had acquitted himself as a “regular minister of the gospel.” The company servant submitted a schedule showing the number of hours which Roisum had spent in religious activities for six months from October 1942 to March 1943, ranging from as little as 11 hours per month to as many as 69, averaging about 40. The board of appeal changed the classification to IY-E and rejected Roisum’s request that an appeal be taken to the President. Roisum was ordered to report to camp, disobeyed the order, and was arrested and indicted. The trial court declared a mistrial on Roisum’s undertaking to obey the board’s order and seek release on habeas corpus. Roisum subsequently failed to comply, apparently because of transportation difficulties, but finally reported to camp on May 23, 1944, as directed. He remained in camp for five days, left on a week-end pass, and never returned. Upon trial Roisum made no effort to introduce new evidence showing the nature of his duties as a minister. He did request the court to charge that if the decision of the local board erroneously classified him in IV-E the order was void and after conviction he moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial on the ground that the evidence in his selective service file showed that the classification of the board was arbitrary and capricious. The trial judge examined the file and concluded that there was no ground to support Roisum’s motion. Petitioners are entitled to raise the question of the validity of their selective service classifications in this proceeding. They have exhausted their remedies in the selective service process, and whatever their position might be in attempting to raise the question by writs of habeas corpus against the camp custodian, they are entitled to raise the issue as a defense in a criminal prosecution for absence without leave. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338, 351-360. The scope of review to which petitioners are entitled, however, is limited; as we said in Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 122-23: “The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final’ means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant.” Compare Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, and Eagles v. United States ex rel. Horowitz, 329 U. S. 317, in which a similar scope of review is enunciated in habeas corpus proceedings by registrants claiming to have been improperly inducted. Section 5 (d) of the Selective Training and Service Act provides that “regular or duly ordained ministers of religion” shall be exempt from training and service under the Act, and § 622.44 of Selective Service Regulations defines the terms “regular minister of religion” and “duly ordained minister of religion.” In order to aid the local boards in applying the regulation, the Director of Selective Service issued Opinion No. 14 (amended) on November 2, 1942, which described the tests to be applied in determining whether Jehovah’s Witnesses were entitled to exemption as ministers, regular or ordained. The opinion stated that Witnesses who were members of the Bethel Family (producers of religious supplies) or pioneers, devoting all or substantially all of their time to the work of teaching the tenets of their religion, generally were exempt, and appended a list of certain members of the Bethel Family and pioneers who were entitled to this exemption. None of these Witnesses were on the list. The opinion stated that members of the Bethel Family and pioneers whose names did not appear on the list, as well as all other Witnesses holding official titles in the organization, must be classified by the boards according to the facts in each case. The determining criteria were stated to be “whether or not they devote their lives in the furtherance of the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witnesses, whether or not they perform functions which are normally performed by regular or duly ordained ministers of other religions, and, finally, whether or not they are regarded by other Jehovah’s Witnesses in the same manner in which regular or duly ordained ministers of other religions are ordinarily regarded.” The opinion further stated that the local board should place in the registrant’s file “a record of all facts entering into its determination for the reason that it is legally necessary that the record show the basis of the local board’s decision.” It will be observed that § 622.44 of the regulation makes “ordination” the only practical difference between a “regular” and a “duly ordained minister.” This seems consistent with § 5 of the Act. We are of the view that the regulation conforms to the Act and that it is valid under the rule-making power conferred by §10 (a).- We agree, also, that Opinion 14 furnishes a proper guide to the interpretation of the Act and Regulations. Our examination of the facts, as stated herein in each case, convinces us that the board had adequate basis to deny to Cox, Thompson and Roisum classification as ministers, regular or ordained. We confine ourselves to the facts appearing in the selective service files of the three petitioners, although the only documents dealing with the petitioners’ status as ministers were submitted by petitioners themselves. The documents show that Thompson and Roisum spent only a small portion of their time in religious activities, and this fact alone, without a far stronger showing than is contained in either of the files of the registrants’ leadership in church activities and the dedication of their lives to the furtherance of religious work, is sufficient for the board to deny them a minister’s classification. As for Cox, the documents suggest but do not prove that Cox spent full time as a “pioneer” between October 1942 and May 1944 when he was ordered to camp. As he made claim of conscientious objector classification only after he was reclassified I-A from IV-F and still later claimed ministerial exemption, the board was justified in deciding from the available facts that Cox had not established his ministerial status. The board might have reasonably held that nothing less than definite evidence of his full devotion of his available time to religious leadership would suffice under these circumstances. Nor may Cox and Thompson complain that the district court failed to pass on the validity of the classification orders. If there was error of the district court in failing to examine the files of the board to determine whether or not there was basis for their classification, it was cured in the Circuit Court of Appeals by that court’s examination. Petitioners do not limit themselves to the claim that directed verdicts should have been entered in their favor because of the invalidity of their classifications as a matter of law; they claim that the issue should have been submitted with appropriate instructions to the jury. The charge requested by Roisum that he be acquitted if the jury found that he was “erroneously” classified was improper. In Estep v. United States it was distinctly stated that mere error in a classification was insufficient grounds for attack. Cox and Thompson requested charges under which the jury would determine “whether or not the defendant is a minister of religion” without considering the action of the local board. We hold that such a charge would also have been improper. Whether there was “no basis in fact” for the classification is not a question to be determined by the jury on an independent consideration of the evidence. The concept of a jury passing independently on an issue previously determined by an administrative body or reviewing the action of an administrative body is contrary to settled federal administrative practice; the constitutional right to jury trial does not include the right to have a jury pass on the validity of an administrative order. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414. Although we held in Estep that Congress did not intend to cut off all judicial review of a selective service order, petitioners have full protection by having the issue submitted to the trial judge and the reviewing courts to determine whether there was any substantial basis for the classification order. When the judge determines that there was a basis in fact to support classification, the issue need not and should not be submitted to the jury. Perhaps a court or jury would reach a different result from the evidence but as the determination of classification is for selective service, its order is reviewable “only if there is no basis in fact for the classification.” Estep v. United States, supra, 122. Consequently when a court finds a basis in the file for the board’s action that action is conclusive. The question of the preponderance of evidence is not for trial anew. It is not relevant to the issue of the guilt of the accused for disobedience of orders. Upon the judge’s determination that the file supports the board, nothing in the file is pertinent to any issue proper for jury consideration. Petitioners also claim that they were denied the right to introduce new evidence at the trial to support their contention that the orders were invalid. Roisum made no attempt to introduce such evidence, Cox was in fact allowed to testify as to his duties as a minister, and only Thompson was denied the opportunity so to testify. Thompson did not specify this point as error in his appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Passing the possible waiver on the part of Thompson by failing to argue this point below, we hold that his contention is without merit. Petitioner claims that his status as a minister is a “jurisdictional fact” which may be determined de novo (reexamination of the record of the former hearing with right to adduce additional evidence) in a criminal trial, and relies on Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, where we held that an alleged alien was entitled to a judicial trial on the issue of alienage in habeas corpus proceedings. But that case is different from this. The alien, there, claimed American citizenship. As such, this Court said, he had a right to a judicial hearing of his claim as a matter of due process. This he could not get before the Commissioner of Immigration. Therefore, since the deportation of a citizen may involve loss “of all that makes life worth living,” this Court decided that the “jurisdiction” of the Commissioner to try the alleged alien could be tested by habeas corpus. P. 284. That gave the alleged alien a judicial hearing. In these cases judicial review of administrative action is allowed in the criminal trial. This assures judicial consideration of a registrant’s rights. Petitioners’ objection on this point is in essence that the review is limited to evidence that appeared in the administrative proceeding. It seems to us that it is quite in accord with justice to limit the evidence as to status in the criminal trial on review of administrative action to that upon which the board acted. As we have said elsewhere the board records were made by petitioners. It was open to them there to furnish full information as to their activities. It is that record upon which the board acted and upon which the registrants’ violation of orders must be predicated. We perceive no error to petitioners’ prejudice in the records. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurs in the result. 54 Stat. 885, 888: “Sec. 5. . . . “(d) Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, and students who are preparing for the ministry in theological or divinity schools recognized as such for more than one year prior to the date of enactment of this Act, shall be exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under this Act.” Selective Service Regulations, 32 C. F. R., 1941 Supp.: Section 622.44. “Class IV-D: Minister of religion or divinity student. (a) In Class IY-D shall be placed any registrant who is a regular or duly ordained minister of religion or who is a student preparing for the ministry in a theological or divinity school which has been recognized as such for more than 1 year prior to the date of enactment of the Selective Training and Service Act (September 16, 1940). “(b) A ‘regular minister of religion’ is a man who customarily preaches and teaches the principles of religion of a recognized church, religious sect, or religious organization of which he is a member, without having been formally ordained as a minister of religion; and who is recognized by such church, sect, or organization as a minister. “(c) A ‘duly ordained minister of religion’ is a man who has been ordained in accordance with the ceremonial ritual or discipline of a recognized church, religious sect, or religious organization, to teach and preach its doctrines and to administer its rites and ceremonies in public worship; and who customarily performs those duties.” Opinion 14 (amended) is on file at the Office of Selective Service Records, Washington, D. C. For a similar conclusion under the same subdivision of the statute, giving exemption to regular and duly ordained ministers of religion and students, see Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, 316-17: “Nor can we say there was no evidence to support the final classification made by the board of appeal. Samuels’ statement that he was best fitted to be a Hebrew school teacher and spiritual leader, the two-year interruption in his education, his return to the day session of the seminary in the month when his selective service questionnaire was returned, and the fact that the seminary in question was apparently not preparing men exclusively for the rabbinate make questionable his claim that he was preparing in good faith for the rabbinate. A registrant might seek a theological school as a refuge for the duration of the war. Congress did not create the exemption in § 5 (d) for him. There was some evidence that this was Samuels’ plan; and that evidence, coupled with his demeanor and attitude, might have seemed more persuasive to the boards than it does in the cold record. Our inquiry is ended when we are unable to say that the board flouted the command of Congress in denying Samuels the exemption.” The Circuit Court of Appeals on April 5, 1946, ordered the judgments in these cases reversed on the ground that the jury should have passed on petitioners’ claims. Upon rehearing the opinion was withdrawn, and on October 4 the court handed down an opinion affirming the judgments. 157 F. 2d 787. In Smith v. United States, 157 F. 2d 176, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the submission of the issue of classification to the jury constituted reversible error. But cf. United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F. 2d 811. For an analogous power of a judge as to admissibility, see Wigmore (3d ed.) § 2550; Steele v. United States No. 2, 267 U. S. 505, 510-11; Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 605; Doe dem. Jenkins v. Davies, 10 Ad. & E. N. S. 314, 323-24; Phipsori, Evidence (8th ed.), p. 9. See Goff v. United States, 135 F. 2d 610, and United States v. Messersmith, 138 F. 2d 599.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GOODYEAR ATOMIC CORP. v. MILLER et al. No. 86-1172. Argued January 19, 1988 Decided May 23, 1988 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, -post, p. 186. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Robert E. Tait argued the cause and filed «briefs for appellant. Thomas W. Merrill argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Lauber, Richard G. Ta-ranto, and Leonard Schaitman. Stewart R. Jaffy argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellee Miller were Michael H. Gottes-man, David M. Silberman, and Laurence Gold. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, and Helen M. Ninos, Dennis L. Hufstader, and Jeffery W. Clark, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benha-Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Beate Bloch; and for the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union by Donald J. Mares and John W. McKendree. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented in this case is whether the Supremacy Clause bars the State of Ohio from subjecting a private contractor operating a federally owned nuclear production facility to a state-law workers’ compensation provision that provides an increased award for injuries resulting from an employer’s violation of a state safety regulation. I — i This case arises from an accident involving a worker at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, a nuclear production facility located near Piketon, Ohio. The plant is owned by the United States, but at all times relevant to this action it was operated by a private company, appellant Goodyear Atomic Corporation, under contract with the Department of Energy (DOE). On July 30, 1980, appellee Esto Miller, a maintenance mechanic employed by Goodyear at the Portsmouth plant, fell from a scaffold while performing routine maintenance work and fractured his left ankle. His fall apparently was caused when his glove caught on a bolt protruding from the guardrail of the scaffolding. Miller applied to the Ohio Industrial Commission for an award under the State’s workers’ compensation program, for which Goodyear pays premiums to cover its Portsmouth employees. He received about $9,000 in workers’ compensation. After returning to work, Miller filed an application for an additional award on the ground that his injury had resulted from Goodyear’s violation of a state safety requirement. Miller alleged that his fall was caused by Goodyear’s failure to comply with Ohio Admin. Code §4121:1-5-03(D)(2) (1987), which provides that “[e]xposed surfaces [on scaffolds] shall be free from sharp edges, burrs or other projecting parts.” The Ohio Constitution provides that when an injury is caused by an employer’s failure to comply with a specific state safety requirement, the Industrial Commission shall provide an additional award of 15% to 50% of the benefits already received. Ohio Const., Art. II, § 35. The state insurance fund recoups these additional payments by increasing the premium paid by the employer. Ibid. The Ohio Industrial Commission denied Miller’s claim for a supplemental award. The Commission held that “the [Ohio] Codes of Specific Safety Requirements . . . may not be applied to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant under the doctrine of federal preemption.” Claim No. 80-19975 (Mar. 8, 1983), App. 18. Miller filed a mandamus action in the Ohio Court of Appeals, seeking an order directing the Industrial Commission to consider his application. The court held that “[u]ntil it is clear that the federal government has preempted the field of safety regulation for safety hazards unrelated to radiation, . . . state specific safety regulations that give rise to an award for violation thereof are equally applicable to an entity that contracts with the federal government for operation of a nuclear power facility owned exclusively by the federal government.” No. 84AP-208 (July 25, 1985), App. 17. The court therefore ordered the Industrial Commission to consider Miller’s claim that he was due an additional award because his injury was caused by a violation of a state safety regulation. A divided Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Miller v. Ohio Industrial Comm’n, 26 Ohio St. 3d 110, 497 N. E. 2d 76 (1986) (per curiam). Relying on the federal pre-emption analysis of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 (1984), the court held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2011 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), did not pre-empt Ohio from applying workers’ compensation safety requirements unrelated to radiation hazards to nuclear facilities. 26 Ohio St. 3d, at 111-112, 497 N. E. 2d, at 77-78. In dissent, Justice Wright agreed with Goodyear’s separate claim, not addressed by the majority, that in the absence of clearly expressed authorization from Congress, the Supremacy Clause barred the application of the state workers’ compensation safety requirements to a federally owned facility. Justice Wright argued that Congress had not provided the necessary clear authorization to justify the application of the Ohio workers’ compensation scheme. Id., at 112-115, 497 N. E. 2d, at 78-80. We noted probable jurisdiction of Goodyear’s appeal, 483 U. S. 1004 (1987), and now affirm the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on different reasoning. r-H l-H Although neither party contests our appellate jurisdiction over this case, we must independently determine as a threshold matter that we have jurisdiction. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 305-306 (1962). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2) gives this Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments by the highest court of a State where the validity of a state statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution and the decision is in favor of its validity. “[A] state statute is sustained within the meaning of § 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds.” Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441 (1979). In this case, the additional-award provision of Ohio’s workers’ compensation statute, as applied to the Portsmouth facility, was drawn in question on the ground that it violated the Supremacy Clause, and the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute’s application. The more difficult question is whether the judgment is “final” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), even though further proceedings are anticipated before the Ohio Industrial Commission. The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court requires that the Industrial Commission consider appellee’s claim that his injury was caused by a failure to comply with a state safety regulation. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975), we recognized four situations in which this Court views a judgment as final under § 1257(2) although further state proceedings are contemplated. In the fourth category are cases “where the federal issue has been finally decided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state proceedings still to come. In these circumstances, if a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal policy, the Court has entertained and decided the federal issue, which itself has been finally determined by the state courts for purposes of the state litigation.” Id., at 482-483. We believe the present case falls within this fourth category. The federal question whether the additional workers’ compensation award is barred by federal law has been finally determined by the Ohio Supreme Court, and a reversal of the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding would preclude any further proceedings. In addition, even if appellant prevails before the Industrial Commission on nonfederal grounds, for example, if the Commission determines that there was no violation of the state safety regulation, the unreviewed decision of the Ohio Supreme Court might seriously erode federal policy in the area of nuclear production. The federal pre-emption analysis of the Ohio court sanctions direct state regulation of nonradiological hazards at the Portsmouth facility, the only nuclear facility producing nuclear fuel for the Navy’s nuclear fleet. Moreover, the decision has important implications for the regulation of federally owned nuclear production facilities in other States. Following our “pragmatic approach” to the question of finality, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, supra, at 486, we therefore conclude that the Ohio decision on the federal issue is a final judgment for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). H-i I — I It is well settled that the activities of federal installations are shielded by the Supremacy Clause from direct state regulation unless Congress provides “clear and unambiguous” authorization for such regulation. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 211 (1976); accord, Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178-179 (1976); Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943). As an initial matter, therefore, we consider whether the federally owned Portsmouth facility is likewise shielded from direct state regulation even though the facility is operated by a private party under contract with the United States. We believe this question was answered in Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S., at 168, in which we faced the issue whether a State could enforce its pollution emission limitations against “federally owned or operated installations” by requiring that such installations obtain a state permit. One of the facilities at issue in Hancock was the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, which, like the Portsmouth facility, is a federally owned nuclear production facility operated by a private contractor. Id., at 174, n. 23. Nuclear production facilities such as the Paducah and Portsmouth plants are authorized by statute to carry out a federal mission, with federal property, under federal control. The Court struck down the permit requirement in Hancock, reasoning that without clear congressional authorization, “‘the federal function must be left free’ of [state] regulation.” Id., at 179, quoting Mayo v. United States, supra, at 447. Hancock thus establishes that a federally owned facility performing a federal function is shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such regulation. In this case, however, we are not presented with a direct state regulation of the operation of the Portsmouth facility. Rather, the case involves the imposition of a supplemental award of workers’ compensation, chargeable against Goodyear, for an injury caused by Goodyear’s failure to comply with a state safety regulation. Appellant and the Solicitor General argue that the application of the Ohio additional award provision is nonetheless tantamount to a regulation of the Portsmouth facility and is thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We need not decide this issue, however, for we conclude that even if the provision is sufficiently akin to direct regulation of the Portsmouth facility to be potentially barred by the Supremacy Clause, ch. 822, 49 Stat. 1938, 40 U. S. C. §290, provides the requisite clear congressional authorization for the application of the provision to workers at the Portsmouth facility. Section 290 provides in relevant part: “Whatsoever constituted authority of each of the several States is charged with the enforcement of and requiring compliances with the State workmen’s compensation laws of said States and with the enforcement of and requiring compliance with the orders, decisions, and awards of said constituted authority of said States shall have the power and authority to apply such laws to all lands and premises owned or held by the United States of America by deed or act of cession, by purchase or otherwise, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State and to all projects, buildings, constructions, improvements, and property belonging to the United States of America, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State, in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries such place may be.” Both appellant and the Solicitor General concede that the initial workers’ compensation award received by respondent Miller is authorized by § 290. They contend, however, that § 290 does not authorize the supplemental award provided in Ohio’s workers’ compensation law when an employer violates a specific state safety regulation. At bottom, appellant and the Solicitor General argue that the phrase “workmen’s compensation laws” in §290, which is not defined, was not intended to include the additional-award provision in Ohio’s workers’ compensation law. Appellant claims that in the absence of a precise definition, we should infer that Congress envisioned the typical workers’ compensation Act, under which workers are automatically entitled to certain benefits when they suffer a work-related injury, without regard to the employer’s fault. A State’s authority to enforce its workers’ compensation laws under § 290, appellant continues, should be limited to such standard awards. We do not believe appellant’s construction of § 290 can be squared with the statute’s language and history. Section 290 provides that a state authority charged with enforcing “workmen’s compensation laws,” which in Ohio is the Industrial Commission, “shall have the.power and authority to apply such laws” to federal premises “in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State.” This language places no express limitation on the type of workers’ compensation scheme that is authorized. On its face, §290 compels the same workers’ compensation award for an employee injured at a federally owned facility as the employee would receive if working for a wholly private facility. In addition, at the time of the passage of § 290 in 1936, workers’ compensation laws provided a wide variety of compensation schemes that do not fit neatly within appellant’s view of the “typical” scheme. At least 15 States provided remedies in addition to basic workers’ compensation awards when an employee was injured because of specified kinds of employer misconduct. Eight of these States, including Ohio, provided supplemental awards when the employer violated a specific safety regulation. We generally presume that Congress is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts. See Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 319-320 (1983). In the absence of affirmative evidence in the language or history of the statute, we are unwilling to assume that Congress was ignorant of the substantial number of States providing additional workers’ compensation awards when a state safety regulation was violated by the employer. Indeed, Congress appears to have recognized the diversity of workers’ compensation schemes when it provided that workers’ compensation would be awarded to workers on federal premises “in the same way and to the same extent” as provided by state law. The meaning of “workmen’s compensation laws” in §290, of course, is not infinitely elastic. We need not address the outer boundaries of that term in this case, however, because we believe it is clear that Congress intended Ohio’s law and others of its ilk, which were solidly entrenched at the time of the enactment of § 290, to apply to federal facilities “to the same extent” that they apply to private facilities within the State. The only evidence in the legislative history of §290 that appellant and the Solicitor General muster in support of their position is that Congress rejected a proposal that would have authorized States to apply state safety and insurance laws directly to federal projects. See S. Rep. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936). But Congress’ reluctance to allow direct state regulation of federal projects says little about whether Congress was likewise concerned with the incidental regulatory effects arising from the enforcement of a workers’ compensation law, like Ohio’s, that provides an additional award when the injury is caused by the breach of a safety regulation. The effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal projects are significantly more intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of such an additional award provision. Appellant may choose to disregard Ohio safety regulations and simply pay an additional workers’ compensation award if an employee’s injury is caused by a safety violation. We believe Congress may reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure is acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S., at 266 (Congress was willing to accept regulatory consequences of application of state tort law to radiation hazards even though direct state regulation of safety aspects of nuclear energy was pre-empted). Because the permission of incidental regulation is consistent with the preclusion of direct regulation, the legislative history relied on by appellant and the Solicitor General does not undermine the plain language of § 290. We conclude that the additional award provision of Ohio’s workers’ compensation law is unambiguously authorized by §290 and therefore does not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Ohio Supreme Court in this case failed to consider the fundamental distinction between state regulation of private facilities and state regulation of federal facilities. When dealing with state regulation of private facilities, analysis under the Supremacy Clause centers on whether Congress has taken affirmative action to pre-empt the state regulation in question. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 712-713 (1985). On the other hand, because the Supremacy Clause immunizes the activities of the Federal Government from state interference, Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 445 (1943), direct state regulation of federal facilities is allowed only to the extent that Congress has clearly authorized such regulation. With certain limited exceptions, the DOE, as agent of the United States, is the exclusive owner of all nuclear production facilities. See 42 U. S. C. § 2061(a); see also Department of Energy Organization Act, 91 Stat. 577, 42 U. S. C. § 7151(a) (transferring responsibility to DOE from the Energy Research and Development Administration). The DOE is authorized to contract with private parties to operate its facilities, but these private contractors are subject to the direction and supervision of the DOE. See 42 U. S. C. §2061(b); H. R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1954) (“In connection with its own production facilities, . . . the Commission is permitted to have the actual operation carried on by other persons under contract to it and under its direction and control”). This federal control over the production of nuclear material is an important aspect of federal nuclear energy policy. See 42 U. S. C. § 2013(c). Appellees and amici argue that Hancock should be read as applying only to situations in which the state regulation may act to prohibit the operation of the federally owned facility. Although Hancock involved a state regulation requiring an operating permit, the central issue presented was the power of the State to enforce its emissions regulations. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S., at 181. Under the Supremacy Clause, we discern no important difference between the authority to order compliance with state regulations and the authority to require a permit prior to operating a facility. In both settings the State is claiming the authority to dictate the manner in which the federal function is carried out. Although the language and history of § 290 indicate that it is addressed to federal enclaves, areas over which the United States has assumed exclusive jurisdiction under U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 17, see S. Rep. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), both appellant and the Solicitor General concede, and we agree, that it authorizes the application of workers’ compensation laws to federal facilities like the Portsmouth plant that are not federal enclaves. There is no doubt that the supplemental award provision is an integral part of the Ohio workers’ compensation statute. The provision was enacted in 1923 as an amendment to the existing workers’ compensation scheme. The amendment abolished the right to bring an action at law when the employer failed to comply with specific safety requirements and substituted the additional percentage award in the event of such a failure. State ex rel. Bailey v. Krise, 18 Ohio St. 2d 191, 195-197, 249 N. E. 2d 55, 58-59 (1969). See 1925 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 83, § 65 (option to sue if injury from employer’s “wilful misconduct”); 1917 Cal. Stats., ch. 586, § 6(b) (50% increase in compensation, not to exceed $2,500, if injury caused by serious and willful misconduct of employer); 1916 Ky. Acts, ch. 33, §§ 3, 29 (option to sue for intentional injury and 15% increase for intentional failure to comply with statute); 1911 Mass. Acts, ch. 751, pt. 2, § 3 (100% increase if injury caused by employer’s serious and willful misconduct); 1925 Mo. Laws, § 3 (15% increase for failure to comply with any statute); 1929 N. M. Laws, ch. 113, § 7 (50% increase if employer fails to provide safety devices required by law); 1929 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 120, § 13 (10% increase for willful failure to comply with any statutory requirement); Ohio Const., Art. 2, § 35 (15% to 50% increase for violation of specific safety requirement); 1921 Ore. Laws, ch. 311, § 6 (option to sue for intentional injury by employer); 1936 S. C. Acts, No. 610, § 13 (10% increase for willful failure to comply with statute); 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 103, § 5 (option to sue for “willful act or omission” or “gross negligence” of employer); 1921 Utah Laws, eh. 67, § 1 (15% increase for willful failure to comply with any statute); 1911 Wash. Laws, ch. 74, § 6 (option to sue for intentional injury); 1913 W. Va. Acts, ch. 10, §28 (option to sue for intentional injury); 1915 Wis. Laws, ch. 378, § l{h) (15% increase for violation of statute); see also 2A A. Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation §69.10 (1987). See 1916 Ky. Acts, ch. 33, § 29; 1925 Mo. Laws § 3; 1929 N. M. Laws, ch. 113, § 7; 1929 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 120, § 13; Ohio Const., Art. II, §35; 1936 S. C. Acts, No. 610, § 13; 1921 Utah Laws, ch. 67, § 1; 1915 Wis. Laws, ch. 378, § 1 (h). For the present versions of these laws, see Ky. Rev. Stat. §342.165 (1983); Mo. Rev. Stat. §287.120(4) (1986); N. M. Stat. Ann. §52-1-10(B) (1978); N. C. Gen. Stat. §97-12 (1985); Ohio Const., Art. II, §35; S. C. Code §42-9-70 (1976); Utah Code Ann. §35-1-12 (1953); Wis. Stat. § 102.57 (1985-1986). Prior to enacting § 290, Congress had authorized recovery of damages under state tort law by persons injured or killed on federal enclaves. See ch. 15, 45 Stat. 54, 16 U. S. C. § 457. Thus, at the time § 290 was enacted, Congress already had evinced a willingness to have state law exert incidental regulatory pressures on federal facilities. Appellant also argues that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), and the DOE’s health and safety regulations promulgated under the 1954 Act, pre-empt the award of additional compensation based on state health and safety regulations. Nothing in the 1954 Act, however, expresses an intent to repeal § 290 as applied to nuclear production facilities, nor can we read the 1954 Act as implicitly repealing § 290 because the two are not inconsistent. Section 290 is therefore as effective an authorization to apply state workers’ compensation laws after the passage of the 1954 Act as before.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. TOWN & COUNTRY ELECTRIC, INC., et al. No. 94-947. Argued October 10,1995 Decided November 28, 1995 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Paul A. Engelmayer, Linda Sher, Norton J. Come, Peter Winkler, and John Emad Arbab. James K. Pease, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Town & Country Electric, Inc., was Douglas E. Witte. Stephen D. Gordon, Laurence Gold, Laurence J. Cohen, Marsha S. Berzon, Mary Lynne Werlwas, and Scott A. Kronland filed briefs for respondent union. Steven R. Shapiro and Alan Hyde filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al. by Maurice Baskin, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the Associated General Contractors of America by Joe F. Canterbury, Jr., Frederic Gover, and Michael E. Kennedy; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Marshall B. Babson, Stanley R. Strauss, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Mona C. Zeiberg; and for the Labor Policy Association by Robert E. Williams and Daniel V. Yager. Michael T. Manley, G. Gordon Atcheson, John J. Blake, and Michael J. Stapp filed a brief for the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, CFL, as amicus curiae. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Can a worker be a company’s “employee,” within the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., if, at the same time, a union pays that worker to help the union organize the company? We agree with the National Labor Relations Board that the answer is “yes.” I The relevant background is the following: Town & Country Electric, Inc., a nonunion electrical contractor, wanted to hire several licensed Minnesota electricians for construction work in Minnesota. Town & Country (through an employment agency) advertised for job applicants, but it refused to interview 10 of 11 union applicants (including two professional union staff) who responded to the advertisement. Its employment agency hired the one union applicant whom Town & Country interviewed, but he was dismissed after only a few days on the job. The members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Locals 292 and 343 (Union), filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country and the employment agency had refused to interview (or retain) them because of their union membership. See National Labor Relations Act (Act) §§ 8(a)(1) and (3), 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3) (1988 ed.). An Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Union members, and the Board affirmed that ruling. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N. L. R. B. 1250,1258 (1992). In the course of its decision, the Board determined that all 11 job applicants (including the two Union officials and the one member briefly hired) were “employees” as the Act defines that word. Ibid. The Board recognized that under well-established law, it made no difference that the 10 members who were simply applicants were never hired. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 185-186 (1941) (statutory word “employee” includes job applicants, for otherwise the Act’s prohibition of “ ‘discrimination in regard to hire’” would “serve no function”). Neither, in the Board’s view, did it matter (with respect to the meaning of the word “employee”) that the Union members intended to try to organize the company if they secured the advertised jobs, nor that the Union would pay them while they set about their organizing. The Board then rejected the company’s fact-based explanations for its refusals to interview or to retain these 11 “employees” and held that the company had committed “unfair labor practices” by discriminating on the basis of union membership. Town & Country Elec., supra, at 1250, n. 3, 1256, 1258. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board. It held that the Board had incorrectly interpreted the statutory word “employee.” In the court’s view, that key word does not cover (and therefore the Act does not protect from antiunion discrimination) those who work for a company while a union simultaneously pays them to organize that company. 34 F. 3d 625, 629 (1994). See also H. B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA4 1989). For this threshold reason the court refused to enforce the Board’s order. Because other Circuits have interpreted the word “employee” differently, see, e. g., Willmar Elec. Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F. 2d 1327, 1330-1331 (CADC 1992) (paid union organizers can be “employees” protected by the Act), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 909 (1993); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F. 2d 26, 30 (CA2 1979) (same), we granted certiorari. We now resolve the conflict in the Board’s favor. II The Act seeks to improve labor relations (“eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce,” 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1988 ed.)) in large part by granting specific sets of rights to employers and to employees. This case grows out of a controversy about rights that the Act grants to “employees,” namely, rights “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” § 157. We granted certiorari to decide only that part of the controversy that focuses upon the meaning of the word “employee,” a key term in the statute, since these rights belong only to those workers who qualify as “employees” as that term is defined in the Act. See, e. g., § 158(a)(1) (“unfair labor practice” to “interfere with . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title”) (emphasis added). The relevant statutory language is the following: “The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.” § 152(3) (emphasis added). We must specifically decide whether the Board may lawfully interpret this language to include company workers who are also paid union organizers. We put the question in terms of the Board’s lawful authority because this Court’s decisions recognize that the Board often possesses a degree of legal leeway when it interprets its governing statute, particularly where Congress likely intended an understanding of labor relations to guide the Act’s application. See, e. g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 891 (1984) (interpretations of the Board, the agency that Congress “ ‘created ... to administer the Act,’ ” will be upheld if “reasonably defensible”) (internal citation omitted); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U. S. 775, 786 (1990) (Congress delegated to the Board “primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy”); ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U. S. 317, 324 (1994) (the Board’s views are entitled to “the greatest deference”). See also Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). We add, however, that the Board needs very little legal leeway here to convince us of the correctness of its decision. Several strong general arguments favor the Board’s position. For one thing, the Board’s decision is consistent with the broad language of the Act itself — language that is broad enough to include those company workers whom a union also pays for organizing. The ordinary dictionary definition of “employee” includes any “person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation.” American Heritage Dictionary 604 (3d ed. 1992). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990) (an employee is a “person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed”). The phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of the ordinary dictionary definition, for it says “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee.” 29 U. S. C. § 152(3) (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). Of course, the Act’s definition also contains a list of exceptions, for example, for independent contractors, agricultural laborers, domestic workers, and employees subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; but no exception applies here. For another thing, the Board’s broad, literal interpretation of the word “employee” is consistent with several of the Act’s purposes, such as protecting “the right of employees to organize for mutual aid without employer interference,” Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 798 (1945); see also 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1988 ed.); and “encouraging and protecting the collective-bargaining process.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at 892. And, insofar as one can infer purpose from congressional reports and floor statements, those sources too are consistent with the Board’s broad interpretation of the word. It is fairly easy to find statements to the effect that an “employee” simply “means someone who works for another for hire,” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947), and includes “every man on a payroll,” 79 Cong. Rec. 9686 (1935) (colloquy between Reps. Taylor and Connery). See also S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1935) (referring to an employee as a “worker”); H. R. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1935) (same); H. R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1935) (same); H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1935) (same). At the same time, contrary statements, suggesting a narrow or qualified view of the word, are scarce, or nonexistent — except, of course, those made in respect to the specific (here inapplicable) exclusions written into the statute. Further, a broad, literal reading of the statute is consistent with cases in this Court such as, say, Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, supra (the Act covers undocumented aliens), where the Court wrote that the “breadth of §2(3)’s definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to 'any employee.’” 467 U. S., at 891. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U. S. 170, 189-190 (1981) (certain “confidential employees” fall within the definition of “employees”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S., at 185-186 (job applicants are “employees”). Cf. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 166 (1971) (retired persons are not “employees” because they do not “work for another for hire”). See also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 131-132 (1944) (independent contractor-like newsboys are “employees”); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 488-490 (1947) (company foremen are “employees”). But see 61 Stat. 137-138, 29 U. S. C. § 152(3) (1988 ed.) (amending Act to overrule Hearst and Packard by explicitly excluding independent contractors and supervisory employees). Finally, at least one other provision of the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act seems specifically to contemplate the possibility that a company’s employee might also work for a union. This provision forbids an employer (say, the company) to make payments to a person employed by a union, but simultaneously exempts from that ban wages paid by the company to “any ... employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee” of the company. 29 U. S. C. § 186(c)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). If Town & Country is right, there would not seem to be many (or any) human beings to which this last phrase could apply. Ill Town & Country believes that it can overcome these general considerations, favoring a broad, literal interpretation of the Act, through an argument that rests primarily upon the common law of agency. It first argues that our prior decisions resort to common-law principles in defining the term “employee.” See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U. S. 318, 323 (1992) (using common-law test to distinguish between “employee” and “independent contractor” under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 739-740 (1989) (using common-law test to distinguish between “employee” and “independent contractor” under Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. §101 et seq.); NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U. S. 254, 256 (1968) (using common-law test to distinguish between “employee” and “independent contractor” under NLRA). And it also points out that the Board itself, in its decision, found “no bar to applying common law agency principles to the determination whether a paid union organizer is an ‘employee,’” Town & Country Elec., Inc., 309 N. L. R. B., at 1254. Town & Country goes on to argue that application of common-law agency principles requires an interpretation of “employee” that excludes paid union organizers. It points to a section of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (dealing with respondeat superior liability for torts), which says: “Since ... the relation of master and servant is dependent upon the right of the master to control the conduct of the servant in the performance of the service, giving service to two masters at the same time normally involves a breach of duty by the servant to one or both of them .... [A person] cannot be a servant of two masters in doing an act as to which an intent to serve one necessarily excludes an intent to serve the other.” Restatement (Second) of Agency §226, Comment a, p. 499 (1957). It argues that, when the paid union organizer serves the union — at least at certain times in certain ways — the organizer is acting adversely to the company. Indeed, it says, the organizer may stand ready to desert the company upon request by the union, in which case, the union, not the company, would have “the right... to control the conduct of the servant.” Ibid. Thus, it concludes, the worker must be the servant (i. e., the “employee”) of the union alone. See id., § 1, and Comment a, p. 8 (“agent” is one who agrees to act “subject to [a principal’s] control”). As Town & Country correctly notes, in the context of reviewing lower courts’ interpretations of statutory terms, we have said on several occasions that when Congress uses the term “employee” in a statute that does not define the term, courts interpreting the statute “ ‘must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of th[at] ter[m] .... In the past, when Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.’” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, supra, at 322-323 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, supra, at 739-740). At the same time, when reviewing the Board’s interpretation of the term “employee” as it is used in the Act, we have repeatedly said that “[s]inee the task of defining the term ‘employee’ is one that ‘has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,’ . . . the Board’s construction of that term is entitled to considerable deference . . . .” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S., at 891 (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., supra, at 130); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U. S., at 177-190. In some cases, there may be a question about whether the Board’s departure from the common law of agency with respect to particular questions and in a particular statutory context, renders its interpretation unreasonable. See NLRB v. United Ins. Co., supra, at 256 (“independent contractor” exclusion). But no such question is presented here since the Board’s interpretation of the term “employee” is consistent with the common law. Town & Country’s common-law argument fails, quite simply, because, in our view, the Board correctly found that it lacks sufficient support in common law. The Restatement’s hornbook rule (to which the quoted commentary is appended) says that a “person may be the servant of two masters ... at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other.” Restatement (Second) of Agency §226, at 498 (emphasis added). The Board, in quoting this rule, concluded that service to the union for pay does not “involve abandonment of... service” to the company. 309 N. L. R. B., at 1254. And, that conclusion seems correct. Common sense suggests that as a worker goes about his or her ordinary tasks during a working day, say, wiring sockets or laying cable, he or she is subject to the control of the company employer, whether or not the union also pays the worker. The company, the worker, the union, all would expect that to be so. And, that being so, that union and company interests or control might sometimes differ should make no difference. As Prof. Seavey pointed out many years ago, “[o]ne can be a servant of one person for some acts and the servant of another person for other acts, even when done at the same time,” for example, where “a city detective, in search of clues, finds employment as a waiter and, while serving the meals, searches the customer’s pockets.” W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency § 85, p. 146 (1964). The detective is the servant both “of the restaurateur” (as to the table waiting) and “of the city” (as to the pocket searching). Ibid. How does it differ from Prof. Seavey’s example for the company to pay the worker for electrical work, and the union to pay him for organizing? Moreover, union organizers may limit their organizing to nonwork hours. See, e. g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945); Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 492-493 (1978). If so, union organizing, when done for pay but during nonwork hours, would seem equivalent to simple moonlighting, a practice wholly consistent with a company’s control over its workers as to their assigned duties. Town & Country’s “abandonment” argument is yet weaker insofar as the activity that constitutes an “abandonment,” i. e., ordinary union organizing activity, is itself specifically protected by the Act. See, e. g., ibid, (employer restrictions on union solicitation during nonworking time in nonworking areas are presumptively invalid under the Act). This is true even if a company perceives those protected activities as disloyal. After all, the employer has no legal right to require that, as part of his or her service to the company, a worker refrain from engaging in protected activity. Neither are we convinced by the practical considerations that Town & Country adds to its agency law argument. The company refers to a Union resolution permitting members to work for nonunion firms, which, the company says, reflects a union effort to “salt” nonunion companies with union members seeking to organize them. Supported by amici curiae, it argues that “salts” might try to harm the company, perhaps quitting when the company needs them, perhaps disparaging the company to others, perhaps even sabotaging the firm or its products. Therefore, the company concludes, Congress could not have meant paid union organizers to have been included as “employees” under the Act. This practical argument suffers from several serious problems. For one thing, nothing in this record suggests that such acts of disloyalty were present, in kind or degree, to the point where the company might lose control over the worker’s normal workplace tasks. Certainly the Union’s resolution contains nothing that suggests, requires, encourages, or condones impermissible or unlawful activity. App. 256-258. For another thing, the argument proves too much. If a paid union organizer might quit, leaving a company employer in the lurch, so too might an unpaid organizer, or a worker who has found a better job, or one whose family wants to move elsewhere. And if an overly zealous union organizer might hurt the company through unlawful acts, so might another unpaid zealot (who may know less about the law), or a dissatisfied worker (who may lack an outlet for his or her grievances). This does not mean they are not “employees.” Further, the law offers alternative remedies for Town & Country’s concerns, short of excluding paid or unpaid union organizers from all protection under the Act. For example, a company disturbed by legal but undesirable activity, such as quitting without notice, can offer its employees fixed-term contracts, rather than hiring them “at will” as in the case before us; or it can negotiate with its workers for a notice period. A company faced with unlawful (or possibly unlawful) activity can discipline or dismiss the worker, file a complaint with the Board, or notify law enforcement authorities. See, e. g., NLRB v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464, 472-478 (1953); Willmar Elec. Service v. NLRB, 968 F. 2d, at 1330 (arsonist who is also union member is still an “employee,” but may be discharged). See also Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F. 2d 86, 89-90 (CA3 1943) (worker who was intoxicated while on duty, “came to work when he chose and ... left the plant and his shift as he pleased,” and utterly failed to perform his assigned duties is still an “employee” protected under the Act), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 778 (1944). And, of course, an employer may as a rule limit the access of nonemployee union organizers to company property. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 538 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956). This is not to say that the law treats paid union organizers like other company employees in every labor law context. For instance, the Board states that, at least sometimes, a paid organizer may not share a sufficient “community of interest” with other employees (as to wages, hours, and working conditions) to warrant inclusion in the same bargaining unit. Brief for National Labor Relations Board 33, n. 14. See, e. g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U. S., at 190 (some confidential workers, although “employees,” may be excluded from bargaining unit). We need not decide this matter. Nor do we express any view about any of the other matters Town & Country raised before the Court of Appeals, such as whether or not Town & Country’s conduct (in refusing to interview, or to retain, “employees” who were on the union’s payroll) amounted to an unfair labor practice. See 34 F. 3d, at 629. We hold only that the Board’s construction of the word “employee” is lawful; that term does not exclude paid union organizers. IV For these reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FLORA v. UNITED STATES. No. 492, October Term, 1957. Argued May 20, 1958. Decided June 16,1958. Rehearing granted June 22, 1959. -Reargued November 12, 1959. Decided March 21, 1960. Randolph W. Thrower reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief on reargument were A. G. McClin-tock, William A. Sutherland and George L. Cohen. Assistant Attorney General Rice reargued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief on reargument were Solicitor General Rankin, Harry Baum and Marvin W. Weinstein. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a Federal District Court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(1) of a suit by a taxpayer for the refund of income tax payments which did not discharge the entire amount of his assessment. This is our second consideration of the case. In the 1957 Term, we decided that full payment of the assessment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, 357 U. S. 63. Subsequently the Court granted a petition for rehearing. 360 U. S. 922. The case has been exhaustively briefed and ably argued. After giving the problem our most careful attention, we have concluded that our original disposition of the case was correct. Under such circumstances, normally a brief epilogue to the prior opinion would be sufficient to account for our decision. However, because petitioner in reargument has placed somewhat greater emphasis upon certain contentions than he had previously, and because our dissenting colleagues have elaborated upon the reasons for their disagreement, we deem it advisable to set forth our reasoning in some detail, even though this necessitates repeating much of what we have already said. The Facts. The relevant facts are undisputed and uncomplicated. This litigation had its source in a dispute between petitioner and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concerning the proper characterization of certain losses which petitioner suffered during 1950. Petitioner reported them as ordinary losses, but the Commissioner treated them as capital losses and levied a deficiency assessment in the amount of $28,908.60, including interest. Petitioner paid $5,058.54 and then filed with the Commissioner a claim for refund of that amount. After the claim was disallowed, petitioner sued for refund in a District Court. The Government moved to dismiss, and the judge decided that the petitioner “should not maintain” the action because he had not paid the full amount of the assessment. But since there was a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on this jurisdictional question, and since the Tenth Circuit had not yet passed upon it, the judge believed it desirable to determine the merits of the claim. He thereupon concluded that the losses were capital in nature and entered judgment in favor of the Government. 142 F. Supp. 602. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district judge upon the jurisdictional issue, and consequently remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint. 246 F. 2d 929. We granted certiorari because the Courts of Appeals were in conflict with respect to a question which is of considerable importance in the administration of the tax laws. The Statute. The question raised in this case has not only raised a conflict in the federal decisions, but has also in recent years provoked controversy among legal commentators. In view of this divergence of expert opinion, it would be surprising if the words of the statute inexorably dictated but a single reasonable conclusion. Nevertheless, one of the arguments which has been most strenuously urged is that the plain language of the statute precludes, or at the very least strongly militates against, a decision that full payment of the .income tax assessment is a jurisdictional condition precedent to maintenance of a refund suit in a District Court. If this were true, presumably we could but recite the statute and enter judgment for petitioner— though we might be pardoned some perplexity as to how such a simple matter could have caused so much confusion. Regrettably, this facile an approach will not serve. Section 1346 (a)(1) provides that the District Courts shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of “(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws . . . (Emphasis added.) It is clear enough that the phrase “any internal-revenue tax” can readily be construed to refer to payment of the entire amount of an assessment. Such an interpretation is suggested by the nature of the income tax, which is “A tax . . . imposed for each taxable year,” with the “amount of the tax” determined in accordance with prescribed schedules. (Emphasis added.) But it is argued that this reading of the statute is foreclosed by the presence in § 1346 (a)(1) of the phrase “any sum.” This contention appears to be based upon the notion that “any sum” is a catchall which confers jurisdiction to adjudicate suits for refund of part of a tax. A catchall the phrase surely is; but to say this is not to define what it catches. The sweeping role which petitioner assigns these words is based upon a conjunctive reading of “any internal-revenue tax,” “any penalty,” and “any sum.” But we believe that the statute more readily lends itself to the disjunctive reading which is suggested by the connective “or.” That is, “any sum,” instead of being related to “any internal-revenue tax” and “any penalty,” may refer to amounts which are neither taxes nor penalties. Under this interpretation, the function of the phrase is to permit suit for recovery of items which might not be designated as either “taxes” or “penalties” by Congress or the courts. One obvious example of such a “sum” is interest. And it is significant that many old tax statutes described the amount which was to be assessed under certain circumstances as a “sum” to be added to the tax, simply as a “sum,” as a “percentum,” or as “costs.” Such a rendition of the statute, which is supported by precedent, frees the phrase “any internal-revenue tax” from the qualifications imposed upon it by petitioner and permits it to be given what we regard as its more natural reading — the full tax. Moreover, this construction, under which each phrase is assigned a distinct meaning, imputes to Congress a surer grammatical touch than does the alternative interpretation, under which the “any sum” phrase completely assimilates the other two. Surely a much clearer statute could have been written to authorize suits for refund of any part of a tax merely by use of the phrase “a tax or any portion thereof,” or simply “any sum paid under the internal revenue laws.” This Court naturally does not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; but neither do we regard ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant to a construction of those enactments. Cf. Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U. S. 87. We conclude that the language of § 1346 (a)(1) can be more readily construed to require payment of the full tax before suit than to permit suit for recovery of a part payment. But, as we recognized in the prior opinion, the statutory language is not absolutely controlling, and consequently resort must be had to whatever other materials might be relevant. Legislative History and Historical Background. Although frequently the legislative history of a statute is the most fruitful source of instruction as to its proper interpretation, in this case that history is barren of any clue to congressional intent. The precursor of § 1346 (a)(1) was § 1310 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1921, in which the language with which we are here concerned appeared for the first time in a jurisdictional statute. Section 1310 (c) had an overt purpose unrelated to the question whether full payment of an assessed tax was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit for refund. Prior to 1921, tax refund suits against the United States could be maintained in the District Courts under the authority of the Tucker Act, which had been passed in 1887. Where the claim exceeded $10,000, however, such a suit could not be brought, and in such a situation the taxpayer’s remedy in District Court was against the Collector. But because the Collector had to be sued personally, no District Court action was available if he was deceased. The 1921 provision, which was an amendment to the Tucker Act, was explicitly designed to permit taxpayers to sue the United States in the District Courts for sums exceeding $10,000 where the Collector had died. The ancestry of the language of § 1346 (a)(1) is no more enlightening than is the legislative history of the 1921 provision. This language, which, as we have stated, appeared in substantially its present form in the 1921 amendment, was apparently taken from R. S. § 3226 (1878). But § 3226 was not a jurisdictional statute at all; it simply specified that suits for recovery of taxes, penalties, or sums could not be maintained until after a claim for refund had been submitted to the Commissioner. Thus there is presented a vexing situation — statutory language which is inconclusive and legislative history which is irrelevant. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that § 1346 (a) (1) expresses no congressional intent with respect to the issue before the Court; but it does make that intent uncommonly difficult to divine. It is argued, however, that the puzzle may be solved through consideration of the historical basis of a suit to recover a tax illegally assessed. The argument proceeds as follows: A suit to recover taxes could, before the Tucker Act, be brought only against the Collector. Such a suit was based upon the common-law count of assumpsit for money had and received, and the nature of that count requires the inference that a suit for recovery of part payment of a tax could have been maintained. Neither the Tucker Act nor the 1921 amendment indicates an intent to change the nature of the refund action in any pertinent respect. Consequently, there is no warrant for importing into § 1346 (a)(1) a full-payment requirement. For reasons which will appear later, we believe that the conclusion would not follow even if the premises were clearly sound. But in addition we have substantial doubt about the validity of the premises. As we have already indicated, the language of the 1921 amendment does in fact tend to indicate a congressional purpose to require full payment as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit for refund. Moreover, we are not satisfied that the suit against the Collector was identical to the common-law action of assumpsit for money had and received. One difficulty is that, because of the Act of February 26, 1845, c. 22, 5 Stat. 727, which restored the right of action against the Collector after this Court had held that it had been implicitly eliminated by other legislation, the Court no longer regarded the suit as a common-law action, but rather as a statutory remedy which “in its nature [was] a remedy against the Government.” Curtis’s Administratrix v. Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479. On the other hand, it is true that none of the statutes relating to this type of suit clearly indicate a congressional intention to require full payment of the assessed tax before suit. Nevertheless, the opinion of this Court in Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S. 85, prevents us from accepting the analogy between the statutory action against the Collector and the common-law count. In this 1875 opinion, the Court described the remedies available to taxpayers as follows: “So also, in the internal-revenue department, the statute which we have copied allows appeals from the assessor to the commissioner of internal revenue ; and, if dissatisfied with his decision, on paying the tax the party can sue the collector; and, if the money was wrongfully exacted, the courts will give him relief by a judgment, which the United States pledges herself to pay. “. . . While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the general government has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed. ... If the compliance with this condition [that appeal must be made to the Commissioner and suit brought within six months of his decision] requires the party aggrieved to pay the money, he must do it. He cannot, after the decision is rendered against him, protract the time within which he can contest that decision in the courts by his own delay in paying the money. It is essential to the honor and orderly conduct of the government that its taxes should be promptly paid, and drawbacks speedily adjusted; and the rule prescribed in this class of cases is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. . . . “The objecting party can take his appeal. He can, if the decision is delayed beyond twelve months, rest his case on that decision; or he can pay the amount claimed, and commence his suit at any time within that period. So, after the decision, he can pay at once, and commence suit within the six months . . . .” 92 U. S., at 88-89. (Emphasis added.) Reargument has not changed our view that this language reflects an understanding that full payment of the tax was a prerequisite to suit. Of course, as stated in our prior opinion, the Cheatham statement is dictum; but we reiterate that it appears to us to be “carefully considered dictum.” 357 U. S., at 68. Equally important is the fact that the Court was construing the claim-for-refund statute from which, as amended, the language of § 1346 (a)(1) was presumably taken. Thus it seems that in Cheatham the Supreme Court interpreted this language not only to specify which claims for refund must first be presented for administrative reconsideration, but also to constitute an additional qualification upon the statutory right to sue the Collector. It is true that the version of the provision involved in Cheatham contained only the phrase “any tax.” But the phrases “any penalty” and “any sum” were added well before the decision in Cheatham; the history of these amendments makes it quite clear that they were not designed to effect any change relevant to the Cheatham rule; language in opinions of this Court after Cheatham is consistent with the Cheatham statement; and in any event, as we have indicated, we can see nothing in these additional words which would negate the full-payment requirement. If this were all the material relevant to a construction of § 1346 (a)(1), determination of the issue at bar would be inordinately difficult. Favoring petitioner would be the theory that, in the early nineteenth century, a suit for recovery of part payment of an assessment could be maintained against the Collector, together with the absence of any conclusive evidence that Congress has ever intended to inaugurate a new rule; favoring respondent would be the Cheatham statement and the language of the 1921 statute. There are, however, additional factors which are dispositive. We are not here concerned with a single sentence in an isolated statute, but rather with a jurisdictional provision which is a keystone in a carefully articulated and quite complicated structure of tax laws. From these related statutes, all of which were passed after 1921, it is apparent that Congress has several times acted upon the assumption that § 1346 (a)(1) requires full payment before suit. Of course, if the clear purpose of Congress at any time had been to permit suit to recover a part payment, this subsequent legislation would have to be disregarded. But, as we have stated, the evidence pertaining to this intent is extremely weak, and we are convinced that it is entirely too insubstantial to justify destroying the existing harmony of the tax statutes. The laws which we consider especially pertinent are the statute establishing the Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court), the Declaratory Judgment Act, and § 7422 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Board of Tax Appeals. The Board of Tax Appeals was established by Congress in 1924 to permit taxpayers to secure a determination of tax liability before payment of the deficiency. The Government argues that the Congress which passed this 1924 legislation thought full payment of the tax assessed was a condition for bringing suit in a District Court; that Congress believed this sometimes caused hardship; and that Congress set up the Board to alleviate that hardship. Petitioner denies this, and contends that Congress’ sole purpose was to enable taxpayers to prevent the Government from collecting taxes by exercise of its power of distraint. We believe that the legislative history surrounding both the creation of the Board and the subsequent revisions of the basic statute supports the Government. The House Committee Report, for example, explained the purpose of the bill as follows: “The committee recommends the establishment of a Board of Tax Appeals to which a taxpayer may appeal prior to the payment of an additional assessment of income, excess-profits, war-profits, or estate taxes. Although a taxpayer may, after payment of his tax, bring suit for the recovery thereof and thus secure a judicial determination on the questions involved, he can not, in view of section 3224 of the Revised Statutes, which prohibits suits to enjoin the collection of taxes, secure such a determination prior to the payment of the tax. The right of appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect assessment. The payment of a large additional tax on income received several years previous and which may have, since its receipt, been either wiped out by subsequent losses, invested in nonliquid assets, or spent, sometimes forces taxpayers into bankruptcy, and often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These results are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for the recovery of the tax after this payment. He is entitled to an appeal and to a determination of his liability for the tax prior to its payment.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, throughout the congressional debates are to be found frequent expressions of the principle that payment of the full tax was a precondition to suit: “pay his tax . . . then . . . file a claim for refund”; “pay the tax and then sue”; “a review in the courts after payment of the tax”; “he may still seek court review, but he must first pay the tax assessed”; “in order to go to court he must pay his assessment”; “he must pay it [his assessment] before he can have a trial in court”; “pay the taxes adjudicated against him, and then commence a suit in a court”; “pay the tax . . . [t]hen . . . sue to get it back”; “paying his tax and bringing his suit”; “first pay his tax and then sue to get it back”; “take his case to the district court — conditioned, of course, upon his paying the assessment.” Petitioner’s argument falls under the weight of this evidence. It is true, of course, that the Board of Tax Appeals procedure has the effect of staying collection, and it may well be that Congress so provided in order to alleviate hardships caused by the long-standing bar against suits to enjoin the collection of taxes. But it is a considerable leap to the further conclusion that amelioration of the hardship of prelitigation payment as a jurisdictional requirement was not another important motivation for Congress' action. To reconcile the legislative history with this conclusion seems to require the presumption that all the Congressmen who spoke of payment of the assessment before suit as a hardship understood — without saying — that suit could be brought for whatever part of the assessment had been paid, but believed that, as a practical matter, hardship would nonetheless arise because the Government would require payment of the balance of the tax by exercising its power of distraint. But if this was in fact the view of these legislators, it is indeed extraordinary that they did not say so. Moreover, if Congress’ only concern was to prevent dis-traint, it is somewhat difficult to understand why Congress did not simply authorize injunction suits. It is interesting to note in this connection that bills to permit the same type of prepayment litigation in the District Courts as is possible in the Tax Court have been introduced several times, but none has ever been adopted. In sum, even assuming that one purpose of Congress in establishing the Board was to permit taxpayers to avoid distraint, it seems evident that another purpose was to furnish a forum where full payment of the assessment would not be a condition precedent to suit. The result is a system in which there is one tribunal for prepayment litigation and another for post-payment litigation, with no room contemplated for a hybrid of the type proposed by petitioner. The Declaratory Judgment Act. The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 was amended by § 405 of the Revenue Act of 1935 expressly to except disputes “with respect to Federal taxes.” The Senate Report explained the purpose of the amendment as follows : “Your committee has added an amendment making it clear that the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act of June 14, 1934, has no application to Federal taxes. The application of the Declaratory Judgments Act to taxes would constitute a radical departure from the long-continued policy of Congress (as expressed in Rev. Stat. 3224 and other provisions) with respect to the determination, assessment, and collection of Federal taxes. Your committee believes that the orderly and prompt determination and collection of Federal taxes should not be interfered with by a procedure designed to facilitate the settlement of private controversies, and that existing procedure both in the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts affords ample remedies for the correction of tax errors.” (Emphasis added.) It is clear enough that one “radical departure” which was averted by the amendment was the potential circumvention of the “pay first and litigate later” rule by way of suits for declaratory judgments in tax cases. Petitioner would have us give this Court’s imprimatur to precisely the same type of “radical departure,” since a suit for recovery of but a part of an assessment would determine the legality of the balance by operation of the principle of collateral estoppel. With respect to this unpaid portion, the taxpayer would be securing what is in effect — even though not technically — a declaratory judgment. The frustration of congressional intent which petitioner asks us to endorse could hardly be more glaring, for he has conceded that his argument leads logically to the conclusion that payment of even $1 on a large assessment entitles the taxpayer to sue — a concession amply warranted by the obvious impracticality of any judicially created jurisdictional standard midway between full payment and any payment. Section 7422 (e) of the 1954 Code. One distinct possibility which would emerge from a decision in favor of petitioner would be that a taxpayer might be able to split his cause of action, bringing suit for refund of part of the tax in a Federal District Court and litigating in the Tax Court with respect to the remainder. In such a situation the first decision would, of course, control. Thus if for any reason a litigant would prefer a District Court adjudication, he might sue for a small portion of the tax in that tribunal while at the same time protecting the balance from distraint by invoking the protection of the Tax Court procedure. On the other hand, different questions would arise if this device were not employed. For example, would the Government be required to file a compulsory counterclaim for the unpaid balance in District Court under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? If so, which party would have the burden of proof? Section 7422 (e) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code makes it apparent that Congress has assumed these problems are nonexistent except in the rare case where the taxpayer brings suit in a District Court and the Commissioner then notifies him of an additional deficiency. Under § 7422 (e) such a claimant is given the option of pursuing his suit in the District Court or in the Tax Court, but he cannot litigate in both. Moreover, if he decides to remain in the District Court, the Government may — but seemingly is not required to — bring a counterclaim; and if it does, the taxpayer has the burden of proof. If we were to overturn the assumption upon which Congress has acted, we would generate upon a broad scale the very problems Congress believed it had solved. These, then, are the basic reasons for our decision, and our views would be unaffected by the constancy or inconstancy of administrative practice. However, because the petition for rehearing in this case focused almost exclusively upon a single clause in the prior opinion — “there does not appear to be a single case before 1940 in which a taxpayer attempted a suit for refund of income taxes without paying the full amount the Government alleged to be due,” 357 U. S., at 69 — we feel obliged to comment upon the material introduced upon reargument. The reargument has, if anything, strengthened, rather than weakened, the substance of this statement, which was directed to the question whether there has been a consistent understanding of the “pay first and litigate later” principle by the interested government agencies and by the bar. So far as appears, Suhr v. United States, 18 F. 2d 81, decided by the Third Circuit in 1927, is the earliest case in which a taxpayer in a refund action sought to contest an assessment without having paid the full amount then due. In holding that the District Court had no jurisdiction of the action, the Court of Appeals said: “None of the various tax acts provide for recourse to the courts by a taxpayer until he has failed to get relief from the proper administrative body or has paid all the taxes assessed against him. The payment of a part does not confer jurisdiction upon the courts. . . . There is no provision for refund to the taxpayer of any excess payment of any installment or part of his tax, if the whole tax for the year has not been paid.” Id., at 83. Although the statement by the court might have been dictum, it was in accord with substantially contemporaneous statements by Secretary of the Treasury A. W. Mellon, by Under Secretary of the Treasury Garrard B. Winston, by the first Chairman of the Board of Tax Appeals, Charles D. Hamel, and by legal commentators. There is strong circumstantial evidence that this view of the jurisdiction of the courts was shared by the bar at least until 1940, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s position in Coates v. United States, 111 F. 2d 609. Out of the many thousands of refund cases litigated in the pre-1940 period — the Government reports that there have been approximately 40,000 such suits in the past 40 years — exhaustive research has uncovered only nine suits in which the issue was present, in six of which the Government contested jurisdiction on part-payment grounds. The Government’s failure to raise the issue in the other three is obviously entirely without significance. Considerations of litigation strategy may have been thought to militate against resting upon such a defense in those cases. Moreover, where only nine lawsuits involving a particular issue arise over a period of many decades, the policy of the Executive Department on that issue can hardly be expected to become familiar to every government attorney. But most important, the number of cases before 1940 in which the issue was present is simply so inconsequential that it reinforces the conclusion of the prior opinion with respect to the uniformity of the pre-1940 belief that full payment had to precede suit. A word should also be said about the argument that requiring taxpayers to pay the full assessments before bringing suits will subject some of them to great hardship. This contention seems to ignore entirely the right of the taxpayer to appeal the deficiency to the Tax Court without paying a cent. If he permits his time for filing such an appeal to expire, he can hardly complain that he has been unjustly treated, for he is in precisely the same position as any other person who is barred by a statute of limitations. On the other hand, the Government has a substantial interest in protecting the public purse, an interest which would be substantially impaired if a taxpayer could sue in a District Court without paying his tax in full. It is instructive to note that, as of June 30, 1959, tax cases pending in the Tax Court involved $920,046,748, and refund suits in other courts involved $446,673,640. It is quite true that the filing of an appeal to the Tax Court normally precludes the Government from requiring payment of the tax, but a decision in petitioner’s favor could be expected to throw a great portion of the Tax Court litigation into the District Courts. Of course, the Government can collect the tax from a District Court suitor by exercising its power of distraint — if he does not split his cause of action — but we cannot believe that compelling resort to this extraordinary procedure is either wise or in accord with congressional intent. Our system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint. A full-payment requirement will promote the smooth functioning of this system; a part-payment rule would work at cross-purposes with it. In sum, if we were to accept petitioner’s argument, we would sacrifice the harmony of our carefully structured twentieth century system of tax litigation, and all that would be achieved would be a supposed harmony of § 1346 (a)(1) with what might have been the nineteenth century law had the issue ever been' raised. Reargument has but fortified our view that § 1346 (a)(1), correctly construed, requires full payment of the assessment before an income tax refund suit can be maintained in a Federal District Court. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter. I should like to append a word to my Brother Whit-taker's opinion, with which I entirely agree. While Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, is no longer law, the opinion of the much lamented Mr. Justice Jackson, based as it was on his great experience in tax litigation, has not lost its force insofar as it laid bare the complexities and perplexities for judicial construction of tax legislation. For one not a specialist in this field to examine every tax question that comes before the Court independently would involve in most cases an inquiry into the course of tax legislation and litigation far beyond the facts of. the immediate case. Such an inquiry entails weeks of study and reflection. Therefore, in construing a tax law it has been my rule to follow almost blindly accepted understanding of the meaning of tax legislation, when that is manifested by long-continued, uniform practice, unless a statute leaves no admissible opening for administrative construction. Therefore, when advised in connection with the disposition of this case after its first argument that “there does not appear to be a single case before 1940 in which a taxpayer attempted a suit for refund of income taxes without paying the full amount the Government alleged to be due,” (357 U. S. 63, at 69), I deemed such a long-continued, unbroken practical construction of the statute controlling as to the meaning of the Revenue Act of 1921, now 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a)(1). Once the basis which for me governed the disposition of the case was no longer available, I was thrown back to an independent inquiry of the course of tax legislation and litigation for more than a hundred years, for all of that was relevant to a true understanding of the problem presented by this case. This involved many weeks of study during what is called the summer vacation. Such a study led to the conclusion set forth in detail in the opinion of my Brother Whittaker. The decision of the Court of Appeals in Flora conflicted with Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F. 2d 146 (C. A. 8th Cir.). Cf. Coates v. United States, 111 F. 2d 609 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F. 2d 776 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Suhr v. United States, 18 F. 2d 81 (C. A. 3d Cir.), semble. As will appear later, prior to 1940 the general view was that full payment was a jurisdictional prerequisite. But a substantial difference of opinion arose after 1940, when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Coates v. United States, 111 F. 2d 609, against the Government. See Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment Before Suing in the District Court? 8 J. Tax. 179; Beaman, When Not to Go to the Tax Court: Advantages and Procedures in Going to the District Court, 7 J. Tax. 356; Rudick and Wender, Federal Income Taxation, 32 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 751, 777-778; Note, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 956; Note, 2 How. L. J. 290. See I. R. C. (1954), §§ 1 (a), 1 (b) (1), 68A Stat. 5, 6. The same general pattern has existed for many years. See, e. g., §§ 116, 117, of the Act of June 30, 1864, c. 173, 13 Stat. 281-282. Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, §275 (a), 43 Stat. 298; Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, §250 (e), 40 Stat. 1084; Act of June 6, 1872, c. 315, §21, 17 Stat. 246; Act of June 30, 1864, e. 173, §119, 13 Stat. 283. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 405. Lower courts have given this construction to the same three phrases in certain claim-for-refund and limitations provisions in prior tax statutes. United States v. Magoon, 77 F. 2d 804; Union Trust Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 259, 261 (“The natural definition of 'tax' comprehends one 'assessment' or one tax in the entire amount of liability”), aff'd, 70 F. 2d 629, 630 (“We agree with the District Court that ‘tax,’ 'penalty,' and ‘sum’ refer to distinct categories of illegal collections and ‘tax’ includes the entire tax liability as assessed by the Commissioner”); United States v. Clarke, 69 F. 2d 748; Hills v. United States, 50 F. 2d 302, 55 F. 2d 1001 (Ct. Cl.); cf. Blair v. Birkenstock, 271 U. S. 348. In the prior opinion we stated that, were it not for certain countervailing considerations, the statutory language “might ... be termed a clear authorization” to sue for the refund of part payment of an assessment. 357 U. S., at 65. It is quite obvious that we did not regard the language as clear enough to preclude deciding the case on other grounds. Moreover, it could at that time be assumed that the terms of the statute favored the taxpayer, because eight members of the Court considered the extrinsic evidence alone sufficient to decide the case against him. Although we are still of that opinion, we now state our views with regard to the bare words of the statute because the argument that these words are decisively against the Government has been urged so strenuously. 42 Stat. 311. 24 Stat. 505, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 1491. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U. S. 28. Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U. S. 1. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 57; remarks of Senator Jones, 61 Cong. Rec. 7506-7507. Another amendment was added in 1925 giving the right to bring refund suits against the United States where the Collector was out of office. 43 Stat. 972. And in 1954, both the $10,000 limitation and the limitation with respect to the Collector being dead or out of office were eliminated. 68 Stat. 589. The text of R. S. § 3226 is set forth in note 16, infra, together with a more detailed account of the origin and development of the pertinent statutory language. The successor of R. S. § 3226 is I. R. C. (1954), §7422 (a), 68A Stat. 876. See Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236. E. g., Act of Feb. 26, 1845, c. 22, 5 Stat. 727; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, c. 74, 12 Stat. 729; Act of June 30, 1864, c. 173, § 44, 13 Stat. 239-240. See note 16, infra. Cheatham was decided in O. T. 1875, while the phrases in question were added to the statute on June 6, 1872. See note 16, infra, for a discussion of the statute involved in Cheatham and its amendment. Section 19 of the Act of July 13, 1866, c. 184, 14 Stat. 152, was involved in Cheatham. That section provided: “Sec. 19. . . . [N]o suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue . . . ." The phrases “any penalty” and “any sum” were first introduced into the statute in § 44 of the Act of June 6, 1872, c. 316, 17 Stat. 257-258, which read as follows: “Sec. 44. That all suits and proceedings for the recovery of any internal tax alleged to have been erroneously assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or jor any sum which it is alleged was excessive, or in any manner wrongfully collected, shall be brought within two years next after the cause of action accrued and not after; and all claims for the refunding of any internal tax or penalty shall be presented to the commissioner of internal revenue within two years next after the cause of action accrued and not after . . . .” (Emphasis added.) A careful reading of this statute discloses the absurd result which would flow from construing the addition of the “any sum” language to affect the full-payment rule, which, under this argument, would be based upon the “any tax” phrase in the 1866 statute. That is, since the “any sum” phrase occurs only in the statute of limitations portion of the 1872 statute, and not in the claim-for-refund provision, a person would be able to bring a suit for part payment without filing a claim for refund. There were no material changes in R. S. § 3226, which provided: “Sec. 3226. No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner of . . . Internal Revenue . . . .” It is no doubt true, as petitioner says, that these various amendments were designed to require submission of all litigable claims to the Commissioner; but, as we have explained, this indicates no more than an intent to cover taxes, penalties, and sums which might, strictly speaking, be neither taxes nor penalties. Kings County Savings Institution v. Blair, 116 U. S. 200, 205 (1886) (“No claim for the refunding of taxes can be made according to law and the regulations until after the taxes have been paid. . . . [N]o suit can be maintained for taxes illegally collected unless a claim therefor has been made within the time prescribed by the law”); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 609 (1895) (dissenting opinion) (“The same authorities [including the Cheatham case] have established the rule that the proper course, in a case of illegal taxation, is to pay the tax under protest or with notice of suit, and then bring an action against the officer who collected it”); Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 20. (1922) (“They might have paid the amount assessed under protest and then brought suit against the Collector . . . .”). This view of Cheatham also corresponds to that of the Court of Appeals in this case. 246 F. 2d, at 930. See also Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F. 2d 146, 152-155 (dissenting opinion). 43 Stat. 336. I. R. C. (1954), § 6331, 68A Stat. 783. The Government has possessed the power of distraint for almost 170 years. See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, c. 15, § 23, 1 Stat. 204. H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7. The Senate Committee on Finance filed a similar report. S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. The reference to R. S. § 3224 in the House Report clearly was meant simply to demonstrate that a determination prior to payment by way of an injunction suit was not possible because of the statutory bar to such a suit. This anti-injunction provision has been law for many decades. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475. It is now § 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 876. See 65 Cong. Rec. 2621, 2684, 8110; 67 Cong. Rec. 525, 1144, 3529, 3755. As we have indicated, some of these remarks were made during debates over proposed changes in the Board of Tax Appeals legislation during the middle of the 1920’s, but they all reflect Congress’ understanding of the pre-1924 procedure and of the changes which were made by establishment of the Board. For example, shortly after the Board legislation was passed, Congress considered and rejected a proposal to make appeal to the Board and then to a Circuit Court of Appeals the taxpayer’s sole remedy. In the course of the debate, a number of Senators discussed at length the taxpayer’s right to bring a refund action in court. Some of the cited quotations are taken from that debate. The following remark of Senator Fletcher is also illuminating: “Mr. FLETCHER. ... I think the most important right that is preserved here ... is the right to go into the district court by the taxpayer upon the payment of the tax. I do not think that we ought to allow him to do that unless he does pay the tax; but when he pays the tax his right to go into the district court is preserved.” 67 Cong. Rec. 3529. (Emphasis added.) See also the materials quoted in note 24, infra. See I. R. C. (1954), § 6213 (a), 68A Stat. 771. For the pertinent 1924 legislation, see Revenue Act of 1924, c. 234, § 274, 43 Stat. 297. In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 721, this Court expressed the view thát the Board “was created by Congress to provide taxpayers an opportunity to secure an independent review ... in advance of their paying the tax found by the Commissioner to be due. Before the Act of 1924 the taxpayer could only contest the Commissioner’s determination of the amount of the tax after its payment.” There are a few interchanges among Senators which might be construed to indicate that they were thinking in terms of preventing distraint; but the same passages demonstrate even more clearly that these Senators also intended to eliminate the necessity of full payment as a prerequisite to suit. For example, the following debate occurred when Senator Reed, who was a member of the Committee on Finance, proposed an amendment which would have permitted a taxpayer to refuse to pay the deficiency even after the Board had ruled against him and which would have required the Government to sue in a District Court. “Mr. REED of Missouri. . . . “The practice, as I understand it, has been to require the taxpayer to pay in the amount of the increased assessment, and then to allow him to get it back if he can. In addition to this, distraints frequently have been issued seizing the property of the citizen .... “Mr. SWANSON. What are the processes by which a citizen who has overpaid can get back his money under the existing law? “Mr. REED of Missouri. As I understand it, he pays his tax. Then he makes an application for a return of it. That is heard through the long, troublesome processes which exist .... When the Treasury is satisfied . . . the taxpayer can go into court at that time. In the meantime, however, he has had to pay his money. “Mr. SWANSON. Does the Senator mean that if there is a dispute, the tax is not assessed permanently against him until the board reaches its final decision? “Mr. SMOOT. Until the board of appeals finally passes upon it, and after that if he wants to go to court he can do so, but in order to go to court he must pay his assessment. “Mr. REED of Missouri. He must pay it before he can have a trial in court. “Mr. WALSH of Montana. Mr. President, the hardships ... in connection with the collection of these taxes is a very real one. . . . At least two or three instances have come under my notice, and my assistance has been asked in cases where the assessing officers have . . . assessed against the [taxpayer] delinquent taxes of such an amount that he found it impossible to pay in advance and secure redress through the ordinary proceeding in a court of law, simply because it would bankrupt him to endeavor to raise the money. He was therefore obliged to suffer a distraint. . . . “. . . After the board of review determines the matter, it seems to me, that is as far as the Government ought to be interrupted in the matter of the collection of its revenues. Then the taxpayer would be obliged to pay the tax and take his ordinary action at law to recover whatever he claims was exacted of him illegally.” 65 Cong. Rec. 8109-8114. A somewhat similar exchange occurred during the 1926 debate over a proposal to prohibit refund suits where an appeal had been taken to the Board. “Mr. REED of Missouri. . . . Now just one further question: “Why is it that a taxpayer can not be given his day in court by direct action, without first requiring him to pay the tax that is assessed? I know I shall be met with the statement that it would mean interminable delay to the Government; but it frequently happens that the tax that is assessed is ruinous, and that the taxpayer can not raise the money. . . . “In my own personal experience I have had two clients who were absolutely ruined by assessments that were unjust and that could not have stood up in a court of justice. . . . [A]nd it was no protection to them to say, 'Pay your taxes and then go into court,’ because they did not have the money to pay the taxes and could not raise the money to pay the taxes and be out of the money two or three years. "... I think the bill needs just one more amendment in this particular, and that is a provision that any citizen can go into court without paying any tax and resist the payment. In the meantime I agree that the Government for its own protection ought to be allowed, perhaps, in such a case as that to issue a distraint. But the idea that a man must first pay his money and then sue to get it back is anomaly in the law.” 67 Cong. Rec. 3530-3533. Senator Reed later proposed that the appeal from the Board be to the District Court instead of to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and Senator Wadsworth, a member of the Finance Committee, asked: “Does the Senator not think that other provision in the bill which permits the taxpayer to take his case to the district court — conditioned, of course, upon his paying the assessment — meets the situation?” 67 Cong. Rec. 3755. S. 1569, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 384, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 150 and H. R. 246, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202. 49 Stat. 1027. S. Rep. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11. “Should the Declaratory Judgment Act be held to apply to tax cases it will mean a complete reversal of our present scheme of taxation. The principle of ‘pay first and litigate later’ will be changed to ‘litigate first and pay later.’ This principle has never before been departed from.” Wideman, Application of the Declaratory Judgment Act to Tax Suits, 13 Taxes 539, 540. For some practitioners’ views on the desirability of litigating tax cases in Federal District Courts, see Dockery, Refund Suits in District Courts, 31 Taxes 523; Yeatman, Tax Controversies, 10 Tex. B. J. 9. These problems have already occurred to the bar. See Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment Before Suing in the District Court? 8 J. Tax. 179, 181. “§ 7422. CIVIL ACTIONS FOR REFUND. “(e) Stay op PROCEEDINGS. — If the Secretary or his delegate prior to the hearing of a suit brought by a taxpayer in a district court or the Court of Claims for the recovery of any income tax, estate tax, or gift tax (or any penalty relating to such taxes) mails to the taxpayer a notice that a deficiency has been determined in respect of the tax which is the subject matter of taxpayer’s suit, the proceedings in taxpayer’s suit shall be stayed during the period of time in which the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redeter-mination of the’ asserted deficiency, and for 60 days thereafter. If the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court, the district court or the Court of Claims, as the case may be, shall lose jurisdiction of taxpayer’s suit to whatever extent jurisdiction is acquired by the Tax Court of the subject matter of taxpayer’s suit for refund. If the taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court for a rede-termination of the asserted deficiency, the United States may counterclaim in the taxpayer’s suit, or intervene in the event of a suit as described in subsection (c) (relating to suits against officers or employees of the United States), within the period of the stay of proceedings notwithstanding that the time for such pleading may have otherwise expired. The taxpayer shall have the burden of proof with respect to the issues raised by such counterclaim or intervention of the United States except as to the issue of whether the taxpayer has been guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax. This subsection shall not apply to a suit by a taxpayer which, prior to the date of enactment of this title, is commenced, instituted, or pending in a district court or the Court of Claims for the recovery of any income tax, estate tax, or gift tax (or any penalty relating to such taxes).” 68A Stat. 877. The possibility of dual jurisdiction in this type of situation was confirmed by cases such as Camp v. United States, 44 F. 2d 126, and Ohio Steel Foundry Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 158, 38 F. 2d 144. See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 109, A431; S. Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 148, 610. For additional evidence of recent congressional understanding of the jurisdictional requirement of § 1346 (a)(1), see the House Report which explained the 1954 amendment abolishing the $10,000 limitation on tax suits against the United States, 68 Stat. 589. After explaining the taxpayer’s right to contest a deficiency in the Tax Court, the report states: "The taxpayer may, however, elect to pay his tax and thereafter bring suit to recover the amount claimed to have been illegally exacted.” H. R. Rep. No. 659, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2. Petitioner cites two earlier cases in which the Government failed to raise the jurisdictional issue. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926); Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924). The Government distinguishes these cases on the ground that, although the total tax for the year had not been paid, the full amount due at the time of suit had been paid. This situation occurred because under §250 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 264, the tax was paid in four installments, and the plaintiffs in Cook and Bowers apparently had paid the due installments. While we do not suggest that the statute will support this type of distinction, adoption of it by the Government or by the bar would not in any way impair the substantial consistency of the view that full payment has for many decades been a prerequisite to suit in District Court. An error as to the applicability of a principle to a unique factual situation does not mean that the principle itself has been rejected. The ground for the decision may have been that the District Court had no jurisdiction because the taxpayer was contesting the legality of the balance of the assessment before the Board of Tax Appeals. In welcoming the members of the Board of Tax Appeals on July 16, 1924, Under Secretary Winston described the difficulties which had arisen in the past. “. . . Under the law a tax once assessed had to be paid by the taxpayer and then his remedy was to sue for its recovery. He must first find the cash for a liability for which he may not have provided. . . . The first interest of all of the people is, of course, that the Government continue to function, and to do this it must have the means of prompt collection of the necessary supplies to keep it going, that is, taxes. The method was, therefore, the determination by the Commissioner of the amount of tax due, its collection and suit to recover. . . . [T]he tax as assessed had to be paid and the taxpayer was left to his remedy in the courts. The payment of the tax was often a great hardship on the taxpayer, meaning in general that he had to raise the cash for an unexpected liability which might not be lawfully due.” Treas. Dept. Press Release, July 16, 1924. See also remarks by Under Secretary Winston in addressing the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the National Tax Association in September 1924, Proceedings of Seventeenth National Conference 271. In commenting upon the Board of Tax Appeals legislation, which contemplated leaving the taxpayer to his District Court remedy if the decision of the Board was adverse, Secretary of the Treasury Mellon stated: “The taxpayer, in the event that decision [of the Board] is against him, will have to pay the tax according to the assessment and have recourse to the courts . . . .” 67 Cong. Rec. 552. On September 17, 1924, the first Chairman of the Board, Charles D. Hamel, read a paper before the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the National Tax Association on Taxation which contained the following remark: “Prior to the enactment of the Act of 1924 . . . [i]f the decision on the appeal [to the Commissioner] was in favor of the government, the taxpayer, only after payment of the tax, had the right to protest the correctness of the decision in the courts . . . Proceedings 277-278. One of the clearest statements of the rule by a commentator is to be found in Bickford, Court Procedure in Federal Tax Cases (Rev. ed. 1929) 3, 7-8, 9, 119. “There are, however, certain other conditions which must be complied with before a suit is maintainable under this section. Briefly stated, these are as follows: “1. The tax must have been paid. “2. After payment, the taxpayer must have filed with the Commissioner ... a sufficient claim for the refund of the taxes sued for. “The first requirement is obvious. We have, in the preceding portions of this volume, found that a proceeding commenced in the Board of Tax Appeals is the only exception to the rule that no review by the courts is permissible at common law or under the statutes, until the tax has been paid and the Government assured of its revenue.” Id., at 119. See also Hamel, The United States Board of Tax Appeals (1926), 10; Klein, Federal Income Taxation (1929), 1372, 1642, 1643; Mellon, Taxation: The People’s Business (1924), 62-63; Bailan tine, Federal Income Tax Procedure, Lectures on Taxation, Columbia University Symposium (1932), 179, 192-193; Caspers, Assessment of Additional Income Taxes for Prior Years, 1 Nat. Income Tax Mag. (Oct. 1923), 12; Graupner, The Operation of the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 Nat. Income Tax Mag. (1925), 295. But see Smith, National Taxes, Their Collection, and Rights and Remedies of the Taxpayer, 8 Geo. L. J. 1, 3 (Apr. 1920). See also Beaman, When Not to Go to the Tax Court: Advantages and Procedures in Going to the District Court, 7 J. Tax. (1957), 356 (“[T]he Bushmiaer case [permitting suit for part of the tax] . . . runs counter to a long tradition of administrative practice and interpretation . . . .”); Rudick and Wender, Federal Income Taxation, 32 N. Y. U. L. Rev. (1957), 751, 777-778 (“It is generally said that a taxpayer has two remedies if he disagrees with a determination of the Commissioner. He may pay the deficiency, file a claim for refund, and sue for the tax in the district court .... Alternatively, the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for review of a deficiency prior to payment. The recent Bushmiaer case is a third alternative. . . . [T]he Bushmiaer case conflicts with more than thirty years of experience in the administration and collection of taxes.”). (Footnote omitted.) Petitioner cites a number of cases in support of his argument that neither the bar nor the Government has ever assumed that full payment of the tax is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit for recovery. The following factors rob these cases of the significance attributed to them by the petitioner: (a) A number of them, although cited by petitioner in his petition for rehearing, were later conceded by him, after his examination of government files, not to be in point. (b) A number of the cited cases involved excise taxes. The Government suggests — and we agree — that excise tax deficiencies may be divisible into a tax on each transaction or event, and therefore present an entirely different problem with respect to the full-payment rule. (c) The cases arising after 1940 are insignificant. Once the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled against the Government in Coates, taxpayers would naturally be much more inclined to sue before full payment, and the Government might well decide not to raise the objection in a particular case for reasons relating to litigation strategy. (d) In some of the cases the only amount remaining unpaid at the time of suit was interest. As we have indicated, the statute lends itself to a construction which would permit suit for the tax after full payment thereof without payment of any part of the interest. (e) In some of the cases the Government was not legally entitled to collect the unpaid tax at the time of suit, either because the tax system at the time permitted installment payment (see note 34, supra), because the unpaid portion had not yet been assessed, or for some other reason. Although the statute may not support any distinction based on facts of this nature, it is quite understandable that a taxpayer might have predicated a suit upon the theory that the distinction was meaningful and that the Government might not have contested it, whether because it agreed or for tactical reasons. In the light of these considerations, we regard the following pre-1941 cases as immaterial: Baldwin v. Higgins, 100 F. 2d 405 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1938) (petitioner concedes); Sampson v. Welch, 23 F. Supp. 271 (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1938) (same); Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States, 20 F, Supp. 83 (D. C. S. D. W. Va. 1937) (same); Sterling v. Ham, 3 F. Supp. 386 (D. C. Me. 1933) (same); Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 15 F. 2d 706 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1926), modified, 22 F. 2d 464 (1927), rev’d, 29 F. 2d 14 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1928) (same); Heinemann Chemical Co. v. Heiner, 36-4 CCH Fed. Tax Serv. ¶ 9302 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1936), rev’d, 92 F. 2d 344 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1937) (only interest unpaid); Welch v. Hassett, 15 F. Supp. 692 (D. C. Mass. 1936), rev’d, 90 F. 2d 833 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1937), aff’d, 303 U. S. 303 (1938) (full assessment paid); Leavitt v. Hendricksen, 37-4 CCH Fed. Tax Serv. ¶9312 (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1937) (no unpaid assessment); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926) (all due installments paid); Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924) (same). Four pre-1941 cases remain. Of these, only two are clearly cases in which the jurisdictional issue was present and not raised by the Government. Tsivoglou v. United States, 31 F. 2d 706 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1929); Thomas v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 313, 18 F. Supp. 942 (1937). McFadden v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 625 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1937); is in the “doubtful” category. There the Commissioner had granted the taxpayer an extension of time for payment of 80% of his assessment and the suit was for the remaining 20%, which had been paid. The relevant facts of the last case, Peerless Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Routzahn, 22 F. 2d 459 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1927), are so unclear that the case means nothing. The Government had applied an admitted 1918 overpayment to a 1917 deficiency, but the deficiency was greater than the overpayment. The taxpayer sued to recover this overpayment, and whether there had been full payment at the time of suit depends upon whether the suit is regarded as one for refund of 1917 or 1918 taxes. Nor can we agree entirely with petitioner’s evaluation of a second group of pre-1941 cases — those in which the issue allegedly was present and the Government did raise it but lost. Five of these cases involved primarily the troublesome concurrent jurisdiction problem that arose before passage of § 7422 (e) of the 1954 Code when a taxpayer both appealed to the Tax Court and brought suit in a Federal District Court. Brampton Woolen Co. v. Field, 55 F. 2d 325 (D. C. N. H. 1931), rev’d, 56 F. 2d 23 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 608; Camp v. United States, 44 F. 2d 126 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1930); Emery v. United States, 27 F. 2d 992 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1928); Old Colony R. Co. v. United States, 27 F. 2d 994 (D. C. Mass. 1928); Ohio Steel Foundry Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 158, 38 F. 2d 144 (1930). In all of these cases except Camp, it appears that the Government did raise the part-payment question. It is true that the contention did not prevail, but this is not very meaningful. In the first place, this question was quite subordinate to the major issue, concurrent jurisdiction. In the second place, the Government won in Brampton on another jurisdictional ground. And finally, in contrast to Flora, in both Camp and Ohio Steel Foundry the full assessment had been paid at the time suit was brought; it was only later that an additional deficiency was asserted by the Commissioner. To these cases should be added Riverside Hospital v. Larson, 38-4 CCH Fed. Tax Serv. ¶ 9542 (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1938), where the Government raised the full-payment question and won, and Suhr v. United States, 14 F. 2d 227 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1926), aff’d, 18 F. 2d 81 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1927), another concurrent jurisdiction case where the Government raised the issue and won, although the grounds for the decision are not entirely clear. This, then, is how we see the pre-1941 situation: Of 14 cases originally cited as being cases in which the jurisdictional issue was present but not raised by the Government, five have been conceded by petitioner not to be in point; six, and possibly seven, are distinguishable for various reasons; and only two, or possibly three, remain. Of five cases cited as being cases in which the jurisdictional issue was raised by the Government, only one, Coates v. United States, 111 F. 2d 609 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1940), or at most three, really involved the Flora question. When to these are added Riverside, where the Government won, Suhr, where it may have won, and Brampton Woolen Co., where it won in the Court of Appeals on another jurisdictional ground, the box score is as follows: two or three cases in which the Government failed to raise the issue; one, or possibly three, cases in which the Government argued the question and lost; one case in which it argued the question and won; one case in which it argued the question and may have won; and one case in which it raised the issue and prevailed on another jurisdictional defense — a total of nine cases at most in which the issue was presented, out of which the Government contested jurisdiction in six. Of course, this calculation may not be precise; but, in view of the many thousands of tax refund suits which have been brought during the decades in question, it is an accurate enough approximation to reflect a general understanding of the jurisdictional significance of “pay first, litigate later.” It would be bootless to consider each of the post-1940 cases cited by petitioner or to list the multitude of cases cited by the Government in which the jurisdictional issue has been raised. As we have stated, we believe these cases have no significance whatsoever. However, perhaps it is worth noting that all but a handful of the cases which petitioner, in the petition for rehearing, asserted to be ones in which the Government failed to raise the jurisdictional issue would be immaterial even if they were pre-Coaies. Thus, for example, petitioner has conceded error with respect to three cases. Dickstein v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (D. C. M. D. Pa. 1957), aff’d, 255 F. 2d 640 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1958); O’Connor v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 962 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1948); Terrell v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 418 (D. C. E. D. La. 1946). A number of the cases involved excise taxes. E. g., Griffiths Dairy v. Squire, 138 F. 2d 758 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1943); Auricchio v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 184 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1943). In some of the cases only interest remained unpaid. Raymond v. United States, 58-1 U. S. T. C. ¶ 9397 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1958); Hogg v. Allen, 105 F. Supp. 12 (D. C. M. D. Ga. 1952). And some of the cases arose in the Third Circuit after a decision adverse to the Government in Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F. 2d 776 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1941). Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218 (1955); Peters v. Smith, 123 F. Supp. 711 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1954), rev’d, 221 F. 2d 721 (1955). It might be noted also that Jones v. Fox, 162 F. Supp. 449 (D. C. Md. 1957), cited as a case in which the Government argued the jurisdictional question and lost, was an excise tax case in which the court distinguished our prior decision in Flora because of the divisibility of the excise tax. Another such decision during the pre-1941 period was Friebele v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 492 (D. C. N. J. 1937). Petitioner points out that the Tax Court has no jurisdiction over excise tax cases. See 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (Zimet Rev. 1958), §50.08. But this fact provides no policy support for his position, since, as we have noted, excise tax assessments may be divisible into a tax on each transaction or event, so that the full-payment rule would probably require no more than payment of a small amount. See note 37, supra. Of this $446,673,640, District Court suits involved $222,177,920; Court of Claims suits, $220,247,436; and state court suits, $4,248,284. See note 22, supra. The practical effects which might result from acceptance of petitioner’s argument are sketched in Lowitz, Federal Tax Refund Suits and Partial Payments, 9 The Decalogue J. 9, 10: “Permitting refund suits after partial payment of the tax assessment would benefit many taxpayers. Such a law would be open to wide abuse and would probably seriously impair the government’s ability to collect taxes. Many taxpayers, without legitimate grounds for contesting an assessment, would make a token payment and sue for refund, hoping at least to reduce the amount they would ultimately have to pay. In jurisdictions where the District Court is considered to be a ‘taxpayer’s court’ most taxpayers would use that forum instead of the Tax Court. Conceivably such legislation could cause the chaotic tax collection situations which exist in some European countries, since there would be strong impetus to a policy of paying a little and trying to settle the balance.” See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399; Treas. Regs, on Procedural Rules (1954 Code) §601.103 (a). See Riordan, Must You Pay Full Tax Assessment Before Suing in the District Court? 8 J. Tax. 179, 181: “1. If the Government is forced to use these remedies [distraint] on a large scale, it will affect adversely taxpayers’ willingness to perform under our voluntary assessment system. “2. It will put the burden on the Government to seek out for seizure the property of every taxpayer who chooses to sue for the refund of a partial payment. Often, the Government will not be able to do this without extraordinary and costly effort and in some cases it may not be able to do it at all. “3. The use of the drastic-collection remedies would often cause inconvenience and perhaps hardship to the creditors, debtors, employers, employees, banks and other persons doing business with the taxpayer.” The language of Cheatham relied upon by this Court in its first opinion was the following: “So also, in the internal-revenue department, the statute which we have copied allows appeals from the assessor to the commissioner of internal revenue; and, if dissatisfied with his decision, on paying the tax the party can sue the collector; and, if the money was wrongfully exacted, the courts will give him relief by a judgment, which the United States pledges herself to pay. “. . . While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the general government has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against whom the tax is assessed. ... If the compliance with this condition [that suit must be brought within six months of the Commissioner’s decision] requires the party aggrieved to pay the money, he must do it. He cannot, after the decision is rendered against him, protract the time within which he can contest that decision in the courts by his own delay in paying the money. It is essential to the honor and orderly conduct of the government that its taxes should be promptly paid, and drawbacks speedily adjusted; and the rule prescribed in this class of cases is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. . . . “The objecting party can take his appeal. He can, if the decision is delayed beyond twelve months, rest his case on that decision; or he can pay the amount claimed, and commence his suit at any time within that period. So, after the decision, he can pay at once, and commence suit within the six months . . . .” 92 U. S., at 88-89.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BALDWIN et al. v. FISH AND GAME COMMISSION OF MONTANA et al. No. 76-1150. Argued October 5, 1977 Decided May 23, 1978 BlacKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Powell, RehNQuist, and SteveNs, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 392. BreNNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 394. ' - James H. Goetz argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. Paul A. Lenzini argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents issues, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution’s Art. IY, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as to the constitutional validity of disparities, as between residents and nonresidents, in a State’s hunting license system. I Appellant Lester Baldwin is a Montana resident. He also is an outfitter holding a state license as a hunting guide. The majority of his customers are nonresidents who come to Montana to hunt elk and other big game. Appellants Carlson, Huseby, Lee, and Moris are residents of Minnesota. They have hunted big game, particularly elk, in Montana in past years and wish to continue to do so. In 1975, the five appellants, disturbed by the difference in the kinds of Montana elk-hunting licenses available to nonresidents, as contrasted with those available to residents of the State, and by the difference in the fees the nonresident and the resident must pay for their respective licenses, instituted the present federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and for reimbursement, in part, of fees already paid. App. 18-29. The defendants were the Fish and Game Commission of the State of Montana, the Commission’s director, and its five commissioners. The complaint- challenged the Montana elk-hunting licensing scheme specifically, and asserted that, as applied to nonresidents, it violated the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IY, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court was convened and, by a divided vote, entered judgment denying all relief to the plaintiff-appellants. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (Mont. 1976). We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 1089 (1977). II The relevant facts are not in any real controversy and many of them are agreed: A. For the 1975 hunting season, a Montana resident could purchase a license solely for elk for $4. The nonresident, however, in order to hunt elk, was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $151; this entitled him to take one elk and two deer. For the 1976 season, the Montana resident could purchase a license solely for elk for $9. The nonresident, in order to hunt elk, was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $225; this entitled him to take one elk, one deer, one black bear, and game birds, and to fish with hook and line. A resident was not required to buy any combination of licenses, but if he did, the cost to him of all the privileges granted by the nonresident combination license was $30. The nonresident thus paid 71/2 times as much as the resident, and if the nonresident wished to hunt only elk, he paid 25 times as much as the resident. B. Montana, with an area of more than 147,000 square miles, is our fourth largest State. Only Alaska, Texas, and California, in that order, are larger. But its population is relatively small; in 1972 it was approximately 716,000. Its 1974 per capita income was 34th among the 50 States. App. 56-57. Montana maintains significant populations of big game, including elk, deer, and antelope. Tr. 191. Its elk population is one of the largest in the United States. Elk are prized by big-game hunters who come from near and far to pursue the animals for sport. The quest for big game has grown in popularity. During the 10-year period from 1960 to 1970 licenses issued by Montana increased by approximately 67% for residents and by approximately 530% for nonresidents. App. 56-57. Owing to its successful management programs for elk, the State has not been compelled to limit the overall number of hunters by means of drawings or lotteries as have other States with harvestable elk populations. Tr. 243. Elk are not hunted commercially in Montana. Nonresident hunters seek the animal for its trophy value; the trophy is the distinctive set of antlers. The interest of resident hunters more often may be in the meat. Id., at 245. Elk are now found in the mountainous regions of western Montana and are generally not encountered in the eastern two-thirds of the State where the plains prevail. Id,., at 9-10, 249: During the summer the animals move to higher elevations and lands that are largely federally owned. In the late fall they move down to lower privately owned lands that provide the winter habitat necessary to their survival. During the critical midwinter period elk are often supported by ranchers. Id., at 46-47, 191, 285-286. Elk management is expensive. In regions of the State with significant elk population, more personnel time of the Fish and Game Commission is spent on elk than on any other species of big game. Defendant’s Exhibit A, p. 9. Montana has more than 400 outfitters who equip and guide hunting parties. Tr. 295. These outfitters are regulated and licensed by the State and provide services to hunters and fishermen. It is estimated that as many as half the nonresidents who hunt elk in western Montana utilize outfitters. Id., at 248. Three outfitter-witnesses testified that virtually all their clients were nonresidents. Id., at 141, 281, 307. 'The State has a force of 70 game wardens. Each warden district covers approximately 2,100 square miles. Id., at 234. To assist wardens in law enforcement, Montana has an “equal responsibility” statute. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 26-906 (Supp. 1977). This law makes outfitters and guides equally responsible for unreported game-law violations committed by persons in their hunting parties. The outfitter thus, in a sense, is a surrogate warden and serves to bolster the State’s warden force. Ill In the District Court the majority observed that the elk once was a plains animal but now roams the mountains of central and western Montana. About 75% of the elk taken are killed on federal land. The animal’s preservation depends upon conservation. 417 F. Supp., at 1007. The majority noted that the appellants conceded that Montana constitutionally may charge nonresidents more for hunting privileges than residents. Id., at 1007-1008. It concluded, however, that on the evidence presented the 7%-to-l ratio in favor of the resident cannot be justified on any basis of cost allocation. Id., at 1008. After satisfying itself as to standing and as to the existence of a justiciable controversy, and after passing comment upon the somewhat controversial subject of wild animal legal ownership, the court concluded that the State “has the power to manage and conserve the elk, and to that end to make such laws and regulations as are necessary to protect and preserve it.” Id., at 1009. In reaching this result, the majority examined the nature of the rights asserted by the plaintiffs. It observed that there were just too many people and too few elk to enable everyone to hunt the animals. “If the elk is to survive as a species, the game herds must be managed, and a vital part of the management is the limitation of the annual kill.” Ibid. Various means of limitation were mentioned, as was the fact that any one control device might deprive a particular hunter of any possibility of hunting elk. The right asserted by the appellants was “no more than a chance to engage temporarily in a recreational activity in a sister state” and was “not fundamental.” Ibid. Thus, it was not protected as a privilege and an immunity under the Constitution’s Art. IV, § 2. The majority contrasted the nature of the asserted right with educational needs at the primary and college levels, citing San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973), and Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38 (WD Wash.), summarily aff’d, 414 U. S. 1057 (1973), and said: "There is simply no nexus between the right to hunt for sport and the right to speak, the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to pursue a calling.” 417 F. Supp., at 1009. It followed that it was necessary only to determine whether the system bears some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. Then: “We conclude that where the opportunity to enjoy a recreational activity is created or supported by a state, where there is no nexus between the activity and any fundamental right, and where by its very nature the activity can be enjoyed by only a portion of those who would enjoy it, a state may prefer its residents over the residents of other states, or condition the enjoyment of the nonresident upon such terms as it sees fit.” Id., at 1010. The dissenting judge took issue with the “ownership theory,” and with any “special public interest” theory, and emphasized the absence of any cost-allocation basis for the license fee differential. He described the majority’s posture as one upholding discrimination because political support was thereby generated, and took the position that invidious discrimination was not to be justified by popular disapproval of equal treatment. Id., at 1012. IV Privileges and immunities. Appellants strongly urge here that the Montana licensing scheme for the hunting of elk violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IY, § 2, of our Constitution. That Clause is not one the contours of which have been precisely shaped by the process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation over the years since 1789. If there is any significance in the fact, the Clause appears in the so-called States’ Relations Article, the same Article that embraces the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Extradition Clause (also in § 2), the provisions for the admission of new States, the Territory and Property Clause, and the Guarantee Clause. Historically, it has been overshadowed by the appearance in 1868 of similar language in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the continuing controversy and consequent litigation that attended that Amendment’s enactment and its meaning and application. The Privileges and Immunities Clause originally was not isolated from the Commerce Clause, now in the Constitution’s Art. I, § 8. In the Articles of Confederation, where both Clauses have their source, the two concepts were together in the fourth Article. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 660-661 (1975); Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562, 627 (1860) (opinion of Wright, J.). Their separation may have been an assurance against an anticipated narrow reading of the Commerce Clause. See Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430-432 (1871). Perhaps because of the imposition of the Fourteenth Amendment upon our constitutional consciousness and the extraordinary emphasis that the Amendment received, it is not surprising that the contours of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, are not well developed, and that the relationship, if any, between the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the “privileges or immunities” language of the Fourteenth Amendment is less than clear. We are, nevertheless, not without some pronouncements by this Court as to the Clause’s significance and reach. There are at least three general comments that deserve mention: The first is that of Mr. Justice Field, writing for a unanimous Court in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869). He emphasized nationalism, the proscription of discrimination, and the assurance of equality of all citizens within any State: “It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.” The second came 70 years later when Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for himself and Mr. Justice Black in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 511 (1939), summed up the history of the Clause and pointed out what he felt to be the difference in analysis in the earlier cases from the analysis in later ones: “As has been said, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there had been no constitutional definition of citizenship of the United States, or of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured thereby or springing therefrom.. .. “At one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights which, according to the jurisprudence of the day, were classed as 'natural rights’; and that the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the United States by guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition of this group of rights by every other State. Such was the view of Justice Washington. “While this description of the civil rights of the citizens of the States has been quoted with approval, it has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does not import that a citizen of one State carries with him into another fundamental privileges and immunities which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the State first mentioned, but, on the contrary, that in any State every citizen of any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own.” (Footnotes omitted.) The third and most recent general pronouncement is that authored by Mr. Justice Marshall for a nearly unanimous Court in Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 660-661 (1975), stressing the Clause's “norm of comity” and the Framers’ concerns: “The Clause thus establishes a norm of comity without specifying the particular subjects as to which citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction of another are guaranteed equality of treatment. The origins of the Clause do reveal, however, the concerns of central import to the Framers. During the preconstitutional period, the practice of some States denying to outlanders the treatment that its citizens demanded for themselves was widespread. The fourth of the Articles of Confederation was intended to arrest this centrifugal tendency with some particularity. ... “The discriminations at which this Clause was aimed were by no means eradicated during the short fife of the Confederation, and the provision was carried over into the comity article of the Constitution in briefer form but with no change of substance or intent, unless-it was to strengthen the force of the Clause in fashioning a single nation.” (Footnotes omitted.) When the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been applied to specific cases, it has been interpreted to prevent a State from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of other States in their pursuit of common callings within the State, Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871); in the ownership and disposition of privately held property within the State, Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898); and in access to the courts of the State, Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U. S. 553 (1920). It has not been suggested, however, that state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distinguish among persons. Suffrage, for example, always has been understood to be tied to an individual’s identification with a particular State. See, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). No one would suggest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a State to open its polls to a person who declines to assert that the State is the only one where he claims a right to vote. The same is true as to qualification for an elective office of the State. Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U. S. 891 (1974); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (NH), summarily aff’d, 414 U. S. 802 (1973). Nor must a State always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do. Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, supra; cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those “privileges” and “immunities” bearing upon the vitality of The Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally. Here we must decide into which category falls a distinction with respect to access to recreational big-game hunting. Many of the early cases embrace the concept that the States had complete ownership over wildlife within their boundaries, and, as well, the power to preserve this bounty for their citizens alone. It was enough to say “that in regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of [a] state, the legislature is [not] bound to extend to the citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to their own citizens.” Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3,230) (CC ED Pa. 1825). It appears to have been generally accepted that although the States were obligated to treat all those within their territory equally in most respects, they were not obliged to share those things they held in trust for their own people. In Corfield, a case the Court has described as “the first, and long the leading, explication of the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause,” see Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S., at 661, Mr. Justice Washington, sitting as Circuit Justice, although recognizing that the States may not interfere with the “right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to- reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal,” 6 F. Cas., at 552, nonetheless concluded that access to oyster beds determined to be owned by New Jersey could be limited to New Jersey residents. This holding, and the conception of state sovereignty upon which it relied, formed the basis for similar decisions during later years of the 19th century. E. g., McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896). See Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 67 Mont. 558, 216 P. 776 (1923). In Geer, a case dealing with Connecticut’s authority to limit the disposition of game birds taken within its boundaries, the Court roundly rejected the contention “that a State cannot allow its own people the enjoyment of the benefits of the property belonging to them in common, without at the same time permitting the citizens of other States to participate in that which they do not own.” 161 U. S., at 530. In more recent years, however, the Court has recognized that the States’ interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim to “own,” including wildlife, is by no means absolute. States may not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources, even their wildlife, to their own people whenever such hoarding and confinement impedes interstate commerce. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911). Nor does a State’s control over its resources preclude the proper exercise of federal power. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S. 265 (1977); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529 (1976); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920). And a State’s interest in its wildlife and other resources must yield when, without reason, it interferes with a nonresident’s right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948). See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). Appellants contend that the doctrine on which Corfield, McCready, and Geer all relied has no remaining vitality. We do not agree. Only last Term, in referring to the “ownership” or title language of those cases and characterizing it “as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction,” the Court pointed out that that language nevertheless expressed “ ‘the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.’ ” Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S., at 284, citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S., at 402. The fact that the State’s control over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal regulation and certain federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their absence. We need look no further than decisions of this Court to know that this is so. It is true that in Toomer v. Witsell the Court in 1948 struck down a South Carolina statute requiring nonresidents of the State to pay a license fee of $2,500 for each commercial shrimp boat, and residents to pay a fee of only $25, and did so on the ground that the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. , Id., at 395-403. See also Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415 (1952), another commercial-livelihood case. Less than three years, however, after the decision in Toomer, so heavily relied upon by appellants here, the Court dismissed for the want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Dakota holding that the total exclusion from that State of nonresident hunters of migratory waterfowl was justified by the State’s assertion of a special interest in wildlife that qualified as a substantial reason for the discrimination. State v. Kemp, 73 S. D. 458, 44 N. W. 2d 214 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U. S. 923 (1951). In that case South Dakota had proved that there was real danger that the flyways, breeding grounds, and nursery for ducks and geese would be subject to excessive hunting and possible destruction by nonresident hunters lured to the State by an abundance of pheasants. 73 S. D., at 464, 44 N. W. 2d, at 217. Appellants have demonstrated nothing to convince us that we should completely reject the Court’s earlier decisions. In his opinion in Coryell, Mr. Justice Washington, although he seemingly relied on notions of “natural rights” when he considered the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, included in his list of situations, in which he believed the States would be obligated to treat each other’s residents equally, only those where a nonresident sought to engage in an essential activity or exercise a basic right. He himself used the term “fundamental,” 6 F. Cas., at 551, in the modern as well as the “natural right” sense. Certainly Mr. Justice Field and the Court invoked the same principle in the language quoted above from Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall., at 180. So, too, did the Court by its holdings in Ward v. Maryland, Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, and Blake v. McClung, all supra, when it was concerned with the pursuit of common callings, the ability to transfer property, and access to courts, respectively. And comparable status of the activity involved was apparent in Toomer, the commercial-licensing case. With respect to such basic and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union, the States must treat residents and nonresidents without unnecessary distinctions. Does the distinction made by Montana between residents and nonresidents in establishing access to elk hunting threaten a basic right in a way that offends the Privileges and Immunities Clause? Merely to ask the question seems to provide the answer. We repeat much of what already has been said above: Elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is a recreation and a sport. In itself — wholly apart from license fees — it is costly and obviously available only to the wealthy nonresident or to the one so taken with the sport that he sacrifices other values in order to indulge in it and to enjoy what it offers. It is not a means to the nonresident’s livelihood. The mastery of the animal and the trophy are the ends that are sought; appellants are not totally excluded from these. The elk supply, which has been entrusted to the care of the State by the people of Montana, is finite and must be carefully tended in order to- be preserved. Appellants’ interest in sharing this limited resource on more equal terms with Montana residents simply does not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union. Appellants do not — and cannot — contend that they are deprived of a means of a livelihood by the system or of access to any part of the State to which they may seek to travel. We do not decide the full range of activities that are sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation that the States may not interfere with a nonresident’s participation therein without similarly interfering with a resident’s participation. Whatever rights or activities may be “fundamental” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we are persuaded, and hold, that elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is not one of them. V Equal protection. Appellants urge, too, that distinctions drawn between residents and nonresidents are not permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when used to allocate access to recreational hunting. Appellees argue that the State constitutionally should be able to charge nonresidents, who are not subject to the State’s general taxing power, more than it charges its residents, who are subject to that power and who already have contributed to the programs that make elk hunting possible. Appellees also urge that Montana, as a State, has made sacrifices in its economic development, and therefore in its tax base, in order to preserve the elk and other wildlife within the State and that this, too, must be counted, along with actual tax revenues spent, when computing the fair share to be paid by nonresidents. We need not commit ourselves to any particular method of computing the cost to the State of maintaining an environment in which elk can survive in order to find the State’s efforts rational, and not invidious, and therefore not violative of the Equal Protection Clause. A repetitious review of the factual setting is revealing: The resident obviously assists in the production and maintenance of big-game populations through taxes. The same taxes provide support for state parks utilized by sportsmen, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1; for roads providing access to the hunting areas, Tr. 156-158, 335; for fire suppression to protect the wildlife habitat, id., at 167; for benefits to the habitat effected by the State’s Environmental Quality Council, id., at 163-165; for the enforcement of state air and water quality standards, id., at 223-224; for assistance by sheriffs’ departments to enforce game laws, Defendants’ Exhibit G, p. 13; and for state highway patrol officers who assist wildlife officers at game checking stations and in enforcement of game laws. Forage support by resident ranchers is critical for winter survival. Tr. 46-47, 286. All this is on a continuing basis. On the other side of the same ledger is the great, and almost alarming, increase in the number of nonresident hunters — in the decade of the 1960’s, almost eight times the increase in resident hunters; the group character of much nonresident hunting, with its opportunity for license “swapping” when the combination license system is not employed, id., at 237; the intermingling of deer and elk in the wild and the inexperienced hunter’s inability to tell one from the other; the obvious limit in the elk supply; the supposition that the nonresident occasional and short-term visitor is more likely to commit game-law violations; the need to supervise hunting practices in order to prevent violations and illegal overkill; and the difficulties of supervision in the primitive areas where the elk is found during the hunting season. All this adds up, in our view, to no irrationality in the differences the Montana Legislature has drawn in the costs of its licenses to hunt elk. The legislative choice was an economic means not unreasonably related to the preservation of a finite resource and a substantial regulatory interest of the State. It serves to limit the number of hunter days in the Montana elk country. There is, to be sure, a contrasting cost feature favorable to the resident, and, perhaps, the details and the figures might have been more precisely fixed and more closely related to basic costs to the State. But, as has been noted, appellants concede that a differential in cost between residents and nonresidents is not in itself invidious or unconstitutional. And “a statutory classification impinging upon no fundamental interest . . . need not be drawn so as to fit with precision the legitimate purposes animating it. . . . That [Montana] might have furthered its underlying purpose more artfully, more directly, or more completely, does not warrant a conclusion that the method it chose is unconstitutional.” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 813 (1976). Appellants also contend that the requirement that nonresident, but not resident, hunters must purchase combination licenses in order to be able to obtain a single elk is arbitrary. In the District Court the State introduced evidence, largely uncontradicted, that nonresident hunters create greater enforcement problems and that some of these problems are alleviated by this requirement. The District Court’s majority appears to have found this evidence credible and the justification rational, and we are in no position to disagree. Many of the same factors just listed in connection with the license fee differential have equal pertinency for the combination license requirement. We perceive no duty on the State to have its licensing structure parallel or identical for both residents and nonresidents, or to justify to the penny any cost differential it imposes in a purely recreational, noncommercial, nonlivelihood setting. Rationality is sufficient. That standard, we feel, has been met by Montana. So long as constitutional requirements have been met, as we conclude is the case here, “ [protection of the wild life of the State is peculiarly within the police power, and the State has great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its protection.” Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545, 552 (1924). The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Montana statutorily defines one’s place of residence. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §83-303 (1966 and Supp. 1977). It imposes a durational requirement of six months for eligibility to receive a resident’s hunting or fishing license. §26-202.3 (2) (Supp. 1975). Appellants, other than Baldwin, make no claim to Montana residence and do not challenge §§ 83-303 and 26-202.3 (2) in any way. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40. We note, in passing, that most States charge nonresidents more than residents for hunting licenses. E. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 16.05.340 (1977) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-4-102 (Supp. 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, § 2401 (Supp. 1977); Wis. Stat. §§ 29.10, 29.105, 29.109, 29.12 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. Stat. § 23.1-33 (Supp. 1977). Others are listed in the Appendix to the Brief for Appellees. 1973 Mont. Laws, ch. 408, § 1, and 1969 Mont. Laws, ch. 172, § 2. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§26-202.1 (4) and (12), and 26-230 (Supp. 1977). A nonresident, however, could obtain a license restricted to deer for $51. §§ 26-202.1 (9) and 26-230. We were advised at oral argument that Montana’s method of use of a combination license is unique among the States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. See Reply Brief for Appellants 29. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§26-202.1 (1), (2), and (4) and 26-230 (Supp. 1977). There are similar disparities between Montana resident and nonresident hunting licenses for all other game, except wild turkey and as to bow-hunting. The present litigation-, however, focuses only on licenses to hunt elk. Disparity in rates has not been without criticism. U. S. Public Land Law Review Comm’n, One Third of the Nation's Land 174 (1970); Norman, Are Nonresident Hunters Getting a Fair Deal?, Outdoor Life, Sept. 1949, p. 21; Yeager, The Federal Take-Over, Montana Outdoors, Jan./Feb. 1975, p. 43; Editorial, Field & Stream, June 1974, p. 4. App. 56. Its estimated population in 1976 has been said to be 753,000. The World Almanac 695 (1978). Of the 50 States, Montana consistently has ranked 42d or lower in population since statehood. App. 56. It has been said that Montana is the State most frequently visited by nonresident hunters. All Outdoors, Michigan Natural Resources 27-28 (Sept.-Oct. 1975). For the license year 197-3H975, Montana licensed hunters from each of the other 49 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 11 foreign countries. Defendants’ Exhibit A, p. 8 (part of deposition of Don L. Brown). Approximately 43,500 nonresident hunting licenses for deer and elk were issued during that year. Id., at 7. The District Court found that elk hunting is recreational in nature and, “except for a few residents who live in exactly the right place,” expensive. 417 F. Supp., at 1009. There was testimony that for a typical seven-day elk hunt a nonresident spends approximately $1,250 exclusive of outfitter’s fee and the hunting license. Tr. 283-284. Thus, while the nonresident combination license fee is not insubstantial, it appears to be a lesser part of the overall expense of the elk hunt. The number of nonresident big-game combination licenses is now restricted to 17,000 in any one license year. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 26-202.1 (16) (f) (Supp. 1977). This limitation was imposed by 1975 Mont. Laws, ch. 546, § 1, effective May 1, 1976. The number of nonresident hunters has not yet reached the 17,000 limit. There are no similar numerical limitations on resident elk or deer licenses. The District Court concluded: “The elk is not and never will be hunted commercially.” 417 F Supp., at 1007. Appellants do not deny that the activity which they wish to pursue is pure sport. The hunter is entitled to take only one elk per year, Montana Department of Fish and Game, Deer, Elle, Bear, and Mountain Lion Regulations, Feb. 27, 1977, and statutory restrictions are placed on the buying and selling of game animals, or parts thereof, taken in Montana. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 26-806 (1967). The Supreme Court of Montana has said: “In Montana, big game hunting is a sport.” State ex rel. Visser v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 150 Mont. 525, 531, 437 P. 2d 373, 376 (1968). “[A] property owner in this state must recognize the fact that there may be some injury to property or inconvenience from wild game for which there is no recourse.” State v. Rathbone, 110 Mont. 225, 242, 100 P. 2d 86, 93 (1940). The concession, was repeated orally in this Court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. The District Court made no specific findings or conclusions about the standing of each of the five appellants. It ruled, however, that two of the nonresident plaintiff-appellants, Lee and Moris, had sufficient standing to ma.int.a.in the suit. 417 F. Supp., at 1008. We agree, and find it unnecessary to make any further inquiry on standing. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 189 (1973). “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” “All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” “The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free' citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . . .” For a description of four theories proffered as to the purpose of the Clause, see S. Doc. No. 92-82, pp. 831-832 (1973). The opinion goes on to read: “Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists. “But the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not intended by the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States. They can have no such operation, except by the permission, express or implied, of those States. The special privileges which they confer must, therefore, be enjoyed at home, unless the assent of other States to their enjoyment therein be given.” 8 Wall., at 180-181. It is possible that this is the language that Mr. Justice Roberts in the quotation, supra, at 381, from Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S., at 511, rather critically regarded as relating to “natural rights.” We suspect, however, that he was referring to the more general preceding sentences in Mr. Justice Washington’s opinion: “The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.” 6 F. Cas., at 551-552. The rationale of these cases seems not to have been affected by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the inclusion therein of a new protection for “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Appellants do not argue that the State of Montana has deprived them of anything to which they are entitled under this provision, so we need not consider here the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S., at 511 (opinion of Roberts, J.); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); R. Howell, The Privileges and Immunities of State Citizenship (1918). It is, of course, possible for residents, with single-animal licenses, hunting in groups to engage in license swapping. The appellants point to the facts that federal land in Montana provides a significant contribution to the elk habitat, and that substantial apportionments to the State flow from the Federal Aid in the Wild Life Restoration Act, 50 Stat. 917, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §§ 669—669i (1976 ed.). We fad to see how these federal aspects transform a recreational pursuit into a fundamental right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or how they impose a barrier to resident-nonresident differentials. Congress knows how to impose such a condition on its largess when it wishes to do so. See 16 U. S. C. § 669 (1976 ed.). See also Pub. L. 94-422, 90 Stat. 1314, adding § 6 (f) (8) to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U. S. C. § 460l-8 (f)(8) (1976 ed.). The dissenting opinion in the District Court ascribes to the majority there a holding that “an otherwise invidious discrimination against nonresidents is justified because the state may rationally consider the discrimination necessary to induce residents to support the state program required to conserve the herd.” 417 F. Supp., at 1011. We agree with that dissent that the State’s need or desire to engender political support for its conservation programs cannot by itself justify an otherwise invidious classification. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 266 (1974). But, in our view, the record, that is, the case as proved, discloses that the classification utilized in Montana's licensing scheme is not “otherwise invidious discrimination.''

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEWYT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 417. Argued April 19, 1955. Decided May 23, 1955. Seymour Sheriff argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Assistant Attorney General Holland argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Ralph S. Spritzer, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson and I. Henry Kutz. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a companion case to United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., ante, p. 232. The main point in the two cases is the same — whether a taxpayer on the accrual basis can, in computing its net operating loss for one year, deduct the amount of excess profits taxes which were paid in that year but had accrued in an earlier year. The years 1944 and 1945 were years of profit for the taxpayer. For the years 1946 and 1947, the taxpayer incurred net operating losses which were allowed by the Commissioner as carry-back deductions to the years 1944 and 1945. The taxpayer sought to augment its net operating loss for 1946 by the amount of excess profits taxes which it paid in 1946 on account of its 1945 excess profits tax liability. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner. 18 T. C. 1245. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 215 F. 2d 518. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted (348 U. S. 895) to resolve the conflict with the Olympic Radip case. Our views, as expressed in the latter case, coincide with those of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the judgment. There is present in this case a point not involved in the Olympic Radio case. The question is whether the excess profits tax that may be offset against 1944 net income is the amount of excess profits tax reported for the year in question or the amount ultimately found to be due. The taxpayer claims it is the former; the Commissioner, the latter. The question centers on § 122 (b)(1) and § 122 (d) (6). As we have.seen in the Olympic Radio case, § 122 (b)(1) directs that the net operating loss for a given year be carried back to the two preceding taxable years. And § 122 (d) (6) allows as a deduction “the amount of tax imposed by Subchapter E of Chapter 2 [i. e., the excess profits tax] paid or accrued within the taxable year . . ..” (Italics added.) The taxpayer’s net income for 1944, as shown by its return, was $827,852.99; and, as finally determined, was $584,866.81. The excess profits tax due according to its 1944 return was $625,561.59. The Commissioner, after allowing as a deduction a net operating loss carry-back of $164,326.38 arising in 1946, and making other adjustments, ultimately determined the taxpayer’s excess profits tax liability for 1944 to be $280,540.33. The Commissioner computed the net income for 1944 at $304,326.48, that is, $584,866.81 minus $280,540.33. Since the net operating loss of $164,326.38 was less than $304,326.48, there was no loss to be carried back to 1945, as § 122 (b)(1) provides “. . . that the carry-back in the case of the first preceding taxable year shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such net operating loss over the net income for the second preceding taxable year . . . .” The taxpayer, however, contends that the excess profits 'tax “accrued” in 1944 is the tax shown on its return for that year, viz., $625,561.59. If this larger amount is the correct figure, then the deduction allowed against 1944 income will be so great as to leave a carry-back which can be deducted against 1945 income. The controversy turns on the meaning of the clause in §122 (d)(6) which reads, “the amount of tax imposed by Subchapter E of Chapter 2 . . . accrued within the taxable year . . . .” The Commissioner contends that the tax “imposed” is the tax ultimately determined to be due. The argument is that the taxpayer having once got back, through credit or refund, the difference between the amount of the tax “accrued” in 1944 and the amount finally determined to be due, no double benefit should be inferred. The double benefit, it is argued, should certainly be denied when the figure upon which it is based has no economic reality. But the rule that general equitable considerations do not control the measure of deductions or tax benefits cuts both ways. It is as applicable to the Government as to the taxpayer. Congress may be strict or lavish in its allowance of deductions or tax benefits. The formula it writes may be arbitrary and harsh in its applications. But where the benefit claimed by the taxpayer is fairly within the statutory language and the construction sought is in harmony with the statute as an organic whole, the benefits will not be withheld from the taxpayer though they represent an unexpected windfall. See Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630. When Congress wrote the word “imposed” into § 122 (d)(6), it might have used it in one of two different senses — either to identify the tax or to define the amount of the tax that is to be levied and collected. We think that Congress used “imposed” in the former sense. In the first place, the deduction allowed by § 122 (d) (6) is not the tax “imposed” by Subchapter E of Chapter 2. It is “the amount of tax imposed by Subchapter E of Chapter 2 . . . accrued within the taxable year.” The word “imposed” when used in conjunction with “accrued” makes tolerably clear that “imposed” merely identifies or describes the tax that “accrued.” That is to say, the sentence as a whole indicates that “imposed” is used merely by way of reference. It seems clear that Congress had that understanding. The Senate Finance Committee reported: “Section 122 of the Code, relating to computation of the net operating loss deduction allowed by section 23 (s) of the Code, is amended so as to allow the excess profits tax paid or accrued within taxable years (subject to certain rules) as a deduction in computing net operating loss for, and net operating loss carry-over and carry-back from, such taxable years.” S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 67. And see H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 65. That indicates that the test of deductibility under § 122 (d) (6) is whether the tax “accrued” within the taxable year. Secondly, the general section dealing with deductions, § 23, allows deductions for taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year, with certain specified exceptions. § 23 (c). Some of the excepted taxes are identified by well-known names, e. g., federal income taxes, estate, inheritance, legacy, succession, and gift taxes. See § 23 (c) (1) (A), (D). Other taxes excepted are identified by reference to the taxes “imposed” by certain provisions of the law. Thus § 23 (c) (1) (B) excepts “war-profits and excess-profits taxes imposed by . . . Subchapter E of Chapter 2.” The applicable Treasury Regulation indicates that the word “imposed” identifies the tax. It provides: “Subject to the exception stated in this section . . . taxes imposed by the United States . . . are deductible from gross income for the year in which paid or accrued.” 26 CFR § 39.23 (c)-1. Section 23 is especially relevant here, since the language of § 122 (d) (6) was taken almost verbatim from § 23. That section as amended by the Revenue Act of 1941 had provided that, in computing net income, a deduction for taxes “paid or accrued within the taxable year” should be allowed. As respects the excess profits tax, § 23 (c) (2) provided: “For the purposes of this subsection, in the case of the excess-profits tax imposed by Subchapter E of Chapter 2— “(A) The deduction shall be limited to the .tax imposed for the taxable year . . . .” (Italics added.) It would seem that (A) would have limited the § 122 (d)(6) adjustment to the tax finally paid. But (A) was omitted from §122 (d)(6). The word “imposed” as used in the quantitative sense was dropped, while the word “imposed” as used to identify the tax was retained. Finally, the tax that “accrued” within a given year is not the tax finally determined to be due but the tax before ultimate adjustments are made. That is elementary in tax law. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U. S. 281, 284. It would seem therefore that the concept “accrued” embodies the annual accounting principle. If, in case of a taxpayer on the accrual basis, events after the taxable year are taken into account, the word “accrued” would be effectively read out of § 122 (d) (6) or given a varied meaning, contrary to our ruling in the Olympic Radio case. It is true that the computations under § 122 are designed to spread losses over a five-year period. But we are concerned with a technical concept that is being used as the basis of the formula for that reallocation. We find no justification for taking “accrued” as used in § 122 (d) (6) to mean one thing in the setting of the Olympic Radio case and another in this situation. Our conclusion is in accord with a line of related decisions. The whole tax scheme has been posited on the basis that the duty to pay is without regard to the deduction made available by the carry-back. See Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U. S. 561, 567. Only recently we applied that principle to the excess profits tax. In United States v. Koppers Co., 348 U. S. 254, we held that these taxes were payable in full the year when they were due and that interest was payable on the amounts so due, even though ultimately portions of the taxes were abated. In short, the amount of tax accrued within the taxable year under § 122 (d)(6) is to be determined in accord with the normal accounting concepts relevant to the accrual basis. That amount is not, of course, to be ascertained solely by reference to the figure set forth in the taxpayer’s return, for that figure may be erroneously computed on the accrual basis. But when an amount is arrived at by proper application of recognized accounting principles on the accrual basis, the test of § 122 (d) (6) has been met. Events and transactions of later years, irrelevant to a determination of income on the accrual basis, do not warrant alteration of the figure computed under § 122 (d) (6) for the year in question. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 122 (b)(1) provides: “If for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941, the taxpayer has a net operating loss, such net operating loss shall be a net operating loss carry-back for each of the two preceding taxable years, except that the carry-back in the case of the first preceding taxable year shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of such net operating loss over the net income for the second preceding taxable year computed (A) with the exceptions, additions, and limitations provided in subsection (d)(1), (2), (4), and (6), and (B) by determining the net operating loss deduction for such sécond preceding taxable year without regard to such net operating loss.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTHEASTERN PROMOTIONS, LTD. v. CONRAD et al. No. 73-1004. Argued October 17, 1974 Decided March 18, 1975 Henry P. Monaghan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was John Alley. Randall L. Nelson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Eugene N. Collins. Irwin Karp filed a brief for the Authors League of America, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Me. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Cour.t. The issue in this case is whether First Amendment rights were abridged when respondents denied petitioner the use of a municipal facility in Chattanooga, Tenn., for the showing of the controversial rock musical “Hair.” It is established, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the States the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 162 (1943). I Petitioner, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., is a New York corporation engaged in the business of promoting and presenting theatrical productions for profit. On October 29, 1971, it applied for the use of the Tivoli, a privately owned Chattanooga theater under long-term lease to the city, to present “Hair” there for six days beginning November 23. This was to be a road company showing of the musical that had played for three years on Broadway, and had appeared in over 140 cities in the United States. Respondents are the directors of the Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium, a municipal theater. Shortly after receiving Southeastern's application, the directors met, and, after a brief discussion, voted to reject it. None of them had seen the play or read the script, but they understood from outside reports that the musical, as produced elsewhere, involved nudity and obscenity on stage. Although no conflicting engagement was scheduled for the Tivoli, respondents determined that the production would not be “in the best interest of the community.” Southeastern was so notified but no written statement of reasons was provided. On November 1 petitioner, alleging that respondents' action abridged its First Amendment rights, sought a preliminary injunction from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Respondents did not then file an answer to the complaint. A hearing was held on November 4. The District Court took evidence as to the play's content, and respondent Conrad gave the following account of the board’s decision: “We use the general terminology in turning down the request for its use that we felt it was not in the best interest of the community and I can’t speak beyond that. That was the board’s determination. “Now, I would have to speak for myself, the policy to which I would refer, as I mentioned, basically indicates that we will, as a board, allow those productions which are clean and healthful and culturally uplifting, or words to that effect. They are quoted in the original dedication booklet of the Memorial Auditorium.” App. 25. The court denied preliminary relief, concluding that petitioner had failed to show that it would be irreparably harmed pending a final judgment since scheduling was “purely a matter of financial loss or gain” and was compensable. Southeastern some weeks later pressed for a permanent injunction permitting it to use the larger auditorium, rather than the Tivoli, on Sunday, April 9, 1972. The District Court held three days of hearings beginning April 3. On the issue of obscenity vel non, presented to an advisory jury, it took evidence consisting of the full script and libretto, with production notes and stage instructions, a recording of the musical numbers, a souvenir program, and the testimony of seven witnesses who had seen the production elsewhere. The jury returned a verdict that “Hair” was obscene. The District Court agreed. It concluded that conduct in the production— group nudity and simulated sex — would violate city ordinances and state statutes making public nudity and obscene .acts criminal offenses. This criminal conduct, the court reasoned, was neither speech nor symbolic .speech, and was to be viewed separately from the musical’s speech elements. Being pure conduct, comparable to rape or murder, it was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Accordingly, the court denied the injunction. 341 F. Supp. 465 (1972). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. 486 F. 2d 894 (1973). The majority relied primarily on the lower court’s reasoning. Neither the judges of the Court of Appeals nor the District Court saw the musical performed. Because of the First Amendment overtones, we granted certiorari. 415 U. S. 912 (1974). Petitioner urges reversal on the grounds that (1) respondents’ action constituted an unlawful prior restraint, (2) the courts below applied an incorrect standard for the determination of the issue of obscenity vel non, and (3) the record does not support a finding that “Hair” is obscene. We do not reach the latter two contentions, for we agree with the first. We hold that respondents’ rejection of petitioner’s application to use this public forum accomplished a prior restraint under a system lacking in constitutionally required minimal procedural safeguards. Accordingly, on this narrow ground, we reverse. II Respondents’ action here is indistinguishable in its censoring effect from the official actions consistently identified as prior restraints in a long line of this Court’s decisions. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 150-151 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293-294 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161-162 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938). In these cases, the plaintiffs asked the courts to provide relief where public officials had forbidden the plaintiffs the use of public places to say what they wanted to say. The restraints took a variety of forms, with officials exercising control over different kinds of public places under the authority of particular statutes. All, however, had this in common: they gave public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression. Invariably, the Court has felt obliged to condemn systems in which the exercise of such authority was not bounded by precise and clear standards. The reasoning has been, simply, that the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum’s use. Our distaste for censorship — reflecting the natural distaste of a free people — is deep-written in our law. In each of the cited cases the prior restraint was embedded in the licensing system itself, operating without acceptable standards. In Shuttlesworth the Court held unconstitutional a Birmingham ordinance which conferred upon the city commission virtually absolute power to prohibit any “parade,” “procession,” or “demonstration” on streets or public ways. It ruled that “a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional.” 394 U. S., at 150-151. In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939), a Jersey City ordinance that forbade public assembly in the streets or parks without a permit from the local director of safety, who was empowered to refuse the permit upon his opinion that he would thereby prevent “ 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage/ ” was held void on its face. Id., at 516 (opinion of Roberts, J.). In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), a unanimous Court held invalid an act which proscribed the solicitation of money or any valuable thing for "any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause” unless that cause was approved by the secretary of the public welfare council. The elements of the prior restraint were clearly set forth: “It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an application to the secretary of the public welfare council of the State; that he is empowered to determine whether the cause is a religious one, and that the issue of a certificate depends upon his affirmative action. If he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime. He is not to issue a certificate as a matter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion.” Id., at 305. The elements of prior restraint identified in Cantwell and other cases were clearly present in the system by which the Chattanooga board regulated the use of its theaters. One seeking to use a theater was required to apply to the board. The board was empowered to determine whether the applicant should be granted permission — in effect, a license or permit — on the basis of its review of the content of the proposed production. Approval of the application depended upon the board's affirmative action. Approval was not a matter of routine; instead, it involved the “appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion” by the board. The board's judgment effectively kept the musical off stage. Respondents did not permit the show to go on and rely on law enforcement authorities to prosecute for anything illegal that occurred. Rather, they denied the application in anticipation that the production would violate the law. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 735-738 (1971) (White, J., concurring). Respondents’ action was no less a prior restraint because the public facilities under their control happened to be municipal theaters. The Memorial Auditorium and the Tivoli were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities. There was no question as to the usefulness of either facility for petitioner’s production. There was no contention by the board that these facilities could not accommodate a production of this size. None of the circumstances qualifying as an established exception to the doctrine of prior restraint was present. Petitioner was not seeking to use a facility primarily serving a competing use. See, e. g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966). Nor was rejection of the application based on any regulation of time, place, or manner related to the nature of the facility or applications from other users. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 408 (1953). No rights of individuals in surrounding areas were violated by noise or any other aspect of the production. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). There was no captive audience. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298, 304, 306-308 (1974); Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 467-468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Whether petitioner might have used some other, privately owned, theater in the city for the production is of no consequence. There is reason to doubt on this record whether any other facility would have served as well as these, since none apparently had the seating capacity, acoustical features, stage equipment, and electrical service that the show required. Even if a privately owned forum had been available, that fact alone would not justify an otherwise impermissible prior restraint. “[0]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 163. Thus, it does not matter for purposes of this case that the board’s decision might not have had the effect of total suppression of the musical' in the community. Denying use of the municipal facility under the circumstances present here constituted the prior restraint. That restraint was final. It was no mere temporary bar while necessary judicial proceedings were under way. Only if we were to conclude that live drama is unprotected by the First Amendment — or subject to a totally different standard from that applied to other forms of expression- — could we possibly find no prior restraint here. Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969). By its nature, theater usually is the acting out — or singing out— of the written word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or conduct. But that is no reason to hold theater subject to a drastically different standard. For, as was said in Burstyn, supra, at 503, when the Court was faced with the question of what First Amendment standard applies to films: “[T]he basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for making an exception to that rule.” Ill Labeling respondents’ action a prior restraint does not end the inquiry. Prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 n. 10 (1963). See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 (1961). We have rejected the contention that the First Amendment’s protection “includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least once, any and every kind of motion picture . . . 'even if this film contains the basest type of pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful overthrow of orderly government... .” Id., at 46-47. Any system of prior restraint, however, “comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S., at 70; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S., at 714; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 181 (1968); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S., at 716. The presumption against prior restraints is heavier — and the degree of protection broader — than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law; a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). In order to be held lawful, respondents’ action, first, must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints, and, second, must have been accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S., at 71. We do not decide whether the performance of “Hair” fits within such an exception or whether, as a substantive matter, the board’s standard for resolving that question was correct, for we conclude that the standard, whatever it may have been, was not implemented by the board under a system with appropriate and necessary procedural safeguards. The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint “avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.” Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58 (1965). See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 367 (1971); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 419-421 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1968). See also Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 489-490 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S., at 70-71; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436 (1957). In Freedman the Court struck down a state scheme for the licensing of motion pictures, holding “that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.” 380 U. S., at 58. We held in Freedman, and we reaffirm here, that a system of prior restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it lacks certain safeguards: First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured. Although most of our cases have pertained to motion picture licensing or censorship, this Court has applied Freedman to the system by which federal customs agents seize imported materials, United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, and to that by which postal officials restrict use of the mails, Blount v. Rizzi, supra. In Blount we held unconstitutional provisions of the postal laws designed to control use of the mails for commerce in obscene materials. The provisions enabled the Postmaster General to halt delivery of mail to an individual and prevent payment of money orders to him. The administrative order became effective without judicial approval, and the burden of obtaining judicial review was placed upon the user. If a scheme that restricts access to the mails must furnish the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman, no less must be expected of a system that regulates use of a public forum. Respondents here had the same powers of licensing and censorship exercised by postal officials in Blount, and by boards and officials in other cases. The theory underlying the requirement of safeguards is applicable here with equal if not greater force. An administrative board assigned to screening stage productions — and keeping off stage anything not deemed culturally uplifting or healthful — may well be less responsive than a court, an independent branch of government, to constitutionally protected interests in free expression. And if judicial review is made unduly onerous, by reason of delay or otherwise, the board's determination in practice may be final. Insistence on rigorous procedural safeguards under these circumstances is “but a special instance of the larger principle that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S., at 66. Because the line between unconditionally guaranteed speech and speech that may be legitimately regulated is a close one, the “separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for . . . sensitive tools.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S., at 525. The perils of prior restraint are well illustrated by this case, where neither the Board nor the lower courts could have known precisely the extent of nudity or simulated sex in the musical, or even that either would appear, before the play was actually performed. Procedural safeguards were lacking here in several respects. The board's system did not provide a procedure for prompt judicial review. Although the District Court commendably held a hearing on petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction within a few days of the board's decision, it did not review the merits of the decision at that time. The question at the hearing was whether petitioner should receive preliminary relief, i. e., whether there was likelihood of success on the merits and whether petitioner would suffer irreparable injury pending full review. Effective review on the merits was not obtained until more than five months later. Throughout, it was petitioner, not the board, that bore the burden of obtaining judicial review. It was petitioner that had the burden of persuasion at the preliminary hearing if not at the later stages of the litigation. Respondents did not file a formal answer to the complaint for five months after petitioner sought review. During the time prior to judicial determination, the restraint altered the status quo. Petitioner was forced to forgo the initial dates planned for the engagement and to seek to schedule the performance at a later date. The delay and uncertainty inevitably discouraged use of the forum. The procedural shortcomings that form the basis for our decision are unrelated to the standard that the board applied. Whatever the reasons may have been for the board’s exclusion of the musical, it could not escape the obligation to afford appropriate procedural safeguards. We need not decide whether the standard of obscenity applied by respondents or the courts below was sufficiently precise or substantively correct, or whether the production is in fact obscene. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U. S. 153 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972). The standard, whatever it may be, must be implemented under a system that assures prompt judicial review with a minimal restriction of First Amendment rights necessary under the circumstances. Reversed. Twice previously, petitioner informally had asked permission to use the Tivoli, and had been refused. In other cities, it had encountered similar resistance and had successfully sought injunctions ordering local officials to permit use of municipal facilities. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F. 2d 340 (CA5 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F. 2d 1016 (CA5 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CA10 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345 (WDNC 1971) ; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634 (ND Ga. 1971). See also P. B. I. C., Inc. v. Byrne, 313 F. Supp. 757 (Mass. 1970), vacated and remanded for further consideration, 413 U. S. 905 (1973). But see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, Civil Action No. 72-105 (WD Okla. Mar. 27, 1972), rev’d, 459 F. 2d 282, supra. The musical had been presented in two Tennessee cities, Memphis and Nashville. Code of the city of Chattanooga § 2-238. The board’s members are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city’s board of commissioners. § 2-237. The chairman, respondent Conrad, is commissioner of public utilities, grounds, and buildings. § 2-236. Neither did it file at that time a formal motion to dismiss. That motion was made later, on November 22, some time after the initial hearing. An answer was finally filed, pursuant to court order, on March 31, 1972. The Memorial Auditorium, completed in 1924, was dedicated to the memory of Chattanooga citizens who had “offered their lives” in World War I. The booklet referred to is entitled Souvenir of Dedication of Soldiers & Sailors Auditorium Chattanooga, Tenn. It contains the following: “It will be [the board's] endeavor to make [the auditorium] the community center of Chattanooga; where civic, educational, religious, patriotic and charitable organizations and associations may have a common meeting place to discuss and further the upbuilding and general welfare of the city and surrounding territory. “It will not be operated for profit, and no effort to obtain financial returns above the actual operating expenses will be permitted. Instead its purpose will be devoted for cultural advancement, and for clean, healthful, entertainment which will make for the upbuild-ing of a better citizenship.” Exhibit 2, p. 40. Chattanooga Code: “Sec. 6-4. Offensive, indecent entertainment. “It shall be unlawful for any person to hold, conduct or carry on, or to cause or permit to be held, conducted or carried on any motion picture exhibition or entertainment of any sort which is offensive to decency, or which is of an obscene, indecent or immoral nature, or so suggestive as to be offensive to the moral sense, or which is calculated to incite crime or riot.” “Sec. 25-28. Indecent exposure and conduct. “It shall be unlawful for any person in the city to appear in a public place in a state of nudity, or to bathe in such state in the daytime in the river or any bayou or stream within the city within sight of any street or occupied premises; or to appear in public in an indecent or lewd dress, or to do any lewd, obscene or indecent act in any public place.” Tennessee Code Ann. (Supp. 1971): “39-1013. Sale or loan of material to minor — Indecent exhibits. — It shall be unlawful: “(a) for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary consideration or otherwise exhibit or make available to a minor: “(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body, which depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors; “(2) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however reproduced, or sound recording, which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (1) hereof above, or which contains explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors; “(b) for any person knowingly to exhibit to a minor for a monetary consideration, or knowingly to sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or otherwise to admit a minor to premises whereon there is exhibited a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors.” “39-3003. Obscene material — Knowingly selling, distributing or exhibiting — Penalty.—It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly sell, distribute, display, exhibit, possess with the intent to sell, distribute, display or exhibit; or to publish, produce, or otherwise create with the intent to sell, distribute, display or exhibit any obscene material.” Subsequent to our grant of the petition for certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that § 39-3007 of the Tennessee Code, which defined “obscene material,” as those words were used in § 39-3003 and related sections, was unconstitutional for failure to satisfy the specificity requirements of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 510 S. W. 2d 258 (1974). Thereafter, a new obscenity statute, Acts 1974 (Adj. S), c. 510, was enacted by the Tennessee Legislature; § 14 of that act specifically repealed the above quoted § 39-3003. Respondents also contended that production of the musical would violate the standard lease that petitioner would be required to sign. The relevant provision of that lease reads: “This agreement is made and entered into upon the following express covenants and conditions, all and every one of which the lessee hereby covenants and agrees to and with the lessor to keep and perform: “1. That said lessee will comply with all laws of the United States and of the State of Tennessee, all ordinances of the City of Chattanooga, and all rules and requirements of the police and fire departments or other municipal authorities of the City of Chattanooga.” Exhibit 3. With respect to petitioner’s musical, respondents’ determination was that the production would not be "in the best interest of the community.” That determination may have been guided by other criteria: (1) their own requirement, in the words of respondent Conrad, that a production be “clean and healthful and culturally uplifting,” App. 25; or (2) the provisions of the statutes and ordinances prohibiting public nudity and obscenity. Whether or not their exercise of discretion was sufficiently controlled by law, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147 (1969), there can be no doubt that approval of an application required some judgment as to^ the content and quality of the production. Also important, though unessential to our conclusion, are the classificatory aspects of the board’s decision. A licensing system need not effect total suppression in order to create a prior restraint. In Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U. S. 676, 688 (1968), it was observed that the evils attendant on prior restraint “are not rendered less objectionable because the regulation of expression is one of classification rather than direct suppression.” In that case, the Court held that a prior restraint was created by a system whereby an administrative board in Texas classified films as “suitable for young persons” or “not suitable for young persons.” The “not suitable” films were not suppressed, but exhibitors were required to have special licenses and to advertise their classification in order to show them. Similarly, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 (1963), the Court held that a system of “informal censorship” working by exhortation and advice sufficiently inhibited expression to constitute a prior restraint and warrant injunctive relief. There, the Court held unconstitutional a system in which a commission was charged with reviewing material “manifestly tending to the corruption of the youth”; it did not have direct regulatory or suppressing functions, but operated by persuasion and intimidation, and these informal methods were found effective. In the present ease, the board classified the musical as unfit for showing in municipal facilities. It did not make a point of publicizing its finding that “Hair” was not in the “best interest” of the public, but the classification stood as a warning to all concerned, private theater owners and general public alike. There is little in the record to indicate the extent to which the board's action may have affected petitioner’s ability to obtain a theater and attract an audience. The board’s classification, whatever the magnitude of its effect, was not unlike that in Interstate Circuit and Bantam Books. This case is clearly distinguishable from Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483 (1973). There, state authorities seized a copy of a film, temporarily, in order to preserve it as evidence. Id,., at 490. The Court held that there was not “any form of ‘final restraint,’ in the sense of being enjoined from, exhibition or threatened with destruction.” Ibid. Here, the board did not merely detain temporarily a copy of the script or libretto for the musical. Respondents reached a final decision to bar performance. See Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 522-524 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648, 656-659 (1955). There was testimony that the musical as performed differed “substantially” from the script, App. 79-80, and that the show was varied to fit the anticipated tastes of different audiences in different parts of the country. Id., at 93. The musical's nude scene, apparently the most controversial portion, was played under varying conditions. No actor was under contractual obligation to perform it, and the number doing so changed from one performance to another, as did the lighting, and the duration of the scene. Id., at 97-98, 23.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al. v. FRISCO TRANSPORTATION CO. No. 15. Argued October 13, 1958. Decided December 15, 1958 Peter T. Beardsley argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 15 and 16. With him on a brief for appellants in No. 15 were Gregory M. Rebman and Wentworth E. Griffin. Carroll J. Donohue, Clarence M. Mulholland, James L. Highsaw, Jr. and Edward J. Hickey, Jr. filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association et al., appellants in No. 16. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission. With him on the brief was ■ Charlie H. Johns, Jr. Ernest D. Grinnell, Jr. argued the causes for appellee. With him on the brief were James L. Homire, John E. McCullough, Alvin J. Baumann and Bernard G. Ostmann. Solicitor General Rankin filed a memorandum for the United States. Together with No. 16, Railway Labor Executives’ Association et al. v. Frisco Transportation Co., and No. 19, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Frisco Transportation Co., also on appeals from the same Court. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue here is whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power to modify certificates of public convenience and necessity containing inadvertent errors, and, if so, whether, in the circumstances of these cases, the Commission could modify certificates which had inadvertently authorized the performance of unrestricted motor carrier services by a wholly owned subsidiary of a railroad. Appellee, a wholly owned subsidiary of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, is a common carrier by motor vehicle engaged primarily in the transportation of property in interstate and intrastate commerce. The greater part of appellee’s motor carrier system was acquired in 1938 and 1939 by the purchase of existing independent motor carriers. These purchases were made pursuant to the predecessor of § 5 (2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(b), which permits the acquisition by a rail carrier of the rights and properties of a motor carrier if the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that the acquisition “will be consistent with the public interest and will enable such [rail] carrier to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition.” In 1938, appellee began seeking permission to operate as a motor carrier over substantial mileage in seven States including routes in issue here. On some of the routes eventually acquired by appellee, the Commission authorized it to carry on unrestricted operations. On others, the Commission imposed restrictions limiting service to points within ten miles of the rail stations of appellee’s parent corporation or to transportation of shipments from, to, or through certain cities. In addition, on some routes the Commission imposed additional restrictions to assure that appellee’s service would be “auxiliary or supplementary” to the services performed by its corporate parent. This case concerns four of appellee’s routes aggregating some 284 miles. Prior to appellee’s purchase, each of the routes was serviced by an independent motor carrier which engaged in unrestricted motor carrier operations. During 1938 and 1939, appellee made application to the Commission for permission to purchase the properties and operating rights of these independent carriers. Finance hearings were held before a Commission examiner to determine whether the acquisitions met the applicable statutory standards. Although appellee sought to continue the acquired carriers’ unrestricted operations, it represented to the Commission in each of its applications that acquisition of the carriers would enable it to establish coordinated truck service with the train servicé of its parent railroad along these routes. A number of motor carriers opposed appellee’s applications, but the hearing examiner recommended approval of each, subject to various conditions. Among these was the recommendation that the authority granted be subject “to such further limitations, restrictions, or modifications as the Commission may hereafter find necessary to impose, in order to insure that the service shall be auxiliary or supplementary to the train service of the [parent] railroad, and shall not unduly restrain competition.” The protestant motor carriers filed exceptions to the hearing examiner’s report on one of the purchases and all went to Division 5 of the Commission for action. It reviewed the reports and adopted the examiner’s recommendations including the above-quoted condition. Although appellee had asked for authority to operate unrestricted service, it took no exceptions to the Division reports and did not ask for review by the full Commission. Rather, it notified the Commission that it would consummate the approved purchases subject to the terms prescribed, and, within thirty days of the reports, it did consummate the transactions and commence operations. Thereafter, in 1939, compliance orders issued to appellee in connection with the four routes in question. These informed appellee that certificates of convenience and necessity authorizing it to engage in interstate and foreign commerce as a common carrier according to specifications set forth in the orders would be issued as soon as appellee complied with applicable statutory requirements, including the filing of rate publications and evidence of security for the protection of the public. The specifications in the compliance orders did not include the condition adopted by Division 5 reserving the right to the Commission to take steps to insure that appellee’s service would be “auxiliary or supplementary” to its parent’s rail services. In 1941, prior to the issuance of certificates covering the four routes, a complaint was filed by various competing motor carriers which charged that appellee was performing unauthorized motor carrier service which was independent of its parent’s rail services. During the course of this proceeding, a number of certificates of convenience and necessity issued to appellee. Those concerning the four routes in question contained no reservations of authority similar to the ones stated in the finance hearing orders issued by Division 5. On August 1, 1944, Division 5 entered findings in that proceeding stating that appellee was performing unauthorized direct motor carrier service which it had not been authorized to perform by the original acquisition orders. The Division further stated that appellee’s original authorization had been limited to services “auxiliary or supplementary” to the rail service of its parent. Because appellee had acquired unconditional certificates, however, the Division did not enter an order, but indicated that the acquisition proceedings would be reopened to determine what, if any, conditions should be imposed in appellee’s certificates. Subsequently, the Commission disapproved the Division’s findings that appellee had engaged in operations unauthorized by its certificates, but it stated that the conditions, if any, which should be imposed would be considered in the reopened proceedings. The reopened proceedings commenced on motion of the Division in 1945. All parties to the proceeding were served with an examiner’s proposed report based on the records of the Commission. This report stated that the Commission had approved appellee’s acquisitions subject to the right to impose conditions to assure that appellee’s operations would be auxiliary or supplementary to the rail service of its parent, but that such a reservation inadvertently had been omitted from the certificates issued to appellee. The report proposed specific conditions to effectuate the original purpose of the Commission — i. e., to assure that appellee’s services were solely “auxiliary or supplementary.” Appellee filed exceptions to the proposed report and requested hearings. Thereupon, the Division reopened the proceedings for further hearings which were held in 1946, after which the matter was referred to examiners for further appropriate proceedings. In an exhaustive report, the examiners discussed the history of appellee’s operations and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the unconditioned certificates. They concluded that the certificates could not authorize operations broader than those approved by the Commission in the finance proceedings and that the certificates inadvertently had omitted relevant restrictions. The Division, in its report, reviewed the Commission’s administrative procedures and practices and pointed out how the error probably had occurred. It showed that certificates are prepared by a staff section of the Commission which, after a prescribed lapse of time from the adoption of reports or orders by the Commission authorizing the issuance of certificates, inserts on mimeographed forms containing stock paragraphs the authority described in the findings of the report. It further stated that, under the Commission rules, this staff section has no discretion to alter anything contained in the reports and is charged with the sole responsibility of transposing the Commission findings into certificate form. Different action, if any, which might be desired can only be taken by the Commission or a Division through a formal supplemental report. The certificates are reviewed by a supervisor, who is also without discretionary authority to make changes, and are then issued. The Division reasoned that as no supplemental report had issued between the conclusion of the finance hearings and the issuance of the certificates, the staff section of certificates obviously had made an inadvertent error in transposing the relevant findings. The full Commission, after oral argument, stressed another aspect of the matter in affirming the action of the Division. In its view, the findings of the finance proceedings which specifically authorized appellee’s purchases, subject to the stated limitations, could not be changed to eliminate such limitations without a formal proceeding at which opponents of the unlimited application could be heard. Each opinion within the Commission thus found that the omission from the certificates of the stated reservations had been due to clerical inadvertence which should be corrected. These corrections were ordered, and in addition specified conditions were imposed consistent with the reservations. Appellee, dissatisfied with the Commission’s final order, commenced an action before a specially convened three-judge District Court to have the order set aside. 28 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq. Appellee argued, and a majority of the court concluded, over a dissent of one of its members, that under United States v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., 350 U. S. 927, the Commission was without power to order modification of the unconditional certificates issued to appellee. Further, the court held that the record lacked substantial evidence to support the Commission finding that the relevant restrictions were omitted from the certificates due to inadvertency. 153 F. Supp. 572. We disagree with both of these conclusions. I. It is well settled that the Commission has the power to reserve in certificates issued to a rail-affiliated motor carrier the right to impose specific conditions to assure that the carrier’s operations will be “auxiliary or supplementary” to the rail services of its affiliate. United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 340 U. S. 419. In that case a certificate, which contained a reservation similar to the one at question here, was issued in 1941. The reason for the reservation is obvious. Congress, in § 5 (2) (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(b), has limited the acquisition of motor carrier franchises by rail carriers or their affiliates to situations where the acquisition will enable the rail carrier to use service by motor carrier to public advantage. The Commission has long interpreted this mandate to confine such acquisitions to “operations which are auxiliary or supplementary to train service/’ at least in the absence of special circumstances which might justify less restricted operations. American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 355 U. S. 141, 148, n. 8. To accomplish this congressional purpose, the Commission can either state in the certificate the conditions necessary to provide the limitation or reserve the right to impose conditions should the necessity arise. United States v.Rock Island Motor Transit Co., supra. Here, as the record shows, appellee sought the right to carry on unrestricted operations over all the routes which it was acquiring. In some instances, the Commission approved unconditioned operations for reasons which do not appear in the record. In others, however, including the four routes here at issue, approval of only conditional service was granted. Such approval was consistent with appellee’s representations that acquisition of the routes would enable it to give service which supplemented the operations of its rail-carrier parent. In fact, the limited approval did not appear inconsistent with appellee’s plans, for it took no appeal from the Division report adopting the order of the Commission examiner which clearly stated that the Commission reserved the right to impose future conditions. And appellee consummated the proposed purchases within thirty days of the Division report. Undoubtedly, therefore, at the time of the finance proceedings, the Commission authorized limited operations on the routes in question, to which appellee acceded. Between two and four years later, the Commission issued certificates to appellee which did not contain the reservation. The question arises, therefore, whether the omission of the restrictions from the certificates was due to a conscious policy choice on the part of the Commission or, as found by it, to error in the administrative process of fashioning the certificates. Certainly a conclusion must be based on one or the other of these alternatives because, as is obvious from the findings of Division 5 as well as the full Commission, the staff section of the Commission which prepared the certificates could not exercise discretion in changing the findings, orders and authorizations contained in the Commission reports. The majority below concluded that the omissions resulted from a policy change, and that the subsequent reopening of the proceedings and conditioning of the certificates was an attempt to restrict appellee’s operation on the basis of newly developed policies. The record does not support this conclusion. The District Court believed it significant that Division 5 only adopted the recommendations of a hearing examiner rather than authoring approval orders of its own. Additionally, the court found special meaning in the fact that one of the certificates issued to appellee contained the relevant reservation while the ones in issue did not. Further, the court viewed the issuance of unrestricted certificates after the commencement of the related carrier proceedings in 1941 as especially important. Viewing these facts, the court refused to accept the majority conclusion of inadvertence. In our view, however, the Commission conclusion is well supported. First, we see no special significance in the fact that Division 5 adopted, without modification, the hearing examiner’s recommendations. Under the practices of the Commission, this is not unusual, see, e. g., 53 M. C. C. 97; 53 M. C. C. 117; 46 M. C. C. 328; and the hearing examiner’s report made it clear that appellee’s operations were to be circumscribed. Second, there is nothing in the record or in the dissenting opinions of the Commission to indicate that the Commission, or a Division, or any Commissioner instructed the staff to delete the restrictions and increase the scope of appellee’s operations. This factor militates strongly in favor of the Commission’s conclusion that the reservations inadvertently were omitted, particularly when it would have been improper for the Commission td change its decision without notice to the protestants who had appeared before the hearing examiner in opposition at the original finance proceedings and had taken exception to at least one of the purchases. 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (b); 5 U. S. C. § 1004. Cf. Federal Communications Comm’n v. National Broadcasting Co. (KOA), 319 U. S. 239. Third, the issuance of one restricted certificate is not inconsistent with the Commission finding because, had the Commission changed its policies, it likely would have treated the route there involved similarly to the four routes in question. In fact, the issuance of this restricted certificate really supports the conclusion that the others were not issued because of a change of policy. Also, the Commission’s exposition of its internal procedures shows how the error could easily have occurred. Finally, as the dissent below points out, at the time these certificates were issued, the staff sections of the Commission normally dealt with certificates authorizing unrestricted service by non-rail-affiliated motor carriers. The certificates issued here were, therefore, unusual, and it is easy to see how the restrictions were omitted. 153 F. Supp. 572, 578-579. Under all these circumstances, the conclusion of the Commission was compelled by the record. Appellee complains that the Commission, or at least Division 5, improperly took official notice of the internal administrative practices and procedures of the Commission. The first full exposition of these procedures appeared in the report of Division 5 in the reopened proceedings, although certain of them had been mentioned in the hearing examiners’ reports. Appellee claims that the Commission had to disclose these procedures at the hearing so that it would have a chance to rebut unfavorable inferences which might be drawn from them. But we fail to see what prejudice could have accrued from taking official notice of the practices, for appellee had adequate opportunity to rebut inferences drawn from them on its argument to the full Commission. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U. S. 515. Particularly is this true where there is no showing that the procedures were misstated to appellee’s prejudice. This is not a case like Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U. S. 292, or United States v. Abilene & Southern R. Co., 265 U. S. 274, where the “facts” officially noticed were in doubt or controverted or were discussed for the first time in the final decision of the Commission. II. The remaining question is whether the Commission has the power to modify certificates issued due to inadvertence. This Court has, on one occasion, reserved this question in a case where it determined that inadvertence was not the reason for the failure to issue a proper certificate. United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424. And on another occasion, in affirming the decision of a three-judge court, we ruled that the power, if any, may only be exercised after proper opportunity for notice and hearing. United States v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., 350 U. S. 927. It is axiomatic that cou'rts have the power and the duty to correct judgments which contain clerical errors or judgments which have issued due to inadvertence or mistake. Gagnon v. United States, 193 U. S. 451. Rule 60 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes this power and specifically provides that “[clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” A similar power is vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission. Section 17 (3) of the Act creating the Commission, 49 U. S. C. § 17 (3), provides that: “The Commission shall conduct its proceedings under any provision of law in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” This broad enabling statute, in our opinion, authorizes the correction of inadvertent ministerial errors. To hold otherwise would be to say that once an error has occurred the Commission is powerless to take remedial steps. This would not, as Congress provided, “best conduce to the ends of justice.” In fact, the presence of authority in administrative officers and tribunals to correct such errors has long been recognized— probably so well recognized that little discussion has ensued in the reported cases. Bell v. Hearne, 19 How. 252. Of course, the power to correct inadvertent ministerial errors may not be used as a guise for changing previous decisions because the wisdom of those decisions appears doubtful in the light of changing policies. Such was the case in United States v. Seatrain Lines, supra, where it was apparent that the Commission had not reopened prior proceedings to correct a mistake in the issuance of a certificate but to execute a subsequently adopted policy. Cf. Watson Bros. Transportation Co. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 905 (D. C. Neb.), aff’d 350 U. S. 927. To allow the reopening of proceedings in such a case under the pretext of correction would undercut the obvious purpose of § 212 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 312, which makes the issuance of a certificate the final step in the administrative process. But nothing in that Section prohibits the correction of inadvertent errors. Here, as we have shown, the certificates issued to appellee mistakenly omitted an intended provision, and the Commission’s subsequent action was not the execution of a newly adopted policy but, as it found in a proceeding in which appellants participated after notice, merely the correction of the inadvertence. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed Mr. Justice Whittaker, believing that the evidence does not support the Commission’s finding that omission of restrictions from the four certificates of convenience and necessity involved was due to mere inadvertent clerical errors of the Commission’s staff, would affirm the judgment of the District Court. 153 F. Supp. 572. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, § 213, 49 Stat. 556, conditioned acquisitions as follows: “Provided, however, That if a carrier other than a motor carrier is an applicant, or any person which is controlled by such a carrier other than a motor carrier or affiliated therewith within the meaning of Section 5 (8) of part I, the Commission shall not enter such an order unless it finds that the transaction proposed will promote the public interest by-enabling such carrier other than a motor carrier to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition.” The Commission has long interpreted the language of § 5 (2) (b), quoted above, to confine acquisitions of motor carriers by railroads or their affiliates to operations which are auxiliary or supplementary to the train service of the railroad. See American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 355 U. S. 141, 148. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., v. Frisco Transportation Co., 43 M. C. C. 641. Campbell Sixty-Six Express, Inc., v. Frisco Transportation Co., 46 M. C. C. 222. The appellants in Nos. 15 and 16, American Trucking Associations, Inc., and Railway Labor Executives’ Association, urge us to hold that the Commission was without power/to issue unconditioned certificates to appellee because of the requirements of § 5 (2) (b) and, therefore, the certificates issued to appellee were void. We have not had occasion to rule definitively whether that Section states rigid requirements that operations of rail-affiliated motor carriers be auxiliary or supplementary to train service. Cf. American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 355 U. S. 141. As resolution of the question is unnecessary for the present decision, we intimate no position with regard to it. See Motor Carrier Act of 1935, § 213, 49 Stat. 556. The reopened proceedings originally involved six routes. The certificate covering one of these contained a reservation of authority, and conditions imposed in connection with that route are not at issue here. On another route, the Commission’s original approval was unconditional as was the certificate issued in connection with it. The Commission has abandoned efforts to impose new conditions on this route. See also Davis, Administrative Law (1951), 600. And the agencies have presumed the existence of such power. See Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation — Interpretation of Certificate, 53 M. C. C. 85; Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. R. Q. Black, doing business as Superior Trucking Co., 51 M. C. C. 717; Greyhound Corporation Extension of Operations—Slidell, La., 47 M. C. C. 103; Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company Extension of Operations — New Mexico Points, 46 M. C. C. 775; Pan American Airways, Inc., North Atlantic Route Amendments, 7 C. A. B. 849.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WITHROW ET AL. v. LARKIN No. 73-1573. Argued December 18, 1974 Decided April 16, 1975 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Betty R. Brown, Solicitor General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the brief were Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and LeRoy L. Dalton, Assistant Attorney General. Robert H. Friebert argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The statutes of the State of Wisconsin forbid the practice of medicine without a license from an Examining Board composed of practicing physicians. The statutes also define and forbid various acts of professional misconduct, proscribe fee splitting, and make illegal the practice of medicine under any name other than the name under which a license has issued if the public would be misled, such practice would constitute unfair competition with another physician, or other detriment to the profession would result. To enforce these provisions, the Examining Board is empowered under Wis. Stat. Ann. §§448.17 and 448.18 (1974) to warn and reprimand, temporarily to suspend the license, and “to institute criminal action or action to revoke license when it finds probable cause therefor under criminal or revocation statute ....” When an investigative proceeding before the Examining Board was commenced against him, appellee brought this suit against appellants, the individual members of the Board, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the statutes. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, the appellants appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. S. 943 (1974). I Appellee, a resident of Michigan and licensed to practice medicine there, obtained a Wisconsin license in August 1971 under a reciprocity agreement between Michigan and Wisconsin governing medical licensing. His practice in Wisconsin consisted of performing abortions at an office in Milwaukee. On June 20, 1973, the Board sent to appellee a notice that it would hold an investigative hearing on July 12,1973, under Wis. Stat. Ann. § 448.17 to determine whether he had engaged in certain proscribed acts. The hearing would be closed to the public, although appellee and his attorney could attend. They would not, however, be permitted to cross-examine witnesses. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the Board would decide “whether to warn or reprimand if it finds such practice and whether to institute criminal action or action to revoke license if probable cause therefor exists under criminal or revocation statutes.” App. 14. On July 6, 1973, appellee filed his complaint in this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order preventing the Board from investigating him and from conducting the investigative hearing. The District Court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. On July 12, 1973, appellants moved to dismiss the complaint. On the same day, appellee filed an amended complaint in which injunctive relief was sought on the ground that Wis. Stat. Ann. §§448.17 and 448.18 were unconstitutional and that appellants’ acts with respect to him violated his constitutional rights. The District Court again denied appellee’s motion for a temporary restraining order, but did not act upon appellants’ motion to dismiss. On July 30, 1973, appellants submitted an amended motion to dismiss. The Board proceeded with its investigative hearing on July 12 and 13, 1973; numerous witnesses testified and appellee’s counsel was present throughout the proceedings. Appellee’s counsel was subsequently informed that appellee could, if he wished, appear before the Board to explain any of the evidence which had been presented. App. 36-37. On September 18, 1973, the Board sent to appellee a notice that a “contested hearing” would be held on October 4, 1973, to determine whether appellee had engaged in certain prohibited acts and that based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing the Board would determine whether his license would be suspended temporarily under Wis. Stat. Ann. §448.18 (7). Appellee moved for a restraining order against the contested hearing. The District Court granted the motion on October 1, 1973. Because the Board had moved from purely investigative proceedings to a hearing aimed at deciding whether suspension of appellee’s license was appropriate, the District Court concluded that a substantial federal question had arisen, namely, whether the authority given to appellants both “to investigate physicians and present charges [and] to rule on those charges and impose punishment, at least to the extent of reprimanding or temporarily suspending” violated appellee’s due process rights. Appellee’s motion to request the convening of a three-judge court was also granted, and appellants’ motion to dismiss was denied. 368 F. Supp. 793, 795-796 (ED Wis. 1973). The Board complied and did not go forward with the contested hearing. Instead, it noticed and held a final investigative session on October 4, 1973, at which appellee’s attorney, but not appellee, appeared. The Board thereupon issued “Findings of Fact,” “Conclusions of Law,” and a “Decision” in which the Board found that appellee had engaged in specified conduct proscribed by the statute. The operative portion of its “Decision” was the following: “Within the meaning of sec. 448.17, Stats., it is hereby determined that there is probable cause to believe that licensee has violated the criminal provisions of ch. 448, Stats., and that there is probable cause for an action to revoke the license of the licensee for engaging in unprofessional conduct. “Therefore, it is the decision of this Board that the secretary verify this document and file it as a verified complaint with the District Attorney of Milwaukee County in accordance with sec. 448.18 (2), Stats., for the purpose of initiating an action to revoke the license of Duane R. Larkin, M. D., to practice medicine and surgery in the State of Wisconsin and initiating appropriate actions for violation of the criminal laws relating to the practice of medicine.” App. 59-60. On November 19, 1973, the three-judge District Court found (with an opinion following on December 21, 1973) that § 448.18 (7) was unconstitutional as a violation of due process guarantees and enjoined the Board from enforcing it. Its holding was: “[F]or the board temporarily to suspend Dr. Lark-in’s license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation would constitute a denial to him of his rights to procedural due process. Insofar as § 448.18 (7) authorizes a procedure wherein a physician stands to lose his liberty or property, absent the intervention of an independent, neutral and detached decision maker, we concluded that it was unconstitutional and unenforceable.” 368 F. Supp. 796, 797 (ED Wis. 1973). Judgment was entered on January 31, 1974, by which it was “Ordered and Adjudged that § 448.18 (7), Wis. Stats., is unconstitutional and that the defendants are preliminarily enjoined until further notice from utilizing the provisions of §448.18 (7), Wis. Stats.” Appellants took an appeal from that decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on June 10, 1974. Subsequently, on July 25, 1974, the District Court, at the initial suggestion of appellants but joined in by a cross-motion of appellee, modified its judgment so as to withdraw its declaration of unconstitutionality and to enjoin the enforcement of § 448.18 (7) against appellee only. The amended judgment declared that appellee would suffer irreparable injury if the statute were applied to him and that his challenge to the statute’s constitutionality had a high likelihood of success. II Appellants correctly assert that the District Court’s initial judgment conflicted with this Court’s holding in Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310 (1940), that a state statute should not be declared unconstitutional by a district court if a preliminary injunction is granted a plaintiff to protect his interests during the ensuing litigation. “The question before [the District Court] was not whether the act was constitutional or unconstitutional . . . but was whether the showing made raised serious questions, under the federal Constitution . . . and disclosed that enforcement of the act, pending final hearing, would inflict irreparable damages upon the complainants.” Id., at 316. The January 31, 1974, judgment should not have declared § 448.18 (7) unconstitutional and it erroneously enjoined the Board from utilizing the section against any licensee. The District Court, however, has subsequently modified its judgment to eliminate the declaration of unconstitutionality and to enjoin application of the statute only as against appellee. Since appellants are no longer forbidden to apply the statutes to other persons, this issue in the case has been effectively settled. We have also concluded that the amended judgment makes inappropriate extended treatment of appellants' contentions that the District Court failed to make the findings and conclusions required by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 (a), and failed to include in the order granting the injunction the reasons for its issuance as required by Rule 65 (d). The District Court's opinion and initial judgment were deficient in this respect, but its amended judgment found what the court said was contained in its prior opinion — that appellee would suffer irreparable injury if the statute were to be applied against him and that appellee’s “challenge to the constitutionality of said statute has a high likelihood of success.” Cf. Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 456 (1973). While a decision to vacate and remand for fuller emendation of the findings, conclusions, and judgment would be justified in view of their lack of specificity, we doubt that such action, in the circumstances present here, would add anything essential to the determination of the merits. The District Court’s decision turned upon the sequence of functions followed by appellants and not upon any factual issue peculiar to this case. We have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and a remand at this juncture would be a costly procedure to emphasize points that have already been made and recognized by both parties as well as by the District Court. Ill The District Court framed the constitutional issue, which it addressed as being whether “for the board temporarily to suspend Dr. Larkin’s license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation would constitute a denial to him of his rights to procedural due process.” 368 F. Supp., at 797. The question was initially answered affirmatively, and in its amended judgment the court asserted that there was a high probability that appellee would prevail on the question. Its opinion stated that the “state medical examining board [did] not qualify as [an independent] decisionmaker [and could not] properly rule with regard to the merits of the same charges it investigated and, as in this case, presented to the district attorney.” Id., at 798. We disagree. On the present record, it is quite unlikely that appellee would ultimately prevail on the merits of the due process issue presented to the District Court, and it was an abuse of discretion to issue the preliminary injunction. Concededly, a “fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955). This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Gibson v„ Berry- hill, 411 U. S. 564, 579 (1973). Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” In re Murchison, supra, at 136; cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532 (1927). In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions, necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Very similar claims have been squarely rejected in prior decisions of this Court. In FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948), the Federal Trade Commission had instituted proceedings concerning the respondents’ multiple basing-point delivered-price system. It was demanded that the Commission members disqualify themselves because long before the Commission had filed' its complaint it had investigated the parties and reported to Congress and to the President, and its members had testified before congressional committees concerning the legality of such a pricing system. At least some of the members had disclosed their opinion that the system was illegal. The issue of bias was brought here and confronted “on the assumption that such an opinion had been formed by the entire membership of the Commission as a result of its prior official investigations.” Id., at 700. The Court rejected the claim, saying: “[T]he fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject of the respondents’ basing point practices. Here, in contrast to the Commission’s investigations, members of the cement industry were legally authorized participants in the hearings. They produced evidence — volumes of it. They were free to point out to the Commission by testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and by arguments, conditions of the trade practices under attack which they thought kept these practices within the range of legally permissible business activities.” Id., at 701. In specific response to a due process argument, the Court asserted: pressed an opinion as to whether certain types of conduct were prohibited by law. In fact, Judges frequently try the same case more than once and decide identical issues each time, although these issues involve questions both of law and fact. Certainly, the Federal Trade Commission cannot possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this respect than a court.” Id., at 702-703 (footnote omitted). “No decision of this Court would require us to hold that it would be a violation of procedural due process for a judge to sit in a case after he had ex- This Court has also ruled that a hearing examiner who has recommended findings of fact after rejecting certain evidence as not being probative was not disqualified to preside at further hearings that were required when reviewing courts held that the evidence had been erroneously excluded. NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U. S. 219, 236-237 (1947). The Court of Appeals had decided that the examiner should not again sit because it would be unfair to require the parties to try “issues of fact to those who may have prejudged them . . . .” 151 F. 2d 854, 870 (CA8 1945). But this Court unanimously reversed, saying: “Certainly it is not the rule of judicial administration that, statutory requirements apart... a judge is disqualified from sitting in a retrial because he was reversed on earlier rulings. We find no warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they ruled strongly against a party in the first hearing.” 330 U. S., at 236-237. More recently we have sustained against due process objection a system in which a Social Security examiner has responsibility for developing the facts and making a decision as to disability claims, and observed that the challenge to this combination of functions “assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 410 (1971). That is not to say that there is nothing to the argument that those who have investigated should not then adjudicate. The issue is substantial, it is not new, and legislators and others concerned with the operations of administrative agencies have given much attention to whether and to what extent distinctive administrative functions should be performed by the same persons. No single answer has been reached. Indeed, the growth, variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have made any one solution highly unlikely. Within the Federal Government itself, Congress has addressed the issue in several different ways, providing for varying degrees of separation from complete separation of functions to virtually none at all. For the generality of agencies, Congress has been content with § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 554 (d), which provides that no employee engaged in investigating or prosecuting may also participate or advise in the adjudicating function, but which also expressly exempts from this prohibition “the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency.” It is not surprising, therefore, to find that “[t] he case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due process . . . .” 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02, p. 175 (1958). Similarly, our cases, although they reflect the substance of the problem, offer no support for the bald proposition applied in this case by the District Court that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from adjudicating. The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle. Appellee relies heavily on In re Murchison, supra, in which a state judge, empowered under state law to sit as a “one-man grand jury” and to compel witnesses to testify before him in secret about possible crimes, charged two such witnesses with criminal contempt, one for perjury and the other for refusing to answer certain questions, and then himself tried and convicted them. This Court found the procedure to be a denial of due process of law not only because-the judge in effect became part of the prosecution and assumed an adversary position, but also because as a judge, passing on guilt or innocence, he very likely relied on “his own personal knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand jury room,” an impression that “could not be tested by adequate cross-examination.” 349 U. S., at 138. Plainly enough, Murchison has not been understood to stand for the broad rule that the members of an administrative agency may not investigate the facts, institute proceedings, and then make the necessary adjudications. The Court did not purport to question the Cement Institute case, supra, or the Administrative Procedure Act and did not lay down any general principle that a judge before whom an alleged contempt is committed may not bring and preside over the ensuing contempt proceedings. The accepted rule is to the eontrary. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 584 — 585 (1964); Nilva v. United States, 352 U. S. 385, 395-396 (1957). Nor is there anything in this case that comes within the strictures of Murchison. When the Board instituted its investigative procedures, it stated only that it would investigate whether proscribed conduct had occurred. Later in noticing the adversary hearing, it asserted only that it would determine if violations had been committed which would warrant suspension of appellee’s license. Without doubt, the Board then anticipated that the proceeding would eventuate in an adjudication of the issue; but there was no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias or prejudgment than inhered in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate. Of course, we should be alert to the possibilities of bias that may lurk in the way particular procedures actually work in practice. The processes utilized by the Board, however, do not in themselves contain an unacceptable risk of bias. The investigative proceeding had been closed to the public, but appellee and his counsel were permitted to be present throughout; counsel actually attended the hearings and knew the facts presented to the Board. No specific foundation has been presented for suspecting that the Board had been prejudiced by its investigation or would be disabled from hearing and deciding on the basis of the evidence to be presented at the contested hearing. The mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investigative procedures is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board members at a later adversary hearing. Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators “are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 421 (1941). We are of the view, therefore, that the District Court was in error when it entered the restraining order against the Board’s contested hearing and when it granted the preliminary injunction based on the untenable view that it would be unconstitutional for the Board to suspend appellee’s license “at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from its own investigation.....” The contested hearing should have been permitted to proceed. IV Nor do we think the situation substantially different because the Board, when it was prevented from going forward with the contested hearing, proceeded to make and issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law asserting that there was probable cause to believe that appellee had engaged in various acts prohibited by the Wisconsin statutes. These findings and conclusions were verified and filed with the district attorney for the purpose of initiating revocation and criminal proceedings. Although the District Court did not emphasize this aspect of the case before it, appellee stresses it in attempting to show prejudice and prejudgment. We are not persuaded. Judges repeatedly issue arrest warrants on the basis that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person named in the warrant has committed it. Judges also preside at preliminary hearings where they must decide whether the evidence is sufficient to hold a defendant for trial. Neither of these pretrial involvements has been thought to raise any constitutional barrier against the judge's presiding over the criminal trial and, if the trial is without a jury, against making the necessary determination of guilt or innocence. Nor has it been thought that a judge is disqualified from presiding over injunction proceedings because he has initially assessed the facts in issuing or denying a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. It is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and it does not violate due process of law. We should also remember that it is not contrary to due process to allow judges and administrators who have had their initial decisions reversed on appeal to confront and decide the same questions a second time around. See Cement Institute, 333 U. Sat 702-703; Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U. S., at 236-237. Here, the Board stayed within the accepted bounds of due process. Having investigated, it issued findings and conclusions asserting the commission of certain acts and ultimately concluding that there was probable cause to believe that appellee had violated the statutes. The risk of bias or prejudgment in this sequence of functions has not been considered to be intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position. Indeed, just as there is no logical inconsistency between a finding of probable cause and an acquittal in a criminal proceeding, there is no incompatibility between the agency filing a complaint based on probable cause and a subsequent decision, when all the evidence is in, that there has been no violation of the statute. Here, if the Board now proceeded after an adversary hearing to determine that appellee’s license to practice should not be temporarily suspended, it would not implicitly be admitting error in its prior finding of probable cause. Its position most probably would merely reflect the benefit of a more complete view of the evidence afforded by an adversary hearing. The initial charge or determination of probable cause and the ultimate adjudication have different bases and purposes. The fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation. Clearly, if the initial view of the facts based on the evidence derived from nonadversarial processes as a practical or legal matter foreclosed fair and effective consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing leading to ultimate decision, a substantial due process question would be raised. But in our view, that is not this case. That the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Findings of that kind made by judges with special insights into local realities are entitled to respect, but injunctions resting on such factors should be accompanied by at least the minimum findings required by Rules 52 (a) and 65 (d). The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. “No person shall practice or attempt or hold himself out as authorized to practice medicine, surgery, or osteopathy, or any other system of treating the sick as the term ‘treat the sick’ is defined in s. 445.01 (l)(a), without a license or certificate of registration from the examining board, except as otherwise specifically provided by statute.” Wis. Stat. Ann. §448.02 (1). “The examining board shall investigate, hear and act upon practices by persons licensed to practice medicine and surgery under s. 488.06, that are inimical to the public health. The examining board shall have the power to warn and to reprimand, when it finds such practice, and to institute criminal action or action to revoke license when it finds probable cause therefor under criminal or revocation statute, and the attorney general may aid the district attorney in the prosecution thereof.” § 448.17. “A license or certificate of registration may be temporarily suspended by the examining board, without formal proceedings, and its holder placed on probation for a period not to exceed 3 months where he is known or the examining board has good cause to believe that such holder has violated sub. (1). The examining board shall not have authority to suspend a license or certificate of registration, or to place a holder on probation, for more than 2 consecutive 3-month periods. All examining board actions under this subsection shall be subject to review under ch. 227.” §448.18 (7). Section 448.18 (l)(g) prohibits “engaging in conduct unbecoming a person licensed to practice or detrimental to the best interests of the public.” Fee splitting is proscribed by §448.23 (1). Section 448.02 (4) regulates the use of a name by a physician in his practice other than the name under which he was licensed. Appellee maintains that he has legal and factual defenses to all charges made against him. Brief for Appellee 28-29, n. 13. The notice indicated that the hearing would be held “to determine whether the licensee has engaged in practices that are inimical to the public health, whether he has engaged in conduct unbecoming a person licensed to practice medicine, and whether he has engaged in conduct detrimental to the best interests of the public.” App. 14. Apart from his claim that the tribunal at the contested hearing would be biased, appellee has not contended that that hearing would not be a full adversary proceeding. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 227.07-227.21. See also Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 218, 208 N. W. 2d 839, 844 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1137 (1974); Margoles v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 47 Wis. 2d 499, 508-511, 177 N. W. 2d 353, 358-359 (1970). No issue has been raised concerning the circumstances, if any, in which the Board could suspend a license without first holding an adversary hearing. The notice stated that the hearing would be held “to determine whether the licensee has practiced medicine in the State of Wisconsin under any other Christian or givefn name or any other surname than that under which he was originally licensed or registered to practice medicine in this state, which practicing has operated to unfairly compete with another practitioner, to mislead the public as to identity, or to otherwise result in detriment to the profession or the public, and more particularly, whether the said Duane Larkin, M. D., has practiced medicine in this state since September 1, 1971, under the name of Glen Johnson.” It would also “determine whether the licensee has permitted persons to practice medicine in this state in violation of sec. 448.02 (1), Stats., more particularly whether the said Duane Larkin, M. D., permitted Young Wahn Ahn, M. D., an unlicensed physician, to perform abortions at his abortion clinic during the year 1972.” Finally the Board would “determine whether the said Duane Larkin, M. D., split fees with other persons during the years 1971, 1972, and 1973 in violation of sec. 448.23 (1).” App. 45-46. Appellee unsuccessfully sought a temporary restraining order against this hearing. See Record on Appeal, Entry 21. The modified judgment reads as follows: “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants are preliminarily enjoined until further notice from utilizing the provisions of §448.18 (7), Wis. Stats., against the plaintiff, Duane Larkin, M. D., on the grounds that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if said statute were to be applied against him, and that the plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of said statute has a high likelihood of success.” Suggestion of Mootness or in the Alternative Motion to Reconsider Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 21-22. See n. 6, supra. Appellants contend in addition that appellee’s motion for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief did not state with particularity the grounds for such relief as required by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 7 (b), and that the motion went beyond the subject matter of the action since the amended complaint challenged only the conducting of the ex parte investigative hearing by the Board. Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that whatever deficiencies appellee’s motion might have had, they are insufficient to require reversal of the District Court decision giving injunctive relief. We also find that the motion was within the subject matter of the case as defined by the amended complaint. See App. 23. Appellants also contend that appellee offered no evidence upon which injunctive relief could be based. This case, however, turns upon questions of law and not upon complicated factual issues, and the District Court has found both that appellee’s challenge to § 448.18 (7) has a high likelihood of success on the merits and that appellee would be irreparably injured absent injunctive relief. If the District Court is correct in its constitutional premise that an agency which has investigated possible offenses cannot fairly adjudicate the legal and factual issues involved, then its conclusion that appellee would suffer irreparable injury by having his license temporarily suspended by such an agency is not irrational, and we will not disturb it. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 577 n. 16 (1973). Finally, we do not agree with appellants’ contention that the District Court should have entirely refrained from deciding the merits of this case and from interfering with the state administrative proceeding. Id., at 575-577. “In addition, the plaintiff requests that the modified judgment should recite specific grounds not previously included in the judgment but contained in the earlier memorandum decision of this court. We conclude that the plaintiff’s position is well taken.” Suggestion of Mootness or in the Alternative Motion to Reconsider Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 19. See n. 6, supra. See Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U. S. 473, 476-477 (1974); Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383, 388-389 (1970). “Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.” Under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, a three-judge district court is required for entering a preliminary or permanent injunction against, the enforcement of a state statute on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of the law. That requirement includes preliminary injunctions against enforcement of state statutes based on “a high likelihood of success” of the constitutional challenge to the statutes. See Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452 (1973); Goldstein v. Cox, 396. U. S. 471 (1970); Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U. S. 310 (1940). After the District Court made its decision, the Board altered its procedures. It now assigns each new cáse to one of the members for investigation, and the remainder of the Board has no contact with the investigative process. Affidavit of John W. Rupel, M. D., Suggestion of Mootness or in the Alternative Motion to Reconsider Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 7. That change, designed .to accommodate the Board’s procedures to the District Court’s decision, does not affect this case. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 579; Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). Cf. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U. S. 145 (1968). Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488, 501-503 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455 (1971); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 578-579, n. 2 (1968). Cf. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U. S. 575, 584 (1964). The decisions of the Courts of Appeals touching upon this question of bias arising from a combination of functions are also instructive. In Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F. 2d 349 (CA1 1962), the Civil Aeronautics Board had the responsibility of making an accident report and also reviewing the decision of a trial examiner that the pilot involved in the accident should have his airline transport pilot rating suspended. The pilot claimed that his right to procedural due process had been violated by the fact that the Board was not an impartial tribunal in deciding his appeal from the trial examiner’s decision since it had previously issued its accident report finding pilot error to be the probable cause of the crash. The Court of Appeals found the Board’s procedures to be constitutionally permissible: “[W]e cannot say that the mere fact, that a tribunal has had contact with a particular factual complex in a prior hearing, or indeed has taken a public position on the facts, is enough to place that tribunal under a constitutional inhibition to pass upon the facts in a subsequent hearing. We believe that more is required. Particularly is this so in the instant case where the Board’s prior contact with the case resulted from its following the Congressional mandate to investigate and report the probable cause of all civil air accidents.” Id., at 358. See also Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F. 2d 512 (CA4 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F. 2d 67, 79-80 (CA10 1972), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 909 (1974); Intercontinental Industries v. American Stock Exchange, 452 F. 2d 935 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 842 (1972); FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 131 U. S. App. D. C. 331, 338, 404 F. 2d 1308, 1315 (1968); Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F. 2d 6, 17-18 (CA10 1967), modified on other grounds sub nom. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F. 2d 795, 801-802 (CA9 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 932 (1967); R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F. 2d 446, 452-453 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 991 (1967); SEC v. R. A. Holman & Co., 116 U. S. App. D. C. 279, 323 F. 2d 284, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 943 (1963). Those cases in which due process violations have been found are characterized by factors not present in the record before us in this litigation, and we need not pass upon their validity. In American Cyanimid Co. v. FTC, 363 F. 2d 757 (CA6 1966), one of the commissioners had previously served actively as counsel for a Senate subcommittee investigating many of the same facts and issues before the Federal Trade Commission for consideration. In Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 366, 336 F. 2d 754 (1964), vacated on other grounds,. 381 U. S. 739 (1965), the court found that a speech made by a commissioner clearly indicated that he had already to some extent reached a decision as to matters pending before that Commission. See also Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 152, 158-161, 425 F. 2d 583, 589-592 (1970). Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 113 U. S. App. D. C. 100, 306 F. 2d 260 (1962), presented a situation in which one of the members of the Securities and Exchange Commission had previously participated as an employee in the inves'tigation of charges pending before the Commission. In Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 102 U. S. App. D. C. 391, 254 F. 2d 90 (1958), a Civil Aeronautics Board member had signed a brief in behalf of one of the parties in the proceedings prior to assuming membership on the Board. See also King v. Caesar Rodney School District, 380 F. Supp. 1112 (Del. 1974). For state-court decisions dealing with issues similar to those involved in this case, see Koelling v. Board of Trustees, 259 Iowa 1185, 146 N. W. 2d 284 (1966); State v. Board of Medical Examiners, 135 Mont. 381, 339 P. 2d 981 (1959); Board of Medical Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 102 A. 2d 248 (1954). See also LeBow v. Optometry Examining Board, 52 Wis. 2d 569, 575, 191 N. W. 2d 47, 50 (1971); Kachian v. Optometry Examining Board, 44 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 170 N. W. 2d 743, 749 (1969). See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.04 (1958); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 11.14 (1970 Supp.). The statute provides in pertinent part: “An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency revi'ew pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not apply— “(A) in determining applications for initial licenses; “(B) to proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities, or practices of public utilities or carriers; or “(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency.” See also 2 K. Davis, supra, §§ 13.06-13.07. Appellee also relies upon statements made by the Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S., at 578-579, n. 2. In that case, however, unlike the present one, “the trier of fact was the same body that was also both the victim of appellant’s statements and the prosecutor that brought the charges aimed at securing his dismissal.” Ibid. In any event, the Court did not analyze the question raised by this case because the appellant in Pickering had not raised a due process contention in the state proceedings. The question of the constitutionality of combining in one agency both investigative and adjudicative functions in the same proceeding was raised but did not require answering in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 579 n. 17. It is asserted by appellants, Brief for Appellants 25 n. 9, and not denied by appellee that an agency employee performed the actual investigation and gathering of evidence in this case and that an assistant attorney general then presented the evidence to the Board at the investigative hearings. While not essential to our decision upholding the constitutionality of the Board’s sequence of functions, these facts, if true, show that the Board had organized itself internally to minimize the risks arising from • combining investigation and adjudication, including the possibility of Board members relying at later suspension hearings upon evidence not then fully subject to effective confrontation. Appellee does claim that state officials harassed him with litigation because he performed abortions. Brief for Appellee 8-9. He also has complained “about the notoriety of his case during the 'secret’ [Board] proceedings.” Id., at 20 n. 8. The District Court made no findings with respect to these allegations, and the record does not provide a basis for finding as an initial matter here that there was evidence of actual bias or prejudgment on the part of appellants. After the initial investigative hearing, appellee was also given the opportunity to appear before the Board to “explain” the evidence that had been presented to it. App. 37. See supra, at 41-42. “The Act does not and probably should not forbid the combination with judging of instituting proceedings, negotiating settlements, or testifying. What heads of agencies do in approving the institution of proceedings is much like what judges do in ruling on demurrers or motions to dismiss. When the same examiner conducts a pre-hearing conference and then presides at the hearing, the harm, if any, is slight, and it- probably goes more to impairment of effectiveness in mediation than to contamination of judging. If deciding officers may consult staff specialists who have not testified, they should be allowed to consult those who have testified; the need here is not for protection against contamination but is assurance of appropriate opportunity to meet what is considered.” 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.11, p. 249 (1958). Quite apart from precedents and considerations concerning the constitutionality of a combination of functions in one agency, the District Court rested its decision upon Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). These decisions, however, pose a very different question. Each held that when review of an initial decision is mandated, the decision-maker must be other than the one who made the decision under review. Gagnon, supra, at 785-786; Morrissey, supra, at 485-486; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 271 (1970). Allowing a decisionmaker to review and evaluate his own prior decisions raises problems that are not present here. Under the controlling statutes, the Board is at no point called upon to review its own prior decisions. The District Court noted that the Board had presented its findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district attorney for the purpose of initiating any appropriate revocation or criminal proceedings, 388 F. Supp., at 798, but made little of it and apparently did not deem the transmittal to a third party critical in light of “local realities.” See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 579. The District Court is, of course, free to give further attention to this issue upon remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALEXANDER v. GARDNER-DENVER CO. No. 72-5847. Argued November 5, 1973 Decided February 19, 1974 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Paul J. Spiegelman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Russell Specter. Robert G. Good argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Keith A. Jones, Denis F. Gordon, Eileen M. Stein, Joseph T. Eddins, and Beatrice Rosenberg. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Milton A. Smith and Jay S. Siegel for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and by Gerard C. Smetana, Lawrence M. Cohen, and Alan Baywid for the American Retail Federation. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the proper relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective-bargaining agreements in the resolution and enforcement of an individual’s rights to equal employment opportunities under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Specifically, we must decide under what circumstances, if any, an employee’s statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. I In May 1966, petitioner Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black, was hired by respondent Gardner-Denver Co. (the company) to perform maintenance work at the company’s plant in Denver, Colorado. In June 1968, petitioner was awarded a trainee position as a drill operator. He remained at that job until his discharge from employment on September 29, 1969. The company informed petitioner that he was being discharged for producing too many defective or unusable parts that had to be scrapped. On October 1, 1969, petitioner filed a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement in force between the company and petitioner’s union, Local No. 3029 of the United Steelworkers of America (the union). The grievance stated: “I feel I have been unjustly discharged and ask that I be reinstated with full seniority and pay.” No explicit claim of racial discrimination was made. Under Art. 4 of the collective-bargaining agreement, the company retained “the right to hire, suspend or discharge [employees] for proper cause.” Article 5, § 2, provided, however, that “there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry,” and Art. 23, § 6 (a), stated that “[n]o employee will be discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just cause.” The agreement also contained a broad arbitration clause covering “differences aris[ing] between the Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement” and “any trouble aris[ing] in the plant.” Disputes were to be submitted to a multi-step grievance procedure, the first four steps of which involved negotiations between the company and the union. If the dispute remained unresolved, it was to be remitted to compulsory arbitration. The company and the union were to select and pay the arbitrator, and his decision was to be “final and binding upon the Company, the Union, and any employee or employees involved.” The agreement further provided that “[t]he arbitrator shall not amend, take away, add to, or change any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator’s decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement.” The parties also agreed that there “shall be no suspension of work” over disputes covered by the grievance-arbitration clause. The union processed petitioner’s grievance through the above machinery. In the final pre-arbitration step, petitioner raised, apparently for the first time, the claim that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination. The company rejected all of petitioner’s claims, and the grievance proceeded to arbitration. Prior to the arbitra-tionhearing, however, petitioner filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 5, 1969. At the arbitration hearing on November 20, 1969, petitioner testified that his discharge was the result of racial discrimination and informed the arbitrator that he had filed a charge with the Colorado Commission because he “could not rely on the union.” The union introduced a letter in which petitioner stated that he was “knowledgeable that in the same plant others have scrapped an equal amount and sometimes in excess, but by all logical reasoning I . . . have been the target of preferential discriminatory treatment.” The union representative also testified that the company’s usual practice was to transfer unsatisfactory trainee drill operators back to their former positions. On December 30, 1969, the arbitrator ruled that petitioner had been “discharged for just cause.” He made no reference to petitioner’s claim of racial discrimination. The arbitrator stated that the union had failed to produce evidence of a practice of transferring rather than discharging trainee drill operators who accumulated excessive scrap, but he suggested that the company and the union confer on whether such an arrangement was feasible in the present case. On July 25, 1970, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that there was not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seg., had occurred. The Commission later notified petitioner of his right to institute a civil action in federal court within 30 days. Petitioner then filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that his discharge resulted from a racially discriminatory employment practice in violation of § 703 (a) (1) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1). The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. 346 F. Supp. 1012 (1971). The court found that the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to petitioner. It then held that petitioner, having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement, was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the District Court’s opinion. 466 F. 2d 1209 (1972). We granted petitioner’s application for certiorari. 410 U. S. 925 (1973). We reverse. II Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 429-430 (1971). Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit. In the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, Congress amended Title VII to: provide the Commission with further authority to investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to institute civil actions against employers or unions named in a discrimination charge. Even in its amended form, however, Title VII does not provide the Commission with direct powers of enforcement. The Commission cannot adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions. Rather, final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts. The Act authorizes courts to issue injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy the effects of unlawful employment practices. 42 U. S. C. -§§ 2000e-5 (f) and (g) (1970 ed., Supp. II). Courts retain these broad remedial powers despite a Commission finding of no reasonable cause to believe that the Act has been violated. Mc Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 798-799. Taken together, these provisions make plain that federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with Title VII. In addition to reposing ultimate authority in federal courts, Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the enforcement process of Title VII. Individual grievants usually initiate the Commission’s investigatory and conciliatory procedures. And' although the 1972 amendment to Title VII empowers the Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. II). In such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices. Hutchings v. United States Industries, 428 F. 2d 303, 310 (CA5 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711, 715 (CA7 1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F. 2d 28, 33 (CA5 1968). See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968). Pursuant to this statutory scheme, petitioner initiated the present action for judicial consideration of his rights under Title VII. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held, however, that petitioner was bound by the prior arbitral decision and had no right to sue under Title VII. Both courts evidently thought that this result was dictated by notions of election of remedies and waiver and by the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes, as enunciated by this Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), and the Steelworkers trilogy. See also Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U. S. 368 (1974). We disagree. Ill Title VII does not speak expressly to the relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective-bargaining agreements. It does, however, vest federal courts with plenary powers to enforce the statutory requirements; and it specifies with precision the jurisdictional prerequisites that an individual must satisfy before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit. In the present case, these prerequisites were met when petitioner (1) filed timely a charge of employment discrimination with the Commission, and (2) received and acted upon the Commission’s statutory notice of the right to sue. 42 U. S. C. § § 2000e-5 (b), (e), and (f). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, at 798. There is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction. In addition, legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq., Congress indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to be of the “highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, at 402. Consistent with this view, Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several forums. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (EEOC); 42 U. S C. § 2000e-5 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (state and local agencies); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (federal courts). And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination. In sum, Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the District Court relied in part on the doctrine of election of remedies. That doctrine, which refers to situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or factually inconsistent, has no application in the present context. In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums. The resulting scheme is somewhat analogous to the procedure under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, where disputed transactions may implicate both contractual and statutory rights. Where the statutory right underlying a particular claim may not be abridged by contractual agreement, the Court has recognized that consideration of the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual dispute under the collective-bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent consideration of the claim by the National Labor Relations Board as an unfair labor practice charge or as a petition for clarification of the union’s representation certificate under the Act. Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U. S. 261 (1964). Cf. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962). There, as here, the relationship between the forums is complementary since consideration of the claim by both forums may promote the policies underlying each.. Thus, the rationale behind the election-of-remedies doctrine cannot support the decision below. We are also unable to accept the proposition that petitioner waived his cause of action under Title VII. To begin, we think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 (1956); Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). These rights are conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual’s right to equal employment opportunities. Title VII’s strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee’s rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953). The actual submission of petitioner’s grievance to arbitration in the present case does not alter the situation. Although presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement, mere resort to the arbitral forum to. enforce contractual rights constitutes no such waiver. Since an employee’s rights under Title VII may not be waived prospectively, existing contractual rights and remedies against discrimination must result from other concessions already made by the union as part of the economic bargain struck with the employer. It is settled law that no additional concession may be exacted from any employee as the price for enforcing those rights. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 332, 338-339 (1944). Moreover, a contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination. Both rights have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee. This point becomes apparent through consideration of the role of the arbitrator in the system of industrial self-government. As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance with the “industrial common law of the shop” and the various needs and desires of the parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties: “[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960). If an arbitral decision is based “solely upon the arbitrator’s view of the requirements of enacted legislation,” rather than on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement,- the arbitrator has “exceeded the scope of the submission,” and the award will not be enforced. Ibid. Thus the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights, and this authority remains regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII. IV The District Court and the Court of Appeals reasoned that to permit an employee to have his claim considered in both the arbitral and judicial forums would be unfair since this woiild mean that the employer, but not the employee, was bound by the arbitral award. In the District Court’s words, it could not “accept a philosophy which gives the employee two strings to his bow when the employer has only one.” 346 F. Supp., at 1019. This argument mistakes the effect of Title VII. Under the Steelworkers trilogy, an arbitral decision is final and binding on the employer and employee, and judicial review is limited as to both. But in instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator’s decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process. An employer does not have “two strings to his bow” with respect to an arbitral decision for the simple reason that Title VII does not provide employers with a cause of action against employees. An employer cannot be the victim of discriminatory employment practices. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F. 2d 569, 573 (CA9 1973). The District Court and the Court of Appeals also thought that to permit a later resort to the judicial forum would undermine substantially the employer’s incentive to arbitrate and would “sound the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts.” 346 F. Supp., at 1019. Again, we disagree. The primary incentive for an employer to enter into an arbitration agreement is the union’s reciprocal promise not to strike. As the Court stated in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S., at 248, “a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration.” It is not unreasonable to assume that most employers will regard the benefits derived from a no-strike pledge as outweighing whatever costs may result from according employees an arbitral remedy • against discrimination in addition to their judicial remedy under Title VII. Indeed, the severe consequences of a strike may make an arbitration clause almost essential from both the employees’ and the employer’s perspective. Moreover, the grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective-bargaining agreement remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for resolving a wide range of disputes, including claims of discriminatory employment practices. Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee. An employer thus has an incentive to make available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration which may satisfy an employee’s perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus saving the employer the expense and aggravation associated with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and arbitration may often eliminate those misunderstandings or discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate resort to the judicial forum. y Respondent contends that even if a preclusion rule is not adopted, federal courts should defer to arbitral decisions on discrimination claims where: (i) the claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim and to fashion a remedy. Under respondent’s proposed rule, a court would grant summary judgment and dismiss the employee’s action if the above conditions were met. The rule’s obvious consequence in the present case would be to deprive the petitioner of his statutory right to attempt to establish his claim in a federal court. At the outset, it is apparent that a deferral rule would be subject to many of the objections applicable to a preclusion rule. The purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal. Furthermore, we have long recognized that “the choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated.” U. S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U. S. 351, 359-360 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Respondent’s deferral rule is necessarily premised on the assumption that arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes and that Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition unlikely. Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation. Where the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the arbitrator must follow the agreement. To be sure, the tension between contractual and statutory objectives may be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement contains provisions facially similar to those of Title VII. But other facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574, 581-583 (1960). Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts. Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S., at 435-437. And as this Court has recognized, “[arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S., at 598. Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts. It is evident that respondent's proposed rule would not allay these concerns. Nor are we convinced that the solution lies in applying a more demanding deferral standard, such as that adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F. 2d 54 (1972). As respondent points out, a standard that adequately insured effectuation of Title VII rights in the arbitral forum would tend to make arbitration a procedurally complex, expensive, and time-consuming process. And judicial enforcement of such a standard would almost require courts to make de novo determinations of the employees' claims. It is uncertain whether any minimal savings in judicial time and expense would justify the risk to vindication of Title VII rights. A deferral rule also might adversely affect the arbitration system as well as the enforcement scheme of Title VII. Fearing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their rights under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass arbitration and institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well be more litigation, not less. We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII. The federal court should consider the employee’s claim de novo. The arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Article 4 of the agreement provided: “MANAGEMENT “The Union recognizes that all rights to manage the Plant, to determine the products to be manufactured, the methods of manufacturing or assembling, the scheduling of production, the control of raw materials, and to direct the working forces, including the right to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause, and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work or other legitimate reasons, and the right to maintain order and efficiency are vested exclusively in the Company. “It is understood by the parties that all rights recognized in this Article are subject to the terms of this Agreement.” Article 5 of the agreement provided: “MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY “Section 1. The parties agree that during the term of this Agreement there shall be no strike, slow-down or other interruption of production, and that for the same period there shall be no lockout, subject to the provisions of Article 26, Term of Agreement. “Section 2. The Company and the Union agree that there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry. The Company further states and the Union approves that no such discrimination shall be practiced against any applicant for employment.” Article 23, containing the grievance-arbitration procedures of the agreement, provided in relevant part : “Section 5. Should differences arise between the Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement, or should any trouble arise in the plant, there shall be no suspension of work, but an earnest effort shall be made by both the Company and the Union to settle such differences promptly. Grievances must be presented within five (5) working days after the date of the occurrence giving rise to the grievance or they shall be considered waived. Grievances shall be taken up in the following manner; except that any grievance filed by the Local Union shall be submitted in writing at Step 3 of the grievance procedure as set forth herein: “Step 1. An attempt shall first be made by the employee with or without his assistant grievance committeeman (at the employee’s option), and the employee’s foreman to settle the grievance. The foreman shall submit his answer within one (1) working day and if the grievance is not settled, it shall be reduced to writing, signed by the employee and his assistant grievance committeeman, and the foreman shall submit his signed answer of such grievance. “Step 2. If the grievance is not settled in Step 1, it shall be presented to the Superintendent, or his representative, within two (2) working days after the Union has received the Foreman’s answer in Step 1. The Superintendent or his representative shall submit his signed answer two (2) working days after receiving the grievance. “Step S. If the grievance is not settled in Step 2, it shall be presented to the manager of Manufacturing or his representative within five (5) working days after the Union has received the Superintendent’s answer in Step 2. The Manager of Manufacturing or his representative shall meet with the representatives of the Union to attempt to resolve the grievance within five (5) working days following the presentation of the grievance. The Manager of Manufacturing or his representative shall submit his signed answer within three (3) working days after the date of such meeting. “Step 4- If the grievance is not settled in Step 3, it shall be referred to the Personnel Manager, and/or his representatives, and the International representative and chairman of the grievance committee within five (5) working days after the Union has received the Step 3 answer. Within ten (10) working days after the grievance has been referred to Step 4, the above mentioned parties shall meet for the purpose of discussing such grievance. Within five (5) working days following the meeting, the Company representatives shall submit their signed answer to the Union. The Union representatives shall signify their concurrence or non-concurrence and affix their signatures to the grievance. “Step 5. Grievances which have not been settled under the foregoing procedure may be referred to arbitration by notice in writing within ten (10) calendar days after the date of the Company’s final answer in Step 4. Within five (5) days after receipt of referral to arbitration the parties shall select an impartial arbitrator. “Should the parties be unable to agree upon an arbitrator, the selection shall be made by the Senior Judge of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the Company, the Union, and any employee or employees involved. The expenses and fee of the arbitrator shall be divided equally between the Company and the Union. The arbitrator shall not amend, take away, add to, or change any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator’s decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the of this Agreement. “Section 6. (a) No employee will be discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just cause. “(g) Should it be determined that the employee has been unjustly suspended or discharged the Company shall reinstate the employee and pay full compensation at the employee’s basic hourly rate or earned rate, whichever is the higher, for the time lost.” In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied on petitioner's deposition acknowledging that he had raised the racial discrimination claim during the arbitration hearing. 346 F. Supp., at 1014. The District Court recognized that a conflict of authorities existed on this issue but chose to rely on Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324, 332 (CA6 1970), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 402 U. S. 689 (1971). There, the Sixth Circuit held that prior submission of an employee’s claim to arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement precluded a later suit under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit appears to have since retreated in part from Dewey by suggesting that there is no preclusion where both arbitration and “court or agency processes” are pursued simultaneously. See Spann v. Kaywood Division, Joanna Western Mills Co., 446 F. 2d 120, 122 (1971). The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have squarely rejected a preclusion rule. See Hutchings v. United States Industries, 428 F. 2d 303 (CA5 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d 711 (CA7 1969); Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F. 2d 569 (CA9 1973). United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (1960). In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), this Court held that a grievance-arbitration provision of a collective-bargaining agreement could be enforced against unions and employers under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185. The Court noted that the congressional policy, as embodied in §203 (d) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 154, 29 U. S. C. § 173 (d), was to promote industrial peace and that the grievance-arbitration provision of a collective agreement was a major factor in achieving this goal. 353 U. S., at 455. In the Steelworkers trilogy, the Court further advanced this policy by declaring that an order to arbitrate will not be denied “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra, at 582-583. The Court also stated that “so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra, at 599. And in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965), the Court held that grievance-arbitration procedures of a collective-bargaining agreement must be exhausted before an employee may file suit to enforce contractual rights. For the reasons stated in Parts III, IV, and V of this opinion, we hold that the federal policy favoring arbitration does not establish that an arbitrator’s resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory claim under Title VII. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866); 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871). For example, Commission action is not barred by “findings and orders” of state or local agencies. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. II). Similarly, an individual’s cause of action is not barred by a Commission finding of no reasonable cause to believe that the Act has been violated. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. II); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). For example, Senator Joseph Clark, one of the sponsors of the bill, introduced an interpretive memorandum which stated: “Nothing in title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights and obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act. . . . [T]itle VII is not intended to and' does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction.” 110 Cong Rec. 7207 (1964). Moreover, the Senate defeated an amendment which would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for most unlawful employment practices. 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-13652 (1964). And a similar amendment was rejected in connection with the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. See H. R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971). See also 2 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 2137, 2179, 2181-2182 (1972). The report of the Senate Committee responsible for the 1972 Act explained that neither the “provisions regarding the individual’s right to sue under title VII, nor any of the other provisions of this bill, are meant to affect existing rights granted under other laws.” S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the 1972 Act, see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 824 (1972). The District Court adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d, at 332, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 402 U. S. 689 (1971), which was apparently based in part on the doctrine of election of remedies. See n. 5, supra. The Sixth Circuit, however, later described Dewey as resting instead on the doctrine of equitable estoppel and on “themes of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F. 2d 743, 747 n. 1 (1971). Whatever doctrinal label is used, the essence of these holdings remains the same. The policy reasons for rejecting the' doctrines of election of remedies and waiver in the context of Title VII are equally applicable to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See generally 5A A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1214-1227 (1964 ed. and Supp. 1971). Most courts have recognized that the doctrine of election of remedies does not apply to suits under Title VII. See, e. g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F. 2d, at 714-715; Hutchings v. United States Industries, 428 F. 2d, at 314; Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 69, 80-81, 478 F. 2d 979, 990-991 (1973); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F. 2d 889, 893-894 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 918 (1972); Newman v. Avco Corp., supra, at 746 n. 1; Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F. 2d, at 572-573. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. As the Court noted in Carey: “By allowing the dispute to go to arbitration . . . those conciliatory measures which Congress deemed vital to 'industrial peace’ . . . and which may be dispositive of the entire dispute, are encouraged. The superior authority of the Board may be invoked at any time. Meanwhile the therapy of arbitration is brought to bear in a complicated and troubled area.” 375 U. S., at 272. Should disagreements arise between the Board and the arbitrator, the Board’s ruling would, of course, take precedence as to those issues within its jurisdiction. Ibid. Nor can it be maintained that election of remedies is required by the possibility of unjust enrichment through duplicative recoveries. Where, as here, the employer has prevailed at arbitration, there, of course, can be no duplicative recovery. But even in cases where the employee has first prevailed, judicial relief can be structured to avoid such windfall gains. See, e. g., Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., supra; Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra. Furthermore, if the relief obtained by the employee at arbitration were fully equivalent to that obtainable under Title VII, there would be no further relief for the court to grant and hence no need for the employee to institute suit. In this case petitioner and respondent did not enter into a voluntary settlement expressly conditioned on a waiver of petitioner’s cause of action under Title VII. In determining the effectiveness of any such waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee’s consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing. In no event can the submission to arbitration of a claim under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement constitute a binding waiver with respect to an employee’s rights under Title VII. See Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 30, 32-35 (1971); Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 545 (1967). As the late Dean Shulman stated: “A proper conception of the arbitrator’s function is basic. He is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure only, to administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement.” Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 999,1016 (1955). Brief for Respondent 37. Respondent's proposed rule is analogous to the NLRB’s policy of deferring to arbitral decisions on statutory issues in certain cases. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N. L. R. B. 1080, 1082 (1955). See also Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 40, 47-48 (1969); Platt, The Relationship between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 398 (1969). Significantly, a substantial proportion of labor arbitrators are not lawyers. See Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 Yale L. J. 1191, 1194 n. 28 (1968). This is not to suggest, of course, that arbitrators do not possess a high degree of competence with respect to the vital role in implementing the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. A further concern is the union’s exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U. S. 650 (1965). In arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 332 (1944). Moreover, harmony of interest between the union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made. See, e. g., Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944). And a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation may prove difficult to establish. See Vaca v. Sipes, supra; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 342, 348-351 (1964). In this respect, it is noteworthy that Congress thought it necessary to afford the protections of Title VII against unions as well as employers. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (c). In Rios, the court set forth the following deferral standard: “First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator unless the contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it must be plain that the arbitrator’s decision is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural infirmities. The burden of proof in establishing these conditions of limitation will be upon the respondent as distinguished from the claimant.” 467 F. 2d, at 58. For a discussion of the problems posed by application of the Rios standard, see Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitrators’ Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 421 (1974). We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since this must be determined in the court’s discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee’s Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RICHARDSON, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. WRIGHT et al. No. 70-161. Argued January 13, 1972 Decided Febrary 24, 1972 Assistant Attorney General Gray argued the cause for appellant in No. 70-151 and for appellee in No. 70-5211. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Kathryn H. Baldwin, Wilmot R. Hastings, Edwin H. Yourman, and Paul Merlin. Robert N. Sayler argued the cause and filed briefs for appellees in No. 70-161 and for appellants in No. 70-5211. Briefs of amici curiae in both cases were filed by Thomas L. Fike for the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County; by David H. Marlin and Jonathan A. Weiss for the National Council of Senior Citizens; and by Albert C. Neimeth for Luella H. Mills et al. Bernard P. Becker and Harvey N. Schmidt filed a brief for Stella Van Guilder et al. as amici curiae. Together with No. 70-5211, Wright et al. v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, also on appeal from the same court. Per Curiam. We noted probable jurisdiction of these appeals, 404 U. S. 819 (1971), to consider the applicability of Gold berg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), to the suspension and termination of disability benefit payments pursuant to § 225 of the Social Security Act, 70 Stat. 817, 42 U. S. C. § 425, and implementing regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Shortly before oral argument, we were advised that the Secretary had adopted new regulations, effective December 27, 1971, governing the procedures to be followed by the Social Security Administration in determining whether to suspend or terminate disability benefits. These procedures include the requirement that a recipient of benefits be given notice of a proposed suspension and the reasons therefor, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence. In light of that development, we believe that the appropriate course is to withhold judicial action pending reprocessing, under the new regulations, of the determinations here in dispute. If that process results in a determination of entitlement to disability benefits, there will be no need to consider the constitutional claim that claimants are entitled to an opportunity to make an oral presentation. In the context of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the District Court for the District of Columbia, 321 F. Supp. 383 (1971), with direction to that court to remand the cause to the Secretary and to retain jurisdiction for such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary upon completion of the administrative procedure. Vacated and remanded.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. CITY OF FULTON et al. No. 84-1725. Argued January 21, 1986 Decided April 7, 1986 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, David M. Cohen, and John W. Showalter. Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Ralph J. Gillis and Robert D. Willis filed a brief for Sam Rayburn Dam Electric Cooperative, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Secretary of Energy violated §5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 16 U. S. C. §825s, or his contractual obligations by putting rates for hydroelectric power generated at federally owned dams into effect on an interim basis pending further review by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The Court of Claims held that the Secretary’s actions exceeded his contractual and statutory authority, and granted summary judgment to respondents. 230 Ct. Cl. 635, 680 F. 2d 115 (1982). After further proceedings, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Court of Claims’ decision was the law of the case and correct on the merits. 751 F. 2d 1255 (1985). We granted certiorari, 473 U. S. 903 (1985), and we now reverse. I A In the Flood Control Act, Congress authorized the construction of a number of dam and reservoir projects, operated by the Army Corps of Engineers and producing large blocks of hydroelectric power. Congress had granted authority for several such projects before 1944, but had enacted no “general law governing the sale and distribution of power” so generated. S. Rep. No. 1030, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1944). Intending “to place by law the responsibility for disposal of such power in an existing Federal agency,” ibid., Congress provided: “Electric power and energy generated at reservoir projects under the control of the War Department and in the opinion of the Secretary of War not required in the operation of such projects shall be delivered to the Secretary of the Interior, who shall transmit and dispose of such power and energy in such manner as to encourage the most widespread use thereof at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business principles, the rate schedules to become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Federal Power Commission. Rate schedules shall be drawn having regard to the recovery (upon the basis of the application of such rate schedules to the capacity of the electric facilities of the projects) of the cost of producing and transmitting such electric energy, including the amortization of the capital investment allocated to power over a reasonable period of years. ...” Ch. 665, § 5, 58 Stat. 887, 890 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 16 U. S. C. § 825s). In order to sell the hydroelectric power turned over to him under that statute, the Secretary of the Interior created what eventually became five regional Power Marketing Administrations (PM As). The PM A Administrators were assigned the responsibility of preparing rate schedules and the supporting accounting and cost allocation studies. There were no formal procedures for public participation in PMA preparation of rate schedules, although some of the PMAs (not including the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), immediately concerned in this suit) began to adopt such procedures starting in late 1977. See 45 Fed. Reg. 86976 (1980). When determining whether to approve a PMA’s proposed rates, the Federal Power Commission utilized its “special expertise” and its “independent judgment” in measuring the proposal against the statutory standards. Bonneville Power Administration, 34 F. P. C. 1462, 1465 (1965). Because the Flood Control Act imposed no particular procedures for Commission review of rate proposals, the Commission was largely free to design its own. See Southeastern Power Administration, 54 F. P. C. 1631, 1632, n. (1975). It developed a practice of affording notice and comment to customers and other affected parties when the Secretary submitted a rate schedule, and granting requests for oral argument or public hearing on a case-by-case basis. The parties differ as to the degree to which Commission practice included the use of interim rates. The Solicitor General cites several instances in which the Commission did implement such rates; respondents answer that those instances were both isolated and unrepresentative. Our own examination of the historical record reveals that beginning in the 1970’s, the Commission announced its intention to examine PMA rate proposals “on the basis of evidentiary records which are developed during the course of [adjudicatory] public hearings,” Bonneville Power Administration, 54 F. P. C. 808, 810 (1975). It provided for full administrative hearings with cross-examination of witnesses. At the same time, the Commission adopted, in some cases, the practice of examining rates submitted to it by the Secretary and, if the rates appeared to lie within the statutory boundaries, approving them on an interim basis pending the formal hearing. It required that the PMA refund any overcharges with interest if the Commission found after a hearing that an approved interim rate had been too high. See Southeastern Power Administration, 54 F. P. C. 3 (1975); Bonneville Power Administration, 52 F. P. C. 1912 (1974); see also Bonneville Power Administration, 58 F. P. C. 2498 (1977) (Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act). The Department of the Interior initially took the view that full evidentiary hearings were inappropriate under the Flood Control Act, and that if such hearings were to be held the Commission had no power to approve rates on an interim basis. The Commission, however, explicitly rejected that position. Southeastern Power Administration, supra, at 1632-1633; see also Bonneville Power Administration, 59 F. P. C. 1194, 1195 (1977) (Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act). The Interior Department then acquiesced in the Commission’s view. See ibid. B This regulatory scheme was upset in 1977, with the passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7101 et seq. (DOE Act). That statute, designed to “assur[e] coordinated and effective administration of Federal energy policy and programs,” §7112, eliminated the Secretary of the Interior’s role in hydroelectric power rate regulation, and abolished the Federal Power Commission entirely. The Interior Secretary’s rate-proposing function was transferred to the new Secretary of Energy, “acting by and through [the] Administrators” of the PMAs. § 7152(a)(2). The Federal Power Commission’s rate approval function was transferred to the Secretary of Energy as well. The Secretary of Energy institutionalized an interim rate-approval process for hydroelectric rates. He delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Resource Applications “the authority to develop, acting by and through the [PMA] administrators, and to confirm, approve, and place in effect on an interim basis, power and transmission rates for the five power marketing administrations.” 43 Fed. Reg. 60636 (1978) (emphasis added). He simultaneously delegated to the new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) “the authority to confirm and approve on a final basis, or to disapprove, rates developed by the Assistant Secretary.” Ibid. Under the new regulatory scheme, the PMAs give extensive public notice of proposed rates. 10 CFR § 903.13 (1985). They provide all interested persons the opportunity to consult with and obtain information from the PMAs, to examine backup data, and to comment on the proposed rates. § 903.14. In most cases, the PMAs hold one or more “public information forums” and “public comment forums” regarding the rate proposal. §§903.15, 903.16. Following this consultation and comment period, the PMA Administrator must develop rates which, in the Assistant Secretary’s judgment, should be confirmed, approved, and placed into effect on an interim basis. The Assistant Secretary must prepare a statement explaining the principal factors on which his decision to confirm and approve the rates was based. §903.21. The Assistant Secretary, after his interim confirmation and approval, submits the proposed rates to FERC for final confirmation and approval. FERC views its role in this process as “in the nature of an appellate body,” 45 Fed. Reg. 79545, 79547 (1980); its function is to determine from the record before it whether “due process requirements have been met and [whether] the Administrator’s program of rate schedules and the decision of the [Assistant Secretary] are rational and consistent with the statutory standards.” Ibid. In exercising that appellate function, FERC relies on the record before it, remanding for supplementation if necessary. If it disapproves the interim rates confirmed and approved by the Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Secretary has the responsibility to submit acceptable substitute rates. Overcharges attributable to excessive interim rates must be refunded with interest to affected customers. 10 CFR § 903.22 (1985). II The dispute in this case involves the price charged for the sale of hydroelectric power by the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA) to respondent cities of Lamar, Fulton, and Thayer, Missouri. Respondents and the United States first signed power purchase contracts in 1952, 1956, and 1963 respectively; the Lamar and Fulton contracts were renewed in early 1977. The language of the 1977 contract is typical: “It is understood and agreed that the rates and/or terms and conditions set forth in the said Rate Schedule ‘F-l,’ with the confirmation and approval of the Federal Power Commission, may be increased, decreased, modified, superseded, or supplemented, at any time, and from time to time, and that if so increased, decreased, modified, superseded, or supplemented, the new rates and/or terms and conditions shall thereupon become effective and applicable to the purchase and sale of Firm Power and Firm Energy under this Contract in accordance with and on the effective date specified in the order of the Federal Power Commission containing such confirmation and approval.” 230 Ct. CL, at 638, 680 F. 2d, at 117 (emphasis by Court of Claims deleted). Provisions for rate increases under the contracts at issue in this case went unused for a long time. SWPA did not increase its basic rate between 1957 and 1977. 44 Fed. Reg. 13068, 13069 (1979). Unfortunately, SWPA’s costs did not also remain constant. As a result, FERC found by 1979 that SWPA’s annual revenues fell about $20 million short of covering costs and repaying investment. Ibid. After considerable congressional and Commission prodding, see H. R. Rep. No. 95-1247, p. 59 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-1067, p. 53 (1978); Southwestern Power Administration, 58 F. P. C. 2170 (1977); see also Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1980: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 2995-2998 (1979), SWPA in April 1978 finally issued notice of a proposed 42% rate increase. 43 Fed. Reg. 16545 (1978). After the close of the public participation period, SWPA developed new studies scaling down its estimate of necessary revenues, and developed new proposed rate schedules increasing basic rates only 33%. On March 1, 1979, the Assistant Secretary confirmed and approved the rates and placed them into effect on an interim basis, effective April 1, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg., at 13073. In June 1981, FERC disapproved the rates as insufficiently supported, finding them likely to be too low. 46 Fed. Reg. 30877 (1981). On reconsideration in January 1982, however, FERC concluded that the rates, while “on the low side,” were nonetheless reasonable; it confirmed and approved the rates through September 30, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 4562, 4563 (1982). Respondents paid the increased rates assessed by SWPA. They then filed suit, seeking to recover money paid pursuant to the interim rate increase between April 1979 and January 1982. The Court of Claims ruled for respondents on the question of liability, 230 Ct. Cl. 635, 680 F. 2d 115 (1982), the Claims Court entered a $954,816 judgment in their favor, App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a-21a, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, 751 F. 2d 1255 (1985). H — I 1 — I 1 — I Respondents contend that interim approval of rate increases by the Assistant Secretary violates the Flood Control Act and their power purchase contracts. They predicate their argument on the statutory direction that rate increases shall “become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Federal Power Commission,” and on the similar contractual language quoted supra, at 659. That language, according to respondents, by its terms precludes interim rate increases. It is important to note what questions are not before this Court. Respondents do not contest that the DOE Act transferred the FPC’s rate-approval function to the Secretary of Energy. See Brief for Respondents 39. They agree that the Secretary could properly confirm and approve the rates on a final basis, without any further procedures or FERC involvement, id., at 43-45, and that he could “delegate and divide that function amongst subordinate officials and agencies,” id., at 44. Further, respondents concede that the contractual language must be read, to some extent, in the light of the DOE Act: they do not argue that the contractual language, providing for rate increases “with the confirmation and approval of the Federal Power Commission,” precludes any rate increase now that that body no longer exists. Rather, respondents’ sole claim is that the statute and the contracts preclude the Secretary from making hydroelectric power rates effective before rendering ajfinal determination that those rates satisfy all statutory requirements. A rate increase, they argue, can become effective only after the entire administrative review process has been completed. A We turn first to respondents’ statutory contention. Section 5 of the Flood Control Act, on its face, says little about the appropriate method of rate implementation under that Act. The relevant federal agencies, however, at least since the mid-1970’s, have interpreted the statute to allow interim rate increases. See supra, at 661-663. We must uphold that interpretation if the statute yields up no definitive contrary legislative command and if the agencies’ approach is a reasonable one. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). The statutory language, providing only that “the rate schedules [shall] become effective upon confirmation and approval by the [Secretary],” does not definitively speak to the question of interim rates. Respondents argue that the requirement that rate schedules become effective “upon” confirmation and approval precludes the Secretary from making rates effective before all confirmation and approval are completed. The Court of Claims agreed. We can find, however, no such unambiguous meaning in the wording of the statute. The agency’s practice of allowing rates to become effective after interim “confirmation and approval,” even though the rates are subject to further examination, is as consistent with the bare statutory language as is respondents’ preferred arrangement. Nor does the legislative history of the Flood Control Act resolve the ambiguity. Respondents draw on that legislative history in arguing that the drafters of § 5 of the Flood Control Act (like the drafters of § 6 of the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, on which § 5 of the Flood Control Act was based) intended to “protec[t] the power consumers.” 90 Cong. Rec. 9283 (1944) (statement of Rep. Rankin). Respondents point out that during the pendency of an interim rate increase, power consumers pay more than they would have paid otherwise, and perhaps more than they should pay. Yet as we shall discuss more extensively below, the goal of protecting power customers is not the only policy embodied in the Flood Control Act. The existence of that policy, without more, hardly supplies an unambiguous legislative command barring any imposition of interim rates. Respondents rely on a statement by Secretary Ickes that the Federal Power Commission would have final yes-or-no authority over rates under the Bonneville Project Act, Columbia River (Bonneville Dam), Oregon and Washington: Hearings on H. R. 7642 before the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 150 (1937), but that statement is not particularly helpful in determining Congress’ intent regarding interim rates. In the absence of a clear legislative command, we must consider whether the Secretary’s choice “ ‘represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute.’” Chevron, supra, at 845, quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 383 (1961). The Secretary has a dual obligation under the Flood Control Act. He is required to protect consumers by ensuring that power is sold “at the lowest possible rates . . . consistent with sound business principles.” See United States v. Tex-La Electric Cooperative, Inc., 693 F. 2d 392, 399-400 (CA5 1982). He is also, however, required by the plain language of the statute to protect the public fisc by ensuring that federal hydroelectric programs recover their own costs and do not require subsidies from the federal treasury. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2051, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1944); see also S. Rep. No. 2280, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936) (Bonneville Project Act); H. R. Rep. No. 2955, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936) (same). Interim ratesetting appears well suited to accommodating that dual goal. That process protects consumers by subjecting proposed rates to initial review before they are made effective, and by allowing for refunds if the rates are ultimately disapproved. It protects the Government by allowing it to collect rate increases that are necessary for recovery of its costs, without having to wait for time-consuming final review. It helps eliminate the possibility that delay in implementation of rate increases, particularly in a period of high inflation, will cause the Government constantly to be playing catchup in its attempt to secure an appropriate rate. Respondents argue that the Secretary’s plan is inconsistent with the congressional scheme because it allows the implementation of rates that may not meet the statutory standards, and that may ultimately be found to be too high. Congress, respondents argue, intended to eliminate just such a possibility when it interposed the requirement of FPC “confirmation and approval” in the ratesetting process. The refund process, they contend, offers insufficient protection because while excessive charges are immediately passed on to the ultimate consumers, refunds of those charges may not successfully trickle down to those same consumers. Yet ratesetting agencies charged with protecting the public commonly have the power to allow rates to go into effect prior to the completion of administrative review. See, e. g., Natural Gas Act, § 4(e), 15 U. S. C. § 717c(e); Federal Power Act, § 205(e), 16 U. S. C. § 824d(e); Federal Communications Act, §204, 47 U. S. C. §204; Interstate Commerce Act, § 15(7), 49 U. S. C. § 10708. See generally W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Industries 122-126 (2d ed. 1976). Congress plainly has not found that practice necessarily incompatible with the goal of consumer protection. Respondents rely on FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U. S. 145 (1962), for the proposition that refunds are an inadequate remedy for excessive rates. In Tennessee Gas, the Commission was faced with a statutory scheme under which a private utility could put a rate increase into effect, after an initial suspension period, without any governmental review of the legality of the increase. The utility argued that once an increased rate went into effect, it should be allowed to collect that rate until the completion of all Commission proceedings on the legality of the rate, since any illegal charges ultimately would be subject to refund. We rejected that position, holding that the Commission did not have to rely solely on its refund procedure to protect consumers and could instead order an interim reduction of the increased rate. Tennessee Gas does not support respondents’ argument. Where the Government seeks to implement an increase under the Flood Control Act, there is no danger of unre-viewed illegal rates, as in Tennessee Gas. The rate when implemented has already been the subject of extensive public participation and review by the Assistant Secretary. The Secretary does not rely solely on the refund procedure to protect consumers, and thus the concerns that led the Tennessee Gas Court to find that process inadequate are not present. Instead, Tennessee Gas illustrates the authority this Court repeatedly has given regulatory agencies to do precisely what respondents claim they should not be able to do— to issue interim rate orders prior to final determinations whether proposed rates meet statutory requirements. Respondents argue that the Secretary should be barred from setting interim rates absent explicit congressional authorization. The Secretary, they contend, cannot create a complex regulatory structure out of thin air. The provisions of the Flood Control Act, however, are general, and are in all respects less complex than the analogous provisions of the Federal Power Act governing regulation of private utility charges. Congress, in declining to set out a detailed mandatory procedural scheme, apparently intended to leave the agency substantial discretion as to how to structure its review. There is no support in the legislative history for the proposition that Congress intended to bar the Secretary from taking all steps regarding power rate regulation not explicitly set out in the general terms of § 5 of the Flood Control Act, and Congress may reasonably have intended to allow more administrative discretion with regard to this federal proprietary activity than with regard to control of private rates. Limiting the agency as respondents suggest would thus dis-serve Congress’ goal of establishing “a convenient and practical method of disposing of power at [federal hydroelectric] projects.” S. Rep. No. 1030, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1944). Indeed, this Court has in other contexts allowed agencies to set interim rates even though their governing statutes did not explicitly so provide. In the Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U. S. 631 (1978), we held that it was “an intelligent and practical exercise of [the agency’s rate] suspension power,” id., at 653, for the Interstate Commerce Commission to set out, without a hearing, interim rates that it would allow to go into effect. We further held that the Commission had authority to condition such an action on the carriers’ promise to refund charges ultimately found to be too high. That refund scheme, although nowhere explicitly approved in the statute, was a “‘legitimate, reasonable, and direct adjunct to the Commission’s explicit statutory power to suspend rates pending investigation.”’ Id., at 655, quoting United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 426 U. S. 500, 514 (1976). The Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases were decided under a quite different statutory scheme from the one at issue today, and analogies between the two statutory schemes are loose at best. We see no reason, however, why we should take a narrower approach to the Secretary’s powers under the Flood Control Act than we took to the ICC’s under its enabling statute. We therefore hold that the procedures established by the Secretary to exercise his powers under the Flood Control Act both are within his delegated authority and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the policies underlying that Act. At bottom, respondents seek to strike down the Secretary’s scheme on the ground that it gives power customers too much process. They concede that there could be no objection to a scheme under which rate review was simply cut off after the Assistant Secretary’s examination, but contend that the administrative plan must be invalidated because the Secretary has allowed still another layer of review. We would not be disposed to accept such a claim absent particularly compelling argument in its favor. Respondents have not supplied such argument here. B Respondents also argue that interim rate increases violate the terms of their power purchase contracts. Respondents make no claim that the contracts must be read literally, to bar any rate increase absent approval by a nonexistent Federal Power Commission. They nonetheless argue that the contractual language unambiguously bars the imposition of interim rates. We can detect no such absolute bar. Respondents have presented no evidence demonstrating that the parties intended the contractual language, which tracks that of the statute, to do anything other than incorporate the statute’s procedural requirements. The Court of Claims based its acceptance of respondents’ position on its desire to construe the contracts “in harmony with” its interpretation of the statutory language, which, it noted, “is incorporated into the contract terms”; on its conclusion that there was no significant administrative practice of interim rate increases; and on its conclusion that the plain meaning of the contractual language unambiguously bars such rate increases. 230 Ct. CL, at 641-645, 680 F. 2d, at 119-121. The first premise is no longer helpful to respondents, since we have determined that the statute allows the imposition of interim rate increases. We have also rejected the second premise, see supra, at 661-663. We now reject the third. The contractual provision that rate increases will become effective “on the effective date specified in the order of the Federal Power Commission containing such confirmation and approval” is, by its terms, no more of a bar to rate increases becoming effective upon interim “confirmation and approval” than is the parallel statutory language. If the Government had meant by that contractual language to bind itself with restrictions going beyond those contained in the statute, we believe that such restrictions would have been set out more explicitly. IV We conclude that nothing in the Flood Control Act or the power purchase contracts at issue in this case precludes the Secretary from making hydroelectric power rates effective upon interim confirmation and approval, even though further review is still pending. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. The cited proceeding arose under both the Flood Control Act and the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 731, codified as amended at 16 U. S. C. §§ 832-832L The relevant provisions of the two statutes are essentially identical, however, and the Commission and Secretary have treated them interchangeably. See 34 F. P. C., at 1465-1470; infra, at 667. See Southeastern Power Administration, 54 F. P. C. 3 (1975), citing 18 CFR § 1.20 (1975) (superseded in 1978); Bonneville Power Administration, 52 F. P. C. 1912, 1912-1913 (1974). But see Southwestern Power Administration, 56 F. P. C. 795 (1976) (confirming new rate schedule without adjudicatory hearing, where SWPA had held on-the-record proceedings before proposing new rate). 42 U. S. C. § 7151(b) (transferring to the Secretary of Energy all FPC functions not explicitly transferred in Subchapter IV of the Act to the new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). The Court of Claims’ suggestion that FERC, rather than the Secretary, inherited the FPC’s rate approval function has been abandoned by respondents, see infra, at 665, and is unsupported by the statutory language. See United States v. Tex-La Electric Cooperative, Inc., 693 F. 2d 392, 395 (CA5 1982). The Assistant Secretary of Resource Applications’ interim rate approval and implementation responsibilities were later transferred to the Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Renewable Energy. See 47 Fed. Reg. 4562, and n. 1 (1982). We shall refer to both of those officers as the “Assistant Secretary” throughout this opinion. After FERC’s final approval of the rates at issue in this case, the Secretary further modified the delegation order in certain respects. 48 Fed. Reg. 55664 (1983). The propriety of the administrative plan as modified in 1983, however, is not now before us. Respondents finally point to § 501(a)(1) of the DOE Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7191(a)(1), which provides that that Act was not intended to abrogate “administrative procedure requirements” imposed by other statutes, including the Flood Control Act. Because we find in the Flood Control Act no “administrative procedure requirement” barring interim rates, this provision adds nothing to respondents’ case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WHITEHOUSE et al. v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 131. Argued February 10-11, 1955. Decided June 6, 1955. Milton Kramer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Lester P. Schoene. Walter J. Cummings, Jr. argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief was Kenneth F. Burgess for the Carrier Members, National Railroad Adjustment Board, Third Division, respondents. John W. Foster, Herbert J. Deany and Joseph H. Wright filed a brief for the Illinois Central Railroad Co., respondent. Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr. and Richard R. Lyman filed a brief for the American Train Dispatchers’ Association et al., as amici curiae. Me. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit arose out of a proceeding before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. A dispute had arisen between the Order of Railroad Telegraphers (Telegraphers) and the Illinois Central Railroad Co. (Railroad) regarding the latter’s employment of a member of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (Clerks) in a position which Telegraphers claimed should, under its collective bargaining agreement with Railroad, be assigned to a member of Telegraphers. After attempted settlement by negotiation had failed, Telegraphers submitted the dispute, in accordance with the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 48 Stat. 926, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., to the Third Division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Notice of the proceeding was served by the Board on Telegraphers and Railroad. Railroad was then advised by letter that Clerks would prosecute a claim in the event that the rights of Clerks under their agreement with Railroad were adversely affected by the disposition of Telegraphers’ claim. Railroad filed a “submission” with the Board asserting that the disputed position involved clerical work of the type customarily performed by clerical forces in the industry and was in fact occupied by a member of Clerks, one Shears. Accordingly, Railroad contended, Telegraphers’ claim should be denied, but in any event notice and opportunity to be heard should be afforded Clerks and Shears. The ten members of the Board, five representing labor and five representing the carriers, deadlocked on the merits and a Referee was appointed as a member of the Board, agreeably to § 3 First (1) of the Railway Labor Act. When Telegraphers’ claim came on for hearing on May 13, 1953, a carrier member of the Board objected that no notice had been served on Clerks pursuant to the requirement of § 3 First (j) of the Act: “Parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect, and the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.” This objection was considered in camera by the regular members of the Board, the Referee having been excluded, as the District Court found, “in accordance with the custom and practice of the Third Division.” An even division resulted and the objection did not carry. After the Board reconvened in public, and in the presence of the Referee, who was not requested to and did not vote on this issue, the carrier member recited that the motion had lost and reiterated his objection, but the hearing resumed. On May 22, apparently after the hearing had ended but prior to any announcement of a decision, Railroad filed the present action against the Board as such, its individual members, and the Referee. Railroad alleged that the failure to give notice violated the Act and that an award to Telegraphers would not prevent Clerks from prosecuting a similar claim successfully. The complaint sought temporary and permanent injunctions directing the Board to issue notice to Clerks and Shears, and restraining it from proceeding with any disposition of the claim until such notice had been given. Telegraphers, on intervention, contended, inter alia, that the means of review prescribed by the Railway Labor Act was exclusive and deprived the District Court of jurisdiction, that Railroad had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, that Railroad showed no injury, and that, in any event, under the Act the Board was not required to notify Shears and Clerks. The Board moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was premature, that other adequate administrative and judicial remedies existed and that Railroad was not threatened with irreparable injury. The District Court held that Shears and Clerks were “employees involved” within § 3 First (j), that it was the “custom and practice” of the Third Division of the Board to deny notice and right to be heard to others than the parties to the specific claim before the Board, and that failure to do so was a denial of due process to the other interested persons and deprived the Board of jurisdiction. It issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Board from proceeding further in the matter unless formal notice was given to Shears and Clerks. On appeal by Telegraphers and the labor members of the Board, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that there could be “hardly any doubt” that Clerks and Shears were “involved” and that any award rendered without notice to them would be void and unenforceable. It rejected the contention that this action was premature because the award might be in favor of Railroad or the proceeding might be dismissed upon the deciding vote of the Referee based on failure to give notice. The court found that the Board had already refused to give notice and held that the Referee had no authority to cast a vote on a “procedural” matter. Since no administrative channel was found available for review of the failure to give notice, the court held that there was no need to await the conclusion of proceedings before the Board. Irreparable injury was found in the fact that Railroad would be required to devote time and money to what it deemed an invalid proceeding and was faced with the threat of a conflicting proceeding by Clerks. Emphasizing that this judicial proceeding did not constitute review of an award, but was “in the nature of mandamus” to compel the Board to perform its duty, the Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 212 F. 2d 22. We granted certiorari because serious questions concerning the administration of the Railway Labor Act are in issue. 348 U. S. 809. We have been urged to resolve the present dispute regarding the requirement of notice to persons not formal parties to a submission to the Board, a dispute which has resulted in numerous conflicting decisions by the Board. This remains a perplexing problem despite the substantial agreement among Courts of Appeals which have considered the question in holding that notice is required to other persons in varying situations. The wording of the notice provision of § 3 First (j) does not give a clear answer. In the context of other related provisions it is certainly not obvious that in a situation like that now before us notice need be given beyond the parties to the submission. See § 3 First (i), (1), (m). Analogy to the law of parties as developed for judicial proceedings is not compelling and in any event does not approach constitutional magnitude. Both its history and the interests it governs show the Railway Labor Act to be unique. “The railroad world is like a state within a state. Its population of some three million, if we include the families of workers, has its own customs and its own vocabulary, and lives according to rules of its own making.” Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 568-569. We have also been urged to reverse the holding of the lower court that a Referee may neither be appointed to resolve a deadlock on the question of notice nor, having been appointed to break a deadlock on the merits, vote to dismiss the proceeding because of failure to give the required notice. Again, we have been asked to judge Railroad’s present claim to relief on the basis of irreparable injuries which are alleged to flow from the dilemma in which Railroad will find itself if confronted either by an invalid award or a situation in which no valid award may be obtained. Railroad asserts that this dilemma is inevitable and will entail continuing industrial friction, the possibility of conflicting awards to both unions, and accumulating claims to back pay or damages which might have been avoided had notice been given and a valid award been rendered. If the award is against it, Railroad claims that it is at a loss to know whether to comply and be subjected both to suits to enjoin compliance and further Board proceedings by the third-party, or to refuse to comply and attempt to defend an enforcement proceeding brought under § 3 First (p). At the lowest it is doubtful whether these hypothetical injuries are fairly to be deemed irreparable and without other adequate administrative or j udicial remedy. Assuming that the Act permits the Board to consider the claim of one union in the light of competing agreements between Railroad and other unions, see Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561, does it permit “final and binding” awards to be rendered interpreting both contracts and resolving the independent claims of both unions in a single proceeding? See § 3 First (m). What, beyond proceedings under the Act, may third parties do to challenge an award in which they were improperly not permitted to participate? Compare Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, with General Committee v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323. To what extent may defects in an award be cured in an enforcement action under § 3 First (p), and are the detriments which are asserted to flow from refusal to comply and reliance upon an enforcement action sufficient to justify judicial intervention? Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160. One thing is unquestioned. Were notice given to Clerks they could be indifferent to it; they would be within their legal rights to refuse to participate in the present proceeding. Clerks here have not attempted to intervene. They have merely stated an intention to bring a separate proceeding in case they are affected by an award in this case. Indeed Railroad refers to an understanding between Clerks and Telegraphers whereby the one will not intervene in proceedings initiated before the Board by the other, but will press its claims independently. And Clerks have joined in a brief of amicus curiae which asserts that third parties are not entitled to notice. We would thus have to consider whether those potential injuries alleged to flow solely from failure of Clerks to participate may be the basis for judicial intervention where there is neither a legal right of the complaining party to be free from such injuries nor any assurance that judicial action will afford relief. These are perplexing questions. Their difficulty admonishes us to observe the wise limitations on our function and to confine ourselves to deciding only what is necessary to the disposition of the immediate case. Here relief is sought prior to any decision on the merits by the Board. Apart from some lower court’s dicta, there is no reason for holding, in the abstract, that any possible award would be rendered void by failure to give notice to an outside even if related interest that cannot be compulsorily joined as a party to the proceeding. The Board has jurisdiction over the only necessary parties to the proceeding and over the subject matter. If failure to give notice be treated as an error, in an award in favor of Railroad it would constitute at best harmless error which could not be made the basis of challenge by Railroad, Telegraphers or Clerks. Railroad’s resort to the courts has preceded any award, and one may be rendered which could occasion no possible injury to it. The inevitable result is to disrupt the proceedings of the Board. Its decision has already been delayed for more than two years. It may be true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that this action must be viewed as “in the nature of mandamus” because mere injunctive relief would not prevent most of the injuries which Railroad seeks to avoid. But mandamus is itself governed by equitable considerations and is to be granted only in the exercise of sound discretion. We hold, in conformity with past decisions, that the injuries are too speculative to warrant resort to extraordinary remedies. See Eccles v. People’s Bank, 333 U. S. 426; Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237; United States ex rel. Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 294 U. S. 50. Moreover, among the injuries asserted by Railroad, only the possibility that it is being put to needless expense incident to the pending Board proceeding will necessarily be involved if judicial relief is denied at this stage of the administrative process. Such expense is inadequate basis for intervention whether by mandamus or injunction. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41; Utah Fuel Co. v. Coal Comm’n, 306 U. S. 56. Reversed. Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Minton dissent. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The individual members of the Board also filed two diametrically opposite answers to the complaint. The five labor members objected to the grant of a preliminary injunction on grounds similar to those put forth by Telegraphers; the five carrier members generally agreed with the position of Railroad and supported the request for relief. E. g., compare Award No. 2253 (3d Div., Aug. 10, 1943, H. Nathan Swaim, Referee) with Award No. 5432 (3d Div., Sept. 6, 1951, Jay S. Parker, Referee). See, e. g., Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. 2d 481 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1936); Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. 2d 768 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1937); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F. 2d 527 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1950); Kirby v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 188 F. 2d 793 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1951); but cf. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, T. & M. R. Co., 156 F. 2d 1 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1946).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 83-1894. Argued February 27, 1985 — Reargued April 22, 1985 Decided June 27, 1985 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 116. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 117. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 133. Laurence Gold reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Marsha S. Berzon, Michael Rubin, George Kaufmann, and David M. Silberman. Deputy Solicitor General Fried reargued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Edward J. Fahy filed a brief for respondent Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association. Paul Alan Levy and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Teamsters for a Democratic Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Carl L. Taylor, Glenn Summers, and Stephan A. Bokat; for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation by Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.; and for Safeway Stores, Inc., et al. by Warren M. Davison and Wesley J. Fastiff. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO (League), a labor union, provides in its constitution that resignations are not permitted during a strike or when a strike is imminent. The League fined 10 of its members who, in violation of this provision, resigned during a strike and returned to work. The National Labor Relations Board held that these fines were imposed in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A). We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in order to decide whether § 8(b)(1)(A) reasonably may be construed by the Board as prohibiting a union from fining members who have tendered resignations invalid under the union constitution. M The League is a national union composed of local associations (locals). In May 1976, its constitution was amended to provide that “[n]o resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent.” This amendment, known as League Law 13, became effective in October 1976, after being ratified by the League’s locals. On May 6, 1977, when a collective-bargaining agreement expired, two locals began an economic strike against several manufacturing companies in Rockford, Illinois, and Beloit, Wisconsin. Forty-three of the two locals’ members participated. In early September 1977, after the locals formally rejected a contract offer, a striking union member submitted a letter of resignation to the Beloit Association. He returned to work the following day. During the next three months, 10 more union members resigned from the Rockford and Beloit locals and returned to work. On December 19, 1977, the strike ended when the parties signed a new collective-bargaining agreement. The locals notified 10 employees who had resigned that their resignations had been rejected as violative of League Law 13. The locals further informed the employees that, as union members, they were subject to sanctions for returning to work. Each was fined approximately the equivalent of his earnings during the strike. The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers’ Association (Association) had represented the employers throughout the collective-bargaining process. It filed charges with the Board against the League and its two locals, the petitioners. Relying on § 8(b)(1)(A), the Association claimed that levying fines against employees who had resigned was an unfair labor practice. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge found that petitioners had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by fining employees for returning to work after tendering resignations. Pattern Makers’ League of North America, 265 N. L. R. B. 1332, 1339 (1982) (decision of G. Wacknov, ALJ). The Board agreed that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibited the union from imposing sanctions on the 10 employees. Pattern Makers’ League of North America, supra. In holding that League Law 13 did not justify the imposition of fines on the members who attempted to resign, the Board relied on its earlier decision in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N. L. R. B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F. 2d 1212 (CA9 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the Board’s order. 724 F. 2d 57 (1983). The Court of Appeals stated that by restricting the union members’ freedom to resign, League Law 13 “frustrate^] the overriding policy of labor law that employees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities.” Id., at 60. Noting that the “mutual reliance” theory was given little weight in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213 (1972), the court rejected petitioners’ argument that their members, by participating in the strike vote, had “waived their Section 7 right to abandon the strike.” 724 F. 2d, at 60-61. Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that under Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S. 423 (1969), labor organizations may impose disciplinary fines against members only if they are “free to leave the union and escape the rule[s].” 724 F. 2d, at 61. We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, 469 U. S. 814 (1984), to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeals over the validity of restrictions on union members’ right to resign. The Board has held that such restrictions are invalid and do not justify imposing sanctions on employees who have attempted to resign from the union. Because of the Board’s “special competence” in the field of labor relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded substantial deference. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 266 (1975). The question for decision today is thus narrowed to whether the Board’s construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U. S. 822, 830 (1984). We believe that § 8(b)(1)(A) properly may be construed as prohibiting the fining of employees who have tendered resignations ineffective under a restriction in the union constitution. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the Board’s order. K A Section 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, grants employees the right to “refrain from any or all [concerted] . . . activities . . . .” This general right is implemented by § 8(b)(1)(A). The latter section provides that a union commits an unfair labor practice if it “restraint] or coerce[s] employees in the exercise” of their § 7 rights. When employee members of a union refuse to support a strike (whether or not a rule prohibits returning to work during a strike), they are refraining from “concerted activity.” Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for returning to work “restraints]” the exercise of their §7 rights. Indeed, if the terms “refrain” and “restrain or coerce” are interpreted literally, fining employees to enforce compliance with any union rule or policy would violate the Act. Despite this language from the Act, the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175 (1967), held that § 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit labor organizations from fining current members. In NLRB v. Textile Workers, supra, and Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U. S. 84 (1973) (per curiam), the Court found as a corollary that unions may not fine former members who have resigned lawfully. Neither Textile Workers, supra, nor Machinists, supra, however, involved a provision like League Law 13, restricting the members’ right to resign. We decide today whether a union is precluded from fining employees who have attempted to resign when resignations are prohibited by the union’s constitution. B The Court’s reasoning in Allis-Chalmers, supra, supports the Board’s conclusion that petitioners in this case violated § 8(b)(1)(A). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held that imposing court-enforceable fines against current union members does not “restrain or coerce” the workers in the exercise of their §7 rights. In so concluding, the Court relied on the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. It noted that the sponsor of § 8(b)(1)(A) never intended for that provision “ 'to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions,’” 388 U. S., at 187, quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 4272 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball), and that other proponents of the measure likewise disclaimed an intent to interfere with unions’ “internal affairs.” 388 U. S., at 187-190. From the legislative history, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to prohibit unions from fining present members, as this was an internal matter. The Court has emphasized that the crux of Allis-Chalmers’ holding was the distinction between “internal and external enforcement of union rules . . . .” Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S., at 428. See also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67, 73 (1973). The congressional purpose to preserve unions’ control over their own “internal affairs” does not suggest an intent to authorize restrictions on the right to resign. Traditionally, union members were free to resign and escape union discipline. In 1947, union constitutional provisions restricting the right to resign were uncommon, if not unknown. Therefore, allowing unions to “extend an employee's membership obligation through restrictions on resignation” would “expan[d] the definition of internal action” beyond the contours envisioned by the Taft-Hartley Congress. International Assn. of Machinists, Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), 270 N. L. R. B. No. 209, p. 11 (1984). C Language and reasoning from other opinions of this Court confirm that the Board’s construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. In Scofield v. NLRB, supra, the Court upheld a union rule setting a ceiling on the daily wages that members working on an incentive basis could earn. The union members’ freedom to resign was critical to the Court’s decision that the union rule did not “restrain or coerce” the employees within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(A). It stated that the rule was “reasonably enforced against union members who [were] free to leave the union and escape the rule.” Id., at 430. The Court deemed it important that if members were unable to take full advantage of their contractual right to earn additional pay, it was because they had “chosen to become and remain union members.” Id., at 435 (emphasis added). The decision in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213 (1972), also supports the Board’s view that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from punishing members not free to resign. There, 31 employees resigned their union membership and resumed working during a strike. We held that fining these former members “restrained or coerced” them, within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(A). In reaching this conclusion, we said that “the vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May.” Id., at 217-218. Restrictions on the right to resign curtail the freedom that the Textile Workers Court deemed so important. See also Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U. S. 84 (1973). HI Section 8(b)(1)(A) allows unions to enforce only those rules that “impai[r] no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws . . . .” Scofield, supra, at 430. The Board has found union restrictions on the right to resign to be inconsistent with the policy of voluntary unionism implicit in § 8(a)(3). See International Assn. of Machinists, Inc., Local 1)11 (Neufeld, Porsche-Audi, Inc.), supra; Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N. L. R. B., at 992 (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, concurring). We believe that the inconsistency between union restrictions on the right to resign and the policy of voluntary unionism supports the Board’s conclusion that League Law 13 is invalid. Closed shop agreements, legalized by the Wagner Act in 1935, became quite common in the early 1940’s. Under these agreements, employers could hire and retain in their employ only union members in good standing. R. Gorman, Labor Law, ch. 28, § 1, p. 639 (1976). Full union membership was thus compulsory in a closed shop; in order to keep their jobs, employees were required to attend union meetings, support union leaders, and otherwise adhere to union rules. Because of mounting objections to the closed shop, in 1947 — after hearings and full consideration — Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 8(a)(3) of that Act effectively eliminated compulsory union membership by outlawing the closed shop. The union security agreements permitted by § 8(a)(3) require employees to pay dues, but an employee cannot be discharged for failing to abide by union rules or policies with which he disagrees. Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of employment. If a new employee refuses formally to join a union and subject himself to its discipline, he cannot be fired. Moreover, no employee can be discharged if he initially joins a union, and subsequently resigns. We think it noteworthy that § 8(a)(3) protects the employment rights of the dissatisfied member, as well as those of the worker who never assumed full union membership. By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, § 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union. League Law 13 curtails this freedom to resign from full union membership. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that League Law 13 does not contravene the policy of voluntary unionism imbedded in the Act. They assert that this provision does not interfere with workers’ employment rights because offending members are not discharged, but only fined. We find this argument unpersuasive, for a union has not left a “worker’s employment rights inviolate when it exacts [his entire] paycheck in satisfaction of a fine imposed for working. ” Wellington, Union Fines and Workers’ Rights, 85 Yale L. J. 1022, 1023 (1976). Congress in 1947 sought to eliminate completely any requirement that the employee maintain full union membership. Therefore, the Board was justified in concluding that by restricting the right of employees to resign, League Law 13 impairs the policy of voluntary unionism. 1 — 1 <3 We now consider specifically three arguments advanced by petitioners: (i) union rules restricting the right to resign are protected by the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A); (ii) the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress did not intend to protect the right of union members to resign; and (iii) labor unions should be allowed to restrict the right to resign because other voluntary associations are permitted to do so. A Petitioners first argue that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) expressly allows unions to place restrictions on the right to resign. The proviso states that nothing in § 8(b)(1)(A) shall “impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Petitioners contend that because League Law 18 places restrictions on the right to withdraw from the union, it is a “rul[e] with respect to the . . . retention of membership,” within the meaning of the proviso. Neither the Board nor this Court has ever interpreted the proviso as allowing unions to make rules restricting the right to resign. Rather, the Court has assumed that “rules "with respect to the . . . retention of membership” are those that provide for the expulsion of employees from the union. The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act is consistent with this interpretation. Senator Holland, the proviso’s sponsor, stated that § 8(b)(1)(A) should not outlaw union rules “which ha[ve] to do with the admission or the expulsion of members.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4271 (1947) (emphasis added). Senator Taft accepted the proviso, for he likewise believed that a union should be free to “refuse [a] man admission to the union, or expel him from the union” Id., at 4272 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the legislative history of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. §401 et seq., confirms that the proviso was intended to protect union rules involving admission and expulsion. Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the Board’s conclusion that League Law 13 is not a “rule with respect to the retention of membership,” within the meaning of the proviso. B The petitioners next argue that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that Congress made a considered decision not to protect union members’ right to resign. Section 8(c) of the House bill contained a detailed “bill of rights” for labor union members. H. R. 3020, § 8(c), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-26 (1947). Included was a provision making it an unfair labor practice to “deny to any [union] member the right to resign from the organization at any time.” H. R. 3020, supra, § 8(c)(4), at 23. The Senate bill, on the other hand, did not set forth specific employee rights, but stated more generally that it was an unfair labor practice to “restrain or coerce” employees in the exercise of their §7 rights. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., §8(b)(1)(A), p. 81 (1947) (as passed by Senate). The Taft-Hartley Act contains the Senate bill’s general language rather than the more specific House prohibitions. See 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A). The petitioners contend that the omission of the House provision shows that Congress expressly decided not to protect the “right to resign.” The legislative history does not support this contention. The “right to resign” apparently was included in the original House bill to protect workers unable to resign because of “closed shop” agreements. Union constitutions limiting the right to resign were uncommon in 1947, see n. 12, supra; closed shop agreements, however, often impeded union resignations. The House Report, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), confirms that closed shop agreements provided the impetus for the inclusion of a right to resign in the House bill. The Report simply states that even under the proposed legislation, employees could be required to pay dues pursuant to union security agreements. Id., at 32. Because the closed shop was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act, see § 8(a)(3), 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3), it is not surprising that Congress thought it unnecessary explicitly to preserve the right to resign. Even if § 8(c)(4) of the House bill, H. R. 3020, supra, was directed at restrictive union rules, its omission from the Taft-Hartley Act does not convince us that the Board’s construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is unreasonable. The House Conference Report, upon which petitioners primarily rely, does state that the specific prohibitions of § 8(c) were “omitted . . . as unfair labor practices,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1947). But this language does not suggest that all employee rights arguably protected by the House bill were to be left unprotected. Cf. id., at 43 (“[T]he primary strike for recognition . . . was not prohibited”). Apparently, the Report was intended merely to inform House Members that the detailed prohibitions of § 8(c) were not separately included in the conference bill as “unfair labor practices.” We are reluctant to reach a contrary conclusion, and thereby overturn the Board’s decision, on the basis of this summary statement in the House Conference Report. Congress must have been aware that the broad language of § 8(b)(1)(A) would reach some of the same union conduct proscribed by the detailed “bill of rights.” Petitioners concede that “absent the legislative history,” the Board’s construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) would be entitled to deference. Tr. of Second Oral Arg. 15 (Apr. 1985). They argue, however, that “in this instance the legislative materials are too clearly opposed to what the Board did to permit the result the Board reached.” Id., at 17. We do not agree. The ambiguous legislative history upon which petitioners rely falls far short of showing that the Board’s interpretation of the Act is unreasonable. C In Textile Workers, 409 U. S, at 216, and Machinists, 412 U. S., at 88 (per curiam), the Court stated that when a union constitution does not purport to restrict the right to resign, the “law which normally is reflected in our free institutions” is applicable. Relying on this quoted language, petitioners argue that League Law 13 is valid. They assert that because the common law does not prohibit restrictions on resignation, such provisions are not violative of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. We find no merit in this argument. Textile Workers, supra, and Machinists, supra, held only that in the absence of restrictions on the right to resign, members are free to leave the union at any time. Although the Court noted that its decisions were consistent with the common-law rule, it did not state that the validity of restrictions on the right to resign should be determined with reference to common law. The Court’s decision in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U. S. 418 (1968), demonstrates that many union rules, although valid under the common law of associations, run afoul of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. There the union expelled a member who failed to comply with a rule requiring the “exhaustion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union.” Id., at 421. Under the common law, associations may require their members to exhaust all internal remedies. See, e. g., Medical Soc. of Mobile Cty. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944). Nevertheless, the Marine Workers Court held that “considerations of public policy” mandated a holding that the union rule requiring exhaustion violated § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A). 391 U. S., at 424; see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S., at 430 (union rule is invalid under § 8(b)(1)(A) if it “impairs [a] policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws”). The Board reasonably has concluded that League Law 13 “restrains or coerces” employees, see § 8(b)(1)(A), and is inconsistent with the congressional policy of voluntary unionism. Therefore, whatever may have been the common law, the Board’s interpretation of the Act merits our deference. V The Board has the primary responsibility for applying “ ‘the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.’” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 488, 496 (1979), quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963), in turn citing NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1958). Where the Board’s construction of the Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected “merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute.” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 497. In this case, two factors suggest that we should be particularly reluctant to hold that the Board’s interpretation of the Act is impermissible. First, in related cases this Court invariably has yielded to Board decisions on whether fines imposed by a union “restrain or coerce” employees. Second, the Board consistently has construed § 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the imposition of fines on employees who have tendered resignations invalid under a union constitution. Therefore, we conclude that the Board’s decision here is entitled to our deference. f — t > The Board found that by fining employees who had tendered resignations, the petitioners violated § 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, even though League Law 13 purported to render the resignations ineffective. We defer to the Board’s interpretation of the Act and so affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the Board’s order. It is so ordered. William Kohl complained in his letter: “I no longer feel that the union officers are acting in the best interest of the men. We need fair and reasonable negotiators to solve our problems.” 3 Record, General Counsel Exhibit 2. Kohl, the other employee who returned to work, was expelled from the union. On January 14, 1978, the Beloit local notified Kohl’s employer that because he was no longer a union member, he should be discharged pursuant to the “union shop” agreement. Two weeks later, the Beloit local informed Kohl that he could gain readmission to the union, and thus remain employed, if he paid back dues, a readmission fee, and $4,200 in “damages ... for deserting the strike by returning to work.” Pattern Makers’ League of North America, 265 N. L. R. B. 1332, 1337 (1982) (decision of G. Wacknov, ALJ). Kohl was denied readmission to the union because he refused to pay the amounts allegedly due. Nevertheless, he was not discharged by his employer. Ibid. The Association also charged that petitioners committed the following unfair labor practices: (i) threatening employees with physical harm and loss of accrued pension benefits if they returned to work during the strike; and (2) attempting to have Kohl and another employee, John Nelson, discharged pursuant to a “union shop” agreement. Ibid. These charges are unrelated to the question presented in this case. Therefore, we express no opinion concerning the disposition of these claims by the ALJ, the Board, and the Court of Appeals. Writing separately, Member Fanning asserted that a restriction on the right to resign would not violate § 8(b)(1)(A) if it functioned only to prevent members from removing their names from the union’s rolls. He agreed, however, that the employees could not be fined for returning to work after tendering their resignations. Pattern Makers’ League of North America, supra, at 1335 (Member Fanning, concurring and dissenting in part). Member Jenkins dissented, as he did in Machinist Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N. L. R. B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F. 2d 1212 (CA9 1984). See n. 5, infra. In Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), several employees resigned from a union and returned to work during a strike. The union constitution prohibited resignations during, or within 14 days preceding, strikes. As in this case, the employees’ resignations were not accepted, and they were fined for aiding and abetting the employer. The Board held that fining these employees for returning to work after tendering resignations violated § 8(b)(1)(A). Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter stated that no restriction on the right to resign was permissible under the Act; they reasoned that such a rule allowed the union to exercise control over “external matters.” Moreover, these Board members thought that restrictions on resignation impaired the congressional policy, embodied in § 8(a)(3), of voluntary unionism. Therefore, they concluded that any discipline premised on such a rule violates § 8(b)(1)(A). 263 N. L. R. B., at 988. Members Fanning and Zimmerman asserted that a rule legitimately could restrict the right to resign for a period of 30 days. Because the rule in question restricted the right to resign indefinitely, however, they agreed that the union had violated §8(b)(1)(A). Id., at 987. Member Jenkins, the lone dissenter, contended that the union’s restriction on resignation was protected by the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), which states that a union may “prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” Id., at 993. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that a union may impose restrictions on its members’ right to resign. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), supra. See n. 5, supra, for a discussion of the Board decision that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce. Section 7 of the Act, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 157, provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.” Section 8(b)(1)(A), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A), provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .” In both Textile Workers, 409 U. S., at 217, and Machinists, 412 U. S., at 88, the Court explicitly left open the question of “the extent to which contractual restriction on a member’s right to resign may be limited by the Act.” Ibid. The proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A), states that nothing in the section shall “impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.” The Court in Allis-Chalmers assumed that the proviso could not be read to authorize the imposition of court-enforceable fines. 388 U. S., at 192. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67, 71, n. 5 (1973) (“This Court... , in holding that court enforcement of union fines was not an unfair labor practice in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., relied on congressional intent only with respect to the first part of this section”) (citation omitted). See Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 365, 117 N. E. 582, 587 (1917) (“The members of the organization . . . who are not willing to obey the orders of the organization are at liberty to withdraw therefrom”); Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 57 App. D. C. 322, 324, 23 F. 2d 743, 745, cert. denied, 276 U. S. 631 (1928) (It is “not unlawful for . . . unions to punish a member by fine, suspension, or expulsion for an infraction of the union rules, since membership in the union is purely voluntary”); Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, Local 301, 108 N. J. Eq. 257, 262, 154 A. 759, 761 (1931) (“association is a voluntary one, and the workmen may decline to become members or withdraw from membership, if dissatisfied with the conduct of its affairs”); Mische v. Kaminski, 127 Pa. Super. 66, 91-92, 193 A. 410, 421 (1937) (members “had a right to leave the union”); Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 540, 38 P. 547, 551 (1894) (“No resort can be had to compulsory methods of any kind either to increase, keep up, or retain such membership”). Our attention has not been called to any provision limiting the right to resign in a union constitution extant in 1947. Indeed, even by the 1970’s, very few unions had such restrictions in their constitutions. See Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 20 Loyola L. Rev. 245, 269 (1974); Wellington, Union Fines and Workers’ Rights, 85 Yale L. J. 1022, 1042 (1976). In International Assn. of Machinists, Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), a majority of the Board held that any restriction on the right to resign violates the Act. This was the position taken by Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N. L. R. B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F. 2d 1212 (CA9 1984). See n. 5, supra. Section 8(a)(3), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3), provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later...: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(2), complements § 8(a)(3) by providing that: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452, generally barred discrimination based on union membership. A proviso to that section stated, however, that “nothing in this Act. . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein . . . .” Under § 8(a)(3), the only aspect of union membership that can be required pursuant to a union shop agreement is the payment of dues. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 41 (1954) (union security agreements cannot be used for “any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees”). “ ‘Membership,’ as a condition of employment, is whittled down to its financial core.” NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U. S. 734, 742 (1963). See also Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435 (1984) (under the Railway Labor Act, employees in a “union shop” cannot be compelled to pay dues to support certain union activities). Therefore, an employee required by a union security agreement to assume financial “membership” is not subject to union discipline. Such an employee is a “member” of the union only in the most limited sense. The focus of § 8(a)(3) on employment rights is understandable because union restrictions on the right to resign were not an issue in 1947. See n. 12, supra, and accompanying text. Senator Taft, for example, stated that § 8(a)(3) was designed to prevent the discharge of workers for reasons other than nonpayment of dues, 93 Cong. Ree. 4885-4886 (1947), because this was “the usual type of abuse, and is the only type of abuse testified to.” Id., at 4886. The dissent suggests that the Board’s decision is inconsistent with 29 U. S. C. § 163, which provides that nothing in the Act “shall be construed so as ... to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.” The Board does not believe, and neither do we, that its interpretation of § 8(b)(1)(A) impedes the “right to strike.” “It [will] not outlaw anybody striking who want[s] to strike. It [will] not prevent anyone using the strike in a legitimate way .... All it [will] do [is] . . . outlaw such restraint and coercion as would prevent people from going to work if they wished to go to work.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4436 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft). Moreover, we do not believe that the effectiveness of strikes will be unduly hampered by the Board’s decision. An employee who voluntarily has joined a union will be reluctant to give up his membership. As Dean Wellington has said: “In making his resignation decision, the dissident must remember that the union whose policies he finds distasteful will continue to hold substantial economic power over him as exclusive bargaining agent. By resigning, the worker surrenders his right to vote for union officials, to express himself at union meetings, and even to participate in determining the amount or use of dues he may be forced to pay under a union security clause.” Wellington, Union Fines and Workers’ Rights, 85 Yale L. J. 1022, 1046 (1976). Justice Blackmun’s dissent asserts that League Law 13 is protected by the proviso because the rule “literally involvfes] the acquisition and retention of membership.” Post, at 121. This interpretation of the proviso would authorize any union restriction on the right to resign. The dissent does say that restrictions on resignation would not be permitted if they “furthered none of the purposes of collective action and self-organization.” Post, at 132, n. 5. This limitation is illusory. An absolute restriction on resignations would enhance a union’s collective-bargaining power, as would a rule that prohibited resignations during the life of the collective-bargaining agreement. In short, there is no limiting principle to the dissent’s reading of the proviso. Justice Blackmun’s dissent also interprets the proviso in a novel manner. He asserts that the only union rules prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(A) are those which “seek to coerce an employee by utilizing the employer’s power over his employment status, or otherwise compel him to take on duties or join in concerted activities he never consented to.” Post, at 120. This position is inconsistent with the Court’s holding in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U. S. 418 (1968). In that case, the Court held invalid a union rule requiring the “exhaustion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union.” Id., at 421. The rule was enforced by the imposition of fines, without “utilizing the employer’s power over the violating members’ employment status.” Moreover, there was no suggestion that union members had not voluntarily agreed to be bound by the rule requiring exhaustion. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S., at 192, the Court assumed that the proviso authorized unions to expel members and to impose fines that carry the threat of expulsion. During the House debates on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., it was proposed that the pending bill be amended to prohibit unions from expelling members for discriminatory reasons. 105 Cong. Rec. 15721 (1959). The two sponsors of the bill, Representatives Landrum and Griffin, opposed this amendment on the ground that they did not seek to repeal the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A). Id., at 15722-15723. As this Court observed in NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 291 (1960): “[WJhat Congress did in 1969 does not establish what it meant in 1947. However, as another major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct, the 1959 Act is a relevant consideration.” Section 8(c)(9) of the House bill, H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 25, prohibited unions from “intimidat[ing a member’s] family.” Although this specific provision was omitted from the Taft-Hartley Act, it is unlikely that Congress intended to protect all union conduct that § 8(c)(9) would have proscribed. Union threats against the family of a member who crossed a picket line, for example, would seem to “restrain or coerce” him in the exercise of his § 7 rights. The dissent by Justice Blackmun suggests that because the Senate “explicitly has rejected” the specific prohibitions in § 8(c) of the House bill, see post, at 121,122, the Taft-Hartley Act leaves unregulated the relationship between a union and its members. The legislative history shows, however, that the Senate did not intend such a result. Senator Taft stated that § 8(b)(1)(A) was designed to warn unions that “they do not have the right to interfere with or coerce employees, either their own members or those outside their union.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4025 (1947) (emphasis added). NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274 (1960), is not controlling. There the Court held that recognitional picketing did not “restrain or coerce” employees in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(1)(A). In so concluding, the Court relied in part on the omission from the Taft-Hartley Act of two provisions in the original House bill explicitly banning recognitional picketing. Other evidence in that case, however, was highly probative of a congressional intent to protect recognitional picketing. The desirability of restrictions on peaceful picketing was widely debated in Congress. Id., at 287-288. Moreover, the Conference Report stated that “ ‘the primary strike for recogition . . . was not prohibited.’” Id., at 289, quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 43 (1947). Finally, §8(b)(4), as added by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4), limits the use of other economic weapons (such as strikes and secondary boycotts) to compel recognition by an employer. See 362 U. S., at 282-284. It is clear that a compromise was reached by the 1947 Congress; recognitional picketing was to be allowed, while the use of other economic weapons to compel recognition was curtailed. There is no evidence of such a compromise with respect to the “right to resign.” It is at least open to question whether all restrictions on the right to resign are valid under the “common law of associations.” See, e. g., Haynes v. Annandale Golf Club, 4 Cal. 2d 28, 47 P. 2d 470 (1935) (a bylaw purporting to allow the association to deny a member’s right of resignation by merely withholding its consent is invalid because unreasonable and arbitrary). Our conclusion that the common law is irrelevant makes it unnecessary to resolve this question. Justice Blackmun’s dissent suggests that the relationship between a union and its members should be governed by contract law. Post, at 119. The rationale of this theory is that a member, by joining the union, “enters into a contract, the terms of which are expressed in the union constitution and by-laws.” Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1054 (1951). Marine Workers shows, of course, that union discipline cannot be analyzed primarily in terms of the common law of contracts. The dissent repeatedly refers to the “promise” made by the employees involved in this case. Post, at 129. Because they were members of the union when League Law 13 was adopted, the dissent reasons that the employees “promised” not to resign during a strike. But the “promise” to which the dissent refers is unlike any other in traditional contract law. As a commentator has recognized: “Membership in a union contemplates a continuing relationship with changing obligations as the union legislates in monthly meetings or in annual conventions. It creates a complex cluster of rights and duties expressed in a constitution. In short, membership is a special relationship. It is as far removed from the main channel of contract law as the relationships created by marriage, the purchase of a stock certificate, or the hiring of a servant.” Summers, supra, at 1055-1056. In holding that unions may impose fines against members who return to work during a strike, the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175 (1967), “essentially accepted the position of the National Labor Relations Board.” Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S. 423, 428 (1969). In Scofield, the Court deferred to the Board’s ruling that § 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit unions from fining members who accept daily wages in excess of a union-imposed ceiling. Four years later, the Court again relied on the Board in holding that § 8(b)(1)(A) has nothing to say about whether union fines are “reasonable” in amount. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67 (1973). Finally, in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213 (1972), and Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U. S. 84 (1973) (per curiam), the Court deferred to the Board’s conclusion that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from fining former members who have resigned lawfully. In United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 617 (General Electric Co.), 197 N. L. R. B. 608 (1972), the Board held that § 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits a union from fining employees who have resigned, even when a provision in the union constitution purports to make the resignations invalid. There two employees resigned during a strike and returned to work. Their resignations were ineffective under a union constitutional provision permitting resignations only during the last 10 days of the union’s fiscal year. The Board nevertheless held that the employees could not be fined for crossing the picket line. It noted that imposing fines on these employees was inconsistent with Scofield v. NLRB, supra, for they effectively were denied “a voluntary method of severing their relationship with the Union.” 197 N. L. R. B., at 609. The Board reached the same conclusion in United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 4-69 (Master Lock Co.), 221 N. L. R. B. 748 (1975). See also Local 1884, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers (Ex-Cell-O Corp.), 219 N. L. R. B. 729 (1975).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. SLOAN No. 76-1607. Argued March 27-28, 1978 Decided May 15, 1978 Rehnqtjist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. BrennaN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 123. Blackmiun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 126. Harvey L. Pitt argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Jones, Howard E. Shapiro, and Frederick B. Wade. Samuel H. Sloan, respondent, argued the cause and filed a brief pro se. Reginald Leo Duff filed a brief for Canadian Javelin, Ltd., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority “summarily to suspend trading in any security ... for a period not exceeding ten days” if “in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so require.” Acting pursuant to this authority the Commission issued a series of consecutive orders suspending trading in the common stock of Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL), for over a year. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that such a series of suspensions was beyond the scope of the Commission's statutory authority. 547 F. 2d 152, 157-158 (1976). We granted certiorari to consider this important question, 434 U. S. 901 (1977), and, finding ourselves in basic agreement with the Court of Appeals, we affirm. We hold that even though there be a periodic redetermination of whether such action is required by “the public interest” and for “the protection of investors,” the Commission is not empowered to issue, based upon a single set of circumstances, a series of summary orders which would suspend trading beyond the initial 10-day period. I On November 29, 1973, apparently because CJL had disseminated allegedly false and misleading press releases concerning certain of its business activities, the Commission issued the first of what was to become a series of summary 10-day suspension orders continuously suspending trading in CJL common stock from that date until January 26, 1975. App. 109. During this series of suspensions respondent Sloan, who owned 13 shares of CJL stock and had engaged in substantial purchases and short sales of shares of that stock, filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit challenging the orders on a variety of grounds. On October 15, 1975, the court dismissed as frivolous all respondent’s claims, except his allegation that the “tacking” of 10-day summary suspension orders for an indefinite period was an abuse of the agency’s authority and a deprivation of due process. It further concluded, however, that in light of two events which had occurred prior to argument, it could not address this question at that time. The first event of significance was the resumption of trading on January 26, 1975. The second was the commencement of a second series of summary 10-day suspension orders, which was still in effect on October 15. This series had begun on April 29, 1975, when the Commission issued a 10-day order based on the fact that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had launched an extensive investigation into alleged manipulation of CJL common stock on the American Stock Exchange and several Canadian stock exchanges. App. 11-12. This time 37 separate orders were issued, suspending trading continuously from April 29, 1975, to May 2, 1976. The court thought the record before it on October 15 inadequate in light of these events and dismissed respondent’s appeal “without prejudice to his repleading after an administrative hearing before the SEC . . . ,” which hearing, though apparently not required by statute or regulation, had been offered by the Commission at oral argument. 527 F. 2d 11, 12 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 935 (1976). Thereafter respondent immediately petitioned the Commission for the promised hearing. The hearing was not forthcoming, however, so on April 23, 1976, during the period when the second series of orders was still in effect, respondent brought the present action pursuant to § 25 (a) (1) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78y (a)(1) (1976 ed.), challenging the second series of suspension orders. He argued, among other things, that there was no rational basis for the suspension orders, that they were not supported by substantial evidence in any event, and that the “tacking” of 10-day summary suspension orders was beyond the Commission’s authority because the statute specifically authorized suspension “for a period not exceeding ten days.” The court held in respondent’s favor on this latter point. It first concluded that despite the fact that there had been no 10-day suspension order in effect since May 2, 1976, and the Commission had asserted that it had no plans to consider or issue an order against CJL in the foreseeable future, the case was not moot because it was “ 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.’ ” 547 F. 2d, at 158, quoting from Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). The court then decided that the statutes which authorized summary suspensions — § 12 (k) and its predecessors — did not empower the Commission to issue successive orders to curtail trading in a security for a period beyond the initial 10-day period. 547 F. 2d, at 157-158. We granted certiorari, specifically directing the attention of the parties to the question of mootness, 434 U. S. 901 (1977), to which we now turn. II Respondent argues that this case is not moot because, as the Court of Appeals observed, it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The Commission, on the other hand, does not urge that the case is demonstrably moot, but rather that there simply are not enough facts on the record to allow a proper determination of mootness. It argues that there is no “reasonable expectation” that respondent will be harmed by further suspensions because, “ ‘the investing public now ha[ving] been apprised of the relevant facts, the concealment of which had threatened to disrupt the market in CJL stock, there is no reason to believe that it will be necessary to suspend trading again.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 15, quoting from Pet. for Cert. 12 n. 7. Cf. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975). The Commission concedes, however, that respondent, in his capacity as a diversified investor, might be harmed in the future by the suspension of some other security which he owns. But it further contends that respondent has not provided enough data about the number or type of securities in his portfolio to enable the Court to determine whether there is a “reasonable” likelihood that any of those securities will be subjected to consecutive summary suspension orders. Contrary to the Commission’s contention, we think even on the record presently before us this case falls squarely within the general principle first enunciated in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, supra, and further clarified in Weinstein v. Bradford, supra, that even in the absence of a class action a case is not moot when “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, supra, at 147 (emphasis added). That the first prong of this test is satisfied is not in dispute. A series of consecutive suspension orders may last no more than 20 days, making effective judicial review impossible during the life of the orders. We likewise have no doubt that the second part of the test also has been met here. CJL has, to put it mildly, a history of sailing close to the wind. Thus, the Commission’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, there is a reasonable expectation, within the meaning of Weinstein v. Bradford, supra, that CJL stock will again be subjected to consecutive summary suspension orders and that respondent, who apparently still owns CJL stock, will suffer the same type of injury he suffered before. This is.sufficient in and of itself to satisfy this part of the test. But in addition, respondent owns other securities, the trading of which may also be summarily suspended. As even the Commission admits, this fact can only increase the probability that respondent will again suffer the type of harm of which he is presently complaining. It thus can only buttress our conclusion that there is a reasonable expectation of recurring injury to the same complaining party. Ill A Turning to the merits, we note that this is not a case where the Commission, discovering the existence of a manipulative scheme affecting CJL stock, suspended trading for 10 days and then, upon the discovery of a second manipulative scheme or other improper activity unrelated to the first scheme, ordered a second 10-day suspension. Instead it is a case in which the Commission issued a series of summary suspension orders lasting over a year on the basis of evidence revealing a single, though likely sizable, manipulative scheme. Thus, the only question confronting us is whether, even upon a periodic redetermination of “necessity,” the Commission is statutorily authorized to issue a series of summary suspension orders based upon a single set of events or circumstances which threaten an orderly market. This question must, in our opinion, be answered in the negative. The first and most salient point leading us to this conclusion is the language of the statute. Section 12 (k) authorizes the Commission “summarily to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten days . . . 15 U. S. C. § 78l(k) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). The Commission would have us read the underscored phrase as a limitation only upon the duration of a single suspension order. So read, the Commission could indefinitely suspend trading in a security without any hearing or other procedural safeguards as long as it redetermined every 10 days that suspension was required by the public interest and for the protection of investors. While perhaps not an impossible reading of the statute, we are persuaded it is not the most natural or logical one. The duration limitation rather appears on its face to be just that — a maximum time period for which trading can be suspended for any single set of circumstances. Apart from the language of the statute, which we find persuasive in and of itself, there are other reasons to adopt this construction of the statute. In the first place, the power to summarily suspend trading in a security even for 10 days, without any notice, opportunity to be heard, or findings based upon a record, is an awesome power with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its shareholders, and other investors. A clear mandate from Congress, such as that found in § 12 (k), is necessary to confer this power. No less clear a mandate can be expected from Congress to authorize the Commission to extend, virtually without limit, these periods of suspension. But we find no such unmistakable mandate in § 12 (k). Indeed, if anything, that section points in the opposite direction. Other sections of the statute reinforce the conclusion that in this area Congress considered summary restrictions to be somewhat drastic and properly used only for very brief periods of time. When explicitly longer term, though perhaps temporary, measures are to be taken against some person, company, or security, Congress invariably requires the Commission to give some sort of notice and opportunity to be heard. For example, § 12 (j) of the Act authorizes the Commission, as it deems necessary for the protection of investors, to suspend the registration of a security for a period not exceeding 12 months if it makes certain findings “on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing . . . 15 U. S. C. § 78l (j) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). Another section of the Act empowers the Commission to suspend broker-dealer registration for a period not exceeding 12 months upon certain findings made only “on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing.” § 78o (b)(4) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). Still another section allows the Commission, pending final determination whether a broker-dealer’s registration should be revoked, to temporarily suspend that registration, but only “after notice and opportunity for hearing.” § 78o (b)(5) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). Former §15 (b)(6), which dealt with the registration of broker-dealers, also lends support to the notion that as a general matter Congress meant to allow the Commission to take summary action only for the period specified in the statute when that action is based upon any single set of circumstances. That section allowed the Commission to summarily postpone the effective date of registration for 15 days, and then, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, to continue that postponement pending final resolution of the matter. The section which replaced § 15 (b)(6) even further underscores this general pattern. It requires the Commission to take some action — either granting the registration or instituting proceedings to determine whether registration should be denied — within 45 days. 15 U. S. C. § 78o (b) (1) (1976 ed.). In light of the explicit congressional recognition in other sections of the Act, both past and present, that any long-term sanctions or any continuation of summary restrictions must be accompanied by notice and an opportunity for a hearing, it is difficult to read the silence in § 12 (k) as an authorization for an extension of summary restrictions without such a hearing, as the Commission contends. The more plausible interpretation is that Congress did not intend the Commission to have the power to extend the length of suspensions under § 12 (k) at all, much less to repeatedly extend such suspensions without any hearing. B The Commission advances four arguments in support of its position, none of which we find persuasive. It first argues that only its interpretation makes sense out of the statute. That is, if the Commission discovers a manipulative scheme and suspends trading for 10 days, surely it can suspend trading 30 days later upon the discovery of a second manipulative scheme. But if trading may be suspended a second time 30 days later upon the discovery of another manipulative scheme, it surely could be suspended only 10 days later if the discovery of the second scheme were made on the eve of the expiration of the first order. And, continues the Commission, since nothing on the face of the statute requires it to consider only evidence of new manipulative schemes when evaluating the public interest and the needs of investors, it must have the power to issue consecutive suspension orders even in the absence of a new or different manipulative scheme, as long as the public interest requires it. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the conclusion simply does not follow from the various premises. Even assuming the Commission can again suspend trading upon learning of another event which threatens the stability of the market, it simply does not follow that the Commission therefore must necessarily have the power to do so even in the absence of such a discovery. On its face and in the context of this statutory pattern, § 12 (k) is more properly viewed as a device to allow the Commission to take emergency action for 10 days while it prepares to deploy its other remedies, such as a temporary restraining order, a preliminary or permanent injunction, or a suspension or revocation of the registration of a security. The Commission's argument would render unnecessary to a greater or lesser extent all of these other admittedly more cumbersome remedies which Congress has given to it. Closely related to the Commission's first argument is its second — its construction furthers the statute's remedial purposes. Here the Commission merely asserts that it “has found that the remedial purposes of the statute require successive suspension of trading in particular securities, in order to maintain orderly and fair capital markets.” Brief for Petitioner 37. Other powers granted the Commission are, in its opinion, simply insufficient to accomplish its purposes. We likewise reject this argument. In the first place, the Commission has not made a very persuasive showing that other remedies are ineffective. It argues that injunctions and temporary restraining orders are insufficient because they take time and evidence to obtain and because they can be obtained only against wrongdoers and not necessarily as a stopgap measure in order to suspend trading simply until more information can be disseminated into the marketplace. The first of these alleged insufficiencies is no more than a reiteration of the familiar claim of many Government agencies that any semblance of an adversary proceeding will delay the imposition of the result which they believe desirable. It seems to us that Congress, in weighing the public interest against the burden imposed upon private parties, has concluded that 10 days is sufficient for gathering necessary evidence. This very case belies the Commission's argument that injunctions cannot be sought in appropriate cases. At exactly the same time the Commission commenced the first series of suspension orders it also sought a civil injunction against CJL and certain of its principals, alleging violations of the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and various other improper practices, including the filing of false reports with the Commission and the dissemination of a series of press releases containing false and misleading information. App. 109. And during the second series of suspension orders, the Commission approved the filing of an action seeking an injunction against those in the management of CJL to prohibit them from engaging in further violations of the Acts. Id., at 101. The second of these alleged insufficiencies is likewise less than overwhelming. Even assuming that it is proper to suspend trading simply in order to enhance the information in the marketplace, there is nothing to indicate that the Commission cannot simply reveal to the investing public at the end of 10 days the reasons which it thought justified the initial summary suspension and then let the investors make their own judgments. Even assuming, however, that a totally satisfactory remedy-— at least from the Commission’s viewpoint — is not available in every instance in which the Commission would like such a remedy, we would not be inclined to read § 12 (k) more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit. Indeed, the Commission’s argument amounts to little more than the notion that § 12 (k) ought to be a panacea for every type of problem which may beset the marketplace. This does not appear to be the first time the Commission has adopted this construction of the statute. As early as 1961 a recognized authority in this area of the law called attention to the fact that the Commission was gradually carrying over the summary suspension power granted in the predecessors of § 12 (k) into other areas of its statutory authority and using it as a pendente lite power to keep in effect a suspension of trading pending final disposition of delisting proceedings. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 854-855 (2d ed. 1961). The author then questioned the propriety of extending the summary suspension power in that manner, id., at 854, and we think those same questions arise when the Commission argues that the summary suspension power should be available not only for the purposes clearly contemplated by § 12 (k), but also as a solution to virtually any other problem which might occur in the marketplace. We do not think § 12 (k) was meant to be such a cure-all. It provides the Commission with a powerful weapon for dealing with certain problems. But its time limit is clearly and precisely defined. It cannot be judicially or administratively extended simply by doubtful arguments as to the need for a greater duration of suspension orders than it allows. If extension of the summary suspension power is desirable, the proper source of that power is Congress. Cf. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 744-745 (1973). The Commission next argues that its interpretation of the statute — that the statute authorizes successive suspension orders — has been both consistent and longstanding, dating from 1944. It is thus entitled to great deference. See United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974). While this undoubtedly is true as a general principle of law, it is not an argument of sufficient force in this case to overcome the clear contrary indications of the statute itself. In the first place it is not apparent from the record that on any of the occasions when a series of consecutive summary suspension orders was issued the Commission actually addressed in any detail the statutory authorization under which it took that action. As we said just this Term in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 287 n. 5 (1978): “This lack of specific attention to the statutory authorization is especially important in light of this Court’s pronouncement in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944), that one factor to be considered in giving weight to an administrative ruling is 'the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’ ” To further paraphrase that opinion, since this Court can only speculate as to the Commission’s reasons for reaching the conclusion that it did, the mere issuance of consecutive summary suspension orders, without a concomitant exegesis of the statutory authority for doing so, obviously lacks “power to persuade” as to the existence of such authority. Ibid. Nor does the existence of a prior administrative practice, even a well-explained one, relieve us of our responsibility to determine whether that practice is consistent with the agency’s statutory authority. “The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be affirmed if it has a 'reasonable basis in law.’ NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 131; Unemployment Commission v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153-154. But the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction, FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U. S. 374, 385, and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.’ NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291.” Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261, 272 (1968). And this is just such a case — the construction placed on the statute by the Commission, though of long standing, is, for the reasons given in Part III-A of this opinion, inconsistent with the statutory mandate. We explicitly contemplated just this situation in FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., supra, at 745, where we said: “But the Commission contends that since it is charged with administration of the statutory scheme, its construction of the statute over an extended period should be given great weight. . . . This proposition may, as a general matter, be conceded, although it must be tempered with the caveat that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate.” And our clear duty in such a situation is to reject the administrative interpretation of the statute. Finally, the Commission argues that for a variety of reasons Congress should be considered to have approved the Commission’s construction of the statute as correct. Not only has Congress re-enacted the summary suspension power without disapproving the Commission’s construction, but the Commission participated in the drafting of much of this legislation and on at least one occasion made its views known to Congress in Committee hearings. Furthermore, at least one Committee indicated on one occasion that it understood and approved of the Commission's practice. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 192 (1969); United States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 305-306 (1967); Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U. S. 272, 283 (1966). While we of course recognize the validity of the general principle illustrated by the cases upon which the Commission relies, we do not believe it to be applicable here. In Zuber v. Allen, supra, at 192, the Court stated that a contemporaneous administrative construction of an agency’s own enabling legislation “is only one input in the interpretational equation. Its impact carries most weight when the administrators participated in drafting and directly made known their views to Congress in committee hearings.” Here the administrators, so far as we are advised, made no reference at all to their present construction of § 12 (k) to the Congress which drafted the “enabling legislation” here in question — the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They made known to at least one Committee their subsequent construction of that section 29 years later, at a time when the attention of the Committee and of the Congress was focused on issues not directly related to the one presently before the Court. Although the section in question was re-enacted in 1964, and while it appears that the Committee Report did recognize and approve of the Commission’s practice, this is scarcely the sort of congressional approval referred to in Zuber, supra. We are extremely hesitant to presume general congressional awareness of the Commission’s construction based only upon a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative documents. That language in a Committee Report, without additional indication of more widespread congressional awareness, is simply not sufficient to invoke the presumption in a case such as this. For here its invocation would result in a construction of the statute which not only is at odds with the language of the section in question and the pattern of the statute taken as a whole, but also is extremely far reaching in terms of the virtually untrammeled and unreviewable power it would vest in a regulatory agency. Even if we were willing to presume such general awareness on the part of Congress, we are not at all sure that such awareness at the time of re-enactment would be tantamount to amendment of what we conceive to be the rather plain meaning of the language of § 12 (k). On this point the present case differs significantly from United States v. Correll, supra, at 304, where the Court took pains to point out in relying on a construction of a tax statute by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that “to the extent that the words chosen by Congress cut in either direction, they tend to support rather than defeat the Commissioner’s position . . . .” Subsequent congressional pronouncements also cast doubt on whether the prior statements called to our attention can be taken at face value. When consolidating the former §§15 (c) (5) and 19 (a) (4) in 1975, see n. 1, supra, Congress also enacted § 12 (j), which allows the Commission “to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the registration of a security, if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the issuer of such security has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.” 15 U. S. C. § 781 (j) (1976 ed.). While this particular power is not new, see 15 U. S. C. § 78s (a)(2), the effect of its exercise was expanded to include a suspension of trading. “With this change,” stated the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, “the Commission is expected to use this section rather than its ten-day suspension power, in cases of extended duration.” S. Rep. No. 94-75, p. 106 (1975) (emphasis added). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the 1963 statements have more force than we are willing to attribute to them, and that, as ,the Commission argues, § 12 (j) does not cover quite as broad a range of situations as § 12 (k), the 1975 congressional statements would still have to be read as seriously undermining the continued validity of the 1963 statements as a basis upon which to adopt the Commission’s construction of the statute. In sum, had Congress intended the Commission to have the power to summarily suspend trading virtually indefinitely we expect that it could and would have authorized it more clearly than it did in § 12 (k). The sweeping nature of that power supports this expectation. The absence of any truly persuasive legislative history to support the Commission’s view, and the entire statutory scheme suggesting that in fact the Commission is not so empowered, reinforce our conclusion that the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding no such power exists. Accordingly, its judgment is Affirmed. This authority is presently found in § 12 (k) of the Act, which was added by amendment in 1975 by Pub. L. 94-29 § 9, 89 Stat. 118. It provides in pertinent part: “If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so require, the Commission is authorized summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than an exempted security) for a period not exceeding ten days .... No member of a national securities exchange, broker, or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security in which trading is so suspended.” 15 U. S. C. § 781 (k) (1976 ed.). This power was previously found in §§ 15 (c) (5) and 19 (a) (4) of the Act, which for all purposes relevant to this case were substantially identical to the current statute, § 12 (k), except that § 15 (c)(5) authorized summary suspension of trading in securities which were traded in the over-the-counter market, while § 19 (a) (4) permitted summary suspension of trading in securities which were traded on the national exchanges. 15 U. S. C. §§ 78o (c) (5) and 78s (a) (4). Congress consolidated those powers in § 12 (k). Respondent also argued that the orders violated his due process rights because he was never given notice and an opportunity for a hearing and that § 12 (k) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court found it unnecessary to address these issues. Respondent also contends that he has suffered collateral legal consequences from the series of suspension orders, and thus the case is not moot. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 57 (1968). We find it unnecessary to address this further contention. The Commission contends that to determine the mathematical probability that at least one of the securities held by respondent will be subjected to consecutive suspension orders it is necessary to know, in addition to other information admittedly available in the Commission’s own records, the number of publicly traded corporations of which respondent is a shareholder. This datum cannot be ascertained with any accuracy on this record, however, claims the Commission, because respondent has made various representations regarding that number at various stages of the litigation. Compare App. 153 with Brief in Response 18. The Commission adds that the probability could be determined with even greater accuracy if respondent revealed the nature of his portfolio because certain securities— those listed on the New York Stock Exchange, for example — are seldom summarily suspended. Within the last five years the Commission has twice issued a series of orders, each of which suspended trading in CJL stock for over a year. In the various staff reports given to the Commission in connection with and attached to the second series of orders, the Division of Enforcement indicates in no less than six separate reports that either the Commission or the various stock exchanges view CJL as a “chronic violator.” App. 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31. And reference is made to “the continuous [CJL] problems.” Id., at 61. Furthermore, counsel for the Commission represented at oral argument that there were in fact three separate bases for the second series of suspensions — alleged market manipulation, a change in management of the company, and a failure to file current reports. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Neither does the first series of orders appear to be of this type. Rather, like the second series, it appears to be predicated mainly on one major impropriety on the part of CJL and its personnel, which impropriety required the Commission, in its opinion, to issue a year-long series of summary suspension orders to protect investors and for the public interest. As previously indicated, see n. 5, swpra, the Commission advances three separate reasons for the suspensions, thus implicitly suggesting that perhaps this is a case where the Commission discovered independent reasons to suspend trading after the initial suspension. We note first that there are doubts whether these “reasons” independently would have justified suspension. For example, we doubt the Commission regularly suspends trading because of a “change in management.” A suspension might be justified if management steps down under suspicious circumstances, but the suspicious circumstance here is the initial reason advanced for suspension — the manipulative scheme — and thus the change in management can hardly be considered an independent justification for suspension. More importantly, however, even assuming the existence of three independent reasons for suspension, that leaves 34 suspension orders that were not based on independent reasons and thus the question still remains-. Does the statute empower the Commission to continue to “roll over” suspension orders for the same allegedly improper activity simply upon a redetermination that the continued suspension is “required” by the public interest and for the protection of investors? The former § 15 (b) (6) provided in pertinent part: “Pending final determination whether any registration under this subsection shall be denied, the Commission may by order postpone the effective date of such registration for a period not to exceed fifteen days, but if, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing (which may consist solely of affidavits and oral arguments), it shall appear to the Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to postpone the effective date of such registration until final determination, the Commission shall so order. Pending final determination whether any such registration shall be revoked, the Commission shall by order suspend such registration if, after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, such suspension shall appear to the Commission to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 78o (b) (6). In 1963, when Congress was considering the former § 15 (c) (5), which extended the Commission’s summary suspension power to securities traded in the over-the-counter market, the Commission informed a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of its current administrative practice. One paragraph in the Commission’s 30-page report to the Subcommittee reads as follows: “Under section 19 (a)(4), the Commission has issued more than one suspension when, upon reexamination at the end of the 10-day period, it has determined that another suspension is necessary. At the same time the Commission has recognized that suspension of trading in a security is a serious step, and therefore has exercised the power with restraint and has proceeded with diligence to develop the necessary facts in order that any suspension can be terminated as soon as possible. The Commission would follow that policy in administering the proposed new section 15 (c) (5).” Hearings on H. It. 6789, H. E. 6793, S. 1642 before a Subcommmittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 219 (1963). The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, when it reported on the proposed 1964 amendments to the Act, indicated that it understood and did not disapprove of the Commission’s practice. It stated: “The Commission has consistently construed section 19 (a) (4) as permitting it to issue more than one suspension if, upon reexamination at the end of the 10-day period, it determines that another suspension is necessary. The committee accepts this interpretation. At the same time the committee recognizes that suspension of trading in a security is a drastic step and that prolonged suspension of trading may impose considerable hardship on stockholders. The committee therefore expects that the Commission will exercise this power with restraint and will proceed with all diligence to develop the necessary facts in order that any suspension can be terminated as soon as possible.” S. Rep. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1963). The purpose of the 1964 amendments was merely to grant the Commission the same power to summarily deal with securities traded in the over-the-counter market as it already had to deal with securities traded on national exchanges. The purpose of the 1975 amendments was simply to consolidate into one section the power formerly contained in two. Under the new provision, when the Commission suspends or revokes the registration of a security, “[n]o . . . broker, or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security the registration of which has been and is suspended or revoked pursuant to the preceding sentence.” 15 U. S. C. § 78l (j) (1976 ed.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MIDDLESEX COUNTY ETHICS COMMITTEE v. GARDEN STATE BAR ASSOCIATION et al. No. 81-460. Argued March 31, 1982 Decided June 21, 1982 BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 438. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 438. Mary Ann Burgess, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, James R. Zazzali, former Attorney General, Erminie L. Conley and James J. Ciancia, Assistant Attorneys General, and Richard M. Hinchan and Jaynee LaVecchia, Deputy Attorneys General. Morton Stavis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bernard K. Freamon and Louise Halper. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Charles S. Sims and Arthur N. Eisenberg for the American Civil Liberties Union; and by Max D. Stem for the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression. Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Bill Lann Lee filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. as amici curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to determine whether a federal court should abstain from considering a challenge to the constitutionality of disciplinary rules that are the subject of pending state disciplinary proceedings within the jurisdiction of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 454 U. S. 962 (1981). The Court of Appeals held that it need not abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). We reverse. I A The Constitution of New Jersey charges the State Supreme Court with the responsibility for licensing and disciplining attorneys admitted to practice in the State. Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3. Under the rules established by the New Jersey Supreme Court, promulgated pursuant to its constitutional authority, a complaint moves through a three-tier procedure. First, local District Ethics Committees appointed by the State Supreme Court are authorized to receive complaints relating to claimed unethical conduct by an attorney. New Jersey Court Rule l:20-2(d). At least two of the minimum of eight members of the District Ethics Committee must be nonattorneys. Complaints are assigned to an attorney member of the Committee to report and make a recommendation. Rule l:20-2(h). The decision whether to proceed with the complaint is made by the person who chairs the Ethics Committee. If a complaint is issued by the Ethics Committee it must state the name of the complainant, describe the claimed improper conduct, cite the relevant rules, and state, if known, whether the same or a similar complaint has been considered by any other Ethics Committee. The attorney whose conduct is challenged is served with the complaint and has 10 days to answer. Unless good cause appears for referring the complaint to another Committee member, each complaint is referred to the member of the Committee who conducted the initial investigation for review and further investigation, if necessary. The Committee member submits a written report stating whether a prima facie indication of unethical or unprofessional conduct has been demonstrated. The report is then evaluated by the chairman of the Ethics Committee to determine whether a prima facie case exists. Absent a prima facie showing, the complaint is summarily dismissed. If a prima facie case is found, a formal hearing on the complaint is held before three or more members of the Ethics Committee, a majority of whom must be attorneys. The lawyer who is charged with unethical conduct may have counsel, discovery is available, and all witnesses are sworn. The panel is required to prepare a written report with its findings of fact and conclusions. The full Committee, following the decision of the panel, has three alternatives. The Committee may dismiss the complaint, prepare a private letter of reprimand, or prepare a presentment to be forwarded to the Disciplinary Review Board. Rule l:20-2(o). The Disciplinary Review Board, a statewide board which is also appointed by the Supreme Court, consists of nine members, at least five of whom must be attorneys and at least three of whom must be nonattorneys. The Board makes a de novo review. Rule 1:20 — 3(d)(3). The Board is required to make formal findings and recommendations to the New Jersey Supreme Court. All decisions of the Disciplinary Review Board beyond a private reprimand are reviewed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Briefing and oral argument are available in the Supreme Court for cases involving disbarment or suspension for more than one year. Rule 1:20-4. B Respondent Lennox Hinds, a member of the New Jersey Bar, served as executive director of the National Conference of Black Lawyers at the time of his challenged conduct. Hinds represented Joanne Chesimard in a civil proceeding challenging her conditions of confinement in jail. In 1977 Chesimard went to trial in state court for the murder of a policeman. Respondent Hinds was not a counsel of record for Chesimard in the murder case. However, at the outset of the criminal trial Hinds took part in a press conference, making statements critical of the trial and of the trial judge's judicial temperament and racial insensitivity. In particular, Hinds referred to the criminal trial as “a travesty,” a “legalized lynching,” and “a kangaroo court.” One member of the Middlesex County Ethics Committee read news accounts of Hinds' comments and brought the matter to the attention of the Committee. In February 1977 the Committee directed one of its members to conduct an investigation. A letter was written to Hinds, who released the contents of the letter to the press. The Ethics Committee on its own motion then suspended the investigation until the conclusion of the Chesimard criminal trial. After the trial was completed the Committee investigated the complaint and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that Hinds had violated DR 1 — 102(A)(5) of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. That section provides that “[a] lawyer shall not. . . [ejngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Respondent Hinds also was charged with violating DR 7-107(D), which prohibits extrajudicial statements by lawyers associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter. The Committee then served a formal statement of charges on Hinds. Instead of filing an answer to the charges in accordance with the New Jersey Bar disciplinary procedures, Hinds and the three respondent organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey contending that the disciplinary rules violated respondents’ First Amendment rights. In addition, respondents charged that the disciplinary rules were facially vague and overbroad. The District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), concluding that “[t]he principles of comity and federalism dictate that the federal court abstain so that the state is afforded the opportunity to interpret its rules in the face of a constitutional challenge.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a-54a. At respondents’ request the District Court reopened the case to allow respondents an opportunity to establish bad faith, harassment, or other extraordinary circumstance which would constitute an exception to Younger abstention. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). After two days of hearings the District Court found no evidence to justify an exception to the Younger abstention doctrine and dismissed the federal-court complaint. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that the state bar disciplinary proceedings did not provide a meaningful opportunity to adjudicate constitutional claims. 643 F. 2d 119 (1981). The court reasoned that the disciplinary proceedings in this case are unlike the state judicial proceedings to which the federal courts usually defer. The Court of Appeals majority viewed the proceedings in this case as administrative, “nonadjudicative” proceedings analogous to the preindictment stage of a criminal proceeding. On petition for rehearing petitioner attached an affidavit from the Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court which stated that the New Jersey Supreme Court would directly consider Hinds’ constitutional challenges and that the court would consider whether such a procedure should be made explicit in the Supreme Court rules. On reconsideration a divided panel of the Third Circuit declined to alter its original decision, stating that the relevant facts concerning abstention are those that existed at the time of the District Court’s decision. 651 F. 2d 154 (1981). Pending review in this Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court has heard oral arguments on the constitutional challenges presented by respondent Hinds and has adopted a rule allowing for an aggrieved party in a disciplinary hearing to seek interlocutory review of a constitutional challenge to the proceedings. II A Younger v. Harris, supra, and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. The policies underlying Younger abstention have been frequently reiterated by this Court. The notion of “comity” includes “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id., at 44. Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights. The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved. Moore v. Sims, 442 U. S. 415, 423 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 604-605 (1975). The importance of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact that the noncriminal proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature, as in Huffman, supra. Proceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the functioning of the state judicial system also evidence the state’s substantial interest in the litigation. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977). Where vital state interests are involved, a federal court should abstain “unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Moore, 442 U. S., at 426. “[T]he . . . pertinent inquiry is whether the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims . . . .” Id., at 430. See also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973). The question in this case is threefold: first, do state bar disciplinary hearings within the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the State Supreme Court constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. B The State of New Jersey, in common with most States, recognizes the important state obligation to regulate persons who are authorized to practice law. New Jersey expresses this in a state constitutional provision vesting in the New Jersey Supreme Court the authority to fix standards, regulate admission to the bar, and enforce professional discipline among members of the bar. N. J. Const., Art. 6, §2, ¶3. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recognized that the local District Ethics Committees act as the arm of the court in performing the function of receiving and investigating complaints and holding hearings. Rule 1:20-2; In re Logan, 70 N. J. 222, 358 A. 2d 787 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that filing a complaint with the local Ethics and Grievance Committee “is in effect a filing with the Supreme Court. . . .” Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N. J. 280, 284, 113 A. 2d 671, 674, cert. denied, 350 U. S. 887 (1955). “From the very beginning a disciplinary proceeding is judicial in nature, initiated by filing a complaint with an ethics and grievance committee.” 18 N. J., at 284, 113 A. 2d, at 674. It is clear beyond doubt that the New Jersey Supreme Court considers its bar disciplinary proceedings as “judicial in nature.” As such, the proceedings are of a character to warrant federal-court deference. The remaining inquiries are whether important state interests are implicated so as to warrant federal-court abstention and whether the federal plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to present the federal challenge. C The State of New Jersey has an extremely important interest in maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses. States traditionally have exercised extensive control over the professional conduct of attorneys. See n. 11, supra. The ultimate objective of such control is “the protection of the public, the purification of the bar and the prevention of a re-occurrence.” In re Baron, 25 N. J. 445, 449, 136 A. 2d 873, 875 (1957). The judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon professionally ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant interest in assuring and maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice. See In re Stein, 1 N. J. 228, 237, 62 A. 2d 801, 805 (1949), quoting In re Cahill, 66 N. J. L. 527, 50 A. 119 (1901). The State’s interest in the professional conduct of attorneys involved in the administration of criminal justice is of special importance. Finally, the State’s interest in the present litigation is demonstrated by the fact that the Mid-dlesex County Ethics Committee, an agency of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, is the named defendant in the present suit and was the body which initiated the state proceedings against respondent Hinds. The importance of the state interest in the pending state judicial proceedings and in the federal case calls Younger abstention into play. So long as the constitutional claims of respondents can be determined in the state proceedings and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain. D Respondent Hinds contends that there was no opportunity in the state disciplinary proceedings to raise his federal constitutional challenge to the disciplinary rules. Yet Hinds failed to respond to the complaint filed by the local Ethics Committee and failed even to attempt to raise any federal constitutional challenge in the state proceedings. Under New Jersey’s procedure, its Ethics Committees constantly are called upon to interpret the state disciplinary rules. Respondent Hinds points to nothing existing at the time the complaint was brought by the local Committee to indicate that the members of the Ethics Committee, the majority of whom are lawyers, would have refused to consider a claim that the rules which they were enforcing violated federal constitutional guarantees. Abstention is based upon the theory that “ ‘[t]he accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.’” Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S., at 45, quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240, 244 (1926). In light of the unique relationship between the New Jersey Supreme Court and the local Ethics Committee, and in view of the nature of the proceedings, it is difficult to conclude that there was no “adequate opportunity” for respondent Hinds to raise his constitutional claims. Moore, 442 U. S., at 430. Whatever doubt, if any, that may have existed about respondent Hinds’ ability to have constitutional challenges heard in the bar disciplinary hearings was laid to rest by the subsequent actions of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Prior to the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court the New Jersey Supreme Court sua sponte entertained the constitutional issues raised by respondent Hinds. Respondent Hinds therefore has had abundant opportunity to present his constitutional challenges in the state disciplinary proceedings. There is no reason for the federal courts to ignore this subsequent development. In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975), we held that “where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.” Id., at 349. An analogous situation is presented here; the principles of comity and federalism which call for abstention remain in full force. Thus far in the federal-court litigation the sole issue has been whether abstention is appropriate. No proceedings have occurred on the merits and therefore no federal proceedings on the merits will be terminated by application of Younger principles. It would trivialize the principles of comity and federalism if federal courts failed to take into account that an adequate state forum for all relevant issues has clearly been demonstrated to be available prior to any proceedings on the merits in federal court. 422 U. S., at 350. Respondents have not challenged the findings of the District Court that there was no bad faith or harassment on the part of petitioner and that the state rules were not “‘flagrantly and patently’ ” unconstitutional. Younger, supra, at 53, quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387, 402 (1941). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a-52a. We see no reason to disturb these findings, and no other extraordinary circumstances have been presented to indicate that abstention would not be appropriate. Ill Because respondent Hinds had an “opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state tribunal the federal issues involved,” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 577, and because no bad faith, harassment, or other exceptional circumstances dictate to the contrary, federal courts should abstain from interfering with the ongoing proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Article 6, § 2, ¶ 3, provides: “The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.” For a more detailed explanation of the disciplinary procedure of the District Ethics Committees, see Rule 1:20-2. As noted below, the procedure, as amended in 1981, now provides that a charged attorney may raise constitutional questions in the District Committees. Any constitutional challenges are to be set forth in the answer to the complaint. Rule 1:20 — 2(j) now provides: “All constitutional questions shall be withheld for consideration by the Supreme Court as part of its review of the final decision of the Disciplinary Review Board. Interlocutory relief may be sought only in accordance with R. 1:20 — 4(d)(i).” Each District Ethics Committee appoints one member of the bar to serve as Secretary. The Secretary maintains records of the proceedings. The Secretary also transmits copies of all documents filed to the Division of Ethics and Professional Services. Rule l:20-2(c). Subsequent to the initiation of the disciplinary hearing involved in this case, Rule l:20-3(e) was amended to provide: “Constitutional challenges to the proceedings not raised before the District Committee shall be preserved, without Board action, for Supreme Court consideration as part of its review of the matter on the merits.. Interlocutory relief may be sought only in accordance with Rule l:20-4(d)(i).” The Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association, with amendment and supplementation, have been adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court as the applicable standard of conduct for members of the bar and the judges of New Jersey. New Jersey Court Rule 1:14. DR 7-107 deals with “Trial Publicity” and states: “(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that he expects to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial. . . .” The majority concluded that the hearings are designed to elicit facts, not legal arguments, as indicated by the presence of nonlawyers. The court also found that the ability to raise constitutional claims before the Ethics Committee does not constitute a meaningful opportunity to have constitutional questions adjudicated. No formal opinion is filed by the District Ethics Committee. The Third Circuit distinguished Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 558 F. 2d 701 (CA3 1977), on the ground that in Gipson the attorney being disciplined was already subject to the state-court action at the time the federal proceeding had been initiated. Judge Adams, concurring, emphasized that state courts have the primary responsibility to discipline their bar and, in general, the federal judiciary is to exercise no supervisory powers. Judge Weis, dissenting, argued that respondents have full opportunity in the New Jersey proceedings to raise constitutional issues, concluding that the disciplinary proceedings are not a series of separate segments before independent bodies but are part of a whole. Judge Weis also concluded that there was nothing to prevent the Ethics Committee from considering constitutional claims. The panel majority noted that no rule existed at the time of the District Court’s decision to assure the Court of Appeals that the New Jersey Supreme Court would consider the constitutional claims. The court also concluded that the possibility of a formal procedure of the New Jersey court for consideration of constitutional claims does not moot this case because the underlying dispute as to the validity of the rules still remains. Judge Weis, again dissenting, concluded that no justiciable controversy remained as to the issue in the Court of Appeals and recommended that the case be remanded and dismissed as moot. Rule l:20-4(d) states: “(i) Interlocutory Review. An aggrieved party may file a motion for leave to appeal with the Supreme Court to seek interlocutory review of a constitutional challenge to proceedings pending before the District Ethics Committee or the Disciplinary Review Board. The motion papers shall conform to R. 2:8-1. Leave to appeal may be granted only when necessary to prevent irreparable injury. If leave to appeal is granted, the record below may, in the discretion of the Court, be supplemented by the filing of briefs and oral argument. “(ii) Final Review. In any case in which a constitutional challenge to the proceedings has been properly raised below and preserved pending review of the merits of the disciplinary matter by the Supreme Court, the aggrieved party may, within 10 days of the filing of the report and recommendation of the Disciplinary Review Board, seek the review of the Court by proceeding in accordance with the applicable provisions of R. 1:19-8.” Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971), concluded that the same comity and federalism principles govern the issuance of federal-court declaratory judgments concerning the state statute that is the subject of the ongoing state criminal proceeding. See M. Shoaf, State Disciplinary Enforcement Systems Structural Survey (ABA National Center for Professional Responsibility 1980). The New Jersey allocation of responsibility is consistent with §2.1 of the ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings (Proposed Draft 1978), which states that the “[ultimate and exclusive responsibility within a state for the structure and administration of the lawyer discipline and disability system and the disposition of individual cases is within the inherent power of the highest court of the state.” The rationale for vesting responsibility with the judiciary is that the practice of law “is so directly connected and bound up with the exercise of judicial power and the administration of justice that the right to define and regulate it naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department.” Id.,, commentary to §2.1. The New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that bar disciplinary proceedings are neither criminal nor civil in nature, but rather are sui ge-neris. In re Logan, 70 N. J. 222, 358 A. 2d 787 (1976). See also ABA Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings § 1.2 (Proposed Draft 1978). As recognized in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977), however, whether the proceeding “is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature,” the salient fact is whether federal-court interference would unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the state. Id., at 335-336. The instant case arose before the 1978 rule change. In 1978 the New Jersey Supreme Court established a Disciplinary Review Board charged with review of findings of District Ethics Committees. Nothing in this rule change, however, altered the nature of such proceedings. The responsibility under Art. 6, § 2, ¶ 3, remains with the New Jersey Supreme Court. The role of local ethics or bar association committees may be analogized to the function of a special master. Anonymous v. Association of Bar of City of New York, 515 F. 2d 427 (CA2), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 863 (1975). The essentially judicial nature of disciplinary actions in New Jersey has been recognized previously by the federal courts. In Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 558 F. 2d 701 (1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that “incursions by federal courts into ongoing [New Jersey] disciplinary proceedings would be peculiarly disruptive of notions of comity.” Id., at 704. This case is distinguishable from Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 462 (1974), in which there was no ongoing state proceeding to serve as a vehicle for vindicating the constitutional rights of the federal plaintiff. This case is also distinguishable from Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 108, n. 9 (1975), in which the issue of the legality of a pretrial detention could not be raised in defense of a criminal prosecution. See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S., at 337. In addition, after the filing of the writ of certiorari the New Jersey Supreme Court amended the state bar disciplinary rules to expressly permit a motion directly to the New Jersey Supreme Court for interlocutory adjudication of constitutional issues. Rule 1:20 — 4(d)(i). See n. 9, supra. Even if interlocutory review is not granted, constitutional issues are preserved for consideration by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Rule 1:20 — 2(j). The New Jersey Supreme Court reviews all disciplinary actions except the issuance of private letters of reprimand. Rule 1:20-4. Rule l:20-2(j), however, requires that all constitutional issues be withheld for consideration by the Supreme Court as part of its review of the decision of the Disciplinary Review Board. This appears to provide for Supreme Court review of constitutional challenges even when a private reprimand is made. Indeed, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court to consider respondent Hinds’ constitutional challenges indicates that the state court desired to give Hinds a swift judicial resolution of his constitutional claims. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals decided whether abstention would be proper as to the respondent organizations who are not parties to the state disciplinary proceedings. We leave this issue to the Court of Appeals on remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. FLORIDA POWER CORP. et al. No. 85-1658. Argued December 3, 1986 Decided February 25, 1987 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 254. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for appellants in No. 85-1658. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Harriet S. Shapiro, and Jack D. Smith. Jay E. Ricks argued the cause for appellants in No. 85-1660. With him on the briefs were Brenda L. Fox, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., and J. Christopher Redding. Allan J. Topols argued the cause for appellees in both cases and filed a brief for appellee Florida Power Corp. With him on the brief was Harry A. Evertz III. Peyton G. Bowman III and Daniel J. Wright filed a brief for appellees Alabama Power Co. et al. Shirley S. Fujimoto and Ralph A. Simmons filed a brief for appellee Tampa Electric Co. Together with No. 85-1660, Group W Cable, Inc., et al. v. Florida Power Corp. et al., also on appeal from the same court. Paul Glist filed a brief for the Texas Cable TV Association, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in No. 85-1658. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Edison Electric Institute by Robert L. Baum and Jan J. Sagett; for the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. et al. by L. Andrew Tollin; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Association of American Railroads by Paul A. Cunningham and Kenneth P. Kolson; and for Nor-West Cable Communications et al. by Harold R. Farrow, Sol Schildhause, and Siegfried Hesse. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present consolidated appeals from a single decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holding that 47 U. S. C. § 224 (the Pole Attachments Act) effects an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. I The Pole Attachments Act, 92 Stat. 35, as amended, 47 U. S. C. §224, was enacted by Congress as a solution to a perceived danger of anticompetitive practices by utilities in connection with cable television service. Cable television operators, in order to deliver television signals to their subscribers, must have a physical carrier for the cable; in most instances underground installation of the necessary cables is impossible or impracticable. Utility company poles provide, under such circumstances, virtually the only practical physical medium for the installation of television cables. Over the past 30 years, utility companies throughout the country have entered into arrangements for the leasing of space on poles to operators of cable television systems. These contracts have generally provided for the payment by the cable companies of a yearly rent for space on each pole to which cables were attached, the fixed costs of making modifications to the poles and of physical installation of cables being borne by the cable operators. In many States the rates charged by the utility companies for these attachments have not been subject to regulation. In response to arguments by cable operators that utility companies were exploiting their monopoly position by engaging in widespread overcharging, Congress in the Pole Attachments Act authorized the Federal Communications Commission to fill the gap left by state systems of public utilities regulation. See S. Rep. No. 95-580, pp. 12-14 (1977). The Act provides that any cable company operating in a State which does not regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of pole attachments may seek relief from alleged overcharging before the Commission, which is empowered to “regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 224(b)(1). The Act establishes a standard for the Commission’s determination of rates, providing that “a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way.” § 224(d)(1). In 1963, appellee Florida Power Corporation (Florida Power) entered into a pole attachment agreement with appellant Cox Cablevision Corporation (Cox). Florida Power subsequently, in 1977 and 1980, contracted for similar purposes with Teleprompter Corporation and Teleprompter Southeast, Inc. (Teleprompter), and Acton CATV, Inc. (Acton), respectively. In November 1980, Teleprompter filed a complaint with the FCC, alleging that its 1980 per pole rent of $6.24 was unreasonable under the Act. In February 1981, Acton filed a complaint concerning the rate under its agreement, which was $7.15 per pole. In July 1981, the Commission’s Common Carrier Bureau issued a memorandum opinion and order finding in favor of Teleprompter and Acton, reforming the agreements to provide in both cases for yearly rents of $1.79 per pole, and ordering refunds of excess rents paid after the filing of the complaints. Florida Power filed an application for review by the FCC; during the pendency of this application Cox filed a complaint seeking revision of the rent charge under its 1963 agreement, which was at that time set at $5.50 per pole. The Common Carrier Bureau ordered reformation of Cox’s agreement to provide for rent of $1.79 per pole. In September 1984 the FCC, in a single order, approved the orders of the Common Carrier Bureau in all three cases. The Commission rejected constitutional arguments raised by Florida Power under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, and upheld the rate calculations made by the Bureau. Florida Power then sought review of the FCC’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Neither Florida Power nor any of the intervenors argued before the Eleventh Circuit that the Pole Attachments Act was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals nonetheless held in a per curiam opinion that the Pole Attachments Act violated the Fifth Amendment. 772 F. 2d 1537 (1985). The court first concluded that the Act effected a taking of property because it authorized a permanent physical occupation of property under our decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982). 772 F. 2d, at 1544. The court then struck down the Act under the Fifth Amendment because it authorizes the FCC to make the initial determination of the amount of compensation to be paid under legislatively prescribed standards. “By prescribing a ‘binding rule’ in regard to the ascertainment of just compensation,” the court stated, “Congress has usurped what has long been held an exclusive judicial function.” Id., at 1546. The FCC and intervenor cable operators noticed separate appeals from this decision. We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument and decision, 476 U. S. 1156 (1986). We now reverse. I — I HH The Court of Appeals found at the outset that the Pole Attachments Act authorizes a permanent physical occupation of property, which, under the rule we adopted in Loretto, is per se a taking for which compensation must be paid. 772 F. 2d, at 1543-1544. We disagree with this premise, for we find that Loretto has no application to the facts of this litigation. In Loretto we reviewed a New York statute which prohibited any owner of rental property from “interfer[ing] with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or premises,” and provided that the landlord could charge cable operators for access to his property only the amount “which the [State Commission on Cable Television] shall, by regulation, determine to be reasonable.” 458 U. S., at 423, and n. 3. The appellant in Loretto had purchased an apartment building upon the roof of which appellee had mounted cables and switching boxes for the provision of cable television service to tenants. The State Commission on Cable Television had declared that a one-time charge of $1 might be levied by landlords in return for the statutory compulsory access to property. Id., at 424-425. We found that our prior decisions interpreting the Takings Clause, along with the purposes of the Clause itself, compelled the conclusion that “a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.” Id., at 426. We reversed the holding of the New York Court of Appeals that the challenged statute did not take property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and remanded for consideration of the issue whether just compensation had been paid. We characterized our holding in Loretto as “very narrow.” Id., at 441. The Court of Appeals in its decision in these cases broadened that narrow holding beyond the scope to which it legitimately applies. For, while the statute we considered in Loretto specifically required landlords to permit permanent occupation of their property by cable companies, nothing in the Pole Attachments Act as interpreted by the FCC in these cases gives cable companies any right to occupy space on utility poles, or prohibits utility companies from refusing to enter into attachment agreements with cable operators. The Act authorizes the FCC, in the absence of parallel state regulation, to review the rents charged by public utility landlords who have voluntarily entered into leases with cable company tenants renting space on utility poles. As we observed in Loretto, statutes regulating the economic relations of landlords and tenants are not per se takings. Id., at 440; see Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 517-518 (1944); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 157 (1921); see also Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U. S. 875 (1983) (dismissing challenge to rent control ordinance under Loretto for want of substantial federal question). “So long as these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.” Loretto, supra, at 440 (emphasis added). This element of required acquiescence is at the heart of the concept of occupation. As we said in Loretto: “[Property law has long protected an owner’s expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.” 458 U. S., at 436 (citation omitted). Appellees contend, in essence, that it is a taking under Loretto for a tenant invited to lease at a rent of $7.15 to remain at the regulated rent of $1.79. But it is the invitation, not the rent, that makes the difference. The line which separates these cases from Loretto is the unambiguous distinction between a commercial lessee and an interloper with a government license. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the per se rule of Loretto to the Pole Attachments Act. I — i I — I HH The remaining question, whether under traditional Fifth Amendment standards the challenged FCC order effected a taking of property, is readily answered. It is of course settled beyond dispute that regulation of rates chargeable from the employment of private property devoted to public uses is constitutionally permissible. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 133-134 (1877); Permian Basin Area Bate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 768-769 (1968). Such regulation of maximum rates or prices “may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return recovered on investment, for investors’ interests provide only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness.” Id., at 769. So long as the rates set are not confiscatory, the Fifth Amendment does not bar their imposition. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 53 (1936); see Permian Basin, supra, at 770. The Pole Attachments Act, as previously noted, provides a range of reasonableness within which the FCC may undertake ratesetting. The Act provides that the minimum reasonable rate is equal to “the additional costs of providing pole attachments,” while the maximum reasonable rate is to be calculated “by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way.” 47 U. S. C. § 224(d)(1). The minimum measure is thus equivalent to the marginal cost of attachments, while the statutory maximum measure is determined by the fully allocated cost of the construction and operation of the pole to which cable is attached. The FCC has evidently interpreted the statute to provide that when it reduces the contract rate for pole attachments, it may only reduce to the maximum rate allowed under the statute. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. The rate imposed by the Commission in this case was calculated according to the statutory formula for the determination of fully allocated cost. App. to Juris. Statement of FCC 23a. Appellees have not contended, nor could it seriously be argued, that a rate providing for the recovery of fully allocated cost, including the actual cost of capital, is confiscatory. Accordingly, we hold that the the FCC regulatory order challenged below does not effect a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment. IV Because we hold that the Pole Attachments Act does not authorize a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, the holding of the Court of Appeals, that the Act is void because it unconstitutionally constrains the judicial determination of just compensation for takings, necessarily falls. The decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The Commission had previously investigated allegations of overcharging by utilities, but had concluded that it had no jurisdiction because pole attachments were not “communications by wire or radio” under the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151. See California Water & Telephone Co., 64 F. C. C. 2d 753, 758 (1977). Florida Power’s agreements with Cox and Acton were for a minimum term of one year, thereafter terminable by either party on six months’ notice. The agreement with Teleprompter provided for a minimum term of 57s years, terminable thereafter on six months’ notice. The rate ordered by the Commission was in both instances substantially lower than the rate which the cable operators had asked the Commission to adopt. The cable operators, after review of information provided by Florida Power, had requested the imposition of annual rents of approximately $2.20 per pole. Appellants in No. 85-1660, Group W Cable, Inc., National Cable Television Association, Inc., and Cox Cablevision Corporation, intervened before the Court of Appeals supporting the FCC. Tampa Electric Company, Alabama Power Company, Arizona Public Service Company, and Mississippi Power and Light Company, appellees in both cases, intervened before the Court of Appeals in support of Florida Power. Florida Power’s opening brief in the Court of Appeals stated that its petition for review of the Commission’s order did not “involve a facial attack on the constitutionality of a legislative act.” See Brief for Petitioner in No. 84-3683 (CA11), p. 35. The Court of Appeals found, and appellees contend here, that “[t]he hard reality of the matter is that if Florida Power desires to exclude the cable companies, for whatever reason, they are powerless to do so . . . because in previous cases where utilities have ordered cable companies to disconnect, the FCC has routinely intervened by issuing temporary stays which prevent the exclusion of the cable companies.” 772 F. 2d 1537,1543 (1985). According to the Solicitor General, the FCC “has not yet taken a position” on whether utilities may terminate attachment contracts for non-retaliatory reasons. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. The language of the Act provides no explicit authority to the FCC to require pole access for cable operators, and the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress intended no such authorization. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-580, p. 16 (1977) (The Act “does not vest within a CATV system operator a right to access to a utility pole, nor does the bill, as reported, require a power company to dedicate a portion of its pole plant to communications use”). We do not decide today what the application of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982), would be if the FCC in a future case required utilities, over objection, to enter into, renew, or refrain from terminating pole attachment agreements. In view of the Commission’s interpretation of the statute, and use of the fully allocated cost measure in this case, we have no occasion to consider the constitutionality of the minimum rate allowable under the statute. Our disposition of the takings question makes it unnecessary to review on the merits the Court of Appeals’ holding that Congress may not establish standards under which the initial determination of compensation will be made by an administrative authority subject to final judicial review.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CAREY et al. v. PIPHUS et al. No. 76-1149. Argued December 6, 1977 Decided March 21, 1978 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., concurred in the result. Blackmun, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Earl B. Hoffenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Michael J. Murray. John Elson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was David Goldberg. Leon Fieldman filed a brief for the National School Boards Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, we consider the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages by students who were suspended from public elementary and secondary schools without procedural due process. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the students are entitled to recover substantial nonpunitive damages even if their suspensions were justified, and even if they do not prove that any other actual injury was caused by the denial of procedural due process. We disagree, and hold that in the absence of proof of actual injury, the students are entitled to recover only nominal damages. I Respondent Jarius Piphus was a freshman at Chicago Vocational High School during the 1973-1974 school year. On January 23, 1974, during school hours, the school principal saw Piphus and another student standing outdoors on school property passing back and forth what the principal described as an irregularly shaped cigarette. The principal approached the students unnoticed and smelled what he believed was the strong odor of burning marihuana. He also saw Piphus try to pass a packet of cigarette papers to the other student. When the students became aware of the principal’s presence, they threw the cigarette into a nearby hedge. The principal took the students to the school’s disciplinary office and directed the assistant principal to impose the “usual” 20-day suspension for violation of the school rule against the use of drugs. The students protested that they had not been smoking marihuana, but to no avail. Piphus was allowed to remain at school, although not in class, for the remainder of the school day while the assistant principal tried, without success, to reach his mother. A suspension notice was sent to Piphus’ mother, and a few days later two meetings were arranged among Piphus, his mother, his sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic. The purpose of the meetings was not to determine whether Piphus had been smoking marihuana, but rather to explain the reasons for the suspension. Following an unfruitful exchange of views, Piphus and his mother, as guardian ad litem, filed suit against petitioners in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U. S. C. § 1343, charging that Piphus had been suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, together with actual and punitive damages in the amount of $3,000. Piphus was readmitted to school under a temporary restraining order after eight days of his suspension. Respondent Silas Brisco was in the sixth grade at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago during the 1973-1974 school year. On September 11, 1973, Brisco came to school wearing one small earring. The previous school year the school principal had issued a rule against the wearing of earrings by male students because he believed that this practice denoted membership in certain street gangs and increased the likelihood that gang members would terrorize other students. Brisco was reminded of this rule, but he refused to remove the earring, asserting that it was a symbol of black pride, not of gang membership. The assistant principal talked to Brisco’s mother, advising her that her son would be suspended for 20 days if he did not remove the earring. Brisco’s mother supported her son’s position, and a 20-day suspension was imposed. Brisco and his mother, as guardian ad litem, filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343, charging that Brisco had been suspended without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, together with actual and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. Brisco was readmitted to school during the pendency of proceedings for a preliminary injunction after 17 days of his suspension. Piphus’ and Brisco’s cases were consolidated for trial and submitted on stipulated records. The District Court held that both students had been suspended without procedural due process. It also held that petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity from damages under the second branch of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975), because they “should have known that a lengthy suspension without any adjudicative hearing of any type” would violate procedural due process. App. to Pet. for Cert. A14. Despite these holdings, the District Court declined to award damages because: “Plaintiffs put no evidence in the record to quantify their damages, and the record is completely devoid of any evidence which could even form the basis of a speculative inference measuring the extent of their injuries. Plaintiffs’ claims for damages therefore fail for complete lack of proof.” Ibid. The court also stated that the students were entitled to declaratory relief and to deletion of the suspensions from their school records, but for reasons that are not apparent the court failed to enter an order to that effect. Instead, it simply dismissed the complaints. No finding was made as to whether respondents would have been suspended if they had received procedural due process. On respondents’ appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 545 F. 2d 30 (1976). It first held that the District Court erred in not granting declaratory and injunctive relief. It also held that the District Court should have considered evidence submitted by respondents after judgment that tended to prove the pecuniary value of each day of school that they missed while suspended. The court said, however, that respondents would not be entitled to recover damages representing the value of missed school time if petitioners showed on remand “that there was just cause for the suspension [s] and that therefore [respondents] would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held.” Id., at 32. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that even if the District Court found on remand that respondents’ suspensions were justified, they would be entitled to recover substantial “non-punitive” damages simply because they had been denied procedural due process. Id., at 31. Relying on its earlier decision in Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F. 2d 569 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 963 (1976), the court stated that such damages should be awarded “even if, as in the case at bar, there is no proof of individualized injury to the plaintiff, such as mental distress . . . .” 545 F: 2d, at 31. We granted certiorari to consider whether, in an action under § 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must prove that he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial “non-punitive” damages. 430 U. S. 964 (1977). II Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983, Rev. Stat. § 1979, derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The legislative history of § 1983, elsewhere detailed, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172-183 (1961); id., at 225-234 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 238-242 (1972), demonstrates that it was intended to “[create] a species of tort liability” in favor of persons who are deprived of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured” to them by the Constitution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417 (1976). Petitioners contend that the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages under this “species of tort liability” should parallel those for recovery of damages under the common law of torts. In particular, they urge that the purpose of an award of damages under § 1983 should be to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights; and, further, that plaintiffs should be required to prove not only that their rights were violated, but also that injury was caused by the violation, in order to recover substantial damages. Unless respondents prove that they actually were injured by the deprivation of procedural due process, petitioners argue, they are entitled at most to nominal damages. Respondents seem to make two different arguments in support of the holding below. First, they contend that substantial damages should be awarded under § 1983 for the deprivation of a constitutional right whether or not any injury was caused by the deprivation. This, they say, is appropriate both because constitutional rights are valuable in and of themselves, and because of the need to deter violations of constitutional rights. Respondents believe that this view reflects accurately that of the Congress that enacted § 1983. Second, respondents argue that even if the purpose of a § 1983 damages award is, as petitioners contend, primarily to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, every deprivation of procedural due process may be presumed to cause some injury. This presumption, they say, should relieve them from the necessity of proving that injury actually was caused. A Insofar as petitioners contend that the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights, they have the better of the argument. Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they protect. Our legal system’s concept of damages reflects this view of legal rights. “The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.” 2 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §25.1, p. 1299 (1956) (emphasis in original). The Court implicitly has recognized the applicability of this principle to actions under § 1983 by stating that damages are available under that section for actions “found ... to have been violative of . . . constitutional rights and to have caused compensable-injury . . . .” Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S., at 319 (emphasis supplied); see C-odd v. Velger, 429 U. S. 624, 630-631 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 232 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971) (action for damages directly under Fourth Amendment); id., at 408-409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). The lower federal courts appear generally to agree that damages awards under § 1983 should be determined by the compensation principle. The Members of the Congress that enacted § 1983 did not address directly the question of damages, but the principle that damages are designed to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of rights hardly could have been foreign to the many lawyers in Congress in 1871. Two other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 appear to incorporate this principle, and no reason suggests itself for reading § 1983 differently. To the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 442 (White, J., concurring in judgment). B It is less difficult to conclude that damages awards under § 1983 should be governed by the principle of compensation than it is to apply this principle to concrete cases. But over the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as well. It is not clear, however, that common-law tort rules of damages will provide a complete solution to the damages issue in every § 1983 case. In some cases, the interests protected by a particular branch of the common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a particular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to apply the tort rules of damages directly to the § 1983 action. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S., at 231-232 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In other cases, the interests protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an analogous branch of the common law of torts. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 196, and n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring) id., at 250-251 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 232 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotic Agents, 403 U. S., at 394; id., at 408-409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). In those cases, the task will be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right. Although this task of adaptation will be one of some delicacy — as this case demonstrates — it must be undertaken. The purpose of § 1983 would be defeated if injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights went uncompensated simply because the common law does not recognize an analogous cause of action. Cf. Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U. S. 183, 190-191 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229, 240 (1969). In order to further the purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question — just as the common-law rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests protected in the various branches of tort law. We agree with Mr. Justice Harlan that “the experience of judges in dealing with private [tort] claims supports the conclusion that courts of law are capable of making the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of [constitutional] rights.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). With these principles in mind, we now turn to the problem of compensation in the case at hand. C The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” This Clause “raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person’s possessions,” or liberty, or life. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 81 (1972). Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Thus, in deciding what process constitutionally is due in various contexts, the Court repeatedly has emphasized that “procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process . . . .” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 344 (1976). Such rules “minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of” life, liberty, or property by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, at 81. In this case, the Court of Appeals held that if petitioners can prove on remand that “[respondents] would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held,” 545 F. 2d, at 32, then respondents will not be entitled to recover damages to compensate them for injuries caused by the suspensions. The court thought that in such a case, the failure to accord procedural due process could not properly be viewed as the cause of the suspensions. Ibid.; cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 285-287 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 270-271, n. 21 (1977). The court suggested that in such circumstances, an award of damages for injuries caused by the suspensions would constitute a windfall, rather than compensation, to respondents. 545 F. 2d, at 32, citing Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F. 2d, at 579; cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, supra, at 285-286. We do not understand the parties to disagree with this conclusion. Nor do we. The parties do disagree as to the further holding of the Court of Appeals that respondents are entitled to recover substantial — although unspecified — damages to compensate them for “the injury which is 'inherent in the nature of the wrong'” 545 F. 2d, at 31, even if their suspensions were justified and even if they fail to prove that the denial of procedural due process actually caused them some real, if intangible, injury. Respondents, elaborating on this theme, submit that the holding is correct because injury fairly may be “presumed” to flow from every denial of procedural due process. Their argument is that in addition to protecting against unjustified deprivations, the Due Process Clause also guarantees the “feeling of just treatment” by the government. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). They contend that the deprivation of protected interests without procedural due process, even where the premise for the deprivation is not erroneous, inevitably arouses strong feelings of mental and emotional distress in the individual who is denied this “feeling of just treatment.” They analogize their case to that of defamation per se, in which “the plaintiff is relieved from the necessity of producing any proof whatsoever that he has been injured” in order to recover substantial compensatory damages. C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 116, p. 423 (1935). Petitioners do not deny that a purpose of procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of protected interests. They go so far as to concede that, in a proper case, persons in respondents' position might well recover damages for mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process. . Petitioners' argument ■ is the more limited one that such injury cannot be presumed to occur, and that plaintiffs at least should be put to their proof on the issue, as plaintiffs are in most tort actions. We agree with petitioners in this respect. As we have observed in another context, the doctrine of presumed damages in the common law of defamation per se “is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 349 (1974). The doctrine has been defended on the grounds that those forms of defamation that are actionable per se are virtually certain to cause serious injury to reputation, and that this kind of injury is extremely difficult to prove. See id., at 373, 376 (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, statements that are defamatory per se by their very nature are likely to cause mental and emotional distress, as well as injury to reputation, so there arguably is little reason to require proof of this kind of injury either. But these considerations do not support respondents’ contention that damages should be presumed to flow from every deprivation of procedural due process. First, it is not reasonable to assume that every departure from procedural due process, no matter what the circumstances or how minor, inherently is as likely to cause distress as the publication of defamation per se is to cause injury to reputation and distress. Where the deprivation of a protected interest is substantively justified but procedures are deficient in some respect, there may well be those who suffer no distress over the procedural irregularities. Indeed, in contrast to the immediately distressing effect of defamation per se, a person may not even know that procedures were deficient until he enlists the aid of counsel to challenge a perceived substantive deprivation. Moreover, where a deprivation is justified but procedures are deficient, whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to the justified deprivation rather than to deficiencies in procedure. But as the Court of Appeals held, the injury caused by a justified deprivation, including distress, is not properly compensable under § 1983. This ambiguity in causation, which is absent in the case of defamation per se, provides additional need for requiring the plaintiff to convince the trier of fact that he actually suffered distress because of the denial of procedural due process itelf. Finally, we foresee no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself. Distress is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff. In sum, then, although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually was caused. D The Court of Appeals believed, and respondents urge, that cases dealing with awards of damages for racial discrimination, the denial of voting rights, and the denial of Fourth Amendment rights support a presumption of damages where procedural due process is denied. Many of the cases relied upon do not help respondents because they held or implied that some actual, if intangible, injury must be proved before compensatory damages may be recovered. Others simply did not address the issue. More importantly, the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another. As we have said, supra, at 258-259, these issues must be considered with reference to the nature of the interests protected by the particular constitutional right in question. For this reason, and without intimating an opinion as to their merits, we do- not deem the cases relied upon to be controlling. Ill Even if respondents’ suspensions were justified, and even if they did not suffer any other actual injury, the fact remains that they were deprived of their right to procedural due process. “It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing . . . .” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S., at 87; see Codd v. Velger, 429 U. S., at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 424 (1915). Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain “absolute” rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights. Because the right to procedural due process is “absolute” in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 375 (1971) ; Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 171-172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. We therefore hold that if, upon remand, the District Court determines that respondents’ suspensions were justified, respondents nevertheless will be entitled to recover nominal damages not to exceed one dollar from petitioners. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. At the time of the suspensions, the Board of Education’s general rule governing suspensions provided: “For gross disobedience or misconduct a pupil may be suspended temporarily by the principal for a period not exceeding one school month for each offense. Each such suspension shall be reported immediately to the District Superintendent and also to the parent or guardian of the pupil, with a full statement of the reasons for such suspension. The District Superintendent shall have authority to review the action of the principal and to return the suspended pupil.” Rule 6-9 of the Rules of the Board of Education of the city of Chicago (1973), quoted in District Court opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. A9. The District Court held that the terms “gross disobedience” and “misconduct” in this general rule are not unconstitutionally vague because they were narrowed by the school principals’ issuance of the particular rules allegedly violated here. Id., at A9-A10. Rule 6-9 was amended following this Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). See App. to Pet. for Cert. A10-A11, n. 3. The complaint named as defendants, individually and in their official capacities, the principal of the school; the General Superintendent of Schools of the city of Chicago; and the members of the Board of Education of the city of Chicago. Also- named as plaintiff in Brisco's suit was People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), a religious corporation organized under the laws of Illinois, the membership of which includes parents of children in the Chicago public schools. The District Court held that PUSH had standing to maintain this suit, a ruling not challenged on appeal. In addition to the procedural due process claim, Brisco's, complaint alleged that enforcement of the “no-earring” rule violated his right to freedom of expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Neither court below passed on this claim, nor do we. The complaint named as defendants, individually and in their official capacities, the principal of the school; the General Superintendent of Schools of the city of Chicago; the members of the Board of Education of the city of Chicago; and the Illinois Superintendent of Public Instruction. The District Court granted the latter party’s motion to dismiss. The District Court read Goss v. Lopez, supra, as requiring “more formal procedures” for suspensions of more than 10 days than for suspensions of less than 10 days, and it set forth a detailed list of procedural requirements. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A11-A12. Petitioners have not challenged either the holding that respondents were denied procedural due process, or the listing of rights that must be granted. Although respondents’ suspensions occurred before Goss v. Lopez was decided, the District Court thought that petitioners' should have been placed on notice that the suspensions violated procedural due process by Linwood v. Board of Ed. of City of Peoria, 463 F. 2d 763 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1027 (1972). Petitioners have not challenged this holding. The District Court expressly held that petitioners did not lose their immunity under the first branch of Wood v. Strickland, i. e., that they did not act “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student,” 420 U. S., at 322: “Here the record is barren of evidence suggesting that any of the defendants acted maliciously in enforcing disciplinary policies against the plaintiffs. Undoubtedly defendants believed that they were protecting the integrity of the educational process.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A13. See also D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.1, pp. 135-138 (1973); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 1 (1935); W. Prosser, Law of Torts §2, p. 7 (4th ed. 1971). See, e. g., United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F. 2d 823, 829-830, and n. 13 (CA3 1976); United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F. 2d 583, 590 (CA2 1975); Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F. 2d 33, 35 (CA1 1973); Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges of Conn., 474 F. 2d 485, 488-489 (CA2 1973); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F. 2d 738, 743 (CA9 1970). See 1 F. Hilliard, Law of Torts, ch. 3, § 5 (3d ed. 1866); T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 25-35 (5th ed. 1869). Thus, one proponent of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 asked during debate: “[W]hat legislation could be more appropriate than to give a person injured by another under color of . . . State laws a remedy by civil action?” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Wilson). And one opponent of § 1 complained: “The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five dollars or even five cents; they may be what lawyers call merely nominal damages; and yet by this section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the Federal courts instead of its being prosecuted as now in the courts of the States.” Id,., at App. 216 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). See also Nahmod, Section 1983 and the “Background” of Tort Liability, 50 Ind. L. J. 5,10 (1974). Section 2 of the Act, 17 Stat. 13-14, now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1985 (3), made it unlawful to conspire, inter alia, “for the purpose of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws . . . .” It further provided (emphasis supplied): “[I]f any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do', or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy . . . .” Section 6 of the Act, 17 Stat. 15, now codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1986, provided (emphasis supplied): “[A]ny person or persons, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done and mentioned in the second section of this act are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the same, shall neglect or refuse to do so, and such wrongful act shall be committed, such person or persons shall be liable to the person injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by any such wrongful act. ...” This is not to say that exemplary or punitive damages might not be awarded in a proper case under § 1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional rights. See, e. g., Silver v. Cormier, 529 F. 2d 161, 163-164 (CA10 1976); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F. 2d 438, 444 n. 4 (CA6 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U. S. 118 (1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F. 2d 554, 558 (CA7 1974); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F. 2d 799, 801 (CA1), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 940 (1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F. 2d 573, 576 (CA5 1967); Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74, 84-88 (CA3 1965). Although we imply no approval or disapproval of any of these cases, we note that there is no basis for such an award in this case. The District Court specifically found that petitioners did not act with a malicious intention to deprive respondents of their rights or to do them other injury, see n. 6, supra, and the Court of Appeals approved only the award of “non-punitive” damages, 545 F. 2d 30, 31 (1976). We also note that the potential liability of § 1983 defendants for attorney’s fees, see Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, amending 42 U. S. C. § 1988, provides additional— and by no means inconsequential — assurance that agents of the State will not deliberately ignore due process rights. See also 18 U. S. C. § 242, the criminal counterpart of § 1983. For discussions of the problems of fashioning damages awards under § 1983, see generally McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1, 55-66 (1974); Nahmod, supra n. 9, at 25-27, n. 89; Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1322, 1366-1383 (1976); Comment, Civil Actions for Damages under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 Texas L. Rev; 1015, 1023-1035 (1967). The Court has looked to the common law of torts in similar fashion in constructing immunities under § 1983. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417-419 (1976), and cases there discussed. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 authorizes courts to look to the common law of the States where this is "necessary to furnish suitable remedies” under § 1983. See, e. g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U. S. 105, 112-114 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 675, 677-678, 682 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 170 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in result in part) ; id., at 201 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); id., at 214-215 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 609-610, 618 (1974); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 266 (1970). A few courts appear to have taken a contrary view in cases where public employees holding property interests in their jobs were discharged with cause but without procedural due process. E. g., Thomas v. Ward, 529 F. 2d 916, 920 (CA4 1975); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F. 2d 176, 178-179 (CA5 1973); Horton v. Orange County Bd. of Ed., 464 F. 2d 536, 537-538 (CA4 1972). See also Burt v. Board of Trustees of Edgefield County School Dist., 521 F. 2d 1201, 1207-1208 (CA4 1975) (opinion of Winter, J.). Respondents also contend that injury should be presumed because, even if they were guilty of the conduct charged, they were deprived of the chance to present facts or arguments in, mitigation to the initial decisionmaker. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 784^-785 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 479-480, 488 (1972). They claim that “[i]t can never be known . . . what, if anything, the exercise of such an opportunity to plead one’s cause on judgmental or discretionary grounds would have availed.” Brief for Respondents 28. But, as previously indicated, the Court of Appeals held that respondents cannot recover damages for injuries caused by their suspensions if the District Court determines that “[respondents] would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held.” 545 F. 2d, at 32. This holding, which respondents do not challenge, necessarily assumes that the District Court can determine what the outcome would have been if respondents had received their hearing. We presume that this determination will include consideration of the likelihood that any mitigating circumstances to which respondents can point would have swayed the initial decisionmakers. “By the very nature of harm resulting from defamatory publications, it is frequently not susceptible of objective proof. Libel and slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and subtle.” 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 5.30, p. 468 (1956); see also Restatement of Torts § 621, comment a, p. 314 (1938). The essence of libel per se is the publication in writing of false statements that tend to injure a person’s reputation. The essence of slander per se is the publication by spoken words of false statements imputing to a person a criminal offense; a loathsome disease; matter affecting adversely a person’s fitness for trade, business, or profession; or serious sexual misconduct. 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §§ 5.9-5.13 (1956); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558, 559, 569-574 (1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 112 (4th ed. 1971). In this case, for example, respondents denied the allegations against them. They may well have been distressed that their denials were not believed. They might have been equally distressed if they had been, disbelieved only after a full-dress hearing, but in that instance they would have no cause of action against petitioners. We use the term “distress” to include mental suffering or emotional anguish. Although essentially subjective, genuine injury in this respect may be evidenced by one’s conduct and observed by others. Juries must be guided by appropriate instructions, and an award of damages must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). See cases cited in Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F. 2d 569, 579 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 963 (1976). In Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F. 2d 1119 (CA7 1974), and Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1974), cited in Hostrop, supra, at 579, the court held that damages may be awarded for humiliation and distress caused by discriminatory refusals to lease housing to plaintiffs. The court’s comment in Seaton that “ [h] umiliation can. be inferred from the circumstances as well as established by the testimony,” 491 F. 2d, at 636, suggests that the court considered the question of actual injury to be one of fact. See generally Annot., Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Resulting from Racial, Ethnic, or Religious Abuse or Discrimination,. 40 A. L. R. 3d 1290 (1971). In Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d 74 (CA3 1965); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (ND Tex. 1970), aff’d, 446 F. 2d 904 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1062 (1972); and Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (Colo. 1967), cited in Hostrop, supra, at 579, the courts indicated that damages may be awarded for humiliation and distress caused by unlawful arrests, searches, and seizures. In Basista v. Weir, the court held that nominal damages could be awarded for an illegal arrest even if compensatory damages were waived; and that such nominal damages would, in an appropriate case, support an award of punitive damages. 340 F. 2d, at 87-88. Because it was unclear whether the plaintiff had waived his claim for compensatory damages, that issue was left open upon remand. Id., at 88. In Sexton v. Gibbs, where the court found “that Plaintiff suffered humiliation, embarrassment and discomfort,” substantial compensatory damages were awarded. 327 F. Supp., at 143. In Rhoads v. Horvat, the court allowed a jury award of $5,000 in compensatory damages for an illegal arrest to stand, stating that it did “not doubt that the plaintiff was outraged by the arrest.” 270 F. Supp., at 311. Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (CA8 1919), cited in Hostrop, supra, at 579, and Ashby v. White, 1 Bro. P. C. 62, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (H. L. 1703), rev’g 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K. B. 1703), do appear to support the award of substantial damages simply upon a showing that a plaintiff was wrongfully deprived of the right to vote. Citing Ashby v. White, this Court has held that actions for damages may be maintained for wrongful deprivations of the right to vote, but it has not considered the prerequisites for recovery. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 540 (1927); see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 469 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 (1915); Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475 (1903); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58 (1900). The common-law rule of damages for wrongful deprivations of voting rights embodied in Ashby v. White would, of course, be quite relevant to the analogous question under § 1983. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §3.8, pp. 191-193 (1973); C. McCormick, Law of Damages §§ 20-22 (1935); Restatement of Torts §907 (1939). A number of lower federal courts have approved the award of nominal damages under § 1983 where deprivations of constitutional rights are not shown to have caused actual injury. E. g., Thompson v. Burke, 556 F. 2d 231, 240 (CA3 1977); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F. 2d, at 829-830; Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F. 2d 33, 35 (CA1 1973); Basista v. Weir, 340 F. 2d, at 87; Bell v. Gayle, 384 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-1027 (ND Tex. 1974); United States ex rel. Myers v. Sielaff, 381 F. Supp. 840, 844 (ED Pa. 1974); Berry v. Macon County Bd. of Ed., 380 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (MD Ala. 1971). Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals’ holding could be affirmed on the ground that the District Court held them to too high a standard of proof of the amount of damages appropriate to compensate intangible injuries that are proved to have been suffered. Brief for Respondents 49-52. It is true that plaintiffs ordinarily are not required to prove with exactitude the amount of damages that should be awarded to compensate intangible injury. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S., at 350. But, as the Court of Appeals said, “in the case at bar, there is no proof of individualized injury to [respondents], such as mental distress . . . .” 545 F. 2d, at 31. With the case in this posture, there is no occasion to consider the quantum of proof required to support a particular damages award where actual injury is proved.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MONTANA et al. v. CROW TRIBE OF INDIANS et al. No. 96-1829. Argued February 24, 1998 Decided May 18, 1998 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scaua, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in paid, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 719. Clay R. Smith, Solicitor of Montana, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, James K Torske, Carter G. Phillips, Paul E. Kalb, and Christine A. Cooke. Robert S. Pelcyger argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Crow Tribe of Indians. Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, As sistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and James C. Kilbourne Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York et al. by Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, Barbara G. Billet, Solicitor General, John W. McConnell, Deputy Solicitor General, and John B. Curdo, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Daniel E. Limgren of California, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Richard Cullen of Virginia, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case originated in 1978 when the Crow Tribe sought to enjoin the State of Montana and its counties from taxing coal extracted from mines held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. Having succeeded in that endeavor, the Tribe and the United States now seek to recover coal-related taxes once paid to the State and counties by Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a nontribal enterprise that mined coal under a lease from the Tribe. We hold that the restitution sought for the Tribe is not warranted. H-i J> Just north of the northern surface boundary of the Crow Reservation in Montana lies the “ceded strip,” approximately 1,137,500 acres of land that was originally part of the reservation. The Tribe ceded the tract to the United States in 1904 for settlement by non-Indians. Act of Apr. 27, 1904, ch. 1624, 33 Stat. 352; see Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 159 (1920). Surface interests in the eeded strip were thereafter conveyed to non-Indians, but the United States holds rights to minerals underlying the strip in trust for the Tribe. Since 1904, the State and the Counties of Big Horn, Treasure, and Yellowstone have exercised full legal authority and responsibility for public services on the eeded strip, and the Tribe has not exercised civil jurisdiction over this area. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F. 2d 1104, 1107 (CA9 1981) (noting the Court of Appeals’ understanding, in Little Light v. Crist, 649 F. 2d 683, 685 (CA9 1981), that “the ceded area is not a part of the reservation”). In 1972, with the approval of the Department of the Interior and pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. § 396a et seq., Westmoreland Resources, a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying approximately 31,000 acres of the eeded strip. After executing the 1972 lease, Westmoreland signed contracts with its customers, four Midwest utility companies, allowing Westmoreland to pass on the cost of valid taxes to the utilities. Westmore-land began mining the coal in the spring of 1974. In November 1974, Westmoreland and the Tribe renegotiated the 1972 lease. The renegotiated royalties were recognized at the time as being among the highest in the United States. Crow Tribe v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573, 587 (Mont. 1985); see App. 376 (testimony of Westmoreland’s president that the renegotiated royalty was “by far the highest royalty that was being paid in the nation”). A settlement agreement attending the 1974 renegotiation stated that the Tribe found the amended lease and associated documents “satisfactory in that they provide the financial, economic and social protections that the Tribe deems necessary.” Id., at 44. The amended lease and the royalties for which it provided had an extendable term of ten years, running from June 14,1972. Id., at 8. Pursuant to the lease, Westmore-land paid the Tribe almost $18 million in royalties through October 1983. Crow Tribe v. United States, 657 F. Supp., at 588. In July 1975, the State imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in Montana, including coal underlying the reservation proper and the ceded strip. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-23-701 to 15-23-704, 15-35-101 to 15-35-111 (1979). The severance tax rate applicable to the ceded strip coal was 30 percent of the contract sales price of the coal extracted; the gross proceeds tax rate was approximately 5 percent of the contract sales price. During the relevant periods, Westmoreland paid approximately $46.8 million in severance taxes to the State and $11.4 million in gross proceeds taxes to Big Horn County. Westmoreland paid these taxes without timely pursuit of the procedures Montana law provides for protests and refunds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-14. The company subsequently agreed, in exchange for $50,000, to dismiss with prejudice any claim of entitlement to a refund of the severance or gross proceeds taxes it had paid to the State or Big Horn County. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37; see also App. 294-296. In January 1976; some six months after the State imposed its coal taxes, the Tribal Council adopted an ordinance setting out a Crow Tribal Coal Taxation Code. Id., at 79-86. The Tribe’s code imposed a 25 percent severance tax on “all persons engaged in or carrying on the business of coal mining within the boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation].” Id., at 81; see also id., at 97-98. Reservation boundaries, as described in the code, included the coal beneath the ceded strip. Id., at 81. Under the Tribe’s constitution, the tax adopted by the Tribal Council was subject to review by the Department of the Interior. Id., at 329. In January 1977, the Department approved the Tribe’s code “to the extent that it applied to coal underlying the Crow Reservation proper.” Id., at 98. Because of a limitation in the Tribe’s constitution, however, the Department “disapproved the tax to the extent that it applied to the Crow Tribe’s coal in the ceded strip.” Id., at 153; see also id., at 217-218, 329, In 1982, the Tribe again enacted a tax for coal mined on the ceded strip, and again the Department rejected the tax. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F. 2d 895, 897 (CA9 1987). According to the Superintendent of the Crow Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department continued to withhold permission for extension of the Tribe’s tax to the ceded area because the Tribe’s constitution “disclaimed jurisdiction outside the boundaries of the reservation.” App. 218. The Tribe endeavored to amend its constitution to satisfy the Department’s objection; it did not petition for court review of the Department’s refusal to approve extension of the Tribe’s tax to the ceded strip. B The Tribe brought a federal action against Montana and Montana counties in 1978, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against imposition of the State’s severance and gross proceed taxes on coal belonging to the Tribe. The State’s taxes, the Tribe alleged, were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe’s right to govern itself. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154 (Mont. 1979). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 650 F. 2d 1104 (1981), amended, 665 F. 2d 1390 (1982) (Crow I). It held that the Tribe’s allegations, if proved, would establish that the IMLA preempted Montana’s taxes, 650 F. 2d, at 1113-1115, and that the taxes impermissibly infringed upon the Tribe’s sovereignty, id., at 1115-1117. While the Ninth Circuit trained on the nonmonetary claim the Tribe was then pursuing, one for declaratory and injunc-tive relief to stop the imposition of Montana’s taxes, the Court of Appeals noted: “As to the taxes already paid by Westmoreland ... it is true that the Tribe has not paid any of the taxes and is apparently not entitled to any refund if the tax statutes are declared invalid.” Id., at 1113, n. 13. The Ninth Circuit further observed that the Tribe’s own attempt “to tax its lessees’ coal production was partially frustrated by the Secretary of the Interior’s refusal to sanction the Tribe’s tax ordinances insofar as they applied to coal production on the ceded strip.” Id., at 1115, n. 19. In July 1982, after the Crow I decision, the Tribe and Westmoreland entered into an amended lease agreement, approved by the Interior Department that September. Under the amended arrangement, Westmoreland agreed to pay the Tribe a tax equal to the State’s then-existing taxes, less any tax payments Westmoreland was required to make to the State and its subdivisions. See App. 135-141; see also id., at 329-330. The 1982 agreement achieved, prospectively, the federal permission the Tribe had long sought. It allowed the Tribe to have an approved tax in place so that, if successful in the litigation against Montana, the Tribe could claim for itself any tax amounts Westmoreland might be ordered to pay into the District Court’s registry pendente lite. Correspondingly, the agreement enabled Westmoreland to avoid double taxation, present and future, and it absolved the company from any tax payment obligation to the Tribe for the 1976-1982 period. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32-35. In November 1982, in keeping with their amended lease agreement, the Tribe and Westmoreland jointly filed a motion to deposit severance tax payments into the District Court’s registry, pending resolution of the controversy over Montana’s authority to tax coal mined at the ceded strip. Id., at 32. In January 1983, the District Court granted the motion. Thereafter, Westmoreland paid the Montana severance tax into the court’s registry in lieu of paying the State. The District Court granted the same interim relief, in November 1987, for the gross proceeds tax. Id., at 35, 36. In ordering the registry deposits, which ultimately would be paid over, with interest, to the prevailing party (Montana or the Tribe), the District Court recalled the Ninth Circuit’s observation that “the Tribe is apparently not entitled to any refund of taxes previously paid by Westmoreland to Montana.” App. 213 (citing Crow I, 650 F. 2d, at 1113, n. 13). The provisional remedy attended to that concern; it “preserve[d the District Court’s] power ... [to give post-1982] tax moneys to their rightful owner after a trial on the merits.” App. 215. In June 1983, the United States intervened on behalf of the Tribe to protect its interests as trustee of the coal upon which Montana’s taxes were levied. Trial took place in January 1984, after which the District Court concluded that federal law did not preempt the State’s taxes on coal underlying the ceded strip. Crow Tribe v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573 (Mont. 1985). The Ninth Circuit again reversed. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F. 2d 895 (1987) (Crow II). Montana’s taxes, as applied to the ceded strip coal, the Court of Appeals held, were both “preempted by federal law and policies,” as reflected in the IMLA, and “void for interfering with tribal self-government.” Id., at 903. Explaining its decision, the Ninth Circuit stressed these considerations: The Tribe had a vital interest in the development of its coal resources, id., at 899, 901; the State’s taxes had “at least some negative impact on the . . . marketability [of the Tribe’s coal],” id., at 900; Montana’s coal tax exactions were not “narrowly tailored” to serve only the State’s “legitimate” interests, id., at 902. Montana appealed, and this Court summarily affirmed. 484 U. S. 997 (1988). When the case returned to the District Court in 1988, the Tribe sought an order directing release of the funds held in the court’s registry. Montana did not object but, in a new twist, Westmoreland did. The company, for the first time in this protracted litigation, asserted that neither Montana nor the Tribe qualified for receipt of the funds. Montana was out because the Ninth Circuit had declared the State’s taxes preempted. The Tribe, according to Westmoreland, did not have a valid tax law in place even in the years following 1982 — the fund deposit period — for want of proper Interior Department approval. Therefore, Westmoreland urged, the company should receive back all deposited funds. Rejecting Westmoreland’s novel claim of entitlement to the deposited funds, the District Court observed that the Ninth Circuit, in Crow I, 650 F. 2d, at 1117, and Crow II, 819 F. 2d, at 898, had characterized the minerals underlying the ceded strip as a “ ‘component of the Reservation land itself.’ ” App. 286. It follows, the District Court next said, that the tax approved for the reservation proper in 1977, see supra, at 703, covered the strip as well, and the Interior Department had erred in ever opining otherwise, App. 286. As to Westmoreland’s operations on the strip, the District Court further stated, the Crow tax had been modified by the 1982 agreement amending the lease. Id., at 287; see supra, at 704-705. That 1982 Tribe-Westmoreland accord controlled, the District Court concluded, rendering the amount deposited payable to the Tribe, and not to Westmoreland. Shortly thereafter, the District Court ordered distribution of funds in its registry to the United States, as trustee for the Tribe. App. 288-291. Having secured exclusively for the Tribe’s benefit West-moreland’s post-1982 tax payments once held in the District Court’s registry, the United States and the Tribe commenced the fray now before us.. Filing amended complaints against Montana and Big Horn County, they invoked theories of as-sumpsit and constructive trust in support of prayers to recover some $58.2 million in state and county taxes paid by Westmoreland prior to the 1983 and 1987 orders directing deposits into the court’s registry. App. to Pet. for Cert. 243-260. These complaints alleged that, because the State and Big Horn County had collected taxes from Westmoreland in violation of federal law, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow them to retain the funds. In “equity and good conscience,” the United States and the Tribe urged, Montana should pay over for the benefit of the Tribe all moneys illegally collected, together with interest thereon. .See id., at 249-250,258-259. Neither the Tribe nor the United States requested, as additional or alternate relief, recovery for the Tribe’s actual financial losses attributable to the State’s taxes. Montana moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that any refund right that may have existed belonged to Westmoreland, as payer of the taxes in question. Id., at 72. The District Court, in December 1990, denied Montana’s motion on the ground that full airing of the parties’ positions was in order. Id., at 67-85. On Montana’s application, the District Court certified for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), the question whether summary judgment for the State was properly denied. Id., at 61-66. The Ninth Circuit, in 1991, initially granted permission for the interlocutory appeal, but one year later, in 1992, dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 969 F. 2d 848 (Crow III). In dismissing the appeal, the Ninth Circuit commented that the “sole issue” presented was whether the Tribe and the United States, although they did not pay the Montana taxes, were nevertheless positioned to state a claim for relief in assumpsit and constructive trust. That issue, the Ninth Circuit said, “was already addressed” in Crow II. The Court of Appeals then recited passages from Crow II indicating why that court had determined that “The state tax[es] threatened] Congress’ overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and economic development.’” 969 F. 2d, at 848-849 (quoting Crow II, 819 F. 2d, at 903). C The District Court conducted a trial in April and May 1994 to determine whether coal taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana and its counties in the years 1975-1982 unjustly enriched the State and its subdivisions at the expense of the Tribe. In detailed findings and conclusions, that court explained why, in its judgment, the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17-38, 42-54. The Tribe’s case rested on three principal points: first, the fact, settled in Crow I, that the coal underlying the ceded strip was a mineral resource of the Tribe; second, the federal policy favoring tribal self-government and economic development; finally, the Ninth Circuit’s preemption decision. Critical to the preemption decision, the District Court recognized, was the Court of Appeals’ determination that “Montana’s coal taxes burdened the Tribe’s economic interests by increasing the costs of production by coal producers, which reduced royalties received by the Tribe.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 45 (citing Crow II, 819 F. 2d, at 899). Counterbalancing the Tribe’s case, the District Court observed first that the State and its subdivisions, not the Tribe, provided “[pjublic services to residents and businesses on the [c]eded [sjtrip, many of which facilitate the mining of coal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47; see supra, at 701,703, n. 5. Key to the District Court’s reasoning, however, was the respective taxing authority of State and Tribe. In a decision rendered two years after the Ninth Circuit’s Crow II preemption decision, this Court held that both State and Tribe may impose severance taxes on on-reservation oil and gas production by a non-Indian lessee. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163 (1989). Cotton Petroleum indicated that Montana’s taxes on ceded strip coal were invalidated, not because the State lacked power to tax the coal at all, but because the taxes at issue were “extraordinarily high.” Id., at 186-187, n. 17. The Tribe’s exercise of taxing authority, on the other hand, required approval from the Secretary of the Interior, and that approval had not been obtained in the relevant period, 1976-1982. See supra, at 703-704. In 1988, the District Court had determined that the Interior Department’s refusal to approve the Tribe’s tax on the ceded strip was an error, see supra, at 707, but the presence of the state taxes did not cause that error. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36. Rather, the Department initially questioned the Tribe’s authority to tax on the ceded strip and later pointed to the Tribe’s noneompli-anee with the proper procedures for amending its constitution to impose the tax. Id., at 36-37. Accorded weight in the District Court’s evaluation, West-moreland would not have paid coal taxes to the Tribe prior to 1983, for Interior Department approval was essential to allow pass-through to the company’s customers. Id., at 35. Furthermore, under the 1982 lease agreement, see supra, at 704-705, the Tribe and Westmoreland stipulated that Westmoreland would have no tax liability to the Tribe for the 1976-1982 period. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36. Moreover, the deposited funds, Westmoreland’s post-1982 tax payments, had been turned over in full to the United States for the benefit of the Tribe. Ibid.; see supra, at 705-707. The District Court further noted that Westmoreland did not timely endeavor to recover taxes paid to the State and counties, and that the Tribe did nothing to prompt West-moreland to initiate appropriate proceedings for refunds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 50-51. In that regard, the District Court recalled the Court of Appeals’ statement in Crow I that “ ‘as to the taxes already paid by Westmoreland,... the Tribe ... is apparently not entitled to any refund if the tax statutes are declared invalid.’” App. to Pet. for Cert. 53 (quoting Crow I, 650 F. 2d, at 1113, n. 13). Concerning the negative effect of Montana’s taxes on the marketability of coal produced in Montana, the District Court entertained additional evidence, supplementing the evidence offered ten years earlier. Westmoreland’s president testified that “he could not identify any utility contracts lost during the relevant time period due to Montana’s coal taxes,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29, and the parties’ economic experts presented conflicting testimony on the impact of Montana’s taxes on the sale of Montana coal. The District Court described the conflicting positions, but made no findings on the matter. Id., at 29-30. Satisfied that the factors justifying preemption did not impel the disgorgement relief demanded by the Tribe, that under Cotton Petroleum, the State could impose a reasonably sized severance tax, and that the State, though enriched by Westmoreland’s tax payments, did not gain that enrichment unjustly at the expense of the Tribe, the District Court refused to order that Montana coal taxes collected between 1975 and 1982 be remitted to the Tribe. The Ninth Circuit again reversed the District Court’s judgment; in a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals read its prior opinions to require the relief the Tribe demanded, i. e., an order directing the State and county to disgorge approximately $58.2 million in coal taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana and its subdivisions before Westmoreland began making payments into the District Court’s registry. 92 F. 3d 826, amended, 98 F. 3d 1194 (1996) (Crow TV). Acknowledging “the absence of traditional requirements for relief under theories of assumpsit or constructive trust,” 92 F. 3d, at 828, the Court of Appeals remanded for entry of the disgorgement order. That court left to the District Court only the “unresolved requests] for prejudgment interest [and attorney’s fees].” Id., at 830-831. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the District Court had not adhered to the “law of this case,” id., at 828, and had therefore abused its discretion, id., at 830. In particular, the Court of Appeals faulted the District Court for giving undue weight to the fact that Westmoreland rather than the Tribe had paid the taxes, id., at 828-829, and to the fact, made plain by this Court in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U. S., at 176-187, that “similar [state] taxes are not always preempted,” Crow IV, 92 F. 3d, at 829. Further, the Ninth Circuit discounted the public services Montana provided at the ceded strip because “the State would have provided such services even if the Tribal coal had not been mined.” Ibid. Finally, the Court of Appeals attributed to the District Court a finding that Westmoreland “would have paid the tribal tax even without [the Interior Department’s] approval because [Westmore-land] agreed to do so in its 1982 lease.” Id., at 830; see also ibid. (‘Westmoreland was willing to pay coal taxes to the Tribe as early as 1976, so there was no reason for the [District Court] to distinguish between the taxes collected before and after 1982.”). We granted certiorari, 522 U. S. 912 (1997), and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II A The petition for certiorari presents the question whether the Tribe — or the United States as its trustee — may recover state and county taxes imposed on and paid by the Tribe’s mineral lessee, Westmoreland, a party who has forfeited entitlement to a tax refund. Taxpayer Westmoreland, it is undisputed, did not qualify for a refund because the company failed to pursue protest and claim procedures within the time Montana law prescribes. Further, Westmoreland entered into a settlement with the State and the county relinquishing any claim it might have had for return of the tax payments in question. See supra, at 702. As a rule, a nontaxpayer may not sue for a refund of taxes paid by another. See, e. g., Furman Univ. v. Livingston, 136 S. E. 2d 254, 256, 244 S. C. 200, 204 (1964); Krauss Co. v. Develle, 236 La. 1072, 1077, 110 So. 2d 104, 106 (1959); Kesbec, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 278 N. Y. 293, 297, 16 N. E. 2d 288, 290 (1938); cf. United States v. California, 507 U. S. 746, 752 (1993). The Ninth Circuit evidently had that rule in mind when it noted, in Crow I, that the Tribe “is apparently not entitled to any refund” of taxes Westmoreland had paid to Montana. 650 F. 2d, at 1113, n. 13. The Tribe now maintains, however, that the disgorgement remedy approved by the Ninth Circuit does not fall within the “refund” category. The Tribe suggests two ways of analyzing its claim. First, Westmoreland was liable for tax payments, but it paid the wrong sovereign; the Tribe, not the State, should have been the recipient of those payments. Second, the State’s taxes adversely affected the Tribe’s economy by reducing the demand for the Tribe’s coal and the royalties the Tribe could charge; a remedial order transferring Westmoreland’s 1975-1982 tax payments from Montana to the Tribe would eliminate the enrichment unjustly gained by the State at the Tribe’s expense. Before inspecting the Tribe’s justifications for the disgorgement ordered by the Court of Appeals, we place in clear view a pathmarking decision this Court rendered less than two years after our summary affirmance in Crow II. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163 (1989), we held that the IMLA did not preempt New Mexico’s nondiscriminatory severance taxes on the production of oil and gas on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation by Cotton Petroleum, a non-Indian lessee. Id., at 186-187. In so holding, we acknowledged that the same on-reservation production of oil and gas was subject to tribal severance taxes, id., at 167-169, and that New Mexico’s taxes might reduce demand for on-reservation leases, id., at 186-187. Cotton Petroleum clarified that neither the IMLA, nor any other federal law, categorically preempts state mineral severance taxes imposed, without discrimination, on all extraction enterprises in the State, including on-reservation operations. “Unless and until Congress provides otherwise, each of the . . . two sovereigns[ — State and Tribe — ]has taxing jurisdiction over all [on-reservation production].” Id., at 189. The Court in Cotton Petroleum distinguished Grow II in a footnote referring to the Solicitor General’s representation that Montana’s taxes were “extraordinarily high” and the Ninth Circuit’s recognition that “the state taxes had a negative effect on the marketability of coal produced in Montana.” 490 U. S., at 186-187, n. 17. Montana, Cotton Petroleum thus indicates, had the power to tax Grow coal, but not at an exorbitant rate. See id., at 187, n. 17 (according to the Tribe’s expert, Montana’s rate was “ 'more than twice that of any other state’s coal taxes’”). We examine the Tribe’s disgorgement claim in light of Cotton Petroleum, a decision on the books before the Tribe (and the United States) filed their current claims for restitution. B We consider first the argument that the Tribe, not Montana, should have received Westmoreland’s 1975-1982 coal tax payments; therefore the proper remedy is to require the State to turn all taxes it collected from Westmoreland over to the Tribe. As authority, the Tribe and the United States rely on eases typified by Valley County v. Thomas, 109 Mont. 345, 97 P. 2d 345 (1939). That ease involved a Montana law providing for the licensing of motor vehicles by the county in which the vehicle is owned and taxable. Valley County claimed that McCone County was unlawfully issuing licenses, and collecting license fees, for vehicles owned and taxable within Valley County. Valley sued McCone for both injunc-tive and monetary relief. The Montana Supreme Court held that if Montana’s vehicle licensing law made Valley, not Mc-Cone, the county entitled to issue the licenses in question, then Valley could recover from McCone the fees McCone improperly collected. It would make scant sense, the court reasoned, to hold instead that Valley should “exact the . . . license fee anew from the [vehicle] owner, leaving the latter to his remedy, if any, for the illegal exaction.” Id., at 385-386, 97 P. 2d, at 366. As the District Court in this case correctly recognized, App. to Pet. for Cert. 49-50, the Valley County pattern is not the one presented here. There, the Montana licensing statute bound both counties. One, and not the other, was the sole subdivision authorized to issue the license and collect the fee. Here, as Cotton Petroleum makes plain, neither the State nor the Tribe enjoys authority to tax to the total exclusion of the other. Moreover, dispositively distancing the Tribe’s situation from that of the prevailing subdivision in Valley County, the Tribe itself could not have taxed lessee Westmoreland during the period in question, for the Interior Department (whether wrongly or rightly) had withheld the essential permission. It bears repetition that the Department did not approve the Tribe’s imposition of a coal tax on ceded strip production until September 1982, see supra, at 705, that the Tribe never sought judicial review of the Department’s pre-1982 disap-provals, see supra, at 703-704, that Westmoreland would pay no tax to the Tribe absent Department approval, see supra, at 706, 710, 713, n. 18, that Montana’s taxes did not impede the Tribe from gaining the Department’s clearance, see supra, at 710, and that Montana received no share of the post-1982 tax payments released from the District Court’s registry, see supra, at 705-707. These were factors the District Court correctly considered significant in holding disgorgement an exorbitant, and therefore inequitable, remedy. C The negative impact of Montana’s high taxes on the marketability of the Tribe’s coal, as the District Court correctly . comprehended, was the principal basis for the Ninth Circuit’s Crow II preemption decision. See supra, at 709. The Tribe and the United States urge that impact as an alternative justification for requiring Montana to disgorge taxes collected from Westmoreland from 1975 through 1982. At oral argument, counsel for the Tribe clarified that the impact of concern was not coal that went unsold because the State’s tax made the price too high. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Instead, the Tribe’s disgorgement claim rested on the coal “actually produced and sold”; by taxing that coal, counsel maintained, Montana “deprived [the Tribe] of its fair share of the economic rent.” Ibid. Again, however, the Tribe itself could not have exaete.d a tax from Westmoreland before 1983, because the Interior Department withheld approval. And the royalty the Tribe and Westmoreland agreed upon in 1974 was both high and long term, running until June 1982. See supra, at 701-702. No evidence suggests Westmoreland would have paid higher royalties, but for Montana’s tax. It merits emphasis also, as the District Court recognized, App. to Pet. for Cert. 46, 50, that under our Cotton Petroleum decision, Montana could have imposed a severance tax, albeit not one so extraordinarily high. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U. S., at 186-187 (New Mexico’s oil and gas severance taxes imposed on on-reservation production, amounting to about 8 percent of the value of the taxpayer’s production, were not preempted by federal law although the taxes could be expected to have “at least a marginal effect on the demand for on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the Tribe to increase its tax rate”). The District Court did not consider awarding the Tribe, in lieu of all the 1975-1982 taxes Montana collected, damages based on actual losses the Tribe suffered. We cannot call this an oversight. The complaint contained no prayer for compensatory damages. See supra, at 707-708, and nn. 7,8. Nor did the proof establish entitlement to such relief. See supra, at 711. The only testimony homing in on Westmoreland’s sales came from the company’s president. He could “identify [no] utility contracts lost during the relevant time period due to Montana’s coal taxes.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29. While he acknowledged that some customers “exereise[d] the payment option under their contracts rather than continuing to receive coal and that the Montana coal taxes were probably a factor,” he identified as other factors “demand, alternative sources, and transportation.” Ibid. Indeed, as just noted, see supra this page, the Tribe concentrated on disgorgement as the desired remedy; it deliberately sought “no damages . . . now” for “coal that was not sold because the price was too high [due to] the State’s tax.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 87. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e), therefore, could not aid the Tribe. That Rule instructs that “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” The Tribe, however, had not shown entitlement to actual damages. In sum, the District Court carefully and fairly determined that the disgorgement demanded was not warranted and should not be granted. In so ruling, that court endeavored to heed both Crow II and Cotton Petroleum, and closely attended to the history of and record in this tangled, long-pending ease. See supra, at 708, n. 8. Proceeding as it did, the District Court ignored no tenable “law of the case” and did not indulge in an “abuse of discretion.” See Crow IV, 92 F. 3d, at 829, 830. As a result of the District Court’s orders for registry deposits, see swpra, at 705, the Tribe has displaced Montana to this extent: With respect to ceded strip mining operations, all severance taxes have gone to the Tribe since January 1983, and all gross proceeds taxes since November 1987. Montana’s retention of preregistry deposit taxes must be assessed in light of the court-ordered distribution of all funds in the registry to the United States, as trustee for the Tribe. See supra, at 707. The District Court, best positioned to make that assessment, was obliged to do so based on the ease and proof the parties presented. The Tribe and the United States here argued for total disgorgement. They did not develop a case for relief of a different kind or size. While we do not foreclose the District Court from any course the Federal Rules and that court’s thorough grasp on this litigation lead it to take, we are satisfied that the Court of Appeals improperly overturned the District Court’s judgment. ‡ * Hi For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Westmoreland’s president contrasted the 35 and 40 cents per ton royalties Westmoreland had agreed to pay the Tribe with federal royalties which were “at that time ... 17 and a half cents a ton, maybe 20 cents a ton.” App. 375-376. The Montana Legislature, post-1985, inei’ementally reduced the severance tax rate to 15 percent of the contract sales price. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25. For the severance tax, the relevant period is 1975-1982, and for the gross proceeds tax, 1975-1987. Big Horn County collected taxes on its own behalf and for other jurisdictions. The Tribe’s Chairman, in a March 11,1975, statement opposing an increase in Montana coal taxes, however, observed that the State “has an important governmental responsibility” for development of Indian coal resources, particularly on the ceded strip; the role of the State, the Chairman added, “is substantially reduced where development takes place on the Crow Reservation, for under... federal law the Crow Tribe ... exercises governmental and proprietary jurisdiction over the people and property within its reservation.” App. 53. On March 3,1978, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior disapproved, on procedural grounds, an amendment to the Crow Constitution that would have had the effect of applying the Tribe’s 1976 coal tax code to the removal of coal underlying the ceded area. Id., at 98; see also Defendant’s Exhs. 542, 543. Specifically, the amended complaints sought all moneys paid as severance taxes from 1975 through 1983, and as gross proceeds taxes from 1975 through 1988, together with prejudgment interest. App. to Pet. for Cert. 250-251, 259. An earlier amended complaint filed in November 1982, a year after Crow I, sought in addition to the declaratory and injunctive relief originally requested, “restitutionary, tax refunds, money damages, and other relief,” including “punitive or exemplary damages.” App. 143, 158. The current complaints seek restitution, but do not refer to “refunds” or “money damages.” In 1998, the Tribe sought once again to amend its complaint, inter alia, to recover from Westmoreland taxes allegedly due under the Tribe’s coal tax ordinance for the period 1976-1982. In a July 1993 order, the District Court denied leave to amend, observing: “This case is now more than fifteen years old”; “defendants have allowed... previous motions to amend the complaint to be granted without objection”; “[t]his motion, however, contains additional causes of action... [which] could change the nature of the litigation.” Record, Doc. No. 637, p. 4. In so ruling, the District Court noted that “[t]he trial court’s discretion [to deny tardy amendments] is... broadened” when newly alleged facts and theories “have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of action.” Id., at 3. The District Court clarified that its 1988 ruling referring to the Interior Department’s error was issued not to suggest any Westmoreland tax obligation to the Tribe in lieu of the State predating the 1982 lease agreement, but “as a basis for ordering that the escrowed funds be released to the Tribe and not Westmoreland by virtue of [that] agreement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36; see also id., at 53-54. The Tribe and the United States also claimed that the State and Big Horn County were unjustly enriched as a result of their tortious interference with the Tribe's contractual and business relationships with the Shell Oil Company. The District Court rejected this claim as not proved, see id., at 64-57, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that disposition. 92 F. 3d 826, 830-831, amended, 98 F. 3d 1194 (1996). We denied the Tribe’s cross-petition for review of the final judgment disposing of the Shell Oil claim. 522 U. S. 819 (1997). The Court of Appeals repeatedly referred to “law of the ease” made in Crow III, see 92 F. 3d, at 828, and n. 2, 829, a decision denying interlocutory review and therefore containing no “holding,” see supra, at 708-709. But cf Crow I, 650 F. 2d, at 1110 (“incidence of [Montana’s] taxes is on the non-Indian mineral lessee”); id., at 1113, n. 13 (“[a]s to the taxes already paid by Westmoreland,. .. [the Tribe] is apparently not entitled to any refund”). But cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 35 (District Court found that during the 1975 through 1982 period Westmoreland "would not have paid coal taxes to the Tribe as no Department of Interior approval had been obtained to allow a pass-through to its customers”). “A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 785, n. 5 (1983). Since 1985, the District Court observed, “the Montana legislature has enacted production incentive credits and incrementally reduced the amount of the severance tax”; in November 1994, the rate was 15 percent of the contract sales price. App. to Pet. for Cert. 25. In view of the evidence diligently canvassed by the District Court, including the Tribe-Westmoreland 1982 agreement that Westmoreland would have no tax liability to the Tribe for the 1976-1982 period, see supra, at 705, 710-711, we see no substantial basis for believing that West-moreland “would have paid the tribal tax even without [the Interior Department’s] approval” or that “Westmoreland was willing to pay coal taxes to the Tribe as early as 1976,” six years before the Department agreed that the Tribe was positioned to tax coal mined at the ceded strip. Crow IV, 92 F. 3d, at 830. The Tribe attempted, unsuccessfully, to show that Montana's high taxes caused the Tribe to lose its lease with Shell Oil Company. See supra, at 711-712, n. 10.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al. v. DAVIS et al. No. 77-1553. Argued December 5, 1978 Decided March 27, 1979 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, BlackmtjN, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which RehNQUist, J., joined, post, p. 634. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 636. William F. Stewart argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was John H. Larson. A. Thomas Hunt argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Timothy B. Flynn and Walter Cochran-Bond. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Qeorge Agnost, Burk E. Delventhal, and Diane L. Hermann for the City and County of San Francisco; by Stephen Warren Solomon and Ralph B. Saltsman for the California Organization of Police and Sheriffs; and by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Jeffrey A. Norris for the Equal Employment Advisory Council. Briefs of afnici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Bruce J. Ennis, Burt Neuborne, E. Richard Larson, Fred Okrand, and Paul Hoffman for the American Civil Liberties Union et ah; by Charles A. Bane, Thomas D. Barr, Norman Redlich, Robert A. Murphy, Norman J. Chachkin, Richard T. Seymour, and Richard S. Kohn for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and by Jack Greenberg, 0. Peter Sherwood, and Eric Schnapper for the N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Robert A. Helman, Arnold Forster, 'Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Richard A. Weisz for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith; by Vilma S. Martinez, Morris J. Bailer, and Joel G. Contreras for the Incorporated Mexican American Government Employees et al.; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The District Court for the Central District of California determined in 1973 that hiring practices of the County of Los Angeles respecting the County Fire Department violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The District Court in an unreported opinion and order permanently enjoined all future discrimination and entered a remedial hiring order. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further consideration. 566 F. 2d 1334 (1977). We granted certiorari to consider questions presented as to whether the use of arbitrary employment criteria, racially exclusionary in operation, but not purposefully discriminatory, violates 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and, if so, whether the imposition of minimum hiring quotas for fully qualified minority applicants is an appropriate remedy in this employment discrimination case. 437 IT. S. 903 (1978). We now find that the controversy has become moot during the pend-ency of this litigation. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and direct that court to modify its remand so as to direct the District Court to dismiss the action. I In 1969, persons seeking employment with the Los Angeles County Fire Department were required to take a written civil service examination and a physical-agility test. Applicants were ranked according to their performance on the two tests and selected for job interviews on the basis of their scores. Those who passed their oral interviews were then placed on a hiring-eligibility list. Because blacks and Hispanics did poorly on the written examination, this method of screening job applicants proved to have a disparate impact on minority hiring. The County of Los Angeles has not used the written civil service examination as a ranking device since 1969. The county desisted, prior to the commencement of this litigation, because it felt that the test had a disparate adverse impact on minority hiring, because it feared that this impact might violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and because it wished, in any event, to increase minority representation in the Fire Department. See App. to Brief for Respondents 1-4. In 1971, the county replaced the 1969 procedure with a new method of screening job applicants. A new written test was designed expressly to eliminate cultural bias. The test was to be given and graded on a pass-fail basis for the sole purpose of screening out illiterates. Five hundred of the passing applicants were to be selected at random for oral interviews and physical-agility tests. Passing applicants were to be ranked solely on the basis of the results of the physical-agility test and the oral interview. See 566 F. 2d, at 1346 (Wallace J., dissenting). An examination was conducted, pursuant to this plan, in January 1972. Ninety-seven percent of the applicants passed the written test. There was no disparate adverse impact on minorities and this use of the written examination has not been challenged in this litigation. After administration of the written test, but before the random selection could be made, an action was filed in state court against the county charging that the random-selection process violated provisions of the county charter and civil service regulations. The county was enjoined from using the random-selection method pending trial on the merits. See ibid. For a time the hiring process came to a halt. The eligibility list drawn from the 1969 examination had been exhausted. The county was unable to devise a nonrandom method of screening job applicants and the county lacked the resources to interview all of the applicants who had passed the 1972 examination. As a consequence of this unintended hiring freeze, vacancies in the County Fire Department increased and the manpower needs of the Department became critical. Finally, to break the logjam, the County Department of Personnel proposed to interview those applicants who had received the top 544 scores on the 1972 written test. Of this number, 492 were white, 10 black, and 33 Mexican-American. The applicants were not to be ranked on the basis of the test results, however, and the interviews were not intended to eliminate the remaining applicants from consideration. The purpose was solely to expedite the hiring of sufficient firefighters to meet the immediate urgent requirements of the Fire Department. See ibid. But when minority representatives objected to the plan, it was abandoned, uneffectuated, prior to the commencement of this litigation. In January 1973, respondents, representing present and future black and Mexican-American applicants to the Fire Department, brought a class action against the County of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, and the Civil Service Commission of the County of Los Angeles (petitioners). Respondents charged that petitioners’ 1969 hiring procedures violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Respondents also charged that petitioners’ plan to interview those applicants who had received the top 544 scores on the 1972 written test violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The District Court found that petitioners had acted without discriminatory intent. Nonetheless, the District Court held that because the 1969 and 1972 written examinations had not been validated as predictive of job performance, petitioners’ employment practices had violated 42 U. S. C. § 1981. The court permanently enjoined all future discrimination and mandated good-faith affirmative-action efforts. The court also entered a remedial hiring order whereby at least 20% of all new firefighter recruits were required to be black and another 20% were required to be Mexican-American until the percentage of blacks and Mexican-Amerieans in the Los Angeles County Fire Department was commensurate with their percentage in Los Angeles County.' The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court with respect to the 1969 examination: The Court of Appeals held that respondents did not have standing to seek relief on account of the 1969 civil service examination because the plaintiff class, as certified by the District Court, consisted only of present and future job applicants and did not include any persons who had in any way been affected by the 1969 test. The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, the District Court’s holding with respect to the 1972 proposal to use ah unvalidated civil service examination. II The only question remaining in this case, then, concerns petitioners’ 1972 plan to interview the top 544 scorers on the 1972 written examination in order to fill temporary emergency manpower needs. We find that this controversy became moot during the pendency of this litigation. “Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969). We recognize that, as a general rule, “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632 (1953). But jurisdiction, properly acquired, may abate if the case becomes moot because (1) it can be said with assurance that “there is no reasonable expectation . . .” that the alleged violation will recur, see id., at 633; see also SEC v. Medical Committee For Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972), and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See, e. g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974); Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). When both conditions are satisfied it may be said that the case is moot because neither party has a legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying questions of fact and law. The burden of demonstrating mootness “is a heavy one.” See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at 632-633. Nevertheless, that burden is fully met on this record. The first condition is met because there can be no reasonable expectation that petitioners will use an unvalidated civil service examination for the purposes contemplated in 1972. Petitioners have not used an unvalidated written examination to rank job applicants since 1969. Petitioners considered employing such a procedure in 1972 only because of a temporary emergency shortage of firefighters and only because petitioners then had no alternative means of screening job applicants. Those conditions were unique, are no longer present, and are unlikely to recur because, since the commencement of this litigation, petitioners have succeeded in instituting an efficient and nonrandom method of screening job applicants and increasing minority representation in the Fire Department. The new procedures are as follows: To fill each group of vacancies petitioners interview 500 applicants who passed their written examination, including the highest scoring 300 whites, 100 blacks, and 100 Mexican-Americans. The number interviewed is several times the number of actual vacancies. The interviewers rate each of these applicants on his or her merits without regard to race or national origin. Thereafter applicants are hired solely on the basis of the score given by the interviewer, again without regard to race or national origin. Those hired are not hired from separate lists, no quotas are used, and the same rating standards are applied to all applicants. The interviewers are not authorized to give extra points because of an applicant’s race or national origin, but are directed only to be alert for talented minority applicants. This procedure has resulted every year since 1972 in a minority hiring level which consistently, though by varying amounts, exceeded 50%. There has been no suggestion by any of the parties, nor is there any reason to believe, that petitioners would significantly alter their present hiring practices if the injunction were dissolved. See also Brief for N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 7. A fortiori, there is no reason to believe that petitioners would replace their present hiring procedures with procedures that they regarded as unsatisfactory even before the commencement of this litigation. Under these circumstances we believe that this aspect of the case has “lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if '[the Court is] to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969). The second condition of mootness is met because petitioners’ compliance during the five years since 1973 with the District Court’s decree and their hiring of over 50% of new recruits from minorities has completely cured any discriminatory effects of the 1972 proposal. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful, from this record, that the 1972 proposal had any discriminatory effects to redress. The plan, it must be remembered, was never carried out. As a consequence, there has been no finding that any minority job applicant was excluded from employment as a result of the proposal. Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976). Nor has there been a finding that any prospective minority job applicant was deterred from applying for employment with the Fire Department as a result of the proposed application of the examination. Cf. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 365-367 (1977). Nor has there been a finding that the 1972 proposal reflected a racial animus that might have tainted other employment practices. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189 (1973). On the contrary the District Court expressly found: “Neither Defendants nor their officials engaged in employment practices with a willful or conscious purpose of excluding blacks and Mexican-Americans from employment at the Los Angeles County Fire Department. To the contrary, several of Defendants’ officials engaged in efforts designed to increase the minority representation in the Los Angeles County Fire Department.” App. 41. All of these circumstances, taken together, persuade us that, whatever might have been the case at the time of trial, the controversy has become moot during the pendency of this litigation. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for entry of an appropriate order directing the District Court to dismiss the action as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39 (1960). So ordered. Revised Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” Despite the fact that the Mexican-American population of Los Angeles County was approximately double the size of the black population, the District Court ordered identical accelerated hiring for both groups due to its finding that the Fire Department’s 5'7"' height requirement for job applicants was a valid requirement for employment and that this height requirement had the effect of eliminating 41% of the otherwise eligible Mexican-American applicants from consideration. See 566 F. 2d 1334, 1337 (1977). The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in this respect and ordered a relative increase in the Mexican-American hiring quota. In light of our disposition on grounds of mootness we do not consider this issue. Respondents contend that their failure to include past applicants in the class was a “mere oversight” which should not be used to vitiate the District Court’s decree. But respondents did not cross petition for modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the District Court with respect to the 1969 test. The issue of oversight, as a consequence, is not properly before us. See FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 560 n. 11 (1976). We intimate no view whether respondents may seek, despite the oversight, to bring a new lawsuit with new and proper parties. See Gibson v. Supercargoes & Checkers, 543 F. 2d 1259, 1264 (CA9 1976). The parties stipulated that approximately 100 vacancies occur in the ranks of firemen each year, and testimony at trial established that 187 applicants were placed on an eligibility list following the 1969 test. Based on this evidence the Court of Appeals concluded that the 1969 list had been exhausted before plaintiffs applied for employment as firefighters in October 1971. See 566 F. 2d, at 1338. Moreover, there appears to be no possibility that persons hired pursuant to the District Court’s order will be terminated in consequence of our vacation of the Court of Appeals’ judgment as moot. Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974). Of necessity our decision “vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of precedential effect . . . .” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 577-578, n. 12 (1975). See also A. L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U. S. 324, 329-330 (1961).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRADLEY et al. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF CITY OF RICHMOND et al. No. 415. Decided November 15, 1965 Jack Greenberg, James M. Nábrit III, S. W. Tucker and Henry L. Marsh III for petitioners in both cases. J. Elliott Drinard and Henry T. Wickham for respondents in No. 415. Frederick T. Gray for respondents in No. 416. Together with No. 416, Gilliam et al. v. School Board of City of Hopewell et al., also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court. Per Curiam. The petitions for writs of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit are granted for the purpose of deciding whether it is proper to approve school desegregation plans without considering, at a full evi-dentiary hearing, the impact on those plans of faculty allocation on an alleged racial basis. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in both these cases in this regard, 345 F. 2d 310, 319-321; 345 F. 2d 325, 328. Plans for desegregating the public school systems of Hopewell and Richmond, Virginia, were approved by the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia without full inquiry into petitioners’ contention that faculty allocation on an alleged racial basis rendered the plans inadequate under the principles of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. The Court of Appeals, while recognizing the standing of petitioners, as parents and pupils, to raise this contention, declined to decide its merits because no evidentiary hearings had been held on this issue. But instead of remanding the cases for such hearings prior to final approval of the plans, the Court of Appeals held that “[wjhether and when such an inquiry is to be had are matters with respect to which the District Court . . . has a large measure of discretion,” and it reasoned as follows: “When direct measures are employed to eliminate all direct discrimination in the assignment of pupils, a District Court may defer inquiry as to the appropriateness of supplemental measures until the effect and the sufficiency of the direct ones may be determined. The possible relation of a reassignment of teachers to protection of the constitutional rights of pupils need not be determined when it is speculative. When all direct discrimination in the assignment of pupils has been eliminated, assignment of teachers may be expected to follow the racial patterns established in the schools. An earlier judicial requirement of general reassignment of all teaching and administrative personnel need not be considered until the possible detrimental effects of such an order upon the administration of the schools and the efficiency of their staffs can be appraised along with the need for such an order in aid of protection of the constitutional rights of pupils.” 345 F. 2d, at 320-321. We hold that petitioners were entitled to such full evidentiary hearings upon their contention. There is no merit to the suggestion that the relation between faculty allocation on an alleged racial basis and the adequacy of the desegregation plans is entirely speculative. Nor can we perceive any reason for postponing these hearings: Each plan had been in operation for at least one academic year; these suits had been pending for several years; and more than a decade has passed since we directed desegregation of public school facilities “with all deliberate speed,” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 301. Delays in desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable. Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 683, 689; Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U. S. 263, 264-265; see Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are vacated and the cases are remanded to the District Court for evidentiary hearings consistent with this opinion. We, of course, express no views of the merits of the desegregation plans submitted, nor is further judicial review precluded in these cases following the hearings. Vacated rnd remanded.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SMITH v. UNITED STATES. No. 292. Argued March 4, 7, 1949. Decided May 31, 1949. Walter R. Hart argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Julian C. Tepper; Harold D. Cohen argued the causef’fbr the United States. With' him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Campbell and Robert S. Erdahl. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court, Petitioner, George Smith, together with Daisart Sportswear, Inc., and another person, was charged by the United States in two informations of forty-onfe counts each with violations of § 301 of the Second War Powers Act and Priorities Regulations Nos. 1 and 3. The first information charged petitioner and his co-defendants with the intentional misuse of priority ratings in forty-one instances in order to purchase certain cotton and rayon materials and the second information charged them with the unlawful utilization of the textiles so obtained. . The same defendants were. also indicted in the same court for conspiring to violate the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the regulations thereunder by selling finished piece goods above the established maximum price and by keeping false records of their transactions. The two informations' and the indictment were consolidated for trial in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York; after trial before a jury , petitioner was found guilty on the indictment and on thirty-five counts of each of the informations. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction as to the indictment and twenty-three counts of each of the informations, but-reversed as to. twelve counts of each of the two' informations. United States v. Daisart Sportswear, 169 F. 2d 856. During 1944 and 1945 the petitioner, Smith, was the sole owner and officer of Daisart Sportswear, Inc. (hereinafter called Daisart), a corporation engaged in the fabrication, purchase, and sale of .textile goods. Its actual operation was as a contractor working on the goods of others. As part of its business Daisart was to furnish Metals Disintegrating Corporation with cloth bags for filtering and packing the metal powders manufactured by Metals Disintegrating under contracts with the Army and Navy. The War Production Board had granted Metals Disintegrating- high preference ratings to secure the materials necessary to fulfill its government contracts. Because of its inability to provide the particular cloth used to make powder bags, which was of a greyish white duck color, very similar to the canvas used in tents, Metals Disintegrating gave Daisart high blanket preference ratings which Daisart was to apply or extend to purchase all the piece gpods needed to manufacture the bags. There is evidence which would justify a jury in finding the following facts. - Thróugh the use of these top priori-. ties petitioner obtained piece goods for his company, and in the orders he certified that the goods were to be manufactured into powder bags. Over two and-a half million square yards of material were thus invoiced to and paid for by Daisart. Metals Disintegrating, however, purchased from Daisart only 11,987 powder bags, consisting of 48,920 square yards of material. Moreover these piece goods which petitioner obtained by means of preference ratings consisted of fabrics of a wide variety of colors and finishes. They were resold.by Daisart, often still in' their .original packing, to manufacturers of civilian clothing at prices far in excess of the maximum established by law. In these transactions petitioner and his corporation in conspiracy with the other person indicted used fictitious names, gave false descriptions of goods and prices, and falsified invoices, but the money paid for the goods arrived by circuitous and devious routes into the bank accounts.of either petitioner or Daisart Sportswear, Inc. Such evidence is amply sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction on the. informations and indictment, but he insists that he is immune-from prosecution for the acts of which he stands convictéd. He bases his claim to immunity on § 202 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended; 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 632, which reads as follows^ , “(a) The Administrator is authorized to make such studies aiid investigations, to conduct such hearings, and to obtain such information as he deems necessary or proper to assist him in prescribing any regulation of order under this Act, or in the administration and/enforcement of this Act and regulations, orders and price schedules thereunder. “(c) For the purpose of obtaining any information under subsection (a), the Administrator may by subpepa fequire any other person to appear and testify or. to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. ‘‘(g) .No person shall be excused from complying with any requirements under this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity provisions of the 'Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (U. S. C., 1934 edition, title. 49, sec. 46), shall apply with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege.” The Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U. S. C. § 46, provides: “That no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, ... on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, . . . Provided, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.” Petitioner’s plea of immunity arose out of his testifying before an examiner of the Office of- Price Administration in response to subpoenas issued by that office. ■ In August, 1945, investigators of the War Production Board began an inquiry into the transactions of Daisart Sportswear-, Inc. Two subpoenas were issued by the Office of Price Administration summoning petitioner individually and as an officer of Daisart to appear before an official of the Office of Price Administration. The subpoenas directed petitioner to produce all records and documents, “pertaining to the purchase, sale, manufacture, fabrication and/or finishing piece goods, materials, fabrics from January 1, 1945, up to the present time.” On April 30, 1946, pursuant to the subpoenas, petitioner appeared with counsel before an examiner of thé O. P. A. After a ruling,'unchallenged by respondent, that the appearance was under the compulsion of a valid subpoena, petitioner was sworn in as a witness and advised erroneously that he could not be compelled to make any self-incriminating statements and further advised that he had certain constitutional guarantees. ■ This was an obvious reference to the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination as recognized by § 202 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, quoted above. After a few questions of a preliminary nature, petitioner stated: “I want to claim privilege as to anything that I say.”. Thereafter, in answer to questions by the examiner, petitioner explained' that the records required by the subpoenas had either been destroyed, lost, or misplaced. He testified that he was the sole owner and officer of Daisart Sportswear, Inc., which until it went out of business in October, 1945, was engaged in the manufacture, purchase, and sale of textiles and allied products. In carrying on this business, the material out of which products were made was often furnished to Daisart by the organization, a so-called .manufacturer, for whom Daisart contracted to make the product. Smith then testified that from various operations Daisart sold surplus fabrics and textiles; that for Metals Disintegrating Company, Daisart made bags and that for certain manufacturing operations Daisart had to acquire materials and fabrics. He denied that Daisart bought any material for the sole purpose of reselling it and stated that Daisart sold only material which was surplusage from its various operations. As examples of his company’s operations, petitioner said that Daisart was a contractor for five companies which he specifically named and for many others whose names had slipped his mind; and that Daisart also manufactured ammunition bags as a subcontractor for Metals Disintegrating Company, which had a prime contract with the Government. In reply to the question as to how Daisart arrived at its selling price with respect to the material it sold, petitioner answered: “Since it was surplus, it was sold at the price billed to me plus freight and haulage and less discount allowed to me.” Petitioner gave the names of “A. Steinman & Co.,” “L. Lazarus & Co.,” and “Southeastern Cottons” as three of the firms from whom Daisart purchased materials and fabrics, stated that Daisart received invoices from the suppliers for its purchases, and that Daisart paid for its purchases by check at all times. He disclosed the Fidelity Union Trust Company of Newark, N. J., as' the bank where Daisart maintained its account,-' and gave the name of the accountant who had the social security and bank statements of Daisart. - He testified that these records would reflect the total overall business of Daisart, including the purchase and sale of all materials. According to petitioner, Daisart usually received the material from the manufacturer with whom it was contracting, and Daisart merely supplied labor and trimming. The manufacturer did not bill Daisart for the material, but simply shipped it for use by Daisart, who in turn billed the manufacturer for the finished garments. It was tacitly understood that if Daisart could save any of the material, it could do as it pleased with that excess material. Petitioner said that the waste from the making of ammunition bags approximated the amount actually Used in "the. bags, and that Metals Disintegrating knew this fact but never made any claim with respect to the waste. After the foregoing evidence, there occurred the following colloquy between petitioner and the examiner:. “Question [by O. P. A. examiner]': So that with respect to Daisart Sportswear Inc., contracting activities on ammunition bag materials, were shipped by the manufacture!'without bill? “Answer [by petitioner]: It was not. Metals Disintegrating Company being a foreign concern and being unable to furnish this material, they asked me to purchase materials for them. They were aware that I cannot do that without proper priorities. Those priorities were forthcoming in a blanket sum. No stipulated amount and I was further told to maintain a constant stock for any orders they may call. I mean Daisart Sportswear Inc-., for any orders they may call for. Their orders came to me sometimes dated and never in any set size or - specified form. They charged from day to day. I then went about purchasing material for their work. When and if I had a surplus, I would notify them and ask them if they had anything immediately on hand as I am overstocked, at which time they told me they had not and to dispose of it. “Question: This is a voluntary statement. You do not claim immunity with respect to that, statement? “Answer: No. “Question: -I assume that anything you tell us,• Mr. Smith, is subject to verification? You state that after a time Metals Disintegrating Company, although it had a contract with the government, was not in a position. to furnish you with the materials necessary for .Daisart to manufacture this item? “Answer: Right. ■ “Question: ■ And that because of that situation,' Daisart was required to obtain priorities so that Daisart could obtain the. materials and that it did-so? “Answer: In a blanket amount. “Question: And that pursuant to that priority, Daisart thereafter acquired materials, some of which were used in the manufacture of ammunition bags for Metals, and some of it was disposed of by Daisart, is that correct? “Answer: Yes. “Question: And those disposals by Daisart formed a good part of the sales of fabrics made by Daisart? “Answer: They did.” When the prosecution during the trial sought to introduce the transcript of this testimony before the O. P. A. official, .petitioner moved for a dismissal of the informations and the indictment against him upon the ground that he was granted immunity from prosecution by . the Price Control Act of 1942 for the acts concerning which he was questioned. Petitioner asserted that the hearing before the O. P. A. official covered essentially the same matters which formed the basis for the informations and the indictment. The trial judge reserved decision on the motion and received the transcript of the testimony in evidence against petitioner' and the corporation. Subsequently the court ruled that the transcript was not admissible against petitioner, but was only admissible against the defendant corporation, and the jury was so instructed. The trial court also overruled the motion for a dismissal of the' charges against petitioner and stated that “the testimony does nobAhpve any part or feature of the commission of a crime, nor will it tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circumstances which others may supply.” This the trial court thought.was the test. Conviction followed on 35 counts of each of the two informations and on the indictment for conspiracy. Petitioner was sentenced to pay $10,000 on each count, a total of $710,000 in fines and to imprisonment in such a way that he would have three years to serve.. The .Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of. peti-tioner on twelve counts of each of the two informations on the ground that because-he had “not waived immunity-in respect to his earlier disclosure that A. Steinam & Co., L. Lazarus & Co., and Southeastern Cottons were sellers to the corporation, he cannot be prosecuted on the counts based on transactions with those companies.” 169 F. 2d at 861. These were the three companies specifically named by petitioner in his testimony before the examiner of the Office of Price Administration. This reversal reduced the amount of the fines imposed upon petitioner by $240,000, but not his sentence of three yéars’ imprisonment. The Court' of Appeals affirmed the rest of the sentences on the informations and the indictment. • It héld that petitioner’s claim to immunity by reason of his testimony before the examiner was clear and good but for the statement made by petitioner set out above. This the court thought was voluntary and waived all immunity, on the facts therein stated and that these were the essential facts in the convictions. 169 F. 2d- at 860, 862. One judge dissented in part on the ground that by his testimony before the O. P. A. official petitioner had acquired immunity from prosecution for the transactions charged in the indictment. Because of the importance of the problem in the administration of federal criminal justice, we brought the case here by certiorari. 335 U. S. 882. First. The evolution of congressional policy in déaling with immunity from criminal prosecution in return for evidence has-been adequately discussed recently by this Court United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424 (1943), and Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1 (1948). Through Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, it was established that absolute immunity from federal criminal prosecution for offenses disclosed by the evidence must be given a person compelled to testify after claim of privilege against self-incrimination. To meet that requirement Congress amended the immunity provisions, of the Interstate Commerce. Act, 24j3tat. 383, § 12, that protected a. witness from use against him of evidence so given in any subsequent criminal proceeding so as to provide that the witness should not be “prosecuted . . . for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify . . . .” P. 141, supra. This remission of responsibility for criminal acts met the “absolute” test of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591. If a witness could not be prosecuted on facts concerning which he testified, the witness could not fairly say he had been compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. He might suffer disgrace and humiliation but such unfortunate results to him are outside of constitutional protection. Id., p. 598. Cf. pp. 630-631. This compulsory testimony statute was further amended in 1906 to provide that the immunity should extend only to a natural person testifying under oath in obedience to a subpoena. 34 Stat. 798. The Monia case, supra, decided in 1943 that it was not necessary for a witness to claim his privilege, against self-incrimination under the compulsory testimony statute as thus amended-. This conclusion was reached on an interpretation of the immunity statute, p. 430, despite a contrary rule requiring a claim of privilege under the self-incrimination provision of-the Fifth Amendment. See Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 113. Cf. Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131. In the light of these decisions adjusting a witness’ duty of testimony to his constitutional protection against self-incrimination, Congress has been enabled, through the use of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 as a model, to legislate so as to force from the lips of the guilty testimony believed necessary to administer a variety of acts. By the date of the Monia decision,. Congress had, foresightedly, added to the standard immunity clause, drawn from the Interstate Commerce Act, the provision, that tjie witness must claim his privilege. By this' addition the statute on compulsory testimony as to this requirement was put on a parity with the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. It is such a supplemented immunity statute that we are called upon to apply in this case. Petitioner was compelled to testify at the examination under the Price Control Act. He was subpoenaed and put under.oath. At the beginning of the examination, he raised a question as to the validity of the subpoena so as to assure himself that he was not voluntarily present. He promptly declared: “I want to claim privilege as to anything that I say.”. In response to the examiner's queries as to his and Daisart's'business activities, petitioner thereafter made the statements set out at pp. 142 to 145, supra. - These statements as to the organization of his business, his use of priorities, his suppliers and customers, his ban'king connections and the method of computing the selling price of surplus materials are clearly more than suggestions from which it might be imagined evidence as to his operations could be obtained. Brown v. Walker,, supra, at 599. Some, at least, of the disclosures, such as the, use of blanket priorities of Metals Disintegrating to procure textiles and thé method of fixing prices on surplus sales, bore directly on the subsequent charges of misuse of priorities and the goods obtained thereby as well as the charge of conspiracy to violate the Price Control Act. The facts brought out'in his examination are not facts disassociated from his prosecution as in Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, but in the language of the Compulsory Testimony Act are pertinent to the prosecution and “concerning which” petitioner testified. The facts were links in the chain of evidence. The Government does not contest thé conclusion that part of the testimony before the examiner, concerns the criminal charges. Second. The Government, however, contends that petitioner’s immunity from prosecution on facts concerning which he. was compelled to testify was waived by a subsequent voluntary statement. This statement as given in question and answer form is set out above at p. 144. Privilege can be waived and with the waiver the statutory immunity disappears. Since the purpose of the remission of penalties is to. force out evidence that is protected by privilege against self-incrimination, a waive! of that protection makes the testimony available for prosecution of the witness. Nor do we see any reason why claim of privilege to all or- any part of testimony may not be withdrawn. Although the privilege against self-incrimination must be claimed, when claimed it is guaranteed by the Constitution. Thereafter only absolute immunity from federal criminal prosecution is sufficient to compel the desired testimony. Waiver of constitutional rights, however, is not lightly to be inferred. A witness cannot properly be held after clairp to have waived his privilege and consequent immunity upon vague and uncertain evidence. It is plain here that petitioner relied from the beginning of his examination upon his privilege. The United States had notice that the witness sought protection against prosecution for any facts to which he was compelled to testify. The Government had then to decide whether to pay the price to secure the facts of the suspected criminal operation. Just before the question that opened the colloquy quoted at p. 144, the examination had elicited that Daisart often contracted with manufacturers to do work on goods bought and furnished by the manufacturer. Then came the question above quoted, pp. 143-144, as to the practice on the ammunition-bag contract. The answer, we think, was responsive. Then came the question; “This is a voluntary statement. You do not claim immunity with respect to that statement?” And the answer, “No.” Whether the “No” applied to the first or second sentence is not known. In view of the specific claim of privilege, it seems unlikely that petitioner would waive the privilege and testify, voluntarily and without protection against prosecution, as to the details of his operations with Metals Disintegrating, the source of the blanket priorities that lay at the base of the charges by information and indictment; No question is made as to the correctness of the transcription. Without any effort to clarify the “No,” the examiner went ahead and had the witness restate the substance of the long answer quoted on p. 144 without any further intimation that the subsequent answers were considered by the examiner to be voluntary. We do not think under these circumstances this equivocal “No” is a waiver of the previous definite claim of general privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court excluded the entire statement before the examiner, including the question just discussed, as evidence against petitioner. Since that court did not think the statement contained testimony proving any part or feature of the commission of a crime and did not tend to a conviction when combined with proof of other circumstances which others might supply, it refused the motion for a directed acquittal. Furthermore, before the question was asked the answer to which the Government argues is a voluntary statement, petitioner, testifying under unquestioned privilege with immunity, gave the information that is detailed above at pp. 141 to 143, inclusive. Without restating the entire substance of the testimony, we think the statements concerning the necessity of Daisart to acquire fabrics for manufacturing, together with information as to the names of the suppliers, the name of Daisart’s bank and as to the manner of Daisart’s receipts, disbursements and sales prices, were sufficient to give petitioner the immunity claimed. Third. Finally the Government presses upon us the argument that, as to the indictment, the 'testimony petitioner gave at the examination under the Price Control Act was wholly sélf-exonerating and therefore did not secure immunity from prosecution by the indictment. The contention is that since the immunity granted by § 202 (g) of the Emergency Price Control Act was an exchange for the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and since this evidence is not incriminating, it therefore cannot be used to setíure immunity from prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Price Control Act. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2282. The indictment was for conspiracy to sell finished piece goods in excess, of prices fixed under the Price Control Act. The position of the Government is that the only testimony relating to the charge of the indictment is that petitioner testified that he sold the goods at prices within the allowable limits. But the indictment also charged as a part of the conspiracy a plan through false invoices to secure payments for the goods by checks to fictitious persons which the conspirators cashed. A glance at the details of the testimony set out at pp. 142 through 145, supra, will demonstrate that petitioner’s testimony at the examination went beyond the exculpatory language concerning the sale price. Petitioner testified as to the business organization of Daisart, its acquisition of materials through the priorities furnished by Metals Disintegrating from named firms on their invoices and its payment for these goods at all times by check. Daisart’s bank was named. Since the. argument on this point relates only to exculpatory statements and not to waivers, it is also to be noted'that all testimony contained in the answer printed on p. 144, above, is to be taken into consideration. Certainly many of these disclosures furnished leads that could have uncovered evidence of the unlawful conspiracy charged in the indictment. Petitioner testified concerning transactions, matters and things substantially, connected with parts of the conspiracy for which he was indicted — for example, th§ testimony that he bought material under invoice from a named supplier and paid for it by check on a named bank. This evidence, being substantially connected (with the conspiracy, was ample to give immunity from the conspiracy prosecution. The Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893, gives immunity from prosecution on account “of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which” the witness is compelled to'testify in return for such evidence. Consequently, we need not decide whether, if only exculpatory evidence was given concerning matters pertinent to the criminal charge, the statute would grant immunity. Reversed. 56 Stat 176,177; 58 Stat. 827; 60 Stat. 868. 32 C. F. R., Cum. Supp. §§ 944.1-944.21; 32 C. F. R., Cum. Supp. § 944.23. 56 Stat. 23 ét seq., as amended, 56 Stat. 767, 58 Stat. 632, 59 Stat. 306,60 Stat. 664. A footnote to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 169 F. 2d 856 at 859, states: “These terms are explained in United States v. Bradford, 2 Cir., 160 F. 2d 729, certiorari denied 331 U. S. 829, 67. S. Ct. 1351, A- preference rating is applied by the original recipient to obtain commodities from a supplier who then extends (uses) the rating to secure the needed commodities from' subsuppliers.” . See Shapiro v. United States, supra, p. 6; Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 142. United States v. Mania, supra, at 429; cf. p. 442, et seq. United States v. Monia, supra, at 429. In the Heike case, the accused had testified in a grand jury investigation as to violations of the Sherman Act. Such testimony did not earn the immunity of the Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904, on a subsequent indictment for a fraud on the revenue by the secret introduction of springs in scales to cause them to indicate less than the actual weight. A table of annual meltings of sugar had been given at the monopoly investigation by Heike. This Court said: “The table of meltings by the year had no bearing on the frauds, as it was not confined to the sugar fraudulently weighed and it does not appear how the number of pounds was made up. The mere fact that a part of the sugar embraced in the table was the sugar falsely weighed did not make the table evidence concerning the frauds. The same consideration shows that it did not tend to incriminate the witness. It neither led nor could have led to a discovery of his crime.” 227 U. S. at 143. See United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 430; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 599; United States v. Weisman, 111 F. 2d 260; United States v. Molasky, 118 F. 2d 128, 134. The Government’s argument is that voluntary statements are not protected by privilege and do not earn immunity. It is suggested, too, that the answers were not responsive to the question and that a witness cannot volunteer facts and secure immunity any more than he can secure remission of penalties by appearing as a witness without compulsion. Further, the Government relies upon the voluntary character of the above statement as á waiver of privilege, not only as to facts included in the statement but also as to similar facts that the witness had disclosed previously under compulsion after claim of privilege. This position is based on the opinion of the Court of Appeals, where it was said: “Even where this testimony repeated previous answers which would have been subject to the witness’ initial general claim of immunity, we see no reason why a witness cannot qualify and limit his claim as the examination proceeds, just as he can make new claims as to issues he has not waived.” 169 F. 2d at 861. Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494, 496, and cases cited; Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 113; United States v. Monia 317 U. S. 424, 427; Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 195. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408, 412; Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Comm’n, 301 U. S. 292, 306; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U. S 389, 394; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464. United States v. Monia 317 U. S. 424, 430. “Compare United States v. St. Pierre, 128 F. 2d 979, 980: “Nor is it material that appellant stated at several points that he . had committed no federal crime; such a contradiction, especially by a nervous or excitable witness would not overcome a clear claim of privilege if he was otherwise entitled to the privilege.” The testimony referred to is as follows: “Question: Can you tell me how Daisart Sportswear Inc., arrived at its selling price with respect to the items that it sold? “Answer: Since it was surplus, it .was sold at the price billed to me plus freight and haulage and less discount allowed to me. “Question: In other words, Daisart Sportswear Inc., sold at cost plus freight less any discounts, cash or otherwise, received by Daisart Sportswear Inc. ? “Answer: Correct.”-

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARKS v. ESPERDY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 253. Argued April 2, 1964. Decided May 18, 1964. Murray A. Gordon argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Charles Gordon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller and L. Paul Winings. Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DON E. WILLIAMS CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 75-1312. Argued December 8, 1976 Decided February 22, 1977 Marvin L. Schrager argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Durward J. Long, Sr. Deputy Solicitor General Jones argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Stuart A. Smith, Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., and David English Carmack. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this federal income tax case is whether an accrual-basis corporate taxpayer, by delivering its fully secured promissory demand note to the trustees of its qualified employees' profit-sharing trust, is. entitled to a deduction therefor under § 404 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §404 (a). I The pertinent facts are stipulated. Petitioner, Don E. Williams Company (taxpayer), is an Illinois corporation with its principal office at Moline in that State. It serves as a manufacturers’ representative and wholesaler for factory tools and supplies. It keeps its books and files its federal income tax returns on the accrual method of accounting and on the basis of the fiscal year ended April 30. Don E. Williams, Jr., president of the taxpayer, owns 87.08% of its outstanding capital stock; Joseph W. Phillips, Jr., vice president, owns 4.17% thereof; and Alice It. Williams, secretary-treasurer, owns 4.58%. In November 1963, the taxpayer’s directors adopted the Don E. Williams Company Profit Sharing Plan and Trust. The trustees are the three officers of the taxpayer and the First National Bank of Moline. The trust was “qualified” under § 401 (a) of the Code and thus, under § 501 (a), is exempt from federal income tax. Near the end of each of its fiscal years 1967, 1968, and 1969, the taxpayer’s directors authorized a contribution of approximately $30,000 to the trust. This amount was accrued as an expense and liability on the taxpayer’s books at the close of the year. In May, the taxpayer delivered to the trustees its interest-bearing promissory demand note for the amount of the liability so accrued. The 1967 and 1968 notes bore interest and the 1969 note bore 8% interest. Each note was guaranteed by the three officer-trustees individually and, in addition, was secured by collateral consisting of Mr. Williams’ stock of the taxpayer and the interests of Mr. Williams and Mr. Phillips under the plan. The value of the collateral plus the net worth of Alice R. Williams, a guarantor, greatly exceeded the face amount of each note. Within a year following the issuance of each note the taxpayer delivered to the trustees its check for the principal amount of the note plus interest. Each check was duly honored. In its federal income tax return filed for each of the fiscal years 1967, 1968, and 1969 the taxpayer claimed a deduction under § 404 (a) for the liability accrued to the trustees. On audit, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent here, ruled that the accruals and the deliveries of the notes to the trustees were not contributions that were “paid,” within the meaning of §404 (a). Accordingly, he disallowed the claimed accrual deductions and, instead, allowed deductions only for the checks for the respective fiscal years in which they were delivered. These adjustments resulted in deficiencies of $15,162.87, $1,360.64, and $530.42, respectively, in the taxpayer’s income taxes for the three years. On petition for redetermination, the United States Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion with three dissents, upheld the Commissioner. 62 T. C. 166 (1974). In so doing, it adhered to its consistent rulings since 1949 to the effect that an accrual-basis employer’s contribution to its qualified employees’ profit-sharing plan in the form of the employer’s promissory note was not something “paid,” and therefore deductible, under § 404 (a) of the 1954 Code or under the predecessor § 23 (p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. With the taxpayer’s case being subject to an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had not yet ruled on the issue, the Tax Court declined to follow decisions of the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that had disagreed with the Tax Court in earlier cases. 62 T. C., at 168. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit also declined to follow its sister Circuits, and affirmed. 527 F. 2d 649 (1975). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 426 U. S. 919 (1976). II A. The statute. Under § 446 of the Code, 26 U. S„ C. § 446, taxable income is computed under the accounting method regularly utilized by the taxpayer in keeping its books. Subject to that requirement, “a taxpayer may compute taxable income” under the cash receipts and disbursements method or, among others, under “an accrual method.” As a consequence, the words “paid or accrued” or “paid or incurred” appear in many of the Code’s deduction provisions. The presence of these phrases reveals Congress’ general intent to give full meaning to the accrual system and to allow the accrual-basis taxpayer to deduct appropriate items that accrue, or are incurred, but are unpaid during the taxable year. Section 404 (a),, however, quoted in n. 1, supra, stands in obvious contrast. It provides that “[i]f contributions are paid by an employer to . . . a . . . profit-sharing . . . plan,” the contributions, subject to a specified limitation in amount, shall be deductible “[i]n the taxable year when paid” (emphasis supplied). The usual alternative words, “or accrued” or “or incurred,” are missing, and their absence indicates congressional intent to permit deductions for profit-sharing plan contributions only to the extent they are actually paid and not merely accrued or incurred during the year. Congress, however, by way of addendum, provided a grace period for the accrual-basis taxpayer. Section 404 (a) (6) allowed a deduction for the taxable year with respect to a contribution on account of that year if it was a “payment . . . made” within the time prescribed for filing that year’s return. Under § 6072 (b) of the Code, this period, for petitioner-taxpayer, was two and one-half months after April 30, the close of its fiscal year, or July 15. B. The legislative history. This history, as is to be expected, is consistent with the theme of the statute’s language. Section 404 is virtually identical with § 23 (p) of the 1939 Code, as amended by § 162 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 863. Committee reports at that time speak of an accrual-basis taxpayer’s deferral of paying compensation and state that, if this was done “under an arrangement having the effect of a . . . profit-sharing . . . plan . . . deferring the receipt of compensation, he will not be allowed a deduction until the year in which the compensation is paid” (emphasis supplied). H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 141 (1942). This, however, would have created a computational problem for the accrual-basis taxpayer who wished to make the maximum contribution possible under the percentage limitations of the statute, see § 404 (a)(3)(A), n. 1, supra, but who would not be able to determine that figure until after the close of the taxable year. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on the Revenue Act of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 465 (1942). Accordingly, Congress provided the grace period, originally 60 days under § 23 (p)(l)(E) of the 1939 Code, as amended, 56 Stat. 865, for the accrual-basis taxpayer. Six years later the House Committee on Ways and Means recommended an extension of the grace time and referred to the then-existing 60-day period for the deduction of “contributions actually paid” (emphasis supplied). H. R. Rep. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1948). The Senate did not then go along. But in 1954 the grace period was lengthened to coincide with the period for filing the return, § 404 (a)(6) of the 1954 Code, and at that time a similar reference, “actually makes payment,” was repeated in the legislative history. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 55 (1954). See, id., at 292, and H. R. Rep. No, 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A151 (1954). The applicable Treasury Regulations since 1942 consistently have stressed payment by the accrual-basis taxpayer. See Reg. Ill, § 29.23 (p)-l (1943); Reg. 118, § 39.23 (p)-l (d) (1953); Reg. § 1.404 (a)-l (c), 26 CFR § 1.404 (a)-l (c) (1975). With the statute re-enacted in the 1954 Code, this administrative construction may be said to have received congressional approval. See Lykes v. United States, 343 U. S. 118, 127 (1952). We thus have, in the life and development of the statute, an unbroken pattern of emphasis on payment for the accrual-basis taxpayer. Indeed, the taxpayer here concedes that more than mere accrual is necessary for the accrual-basis taxpayer to be entitled to the deduction. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. The taxpayer would find that requirement satisfied by the issuance and delivery of its promissory note. To that aspect of the case we now turn. Ill In the light of the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the taxpayer’s just-mentioned concession, the controversy before us obviously comes down to the question whether the taxpayer’s issuance and delivery of its promissory note to the trustees within the grace period, unaccompanied, however, by discharge of the note within that period, made the accrued contribution one that was “paid” within the meaning of §404 (a). The obligation to make the contribution for the taxable year existed, and the liability was even formally recognized by the taxpayer by the issuance and delivery of its note of acknowledged value. But was all this a contribution “paid” to the profit-sharing plan? Two decisions of this Court, although they concern cash-basis taxpayers, are of helpful significance. The first is Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 140 (1931). There a taxpayer had endorsed notes issued by a corporation which later became insolvent. The taxpayer and his partner took up the notes with the creditor by replacing them with their own joint note. The Court unanimously held that this did not entitle the cash-basis taxpayer to a bad-debt deduction for, as the Board of Tax Appeals observed, he had “ 'merely exchanged his note under which he was primarily liable for the corporation’s notes under which he was secondarily liable, without any outlay of cash or property having a cash value.’ ” Id., at 141. The second decision is Helvering v. Price, 309 U. S. 409 (1940). There the taxpayer argued that his giving a secured note to a bank in response to a guarantee gave rise to a deduction. The Court observed that the note “was not the equivalent of cash to entitle the taxpayer to the deduction,” and concluded that the fact the note was secured made no difference in the result. “[T]he collateral was not payment. It was given to secure respondent’s promise to pay” and “did not transform the promise into the payment required to constitute a deductible loss in the taxable year.” Id., at 413-414. The reasoning is apparent: the note may never be paid, and if it is not paid, “the taxpayer has parted with nothing more than his promise to pay.” Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F. 2d 848, 852 (CA1 1932). If, as was suggested, the language of § 404 (a) places all taxpayers on a cash basis with respect to payments to a qualified profit-sharing trust, the principle of Eckert and of Price clearly is controlling here. The petitioner argues, of course, that that principle is not applicable to the accrual-basis taxpayer. We are not persuaded. The statutory terms “paid” and “payment,” coupled with the grace period and the legislative history’s reference to “paid” and “actually paid,” demonstrate that, regardless of the method of accounting, all taxpayers must pay out cash or its equivalent by the end of the grace period in order to qualify for the § 404 (a) deduction. This accords, also, with the apparent policy behind the statutory provision, namely, that an objective outlay-of-assets test would insure the integrity of the employees’ plan and insure the full advantage of any contribution which entitles the employer to a tax benefit. Other arguments advanced by the taxpayer are also unconvincing: 1. The taxpayer argues that because its notes are acknowledged to have had value, it is entitled to a deduction equal to that value. It is suggested that such a note would qualify as income to a seller-recipient. Whatever the situation might be with respect to the recipient, the note, for the maker, even though fully secured, is still only his promise to pay. It does not in itself constitute an outlay of cash or other property. A similar argument was made in Helvering v. Price, supra, and was not availing for the taxpayer there. See Brief for Respondent, O. T. 1939, No. 559, pp. 16-17. 2. The taxpayer suggests that the transaction equates with a payment of cash to the trustees followed by a loan, evidenced by the note in return, in the amount of the cash advanced. But “a transaction is to be given its tax effect in accord with what actually occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred. “. . . This Court has observed repeatedly that, while a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not. . . and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to follow but did not.” Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U. S. 134, 148-149 (1974). See Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U. S. 673, 690 (1974). What took place here is clear, and income tax consequences follow accordingly. We do not indulge in speculating how the transaction might have been recast with a different tax result. 3. Taxpayer heavily relies on the fact that three Courts of Appeals — the only courts at that level to pass upon the issue until the present case came to the Seventh Circuit, see n. 4, supra — have resolved the issue adversely to the Commissioner. We cannot ignore those decisions or lightly pass them by. Indeed, petitioner taxpayer has a stronger argument than the taxpayers in those cases because they concerned note transactions of somewhat lesser integrity, in the sense that the notes either bore a lower interest rate or no interest at all, or were less adequately secured. After careful review of those cases, however, we conclude that their analytical structure rests on two errors: (a) The three Courts of Appeals, in considering § 404 (a), assumed, mistakenly we feel, that the word “paid” in the statute has the same meaning it possesses in § 267 (a). The latter section disallows deductions by an accrual-basis taxpayer for certain items that are accrued but not yet paid to related cash-basis payees. The analogy the Courts of Appeals drew between § 404 (a) and § 267 (a) derives from two earlier cases, namely, Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 164 F. 2d 268 (CA3 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 861 (1948), and Musselman Hub-Brake Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F. 2d 65 (CA6 1943), where it was ruled that an accrual-basis corporate taxpayer’s delivery of a demand note to one of its officers for salary or to its controlling shareholder for royalties and interest effected a payment of those items under § 24 (c) of the 1939 Code (the predecessor of § 267 (a) of the 1954 Code). But this interpretation of the term "paid” in § 267 (a) necessarily resulted from the desirability of affording simultaneously consistent treatment to the deduction and to the income inclusion. The statute’s purpose was to prevent the tax avoidance that would result if an accrual-basis corporation could claim a deduction for an accrued item its related cash-basis payee would not include in income until it was paid, if ever. See H. R. Rep. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1937); S. Rep. No. 1242, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 31 (1937). Because the recipient of the note was required to include its value in income at the time of receipt, disallowance of the deduction to the maker corporation sympathetically was deemed not to serve the underlying policy of § 24 (c) of the 1939 Code. Musselman, 139 F. 2d, at 68; Logan Engineering Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 860, 868 (1949). The term "paid” in the statute was thus used merely, and only insofar as, to insure that transactions between related entities received consistent tax treatment. This situation has no counterpart under § 404 (a), for the qualified plan is exempt from tax. A policy consideration that might call for equivalence on both sides of the income tax ledger plainly is not present. And one is not brought into being by the fact that the trustees must disclose the note in the information report required to be filed by § 6047 (a) of the Cbde. (b) The three Courts of Appeals seemed to equate a promissory note with a check. The line between the two may be thin at times, but it is distinct. The promissory note, even when payable on demand and fully secured, is still, as its name implies, only a promise to pay, and does not represent the paying out or reduction of assets. A check, on the other hand, is a direction to the bank for immediate payment, is a medium of exchange, and has come to be treated for federal tax purposes as a conditional payment of cash. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 524 (1949); Rev. Rul. 54-465, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 93. The factual difference is illustrated and revealed by taxpayer’s own payment of each promissory note with a check within a year after issuance. We therefore find ourselves in disagreement with the result reached by the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in their respective cases hereinabove cited. We agree, instead, with the Tax Court in its uniform line of decisions and with the Seventh Circuit in the present case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Section 404 (a), as amended by § 24 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1623, reads in pertinent part: “(a) General rule. “If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, . . . such contributions . . . shall not be deductible under section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses) or section 212 (relating to expenses for the production of income) ; but, if they satisfy the conditions of either of such sections, they shall be deductible under this section, subject, however, to the following limitations as to the amounts deductible in any year: “(3) Stock bonus and profit-sharing trusts. “(A) Limits on deductible contributions. “In the taxable year when paid, if the contributions are paid into a . . . profit-sharing trust, and if such taxable year ends within or with a taxable year of the trust with respect to which the trust is exempt under section 501 fa), in an amount not in excess of 15 percent of the compensation otherwise paid or accrued during the taxable year to all employees under the . . . profit-sharing plan. . . Respondent acknowledges that a solvent taxpayer’s issuance and delivery of a check is a contribution that is “paid,” within the language of §404 (a). Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-31. See Dick Bros. v. Commissioner, 205 F. 2d 64 (CA3 1953). Logan Engineering Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 860 (Kern, J., reviewed by the court with no dissents), appeal dismissed (CA7 1949); Slaymaker Lock Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 1001 (1952) (Bruce, J.), rev’d sub nom. Sachs v. Commissioner, 208 F. 2d 313 (CA3 1953); Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T. C. 1061 (1956) (Withey, J.), remanded, 258 F. 2d 237 (CA9 1958), supplemental opinion, 294 F. 2d 667 (1961); Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 817 (1962) (Fay, J., reviewed by tbe court with no dissents), remanded, 313 F. 2d 843 (CA10 1963). Memorandum decisions to the same effect are Freer Motor Transfer v. Commissioner, 8 TCM 507 (1949), ¶ 49,124 P-H Memo TC (Kern, J.); Sachs v. Commissioner, 11 TCM 882 (1952), ¶ 52,256 P-H Memo TC (LeMire, J.), remanded, 208 F. 2d 313 (CA3 1953); Lancer Clothing Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 TCM 776 (1975), ¶ 75,180 P-H Memo TC (Scott, J.), on appeal to the Second Circuit, No. 76-4012; Coastal Electric Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 TCM 1007 (1975), ¶ 75,231 P-H Memo TC (Goffe, J.), on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, No. 75-2184. See Rev. Rul. 71-95, 1971-1 Cum. Bull. 130; Rev. Rul. 55-608, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 546, 548. See also Patmon, Young & Kirk v. Commissioner, 536 F. 2d 142 (CA6 1976), concerning a cash basis taxpayer. Sachs v. Commissioner, 208 F. 2d 313 (CA3 1953) (negotiable interest-bearing demand notes); Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F. 2d 237, 240 (CA9 1958) (non-interest-bearing demand notes, said to present a “close” question); Wasatch Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F. 2d 843 (CA10 1963) (unsecured interest-bearing five-year promissory notes). Accord, Advance Constr. Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1267 (ND Ill. 1972) (secured interest-bearing term promissory note). The persistence of the Government in pursuing its position on an issue of tax law has been noted before. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., ante, at 54-55 (dissenting opinion). This time, however, the Government’s position has been consistently accepted for more than 25 years by the Tax Court. It thus has not encountered uniform judicial rejection over a substantial period, as it had on the Foster Lumber issue. See, e. g., §§162 (a), 163(a), 164(a), 174(a)(1), 175(a), 177(a), 180 (a), 182 (a), 212, 216 (a), and 217 (a). See also § 7701 (a) (25). Section 404 (a) (6), as it read prior to a 1974 amendment, provided: “(6) Taxpayers on accrual basis. “For purposes of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), a taxpayer on the accrual basis shall be deemed to have made a payment on the last day of the year of accrual if the payment is on account of such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year (including extension thereof).” Section 1013 (c) (2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 923, amended this section to afford the same grace period to a cash-basis taxpayer. At least one witness at the time aptly described the law as having been “drafted in such a way that all corporations are put on a cash basis on the payment to trusts.” Statement of Richard D. Sturtevant in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on the Revenue Act of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 465 (1942). Reg. § 1.404 (a)-l (c) reads: “Deductions under section 404 (a) are generally allowable only for the year in which the contribution or compensation is paid, regardless of the fact that the taxpayer, may make his returns on the accrual method of accounting. Exceptions are made in the case of . . . and, as provided by section 404 (a)(6), in the case of payments made by a taxpayer on the accrual method of accounting not later than the time prescribed by law for filing the return for the taxable year of accrual (including extensions thereof). This latter provision is intended to permit a taxpayer on the accrual method to deduct such accrued contribution or compensation in the year of accrual, provided payment is actually made not later than the time prescribed by law for filing. the return for the taxable year of accrual (including extensions thereof) . . . .” Other courts have applied Eckert and Price to situations other than a claimed bad-debt deduction, Cleaver v. Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 342 (CA7 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 849 (1947) (interest); Jenkins v. Bitgood, 101 F. 2d 17 (CA2), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 636 (1939) (loss); Baltimore Dairy Lunch, Inc. v. United States, 231 F. 2d 870, 875 (CA8 1956) (loss); Guren v. Commissioner, 66 T. C. 118 (1976) (charitable contribution); Petty v. Commissioner, 40 T. C. 521, 524 (1963) (Atkins, J., for seven judges, concurring) (charitable contribution). A similar policy applies to deductions for charitable contributions under § 170 (a) of the Code. These deductions, too-, are limited to those the “payment of which is made within the taxable year,” even though the particular taxpayer is on the accrual basis. See H. R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 19 (1938), referring to §§23 (o) and (q) of the Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 463, 464. By § 2003 (a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 971, § 4975 was added to the 1954 Code. It makes an employer’s issuance of its promissory note to a qualified profit-sharing plan a “prohibited transaction” subject to penalty. See §§4975 (a), (b), and (c)(1)(B). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 308 (1974). By this penalty imposition, Congress has reaffirmed the actual-payment requirement of §404 (a), and strengthened its enforceability. Section 267 relates to items that would be deductible under §§ 162 or 212 and reads: “(a) Deductions disallowed. “No deduction shall be allowed— “(2) Unpaid expenses and interest. “In respect of expenses, otherwise deductible under section 162 or 212, or of interest, otherwise deductible under section 163,'— “(A) If within the period consisting of the taxable year of the taxpayer and 2% months after the close thereof (i) such expenses or interest are not paid, and (ii) the amount thereof is not includible in the gross income of the person to whom the payment is to be made; and “(B) If, by reason of the method of accounting of the person to whom the payment is to be made, the amount thereof is not, unless paid, includible in the gross income of such person for the taxable year in which or with which the taxable year of the taxpayer ends; and “(C) If, at the close of the taxable year of the taxpayer or at any time within 2% months thereafter, both the taxpayer and the person to whom the payment is to be made are persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of subsection (b). “(b) Relationships. “The persons referred to in subsection (a) are: “ (4) A grantor and a fiduciary of any trust . . . .” Section 404 (a), on the other hand, concerns items specifically precluded as deductions under §§ 162 and 212. Celina Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 142 F. 2d 449 (CA6 1944) ; Commissioner v. Mundet Cork Corp., 173 F. 2d 757 (CA2 1949); Akron Welding & Spring Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 715 (1948), are to the same effect. See Rev. Rul. 55-608, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 546, 548.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BLUM, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF NEW YORK v. BACON et al. No. 81-770. Argued April 28, 1982 Decided June 14, 1982 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Robert S. Hammer, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, and Shirley Adelson Siegel, Solicitor General. Martin A. Schwartz argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Eileen R. Kaufman. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. New York has established an Emergency Assistance Program that receives substantial federal funding under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U. S. C. § 603(a)(5). The program excludes recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from emergency assistance in the form of cash. It also excludes public assistance recipients (including AFDC recipients) from reimbursement for lost or stolen grants, even though it provides such reimbursement to other public benefit recipients. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York’s treatment of AFDC recipients is not inconsistent with the federal Act and regulations but violates the Equal Protection Clause. Because we conclude that the New York law is invalid under the Act, we affirm without reaching the equal protection issue. I Appellee Jeanne Bacon has two minor children and depends entirely on an AFDC grant to support her family. On June 1, 1977, while she was shopping, her wallet and food stamps were stolen. She promptly reported the theft to the police and to the New York Department of Social Services (DSS). She requested emergency assistance (E A) under the State’s federally funded Emergency Assistance Program, explaining that she had no money to purchase food and other essential items for her household for the month. DSS denied her request on the basis of a recent state law which precludes the furnishing of any cash E A to persons receiving or eligible for AFDC, N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 350 — j(2)(c) and (3) (McKinney Supp. 1981) (the “no-cash” provision), or of EA in any form to replace a lost or stolen public assistance grant, including an AFDC grant. §350-j(2)(e) (the “loss-or-theft” provision). Appellee Gertrude Parrish suffered a similar fate. An AFDC mother, she lost her food and AFDC funds when her apartment was broken into and ransacked. She applied for EA, and DSS denied her request on the same basis as it denied relief to appellee Bacon. The other named appellees, Linda Selders and Freddie Mae Goodwine, also were denied EA after they cashed their AFDC checks and suffered the loss of their money. Appellees brought this class action to enjoin enforcement of the state law insofar as it denies EA pursuant to the no-cash provision and the loss-or-theft provision. Appellees argued that the law conflicts with the Act and violates equal protection because it arbitrarily discriminates against AFDC recipients: it provides cash EA to all eligible recipients other than AFDC recipients, and provides EA for lost or stolen public benefit grants to all public benefit recipients (such as recipients of social security and Supplemental Security Income) other than those on public assistance (including AFDC recipients). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of appel-lees on the ground that the state provisions impermissibly narrowed the eligibility standards imposed on state EA programs by § 406(e) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606(e), and were thus invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Bacon v. Toia, 437 F. Supp. 1371 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Bacon v. Toia, 580 F. 2d 1044 (1978). Shortly thereafter, this Court decided Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725 (1978), in which we held that § 406(e) imposes permissive, not mandatory, standards on participating States. The Court of Appeals granted a motion for rehearing, vacated the judgment of the District Court, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Quern. On remand, the District Court changed its prior decision and held that the New York law was not inconsistent with the federal Act. In a subsequent opinion, the District Court invalidated the no-cash provision as a violation of equal protection but upheld the loss-or-theft provision. Bacon v. Toia, 493 F. Supp. 865 (1980). On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that our decision in Quern foreclosed a finding that the law violates the Supremacy Clause. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that both the no-cash and loss-or-theft provisions violate equal protection. Bacon v. Toia, 648 F. 2d 801 (1981;. We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 1122. II Where a party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the constitutional issue. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 692-693 (1979); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 543 (1974). We conclude that this case may be resolved on statutory grounds. As we explain below, the New York no-cash and loss-or-theft rules conflict with valid federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) (now the Secretary of Health and Human Services) which proscribe inequitable treatment under the EA program. Thus, New York’s rules are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. A Before reviewing the federal regulations that we find to be dispositive of this case, we first address appellant’s claim that reliance on the Act is foreclosed by our decision in Quern v. Mandley, supra. In that case, we carefully reviewed the nature and scope of the EA program and examined one aspect of its relationship to the AFDC program. Under Title IV-A of the Act, state public assistance plans approved by the Secretary are eligible for federal financial assistance. AFDC is a major categorical aid program funded under the Act — indeed, it is “the core of the Title IV-A system.” Id., at 728. States are required, as a condition of federal funding under the AFDC program, to make assistance available to all persons who meet statutory eligibility criteria. Id., at 740; 42 U. S. C. §§602(a)(10), 606(a). The EA program is a supplement to such categorical assistance programs as AFDC. It permits federal reimbursement to States which choose to provide for temporary emergency assistance in their Title IV-A plans. 42 U. S. C. § 603(a)(5). In contrast to AFDC, the EA program establishes much broader eligibility standards and is not limited to persons eligible for AFDC. 42 U. S. C. § 606(e). Plaintiffs in Quern made the broad claim that a State participating in the federal EA program may not limit eligibility for EA more narrowly than the federal eligibility standards in § 406(e). The state plan at issue provided emergency assistance only to certain AFDC families who were without shelter and to applicants presumptively eligible for AFDC who were in immediate need of clothing or household furnishings. We rejected the plaintiffs’ broad claim and held that unlike the AFDC program, § 406(e) establishes only permissive, not mandatory, eligibility standards. Quern did not address the statutory issue before us today — whether the complete and automatic exclusion of AFDC recipients from a State’s EA program is inconsistent with the Act and applicable regulations. The Court had no occasion to consider the question, since the EA program in that case included only AFDC recipients. In addition, the only pertinent federal regulations in Quern undermined the plaintiffs’ claims and supported the State’s rules. See 436 U. S., at 743-744, n. 19; 45 CFR §233.120 (1981). Here, on the other hand, the Secretary has promulgated a regulation inconsistent with New York’s no-cash and loss-or-theft rules. See 45 CFR §233.10 (1981); infra, at 139-142. In short, although we emphasized in Quern that a State retains considerable flexibility in determining which emergencies to cover under its EA plan, we hardly suggested that the Secretary had been stripped of all authority to review a plan that arbitrarily or inequitably excluded a class of recipients. B The Secretary, who is charged with administering federal funding for EA under the Act, has promulgated the following regulation applicable to state plans under Title IV-A, including EA programs: “(a) State plan requirements. A State plan under title I, IV-A, X, XIV, or XVI, of the Social Security Act must: “(1) Specify the groups of individuals, based on reasonable classifications, that will be included in the program, and all the conditions of eligibility that must be met by the individuals in the groups. The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.” 45 CFR § 233.10 (1981). The Secretary has also issued regulations exclusively addressed to the EA program. 45 CFR §233.120 (1981). On the authority of these regulations, the Secretary has specifically required the inclusion of AFDC recipients in any EA program, and has disapproved New York's EA plan because it excludes AFDC recipients as a class. Shortly after this Court’s decision in Quern, the Office of Family Assistance of the Social Security Administration issued Action Transmittal SSA-AT-78-44 (OFA) addressed to state agencies administering approved public assistance programs. The Transmittal explains that after Quern, “States remain free, under Federal policy to develop their own definition of the kind of emergencies they will meet under this program.” App. 173a. Nevertheless, “[a] State Plan must clearly specify that AFDC recipients are included in its EA program. Other categories of needy families with children may be included at State option; these categories must be specified in the plan.” Id., at 174a (emphasis added). In an ami-cus brief filed at the invitation of the Court of Appeals below, the Secretary confirmed that New York’s exclusion of AFDC recipients through its no-cash and loss-or-theft provisions violates federal regulations, in particular the “equitable treatment” regulation, 45 CFR § 233.10 (1981). App. to Motion to Affirm 12a-17a. As the Secretary interpreted that regulation, the discrimination in New York’s program is not justified by, or tailored to, the purposes of the EÁ program. Ibid. We agree that New York’s law is invalid under the equitable-treatment regulation insofar as it automatically excludes AFDC recipients from the EA program. The regulation, and the Secretary’s decision to apply it to strike down New York’s no-cash and loss-or-theft rules, clearly deserve judicial deference. We have often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference. See, e. g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27 (1981); Quern, 436 U. S., at 738. In light of the strong support in the legislative history for the Secretary’s conclusion that the automatic exclusion of AFDC recipients from an EA program is inequitable in light of the purposes of the EA program, we find such deference particularly appropriate in this case. C In 1967, Congress thoroughly revised the Social Security Act, including many of its public assistance provisions. The House and Senate Committee Reports concerning the portion of the revision that would ultimately become the EA program make it unmistakably clear that AFDC recipients were expected to benefit from the program. The initial House Report states: “Your committee understands that the process of determining eligibility and authorizing payments frequently precludes the meeting of emergency needs when a crisis occurs. In the event of eviction, or when utilities are turned off, or when an alcoholic parent leaves children without food, immediate action is necessary. It frequently is unavailable under State programs today. When a child is suddenly deprived of his parents by their accidental death or when the agency finds that the conditions in the home are contrary to the child’s welfare, the normal methods of payment have to be suspended while new arrangements and court referrals are made. “To encourage public welfare agencies to move promptly and with maximum effectiveness in such situations, the bill contains an offer to the States of 50-percent participation in emergency assistance payments. . . . The eligible families involved are those with children under 21 who either are or have recently been living with close relatives. The families do not have to be receiving or eligible upon application to receive AFDC (although they are generally of the same type), but they must be without available resources .... “Assistance might be in any form .... The provision is broad enough that emergencies can be met in migrant families as well as those meeting residence requirements of the State’s AFDC program. Its utilization would be optional with thé States.” H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 (1967) (emphasis added). This passage leaves the obvious implication that persons who are eligible for AFDC benefits would receive EA. The Senate Report is almost identical, except for an explanation of the changes in the Senate bill. S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 165-166 (1967). Indeed, in an earlier summary of this provision, the Senate Report describes EA as one of a series of amendments that “would set up new protections for the children in AFDC families.” Id., at 146. The House and Senate debates on this portion of the Social Security Amendments, although abbreviated, buttress our understanding of congressional intent. Senator Long, floor manager of the bill, repeated the Senate Report’s characterization of EA as one of several changes that would establish “new protections for the children in AFDC families.” 113 Cong. Rec. 32592 (1967). Comments by other legislators reveal a similar understanding. Testimony by witnesses and statements introduced at the Senate hearings on the bill are also illuminating. Many statements assume that AFDC would be covered, and some reveal the belief that E A would be principally an AFDC program. l — t H-< The Secretary s decision to apply the equitable treatment” regulation so as to forbid a State to exclude AFDC recipients from its E A program is eminently reasonable and deserves judicial deference. The regulation explicitly forbids the “inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.” 45 CFR §233.10 (1981). AFDC recipients are “the core of the Title IV-A system,” Quern, 436 U. S., at 728, and the principal group of beneficiaries under federally assisted state welfare programs. Moreover, the legislative history reviewed above leaves no doubt that AFDC recipients were expected to be included in a state EA program receiving federal financial assistance. Because New York’s no-cash and loss-or-theft rules conflict with a valid federal regulation, they are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 295-296 (1979). In light of our disposition of this Supremacy Clause claim, we do not address appellees’ equal protection argument. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. New York Soc. Serv. Law §350 — j (McKinney Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part: “2. For purposes of this section, the term ‘emergency assistance’ means aid, care and services authorized during a period not in excess of thirty days in any twelve month period to meet the emergency needs of a child or the household in which he is living, in the following circumstances: “(a) where the child is under twenty-one years of age; and “(b) the child is living with, or within the previous six months has lived with, one or more persons specified in subdivision b of section three hundred forty-nine of this chapter; and “(c) in cases of applications for grants of cash assistance, such child or such household is not categorically eligible for or receiving aid to dependent children; and “(d) such emergency needs resulted from a catastrophic occurrence or from a situation which threatens family stability and which has caused the destitution of the child and/or home; and “(e) such occurrence or situation could not have been foreseen by the applicant, was not under his control, and, in the case of a person receiving public assistance, did not result from the loss, theft or mismanagement of a regular public assistance grant; and “(f) the emergency grant being applied for will not replace or duplicate a public assistance grant already made under section one hundred thirty-one-a of this chapter. “3. Emergency assistance to needy families with children shall be provided to the extent of items of need and services set forth in sections one hundred thirty-one and one hundred thirty-one-a of this chapter .... Such emergency assistance, but not including cash grants, may be furnished to a family eligible for aid to dependent children only in the form of emergency services, and so long as federal aid remains available, for emergency fuel grants in the form of vendor restricted payments” (emphasis added). The record indicates that appellees have standing to challenge the no-cash as well as the loss-or-theft provision. In the ease of appellees Bacon, Parrish, and Goodwine, DSS purported to rely on the loss-or-theft provision in denying EA. However, Parrish was denied EA for lost food as well as lost money. The no-cash provision, not the loss-or-theft provision, would appear to justify denial of E A for the lost food, since that loss did not result from the theft of her public assistance grant. In the case of appellee Selders, DSS denied EA for her lost cash pursuant to an administrative memorandum that outlines both the no-cash and the loss-or-theft exclusions for AFDC recipients. App. 34a-37a, 51a. It is therefore unclear which exclusion the State purported to rely upon in denying assistance. However, Selders lost a food stamp voucher as well as the cash from her AFDC grant. DSS refused to provide the cash equivalent of the voucher. Although DSS replaced the voucher, Selders was unable to make use of the replacement because she had no cash. Bacon v. Toia, 437 F. Supp. 1371, 1376-1377 (SDNY 1977). Accordingly, it was the State’s no-cash rule that prevented her from obtaining effective EA. Id., at 1384-1385. Selders alone was denominated a representative of the subclass of plaintiffs challenging the no-cash rule. Id., at 1381. In light of these facts and appellant’s concession that DSS relied upon both the no-cash and the loss-or-theft provisions in denying assistance, Brief for Appellant 6-7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 17, we conclude that appellees have standing to challenge both provisions. Appellees also sought to enjoin enforcement of the statutory provision denying replacement or duplication of a public assistance grant already made. N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 350 — j(2)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1981). They no longer seek relief with respect to that provision because the District Court determined that the provision does not preclude EA in the event of a true emergency. Bacon v. Toia, 493 F. Supp. 865, 875 (SDNY 1980). Section 406(e) of the Act provides in part: “(1) The term ‘emergency assistance to needy families with children’ means any of the following, furnished for a period not in excess of 30 days in any 12-month period, in the case of a needy child under the age of 21 who is . . . living with any of the relatives specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, but only where such child is without available resources, the payments, care, or services involved as necessary to avoid destitution of such child or to provide living arrangements in a home for such child, and such destitution or need for living arrangements did not arise because such child or relative refused without good cause to accept employment or training for employment— “(A) money payments, payments in kind, or such other payments as the State agency may specify with respect to, or medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law on behalf of, such child or any other member of the household in which he is living, and “(B) such services as may be specified by the Secretary; “but only with respect to a State whose State plan approved under section 602 of this title includes provision for such assistance. “(2) Emergency assistance as authorized under paragraph (1) may be provided ... to migrant workers with families in the State or in such part or parts thereof as the State shall designate.” 81 Stat. 893. Appellant argues that the statutory issue is not properly before us. It is well accepted, however, that without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U. S. 479 (1976) (per curiam); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419 (1977); see also R. Stem & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 478 (5th ed. 1978). Moreover, the statutory issue was raised and decided in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Appellant also asserts that the appellees were required to file a cross-appeal because they seek to modify the judgment below. Acceptance of the appellees’ statutory argument will allegedly result in such a modification because “the injunction granted below on the basis of constitutional right would be modified to one based upon statute or regulation.” Reply of Appellant to Motion to Affirm 8. Appellant cites no authority for this novel view that an affirmance which does not alter the relief ordered in the judgment below “modifies” the judgment simply because the affirmance rests on a different legal basis than the court below adopted. For a general discussion of the EA and AFDC programs, see Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S., at 728-729, 735-736, 739, 742-743. In a footnote, the Court reported that some States have narrowed eligibility for EA programs by excluding AFDC recipients if the emergency need is one theoretically covered by the basic assistance grant. Id., at 739-740, n. 16. This descriptive statement is not, of course, an expression of opinion, much less a holding, with respect to the issue before us. These regulations were adopted pursuant to § 1102 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1302, which provides the Secretary with authority to “make . . . such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which [he] is charged under this chapter.” We have described this provision as creating “broad rule-making powers.” Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 277, n. 28 (1969). The Secretary has also argued that 45 CFR §233.10(a)(1) (1981) is authorized pursuant to § 402(a)(5), 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(5), under which a state plan under Title IV-A “must. . . provide such methods of administration ... as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan.” See App. to Motion to Affirm 8a. This section applies to all portions of a state plan under Title IV-A, including the EA program. See Quern, supra, at 741-742. It appears that the Secretary has consistently taken the position that automatic exclusions of AFDC recipients from an EA program violate the “equitable treatment” regulation, 45 CFR § 233.10 (1981). In an amicus brief filed at the invitation of the court in Ingerson v. Pratt, Civ. Action No. 76-3255-S (Mass., Nov. 14, 1979), the Secretary stated that the regulation applies to EA programs. The Office of Family Assistance later determined that Massachusetts’ “recipient status” rule violates the regulation because it provides that the EA benefits available to AFDC recipients will be affected by the amount received in the AFDC grant, whereas the EA benefits available to non-AFDC recipients will not be affected by the amount of assistance received. Documentation of the U. S. Dept. of HEW relating to Ingerson v. Pratt, File of the Clerk of this Court in No. 81-770. The District Court has invalidated this rule (as well as another state rule) based on the “equitable treatment” regulation. Ingerson v. Pratt, Civ. Action No. 76-3255-S (Mass., Feb. 8, 1982). The EA program, a small part of the 1967 Social Security Amendments, originated with the President’s limited proposal to extend temporary assistance to migratory workers. See H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 122-123 (1967). The assistance “would be in an amount consistent with what the individuals would receive if they were eligible under a public assistance plan in the State in which they are living.” House Committee on Ways and Means, Section-by-Section Analysis of H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (Comm. Print 1967). In the House, the Ways and Means Committee adopted a much broader proposal, very similar to the version ultimately enacted. See H. R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 137-139 (1967). After House passage, the Senate made three changes— increasing the amount of time that emergency assistance would be available, denying assistance if a child or relative refused without good cause to accept employment, and more explicitly protecting migrant workers. In conference, the second and third changes were accepted. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 60 (1967). Congress adopted the conference bill. The Senate Report also inserts “AFDC” prior to the word “eligibility” in the first sentence quoted in the text above — yet another indication that those eligible for or receiving AFDC were presumed to be covered. Other portions of the legislative documents indicate that the EA program was viewed as an extension of the AFDC program. For example, the House bill initially contained the title, “Emergency Assistance for Certain Needy Families with Dependent Children.” H. R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 137 (1967) (emphasis added). The bill as enacted placed the EA provisions within Subchapter IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., entitled “Aid to Families With Dependent Children.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 603(a)(5), 606(e). Moreover, numerous historical documents place discussion of the EA program within an “AFDC” category. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 97 (1967); Senate Committee on Finance, Social Security Amendments of 1967: Comparison of H. R. 12080, As Passed by the House of Representatives with Existing Law, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 37-38 (Comm. Print 1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4, 165-166 (1967); Senate Committee on Finance, The Social Security Amendments of 1967, Brief Summary of Major Provisions and Detailed Comparison with Prior Law, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 68-69 (1968). Congress expressed concern that categorical aid programs (which include AFDC) were often too inflexible to afford immediate emergency relief. The implicit assumption is that if a state EA plan covered emergency needs that were not promptly met under these programs, persons receiving or eligible for aid under the programs would receive EA. Thus, Senator Ribicoff emphasized that welfare agencies need to have “flexibility’' in dealing with emergencies; and Senator Curtis explained that “[f]or a period of 30 days, emergency assistance can be paid in cases where [EA recipients] cannot meet other qualifications.” 113 Cong. Rec. 32853, 36319 (1967). Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1034 (1967) (statement of Commissioner, Louisiana Dept, of Public Welfare); id., at App. A8 (statement of Commissioner, Alabama Dept, of Pensions and Security); id., at App. A125 (statement of Governor of Hawaii); id., at App. A289 (statement of Rhode Island Dept, of Social Welfare). Appellant asserts that the no-cash rule does not discriminate against AFDC recipients at all. On its face, of course, the rule excludes AFDC as well as all other public assistance recipients and thus violates the regulation. But appellant claims that AFDC recipients may obtain the same emergency benefits through special grants under other provisions of the state welfare law. Both lower courts rejected this claim, concluding that the special grant provisions are more limited than EA provisions. 648 F. 2d, at 807-808; 493 F. Supp., at 872-873. In particular, the Court of Appeals, after reviewing relevant state cases, determined that the state EA program would provide grants in cases of loss caused by burglary or public auction following eviction, and would provide food and other immediate living expenses, while special grants would not cover these items. 648 F. 2d, at 808. We have no reason to question the conclusion of the lower courts, given their familiarity with state law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346 (1976). Of course, we do not suggest that a State may not choose to provide AFDC special grants for emergencies as an alternative to including AFDC recipients within the EA program, if the special grants are provided as promptly and for the same emergencies as the EA grants. Cf. Quern, 436 U. S., at 734-739. We do not reach the question whether the loss-or-theft provision in N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 350 — j (McKinney Supp. 1981) is invalid as applied to public assistance recipients other than those receiving AFDC. The question presented in appellant’s jurisdictional statement refers only to the discrimination against AFDC recipients; thus, appellant challenges the judgment below only insofar as it requires the granting of EA to AFDC recipients.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA v. CONSTRUCTION LABORERS VACATION TRUST FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA et al. No. 82-695. Argued April 19, 1983 — Decided June 24, 1983 Patti S. Kitching, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, and Edmond B. Mamer, Deputy Attorney General. James P. Watson argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were George M. Cox and John S. Miller, Jr. William D. Dexter filed a brief for the Multistate Tax Commission as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Stuart A. Smith, T. Timothy Ryan, Jr., Karen I. Ward, and Allen H. Feldman for the United States; by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; by Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., and Victor J. Van Bourg for the Boards of Trustees of the Carpenters Vacation and Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California et al.; and by Eugene B. Granof and George J. Pantos for the ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC). Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, Christina G. Dunnell, Assistant Attorney General, and Ann Thacher Anderson filed a brief for the State of Connecticut et al. as amici curiae. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question in dispute between the parties is whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), permits state tax authorities to collect unpaid state income taxes by levying on funds held in trust for the taxpayers under an ERISA-covered vacation benefit plan. The issue is an important one, which affects thousands of federally regulated trusts and all nonfederal tax collection systems, and it must eventually receive a definitive, uniform resolution. Nevertheless, for reasons involving perhaps more history than logic, we hold that the lower federal courts had no jurisdiction to decide the question in the case before us, and we vacate the judgment and remand the case with instructions to remand it to the state court from which it was removed. I None of the relevant facts is in dispute. Appellee Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California (CLVT) is a trust established by an agreement between four associations of employers active in the construction industry in southern California and the Southern California District Council of Laborers, an arm of the District Council and affiliated locals of the Laborers’ International Union of North America. The purpose of the agreement and trust was to establish a mechanism for administering the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement that grants construction workers a yearly paid vacation. The trust agreement expressly proscribes any assignment, pledge, or encumbrance of funds held in trust by CLVT. The Plan that CLVT administers is unquestionably an “employee welfare benefit plan” within the meaning of § 3 of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1), and CLVT and its individual trustees are thereby subject to extensive regulation under Titles I and III of ERISA. Appellant Franchise Tax Board is a California agency charged with enforcement of that State’s personal income tax law. California law authorizes appellant to require any person in possession of “credits or other personal property or other things of value, belonging to a taxpayer” “to withhold . . . the amount of any tax, interest, or penalties due from the taxpayer . . . and to transmit the amount withheld to the Franchise Tax Board.” Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 18817 (West Supp. 1983). Any person who, upon notice by the Franchise Tax Board, fails to comply with its request to withhold and to transmit funds becomes personally liable for the amounts identified in the notice. § 18818. In June 1980, the Franchise Tax Board filed a complaint in state court against CLVT and its trustees. Under the heading “First Cause of Action,” appellant alleged that CLVT had failed to comply with three levies issued under § 18817, con-eluding with the allegation that it had been “damaged in a sum . . . not to exceed $380.56 plus interest from June 1, 1980.” App. 3-8. Under the heading “Second Cause of Action,” appellant incorporated its previous allegations and added: “There was at the time of the levies alleged above and continues to be an actual controversy between the parties concerning their respective legal rights and duties. The Board [appellant] contends that defendants [CLVT] are obligated and required by law to pay over to the Board all amounts held ... in favor of the Board’s delinquent taxpayers. On the other hand, defendants contend that section 514 of ERISA preempts state law and that the trustees lack the power to honor the levies made upon them by the State of California. “[Defendants will continue to refuse to honor the Board’s levies in this regard. Accordingly, a declaration by this court of the parties’ respective rights is required to fully and finally resolve this controversy.” Id., at 8-9. In a prayer for relief, appellant requested damages for defendants’ failure to honor the levies and a declaration that defendants are “legally obligated to honor all future levies by the Board.” Id., at 9. CLVT removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and the court denied the Franchise Tax Board’s motion for remand to the state court. On the merits, the District Court ruled that ERISA did not pre-empt the State’s power to levy on funds held in trust by CLVT. CLVT appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 679 F. 2d 1307 (CA9 1982). On petition for rehearing, the Franchise Tax Board renewed its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the complaint in this case. The petition for rehearing was denied, and an appeal was taken to this Court. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction pending argument on the merits. 459 U. S. 1085 (1982). We now hold that this case was not within the removal jurisdiction conferred by 28 U. S. C. § 1441, and therefore we do not reach the merits of the preemption question. II The jurisdictional structure at issue in this case has remained basically unchanged for the past century. With exceptions not relevant here, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Ibid. If it appears before final judgment that a case was not properly removed, because it was not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district court must remand it to the state court from which it was removed. See 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c). For this case — as for many cases where there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties — the propriety of removal turns on whether the case falls within the original “federal question” jurisdiction of the United States district courts: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, the statutory phrase “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts. Especially when considered in light of § 1441’s removal jurisdiction, the phrase “arising under” masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system. The most familiar definition of the statutory “arising under” limitation is Justice Holmes’ statement, “A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1916). However, it is well settled that Justice Holmes’ test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district courts’ original jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction. We have often held that a case “arose under” federal law where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law, see, e. g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921); Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486 (1917), and even the most ardent proponent of the Holmes test has admitted that it has been rejected as an exclusionary principle, see Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253, 270-272 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 2d 823, 827 (CA2 1964) (Friendly, J.). Leading commentators have suggested that for purposes of § 1331 an action “arises under” federal law “if in order for the plaintiff to secure the relief sought he will be obliged to establish both the correctness and the applicability to his case of a proposition of federal law.” P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 889 (2d ed. 1973) (hereinafter Hart & Wechsler); cf. T. B. Harms Co., supra, at 827 (“a case may ‘arise under’ a law of the United States if the complaint discloses a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law”). One powerful doctrine has emerged, however — the “well-pleaded complaint” rule — which as a practical matter severely limits the number of cases in which state law “creates the cause of action” that may be initiated in or removed to federal district court, thereby avoiding more-or-less automatically a number of potentially serious federal-state conflicts. “[Wjhether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute, . . . must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 75-76 (1914). Thus, a federal court does not have original jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint presents a state-law cause of action, but also asserts that federal law deprives the defendant of a defense he may raise, Taylor v. Anderson, supra; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 (1908), or that a federal defense the defendant may raise is not sufficient to defeat the claim, Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U. S. 454 (1894). “Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course of the litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff’s original cause of action, arises under the Constitution.” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, supra, at 152. For better or worse, under the present statutory scheme as it has existed since 1887, a defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiffs complaint establishes that the case “arises under” federal law. “[A] right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936). For many cases in which federal law becomes relevant only insofar as it sets bounds for the operation of state authority, the well-pleaded complaint rule makes sense as a quick rule of thumb. Describing the case before the Court in Gully, Justice Cardozo wrote: “Petitioner will have to prove that the state law has been obeyed before the question will be reached whether anything in its provisions or in administrative conduct under it is inconsistent with the federal rule. If what was done by the taxing officers in levying the tax in suit did not amount in substance under the law of Mississippi to an assessment of the shareholders, but in substance as well as in form was an assessment of the bank alone, the conclusion will be inescapable that there was neither tax nor debt, apart from any barriers Congress may have built. On the other hand, a finding upon evidence that the Mississippi law has been obeyed may compose the controversy altogether, leaving no room for a contention that the federal law has been infringed. The most that one can say is that a question of federal law is lurking in the background, just as farther in the background there lurks a question of constitutional law, the question of state power in our federal form of government. A dispute so doubtful and conjectural, so far removed from plain necessity, is unavailing to extinguish the jurisdiction of the states.” Id., at 117. The rule, however, may produce awkward results, especially in cases in which neither the obligation created by state law nor the defendant’s factual failure to comply are in dispute, and both parties admit that the only question for decision is raised by a federal pre-emption defense. Nevertheless, it has been correctly understood to apply in such situations. As we said in Gully: “By unimpeachable authority, a suit brought upon a state statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States because prohibited thereby.” Id., at 116. Simply to state these principles is not to apply them to the case at hand. Appellant’s complaint sets forth two “causes of action,” one of which expressly refers to ERISA; if either comes within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, removal was proper as to the whole case. See 28 U. S. C. § 1441(c). Although appellant’s complaint does not specifically assert any particular statutory entitlement for the relief it seeks, the language of the complaint suggests (and the parties do not dispute) that appellant’s “first cause of action” states a claim under Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §18818 (West Supp. 1983), see swpra, at 5-6, and its “second cause of action” states a claim under California’s Declaratory Judgment Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1060 (West 1980). As an initial proposition, then, the “law that creates the cause of action” is state law, and original federal jurisdiction is unavailable unless it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims, or that one or the other claim is “really” one of federal law. A Even though state law creates appellant’s causes of action, its case might still “arise under” the laws of the United States if a well-pleaded complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties. For appellant’s first cause of action — to enforce its levy, under §18818 — a straightforward application of the well-pleaded complaint rule precludes original federal-court jurisdiction. California law establishes a set of conditions, without reference to federal law, under which a tax levy may be enforced; federal law becomes relevant only by way of a defense to an obligation created entirely by state law, and then only if appellant has made out a valid claim for relief under state law. See supra, at 11-12. The well-pleaded complaint rule was framed to deal with precisely such a situation. As we discuss above, since 1887 it has been settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case. Appellant’s declaratory judgment action poses a more difficult problem. Whereas the question of federal pre-emption is relevant to appellant’s first cause of action only as a potential defense, it is a necessary element of the declaratory judgment claim. Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1060 (West 1980), a party with an interest in property may bring an action for a declaration of another party’s legal rights and duties with respect to that property upon showing that there is an “actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties” of the parties. The only questions in dispute between the parties in this case concern the rights and duties of CLVT and its trustees under ERISA. Not only does appellant’s request for a declaratory judgment under California law clearly encompass questions governed by ERISA, but appellant’s complaint identifies no other questions as a subject of controversy between the parties. Such questions must be raised in a well-pleaded complaint for a declaratory judgment. Therefore, it is clear on the face of its well-pleaded complaint that appellant may not obtain the relief it seeks in its second cause of action (“[t]hat the court declare defendants legally obligated to honor all future levies by the Board upon [CLVT],” App. 9) without a construction of ERISA and/or an adjudication of its pre-emptive effect and constitutionality— all questions of federal law. Appellant argues that original federal-court jurisdiction over such a complaint is foreclosed by our decision in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667 (1950). As we shall see, however, Skelly Oil is not directly controlling. In Skelly Oil, Skelly Oil and Phillips had a contract, for the sale of natural gas, that entitled the seller — Skelly Oil — to terminate the contract at any time after December 1,1946, if the Federal Power Commission had not yet issued a certificate of convenience and necessity to a third party, a pipeline company to whom Phillips intended to resell the gas purchased from Skelly Oil. Their dispute began when the Federal Power Commission informed the pipeline company on November 30 that it would issue a conditional certificate, but did not make its order public until December 2. By this time Skelly Oil had notified Phillips of its decision to terminate their contract. Phillips brought an action in United States District Court under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. §2201, seeking a declaration that the contract was still in effect. 339 U. S., at 669-671. There was no diversity between the parties, and we held that Phillips’ claim was not within the federal-question jurisdiction conferred by § 1331. We reasoned: “ ‘[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.’ Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240. Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction. When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area to which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them, ‘jurisdiction’ means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to fedéral courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Prior to that Act, a federal court would entertain a suit on a contract oply if the plaintiff asked for an immediately enforceable remedy like money damages or an injunction, but such relief could only be given if the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense of a federal right or diversity, provided foundation for resort to the federal courts. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing the plaintiff’s right even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the requirements of jurisdiction — the limited subject matters which alone Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate — were not impliedly repealed or modified.” 339 U. S., at 671-672. We then observed that, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, an action by Phillips to enforce its contract would not present a federal question. Id., at 672. Shelly Oil has come to stand for the proposition that “if, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created action, jurisdiction is lacking.” 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2767, pp. 744-745 (2d ed. 1983). Cf. Public Service Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 248 (1952) (dictum). 1. As an initial matter, we must decide whether the doctrine of Shelly Oil limits original federal-court jurisdiction under § 1331 — and by extension removal jurisdiction under § 1441 — when a question of federal law appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint for a state-law declaratory judgment. Apparently, it is a question of first impression. As the passage quoted above makes clear, Shelly Oil relied significantly on the precise contours of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act as well as of §1331. Cf. 339 U. S., at 674 (stressing the need to respect “the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act”). The Court’s emphasis that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to affect only the remedies available in a federal district court, not the court’s jurisdiction, was critical to the Court’s reasoning. Our interpretation of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act in Shelly Oil does not apply of its own force to state declaratory judgment statutes, many of which antedate the federal statute, see Developments in the Law — Declaratory Judgments — 1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 790-791 (1949). Cf. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 264-265 (1933) (Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over federal questions in a state declaratory judgment). Yet while Shelly Oil itself is limited to the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, fidelity to its spirit leads us to extend it to state declaratory judgment actions as well. If federal district courts could take jurisdiction, either originally or by removal, of state declaratory judgment claims raising questions of federal law, without regard to the doctrine of Shelly Oil, the federal Declaratory Judgment Act — with the limitations Shelly Oil read into it — would become a dead letter. For any case in which a state declaratory judgment action was available, litigants could get into federal court for a declaratory judgment despite our interpretation of §2201, simply by pleading an adequate state claim for a declaration of federal law. Having interpreted the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 to include certain limitations on the jurisdiction of federal district courts to entertain declaratory judgment suits, we should be extremely hesitant to interpret the Judiciary Act of 1875 and its 1887 amendments in a way that renders the limitations in the later statute nugatory. Therefore, we hold that under the jurisdictional statutes as they now stand federal courts do not have original jurisdiction, nor do they acquire jurisdiction on removal, when a federal question is presented by a complaint for a state declaratory judgment, but Shelly Oil would bar jurisdiction if the plaintiff had sought a federal declaratory judgment. 2. The question, then, is whether a federal district court could take jurisdiction of appellant’s declaratory judgment claim had it been brought under 28 U. S. C. §2201. The application of Shelly Oil to such a suit is somewhat unclear. Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA specifically grants trustees of ERISA-covered plans like CLVT a cause of action for injunctive relief when their rights and duties under ERISA are at issue, and that action is exclusively governed by federal law. If CLVT could have sought an injunction under ERISA against application to it of state regulations that require acts inconsistent with ERISA, does a declaratory judgment suit by the State “arise under” federal law? We think not. We have always interpreted what Shelly Oil called “the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875,” 339 U. S., at 673, with an eye to practicality and necessity. “What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation ... a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside.” Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S., at 117-118. There are good reasons why the federal courts should not entertain suits by the States to declare the validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law. States are not significantly prejudiced by an inability to come to federal court for a declaratory judgment in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a person subject to federal regulation. They have a variety of means by which they can enforce their own laws in their own courts, and they do not suffer if the pre-emption questions such enforcement may raise are tested there. The express grant of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties, see infra, at 25, as to whom Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal court was necessary to further the statute’s purposes. It did not go so far as to provide that any suit against such parties must also be brought in federal court when they themselves did not choose to sue. The situation presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of the validity of state law is sufficiently removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction that informed onr statutory interpretation in Shelly Oil and Gully to convince us that, until Congress informs us otherwise, such a suit is not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts. Accordingly, the same suit brought originally in state court is not removable either. B CLVT also argues that appellant’s “causes of action” are, in substance, federal claims. Although we have often repeated that “the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon,” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913), it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rale that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Assn. of Machinists, 376 F. 2d 337, 339-340 (CA6 1967), aff’d, 390 U. S. 557 (1968). CLVT’s best argument stems from our decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735. In that case, the petitioner filed suit in state court alleging simply that it had a valid contract with the respondent, a union, under which the respondent had agreed to submit all grievances to binding arbitration and not to cause or sanction any “work stoppages, strikes, or slowdowns.” The petitioner further alleged that the respondent and its officials had violated the agreement by participating in and sanctioning work stoppages, and it sought temporary and permanent injunctions against further breaches. App., O. T. 1967, No. 445, pp. 2-9. It was clear that, had petitioner invoked it, there would have been a federal cause of action under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185, see Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), and that, even in state court, any action to enforce an agreement within the scope of § 301 would be controlled by federal law, see Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95, 103-104 (1962). It was also clear, however, under the law in effect at the time, that independent limits on federal jurisdiction made it impossible for a federal court to grant the injunctive relief petitioner sought. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962) (later overruled in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970)). The Court of Appeals held, 376 F. 2d, at 340, and we affirmed, 390 U. S., at 560, that the petitioner’s action “arose under” §301, and thus could be removed to federal court, although the petitioner had undoubtedly pleaded an adequate claim for relief under the state law of contracts and had sought a remedy available only under state law. The necessary ground of decision was that the pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action “for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of §301. Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of action completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily “arises under” federal law. CLVT argues by analogy that ERISA, like §301, was meant to create a body of federal common law, and that “any state court action which would require the interpretation or application of ERISA to a plan document ‘arises under’ the laws of the United States.” Brief for Appellees 20-21. ERISA contains provisions creating a series of express causes of action in favor of participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries of ERISA-covered plans, as well as the Secretary of Labor. § 502(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a). It may be that, as with § 301 as interpreted in Avco, any state action coming within the scope of § 502(a) of ERISA would be removable to federal district court, even if an otherwise adequate state cause of action were pleaded without reference to federal law. It does not follow, however, that either of appellant’s claims in this case comes within the scope of one of ERISA’s causes of action. The phrasing of § 502(a) is instructive. Section 502(a) specifies which persons — participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the Secretary of Labor — may bring actions for particular kinds of relief. It neither creates nor expressly denies any cause of action in favor of state governments, to enforce tax levies or for any other purpose. It does not purport to reach every question relating to plans covered by ERISA. Furthermore, § 514(b)(2)(A) of ERISA, '29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), makes clear that Congress did not intend to pre-empt entirely every state cause of action relating to such plans. With important, but express limitations, it states that “nothing in this subehapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” Against this background, it is clear that a suit by state tax authorities under a statute like § 18818 does not “arise under” ERISA. Unlike the contract rights at issue in Avco, the State’s right to enforce its tax levies is not of central concern to the federal statute. For that reason, as in Gully, see supra, at 11-12, on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are many reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of ERISA why the State may or may not be entitled to the relief it seeks. Furthermore, ERISA does not provide an alternative cause of action in favor of the State to enforce its rights, while § 301 expressly supplied the plaintiff in Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its pre-empted state contract claim. Therefore, even though the Court of Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes enforcement of the State’s levy in the circumstances of this case, an action to enforce the levy is not itself pre-empted by ERISA. Once again, appellant’s declaratory judgment cause of action presents a somewhat more difficult issue. The question on which a declaration is sought — that of the CLVT trustees’ “power to honor the levies made upon them by the State of California,” see supra, at 6 — is undoubtedly a matter of concern under ERISA. It involves the meaning and enforceability of provisions in CLVT’s trust agreement forbidding the trustees to assign or otherwise to alienate funds held in trust, see supra, at 4-5, and n. 3, and thus comes within the class of questions for which Congress intended that federal courts create federal common law. Under § 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA, a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of a plan covered by ERISA may bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine whether the plan’s trustees may comply with a state levy on funds held in trust. Nevertheless, CLVT’s argument that appellant’s second cause of action arises under ERISA fails for the second reason given above. ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief by some other party does not “arise under” that provision. IV Our concern in this case is consistent application of a system of statutes conferring original federal-court jurisdiction, as they have been interpreted by this Court over many years. Under our interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. We hold that a suit by state tax authorities both to enforce its levies against funds held in trust pursuant to an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan, and to declare the validity of the levies notwithstanding ERISA, is neither a creature of ERISA itself nor a suit of which the federal courts will take jurisdiction because it turns on a question of federal law. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand so that this case may be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. It is so ordered. Along with CLVT itself, CLVT’s individual trustees are also appellees. At various points throughout this opinion, the trust and its trustees are referred to collectively as “CLVT.” As part of the hourly compensation due bargaining unit members, employers pay a certain amount to CLVT, which places the money in an account for each employee. Once a year, CLVT distributes the money in each account to the employee for whom it is kept, provided the employee complies with CLVT’s application procedures. Any funds held for employees who fail to make a timely application are used to defray CLVT’s administrative expenses. See generally Trust Agreement, Art. IX, App. 45-51 (“The Plan”). This system was set up in large part because union members typically work for several employers during the course of a year. Article IX, ¶9.08, provides in part: “[N]o payments due the Fund and no monies in vacation accounts established pursuant to the Plan shall be subject in any manner to anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, encumbrance or charge by any employee or any other persons and any such anticipation, alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance or charge shall be void and ineffective. The money credited to a vacation account shall be subject to withdrawal and distribution only at the times, in the manner and for the purposes specified in this Agreement.” Id., at 49. Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. V), requires plan trustees to discharge their duties “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries,” “for the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits... and... defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan,” and “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan” insofar as they are consistent with ERISA. § § 1104(a)(1)(A), (D). At several points in 1977 and 1978, appellant issued notices to CLVT requesting it to withhold and to transmit approximately $380 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties due from three individuals. CLVT did not dispute that the individuals in question were beneficiaries of its trust or that it was then holding vacation benefit funds for them. In each case, however, it acknowledged receipt of appellant’s notice and informed appellant that it had requested an opinion letter from the Administrator for Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs of the United States Department of Labor as to whether it was permitted under ERISA to honor appellant’s levy. CLVT also informed appellant that it would withhold the funds from the individual workers until it received an opinion from the Department of Labor, but that it would not transmit the funds to the Franchise Tax Board. Appellant took no immediate action to enforce its levy, and in January 1980 CLVT finally received the opinion letter it had requested. The opinion letter concluded: “[I]t is the position of the Department of Labor that the process of any state judicial or administrative agency seeking to levy for unpaid taxes or unpaid unemployment insurance contributions upon benefits due a participant or beneficiary under the Plan is pre-empted under ERISA section 514 [29 U. S. C. § 1144].” App. 71. Accordingly, on January 7, 1980, counsel for CLVT furnished appellant a copy of the opinion letter, informed appellant that CLVT lacked the power to honor appellant’s levies, and stated their intention to recommend that CLVT should disburse the funds it had withheld to the employees in question. The complaint does not identify statutory authority for the relief requested; indeed, the only statute mentioned on the face of the complaint is ERISA. See infra, at 13. At least for purposes of determining whether the courts below had jurisdiction over this ease, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). ERISA may also be an “Act of Congress regulating commerce” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1337 (1976 ed., Supp. V), but we have not distinguished between the “arising under” standards of § 1337 and § 1331. See, e. g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667 (1950). The statute’s “arising under” language tracks similar language in Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution, which has been construed as permitting Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to any case of which federal law potentially “forms an ingredient,” see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824), and its limited legislative history suggests that the 44th Congress may have meant to “confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred,” 2 Cong. Rec. 4986 (1874) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter). Nevertheless, we have only recently reaffirmed what has long been recognized — that “Art. Ill ‘arising under’ jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under § 1381.” Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 495 (1983). The well-pleaded complaint rule applies to the original jurisdiction of the district courts as well as to their removal jurisdiction. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco Inc., 415 U. S. 125, 127 (1974) (percuriam) (casebrought originally in federal court); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U. S. 656, 663 (1961) (attack on jurisdiction of state court). It is possible to conceive of a rational jurisdictional system in which the answer as well as the complaint would be consulted before a determination was made whether the case “arose under” federal law, or in which original and removal jurisdiction were not coextensive. Indeed, until the 1887 amendments to the 1875 Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433, the well-pleaded complaint rule was not applied in full force to cases removed from state court; the defendant’s petition for removal could furnish the necessary guarantee that the case necessarily presented a substantial question of federal law. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U. S. 135, 140 (1880); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 203-204 (1878). Commentators have repeatedly proposed that some mechanism be established to permit removal of cases in which a federal defense may be dispositive. See, e. g., American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts § 1312, pp. 188-194 (1969) (ALI Study); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 233-234 (1948). But those proposals have not been adopted. Gully was a suit by Mississippi tax authorities, claiming that the First National Bank had failed to make good on a contract with its predecessor corporation whereby, according to the State, the bank had promised to pay the predecessor’s tax liabilities. 299 U. S., at 111-112. It had been removed to federal court, and the motion for remand had been defeated, on the ground that the State’s “power to lay a tax upon the shares of national banks has its origin and measure in the provisions of a federal statute” and that “by necessary implication a plaintiff counts upon the statute in suing for the tax.” Id., at 112. . E. g., Trent Realty Associates v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 657 F. 2d 29, 34-36 (CA3 1981); First National Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen National Bank, 627 F. 2d 848, 850-852 (CA8 1980); Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F. 2d 654, 660 (CA9 1972); cf. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F. 2d 417, 422-423 (CA1 1979). Note, however, that a claim of federal pre-emption does not always arise as a defense to a coercive action. See n. 20, infra. And, of course, the absence of original jurisdiction does not mean that there is no federal forum in which a pre-emption defense may be heard. If the state courts reject a claim of federal pre-emption, that decision may ultimately be reviewed on appeal by this Court. See, e. g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) (deciding pre-emption question at issue in Trent Realty, supra). To obtain declaratory relief in California, a party must plead “facts showing the existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.” Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 947, 582 P. 2d 970, 972 (1978). In Wycoff Co., a company that transported films between various points within the State of Utah sought a declaratory judgment that a state regulatory commission had no power to forbid it to transport over routes authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission. However, “[i]t offered no evidence whatever of any past, pending or threatened action by the Utah Commission.” 344 U. S., at 240. We held that there was no jurisdiction, essentially because the dispute had “not matured to a point where we can see what, if any, concrete controversy will develop.” Id., at 245. We also added: “Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks in essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not of the defense, which will determine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of action, which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not itself involve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. This is dubious even though the declaratory complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action. Federal courts will not seize litigations from state courts merely because one, normally a defendant, goes to federal court to begin his federal-law defense before the state court begins the case under state law.” Id., at 248. The existence of this question was noted by the leading proponent of declaratory judgments during the interim between this Court’s first indication that state declaratory judgment actions did not fall outside Art. Ill’s “case or controversy” limitation and passage of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, but the issue did not come before us. See E. Borehard, Declaratory Judgments 298-300 (1934). California’s Declaratory Judgment Act was enacted 13 years before the federal Act. See ch. 463, § 1, 1921 Cal. Stats. 689. California may well regard its statute as having a more substantive purpose than the federal Act as interpreted in Shelly Oil. According to the leading commentator on California procedure: “Declaratory relief is not a special proceeding. It is an action, classified as equitable by reason of the type of relief offered . . . .” 3 B. Witkin, California Procedure § 705(c), p. 2329 (2d ed. 1971). See also Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal.2d 352, 362, 101 P. 2d 484, 489 (1940); cf. Mefford v. Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 2d 919, 922, 228 P. 2d 847, 849 (1951) (declaratory judgment is intended “to liquidate uncertainties and controversies”). But cf. Western Title Guaranty Co. v. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist., 235 Cal. App. 2d 815, 822, 45 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (1965) (citing federal cases). It is not beyond the power of Congress to confer a right to a declaratory judgment in a case or controversy arising under federal law — within the meaning of the Constitution or of § 1331 — without regard to Shelly Oil’s particular application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. The 1969 ALI report strongly criticized the Shelly Oil doctrine: “If no other changes were to be made in federal question jurisdiction, it is arguable that such language, and the historical test it seems to embody, should be repudiated.” ALI Study § 1311, at 170-171. Nevertheless, Congress has declined to make such a change. At this point, any adjustment in the system that has evolved under the Shelly Oil rule must come from Congress. It may seem odd that, for purposes of determining whether removal was proper, we analyze a claim brought under state law, in state court, by a party who has continuously objected to district court jurisdiction over its case, as if that party had been trying to get original federal-court jurisdiction all along. That irony, however, is a more-or-less constant feature of the removal statute, under which a case is removable if a federal district court could have taken jurisdiction had the same complaint been filed. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 234 (1948). For instance, federal courts have consistently adjudicated suits by alleged patent infringers to declare a patent invalid, on the theory that an infringement suit by the declaratory judgment defendant would raise a federal question over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. See E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F. 2d 852 (CA7 1937); Hart & Wechsler 896-897. Taking jurisdiction over this type of suit is consistent with the dictum in Public Service Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 248 (1952), see n. 14, supra, in which we stated only that a declaratory judgment plaintiff could not get original federal jurisdiction if the anticipated lawsuit by the declaratory judgment defendant would not “arise under” federal law. It is also consistent with the nature of the declaratory remedy itself, which was designed to permit adjudication of either party’s claims of right. See E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 15-18, 23-25 (1934). Section 502(a)(3) provides: “[A civil action may be brought] by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subehapter . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3). See also n. 26, infra (federal jurisdiction over suits under § 502 is exclusive, and they are governed entirely by federal common law). Even if ERISA did not expressly provide jurisdiction, CLVT might have been able to obtain federal jurisdiction under the doctrine applied in some cases that a person subject to a scheme of federal regulation may sue in federal court to enjoin application to him of conflicting state regulations, and a declaratory judgment action by the same person does not necessarily run afoul of the Shelly Oil doctrine. See, e. g., Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 506-508 (1972); Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F. 2d 1295, 1303-1306 (CA9 1975), aff’d sub nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519 (1977); First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F. 2d, at 423, and n. 8. We express no opinion, however, whether a party in CLVT’s position could sue under ERISA to enjoin or to declare invalid a state tax levy, despite the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S. 393 (1982). To do so, it would have to show either that state law provided no “speedy and efficient remedy” or that Congress intended § 502 of ERISA to be an exception to the Tax Injunction Act. Indeed, as appellant’s strategy in this case shows, they may often be willing to go to great lengths to avoid federal-court resolution of a preemption question. Realistically, there is little prospect that States will flood the federal courts with declaratory judgment actions; most questions will arise, as in this case, because a State has sought a declaration in state court and the defendant has removed the case to federal court. Accordingly, it is perhaps appropriate to note that considerations of comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it. Cf. nn. 19 and 20, supra. Alleged patent infringers, for example, have a clear interest in swift resolution of the federal issue of patent validity— they are liable for damages if it turns out they are infringing a patent, and they frequently have a delicate network of contractual arrangements with third parties that is dependent on their right to sell or license a product. Parties subject to conflicting state and federal regulatory schemes also have a clear interest in sorting out the scope of each government’s authority, especially where they face a threat of liability if the application of federal law is not quickly made clear. CLVT suggests that we treat the motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint it filed in the District Court as a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment under § 502 of ERISA, which might then provide an independent jurisdictional basis for reaching the merits of the pre-emption issue in this case. Brief for Appellees 9-11; see First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Boston v. Greenwald, supra, at 423; Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1188-1184 (ND Cal. 1977). Apparently, CLVT never filed an answer or a counterclaim in this case because it stipulated that the District Court could treat its motion to dismiss as a cross-motion for summary judgment, and the court decided the case on that basis. See App. to Juris. Statement 17 (District Court’s “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law”). Under the circumstances, we decline to adopt such a broad construction of CLVT’s pleadings. To similar effect is Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 677 (1974), in which we held that — unlike all other ejectment suits in which the plaintiff derives its claim from a federal grant, e. g., Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74 (1914) — an ejectment suit based on Indian title is within the original “federal question” jurisdiction of the district courts, because Indian title creates a federal possessory right to tribal lands, “wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession.” Cf. 414 U. S., at 682-683 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The statute further states that “the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary,” except for actions by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due, to enforce rights under the terms of a plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits, over which state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. § 502(e)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(e)(1). In addition, ERISA’s legislative history indicates that, in light of the Act’s virtually unique pre-emption provision, see § 514, 29 U. S. C. § 1144, “a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits). Indeed, precedent involving other statutes granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts suggests that, if such an action were not within the class of cases over which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the proper course for a federal district court to take after removal would be to dismiss the case altogether, without reaching the merits. See, e. g., General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 260 U. S. 261, 287-288 (1922); Koppers Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 337 F. 2d 499, 501-502 (CA8 1964) (Blackmun, J.). In contrast, § 301(a) of the LMRA applies to all “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations." We have not taken a restrictive view of who may sue under §301 for violations of such contracts, see, e. g., Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459 (1960); cf. Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F. 2d 190, 196-198 (CA3 1977), or of what contracts are covered by § 301, see Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U. S. 17 (1962). See also Black-Clawson Co. v. Machinists Lodge 335, 313 F. 2d 179, 181-182 (CA21962) (suit by employer for declaratory judgment as to contract obligations arises under § 301). But even under § 301 we have never intimated that any action merely relating to a contract within the coverage of § 301 arises exclusively under that section. For instance, a state battery suit growing out of a violent strike would not arise under § 301 simply because the strike may have been a violation of an employer-union contract. Cf. Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634, 640-642 (1958). In theory (looking only at the complaint), it may turn out that the levy was improper under state law, or that in fact the defendant had complied with the levy. Cf. Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 117 (1936). Furthermore, a levy on CLVT might be for something like property taxes on real estate it owned. CLVT’s trust agreement authorizes its trustees to pay such taxes. Art. V, ¶ 5.21(k), App. 29. See supra, at 24, n. 26. Of course, in suggesting that the trustees’ power to comply with a state tax levy is — as a subset of the trustees’ general duties with respect to CLVT — a matter of concern under ERISA, we express no opinion as to whether ERISA forbids the trustees to comply with the levies in this case or otherwise pre-empts the State’s power to levy on funds held in trust. The same is true of our holding that ERISA does not pre-empt the State’s causes of action entirely. Merely to hold that ERISA does not have the same effect on appellant’s suit in this case that § 301 of the LMRA had on the petitioner’s contract suit in Avco is not to prejudge the merits of CLVT’s pre-emption claim. See n. 19, supra. Section 502(a)(3)(B) of ERISA has been interpreted as creating a cause of action for a declaratory judgment. See Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F. 2d 523, 527 (CA31979). We repeat, however, the caveat expressed in n. 21, supra, as to the effect of the Tax Injunction Act. CLVT also argues that this case is directly controlled by Avco, on the theory that CLVT’s trust agreement is a contract covered by § 301 of the LMRA itself. Brief for Appellees 19, n. 19. We reject this argument essentially for the reasons given in n. 28, supra. In this case, the State does not rely on any contract within the scope of §301. The connection between appellant’s causes of action to enforce its levy and for a declaration of rights and duties and a suit to enforce the trust agreement is too attenuated for us to say that either “arises under” § 301.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HARDIN, MAYOR OF TAZEWELL, et al. v. KENTUCKY UTILITIES CO. No. 40. Argued December 13, 1967. Decided January 16, 1968. William R. Stanifer argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 40 and 50. With him on the brief for petitioners in No. 40 was Philip P. Ardery. Clyde Y. Cridlin was on the brief for petitioner in No. 50. Robert H. Marquis argued the cause for petitioner in No. 51. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Richard A. Posner, Charles J. McCarthy and Thomas A. Pedersen. Malcolm Y. Marshall argued the cause for respondent in all three cases. With him on the brief were Squire R. Ogden and James S. Welch. Together with No. 50, Powell Valley Electric Cooperative v. Kentucky Utilities Co., and No. 51, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kentucky Utilities Co., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision in these cases is whether Congress has prohibited the Tennessee Valley Authority from competing in the sale of electricity with respondent, the Kentucky Utilities Company, in two small villages in Claiborne County, Tennessee, and in a narrow corridor between the two villages and the Tennessee-Kentucky state boundary 16 miles away. By § 15d of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as added by the 1959 amendments to that Act, Congress barred the TVA from expanding its sales outside “the area for which the Corporation [TVA] or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July , 1957/’1 and our problem is therefore the narrow one of deciding whether these villages and the narrow corridor are part of an “area” for which TYA was the primary source of power on the crucial date. The difficulty lies in determining the location and extent of the “area” to which the statute refers. In June 1957, TVA supplied 62% of the power used in all of Claiborne County, and therefore if the entire county is an “area” within the meaning of the statute, TVA would have been the “primary” source of power, and its expansion into the two villages would be permissible. On the other hand, in the villages themselves, TVA supplied only 6% of the power in June 1957, while respondent supplied 94%; thus if the two villages either alone or with the corridor constitute an “area,” TVA would not have been the primary source of power, and it would be barred by § 15d from expanding into that area. The question of statutory interpretation now before us arose in this way. TVA is the major supplier of electric power in Tennessee and in many adjoining areas- of Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Virginia, and Kentucky. Respondent, whose service area is centered in Kentucky, has long served customers in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the two villages within 16 miles of the Kentucky border in Claiborne County, Tennessee. The power lines of TVA distributors also crisscross Claiborne County, and TVA has therefore been- able to serve a small number of customers in the two villages, even though respondent was the predominant source of power. Because Kentucky Utilities’ retail rates for electricity in the two villages were approximately 2y2 times higher for typical consumers than the rates for TVA power, the value of residential and commercial properties served by TVA was substantially and uniformly higher than the value of similar properties served by respondent. This rate disparity created a seething discontent among residential and industrial consumers in the villages. Pointing out that they lived in the very heart of the TVA watershed and in immediate proximity to TVA’s large Norris Lake, these citizens contended that it was wholly unjust and inequitable to deny them the benefits and advantages of cheap TVA power. After complaints, planning, and consultations over a period of more than three years, the local governments engaged a contractor to build the facilities necessary to establish a municipal system linked to TVA’s cheap power. Kentucky Utilities’ customers immediately began to discontinue their service and become customers of the municipal system. Kentucky Utilities then filed this suit against TVA, the mayors of the twb Tazewells, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor, charging them with conspiracy to destroy its Tazewell business and asking the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system in alleged violation of § 15d. The District Court upheld the determination of the TVA Board of Directors that the two Tazewells were within TVA’s primary service “area” and dismissed the case, 237 F. Supp. 502 (1964), but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the two villages plus the corridor constituted an “area” and that TVA accordingly was barred from extending its service in the Tazewells. 375 F. 2d 403 (1966). We granted certiorari, 386 U. S. 980 (1967), to resolve this important question in the administration of the TVA Act. We reverse and agree with the District Court that the TVA Board properly determined the relevant service “area” to extend beyond the two Taze-wells and to include the entire county. TVA, as the primary power source within this area, could therefore properly make its low-cost power available to consumers in this entire county area including the two villages. I. Before discussing the merits, we shall briefly consider petitioners’ contention that the Kentucky Utilities Company lacks standing to challenge the legality of TVA’s activities. We agree with both the courts below that this contention is without merit. This Court has, it is true, repeatedly held that the economic injury which results from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, ■confer standing on the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor’s operations. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1882); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938); Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940). But competitive injury provided no basis for standing in the above cases simply because the statutory and constitutional requirements that the plaintiff sought to enforce were in no way concerned with protecting against competitive injury. In contrast, it has been the rule, at least since the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924), that when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision. See Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 19 (1942); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 83 (1958). Petitioners concede, as of course they must, that one of the primary purposes of the area limitations in § 15d of the Act was to protect private utilities from TYA competition. This is evident from the provision itself and is amply supported by its legislative history. The provision grew out of TVA’s efforts to find some way to meet the cost of new facilities without dependence upon annual appropriations from Congress. In 1955 TVA began to seek authority to issue bonds to finance these expenditures. Although TVA spokesmen assured Congress that the objective was not territorial expansion but only improvement of facilities in TVA’s existing service area, many members of Congress were apprehensive and thought that if congressional budgetary control was to be weakened, some substitute to prevent territorial expansion should be found. A series of bills to give TVA borrowing power failed to pass. Several bills were then introduced combining the grant of borrowing power with various provisions to prohibit territorial expansion, and one of these bills was eventually-enacted as the TYA amendments of 1959. Although discussions of the territorial limitation mentioned a number of policy reasons for the restriction, it is clear and undisputed that protection of private utilities from TVA competition was almost universally regarded as the primary objective of the limitation. Since respondent is thus in the class which § 15d is designed to protect, it has standing under familiar judicial principles to bring this suit, see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944); cf. United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426, 433-434 (1949), and no explicit statutory provision is necessary to confer standing. II. Basic to our consideration of the merits of these cases is an appraisal of the significance of the TVA Board’s determination that all of Claiborne County, including the two Tazewells, constituted a single “area” in which TYA is the primary source of power. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gave no weight whatever to this determination and urge that the finding should instead have been treated like an administrative interpretation by an agency or executive officer, to be set aside only if it is not properly related to the purposes of the statute. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not altogether clear in dealing with this question, however, and respondent has not attempted to argue here that the Court of Appeals could have decided the matter entirely on its own, without any consideration of the TVA Board’s finding. Rather, respondent appears to agree with petitioners that the determination of the TVA Board is entitled to acceptance unless it lies outside the range of permissible choices contemplated by the statute, and we think this is the proper rule. The initial determination as to the extent of the “area” under § 15d must be made by the TVA Board in every case, since TVA is required under the Act to make power available to public bodies and cooperatives within the permissible area. In making this determination as to the most appropriate boundaries for its service area, the TYA Board will normally evaluate the economic and engineering aspects of providing its service to the customers in question, especially in relation to the particular topography of the affected region. Given the innate and inevitable vagueness of the “area” concept and the complexity of the factors relevant to decision in this matter, we think it is more efficient, and thus more in line with the overall purposes of the Act, for the courts to take the TVA’s “area” determinations as their starting points and to set these determinations aside only when they lack reasonable support in relation to the statutory purpose of controlling, but not altogether prohibiting, territorial expansion. Cf. SEC v. New England Electric, 384 U. S. 176, 185 (1966); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 109-110 (1904). III. Tested by this standard, we think the determination of the TVA Board with respect to Claiborne County should have been upheld by the court below. Neither the language of § 15d, its legislative history, nor any of the economic and technical circumstances of this particular locality suggest that the TVA Board’s determination here exceeded the outer boundaries of choice contemplated in the Act. Certainly nothing in the language of § 15d (a) itself forecloses the TVA’s present decision. The second paragraph of that section reads: “Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Corporation or its distributors from, supplying electric power to any customer within any area in which the Corporation or its distributors had generally established electric service on July 1, 1957, and to which electric service was not being supplied from any other source on the effective date of this Act.” In light of this provision, respondent argues that even within its “area,” TVA may not extend its services to new customers previously served by a private company. Literally, of course, this language does not establish such a rule. It simply states that when a customer is served by a private utility in this area of generally established service, an area perhaps broader than the “area” of primary service which is controlling under the first paragraph of § 15d (a), the Act may prevent TVA from supplying the customer; other parts of the subsection must be looked to for the actual prohibition. This literal reading, moreover, is the only' appropriate one in light of other provisions of the statute. The first paragraph of § 15d (a) authorizes TVA to provide power not only within its “area” but also within an additional region “extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such area.” This is followed by a proviso denying TVA the right to serve within this additional region any “municipality receiving electric service from another source on or after July 1, 1957.” Since the Act makes the existence of a private supplier an explicit bar to TVA expansion only within the additional region, we cannot read the statute as also making the existence of a private supplier, in and of itself, an automatic bar to expansion in the primary service “area.” The parties have also called our attention to numerous incidents in the legislative history suggesting that Congress may have regarded the very villages involved in this case as either inside or outside of TVA’s service area. Petitioners note that maps placed before the congressional committees showed the Tazewells as within TVA’s primary service area. Respondent counters that one map submitted to the House Public Works Committee showed the Tazewells as within respondent’s service area. In addition, respondent notes that a “gentlemen’s agreement” between TVA and neighboring private utilities had placed the Tazewells within respondent’s area, and respondent refers to a number of statements indicating that various sponsors of the territorial limitations intended to enact the “gentlemen’s agreement” into law. We do not find any of this information particularly helpful in resolving the question before us. The maps on which petitioners rely were large-scale representations of TYA’s entire multistate system, and they were submitted to various committees for general reference. Even if all these maps had placed the Tazewells in the same area, it would be artificial in the extreme to assume that Congress actually entertained any specific intention with respect to these small villages in one tiny portion of the county, the State and the map. With respect to the “gentlemen’s agreement,” it is undeniable that many members of Congress did hope to freeze completely the existing situation by enactment of the territorial limitation. Others, the majority of the Senate Public Works Committee in particular, undoubtedly sought to include language that would authorize adjustments and permit a certain amount of elasticity in the availability of TYA service. We think it is sufficient to note, without tracing all the changes in the wording of the territorial limitation, that the language of the Act in its final form is a compromise and that the views of those who sought the most restrictive wording cannot control interpretation of the compromise version. Finally, we think that apart from the structure of the Act and its legislative history, the facts of the situation in Claiborne County, in Tennessee, and in Kentucky support rather than undercut the TVA Board’s determination. The parties place great stress on the question whether respondent’s service area should be characterized as a “peninsula” attached to its main region of service or as a mere “island” surrounded by TVA territory and therefore more properly subject to TVA intrusion. But we can attribute no controlling significance to such characterizations. The most isolated area of private service will necessarily be connected to the private company’s main area by at least one power fine such as the one present here, and the company may even, as here, serve scattered customers along the line — if indeed the region contains any customers to serve. At the same time a broad area served almost entirely by a private company and contiguous with its main service area may be crisscrossed by the lines of TVA distributors and TVA may even have scattered customers along these lines; the fact that the private company was thus surrounded by TVA might not under this statute justify TVA expansion into the “peninsula” or “island,” whatever it may be, served by private power. In the present cases respondent did serve a substantial number of customers in the corridor between the Tazewells and its main service area in Kentucky, but if a “peninsula,” it was at best a very narrow and tiny one in relation to the possible patterns of power distribution. TVA, on the other hand, served most of the rural areas in Claiborne County and had a substantial minority of the customers in the Tazewells themselves. Under these circumstances, the TVA Board could properly have concluded that the pattern of electric power distribution would be more sensible and efficient if TVA competed in the entire Tazewell municipal area as well as serving the relatively unprofitable rural customers, many of whom were rather close to respondent’s transmission line into the Tazewells. In addition, the Board could have considered the existence of its significant, though not primary, service in the Tazewells themselves as a compelling reason for including these villages in its “area,” since the factors supporting inclusion were in any event significant and since the great disparity of rates in the villages had resulted in significant economic dislocations. Under all these circumstances we cannot say that the conclusion of the TYA Board in the present cases is incompatible with the “area” concept formulated in the Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm that of the District Court. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, § 15d (a), 73 Stat. 280, as amended, 73 Stat. 338, 16 U. S. C. §831n-4 (a). The full text of the relevant portion of § 15d (a) is as follows: “Unless otherwise specifically authorized by Act of Congress the Corporation shall make no contracts for the sale or delivery of power which would have the effect of making the Corporation or its distributors, directly or indirectly, a source of power supply outside the area for which the Corporation or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957, and such additional area extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such area as may be necessary to care for the growth of the Corporation and its distributors within said area: Provided, however, That such additional area shall not in any event increase by more than 2% per centum (or two thousand square miles, whichever is the lesser) the area for which the Corporation and its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957: And provided further, That no part of such additional area may be in a State not now served by the Corporation or its distributors or in a municipality receiving electric service from another source on or after July 1, 1957, and no more than five hundred square miles of such additional area may be in any one State now served by the Corporation or its distributors. “Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Corporation or its distributors from supplying electric power to any customer within any area in which the Corporation or its distributors had generally established electric service on July 1, 1957, and to which electric service was not being supplied from any other source on the effective date of this Act.” For the owner of an electrically heated home, TVA power might cost $30.50 for a winter month as against $75.53 for the identical amount of power supplied by respondent. S. 2373, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 4266, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). S. 1855, S. 1869, S. 1986, S. 2145, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 931, H. R. 3460, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). One of the Senators active in framing the territorial limitation expressed concern over TVA’s powerful bargaining position with respect to its purchase of coal. See S. Rep. No. 470, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1959) (supplemental views of Senator Randolph). See, e. g., id., at 9 (majority report); id., at 54-55 (supplemental views of Senator Randolph); 105 Cong. Rec. 13053 (July 9, 1959) (remarks of Senator Cooper); id., at 13054 (remarks of Senator Holland); id., at 13055 (remarks of Senator Kerr); id., at 13060-13061 (remarks of Senator Randolph); id., at 13061 (remarks of Senator Byrd); hearings on H. R. 3460 before House Committee on Public Works, March 10-11, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 110, 115 (testimony of Representative Vinson); id., at 122 (testimony of Representative Boykin). Petitioners’ reliance on Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 96 U. S. App. D. C. 273, 225 F. 2d 924, cert. denied, 350 U. S. 884 (1955), is thus misplaced. The Court in McKay ruled that an explicit statutory provision was necessary to confer standing because of the “long established rule” that an injured competitor cannot sue to enforce statutory requirements not designed to protect competitors. In the case of statutes concerned with protecting competitive interests, the “long established rule” is of course precisely the opposite. The Court of Appeals stated at one point: “But, TVA argues, the 1959 Act must be read as committing to its Board of Directors authority to determine 'the area’ in which it was the primary source of power on that date. We find no words in the Act which directly or impliedly delegated to TVA’s Board such authority.” 375 F. 2d, at 412. Later in its opinion, however, the court suggests that this statement was not intended to deny any role to the Board’s determination: “We hold that the resolution of the TVA Board did not foreclose the testing of its validity by the District Judge or by this Court on this appeal.” 375 F. 2d, at 415. See § 12 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 65, 16 U. S. C. § 831k. It should be noted that the agency determination upon which the Court places so much weight was reached at a “special meeting” of the Board of Directors on August 26, 1964, more than eight months after respondent filed its complaint, and only three weeks before trial. One of the staff memoranda upon which the determination was based refers specifically to this litigation. One might have supposed that a determination which was made post litem, motam warranted at least cautious treatment.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HISHON v. KING & SPALDING No. 82-940. Argued October 31, 1983 Decided May 22, 1984 Emmet J. Bondurant argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Deputy Solicitor General Bator argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief for the United States et al. were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, David A. Strauss, Brian K. Landsberg, James W. Clute, and Philip B. Sklover. Charles Morgan, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were J. Richard Cohen, Steven E. Vagle, Hamilton Lokey, and Gerald F. Handley. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of University Women et al. by Judith I. Avner and Anne E. Simon; for the American Civil Liberties Union by Samuel Estreicher, Burt Neubome, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, E. Richard Larson, Charles S. Sims, and Mary L. Heen; for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. by Justin J. Finger, Meyer Eisenberg, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Leslie K. Shedlin, and Nathan Z. Dershowitz; for California Women Lawyers by Elizabeth S. Salveson; for the Dallas Association of Black Women Attorneys et al. by Neil H. Cogan; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Jack Greenberg, Charles S. Ralston, Gail J. Wright, and Elizabeth Bartholet; for the Women’s Bar Association of Illinois et al. by Paddy Harris McNamara, Susan N. Sekuler, and Jacqueline S. Lustig; for the Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts by Leah Sprague Crothers; and for Robert Abrams et al. by Paulette M. Caldwell, Lawrence S. Robbins, and Barbara S. Schulman. Joseph D. Alviani filed a brief for the New England Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to determine whether the District Court properly dismissed a Title VII complaint alleging that a law partnership discriminated against petitioner, a woman lawyer employed as an associate, when it failed to invite her to become a partner. I A In 1972 petitioner Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position as an associate with respondent, a large Atlanta law firm established as a general partnership. When this suit was filed in 1980, the firm had more than 50 partners and employed approximately 50 attorneys as associates. Up to that time, no woman had ever served as a partner at the firm. Petitioner alleges that the prospect of partnership was an important factor in her initial decision to accept employment with respondent. She alleges that respondent used the possibility of ultimate partnership as a recruiting device to induce petitioner and other young lawyers to become associates at the firm. According to the complaint, respondent represented that advancement to partnership after five or six years was “a matter of course” for associates “who receive[d] satisfactory evaluations” and that associates were promoted to partnership “on a fair and equal basis.” Petitioner alleges that she relied on these representations when she accepted employment with respondent. The complaint further alleges that respondent’s promise to consider her on a “fair and equal basis” created a binding employment contract. In May 1978 the partnership considered and rejected Hishon for admission to the partnership; one year later, the partners again declined to invite her to become a partner. Once an associate is passed over for partnership at respondent’s firm, the associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere. Petitioner’s employment as an associate terminated on December 31, 1979. B Hishon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 19, 1979, claiming that respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. Ten days later the Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and on February 27, 1980, Hishon brought this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, backpay, and compensatory damages “in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to partnership.” This, of course, negates any claim for specific performance of the contract alleged. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Title VII was inapplicable to the selection of partners by a partnership. 24 FEP Cases 1303 (1980). A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 678 F. 2d 1022 (1982). We granted certio-rari, 459 U. S. 1169 (1983), and we reverse. At this stage of the litigation, we must accept petitioners allegations as true. A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The issue before us is whether petitioner’s allegations state a claim under Title VII, the relevant portion of which provides as follows: “(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). A Petitioner alleges that respondent is an “employer” to whom Title VII is addressed. She then asserts that consideration for partnership was one of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” as an associate with respondent. See §2000e-2(a)(l). If this is correct, respondent could not base an adverse partnership decision on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Once a contractual relationship of employment is established, the provisions of Title VII attach and govern certain aspects of that relationship. In the context of Title VII, the contract of employment may be written or oral, formal or informal; an informal contract of employment may arise by the simple act of handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a workplace. The contractual relationship of employment triggers the provision of Title VII governing “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Title VII in turn forbids discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Because the underlying employment relationship is contractual, it follows that the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” clearly include benefits that are part of an employment contract. Here, petitioner in essence alleges that respondent made a contract to consider her for partnership. Indeed, this promise was allegedly a key contractual provision which induced her to accept employment. If the evidence at trial establishes that the parties contracted to have petitioner considered for partnership, that promise clearly was a term,- condition, or privilege of her employment. Title VII would then bind respondent to consider petitioner for partnership as the statute provides, i. e., without regard to petitioner’s sex. The contract she alleges would lead to the same result. Petitioner’s claim that a contract was made, however, is not the only allegation that would qualify respondent’s consideration of petitioner for partnership as a term, condition, or privilege of employment. An employer may provide its employees with many benefits that it is under no obligation to furnish by any express or implied contract. Such a benefit, though not a contractual right of employment, may qualify as a “privileg[e]” of employment under Title VII. A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all. Those benefits that comprise the “incidents of employment,” S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1964), or that form “an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees,” Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 178 (1971), may not be afforded in a manner contrary to Title VII. Several allegations in petitioner’s complaint would support the conclusion that the opportunity to become a partner was part and parcel of an associate’s status as an employee at respondent’s firm, independent of any allegation that such an opportunity was included in associates’ employment contracts. Petitioner alleges that respondent’s associates could regularly expect to be considered for partnership at the end of their “apprenticeships,” and it appears that lawyers outside the firm were not routinely so considered. Thus, the benefit of partnership consideration was allegedly linked directly with an associate’s status as an employee, and this linkage was far more than coincidental: petitioner alleges that respondent explicitly used the prospect of ultimate partnership to induce young lawyers to join the firm. Indeed, the importance of the partnership decision to a lawyer’s status as an associate is underscored by the allegation that associates’ employment is terminated if they are not elected to become partners. These allegations, if proved at trial, would suffice to show that partnership consideration was a term, condition, or privilege of an associate’s employment at respondent’s firm, and accordingly that partnership consideration must be without regard to sex. B Respondent contends that advancement to partnership may never qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment for purposes of Title VII. First, respondent asserts that elevation to partnership entails a change in status from an “employee” to an “employer.” However, even if respondent is correct that a partnership invitation is not itself an offer of employment, Title VII would nonetheless apply and preclude discrimination on the basis of sex. The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to fall within Title VII’s protection; it need only be a term, condition, or privilege of employment. It is also of no consequence that employment as an associate necessarily ends when an associate becomes a partner. A benefit need not accrue before a person’s employment is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of that employment relationship. Pension benefits, for example, qualify as terms, conditions, or privileges of employment even though they are received only after employment terminates. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U. S. 1073, 1079 (1983) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). Accordingly, nothing in the change in status that advancement to partnership might entail means that partnership consideration falls outside the terms of the statute. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 128-129 (SDNY 1977). Second, respondent argues that Title VII categorically exempts partnership decisions from scrutiny. However, respondent points to nothing in the statute or the legislative history that would support such a per se exemption. When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it expressly did so. Third, respondent argues that application of Title VII in this case would infringe constitutional rights of expression or association. Although we have recognized that the activities of lawyers may make a “distinctive contribution.... to the ideas and beliefs of our society,” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 431 (1963), respondent has not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by a requirement that it consider petitioner for partnership on her merits. Moreover, as we have held in another context, “[invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” Norwood, v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 470 (1973). There is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976); Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93-94 (1945). Ill We conclude that petitioner’s complaint states a claim cognizable under Title VII. Petitioner therefore is entitled to her day in court to prove her allegations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The parties dispute whether the partnership actually reconsidered the 1978 decision at the 1979 meeting. Respondent claims it voted not to reconsider the question and that Hishon therefore was required to file her claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the May 1978 meeting, not the meeting one year later, see 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e). The District Court’s disposition of the case made it unnecessary to decide that question, and we do not reach it. The District Court dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim. Although limited discovery previously had taken place concerning the manner in which respondent was organized, the court did not find any “jurisdictional facts” in dispute. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U. S. 442, 446 (1942). Its reasoning makes clear that it dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the ground that her allegations did not state a claim cognizable under Title VII. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the wisdom of the District Court’s invocation of Rule 12(b)(1), as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). The statute defines an “employer” as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,” § 2000e(b), and a “person” is explicitly defined to include “partnerships,” §2000e(a). The complaint alleges that respondent’s partnership satisfies these requirements. App. 6. Petitioner has raised other theories of Title VII liability which, in light of our disposition, need not be addressed. Title VII also may be relevant in the absence of an existing employment relationship, as when an employer refuses to hire someone. See § 2000e-2(a)(l). However, discrimination in that circumstance does not concern the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” which is the focus of the present case. Petitioner alleges not only that respondent promised to consider her for partnership, but also that it promised to consider her on a “fair and equal basis.” This latter promise is not necessary to petitioner’s Title VII claim. Even if the employment contract did not afford a basis for an implied condition that the ultimate decision would be fairly made on the merits, Title VII itself would impose such a requirement. If the promised consideration for partnership is a term, condition, or privilege of employment, then the partnership decision must be without regard to “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Senate Report No. 867 concerned S. 1937, which the Senate postponed indefinitely after it amended a House version of what ultimately became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 110 Cong. Rec. 14602 (1964). The Report is relevant here because S. 1937 contained language similar to that ultimately found in the Civil Rights Act. It guaranteed “equal employment opportunity,” which was defined to “include all the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 (1964). Chemical & Alkali Workers pertains to §8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which describes the obligation of employers and unions to meet and confer regarding “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 61 Stat. 142, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(d). The meaning of this analogous language sheds light on the Title VII provision at issue here. We have drawn analogies to the NLRA in other Title VII contexts, see Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 768-770 (1976), and have noted that certain sections of Title VII were expressly patterned after the NLRA, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 419 (1975). Respondent’s own submissions indicate that most of respondent’s partners in fact were selected from the ranks of associates who had spent their entire prepartnership legal careers (excluding judicial clerkships) with the firm. See App. 45. The only legislative history respondent offers to support its position is Senator Cotton’s defense of an unsuccessful amendment to limit Title VII to businesses with 100 or more employees. In this connection the Senator stated: “[W]hen a small businessman who employs 30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner; and when a businessman selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces when he selects a wife.” 110 Cong. Rec. 13085 (1964); accord, 118 Cong. Rec. 1524, 2391 (1972). Because Senator Cotton’s amendment failed, it is unclear to what extent Congress shared his concerns about selecting partners. In any event, his views hardly conflict with our narrow holding today: that in appropriate circumstances partnership consideration may qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of a person’s employment with an employer large enough to be covered by Title VII. For example, Congress expressly exempted Indian tribes and certain agencies of the District of Columbia, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b)(l), small businesses and bona fide private membership clubs, § 2000e(b)(2), and certain employees of religious organizations, §2000e-l. Congress initially exempted certain employees of educational institutions, § 702, 78 Stat. 255, but later revoked that exemption, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, §3, 86 Stat. 103.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MOORMAN MANUFACTURING CO. v. BAIR, DIRECTOR OF REVENUE OF IOWA No. 77-454. Argued March 21, 1978 Decided June 15, 1978 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Marshall, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. BreNNAN, J., post, p. 281, and BlackmuN, J., post, p. 282, filed dissenting opinions. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BlackmuN, J., joined, post, p. 283. Donald K. Barnes argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Walter R. Brown, John V. Donnelly, Carl O. Schmiedeskamp, and Robert W. Cook. Harry M. Griger, Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Richard C. Turner, Attorney General. Ernest S. Christian, Jr., and Allan Abbot Tuttle filed a brief for the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce as amicus curiae urging reversal. James L. Rogers, John R. Phillips, and Philip B. Kurland filed a brief for the Iowa Manufacturers Assn, et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Wiliam D. Dexter, James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon, and Theodore W. deLooze, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Multistate Tax Comm’n et al. as amici curiae. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether the single-factor sales formula employed by Iowa to apportion the income of an interstate business for income tax purposes is prohibited by the Federal Constitution. I Appellant, Moorman Manufacturing Co., is an Illinois corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of animal feeds. Although the products it sells to Iowa customers are manufactured in Illinois, appellant has over 500 salesmen in Iowa and it owns six warehouses in the State from which deliveries are made to Iowa customers. Iowa sales account for about 20% of appellant's total sales. Corporations, both foreign and domestic, doing business in Iowa are subject to the State’s income tax. The taxable income for federal income tax purposes, with certain adjustments, is treated as the corporation’s “net income” under the Iowa statute. If a corporation’s business is not conducted entirely within Iowa, the statute imposes a tax only on the portion of its income “reasonably attributable” to the business within the State. There are essentially two steps in computing the share of a corporation’s income “reasonably attributable” to Iowa. First, certain income, “the geographical source of which is easily identifiable,” is attributed entirely to a particular State. Second, if the remaining income is derived from the manufacture or sale of tangible personal property, “the part thereof attributable to business within the state shall be in that proportion which the gross sales made within the state bear to the total gross sales.” This is the single-factor formula that appellant challenges in this case. If the taxpayer believes that application of this formula subjects it to taxation on a greater portion of its net income than is “reasonably attributable” to business within the State, it may file a statement of objections and submit an alternative method of apportionment. If the evidence submitted by the taxpayer persuades the Director of Revenue that the statute is “inapplicable and inequitable” as applied to it, he may recalculate the corporation’s taxable income. During the fiscal years 1949 through 1960, the State Tax Commission allowed appellant to compute its Iowa income on the basis of a formula consisting of three, equally weighted factors — property, payroll, and sales — rather than the formula prescribed by statute. For the fiscal years 1961 through 1964, appellant complied with a directive of the State Tax Commission to compute its income in accordance with the statutory formula. Since 1965, however, appellant has resorted to the three-factor formula without the consent of the commission. In 1974, the Iowa Director of Revenue revised appellant’s tax assessment for the fiscal years 1968 through 1972. This assessment was based on the statutory formula, which produced a higher percentage of taxable income than appellant, using the three-factor formula, had reported on its return in each of the disputed years. The higher percentages, of course, produced a correspondingly greater tax obligation for those years. After the Tax Commission had rejected Moorman’s appeal from the revised assessment, appellant challenged the constitutionality of the single-factor formula in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. That court held the formula invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed, holding that an apportionment formula that is necessarily only a rough approximation of the income properly attributable to the taxing State is not subject to constitutional attack unless the taxpayer proves that the formula has produced an income attribution “out of all proportion to the business transacted” within the State. The court concluded that appellant had not made such a showing. We noted probable jurisdiction of Moorman’s appeal, 434 U. S. 953, and now affirm. II Appellant contends that Iowa’s single-factor formula results in extraterritorial taxation in violation of the Due Process Clause. This argument rests on two premises: first, that appellant’s Illinois operations were responsible for some of the profits generated by sales in Iowa; and, second, that a formula that reaches any income not in fact earned within the borders of the taxing State violates due process. The first premise is speculative and the second is foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court. Appellant does not suggest that it has shown that a significant portion of the income attributed to Iowa in fact was generated by its Illinois operations; the record does not contain any separate accounting analysis showing what portion of appellant’s profits was attributable to sales, to manufacturing, or to any other phase of the company’s operations. But appellant contends that we should proceed on the assumption that at least some portion of the income from Iowa sales was generated by Illinois activities. Whatever merit such an assumption might have from the standpoint of economic theory or legislative policy, it cannot support a claim in this litigation that Iowa in fact taxed profits not attributable to activities within the State during the years 1968 through 1972. For all this record reveals, appellant’s manufacturing operations in Illinois were only marginally profitable during those years and the high-volume sales to Iowa customers from Iowa warehouses were responsible for the lion’s share of the income generated by those sales. Indeed, a separate accounting analysis might have revealed that losses in Illinois operations prevented appellant from earning more income from exploitation of a highly favorable Iowa market. Yet even were we to assume that the Illinois activities made some contribution to the profitability of the Iowa sales, appellant’s claim that the Constitution invalidates an apportionment formula whenever it may result in taxation of some income that did not have its source in the taxing State is incorrect. The Due Process Clause places two restrictions on a State’s power to tax income generated by the activities of an interstate business. First, no tax may be imposed unless there is some minimal connection between those activities and the taxing State. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U. S. 753, 756. This requirement was plainly satisfied here. Second, the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to “values connected with the taxing State.” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325. Since 1934 Iowa has used the formula method of computing taxable income. This method, unlike separate accounting, does not purport to identify the precise geographical source of a corporation’s profits; rather, it is employed as a rough approximation of a corporation’s income that is reasonably related to the activities conducted within the taxing State. The single-factor formula used by Iowa, therefore, generally will not produce a figure that represents the actual profits earned within the State. But the same is true of the Illinois three-factor formula. Both will occasionally over-reflect or under-reflect income attributable to the taxing State. Yet despite this imprecision, the Court has refused to impose strict constitutional restraints on a State’s selection of a particular formula. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a single-factor formula is presumptively valid. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, for example, the taxpayer challenged Connecticut’s use of such a formula to apportion its net income. Underwood’s manufacturing operations were conducted entirely within Connecticut. Its main office, however, was in New York City and it had branch offices in many States where its typewriters were sold and repaired. Applying a single-factor property formula, Connecticut taxed 47% of the company’s net income. Claiming that 97% of its profits were generated by transactions in tangible personal property outside Connecticut, Underwood contended that the formula taxed “income arising from business conducted beyond the boundaries of the State” in violation of the Due Process Clause. Id., at 120. Rejecting this claim, the Court noted that Connecticut “adopted a method of apportionment which, for all that appears in this record, reached, and was meant to reach, only the profits earned within the State,” id., at 121, and held that the taxpayer had failed to carry its burden of proving that “the method of apportionment adopted by the State was inherently arbitrary, or that its application to this corporation produced an unreasonable result.” Ibid, (footnote omitted) In individual cases, it is true, the Court has found that the application of a single-factor formula to a particular taxpayer violated due process. See Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U. S. 123; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, supra. In Hans Rees’, for example, the Court concluded that proof that the formula produced a tax on 83% of the taxpayer’s income when only 17% of that income actually had its source in the State would suffice to invalidate the assessement under the Due Process Clause. But in neither Hans Rees’ nor Norfolk & Western did the Court depart from the basic principles that the States have wide latitude in the selection of apportionment formulas and that a formula-produced assessment will only be disturbed when the taxpayer has proved by “clear and cogent evidence” that the income attributed to the State is in fact “out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted ... in that State,” 283 U. S., at 135, or has “led to a grossly distorted result,” 390 U. S., at 326. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U. S. 553, on which appellant relies, does not suggest a contrary result. In that case the Court held that a regulation prescribing a single-factor sales formula was not authorized by the District of Columbia Code. It concluded that the formula violated the statutory requirement that the net income of a corporation doing business both inside and outside the District must be deemed to arise from “sources” both inside and outside the District. But that statutory requirement has no counterpart in the Constitution, and the Court in General Motors made clear that it did “not mean to take any position on the constitutionality of a state income tax based on the sales factor alone.” Id., at 561. The Iowa statute afforded appellant an opportunity to demonstrate that the single-factor formula produced an arbitrary result in its case. But this record contains no such showing and therefore the Director’s assessment is not subject to challenge under the Due Process Clause. Ill Appellant also contends that during the relevant years Iowa and Illinois imposed a tax on a portion of the income derived from the Iowa sales that was also taxed by the other State in violation of the Commerce Clause. Since most States use the three-factor formula that Illinois adopted in 1970, appellant argues that Iowa’s longstanding single-factor formula must be held responsible for the alleged duplication and declared unconstitutional. We cannot agree. In the first place, this record does not establish the essential factual predicate for a claim of duplicative taxation. Appellant’s net income during the years in question was approximately $9 million. Since appellant did not prove the portion derived from sales to Iowa customers, rather than sales to customers in other States, we do not know whether Illinois and Iowa together imposed a tax on more than 100% of the relevant net income. The income figure that appellant contends was subject to duplicative taxation was computed by comparing gross sales in Iowa to total gross sales. As already noted, however, this figure does not represent actual profits earned from Iowa sales. Obviously, all sales are not equally profitable. Sales in Iowa, although only 20%> of gross sales, may have yielded a much higher percentage of appellant’s profits. Thus, profits from Iowa sales may well have exceeded the $2.5 million figure that appellant contends was taxed by the two States. If so, there was no duplicative taxation of the net income generated by Iowa sales. In any event, on this record its existence is speculative. Even assuming some overlap, we could not accept appellant's argument that Iowa, rather than Illinois, was necessarily at fault in a constitutional sense. It is, of course, true that if Iowa had used Illinois’ three-factor formula, a risk of duplication in the figures computed by the two States might have been avoided. But the same would be true had Illinois used the Iowa formula. Since the record does not reveal the sources of appellant’s profits, its Commerce Clause claim cannot rest on the premise that profits earned in Illinois were included in its Iowa taxable income and therefore the Iowa formula was at fault for whatever overlap may have existed. Rather, the claim must be that even if the presumptively valid Iowa formula yielded no profits other than those properly attributable to appellant’s activities within Iowa, the importance of avoiding any risk of duplication in the taxable income of an interstate concern justifies invalidation of the Iowa statute. Appellant contends that, to the extent this overlap is permitted, the corporation that does business in more than one State shoulders a tax burden not shared by those operating entirely within a State. To alleviate the burden, appellant invites us to hold that the Commerce Clause itself, without implementing legislation by Congress, requires Iowa to compute corporate net income under the Illinois equally weighted, three-factor formula. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Constitution does not require such a result. The only conceivable constitutional basis for invalidating the Iowa statute would be that the Commerce Clause prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable income by the States. If the Constitution were read to mandate such precision in interstate taxation, the consequences would extend far beyond this particular case. For some risk of duplicative taxation exists whenever the States in which a corporation does business do not follow identical rules for the division of income. Accepting appellant’s view of the Constitution, therefore, would require extensive judicial lawmaking. Its logic is not limited to a prohibition on use of a single-factor apportionment formula. The asserted constitutional flaw in that formula is that it is different from that presently employed by a majority of States and that difference creates a risk of duplicative taxation. But a host of other division-of-income problems create precisely the same risk and would similarly rise to constitutional proportions. Thus, it would be necessary for this Court to prescribe a uniform definition of each category in the three-factor formula. For if the States in which a corporation does business have different rules regarding where a “sale” takes place, and each includes the same sale in its three-factor computation of the corporation’s income, there will be duplicative taxation despite the apparent identity of the formulas employed. A similar risk of multiple taxation is created by the diversity among the States in the attribution of “nonbusiness” income, generally defined as that portion of a taxpayer’s income that does not arise from activities in the regular course of its business. Some States do not distinguish between business and non-business income for apportionment purposes. Other States, however, have adopted special rules that attribute nonbusiness income to specific locations. Moreover, even among the latter, there is diversity in the definition of nonbusiness income and in the designation of the locations to which it is deemed attributable. The potential for attribution of the same income to more than one State is plain. The prevention of duplicative taxation, therefore, would require national uniform rules for the division of income. Although the adoption of a uniform code would undeniably advance the policies that underlie the Commerce Clause, it would require a policy decision based on political and economic considerations that vary from State to State. The Constitution, however, is neutral with respect to the content of any uniform rule. If division-of-income problems were to be constitutionalized, therefore, they would have to be resolved in the manner suggested by appellant for resolution of formula diversity — the prevalent practice would be endorsed as the constitutional rule. This rule would at best be an amalgam of independent state decisions, based on considerations unique to each State. Of most importance, it could not reflect the national interest, because the interests of those States whose policies are subordinated in the quest for uniformity would be excluded from the calculation. While the freedom of the States to formulate independent policy in this area may have to yield to an overriding national interest in uniformity, the content of any uniform rules to which they must subscribe should be determined only after due consideration is given to the interests of all affected States. It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy decisions. Finally, it would be an exercise in formalism to declare appellant’s income tax assessment unconstitutional based on speculative concerns with multiple taxation. For it is evident that appellant would have had no basis for complaint if, instead of an income tax, Iowa had imposed a more burdensome gross-receipts tax on the gross receipts from sales to Iowa customers. In Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Revenue Dept., 419 U. S. 560, the Court sustained a tax on the entire gross receipts from sales made by the taxpayer into Washington State. Because receipts from sales made to States other than Washington were not included in Standard Pressed Steel’s taxable gross receipts, the Court concluded that the tax was “ 'apportioned exactly to the activities taxed.’ ” Id., at 564. In this case appellant’s actual income tax obligation was the rough equivalent of a 1 % tax on the entire gross receipts- from its Iowa sales. Thus, the actual burden on interstate commerce would have been the same had Iowa imposed a plainly valid gross-receipts tax instead of the challenged income tax. Of more significance, the gross-receipts tax sustained in Standard Pressed Steel and General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436, is inherently more burdensome than the Iowa income tax. It applies whether or not the interstate concern is profitable and its imposition may make the difference between profit and loss. In contrast, the income tax is only imposed on enterprises showing a profit and the tax obligation is not heavy unless the profits are high. Accordingly, until Congress prescribes a different rule, Iowa is not constitutionally prohibited from requiring taxpayers to prove that application of the single-factor formula has produced arbitrary results in a particular case. The judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court is affirmed. So ordered. The statute provides: “Interest, dividends, rents, and royalties (less related expenses) received in connection with business in the state, shall be allocated to the state, and where received in connection with business outside the state, shall be allocated outside of the state.” Iowa Code §422.33 (1) (a) (1977). In describing this section, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that “certain income, the geographical source of which is easily identifiable, is allocated to the appropriate state.” 254 N. W. 2d 737, 739. Thus, for example, rental income would be attributed to the State where the property was located. And in appellant’s case, this section operated to exclude its investment income from the tax base. Iowa Code §422.33 (1) (6) (1977). The operation of the two formulas may be briefly described. The single-factor sales formula yields a percentage representing a ratio of gross sales in Iowa to total gross sales. The three-factor formula yields a percentage representing an average of three ratios: property within the State to total property, payroll within the State to total payroll, and sales within the State to total sales. These percentages are multiplied by the adjusted total net income to arrive at Iowa taxable net income. This net income figure is then multiplied by the tax rate to compute the actual tax obligation of the taxpayer. For those years the two formulas resulted in the following percentages: For a description of how these percentages are computed, see n. 3, supra. Thus, in 1968, for example, Moorman’s three-factor computation resulted in a tax of $81,466, whereas the Director’s single-factor computation resulted in a tax of $121,363. See, e. g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271; Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331. See also Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, supra; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U. S. 682. The Court, it is true, expressed doubts about the wisdom of the economic assumptions underlying the challenged formula and noted that its use in the context of the more prevalent three-factor formula would not advance the policies underlying the Commerce Clause. But these considerations were deemed relevant to the question of legislative intent, not constitutional interpretation. In his concurring opinion, Justice McCormick of the Iowa Supreme Court made this point: “In the present case, Moorman did not attempt to prove the amount of its actual net income from Iowa, activities in the years involved. Therefore no basis was presented for comparison of the corporation’s Iowa income and the income apportioned to Iowa under the formula. In this era of sophisticated accounting techniques, it should not be impossible for a unitary corporation to prove its actual income from activities in a particular state. However, Moorman showed only that its tax liability would be substantially less if Iowa employed a three-factor apportionment formula. We have no basis to assume that the three-factor formula produced a result equivalent to the corporation’s actual income from Iowa activities. Having failed to establish a basis for comparison of its actual income in Iowa with the income apportioned to Iowa under the single-factor formula, Moorman did not demonstrate that the single-factor formula produced a grossly unfair result. Thus it did not prove unconstitutionality of the formula as applied.” 254 N. W. 2d, at 757. Since Illinois did not adopt its income tax until 1970, there was no possibility of any overlap until that year. The alleged overlap in the three years following Illinois’ enactment of an income tax was 34.38% in 1970, 34.51% in 1971, and 37.01% in 1972. Since there is no evidence in the record regarding the percentages of its total net income taxed in the other States in which it did business during those years, any claim that appellant was taxed on more than 100% of its total net income would also be speculative. Appellant also contends that the Iowa formula discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, because an Illinois corporation doing business in Iowa must pay tax on a greater portion of its income than a local Iowa company, and an Iowa company doing business in Illinois will pay tax on less of its income than an Illinois corporation doing business in Iowa. The simple answer, however, is that whatever disparity may have existed is not attributable to the Iowa statute. It treats both local and foreign concerns with an even hand; the alleged disparity can only be the consequence of the combined effect of the Iowa and Illinois statutes, and Iowa is not responsible for the latter. Thus, appellant’s “discrimination” claim is simply a way of describing the potential consequences of the use of different formulas by the two States. These consequences, however, could be avoided by the adoption of any uniform rule; the “discrimination” does not inhere in either State’s formula. Thus, while some States such as Iowa assign sales by destination, “sales can be assigned to the state ... of origin, the state in which, the sales office is located, the state where an employee of the business making the sale carries on his activities or where the order is first accepted, or the state in which an interstate shipment is made.” Note, State Taxation of Interstate Businesses and the Multistate Tax Compact: The Search for a Delicate Uniformity, 11 Colum. J. Law & Soc. Prob. 231, 237 n. 20 (1975) (citation omitted). See, e. g., Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act § 1 (a). Thus, one State in which a corporation does business may consider a particular type of income business income and simply include it in its apportionment formula; a second State may deem that same income nonbusiness income and attribute it to itself as the “commercial domicile” of the company; and a third State, though also considering it nonbusiness income, may attribute it to itself as the “legal domicile” of the company. See Note, supra n. 13, at 239. This process is especially unsettling if a longstanding tax policy of one State, such as Iowa’s, becomes the object of constitutional attack simply because it is different from the recently adopted practice of its neighbor.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. WYMAN-GORDON CO. No. 463. Argued March 3, 1969. Decided April 23, 1969. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, and Norton J. Come. Quentin 0. Young argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Fortas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White join. On the petition of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and pursuant to its powers under § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, 29 U. S. C. § 159, the National Labor Relations Board ordered an election among the production and maintenance employees of the respondent company. At the election, the employees were to select one of two labor unions as their exclusive bargaining representative, or to choose not to be represented by a union at all. In connection with the election, the Board ordered the respondent to furnish a list of the names and addresses of its employees who could vote in the election, so that the unions could use the list for election purposes, The respondent refused to comply with the order, and the election was held without the list. Both unions were defeated in the election. The Board upheld the unions’ objections to the election because the respondent had not furnished the list, and the Board ordered a new election. The respondent again refused to obey a Board order to supply a list of employees, and the Board issued a subpoena ordering the respondent to provide the list or else produce its personnel and payroll records showing the employees’ names and addresses. The Board filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking to have its subpoena enforced or to have a mandatory injunction issued to compel the respondent to comply with its order. The District Court held the Board’s order valid and directed the respondent to comply. 270 F. Supp. 280 (1967). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. 397 F. 2d 394 (1968). The Court of Appeals thought that the order in this case was invalid because it was based on a rule laid down in an earlier decision by the Board, Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N. L. R. B. 1236 (1966), and the Excelsior rule had not been promulgated in accordance with the requirements that the Administrative Procedure Act prescribes for rule making, 5 U. S. C. § 553. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning the validity and effect of the Excelsior rule. 393 U. S, 932 (1968). I. The Excelsior case involved union objections to the certification of the results of elections that the unions had lost at two companies. The companies had denied the unions a list of the names and addresses of employees eligible to vote. In the course of the proceedings, the Board “invited certain interested parties” to file briefs and to participate in oral argument of the issue whether the Board should require the employer to furnish lists of employees. 156 N. L. R. B., at 1238. Various employer groups and trade unions did so, as amici curiae. After these proceedings, the Board issued its decision in Excelsior. It purported to establish the general rule that such a list must be provided, but it declined to apply its new rule to the companies involved in the Excelsior case. Instead, it held that the rule would apply “only in those elections that are directed, or consented to, subsequent to 30 days from the date of [the] Decision.” Id., at 1240, n. 5. Specifically, the Board purported to establish “a requirement that will be applied in all election cases. That is, within 7 days after the Regional Director has approved a consent-election agreement entered into by the parties ... , or after the Regional Director or the Board has directed an election . . . , the employer must file with the Regional Director an election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters. The Regional Director, in turn, shall make this information available to all parties in the case. Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections are filed.” Id., at 1239-1240. Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the Board “to make ... , in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.” 29 U. S. C. § 156. The Administrative Procedure Act contains specific provisions governing agency rule making, which it defines as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect,” 5 U. S. C. § 551 (4). The Act requires, among other things, publication in the Federal Register of notice of proposed rule making and of hearing; opportunity to be heard; a statement in the rule of its basis and purposes; and publication in the Federal Register of the rule as adopted. See 5 U. S. C. § 553. The Board asks us to hold that it has discretion to promulgate new rules in adjudicatory proceedings, without complying with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The rule-making provisions of that Act, which the Board would avoid, were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application. See H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 21-26 (1946); S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 13-16 (1945). They may not be avoided by the process of making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. There is no warrant in law for the Board to replace the statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of its own invention. Apart from the fact that the device fashioned by the Board does not comply with statutory command, it obviously falls short of the substance of the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The “rule” created in Excelsior was not published in the Federal Register, which is the statutory and accepted means of giving notice of a rule as adopted; only selected organizations were given notice of the “hearing,” whereas notice in the Federal Register would have been general in character; under the Administrative Procedure Act, the terms or substance of the rule would have to be stated in the notice of hearing, and all interested parties would have an opportunity to participate in the rule making. The Solicitor General does not deny that the Board ignored the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. But he appears to argue that Excelsior’s command is a valid substantive regulation, binding upon this respondent as such, because the Board promulgated it in the Excelsior proceeding, in which the requirements for valid adjudication had been met. This argument misses the point. There is no question that, in an adjudicatory hearing, the Board could validly decide the issue whether the employer must furnish a list of employees to the union. But that is not what the Board did in Excelsior. The Board did not even apply the rule it made to the parties in the adjudicatory proceeding, the only entities that could properly be subject to the order in that case. Instead, the Board purported to make a rule: i. e., to exercise its quasi-legislative power. Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are applied and announced therein. See H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies 36-52 (1962). They generally provide a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in future cases. Subject to the qualified role of stare decisis in the administrative process, they may serve as precedents. But this is far from saying, as the Solicitor General suggests, that commands, decisions, or policies announced in adjudication are “rules” in the sense that they must, without more, be obeyed by the affected public. In the present case, however, the respondent itself was specifically directed by the Board to submit a list of the names and addresses of its employees for use by the unions in connection with the election. This direction, which was part of the order directing that an election be held, is unquestionably valid. See, e. g., NLRB v. Waterman S. S. Co., 309 U. S. 206, 226 (1940). Even though the direction to furnish the list was followed by citation to “Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB No. 111,” it is an order in the present case that the respondent was required to obey. Absent this direction by the Board, the respondent was under no compulsion to furnish the list because no statute and no validly adopted rule required it to do so. Because the Board in an adjudicatory proceeding directed the respondent itself to furnish the list, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit must be reversed. II. The respondent also argues that it need not obey the Board’s order because the requirement of disclosure of employees’ names and addresses is substantively invalid. This argument lacks merit. The objections that the respondent raises to the requirement of disclosure were clearly and correctly answered by the Board in its Excelsior decision. All of the United States Courts of Appeals that have passed on the question have upheld the substantive validity of the disclosure requirement, and the court below strongly intimated a view that the requirement was substantively a proper one, 397 F. 2d, at 396. We have held in a number of cases that Congress granted the Board a wide discretion to ensure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives. See, e. g., NLRB v. Waterman S. S. Co., supra, at 226; NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U. S. 324, 330 (1946). The disclosure requirement furthers this objective by encouraging an informed employee electorate and by allowing unions the right of access to employees that management already possesses. It is for the Board and not for this Court to weigh against this interest the asserted interest of employees in avoiding the problems that union solicitation may present. III. The respondent contends that even if the disclosure requirement is valid, the Board lacks power to enforce it by subpoena. Section 11 (1) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that the Board shall have access to “any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question,” and empowers the Board to issue subpoenas “requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceeding or investigation.” Section 11 (2) gives the district courts jurisdiction, upon application by the Board, to issue an order requiring a person who has refused to obey the Board's subpoena “to appear before the Board . . . there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question . . . .” 29 U. S. C. §§ 161 (1), (2). The respondent takes the position that these statutory provisions do not give the Board authority to subpoena the lists here in question because they are not “evidence” within the meaning of the statutory language. The District Court held, however, that “in the context of § 11 of the Act, 'evidence' means not only proof at a hearing but also books and records and other papers which will be of assistance to the Board in conducting a particular investigation.” The courts of appeals that have passed on the question have construed the term “evidence” in a similar manner. NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Division, 384 F. 2d 188, 191-192 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1967). See NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F. 2d 52, 55-58 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F. 2d 253, 259 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1968); British Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F. 2d 1182, 1184 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F. 2d 1247 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1969). We agree that the list here in issue is within the scope of § 11 so that the Board’s subpoena power may be validly exercised. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to reinstate its judgment. It is so ordered. When we granted certiorari, the Fifth Circuit had expressly approved the procedure the Board followed in adopting the Excelsior rule. Howell Refining Co. v. NLRB, 400 F. 2d 213 (1968). Two other circuits had approved enforcement of the Excelsior rule without explicitly passing on the correctness of the method by which it was adopted. NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Division, 384 F. 2d 188 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F. 2d 52 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967). After our grant of certiorari in the present case; three more courts of appeals explicitly upheld the Excelsior rule and the procedure by which it was adopted, NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F. 2d 253 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1968); British Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F. 2d 1182 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F. 2d 1247 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1969); and the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding in Howell Refining Co., Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F. 2d 1158 (1969). We agree with the opinion of Chief Judge Aldrich below that the Excelsior rule involves matters of substance and that it therefore does not fall within any of the Act’s exceptions. See 5 U. S. C. §553 (b) (A). The Board has never utilized the Act’s rule-making procedures. It has been criticized for contravening the Act in this manner. See, e. g., 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.13 (Supp. 1965); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 Yale L. J. 729 (1961). The Solicitor General argues that this Court has previously approved “rules” articulated by the Board in the adjudication of particular cases without questioning the propriety of that procedure. He cites Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U. S. 324 (1946); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344 (1953); and Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96 (1954). In none of these cases has this Court ruled upon or sanctioned the exercise of quasi-legislative power—i. e., rule making—without compliance with § 6 of the NLRA and the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. In his Decision and Direction of Election, the Regional Director ordered that “[a)n election eligibility list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be filed with the Regional Director within seven (7) days of the date of this Decision and Direction of Election. The Regional Director shall make the list available to all parties to the election. . . .” Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissent argues that because the Board improperly relied upon the Excelsior “rule” in issuing its order, we are obliged to remand. He relies on SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943). To remand would be an idle and useless formality. Chenery does not require that we convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game. In Chenery, the Commission had applied the wrong standards to the adjudication of a complex factual situation, and the Court held that it would not undertake to decide whether the Commission’s result might have been justified on some other basis. Here, by contrast, the substance of the Board’s command is not seriously contestable. There is not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a proceeding before the Board, whether the Board acted through a rule or an order. It would be meaningless to remand. See NLRB v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 409 F. 2d 1207 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1969), and the cases cited in n. 1, supra. 270 F. Supp., at 285. The Court of Appeals did not reach the issue whether the Board could subpoena the lists in question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION v. SCHOR et al. No. 85-621. Argued April 29, 1986 Decided July 7, 1986 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 859. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-621. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Bruce N. Kuhlik, Kenneth M. Raisler, Pat G. Nicolette, Whitney Adams, and Anne H. Wright. Robert L. Byman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 85-642. With him on the briefs were Howard R. Barron and Lawrence G. Weppler. Leslie J. Carson, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was H. Bartow Farr III. Together with No. 85-642, ContiCommodity Services, Inc. v. Schor et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA or Act), 7 U. S. C. §1 et seq., empowers the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings and, if so, whether that grant of authority violates Article III of the Constitution. I The CEA broadly prohibits fraudulent and manipulative conduct in connection with commodity futures transactions. In 1974, Congress “overhauled]” the Act in order to institute a more “comprehensive regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-975, p. 1 (1974). See Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. Congress also determined that the broad regulatory powers of the CEA were most appropriately vested in an agency which would be relatively immune from the “political winds that sweep Washington.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-975, at 44, 70. It therefore created an independent agency, the CFTC, and entrusted to it sweeping authority to implement the CEA. Among the duties assigned to the CFTC was the administration of a reparations procedure through which disgruntled customers of professional commodity brokers could seek redress for the brokers’ violations of the Act or CFTC regulations. Thus, § 14 of the CEA, 7 U. S. C. § 18 (1976 ed.), provides that any person injured by such violations may apply to the Commission for an order directing the .offender to pay reparations to the complainant and may enforce that order in federal district court. Congress intended this administrative procedure to be an “inexpensive and expeditious” alternative to existing fora available to aggrieved customers, namely, the courts and arbitration. S. Rep. No. 95-850, p. 11 (1978). See also 41 Fed. Reg. 3994 (1976) (accompanying CFTC regulations promulgated pursuant to §14). In conformance with the congressional goal of promoting efficient dispute resolution, the CFTC promulgated a regulation in 1976 which allows it to adjudicate counterclaims “arising] out of the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.” Id., at 3995, 4002 (codified at 17 CFR § 12.23(b)(2) (1983)). This permissive counterclaim rule leaves the respondent in a reparations proceeding free to seek relief against the reparations complainant in other fora. The instant dispute arose in February 1980, when respondents Schor and Mortgage Services of America, Inc., invoked the CFTC’s reparations jurisdiction by filing complaints against petitioner ContiCommodity Services, Inc. (Conti), a commodity futures broker, and Richard L. Sandor, a Conti employee. Schor had an account with Conti which contained a debit balance because Schor’s net futures trading losses and expenses, such as commissions, exceeded the funds deposited in the account. Schor alleged that this debit balance was the result of Conti’s numerous violations of the CEA. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-621, p. 53a. Before receiving notice that Schor had commenced the reparations proceeding, Conti had filed a diversity action in Federal District Court to recover the debit balance. ContiCommodity Services, Inc. v. Mortgage Services of America, Inc., No. 80-C-1089 (ND Ill., filed Mar. 4, 1980). Schor counterclaimed in this action, reiterating his charges that the debit balance was due to Conti’s violations of the CEA. Schor also moved on two separate occasions to dismiss or stay the District Court action, arguing that the continuation of the federal action would be a waste of judicial resources and an undue burden on the litigants in view of the fact that “[t]he reparations proceedings . . . will fully . . . resolve and adjudicate all the rights of the parties to this action with respect to the transactions which are the subject matter of this action.” App. 13. See also id., at 19. Although the District Court declined to stay or dismiss the suit, see id., at 15,16, Conti voluntarily dismissed the federal court action and presented its debit balance claim by way of a counterclaim in the CFTC reparations proceeding. See id., at 29-32. Conti denied violating the CEA and instead insisted that the debit balance resulted from Schor’s trading, and was therefore a simple debt owed by Schor. Schor v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 159, 162, 740 F. 2d 1262, 1265 (1984); App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 85-621, p. 53a. After discovery, briefing, and a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Schor’s reparations proceeding ruled in Conti’s favor on both Schor’s claims and Conti’s counterclaims. After this ruling, Schor for the first time challenged the CFTC’s statutory authority to adjudicate Conti’s counterclaim. See id., at 62a. The ALJ rejected Schor’s challenge, stating himself “bound by agency regulations and published agency policies.” Id., at 62a-63a. The Commission declined to review the decision and allowed it to become final, id., at 50a-52a, at which point Schor filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Prior to oral argument, the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, raised the question whether CFTC could constitutionally adjudicate Conti’s counterclaims in light of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982), in which this Court held that “Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 584 (1985). After briefing and argument, the Court of Appeals upheld the CFTC’s decision on Schor’s claim in most respects, but ordered the dismissal of Conti’s counterclaims on the ground that “the CFTC lacks authority (subject matter competence) to adjudicate” common law counterclaims. 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 161, 740 F. 2d, at 1264. In support of this latter ruling, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the CFTC’s exercise of jurisdiction over Conti’s common law counterclaim gave rise to “[sjerious constitutional problems” under Northern Pipeline. 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 174, 740 F. 2d, at 1277. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that, under well-established principles of statutory construction, the relevant inquiry was whether the CEA was “ ‘fairly susceptible’ of [an alternative] construction,” such that Article III objections, and thus unnecessary constitutional adjudication, could be avoided. Ibid. (quoting Ralpho v. Bell, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 368, 380, 569 F. 2d 607, 619 (1977)). After examining the CEA and its legislative history, the court concluded that Congress had no “clearly expressed” or “explicit” intention to give the CFTC constitutionally questionable jurisdiction over state common law counterclaims. See 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 166, 178, 740 F. 2d, at 1269, 1281. The Court of Appeals therefore “adopt[ed] the construction of the Act that avoids significant constitutional questions,” reading the CEA to authorize the CFTC to adjudicate only those counterclaims alleging violations of the Act or CFTC regulations. Id., at 175, 740 F. 2d, at 1278. Because Conti’s counterclaims did not allege such violations, the Court of Appeals held that the CFTC exceeded its authority in adjudicating those claims, and ordered that the AL J’s decision on the claims be reversed and the claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id., at 161, 740 F. 2d, at 1264. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc by a divided vote. In a dissenting statement, Judge Wald, joined by Judge Starr, urged that rehearing be granted because the panel’s holding would “resul[t] in a serious evisceration of a congressionally crafted scheme for compensating victims of Commodity Futures Trading Act . . . violations” and would in practical effect “decimat[e]” the efficacy of this “faster and less expensive alternative forum.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-621, p. 71a. This Court granted the CFTC’s petition for certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Thomas, supra, at 582-593. 473 U. S. 568 (1985). We had there ruled that the arbitration scheme established under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U. S. C. § 136 et seq., does not contravene Article III and, more generally, held that “Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.” 473 U. S., at 593. On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its prior judgment. It reaffirmed its earlier view that Northern Pipeline drew into serious question the Commission’s authority to decide debit-balance counterclaims in reparations proceedings; concluded that nothing in Thomas altered that view; and again held that, in light of the constitutional problems posed by the CFTC’s adjudication of common law counterclaims, the CEA should be construed to authorize the CFTC to adjudicate only counterclaims arising from violations of the Act or CFTC regulations. See 248 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 157-158, 770 F. 2d 211, 213-214 (1985). We again granted certiorari, 474 U. S. 1018 (1985), and now reverse. II The Court of Appeals was correct in its understanding that “[f]ederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality.” Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749 (1961). See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500-501 (1979). Where such “serious doubts” arise, a court should determine whether a construction of the statute is “fairly possible” by which the constitutional question can be avoided. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). See also Machinists v. Street, supra, at 750. It is equally true, however, that this canon of construction does not give a court the prerogative to ignore the legislative will in order to avoid constitutional adjudication; “‘[although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute . . .’or judicially rewriting it.” Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 211 (1961)). See also Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 742-743 (1984). Assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly discerned a “serious” constitutional problem in the CFTC’s adjudication of Conti’s counterclaim, we nevertheless believe that the court was mistaken in finding that the CEA could fairly be read to preclude the CFTC’s exercise of jurisdiction over that counterclaim. Our examination of the CEA and its legislative history and purpose reveals that Congress plainly intended the CFTC to decide counterclaims asserted by respondents in reparations proceedings, and just as plainly delegated to the CFTC the authority to fashion its counterclaim jurisdiction in the manner the CFTC determined necessary to further the purposes of the reparations program. Congress’ assumption that the CFTC would have the authority to adjudicate counterclaims is evident on the face of the statute. See, e. g., 7 U. S. C. § 18(c) (providing that before action will be taken on complaints filed by nonresident complainants, a bond must be filed which must cover, inter alia, “any reparation award that may be issued by the Commission against the complainant on any counterclaim by respondent”) (emphasis added); § 18(d) {“any person for whose benefit [a reparation award] was made” may enforce the judgment in district court) (emphasis added). See also § 18(e) (judicial review available to “any party”). Accordingly, the court below did not seriously contest that Congress intended to authorize the CFTC to adjudicate some counterclaims in reparations proceedings. Rather, the court read into the facially unqualified reference to counterclaim jurisdiction a distinction between counterclaims arising under the Act or CFTC regulations and all other counterclaims. See 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 173, 740 F. 2d, at 1278. While the court’s reading permitted it to avoid a potential Article III problem, it did so only by doing violence to the CEA, for its distinction cannot fairly be drawn from the language or history of the CEA, nor reconciled with the congressional purposes motivating the creation of the reparations proceedings. We can find no basis in the language of the statute or its legislative history for the distinction posited by the Court of Appeals. Congress empowered the CFTC “to make and promulgate such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the Commission, are reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes of [the CEA].” 7 U. S. C. § 12a(5) (emphasis added). The language of the congressional Report that specifically commented on the scope of the CFTC’s authority over counterclaims unambiguously demonstrates that, consistent with the sweeping authority Congress delegated to the CFTC generally, Congress intended to vest in the CFTC the power to define the scope of the counterclaims cognizable in reparations proceedings: “Counterclaims will be recognized in the [reparations] proceedings ... on such terms and under such circumstances as the Commission may prescribe by regulation. It is the intent of the Committee that the Commission will promulgate appropriate regulations to implement this section.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-975, p. 23 (1974). Moreover, quite apart from congressional statements of intent, the broad grant of power in § 12a(5) clearly authorizes the promulgation of regulations providing for adjudication of common law counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as a reparations complaint because such jurisdiction is necessary, if not critical, to accomplish the purposes behind the reparations program. Reference to the instant controversy illustrates the crippling effect that the Court of Appeals’ restrictive reading of the CFTC’s counterclaim jurisdiction would have on the efficacy of the reparations remedy. The dispute between Schor and Conti is typical of the disputes adjudicated in reparations proceedings: a customer and a professional commodities broker agree that there is a debit balance in the customer’s account, but the customer attributes the deficit to the broker’s alleged CEA violations and the broker attributes it to the customer’s lack of success in the market. The customer brings a reparations claim; the broker counterclaims for the amount of the debit balance. In the usual case, then, the counterclaim “arises out of precisely the same course of events” as the principal claim and requires resolution of many of the same disputed factual issues. Friedman v. Dean Witter & Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. Fut. L. Rep. ¶ 21,307, p. 25,538 (1981). Under the Court of Appeals’ approach, the entire dispute may not be resolved in the administrative forum. Consequently, the entire dispute will typically end up in court, for when the broker files suit to recover the debit balance, the customer will normally be compelled either by compulsory counterclaim rules or by the expense and inconvenience of litigating the same issues in two fora to forgo his reparations remedy and to litigate his claim in court. See, e. g., App. 13 (Schor’s motion to dismiss Conti’s federal court action) (“[C]ontinuation of this action, in light of the prior filed reparations proceedings, would be unjust to [Schor] in that it would require [him], at a great cost and expense, to litigate the same issues in two forums. If this action proceeds, defendants will be required pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)] to file a counterclaim in this action setting forth all the claims that they have already filed before the CFTC”). In sum, as Schor himself aptly summarized, to require a bifurcated examination of the single dispute “would be to emasculate if not destroy the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act to provide an efficient and relatively inexpensive forum for the resolution of disputes in futures trading.” Ibid. See also App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 85-621, p. 71a (Wald, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (“To bifurcate, as the panel’s decision now requires, the main reparations proceeding from counterclaims between the same parties . . . will realistically mean that the courts, not the agency, will end up dealing with all of these claims. The faster and less expensive alternative forum will be decimated”). As our discussion makes manifest, the CFTC’s long-held position that it has the power to take jurisdiction over counterclaims such as Conti’s is eminently reasonable and well within the scope of its delegated authority. Accordingly, as the CFTC’s contemporaneous interpretation of the statute it is entrusted to administer, considerable weight must be accorded the CFTC’s position. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844-845 (1984); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969). The Court of Appeals declined to defer to the CFTC’s interpretation because, in its view, the Commission had not maintained a consistent position on the scope of its authority to adjudicate counterclaims and the question was not one on which a specialized administrative agency, in contrast to a court of general jurisdiction, had superior expertise. 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 176, 740 F. 2d, at 1279. We find both these reasons insubstantial. First, the CFTC issued the counterclaim rule currently in force at the time that the reparations program first took effect and has never altered that rule. The only “inconsistency” identified by the Court of Appeals was a proposed rule, published by the Commission for notice and comment, that would have allowed a narrower class of counterclaims. 40 Fed. Reg. 55666-55667, 55672-55673 (1975). It goes without saying that a proposed regulation does not represent an agency’s considered interpretation of its statute and that an agency is entitled to consider alternative interpretations before settling on the view it considers most sound. Indeed, it would be antithetical to the purposes of the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 553, to tax an agency with “inconsistency” whenever it circulates a proposal that it has not firmly decided to put into effect and that it subsequently reconsiders in response to public comment. Second, the Court of Appeals was incorrect to state on the facts of this case that the CFTC’s expertise was not deserving of deference because of the “statutory interpretation-jurisdictional” nature of the question at issue. 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 176, 740 F. 2d, at 1279. An agency’s expertise is superior to that of a court when a dispute centers on whether a particular regulation is “reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes” of the Act the agency is charged with enforcing; the agency’s position, in such circumstances, is therefore due substantial deference. Such deference is especially warranted here, for Congress has twice amended the CEA since the CFTC declared by regulation that it would exercise jurisdiction over counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as the principal reparations dispute but has not overruled the CFTC’s assertion of jurisdiction. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 380-381. It is well established that when Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the “congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 274-275 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See also FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426 (1986). Moreover, we need not, as the Court of Appeals argued, rely simply on congressional “silence” to find approval of the CFTC’s position in the subsequent amendments to the CEA, see 239 U. S. App. D. C., at 177, 740 F. 2d, at 1280. Congress explicitly affirmed the CFTC’s authority to dictate the scope of its counterclaim jurisdiction in the 1983 amendments to the Act: “The Commission may promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders as it deems necessary or appropriate for the efficient and expeditious administration of this section. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such rules, regulations, and orders may prescribe, or otherwise condition, without limitation, . . . the nature and scope of. . . counterclaims,. . . and all other matters governing proceedings before the Commission under this section.” 7 U. S. C. § 18(b). See also H. R. Rep. No. 97-565, pt. 1, p. 55 (1982) (“[T]he reparations program seeks to pass upon the whole controversy surrounding each claim, including counter-claims arising out of the same set of facts”). Where, as here, “Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation,” we cannot but deem that construction virtually conclusive. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 380-381. See also Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 785, and n. 12 (1983). In view of the abundant evidence that Congress both contemplated and authorized the CFTC’s assertion of jurisdiction over Conti’s common law counterclaim, we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ analysis is untenable. The canon of construction that requires courts to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication did not empower the Court of Appeals to manufacture a restriction on the CFTC’s jurisdiction that was nowhere contemplated by Congress and to reject plain evidence of congressional intent because that intent was not specifically embodied in a statutory mandate. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S., at 742-743. We therefore are squarely faced with the question whether the CFTC’s assumption of jurisdiction over common law counterclaims violates Article III of the Constitution. 1 — 1 1 — 1 H Article III, §1, directs that the “judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and provides that these federal courts shall be staffed by judges who hold office during good behavior, and whose compensation shall not be diminished during tenure in office. Schor claims that these provisions prohibit Congress from authorizing the initial adjudication of common law counterclaims by the CFTC, an administrative agency whose adjudicatory officers do not enjoy the tenure and salary protections embodied in Article III. Although our precedents in this area do not admit of easy synthesis, they do establish that the resolution of claims such as Schor’s cannot turn on conclusory reference to the language of Article III. See, e. g., Thomas, 473 U. S., at 583. Rather, the constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the requirements of Article III. See, e. g., id., at 590; Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 64. This inquiry, in turn, is guided by the principle that “practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III.” Thomas, supra, at 587. See also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 53. A Article III, § 1, serves both to protect “the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government,” Thomas, supra, at 583, and to safeguard litigants’ “right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.” United States v. Will, 449 U. S. 200, 218 (1980). See also Thomas, supra, at 582-583; Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 58. Although our cases have provided us with little occasion to discuss the nature or significance of this latter safeguard, our prior discussions of Article III, § 1’s guarantee of an independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the United States intimated that this guarantee serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests. See, e. g., id., at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (noting lack of consent to non-Article III jurisdiction); id., at 95 (White, J., dissenting) (same). See also Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 460, n. 108 (1983) (Article III, §1, “was designed as a protection for the parties from the risk of legislative or executive pressure on judicial decision”). Cf. Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Our precedents also demonstrate, however, that Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court. See, e. g., Thomas, supra, at 583; Crowell v. Benson, supra. Moreover, as a personal right, Article Ill’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried. See, e. g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1969) (waiver of criminal trial by guilty plea); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 158 (1968) (waiver of right to trial by jury in criminal case); Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 38(d) (waiver of right to trial by jury in civil cases). Indeed, the relevance of concepts of waiver to Article III challenges is demonstrated by our decision in Northern Pipeline, in which the absence of consent to an initial adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal was relied on as a significant factor in determining that Article III forbade such adjudication. See, e. g., 458 U. S., at 80, n. 31; id., at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 95 (White, J., dissenting). See also Thomas, supra, at 584, 591. Cf. Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512 (1889); Heckers v. Fowler, 2 Wall. 123 (1865). In the instant cases, Schor indisputably waived any right he may have possessed to the full trial of Conti’s counterclaim before an Article III court. Schor expressly demanded that Conti proceed on its counterclaim in the reparations proceeding rather than before the District Court, see App. 13, 19, and was content to have the entire dispute settled in the forum he had selected until the AL J ruled against him on all counts; it was only after the ALJ rendered a decision to which he objected that Schor raised any challenge to the CFTC’s consideration of Conti’s counterclaim. Even were there no evidence of an express waiver here, Schor’s election to forgo his right to proceed in state or federal court on his claim and his decision to seek relief instead in a CFTC reparations proceeding constituted an effective waiver. Three years before Schor instituted his reparations action, a private right of action under the CEA was explicitly recognized in the Circuit in which Schor and Conti filed suit in District Court. See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F. 2d 96, 103, n. 8 (CA7 1977). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 (1982) (affirming the existence of a private cause of action under the CEA). Moreover, at the time Schor decided to seek relief before the CFTC rather than in the federal courts, the CFTC’s regulations made clear that it was empowered to adjudicate all counterclaims “aris[ing] out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences set forth in the complaint.” 41 Fed. Reg. 3995 (1976) (codified in 17 CFR § 12.23(b)(2) (1983)). Thus, Schor had the option of having the common law counterclaim against him adjudicated in a federal Article III court, but, with full knowledge that the CFTC would exercise jurisdiction over that claim, chose to avail himself of the quicker and less expensive procedure Congress had provided him. In such circumstances, it is clear that Schor effectively agreed to an adjudication by the CFTC of the entire controversy by seeking relief in this alternative forum. Cf. McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426, 440 (1880). B As noted above, our precedents establish that Article III, § 1, not only preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United States, but also serves as “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances.” Northern Pipeline, supra, at 58. See also United States v. Will, supra, at 217. Article III, § 1, safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional attempts “to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating” constitutional courts, National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U. S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, C. J., dissenting), and thereby preventing “the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam). See Thomas, 473 U. S., at 582-583; Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 57-58, 73-74, 83, 86; id., at 98, 115-116 (White, J., dissenting). To the extent that this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article III, §2. See, e. g., United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226, 229 (1938). When these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect. In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules. Thomas, 473 U. S., at 587. Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers. Thus, in reviewing Article III challenges, we have weighed a number of factors, none of which has been deemed determinative, with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary. Id., at 590. Among the factors upon which we have focused are the extent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power” are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III. See, e. g., id., at 587, 589-593; Northern Pipeline, supra, at 84-86. An examination of the relative allocation of powers between the CFTC and Article III courts in light of the considerations given prominence in our precedents demonstrates that the congressional scheme does not impermissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary. The CFTC’s adjudicatory powers depart from the traditional agency model in just one respect: the CFTC’s jurisdiction over common law counterclaims. While wholesale importation of concepts of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction into the agency context may create greater constitutional difficulties, we decline to endorse an absolute prohibition on such jurisdiction out of fear of where some hypothetical “slippery slope” may deposit us. Indeed, the CFTC’s exercise of this type of jurisdiction is not without precedent. Thus, in RFC v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U. S. 163, 168-171 (1943), we saw no constitutional difficulty in the initial adjudication of a state law claim by a federal agency, subject to judicial review, when that claim was ancillary to a federal law dispute. Similarly, in Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323 (1966), this Court upheld a bankruptcy referee’s power to hear and decide state law counterclaims against a creditor who filed a claim in bankruptcy when those counterclaims arose out of the same transaction. We reasoned that, as a practical matter, requiring the trustee to commence a plenary action to recover on its counterclaim would be a “meaningless gesture.” Id., at 334. In the instant cases, we are likewise persuaded that there is little practical reason to find that this single deviation from the agency model is fatal to the congressional scheme. Aside from its authorization of counterclaim jurisdiction, the CEA leaves far more of the “essential attributes of judicial power” to Article III courts than did that portion of the Bankruptcy Act found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline. The CEA scheme in fact hews closely to the agency model approved by the Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). The CFTC, like the agency in Crowell, deals only with a “particularized area of law,” Northern Pipeline, supra, at 85, whereas the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline extended to broadly “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to eases under title 11.” 28 U. S. C. § 1471(b) (quoted in Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 85) (emphasis added). CFTC orders, like those of the agency in Crowell, but unlike those of the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act, are enforceable only by order of the district court. See 7 U. S. C. § 18(f); Northern Pipeline, supra, at 85-86. CFTC orders are also reviewed under the same “weight of the evidence” standard sustained in Crowell, rather than the more deferential standard found lacking in Northern Pipeline. See 7 U. S. C. § 9; Northern Pipeline, supra, at 85. The legal rulings of the CFTC, like the legal determinations of the agency in Crowell, are subject to de novo review. Finally, the CFTC, unlike the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act, does not exercise “all ordinary powers of district courts,” and thus may not, for instance, preside over jury trials or issue writs of habeas corpus. 458 U. S., at 85. Of course, the nature of the claim has significance in our Article III analysis quite apart from the method prescribed for its adjudication. The counterclaim asserted in this litigation is a “private” right for which state law provides the rule of decision. It is therefore a claim of the kind assumed to be at the “core” of matters normally reserved to Article III courts. See, e. g., Thomas, supra, at 587; Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 70-71, and n. 25; id., at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Yet this conclusion does not end our inquiry; just as this Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative for Article III purposes the distinction between public rights and private rights, Thomas, supra, at 585-586, there is no reason inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the state law character of a claim talismanic power in Article III inquiries. See, e. g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 68, n. 20; id., at 98 (White, J., dissenting). We have explained that “the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that ‘could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers” is less than when private rights, which are normally within the purview of the judiciary, are relegated as an initial matter to administrative adjudication. Thomas, 473 U. S., at 589 (quoting Northern Pipeline, supra, at 68). Similarly, the state law character of a claim is significant for purposes of determining the effect that an initial adjudication of those claims by a non-Article III tribunal will have on the separation of powers for the simple reason that private, common law rights were historically the types of matters subject to resolution by Article III courts. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 68, n. 20, 84; id., at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). The risk that Congress may improperly have encroached on the federal judiciary is obviously magnified when Congress “withdraw[s] from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty” and which therefore has traditionally been tried in Article III courts, and allocates the decision of those matters to a non-Article III forum of its own creation. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856). Accordingly, where private, common law rights are at stake, our examination of the congressional attempt to control the manner in which those rights are adjudicated has been searching. See, e. g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U. S., at 84; id., at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). In this litigation, however, “[ljooking beyond form to the substance of what” Congress has done, we are persuaded that the congressional authorization of limited CFTC jurisdiction over a narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the CFTC’s primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function does not create a substantial threat to the separation of powers. Thomas, supra, at 589. It is clear that Congress has not attempted to “withdraw from judicial cognizance” the determination of Conti’s right to the sum represented by the debit balance in Schor’s account. Congress gave the CFTC the authority to adjudicate such matters, but the decision to invoke this forum is left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal judiciary to take jurisdiction of these matters is unaffected. In such circumstances, separation of powers concerns are diminished, for it seems self-evident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of court or resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the separation of powers, Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism through which willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve their differences. This is not to say, of course, that if Congress created a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals equipped to handle the entire business of the Article III courts without any Article III supervision or control and without evidence of valid and specific legislative necessities, the fact that the parties had the election to proceed in their forum of choice would necessarily save the scheme from constitutional attack. See, e. g., Northern Pipeline, supra, at 73-74. But this case obviously bears no resemblance to such a scenario, given the degree of judicial control saved to the federal courts, see supra, at 852-853, as well as the congressional purpose behind the jurisdictional delegation, the demonstrated need for the delegation, and the limited nature of the delegation. When Congress authorized the CFTC to adjudicate counterclaims, its primary focus was on making effective a specific and limited federal regulatory scheme, not on allocating jurisdiction among federal tribunals. Congress intended to create an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum through which customers could enforce the provisions of the CEA against professional brokers. Its decision to endow the CFTC with jurisdiction over such reparations claims is readily understandable given the perception that the CFTC was relatively immune from political pressures, see H. R. Rep. No. 93-975, pp. 44, 70 (1974), and the obvious expertise that the Commission possesses in applying the CEA and its own regulations. This reparations scheme itself is of unquestioned constitutional validity. See, e. g., Thomas, supra, at 589; Northern Pipeline, supra, at 80-81; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). It was only to ensure the effectiveness of this scheme that Congress authorized the CFTC to assert jurisdiction over common law counterclaims. Indeed, as was explained above, absent the CFTC’s exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations procedure would have been confounded. It also bears emphasis that the CFTC’s assertion of counterclaim jurisdiction is' limited to that which is necessary to make the reparations procedure workable. See 7 U. S. C. § 12a(5). The CFTC adjudication of common law counterclaims is incidental to, and completely dependent upon, adjudication of reparations claims created by federal law, and in actual fact is limited to claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the reparations claim. In such circumstances, the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed de minimis. Conversely, were we to hold that the Legislative Branch may not permit such limited cognizance of common law counterclaims at the election of the parties, it is clear that we would “defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task.” Crowell v. Benson, supra, at 46. See also Thomas, supra, at 583-584. We do not think Article III compels this degree of prophylaxis. Nor does our decision in Bowsher v. Synar, ante, p. 714, require a contrary result. Unlike Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch. Instead, the separation of powers question presented in this litigation is whether Congress impermissibly undermined, without appreciable expansion of its own power, the role of the Judicial Branch. In any case, we have, consistent with Bowsher, looked to a number of factors in evaluating the extent to which the congressional scheme endangers separation of powers principles under the circumstances presented, but have found no genuine threat to those principles to be present in this litigation. In so doing, we have also been faithful to our Article III precedents, which counsel that bright-line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad principles applicable in all Article III inquiries. See, e. g., Thomas, 473 U. S. 568 (1985). Rather, due regard must be given in each case to the unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III. We conclude that the limited jurisdiction that the CFTC asserts over state law claims as a necessary incident to the adjudication of federal claims willingly submitted by the parties for initial agency adjudication does not contravene separation of powers principles or Article III. C Schor asserts that Article III, § 1, constrains Congress for reasons of federalism, as well as for reasons of separation of powers. He argues that the state law character of Conti’s counterclaim transforms the central question in this litigation from whether Congress has trespassed upon the judicial powers of the Federal Government into whether Congress has invaded the prerogatives of state governments. At the outset, we note that our prior precedents in this area have dealt only with separation of powers concerns, and have not intimated that principles of federalism impose limits on Congress’ ability to delegate adjudicative functions to non-Article III tribunals. This absence of discussion regarding federalism is particularly telling in Northern Pipeline, where the Court based its analysis solely on the separation of powers principles inherent in Article III despite the fact that the claim sought to be adjudicated in the bankruptcy court was created by state law. See, e. g., 458 U. S., at 57-60, and n. 11. Even assuming that principles of federalism are relevant to Article III analysis, however, we are unpersuaded that those principles require the invalidation of the CFTC’s counterclaim jurisdiction. The sole fact that Conti’s counterclaim is resolved by a federal rather than a state tribunal could not be said to unduly impair state interests, for it is established that a federal court could, without constitutional hazard, decide a counterclaim such as the one asserted here under its ancillary jurisdiction, even if an independent jurisdictional basis for it were lacking. See, e. g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, 417 U. S. 467, 469, n. 1 (1974); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 609 (1926). Given that the federal courts can and do exercise ancillary jurisdiction over counterclaims such as the one at issue here, the question becomes whether the fact that a federal agency rather than a federal Article III court initially hears the state law claim gives rise to a cognizably greater impairment of principles of federalism. Schor argues that those Framers opposed to diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts acquiesced in its inclusion in Article III only because they were assured that the federal judiciary would be protected by the tenure and salary provisions of Article III. He concludes, in essence, that to protect this constitutional compact, Article III should be read to absolutely preclude any adjudication of state law claims by federal decisionmakers that do not enjoy the Article III salary and tenure protections. We are unpersuaded by Schor’s novel theory, which suffers from a number of flaws, the most important of which is that Schor identifies no historical support for the critical link he posits between the provisions of Article III that protect the independence of the federal judiciary and those provisions that define the extent of the judiciary’s jurisdiction over state law claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Respondents’ suit was governed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. Congress again significantly revised the Act in early 1983. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294. The changes effected by the 1983 amendments that are relevant to CFTC proceedings became effective only as of May 1983, and therefore do not control in this proceeding. See § 239, 96 Stat. 2327. Two complaints, relating to separate trading accounts, were filed on behalf of Schor and the mortgage banking company, Mortgage Services of America, Inc., of which Schor was president and 90% shareholder. The complaints contained virtually identical allegations and were consolidated at the administrative level. The Court of Appeals also consolidated the two separate petitions for review of the CFTC’s final reparation order filed by Schor and Mortgage Services of America, Inc. Because the legal issues involved in the two actions are for all relevant purposes identical, we refer to Schor and Mortgage Services of America, Inc., jointly as “Schor,” and to ContiCommodity Services, Inc., and Sandor jointly as “Conti.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION OF STEAM, HOT WATER, HYDRAULIC SPRINKLER, PNEUMATIC TUBE, ICE MACHINE & GENERAL PIPEFITTERS OF NEW YORK AND VICINITY, LOCAL UNION NO. 638 No. 75-777. Argued October 6, 1976 Decided February 22, 1977 Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, John S. Irving, and Jay E. Shanklin. Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Patrick C. O’Donoghue, Donald J. Capuano, and George Kaufmann. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, and Douglas S. McDowell for the Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute et al.; by Richard C. Hotvedt for the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., et al.; and by Vincent J. Apruzzese and Francis A. Mastro for the Public Service Electric & Gas Co. et al. Gerard C. Smetana, William H. DuRoss III, and Lawrence B. Kraus filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Under § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. 1158(b)(4)(B), a union commits an unfair labor practice when it induces employees to refuse to handle particular goods or products or coerces any person engaged in commerce, where “an object” of the inducement or coercion is to require any person to cease doing business with any other person. A proviso, added to § 8 (b) (4) (B) in 1959, declares that the section “shall [not] be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” Although without the proviso the section on its face would seem to cover any coercion aimed at forcing a cessation of business, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) and the judiciary have construed the statute more narrowly, both before and after the proviso was added, to prohibit only secondary, rather than primary, strikes and picketing. Among other things, it is not necessarily a violation of §8 (b)(4)(B) for a union to picket an employer for the purpose of preserving work traditionally performed by union members even though in order to comply with the union’s demand the employer would have to cease doing business with another employer. National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612 (1967) (National Woodwork). The question now before us is whether a union seeking the kind of work traditionally performed by its members at a construction site violates §8 (b)(4)(B) when it induces its members to engage in a work stoppage against an employer who does not have control over the assignment of the work ■sought by the union. More specifically, the issue is whether a union-instigated refusal of a subcontractor’s employees to handle or install factory-piped climate-control units, which were included in the general contractor’s job specifications and delivered to the construction site, was primary activity beyond the reach of § 8 (b) (4) (B) or whether it was secondary activity prohibited by the statute. As we shall see, this issue turns on whether the boycott was “addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees,” National Woodwork, supra, at 645, and is therefore primary conduct, or whether the boycott was “tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,” 386 U. S., at 644, in which event the boycott would be prohibited secondary activity. I Austin Co., Inc. (Austin), was the general contractor and engineer on a construction project known as the Norwegian Home for the Aged. As the result of competitive bidding, Austin awarded a subcontract to Hudik-Ross Co., Inc. (Hudik), to perform the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning work for the Norwegian Home construction. Hudik employs a regular complement of about 10 to 20 steamfitters. For many years, these employees have been represented by respondent Enterprise Association (Enterprise), a plumbing and pipefitting union. Over the years Hudik and Enterprise have entered into successive collective-bargaining agreements, and such an agreement was in force at the time that the dispute involved in the present litigation arose. Austin had no agreement with Enterprise regarding the work to be done on the Norwegian Home project. The subcontract between Austin and Hudik incorporated Austin’s job specifications. These specifications provided that Austin would purchase certain climate-control units manufactured by Slant/Fin Corp. (Slant/Fin) to be installed in the Norwegian Home. The specifications further provided that the internal piping in the climate-control units was to be cut, threaded, and installed at the Slant/Fin factory. At the time that Hudik entered into the subcontract with Austin, Hudik was aware that its employees would be called upon to install the Slant/Fin units but not to do the internal piping work for the units on the jobsite. Traditionally, members of respondent union have performed the internal piping on heating and air-conditioning units on the jobsite. Also, Rule IX of the then-current collective-bargaining contract between Hudik and Enterprise provided that pipe threading and cutting were to be performed on the jobsite in accordance with Rule V, which in turn specified that the work would be performed by units of two employees. There had been similar or identical provisions in previous collective-bargaining contracts. There is no dispute that the work designated by Austin’s specifications to be performed at the Slant/Fin factory was the kind of cutting and threading work referred to in Rule IX. When the Slant/Fin units arrived on the job, the union steamfitters refused to install them. The business agent of the union told Austin’s superintendent that the steamfitters “would not install the Slant/Fin units because the piping inside the units was steamfitters’ work.” Enterprise Assn. of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N. L. R. B. 760, 762 (1973). Hudik was informed that the factory-installed internal piping in the units was in violation of Rule IX of the union contract and “that such piping was Local 638’s work.” Ibid. When the union persisted in its refusal to install the units, thereby interfering with the completion of the Norwegian Home job, Austin filed a complaint with the Board, alleging that Enterprise had committed an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act by engaging in a strike and encouraging Hudik employees to refuse to install the Slant/Fin units in furtherance of an impermissible object. Specifically, Austin charged that the union’s action was taken to force Hudik to cease doing business with Austin and to force Hudik and Austin to cease dealing with the products of Slant/Fin. The union’s position before the Administrative Law Judge was that it was merely seeking to enforce its contract with Hudik and to preserve the jobsite cutting and threading work covered by Rule IX. The Administrative Law Judge found that because Austin had specified factory-piped units, there was no internal threading and cutting work to be done on the jobsite of the kind covered by Rule IX and that no such work at the Norwegian Home project could be obtained through pressure on Hudik alone, even if Hudik was forced to abandon its contract, unless and until Austin changed its job specifications so as to provide the piping the union members had traditionally performed for Hudik as a subcontractor. The Administrative Law Judge thus concluded that the union had violated § 8 (b) (4) (B) because in seeking to enforce its contract and to obtain the work at the Norwegian Home jobsite, the union’s object was in reality to influence Austin by exerting pressure on Hudik, an employer who had no power to award the work to the union. The Board agreed. Enterprise Assn., supra. It noted first that the steamfitters’ refusal to install the Slant/Fin units “was based on a valid work preservation clause in the agreement with Hudik, the subcontractor, and was for the purpose of preserving work they had traditionally performed.” 204 N. L. R. B. 760. This did not settle the legality of the work stoppage under §8 (b)(4)(B), however; for “Hudik was incapable of assigning its employees this work; such work was never Hudik’s to assign in the first place. . . . Respondent was exerting prohibited pressure on Hudik with an object of either forcing a change in Austin’s manner of doing business or forcing Hudik to terminate its subcontract with Austin. Since the pressure exerted by the Respondent on Hudik was undertaken for its effect on other employers, this pressure was secondary and prohibited by Section 8 (b) (4) (B).” Ibid, (as amended by order of Aug. 30, 1973). A divided Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, set aside the Board’s order. 172 U. S. App. D. C.. 225, 521 F. 2d 885 (1975). We granted certiorari because of an apparent conflict between the Circuits. 424 U. S. 908 (1976). II In setting aside the Board’s order, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Board on both legal and factual grounds. We deal first with the Court of Appeals’ proposition that “an employer who is struck by his own employees for the purpose of requiring him to do what he has lawfully contracted to do to benefit those employees can [njever be considered a neutral bystander in a dispute not his own.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 243, 521 F. 2d, at 903 (footnote omitted). Under this view, a strike or refusal to handle undertaken to enforce such a contract would not itself warrant an inference that the union sought to satisfy secondary, rather than primary, objectives, whatever the impact on the immediate employer or on other employers might be. Thus, where a union seeks to enforce a work-preservation agreement by a strike or work stoppage, the existence of the agreement would always provide an adequate defense to a § 8 (b) (4) unfair labor practice charge. This approach is untenable under the Act and our cases construing it. Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U. S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door), involved a collective-bargaining contract containing a provision, then quite legal, that “ 'workmen shall not be required to handle non-union material.’ ” Id., at 95. The case arose when certain nonunion doors arrived at a construction site and the union notified the contractor that the doors would not be hung. The Board found that the union had committed an unfair labor practice by encouraging employees to strike or refuse to handle the disputed doors in order to force the contractor to cease doing business with the door manufacturer. The union stood squarely on the contract; and as the case arrived here the sole question was whether the collective-bargaining provision was a “defénse to a charge of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (A) when, in the absence of such a provision, the union conduct would unquestionably be a violation.” Id., at 101. The union argued that if the statute was aimed at protecting neutral employers from becoming involuntarily involved in the labor disputes of others, ''protection should not extend to an employer who has agreed to a hot cargo provision, for such an employer is not in fact involuntarily involved in the dispute,” especially “when the employer takes no steps at the time of the boycott to repudiate the contract and to order his employees to handle the goods.” In such circumstances, “[t]he union does no more than inform the employees of their contractual rights and urge them to take the only action effective to enforce them.” Id., at 105. These arguments were squarely rejected: “Nevertheless, it seems most probable that the freedom of choice for the employer contemplated by § 8 (b) (4) (A) is a freedom of choice at the time the question whether to boycott or not arises in a concrete situation calling for the exercise of judgment on a particular matter of labor and business policy. Such a choice, free from the prohibited pressures — whether to refuse to deal with another or to maintain normal business relations on the ground that the labor dispute is no concern of his— must as a matter of federal policy be available to the secondary employer notwithstanding any private agreement entered into between the parties. See National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350, 364, This is so because by the employer’s intelligent exercise of such a choice under the impact of a concrete situation when judgment is most responsible, and not merely at the time a collective bargaining agreement is drawn up covering a multitude of subjects, often in a general and abstract manner, Congress may rightly be assumed to have hoped that the scope of industrial conflict and the economic effects of tire primary dispute might be effectively limited.” Id., at 105-106. The Court went on to hold that inducements of employees that are prohibited by § 8 (b) (4) in the absence of a contractual provision countenancing them “are likewise prohibited when there is such a provision,” 357 U. S., at 106. This was true even though the making and voluntary observance of such contracts were not contrary to law at the time that Sand Door was decided; however lawful, these contracts could not be enforced “by the means specifically prohibited” by the section. Id., at 108. The Court held that the legality of the union’s conduct is to be viewed at the time of the boycott. Sand Door’s holding that employer promises in a collective-bargaining contract provide no defense to a § 8 (b) (4) charge against a union has not been disturbed. In contemplating the 1959 amendments to the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress viewed that part of Sand Door in which the Court suggested that contractual provisions having secondary objectives were not forbidden by law as creating a loophole in the Act. Section 8 (e) was enacted to close that loophole. See National Woodwork, 386 U. S., at 634. Section 8 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. Y), makes it an unfair labor practice, with provisos, for unions and employers to enter into collective-bargaining contracts whereby the employer ceases or agrees to cease doing business with any other person. Although on its face not limited to agreements having secondary objectives, the section was construed by the Board and this Court as only closing the loophole left by Sand Door and as having no broader reach than § 8 (b) (4) itself. Section 8 (e) does not prohibit agreements made for “primary” purposes, including the purpose of preserving for the contracting employees themselves work traditionally done by them. 386 U. S.; at 635. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can it be thought, that in enacting § 8 (e) Congress intended to disagree with or ease Sand Door’s construction of § 8 (b)(4), under which a perfectly legal collective-bargaining contract may not be enforced by a strike or refusal to handle which in the absence of such a provision would be a violation of the statute. The intention of Congress as to this aspect of Sand Dpor could not be clearer, A proviso to § 8 (e) exempted from that section certain agreements in the construction industry that the section would otherwise have prohibited, but the Committee Report explained that the “proviso applies only to section 8 (e) and therefore leaves unaffected the law developed under section 8 (b)(4),” noting particularly that picketing to enforce agreements saved by the proviso “would be illegal under the Sand Door case.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1959), 1 NLRB Legislative History of the Labor-Management and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 943 (1959) (hereafter 1 Leg. Hist.). Undoubtedly, Congress embraced the rule then followed by the Board and approved by this Court in Sand Door that a contract permitting or justifying the challenged union conduct is no defense to a § 8 (b) (4) charge. To hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that a work stoppage is necessarily primary and not an unfair labor practice when it aims at enforcing a legal promise in a collective-bargaining contract is inconsistent with the statute as construed in Sand Door, a construction that was accepted and that has never been abandoned by Congress. Nor did we modify Sand Door in National Woodwork. The union in National Woodwork induced the employees of four contractors not to handle precut and prefitted doors that had arrived at the respective construction sites. In three instances, the precut doors had been specified by the architect or the owner; in the fourth, the decision to use precut doors was that of the immediate contractor-employer, Frouge Corp. In each case, there was a provision in the collective-bargaining contract that carpenters would not be required to handle precut or prefitted doors. The General Counsel of the Board filed charges in all four cases, asserting that the agreements were forbidden by § 8 (e) and that the refusal to handle in each case violated §8 (b)(4)(B). The trial examiner, whose findings were adopted by the Board, concluded that none of the agreements was invalid on its face but that in seeking to enforce the contract by refusing to handle in the three situations where the doors had been specified by the architect or owner, the union had violated §8 (b)(4)(B). In these situations, the legality of the contract no more immunized the work stoppage from the § 8 (b) (4) charge than would “the then-lawful ‘hot-cargo’ clause in the Sand Door case.” Metropolitan Dist. Council of Phila., 149 N. L. R. B. 646, 658 (1964). On the other hand, in the Frouge situation, where the choice lay with the contractor who “therefore was in a position to . . . settle the dispute with the District Council by granting its request to assign that work to the carpenters on the jobsite,” id., at 659 n. 21, the union was seeking only to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his own employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the employees by preserving their unit work. Neither the execution nor the enforcement of the Frouge agreement violated the Act. Only the Frouge decision was appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in part, concluding that the Frouge agreement was prohibited by § 8 (e). In reversing the Court of Appeals’ § 8 (e) holding and agreeing that § 8 (b) (4) (B) had not been violated, we held that neither the Frouge contract nor its maintenance was illegal. Our rationale was not that the work-preservation provision was valid under § 8 (e) and that therefore it could be enforced by striking or picketing without violating § 8 (b) (4) (B). Expressly recognizing the continuing validity of the Sand Door decision that a valid contract does not immunize conduct otherwise violative of § 8 (b)(4), 386 U. S., at 634, we held that neither § 8 (b) (4) (B) nor § 8 (e) forbade primary activity by employees designed to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them and that on this basis the union’s conduct violated neither section. To determine whether the Frouge employees’ refusal to handle was permissible primary activity or was forbidden secondary coercion, we inquired: “[Whether] under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union’s objective was preservation of work for Frouge’s employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter the case, Frouge, the boycotting employer, would be a neutral bystander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress, become secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of the agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its aim. The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-á-vis his own employees.” 386 U. S., at 644-645 (footnotes omitted). We went on to rule that there was substantial evidence to sustain the finding of the Board that both the agreement and the union activity at the Frouge jobsite related solely to the preservation of the traditional tasks of the jobsite carpenters. In consequence, we agreed that there was neither a § 8 (b) (4) (B) nor a § 8 (e) unfair labor practice. There is thus no doubt that the collective-bargaining provision that pipes be cut by hand on the job and that the work be conducted by units of two is not itself a sufficient answer to a § 8 (b) (4) (B) charge. The substantial question before us is whether, with or without the collective-bargaining contract, the union’s conduct at the time it occurred was proscribed secondary activity within the meaning of the section. If it was, the collective-bargaining provision does not save it. If it was not, the reason is that § 8 (b) (4) (B) did not reach it, not that it was immunized by the contract. Thus, regardless of whether an agreement is valid under § 8 (e), it may not be enforced by means that would violate §8 (b)(4). Ill The Court of Appeals was also of the view that the Board’s “control" test, under which the union commits an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (B) when it coerces an employer in order to obtain work that the employer has no power to assign, is invalid as a matter of law because it fails to comply with the National Woodwork standard that the union’s conduct be judged in light of all the relevant circumstances. Again, we think the Court of Appeals was in error. As we have seen, in National Woodwork the Board found unfair labor practices in three instances by inferring an improper secondary objective from the fact that the work sought by the union was not under the control of the immediate employer, but it found no unfair practice in the Frouge situation because Frouge did have the power to settle the dispute with the union. In sustaining the Board with respect to Frouge and in posing the issue whether under all the circumstances the boycott was tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere, we did not purport to announce a new legal standard and then ourselves to assess the facts in light of the modified construction of the statute. Such an assessment would 'have been a more proper task for the Board in the first instance; yet there was no remand for further proceedings in the light of a newly fashioned standard. The Board had sustained the trial examiner, who had examined the facts to determine whether the agreement and boycott had secondary objectives and concluded that they did not. This Court simply sustained the Board’s findings as supported by substantial evidence, without questioning either the legal standard employed by the Board or the Board’s resolution of the facts under that standard. Furthermore, the Court expressly recognized that as the case came to it, no question was raised about the results with respect to the three contractors other than Frouge. 386 U. S., at 616-617, n. 3. Here, the Administrative Law Judge, cognizant of National Woodwork and the Board’s own precedents, examined the history both of the relevant jobsite work traditionally done by the steamfitters and of the contractual provision calling for jobsite cutting and threading of pipe, assessed the agreement and refusal to handle in light of the actual conditions in the New York market, and concluded that “ ‘under all the surrounding circumstances/ ” Hudik was “only a means or instrumentality for exerting pressure against Slant/Fin and Austin with whom the Union has its primary dispute.” It thus does not appear to us that either the Administrative Law Judge or the Board, in agreeing with him, articulated a different standard from that which this Court recognized as the proper test in National Woodwork. Nor is it the case that the Board, in applying its control standard, failed to consider all of the relevant circumstances. Surely the fact that the Board distinguishes between two otherwise identical cases because in the one the employer has control of the work and in the other he has no power over it does not indicate that the Board has ignored any material circumstance. The contrary might more rationally be inferred. Of course, the Board may assign to the presence or absence of control much more weight than would the Court of Appeals, but this far from demonstrates a departure from the totality-of-the-circumstances test recognized in National Woodwork. There is little or no basis in the statute, its legislative history, or our cases for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the distinction the Board has drawn between those cases where the struck employer is in position to deliver the work to the union and those where the work is controlled by others is erroneous as a matter of law. The Board has taken this approach in applying § 8 (b) (4) at least since 1958, when it decided Clifton Deangulo, 121 N. L. R. B. 676. In that case, the facts of which were similar to this one, Limbach, a plumbing and heating contractor, was engaged to install certain comfort induction units. The union claimed that certain provisions in its collective-bargaining agreement with Limbach reserved to its members much of the work that had been performed at the factory on these units. Therefore, at the union’s behest, the employees refused to handle the units. Relying on its decision in the Sand Door case, Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 113 N. L. R. B. 1210 (1955), and ruling against the union, the Board rejected the union’s “main contentions . . . that the dispute was with Limbach, who was the primary employer; that the Union was seeking merely to exercise a valid contractual right to which Limbach had voluntarily agreed in advance, and that it was therefore engaged in privileged primary activity, not in proscribed secondary activity.” 121 N. L. R. B., at 684. The Board also observed that Limbach “had given to union members all work within the Union’s jurisdiction which it had been awarded on the project. It was powerless, of course, to give them additional work which it had not obtained and which, in fact, had been reserved by the very contractor through whom it had derived its own standing as an employer on the job.” Id., at 685-686. Since that time, as its decision in National Woodwork exemplifies, the Board has continued to interpret and apply § 8 (b) (4) (B) to find an unfair labor practice, at least where the union employs a product boycott to claim work that the immediate employer is not in a position to award, and it has declined to find a violation where the employer has such power, even if awarding the work might cause him to terminate contractual relations with another employer. In the latter circumstances, the cease-doing-business consequences are merely incidental to primary activity, but not in the former where the union, if it is to obtain work, must intend to exert pressure on one or more other employers. No legislative disagreement with the Board’s interpretation of § 8 (b) (4) was expressed in 1959 when Congress amended the section. On the contrary, in adding the primary-secondary proviso to the section, as the relevant reports clearly show, Congress intended merely to reflect the existing law. “This provision does not eliminate, restrict, or modify the limitations on picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute that are in existing law.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 942. Furthermore, the Courts of Appeals regularly sustained the relevant Board interpretations of § 8 (b)(4), and we did not question the Board’s approach in National Woodwork, let alone overrule it sub dlentio. It is true that since our decision in that case some Courts of Appeals, like the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, have concluded that the Board’s interpretation of the statute is in error. The Board’s reading and application of the statute involved in this case, however, are long established, have remained undisturbed by Congress, and fall well within that category of situations in which the courts should defer to the agency’s understanding of the statute which it administers. See Bayside Enterprises v. NLRB, 429 U. S. 298, 303-304 (1977); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U. S. 67, 76 (1973); NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U. S. 254, 260 (1968) ; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Sand Door, 357 U. S., at 107. IY Wholly apart from its determination that the union’s conduct was justified as a measure to enforce its collective-bargaining contract and that the Board applied an incorrect standard for determining liability, the Court of Appeals held that since there was “no substantial evidence ... in this record that the union’s purpose was also ‘to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,’ the Board’s decision holding the union guilty of a Section 8 (b) (4) (B) violation may not stand.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 244, 521 F. 2d, at 904. We disagree. That there existed inducement and coercion within the meaning of § 8 (b) (4) is not disputed. The issue is whether “an object” of the inducement and the coercion was to cause the cease-doing-business consequences prohibited by § 8 (b) (4), the resolution of which in turn depends on whether the product boycott was “addressed to the labor relations of [Hudik] . . . vis-a-vis his own employees,” National Woodwork, 386 U. S., at 645, or whether the union’s conduct was “tactically calculated to satisfy [its] objectives elsewhere,” id., at 644. There is ample support in the record for the Board’s resolution of this question. The union sought to enforce its contract with Hudik by a jobsite product boycott by which the steamfitters asserted their rights to the cutting and threading work on the Norwegian Home project. It is uncontrovertible that the work at this site could not be secured by pressure on Hudik alone and that the union’s work objectives could not be obtained without exerting pressure on Austin as well. That the union may also have been seeking to enforce its contract and to convince Hudik that it should bid on no more jobs where prepiped units were specified does not alter the fact that the union refused to install the Slant/Fin units and asserted that the piping work on the Norwegian Home job belonged to its members. It was not error for the Board to conclude that the union’s objectives were not confined to the employment relationship with Hudik but included the object of influencing Austin in a manner prohibited by § 8 (b) (4) (B). The Court of Appeals was of the view that other inferences from the facts were possible. The court, for example, could “clearly see that it was possible for Hudik-Ross to settle the labor dispute which it had created. The record is void of any suggestion that Hudik-Ross attempted to negotiate a compromise with the union under which the union would have agreed to install the climate control units in exchange for extra pay or other special benefits.” 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 239, 521 F. 2d, at 899. How this observation impugns the Board’s finding with respect to the union’s object is not clear. The union simply refused to handle the Slant/ Fin units and asserted that under the contract the cutting and threading work belonged to them. The commonsense inference from these facts is that the product boycott was in part aimed at securing the cutting and threading work at the Norwegian Home job, which could only be obtained by exerting pressure on Austin. The statutory standard under which the Court of Appeals was obliged to review this case was not whether the Court of Appeals would have arrived at the same result as the Board did, but whether the Board’s findings were “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112 (1956); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 491 (1947); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938). It appears to us that in reweighing the facts and setting aside the Board’s order, the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its own views of the facts for those of the Board. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Section 8 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b), provides in relevant part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either ease an object thereof is— “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” The pre- and post-1959 developments are fully canvassed in National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612 (1967). The facts here stated are taken from the findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by the Board. Enterprise Assn. of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N. L. R. B. 760 (1973). Rule IX provided in relevant part: “Radiator branches, convector branches and coil connections shall be cut and threaded by hand on the job in accordance with Rule V." App. 89. Rule V provided: “MEN TO WORK IN UNITS OF TWO “All work to be performed within the jurisdiction of Enterprise Association must be performed by journeymen steamfitters or apprentices working in units of two, one of whom must be a steamfitter. A unit shall be composed of: “A. Steamfitter with a steamfitter, or “B. Steamfitter with an apprentice.” Id., at 87-88. For a discussion of the decisions of the Courts of Appeals on the issues presented in this case see n. 15, infra. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was renumbered as § 8 (b) (4) (B) in 1959. As we shall see, no substantive changes made by the 1959 amendments had any effect on the rule established in Sand Door. Part of the same contractual rule provided that “ ‘[n]o employee shall work on any job on which cabinet work, fixtures, millwork, sash, doors, trim or other detailed millwork is used unless the same is Union-made and bears the Union Label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.’ ” National Woodwork, 386 U. S., at 615 n. 2. The Board found that this sentence violated § 8 (e). This finding, consistent with prevailing law, was not challenged by the union. See, e. g., NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers of America, 309 F. 2d 31, 35-36 (CA9 1962), cert. denied, 372 U. S. 943 (1963); Employing Lithographers of Greater Miami v. NLRB, 301 F. 2d 20, 29-30 (CA5 1962). The validity of the will-not-handle provision in this case was not challenged by the charging party, and the Board referred to it as a valid provision.' Because the scope of the prohibitions in §§ 8 (b) (4) (B) and 8 (e) are essentially identical, except where the proscriptions in § 8 (e) are limited by the provisos in that section, the Court of Appeals regarded as anomalous that a valid provision in a collective-bargaining contract could not be enforced through economic pressure exerted by the union. This conclusion ignores the substance of our decision in Sand Door. Even though a work-preservation provision may be valid in its intendment and valid in its application in other contexts, efforts to apply the provision so as to influence someone other than the immediate employer are prohibited by § 8 (b) (4) (B). See George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F. 2d 323, 327 (CA4 1973). Nor does the Board’s decision undermine the collective-bargaining process as the Court of Appeals suggests. In appropriate circumstances, the Board has not found the lack of control to be determinative, Painters Dist. Council No. 20 (Uni-Coat), 185 N. L. R. B. 930 (1970), and the Board has declared its intention to continue to eschew a mechanical application of its control test in order to ascertain whether the struck employer is truly an unoffending employer. See Local 438, United Pipe Fitters (George Koch Sons, Inc.), 201 N. L. R. B. 59, 64 (1973). “[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 95 (1943). This rule has not been disturbed. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 397 (1974); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U. S. 233, 249 (1972); K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.01, p. 397 (Supp. 1976). When an administrative agency has made an error of law, the duty of the Court is to “correct the error of law committed by that body, and after doing so to remand the case to the [agency] so as to afford it the opportunity of examining the evidence and finding the facts as required by law.” ICC v. Clyde S. S. Co., 181 U. S. 29, 32-33 (1901). 204 N. L. R. B., at 764. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Austin and Slant/Fin were primary employers. The Board, while adopting the remainder of the Administrative Law Judge’s report, did not reach this question. The Board addressed the question in George Koch Sons, Inc., supra. The Board recognized that there had been some ambiguity on this issue in earlier decisions. “Specifically, of late, the Board has characterized its approach simply in terms of a right-of-control test. The test as stated would seem to imply that the Board looked solely at the pressured employer’s 'contract right to control’ the work at issue at the time of the pressure to determine whether that pressure was primary or secondary. In fact, this is not now the Board’s approach nor was it ever. “Rather, the Board has always proceeded with an analysis of (1) whether under all the surrounding circumstances the union’s objective was work preservation and then (2) whether the pressures exerted were directed at the right person, i. e., at the primary in the dispute. ... In following this approach, however, our analysis has not [been] nor will it ever be a mechanical one, and, in addition to determining, under all the surrounding circumstances, whether the union’s objective is truly work preservation, we have studied and shall continue to study not only the situation the pressured employer finds himself in but also how he came to be in that situation. And if we find that the employer is not truly an 'unoffending employer’ who merits the Act’s protections, we shall find no violation in a union’s pressures such as occurred here, even though a purely mechanical or surface look at the case might present an appearance of a parallel situation.” 201 N. L. R. B., at 64 (footnotes omitted). The Board also adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s discussion of the economic context in which the dispute arose. The Administrative Law Judge was of the view that union pressure on Austin and other contractors who preferred factory-piped units could effectively foreclose Slant/Fin and similar producers from the market. The Board did not disturb the Administrative Law Judge’s findings: “If prepaid units cannot be installed in the large commercial, public, and industrial buildings in the New York area or in other areas effectively organized by the Union and other building trades unions, the manufacture will be materially affected and Austin and other engineers and general contractors will not specify their purchase and use in buildings.” 204 N. L. R. B., at 764. “In my opinion, it is an appropriate subject of official notice that in New York City and probably in all or most of the major cities in this country, the building and construction industry is unionized, certainly with respect to major industrial, commercial, and public construction. Unionized in this context means that craft unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO represent and have contracts for the employees who work on such projects and, in fact, the unions are the source of the labor supply and furnish the employees to the employer-contractors. The strategic position of the unions in the industry is confirmed by the fact that governmental efforts to increase the number of minority employees in the industry are concentrated on the unions and not on the employers. In most industries, if it is desired to increase the number of minority employees, governmental pressure is effectively directed to the employers. But in the construction industry it is the unions that control the labor supply and if the union steamfitter employees of Hudik on the Norwegian job refuse to work, other steamfitters will not be available to Hudik or to anyone else to perform work on the job.” Id., at 764 n. 10. See, e. g., George Koch Sons, Inc., supra; International Assn. of Heat & Frost Insulators, Local 12, 193 N. L. R. B. 40 (1971); Enterprise Assn., Local 638, 183 N. L. R. B. 516 (1970); Local 742, Carpenters, 178 N. L. R. B. 351 (1969); Local 636, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 177 N. L. R. B. 189 (1969); Pipe Fitters Local No. 120, 168 N. L. R. B. 991 (1967); International Assn. of Heat & Frost Insulators, Local 53, 149 N. L. R. B. 1075 (1964); Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council, 144 N. L. R. B. 91 (1963); International Longshoremen’s Assn., 137 N. L. R. B. 1178 (1962); Local 5, United Assn. of Journeymen, 137 N. L. R. B. 828 (1962); Enterprise Assn., Local 638, 124 N. L. R. B. 521 (1959); Local 636, United Assn. of Journeymen, 123 N. L. R. B. 225 (1959). See, e. g., Pipefitters Local No. 120, supra, at 992; Metropolitan Dist. Council of Phila., 149 N. L. R. B. 646, 659 n. 21 (1964) (National Woodwork). Prior to this Court’s decision in National Woodwork, the Courts of Appeals had uniformly held that it was a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (B) for a union to use economic pressures to obtain work that was not within the struck employer’s power to award. See Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 339 F. 2d 142 (CA6 1964); NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Assn., 331 F. 2d 712 (CA3 1964); Local No. 5, United Assn. of Journeymen v. NLRB, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 100, 321 F. 2d 366, cert. denied, 375 U. S. 921 (1963); NLRB v. Enterprise Assn., 285 F. 2d 642 (CA2 1960); Local No. 636, United Assn. of Journeymen v. NLRB, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 24, 278 F. 2d 858 (1960). Generally, the Courts of Appeals did not treat the Board’s control test as a per se rule, reasoning instead that the absence of the right to control the work sought is strong evidence that the objective of the economic pressure being applied by the union is to affect someone other than the struck employer. In many of the pre-National Woodwork cases the unions argued that their activity was primary on the ground that they were merely enforcing valid work-preservation agreements. The Courts of Appeals uniformly rejected this argument for a variety of reasons. Two of the preNational Woodwork eases flatly held that the existence of a valid work-preservation agreement cannot validate conduct that otherwise would be unlawful under §8 (b)(4)(B). Ohio Valley Carpenters, supra, at 145; Local No. 6, supra, at 369-370. Since this Court’s decision in National Woodwork, six Circuits have addressed the control issue. The Fourth Circuit in a well-reasoned opinion has expressly sustained the Board’s control test. George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F. 2d 323 (1973). The Ninth Circuit has done the same. See Associated General Contractors of California v. NLRB, 514 F. 2d 433 (1975). But see Western Monolithics Concrete Products v. NLRB, 446 F. 2d 522 (CA9 1971). The Third, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits have rejected the Board's control theory. In addition to the District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in the present case, see Local No. 636, United Assn. of Journeymen v. NLRB, 139 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 430 F. 2d 906 (1970); American Boiler Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 404 F. 2d 556 (CA8 1968); NLRB v. Local 164, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 388 F. 2d 105 (CA3 1968). The First Circuit has said the same thing in dictum. Beacon Castle Square Bldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 406 F. 2d 188 (1969). The dissenters now assert a different definition of what constitutes prohibited secondary activity: “If the purpose of a contract provision, or of economic pressure on an employer, is to secure benefits for that employer’s own employees, it is primary; if the object is to affect the policies of some other employer toward his employees, the contract or its enforcement is secondary.” Post, at 535. National Woodwork did not, however, adopt this standard for applying the proscriptions of §8 (b)(4)(B). The distinction between primary and secondary activity does not always turn on which group of employees the union seeks to benefit. There are circumstances under which the union’s conduct is secondary when one of its purposes is to influence directly the conduct of an employer other than the struck employer. In these situations, a union’s efforts to influence the conduct of the nonstruck employer are not rendered primary simply because it seeks to benefit the employees of the struck employer. National Woodwork itself embraced the view that the union’s conduct would be secondary if its tactical object was to influence another employer: “There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object oj the agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its aim.” (Eimphasis added.) 386 U. S., at 645. Under the standard announced, we found no unfair labor practice in National Woodwork. Frouge, the struck employer, was faced with the choice of either giving the cutting and fitting work to its own employees or giving it to the door manufacturer. Cf. Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964). The Court sustained the Board’s finding that the union’s sole object was to influence Frouge to give the work to its own employees. The union thus had no object of influencing the door manufacturer, even though any influence that the union had on Frouge would have had an incidental effect on persons with whom Frouge had commercial dealings. Cf. NLRB v. Operating Engineers, 400 U. S. 297, 304 (1971) (“Some disruption of business relationships is the necessary consequence of the purest form of primary activity”). The National Woodwork opinion also noted that the Court then had no occasion “to decide the questions which might arise where the workers carry on a boycott to reach out to monopolize jobs or acquire new job tasks.” 386 U. S., at 630-631. That reservation was apparently meaningless, for under the theory of the dissent, seemingly derived from National Woodwork itself, striking workers may legally demand that their employer cease doing business with another company even if the union’s object is to obtain new work so long as that work is for the benefit of the striking employees. If, for example, Hudik had in the past used prepiped units without opposition from the union, and the union had demanded that Hudik not fulfill its contract with Austin on the Norwegian Home job — all for the benefit of Hudik employees — it would appear that the dissenters’ approach would exonerate the union. Respondents take the same view. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. We disagree, for the union’s object would necessarily be to force Hudik to cease doing business with Austin, not to preserve, but to aggrandize, its own position and that of its members. Such activity is squarely within the statute. Here, of course, the union sought to acquire work that it never had and' that its employer had no power to give it, namely, the piping work on units specified by any contractor or developer who prefers and uses prepiped units. By seeking the work at the Norwegian Home, the union’s tactical objects necessarily included influencing Austin; this conduct falls squarely within the statement of Nationcd Woodwork that a union’s activity is secondary if its tactical object is to influence the boycotted employer. “It is not necessary to find that the sole object of the strike” was secondary so long as one of the union’s objectives was to influence another employer by inducing the struck employer to cease doing business with that other employer. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U. S. 675, 689 (1951). See also Wilson v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 471, 491 F. 2d 200, 203 (CA8 1974); Riverton Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 453 F. 2d 1035, 1040 (CA6), cert. denied, 407 U. S. 915 (1972); NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 584, 341 F. 2d 29, 32 (CA2), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 816 (1965). The dissenters assert that “[njothing whatever in the record even remotely suggests that the union had any quarrel with Slant/Fin or Austin.” Post, at 536 and 539-540. The Court has held, however, that there is no need for the Board to make such a finding in order to conclude that a § 8 (b) (4) (B) violation has occurred. National Woodwork, 386 II. S., at 645, quoted at n. 16, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NIXON v. FITZGERALD No. 79-1738. Argued November 30, 1981 Decided June 24, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 758. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 764. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 797. Herbert J. Miller, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was R. Stan Mortenson. John E. Nolan, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Samuel T. Perkins and Arthur B. Spitzer. Louis Alan Clark filed a brief for the Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Lee for the United States; by Roger J. Marzulla and William H. Mellor III for the Mountain States Legal Foundation; by John C. Armor and H. Richard Mayberry for the National Taxpayers Legal Fund, Inc.; and by Thomas J. Madden for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages from a former President of the United States. The claim rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President’s official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States. I In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. Fitzgerald’s dismissal occurred in the context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the Armed Forces. Respondent’s discharge attracted unusual attention in Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13,1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. To the evident embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft. Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald’s dismissal. The press reported those hearings prominently, as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was queried about Fitzgerald’s impending separation from Government service. The President responded by promising to look into the matter. Shortly after the news conference the petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H. R. Halde-man to arrange for Fitzgerald’s assignment to another job within the administration. It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. Fitzgerald’s proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the administration. In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that “‘Fitzgerald is no doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.’” Butterfield therefore recommended that “‘[w]e should let him bleed, for a while at least.’ ” There is no evidence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum. Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a congressional Committee. The Commission convened a closed hearing on Fitzgerald’s allegations on May 4, 1971. Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 152 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 467 F. 2d 755 (1972), public hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received “some advice” from the White House before Fitzgerald’s job was abolished. But the Secretary declined to be more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking “executive privilege.” At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President was asked about Mr. Seamans’ testimony. Mr. Nixon took the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald’s dismissal: “I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case of some person down the line deciding he should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. I made it and I stick by it.” A day later, however, the White House press office issued a retraction of the President’s statement. According to a press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had “put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald.” After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App. 60a. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald’s dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. Id., at 86a-87a. The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact motivated by “reasons purely personal to” respondent. Id., at 86a. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in force, the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald’s reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by the Commission, “the evidence of record does not support [Fitzgerald’s] allegation that his position was abolished and that he was separated ... in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Prox-mire Committee on November 13, 1968.” Id., at 81a. Following the Commission’s decision, Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil Service Commission. As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and “one or More” unnamed “White House Aides” styled only as “John Does.” The District Court dismissed the action under the District of Columbia’s 3-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DC 1974), and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 75, 553 F. 2d 220 (1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dismissal at least until 1973. In that year, reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald at least should be made to “bleed for a while” before being offered another job in the administration. Id., at 80, 84, 553 F. 2d, at 225, 229. Holding that concealment of illegal activity would toll the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court. Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the District Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint— more than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission — that Fitzgerald first named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution. The court also ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute Presidential immunity. Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 285, 606 F. 2d 1192 (1979), aff’d in pertinent part by an equally divided Court, 452 U. S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed immunity defense. As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certio-rari to decide this important issue. 452 U. S. 959 (1981). II Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the nonfinal order in which the District Court rejected petitioner’s claim to absolute immunity. We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy. A Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority to review “[cjases in” the courts of appeals. When the petitioner in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing the “jurisdictional” basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision, respondent argued that the District Court’s order was not an appealable “case” properly “in” the Court of Appeals within the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree. Under the “collateral order” doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), a small class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, supra, at 546-547. As an additional requirement, Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order must “presen[t] a serious and unsettled question.” 337 U. S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977) (claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U. S. App. D. C. 179, 227-229, 569 F. 2d 10, 58-60 (1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 372, 521 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff’d in pertinent part en banc, 180 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 107-108, n. 18, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1283-1284, n. 18 (1976), cert. dism’d sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U. S. 189 (1978). In “dismissing” the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner’s appeal lay outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no “serious and unsettled question” of law. This argument was pressed by the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss on the basis of that court’s “controlling” decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that petitioner’s interlocutory appeal failed to raise a “serious and unsettled” question. Although the Court of Appeals had ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this Court at the time petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. In light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a “serious and unsettled” and therefore appealable question to the Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was “in” the Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certio-rari jurisdiction. B Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for certiorari in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. Under its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald a sum of $142,000. In consideration, Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner’s immunity claim, no further payments would be made. The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract: “Given respondents’ continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains ‘definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.’” Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 368, 371 (1982), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). Ill A This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English cases at common law, the Court concluded that “[t]he interests of the people” required a grant of absolute immunity to public officers. Id., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise their discretion in a way “injuriously affect[ing] the claims of particular individuals,” id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of “public policy and convenience” therefore compelled a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts. “In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint.” Id., at 498. Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which made no express provision for immunity for any official, had abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in light of the “presuppositions of our political history” and our heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible “that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason” without some indication of intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), involving a § 1983 suit against a state judge, recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine “‘not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’ ” Id., at 554, quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith.” 386 U. S., at 557. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a § 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In that case we rejected the officials’ claim to absolute immunity under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that state executive officials possessed a “good faith” immunity from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public policy, the Court held that “in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.” 416 U. S., at 247. As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the nature of their official functions and the range of decisions that conceivably might be taken in “good faith.” This “functional” approach also defined a second tier, however, at which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials— notably judges and prosecutors — required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978) (state judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Econo mou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. In Butz the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving federal officials charged with common-law torts, that all high federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damages actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, id., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, “because of the special nature of their responsibilities,” id., at 511, “require a full exemption from liability.” Id., at 508. In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the question whether other federal officials could show that “public policy requires an exemption of that scope.” Id., at 506. B Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421. This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498. This case now presents the claim that the President of the United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries into history and policy, though mandated independently by our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of “public policy” analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President’s office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers. < Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President’s unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice Story’s analysis remains persuasive: “There are. . . incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to perform them .... The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). A The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II, § 1, of the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States . . . .” This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of federal law — it is the President who is charged constitutionally to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully' executed”; the conduct of foreign affairs — a realm in which the Court has recognized that “[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret”; and management of the Executive Branch — a task for which “imperative reasons re-quir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties.” In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). We find these cases to be inapposite. The President’s unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials. Because of the singular importance of the President’s duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges— for whom absolute immunity now is established — a President must concern himself with matters likely to “arouse the most intense feelings.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 654. Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official “the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with” the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 (1979). This concern is compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system. Nor can the sheer prominence of the President’s office be ignored. In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. B Courts traditionally have recognized the President’s constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint. For example, while courts generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of an official’s evidentiary privilege, we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is “rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 708. It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191, 196 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). But our cases also have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, at 703-713. When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests — as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. Nixon, supra — the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages based on a President’s official acts, we hold it is not. c In defining the scope of an official’s absolute privilege, this Court has recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity’s justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held that an official’s absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 508-517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 430-431. But the Court also has refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters “committed by law to [an official’s] control or supervision”); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575 (1959) (fact “that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner’s line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable . . Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S., at 363, and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside “the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding”). In view of the special nature of the President’s constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official responsibility. Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which of the President’s innumerable “functions” encompassed a particular action. In this case, for example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress — a violation of 5 U. S. C. §7211 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, an inquiry into the President’s motives could not be avoided under the kind of “functional” theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside the outer perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of an employee who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of “ ‘such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.’ ” Brief for Respondent 39, citing 5 U. S. C. § 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within the outer perimeter of his duties of office, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed statutory proceedings. This construction would subject the President to trial on virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect. It clearly is within the President’s constitutional and statutory authority to prescribe the manner in which the Secretary will conduct the business of the Air Force. See 10 U. S. C. § 8012(b). Because this mandate of office must include the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, we conclude that petitioner’s alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority. V A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive. There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. In addition, there are formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not apply with equal force to other executive officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President’s traditional concern for his historical stature. The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President “above the law.” For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends. VI For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for action consistent with this opinion. So ordered. See Economies of Military Procurement: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, pp. 199-201 (1968-1969). It is not disputed that officials in the Department of Defense were both embarrassed and angered by Fitzgerald’s testimony. Within less than two months of respondent’s congressional appearance, staff had prepared a memorandum for the outgoing Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, listing three ways in which Fitzgerald might be removed from his position. See App. 209a-211a (memorandum of John Lang to Harold Brown, Jan. 6, 1969). Among these was a “reduction in force” — the means by which Fitzgerald ultimately was removed by Brown’s successor in office under the new Nixon administration. The reduction in force was announced publicly on November 4, 1969, and Fitzgerald accordingly was separated from the Air Force upon the elimination of his job on January 5, 1970. See The Dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald by the Department of Defense: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Some 60 Members of Congress also signed a letter to the President protesting the “firing of this dedicated public servant” as a “punitive action.” Id., at 115-116. A briefing memorandum on the Fitzgerald matter had been prepared by White House staff in anticipation of a possible inquiry at the forthcoming press conference. Authored by aide Patrick Buchanan, it advanced the view that the Air Force was “firing... a good public servant.” App. 269a (memorandum of Patrick Buchanan to Richard Nixon, Dec. 5, 1969). The memorandum suggested that the President order Fitzgerald's retention by the Defense Department. Id., at 228a. See id., at 109a-112a (deposition of H. R. Haldeman); id., at 137a-141a (deposition of petitioner Richard Nixon). Haldeman’s deposed testimony was based on his handwritten notes of December 12, 1969. Id., at 275a. See id., at 126a (deposition of Robert Mayo); id., at 141a (deposition of Richard Nixon). Both Mayo and his deputy, James Schlesinger, appear to have resisted at least partly due to a suspicion that Fitzgerald lacked institutional loyalty to executive policies and that he spoke too freely in communications with friends on Capitol Hill. Both also stated that high-level positions were presently unavailable within the Bureau of the Budget. See id., at 126a (deposition of Robert Mayo); id., at 146a-147a (deposition of James Schlesinger). Quoted in Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald (Sept. 18, 1973) (CSC Decision), reprinted in App. 60a, 84a. (Page citations to the CSC Decision refer to the cited page in the Joint Appendix.) Id., at 85a. The memorandum added that “‘[w]e owe “first choice on Fitzgerald” to [Senator] Proxmire and others who tried so hard to make him a hero [for exposing the cost overruns].’ ” Suspicion of Fitzgerald’s assumed loyalty toward Senator Proxmire was widely shared in the White House and in the Defense Department. According to the CSC Decision, supra: “While Mr. Fitzgerald has denied that he was ‘Senator Proxmier’s [sic] boy in the Air Force’, and he may honestly believe it, we find this statement difficult to accept. It is evident that the top officials in the Air Force, without specifically saying so, considered him to be just that. . . . We also note that upon leaving the Air Force Mr. Fitzgerald was employed as a consultant by the Proxmire Committee and that Senator Proxmire appeared at the Commission hearing as a character witness for [Fitzgerald].” App. 83a. Id., at 61a. See id., at 83a-84a. See ibid. Id., at 185a. A few hours after the press conference, Mr. Nixon repeated privately to Presidential aide Charles Colson that he had ordered Fitzgerald’s firing. Id., at 214a-215a (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). Id., at 196a (transcription of statement of White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, Feb. 1, 1973). In a conversation with aide John Ehrliehman, following his conversation with Charles Colson, see n. 13, supra, the President again had claimed responsibility for Fitzgerald’s dismissal. When Ehrliehman corrected him on several details, however, the President concluded that he was “thinkin’ of another case.” Id., at 218a (recorded conversation of Jan. 31, 1973). See id., at 220a. It was after this conversation that the retraction was ordered. Fitzgerald’s position in the Air Force was in the “excepted service” and therefore not covered by civil service rules and regulations for the competitive service. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 152 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 4, 467 F. 2d 755, 758 (1972); see CSC Decision, App. 63a-64a. In Hampton, however, the court held that Fitzgerald’s employment nonetheless was under “legislative protection,” since he was a “preference eligible” veteran entitled to various statutory protections under the Veterans’ Preference Act. See 152 U. S. App. D. C., at 4-14, 467 F. 2d, at 758-768. Among these were the benefits of the reduction-in-force procedures established by civil service regulation. See id., at 4, 467 F. 2d, at 758. The Examiner found that Fitzgerald in fact was dismissed because of his superiors’ dissatisfaction with his job pérformance. App. 86a-87a. Their attitude was evidenced by “statements that he was not a Team player’and'not on the Air Force team.’” Id., at 83a. Without deciding whether this would have been an adequate basis for an “adverse action” against Fitzgerald as an “inadequate or unsatisfactory employee,” id., at 86a, the Examiner held that the Commission’s adverse action procedures, current version codified at 5 CFR pt. 752 (1982), implicitly forbade the Air Force to employ a “reduction in force” as a means of dismissing respondent for reasons “personal to” him. App. 87a. The Commission also ordered that Fitzgerald should receive backpay. Id., at 87a-88a. Following the Commission’s order, respondent was offered a new position with the Defense Department, but not one that he regarded as equivalent to his former employment. Fitzgerald accordingly filed an enforcement action in the District Court. This litigation ultimately culminated in a settlement agreement. Under its terms the United States Air Force agreed to reassign Fitzgerald to his former position as Management Systems Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, effective June 21, 1982. See Settlement Agreement in Fitzgerald v. Hampton et al., Civ. No. 76-1486 (DC June 15, 1982). The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy to deprive him of his job, to deny him reemployment, and to besmirch his reputation. Fitzgerald alleged that the conspiracy had continued through the Commission hearings and remained in existence at the initiation of the lawsuit. See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690-692 (DC 1974). The general allegations of the complaint remained essentially unchanged. In averring Nixon’s participation in the alleged conspiracy against him, the complaint quoted petitioner’s press conference statement that he was “totally aware” of and in fact “approved” Fitzgerald’s dismissal. Second Amended Complaint in Fitzgerald v. Butterfield, Civ. No. 74-78 (DC), p. 6. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-2a. The District Court held that respondent was entitled to “infer” a cause of action under 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) and 18 U. S. C. § 1505. Neither expressly confers a private right to sue for relief in damages. The first, 5 U. S. C. § 7211 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), provides generally that “[t]he right of employees . . . to . . . furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied.” The second, 18 U. S. C. § 1505, is a criminal statute making it a crime to obstruct congressional testimony. The correctness of the decision that a cause of action could be “implied” under these statutes is not currently before us. As explained infra, this case is here under the “collateral order” doctrine, for review of the District Court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground that he enjoyed absolute immunity from civil suit. The District Court also held that respondent had stated a claim under the common law of the District of Columbia, but respondent subsequently abandoned his common-law cause of action. See Supplemental Brief in Opposition 2. See Brief in Opposition 2. Although Fitzgerald has not continued to urge this argument, the challenge was jurisdictional, and we therefore address it. The statute provides in pertinent part: “Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: “(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree. . . .” There can be no serious doubt concerning our power to review a court of appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction — a power we have exercised routinely. See, e. g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U. S. 478 (1978). If we lacked authority to do so, decisions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction would be insulated entirely from review by this Court. Nor, now that we have taken jurisdiction of the case, need we remand to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits. The immunity question is a pure issue of law, appropriate for our immediate resolution. Especially in light of the Court of Appeals’ now-binding decision of the issue presented, concerns of judicial economy fully warrant our decision of the important question presented. Respondent filed a copy of this agreement with the Clerk of this Court on August 24,1981, as an appendix to his brief in opposition to a motion of Morton, Ina, David, Mark, and Gary Halperin to intervene and for other relief. On June 10, 1980, prior to the Court’s action on the petition for certiorari, counsel to the parties had advised the Court that their clients had reached an agreement to liquidate damages, but that there remained a live controversy. Counsel did not include a copy of the agreement in their initial submission. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), was distinguished on the ground that the suit against the Postmaster General had asserted a common-law — and not a constitutional — cause of action. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 493-496. Although the Court in Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508, described the requisite inquiry as one of “public policy,” the focus of inquiry more accurately may be viewed in terms of the “inherent” or “structural” assumptions of our scheme of government. In the present ease we therefore are presented only with “implied” causes of action, and we need not address directly the immunity question as it would arise if Congress expressly had created a damages action against the President of the United States. This approach accords with this Court’s settled policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional issues. Reviewing this case under the “collateral order” doctrine, see supra, at 742, we assume for purposes of this opinion that private causes of action may be inferred both under the First Amendment and the two statutes on which respondent relies. But it does not follow that we must — in considering a Bivens (Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)) remedy or interpreting a statute in light of the immunity doctrine — assume that the cause of action runs against the President of the United States. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951) (construing § 1983 in light of the immunity doctrine, the Court could not accept “that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition [of legislative immunity] so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us,” and therefore would not address issues that would arise if Congress had undertaken to deprive state legislators of absolute immunity). Consequently, our holding today need only be that the President is absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in the absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. We decide only this constitutional issue, which is necessary to disposition of the case before us. U. S. Const., Art. II, §3. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948). Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 134-135 (1926). Noting that the Speech and Debate Clause provides a textual basis for congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be .assumed to have rejected any similar grant of executive immunity. This argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity of judges is well settled. See, e. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978). Second, this Court already has established that absolute immunity may be extended to certain officials of the Executive Branch. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 511-512; see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (extending immunity to prosecutorial officials within the Executive Branch). Third, there is historical evidence from which it may be inferred that the Framers assumed the President’s immunity from damages liability. At the Constitutional Convention several delegates expressed concern that subjecting the President even to impeachment would impair his capacity to perform his duties of office. See 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 64 (1911) (remarks of Gouvemeur Morris); id,., at 66 (remarks of Charles Pinckney). The delegates of course did agree to an Impeachment Clause. But nothing in their debates suggests an expectation that the President would be subjected to the distraction of suits by disappointed private citizens. And Senator Maclay has recorded the views of Senator Ellsworth and Vice President John Adams — both delegates to the Convention — that “the President, personally, was not the subject to any process whatever .... For [that] would . . . put it in the power of a common justice to exercise any authority over him and stop the whole machine of Government.” Journal of William Maclay 167 (E. Maclay ed. 1890). Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the separation of powers that the President must be permitted to discharge his duties undistracted by private lawsuits. 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418-419 (1st ed. 1833) (quoted supra, at 749). Thomas Jefferson also argued that the President was not intended to be subject to judicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807), that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly, and stated his broader view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: “The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the others, is further manifested by the means it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive.” 10 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 404 n. (P. Ford ed. 1905) (quoting a letter from President Jefferson to a prosecutor at the Burr trial) (emphasis in the original). See also 5 D. Malone, Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the President 320-325 (1974). In light of the fragmentary character of the most important materials reflecting the Framers’ intent, we do think that the most compelling arguments arise from the Constitution’s separation of powers and the Judiciary’s historic understanding of that doctrine. See text supra. But our primary reliance on constitutional structure and judicial precedent should not be misunderstood. The best historical evidence clearly supports the Presidential immunity we have upheld. Justice White’s dissent cites some other materials, including ambiguous comments made at state ratifying conventions and the remarks of a single publicist. But historical evidence must be weighed as well as cited. When the weight of evidence is considered, we think we must place our reliance on the contemporary understanding of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Ellsworth. Other powerful support derives from the actual history of private lawsuits against the President. Prior to the litigation explosion commencing with this Court’s 1971 Bivens decision, fewer than a handful of damages actions ever were filed against the President. None appears to have proceeded to judgment on the merits. Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the prospect that damages liability may render an official unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 949 (1950)-, “[t]he justification for. . . [denying recovery] is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute . . . .” These dangers are significant even though there is no historical record of numerous suits against the President, since a right to sue federal officials for damages for constitutional violations was not even recognized until Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). This tradition can be traced far back into our constitutional history. See, e. g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 501 (1866) (“[W]e are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us”); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838) (“The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power”). See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (Secretary of the Air Force); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E. B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F. R. D. 318, 323-324 (DC 1966), aff’d sub nom. V. E. B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 10, 384 F. 2d 979, cert. denied, 389 U. S. 952 (1967) (Department of Justice officials). Although the President was not a party, the Court enjoined the Secretary of Commerce from executing a direct Presidential order. See 343 U. S., at 583. The Court has recognized before that there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 371-373 (1980); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712, and n. 19 (basing holding on special importance of evidence in a criminal trial and distinguishing civil actions as raising different questions not presented for decision). It never has been denied that absolute immunity may impose a regrettable cost on individuals whose rights have been violated. But, contrary to the suggestion of Justice White’s dissent, it is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong. The dissent’s objections on this ground would weigh equally against absolute immunity for any official. Yet the dissent makes no attack on the absolute immunity recognized for judges and prosecutors. Our implied-rights-of-action cases identify another area of the law in which there is not a damages remedy for every legal wrong. These cases establish that victims of statutory crimes ordinarily may not sue in federal eourt in the absence of expressed congressional intent to provide a damages remedy. See, e. g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287 (1981). Justice White does not refer to the jurisprudence of implied rights of action. Moreover, the dissent undertakes no discussion of cases in the Bivens line in which this Court has suggested that there would be no damages relief in circumstances “counseling hesitation” by the judiciary. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, at 396; Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19 (1980) (in direct constitutional actions against officials with "independent status in our constitutional scheme . . . judicially created remedies . . . might be inappropriate”). Even the case on which Justice White places principal reliance, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), provides dubious support at best. The dissent cites Marbury for the proposition that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” Id., at 163. Yet Marbury does not establish that the individual’s protection must come in the form of a particular remedy. Marbury, it should be remembered, lost his case in the Supreme Court. The Court turned him away with the suggestion that he should have gone elsewhere with his claim. In this case it was clear at least that Fitzgerald was entitled to seek a remedy before the Civil Service Commission — a remedy of which he availed himself. See supra, at 736-739, and n. 17. The presence of alternative remedies has played an important role in our previous decisions in the area of official immunity. E. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 428-429 (“We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs”). The same remedy plays a central role with respect to the misconduct of federal judges, who also possess absolute immunity. See Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L. J. 681, 690-706 (1979). Congressmen may be removed from office by a vote of their colleagues. U. S. Const., Art. I, §5, cl. 2. Prior to petitioner Nixon’s resignation from office, the House Judiciary Committee had convened impeachment hearings. See generally Report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1305 (1974). The dissenting opinions argue that our decision places the President “above the law.” This contention is rhetorically chilling but wholly unjustified. The remedy of impeachment demonstrates that the President remains accountable under law for his misdeeds in office. This case involves only a damages remedy. Although the President is not liable in civil damages for official misbehavior, that does not lift him “above” the law. The dissents do not suggest that a judge is “above” the law when he enters a judgment for which he cannot be held answerable in civil damages; or a prosecutor is above the law when he files an indictment; or a Congressman is above the law when he engages in legislative speech or debate. It is simply error to characterize an official as “above the law” because a particular remedy is not available against him.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. NEWS SYNDICATE CO., INC., et al. No. 339. Argued March 1, 1961. Decided April 17, 1961. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Stuart Rothman and Norton J. Come. John R. Schoemer, Jr. argued the cause for News Syndicate Co., Inc., respondent. With him on the briefs were Andrew L. Hughes and Stuart N. Updike. ' Gerhard P. Van Arkel argued the cause for New York Mailers’ Union No. 6, respondent. With him on the brief were Henry Kaiser and David I. Shapiro. Me. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent union, affiliated with the International Typographical Union, entered into collective bargaining agreements with various publishers, including respondent News Syndicate (and Dow Jones & Co.), which contained a provision that “the General Laws of the International Typographical Union . . . not in conflict with this contract or with federal or state law shall govern relations between the parties on conditions not specifically enumerated herein.” The contract limited mail-room employment to “journeymen and apprentices.” The contract also provided that mail-room superintendents, foremen, and assistant foremen must be members of the union arid that the foremen would do the hiring. The General Laws of ITU provided that “foremen or journeymen” should be “active members” of the union, that only union members should operate, maintain, and service any mailing machinery or equipment, that no person should be eligible as a “learner” who is not a union member. Another provision of the contract stated, however, that “The Union shall not discipline the Foreman for carrying out the instructions of the Publisher or his representatives in accordance with this agreement.” It also provided, that the foremen “shall be appointed and may be removed by the Publisher.” The foreman at one plant was a union member and the Board found that he discriminated in favor of union men against a nonunion employee named Julius Arrigale. It also found that the foreman at another plant was a union member and discriminated in favor of union men and against a nonunion employee named Burton Randall. It concluded that the union and the News Syndicate had violated §8 (b)(1)(A) and (2) and §8 (a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 140-141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158, respectively, by their contract arrangements and by operating an unlawful closed shop and preferential hiring system. It held that vesting control over employment in union foremen was a delegation of exclusive control over hiring to the union without the requisite safeguards prescribed by the Board in Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 N. L. R. B. 883. The order of the Board contained various provisions including a direction that all employees in the mail-rooms be reimbursed for dues and assessments paid the union for a period beginning six months before the service of the charges against it; and this duty was made, so far as concerns the news mail-room, a joint and several liability of the union and News Syndicate. 122 N. L. R. B. 818. The Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the order. That court held that the finding of discrimination against Randall was in part supported by the record; and it refused enforcement of the Board’s order, allowing the Board, if it wished, to enter an order directed only to that instance of discrimination the Court of Appeals found the record to show. 279 F. 2d 323. The case is here on petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted along with No. 340, International Typographical Union v. Labor Board, post, p. 705, because of the conflict between them. 364 U. S. 877, 878. What we have this day decided in Carpenters Local 60 v. Labor Board, ante, p. 651, is dispositive of the provision in the Board’s order requiring respondents to reimburse union members for dues and assessments. We also believe the Court of Appeals was right in concluding that the contract on its face is not unlawful even though the foremen — who are union members — do the hiring. In the first place, the contract (unlike the General Laws) does not require journeymen and apprentices to be union members. In the second place, the provisions of the contract which we have set forth make the foremen “solely the employers’ agents,” as the Court of Appeals concluded. 279 F. 2d, at 330. Finally, as we said in Teamsters Local 357 v. Labor Board, decided this day, ante, p. 667, we will not assume that unions and employers will violate the federal law, favoring discrimination in favor of union members against the clear command of this Act of Congress. As stated by the Court of Appeals, “In the absence of provisions calling explicitly for illegal conduct, the contract cannot be held illegal because it failed affirmatively to disclaim all illegal objectives.” 279 F. 2d, at 330. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the General Laws provision of the contract is not per se unlawful. For it has in it the condition that only those General Laws of the union are incorporated which are “not in conflict with this contract or with federal or state law.” Any rule or regulation of the union which permitted or required discrimination in favor of union employees would, therefore, be excluded from incorporation in the contract since it would be at war with the Act. We can say with Judge Prettyman in Honolulu Star-Bulletin v. Labor Board, 107 U. S. App. D. C. 58, 61, 274 F. 2d 567, 570, that while the words “not in conflict with federal . . . law” might in some circumstances be puzzling or uncertain as to meaning, “there could hardly be any uncertainty respecting a closed-shop clause.” For the command of § 8 is clear and explicit and the only exception is plainly spelled out in the provisos to § 8 (a) (3). Whether in practice respondents maintained and enforced closed-shop and preferential hiring conditions raises a distinct question. The Board’s case comes down to the method by which those in the mail-room became journeymen. One could either take an apprentice training program or pass a competency examination. Apprentices were hired by the foremen; but the Court of Appeals found that there were no discriminatory practices in the actual hiring of apprentices. If a person followed the examination route, the contract .provided for it to be given “by impartial examiners qualified to judge journeyman competency selected by the parties hereto.” The examiners were union officials and the mail-room foremen. The union proposed and News Syndicate agreed in 1956 to put into the class of a “regular substitute” those extras who in the prior two years had earned 15 vacation credits, which was another way of describing those who had averaged about three days’ work a week. Those who were hired on a day-to-day basis (“shaped for work”) included 60 nonunion men. Of these, 31 were invited to take the examination. They passed, were made “regular substitutes,” and subsequently became union members. Thereafter each of the new “regular substitutes” was hired prior to Randall, though he had “shaped” at the News longer than many of them. Randall, it appears, had full-time outside jobs that kept him from “shaping” regularly. Arrigale was a nonjourneyman who shaped up for the Wall Street Journal, which had essentially the same hiring setup as the News. The asserted discrimination occurred when “outside card-men” were hired in preference to Arrigale, although Arri-gale was “shaping” steadily and was the oldest nonunion extra. The foreman testified he took “outside card-men” because he could be sure of their competency, because they would have taken the journeyman test or had served as apprentices. There was no evidence that membership in the union was a condition for the journeyman test, save that all journeymen in fact did become union men. Respondents, therefore, contend that to accord priority in the hire of extras to men who work regularly for the employer (and who also have the journeyman status). is a hiring system based on competency and legitimate employee qualifications. The Court of Appeals concluded: “We find ... a dearth of evidence either that a Union journeyman has ever been hired in preference (let alone, an unlawful preference) to a nonunion journeyman, or that the qualifying standards for taking a competency examination are discriminatory. The record is barren of even the slightest hint that there has been discrimination in the conduct of the examinations. Availability, dependability and regularity of service, as well as mere competency, are valid nondiscriminatory considerations in determining the order of hire. The fact that one applicant is as competent as another, does not mean that the other may not properly be preferred on the basis of his other qualifications. And the fact that those achieving status as new ‘regular substitutes’ subsequently became Union members and even indicated their willingness to do so prior to the adoption of the standard, does not indicate, at least on this record, that the standard, seemingly fair, was discriminatory in its effect. Randall admitted that he would have welcomed the opportunity to become a Union member, and for aught that appears in the record, so would the remaining extras who did not meet the established standard. “We conclude that the record does not warrant a finding that the hiring system in general, or the competency system in particular, by its discrimination against nonunion applicants, encouraged Union membership.” 279 F. 2d, at pp. 333-334. This finding of the Court of Appeals disposed of Arrigale’s complaint'and all of Randall’s with the exception of the loss of one night’s employment as to which the court sustained the Board. The Board drew contrary inferences. But it does not now seriously challenge the foregoing finding of the Court of Appeals. Rather, its main reliance is on the long history of ITU’s use of the closed shop, the fact that foremen were union members, and the obscurity of the “not in conflict” clause of the agreement. We think the reversal of the Board on the facts by the Court of Appeals was within the scope of review entrusted to it. See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, 490-491. ’ A~ , Affirmed. Mr. Justice Whittaker dissents. See his dissenting opinion in Carpenters Local 60 v. Labor Board, decided this day, ante, p. 660. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 8 provides in relevant part: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later . . . . Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That .this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; . . . “(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . .” Section 7 provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” The 1947 amendments to the Act changed the ruling in Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U. S. 485, which held that foremen were “employees.” Section 2 (3) now excludes from the term “employees” one who is “employed as a supervisor.” Section 2 (11) defines a “supervisor” as one “having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,” etc., employees. Section 14 (a) provides: “Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.” As stated by Senator Taft, under these provisions even a union of foremen could be recognized by an employer, though no employer could be compelled to do so. S. Eep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. Burton Randall is neither a union member nor a journeyman within the meaning of the contract between the union and the News. The hiring practices at the News are as follows: The minimum mailing-room staff (“regular situation holders”) are both union members and journeymen; they report for work each night and are not required to “shape.” To fill in vacancies and to meet added needs, the foreman next turns to “regular substitutes,” who are both journeymen and union members. Next in line of priority are those the Board insists are referred to as “outside card men,” but who are at any rate both journeymen and union members regularly shaping up for other newspapers, but available for work on the News. The lowest priority category consists of what the Board calls “nonunion shapers” (and the union, “non-journeymen casuals”); at any rate, these men have neither union membership nor journeyman status. Within the category, such men are ranked in seniority running from the date of first shaping up for the News. Burton Randall is a “nonunion shaper” or “non-journeyman casual.” He has been turning up for the “shaping” at the News for a good many years; for most of them, he showed only on Fridays and Saturdays since he held another job. From 1950 to 1956, he was third in seniority on the “casual” list; from 1956, he was first on that list.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. SCHREIBER et al. No. 482. Argued April 27, 1965. Decided May 24, 1965. Assistant Attorney General Douglas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Nathan Lewin, Sherman L. Cohn, Harvey L. Zuckman and Henry Geller. Allen E. Susman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jeffrey L. Nagin and Harry M. Plotkin. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case are the extent of the Federal Communications Commission’s authority to promulgate procedural standards for determining whether testimony taken and documents produced during an investigatory-proceeding should be accorded confidential treatment, and the scope of judicial review of determinations made pursuant to such standards. This case had its origin in a subpoena and various orders issued during the course of an investigatory proceeding conducted by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to § 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 1094, 47 U. S. C. § 403 (1958 ed.) The proceeding, financed by specific congressional appropriation, was initiated on February 26, 1959, and had as its objective the gathering of “comprehensive information concerning the respective roles played by the networks, advertisers, agencies, talent, film producers and distributors, and other major elements in the television industry.” As an initial step in the investigation, the Commission ordered that an “inquiry be made to determine the policies and practices pursued by the networks and others in the acquisition, ownership, production, distribution, selection, sale and licensing of programs for television exhibition, and the reasons and necessity in the public interest for said policies and practices . . . .” The Commission authorized its chief hearing examiner to conduct the investigation. He was empowered, inter alia, to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, and require the production of any records or documents deemed relevant to the inquiry. The Commission ordered that “said investigatory proceeding shall be a public proceeding except that the said presiding officer may order non-public sessions of the said investigatory proceeding where and to the extent that the public interest, the proper dispatch of the business of said proceeding, or the ends of justice will be served thereby.” In October 1960, public sessions were held in Los Angeles, California, at which time evidence was received concerning the functions, policies and practices of television companies, talent agencies and representatives, program “packagers,” sales representatives, and others. On October 17, 1960, the Presiding Officer issued a subpoena duces tecum to respondent Schreiber, a Vice President of respondent Music Corporation of America, Inc. (MCA) — one of the largest packagers and producers of network television programs, directing him to appear at the hearing and to produce certain documents described in the annexes to the subpoena. Respondent Schreiber appeared and produced the material specified in Annex A. He refused, however, to submit without qualification the material called for in Annex B, which included a list of the programs packaged by MCA. Respondent Schreiber stated that he would produce the subpoenaed materials only “if the Commission will take this information and assure us that it will be held in confidence, will not be published, and will not be made available to other people, other than those on the Commission, and that serve the Commission.” As grounds for confidential treatment, he asserted that the information sought might disclose trade secrets and confidential data, and that the information was outside the scope of the hearing. He also objected generally to the procedures governing the hearing on the ground that they would require “public disclosure of trade secrets and confidential data of my company which might be of aid to its many competitors in this highly competitive television industry.” The Presiding Officer found “no doubt” as to the relevance of the material and rejected, as “without merit,” the claim that the information should be received in confidence. Respondents then petitioned the Commission for review. On January 25,1961, the Commission affirmed the Presiding Officer and ordered respondents to appear, testify and produce the material subpoenaed at a reconvened hearing. In its opinion the Commission stressed the importance of publicizing the information gathered during the course of the investigation and reaffirmed its resolve to permit in camera sessions only in extraordinary situations: “[W]e determined that public proceedings should be the rule herein, and that non-public procedures should be used only in those extraordinary instances where disclosure would irreparably damage private, competitive interests and where such interests could be found by the Presiding Officer to outweigh the paramount interest of the public and the Commission in full public disclosure.” The -Commission noted that the Presiding Officer and Commission counsel had made “every effort to avoid public disclosure of detailed internal financial information or detailed contractual arrangements which might in fact irreparably harm private interests without sufficient compensating benefit to the public,” and found that they had not departed from this standard in rejecting respondents’ claim of likely competitive harm which, the Commission held, was “totally unsupported by their pleadings and contrary to the record.” Accordingly, the Commission ordered respondents “to testify . . . regarding all matters deemed relevant by said Presiding Officer,” and to produce the information required by the subpoena and “such other information and data as may be deemed relevant and ordered or directed to be produced by the said Presiding Officer.” On remand, a broader claim for confidentiality was made by respondents. They requested that all testimony and documentary evidence to be elicited from them be received in nonpublic sessions, and disclosed only if a court, in subsequent litigation, should authorize its public disclosure. The contention was rejected by the Presiding Officer, but respondent Schreiber persisted in his refusal to comply with the subpoena and the Commission's orders. The Commission thereupon petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of California for the enforcement of its subpoena and orders. The District Court found that the investigation was statutorily authorized, that the information requested in Annex B was relevant to the inquiry, and that respondents had disobeyed valid orders and a valid subpoena. Accordingly, the District Court ordered respondents to appear at a reconvened hearing and to comply with the Commission’s subpoena and orders. However, the court, in order to protect “respondents’ rights and to preclude disclosure of trade secrets of which competitors might take advantage,” ordered that all testimony given and documents produced by respondents be received and held in confidence, The court’s order further provided that, after the investigation of respondents had been completed, the Commission could move the court for an order, “should good cause exist therefor,” permitting such testimony and documents to be made public. 201 F. Supp. 421. On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that portion of the District Court’s order which pertains to the questions now before this Court. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in conditioning its order to require confidential treatment of the information sought. 329 F. 2d 517. In dissent, Judge Browning stated that the Commission’s procedural rule, requiring public hearings unless in camera, proceedings could be justified by those from whom the information was sought, was well within the Commission’s power. It was Judge Browning’s view that the District Court could require confidential treatment only if the Commission’s application of its procedural rule and consequent refusal to accord confidential treatment were found to be arbitrary or an abuse of the Commission’s discretion. Id., at 528-534. Because this case presents important questions concerning the respective roles to be performed by federal courts and the Federal Communications Commission in the administration of the Communications Act of 1934, we granted certiorari. 379 U. S. 927. We hold that the Commission’s rule — requiring public disclosure except where the proponents of a request for confidential treatment have demonstrated that the public interest, proper dispatch of business, or the ends of justice would be served by nonpublic sessions — was well within the Commission’s statutory authority. We further find that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in applying this rule. Accordingly, we modify the decision below insofar as it affirms the District Court’s imposition of conditions upon the enforcement of the subpoena and orders issued by the Commission. I. Section 4 (j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 1068, 47 U. S. C. § 154 (j) (1958 ed.), empowers the Federal Communications Commission to “conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” This Court has interpreted that provision as “explicitly and by implication” delegating to the Commission power to resolve “subordinate questions of procedure . . . [such as] the scope of the inquiry, whether applications should be heard contemporaneously or successively, whether parties should be allowed to intervene in one another’s proceedings, and similar questions.” Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138. The statute does not merely confer power to promulgate rules generally applicable to all Commission proceedings, cf. Federal Communications Comm’n v. WJR, 337 U. S. 265, 282; it also delegates broad discretion to prescribe rules for specific investigations, cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 321-322, and to make ad hoc procedural rulings in specific instances, Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra. Congress has “left largely to its judgment the determination of the manner of conducting its business which would most fairly and reasonably accommodate” the proper dispatch of its business and the ends of justice. Federal Communications Comm’n v. WJR, supra. In the Pottsville Broadcasting case, this Court stressed, in upholding this delegation of broad procedural authority, the established principle that administrative agencies “should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.” 309 U. S., at 143. This principle, which has been upheld in a variety of applications, is an outgrowth of the congressional determination that administrative agencies and administrators will be familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved. Thus, underlying the broad delegation in § 4 (j) of procedural rule-making power to the Federal Communications Commission is a “recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors.” Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138. To permit federal district courts to establish administrative procedures de novo would, of course, render nugatory Congress’ effort to insure that administrative procedures be designed by those most familiar with the regulatory problems involved. Thus, in providing for judicial review of administrative procedural rule-making, Congress has not empowered district courts to substitute their judgment for that of the agency. Instead, it has limited judicial responsibility to insuring consistency with governing statutes and the demands of the Constitution. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 214— 218; Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 144-145; Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 276-277. It is apparent that the courts below did not respect this congressional distribution of authority. The Commission promulgated a rule governing disclosure in this investigation. Yet, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals inquired into the validity of the Commission’s exercise of its rule-making authority. Instead, the District Court devised procedures to be followed by the Commission on the basis of the court’s conception of how the public and private interests involved could best be served. In reviewing this determination, the Court of Appeals found that the District Judge had not abused his discretion, “but, on the contrary, established a fair and just procedure whereby a most important investigation could proceed without being unduly disrupted, obstructed or prolonged, and at the same time afford [respondents] protection against the improvident disclosure of possible valuable trade secrets.” 329 F. 2d, at 524. In so doing, the Court of Appeals erred. The question for decision was whether the exercise of discretion by the Commission was within permissible limits, not whether the District Judge’s substituted judgment was reasonable. It is also evident that the Commission’s procedural rule — requiring public proceedings except where it is shown that the public interest, the dispatch of business, or the ends of justice would be served by nonpublic sessions — was well within the Commission’s power. Grants of agency authority comparable in scope to § 4 (j) have been held to authorize public disclosure of information, or receipt of data in confidence, as the agency may determine to be proper upon a balancing of the public and private interests involved. That § 4 (j) is broad enough to empower the Commission to establish standards for determining whether to conduct an investigation publicly or in private is demonstrated by this Court’s decision in Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294. There, the Court pointed out that a similar grant of rule-making authority — § 315 (c) of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 941, 942-943 — which authorizes the Tariff Commission “to adopt such reasonable procedure, rules, and regulations as it may deem necessary,” empowered the Commission “to shape its course within reasonable limits by its own conception of the promptings of policy and fairness. It would have kept within the statute even though it had made the hearings private and had refrained from the publication of anything, either the records of its agents or the testimony of witnesses. . . . Instead, it made the hearing public, and exposed everything to view except only when publication was likely in its judgment to result in hardship or injustice.” 288 IT. S., at 321-322. The delegated power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily, but its exercise may not be impeached merely because reasonable minds might differ on the wisdom thereof. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186, 215-218; Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139, 146; Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, supra, at 321-322. It is apparent, however, that the Commission’s determination in the present case that “public proceedings should be the rule” with exceptions granted “only in those extraordinary instances where disclosure would irreparably damage private, competitive interests and where such interests could be found by the Presiding Officer to outweigh the paramount interest of the public and the Commission in full public disclosure” was not an arbitrary exercise of the Commission’s authority. The procedural rule, establishing a presumption in favor of public proceedings, accords with the general, policy favoring disclosure of administrative agency proceedings. Moreover, the reasons advanced by the Commission in support of its determination to make public hearings the norm and to place the burden of justifying confidential treatment upon those from whom information is sought amply demonstrate that the Commission’s exercise of its delegated powers may not be successfully attacked as arbitrary or capricious. The investigative inquiry was designed to secure information to aid the Commission in the discharge of its many functions. The Commission stated that the subject matter of the inquiry is “complex and generally unknown” involving “many-sided transaction [s]” among “networks, advertising agencies, program producers, program packagers, talent agencies” and others. Therefore, the Commission determined, in order “to obtain a full and rounded picture of such transactions, it is highly desirable that the facts, information, data and opinion supplied by one group or individual be known to other groups and individuals involved, so that they may verify, refute, explain, amplify or supplement the record from their own diverse points of view.” The Commission observed that, in addition to stimulating the flow of information, public hearings serve to inform those segments of the public primarily affected by the agency’s regulatory policies and those likely to be affected by subsequent administrative or legislative action of the factual basis for any action ultimately taken- — a practical inducement to public acceptance of the results of the investigation. Also implicit in the Commission’s discourse is a recognition that publicity tends to stimulate the flow of information and public preferences which may significantly influence administrative and legislative views as to the necessity and character of prospective action. The Commission further pointed out that public disclosure is necessary to the execution of its duty under § 4 (k) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 1068, 47 U. S. C. § 154 (k) (1958 ed.), to make annual reports to Congress. Significantly, this investigation was specifically authorized by Congress so that Congress might “draw upon the facts which are obtained.” We hold, therefore, that the Commission’s adoption of the procedural rule favoring public disclosure and placing upon those from whom information is sought the burden of demonstrating the need for in camera proceedings is statutorily authorized. II. Remaining for determination is whether the Commission’s application of its disclosure rule and the consequent rejection of respondents’ requests for confidential treatment were so arbitrary or unreasonable as to warrant the imposition by the District Court of conditions upon enforcement of the Commission’s subpoena and orders. Upon remand from the Commission, respondents moved that all testimony and documents to be elicited from them — not merely Annex B — should be received in camera. Respondents asserted that in light of the announced scope of the inquiry, the Commission’s order to produce documents upon request and to testify “regarding all matters deemed relevant” would require MCA “to disclose all of its business information to its many competitors and to make a public record of all of its activities,” and that such a disclosure, if demanded, would necessarily include confidential business secrets. No factual showing was made; there was only the argument. The District Court accepted the argument, finding “well-grounded [the] fears of the respondents that the testimony to be given might result in disclosure of trade-secrets, of which competitors might take advantage.” 201 F. Supp., at 425. Accordingly, the court ordered that all testimony and documents adduced by respondents be received in confidence. In so doing the District Court erred, for it is clear that the Presiding Officer did not abuse his discretion in rejecting this request for blanket nondisclosure. The Presiding Officer did not know what information would actually be sought, what questions asked. Indeed, he could only speculate as to whether the Commission would seek to elicit any data which, if disclosed to MCA’s competitors, would work competitive harm. He could not ascertain the likelihood of irreparable damage to private competitive interests, nor could he discern whether the private interest outweighed the public interest in disclosure. If and when information was demanded which if disclosed might in fact injure MCA competitively, there would be ample opportunity to request that it be received in confidence, and to seek judicial protection if the request were denied. Cf. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440. The Presiding Officer would have abused his discretion in denying the request only if it were shown that no information could have been elicited from respondents which could be publicly disclosed. The record affords no justification for such a proposition. The only other possible basis for the District Court’s order would be an assumption that the Presiding Officer would consistently require disclosure even if a balancing of public and private interests compelled secrecy. There is no support for such an assumption in the record and it runs contrary to the presumption to which administrative agencies are entitled — -that they will act properly and according to law. Nor can the District Court’s order be saved on the ground that it did not direct that all information be held in confidence, but merely deferred the determination of whether the information was entitled to confidential treatment until after the inquiry of respondents had been completed. The order directs that there be no disclosure until the court so orders, “should good cause exist therefor.” Not only does this order seem to shift the burden of proof to the Commission to justify publication, despite the valid rule to the contrary, but it also permits respondents to avoid submitting the issue of disclosure to the Presiding Officer despite the “long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51; Reisman v. Caplin, supra. Moreover, the District Court’s order forbids disclosure until completion of the investigation of respondents without any showing that secrecy is justified. During this period the Commission could not make the information available to Congress, and the Commission would be denied the benefit of other evidence stimulated by disclosure. And the period during which the benefits of disclosure would be denied would inevitably be long. Respondent first appeared before the Presiding Officer on October 21,1960, and resolution of the issues then raised has caused a delay of more than four and one-half years. We do not find forceful respondents’ contention that the District Court’s order was necessary to protect against the discriminatory treatment of MCA by the Commission. The allegation finds little support in the record; moreover, no reference is made to this factor in the District Court’s opinion or findings of fact. Respondents’ assertions that “the Commission’s interest in MCA was deep” and that “concentration upon MCA was unique,” even if true, would not demonstrate the need for secrecy. Instead, such assertions merely lend credence to the Commission’s unchallenged finding that because of the importance of MCA in the industry, the failure to explore fully the policies and practices of MCA “would seriously impair, if not render nugatory, any attempt on the Commission’s part to understand and delineate the policies, practices and activities involved in the creation, production, sale and licensing of television filmed programs.” Furthermore, it is clear that respondents are adequately protected against improvident disclosure, even if the Commission should unfairly seek disclosure of information which would be competitively disastrous to respondents. Not only does the administrative remedy exist, but judicial protection against Commission overreaching also remains available with respect to any requests for information made in the future. We conclude, therefore, that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in rejecting respondents’ requests for blanket nondisclosure and accordingly hold that the District Court erred in ordering the Commission to afford confidential treatment to all information elicited from respondents. Respondents also moved that confidential treatment be accorded Annex B which called for the production of a list of programs as to which MCA served as a “packager” and those in which MCA had a financial interest. Respondent Schreiber testified that the information sought would disclose MCA’s confidential agency relationships with clients, “might be used detrimentally,” and “would be possibly advantageous to our competitors.” We find that the Commission’s affirmance of the Presiding Officer’s determination that the material sought in Annex B should be received in public session was clearly proper. Certainly private agreements between MCA and its clients not to disclose facts without the client’s consent could not affect the Commission in the discharge of its public duties. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961). And the naked assertion of possible competitive injury does not establish that the Presiding Officer abused his discretion in declining to accord confidential treatment. Moreover, there is nothing in the District Court’s opinion, findings or conclusions of law which indicates the likelihood, or even the possibility, of competitive harm from public disclosure of the Annex B information. MCA’s competitors and others engaged in similar businesses had furnished publicly the same type of information without objection. Respondents did not attempt before the Commission or on review to distinguish the information furnished by MCA’s competitors or the list of programs produced by MCA (subpoenaed in Annex A) which was introduced without objection by respondent Schreiber. Nor did respondents file affidavits in support of their position. But, even if it were conceded that disclosure of Annex B might have some competitive impact, there is no warrant for concluding that the Presiding Officer abused his discretion in finding that respondents had not sustained their burden of demonstrating that the private interest involved outweighed the public interest in disclosure. One further point should be discussed. During oral argument counsel for respondents suggested that his clients were prejudiced in their efforts to demonstrate the need for confidential treatment of the information contained in Annex B by restrictions imposed upon the participation of counsel by the then-prevailing Commission rules. We do not find this contention persuasive. Respondents filed a petition, prepared and signed by counsel, seeking review before the full Commission of the Presiding Officer’s rejection of their confidentiality request. Subsequently, they filed a second motion for confidential treatment with the Presiding Officer and respondents’ counsel was afforded an opportunity to argue orally in support of the motion. Thus, it is evident that the then-existing Commission rules restricting the rights of counsel did not prejudice respondents in their efforts to secure in camera proceedings with regard to Annex B, and hence there is no occasion to order that respondents be afforded an additional opportunity to present objections to the disclosure of the information subpoenaed in Annex B. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified so as to strike paragraph 2 of the District Court’s order, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to enforce the Commission’s orders and subpoena without qualification. It is so ordered. Section 403 provides: “The Commission shall have full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which complaint is authorized to be made, to or before the Commission by any provision of this Act, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of this Act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this Act. The Commission shall have the same powers and authority to proceed with any inquiry instituted on its own motion as though it had been appealed to by complaint or petition under any of the provisions of this Act, including the power to make and enforce any order or orders in the case, or relating to the matter or thing concerning which the inquiry is had, excepting orders for the payment of money.” Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 1956, 69 Stat. 199, 201-202. Statement of Commission Chairman McConnaughey; Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 293. Chairman McConnaughey also noted that “[o]nly with this information can the problems affecting the further expansion of television outlets be adequately identified and evaluated, and appropriate recommendations made for their solution.” Id., at 294. See also Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1956, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 663-664. The purpose and scope of the inquiry are set forth in the Commission’s order of Feb. 26, 1959. 24 Fed. Reg. 1605. On Nov. 10, 1959, the Commission entered a supplemental order “[t]hat the inquiry and investigatory proceeding instituted pursuant to the Commission’s Order of February 26, 1959 (FCC 59-166), be and is hereby amended and enlarged to determine the policies, practices, mechanics and surveillance pursued and carried out by networks, station licensees and others in connection with the acquisition, ownership, production, distribution, selection, sale and licensing of programs for radio and television exhibition and the policies and practices pursued by networks, station licensees and others in connection with the selection, presentation and supervision of advertising material for broadcast to the public and the reasons and necessity in the public interest for said policies and practices . . . .” Id,., at 9275, 9276. In its orders the Commission noted that the information sought was necessary (1) to complete its general investigation of radio and television broadcasting pursuant to the Independent Offices Appropriations Act; (2) to determine “what, if any, rules, regulations, legislation or other actions are necessary or desirable in the public interest in connection with” television programming; (3) to determine where the public interest lies in the granting of construction permits, station licenses, modifications and renewals; and (4) to enable the Commission to report and make specific recommendations to Congress in relation to the regulation of broadcasting. Id., at 1605, 9275. Id., at 1605. Ibid. "Packagers” develop and assemble the talent and scripts for a particular program or programs. A “producer” has general charge of the process of preparing the package for television showing. The Commission’s unchallenged finding was: “that MCA, Inc., (a) represents a large share of the talent, both acting and creative, engaged in television programming; (b) produces television programs; (c) packages and/or sells such programs; (d) maintains and leases production facilities for such programs and generally engages, on a large scale, in all facets of television program production. The record of the proceeding to date clearly establishes that failure fully to explore the policies, practices and activities of MCA, Inc., in connection with television programming would seriously impair, if not render nugatory, any attempt on the Commission’s part to understand and delineate the policies, practices and activities involved in the creation, production, sale and licensing of television filmed programs . . . .” R. 16. “ (A) A list by name or title of all television programs whether series programs, special programs, or otherwise, which appeared or were exhibited by or through the facilities of the television networks operated by NBC, CBS, or ABC since September 1, 1958, which programs were produced by MCA, Inc. or Revue Productions, Inc. and/or in which MCA, Inc. or Revue Productions, Inc. has or had a financial or proprietary interest or with regard to which MCA, Inc. or Revue Productions, Inc. is or was entitled to receive or has received a percentage of the profits or other compensation or fees in connection with the production or exhibition of such programs other than remuneration or compensation for the representation as agent of individual natural persons as talent.” “(B) A list of all television programs whether series programs, special programs, or otherwise, which appeared on or were exhibited by or through the facilities of the television networks of NBC, CBS, or ABC, since September 1, 1958, in which MCA, Inc. or any predecessor affiliate or subsidiary of MCA, Inc. acted as packager and/or, by agreement or otherwise, is entitled to receive or has received a percentage of the cost or selling price of said program or was or is entitled to receive or has received other compensation, remuneration or fees in connection with the packaging, licensing for broadcast or selling of said program, otherwise than as remuneration or compensation for the representation as agent of individual natural persons as talent.” See infra, pp. 293-294. On review of the Presiding Officer’s first order, the Commission, although dealing with the merits of that order, held "that the orders and directions of the Presiding Officer as to relevance and public disclosure of evidence, information and data are interlocutory in nature, do not of themselves 'aggrieve’ any person, and are not, as of right, appealable to the Commission.” This holding precluded an application to the Commission for review of the Presiding Officer’s second order. Respondents do not challenge these findings. Paragraph 2 of the District Court’s order provides: “It is Further Ordered that any further interrogation of respondents and any documents produced by respondents be taken and held by the Commission in private and confidential session, that the public be excluded therefrom, that all testimony adduced and documents produced be maintained in confidence by the Commission, that the Commission by motion duly made and served, may move the Court upon the conclusion of such interrogation and production for an order, should good cause exist therefor, permitting such testimony and documents to be made public, and that respondents shall retain the right to oppose such motion if and when so made.” Under the procedures established by the Presiding Officer, counsel for a witness could not, during the course of interrogation of his client, take exception to, request clarification of, or object to any question, nor could he initiate consultation with his client. Counsel could consult with his client only upon the request of the client if approved by the Presiding Officer. The District Court held that under § 6 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240, respondents were entitled to the assistance of counsel in the following respects: the right to have counsel object to any question and state his reasons therefor, and the right to have counsel initiate consultation without interference by the Commission or its agents. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the procedures established by the Presiding Officer were not violative of any constitutional or statutory provisions. On Sept. 2, 1964, the Commission amended Part I of its Rules and Regulations, permitting counsel for any person compelled to appear in Commission proceedings to advise his client either upon his own initiative or that of his client, “to make objections on the record, and to state briefly the basis for such objections.” 29 Fed. Reg. 12774^12775. Finding this amendment to be “in accord with respondents’ legal position on this matter,” respondents did not seek review of the ruling below. Given the change in the Commission’s rules, we need not, and do not, express any views as to the legality of the prior rules concerning a witness’ right to the assistance of counsel. The Commission’s own conception of its authority is-similarly broad. Section 1.1 of the Commission’s General Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that procedures to be followed in investigative proceedings shall “be such as in the opinion of the Commission will best serve the purposes of such proceeding.” 47 CFR § 1.1 (1965). Civil Aeronautics Board v. Hermann, 353 U. S. 322; Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186; Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S. 248; Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501; Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm’n, 306 U. S. 56; Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U. S. 139; American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 71 App. D. C. 259, 110 F. 2d 117 (1940); E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 61 App. D. C. 386, 63 F. 2d 362 (1933). Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, supra. Section 3 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 238, 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (c) (1958 ed.), provides: “Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause found.” This statute has been interpreted to apply to all information received in any “formal proceeding.” Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 24 (1947). In construing §3 (c), the District Court for the District of Columbia has stated: “Of course, the public interest in open hearings places the burden on the plaintiffs to show that their documents should be received in confidence.” Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D. C. D. C. 1963). See also Davis, Administrative Law § 8.09 (1958). See generally Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225 (1957); Note, 72 Yale L. J. 1227 (1963). Statement of Senator Magnuson, 101 Cong. Rec. 7629. Respondents do not contend that a denial of confidential treatment would result in the abridgment of any constitutional right. See note 15, supra. It should also be noted that during the initial proceeding before the Presiding Officer when respondent Schreiber first objected to disclosure of the Annex B information, he was afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel. In addition, the Commission rules then in effect contained no restrictions on the right of counsel to prepare written documents in support of requests for confidential treatment or on the right of witnesses, such as respondent Schreiber, to submit such documents.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MARION et al. No. 70-19. Argued November 8, 1971 Decided December 20, 1971 Deputy Solicitor General Greenawalt argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Petersen, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Mervyn Hamburg. Thomas Penfield Jackson argued the cause for appel-lees and filed a brief for appellee Marion. Benjamin Wright Gotten filed a brief for appellee Cratch. Alan Y. Cole and Isaac N. Groner filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires us to decide whether dismissal of a federal indictment was constitutionally required by reason of a period of three years between the occurrence of the alleged criminal acts and the filing of the indictment. On April 21, 1970, the two appellees were indicted and charged in 19 counts with operating a business known as Allied Enterprises, Inc., which was engaged in the business of selling and installing home improvements such as intercom sets, fire control devices, and burglary detection systems. Allegedly, the business was fraudulently conducted and involved misrepresentations, alterations of documents, and deliberate nonperformance of contracts. The period covered by the indictment was March 15, 1965, to February 6, 1967; the earliest specific act alleged occurred on September 3, 1965, the latest on January 19, 1966. On May 5, 1970, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the indictment “for failure to commence prosecution of the alleged offenses charged therein within such time as to afford [them their] rights to due process of law and to a speedy trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” No evidence was submitted, but from the motion itself and the arguments of counsel at the hearing on the motion, it appears that Allied Enterprises had been subject to a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist order on February 6, 1967, and that a series of articles appeared in the Washington Post in October 1967, reporting the results of that newspaper’s investigation of practices employed by home improvement firms such as Allied. The articles also contained purported statements of the then United States Attorney for the District of Columbia describing his office’s investigation of these firms and predicting that indictments would soon be forthcoming. Although the statements attributed to the United States Attorney did not mention Allied specifically, that company was mentioned in the course of the newspaper stories. In the summer of 1968, at the request of the United States Attorney’s office, Allied delivered certain of its records to that office, and in an interview there appellee Marion discussed his conduct as an officer of Allied Enterprises. The grand jury that indicted appellees was not impaneled until September 1969, appellees were not informed of the grand jury’s concern with them until March 1970, and the indictment was finally handed down in April. Appellees moved to dismiss because the indictment was returned "an unreasonably oppressive and unjustifiable time after the alleged offenses.” They argued that the indictment required memory of many specific acts and conversations occurring several years before, and they contended that the delay was due to the negligence or indifference of the United States Attorney in investigating the ease and presenting it to a grand jury. No specific prejudice was claimed or demonstrated. The District Court judge dismissed the indictment for “lack of speedy prosecution” at the conclusion of the hearing and remarked that since the Government must have become aware of the relevant facts in 1967, the defense of the case “is bound to have been seriously prejudiced by the delay of at least some three years in bringing the prosecution that should have been brought in 1967, or at the very latest early 1968.” The United States appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V). We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits of the case. We now hold that the Court has jurisdiction, and on the merits we reverse the judgment of the District Court. I Prior to its recent amendment, 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V) authorized an appeal to this Court by the United States when in any criminal case a district court sustained “a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy/’ It is plain to us that the appeal of the United States is within the purview of this section. Appellees had not been placed in jeopardy when the District Court rendered its judgment. The trial judge based his ruling on undue delay prior to indictment, a matter that was beyond the power of the Government to cure since re-indictment would not have been permissible under such a ruling. The motion to dismiss rested on grounds that had nothing to do with guilt or innocence or the truth of the allegations in the indictment but was, rather, a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance, that is, where the defendant does not deny that he has committed the acts alleged and that the acts were a crime but instead pleads that he cannot be prosecuted because of some extraneous factor, such as the running of the statute of limitations or the denial of a speedy trial. See United States v. Weller, 401 U. S. 264, 260 (1971). The motion rested on constitutional grounds exclusively, and neither the motion, the arguments of counsel, the Court’s oral opinion, nor its judgment mentioned Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 (b), as a ground for dismissal. Our jurisdiction to hear this appeal has been satisfactorily established. II Appellees do not claim that the Sixth Amendment was violated by the two-month delay between the return of the indictment and its dismissal. Instead, they claim that their rights to a speedy trial were violated by the period of approximately three years between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the return of the indictment; it is argued that this delay is so substantial and inherently prejudicial that the Sixth Amendment required the dismissal of the indictment. In our view, however, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an “accused,” an event that occurred in this case only when the appellees were indicted on April 21, 1970. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been “accused” in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time. The Amendment would appear to guarantee to a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposition of the charges against him. “[T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed.” Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 10 (1959). Our attention is called to nothing in the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Amendment indicating that it does not mean what it appears to say, nor is there more than marginal support for the proposition that, at the time of the adoption of the Amendment, the prevailing rule was that prosecutions would not be permitted if there had been long delay in presenting a charge. The framers could hardly have selected less appropriate language if they had intended the speedy trial provision to protect against pre-accusation delay. No opinions of this Court intimate support for appellees’ thesis, and the courts of appeals that have considered the question in constitutional terms have never reversed a conviction or dismissed an indictment solely on the basis of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial provision where only pre-indictment delay was involved. Legislative efforts to implement federal and state speedy trial provisions also plainly reveal the view that these guarantees are applicable only after a person has been accused of a crime. The Court has pointed out that “[a]t the common law and in the absence of special statutes of limitations the mere failure to find an indictment will not operate to discharge the accused from the offense nor will a nolle prosequi entered by the Government or the failure of the grand jury to indict.” United States v. Cadarr, 197 U. S. 475, 478 (1905). Since it is “doubtless true that in some cases the power of the Government has been abused and charges have been kept hanging over the heads of citizens, and they have been committed for unreasonable periods, resulting in hardship,” the Court noted that many States “[w]ith a view to preventing such wrong to the citizen . . . [and] in aid of the constitutional provisions, National and state, intended to secure to the accused a speedy trial” had passed statutes limiting the time within which such trial must occur after charge or indictment. Characteristically, these statutes to which the Court referred are triggered only when a citizen is charged or accused. The statutes vary greatly in substance, structure, and interpretation, but a common denominator is that “[i]n no event . . . [does] the right to speedy trial arise before there is some charge or arrest, even though the prosecuting authorities had knowledge of the offense long before this.” Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 57 Col. L. Rev. 846, 848 (1957). No federal statute of general applicability has been enacted by Congress to enforce the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment, but Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 (b), which has the force of law, authorizes dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint “[i]f there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial . . . .” The rule clearly is limited to post-arrest situations. Appellees’ position is, therefore, at odds with longstanding legislative and judicial constructions of the speedy trial provisions in both national and state constitutions. III It is apparent also that very little support for appel-lees’ position emerges from a consideration of the purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial provision, a guarantee that this Court has termed “an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966); see also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 Ü. S. 213, 221-226 (1967); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 37-38 (1970). Inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a defendant’s ability to present an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 377-378 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. Invocation, of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to arrest. Until this event occurs, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public accusation: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer. Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself. But this possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper context. Possible prejudice is inherent in any delay, however short; it may also weaken the Government’s case. The law has provided other mechanisms to guard against possible as distinguished from actual prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and arrest or charge. As we said in United States v. Ewell, supra, at 122, “the applicable statute of limitations . . . is . . . the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.” Such statutes represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; they “are made for the repose of society and the protection of those who may [during the limitation] . . . have lost their means of defence.” Public Schools v. Walker, 9 Wall. 282, 288 (1870). These statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced. As this Court observed in Toussie v. United States, 397 U. S. 112, 114-115 (1970): “The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.” There is thus no need to press the Sixth Amendment into service to guard against the mere possibility that pre-accusation delays will prejudice the defense in a criminal case since statutes of limitation already perform that function. Since appellees rely only on potential prejudice and the passage of time between the alleged crime and the indictment, see Part IV, infra, we perhaps need go no further to dispose of this case, for the indictment was the first official act designating appellees as accused individuals and that event occurred within the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, since a criminal trial is the likely consequence of our judgment and since appellees may claim actual prejudice to their defense, it is appropriate to note here that the statute of limitations does not fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959). However, we need not, and could not now, determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution. Actual prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may result from the shortest and most necessary delay; and no one suggests that every delay-caused detriment to a defendant’s case should abort a criminal prosecution. To accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case. It would be unwise at this juncture to attempt to forecast our decision in such cases. IV In the case before us, neither appellee was arrested, charged, or otherwise subjected to formal restraint prior to indictment. It was this event, therefore, that transformed the appellees into “accused” defendants who are subject to the speedy trial protections of the Sixth Amendment. The 38-month delay between the end of the scheme charged in the indictment and the date the defendants were indicted did not extend beyond the period of the applicable statute of limitations here. Appellees have not, of course, been able to claim undue delay pending trial, since the indictment was brought on April 21, 1970, and dismissed on June 8, 1970. Nor have appellees adequately demonstrated that the pre-indictment delay by the Government violated the Due Process Clause. No actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them. Appellees rely solely on the real possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended delay: that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost. In light of the applicable statute of limitations, however, these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that appellees cannot receive a fair trial and to therefore justify the dismissal of the indictment. Events of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time appellees’ due process claims are speculative and premature. Reversed. App. 39. The court’s oral decision consisted of the following statement: “It appears to the Court that the matters complained of occurred between March 1965 and January 1966. It further appears that these matters were known from early 1967 or a matter of common knowledge in late 1967. There appears no reason why a three-year delay from 1967 was justified by the necessity of research and examination delving into the various transactions, they could have been discovered and handled much, much sooner, certainly probably during the year 1967 or at the latest early 1968. “The defendants have been indicted on 19 counts, each of which I believe carries a ten-year sentence, each of which is a separate, distinct transaction which would justify consecutive sentences, and by the very nature of this outrageous scheme if the allegations could be believed, the ability to remember, to build up in one’s recollection, to produce the necessary defense, is bound to have been seriously prejudiced by the delay of at least some three years in bringing the prosecution that should have been brought in 1967, or at the very latest early 1968. “The Court, therefore, views that there has been a lack of speedy prosecution in this case, and will grant the motion to dismiss.” Ibid. The Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V), at the time of this appeal, provided in relevant part: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: “From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, § 14 (a), 84 Stat. 1890, amended the Criminal Appeals Act to read in pertinent part as follows: “In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.” This amendment thus terminated the Court’s appellate jurisdiction of Government appeals from district court judgments in federal criminal cases. Pending cases were not affected by the amendment, however, since subsection (b) of § 14 provides: “The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to any criminal case begun in any district court before the effective date of this section.” The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 took effect on January 2, 1971; the appellees in this case were indicted on April 21, 1970. 401 U. S. 934 (1971). Rule 48(b) provides that: “If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.” In any event, it is doubtful that Rule 48 (b) applies in the circumstances of this case, where the indictment was the first formal act in the criminal prosecution of these appellees. See cases cited in n. 11, infra. The history of the speedy trial provision is sparse and unillu-minating with respect to the issue before us. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 31-32, 34 (1951); R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, p. 202 (1955); I. Brant, The Bill of Rights 223 (1965); Dumbauld, State Precedents for the Bill of Rights, 7 J. Pub. L. 323, 335 n. 91 (1958); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 476, 484 (1968). A single case that antedates the Bill of Rights, Rex v. Robinson, 1 Black. W. 541, 96 Eng. Rep. 313 (K. B. 1765), and three 19th century British cases, Rex v. Marshall, 13 East 322, 104 Eng. Rep. 394 (K. B. 1811); Regina v. Hext, 4 Jurist 339 (Q. B. 1840); Regina v. Robins, 1 Cox’s C. C. 114 (Somerset Winter Assizes 1844), are cited for the proposition that the framers intended to protect against pre-indictment delay by enacting the Sixth Amendment. These cases fail to establish a definite rule that the Founders sought to constitutionalize, however, and the Government’s argument concerning the history of the Sixth Amendment, while not dispositive, is more persuasive. Brief for the United States 15-18. The Government points out that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, provided for "more speedy Relief of all Persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed criminal Matters" and required that persons jailed for felonies or treason be brought to trial upon their own motion within two terms of court or be discharged on bail. The Act does not allude to delay before arrest. Most of the States that ratified the Bill of Rights had either adopted the British Act or passed a similar law, Petition of Provoo, 17 F. R. D. 183, 197 n. 6 (Md.), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Provoo, 350 U. S. 857 (1955), and many of them had speedy trial provisions in their own constitutions which were modeled on the British Act. Article 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which may have been the model Madison used for the Sixth Amendment, Rutland, supra, n. 5, at 202, secured the right to a speedy trial in "criminal prosecutions" where "a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation." See generally Heller, supra, n. 5, at 23. Insofar as this meager evidence is probative at all, it seems to imply that the Sixth Amendment was designed to assure that those accused of crimes would have their trial without undue delay. This Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee in only a small number of cases. See, e. g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354 (1957); United States v. Provoo, supra, n. 6; Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77 (1905). See also Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 10 (1959). Most courts of appeals have recognized the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial only after a prosecution has been formally initiated or have held that the sole safeguard against pre-indictment delay is the relevant statute of limitations: United States v. Feinberg, 383 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 1967); Carlo v. United States, 286 F. 2d 841, 846 (CA2), cert. denied, 366 U. S. 944 (1961); Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F. 2d 182, 185 n. 3 (CA4 1968); United States v. Durham, 413 F. 2d 1003, 1004 (CA5 1969); Kroll v. United States, 433 F. 2d 1282, 1286 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 944 (1971); United States v. Grayson, 416 F. 2d 1073, 1076-1077 (CA5 1969); United States v. Wilson, 342 F. 2d 782, 783 (CA5), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 860 (1965); Donnell v. United States, 229 F. 2d 560, 567 (CA5 1956); Harlow v. United States, 301 F. 2d 361, 366 (CA5), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 814 (1962); Bruce v. United States, 351 F. 2d 318, 320 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 921 (1966); Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F. 2d 465, 469 (CA6 1959); United States v. Harris, 412 F. 2d 471, 473 (CA6 1969); Lothridge v. United States, 441 F. 2d 919, 922 (CA6 1971); Parker v. United States, 252 F. 2d 680, 681 (CA6), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 964 (1958); Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F. 2d 494 (CA6 1971); United States v. Panczko, 367 F. 2d 737, 738-739 (CA7 1966); Terlikowski v. United States, 379 F. 2d 501, 504 (CA8), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1008 (1967); Foley v. United States, 290 F. 2d 562, 565 (CA8 1961); Benson v. United States, 402 F. 2d 576, 579 (CA9 1968); Venus v. United States, 287 F. 2d 304, 307 (CA9 1960), rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 368 U. S. 345 (1961); D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F. 2d 338, 350 (CA9 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 935 (1952); United States v. Reed, 413 F. 2d 338, 340 (CA10 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Sartain v. United States, 397 U. S. 954 (1970); Nickens v. United States, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 338, 340, 323 F. 2d 808, 810 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 905 (1964). Some courts of appeals have stated that pre-indictment delay may be cause for dismissal but they have seemed to treat the question primarily as one of due process (although the Sixth Amendment is occasionally mentioned) and have required a showing of actual prejudice: Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F. 2d 735, 737 (CA1 1967); Fleming v. United States, 378 F. 2d 502, 504 (CA1 1967); United States v. Capaldo, 402 F. 2d 821, 823 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 989 (1969); United States v. Simmons, 338 F. 2d 804, 806 (CA2 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 983 (1965); United States v. Holiday, 319 F. 2d 775, 776 (CA2 1963); United States v. Hammond, 360 F. 2d 688, 689 (CA2 1966); United States v. Dickerson, 347 F. 2d 783, 784 (CA2 1965); United States v. Rivera, 346 F. 2d 942, 943 (CA2 1965); United States v. Sanchez, 361 F. 2d 824, 825 (CA2 1966); United States v. Harbin, 377 F. 2d 78, 79, 80 n. 1 (CA4 1967); United States v. Lee, 413 F. 2d 910, 912-913 (CA7 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1022 (1970); United States v. Napue, 401 F. 2d 107, 114-115 (CA7 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1024 (1969); Lucas v. United States, 363 F. 2d 500, 502 (CA9 1966); Sanchez v. United States, 341 F. 2d 225, 228 n. 3 (CA9), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 856 (1965); Acree v. United States, 418 F. 2d 427, 430 (CA10 1969). Although Petition of Provoo, 17 F. R. D. 183 (Md.), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Provoo, 350 U. S. 857 (1955), is sometimes cited for the proposition that pre-indictment delay will justify dismissal, the District Court explicitly stated that it considered this delay to be relevant only on the issue of whether the defendant had been denied a fair trial. 17 F. R. D., at 202. In Taylor v. United States, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 183, 238 F. 2d 259 (1956), a conviction was vacated where there had been a six-year delay between the crime (housebreaking) and trial, 3 1/2 years of which was a delay between crime and indictment; the defendant had been in prison on another charge during this time, and the defendant was substantially prejudiced in his ability to defend against the housebreaking charge. The Court of Appeals stated: "We do not rely on the mere lapse of time between the commission of the offenses and the date of indictment, considered by itself, for that is governed by the statute of limitations. It is the combination of the factors set forth above [post-indictment delay, prejudice] which motivates our decision." Id., at 186, 238 F. 2d, at 262. In three instances district courts have held, however, that "delay" for Sixth Amendment purposes must be computed from the time of the crime or from the time when the Government considers the defendants’ actions criminal, and have dismissed indictments for excessive delay. United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (DC 1965); United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585 (Alaska 1970); United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41 (DC 1963). There is a unique line of cases in the District of Columbia Circuit concerning pre-indictment delay in narcotics cases where the Government relies on secret informers and (frequently) on single transactions. These cases take a more rigid stance against such delays, but they are based on the Court of Appeals’ purported supervisory jurisdiction and not on the Sixth Amendment. See, e. g., Ross v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 233, 238, 349 F. 2d 210, 215 (1965); Bey v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 337, 350 F. 2d 467 (1965); Powell v. United States, 122 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 231, 352 F. 2d 705, 707 (1965); Tynan v. United States, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 206, 208, 376 F. 2d 761, 763 (1967) (explicitly limiting Ross). The provision the Court dealt with in Cadarr was § 939 of the then District of Columbia Code adopted by Congress, 31 Stat. 1342. That section provided that if any person “charged with a criminal offense shall have been committed or held to bail,” the grand jury must act within a specified time or the accused would be set free. The provision remains in the present code as § 23-102, 84 Stat. 605, and then, as now, does not purport to reach behind the time of charge, commitment, or holding for bail. See, e. g., Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 103-5 (a) (1969); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, §781 (1964); Cal. Pen. Code § 1382 (1970); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-191 (1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.556 (1967). A more comprehensive list of such state statutes appears in American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial 14-15 (Approved Draft 1968). The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York recently promulgated rules on trial delay and detention which cover defendants who are “held in custody” and which begin computation of delay periods from the date of arrest. Rule 29.1, New York Law Journal, April 30, 1971, p. 1, col. 6. See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 476 (1968); Note, Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due Process Standards, 43 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 722 (1968); Note, Constitutional Limits on Pre-Arrest Delay, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 670 (1966); Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Ya. L. Rev. 1587 (1965); Note, Justice Overdue — Speedy Trial for the Potential Defendant, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 95 (1952). The rules that the Second Circuit en banc recently adopted in United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F. 2d 1312 (CA2 1971), which appear in Appendix, 28 U. S. C. A. (May 1971 Supp.), require trial within a specified period but apply to “all persons held in jail prior to trial” and “defendants” in “all other criminal cases.” Rule 2. Rule 4 provides that: “In all cases the government must be ready for trial within six months from the date of the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a complaint or of a formal charge upon which the defendant is to be tried (other than a sealed indictment), whichever is earliest.” See generally Comment, Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 71 Col. L. Rev. 1059 (1971). Cf. also S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., a bill intended “[t]o give effect to the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial for persons charged with offenses against the United States.” The protections of the bill are engaged “within sixty days from the date the defendant is arrested or a summons is issued, except that if an information or indictment is filed, then within sixty days from the date of such filing.” §3161 (b)(1). Nickens v. United States, supra, at 339, 323 F. 2d, at 809; Harlow v. United States, supra; Hoopengarner v. United States, supra; United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710, 720-721 (SD Fla. 1962). In its Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, n. 10, supra, at 6, the ABA defined the time at which the beginning of the delay period should be computed as “the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been continuously held in custody or on bail or recognizance until that date to answer for the same crime or a crime based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, then the time for trial should commence running from the date he was held to answer.” Rule 2.2 (a). Under the ABA Standards, after a defendant is charged, it is contemplated that his right to a speedy trial would be measured by a statutory time period excluding necessary and other justifiable delays; there is no necessity to allege or show prejudice to the defense. Rule 2.1, ibid. Extending a Sixth Amendment right to a period prior to indictment or holding to answer would also create procedural problems: “[W]hile other rights may be violated by delay in arrest or charge, it does not follow that the time for trial should be counted from any date of inaction preceding filing of the charge or holding the defendant to answer. To recognize a general speedy trial right commencing as of the time arrest or charging was possible would have unfortunate consequences for the operation of the criminal justice system. Allowing inquiry into when the police could have arrested or when the prosecutor could have charged would raise difficult problems of proof. As one court said, ‘the Court would be engaged in lengthy hearings in every case to determine whether or not the prosecuting authorities had proceeded diligently or otherwise.’ [United States v. Port, Crim. No. 33162, (ND Cal., June 2, 1952). Quoted in Note, Justice Overdue — Speedy Trial for the Potential Defendant, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 95, 101-102, n. 34.]” Commentary to Rule 2.2 (a), Speedy Trial, n. 10, supra, at 23. The Court has indicated that criminal statutes of limitation are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose. United States v. Habig, 390 U. S. 222, 227 (1968). The policies behind civil statutes of limitation are in many ways similar. They "represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate," Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314 (1945), and their underlying rationale is "to encourage promptness in the bringing of actions, that the parties shall not suffer by loss of evidence from death or disappearance of witnesses, destruction of documents or failure of memory." Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 672 (1913). Such statutes "are founded upon the general experience of mankind that claims, which are valid, are not usually allowed to remain neglected," Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386, 390 (1869), they "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared," Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342, 348-349 (1944), and they "are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. . . . [C]ourts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights." Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428 (1965). As in the criminal law area, such statutes represent a legislative judgment about the balance of equities in a situation involving the tardy assertion of otherwise valid rights: "The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 349. "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been committed.” 18 U. S. C. § 3282. Brief for the United States 26-27. A number of courts of appeals have considered the question. See, e. g., Benson v. United States, 402 F. 2d, at 580; Schlinsky v. United States, supra; United States v. Capaldo, supra; United States v. Lee, 413 F. 2d, at 913; United States v. Wilson, supra; United States v. Harbin, 377 F. 2d, at 80; Acree v. United States, supra; Nickens v. United States, supra, at 340 n. 2, 323 F. 2d, at 810 n. 2. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 310 (1966): “There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause tu arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KOSAK v. UNITED STATES No. 82-618. Argued November 7, 1983 Decided March 21, 1984 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 862. Jeffrey L. Naftulin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Marc Richman. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether 28 U. S. C. § 2680(c), which exempts from the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs,” precludes recovery against the United States for injury to private property sustained during a temporary detention of the property by the Customs Service. HH While a serviceman stationed in Guam, petitioner assembled a large collection of oriental art. When he was transferred from Guam to Philadelphia, petitioner brought his art collection with him. In his customs declaration, petitioner stated that he intended to keep the contents of the collection for himself. Subsequently, acting upon information that, contrary to his representations, petitioner planned to resell portions of his collection, agents of the United States Customs Service obtained a valid warrant to search petitioner’s house. In executing that warrant, the agents seized various antiques and other objects of art. Petitioner was charged with smuggling his art collection into the country, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 545. After a jury trial, he was acquitted. The Customs Service then notified petitioner that the seized objects were subject to civil forfeiture under 19 U. S. C. § 1592, which at the time permitted confiscation of goods brought into the United States “by means of any false statement.” Relying on 19 U. S. C. § 1618, petitioner filed a petition for relief from the forfeiture. The Customs Service granted the petition and returned the goods. Alleging that some of the objects returned to him had been injured while in the custody of the Customs Service, petitioner filed an administrative complaint with the Service requesting compensation for the damage. The Customs Service denied relief. Relying on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), petitioner then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking approximately $12,000 in damages for the alleged injury to his property. The Government moved for a dismissal of the complaint or for summary judgment on the ground that petitioner’s claim was barred by § 2680(c). The District Court granted the Government’s motion. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 679 F. 2d 306 (CA3 1982). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the United States may be held liable for torts committed by its employees only on the basis of a statutory provision evincing a “‘clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity.’” Id., at 309 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). In the court’s view, the Federal Tort Claims Act, as qualified by § 2680(c), fails to provide the necessary relinquishment of governmental immunity from suits alleging that customs officials damaged or lost detained property. On the contrary, the court observed, the “clear language” of § 2680(c) shields the United States from “all claims arising out of detention of goods by customs officers and does not purport to distinguish among types of harm.” 679 F. 2d, at 308. On that basis, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the liability of the United States for injuries caused by the negligence of customs officials in handling property in their possession. 459 U. S. 1101 (1983). We now affirm. II A The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, provides generally that the United States shall be liable, to the same extent as a private party, “for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U. S. C. §2674. The Act’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity is, however, subject to 13 enumerated exceptions. 28 U. S. C. §§2680(a)-(f), (h)-(n). One of those exceptions, § 2680(c), exempts from the coverage of the statute “[a]ny claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs . . . .” Petitioner asks us to construe the foregoing language to cover only claims “for damage caused by the detention itself and not for the negligent. . . destruction of property while it is in the possession of the customs service.” By “damage caused by the detention itself,” petitioner appears to mean harms attributable to an illegal detention, such as a decline in the economic value of detained goods (either because of depreciation or because of a drop in the price the goods will fetch), injury resulting from deprivation of the ability to make use of the goods during the period of detention, or consequential damages resulting from lack of access to the goods. The Government asks us to read the exception to cover all injuries to property sustained during its detention by customs officials. The starting point of our analysis of these competing interpretations must, of course, be the language of § 2680(c). “[W]e assume ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.’” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)). At first blush, the statutory language certainly appears expansive enough to support the Government’s construction; the encompassing phrase, “arising in respect of,” seems to sweep within the exception all injuries associated in any way with the “detention” of goods. It must be admitted that this initial reading is not ineluctable; as Judge Weis, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, pointed out, it is possible (with some effort) to read the phrase, “in respect of” as the equivalent of “as regards” and thereby to infer that “the statutory exception is directed to the fact of detention itself, and that alone.” 679 F. 2d, at 310. But we think that the fairest interpretation of the crucial portion of the provision is the one that first springs to mind: “any claim arising in respect of” the detention of goods means any claim “arising out of” the detention of goods, and includes a claim resulting from negligent handling or storage of detained property. Relying on the analysis of the Second Circuit in Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (1958), petitioner argues that the foregoing reading of the plain language of § 2680(c) is undercut by the context in which the provision appears. “That the exception does not and was not intended to bar actions based on the negligent destruction, injury or loss of goods in the possession or control of the customs authorities is best illustrated by the fact that the exception immediately preceding it expressly bars actions ‘arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission’ of mail. 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(b). If Congress had similarly wished to bar actions based on the negligent loss of goods which governmental agencies other than the postal system undertook to handle, the exception in 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680(b) shows that it would have been equal to the task. The conclusion is inescapable that it did not choose to bestow upon all such agencies general absolution from carelessness in handling property belonging to others.” Id., at 534. We find the conclusion reached by petitioner and the Second Circuit far from “inescapable.” The specificity of § 2680(b), in contrast with the generality of § 2680(c), suggests, if anything, that Congress intended the former to be less encompassing than the latter. The motivation for such an intent is not hard to find. One of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at fault. In order to ensure that § 2680(b), which governs torts committed by mailmen, did not have the effect of barring precisely the sort of suit that Congress was most concerned to authorize, the draftsmen of the provision carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the Government was not assuming financial responsibility — namely, “the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter” — thereby excluding, by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles. The absence of any analogous desire to limit the reach of the statutory exception pertaining to the detention of property by customs officials explains the lack of comparable nicety in the phraseology of § 2680(c). B The legislative history of § 2680(c), though meager, supports the interpretation of the provision that we have derived from its language and context. Two specific aspects of the evolution of the provision are telling. First, the person who almost certainly drafted the language under consideration clearly thought that it covered injury to detained property caused by the negligence of customs officials. It appears that the portion of § 2680(c) pertaining to the detention of goods was first written by Judge Alexander Holtzoff, one of the major figures in the development of the Tort Claims Act. In his report explicating his proposals, Judge Holtzoff explained: “[The proposed provision would exempt from the coverage of the Act] [c]laims arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty. This exception appears in all previous drafts. It is expanded, however, so as to include immunity from liability in respect of loss in connection with the detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise. The additional proviso has special reference to the detention of imported goods in appraisers’ warehouses or customs houses, as well as seizures by law enforcement officials, internal revenue officers, and the like.” A. Holtzoff, Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1981) (Holtzoff Report) (emphasis added). Though it cannot be definitively established that Congress relied upon Judge Holtzoff’s report, it is significant that the apparent draftsman of the crucial portion of § 2680(c) believed that it would bar a suit of the sort brought by petitioner. Second, the congressional Committees that submitted Reports on the various bills that ultimately became the Tort Claims Act suggested that the provision that was to become § 2680(c), like the other exceptions from the waiver of sovereign immunity, covered claims “arising out of” the designated conduct. Thus, for example, the House Judiciary Committee described the proposed exceptions as follows: “These exemptions cover claims arising out of the loss or miscarriage of postal matter; the assessment or collection of taxes or assessments; the detention of goods by customs officers; admiralty and maritime torts; deliberate torts such as assault and battery; and others.” H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). The Committees’ casual use of the words, “arising out of,” with reference to the exemption of claims pertaining to the detention of goods substantially undermines petitioner’s contention that the phrase, “in respect of,” was designed to limit the sorts of suits covered by the provision. Of perhaps greater importance than these two clues as to the meaning of the prepositional phrase contained in § 2680(c) is the fact that our interpretation of the plain language of the provision accords with what we know of Congress’ general purposes in creating exceptions to the Tort Claims Act. The three objectives most often mentioned in the legislative history as rationales for the enumerated exceptions are: ensuring that “certain governmental activities” not be disrupted by the threat of damages suits; avoiding exposure of the United States to liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not extending the coverage of the Act to suits for which adequate remedies were already available. The exemption of claims for damage to goods in the custody of customs officials is certainly consistent with the first two of these purposes. One of the most important sanctions available to the Customs Service in ensuring compliance with the customs laws is its power to detain goods owned by suspected violators of those laws. Congress may well have wished not to dampen the enforcement efforts of the Service by exposing the Government to private damages suits by disgruntled owners of detained property. Congress may also have been concerned that a waiver of immunity from suits alleging damage to detained property would expose the United States to liability for fraudulent claims. The Customs Service does not have the staff or resources it would need to inspect goods at the time it seizes them. Lacking a record of the condition of a piece of property when the Service took custody of it, the Government would be in a poor position to defend a suit in which the owner alleged that the item was returned in damaged condition. Congress may have reasoned that the frequency with which the Government would be obliged to pay undeserving claimants if it waived immunity from such suits offset the inequity, resulting from retention of immunity, to persons with legitimate grievances. To a lesser extent, our reading of § 2680(c) is consistent with the third articulated purpose of the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act. At common law, a property owner had (and retains) a right to bring suit against an individual customs official who negligently damaged his goods. Title 28 U. S. C. §2006 provides that judgments in such suits shall be paid out of the Federal Treasury if a court certifies that there existed probable cause for the detention of the goods and that the official was acting under the directions of an appropriate supervisor. Congress in 1946 may have concluded that this mode of obtaining recompense from the United States (or from an individual officer) was “adequate.” To be sure, there are significant limitations to the common-law remedy, the most important of which is the apparent requirement that the plaintiff prove negligence on the part of a particular customs official. Such proof will often be difficult to come by. But Congress may well have concluded that exposing the United States to liability for injury to property in the custody of the Customs Service under circumstances in which the owner is not able to demonstrate such specific negligence would open the door to an excessive number of fraudulent suits. rH HH HH Petitioner and some commentators argue that § 2680(c) should not be construed in a fashion that denies an effectual remedy to many persons whose property is damaged through the tortious conduct of customs officials. That contention has force, but it is properly addressed to Congress, not to this Court. The language of the statute as it was written leaves us no choice but to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the Tort Claims Act does not cover suits alleging that customs officials injured property that had been detained by the Customs Service. It is so ordered. Because Guam is outside the customs territory of the United States, all goods imported therefrom are subject to duties. 19 U. S. C. § 1202. Section 1618 permits the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or mitigate a forfeiture “if he finds that such . . . forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances as to justify the remission or mitigation of such . . . forfeiture . . . .” Petitioner also requested damages for two other alleged injuries related to the seizure and detention of his property: the destruction of a cork pagoda by customs officials during the search of petitioner’s house, and the accidental seizure of a sales receipt for a stereo receiver (without which petitioner was unable to obtain warranty repairs). App. 6-7. In his brief, petitioner argues that these two claims are segregable from his primary claim for damages resulting from the injury to the detained goods and merit separate analysis. Because petitioner did not present this argument to the Court of Appeals, we decline to consider it. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 788, n. 7 (1977). Civil Action No. 81-2054 (ED Pa. Oct. 15, 1981). The District Court did not identify the grounds for its ruling. We see no reason to doubt the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals that the District Court was persuaded by the Government’s argument that § 2680(c) barred the suit. 679 F. 2d 306, 307, and n. 2. It would have been better practice, however, for the District Court to have noted the reasons for its judgment. In three cases, Courts of Appeals have construed § 2680(c) in ways that would not bar petitioner’s suit. A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F. 2d 669 (CA5 1982); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F. 2d 849 (CA9 1978); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (CA2 1958). In two other cases, Courts of Appeals have read the provision as did the Third Circuit in this case. United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Aircraft, 662 F. 2d 1372 (CA11 1981); United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443 AY, 501 F. 2d 1327 (CA5 1974). In Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 462, n. 3 (1980), we acknowledged the divergence in the views of the Circuits but expressly declined to decide the issue. The full text of § 2680(c) provides: “The provisions of [28 U. S. C. §§ 2671-2679] and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— “(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.” We have no occasion in this case to decide what kinds of “law-enforcement officer[s],” other than customs officials, are covered by the exception. In view of the fact that the Tort Claims Act permits recovery only of “money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), it is unclear whether, even in the absence of § 2680(c), any of the foregoing sorts of damage would be recoverable under the Act. Cf., e. g., Idaho ex rel. Trombley v. United States Dept. of Army, Corps of Engineers, 666 F. 2d 444 (CA9) (adopting a restrictive interpretation of the language of § 1346(b)), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 823 (1982). If the sorts of damages that, under petitioner’s theory, are covered by § 2680(c) would not be recoverable in any event because of the limitation built into § 1346(b), § 2680(c) would be mere surplusage. The unattractiveness of such a construction of the statute, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 392 (1979), would cast considerable doubt on petitioner’s position. However, because the question of the scope of § 1346(b) has not been briefed or argued in this case, we decline to rely on any inferences that might be drawn therefrom in our decision today. Because petitioner conceded below that the injuries to his property occurred after it had been lawfully detained by customs officers, we need not consider the meaning of the term “detention” as used in the statute. The Court of Appeals, while properly emphasizing the plain language of § 2680(c) as the basis for its ruling, suggested that the structure of the Tort Claims Act should affect how that language is read. Relying on the principles that “sovereign immunity is the rule, and that legislative departures from the rule must be strictly construed,” the Court of Appeals suggested that § 2680(c), as an exception from a statute waiving sovereign immunity, should be broadly construed. 679 F. 2d, at 308-309. We find such an approach unhelpful. Though the Court of Appeals is certainly correct that the exceptions to the Tort Claims Act should not be read in a way that would “‘nullif[y them] through judicial interpretation,’” id., at 309, unduly generous interpretations of the exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of the statute. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 548, n. 5 (1951); cf. Block v. Neal, 460 U. S. 289, 298 (1983) (“‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced’ ”) (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.)). We think that the proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 is to identify “those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exception” — no less and no more. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953). For reiterations of this argument, see A & D International, Inc. v. United States, 665 F. 2d, at 672; A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F. 2d, at 850. See General Tort Bill: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Claims, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1932) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Rugg). Judge Holtzoff went on to explain that “[t]his provision is suggested in the proposed draft of the bill submitted by the Crown Proceedings Committee in England in 1927. ...” Holtzoff Report, at 16. The relevant portion of the bill to which Holtzoff referred was even more explicit: “No proceedings shall lie under this section— “(c) for or in respect of the loss of or any deterioration or damage occasioned to, or any delay in the release of, any goods or merchandise by reason of anything done or omitted to be done by any officer of customs and excise acting as such . . . .” Report of Crown Proceedings Committee §ll(5)(c), pp. 17-18 (Apr. 1927). (It appears that this bill was never enacted into law in England.) Mr. Holtzoff wrote his report while serving as Special Assistant to the Attorney General. He had been “assigned by Attorney General Mitchell to the special task of co-ordinating the views of the Government departments” regarding the proper scope of a tort claims statute. See Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, n. 2 (1983). Holtzoff submitted his report, in which his draft bill was contained, to Assistant Attorney General Rugg, who in turn transmitted it to the General Accounting Office of the Comptroller General. Insofar as Holtzoff’s report embodied the views of the Executive Department at that stage of the debates over the tort claims bill, it is likely that, at some point, the report was brought to the attention of the Congressmen considering the bill. We agree with the dissent that, because the report was never introduced into the public record, the ideas expressed therein should not be given great weight in determining the intent of the Legislature. See post, at 863-864. But, in the absence of any direct evidence regarding how Members of Congress understood the provision that became § 2680(c), it seems to us senseless to ignore entirely the views of its draftsman. See also S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1942). Cf. 679 F. 2d, at 809 (Weis, J., dissenting) (discussed, supra, at 854). The dissent objects to our effort to test our interpretation of § 2680(c) for conformity with the legislative purposes that underlie § 2680 as a whole, principally on the ground that we take inadequate account of the “central purpose” of the Tort Claims Act. Post, at 866-869. The dissent mistakes the nature of our analysis. Our view is that the language of § 2680(c) is inclusive enough to exempt the United States from liability for negligence in the handling or storage of goods detained by the Customs Service, see supra, at 854. Our purpose in looking to the legislative history is merely to ensure that our construction is not undercut by any indication that Congress meant the exception to be read more narrowly. Because of the sparseness of the evidence regarding the purpose of § 2680(c) itself, see supra, at 855-858, we consider it advisable to consider Congress’ more general objectives in excluding certain kinds of claims from the broad waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the Tort Claims Act. Because we find that our reading of § 2680(c) is consistent with those objectives, we see no need to throw our analytical net any wider. For a variety of expressions of these three purposes, see S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946); Tort Claims: Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1942) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Shea); Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H. R. 7236 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 22 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff); Hearings, supra n. 11, at 17 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Rugg); Holtzoff Report, at 15. To our knowledge, the only arguably relevant specific statement as to the purpose of § 2680(c) appears in the testimony of Alexander Holtzoff before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Holtzoff emphasized the adequacy of existing remedies as a justification for the portion of the provision pertaining to the recovery of improperly collected taxes; he did not proffer an explanation for the portion of the provision pertaining to the detention of goods. Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 38 (1940). See, e. g., 19 U. S. C. § 1594 (authorizing seizure of “a vessel or vehicle” to force payment of assessed penalties); 19 U. S. C. § 1595a(a) (authorizing seizure of property used to facilitate the illegal importation of other goods). The Government’s vulnerability to fraudulent claims would be especially great in a case in which the Customs Service took custody of the goods from a shipper rather than from the owner. The shipper would contend that it exercised due care in the handling of the goods. The owner would demonstrate that he received the goods in damaged condition. In the absence of an extensive system for accounting for the movements and treatment of property in its custody, the Customs Service would be hard pressed to establish that its employees were not at fault. We do not suggest that such a dilemma would automatically give rise to liability on the part of the United States; that of course would depend upon the substance of the pertinent state tort law. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2674. But uneasiness at the prospect of such scenarios may have influenced Congress when it carved out this exception to the Tort Claims Act. See, e. g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F. 2d 1146, 1149 (CA4 1974); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774, 775 (CA2 1944); J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments §§ 613, 618, pp. 387, 390 (1832). See States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, supra, at 1149-1150. We note that there exists at least one other remedial system that might enable someone in petitioner’s position to obtain compensation from the Government. If the owner of property detained by the Customs Service were able to establish the existence of an implied-in-fact contract of bailment between himself and the Service, he could bring suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1976 ed., Supp. V). See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460 (1980). At oral argument, the Government contended that a property owner could recover against the United States under this theory by bringing suit against the relevant District Director of the Customs Service and would not be obliged to prove negligence on the part of any specific customs official. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. Though we do not decide the issue, such an interpretation of the common-law doctrine appears questionable to us. Except in cases in which the property owner could demonstrate that the Director expressly authorized tortious conduct by a subordinate, it seems likely that the owner would be obliged to identify and bring suit against the individual whose malfeasance caused the injury to his goods. The dissent finds “internally inconsistent” the foregoing “hypothetical rationales” for § 2680(c). Post, at 865. Thus, the dissent suggests that the fact that an owner of goods damaged by the Customs Service might recover from the United States under the Tucker Act, see n. 22, supra, makes it unlikely that Congress would have been chary of creating a remedy under the Tort Claims Act because of the risk of exposing the Government to an excessive number of fraudulent suits. Post, at 865-866. But the requirement that an owner, to recover under the Tucker Act, prove that the Service entered into an implied-in-fact contract of bailment would operate to screen out many fraudulent claims; Congress rationally could have concluded that, in view of the absence of any comparable filter in the Tort Claims Act, it was inadvisable to extend the coverage of the latter to owners of detained goods. Similarly, the dissent finds it implausible that Congress might have feared that the creation of a remedy against the United States under the Tort Claims Act would inhibit vigorous enforcement of the customs laws, see supra, at 859, when there already existed a common-law remedy against customs officials for negligence in the handling of goods, see supra, at 860-861. Post, at 866. But, as explained above, the apparent requirement that the owner, to recover under the common law, prove negligence on the part of a specific customs official, see supra, at 860-861, and n. 23, combined with the obligation of the United States to indemnify the official if he acted under proper authority, see supra, at 860, would have minimized the effect of the extant remedies on the willingness of the Service to adopt vigorous enforcement policies and the willingness of its officials to implement those policies. Congress might well have feared that the creation of a remedy under the Tort Claims Act would have increased the liability of the United States to such a degree as to curtail the exercise by the Service of its authority to detain goods. Comment, Governmental Liability for Customs Officials’ Negligence: Kosak v. United States, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 1040 (1983); Note, Using the Federal Tort Claims Act to Remedy Property Damage Following Customs Service Seizures, 17 U. Mich. J. of L. Ref. 83 (1983).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. SILK, doing business as ALBERT SILK COAL CO. NO. 312. Argued March 10, 1947. — Decided June 16, 1947. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Sewall Key and Lyle M. Turner. Jack B. Tate was also with them on the brief in No. 312. Ralph F. Glenn argued the cause for respondent in No. 312. With him on the brief were Robert Stone and Warren W. Shaw. Wilbur E. Benoy argued the cause for respondent in No. 673. With him on the brief were Arthur M. Sebastian and Robert Driscoll. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider together the above two cases. Both involve suits to recover sums exacted from businesses by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as employment taxes on employers under the Social Security Act. In both instances the taxes were collected on assessments made administratively by the Commissioner because he concluded the persons here involved were employees of the taxpayers. Both cases turn on a determination as to whether the workers involved were employees under that Act or whether they were independent contractors. Writs of certiorari were granted, 329 U. S. 702 and 329 U. S. 709, because of the general importance in the collection of social security taxes of deciding what are the applicable standards for the determination of employees under the Act. Varying standards have been applied in the federal courts. Respondent in No. 312, Albert Silk, doing business as the Albert Silk Coal Co., sued the United States, petitioner, to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected from respondent for the years 1936 through 1939 under the Social Security Act. The taxes were levied on respondent as an employer of certain workmen some of whom were engaged in unloading railway coal cars and the others in making retail deliveries of coal by truck. Respondent sells coal at retail in the city of Topeka, Kansas. His coalyard consists of two buildings, one for an office and the other a gathering place for workers, railroad tracks upon which carloads of coal are delivered by the railroad, and bins for the different types of coal. Respondent pays those who work as unloaders an agreed price per ton to unload coal from the railroad cars. These men come to the yard when and as they please and are assigned a car to unload and a place to put the coal. They furnish their own tools, work when they wish and work for others at will. One of these unloaders testified that he worked as regularly “as a man has to when he has to eat” but there was also testimony that some of the unloaders were floaters who came to the yard only intermittently. Respondent owns no trucks himself but contracts with workers who own their own trucks to deliver coal at a uniform price per ton. This is paid to the trucker by the respondent out of the price he receives for the coal from the customer. When an order for coal is taken in the company office, a bell is rung which rings in the building used by the truckers. The truckers have voluntarily adopted a call list upon which their names come up in turn, and the top man on the list has an opportunity to deliver the coal ordered. The truckers are not instructed how to do their jobs, but are merely given a ticket telling them where the coal is to be delivered and whether the charge is to be collected or not. Any damage caused by them is paid for by the company. The District Court found that the truckers could and often did refuse to make a delivery without penalty. Further, the court found that the truckers may come and go as they please and frequently did leave the premises without permission. They may and did haul for others when they pleased. They pay all the expenses of operating their trucks, and furnish extra help necessary to the delivery of the coal and all equipment except the yard storage bins. No record is kept of their time. They are paid after each trip, at the end of the day or at the end of the week, as they request. The Collector ruled that the unloaders and truckers were employees of the respondent during the years 1936 through 1939 within the meaning of the Social Security Act and he accordingly assessed additional taxes under Titles VIII and IX of the Social Security Act and Sub-chapters A and C of Chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code. Respondent filed a claim for a refund which was denied. He then brought this action. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals thought that the truckers and unloaders were independent contractors and allowed the recovery. Respondent in No. 673, Grey van Lines, Inc., a common carrier by motor truck, sued the petitioner, a Collector of Internal Revenue, to recover employment taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected from it under similar provisions of the Social Security Act involved in Silk’s case for the years or parts of years 1937 through the first quarter of 1942. From a holding for the respondent in the District Court petitioner appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The chief question in this case is whether truckmen who perform the actual service of carrying the goods shipped by the public are employees of the respondent. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals thought that the truckmen were independent contractors. The respondent operates its trucking business under a permit issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the “grandfather clause” of the Motor Carrier Act. 32 M. C. C. 719, 723. It operates throughout thirty-eight states and parts of Canada, carrying largely household furniture. While its principal office is in Chicago, it maintains agencies to solicit business in many of the larger cities of the areas it serves, from which it contracts to move goods. As early as 1930, before the passage of the Social Security Act, the respondent adopted the system of relations with the truckmen here concerned, which gives rise to the present issue. The system was based on contracts with the truckmen under which the truckmen were required to haul exclusively for the respondent and to furnish their own trucks and all equipment and labor necessary to pick up, handle and deliver shipments, to pay all expenses of operation, to furnish all fire, theft, and collision insurance which the respondent might specify, to pay for all loss or damage to shipments and to indemnify the company for any loss caused it by the acts of the truckmen, their servants and employees, to paint the designation “Greyvan Lines” on their trucks, to collect all money due the company from shippers or consignees, and to turn in such moneys at the office to which they report after delivering a shipment, to post bonds with the company in the amount of $1,000 and cash deposits of $250 pending final settlement of accounts, to personally drive their trucks at all times or be present on the truck when a competent relief driver was driving (except in emergencies, when a substitute might be employed with the approval of the company), and to follow all rules, regulations, and instructions of the company. All contracts or bills of lading for the shipment of goods were to be between the respondent and the shipper. The company’s instructions covered directions to the truckmen as to where and when to load freight. If freight was tendered the truckmen, they were under obligation to notify the company so that it could complete the contract for shipment in its own name. As remuneration, the truckmen were to receive from the company a percentage of the tariff charged by the company varying between 50 and 52% and a bonus up to 3% for satisfactory performance of the service. The contract was terminable at any time by either party. These truckmen were required to take a short course of instruction in the company’s methods of doing business before carrying out their contractual obligations to haul. The company maintained a staff of dispatchers who issued orders for the truckmen’s movements, although not the routes to be used, and to which the truckmen, at intervals, reported their positions. Cargo insurance was carried by the company. All permits, certificates and franchises “necessary to the operation of the vehicle in the service of the Company as a motor carrier under any Federal or State Law” were to be obtained at the company’s expense. The record shows the following additional undisputed facts, not contained in the findings. A manual of instructions, given by the respondent to the truckmen, and a contract between the company and Local No. 711 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America were introduced in evidence. It suffices to say that the manual purported to regulate in detail the conduct of the truckmen in the performance of their duties, and that the agreement with the Union provided that any truckman must first be a member of the union, and that grievances would be referred to representatives of the company and the union. A company official testified that the manual was impractical and that no attempt was made to enforce it. We understand the union contract was in effect. The company had some trucks driven by truckmen who were admittedly company employees. Operations by the company under the two systems were carried out in the same manner. The insurance required by the company was carried under a blanket company policy for which the truckmen were charged proportionately. The Social Security Act of 1935 was the result of long consideration by the President and Congress of the evil of the burdens that rest upon large numbers of our people because of the insecurities of modern life, particularly old age and unemployment. It was enacted in an effort to coordinate the forces of government and industry for solving the problems. The principal method adopted by Congress to advance its purposes was to provide for periodic payments in the nature of annuities to the elderly and compensation to workers during periods of unemployment. Employment taxes, such as we are here considering, are necessary to produce the revenue for federal participation in the program of alleviation. Employers do not pay taxes on certain groups of employees, such as agricultural or domestic workers but none of these exceptions are applicable to these cases. §§ 811 and 907. Taxes are laid as excises on a percentage of wages paid the nonexempt employees. §§ 804 and 901; I. R. C. §§ 1410, 1600. “Wages” means all remuneration for the employment that is covered by the Act, cash or otherwise. §§ 811, 907; I. R. C. §§ 1426,1607 (b). “Employment” means “any service, of whatever nature, performed ... by an employee for his employer, except . . . Agricultural labor” et cetera. §§ 811 (b), 907 (c); I.- R. C. §§ 1426 (b), 1607 (c). As a corollary to the coverage of employees whose wages are the basis for the employment taxes under the tax sections of the social security legislation, rights to benefit payments under federal old age insurance depend upon the receipt of wages as employees under the same sections. 53 Stat. 1360, §§ 202, 209 (a), (b), (g), 205 (c) (1). See Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358. This relationship between the tax sections and the benefit sections emphasizes the underlying purpose of the legislation — the protection of its beneficiaries from some of the hardships of existence. Helvering v. Davis, supra, 640. No definition of employer or employee applicable to these cases occurs in the Act. See § 907 (a) and I. R. C. § 1607 (a). Compare, as to carrier employment, I. R. C. § 1532 (d), as amended by 60 Stat. 722, § 1. Nothing that is helpful in determining the scope of the coverage of the tax sections of the Social Security Act has come to our attention in the legislative history of the passage of the Act or amendments thereto. Since Congress has made clear by its many exemptions, such as, for example, the broad categories of agricultural labor and domestic service, 53 Stat. 1384,1393, that it was not its purpose to make the Act cover the whole field of service to every business enterprise, the sections in question are to be read with the exemptions in mind. The very specificity of the exemptions, however, and the generality of the employment definitions indicates that the terms “employment” and “employee,” are to be construed to accomplish the purposes of the legislation. As the federal social security legislation is an attack on recognized evils in our national economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would not comport with its purpose. Such an interpretation would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit schemes by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the expense of the benefits sought by the legislation. These considerations have heretofore guided our construction of the Act. Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358; Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358. Of course, this does not mean that all who render service to an industry are employees. Compare Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 520. Obviously the private contractor who undertakes to build at a fixed price or on cost-plus a new plant on specifications is not an employee of the industry thus served nor are his employees. The distributor who undertakes to market at his own risk the product of another, or the producer who agrees so to manufacture for another, ordinarily cannot be said to have the employer-employee relationship. Production and distribution are different segments of business. The purposes of the legislation are not frustrated because the Government collects employment taxes from the distributor instead of the producer or the other way around. The problem of differentiating between employee and an independent contractor, or between an agent and an independent contractor, has given difficulty through the years before social legislation multiplied its importance. When the matter arose in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act, we pointed out that the legal standards to fix responsibility for acts of servants, employees or agents had not been reduced to such certainty that it could be said there was “some simple, uniform and easily applicable test.” The word “employee,” we said, was not there used as a word of art, and its content in its context was a federal problem to be construed “in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.” We concluded that, since that end was the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, “employees” included workers who were such as a matter of economic reality. The aim of the Act was to remedy the inequality of bargaining power in controversies over wages, hours and working conditions. We rejected the test of the “technical concepts pertinent to an employer’s legal responsibility to third persons for acts of his servants.” This is often referred to as power of control, whether exercised or not, over the manner of performing service to the industry. Restatement of the Law, Agency, § 220. We approved the statement of the National Labor Relations Board that “the primary consideration in the determination of the applicability of the statutory definition is whether effectu-ation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act.” Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 120, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131. Application of the social security legislation should follow the same rule that we applied to the National Labor Relations Act in the Hearst case. This, of course, does not leave courts free to determine the employer-employee relationship without regard to the provisions of the Act. The taxpayer must be an “employer” and the man who receives wages an “employee.” There is no indication that Congress intended to change normal business relationships through which one business organization obtained the services of another to perform a portion of production or distribution. Few businesses are so completely integrated that they can themselves produce the raw material, manufacture and distribute the finished product to the ultimate consumer without assistance from independent contractors. The Social Security Act was drawn with this industrial situation as a part of the surroundings in which it was to be enforced. Where a part of an industrial process is in the hands of independent contractors, they are the ones who should pay the social security taxes. The long-standing regulations of the Treasury and the Federal Security Agency (H. Doc. 595, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.) recognize that independent contractors exist under the Act. The pertinent portions are set out in the margin. Certainly the industry’s right to control how “work shall be done” is a factor in the determination of whether the worker is an employee or independent contractor. The Government points out that the regulations were construed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to cover the circumstances here presented. This is shown by his additional tax assessments. Other instances of such administrative determinations are called to our attention. So far as the regulations refer to the effect of contracts, we think their statement of the law cannot be challenged successfully. Contracts, however “skilfully devised,” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 115, should not be permitted to shift tax liability as definitely fixed by the statutes. Probably it is quite impossible to extract from the statute a rule of thumb to define the limits of the employer-employee relationship. The Social Security Agency and the courts will find that degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relation and skill required in the claimed independent operation are important for decision. No one is controlling nor is the list complete. These unloaders and truckers and their assistants are from one standpoint an integral part of the businesses of retailing coal or transporting freight. Their energy, care and judgment may conserve their equipment or increase their earnings but Greyvan and Silk are the directors of their businesses. On the other hand, the truckmen hire their own assistants, own their trucks, pay their own expenses, with minor exceptions, and depend upon their own initiative, judgment and energy for a large part of their success. Both lower courts in both cases have determined that these workers are independent contractors. These inferences were drawn by the courts from facts concerning which there is no real dispute. The excerpts from the opinions below show the reasons for their conclusions. Giving full consideration to the concurrence of the two lower courts in a contrary result, we cannot agree that the unloaders in the Silk case were independent contractors. They provided only picks and shovels. They had no opportunity to gain or lose except from the work of their hands and these simple tools. That the unloaders did not work regularly is not significant. They did work in the course of the employer’s trade or business. This brings them under the coverage of the Act. They are of the group that the Social Security Act was intended to aid. Silk was in a position to exercise all necessary supervision over their simple tasks. Unloaders have often been held to be emplees in tort cases. There are cases, too, where driver-owners of trucks or wagons have been held employees in accident suits at tort or under workmen’s compensation laws. But we agree with the decisions below in Silk and Greyvan that where the arrangements leave the driver-owners so much responsibility for investment and management as here, they must be held to be independent contractors. These driver-owners are small businessmen. They own their own trucks. They hire their own helpers. In one instance they haul for a single business, in the other for any customer. The distinction, though important, is not controlling. It is the total situation, including the risk undertaken, the control exercised, the opportunity for profit from sound management, that marks these driver-owners as independent contractors. No. 312, United States v. Silk, is affirmed in part and reversed in part. No. 673, Harrison v. Greyvan Lines, Inc., is affirmed. Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy are of the view that the applicable principles of law, stated by the Court and with which they agree, require reversal of both judgments in their entirety. Mr. Justice Rutledge. I join in the Court’s opinion and in the result insofar as the principles stated are applied to the unloaders in the Silk case. But I think a different disposition should be made in application of those principles to the truckers in that case and in the Greyvan case. So far as the truckers are concerned, both are borderline cases. That would be true, I think, even if the so-called “common law control” test were conclusive, as the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals in each case seem to have regarded it. It is even more true under the broader and more factual approach the Court holds should be applied. I agree with the Court’s views in adopting this approach and that the balance in close cases should be cast in favor of rather than against coverage, in order to fulfill the statute’s broad and beneficent objects. A narrow, constricted construction in doubtful cases only goes, as indeed the opinion recognizes, to defeat the Act’s policy and purposes pro tanto. But I do not think it necessary or perhaps in harmony with sound practice, considering the nature of this Court’s functions and those of the district courts, for us to undertake drawing the final conclusion generally in these borderline cases. Having declared the applicable principles of law to be applied, our function is sufficiently discharged by seeing to it that they are observed. And when this has been done, drawing the final conclusion, in matters so largely factual as the end result must be in close cases, is more properly the business of the district courts than ours. Here the District Courts and the Circuit Courts of Appeals determined the cases largely if not indeed exclusively by applying the so-called “common law control” test as the criterion. This was clearly wrong, in view of the Court’s present ruling. But for its action in drawing the ultimate and largely factual conclusion on that basis, the error would require remanding the causes to the District Courts in order for them to exercise that function in the light of the present decision. I would follow that course, so far as the truckers are concerned. Titles VIII and IX, Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 636 and 639, as repealed in part 53 Stat. 1. See Internal Revenue Code, chap. 9, subchap. A and C. Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. 2d 636; Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. 2d 176; Deecy Products Co. v. Welch, 124 F. 2d 592; American Oil Co. v. Fly, 135 F. 2d 491; Glenn v. Beard, 141 F. 2d 376; Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 141 F. 2d 324; United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655; Glenn v. Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51, 53; McGowan v. Lazeroff, 148 F. 2d 512; United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 154 F. 2d 745; United States v. Vogue, Inc., 145 F. 2d 609, 612; United States v. Aberdeen Aerie No. 24., 148 F. 2d 655, 658; Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679, 680-81; Nevins, Inc. v. Rothensies, 151 F. 2d 189. 155 F. 2d 356. 156 F. 2d 412. Message of the President, January 17, 1935, and Report of the Committee on Economic Security, H. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619. See 53 Stat. 1384,1393, “The term 'employment’ means any service performed prior to January 1,1940, which was employment as defined in this section prior to such date, and any service, of whatever nature, performed after December 31, 1939, within the United States by an employee for the person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of either, except— . . . .” Compare 49 Stat. 639 and 643. Nothing to suggest tax avoidance appears in these records. Treasury Regulations 90, promulgated under Title IX of the Social Security Act, Art. 205: “Generally the relationship exists when the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the emploj'-er not only as to what shall be done but how it shall be done. . . . The right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person possessing that right is an employer. Other factors characteristic of an employer are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the services. In general, if an individual is subject to the control or direction of another merely as to the result to be accomplished by the work and not as to the means and methods for accomplishing the result, he is an independent contractor, not an employee. “If the relationship of employer and employee exists, the designation or description of the relationship by the parties as anything other than that of employer and employee is immaterial. Thus, if two individuals in fact stand in the relation of employer and employee to each other, it is of no consequence that the employee is designated as a partner, coadventurer, agent, or independent contractor. “The measurement, method, or designation of compensation is also immaterial, if the relationship of employer and employee in fact exists. “Individuals performing services as independent contractors are not employees. Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow an independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their services to the public, are independent contractors and not employees.” 26 C. F. R. § 400.205. See also Treasury Regulations 91, 26 C. F. R. §401.3. (Emphasis added.) The citation of these cases does not imply approval or disapproval of the results. The cases do show the construction of the regulation by the agency. United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655; Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. 2d 176; Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 141 F. 2d 324; Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F. 2d 636; American Oil Co. v. Fly, 135 F. 2d 491; Glenn v. Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51. See also note 2. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465; Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355; Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331. United, States v. Silk, 155 F. 2d 356, 358-9: “But even while they work for appellee they are not subject to his control as to the method or manner in which they are to do their work. The undisputed evidence is that the only supervision or control ever exercised or that could be exercised over the haulers was to give them the sales ticket if they were willing to take it, and let them deliver the coal. They were free to choose any route in going to or returning. They were not required even to take the coal for delivery. “We think that the relationship between appellee and the unloaders is not materially different from that between him and the haulers. In response to a question on cross examination, appellee did testify that the unloaders did what his superintendent at the coal yard told them to do, but when considered in the light of all his testimony, all that this answer meant was that they unloaded the ear assigned to them into the designated bin. . . . “The undisputed facts fail to establish such reasonable measure of direction and control over the method and means of performing the services performed by these workers as is necessary to establish a legal relationship of employer and employee between appellee and the workers in question.” Greyvan Lines v. Harrison, 156 F. 2d 412, 414-16. After stating the trial court’s finding that the truckmen were not employees, the appellate court noted: “Appellant contends that in determining these facts the court failed to give effect to important provisions of the contracts which it asserts clearly show the reservation of the right of control over the truckmen and their helpers as to the methods and means of their operations which, it is agreed, furnish the test for determining the relationship here in question. . . .” It then discussed the manual and concluded: “While it is true that many provisions of the manual, if strictly enforced, would go far to establish an employer-employee relationship between the Company and its truckmen, we agree with appellee that there was evidence to justify the court’s disregarding of it. It was not prepared until April, 1940, although the tax period involved was from November, 1937, through March, 1942, and there was no evidence to show any change or tightening of controls after its adoption and distribution; one driver testified that he was never instructed to follow the rules therein provided; an officer of the Company testified that it had been prepared by a group of three men no longer in their employ, and that it had been impractical and was not adhered to.” After a discussion of the helper problem, this statement appears: “. . . the Company cannot be held liable for employment taxes on the wages of persons over whom it exerts no control, and of whose employment it has no knowledge. And this element of control of the truck-men over their own helpers goes far to prevent the employer-employee relationship from arising between them and the Company. While many factors in this case indicate such control as to give rise to that relationship, we think the most vital one is missing because of the complete control of the truckmen as to how many, if any, and what helpers they make use of in their operations. . . .” Cf. Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679. I. R. C., chap. 9, subchap. A, § 1426 (b), as amended, 53 Stat. 1384: “The term 'employment’ means any service performed ... by an employee for the person employing him . . . except— “(3) Casual labor not in the course of the employer’s trade or business; . . .” Swift & Co. v. Alston, 48 Ga. App. 649, 173 S. E. 741; Holmes v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 1465, 22 So. 403; Muncie Foundry Co. v. Thompson, 70 Ind. App. 157, 123 N. E. 196; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Bennett, 36 Okla. 358, 128 P. 705; Murray’s Case, 130 Me. 181, 154 A. 352; Decatur R. Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 472, 114 N. E. 915; Benjamin v. Fertilizer Co., 169 Miss. 162, 152 So. 839. Western Express Co. v. Smeltzer, 88 F. 2d 94; Industrial Commission v. Bonfils, 78 Colo. 306, 241 P. 735; Coppes Bros. & Zook v. Pontius, 76 Ind. App. 298, 131 N. E. 845; Burruss v. B. M. C. Logging Co., 38 N. M. 254, 31 P. 2d 263; Bradley v. Republic Creosoting Co., 281 Mich. 177, 274 N. W. 754; Rouse v. Town of Bird Island, 169 Minn. 367, 211 N. W. 327; Industrial Commission v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006; Kirk v. Lime Co. & Insurance Co., 137 Me. 73, 15 A. 2d 184; Showers v. Lund, 123 Neb. 56, 242 N. W. 258; Burt v. Davis-Wood Lumber Co., 157 La. 111, 102 So. 87; Dunn v. Reeves Coal Yards Co., Inc., 150 Minn. 282, 184 N. W. 1027; Waters v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 52 Minn. 474, 55 N. W. 52; Warner v. Hardwood Lumber Co., 231 Mich. 328, 204 N. W. 107; Frost v. Blue Ridge Timber Corp., 158 Tenn. 18, 11 S. W. 2d 860; Lee v. Mark H. Brown Lumber Co., 15 La. App. 294, 131 So. 697. See particularly Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518. Compare United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655; Glenn v. Standard Oil Co., 148 F. 2d 51. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Greyvan case stated, after referring to United States v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655: “It is true that the facts there do not present as close a question as in the case at bar.” And see note 3. It is not at all certain that either Silk or Greyvan Lines would not be held liable in tort, under application of the common law test, for injuries negligently inflicted upon persons or property of others by their truckers, respectively, in the course of operating the trucks in connection with their businesses. Indeed this result would seem to be clearly indicated, in the case of Greyvan particularly, in view of the fact that the trucks bore its name, in addition to other factors including a large degree of control exercised over the trucking operations. For federal cases in point see Silent Automatic Sales Corp. v. Stayton, 45 F. 2d 471 (applying Missouri law); Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Thompson, 101 F. 2d 301 (applying Nebraska law); Young v. Wilky Carrier Corp., 54 F. Supp. 912, aff’d, 150 F. 2d 764 (applying Pennsylvania law). And see for a general collection of state cases, 9 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (1941) § 6056. Certainly the question of coverage under the statute, as an employee, should not be determined more narrowly than that of employee status for purposes of imposing vicarious liability in tort upon an employer, whether by application of the control test exclusively or of the Court’s broader ruling. In the Silk case formal findings of fact and conclusions of law by the District Court do not appear in the record. But a “Statement by the Court” recites details of the arrangements with the truckers and unloaders in the focus of whether Silk exercised control over them and concludes he did not; hence, there was no employer-employee relation. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, though recognizing the necessity for liberal construction of the Act, treats the facts found in the same focus of control. The court was influenced by the regulations promulgated under the Act (Reg. 90, Art. 205) and also by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Reg. 91, Art. 3). The opinion concludes: “The undisputed facts fail to establish such reasonable measure of direction and control over the method and means of performing the services ... as is necessary” to create the employer-employee relation. 155 F. 2d 356, 359. In the Greyvan case formal findings and conclusions were filed. The Circuit Court of Appeals, accepting the findings, concluded they did not show “change or tightening of controls” after the company’s adoption of a manual in 1940, although its provisions “if strictly enforced, would go far to establish an employer-employee relationship . . . 156 F. 2d 412, 415. However, it found another factor conclusive: “While many factors in this case indicate such control as to give rise to that relationship, we think the most vital one is missing because of the complete control of the truckmen as to how many, if any, and what helpers they make use of in their operations.” 156 F. 2d at 416. Apparently not control of the method of performing the work in general but absence of expressly reserved right of control in a single feature became the criterion used.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RENEGOTIATION BOARD v. BANNERCRAFT CLOTHING CO., INC., et al. No. 72-822. Argued October 17, 1973 Decided February 19, 1974 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Brennan, White, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 26. Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Walter H. Fleischer, and William D. Appier. Robert L. Ackerly argued the cause for respondents Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., et al. With him on the brief were James J. Gallagher, Charles A. O’Connor III, and David V. Anthony. Burton A. Schwalb argued the cause for respondent David B. Lilly Co., Inc. With him on the brief were Michael Evan Jaffe and Marian B. Horn Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Gerald C. Smetana, Lawrence M. Cohen, and Alan Raywid■ for Sears, Roebuck & Co., and by Milton A. Smith, Mr. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, and Mr. Raywid for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Three cases, consolidated for hearing in the court below, raise the issue of the effect of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552, upon proceedings pending under the Renegotiation Act of 1951, c. 15, 65 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1211 et seg. In particular, they concern the jurisdiction of a federal district court to enjoin the renegotiation process until an FOIA claim is resolved. I The three respondents, Bannercraft Clothing Company, Inc., Astro Communication Laboratory, a division of Aiken Industries, Inc., and David B. Lilly Co., Inc., successor to Delaware Fastener Corporation, all possessed national defense contracts with a “Department” of the United States, as defined in § 103 (a) of the Renegotiation Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1213 (a). These agreements, therefore, under § 102 of that Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1212, were subject to renegotiation. A. Bannercraft. In 1966 and 1967, this respondent manufactured uniforms at a plant in Philadelphia. Its fiscal year was the calendar year. Because most of its production was subject to renegotiation, the company, for each of the two years, timely filed with the Renegotiation Board the financial statement required under § 105 (e)(1) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (e)(1). Representatives of the Eastern Regional Renegotiation Board then reviewed Bannercraft’s operations and conferred with its president. On February 20, 1970, the Regional Board, by letter, advised the contractor that it was recommending that Bannercraft in 1967 had realized excessive profits in the amount of $1,400,000, subject to the usual adjustment for state taxes measured by income and for any tax credit to which the contractor was entitled under § 1481 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 1481. Bannercraft promptly requested that it be furnished, pursuant to 32 CFR § 1477.3 (1970), with a “written summary of the facts and reasons” upon which the determination was based. It asserted, however, that “it is not possible to state [as the Regulation’s proviso required] whether all relevant evidence has been submitted since we have never had in writing the basis upon which you made this determination.” The Regional Board replied that because “the statement required by the regulation” was not submitted, “your request for a summary is defective.” Bannercraft’s response was that it had “submitted all of the evidence which it believes to be relevant to the renegotiation proceedings,” but that this was “without prejudice to an opportunity to offer evidence on the issues disclosed by the [Regional Board's] Summary of Facts and Reasons” and that the required statement was “somewhat meaningless when we do not have a written statement of the issue upon which you have made your finding.” On March 16, Bannercraft, pursuant to the FOIA, made a written request of the Renegotiation Board that six categories of documents be produced. No response to this request was forthcoming. In late April, the Board, by letters, notified Banner-craft of its determinations that the contractor had realized excessive profits in the amount of $75,000 for 1966 (the same figure determined by the Regional Board) and $1,450,000 for 1967 (an increase of $50,000 over the Regional Board's determination). Bannercraft then went to court. On May 1, it filed a complaint against the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, praying that the Board be enjoined from withholding the documents requested and from conducting any further renegotiation proceedings with Bannercraft for 1966 and 1967 until the documents were produced. The Board opposed the application for temporary relief and moved to dismiss. Judge Smith issued a temporary restraining order and, thereafter, a preliminary injunction, each without opinion, and stayed further Board proceedings. In May, the Board issued a Statement of Facts and Reasons for Bannercraft’s years 1966 and 1967. Ban-nercraft then made a further request for documents related to the factual basis for the Board’s conclusions reflected in the Statement. In July, the Board responded. It produced some documents and, with respect to others, claimed exemption under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) or asserted that the information sought was not covered by the Act. On August 4, the Board moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction. It took the position that its response to Bannercraft’s requests fulfilled its obligations under the FOIA. The District Court denied the motion. The Board then appealed. B. Astro. This respondent’s factual case is essentially the same as Bannercraft’s. The year at issue is the fiscal year ended September 30, 1967. Astro, pursuant to the FOIA, requested production by the Board of five categories of material. At a conference held on May 12, 1970, Astro was advised that the Board had made a tentative determination of excessive profits for the year in the amount of $225,000. In July, the Board denied Astro’s FOIA request. On August 12, Astro filed its complaint against the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It prayed for relief similar to that sought by Bannercraft. Judge Pratt enjoined the Board from continuing renegotiation proceedings with Astro. The court also ordered the Board to allow Astro, within 30 days, to inspect and obtain copies of all documents requested by Astro that the Board had no objection to turning over, and to submit to the court, in camera, all documents the Board objected to producing, with a statement of reasons for each objection. The Board appealed. C. Lilly. This respondent’s case is similar to the other two. In June 1970, Lilly and its predecessor in interest, Delaware Fastener Corporation, were advised by their renegotiator that he had made determinations of excessive profits for 1967 for Lilly in the amount of $200,000 and for Fastener in the amount of $500,000. On June 29, the two corporations asked the Board to furnish certain categories of information. No response was immediately forthcoming from the Board. On July 9, Lilly filed its complaint against the Board in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, praying for an order compelling the Board to produce the documents demanded and restraining the Board from acting and, in particular, from requiring the contractors to elect a procedure until the documents had been produced and the contractors had been given a reasonable time to study them. Thereafter, the Board denied the request for information. On July 31, Judge Jones issued an order temporarily restraining the Board from continuing renegotiation with Lilly and Delaware. Subsequently, the Board moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On September 1, a preliminary injunction was issued. The Board appealed. The three appeals were consolidated and heard together in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed all three decisions. 151 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 466 F. 2d 345 (1972). It held that the District Court possessed jurisdiction under the FOIA to enjoin administrative proceedings before the Board and to order the production of appropriate documents. It concluded that, “although it is undeniably true that Congress was principally interested in opening administrative processes to the scrutiny of the press and general public” when it enacted the FOIA, “Congress was also troubled by the plight of those forced to litigate with agencies on the basis of secret laws or incomplete information.” Id., at 181, 466 F. 2d, at 352. The court then described this latter congressional concern as a “subsidiary statutory purpose,” citing excerpts from S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1965), and from H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966), and also citing 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(2). See infra, at 12 n. 9. It reasoned that, despite “the fact that the Act nowhere in terms authorizes . . . injunctions” against agency proceedings, in enacting the statute Congress intended to confer broad equitable jurisdiction upon the district courts, and that “temporary stays of pending administrative procedures may be necessary on occasion to enforce the policy” of the FOIA. 151 U. S. App. D. C., at 181-183, 466 F. 2d, at 352-354. The court then turned to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies question. It observed that there is no general rule that it is always improper for a court to interfere with pending administrative proceedings, citing McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 193 (1969). It concluded that “when the purposes of the doctrine are individually measured against the facts of these cases, it is plain that no legitimate judicial policy would be served by depriving these appellees of the relief they seek.” 151 U. S. App. D. C., at 184, 466 F. 2d, at 355. In effect, the court reasoned that contractors need exhaust only their administrative remedies under the FOIA, and not their administrative remedies under the Renegotiation Act, as a condition precedent to requesting injunctive relief against renegotiation proceedings. The court found the contractors’ remedies before the Board and de novo proceedings in the Court of Claims inadequate to prevent irreparable harm. The dissenting judge began with the accepted proposition that federal courts have only limited jurisdiction and stated that the majority’s observation, to the effect that the “existence of present need for judicial intervention does have a bearing on both jurisdiction and exhaustion,” is “an error bordering on constitutional dimensions,” for the appellees’ need “is wholly irrelevant to determination of the jurisdiction of the District Courts in these cases.” Id., at 191, 466 F. 2d, at 362. The dissent then turned to the principle that where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. Thus, in the FOIA, Congress gave the general public an express right of access to all Federal Government information not within the exempted categories. This right was enforceable by “the specific, narrow, remedies of an injunction against withholding agency records and an affirmative order to produce such records improperly withheld.” Ibid. The dissent concluded that no jurisdiction to grant any other remedy was conferred by Congress and that the District Court, therefore, was without jurisdiction to enjoin the proceedings before the Renegotiation Board. Nothing in the congressional reports cited by the majority justified its contrary conclusion. The dissent further concluded that there was no suggestion that Congress had any concern with litigants before the administrative agencies, and that what they were concerned with was to make information available “to any member of the public without requiring any showing of need therefor.” Id., at 192, 466 F. 2d, at 363. The dissent also was at odds with the majority’s disposition of the exhaustion issue. It asserted that the majority seriously misconstrued the intended functioning of the Renegotiation Board’s procedures, namely, that controlled access to information concerning the Government’s position plays a significant role in the administrative process; that interruption of the administrative proceedings totally destroys the balance of negotiating strength; and that the attempt to enjoin the ongoing negotiations was really not a request for relief under the FOIA but was a challenge to the Board’s procedures themselves. Id., at 194-195, 466 F. 2d, at 365-366. We granted certiorari, 410 U. S. 907 (1973), because of the importance of the issue of the impact of the FOIA upon long-established procedures of the Renegotiation Board. II Before considering the issue of the District Court’s jurisdiction to enjoin a proceeding pending in the Renegotiation Board, it is helpful to review the provisions of the FOIA and of the Renegotiation Act of 1951: A. The FOIA. This statute, 5 U. S. C. § 552, was enacted in 1966, 80 Stat. 383, as a revision of § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1965); H. R, Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-6 (1966). It was amended by Pub. L. 90-23, adopted June 5, 1967, 81 Stat. 54. ' Section 552 (a) states, “Each agency shall make available to the public” certain information of enumerated categories. This covers virtually all information not specifically exempted by § 552 (b). Section 552 (a) (2) provides the sanction that a “final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction” may not be relied upon as precedent by the agency against a party unless “it has been indexed and either made available or published,” or unless a party has “actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.” Section 552 (a) (3) specifically vests the District Court with jurisdiction “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.” It places the burden on the agency to sustain its action; it empowers the District Court to punish the responsible employee for contempt in the event of noncompliance; and it provides that the FOIA suit generally is to take precedence on the court's docket and is to be expedited on the calendar. B. The Renegotiation Act of 1951. This statute, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 1211-1233, enacted shortly after the close of World War II and at the height of the Korean conflict, recites that Congress had made available “extensive funds” for the execution of the national defense program and that “sound execution” of the program requires “the elimination of excessive profits from contracts made with the United States, and from related subcontracts.” § 101, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1211. The Renegotiation Board is established as an independent agency in the Executive Branch to accomplish this objective. § 107, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1217 (a). The Board’s functions are excluded from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq., and § 701 et seq.) except the public information section thereof (5 U. S. C. § 552). § 111, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1221. The Board operates primarily by informal negotiation with the contractor and not by formal hearing. It is directed to “endeavor to make an agreement with the contractor . . . with respect to the elimination of excessive profits.” § 105 (a), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (a). The contractor subject to the Act must file, for its fiscal year, a detailed financial statement. §105 (e)(1), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (e)(1). On the basis of this statement an initial determination of excessive profits is made. From the date of filing of the statement, the Board has one year to commence proceedings and, with stated exceptions, the renegotiation is to be completed within two years following its commencement or “all liabilities of the contractor ... for excessive profits with respect to which such proceeding was commenced shall thereupon be discharged.” § 105 (c), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (c). If the Board and the contractor do not agree, the Board by order determines the excessive profits. § 105 (a), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (a). At the request of the contractor, the Board shall furnish it “with a statement of such determination, of the facts used as a basis therefor, and of its reasons for such determination.” Ibid. The contractor then may initiate a de novo proceeding in the Court of Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the contractor’s excessive profits. § 108, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1218 (1970 ed., Supp. II). The action “shall not be treated as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board,” ibid., and the Board’s statement “shall not be used in the Court of Claims as proof of the facts or conclusions stated therein,” § 105 (a), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. II). The renegotiation process itself is initiated by notice to the contractor and by assignment of the contractor’s report to the appropriate Regional Board. 32 CFR § 1472.2 (1972). Personnel of the Regional Board then prepare a “Report of Renegotiation” which includes a “recommendation with respect to the amount, if any, of excessive profits for the fiscal year under review.” 32 CFR § 1472.3 (d). This is only the first of several steps within the agency structure. Thereafter the statement is reviewed, successively, by a panel of the Regional Board, by the Regional Board itself, and finally by the Renegotiation Board. At each level there is consultation with the contractor, the preparation of a report and analysis, and submission to the next higher level of a recommendation as to excessive profits. 32 CFR §§ 1472.3 (d) and (f)-(i), and §§ 1472.4 (b)-(d). At each stage, the contractor is entitled to a statement of the basis for the recommendation. Each level is free to make new findings and no level is bound by the determination of the level below; the recommended settlement may decrease or increase at each level. Ibid. Ill It is clear, we think, that the Renegotiation Board, as an entity, is not exempt from applicable provisions of the FOIA. The Board, of course, is an “independent establishment” in the Executive Branch. § 107 (a) of the Renegotiation Act, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1217 (a). But “agency” is broadly defined to mean “each authority of the Government of the United States,” except the Congress, the courts, territorial governments, the government of the District of Columbia, and, with respect to 5 U. S. C. § 552, certain other specifically described entities and functions. 5 U. S. C. §551 (1). The Renegotiation Board is not among those excepted. Further, the House Committee’s discussion of the requirement of § 552 (a)(2), that an agency’s concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as final opinions, be made available, discloses that a reason for this provision was that “a recent survey indicated that five agencies— including . . . the Renegotiation Board — do not make public the minority views of their members.” H. R. Rep. No; 1497, supra, at 8. Thus, despite its unique operational methods, the Board falls within the definition of “agency” in § 551 (1). So to conclude, however, does not provide automatically the answer to the question whether the FOIA authorizes a district court to enjoin Renegotiation Board proceedings until the court determines that the contractor is or is not entitled to information it claims under the FOIA. As to this question, the respondent contractors assert that, although the FOIA does not grant this injunctive power in express terms, the power is to be implied from the court's inherent capacity to provide appropriate equitable relief. The Board, on the other hand, emphasizes that Congress in the Act expressly authorized the court to compel the production of agency records improperly withheld, placed the burden on the agency to sustain its action, and directed precedence on the docket for suits under the Act “over all other causes” and expedition of those suits “in every way.” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(3). The Board then contends that these provisions constitute the exclusive method for enforcing the disclosure requirements of the Act and that any implication of other injunctive power, at the behest of a litigant before the agency, would be inconsistent with the statutory language. Clearly, as the Court of Appeals held, 151 U. S. App. D. C., at 181, 466 F. 2d, at 352, the Congress “was principally interested in opening administrative processes to the scrutiny of the press and general public when it passed the Information Act.” The Second Circuit has described the Act’s “ultimate purpose” as one “to enable the public to have sufficient information in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed choices with respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal governmental activities” (footnote omitted). Frankel v. SEC, 460 F. 2d 813, 816, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 889 (1972). The Senate Report, too, expressed concern for “an informed electorate.” S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). The FOIA, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(3), explicitly confers jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief of a described type, namely, “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” In addition, it provides a specific remedy for noncompliance. This primary purpose of the FOIA, and this express grant of jurisdiction to enjoin in a specific way, coupled with a limited sanction, might suggest that the Act’s provision for compelled production was intended to be the exclusive enforcement method. It has been held that “where a statute creates a right and provides a special remedy, that remedy is exclusive.” United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 331 (1919). And “Congress for reasons of its own decided upon the method for the protection of the 'right’ which it created. It selected the precise machinery and fashioned the tool which it deemed suited to that end.” Switchmen’s Union v. NMB, 320 U. S. 297, 301 (1943). See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 (1974). One therefore may argue, as the Board has argued here, that this is not a situation where “Congress has utilized ... the broad equitable jurisdiction that inheres in courts and where the proposed exercise of that jurisdiction is consistent with the statutory language and policy, the legislative background and the public interest.” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 403 (1946). There is significant authority, however, that points to the opposite conclusion. Porter itself, although recognizing the kind of situation to which Babcock is applicable, 328 U. S., at 403, upheld broad equitable power in the District Court under a statute authorizing the court to grant injunctive and restraining relief “or other order,” and did so, not only because of the presence of the “other order” language, but because of the “traditional equity powers of a court.” Id., at 400. Emphasis on broad equity power, even in the face of a silent statute, also appears in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, 290-291 (1960); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 671 n. 22 (1963); see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 659 (1965), and is sometimes related to the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a). FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U. S. 597, 603-604 (1966). The broad language of the FOIA, with its obvious emphasis on disclosure and with its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions; the truism that Congress knows how to deprive a court of broad equitable power when it chooses so to do, Scripps-Howard, supra, 316 U. S., at 17; and the fact that the Act, to a definite degree, makes the district courts the enforcement arm of the statute, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (3), persuade us that the Babcock and Switchmen’s Union principle of a statutorily prescribed special and exclusive remedy is not applicable to FOIA cases. With the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court by § 552 (a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act’s primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity court. IY We find it unnecessary, however, to decide in these cases, whether, or under what circumstances, it would be proper for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin agency action pending the resolution of an asserted FOIA claim. We hold only that in a renegotiation case the contractor is obliged to pursue its administrative remedy and, when it fails to do so, may not attain its ends through the route of judicial interference. The nature of the renegotiation process mandates this result, and, were it otherwise, the effect would be that renegotiation, and its aims, would be supplanted and defeated by an FOIA suit. Before the adoption of the FOIA this Court consistently held that the design of the Renegotiation Act was to have renegotiation proceed expeditiously without interruption for judicial review, and that the Board’s proceedings were not to be enjoined prior to the exhaustion of the administrative process. This was the result where the proceedings were challenged on constitutional grounds, Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947); Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 789-793 (1948), on statutory grounds, Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U. S. 540 (1946), and on procedural grounds, Lichter, 334 U. S., at 791. The Court’s emphasis was on the absence of any “lawful function” on the part of the courts “to anticipate the administrative decision with their own,” Aircraft, 331 U. S., at 767; on the availability of a due process hearing in the post-administrative de novo proceeding in the Tax Court, Macauley, 327 U. S., at 543, where constitutional as well as nonconstitutional issues could be resolved, Aircraft, 331 U. S., at 769 n. 30, citing 89 Cong. Rec. 9930 (1943), and at 771; and on the Act’s provisions for expeditious settlement in informal negotiation free “from the tedious burden of litigation.” Id., at 770. In Aircraft the Court rejected arguments substantially the same as those advanced by the respondents here, id., at 758 n. 12 (inability to participate effectively because of lack of information upon which the Board had relied, see No. 95, O. T. 1946, Tr. of R., Vol. I, p. 141), and refused to permit renegotiation to be enjoined. “To countenance short-circuiting of the Tax Court proceedings here would be, under all the circumstances but more especially in view of Congress’ policy and command with respect to those proceedings, a long overreaching of equity’s strong arm.” 331 U. S., at 781. Reflection upon the nature of the Renegotiation Board’s process fortifies these conclusions. The character and the entire atmosphere of the process is negotiation — that is, renegotiation — of an existing contract. And negotiation is a bargaining process, with give and take, and with stress upon and use of the strengths of one’s own position and the weaknesses of the position of the other party. It is in a process such as this where the phrase "leading from strength” has been so effectively transferred in practical application from the card table to the world of commerce. It is part of the warp and woof of production. It is pure bargaining — permitted by the statute with respect to contracts already made — the same kind of bargaining that produces the union-employer agreement or the transfer of substantial property from the willing seller to the interested buyer. We see nothing in the adoption of the FOIA in 1966 that impinges upon the settled law of the Aircraft-Lichter-Macauley cases or that warrants an exception to the principle they espouse. Nothing new by way of due process emerged with the FOIA. Nothing therein indicates that Congress wished to change the Renegotiation Act’s purposeful design of negotiation without interruption for judicial review. FOIA’s stress was on disclosure, to be sure, but it was on disclosure for the public, EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 80 (1973), and not for the negotiating self-interested contractor. Id,., at 86; see K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.4, p. 120, § 3A.29, p. 171 (Supp. 1970). And when Congress in 1971 reviewed the Renegotiation Act and substituted the Court of Claims for the Tax Court, no other significant change in the existing process was effected. See S. Rep. No. 92-245 (1971), accompanying. H. R. 8311, which became the amending statute, Pub. L. 92-41, 85 Stat. 97. It is no answer to say, as Bannercraft and Astro urge, that Aircraft, Lichter, and Macauley relate only to issues on the merits over which Congress had vested jurisdiction in the first instance in the Board and then in the Tax Court. We read those decisions otherwise. Seeking injunctive relief during the pendency of renegotiation encourages delay through resort to preliminary litigation over an FOIA claim. The delay is not imaginary or without ultimate consequence. The present cases provide an example of this, for each has been pending now for more than three years. The Government is foreclosed from taking action to recover excessive profits until the Board’s final order is entered; even then, interest does not begin to run until 30 days after the entry of that order. 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 1215 (b)(1) and (2). The contractor, by delay, has little to lose and much to gain. There is no limitation or denial of the contractor’s normal litigation rights when the renegotiation process is at end. The contractor may institute its de novo proceeding in the Court of Claims, unfettered by any prejudice from the agency proceeding and free from any claim that the Board’s determination is supported by substantial evidence. There the usual rights of discovery are available. And there the parties are not bound by a prior determination made at any level of the Renegotiation Board structure. 50 U. S. C. App. § 1218. That proceeding is the judicial remedy at law provided by the Renegotiation Act and is adequate protection against injury. Note, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1072, 1084 (1973). We note that a contractor does not become obligated to remit excessive profits until termination of the Court of Claims suit, if it elects that course. The injury suffered, absent an injunction, is no more than the risk of being unsuccessful in the de novo bargaining process and the incurrence of the expense incident to renegotiation. Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 51-52 (1938); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 429 (1965). Without a clear showing of irreparable injury, see Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 106, 111, 259 F. 2d 921, 926 (1958), failure to exhaust administrative remedies serves as a bar to judicial intervention in the agency process. Myers, supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 153 U. S. App. D. C. 380, 382, 473 F. 2d 91, 93 (1972). Interference with the agency proceeding opens the way to the use of the FOIA as a tool of discovery, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F. 2d 210, 211 (CA6 1970), over and beyond that provided by the regulations issued by the Renegotiation Board for its proceedings. See 32 CFR §§ 1480.1-1480.12 (1972). Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of the Act. Protection for the contractor in the renegotiation process is afforded through the injunctive power specifically bestowed by 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(3). The Renegotiation Act and its predecessors obviously emerged from congressional awareness that, with the vastness of defense expenditure, overcharging and misappropriation of public funds by unscrupulous contractors and those fortuitously placed to perform needed work were almost inevitable. The target of the legislation was excessive profit, not the fair and reasonable one. The latter was anticipated and accepted. The line between a reasonable profit and excessive profit is not always easily ascertained or brightly lit. But the ascertainment of excessive profits was a duty vested by the Congress in the Renegotiation Board in the first instance. The Board thus is the fulcrum of a process that enables the Government initially to consult a contractor, to make a contract with it, and then to have the contract subject to modification for excessive profits, whenever they materialize, without violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The disgorging of excessive profits is not by way of a tax, .but the process is not unlike the imposition of a tax equivalent to the excessive profits. Congress’ initial placing of the contractor-initiated final proceeding in the Tax Court is indicative of the relationship. Of course, there is uncertainty in the renegotiation process. And, of course, that uncertainty is lessened or eliminated if the contractor, like the poker player, is able to ascertain all the cards in the Board’s hand. There is risk, also, when the contractor accepts the determination of excessive profits made at any level of the renegotiation process. These risks, however, are the same risks that are inherent in the negotiation and voluntary settlement of any dispute. The one who pays possibly might pay less if he resorts to the factfinder instead of making the settlement. But he might pay more. That is the calculated risk he takes. It is the calculated risk provided for by Congress in the administrative process it prescribed in the Renegotiation Act. It is not a risk ungenerously laid upon the contractor, for it is counterbalanced by the profound interest of the public in the recapture of excessive profits that may flow to the contractor under its government contracts. We stress, in conclusion, that the merits are not before us. They are yet to be decided by the District Court. Whether any demand made by these contractors is so vague as not to constitute a “request for identifiable records,” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (3), or is for material exempt from disclosure under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b), are questions that remain open for decision on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Shortly prior thereto, the Regional Board advised the contractor that it had determined its excessive profits for 1966 to be $75,000. “§ 1477.3 Furnishing of other statements. “When a Regional Board has made ... a final recommendation in a Class A case . . . and the contractor is unable to decide whether to enter into an agreement for the refund of excessive profits so determined or recommended, the Regional Board . . . will furnish the contractor a written summary of the facts and reasons upon which such final determination or recommendation is based in order to assist the contractor in determining whether or not it will enter into an agreement: Provided, That the contractor requests such a statement within a reasonable time after it has been advised of such final determination or recommendation, and states that it has submitted all the evidence which it believes to be relevant to the renegotiation proceedings.” The request was based on the decision, only six days earlier, in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 147, 425 F. 2d 578 (1970), that the Renegotiation Board was subject to the FOIA and that certain Board orders and opinions were accessible to the contractor after deletions made in the light of the Act’s exemption provisions. See the same case on remand, 325 F. Supp. 1146, aff’d, 157 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 482 F. 2d 710 (1973). The documents Bannercraft requested were: (1) communications between the Board and other Government agencies with respect to Bannercraft’s renegotiate contracts for 1966 and 1967; (2) investigatory or other reports prepared by Board employees “containing facts which are relevant to the Board’s determination as to Bannercraft’s renegotiate contracts” for the two years; (3) final opinions, and the like, and summaries on which determinations were based for the years 1962 through 1968 for 11 named companies engaged in similar manufacture; (4) facts upon which the Board concluded that Bannercraft’s pricing policy in 1966 was unreasonable; (5) identification of those manufacturers with which Bannercraft’s production cost was compared, as stated in the summary for 1966, with cross-reference to comparable data as to each of the 11 named manufacturers; and (6) the “procurement information,” described in the summary for 1966, that the Board contended indicated that there was a lack of effective price competition. “§ 552. “(b) This section does not apply to matters that are— “(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; “(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; “(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; “(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency . . . .” The Board took the position (a) that the Board-agency communications, the investigatory and other reports, and the “procurement information” (to the extent it consisted of written records), being the first, second, and sixth items specified in the request of March 16, were exempt under 5 U. S. C. §§ 652 (b) (3), (4), (5), and (7); (b) that the facts relied upon by the Board in concluding that Bannercraft’s pricing policy was unreasonable, that is, the fourth item in the request of March 16, and the identification of manufacturers, the fifth item, were not requests “for records”; and (c) that copies of clearance notices, orders, and renegotiation agreements issued with respect to the 11 companies named in the third item of the March 16 request, and with respect to manufacturers with whom Bannereraft’s production cost was compared, as called for by the fifth item, all with identifying details deleted, were supplied therewith. Beyond this, documents requested by Bannercraft were refused. These were all documents that constituted the Astro renegotiation report for the year; all documents in the file that analyzed “or in any way [bore] upon” Astro’s treatment of selling expenses; all file documents that had to do with “Information received,” as referred to in a stated communication from the Regional Board to Astro; all file documents that related to the reasons for the Board’s order denying Astro’s request to file an untimely application for commercial exemption; and all records that had to do with Astro’s renegotiation for the year “to the extent that such documents have been generated by and are in the custody of either” the Regional Board or the Board itself. Delaware Fastener Corp. was merged into David B. Lilly Co., Inc., in 1970 after renegotiation proceedings as to each corporation had begun, but before Lilly’s suit was instituted. The corporations requested all communications between the Board and other governmental agencies concerning either corporation; all sections of the Report of Renegotiation prepared by the Regional Board; all analyses used in comparing either of the corporations “with other contractors or subcontractors and reflecting the facts relating to such comparisons”; all written communications between the Board and firms holding renegotiable contracts or subcontracts in any way concerning either of the corporations and their performance; and all intra-agency memoranda and written communications consisting of recommendations or analyses prepared by the Board in connection with the renegotiation proceedings. “§ 552. Public Information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings. "(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: “(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying— “(A) final opinions . . . “(B) . . . statements of policy and interpretations . . . and “(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public; “. . .A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if— “(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or “ (ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.” In pertinent part, § 552 (a) (3) provides: “On complaint, the district court . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. In the event of noneompliance with the order of the court, the district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee . . . . Except as to causes the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this paragraph, take precedence on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.” Predecessor renegotiation statutes are cited and described in Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 745 n. 1 (1948). Section 105 (c), 50 U. S. C. App. § 1215 (c), provides that, in the absence of fraud, malfeasance, or willful misrepresentation, all liabilities of the contractor for excessive profits shall be discharged if the “proceeding is not commenced prior to the expiration of one year following the date upon which such statement is so filed.” The respondents in the present litigation have agreed to suspend their limitation periods pending resolution of the FOIA claims. See 151 U. S. App. D. C. 174, 190 n. 12, 466 F. 2d 345, 361 n. 12 (1972). Until July 1971 the proceeding was to be initiated in the Tax Court. 65 Stat. 21. The CFR citations throughout this section of this opinion are to the 1972 version of Renegotiation Board procedures in effect at the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The regulations were amended substantially in the fall of 1972. See 32 CFR pts. 1400-1599 (1973). The Court of Appeals in the present litigation and other federal decisions have recognized the general applicability of the FOIA to the Renegotiation Board. See Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 153 U. S. App. D. C. 398, 473 F. 2d 109 (1972); Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 312, 327, 459 F. 2d 1393, 1401 (1972); Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 147, 425 F. 2d 578 (1970). Among other decisions emphasizing this general public purpose of the Act are Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F. 2d 47, 48 (CA4 1973); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 146 U. S. App. D. C. 237, 242, 450 F. 2d 698, 703 (1971); Soucie v. David, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 144, 153, 448 F. 2d 1067, 1076 (1971); LaMorte v. Mansfield, 438 F. 2d 448, 451 (CA2 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 25, 424 F. 2d 935, 938, cert. denied, 400 U. S. 824 (1970). S. 1666, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., was passed by the Senate on July 28, 1964, 110 Cong. Rec. 17086-17089, and reconsidered and passed again on July 31, 1964, 110 Cong Rec. 17666-17668. There was insufficient time, however, for full consideration by the House. S. 1160, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., then became the FOIA and “is substantially S. 1666.” S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1965). There was no change in the remedy provided. The Senate report which accompanied S. 1666 explains, “The provision for enjoining an agency from further withholding is placed in the statute to make clear that the district courts shall have this power.” S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964). In discussing the contempt provision, the Report states, “This is another addition which has been made to avoid any possible misunderstanding as to the courts’ powers.” Ibid. See Note, 1973 U. Ill. L. F. 180, 191 (1973); Note, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 757, 765 (1973). “The committee has provided that any contractor aggrieved by a determination of excessive profits under the old law, whether he was cooperative and signed a closing agreement or not, may have a review of that determination in the Tax Court of the United States and in the review have all issues, constitutional and otherwise, decided by the court.” (Remarks of Cong. Disney.) The Court of Claims has been described, “by virtue of its role in the renegotiation process and its general expertise in the field of government contracts,” as being “uniquely qualified to supervise discovery against the Renegotiation Board.” Note, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1072, 1084 (1973). In this litigation there is no allegation or evidence that the Board was negotiating in bad faith or acting ultra vires. We therefore are not now concerned with the situation where allegations or evidence of that kind is present. Since the institution of these suits, the Board has amended its regulations to expand the discovery available to contractors. See 32 CFR §§ 1470.3, 1472.3 to 1472.6, 1474.3 to 1474.5 (1973).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

METROPOLITAN STEVEDORE CO. v. RAMBO et al. No. 96-272. Argued March 17, 1997 Decided June 19, 1997 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 141. Robert E. Babcock argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Scott Glabman. Thomas J. Pierry III argued the cause for respondent Rambo. With him on the brief was Thomas j Pierry Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. by Charles T. Carroll, Jr., F. Edwin Froelich, and Franklin W. Losey; and for the National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. by Alvin G. Kalmanson and Roy D. Axelrod. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. This case under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is before us a second time, now raising the question whether the Act bars nominal compensation to a worker who is presently able to earn at least as much as before he was injured. We hold nominal compensation proper when there is a significant possibility that the worker’s wage-earning capacity will fall below the level of his preinjury wages sometime in the future. I Respondent John Rambo injured his back and leg in 1980 while doing longshore work for petitioner Metropolitan Stevedore Company. Rambo claimed against Metropolitan for compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. §901 et seq., and the parties stipulated that Rambo had sustained a 22/2% permanent partial disability, which would normally reflect a $120.24 decline in his pre-injury $534.38 weekly wage. This, in turn, was reduced to an award of $80.16 per week under §8(c)(21) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(21), providing for compensation at the rate of 66%% of the difference between an employee’s preinjury wages and postinjury wage-earning capacity. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) entered an order incorporating this stipulated award. App. 51; Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo (Rambo I), 515 U. S. 291, 293 (1995). Rambo was later trained as a longshore crane operator and got full-time work with his new skills, with occasional stints as a heavy-truck operator to earn extra pay. His resulting annual eárnings between 1985 and 1990 were about three times what he had made before his injury. As a consequence, Metropolitan moved in 1989 to modify Rambo’s earlier disability award, see § 22, 33 U. S. C. § 922, and a hearing was held before an ALJ. While there was no evidence that Rambo’s physical condition had improved, the ALJ ordered the disability payments discontinued based on the tripling of Rambo’s preinjury earnings: “After taking into consideration the increase in wages due to the rate of inflation and any increase in salary for the particular job, it is evident that [Rambo] no longer has a wage-earning capacity loss. Although [Rambo] testified that he might lose his job at some future time, the evidence shows that [Rambo] would not be at any greater risk of losing his job than anyone else. Moreover, no evidence has been offered to show that [Rambo’s] age, education, and vocational training are such that he would be at greater risk of losing his present job or in seeking new employment in the event that he should be required to do so. Likewise, the evidence does not show that [Rambo’s] employer is a beneficent one. On the contrary, the evidence shows that [Rambo] is not only able to work full time as a crane operator, but that he is able to work as a heavy lift truck operator when the time is available within which to do so.” App. 55. See also Rambo I, supra, at 293-294. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the modification order, App. 57, 61, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that § 22 authorizes modification of an award only for changed physical conditions, Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 28 F. 3d 86 (1994). We in turn reversed in Rambo /, holding that “[t]he fundamental purpose of the Act is to compensate employees (or their beneficiaries) for wage-earning capacity lost because of injury; where that wage-earning capacity has been reduced, restored, or improved, the basis for compensation changes and the statutory scheme allows for modification.” 515 U. S., at 298. Since the essence of wage-earning capacity is economic, not physical, id., at 296-298, that capacity may be affected “even without any change in the employee’s physical condition,” id., at 301. On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed the order discontinuing compensation payments. It recognized that when a worker suffers a significant physical impairment without experiencing a present loss of earnings, there may be serious tension between the statutory mandate to account for future effects of disability in determining a claimant’s wage-earning capacity (and thus entitlement to compensation), see § 8(h), 33 U. S. C. § 908(h), and the statutory prohibition against issuing any new order to pay benefits more than one year after compensation ends or an order is entered denying an award, see § 22, 33 U. S. C. § 922. The Court of Appeals reconciled the two provisions by reading the statute to authorize a present nominal award subject to later modification if conditions should change. Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 81 F. 3d 840, 844 (1996). The court reversed the order ending Rambo’s benefits as unsupported by substantial evidence, due to “overemphasis on] Rambo’s current status and failfure] to consider the effect of Rambo’s permanent partial disability on his future earnings,” ibid., and it remanded for entry of a nominal award reflecting Rambo’s permanent partial disability, id., at 845. We granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 1002 (1996). While we agree that nominal compensation may be awarded under certain circumstances despite the worker’s present ability to earn more than his preinjury wage, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals directing entry of such an award and remand for factfinding by the ALJ. II The LHWCA authorizes compensation not for physical injury as such, but for economic harm to the injured worker from decreased ability to earn wages. See Rambo I, supra, at 297-298. The Act speaks of this economic harm as “disability,” defined as the “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment,” § 2(10), 33 U. S. C. § 902(10). Such incapacity is conclusively presumed for certain enumerated or “scheduled” injuries, which are compensated at 66%% of the worker’s preinjury wages over specified periods of time. See §§ 8(c)(1)—8(c)(20), 8(c)(22), 33 U.S.C. §§ 908(c)(1)-908(c)(20), 908(c)(22); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Pro grams, 449 U. S. 268, 269 (1980). For other, so-called “unscheduled” injuries resulting in less than total disability, the Act sets compensation at “66% per centum of the difference between the average weekly [preinjury] wages of the employee and the employee’s wage-earning capacity thereafter.” § 8(c)(21), 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(21) (permanent partial disability); see also § 8(e), 33 U. S. C. § 908(e) (temporary partial disability). For figuring this difference, § 8(h) explains that the claimant’s postinjury “wage-earning capacity” is to be determined “by his actual earnings if such actual earnings fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity: Provided, however, That if the employee has no actual earnings or his actual earnings do not fairly and reasonably represent his wage-earning capacity, the deputy commissioner may, in the interest of justice, fix such wage-earning capacity as shall be reasonable, having due regard to the nature of his injury, the degree of physical impairment, his usual employment, and any other factors or circumstances in the case which may affect his capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition, including the effect of disability as it may naturally extend into the future.” § 8(h), 33 U. S. C. § 908(h). See also § 10, 33 U. S. C. § 910 (method for determining prein-jury wages). See generally Rambo I, 515 U. S., at 297-298. We may summarize these provisions and their implications this way. Disability is a measure of earning capacity lost as a result of work-related injury. By distinguishing between the diminished capacity and the injury itself, and by defining capacity in relation both to the injured worker’s old job and to other employment, the statute makes it clear that disability is the product of injury and opportunities in the job market. Capacity, and thus disability, is not necessarily reflected in actual wages earned after injury, see id., at 300-301; Potomac Elec. Power, supra, at 272, n. 5, and when it is not, the factfinder under the Act must make a determination of disability that is “reasonable” and “in the interest of justice,” and one that takes account of the disability’s future effects, § 8(h). In some cases a disparity between the worker’s actual postinjury wages and his job-market capacity will be obvious, along with the reasons for it. If a disabled worker with some present capacity chooses not to work at all, or to work at less than his capacity, a windfall is avoided by determining present disability and awarding a benefit accordingly. See, e. g., Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 905 F. 2d 84, 87-88 (CA5 1990). At the other extreme, a worker with some present disability may nonetheless be fortunate enough to receive not merely the market wages appropriate for his diminished capacity, but full preinjury wages (say, because an employer is generous, for whatever reason). See, e. g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. McLellan, 288 F. 2d 250, 251 (CA2 1961); see also Edwards v. Director, OWCP, 999 F. 2d 1374, 1375-1376 (CA9 1993) (holding that wages from short-lived employment do not represent actual earning capacity on open market). Once again, the present disability may still be calculated and a corresponding award made. A problem in applying the provisions applicable when there is a disparity between current wages and wage-earning capacity arises in a case like this one, however. The worker now receives appropriate market wages as high or higher than those before his injury, thus experiencing no decline in present capacity. And yet (we assume for now) there is some particular likelihood that in the future the combination of injury and market conditions may leave him with a lower capacity. The question is whether such a person is presently disabled within the meaning of the statute, and if so, what provision should be made for the potential effects of disability in the future. There are two reasons to treat such a person as presently disabled under the statute. The first follows from the provision of law that on its face bars an injured worker from waiting for adverse economic effects to occur in the future before bringing his disability claim, which generally must be filed within a year of injury. § 13(a), 33 U. S. C. § 913(a); Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U. S. 197 (1952). He is also barred from seeking a new, modified award after one year from the date of any denial or termination of benefits. § 22, 33 U. S. C. § 922. Because an injured worker who has a basis to anticipate wage loss in the fixture resulting from a combination of his injury and job-market opportunities must nonetheless claim promptly, it is likely that Congress intended “disability” to include the injury-related potential for future wage loss. And because a losing claimant loses for all time after one year from the denial or termination of benefits, it is equally likely that Congress intended such a claimant to obtain some award of benefits in anticipation of the future potential loss. This conclusion is confirmed by the provision of § 8(h) that in cases of disparity between actual wages and earning capacity, the natural effects of disability that will occur in the future must be given “due regard” as one of the “factors or circumstances in the case which may affect [a claimant’s] capacity to earn wages in his disabled condition.” Although this mandate is phrased in general terms, its practical effect is limited to the class of cases at issue here, where the worker is presently able to earn at least as much as before his injury. In all other cases, when injury depresses the claimant’s wage-earning capacity under the conditions prevailing at the time of an award, so that the present effects of his disability are unquestionably compensable immediately, the Act already makes provision for the future effects of disability by means of § 22, which liberally permits modification of awards in response to changed conditions that occur within one year of the last payment of compensation (or a denial or termination of benefits). 33 U. S. C. § 922. Rambo I held that this provision allows modification whenever a changed combination of training and economic (let alone physical) circumstances reduces, restores, or improves wage-earning capacity. 515 U. S., at 296-297. Since ongoing awards may be modified if future possibilities become present realities, there is no need to account for such possibilities in calculating a worker’s immediately compensable disability; the Act plainly takes a wait-and-see approach to future contingencies here. The first award in this case was a standard illustration of the proper practice of basing capacity determinations and compensation awards on present reality. If Rambo’s initial award had already been discounted to reflect the odds of his obtaining less strenuous but higher paying work in the future, Rambo I could hardly have held that the Act permitted reduction of that initial award again when Rambo actually received training as a crane operator and found work using his new skills. The first award simply reflected the degree of diminished capacity operative at the time it was made, and it was proper to revise it when conditions changed. Thus, if § 8(h)’s admonition to consider future effects when calculating capacity has any practical application, it must be because it may apply in a case such as this one, in which there is no present wage loss and would thus be no present award if compensation were to be based solely on present employment conditions. If the future were ignored and compensation altogether denied whenever present earning capacity had not (yet) declined, § 22 would bar modification in response to future changes in condition after one year. To implement the mandate of § 8(h) in this class of cases, then, “disability” must be read broadly enough to cover loss of capacity not just as a product of the worker’s injury and present market conditions, but as a potential product of injury and market opportunities in the future. There must, in other words, be a cognizable category of disability that is potentially substantial, but presently nominal in character. There being, then, a need to account for potential future effects in a present determination of wage-earning capacity (and thus disability) when capacity does not immediately decline, the question is which of two basic methods to choose to do this. The first would be to make a one-time calculation of a periodic benefit following the approach of the common law of torts, which bases lump-sum awards for loss of future earnings on an estimate of “the difference . . . between the value of the plaintiff’s services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have been had there been no harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 924, Comment d, p. 525 (1977). This predictive approach ordinarily requires consideration of every possible variable that could have an impact on ability to earn, including “[ejnvironmental factors such as the condition of the labor market, the chance of advancement or of being laid off, and the like.” 4 F. Harper, F. James, & O. Gray, Law of Torts § 25.8, pp. 550-551 (2d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted). Prediction of future employment may well be the most troublesome step in this wide-ranging enquiry. As the tripling of Rambo’s own earnings shows, a claimant’s future ability to earn wages will vary as greatly as opportunity varies, and any estimate of wage-earning potential turns in part on the probabilities over time that suitable jobs within certain ranges of pay will actually be open. In these calculations, there is room for error. Cf. id., §25.8, at 553 (to determine lost wage-earning capacity, juries must often “use their judgment (in effect,... speculate)”). That juries in tort cases must routinely engage in such difficult predictions (compounded further by discounting for present value) is the price paid by the common-law approach for the finality of a one-time lump-sum judgment. The second possible way to account for future developments would be to do in this situation just what the Act already does through the modification provision in the run of cases: to wait and see, that is, to base calculation of diminished wage-earning capacity, and thus compensation, on current realities and to permit modifications reflecting the actual effects of an employee’s disability as manifested over time. This way, finality is exchanged for accuracy, both in compensating a worker for the actual economic effects of his injury, and in charging the employer and his insurer for that amount alone. Metropolitan denies that the second, wait-and-see alternative is even open, arguing that § 8(h) gives the factfinder only two choices: either deny compensation altogether because a claimant’s actual wages have not diminished, or, if the ALJ concludes that the worker’s current income does not fairly represent his present wage-earning capacity, calculate the extent of the worker’s disability (and his consequent entitlement to compensation) in toto based on all relevant factors, including the future effects of the disability. See Brief for Petitioner 9. What we have already said, however, shows the unsoundness of Metropolitan’s two options. The practical effect of denying any compensation to a disabled claimant on the ground that he is presently able to earn as much as (or more than) before his injury would run afoul of the Act’s mandate to account for the future effects of disability in fashioning an award, since those effects would not be reflected in the current award and the 1-year statute of limitations for modification after denial of compensation would foreclose responding to such effects on a wait-and-see basis as they might arise. On the other hand, trying to honor that mandate by basing a present award on a comprehensive prediction of an inherently uncertain future would, as we have seen, almost always result in present overcompensation or undercompensation. And it would be passing strange to credit Congress with the intent to guarantee fairness to employers and employees by a wait-and-see approach in most cases where future effects are imperfectly foreseeable, but to find no such intent in one class of cases, those in which wage-earning ability does not immediately decline. There is moreover an even more fundamental objection to Metropolitan’s proposed options. They implicitly reject the very conclusion required to make sense of the combined provisions limiting claims and mandating consideration of future effects: that a disability whose substantial effects are only potential is nonetheless a present disability, albeit a presently nominal one. It is, indeed, this realization that points toward a way to employ the wait-and-see approach to provide for the future effects of disability when capacity does not immediately decline. It is simply “reasonable” and “in the interest of justice” (to use the language of § 8(h)) to reflect merely nominal current disability with a correspondingly nominal award. Ordering nominal compensation holds open the possibility of a modified award if a future conjunction of injury, training, and employment opportunity should later depress the worker’s ability to earn wages below the preinjury level, turning the potential disability into an actual one. It allows full scope to the mandate to consider the future effects of disability, it promotes accuracy, it preserves administrative simplicity by obviating cumbersome enquiries relating to the entire range of possible future states of affairs, and it avoids imputing to Congress the unlikely intent to join a wait-and-see rule for most cases with a predict-the-future method when the disability results in no current decline in what the worker can earn. Our view, as it turns out, coincides on this point with the position taken by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), who is charged with the administration of the Act, and who also construes the Act as permitting nominal compensation as a mechanism for taking future effects of disability into account when present wage-earning ability remains undiminished. See Brief for Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 12-21, 24-31. The Secretary of Labor has delegated the bulk of her statutory authority to administer and enforce the Act, including rulemaking power, to the Director, see Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 125-126 (1995); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 519 U. S. 248, 262-263 (1997), and the Director’s reasonable interpretation of the Act brings at least some added persuasive force to our conclusion, see, e. g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944) (giving weight to agency’s persuasive interpretation, even when agency lacks “power to control”); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 345-346 (1997). There is, of course, the question of how high the potential for disability need be to be recognized as nominal, but that is an issue not addressed by the parties, and it would be imprudent of us to address it now with any pretense of settling it for all time. Here it is enough to recall that in those cases where an injury immediately depresses ability to earn wages under present conditions, the payment of actual compensation holds open the option of modification under §22 even for future changes in condition whose probability of occurrence may well be remote at the time of the original award. Consistent application of the Act’s wait-and-see approach thus suggests that nominal compensation permitting future modification should not be limited to instances where a decline in capacity can be shown to a high degree of statistical likelihood. Those courts to have dealt with the matter explicitly have required a showing that there is a significant possibility that a worker’s wage-earning capacity will at some future point fall below his preinjury wages, see Hole v. Miami Shipyards Corp., 640 F. 2d 769, 772 (CA5 1981); Randall v. Comfort Control, Inc., 725 F. 2d 791, 800 (CADC 1984), and, in the absence of rulemaking by the agency specifying how substantial the possibility of future decline in capacity must be to justify a nominal award, we adopt this standard. We therefore hold that a worker is entitled to nominal compensation when his work-related injury has not diminished his present wage-earning capacity under current circumstances, but there is a significant potential that the injury will cause diminished capacity under future conditions. H-1 1 — H h — H The application of this legal standard to the case before us depends in part on how the burden of persuasion is allocated. Section 7(c) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 556(d), which applies to adjudications under the Act, see Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 270 (1994), places the burden of persuasion on the proponent of an order, id., at 272-281; when the evidence is evenly balanced, the proponent loses, see id., at 281. On the initial claim for nominal compensation under the Act, then, the employee has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been injured and that the odds are significant that his wage-earning capacity will fall below his preinjury wages at some point in the fixture. But when an employer seeks modification of previously awarded compensation, the employer is the proponent of the order with the burden of establishing a change in conditions justifying modification. In a case like this, where the prior award was based on a finding of economic harm resulting from an actual decline in wage-earning capacity at the time the award was entered, the employer satisfies this burden by showing that as a result of a change in capacity the employee’s wages have risen to a level at or above his preinjury earnings. Once the employer makes this showing, § 8(h) gives rise to the presumption that the employee’s wage-earning capacity is equal to his current, higher wage and, in the face of this presumption, the burden shifts back to the claimant to show that the likelihood of a future decline in capacity is sufficient for an award of nominal compensation. We emphasize that the probability of a future decline is a matter of proof; it is not to be assumed pro forma as an administrative convenience in the run of cases. In this case, the first award of compensation was based on the parties’ stipulation that Rambo suffered 22lk% permanent partial disability as a result of his injury, whereby Rambo established that the injury impaired his ability to undertake at least some types of previously available gainful labor and thus prevented him from earning as much as he had before his accident. Metropolitan sought termination of the award based solely on evidence, which the ALJ found persuasive, that Rambo is now able to earn market wages as a crané operator significantly greater than his preinjury earnings. There is therefore substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s decision to terminate actual (as opposed to nominal) benefits, since under present conditions Rambo’s capacity to earn wages is no longer depressed. But the ALJ failed to consider whether there is a significant possibility that Rambo’s wage-earning capacity will decline again in the future. Because there is no evidence in the record of the modification proceedings showing that Rambo’s physical condition has improved to the point of full recovery, the parties’ earlier stipulation of permanent partial disability at least raises the possibility that Rambo’s ability to earn will decline in the event he loses his current employment as a crane operator. The ALJ’s order altogether terminating benefits must therefore be vacated for failure to consider whether a future decline in Rambo’s earning capacity is sufficiently likely to justify nominal compensation. Since the ALJ is the factfinder under the Act, see §§ 21(b)(3), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 921(b)(3), (c), however, the Court of Appeals should have remanded to the agency for further findings of fact, see, e. g., Randall v. Comfort Control, Inc., 725 F. 2d, at 799-800 (remanding for consideration of nominal award), instead of directing entry of a nominal award based on its own appraisal of the evidence. We therefore vacate the Ninth Circuit’s judgment insofar as it directs entry of an award of nominal compensation, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Judge Reinhardt dissented in part on other grounds. 81 F. 3d, at 845. A different conclusion might, perhaps, be drawn from our observation-46 years ago in Pillsbury, 342 U. S., at 198-199, that the agency allowed claims to be filed within one year of injury but before recovery for present disability could be had. If that practice were assumed to be authorized by the Act, an injured worker who anticipated future loss of earning capacity could file a claim within the 1-year period permitted by § 13(a) yet defer litigation of the claim indefinitely until a capacity loss manifested itself, thereby undercutting our inference from the limitations provision that present disability must be conceived as including the potential for future decline in capacity. But it seems unlikely that when Congress enacted § 13(a) it intended workers to be able to file claims before they could establish all the elements entitling them to compensation. Moreover, while the practical effect of permitting protective filings and indefinitely deferring adjudication is in one respect the same as awarding nominal compensation when there is a significant possibility of future capacity loss, in that both approaches hold open the possibility of compensating a worker when the potential future economic effects of his injury actually appear, the former approach, unlike the latter, has the defect of putting off the adjudication of every element of the worker’s claim, including such matters as the work-related nature of the injury, until long after the evidence grows stale. We therefore think that the inference we draw from the limitations provision is the better one. As we noted in Rambo I, however, not every fluctuation in actual wages is a ground for modification, but only those shifts reflecting a change in the worker’s underlying capacity, see 515 U. S., at 300-301, such as a change in physical condition, skill level, or the availability of suitable jobs. “There may be cases raising difficult questions as to what constitutes a change in wage-earning capacity, but we need not address them here.” Ibid. In liberally permitting modification, the Act resembles virtually all other workers’ compensation schemes. See 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 81.10, p. 15-1045 (1996). “[I]t is one of the main advantages of the reopening device [in workers’ compensation schemes] that it permits a commission to make the best estimate of disability it can at the time of the original award, although at that moment it may be impossible to predict the extent of future disability, without having to worry about being forever bound by the first appraisal.” Id., § 81.31(a), at 15-1127 to 15-1132 (footnotes omitted). The need for finality in workers’ compensation awards is further reduced because compensation is paid periodically over the life of the disability, rather than in a lump sum, see §§ 14(a), (b), 33 U. S. C. §§ 914(a), (b) (providing for periodic payment of compensation). Thus, modifying a worker’s compensation award generally affects future payments only, rather than retroactively adjusting a prior lump-sum payment. “Under the typical award in the form of periodic payments ..., the objectives of [workers’ compensation] legislation are best accomplished if the commission can increase, decrease, revive, or terminate payments to correspond to a claimant’s changed condition,” subject, under most such laws, to certain time limitations. 3 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 81.10, at 15-1045; id., § 81.21, at 15-1046 to 15-1047. As a simplified example of the sort of calculation that would be required under this approach, a factfinder might decide in the present case that Rambo has a 75% chance of keeping work as a crane operator with annual earnings of $60,000, and a 25% chance of being laid off from that job and remaining unemployed with no income because his injuries would prevent him from performing more strenuous work, for a weighted average future wage-earning capacity of $45,000. (($60,000X.75) + ($0x.25) = $45,000.) Of course, even if the factfinder somehow got the probabilities and earnings for each possible future state right, the weighted average future capacity would rarely correspond to actual developments. In our hypothetical, Rambo’s actual future capacity would be $15,000 a year more than his predicted capacity if he kept his job as a crane operator, and $45,000 less if he lost that job and found no other. Thus, if a compensation award were based on the weighted average, Rambo would necessarily end up either overcompensated or undercompensated, even though the Act might meet its objectives for the system as a whole. The one possible escape from this conclusion rests on an implausible reading of the Act. A claimant could, arguably, preserve a right to compensation in the future by reapplying within the 1-year period and successively each year thereafter. See § 22, 33 U. S. C. § 922 (permitting modification “at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim”). But this would be a strange way to administer the Act, for its very premise is that a claimant would repeatedly file reapplications knowing his disability to be without present effect and (on Metropolitan’s theory) himself without any good-faith claim to the present compensation sought. The legislative history to the 1938 amendments to the Act, which added § 8(h), indicates that Congress understood that the reference to future effects in the new subsection would interact with § 22 by allowing compensation for permanent partial disability for employees whose job opportunities are narrowed by injury but whose wages have not declined: “[Section 8(h)] provides for consideration of the effects of an injury . . . upon the employee’s future ability to earn.... Often an employee returns to work earning for the time being the same wages as he earned prior to injury, although still in a disabled condition and with his opportunity to secure gainful employment definitely limited.... It is clear that in such a ease the employee’s ability to compete in the labor market has been definitely affected; and, though at present the employee is paid his former full-time earnings, he suffers permanent partial disability which should be compensable under the ... Act.... “In a case such as that..., an unscrupulous employer might with profit to himself continue the original wages ... until the ... right of review of the case (sec. 22) had run,... thus defeating] the beneficent provisions of the..: Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 1945, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 5-6 (1938); S. Rep. No. 1988, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1938). See Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S. 202, 208, 210-211 (1997) (weighing administrative simplicity in favor of permissible construction of statute). The OWCP Director argues that when the employee has the burden of persuasion, the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) preponderance of the evidence standard (see infra, at 139) requires him to show that an injury-related future decline in wages is more likely than not to occur. Brief for Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 22-23. The Director’s position confuses the degree of certainty needed to find a fact or element under the preponderance standard with the fact or element to be so established, which in this case is the statistical odds that wage-earning capacity will decline in the future. “The burden of showing something by a preponderance of the evidence . .. simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact’s existence.” Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 622 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the preponderance standard goes to how convincing the evidence in favor of a fact must be in comparison with the evidence against it before that fact may be found, but does not determine what facts must be proven as a substantive part of a claim or defense. See Greenwich Collieries v. Director, OWCP, 990 F. 2d 730, 736 (CA3 1993) (“A preponderance of the evidence is ... [e]videnee which is ... more convincing than the evidence . . . offered in opposition to it . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 512 U. S. 267 (1994). Unlike other standards of proof such as reasonable doubt or clear and convincing evidence, the preponderance standard “allows both parties to share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,” Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 390 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), except that “when the evidence is evenly balanced, the [party with the burden of persuasion] must lose,” Director, Of fice of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U. S. 267, 281 (1994). Thus, under the preponderance standard, proof that a future decline in capacity is more likely than not (in the sense that the evidence predicting such a decline is more convincing than the evidence predicting none) would be required only if the fact of such a decline, rather than some degree of probability of its occurrence, were a substantive element of a claim for nominal compensation, which the Director does not maintain. Even assuming that the Director’s formally promulgated construction of the LHWCA would be entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), see Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 134 (1995), we do not defer to the Director’s interpretation here of the APA’s provision for allocating the burden of persuasion under the preponderance of the evidence standard, for three reasons. (1) The APA is not a statute that the Director is charged with administering. Cf. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 148 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Chevron, supra, at 842; Professional Reactor Operator Soc. v. NRC, 939 F. 2d 1047, 1051 (CADC 1991). (2) This interpretation does not appear to be embodied in any regulation or similar binding policy pronouncement to which such deference would apply. See Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 740-741 (1996); 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §3.5, p. 120 (3d ed. 1994). (3) The interpretation is couched in a logical non sequitur, as just explained. The dissent argues that the ALJ expressly found that Rambo’s present wages adequately reflect his future prospects. Post, at 148-150. In our view, however, the language in the modification order relied on by the dissent addresses whether Rambo’s current wages accurately reflect his earning capacity under present market conditions, see supra, at 128 (current wages do not always reflect current capacity); Edwards v. Director, OWCP, 999 F. 2d 1374, 1375 (CA9 1993) (adopting OWCP Director’s position that “earnings in post-injury employment must be sufficiently regular to establish true earning capacity”), not the distinct question whether there is a significant chance that his ability to earn will again decline in the future. See App. 53 (ALJ characterized his task as “considering] wage-earning capacity in an open labor market under normal employment conditions”). The ALJ’s failure to consider the latter question is not surprising, since prior to this case there was no governing authority from this Court or the Ninth Circuit approving nominal awards for possible future declines.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. NATIONAL CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR BROADCASTING et al. No. 76-1471. Argued January 16, 1978 — Decided June 12, 1978 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except BreNNAN, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 76-1521, 76-1595, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. Ernest W. Jennes and Russell H. Carpenter, Jr., filed briefs for petitioners in No. 76-1521; Lee Loevinger, David B. Lytle, and Walter A. Smith, Jr., filed a brief for petitioner in No. 76-1595; Arthur B. Hanson, Aloysius B. McCabe, and Michael Yourshaw filed briefs for petitioner in No. 76-1604; John B. Kenkel and William M. Barnard filed a brief for petitioners in No. 76-1624; and John H. Midlen and John H. Midlen, Jr., filed a brief for petitioners in No. 76-1685. Daniel M. Armstrong argued the cause for the Federal Communications Commission, petitioner in No. 76-1471 and a respondent in No. 76-1595. With him on the briefs were Sheldon M. Guttmann and Keith H. Fagan. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Shenefield, Frank H. Easterbrook, Barry Grossman, Robert B. Nicholson, and Bruce E. Fein. Charles M. Firestone argued the cause for National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, a respondent in Nos. 76-1471, 76-1521, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. With him on the brief were Edward J. Kuhlmann and Nolan A. Bowie. James A. McKenim, Jr., and Thomas N. Frohock filed a brief for American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., a respondent in Nos. 76-1471, 76-1521, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. R. Russell Eagan, Robert A. Beizer, John P. Southmayd, Thomas H. Wall, Alan C. Campbell, Richard Hildreth, and James E. Greeley filed a brief for Gray Communications Systems, Inc., et ah, respondents in Nos. 76-1471, 76-1521, 76-1595, 76-1604, 76-1624, and 76-1685. Paul Dobin and Ian D. Volner filed a brief in No. 76-1471 for Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp., as respondent Under this Court's Rule 21 (4). Together with No. 76-1521, Channel Two Television Co. et al. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting; No. 76-1595, National Association of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Commission et al.; No. 76-1604, American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al.; No. 76-1624, Illinois Broadcasting Co., Inc., et al. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al.; and No. 76-1685, Post Co. et al. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Mr. Griswold and Victor E. Ferrad, Jr., for Dispatch Printing Co: et al, and by J. Roger Woll'enberg, Timothy N. Black, John F. Cooney, and John E. Flick for Times Mirror Co. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were^ filed by the National Emergency Civil Liberties Foundation, and by Earle K. Moore for the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ et al. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in these cases are Federal Communications Commission regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or television broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community. Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F. C. C. 2d 1046 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Order), as amended upon reconsideration, 53 F. C. C. 2d 589 (1975), codified in 47 CFR §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1976). The regulations, adopted after a lengthy rulemaking proceeding, prospectively bar formation or transfer of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations. Existing combinations are generally permitted to continue in operation. However, in communities in which there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and the only broadcast station, or (where there is more than one broadcast station) of the only daily newspaper and the only television station, divestiture of either the newspaper or the broadcast station is required within five years, unless grounds for waiver are demonstrated. The questions for decision are whether these regulations either exceed the Commission’s authority under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), or violate the First or Fifth Amendment rights of newspaper owners; and whether the lines drawn by the Commission between new and existing newspaper-broadcast combinations, and between existing combinations subject to divestiture and those allowed to continue in operation, are arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of § 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. i 706 (2) (A) (1976 ed.). For the reasons set forth below, we sustain the regulations in their entirety. I A Under the regulatory scheme established by the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, and continued in the Communications Act of 1934, no television or radio broadcast station may operate without a license granted by the Federal Communications Commission. 47 U. S. C. § 301. Licensees who wish to continue broadcasting must apply for renewal of their licenses every three years, and the Commission may grant an initial license or a renewal only if it finds that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby. §§ 307 (a), (d), 308 (a), 309 (a), (d). In setting its licensing policies, the Commission has long acted on the theory that diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic power. See, e. g., Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 F. C. C. 1476, 1476-1477 (1964). This perception of the public interest has been implemented over the years by a series of regulations imposing increasingly stringent restrictions on multiple ownership of broadcast stations. In the early 1940’s, the Commission promulgated rules prohibiting ownership or control of more than one station in the same broadcast service (AM radio, FM radio, or television) in the same community. In 1953, limitations were placed on the total number of stations in each service a person or entity may own or control. And in 1970, the Commission adopted regulations prohibiting, on a prospective basis, common ownership of a VHF television station and any radio station serving the same market. More generally, “[diversification of control of the media of mass communications” has been viewed by the Commission as “a factor of primary significance” in determining who, among competing applicants in a comparative proceeding, should receive the initial license for a particular broadcast facility. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F. C. C. 2d 393, 394-395 (1965) (italics omitted). Thus, prior to adoption of the regulations at issue here, the fact that an applicant for an initial license published a newspaper in the community to be served by the broadcast station was taken into account on a case-by-case basis, and resulted in some instances in awards of licenses to competing applicants. Diversification of ownership has not been the sole consideration thought relevant to the public interest, however. The Commission’s other, and sometimes conflicting, goal has been to ensure “the best practicable service to the public.” Id., at 394. To achieve this goal, the Commission has weighed factors such as the anticipated contribution of the owner to station operations, the proposed program service, and the past broadcast record of the applicant — in addition to diversification of ownership — in making initial comparative licensing decisions. See id., at 395-400. Moreover, the Commission has given considerable weight to a policy of avoiding undue disruption of existing service. As a result, newspaper owners in many instances have been able to acquire broadcast licenses for stations serving the same communities as their newspapers, and the Commission has repeatedly renewed such licenses on findings that continuation of the service offered by the common owner would serve the public interest. See Order, at 1066-1067, 1074-1075. B Against this background, the Commission began the instant rulemaking proceeding in 1970 to consider the need for a more restrictive policy toward newspaper ownership of radio and television broadcast stations. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. 18110), 22 F. C. C. 2d 339 (1970). Citing studies showing the dominant role of television stations and daily newspapers as sources of local news and other information, id., at 346; see id., at 344 — 346, the notice of rulemaking proposed adoption of regulations that would eliminate all newspaper-broadcast combinations serving the same market, by prospectively banning formation or transfer of such combinations and requiring dissolution of all existing combinations within five years, id., at 346. The Commission suggested that the proposed regulations would serve “the purpose of promoting competition among the mass media involved, and maximizing diversification of service sources and viewpoints.” Ibid. At the same time, however, the Commission expressed “substantial concern” about the disruption of service that might result from divestiture of existing combinations. Id., at 348. Comments were invited on all aspects of the proposed rules. The notice of rulemaking generated a considerable response. Nearly 200 parties, including the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, various broadcast and newspaper interests, public interest groups, and academic and research entities, filed comments on the proposed rules. In addition, a number of studies were submitted, dealing with the effects of newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership on competition and station performance, the economic consequences of divestiture, and the degree of diversity present in the mass media. In March 1974, the Commission requested further comments directed primarily to the core problem of newspaper-television station cross-ownership, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 18110), 47 F. C. C. 2d 97 (1974), and close to 50 sets of additional comments were filed. In July 1974, the Commission held three days of oral argument, at which all parties who requested time were allowed to speak. The regulations at issue here were promulgated and explained in a lengthy report and order released by the Commission on January 31, 1975. The Commission concluded, first, that it had statutory authority to issue the regulations under the Communications Act, Order, at 1048, citing 47 U. S. C. §§ 2 (a), 4 (i), 4 (j), 301, 303, 309 (a), and that the regulations were valid under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, Order, at 1050-1051. It observed that “[t]he term public interest encompasses many factors including 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources/ ” Order, at 1048, quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 (1945), and that “ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of presentation,” Order, at 1050. The Order further explained that the prospective ban on creation of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations was grounded primarily in First Amendment concerns, while the divestiture regulations were based on both First Amendment and antitrust policies. Id., at 1049. In addition, the Commission rejected the suggestion that it lacked the power to order divestiture, reasoning that the statutory requirement of license renewal every three years necessarily implied authority to order divestiture over a five-year period. Id., at 1052. After reviewing the comments and studies submitted by the various parties during the course of the proceeding, the Commission then turned to an explanation of the regulations and the justifications for their adoption. The prospective rules, barring formation of new broadcast-newspaper combinations in the same market, as well as transfers of existing combinations to new owners, were adopted without change from the proposal set forth in the notice of rulemaking. While recognizing the pioneering contributions of newspaper owners to the broadcast industry, the Commission concluded that changed circumstances made it possible, and necessary, for all new licensing of broadcast stations to “be expected to add to local diversity.” Id., at 1075. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission did not find that existing co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations had not served the public interest, or that such combinations necessarily “spea[k] with one voice” or are harmful to competition. Id., at 1085, 1089. In the Commission's view, the conflicting studies submitted by the parties concerning the effects of newspaper ownership on competition and station performance were inconclusive, and no pattern of specific abuses by existing cross-owners was demonstrated. See id., at 1072-1073, 1085, 1089. The prospective rules were justified, instead, by reference to the Commission's policy of promoting diversification of ownership: Increases in diversification of ownership would possibly result in enhanced diversity of viewpoints, and, given the absence of persuasive countervailing considerations, “even a small gain in diversity” was “worth pursuing.” Id., at 1076, 1080 n. 30. With respect to the proposed across-the-board divestiture requirement, however, the Commission concluded that “a mere hoped-for gain in diversity” was not a sufficient justification. Id., at 1078. Characterizing the divestiture issues as “the most difficult” presented in the proceeding, the Order explained that the proposed rules, while correctly recognizing the central importance of diversity considerations, “may have given too little weight to the consequences which could be expected to attend a focus on the abstract goal alone.” Ibid. Forced dissolution would promote diversity, but it would also cause “disruption for the industry and hardship for individual owners,” “resulting in losses or diminution of service to the public.” Id., at 1078, 1080. The Commission concluded that in light of these countervailing considerations divestiture was warranted only in “the most egregious cases,” which it identified as those in which a newspaper-broadcast combination has an “effective monopoly” in the local “marketplace of ideas as well as economically.” Id., at 1080-1081. The Commission recognized that any standards for defining which combinations fell within that category would necessarily be arbitrary to some degree, but “[a] choice had to be made.” Id., at 1080. It thus decided to require divestiture only where there was common ownership of the sole daily newspaper published in a community and either (1) the sole broadcast station providing that entire community with a clear signal, or (2) the sole television station encompassing the entire community with a clear signal. Id., at 1080-1084. The Order identified 8 television-newspaper and 10 radio-newspaper combinations meeting the divestiture criteria. Id., at 1085, 1098. Waivers of the divestiture requirement were granted sua sponte to 1 television and 1 radio combination, leaving a total of 16 stations subject to divestiture. The Commission explained that waiver requests would be entertained in the latter cases, but, absent waiver, either the newspaper or the broadcast station would have to be divested by January 1,1980. Id., at 1084-1086. On petitions for reconsideration, the Commission reaffirmed the rules in all material respects. Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 18110), 53 F. C. C. 2d 589 (1975). C Various parties — including the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB), the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), and several broadcast licensees subject to the divestiture requirement — petitioned for review of the regulations in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 47 U. S. C. § 402 (a) and 28 U. S. C. §§2342 (1), 2343 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Numerous other parties intervened, and the United States— represented by the Justice Department — was made a respondent pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2344, 2348. NAB, ANPA, and the broadcast licensees subject to divestiture argued that the regulations went too far in restricting cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations; NCCB and the Justice Department contended that the regulations did not go far enough and that the Commission inadequately justified its decision not to order divestiture on a more widespread basis. Agreeing substantially with NCCB and the Justice Department, the Court of Appeals affirmed the prospective ban on new licensing of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations, but vacated the limited divestiture rules, and ordered the Commission to adopt regulations requiring dissolution of all existing combinations that did not qualify for a waiver under the procedure outlined in the Order. 181 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 555 F. 2d 938 (1977); see n. 11, supra. The court held, first, that the prospective ban was a reasonable means of furthering “the highly valued goal of diversity” in the mass media, 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 17, 555 F. 2d, at 954, and was therefore not without a rational basis. The court concluded further that, since the Commission “explained why it considers diversity to be a factor of exceptional importance,” and since the Commission’s goal of promoting diversification of mass media ownership was strongly supported by First Amendment and antitrust policies, it was not arbitrary for the prospective rules to be “based on [the diversity] factor to the exclusion of others customarily relied on by the Commission.” Id., at 13 n. 33, 555 F. 2d, at 950 n. 33; see id., at 11-12, 555 F. 2d, at 948-949. The court also held that the prospective rules did not exceed the Commission’s authority under the Communications Act. The court reasoned that the public interest standard of the Act permitted, and indeed required, the Commission to consider diversification of mass media ownership in making its licensing decisions, and that the Commission’s general rule-making authority under 47 U. S. C. §§ 303 (r) and 154 (i) allowed the Commission to adopt reasonable license qualifications implementing the public-interest standard. 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 14-15, 555 F. 2d, at 951-952. The court concluded, moreover, that since the prospective ban was designed to “increas [e] the number of media voices in the community,” and not to restrict or control the content of free speech, the ban would not violate the First Amendment rights of newspaper owners. Id., at 16-17, 555 F. 2d, at 953-954. After affirming the prospective rules, the Court of Appeals invalidated the limited divestiture requirement as arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of § 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 TJ. S. C. § 706 (2) (A) (1976 ed.). The court’s primary holding was that the Commission lacked a rational basis for “grandfathering” most existing combinations while banning all new combinations. The court reasoned that the Commission’s own diversification policy, as reinforced by First Amendment policies and the Commission’s statutory obligation to “encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest,” 47 U. S. C. § 303 (g), required the Commission to adopt a “presumption” that stations owned by co-located newspapers “do not serve the public interest,” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 25-26, 555 F. 2d, at 962-963. The court observed that, in the absence of countervailing policies, this “presumption” would have dictated adoption of an across-the-board divestiture requirement, subject only to waiver “in those cases where the evidence clearly discloses that cross-ownership is in the public interest.” Id., at 29, 555 F. 2d, at 966. The countervailing policies relied on by the Commission in its decision were, in the court’s view, “lesser policies” which had not been given as much weight in the past as its diversification policy. Id., at 28, 555 F. 2d, at 965. And “the record [did] not disclose the extent fib which divestiture would actually threaten these [other policies].” Ibid. The court concluded, therefore, that it was irrational for the Commission not to give controlling weight to its diversification policy and thus to extend the divestiture requirement to all existing combinations. The Court of Appeals held further that, even assuming a difference in treatment between new and existing combinations was justifiable, the Commission lacked a rational basis for requiring divestiture in the 16 “egregious” cases while allowing the remainder of the existing combinations to continue in operation. The court suggested that “limiting divestiture to small markets of 'absolute monopoly' squanders the opportunity where divestiture might do the most good,” since “[d]ivestiture . . . may be more useful in the larger markets.” Id., at 29, 555 F. 2d, at 966. The court further observed that the record “[did] not support the conclusion that divestiture would be more harmful in the grandfathered markets than in the 16 affected markets,” nor did it demonstrate that the need for divestiture was stronger in those 16 markets. Ibid. On the latter point, the court noted that, “[although the affected markets contain fewer voices, the amount of diversity in communities with additional independent voices may in fact be no greater.” Ibid. The Commission, NAB, ANPA, and several cross-owners who had been intervenors below, and whose licenses had been grandfathered under the Commission’s rules but were subject to divestiture under the Court of Appeals’ decision, petitioned this Court for review. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 815 (1977), and we now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it upholds the prospective ban and reverse the judgment insofar as it vacates the limited divestiture requirement. II Petitioners NAB and ANPA contend that the regulations promulgated by the Commission exceed its statutory rule-making authority and violate the constitutional rights of newspaper owners. We turn first to the statutory, and then to the constitutional, issues. A (1) Section 303 (r) of the Communications Act, 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r), provides that “the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . [m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act]See also 47 U. S. C. §154 (i). As the Court of Appeals recognized, 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 14, 555 F. 2d, at 951, it is now well established that this general rulemaking authority supplies a statutory basis for the Commission to issue regulations codifying its view of the public-interest licensing standard, so long as that view is based on consideration of permissible factors and is otherwise reasonable. If a license applicant does not qualify under standards set forth in such regulations, and does not proffer sufficient grounds for waiver or change of those standards, the Commission may deny the application without further inquiry. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943). This Court has specifically upheld this rulemaking authority in the context of regulations based on the Commission's policy of promoting diversification of ownership. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., supra, we sustained the portion of the Commission’s multiple-ownership rules placing limitations on the total number of stations in each broadcast service a person may own or control. See n. 2, supra. And in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, we affirmed regulations that, inter alia, prohibited broadcast networks from owning more than one AM radio station in the same community, and from owning “ 'any standard broadcast station in any locality where the existing standard broadcast stations are so few or of such unequal desirability . . . that competition would be substantially restrained by such licensing.’ ” See 319 U. S., at 206-208; n. 1, supra. Petitioner NAB attempts to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved efforts to increase diversification within the boundaries of the broadcasting industry itself, whereas the instant regulations are concerned with diversification of ownership in the mass communications media as a whole. NAB contends that, since the Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission only to regulate “communication by wire or radio,” 47 U. S. C. § 152 (a), it is impermissible for the Commission to use its licensing authority with respect to broadcasting to promote diversity in an overall communications market which includes, but is not limited to, the broadcasting industry. This argument undersells the Commission’s power to regulate broadcasting in the “public interest.” In making initial licensing decisions between competing applicants, the Commission has long given “primary significance” to “diversification of control of the media of mass communications,” and has denied licenses to newspaper owners on the basis of this policy in appropriate cases. See supra, at 781, and n. 4. As we have discussed on several occasions, see, e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 210-218; Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 375-377, 387-388 (1969), the physical scarcity of broadcast frequencies, as well as problems of interference between broadcast signals, led Congress to delegate broad authority to the Commission to allocate broadcast licenses in the “public interest.” And “[t]he avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States.” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 217. It was not inconsistent with the statutory scheme, therefore, for the Commission to conclude that the maximum benefit to the “public interest” would follow from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote diversification of the mass media as a whole. Our past decisions have recognized, moreover, that the First Amendment and antitrust values underlying the Commission’s diversification policy may properly be considered by the Commission in determining where the public interest lies. “[T]he 'public interest’ standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles,” Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 122 (1973), and, in particular, to the First Amendment goal of achieving “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,” Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S., at 20. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 385, 390. See also United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 649, 667-669, and n. 27 (1972) (plurality opinion). And, while the Commission does not have power to enforce the antitrust laws as such, it is permitted to take antitrust policies into account in making licensing decisions pursuant to the public-interest standard. See, e. g., United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U. S. 334, 351 (1959); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 222-224. Indeed we have noted, albeit in dictum: "[I]n a given case the Commission might find that antitrust considerations alone would keep the statutory standard from being met, as when the publisher of the sole newspaper in an area applies for a license for the only available radio and television facilities, which, if granted, would give him a monopoly of that area’s major media of mass communication.” United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra, at 351-352. (2) It is thus clear that the regulations at issue are based on permissible public-interest goals and, so long as the regulations are not an unreasonable means for seeking to achieve these goals, they fall within the general rulemaking authority recognized in the Storer Broadcasting and National Broadcasting cases. Petitioner ANPA contends that the prospective rules are unreasonable in two respects: first, the rulemaking record did not conclusively establish that prohibiting common ownership of co-located newspapers and broadcast stations would in fact lead to increases in the diversity of viewpoints among local communications media; and second, the regulations were based on the diversification factor to the exclusion of other service factors considered in the past by the Commission in making initial licensing decisions regarding newspaper owners, see supra, at 782. With respect to the first point, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, notwithstanding the inconclusiveness of the rulemaking record, the Commission acted rationally in finding that diversification of ownership would enhance the possibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints. As the Court of Appeals observed, “ [d] iversity and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable on both policy and First Amendment grounds.” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 24, 555 F. 2d, at 961. Moreover, evidence of specific abuses by common owners is difficult to compile; “the possible benefits of competition do not lend themselves to detailed forecast.” FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U. S. 86, 96 (1953). In these circumstances, the Commission was entitled to rely on its judgment, based on experience, that “it is unrealistic to expect true diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper combination. The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be the same as if they were antagonistically run.” Order, at 1079-1080; see 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 25, 555 F. 2d, at 962. As to the Commission’s decision to give controlling weight to its diversification goal in shaping the prospective rules, the Order makes clear that this change in policy was a reasonable administrative response to changed circumstances in the broadcasting industry. Order, at 1074M075; see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137-138 (1940). The Order explained that, although newspaper owners had previously been allowed, and even encouraged, to acquire licenses for co-located broadcast stations because of the shortage of qualified license applicants, a sufficient number of qualified and experienced applicants other than newspaper owners was now available. In addition, the number of channels open for new licensing had diminished substantially. It had thus become both feasible and more urgent for the Commission to take steps to increase diversification of ownership, and a change in the Commission’s policy toward new licensing offered the possibility of increasing diversity without causing any disruption of existing service. In light of these considerations, the Commission clearly did not take an irrational view of the public interest when it decided to impose a prospective ban on new licensing of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations. B Petitioners NAB and ANPA also argue that the regulations, though designed to further the First Amendment goal of achieving “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,” Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S., at 20, nevertheless violate the First Amendment rights of newspaper owners. We cannot agree, for this argument ignores the fundamental proposition that there is no “unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 388. The physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum are well known. Because of problems of interference between broadcast signals, a finite number of frequencies can be used productively; this number is far exceeded by the number of persons wishing to broadcast to the public. In light of this physical scarcity, Government allocation and regulation of broadcast frequencies are essential, as we have often recognized. Id., at 375-377, 387-388; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S., at 210-218; Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 282 (1933); see supra, at 795. No one here questions the need for such allocation and regulation, and, given that need, we see nothing in the First Amendment to prevent the Commission from allocating licenses so as to promote the “public interest” in diversification of the mass communications media. NAB and ANPA contend, however, that it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to promote diversification by barring a newspaper owner from owning certain broadcasting stations. In support, they point to our statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), to the effect that “government may [not] restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others,” id., at 48-49. As Buckley also recognized, however, “ 'the broadcast media pose unique and special problems not present in the traditional free speech case.’ ” Id., at 50 n. 55, quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S., at 101. Thus efforts to “ 'enhanc[e] the volume and quality of coverage’ of public issues” through regulation of broadcasting may be permissible where similar efforts to regulate the print media would not be. 424 U. S., at 50-51, and n. 55, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, at 393; cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974). Requiring those who wish to obtain a broadcast license to demonstrate that such would serve the “public interest” does not restrict the speech of those who are denied licenses; rather, it preserves the interests of the “people as a whole ... in free speech.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co., supra, at 390. As we stated in Red Lion, “to deny a station license because 'the public interest’ requires it 'is not a denial of free speech.’ ” 395 U. S., at 389, quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 227. See also Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., supra. Relying on cases such as Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958), and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347 (1976), NAB and ANPA also argue that the regulations unconstitutionally condition receipt of a broadcast license upon forfeiture of the right to publish a newspaper. Under the regulations, however, a newspaper owner need not forfeit anything in order to acquire a license for a station located in another community. More importantly, in the cases relied on by those petitioners, unlike the instant case, denial of a benefit had the effect of abridging freedom of expression, since the denial was based solely on the content of constitutionally protected speech; in Speiser veterans were deprived of a special property-tax exemption if they declined to subscribe to a loyalty oath, while in Elrod certain public employees were discharged or threatened with discharge because of their political affiliation. As we wrote in National Broadcasting, supra, “the issue before us would be wholly different” if “the Commission '[were] to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views.” 319 U. S., at 226. Here the regulations are not content related; moreover, their purpose and effect is to promote free speech, not to restrict it. Finally, NAB and ANPA argue that the Commission has unfairly “singled out” newspaper owners for more stringent treatment than other license applicants. But the regulations treat newspaper owners in essentially the same fashion as other owners of the major media of mass communications were already treated under the Commission’s multiple-ownership rules, see supra, at 780-781, and nn. 1-3; owners of radio stations, television stations, and newspapers alike are now restricted in their ability to acquire licenses for co-located broadcast stations. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936), in which this Court struck down a state tax imposed only on newspapers, is thus distinguishable in the degree to which newspapers were singled out for special treatment. In addition, the effect of the tax in Grosjean was “to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled,” id., at 250, an effect inconsistent with the protection conferred on the press by the First Amendment. In the instant case, far from seeking to limit the flow of information, the Commission has acted, in the Court of Appeals’ words, “to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public without on-going government surveillance of the content of speech.” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 17, 555 F. 2d, at 954. The regulations are a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications; thus they do not violate the First Amendment rights of those who will be denied broadcast licenses pursuant to them. Being forced to “choose among applicants for the same facilities,” the Commission has chosen on a “sensible basis,” one designed to further, rather than contravene, “the system of freedom of expression.” T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 663 (1970). Ill After upholding the prospective aspect of the Commission's regulations, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission's decision to limit divestiture to 16 “egregious cases” of “effective monopoly” was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of § 10 (e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (A) (1976 ed.). We agree with the Court of Appeals that regulations promulgated after informal rulemaking, while not subject to review under the “substantial evidence” test of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §706 (2)(E) (1976 ed.) quoted in n. 21, supra, may be invalidated by a reviewing court under the “arbitrary or capricious” standard if they are not rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 413-416 (1971). Although this review “is to be searching and careful,” “[t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id., at 416. In the view of the Court of Appeals, the Commission lacked a rational basis, first, for treating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations more leniently than combinations that might seek licenses in the future; and, second, even assuming a distinction between existing and new combinations had been justified, for requiring divestiture in the “egregious cases” while allowing all other existing combinations to continue in operation. We believe that the limited divestiture requirement reflects a rational weighing of competing policies, and we therefore reinstate the portion of the Commission's order that was invalidated by the Court of Appeals. The Commission was well aware that separating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations would promote diversification of ownership. It concluded, however, that ordering widespread divestiture would not result in “the best practicable service to the American public,” Order, at 1074, a goal that the Commission has always taken into account and that has been specifically approved by this Court, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940); see supra, at 782. In particular, the Commission expressed concern that divestiture would cause “disruption for the industry” and “hardship for individual owners,” both of which would result in harm to the public interest. Order, at 1078. Especially in light of the fact that the number of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations was already on the decline as a result of natural market forces, and would decline further as a result of the prospective rules, the Commission decided that across-the-board divestiture was not warranted. See id., at 1080 n. 29. The Order identified several specific respects in which the public interest would or might be harmed if a sweeping divestiture requirement were imposed: the stability and continuity of meritorious service provided by the newspaper owners as a group would be lost; owners who had provided meritorious service would unfairly be denied the opportunity to continue in operation; “economic dislocations” might prevent new owners from obtaining sufficient working capital to maintain the quality of local programming; and local ownership of broadcast stations would probably decrease. Id., at 1078. We cannot say that the Commission acted irrationally in concluding that these public-interest harms outweighed the potential gains that would follow from increasing diversification of ownership. In the past, the Commission has consistently acted on the theory that preserving continuity of meritorious service furthers the public interest, both in its direct consequence of bringing proved broadcast service to the public, and in its indirect consequence of rewarding- — and avoiding losses to— licensees who have invested the money and effort necessary to produce quality performance. Thus, although a broadcast license must be renewed every three years, and the licensee must satisfy the Commission that renewal will serve the public interest, both the Commission and the courts have recognized that a licensee who has given meritorious service has a “legitimate renewal expectanc[y]” that is “implicit in the structure of the Act” and should not be destroyed absent good cause. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143 U. S. App. D. C. 383, 396, 444 F. 2d 841, 854 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 923 (1971); see Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 44, and n. 35, 447 F. 2d 1201, 1213, and n. 35 (1971); In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant-, Stemming From the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F. C. C. 2d 419, 420 (1977); n. 5, supra. Accordingly, while diversification of ownership is a relevant factor in the context of license renewal as well as initial licensing, the Commission has long considered the past performance of the incumbent as the most important factor in deciding whether to grant license renewal and thereby to allow the existing owner to continue in operation. Even where an incumbent is challenged by a competing applicant who offers greater potential in terms of diversification, the Commission’s general practice has been to go with the “proved product” and grant renewal if the incumbent has rendered meritorious service. See generally In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, supra; n. 5, supra. In the instant proceeding, the Commission specifically noted that the existing newspaper-broadcast cross-owners as a group had a “long record of service” in the public interest; many were pioneers in the broadcasting industry and had established and continued “ [t] raditions of service” from the outset. Order, at 1078. Notwithstanding the Commission’s diversification policy, all were granted initial licenses upon findings that the public interest would be served thereby, and those that had been in existence for more than three years had also had their licenses renewed on the ground that the public interest would be furthered. The Commission noted, moreover, that its own study of existing co-located newspaper-television combinations showed that in terms of percentage of time devoted to several categories of local programming, these stations had displayed “an undramatic but nonetheless statistically significant superiority” over other television stations. Id., at 1078 n. 26. An across-the-board divestiture requirement would result in loss of the services of these superior licensees, and — whether divestiture caused actual losses to existing owners, or just denial of reasonably anticipated gains — the result would be that future licensees would be discouraged from investing the resources necessary to produce quality service. At the same time, there was no guarantee that the licensees who replaced the existing cross-owners would be able to provide the same level of service or demonstrate the same long-term commitment to broadcasting. And even if the new owners were able in the long run to provide similar or better service, the Commission found that divestiture would cause serious disruption in the transition period. Thus, the Commission observed that new owners “would lack the long knowledge of the community and would have to begin raw,” and — because of high interest rates — might not be able to obtain sufficient working capital to maintain the quality of local programming. Id., at 1078; see n. 22, supra. The Commission’s fear that local ownership would decline was grounded in a rational prediction, based on its knowledge of the broadcasting industry and supported by comments in the record, see Order, at 1068-1069, that many of the existing newspaper-broadcast combinations owned by local interests would respond to the divestiture requirement by trading stations with out-of-town owners. It is undisputed that roughly 75% of the existing co-located newspaper-television combinations are locally owned, see 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 26-27, 555 F. 2d, at 963-964, and these owners’ knowledge of their local communities and concern for local affairs, built over a period of years, would be lost if they were replaced with outside interests. Local ownership in and of itself has been recognized to be a factor of some — if relatively slight — significance even in the context of initial licensing decisions. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F. C. C. 2d, at 396. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for the Commission to consider it as one of several factors militating against divestiture of combinations that have been in existence for many years. In light of these countervailing considerations, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that it was arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to “grandfather” most existing combinations, and to leave opponents of these combinations to their remedies in individual renewal proceedings. In the latter connection we note that, while individual renewal proceedings are unlikely to accomplish any “overall restructuring” of the existing ownership patterns, the Order does make clear that existing combinations will be subject to challenge by competing applicants in renewal proceedings, to the same extent as they were prior to the instant rulemaking proceedings. Order, at 1087-1088 (emphasis omitted); see n. 12, supra. That is, diversification of ownership will be a relevant but somewhat secondary factor. And, even in the absence of a competing applicant, license renewal may be denied if, inter alia, a challenger can show that a common owner has engaged in specific economic or programming abuses. See nn. 12 and 13, supra. (2) In concluding that the Commission acted unreasonably in not extending its divestiture requirement across the board, the Court of Appeals apparently placed heavy reliance on a “presumption” that existing newspaper-broadcast combinations “do not serve the public interest.” See supra, at 790-791. The court derived this presumption primarily from the Commission’s own diversification policy, as “reaffirmed” by adoption of the prospective rules in this proceeding, and secondarily from “[t]he policies of the First Amendment,” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 26, 555 F. 2d, at 963, and the Commission’s statutory duty to “encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest,” 47 U. S. C. § 303 (g). As explained in Part II above, we agree that diversification, of ownership farthers statutory and constitutional policies, and, as the Com-inission recognized, separating existing newspaper-broadcast combinations would promote diversification. But the weighing of policies under the “public interest” standard is a task that Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance, and we are unable to find anything in the Communications Act, the First Amendment, or the Commission's past or present practices that would require the Commission to “presume” that its diversification policy should be given controlling weight in all circumstances. Such a “presumption” would seem to be inconsistent with the Commission’s longstanding and judicially approved practice of giving controlling weight in some circumstances to its more general goal of achieving “the best practicable service to the public.” Certainly, as discussed in Part III-A (1) above, the Commission through its license renewal policy has made clear that it considers diversification of ownership to be a factor of less significance when deciding whether to allow an existing licensee to continue in operation than when evaluating applicants seeking initial licensing. Nothing in the language or the legislative history of § 303 (g) indicates that Congress intended to foreclose all differences in treatment between new and existing licensees, and indeed, in amending § 307 (d) of the Act in 1952, Congress appears to have lent its approval to the Commission’s policy of evaluating existing licensees on a somewhat different basis from new applicants. Moreover, if enactment of the prospective rules in this proceeding itself were deemed to create a “presumption” in favor of divestiture, the Commission's ability to experiment with new policies would be severely hampered. One of the most significant advantages of the administrative process is its ability to adapt to new circumstances in a flexible manner, see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S., at 137-138, and we are unwilling to presume that the Commission acts unreasonably when it decides to try out a change in licensing policy primarily on a prospective basis. The Court of Appeals also relied on its perception that the policies militating against divestiture were “lesser policies” to which the Commission had not given as much weight in the past as its diversification policy. See supra, at 791. This perception is subject to much the same criticism as the “presumption” that existing co-located newspaper-broadcasting combinations do not serve the public interest. The Commission's past concern with avoiding disruption of existing service is amply illustrated by its license renewal policies. In addition, it is worth noting that in the past when the Commission has changed its multiple-ownership rules it has almost invariably tailored the changes so as to operate wholly or primarily on a prospective basis. For example, the regulations adopted in 1970 prohibiting common ownership of a YHF television station and a radio station serving the same market were made to apply only to new licensing decisions; no divestiture of existing combinations was required. See n. 3, supra. The limits set in 1953 on the total numbers of stations a person could own, upheld by this Court in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956), were intentionally set at levels that would not require extensive divestiture of existing combinations. See Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F. C. C., at 292. And, while the rules adopted in the early 1940’s prohibiting ownership or control of more than one station in the same broadcast service in the same community required divestiture of approximately 20 AM radio combinations, FCC Eleventh Annual Report 12 (1946), the Commission afforded an opportunity for case-by-case review, see Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943). Moreover, television and FM radio had not yet developed, so that application of the rules to these media was wholly prospective. See Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, supra, n. 1; Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, supra, n. 1. The Court of Appeals apparently reasoned that the Commission’s concerns with respect to disruption of existing service, economic dislocations, and decreases in local ownership necessarily could not be very weighty since the Commission has a practice of routinely approving voluntary transfers and assignments of licenses. See 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 26-28, 555 F. 2d, at 963-965. But the question of whether the Commission should compel proved licensees to divest their stations is a different question from whether the public interest is served by allowing transfers- by licensees who no longer wish to continue in the business. As the Commission’s brief explains: “[I]f the Commission were to force broadcasters to stay in business against their will, the service provided under such circumstances, albeit continuous, might well not be worth preserving. Thus, the fact that the Commission approves assignments and transfers in no way undermines its decision to place a premium on the continuation of proven past service by those licensees who wish to remain in business.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-1471, p. 38 (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals’ final basis for concluding that the Commission acted arbitrarily in not giving controlling weight to its divestiture policy was the Court’s finding that the rulemaking record did not adequately “disclose the extent to which divestiture would actually threaten” the competing policies relied upon by the Commission. 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 28, 555 F. 2d, at 965. However, to- the extent that factual determinations were involved in the Commission’s decision to “grandfather” most existing combinations, they were primarily of a judgmental or predictive nature — e. g., whether a divestiture requirement would result in trading of stations with out-of-town owners; whether new owners would perform as well as existing crossowners, either in the short run or in the long run; whether losses to existing owners would result from forced sales; whether such losses would discourage future investment in quality programming; and whether new owners would have sufficient working capital to finance local programming. In such circumstances complete factual support in the record for the Commission’s judgment or prediction is not possible or required; “a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency,” FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 29 (1961); see Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 331, 338-339, 499 F. 2d 467, 474-475 (1974). B We also must conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was arbitrary to order divestiture in the 16 “egregious cases” while allowing other existing combinations to continue in operation. The Commission’s decision was based not — as the Court of Appeals may have believed, see supra, at 792 — on a conclusion that divestiture would be more harmful in the “grandfathered” markets than in the 16 affected markets, but rather on a judgment that the need for diversification was especially great in cases of local monopoly. This policy judgment was certainly not irrational, see United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U. S., at 351-352, and indeed was founded on the very same assumption that underpinned the diversification policy itself and the- prospective rules upheld by the Court of Appeals and now by this Court — that the greater the number of owners in a market, the greater the possibility of achieving diversity of program and service viewpoints. As to the Commission’s criteria for determining which existing newspaper-broadcast combinations have an “effective monopoly” in the “local marketplace of ideas as well as economically,” we think the standards settled upon by the Commission reflect a rational legislative-type judgment. Some line had to be drawn, and it was hardly unreasonable for the Commission to confine divestiture to communities in which there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and either the only television station or the only broadcast station of any kind encompassing the entire community with a clear signal. Cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, supra, at 351-352, quoted, supra, at 796. It was not irrational, moreover, for the Commission to disregard media sources other than newspapers and broadcast stations in setting its divestiture standards. The studies cited by the Commission in its notice of rulemaking unanimously concluded that newspapers and television are the two most widely utilized media sources for local news and discussion of public affairs; and, as the Commission noted in its Order, at 1081, “aside from the fact that [magazines and other periodicals] often had only a tiny fraction in the market, they were not given real weight since they often dealt exclusively with regional or national issues and ignored local issues.” Moreover, the differences in treatment between radio and television stations, see n. 10, supra, were certainly justified in light of the far greater influence of television than radio as a source for local news. See Order, at 1083. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. See Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations (AM radio), 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943); Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broadcast Stations, § 4.226, 6 Fed. Reg. 2284, 2284r-2285 (1941); Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations (FM radio), §3.228 (a), 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940). In 1941 the Commission issued “chain broadcasting” regulations that, among other things, prohibited any organization from operating more than one broadcast network and barred any network from owning more than one standard broadcast station in the same community. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 193, 206-208 (1943). In 1964 the Commission tightened its multiple-ownership regulations so as to prohibit common ownership of any stations in the same broadcast service that have overlaps in certain service contours. See Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 45 F. C. C. 1476 (1964). See Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F. C. C. 288 (1953). The regulations limited each person to a total of seven AM radio stations, seven FM radio stations, and five VHF television stations. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956), the regulations were upheld by this Court. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F. C. C. 2d 306 (1970), as modified, 28 F. C. C. 2d 662 (1971). No divestiture of existing television-radio combinations was required. The regulations also provided that license applications involving common ownership of a UHF television station and a radio station serving the same market would be considered on a case-by-case basis and that common ownership of AM and FM radio stations serving the same market would be permitted. See, e. g., McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 195, 239 F. 2d 15 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U. S. 918 (1957); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 13, 189 F. 2d 677, cert. denied, 342 U. S. 830 (1951). In the early 1940's, the Commission considered adopting rules barring common ownership of newspapers and radio stations, see Order Nos. 79 and 79-A, 6 Fed. Reg. 1580, 3302 (1941), but, after an extensive rulemaking proceeding, decided to deal with the problem on an ad hoc basis, Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, Notice of Dismissal of Proceeding, 9 Fed. Reg. 702 (1944). The Commission’s policy with respect to license renewals has undergone some evolution, but the general practice has been to place considerable weight on the incumbent’s past performance and to grant renewal — even where the incumbent is challenged by a competing applicant — if the incumbent has rendered meritorious service. In 1970 the Commission adopted a policy statement purporting to codify its previous practice as to comparative license renewal hearings. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F. C. C. 2d 424. Citing considerations of predictability and stability, the statement adopted the policy that, where an incumbent’s program service “has been substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area,” the incumbent would be granted an automatic preference over any new applicant without consideration of other factors — including diversification of ownership — that are taken into account in initial licensing decisions. Id.., at 425. This policy statement was overturned on appeal, Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 145 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 447 F. 2d 1201 (1971), on the ground that the Commission was required to hold full hearings at which all relevant public-interest factors would be considered. The court agreed with the Commission, however, that “incumbent licensees should be judged primarily on their records of past performance.” Id., at 44, 447 F. 2d, at 1213. The court stated further that “superior performance [by an incumbent] should be a plus of major significance in renewal proceedings.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). After the instant regulations were promulgated, the Commission adopted a new policy statement in response to the Citizens Communications decision, returning to a case-by-case approach in which all factors would be considered, but in which the central factor would still be the past performance of the incumbent. In re Formulation .of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F. C. C. 2d 419 (1977), pet. for review pending sub nom. National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, No. 77-1500 (CADC). This proceeding was a continuation of the earlier proceeding that had resulted in adoption of regulations barring new licensing of radio-YHF television combinations in the same market, while permitting AM-FM combinations and consigning radio-UHF television combinations to case-by-case treatment. See supra, at 781, and n. 3. In addition to the proposal with respect to common ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations, the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking suggested the possibility of prohibiting AM-FM combinations and requiring divestiture of existing television-radio combinations serving the same market, but these latter proposals were not adopted and they are not at issue here. See Order, at 1052-1055. The studies generally showed that radio w&s the third most important source of news, ranking ahead of magazines and other periodicals. See 22 F. C. C. 2d, at 345. The rules prohibit a newspaper owner from acquiring a license for a co-located broadcast station, either by transfer or by original licensing; if a broadcast licensee acquires a daily newspaper in the same market, it must dispose of its license within a year or by the time of its next renewal date, whichever comes later. See Order, at 1074-1076, 1099-1107. Noncommercial educational television stations and college newspapers are not included within the scope of the rules. 47 CFR § 73.636, and n. 10 (1976). For purposes of the rules, ownership is defined to include operation or control, §73.636 n. 1; a “daily newspaper” is defined as “one which is published four or more days per week, which is in the English language and which is circulated generally in the community of publication,” §73.636 n. 10; and a broadcast station is considered to serve the same community as a newspaper if a specified service contour of the station— “Grade A” for television, 2 mV/m for AM, and 1 mV/m for FM— encompasses the city in which the newspaper is published, Order, at 1075. The Commission did provide, however, for waiver of the prospective ban in exceptional circumstances. See Order, at 1076 n. 24, 1077; Memorandum Opinion and Order (Docket No. 18110), 53 F. C. C. 2d 589, 591, 592 (1975). Radio and television stations are treated the same under the regulations to the extent that, if there is only one broadcast station serving a community — regardless of whether it is a radio or television station — common ownership of it and a co-located daily newspaper is barred. On the other hand, radio and television stations are given different weight to the extent that the presence of a radio station does not exempt a newspaper-television combination from divestiture, whereas the presence of a television station does exempt a newspaper-radio combination. The latter difference in treatment was explained on the ground that “[Realistically, a radio station cannot be considered the equal of either the paper or the television station in any sense, least of all in terms of being a source for news or for being the medium turned to for discussion of matters of local concern.” Order, at 1083. The Commission also explained that the regulations did not take into account the presence of magazines and other periodicals, or out-of-town radio or television stations not encompassing the entire community with a clear signal, since — aside from their often small market share — these sources could not be depended upon for coverage of local issues. See id., at 1081-1082. While noting that the Commission “would not be favorably inclined to grant any request premised on views rejected when the rule was adopted,” the Order stated that temporary or permanent waivers might be granted if the common owner were unable to sell his station or could sell it only at an artificially depressed price; if it could be shown that separate ownership of the newspaper and the broadcast station “cannot be supported in the locality"; or, more generally, if the underlying purposes of the divestiture rule “would be better served by continuation of the current ownership pattern.” Id., at 1085. As to existing newspaper-broadcast combinations not subject to the divestiture requirement, the Commission indicated that, within certain limitations, issues relating to concentration of ownership would continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis in the context of license renewal proceedings. Thus, while making clear the Commission’s view that renewal proceedings were not a proper occasion for any "overall restructuring” of the broadcast industry, the Order stated that diversification of ownership would remain a relevant consideration in renewal proceedings in which common owners were challenged by competing applicants. Id., at 1088 (emphasis in original); see id., at 1087-1089; n. 5, supra. The Order suggested, moreover, that where a petition to deny renewal is filed, but no competing applicant steps forward, the renewal application would be set for hearing if a sufficient showing were made of specific abuses by a common owner, or of economic monopolization of the sort that would violate the Sherman Act. Order, at 1080 n. 29,1088. The Order does not malee clear the extent to which hearings will be available on petitions to deny renewal that do not allege specific abuses or economic monopolization. Counsel for the Commission informs us, however, that the Order was intended to “limi[t] such challengers only to the extent that [the Commission] will not permit them to re-argue in an adjudicatory setting the question already decided in this rulemaking, i. e., in what circumstances is the continued existence of eo-located newspaper-broadcast combinations -per se undesirable.” Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-1471, p. 8; see n. 13, infra. The Court of Appeals apparently believed that, under the terms of the Order, future petitions to deny license renewal to existing cross-owners could be set for hearing only if they alleged economic monopolization, and not if they alleged specific programming abuses. See 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 29 n. 108, 555 F. 2d, at 966 n. 108. On the basis of this assumption, the court held that the standards for petitions to deny were unreasonable. Since we do not read the Order as foreclosing the possibility of a hearing upon a claim of specific abuses, and since the Commission itself is apparently of the view that the only issue foreclosed in petitions to deny is the question of whether newspaper-broadcast ownership is per se undesirable, see n. 12, supra, we cannot say that the Order itself unreasonably limits the availability of petitions to deny renewal. The reasonableness of the Commission’s actions on particular petitions to deny filed subsequent to the Order is, of course, not before us at this time. Upon motion, of the Commission the Court of Appeals temporarily stayed its mandate — insofar as it overturned the Commission’s limited divestiture requirement — pending the filing of a petition for certiorari by the Commission. 181 U. S. App. D. C. 30, 655 F. 2d 967 (1977). The Commission filed its petition for certiorari within the time allotted by the Court of Appeals, and thus the stay has remained in effect. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (f); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 41 (b). Several of the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals exceeded the proper role of a reviewing court by directing the Commission to adopt a rule requiring divestiture of all existing combinations, rather than allowing the Commission to reconsider its decision and formulate its own approach in light of the legal principles set forth by the court. Petitioners cite well-established authority to the effect that, absent extraordinary circumstances, “the function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the Commission for reconsideration.” FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 20 (1952); accord, NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1974); South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Operating Engineers, 425 U. S. 800, 805-806 (1976). In light of our disposition of these cases, we need not decide whether the Court of Appeals was justified in departing from the latter course of action. The rationality of the limited divestiture requirement is discussed in Part III, infra. NAB and ANPA mate one final argument in support of their position that the regulations exceed the Commission’s authority. They claim that— regardless of the otherwise broad scope of the Commission’s rulemaking authority — both Congress and the Commission itself have indicated that the Commission lacks authority to promulgate any rules prohibiting newspaper owners from acquiring broadcast licenses. They rely on a legal opinion by the Commission’s first General Counsel that was submitted to the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Memorandum to the Commission: Opinion of the General Counsel, Jan. 25, 1937, reprinted in App. 445-465, and the legislative history of proposed amendments to the Act that were considered in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s but never passed, S. 1333, § 25, Hearings on S. 1333 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 1973, § 14, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. 658, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (House amendment § 7 (c)). This argument is wholly unavailing. Apart from any questions as to the weight that should be given to a General Counsel’s opinion which was never formally adopted by the Commission, and to legislative statements made subsequent to enactment of the statute being construed,, see, e. g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 170 (1968); United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405, 411 (1962), the cited materials are simply irrelevant to the issue in this case. The Commission’s General Counsel merely concluded that newspaper owners, as a class, could not be absolutely barred from owning broadcast stations; he did not address the much narrower question of whether a newspaper owner may be barred from acquiring a broadcast station located in the same community as the newspaper. See Opinion of the General Counsel, supra, App. 447, 449. Similarly, the proposed amendments to the Act apparently would have only precluded the Commission from adopting a total prohibition on newspaper ownership of broadcast stations. See Hearings on S. 1333, supra, at 44, 69-70; Hearings on S. 1973 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, 42-44, 103-105 (1949); S. Rep. No. 741, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1949). Congress’ rejection of the amendments as unnecessary, see House Conf. Rep. No. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19 (1952); S. Rep. No. 741, supra, at 2-3 — following the Commission’s representation that it lacked such authority even without the amendments, see Hearings on S. 1973, supra, at 103-104 (testimony of FCC Chairman Hyde) — sheds no fight on the question at issue here. We note also that the regulations are in form quite similar to the prohibitions imposed by the antitrust laws. This court has held that application of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment. See, e. g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143 (1951); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131, 139-140 (1969). See also United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U. S. 334, 351-352 (1959). Since the Commission relied primarily on First Amendment rather than antitrust considerations, however, the fact that the antitrust laws are fully applicable to newspapers is not a complete answer to the issues in this case. NAB frames this argument in terms of the First Amendment; ANPA advances it as an equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment. The reasonableness of the regulations as a means of achieving diversification is underscored by the fact that waivers are potentially available from both the prospective and the divestiture rules in cases in which a broadcast station and a co-located daily newspaper cannot survive without common ownership. See nn. 9,11, supra. The APA provides in relevant part: “To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall — ■ “ (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; "(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; “(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; “ (D) without observance of procedure required by law; “(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or “(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. “In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U. S. C. §706 (2) (1976 ed.). Although the Order is less than entirely clear in this regard, the Commission’s theory with respect to “economic dislocations” and programming apparently was that, because of high interest rates, new owners would have to devote a substantial portion of revenues to debt service, and insufficient working capital would remain to finance local programming. See Order, at 1068 (describing comments to this effect). In the Order the Commission expressed concern that a sweeping divestiture requirement “could reduce local ownership as well as the involvement of owners in management!’ Id., at 1078 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals questioned the validity of any reliance on owner involvement in management, because “no evidence was presented that the local owners . . . are actively involved in daily management” and the Order itself had observed that “‘[m]ost of the parties state that their broadcast stations and newspapers have separate management, facilities, and staff 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 27, 555 F. 2d, at 964, quoting Order, at 1059. Of course, the fact that newspapers and broadcast stations are separately managed does not foreclose the possibility that the common owner participates in management of the broadcast station and not the newspaper. But in any event, the Commission clearly did not place any significant weight on this factor, and we therefore need not consider it. See 5 U. S. G. §706 (1976 ed.), quoted in part in n. 21, supra (rule of prejudicial error). We agree with the Court of Appeals that “[p]rivate losses are a relevant concern under the Communications Act only when shown to have an adverse effect on the provision of broadcasting service to the public.” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 27-28, 555 F. 2d, at 964-965, citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 474-476 (1940), and Carroll Broadcasting v. FCC, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 346, 258 F. 2d 440 (1958). Private losses that result in discouragement of investment in quality service have such an effect. Section 301 of the Act provides that “no [broadcast] license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.” 47 U. S. C. § 301. The fact that a licensee does not have any legal or proprietary right to a renewal does not mean, however, that the Commission cannot take into account the incumbent’s past performance in deciding whether renewal would serve the public interest. See infra, at 810-811, and n. 31. See B. Robbins, A Study of Pioneer AM Radio Stations and Pioneer Television Stations (1971), reprinted in App. 694-712. Earlier in the Order, the Commission had noted that this study was the first to be based on the 1973 annual programming reports for television stations, which were not yet available at the time the programming studies submitted by the parties were conducted. Order, at 1073; see id,., at 1094. The United States suggests that the Commission could not properly have relied on this study since it was not made available to the parties for comment in advance of the Commission’s decision. Brief for United States 46 n. 39. No party petitioned the Commission for reconsideration on this ground, nor was the issue raised in the Court of Appeals or in any of the petitions for certiorari, and it is therefore not before us. Commissioner Hooks effectively summarized this complex of factors in hia separate opinion, concurring in the Commission’s decision not to order across-the-board divestiture, while dissenting on other grounds: “[A]s I contemplate the superior performance of many newspaper-owned stations . . . and speculate on the performance of some unknown successor, my conditioned response yields 'a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’ philosophy. Opponents [of divestiture] ask: Why require divestiture for its own sake of a superior broadcaster, with experience, background and resources, for an unknown licensee whose operation may be inferior? Can we afford, through wide-scale divestiture, to experiment with a dogmatic diversity formula; and, after the churning has ceased, who will profit — the new owners or the public?” Order, at 1109. The fact that 75%, but not all, of the existing television-newspaper combinations are locally owned does not mean that it was irrational for the Commission to take into account local ownership as one of several factors justifying a decision to “grandfather” most existing combinations, including those that are not locally owned. The Commission has substantial discretion as to whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 201-202 (1947), and — in the context of a rule based on a multifactor weighing process — every consideration need not be equally applicable to each individual case. The Order at one point states: “If our democratic society is to function, nothing cm be more important than insuring that there is a free flow of information from as many divergent sources as possible.” Order, at 1079 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals recognized, however, that “the Commission probably did not intend for this . . . statemenft] to be read literally,” 181 U. S. App. D. C., at 26, 555 F. 2d, at 963, and, indeed, it appears from the context that the statement was intended only as an explanation of why the Commission was adopting a First Amendment rather than an antitrust focus. Prior to 1952, § 307 (d) provided that decisions on renewal applications “shall be limited to and governed by the same considerations and practice which affect the granting of original applications.” See Communications Act of 1934, § 307 (d), 48 Stat. 1084. In 1952 the section was amended to provide simply that renewal “may be granted ... if the Commission finds that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby.” Communications Act Amendments, 1952, § 5, 66 Stat. 714. The House Report explained that the previous language “is neither realistic nor does it reflect the way in which the Commission actually has handled renewal cases,” H. R. Rep. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1952), and the Senate Report specifically stated that the Commission has the “right and duty to consider, in the case of a station which has been in operation and is applying for renewal, the overall performance of that station against the broad standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity,” S. Rep. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1951). The Commission also points out, Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-1471, p. 24, that it has a rule against “trafficking” — i. e., the acquisition and sale of licenses to realize a quick profit — that applies to license transfers or assignments within three years after a licensee commences operations. See 47 CFR § 1.597 (1976); Crowder v. FCC, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 198, 201-202, and nn. 22-23, 399 F. 2d 569, 572-573, and nn. 22-23, cert. denied, 393 U. S. 962 (1968).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OLIM et al. v. WAKINEKONA No. 81-1581. Argued January 19, 1983 Decided April 26, 1983 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, and in Part I of which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 251. Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was James H. Dannenberg, Deputy Attorney General. Robert Gilbert Johnston argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Clayton C. Ikei. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, J. Kirk Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Judith W. Rogers, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Amata F. Fa’alevao of American Samoa, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Jim Smith of Florida, David H. Leroy of Idaho, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, William A. Attain of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Richard H. Brya/n of Nevada, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, Jeff Bingaman ot New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, John J. Easton of Vermont, Gerald L. Battles of Virginia, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and Steven F. Freudenthal of Wyoming; and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Stephen R. Delinsky, Barbara A. H. Smith, and Leo J. Cushing, Assistant Attorneys General, Anthony Ching, Solicitor General of Arizona, and the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wilson L. Condon of Alaska, Aviata F. Fa’alevao of American Samoa, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Jim Smith of Florida, David H. Leroy of Idaho, William A. Attain of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely of Montana, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, JeffBingaman of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, Robert 0. Wefald of North Dakota, William J. Brown of Ohio, Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Island, Mark V. Meierhenry of South Dakota, William M. Leech, Jr., of Tennessee, JohnJ. Easton of Vermont, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, and Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the transfer of a prisoner from a state prison in Hawaii to one in California implicates a liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I A Respondent Delbert Kaahanui Wakinekona is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a result of his murder conviction in a Hawaii state court. He also is serving sentences for various other crimes, including rape, robbery, and escape. At the Hawaii State Prison outside Honolulu, respondent was classified as a maximum security risk and placed in the maximum control unit. Petitioner Antone Olim is the Administrator of the Hawaii State Prison. The other petitioners constituted a prison “Program Committee.” On August 2, 1976, the Committee held hearings to determine the reasons for a breakdown in discipline and the failure of certain programs within the prison’s maximum control unit. Inmates of the unit appeared at these hearings. The Committee singled out respondent and another inmate as troublemakers. On August 5, respondent received notice that the Committee, at a hearing to be held on August 10, would review his correctional program to determine whether his classification within the system should be changed and whether he should be transferred to another Hawaii facility or to a mainland institution. The August 10 hearing was conducted by the same persons who had presided over the hearings on August 2. Respondent retained counsel to represent him. The Committee recommended that respondent’s classification as a maximum security risk be continued and that he be transferred to a prison on the mainland. He received the following explanation from the Committee: “The Program Committee, having reviewed your entire file, your testimony and arguments by your counsel, concluded that your control classification remains at Maximum. You are still considered a security risk in view of your escapes and subsequent convictions for serious felonies. The Committee noted the progress you made in vocational training and your expressed desire to continue in this endeavor. However your relationship with staff, who reported that you threaten and intimidate them, raises grave concerns regarding your potential for further disruptive and violent behavior. Since there is no other Maximum security prison in Hawaii which can offer you the correctional programs you require and you cannot remain at [the maximum control unit] because of impending construction of a new facility, the Program Committee recommends your transfer to an institution on the mainland.” App. 7-8. Petitioner Olim, as Administrator, accepted the Committee’s recommendation, and a few days later respondent was transferred to Folsom State Prison in California. B Rule IV of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations of the Corrections Division, Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, approved in June 1976, recites that the inmate classification process is not concerned with punishment. Rather, it is intended to promote the best interests of the inmate, the State, and the prison community. Paragraph 3 of Rule IV requires a hearing prior to a prison transfer involving “a grievous loss to the inmate,” which the Rule defines “generally” as “a serious loss to a reasonable man.” App. 21. The Administrator, under ¶ 2 of the Rule, is required to establish “an impartial Program Committee” to conduct such a hearing, the Committee to be “composed of at least three members who were not actively involved in the process by which the inmate . . . was brought before the Committee.” App. 20. Under ¶3, the Committee must give the inmate written notice of the hearing, permit him, with certain stated exceptions, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, afford him an opportunity to be heard, and apprise him of the Committee’s findings. App. 21-24. The Committee is directed to make a recommendation to the Administrator, who then decides what action to take: “[The Administrator] may, as the final decisionmaker: “(a) Affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, the recommendation; or “(b) hold in abeyance any action he believes jeopardizes the safety, security, or welfare of the staff, inmate . . . , other inmates . . . , institution, or community and refer the matter back to the Program Committee for further study and recommendation.” Rule IV, ¶ 3d(3), App. 24. The regulations contain no standards governing the Administrator’s exercise of his discretion. See Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 144-145, 621 P. 2d 976, 980-981 (1981). C Respondent filed suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against petitioners as the state officials who caused his transfer. He alleged that he had been denied procedural due process because the Committee that recommended his transfer consisted of the same persons who had initiated the hearing, this being in specific violation of Rule IV, ¶ 2, and because the Committee was biased against him. The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the complaint, holding that the Hawaii regulations governing prison transfers do not create a substantive liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 459 F. Supp. 473 (1978). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. 664 F. 2d 708 (1981). It held that Hawaii had created a constitutionally protected liberty interest by promulgating Rule IV. In so doing, the court declined to follow cases from other Courts of Appeals holding that certain procedures mandated by prison transfer regulations do not create a liberty interest. See, e. g., Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934 (CA2 1979); Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13 (CA1 1977). The court reasoned that Rule IV gives Hawaii prisoners a justifiable expectation that they will not be transferred to the mainland absent a hearing, before an impartial committee, concerning the facts alleged in the prehearing notice. Because the Court of Appeals’ decision created a conflict among the Circuits, and because the case presents the further question whether the Due Process Clause in and of itself protects against interstate prison transfers, we granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 1005 (1982). II In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976), and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U. S. 236 (1976), this Court held that an intrastate prison transfer does not directly implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Meachum, inmates at a Massachusetts medium security prison had been transferred to a maximum security prison in that Commonwealth. In Montanye, a companion case, an inmate had been transferred from one maximum security New York prison to another as punishment for a breach of prison rules. This Court rejected “the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” Meachum, 427 ,U. S., at 224 (emphasis in original). It went on to state: “The initial decision to assign the convict to a particular institution is not subject to audit under the Due Process Clause, although the degree of confinement in one prison may be quite different from that in another. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons. “Neither, in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Id., at 224-225 (emphasis in original). The Court observed that, although prisoners retain a residuum of liberty, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555-556 (1974), a holding that “any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts.” 427 U. S., at 225 (emphasis in original). Applying the Meachum, and Montanye principles in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), this Court held that the transfer of an inmate from a prison to a mental hospital did implicate a liberty interest. Placement in the mental hospital was “not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual,” because it brought about “consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime.” Id., at 493. Respondent argues that the same is true of confinement of a Hawaii prisoner on the mainland, and that Vitek therefore controls. We do not agree. Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State. Often, confinement in the inmate’s home State will not be possible. A person convicted of a federal crime in a State without a federal correctional facility usually will serve his sentence in another State. Overcrowding and the need to separate particular prisoners may necessitate interstate transfers. For any number of reasons, a State may lack prison facilities capable of providing appropriate correctional programs for all offenders. Statutes and interstate agreements recognize that, from time to time, it is necessary to transfer inmates to prisons in other States. On the federal level, 18 U. S. C. § 5003(a) authorizes the Attorney General to contract with a State for the transfer of a state prisoner to a federal prison, whether in that State or another. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U. S. 473 (1981). Title 18 U. S. C. §4002 (1976 ed. and Supp. V) permits the Attorney General to contract with any State for the placement of a federal prisoner in state custody for up to three years. Neither statute requires that the prisoner remain in the State in which he was convicted and sentenced. On the state level, many States have statutes providing for the transfer of a state prisoner to a federal prison, e. g., Haw. Rev. Stat. §353-18 (1976), or another State’s prison, e. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. §33.30.100 (1982). Corrections compacts between States, implemented by statutes, authorize incarceration of a prisoner of one State in another State’s prison. See, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 11189 (West 1982) (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); § 11190 (codifying Western Interstate Corrections Compact); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 18-102 (1981) (codifying New England Interstate Corrections Compact); § 18-106 (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 355-1 (1976) (codifying Western Interstate Corrections Compact); Idaho Code § 20-701 (1979) (codifying Interstate Corrections Compact); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 196.610 (1982) (same). And prison regulations such as Hawaii’s Rule IV anticipate that inmates sometimes will be transferred to prisons in other States. In short, it is neither unreasonable nor unusual for an inmate to serve practically his entire sentence in a State other than the one in which he was convicted and sentenced, or to be transferred to an out-of-state prison after serving a portion of his sentence in his home State. Confinement in another State, unlike confinement in a mental institution, is “within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Meachum, 427 U. S., at 225. Even when, as here, the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing, the confinement remains within constitutional limits. The difference between such a transfer and an intrastate or interstate transfer of shorter distance is a matter of degree, not of kind, and Meachum instructs that “the determining factor is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight.” 427 U. S., at 224. The reasoning of Meachum and Montanye compels the conclusion that an interstate prison transfer, including one from Hawaii to California, does not deprive an inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in and of itself. III The Court of Appeals held that Hawaii’s prison regulations create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. In Meachum, however, the State had “conferred no right on the prisoner to remain in the prison to which he was initially assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of misconduct,” 427 U. S., at 226, and “ha[d] not represented that transfers [would] occur only on the occurrence of certain events,” id., at 228. Because the State had retained “discretion to transfer [the prisoner] for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” ibid., the Court found that the State had not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Similarly, because the state law at issue in Montanye “impose[d] no conditions on the discretionary power to transfer,” 427 U. S., at 243, there was no basis for invoking the protections of the Due Process Clause. These cases demonstrate that a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion. An inmate must show “that particularized standards or criteria guide the State’s decisionmakers.” Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). If the decisionmaker is not “required to base its decisions on objective and defined criteria,” but instead “can deny the requested relief for any constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all,” ibid., the State has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See id., at 466-467 (opinion of the Court); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S., at 488-491 (summarizing cases). Hawaii’s prison regulations place no substantive limitations on official discretion and thus create no liberty interest entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. As Rule IV itself makes clear, and as the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held in Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw., at 144-145, 621 P. 2d, at 980-981, the prison Administrator’s discretion to transfer an inmate is completely unfettered. No standards govern or restrict the Administrator’s determination. Because the Administrator is the only decisionmaker under Rule IV, we need not decide whether the introductory paragraph of Rule IV, see n. 1, supra, places any substantive limitations on the purely advisory Program Committee. The Court of Appeals thus erred in attributing significance to the fact that the prison regulations require a particular kind of hearing before the Administrator can exercise his unfettered discretion. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently stated in Shango v. Jurich, 681 F. 2d 1091, 1100-1101 (1982), “[a] liberty interest is of course a substantive interest of an individual; it cannot be the right to demand needless formality.” Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement. See generally Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 146, 186 (1983). If officials may transfer a prisoner “for whatever reason or for no reason at all,” Meachum, 427 U. S., at 228, there is no such interest for process to protect. The State may choose to require procedures for reasons other than protection against deprivation of substantive rights, of course, but in making that choice the State does not create an independent substantive right. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 471 (1983). IV In sum, we hold that the transfer of respondent from Hawaii to California did not implicate the Due Process Clause directly, and that Hawaii’s prison regulations do not create a protected liberty interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Paragraph 1 of Rule IV states: “An inmate’s . . . classification determines where he is best situated within the Corrections Division. Rather than being concerned with isolated aspects of the individual or punishment (as is the adjustment process), classification is a dynamic process which considers the individual, his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates . . . , the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors. It never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division.” App. 20. Petitioners concede, “for purposes of the argument,” that respondent suffered a “grievous loss” within the meaning of Rule IV when he was transferred from Hawaii to the mainland. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 25. Rule V provides that an inmate may retain legal counsel if his hearing concerns a “potential Interstate transfer.” App. 25. Respondent also had alleged that the transfer violated the Hawaii Constitution and state regulations and statutes. In light of its dismissal of respondent’s federal claims, the District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over these state-law claims. 459 F. Supp., at 476. Several months before the Court of Appeals handed down its decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii had held that because Hawaii’s prison regulations do not limit the Administrator’s discretion to transfer prisoners to the mainland, they do not create any liberty interest. Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw. 138, 621 P. 2d 976 (1981). In a petition for rehearing in the present case, petitioners directed the Ninth Circuit’s attention to the Lono decision. See 664 F. 2d, at 714. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the Hawaii court’s interpretation of the regulations was not different from its own; the Hawaii court merely had reached a different result on the “federal question.” The Court of Appeals thus adhered to its resolution of the case. Id., at 714-716. Indeed, in Vitek itself the Court did not read Meachum and Montanye as stating a rule applicable only to intrastate transfers. The Court stated: “In Meachum v. Fano . . . and Montanye v. Haymes ... we held that the transfer of a prisoner from one prison to another does not infringe a protected liberty interest.” 445 U. S., at 489 (emphasis added). The Court’s other cases describing Meachum and Montanye also have eschewed the narrow reading respondent now proposes. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 467-468 (1983); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78, 88, n. 9 (1976). This statute has been invoked to transfer prisoners from Hawaii state facilities to federal prisons on the mainland. See Anthony v. Wilkinson, 637 F. 2d 1130 (CA7 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hawaii v. Mederios, 453 U. S. 902 (1981). After the decisions in Meachum and Montanye, courts almost uniformly have held that an inmate has no entitlement to remain in a prison in his home State. See Beshaw v. Fenton, 635 F. 2d 239, 246-247 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 453 U. S. 912 (1981); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d 934, 937, n. 4 (CA2 1979); Sisbarro v. Warden, 592 F. 2d 1, 3 (CA1), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 849 (1979); Fletcher v. Warden, 467 F. Supp. 777, 779-780 (Kan. 1979); Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F. Supp. 926, 931-933 (DC 1976); McDonnell v. United States Attorney General, 420 F. Supp. 217, 220 (ED Ill. 1976); Goodnow v. Perrin, 120 N. H. 669, 671, 421 A. 2d 1008, 1010 (1980); Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt. 448, 449-450, 378 A. 2d 105, 106-107 (1977); In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d 216, 227-228, 622 P. 2d 373, 379 (1980); cf. Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d 468 (CA9 1974) (pre-Meachum, transfers from Alaska to other States); Hillen v. Director of Department of Social Services, 455 F. 2d 510 (CA9), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 989 (1972) (pre-Meachum transfer from Hawaii to California). But see In re Young, 95 Wash. 2d, at 233, 622 P. 2d, at 382 (concurring opinion); State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N. W. 2d 621 (N. D. 1977); cf. Tai v. Thompson, 387 F. Supp. 912 (Haw. 1975) (pre-Meachum transfer). Respondent’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. The Court in Montanye took note that among the hardships that may result from a prison transfer are separation of the inmate from home and family, separation from inmate friends, placement in a new and possibly hostile environment, difficulty in making contact with counsel, and interruption of educational and rehabilitative programs. 427 U. S., at 241, n. 4. These are the same hardships respondent faces as a result of his transfer from Hawaii to California. Respondent attempts to analogize his transfer to banishment in the English sense of “beyond the seas,” arguing that banishment surely is not within the range of confinement justified by his sentence. But respondent in no sense has been banished; his conviction, not the transfer, deprived him of his right freely to inhabit the State. The fact that his confinement takes place outside Hawaii is merely a fortuitous consequence of the fact that he must be confined, not an additional element of his punishment. See Girouard v. Hogan, 135 Vt., at 449-450, 378 A. 2d, at 106-107. Moreover, respondent has not been exiled; he remains within the United States. In essence, respondent’s banishment argument simply restates his claim that a transfer from Hawaii to the mainland is different in kind from other transfers. As has been shown in the text, however, respondent’s transfer was authorized by his conviction. A conviction, whether in Hawaii, Alaska, or one of the contiguous 48 States, empowers the State to confine the inmate in any penal institution in any State unless there is state law to the contrary or the reason for confining the inmate in a particular institution is itself constitutionally impermissible. See Montanye, 427 U. S., at 242; id., at 244 (dissenting opinion); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319 (1972); Fajeriak v. McGinnis, 493 F. 2d, at 470. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983), unlike this case, state law limited the decisionmakers’ discretion. To the extent the dissent doubts that the Administrator’s discretion under Rule IV is truly unfettered, post, at 258, and n. 11, it doubts the ability or authority of the Hawaii Supreme Court to construe state law. In Meachum itself, the Court of Appeals had interpreted the applicable regulations as entitling inmates to a pretransfer hearing, see Fano v. Meachum, 520 F. 2d 374, 379-380 (CA1 1975), but this Court held that state law created no liberty interest. Other courts agree that an expectation of receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Jiles, 658 F. 2d 194, 200 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 923 (1982); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F. 2d 1287, 1298-1299 (CA6 1980); Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F. 2d 916, 924-925 (CA2 1980); Cofone v. Manson, 594 F. 2d, at 938; Lombardo v. Meachum, 548 F. 2d 13, 14-16 (CA1 1977); Adams v. Wainwright, 512 F. Supp. 948, 953 (ND Fla. 1981); Lono v. Ariyoshi, 63 Haw., at 144-145, 621 P. 2d, at 980-981. Petitioners assert that the hearings required by Rule IV not only enable the officials to gather information and thereby to exercise their discretion intelligently, but also have a therapeutic purpose: inmate participation in the decisionmaking process, it is hoped, reduces tension in the prison. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 52-53. In light of this conclusion, respondent’s claim of bias in the composition of the prison Program Committee becomes irrelevant.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY v. CALIFORNIA BOARD OF EQUALIZATION No. 75-1868. Argued February 23, 1977— Decided April 4, 1977 Arthur B. Hanson argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Michael N. Khourie, Glenn L. Archer, Jr., and Michael C. Durney. Philip M. Plant, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Ernest P. Goodman, Assistant Attorney General. Harold T. Halfpenny filed a brief for the Direct Mail/Marketing Assn., Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip Weinberg, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant National Geographic Society, a nonprofit scientific and educational corporation of the District of Columbia, maintains two offices in California that solicit advertising copy for the Society’s monthly magazine, the National Geographic Magazine. However, the offices perform no activities related to the Society’s operation of a mail-order business for the sale from the District of Columbia of maps, atlases, globes, and books. Orders for these items are mailed from California directly to appellant’s Washington, D. C., headquarters on coupons or forms enclosed with announcements mailed to Society members and magazine subscribers or on order forms contained in the magazine. Deliveries are made by mail from the Society’s Washington, D. C., or Maryland offices. Payment is either by cash mailed with the order or after a mailed billing following receipt of the merchandise. Such mail-order sales to California residents during the period involved in this suit aggregated $83,596.48. California Rev. & Tax. Code § 6203 (West Supp. 1976) requires every “retailer engaged in business in this state and making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use, or other consumption in this state” to collect from the purchaser a use tax in lieu of the sales tax imposed upon local retailers. The California Supreme Court held that appellant is subject to the statute as a “ 'retailer engaged in business in this state,' ” because its maintenance of the two offices brings appellant within the definition under § 6203 (a) that includes “ '[a]ny retailer maintaining . . . an office. . . .'" 16 Cal. 3d 637, 642, 547 P. 2d 458, 460—461 (1976). Section 6204 makes the retailer liable to the State for any taxes required to be collected regardless of whether he collects the tax. See Bank of America v. State Bd. of Equalization, 209 Cal. App. 2d 780, 793, 26 Cal. Rptr. 348, 355 (1962). The question presented by this case is whether the Society’s activities at the offices in California provided sufficient nexus between the out-of-state seller appellant and the State—as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause—to support the imposition upon the Society of a use-tax-collection liability pursuant to §§ 6203 and 6204, measured by the $83,596.48 of mail-order sales of merchandise from the District of Columbia and Maryland. The California Supreme Court held that the imposition of use-tax-collection liability on the Society violated neither Clause, 16 Cal. 3d 637, 547 P. 2d 458 (1976). We noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 883 (1976). We affirm. I All States that impose sales taxes also impose a corollary-use tax on tangible property bought out of State to protect sales tax revenues and put local retailers subject to the sales tax on a competitive parity with out-of-state retailers exempt from the sales tax. H. R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 614 (1965). The constitutionality of such state schemes is settled. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 581 (1937); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934). But the limitation of use taxes to consumption within the State so as to avoid problems of due process that might arise from the extension of the sales tax to interstate commerce, see, e. g., Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359, 363 (1941); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, supra, at 95, does not avoid all constitutional difficulties. States necessarily impose the burden of collecting the tax on the out-of-state seller; the impracticability of its collection from the multitude of individual purchasers is obvious. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 343 (1954). However, not every out-of-state seller may constitutionally be made liable for payment of the use tax on merchandise sold to purchasers in the State. The California Supreme Court concluded, based on its survey of the relevant decisions of this Court, that the “slightest presence” of the seller in California established sufficient nexus between the State and the seller constitutionally to support the imposition of the duty to collect and pay the tax. The California court stated, 16 Cal. 3d, at 644, 547 P. 2d, at 462: “We are satisfied that from the above cited decisions the following principle can be distilled and we thus hold: Where an out-of-state seller conducts a substantial mail order business with residents of a state imposing a use tax on such purchasers and the seller’s connection with the taxing state is not exclusively by means of the instruments of interstate commerce, the slightest presence within such taxing state independent of any connection through interstate commerce will permit the state constitutionally to impose on the seller the duty of collecting the use tax from such mail order purchasers and the liability for failure to do so.” (Emphasis supplied.) Our affirmance of the California Supreme Court is not to be understood as implying agreement with that court’s "slightest presence” standard of constitutional nexus. Appellant’s maintenance of two offices in the State and solicitation by employees assigned to those offices of advertising copy in the range of $1 million annually, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, establish a much more substantial presence than the expression “slightest presence” connotes. Our affirmance thus rests upon our conclusion that appellant’s maintenance of the two offices in California and activities there adequately establish a relationship or “nexus” between the Society and the State that renders constitutional the obligations imposed upon appellant pursuant to §§ 6203 and 6204. This conclusion is supported by several of our decisions. The requisite nexus was held to be shown when the out-of-state sales were arranged by the seller’s local agents working in the taxing State, Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939); General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335 (1944), and in cases of maintenance in the State of local retail store outlets by out-of-state mail-order sellers. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U. S. 373 (1941). In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960), the necessary basis was found in the case of a Georgia-based company that had “10 wholesalers, jobbers, or 'salesmen' conducting continuous local solicitation in Florida and forwarding the resulting orders from that State to Atlanta for shipment of the ordered goods,” id., at 211, although maintaining no office or place of business in Florida, and having no property or regular full-time employees there. Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Rev. Dept., 419 U. S. 560 (1975), is also instructive. That case involved a direct tax upon the gross receipts of a foreign corporation resulting from sales to a State of Washington customer, and not imposition of use-tax-collection duties. Although “a vice in a tax on gross receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business is the risk of multiple taxation . . . ,” id., at 563, see Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, supra, a concern not present when only imposition of use-tax-collection duty is involved, Standard Pressed Steel held that maintenance in the taxing State of a single employee, an engineer whose office was in his Washington home and whose primary responsibility was to consult with the Washington-based customer regarding its anticipated needs for the out-of-state supplier’s product, established a sufficient relation to activities within the State producing the gross receipts as to support imposition of the tax. It is particularly significant for our purposes in this case that the Court characterized as “frivolous” the argument that the seller’s in-state activities were so thin and inconsequential that the tax had no reasonable relation to the protection and benefits conferred by the taxing State, for the employee “made possible the realization and continuance of valuable contractual relations between [the seller and its Washington customer].” 419 U. S., at 562. Other fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory direct taxes have also been sustained when the taxes have been shown to be fairly related to the services provided the out-of-state seller by the taxing State. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, ante, p. 274; General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436 (1964); Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450 (1959); Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940). The case for the validity of the imposition upon the out-of-state seller enjoying such services of a duty to collect a use tax is even stronger. See Norton Co. v. Illinois Rev. Dept., 340 U. S. 534, 537 (1951). The out-of-state seller runs no risk of double taxation. The consumer’s identification as a resident of the taxing State is self-evident. The out-of-state seller becomes liable for the tax only by failing or refusing to collect the tax from that resident consumer. Thus, the sole burden imposed upon the out-of-state seller by statutes like §§ 6203 and 6204 is the administrative one of collecting it. Compare McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944) (sales tax), with Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, supra, and General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, supra. See also American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U. S. 451, 454-455 (1965). Two decisions that have held fact patterns deficient to establish the necessary nexus to impose the duty to collect the use tax highlight the significance of the inquiry whether the out-of-state seller enjoys services of the taxing State. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954), struck down a Maryland assessment against a Delaware store near the border between the two States. The store had made over-the-counter sales to Maryland residents and occasionally shipped or delivered goods by truck into that State. The store advertised in Delaware by newspaper and radio, and some of these advertisements reached Maryland residents. These advertisements were sometimes supplemented with “flyers” mailed to customers, some of whom lived in Maryland. The Court concluded that Maryland could not satisfy the due process requirement. In addition to the almost total lack of contacts between Maryland and the Delaware store— Marylanders went to Delaware to make purchases, the seller did not go to Maryland to make sales—the seller obviously could not know whether the goods sold over the counter in Delaware were transported to Maryland prior to their use. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, supra, at 212. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Rev. Dept., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), presented the question in the case of an out-of-state seller whose only connection with customers in the taxing State was by common carrier or mail. Illinois subjected appellant Bellas Hess, a national mail-order house centered in Missouri, to use tax liability based upon mail-order sales to customers in that State. Bellas Hess owned no tangible property in Illinois, had no sales outlets, representatives, telephone listings, or solicitors in that State, and did not advertise there by radio, television, billboards, or newspapers. It communicated with potential customers by mailing catalogues throughout the United States, including Illinois, twice a year and occasionally supplemented this effort by mailing out “flyers.” All orders for merchandise were mailed to Bellas Hess’ Missouri plant, and the goods were sent to customers by mail or common carrier. Bellas Hess held that, constitutionally, the basis for the requisite nexus was not to be found solely in Bellas Hess’ mail-order activities in the State. The Court’s opinion carefully underscored, however, the “sharp distinction . . . between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within [the taxing] State, and those [like Bellas Hess] who do no more than communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business.” Id., at 758. Appellant Society clearly falls into the former category. II The Society argues, however, that its contacts with customers in California were related solely to its mail-order sales by means of common carrier or the mail, that the two offices played no part in that activity, and that therefore this case is controlled by Bellas Hess. The Society argues in other words that there must exist a nexus or relationship not only between the seller and the taxing State, but also between the activity of the seller sought to be taxed and the seller’s activity within the State. We disagree. However fatal to a direct tax a “showing that particular transactions are dissociated from the local business . . . ,” Norton Co. v. Illinois Rev. Dept., supra, at 537; American Oil Co. v. Neill, supra; Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77 (1938), such dissociation does not bar the imposition of the use-tax-collection duty. It is true that Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward, relied on by appellant, involved fact patterns that included proof of assistance by local operations of the mail-order business. Sears maintained 12 retail stores in the taxing State and was qualified to do business there. Sears’ agents in the States, although not directly involved in the solicitation of the mail-order sales, at times assisted in processing such orders. The holding that Sears could not avoid use-tax liability did not, however, turn on that fact. The holding, rather, was that the fact Sears’ business was departmentalized—the mail-order and retail stores operations were separately administered—did not preclude the finding of sufficient nexus. Montgomery Ward, a companion case to Sears, Roebuck, presented a somewhat similar fact pattern. There the local retail stores engaged in local advertising of the mail-order merchandise. But here again we disagree that this fact was crucial to the Court’s decision. Even if, as the Society argues, the fact patterns of Sears and Montgomery Ward may be regarded as the equivalent of the in-state solicitation by local agents found sufficient to supply the nexus for imposition of the use-tax-collection duty in Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939), see also Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U. S. 207 (1960) (local solicitation by commission “salesmen”); General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335 (1944) (traveling salesmen sent into taxing State); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921) (local distributor and dealer); and Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86 (1934) (local refining, storage, and distributing facilities), the relevant constitutional test to establish the requisite nexus for requiring an out-of-state seller to collect and pay the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the use tax relates to the seller’s activities carried on within the State, but simply whether the facts demonstrate “some definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State and] the person . . . it seeks to tax.” Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U. S., at 344—345. (Emphasis added.) Here the Society’s two offices, without regard to the nature of their activities, had the advantage of the same municipal services—fire and police protection, and the like—as they would have had if their activities, as in Sears and Montgomery Ward, included assistance to the mail-order operations that generated the use taxes. The Society’s reliance on Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, supra, is also misplaced. The sales with respect to which Maryland sought to impose upon Miller the duty to collect its tax were of goods sold to residents of Maryland at Miller’s Delaware store, although Miller made occasional deliveries in Maryland. Moreover, the lack of certainty that the merchandise sold over the counter to Maryland customers in Delaware was transported to Maryland prior to its use militated against a finding of adequate nexus with respect to those purchases. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, supra, at 212-213. The relational defect between the taxing State and the person or property sought to be taxed therefore obviated any relevance of a relationship between the State and the out-of-state retailer. We conclude that the Society’s continuous presence in California in offices that solicit advertising for its magazine provides a sufficient nexus to justify that State’s imposition upon the Society of the duty to act as collector of the use tax. Affirmed. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The relevant sections of the Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code provide: § 6203 (West Supp. 1976). “Except as provided by Sections 6292 and 6293 every retailer engaged in business in this state and making sales of tangible personal property for storage, use, or other consumption in this state, not exempted under Chapters 3.5 or 4 of this part, shall, at the time of making the sales or, if the storage, use, or other consumption of the tangible personal property is not then taxable hereunder, at the time the storage, use, or other consumption becomes taxable, collect the tax from the purchaser and give to the purchaser a receipt therefor in the manner and form prescribed by the board. “ ‘Retailer engaged in business in this state’ as used in this and the preceding section means and includes any of the following: “(a) Any retailer maintaining, occupying, or using, permanently or temporarily, directly or indirectly, or through a subsidiary, or agent, by whatever name called, an office, place of distribution, sales or sample room or place, warehouse or storage place or other place of business.” § 6204 (West 1970). “The tax required to be collected by the retailer and any amount unreturned to the customer which is not tax but was collected from the customer under the representation by the retailer that it was tax constitutes debts owed by the retailer to this state.” The magazine is exempted from sales and use taxes as a “periodical.” § 6362. The offices are in San Francisco and Los Angeles and have been maintained since 1956. Each office was originally staffed with one salesman and one secretary, but each office has since increased its personnel to four. The basic function of the offices is to solicit advertising for the magazine, 16 Cal. 3d, at 640, 547 P. 2d, at 459-460. Sales of advertising copy by the two offices aggregate about $1 million annually. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. During a nine-month period from August 1, 1963, to May 6, 1964, appellant Society also used these offices to make over-the-counter sales, upon which sales taxes were paid, of maps, atlases, globes, and books totaling $679.20 for the San Francisco office and $2,161.85 for the Los Angeles office. The California Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider these sales in determining whether sufficient nexus was shown since the Society’s office activities sufficed in its view adequately to prove sufficient nexus. 16 Cal. 3d, at 641 n. 6, 547 P. 2d, at 460 n. 6. We are of the same view. Although appellant’s potential liability exceeds $180,000 and covers a nine-year period, ibid., the assessment by the California Board of Equalization for the years involved in this case is $3,838.76, including interest and penalties. Appellant paid the assessment under protest and sued for its refund in State Superior Court and recovered a judgment. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed. 121 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1975). The California Supreme Court reversed and sustained the assessment. 16 Cal. 3d 637, 547 P. 2d 458 (1976). Henneford obviated the necessity for legislation sought by the National Asssociation of State Tax Administrators in the 73d through 76th Congresses to permit States to extend their sales taxes to certain interstate transactions. See H. R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 613-615 (1965). Some 45 States and the District of Columbia require out-of-state sellers to collect use taxes on sales made to state residents. Brief for Direct Mail/Marketing Assn, as Amicus Curiae 4. Appellant Society argues that under the California Supreme Court’s “slightest presence” test §§ 6203 and 6204 could be applied even if the Society maintained no offices in the State but merely owned a parking lot. But the sections were applied to appellant only because it maintained the offices. Appellant was therefore only subject to the law because it fell within “retailer engaged in business in this state” as defined in § 6203 (a). Appellant conceded at oral argument that Bellas Hess would have required reversal in the absence of the proof of maintenance of the two offices. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29, 34-35. Contrary to appellant's argument, Brief for Appellant 6, the fact that it has not registered to do business in California is not determinative against the validity of the application of §§ 6203 and 6204. See General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 62 (1939).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

STEVENS v. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY et al. No. 89-1821. Argued March 19, 1991 Decided April 24, 1991 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Marshall, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Sou-PER, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV of which STEVENS, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 11. Alison Steiner argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Michael Adelman and Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. Amy L. Wax argued the cause pro hac vice for respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Harriet S. Shapiro, Michael Jay Singer, and Donald R. Livingston. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns a claim of age discrimination said to be in violation of § 15 (the federal employees' component) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as added by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 74, and amended, 29 U. S. C. § 633a. I Petitioner Charles Z. Stevens III is an employee of the United States Internal Revenue Service (Service). In August 1986, when he was 63 years of age, Stevens was accepted into the Service's Revenue Officer Training Program at Austin, Tex., and assumed probationary status as a civil service employee. On April 27, 1987, he was advised that his performance in the program was not satisfactory. He then requested a transfer out of the program and a demotion, rather than face separation from the Service. Believing that he had been the victim of age discrimination, Stevens on May 21 wrote his Congressman for assistance. See App. 8. That inquiry proved to be nonproductive. In September 1987, petitioner attempted to invoke his agency's administrative procedure for resolving age discrimination complaints through an initial meeting with an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor. This, however, was long after the expiration of the 30-day period prescribed for such an application by 29 CFR §§ 1613.511, 1613.512, and 1613.214(a)(1)(i) (1990). On October 19, petitioner filed a formal administrative complaint of age discrimination with the Department of the Treasury. App. 11. At the end of that complaint was the following statement: “This is also my notice of intention to sue in U. S. Civil District Court if the matter is not satisfactorily resolved.” Id., at 15. The complaint was rejected, it was said, because of the delay in seeking a meeting with the counselor and because there was no showing of good cause for not complying with the 30-day requirement. Id., at 16. This action was described by the Director of the Regional Complaints Center as “a final agency decision.” Id., at 19. On petitioner’s appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Office of Review and Appeals, the rejection for untimeliness was affirmed on March 30, 1988. Id., at 20. On May 3, 1988, petitioner filed pro se his complaint against the Department of the Treasury and its Secretary in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Id., at 2. At an ensuing hearing, petitioner was represented by counsel. The defense moved to dismiss the action on the ground that petitioner had failed to establish any basis for tolling the 30-day period. Id., at 22. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-l. It noted: “[A]n employee who believes that he has been discriminated against because of age has two avenues of relief under the ADEA”: he either “may proceed directly to federal court and initiate an action no later than 180 days from the unlawful action and notify the EEOC within 30 days prior to commencing suit,” id., at A-3, citing 29 U. S. C. §633a(d), or he “may file an administrative complaint with the employing federal agency and appeal an adverse finding to the” EEOC, in which case he “may bring a federal civil action only after exhausting his administrative remedies,” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3, citing 29 U. S. C. §633a(b). The court reasoned that the alternative administrative procedure, which petitioner had attempted, had not properly been invoked because of the untimeliness of Stevens’ complaint and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The court therefore concluded that it was “without jurisdiction” to apply the ADEA “to the circumstances of Stevens’ demotion in April, 1987.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3 to A-4. Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, that court disagreed with the District Court’s statement that the employee could go directly to federal court “no later than 180 days from the unlawful action.” It said that Stevens had to file a notice of intent to sue within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory action but that he did not have to initiate his federal suit within that period. Id., at A-7. The court went on to say: “However, Stevens did not initiate the present action in federal court until May [3], 1988[;] therefore Stevens’ notice to the EEOC, of October 19, 1987 was not effective.” Ibid. The court concluded: “Although the district court did not state the applicable law correctly, ultimately the correct result was reached since Stevens failed to meet the requirements set forth in 29 U. S. C. 633a(d).” Id., at A-8. The District Court’s dismissal was affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 897 F. 2d 526 (1990). We granted certiorari over respondents’ opposition because of what appeared to us to be a clear misreading by the lower courts of the applicable and important federal statute. 498 U. S. 957 (1990). II As the District Court noted in its opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3, § 15 of the ADEA provides two alternative routes for pursuing a claim of age discrimination. An individual may invoke the EEOC’s administrative process and then file a civil action in federal district court if he is not satisfied with his administrative remedies. See 29 U. S. C. §§633a(b) and (c). A federal employee complaining of age discrimination, however, does not have to seek relief from his employing agency or the EEOC at all. He can decide to present the merits of his claim to a federal court in the first instance. See §633a(d). Both routes to court are implicated in this case. We address the direct route first. Section 15(d) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 633a(d), reads: “When the individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimination with the Commission, no civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the individual has given the Commission not less than thirty days’ notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.” (Emphasis added.) The District Court obviously misread this statute when it said that the federal employee “may proceed directly to federal court and initiate an action no later than 180 days from the unlawful action and notify the EEOC within 30 days prior to commencing suit.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-3 (emphasis added). The court thus imposed a requirement that the federal court action be instituted within the 180-day period and an additional requirement that the EEOC be notified within 30 days prior to the commencement of the suit. But the statute reads otherwise as to both requirements. It calls for a notice of not less than 30 days to the Commission of an intent to sue (not notification within 30 days), and it provides that the notice shall be filed with the Commission within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice (not filed within 180 days of the notice). Clearly, petitioner Stevens met both requirements. The EEOC was notified on October 19, 1987, the 176th day after the alleged discriminatory action — petitioner’s transfer and demotion of April 27, 1987 — had occurred. And suit was not filed until May 3, 1988, a date more than 30 days after the notice was given. The Court of Appeals corrected one of the District Court’s two errors: “Contrary to what the district court stated, Stevens had to file a notice of intent to sue with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory action. Stevens did not have to initiate his federal action within 180 days of the alleged action, but merely give notice to the EEOC of his intention to initiate a civil action.” Id., at A-7. But the Court of Appeals then added the sentence already noted: “However, Stevens did not initiate the present action in federal court until May 4, 1988[;] therefore Stevens’ notice to the EEOC, of October 19, 1987 was not effective.” This enigmatic sentence surely implies, even if it does not say so directly, that the court was not in disagreement with the District. Court’s second error — that the federal litigation had to be commenced within 30 days of the notice, instead of after 30 days from the notice. We note, at this point, that the District Court’s and Court of Appeals’ error in their reading of the statute has also been replicated by two other courts. See Castro v. United States, 775 F. 2d 399, 403 (CA1 1985); McKinney v. Dole, 246 U. S. App. D. C. 376, 387, 765 F. 2d 1129, 1140 (1985). The applicable regulations are positive as to the absence of such a “within 30 days” requirement under the ADEA, in marked contrast with the situation concerning the assertion of a Title VII claim. See 29 CFR §1613.514 (1990). Respondents concede all this, for they say that “the statute is clear.” Brief for Respondents 29. There is no foundation that we can discern for any conclusion that the suit was not filed within the applicable period of limitations. The statute does not expressly impose any additional limitations period for a complaint of age discrimination. We therefore assume, as we have before, that Congress intended to impose an appropriate period borrowed either from a state statute or from an analogous federal one. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 146-148 (1987). In this case, we need not decide which limitations period is applicable to a civil action under 29 U. S. C. §633a(c). Stevens filed his suit on May 3, 1988, only one year and six days after the allegedly discriminatory event of April 27, 1987. That, as respondents acknowledge, Brief for Respondents 30, “is well within whatever statute of limitations might apply to the action.” HH WH The Solicitor General, however, submits that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed as having been improvidently granted. Id., at 31. He rests this submission on the argument that petitioner did not properly present the merits of the timeliness issue to the Court of Appeals, and that this Court should not address that question for the first time. Id., at 8-9, 11-15. He made the same argument in his opposition to the petition for certiorari. Brief in Opposition 5-7. We rejected that argument in granting certiorari, and we reject it again now because the Court of Appeals, like the District Court before it, decided the substantive issue presented. The District Court heard the case on the merits. Tr. 83-176. The Court of Appeals in its turn specifically referred to Stevens’ notice of intention to file a civil suit, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-7, and, as we have explained, answered the timeliness question incorrectly. We thus are satisfied that the issue is properly before us. < Answering the timeliness question in petitioner s favor, as we have, brings us to an issue involving the administrative route to federal court. Once petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint, was he required to exhaust his administrative remedies in order to file a civil action in district court? The Court of Appeals expressly stated its Circuit rule on exhaustion just eight days after it issued the opinion below. In White v. Frank, 895 F. 2d 243, 244 (CA5), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 890 (1990), the court said: “[A]n ADEA plaintiff who chooses to appeal the employer’s determination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . must await final action by that agency before filing an action in federal district court.” The exhaustion issue has divided the Circuits. Compare, e. g., Langford v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 839 F. 2d 1192, 1194-1195 (CA6 1988), with Purtill v. Harris, 658 F. 2d 134, 138 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1131 (1983). Although the issue is an important one, it is here that we encounter procedural difficulty. Respondents in direct contradiction of their position before the Court of Appeals, now fully agree with petitioner on the merits of the exhaustion issue. According to the Solicitor General, a federal employee who elects agency review of an age discrimination claim need not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a civil action. Respondents have thus abandoned the position that they took before the Court of Appeals when, in their brief there, they said: “If an employee files an administrative claim with his agency, the employee must properly exhaust his administrative remedies like employees alleging other types of discrimination .... “It is well established that a federal employee must timely exhaust any administrative remedies available to him before he can bring suit .... Therefore, Judge Bunton properly dismissed Mr. Stevens’ cause of action because Mr. Stevens did not meet the administrative requirements.” Brief for Appellees in No. 89-1432 (CA5), pp. 6-7. Respondents, of course, acknowledge this, Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, and concede that they indeed “took a different position,” id., at 22. They candidly say that “we have reconsidered our position.” Id., at 33. It is all well and good for respondents to rethink their position. Their choice, however, has meant that on the merits there is no one before us who stands in a position adverse to petitioner. Neither is there anyone before us who defends the results reached in those décided cases where Courts of Appeals have found an exhaustion requirement when administrative relief is sought before a court action is instituted. See, e. g., McGinty v. United States Department of the Army, 900 F. 2d 1114 (CA7 1990); Castro v. United States, 775 F. 2d 399 (CA1 1985); Purtill v. Harris, supra. Those cases stand in conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Langford v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, supra. In each of these cited cases, the United States put forward the exhaustion requirement. We must assume, in view of the Solicitor General’s concession here, that the Government no longer will defend its earlier litigation position. Under these circumstances we are disinclined to rule on the merits of the exhaustion issue. We feel that our only proper course is to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand the case for further proceedings. On remand, the defense presumably (and it is a strong presumption) will submit to the Court of Appeals its altered positions — that there is no exhaustion issue at all in this case because petitioner did not institute his court action until after a final decision of the agency had been made — and, if that submission is not accepted by the court, that respondents now have withdrawn from the stance they took before the Court of Appeals on the merits. In either event, petitioner Stevens finally should gain his day in court and will not have all avei ues to relief completely blocked. Meanwhile, to be sure, the rulings in McGinty, Castro, and Purtill, and any other ruling to the same effect will remain outstanding and in conflict with Langford. There is little or nothing, by way of disagreement or agreement with those cases, that this Court should do in the present litigation. The cases may be respectively challenged or supported by some future litigant in a way that will lead to a definitive resolution of the existing conflict in authority. If this does not come about, then, because of the Government’s change of mind and new position, any legal significance of the conflict may simply fade away with the passage of time. Reversed and remanded. The EEOC accepts a notice given to the employing agency as sufficient compliance with the statutory notice requirement. See Management Directive EEO-MD 107, ch. 12, pp. 12-2 and 12-3 (1987). Indeed, when Stevens formally was advised of his right to sue, he was told: “[Y]ou MAY have up to six years after the right of action first accrued in which to file a civil action.” This was a reference to the general statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), for a civil action against the Government. See Brief for Respondents 30, n. 22.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KINGSLEY INTERNATIONAL PICTURES CORP. v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. No. 394. Argued April 23, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959. Ephraim London argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Seymour H. Chalif and Stephen A. Wise. Charles A. Brind, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Once again the Court is required to consider the impact of New York’s motion picture licensing law upon First Amendment liberties, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States. Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495. The New York statute makes it unlawful “to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel [with certain exceptions not relevant here], unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department. . . .” The law provides that a license shall issue “unless such film or a part'thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime----” A recent statutory amendment provides that, “the.term ‘immoral’ and the phrase ‘of such a character that its exhibition woúld tend to corrupt morals’ shall denote a motion picture film or part thereof, the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdhess, or which expressly or impliedly presents such.acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.” As the distributor of a motion picture entitled “Lady Chatterley’s Lover/’ the appellant Kingsley submitted that film to the Motion Picture Division of the New York Education Department for a license. Finding three isolated scenes in the film “ ‘immoral’ within the intent of our Law,” the Division refused to issue a license until the scenes in question were deleted. The distributor petitioned the Regents of the University of the State of New York for a review of that ruling. The Regents upheld the denial of a license, but on the broader ground that “the whole theme of this motion picture is immoral under said law, for that theme is the presentation of adultery as a desirable, acceptable and proper pattern of behavior.” Kingsley sought judicial review of the Regents’ determination. The Appellate Division unanimously annulled the action of the Regents and directed that a license be issued. 4 App. Div. 2d 348, 165 N. Y. S. 2d 681. A sharply divided Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Appellate Division and upheld the Regents’ refusal to license the film for exhibition. 4 N. Y. 2d 349, 151 N. E. 2d 197, 175 N. Y. S. 2d 39. The Court of Appeals unanimously and explicitly rejected any notion that the film is obscene. See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476. Rather, the court found that the picture as a whole “alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior.” As Chief Judge Conway’s prevailing opinion emphasized, therefore, the only portion' of the statute involved in this case is that part of §§122 and 122-a of the Education Law requiring the denial of a license to' motion pictures “which are immoral in that they portray ‘acts of sexual immorality ... as desir.able, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.’ ” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 351, 151 N. E. 2d, at 197, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 40. A majority of the Court of Appeals ascribed to that language a precise purpose of the New York Legislature to require the denial of a license to a motion picture “because its subject matter is adultery presented as being right and desirable for certain people under certain circumstances.” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 369, 151 N. E. 2d, at 208, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 55 (concurring opinion). ' We accept the premise that the motion picture here in question, can be so characterized. We accept too, as we must, the construction- of the New York Legislature’s language which the Court of Appeals has put upon it. Albertson v. Millard, 345 U. S. 242; United States v. Burnison, 339 U. S. 87; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R. R. Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495. That construction, we emphasize, gives to the term “sexual immorality” a concept entirely different from the- concept embraced in words like “obscenity” or “pornography.” Moreover, it is not suggested-that the film would itself operate as an incitement to illegal action. Rather, the New York Court of Appeals tells us that the relevant portion of the New York Education Law requires the denial of a license to. any motion picture which approvingly portrays an adulterous relationship, quite without reference to the manner of its portrayal. What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea — that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty. It is contended that the State’s action was justified because the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry. This argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to. the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. ■ And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing. Advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not, as Mr. Justice Brandéis long ago pointed out, “a justification for denying free speech whére the advocacy, falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, at 376 (concurring opinion). “Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied, to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of thé rights of free speech. . . Id., at 378. The inflexible command which the New Fork Court of Appeals has attributed to the State'Legislature thus cuts so close to the core of constitutional freedom as to make it quite needless in this case to examine the periphery. Specifically, there is no occasion to consider the appellant’s contention that the State is entirely without power to require films of any kind to be licensed prior to their exhibition. Nor need we here determine'whether, despite problems peculiar to motion pictures, the controls which a State may impose upon this medium of expression are precisely coextensive with those allowable for newspapers, books, or individual speech'. It is enough for the present case to reaffirm that motion pictures are within the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ basic protection. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495. Reversed. McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1953, Education Law, § 129. McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1953, Education Law, § 122. McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1953 (Cum. Supp. 1958), Education Law, §122-a. “An applicant for a. license or permit, in case his application be denied by the director of the division or by the officer authorized to issue the same, shall have the right of review by the regents.” McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1953, Education Law, § 124. The proceeding was brought under Art. 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act, Gilbert-Bliss’ N. Y. Civ. Prac., Vol. 6B, 1944, 1949 Supp., § 1283 et seg. See also, McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, 1953, Education Law, § 124. Although four of the seven judges of the Court of Appeals voted to reverse the order of the Appellate Division, only three of them were of the clear opinion that denial of a license was permissible under the Constitution. Chief Judge Conway wrote an opinion in' which Judges Froessel and Burke concurred, concluding that denial of the license was constitutionally permissible. Judge Desmond wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he stated: “I Confess doubt as to the validity of such a statute but I do not know how that doubt can be resolved unless we reverse here and let the Supreme Court have the final say.” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 369, 151 N. E. 2d, at 208, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 55. Judge Dye, Judge Fuld, and Judge Van Voorhis wrote separate dissenting opinions. The opinion written by Chief Judge Conway stated: “[I]t is curious indeed to say in one breath, as some do, that obscene motion pictures may be censored, and then in another breath that motion pictures which alluringly portray adultery as proper and desirable may not be censored. As stated above, ‘The law is concerned with effect, not merely with but one means of producing it.’ It must be firmly borne in mind .that to give obscenity, as defined, the stature of the only constitutional limitation is to extend an invitation to corrupt the public morals by methods of presentation which craft will insure do not fall squarely within the definition of that term. Precedent, just as sound principle, will not support a statement that motion pictures must be ‘out and out’ obscene before they may be censored.” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 364, 151 N. E. 2d, at 205, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 51. Judge Desmond’s concurring opinion stated: “[It is not] necessarily determinative that this film is not obscene in the dictionary sense. . . 4 N. Y. 2d, at 369, 151 N. E. 2d, at 208, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 55. Judge Dye’s dissenting opinion stated: “No one contends that the film in question is obscene within the narrow legal limits of obscenity as recently defined by the Supreme Court. ...” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 371, 151 N. E. 2d, at 210, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 57. Judge Van Voorhis’ dissenting opinion'stated: “[I]t is impossible to write off this entire drama as ‘mere pornography’ Judge Van Voorhis, however, would have remitted the case to the Board of Regents to consider whether certain “passages” in the film “might have been eliminated as ‘obscene’ without doing violence to constitutional liberties.” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 375, 151 N. E. 2d, at 212, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 60. This is also emphasized in the brief of counsel for the Regents,, which states, “The full definition is not before this Court — only these parts of the definition as cited — and any debate as to whether other parts of the definition are a proper standard has no bearing in this case.” In concurring, Judge Desmond agreed that this was the meaning of the statutory language in question, and that “the theme and content of this film fairly deserve that characterization. ...” 4 N. Y. 2d, at 366, 151 N. E. 2d, at 206, 175 N. Y. S. 2d, at 52. See by way of contrast, Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446; United States v. Limehouse, 285 U. S. 424. Thomas Jefferson wrote more than a hundred and fifty years ago, f‘But we have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their errors. And especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced by the false reasoning. These are safer correctives than the conscience of- a judge.” Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Elijah Boardman, July 3, 1801, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 115, folio 19761. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697. Cf. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436; Alberts v. California, 354 U. S. 476. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROBERTSON v. UNITED STATES. No. 388. Argued March 31, 1952. Decided June 2, 1952. Samuel E. Blackham argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Clyde D. Sandgren. Marvin E. Frankel argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Slack and Harry Baum. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner is a musician and composer who between the years 1936 and 1939 composed a symphony. In 1945 Henry H. Reichhold, a philanthropist, established a music award offering $25,000, $5,000, and $2,500 for the three best symphonic works written by native-born composers of this hemisphere. The terms of the offer provided that none of the compositions could be published or publicly performed prior to entry in the contest and that each composition receiving an award would remain the property of the composer except that he would grant the Detroit Orchestra, Inc., (1) all synchronization rights as applied to motion pictures, (2) all mechanical rights as applied to phonograph recordings, electrical transcriptions and music rolls, and (3) the exclusive right to authorize the first performance of the composition in each of the countries whose citizens were eligible to enter the contest and to designate the publisher of the composition. Petitioner submitted his symphony and on December 14, 1947, won the $25,000 award. He included that amount in his 1947 income tax return as gross income, claimed the benefits of § 107 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 107 (b), 53 Stat. 878, as amended), and computed the tax as though the $25,000 had been received ratably during the years 1937, 1938, and 1939. Thereafter he filed a claim for refund on the ground that the award constituted a nontaxable gift. The Commissioner did not allow the claim but determined a deficiency on the ground that the tax should have been computed under § 107 (b) as though the award had been ratably received over the three-year period ending with 1947. Petitioner paid the deficiency, filed a supplemental claim for refund, and brought this suit to obtain it. The District Court held that the award was a gift and not taxable by reason of § 22 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Appeals reversed. 190 F. 2d 680. The case is here on certiorari, 342 U. S. 896, because of the conflict between that decision and McDermott v. Commissioner, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 176, 150 F. 2d 585, decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. And see Williams v. United States, 114 Ct. Cl. 1, 84 F. Supp. 362. I. In the legal sense payment of a prize to a winner of a contest is the discharge of a contractual obligation. The acceptance by the contestants of the offer tendered by the sponsor of the contest creates an enforceable contract. See 6 Corbin on Contracts, § 1489; Restatement, Contracts, § 521. The discharge of legal obligations — the payment for services rendered or consideration paid pursuant to a contract — is in no sense a gift. The case would be different if an award were made in recognition of past achievements or present abilities, or if payment were given not for services (see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com missioner, 279 U. S. 716, 730), but out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses. Where the payment is in return for services rendered, it is irrelevant that the donor derives no economic benefit from it. II. Section 107 (b) defines “artistic work” as the “musical” or “artistic composition” of an individual, “the work on which . . . covered a period of thirty-six calendar months or more from the beginning to the completion” of the composition. In case the gross income from a particular artistic work in the taxable year is not less than a particular percentage (not material here), the tax attributable to the income of the taxable year may be computed as though it had “been received ratably over that part of the period preceding the close of the taxable year but not more than thirty-six calendar months.” The question is whether the amount of the prize should be taxed ratably over the 36 months ending with the close of 1947 (the taxable year in which it was received) or over the last 36 months of the period (1937 to 1939) when petitioner wrote the symphony. The phrase in question, as it originated (H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., § 128), read “ratably over the period of thirty-six calendar months ending with the close of the taxable year.” In that form the present tax would have been computed as the Commissioner contended, viz. the tax would be laid over a period of 36 months extending back from the close of the taxable year. The change in wording does not seem to us to have made a change in meaning. The present words “ratably over that part of the period preceding the close of the taxable year but not more than thirty-six calendar months” would on their face seem to refer to a period ending with the close of the taxable year and extending back a maximum of 36 months. That wording was adopted in order to treat the income as though it had “been received ratably over (1) the part of the period of the work which preceded the close of the taxable year, or (2) a period of 36 calendar months, whichever of such periods is the shorter.” See S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 109. The House Conferees, in agreeing to the change, stated that it “clarifies the language of the House bill.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 43. That history strongly suggests that the purpose was not to change the allowable period of allocation from one ending with the close of the taxable year to one covering any 36 months in the past when the work was done, but to prevent tax reduction by proration of income over a period of work greater than the duration of the work preceding the close of the taxable year. That is the construction given by Treasury Regulations 111, § 29.107-2; and while much more could be said, it seems to us that that construction fits the statutory scheme. Affirmed. Me. Justice Frankfurter, not having heard the argument owing to illness, took no part in the disposition of this case. Mr. Justice Jackson dissents. Section 107 (b) provides: “For the purposes of this subsection, the term ‘artistic work or invention’, in the case of an individual, means a literary, musical, or artistic composition of such individual or a patent or copyright covering an invention of or a literary, musical, or artistic composition of such individual, the work on which by such individual covered a period of thirty-six calendar months or more from the beginning to the completion of such composition or invention. If, in the taxable year, the gross income of any individual from a particular artistic work or invention by him is not less than 80 per centum of the gross income in respect of such artistic work or invention in the taxable year plus the gross income therefrom in previous taxable years and the twelve months immediately succeeding the close of the taxable year, the tax attributable to the part of such gross income of the taxable year which is not taxable as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months shall not be greater than the aggregate of the taxes attributable to such part had it been received ratably over that part of the period preceding the close of the taxable year but not more than thirty-six calendar months.” Section 22 (b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides: “The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter: . . . “The value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance . . . .” See note 1, supra. Section 29.107-2 provides in part: “The method of allocating the gross income from the artistic work or invention to the taxable years in which falls any of the calendar months (not exceeding 36 calendar months) included within the part of the period of work which precedes the close of the current taxable year may be illustrated by the following examples: “Example (1). On October 1, 1942, A, an individual, who makes his returns on a calendar year basis and on the basis of cash receipts and disbursements, receives $36,000 in full payment for a musical composition, the work on which was commenced by A on July 10, 1938, and completed on January 29, 1943. Although the period of work covers 55 calendar months, allocations may be made to only the last 36 calendar months included within the part of the period of work which precedes the close of 1942 (the current taxable year). Therefore, $1,000 ($36,000 divided by 36) must be allocated to each of the 36 calendar months preceding January 1, 1943. Accordingly, $12,000 is allocated to 1940, $12,000 to 1941, and $12,000 to 1942 (the current taxable year). “Example (%). Assume the same facts as in example (1) except that the period of work was commenced by A on July 1, 1941, and completed on September 1, 1944. Although the period of work covers 38 calendar months, allocations may be made to only the 18 calendar months which are included within the part of the period of work which precedes the close of 1942 (the current taxable year). Therefore, $2,000 ($36,000 divided by 18) must be allocated to each of 18 calendar months preceding January 1, 1943. Accordingly, $12,000 is allocated to 1941, and $24,000 to 1942 (the current taxable year).”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTY DOLLARS ($8,850) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY No. 81-1062. Argued January 18, 1983 Decided May 23, 1983 O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 570. Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Carter G. Phillips, John Fichter De Pue, and David B. Smith. Victor Sherman argued the cause for claimant Vasquez. With him on the brief was Paul L. Gabbert. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. United States Customs officials seized $8,850 in currency from the claimant as she passed through customs at Los Angeles International Airport. The question in this case is whether the Government’s 18-month delay in filing a civil proceeding for forfeiture of the currency violates the claimant’s right to due process of law. We conclude that the four-factor balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), provides the relevant framework for determining whether the delay in filing a forfeiture action was reasonable. Applying the Barker test to the circumstances of this case, we find no unreasonable delay. I A Section 231 of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1122, 31 U. S. C. § 1101, requires persons knowingly transporting monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 into the United States to file a report with the Customs Service declaring the amount being transported. Congress has authorized the Government to seize and forfeit any monetary instruments for which a required report was not filed. 31 U. S. C. § 1102(a). Since the Bank Secrecy Act does not specify the procedures to be followed in seizing monetary instruments, the Customs Service generally follows the procedures governing forfeitures for violations of the customs laws, as set forth in 19 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and the implementing regulations. Under these procedures, the Customs Service notifies any person who appears to have an interest in the seized property of the property’s liability to forfeiture and of the claimant’s right to petition the Secretary of the Treasury for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture. See 19 CFR § 162.31(a) (1982). The regulations require a claimant to file the petition within 60 days. 19 CFR § 171.12(b) (1982). If the claimant does not file a petition, or if the decision on a petition makes legal proceedings appear necessary, the appropriate customs officer must prepare a full report of the seizure for the United States Attorney. 19 U. S. C. § 1603 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Upon receipt of a report, the United States Attorney is required “immediately to inquire into the facts” and, if it appears probable that a forfeiture has been incurred, “forthwith to cause the proper proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted, without delay.” 19 U. S. C. § 1604 (1976 ed., Supp. V). After a case is reported to the United States Attorney for institution of legal proceedings, no administrative action may be taken on any petition for remission or mitigation. 19 CFR § 171.2(a) (1982). The Customs Service processes over 50,000 noncontra-band forfeitures per year. U. S. Customs Service, Customs U. S. A. 36 (1982). In 90% of all seizures, the claimant files an administrative petition for remission or mitigation. Brief for United States 7. The Secretary in turn grants at least partial relief for an estimated 75% of the petitions. Ibid. Typically, this relief terminates the dispute without the filing of a forfeiture action in district court. B On September 10, 1975, claimant Mary Josephine Vasquez and a companion arrived at Los Angeles International Airport after a short visit to Canada. During customs processing, Vasquez declared that she was not carrying more than $5,000 in currency. Nevertheless, a customs inspector discovered and seized $8,850 in United States currency from her. On September 18, 1975, the Customs Service officially informed Vasquez by letter that the seized currency was subject to forfeiture and that she had the right to petition for remission or mitigation. A week later, Vasquez filed a petition for remission or mitigation, asserting that the violation was unintentional because she had mistakenly believed she was required to declare only funds that had been obtained in another country and that she had brought the seized funds with her from the United States. On October 20, 1975, the Customs Office of Investigation assigned Special Agent Pompeo to investigate the petition. Within a few days, Agent Pompeo had interviewed the customs inspectors at the airport who were involved in the seizure. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact him, in mid-November Agent Pompeo contacted Vasquez’ attorney to arrange an interview with Vasquez. The attorney was unable to meet at that time, and he desired to be present during the interview with his client. Around this time, Agent Pompeo also opened a criminal file because she suspected Vasquez of smuggling drugs. From November 1975 until April 1976, Agent Pompeo contacted various state, federal, and Canadian law enforcement officials to determine whether the seized currency was part of a narcotics transaction. In January 1976, Vasquez’ attorney inquired about the status of the petition, and was informed it was still under investigation. On March 2, 1976, Agent Pompeo again contacted the attorney regarding an interview with Vasquez, and an interview took place three days later. On April 26, 1976, the attorney again inquired about the status of the petition and requested that it be acted on as soon as possible. Also in April 1976, Agent Pompeo received final reports from the law enforcement agencies. From these reports, Agent Pompeo concluded there was no evidence to support a charge of narcotics violations. In May 1976, Agent Pompeo submitted a report to the United States Attorney, recommending prosecution of Vasquez for the reporting violation. After Agent Pompeo re-interviewed the customs agents and reported her findings, the United States Attorney submitted the case to the grand jury. On June 15, 1976, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Vasquez with the felony of knowingly and willfully making false statements to a United States Customs officer, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001; and with the misdemeanor of knowingly and willfully transporting $8,850 into the United States without filing a report, in violation of 31 U. S. C. §§ 1058 and 1101. The indictment sought forfeiture of the currency as part of the misdemeanor count. In August 1976, Agent Pompeo recommended that disposition of the remission petition be withheld until the currency was no longer needed as evidence at the criminal trial. On December 24, 1976, Vasquez was convicted on the felony count but acquitted on the misdemeanor charge of willfully failing to file a currency report. Four days after the criminal trial was completed, Vasquez' attorney again inquired whether there would be any further delay in acting on the petition. On March 10,1977, the Customs Service informed Vasquez that the claim of forfeiture had been referred to the United States Attorney. Within two weeks, a complaint seeking forfeiture under 31 U. S. C. § 1102 was filed in Federal District Court. In answer to the complaint, Vasquez admitted the factual allegations but asserted as one of several affirmative defenses that the Government’s “dilatory processing” of her petition for remission or mitigation and “dilatory” commencement of the civil forfeiture action violated her right to due process. The District Court, after a 2-day bench trial held in January 1978, determined that the time which had elapsed was reasonable under the circumstances and therefore declared the currency forfeited under 31 U. S. C. § 1102. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 645 F. 2d 836 (1981). Proceeding from the premise that the Government must bring forfeiture actions promptly because seizures infringe upon property rights, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government’s 18-month delay in filing its forfeiture action was unjustified. The Court of Appeals specifically held that pending administrative or criminal investigations cannot justify the delay when the necessary elements for a forfeiture were established at the time of the seizure and when the claimant seeks a speedy resolution of the claim. The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Government’s argument that the claimant should be required to show that the delay prejudiced her ability to present a defense to the forfeiture action. As a remedy for the due process violation, the Court of Appeals ordered dismissal of the Government’s forfeiture action. Since other Circuits have determined that pending criminal or administrative investigations and prejudice to the claimant are relevant considerations in determining whether a delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings violates due process, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 455 U. S. 1015 (1982). We reverse. II The due process issue presented here is a narrow one. Vasquez concedes that the Government could constitutionally seize her property without a prior hearing. Nor does Vasquez challenge the sufficiency of the judicial hearing that was eventually held. She argues only that the Government’s delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding violated her due process right to a hearing “‘at a meaningful time,”’ Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 80 (1972), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). Unlike the situation where due process requires a prior hearing, there is no obvious bright line dictating when a postseizure hearing must occur. Because our prior cases in this area have wrestled with whether due process requires a preseizure hearing, we have not previously determined when a postseizure delay may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time. The Government argues that there is no general due process requirement of prompt postseizure filing of a judicial forfeiture action. Rather, the Government urges that the standard for assessing the timeliness of the suit be the same as that employed for due process challenges to delay in instituting criminal prosecutions. As articulated in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783 (1977), such claims can prevail only upon a showing that the Government delayed seeking an indictment in a deliberate attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the defendant or in reckless disregard of its probable prejudicial impact upon the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges. The Government argues that in the absence of unfair conduct of this sort, the timeliness of the suit is controlled only by the applicable statute of limitations. Here, Congress has required the Government to institute forfeiture proceedings within five years. 19 U. S. C. §1621 (1976 ed., Supp. V). We reject the Government’s suggestion that Lovasco provides the appropriate test for determining whether the delay violates the due process command. Lovasco recognized that the interests of the suspect and society are better served if, absent bad faith or extreme prejudice to the defendant, the prosecutor is allowed sufficient time to weigh and sift evidence to ensure that an indictment is well founded. While the value of allowing the Government time to pursue its investigation applies to the civil forfeiture situation as well as the criminal proceeding, a major distinction exists. A suspect who has not been indicted retains his liberty; a claimant whose property has been seized, however, has been entirely deprived of the use of the property. A more apt analogy is to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial once an indictment or other formal process has issued. In that situation, the defendant no longer retains his complete liberty. Even if he is allowed to post bail, his liberty is subject to the conditions required by his bail agreement. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), we developed a test to determine when Government delay has abridged the right to a speedy trial. The Barker test involves a weighing of four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id., at 530. Of course, Barker dealt with the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial rather than the Fifth Amendment right against deprivation of property without due process of law. Nevertheless, the Fifth Amendment claim here — which challenges only the length of time between the seizure and the initiation of the forfeiture trial — mirrors the concern of undue delay encompassed in the right to a speedy trial. The Barker balancing inquiry provides an appropriate framework for determining whether the delay here violated the due process right to be heard at a meaningful time. We have often repeated the seminal statement from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972), that “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” E. g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U. S. 188, 200 (1982); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 14-15, n. 15 (1978). The flexible approach of Barker, which “necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis,” 407 U. S., at 530, is thus an appropriate inquiry for determining whether the flexible requirements of due process have been met. As we stressed in Barker, none of these factors is a necessary or sufficient condition for finding unreasonable delay. Rather, these elements are guides in balancing the interests of the claimant and the Government to assess whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied in a particular case. III In applying the Barker balancing test to this situation, the overarching factor is the length of the delay. As we said in Barker, the length of the delay “is to some extent a triggering mechanism.” Ibid. Little can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively improper, for the determination necessarily depends on the facts of the particular case. Our inquiry is the constitutional one of due process; we are not establishing a statute of limitations. Obviously, short delays — of perhaps a month or so — need less justification than longer delays. We regard the delay here — some 18 months— as quite significant. Being deprived of this substantial sum of money for a year and a half is undoubtedly a significant burden. Closely related to the length of the delay is the reason the Government assigns to justify the delay. Id., at 531. The Government must be allowed some time to decide whether to institute forfeiture proceedings. The customs official’s decision to seize property is of necessity a hasty one. Both the Government and the claimant have an interest in a rule that allows the Government some time to investigate the situation in order to determine whether the facts entitle the Government to forfeiture so that, if not, the Government may return the money without formal proceedings. Cf. Lovasco, supra, at 791. Normally, investigating officials can make such a determination fairly quickly, so that this reason alone could only rarely justify a lengthy delay. An important justification for delaying the initiation of forfeiture proceedings is to see whether the Secretary’s decision on the petition for remission will obviate the need for judicial proceedings. This delay can favor both the claimant and the Government. Cf. Barker, supra, at 521; Lovasco, supra, at 794-795. In many cases, the Government’s entitlement to the property is clear, and the claimant’s only prospect for reacquiring the property is that the Secretary will favorably exercise his discretion and allow remission or mitigation. If the Government were forced to initiate judicial proceedings without regard to administrative proceedings, the claimant would lose this benefit. Further, administrative proceedings are less formal and expensive than judicial forfeiture proceedings. Given the great percentage of successful petitions, allowing the Government to wait for action on administrative petitions eliminates unnecessary and burdensome court proceedings. Finally, a system whereby the judicial proceeding occurs after administrative action spares litigants and the Government from the burden of simultaneously participating in two forums. The Government takes the extreme position, however, that a pending administrative petition should completely toll the requirement of filing a judicial proceeding. Nothing in the statutory scheme or in our cases supports this argument. A claimant need not waive his right to a prompt judicial hearing simply because he seeks the additional remedy of an administrative petition for mitigation. Unreasonable delay in processing the administrative petition cannot justify prolonged seizure of his property without a judicial hearing. Rather, the pendency of an administrative petition is simply a weighty factor in the flexible balancing inquiry. Pending criminal proceedings present similar justifications for delay in instituting civil forfeiture proceedings. A prior or contemporaneous civil proceeding could substantially hamper the criminal proceeding, which — as here — may often include forfeiture as part of the sentence. A prior civil suit might serve to estop later criminal proceedings and may provide improper opportunities for the claimant to discover the details of a contemplated or pending criminal prosecution. Compare Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. In some circumstances, a civil forfeiture proceeding would prejudice the claimant’s ability to raise an inconsistent defense in a contemporaneous criminal proceeding. See, e. g., United States v. U. S. Currency, 626 F. 2d 11 (CA6 1980). Again, however, the pendency of criminal proceedings is only an element to be considered in determining whether delay is unreasonable. Although federal criminal proceedings are generally fairly rapid since the advent of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U. S. C. § 3161 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), the pendency of a trial does not automatically toll the time for instituting a forfeiture proceeding. In this case the Government relies on both a pending petition for mitigation or remission and a pending criminal proceeding to justify the delay in filing civil forfeiture proceedings. During the initial seven months after the seizure the Customs Service was determining whether to grant the petition. This investigation required responses to inquiries to state, federal, and Canadian law enforcement officers. Such an investigation inherently is time consuming, and there is no indication that it was not pursued with diligence. The Customs Service then referred the matter to the United States Attorney, who obtained criminal indictments within two months. Importantly, one count of the indictment sought forfeiture as part of the sentence. If the Government had prevailed, a civil forfeiture would have been rendered unnecessary. There is no evidence in the record that the Government was responsible for the slow pace of the criminal proceedings, which reached a verdict five months later. After the criminal trial ended, the Secretary of the Treasury made a final decision within three months to deny the petition, and the United States Attorney promptly filed a civil forfeiture proceeding. We are impressed by the assessment made by the District Court that the Goverment had acted with all due speed. Indeed, in an oral colloquy during trial the District Judge commented: “I have been anxious to see in this case whether there has been a lot of dilitory [sic] conduct that the government has really not done what it should do in order to push this thing with all reasonable speed, and, frankly, I don’t see any point in which the government has been lax. “If I had found such, and I found it an unreasonable length of time, I would have been happy to so hold .... “But, in view of the evidence here, I just cannot see any way in which this Court can say that the government has not pursued their claim in all reasonable diligence.” App. 77. In sum, the Government’s diligent pursuit of pending administrative and criminal proceedings indicates strongly that the reasons for its delay in filing a civil forfeiture proceeding were substantial. The third element to be considered in the due process balance is the claimant’s assertion of the right to a judicial hearing. A claimant is able to trigger rapid filing of a forfeiture action if he desires it. First, the claimant can file an equitable action seeking an order compelling the filing of the forfeiture action or return of the seized property. See Slocum, v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1, 10 (1817) (Marshall, C. J.). Less formally, the claimant could simply request that the Customs Service refer the matter to the United States Attorney. If the claimant believes the initial seizure was improper, he could file a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) for a return of the seized property. Yasquez did none of these things and only occasionally inquired about the result of the petition for mitigation or remission and asked that the Secretary reach a decision promptly. The failure to use these remedies can be taken as some indication that Yasquez did not desire an early judicial hearing. The final element is whether the claimant has been prejudiced by the delay. The primary inquiry here is whether the delay has hampered the claimant in presenting a defense on the merits, through, for example, the loss of witnesses or other important evidence. Such prejudice could be a weighty factor indicating that the delay was unreasonable. Here, Vasquez has never alleged or shown that the delay affected her ability to defend against the impropriety of the forfeiture on the merits. On the contrary, Vasquez conceded that the elements necessary for a forfeiture under § 1102(a) were present in her case. IV In this case, the balance of factors indicates that the Government’s delay in instituting civil forfeiture proceedings was reasonable. Although the 18-month delay was a substantial period of time, it was justified by the Government’s diligent efforts in processing the petition for mitigation or remission and in pursuing related criminal proceedings. Vasquez never indicated that she desired early commencement of a civil forfeiture proceeding, and she has not asserted or shown that the delay prejudiced her ability to defend against the forfeiture. Therefore, the claimant was not denied due process of law. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. In addition to the general remission provisions of Title IV, Title II of the Bank Secrecy Act contains its own remission provision, 31 U. S. C. § 1104: “The Secretary may in his discretion remit any forfeiture or penalty under this subchapter in whole or in part upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just.” At the time of the seizure in this case, a customs officer could institute nonjudicial, summary forfeiture proceedings if the value of the seized merchandise was not more than $2,500. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 1607-1609. Congress has since raised this limit to $10,000. 19 U. S. C. § 1607 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Even for a seizure of property appraised at less than $10,000, the claimant has a right to a judicial determination upon posting a $250 bond to cover costs. 19 U. S. C. § 1608. At the time of the seizure of the currency from Vasquez, 19 U. S. C. § 1603 contained no requirement of a prompt report of a seizure by the Customs Service to the United States Attorney for purposes of instituting forfeiture proceedings. As amended in 1978, § 1603 now requires the appropriate customs officer “to report promptly” to the United States Attorney whenever legal proceedings “in connection with such seizure or discovery are required.” 19 U. S. C. § 1603 (1976 ed., Supp. V). On September 11, 1975, the day after the seizure, Vasquez’ counsel had written an informal letter to the District Director of Customs, explaining why she had not declared the money. This inquiry was relevant to the reporting violation. A currency reporting violation is normally a misdemeanor, but a reporting violation committed in furtherance of any other federal offense is a felony. Compare 31 U. S. C. § 1058 with 31 U. S. C. § 1059. The conviction on the felony count was subsequently reversed because court files were left in the jury room during deliberations. United States v. Vasquez, 597 F. 2d 192 (CA9 1979). On March 28, 1977, the Customs Service officially notified Vasquez that her petition had been denied. Because we find no violation of due process, we do not decide whether dismissal of the forfeiture action with prejudice would be an appropriate remedy for undue delay. E. g., White v. Acree, 594 F. 2d 1385 (CA10 1979). E. g., United States v. Thirty-Six Thousand One Hundred & Twenty-Five Dollars in U. S. Currency, 642 F. 2d 1211 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 835 (1981) (aff’g 510 F. Supp. 303 (ED La. 1980)). E. g., United States v. Various Pieces of Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, 649 F. 2d 606 (CA8 1981); United States v. One 1976 Mercedes 450 SLC, 667 F. 2d 1171 (CA5 1982). The general rule, of course, is that absent an “extraordinary situation” a party cannot invoke the power of the state to seize a person’s property without a prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 378-379 (1971). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); cf. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974). But we have previously held that such an extraordinary situation exists when the government seizes items subject to forfeiture. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974), the Court upheld a Puerto Rico statute modeled after a federal forfeiture statute, 21 U. S. C. § 881(a), which allowed Puerto Rican authorities to seize, without prior notice or hearing, a yacht suspected of importing marihuana. Pearson Yacht clearly indicates that due process does not require federal customs officials to conduct a hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture. Such a requirement would make customs processing entirely unworkable. The government interests found decisive in Pearson Yacht are equally present in this situation: the seizure serves important governmental purposes; a pre-seizure notice might frustrate the statutory purpose; and the seizure was made by government officials rather than self-motivated private parties. In United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 (1971), we construed a statute allowing customs officials to seize obscene material as requiring a postseizure filing within 14 days and completion of the hearing in an additional 60 days. That case interpreted the statute so as to avoid possible First Amendment problems of prior restraint. The case did not involve, and thus we had no occasion to address, the time restraints imposed by the Due Process Clause. Even if we'were inclined to interpret the statutes here in such a way as to avoid any due process question, it would be impossible to read into the statutory scheme, as we did in Thirty-seven Photographs, a short statute of limitations, since 19 U. S. C. § 1621 (1976 ed., Supp. V) expressly allows the Government to bring a civil forfeiture proceeding within five years. The deprivation in Barker — loss of liberty — may well be more grievous than the deprivation of one’s use of property at issue here. Thus, the balance of the interests, which depends so heavily on the context of the particular situation, may differ from a situation involving the right to a speedy trial. By regulation, the Secretary is not allowed to process any petition for remission or mitigation while a civil forfeiture proceeding is pending. 19 CFR § 171.2(a) (1982). Under the 1978 revisions to 19 CFR § 162.31(a), the Customs Service is now required to warn claimants that unless they agree to defer judicial forfeiture proceedings until completion of the administrative process, the case will be referred promptly to the United States Attorney for institution of judicial proceedings, or summary forfeiture proceedings will be begun.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHARDON, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION OF PUERTO RICO, et al. v. FERNANDEZ et al. No. 81-249. Decided November 2, 1981 Together with Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Rodriguez; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Santiago de Orta; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Angiuta de Rios; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Sanchez; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Santana; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Perez-Ramirez; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Roman de Molina; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Collazo; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Garcia; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Lopez de Ferra; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Beltran; Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Cacho de Freytes; and Chardon, Secretary of Public Education of Puerto Rico, et al. v. Navarro, also on petition for certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 19.4). Per Curiam. Respondents were nontenured administrators in the Puerto Rico Department of Education during the 1976-1977 school year. On dates prior to June 18, 1977, each respondent was notified by letter that his appointment would terminate at a specified date between June 30 and August 8, 1977. On June 19, 1978, Rafael Rivera Fernandez filed a complaint alleging that the terminations violated 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the action had accrued on the date the employees received the letters and that the claims were therefore barred by the applicable 1-year statute of limitations, P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 31, § 5298(2) (1968). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed on the ground that the limitations period did not begin running until respondents’ appointments ended. 648 F. 2d 765 (1981). The decision below is contrary to a recent decision of this Court: Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250 (1980). In that case, Ricks filed suit alleging that the denial of tenure at a state college deprived him of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. And we held that the applicable limitations periods began to run when Ricks was denied tenure, rather than on the date his employment terminated. His action was, therefore, time-barred. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Ricks on the ground that Ricks had alleged that denial of tenure was the “unlawful employment practice,” whereas here respondents allege that termination of their employment as administrators was the “unlawful employment practice.” We think Ricks is indistinguishable. When Ricks was denied tenure, he was given a 1-year “terminal” contract. Thus, in each case, the operative decision was made — and notice given — in advance of a designated date on which employment terminated. In Ricks, we held that the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful. 449 U. S., at 258. The fact of termination is not itself an illegal act. In Ricks, the alleged illegal act was racial discrimination in the tenure decision. Id., at 259. Here, respondents allege that the decision to terminate was made solely for political reasons, violative of First Amendment rights. There were no other allegations, either in Ricks or in these cases, of illegal acts subsequent to the date on which the decisions to terminate were made. As we noted in Ricks, “[m]ere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Id., at 257. In the cases at bar, respondents were notified, when they received their letters, that a final decision had been made to terminate their appointments. The fact that they were afforded reasonable notice cannot extend the period within which suit must be filed. We therefore grant certiorari. The judgments entered below on May 8, 1981, and June 11, 1981, are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Reversed and remanded. Petitioners request a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to review a total of 14 judgments entered in favor of 36 respondents. The published decision, discussed in text, represents one judgment in a suit brought by 23 respondents; that decision was issued May 8, 1981. See 648 F. 2d 765 (1981). Identical individual judgments in favor of the other 13 respondents were issued on June 11, 1981. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a (unpublished orders). Delaware State College had a policy of giving a final 1-year contract to teachers who were denied tenure. Only when that contract expired, did the “employment relationship en[d].” 449 U. S., at 253. Apparently, the practice of the Puerto Rico Department of Education was similar in principle. Following a decision to terminate, the actual ending of employment was deferred to a designated date. Advance notice of termination is a customary and reasonable employment practice which affords the employee an opportunity to find another job.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RABANG v. BOYD, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 403. Argued May 1, 1957. Decided May 27, 1957. John Caughlan argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. J. F. Bishop argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney and Beatrice Rosenberg. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner, born in 1910 in the Philippine Islands, has lived in the continental United States since 1930, when he was admitted for permanent residence. In February 1951, he was convicted upon a plea of guilty of violating the federal narcotics laws. He was taken into custody in March 1951, and, after administrative proceedings, was ordered deported under the Act of February 18, 1931, as amended, which provided for the deportation of “any alien” convicted of violating a federal narcotics law. Petitioner applied to the District Court for the Western District of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus and declaratory relief from the order of the Immigration and Naturalization Service deporting him to the Philippine Islands. The District Court denied the petitioner’s application, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari. The sole issue for decision is whether the petitioner is deportable as an alien within the meaning of the 1931 Act. The parties agree that the petitioner was a national of the United States at birth and when he entered the continental United States for permanent residence. Under the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. Article IX of the Treaty provided that . . [t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants . . . shall be determined by the Congress.” Pursuant to that Article, the Congress declared, inter alia, in the Act of July 1, 1902, that Filipinos born in the Islands after 1899 were to . . be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States . ...” The Filipinos, as nationals, owed an obligation of permanent allegiance to this country. Upon the proclamation of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, § 14 of the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 became operative. Section 14 provided: “Upon the final and complete withdrawal of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands the immigration laws of the United States (including all the provisions thereof relating to persons ineligible to citizenship) shall apply to persons who were born in the Philippine Islands to the same extent as in the case of other foreign countries.” 48 Stat. 464, 48 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 1244. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner lost his status as a national when the United States relinquished its sovereignty over the Islands on July 4, 1946, and that this occurred regardless of his residence in the continental United States on that date. The petitioner argues that his status as a national, acquired at birth under the Treaty and the 1902 statute, bears such close relationship to the constitutionally secured birthright of citizenship acquired by the American-born, that its divestiture should rest only upon the most explicit expression of congressional intention. In the Independence Act, the Congress granted full and complete independence to the Islands, and necessarily severed the obligation of permanent allegiance owed by Filipinos who were nationals of the United States. Anything less than the severance of the ties for all Filipinos, regardless of residence in or out of the continental United States, would not have fulfilled our long-standing national policy to grant independence to the Philippine people. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 674-678, 692. Section 14 of the Independence Act in clear language applies “to persons who were born in the Philippine Islands.” This language demonstrates, and we hold, as did the courts below, that persons born in the Islands, and who thereby were nationals of the United States, became aliens on July 4, 1946, regardless of permanent residence in the continental United States on that date. The petitioner contends that, because he was admitted for permanent residence at the time the Islands were a territory of the United States, he did not enter from a foreign country and therefore cannot be an alien within the purview of the 1931 Act. He relies on Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, where this Court held that a Filipino admitted for permanent residence in 1930 was not deportable under § 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 as an alien sentenced for certain crimes “committed . . . after entry.” (Emphasis added.) The word “entry” was held to be significant of a congressional purpose to limit deportation under § 19 (a) to aliens arriving “from some foreign port or place,” a description which did not fit a territory belonging to the United States. But the 1931 Act differs from the 1917 Act because it is silent as to whether “entry” from a foreign country is a condition of deportability. By its terms, the 1931 Act applies to “. . . any alien . . . who, after . . . [February 18, 1931], shall be convicted . . .” of a federal narcotics offense. It follows that the holding in Gonzales is not applicable. The petitioner argues that the requirement of “entry,” as construed in Gonzales, was incorporated into the 1931 Act by the provision that deportation shall be accomplished “in manner provided in sections 19 and 20” of the Immigration Act of 1917. We hold that the reference to the “manner provided” in those sections draws into the 1931 Act only the procedural steps for securing deportation set forth in those sections. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585. The Congress adopted these procedures by reference instead of spelling them out in the 1931 Act. The petitioner urges finally that the requirement of “entry” is implicit in the 1931 Act. Citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, he argues that the bounds of the power to deport aliens are circumscribed by the bounds of the power to exclude them, and that the power to exclude extends only to “foreigners” and does not embrace Filipinos admitted from the Islands when they were a territory of the United States. It is true that Filipinos were not excludable from the country under any general statute relating to the exclusion of “aliens.” See Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 12-13; Toyota v. United States, 268 U. S. 402, 411. But the fallacy in the petitioner’s argument is the erroneous assumption that Congress was without power to legislate the exclusion of Filipinos in the same manner as “foreigners.” This Court has held that “. . . the power to acquire territory by treaty implies not only the power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be . . . .” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 279. Congress not only had, but exercised, the power to exclude Filipinos in the provision of § 8 (a)(1) of the Independence Act, which, for the period from 1934 to 1946, provided: “For the purposes of the Immigration Act of 1917, the Immigration Act of 1924 (except section 13 (c)), this section, and all other laws of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, citizens of the Philippine Islands who are not citizens of the United States shall be considered as if they were aliens. For such purposes the Philippine Islands shall be considered as a separate country and shall have for each fiscal year a quota of fifty. . . ” 48 Stat. 462, 48 U. S. C. (1934 ed.) § 1238. The 1931 Act plainly covers the situation of the petitioner, who was an alien, and who was convicted of a federal narcotics offense. Cf. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521. We therefore conclude that the petitioner was deportable as an alien under that Act. The judgment is Affirmed. The Act of February 18, 1931, as amended, provided: “. . . [A]ny alien (except an addict who is not a dealer in, or peddler of, any of the narcotic drugs mentioned in this Act) who, after . . . [February 18, 1931], shall be convicted for violation of or conspiracy to violate any statute of the United States or of any State, Territory, possession, or of the District of Columbia, taxing, prohibiting, or regulating the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, or any salt, derivative, or preparation of opium or coca leaves, shall be taken into custody and deported in manner provided in sections 19 and 20 of the Act of February 5, 1917, entitled 'An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States.’ ” 46 Stat. 1171, as amended, 54 Stat. 673, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 156a. 234 F. 2d 904. 352 U. S. 906. 30 Stat. 1754. Id., at 1759. 32 Stat. 691, 692; compare 39 Stat. 545, 546. Compare § 101 of the Nationality Act of 1940, which defines the term “national” as follows: “(a) The term 'national’ means a person owing permanent allegiance to a state. “(b) The term 'national of the United States’ means ... (2) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States. It does not include an alien.” 54 Stat. 1137, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 501. Presidential Proclamation No. 2695, 60 Stat. 1352, 11 Fed. Reg. 7517; Presidential Proclamation No. 2696, 60 Stat. 1353, 11 Fed. Reg. 7517. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has consistently followed this principle. E. g., Resurreccion-Talavera v. Barber, 231 F. 2d 524; Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F. 2d 398, aff’d on other grounds, 347 U. S. 637; Mangaoang v. Boyd, 205 F. 2d 553; Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F. 2d 795; cf. Banez v. Boyd, 236 F. 2d 934. The “manner provided” in § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 889, as amended, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 155, was “upon the warrant of the Attorney General.” Section 20, 39 Stat. 890, as amended, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. IV) § 156, related to ports to which aliens are to be deported, costs of deportation and other details. The Attorney General is required by that section to deport “to the country specified by the alien, if it is willing to accept him into its territory.” In the administrative proceedings the petitioner specified the Philippine Islands. It is not contended that the procedures specified in §§ 19 and 20 were not followed in this case. See Magoon, Reports (1902), 120: “The inhabitants of the islands acquired by the United States during the late war with Spain, not being citizens of the United States, do not possess the right of free entry into the United States. That right is appurtenant to citizenship. The rights of immigration into the United States by the inhabitants of said islands are no more than those of aliens of the same race coming from foreign lands.” Illustrative of the scope of the congressional power is the treatment afforded Puerto Ricans who were first nationals, 31 Stat. 77, 79, and who later became citizens, 39 Stat. 951, 953. See also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 280, as to the status of the inhabitants of other territories acquired by the United States.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. SUPERIOR COURT TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION et al. No. 88-1198. Argued October 30, 1989 Decided January 22, 1990 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts V and VI, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 436. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 453. Ernest J. Isenstadt argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88-1198 and respondent in No. 88-1393. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Boudin, Kevin J. Arquit, Jay C. Shaffer, and Karen G. Bokat. Willard K. Tom argued the cause for respondents in' No. 88-1198 and petitioners in No. 88-1393. With him on the brief for the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association were Donald I. Baker, David T. Shelledy, and Michael L. Denger. Douglas E. Rosenthal filed a brief for Ralph J. Perrotta et al. Together with No. 88-1393, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of South Dakota et al. by Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, and Jeffrey P. Hallem, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Cor-bin, Attorney General of Arizona, and Alison J. Butterfield, Douglas B. Baily, Attorney General of Alaska, and Richard D. Monkman, Assistant Attorney General, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, and Thomas P. McMahon, First Assistant Attorney General, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, and David G. Culley, Deputy Attorney General, Warren Price HI, Attorney General of Hawaii, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, and John R. Perkins, Deputy Attorney General, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, John W. Campbell, Deputy Attorney General, and Mark S. Braun, Assistant Attorney General, Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General of Kentucky, and James M. Ringo, Assistant Attorney General, William J. Guste, Jr,, Attorney General of Louisiana, and Anne F. Benoit, Assistant Attorney General, J. Joseph Cmran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, and Michael F. Brockmeyer and Ellen S. Cooper, Assistant Attorneys General, Robert M. Spire, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General, Lou McCreary, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Aliene D. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General of Wisconsin, Mark E. Musolf, Deputy Attorney General, and Kevin J. O’Connor and Matthew J. Frank, Assistant Attorneys General; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Wm. Warfield Ross, Gerald P. Norton, John A. Powell, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Elizabeth Symonds; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Rick Harris. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Medical Association by Jack R. Bierig and Carter G. Phillips; and for the Washington Council of Lawyers et al. by Andrew J. Pincus. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Pursuant to a well-publicized plan, a group of lawyers agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court until the District of Columbia government increased the lawyers’ compensation. The questions presented are whether the lawyers’ concerted conduct violated §5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and, if so, whether it was nevertheless protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. I — I The burden of providing competent counsel to indigent defendants in the District of Columbia is substantial. During 1982, court-appointed counsel represented the defendant in approximately 25,000 cases. In the most serious felony cases, representation was generally provided by full-time employees of the District’s Public Defender System (PDS). Less serious felony and misdemeanor cases constituted about 85 percent of the total caseload. In these cases, lawyers in private practice were appointed and compensated pursuant to the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act (CJA). Although over 1,200 lawyers have registered for CJA appointments, relatively few actually apply for such work on a regular basis. In 1982, most appointments went to approximately 100 lawyers who are described as “CJA regulars.” These lawyers derive almost all of their income from representing indigents. In 1982, the total fees paid to CJA lawyers amounted to $4,579,572. In 1974, the District created a Joint Committee on Judicial Administration with authority to establish rates of compensation for CJA lawyers not exceeding the rates established by the federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964. After 1970, the federal Act provided for fees of $30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time. See 84 Stat. 916, codified at 18 U. S. C. §3006A (1970 ed.). These rates accordingly capped the rates payable to the District’s CJA lawyers, and could not be exceeded absent amendment to either the federal statute or the District Code. Bar organizations began as early as 1975 to express concern about the low fees paid to CJA lawyers. Beginning in 1982, respondents, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA) and its officers, and other bar groups sought to persuade the District to increase CJA rates to at least $35 per hour. Despite what appeared to be uniform support for the bill, it did not pass. It is also true, however, that nothing in the record indicates that the low fees caused any actual shortage of CJA lawyers or denied effective representation to defendants. In early August 1983, in a meeting with officers of SCTLA, the Mayor expressed his sympathy but firmly indicated that no money was available to fund an increase. The events giving rise to this litigation then ensued. At an SCTLA meeting, the CJA lawyers voted to form a “strike committee.” The eight members of that committee promptly met and informally agreed “that the only viable way of getting an increase in fees was to stop signing up to take new CJA appointments, and that the boycott should aim for a $45 out-of-court and $55 in-court rate schedule.” In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 107 F. T. C. 510, 538 (1986). On August 11, 1983, about 100 CJA lawyers met and resolved not to accept any new cases after September 6 if legislation providing for an increase in their fees had not passed by that date. Immediately following the meeting, they prepared (and most of them signed) a petition stating: “We, the undersigned private criminal lawyers practicing in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, agree that unless we are granted a substantial increase in our hourly rate we will cease accepting new appointments under the Criminal Justice Act.” 272 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 276, 856 F. 2d 226, 230 (1988). On September 6, 1983, about 90 percent of the CJA regulars refused to accept any new assignments. Thereafter, SCTLA arranged a series of events to attract the attention of the news media and to obtain additional support. These events were well publicized and did engender favorable editorial comment, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that “there is no credible evidence that the District’s eventual capitulation to the demands of the CJA lawyers was made in response to public pressure, or, for that matter, that this publicity campaign actually engendered any significant measure of public pressure.” 107 F. T. C., at 543. As the participating CJA lawyers had anticipated, their refusal to take new assignments had a severe impact on the District’s criminal justice system. The massive flow of new cases did not abate, and the need for prompt investigation and preparation did not ease. As the ALJ found, “there was no one to replace the CJA regulars, and makeshift measures were totally inadequate. A few days after the September 6 deadline, PDS was swamped with cases. The handful of CJA regulars who continued to take cases were soon overloaded. The overall response of the uptown lawyers to the PDS call for help was feeble, reflecting their universal distaste for criminal law, their special aversion for compelled in-digency representation, the near epidemic siege of self-doubt about their ability to handle cases in this field, and their underlying support for the demands of the CJA lawyers. Most of the law student volunteers initially observed the boycott, and later all law student volunteers were limited (as they usually are) to a relatively few minor misdemeanors.” Id., at 544 (footnotes omitted). Within 10 days, the key figures in the District’s criminal justice system “became convinced that the system was on the brink of collapse because of the refusal of CJA lawyers to take on new cases.” Ibid. On September 15, they hand-delivered a letter to the Mayor describing why the situation was expected to “reach a crisis point” by early the next week and urging the immediate enactment of a bill increasing all CJA rates to $35 per hour. The Mayor promptly met with members of the strike committee and offered to support an immediate temporary increase to the $35 level as well as a subsequent permanent increase to $45 an hour for out-of-court time and $55 for in-court time. At noon on September 19, 1983, over 100 CJA lawyers attended an SCTLA meeting and voted to accept the $35 offer and end the boycott. The city council’s Judiciary Committee convened at 2 o’clock that afternoon. The committee recommended legislation increasing CJA fees to $35, and the council unanimously passed the bill on September 20. On September 21, the CJA regulars began to accept new assignments and the crisis subsided. II The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against SCTLA and four of its officers (respondents) alleging that they had “entered into an agreement among themselves and with other lawyers to restrain trade by refusing to compete for or accept new appointments under the CJA program beginning on September 6, 1983, unless and until the District of Columbia increased the fees offered under the CJA program.” Id., at 511. The complaint alleged that virtually all of the attorneys who regularly compete for or accept new appointments under the CJA program had joined the agreement. The FTC characterized respondents’ conduct as “a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott” and concluded that they were engaged in “unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” After a 3-week hearing, the ALJ found that the facts alleged in the complaint had been proved, and rejected each of respondents’ three legal defenses — that the boycott was adequately justified by the public interest in obtaining better legal representation for indigent defendants; that as a method of petitioning for legislative change it was exempt from the antitrust laws under our decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961); and that it was a form of political action protected by the First Amendment under our decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982). The ALJ nevertheless concluded that the complaint should be dismissed because the District officials, who presumably represented the victim of the boycott, recognized that its net effect was beneficial. The increase in fees would attract more CJA lawyers, enabling them to reduce their caseloads and provide better representation for their clients. “I see no point,” he concluded, “in striving resolutely for an antitrust triumph in this sensitive area when the particular case can be disposed of on a more pragmatic basis — there was no harm done.” 107 F. T. C., at 561. The ALJ’s pragmatic moderation found no favor with the FTC. Like the ALJ, the FTC rejected each of respondents’ defenses. It held that their “coercive, concerted refusal to deal” had the “purpose and effect of raising prices” and was illegal per se. Id., at 573. Unlike the ALJ, the FTC refused to conclude that the boycott was harmless, noting that the “boycott forced the city government to increase the CJA fees from a level that had been sufficient to obtain an adequate supply of CJA lawyers to a level satisfactory to the respondents. The city must, as a result of the boycott, spend an additional $4 million to $5 million a year to obtain legal services for indigents. We find that these are substantial anticompetitive effects resulting from the respondents’ conduct.” Id., at 577. Finally, the FTC determined that the record did not support the AL J’s conclusion that the District supported the boycott. The FTC also held that such support would not in any event excuse respondents’ antitrust violations. Accordingly,. it entered a cease-and-desist order “to prohibit the respondents from initiating another boycott. . . whenever they become dissatisfied with the results or pace of the city’s legislative process.” Id., at 602. The Court of Appeals vacated the FTC order and remanded for a determination whether respondents possessed “significant market power.” The court began its analysis by recognizing that absent any special First Amendment protection, the boycott “constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 280, 856 F. 2d, at 234. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by respondents’ reliance on Claiborne Hardware or Noerr, or by their argument that the boycott was justified because it was designed to improve the quality of representation for indigent defendants. It concluded, however, that “the SCTLA boycott did contain an element of expression warranting First Amendment protection.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 294, 856 F. 2d, at 248. It noted that boycotts have historically been used as a dramatic means of expression and that respondents intended to convey a political message to the public at large. It therefore concluded that under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), a restriction on this form of expression could not be justified unless it is no greater than is essential to an important governmental interest. - This test, the court reasoned, could not be satisfied by the application of an otherwise appropriate per se rule, but instead required the enforcement agency to “prove rather than presume that the evil against which the Sherman Act is directed looms in the conduct it condemns.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 296, 856 F. 2d, at 250. Because of our concern about the implications of the Court of Appeals’ unique holding, we granted the FTC’s petition for certiorari as well as respondents’ cross-petition. 490 U. S. 1019 (1989). We consider first the cross-petition, which contends that respondents’ boycott is outside the scope of the Sherman Act or is immunized from antitrust regulation by the First Amendment. We then turn to the FTC’s petition. Ill Reasonable lawyers may differ about the wisdom of this enforcement proceeding. The dissent from the decision to file the complaint so demonstrates. So, too, do the creative conclusions of the AL J and the Court of Appeals. Respondents’ boycott may well have served a cause that was worthwhile and unpopular. We may assume that the preboycott rates were unreasonably low, and that the increase has produced better legal representation for indigent defendants. Moreover, given that neither indigent criminal defendants nor the lawyers who represent them command any special appeal with the electorate, we may also assume that without the boycott there would have been no increase in District CJA fees at least until the Congress amended the federal statute. These assumptions do not control the case, for it is not our task to pass upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements. As the ALJ, the FTC, and the Court of Appeals all agreed, respondents’ boycott “constituted a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 280, 856 F. 2d, at 234. As such, it also violated the prohibition against unfair methods of competition in § 5 of the FTC Act. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 694 (1948). Prior to the boycott CJA lawyers were in competition with one another, each deciding independently whether and how often to offer to provide services to the District at CJA rates. The agreement among the CJA lawyers was designed to obtain higher prices for their services and was implemented by a concerted refusal to serve an important customer in the market for legal services and, indeed, the only customer in the market for the particular services that CJA regulars offered. “This constriction of supply is the essence of ‘price-fixing/ whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the quantity demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price offered.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 280, 856 F. 2d, at 234. The horizontal arrangement among these competitors was unquestionably a “naked restraint” on price and output. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board, of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 110 (1984). It is, of course, true that the city purchases respondents’ services because it has a constitutional duty to provide representation to indigent defendants. It is likewise true that the quality of representation may improve when rates are increased. Yet neither of these facts is an acceptable justification for an otherwise unlawful restraint of trade. As we have remarked before, the “Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.” National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 695 (1978). This judgment “recognizes that all elements of a bargain — quality, service, safety, and durability — and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.” Ibid. That is equally so when the quality of legal advocacy, rather than engineering design, is at issue. The social justifications proffered for respondents’ restraint of trade thus do not make it any less unlawful. The statutory policy underlying the Sherman Act “precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.” Ibid. Respondents’ argument, like that made by the petitioners in Professional Engineers, ultimately asks us to find that their boycott is permissible because the price it seeks to set is reasonable. But it was settled shortly after the Sherman Act was passed that it “is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable. See, e. g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 397-398 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 340-341 (1897).” Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 647 (1980). Respondents’ agreement is not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act simply because its objective was the enactment of favorable legislation. Our decision in Noerr in no way detracts from this conclusion. In Noerr, we “considered whether the Sherman Act prohibited a publicity campaign waged by railroads” and “designed to foster the adoption of laws destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for truckers among the general public, and to impair the relationships existing between truckers and their customers.” Claiborne Hardware, 458 U. S., at 913. Interpreting the Sherman Act in the light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, the Court noted that “at least insofar as the railroads’ campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality was not at all affected by any . anticompetitive purpose it may have had.” 365 U. S., at 139-140. It of course remains true that “no violation of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws,” id., at 135, even if the defendants’ sole purpose is to impose a restraint upon the trade of their competitors, id., at 138-140. But in the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of public action; in this case the boycott was the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable legislation. The restraint of trade that was implemented while the boycott lasted would have had precisely the same anticompetitive consequences during that period even if no legislation had been enacted. In Noerr, the desired legislation would have created the restraint on the truckers’ competition; in this case the emergency legislative response to the boycott put an end to the restraint. Indeed, respondents’ theory of Noerr was largely disposed of by our opinion in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U. S. 492 (1988). We held that the Noerr doctrine does not extend to “every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action.” 486 U. S., at 503. We explained: “If all such conduct were immunized then, for example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for governmental ratemaking or price supports. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 324 U. S. 439, 456-463 (1945). Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to the conspirators’ terms. But see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942). Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry and spur legislative action.” Ibid. IV SCTLA argues that if its conduct would otherwise be prohibited by the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment rights recognized in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982). That case arose after black citizens boycotted white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. The white merchants sued under state law to recover losses from the boycott. We found that the “right of the States to regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.” Id., at 914. We accordingly held that “the nonviolent elements of petitioners’ activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.” Id., at 915. SCTLA contends that because it, like the boycotters in Claiborne Hardware, sought to vindicate constitutional rights, it should enjoy a similar First Amendment protection. It is, of course, clear that the association’s efforts to publicize the boycott, to explain the merits of its cause, and to lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation — like similar activities in Claiborne Hardware — were activities that were fully protected by the First Amendment. But nothing in the FTC’s order would curtail such activities, and nothing in the FTC’s reasoning condemned any of those activities. The activity that the FTC order prohibits is a concerted refusal by CJA lawyers to accept any further assignments until they receive an increase in their compensation; the undenied objective of their boycott was an economic advantage for those who agreed to participate. It is true that the Claiborne Hardware case also involved a boycott. That boycott, however, differs in a decisive respect. Those who joined the Claiborne Hardware boycott sought no special advantage for themselves. They were black citizens in Port Gibson, Mississippi, who had been the victims of political, social, and economic discrimination for many years. They sought only the equal respect and equal treatment to which they were constitutionally entitled. They struggled “to change a social order that had consistently treated them as second class citizens.” Id., at 912. As we observed, the campaign was not intended “to destroy legitimate competition.” Id., at 914. Equality and freedom are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled over within it. The same cannot be said of attorney’s fees. As we recently pointed out, our reasoning in Claiborne Hardware is not applicable to a boycott conducted by business competitors who “stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market.” Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., supra, at 508. No matter how altruistic the motives of respondents may have been, it is -undisputed that their immediate objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for their services. Such an economic boycott is well within the category that was expressly distinguished in the Claiborne Hardware opinion itself. 458 U. S., at 914-915. Only after recognizing the well-settled validity of prohibitions against various economic boycotts did we conclude in Claiborne Hardware that “peaceful, political activity such as that found in the [Mississippi] boycott” are entitled to constitutional protection. We reaffirmed the government’s “power to regulate [such] economic activity.” Id., at 912-913. This conclusion applies with special force when a clear objective of the boycott is to economically advantage the participants. V Respondents’ concerted action in refusing to accept further CJA assignments until their fees were increased was thus a plain violation of the antitrust laws. The exceptions derived from Noerr and Claiborne Hardware have no application to respondents’ boycott. For these reasons we reject the arguments made by respondents in the cross-petition. The Court of Appeals, however, crafted a new exception to the per se rules, and it is this exception which provoked the FTC’s petition to this Court. The Court of Appeals derived its exception from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). In that case O’Brien had burned his Selective Service registration certificate on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. He did so before a sizable crowd and with the purpose of advocating his antiwar beliefs. We affirmed his conviction. We held that the governmental interest in regulating the “nonspeech element” of his conduct adequately justified the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms. Specifically, we concluded that the statute’s incidental restriction on O’Brien’s freedom of expression was no greater than necessary to further the Government’s interest in requiring registrants to have valid certificates continually available. However, the Court of Appeals held that, in light of O’Brien, the expressive component of respondents’ boycott compelled courts to apply the antitrust laws “prudently and with sensitivity,” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 279-280, 856 F. 2d, at 233-234, with a “special solicitude for the First Amendment rights” of respondents. The Court of Appeals concluded that the governmental interest in prohibiting boycotts is not sufficient to justify a restriction on the communicative element of the boycott unless the FTC can prove, and not merely presume, that the boycotters have market power. Because the Court of Appeals imposed this special requirement upon the government, it ruled that per se antitrust analysis was inapplicable to boycotts having an expressive component. There are at least two critical flaws in the Court of Appeals’ antitrust analysis: it exaggerates the significance of the expressive component in respondents’ boycott and it denigrates the importance of the rule of law that respondents violated. Implicit in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals are unstated assumptions that most economic boycotts do not have an expressive component, and that the categorical prohibitions against price fixing and boycotts are merely rules of “administrative convenience” that do not serve any substantial governmental interest unless the price-fixing competitors actually possess market power. It would not much matter to the outcome of this case if these flawed assumptions were sound. O’Brien would offer respondents no protection even if their boycott were uniquely expressive and even if the purpose of the per se rules were purely that of administrative efficiency. We have recognized that the government’s interest in adhering to a uniform rule may sometimes satisfy the O’Brien test even if making an exception to the rule in a particular case might cause no serious damage. United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 688 (1985) (“The First Amendment does not bar application of a neutral regulation that incidentally burdens speech merely because a party contends that allowing an exception in the particular case will not threaten important government interests”). The administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling. The per se rules avoid “the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). If small parties “were allowed to prove lack of market power, all parties would have that right, thus introducing the enormous complexities of market definition into every price-fixing case.” R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 269 (1978). For these reasons, it is at least possible that the Claiborne Hardware doctrine, which itself rests in part upon O’Brien, exhausts O’Brien’s application to the antitrust statutes. In any event, however, we cannot accept the Court of Appeals’ characterization of this boycott or the antitrust laws. Every concerted refusal to do business with a potential customer or supplier has an expressive component. At one level, the competitors must exchange their views about their objectives and the means of obtaining them. The most blatant, naked price-fixing agreement is a product of communication, but that is surely not a reason for viewing it with special solicitude. At another level, after the terms of the boycotters’ demands have been agreed upon, they must be communicated to its target: “[W]e will not do business until you do what we ask.” That expressive component of the boycott conducted by these respondents is surely not unique. On the contrary, it is the hallmark of every effective boycott. At a third level, the boycotters may communicate with third parties to enlist public support for their objectives; to the extent that the boycott is newsworthy, it will facilitate the expression of the boycotters’ ideas. But this level of expression is not an element of the boycott. Publicity may be generated by any other activity that is sufficiently newsworthy. Some activities, including the boycott here, may be newsworthy precisely for the reasons that they are prohibited: the harms they produce are matters of public concern. Certainly that is no reason for removing the prohibition. In sum, there is thus nothing unique about the “expressive component” of respondents’ boycott. A rule that requires courts to apply the antitrust laws “prudently and with sensitivity” whenever an economic boycott has an “expressive component” would create a gaping hole in the fabric of those laws. Respondents’ boycott thus has no special characteristics meriting an exemption from the per se rules of antitrust law. Equally important is the second error implicit in respondents’ claim to immunity from the per se rules. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals assumed that the antitrust laws permit, but do not require, the condemnation of price fixing and boycotts without proof of market power. The opinion further assumed that the per se rule prohibiting such activity “is only a rule of 'administrative convenience and efficiency,’ not a statutory command.” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 295, 856 F. 2d, at 249. This statement contains two errors. The per se rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the rules nevertheless have the same force and effect as any other statutory commands. Moreover, while the per se rule against price fixing and boycotts is indeed justified in part by “administrative convenience,” the Court of Appeals erred in describing the prohibition as justified only by such concerns. The per se rules also reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have “a substantial potential for impact on competition.” Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2, 16 (1984). As we explained in Professional Engineers, the rule of reason in antitrust law generates “two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality — they are ‘illegal per se.’ In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.” 435 U. S., at 692. “Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.” Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 344 (1982). The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are justified by the State’s interest in protecting human life and property. Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen. If the especially skilled drivers and pilots were to paint messages on their cars, or attach streamers to their planes, their conduct would have an expressive component. High speeds and unusual maneuvers would help to draw attention to their messages. Yet the laws may nonetheless be enforced against these skilled persons without proof that their conduct was actually harmful or dangerous. In part, the justification for these per se rules is rooted in administrative convenience. They are also supported, however, by the observation that every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some threat to the community. An unpredictable event may overwhelm the skills of the best driver or pilot, even if the proposed course of action was entirely prudent when initiated. A bad driver going slowly may be more dangerous that a good driver going quickly, but a good driver who obeys the law is safer still. So it is with boycotts and price fixing. Every such horizontal arrangement among competitors poses some threat to the free market. A small participant in the market is, obviously, less likely to cause persistent damage than a large participant. Other participants in the market may act quickly and effectively to take the small participant’s place. For reasons including market inertia and information failures, however, a small conspirator may be able to impede competition over some period of time. Given an appropriate set of circumstances and some luck, the period can be long enough to inflict real injury upon particular consumers or competitors. As Justice Douglas observed in an oft-quoted footnote to his United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940), opinion: “Price-fixing agreements may or may not be aimed at complete elimination of price competition. The group making those agreements may or may not have power to control the market. But the fact that the group cannot control the market prices does not necessarily mean that the agreement as to prices has no utility to the members of the combination. The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements is dependent on many factors, such as competitive tactics, position in the industry, the formula underlying pricing policies. Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.” Id., at 225-226, n. 59. See also Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S., at 351, and n. 23. Of course, some boycotts and some price-fixing agreements are more pernicious than others; some are only partly successful, and some may only succeed when they are buttressed by other causative factors, such as political influence. But an assumption that, absent proof of market power, the boycott disclosed by this record was totally harmless — when overwhelming testimony demonstrated that it almost produced a crisis in the administration of criminal justice in the District and when it achieved its economic goal — is flatly inconsistent with the clear course of our antitrust jurisprudence. Conspirators need not achieve the dimensions of a monopoly, or even a degree of market power any greater than that already disclosed by this record, to warrant condemnation under the antitrust laws. <1 HH The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed insofar as that court held the per se rules inapplicable to the lawyers’ boycott. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45(a)(1), provides: “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” The First Amendment to the Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” D. C. Code §§ 11-2601 — 11-2609 (1981). In a small number of cases, the indigent defendants were represented by third-year law students or private counsel serving without compensation. As the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted: “Because of the nature of CJA practice — its long hours away from the office (assuming the CJA lawyer has an office), the deadlines of Superior Court, and the problem of meeting deadlines in other courts — CJA regulars ordinarily do not take civil cases, nor do they usually appear on the criminal side of U. S. District court.” In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 107 F. T. C. 510, 522, n. 54 (1986). The ALJ found that “at most” 13 of the CJA regulars continued to take assignments. 107 F. T. C., at 542, n. 173. It is not clear how much of this finding by the ALJ was accepted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission). The Court of Appeals suggested that the finding was implicitly rejected by the Commission because not expressly accepted. See 272 U. S. App. D. C. 272, 297, 856 F. 2d 226, 251 (1988). We do not rely upon the finding, and need not decide whether the Commission did indeed reject it. We note, however, that the Commission endorsed findings attributing the District’s eventual change of position to a crisis resulting from the lawyers’ exercise of power. 107 F. T. C., at 572, and n. 69. Those findings seem to embody the conclusion that the reversal is not attributable to public pressure or publicity. “During the period from September 6 to September 20, there was a daily average of 63 defendants on the weekday lock-up list and 43 on the Saturday list.” Id., at 543, n. 183. Commissioner Pertschuk dissented from the decision to issue a complaint on the ground that it represented an unwise use of the FTC’s scarce resources. He did not, however, disagree with the conclusion that a violation of law had been alleged. 107 F. T. C., at 512-513. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, provides: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousands dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” The FTC found: “ ‘[T]he city’s purchase of CJA legal services for indigents is based on competition. The price offered by the city is based on competition, because the city must attract a sufficient number of individual lawyers to meet its needs at that price. The city competes with other purchasers of legal services to obtain an adequate supply of lawyers, and the city’s offering price is an element of that competition. Indeed, an acknowledgement of this element of competition is implicit in the respondents’ argument that an increase in the CJA fee was ‘necessary to attract, and retain, competent lawyers. ’ If the offering price had not attracted a sufficient supply of qualified lawyers willing to accept CJA assignments for the city to fulfill its constitutional obligation, then presumably the city would have increased its offering price or otherwise sought to make its offer more attractive. In fact, however, the city’s offering price before the boycott apparently was sufficient to obtain the amount and quality of legal services that it needed.’” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 278, 856 F. 2d, at 232. The Court of Appeals agreed with this analysis: “The Commission correctly determined that the CJA regulars act as ‘competitors’ in the only sense that matters for antitrust analysis: They are individual business people supplying the same service to a customer, and as such may be capable, through a concerted restriction on output, of forcing that customer to pay a higher price for their service. That the D. C. government, like the buyers of many other services and commodities, prefers to offer a uniform price to all potential suppliers does not alter in any way the anti-competitive potential of the petitioners’ boycott. The antitrust laws do not protect only purchasers who negotiate each transaction individually, instead of posting a price at which they will trade with all who come forward. Nor should any significance be assigned to the origin of the demand for CJA services; here the District may be compelled by the Sixth Amendment to purchase legal services, there it may be compelled by the voters to purchase street paving services. The reason for the government’s demand for a service is simply irrelevant to the issue of whether the suppliers of it have restrained trade by collectively refusing to satisfy it except upon their own terms. We therefore conclude, as did the Commission, that the petitioners engaged in a ‘restraint of trade’ within the meaning of Section 1.” Id.., at 281, 856 F. 2d, at 235 (footnote omitted). “In [Claiborne Hardware] we held that the First Amendment protected the nonviolent elements of a boycott of white merchants organized by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and designed to make white government and business leaders comply with a list of demands for equality and racial justice. Although the boycotters intended to inflict economic injury on the merchants, the boycott was not motivated by any desire to lessen competition or to reap economic benefits but by the aim of vindicating rights of equality and freedom lying at the heart of the Constitution, and the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market. Id., at 914-915. Here, in contrast, petitioner was at least partially motivated by the desire to lessen competition, and, because of petitioner’s line of business, stood to reap substantial economic benefits from making it difficult for respondent to compete.” Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U. S., at 508-509. Respondents contend that, just as the Claiborne Hardware boycott sought to secure constitutional rights to equality and freedom, the lawyers’ boycott sought to vindicate the Sixth Amendment rights of indigent defendants. Claiborne Hardware, however, does not protect every boycott having a constitutional dimension. Indeed, insofar as respondents seek immunity from prosecution on the basis of their good intent, their theory of defense “is merely another variety of an age-old argument.” See United States v. Cullen, 454 F. 2d 386, 392 (CA7 1971). Claiborne Hardware does not, and could not, establish a rule immunizing from prosecution any boycott based upon sincere constitutional concerns. Such an exemption would authorize the government’s contractors in nearly all areas to circumvent antitrust law on the basis of their own theory of the government’s obligations. “A nonviolent and totally voluntary boycott may have a disruptive effect on local economic conditions. This Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 [(1949)]; NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607 [(1980)]. The right of business entities to ‘associate’ to suppress competition may be curtailed. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 [(1978)]. Unfair trade practices may be restricted. Secondary boycotts and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited, as part of ‘Congress’ striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife.’ NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, supra, at 617-618 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). See Longshoremen v. Allied International, Inc., 456 U. S. 212, 222-223, and n. 20 [(1982)].” 458 U. S., at 912. “This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. . . . [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 391 U. S., at 376-377. See 458 U. S., at 912. In our opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2 (1984), we noted that “[t]he rationale for per se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct. See, e. g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332, 350-351 (1982).” Id., at 15-16, n. 25. The Court of Appeals overlooked the words “in part” in that footnote, and also overlooked the statement in text that “there must be a substantial potential for impact on competition in order to justify per se condemnation.” Id., at 16. As the following paragraph from its opinion demonstrates, the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the per se rule against price fixing is “only” a rule of administrative convenience: “The antitrust laws permit, but do not require, the condemnation of price fixing without proof of market power; even the per se rule, as the Commission acknowledges in its brief, is only a rule of ‘administrative convenience and efficiency,’ not a statutory command. FTC Brief at 39; see Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U. S. 2, 15 n. 25 (1984). While the rule may occasionally be overinclusive, condemning the ineffectual with the harmful, there is no known danger that socially beneficial arrangements will be prohibited, for price-fixing agreements rarely, if ever, have redeeming virtues. As for the hapless but harmless, as Professor Areeda has noted, defendants charged with conspiring to fix prices ‘have little moral standing to demand proof of power or effect when the most they can say for themselves is that they tried to harm the public but were mistaken in their ability to do so.’ VIIP. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1509 at 411 (1986).” 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 295, 856 F. 2d, at 249. “In sum, price-fixing cartels are condemned per se because the conduct is tempting to businessmen but- very dangerous to society. The conceivable social benefits are few in principle, small in magnitude, speculative in occurrence, and always premised on the existence of price-fixing power which is likely to be exercised adversely to the public. Moreover, toleration implies a burden of continuous supervision for which the courts consider themselves ill-suited. And even if power is usually established while any defenses are not, litigation will be complicated, condemnation delayed, would be price-fixers encouraged to hope for escape, and criminal punishment less justified. Deterrence of a generally pernicious practice would be weakened. The key points are the first two. Without them, there is no justification for categorical condemnation.” 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1509, pp. 412-413 (1986). Cf. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 Texas L. Rev. 41, 80 (1984) (suggesting circumstances in which a firm that lacks market power may nonetheless benefit from anticompetitive tactics). “Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter into conspiracies to fix prices. Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.” R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 269 (1978). In response to Justice Brennan’s opinion, and particularly to its observation that some concerted arrangements that might be characterized as “group boycotts” may not merit per se condemnation, see post, at 462, n. 9, we emphasize that this case involves not only a boycott but also a horizontal price-fixing arrangement — a type of conspiracy that has been consistently analyzed as a per se violation for many decades. All of the “group boycott” cases cited in Justice Brennan’s footnote involved nonprice restraints. There was likewise no price-fixing component in any of the boycotts listed on pages 447-448 of Justice Brennan’s opinion. Indeed, the text of the opinion virtually ignores the price-fixing component of respondents’ concerted action. On remand, the Court of Appeals should review respondents’ objections to the form of the order entered by the Commission. See 272 U. S. App. D. C., at 299, 856 F. 2d, at 253.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GROVE CITY COLLEGE et al. v. BELL, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, et al. No. 82-792. Argued November 29, 1983 Decided February 28, 1984 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III of which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 576. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the result, post, p. 579. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 581. David M. Lascell argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Robb M. Jones. Acting Solicitor General Bator argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, De-puty Assistant Attorney General Cooper, John H. Garvey, and Brian K. Landsberg Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Edward E. Potter; for Hillsdale College by Robert W. Barker; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of University Women et al. by Nancy Duff Campbell and Margaret A. Kohn; for the Council of Collegiate Women Athletic Administrators by Lionel S. Sobel; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by Richard C. Dinkelspiel, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Norman J. Chachkin, and Roger L. Waldman; and for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. by Robert H. Kapp, Joseph M. Hassett, John C. Keeney, Jr., Joaquin Avila, and Morris J. Bailer. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. by Maxwell A. Miller; for Wabash College by David N. Shane; and for Representative Claudine C. Schneider et al. by Karen Syma Shinberg Czapanskiy. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), prohibits sex discrimination in “any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” and §902 directs agencies awarding most types of assistance to promulgate regulations to ensure that recipients adhere to that prohibition. Compliance with departmental regulations may be secured by termination of assistance “to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been . . . found” or by “any other means authorized by law.” §902, 20 U. S. C. § 1682. This case presents several questions concerning the scope and operation of these provisions and the regulations established by the Department of Education. We must decide, first, whether Title IX applies at all to Grove City College, which accepts no direct assistance but enrolls students who receive federal grants that must be used for educational purposes. If so, we must identify the “education program or activity” at Grove City that is “receiving Federal financial assistance” and determine whether federal assistance to that program may be terminated solely because the College violates the Department’s regulations by refusing to execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. Finally, we must consider whether the application of Title IX to Grove City infringes the First Amendment rights of the College or its students. I — 1 Petitioner Grove City College is a private, coeducational, liberal arts college that has sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. Grove City’s desire to avoid federal oversight has led it to decline to participate, not only in direct institutional aid programs, but also in federal student assistance programs under which the College would be required to assess students’ eligibility and to determine the amounts of loans, work-study funds, or grants they should receive. Grove City has, however, enrolled a large number of students who receive Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG’s), 20 U. S. C. § 1070a (1982 ed.), under the Department of Education’s Alternate Disbursement System (ADS). The Department concluded that Grove City was a “recipient” of “Federal financial assistance” as those terms are defined in the regulations implementing Title IX, 34 CFR §§ 106.2(g)(1), (h) (1982), and, in July 1977, it requested that the College execute the Assurance of Compliance required by 34 CFR § 106.4 (1983). If Grove City had signed the Assurance, it would have agreed to “[cjomply, to the extent applicable to it, with Title IX . . . and all applicable requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Department’s regulation ... to the end that ... no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be . . . subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity for which [it] receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance from the Department.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-126 — A-127. When Grove City persisted in refusing to execute an Assurance, the Department initiated proceedings to declare the College and its students ineligible to receive BEOG’s. The Administrative Law Judge held that the federal financial assistance received by Grove City obligated it to execute an Assurance of Compliance and entered an order terminating assistance until Grove City “corrects its noncompliance with Title IX and satisfies the Department that it is in compliance” with the applicable regulations. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-97. Grove City and four of its students then commenced this action in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which concluded that the students’ BEOG’s constituted “Federal financial assistance” to Grove City but held, on several grounds, that the Department could not terminate the students’ aid because of the College’s refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (1980). The Court of Appeals reversed. 687 F. 2d 684 (CA3 1982). It first examined the language and legislative history of Title IX and held that indirect, as well as direct, aid triggered coverage under § 901(a) and that institutions whose students financed their educations with BEOG’s were recipients of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX. Although it recognized that Title IX’s provisions are program-specific, the court likened the assistance flowing to Grove City through its students to nonearmarked aid, and, with one judge dissenting, declared that “[w]here the federal government furnishes indirect or non-earmarked aid to an institution, it is apparent to us that the institution itself must be the ‘program.’” 687 F. 2d, at 700. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Department could condition financial aid upon the execution of an Assurance of Compliance and that the Department had acted properly in terminating federal financial assistance to the students and Grove City despite the lack of evidence of actual discrimination. We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 1199 (1983), and we now affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the Department could terminate BEOG’s received by Grove City’s students to force the College to execute an Assurance of Compliance. t-H I — H In defending its refusal to execute the Assurance of Compliance required by the Department’s regulations, Grove City first contends that neither it nor any “education program or activity” of the College receives any federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX by virtue of the fact that some of its students receive BEOG’s and use them to pay for their education. We disagree. Grove City provides a well-rounded liberal arts education and a variety of educational programs and student services. The question is whether any of those programs or activities “receives] Federal financial assistance” within the meaning of Title IX when students finance their education with BEOG’s. The structure of the Education Amendments of 1972, in which Congress both created the BEOG program and imposed Title IX’s nondiscrimination requirement, strongly suggests an affirmative conclusion. BEOG’s were aptly characterized as a “centerpiece of the bill,” 118 Cong. Rec. 20297 (1972) (Rep. Pucinski), and Title IX “relate[d] directly to [its] central purpose.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30412 (1971) (Sen. Bayh). In view of this connection and Congress’ express recognition of discrimination in the administration of student financial aid programs, it would indeed be anomalous to discover that one of the primary components of Congress’ comprehensive “package of federal aid,” id., at 2007 (Sen. Pell), was not intended to trigger coverage under Title IX. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the language of § 901(a) contains no hint that Congress perceived a substantive difference between direct institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students. The linchpin of Grove City’s argument that none of its programs receives any federal assistance is a perceived distinction between direct and indirect aid, a distinction that finds no support in the text of § 901(a). Nothing in § 901(a) suggests that Congress elevated form over substance by making the application of the nondiscrimination principle dependent on the manner in which a program or activity receives federal assistance. There is no basis in the statute for the view that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive checks directly from the Federal Government are subject to regulation. Cf. Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 601-604 (SC 1974), affirmance order, 529 F. 2d 514 (CA4 1975). As the Court of Appeals observed, “by its all inclusive terminology [§ 901(a)] appears to encompass all forms of federal aid to education, direct or indirect.” 687 F. 2d, at 691 (emphasis in original). We have recognized the need to “‘accord [Title IX] a sweep as broad as its language,”’ North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 801 (1966)), and we are reluctant to read into § 901(a) a limitation not apparent on its face. Our reluctance grows when we pause to consider the available evidence of Congress’ intent. The economic effect of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable, see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 397, n. 6 (1983); id., at 412 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 783 (1973); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 463-465 (1973), and the BEOG program was structured to ensure that it effectively supplements the College’s own financial aid program. Congress undoubtedly comprehended this reality in enacting the Education Amendments of 1972. The legislative history of the Amendments is replete with statements evincing Congress’ awareness that the student assistance programs established by the Amendments would significantly aid colleges and universities. In fact, one of the stated purposes of the student aid provisions was to “provid[e] assistance to institutions of higher education.” Pub. L. 92-318, § 1001(c)(1), 86 Stat. 381, 20 U. S. C. § 1070(a)(5). Congress’ awareness of the purpose and effect of its student aid programs also is reflected in the sparse legislative history of Title IX itself. Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 684-685 (1979); 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh). The drafters of Title VI envisioned that the receipt of student aid funds would trigger coverage, and, since they approved identical language, we discern no reason to believe that the Congressmen who voted for Title IX intended a different result. The few contemporaneous statements that attempted to give content to the phrase “receiving Federal financial assistance,” while admittedly somewhat ambiguous, are consistent with Senator Bayh’s declaration that Title IX authorizes the termination of “all aid that comes through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971). Such statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect, but, at least in instances where they are consistent with the plain language of Title IX, Senator Bayh’s remarks are “an authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 527. The contemporaneous legislative history, in short, provides no basis for believing that Title IX’s broad language is somehow inconsistent with Congress’ underlying intent. See also 20 U. S. C. § 1094(a)(3) (1982 ed.). Persuasive evidence of Congress’ intent concerning student financial aid may also be gleaned from its subsequent treatment of Title IX. We have twice recognized the probative value of Title IX’s unique postenactment history, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 535; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 687, n. 7, 702-703, and we do so once again. The Department’s sex discrimination regulations made clear that “[scholarships, loans, [and] grants . . . extended directly to . . . students for payment to” an institution constitute federal financial assistance to that entity. 40 Fed. Reg. 24137 (1975); see n. 6, supra. Under the statutory “laying before” procedure of the General Education Provisions Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1232(d)(1) (1982 ed.), Congress was afforded an opportunity to invalidate aspects of the regulations it deemed inconsistent with Title IX. The regulations were clear, and Secretary Weinberger left no doubt concerning the Department’s position that “the furnishing of student assistance to a student who uses it at a particular institution . . . [is] Federal aid which is covered by the statute.” Yet, neither House passed a disapproval resolution. Congress’ failure to disapprove the regulations is not dispositive, but, as we recognized in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 533-534, it strongly implies that the regulations accurately reflect congressional intent. Congress has never disavowed this implication and in fact has acted consistently with it on a number of occasions. With the benefit of clear statutory language, powerful evidence of Congress’ intent, and a longstanding and coherent administrative construction of the phrase “receiving Federal financial assistance,” we have little trouble concluding that Title IX coverage is not foreclosed because federal funds are granted to Grove City’s students rather than directly to one of the College’s educational programs. There remains the question, however, of identifying the “education program or activity” of the College that can properly be characterized as “receiving” federal assistance through grants to some of the students attending the College. Ill An analysis of Title IX’s language and legislative history led us to conclude in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 538, that “an agency’s authority under Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limitations of §§ 901 and 902.” Although the legislative history contains isolated suggestions that entire institutions are subject to the nondiscrimination provision whenever one of their programs receives federal assistance, see 1975 Hearings 178 (Sen. Bayh), we cannot accept the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that in the circumstances present here Grove City itself is a “program or activity” that may be regulated in its entirety. Nevertheless, we find no merit in Grove City’s contention that a decision treating BEOG’s as “Federal financial assistance” cannot be reconciled with Title IX’s program-specific language since BEOG’s are not tied to any specific “education program or activity.” If Grove City participated in the BEOG program through the RDS, we would have no doubt that the “education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” would not be the entire College; rather, it would be its student financial aid program. RDS institutions receive federal funds directly, but can use them only to subsidize or expand their financial aid programs and to recruit students who might otherwise be unable to enroll. In short, the assistance is earmarked for the recipient’s financial aid program. Only by ignoring Title IX’s program-specific language could we conclude that funds received under the RDS, awarded to eligible students, and paid back to the school when tuition comes due represent federal aid to the entire institution. We see no reason to reach a different conclusion merely because Grove City has elected to participate in the ADS. Although Grove City does not itself disburse students’ awards, BEOG’s clearly augment the resources that the College itself devotes to financial aid. As is true of the RDS, however, the fact that federal funds eventually reach the College’s general operating budget cannot subject Grove City to institution-wide coverage. Grove City’s choice of administrative mechanisms, we hold, neither expands nor contracts the breadth of the “program or activity” — the financial aid program — that receives federal assistance and that may be regulated under Title IX. To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ holding that BEOG’s received by Grove City’s students constitute aid to the entire institution rests on the possibility that federal funds received by one program or activity free up the College’s own resources for use elsewhere, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning is doubly flawed. First, there is no evidence that the federal aid received by Grove City’s students results in the diversion of funds from the College’s own financial aid program to other areas within the institution. Second, and more important, the Court of Appeals’ assumption that Title IX applies to programs receiving a larger share of a school’s own limited resources as a result of federal assistance earmarked for use elsewhere within the institution is inconsistent with the program-specific nature of the statute. Most federal educational assistance has economic ripple effects throughout the aided institution, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which programs or activities derive such indirect benefits. Under the Court of Appeals’ theory, an entire school would be subject to Title IX merely because one of its students received a small BEOG or because one of its departments received an earmarked federal grant. This result cannot be squared with Congress’ intent. The Court of Appeals’ analogy between student financial aid received by an educational institution and nonearmarked direct grants provides a more plausible justification for its holding, but it too is faulty. Student financial aid programs, we believe, are sui generis. In neither purpose nor effect can BEOG’s be fairly characterized as unrestricted grants that institutions may use for whatever purpose they desire. The BEOG program was designed, not merely to increase the total resources available to educational institutions, but to enable them to offer their services to students who had previously been unable to afford higher education. It is true, of course, that substantial portions of the BEOG’s received by Grove City’s students ultimately find their way into the College’s general operating budget and are used to provide a variety of services to the students through whom the funds pass. However, we have found no persuasive evidence suggesting that Congress intended that the Department’s regulatory authority follow federally aided students from classroom to classroom, building to building, or activity to activity. In addition, as Congress recognized in considering the Education Amendments of 1972, the economic effect of student aid is far different from the effect of nonearmarked grants to institutions themselves since the former, unlike the latter, increases both an institution’s resources and its obligations. See Pub. L. 92-318, § 1001(a), 86 Stat. 375, 20 U. S. C. § 1070e; S. Rep. No. 92-346, p. 43 (1971); 118 Cong. Rec. 20331 (1972) (Rep. Badillo). In that sense, student financial aid more closely resembles many earmarked grants. We conclude that the receipt of BEOG’s by some of Grove City’s students does not trigger institutionwide coverage under Title IX. In purpose and effect, BEOG’s represent federal financial assistance to the College’s own financial aid program, and it is that program that may properly be regulated under Title IX. IV Since Grove City operates an “education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” the Department may properly demand that the College execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX. 34 CFR § 106.4 (1983). Grove City contends, however, that the Assurance it was requested to sign was invalid, both on its face and as interpreted by the Department, in that it failed to comport with Title IX’s program-specific character. Whatever merit that objection might have had at the time, it is not now a valid basis for refusing to execute an Assurance of Compliance. The Assurance of Compliance regulation itself does not, on its face, impose institutionwide obligations. Recipients must provide assurance only that “each education program or activity operated by . . . [them] and to which this part applies will be operated in compliance with this part.” 34 CFR § 106.4 (1983) (emphasis added). The regulations apply, by their terms, “to every recipient and to each education program or activity operated by such recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.” 34 CFR §106.11 (1983) (emphasis added). These regulations, like those at issue in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512 (1982), “conform with the limitations Congress enacted in §§901 and 902.” Id., at 539. Nor does the Department now claim that its regulations reach beyond the College’s student aid program. Furthermore, the Assurance of Compliance currently in use, like the one Grove City refused to execute, does not on its face purport to reach the entire College; it certifies compliance with respect to those “education programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance.” See n. 2, supra. Under this opinion, consistent with the program-specific requirements of Title IX, the covered education program is the College’s financial aid program. A refusal to execute a proper program-specific Assurance of Compliance warrants termination of federal assistance to the student financial aid program. The College’s contention that termination must be preceded by a finding of actual discrimination finds no support in the language of § 902, which plainly authorizes that sanction to effect “[c]ompliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section.” Regulations authorizing termination of assistance for refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title VI had been promulgated, 45 CFR §80.4 (Supp., Jan. 1, 1965), and upheld, Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F. 2d 804 (CA5 1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1046 (1968), long before Title IX was enacted, and Congress no doubt anticipated that similar regulations would be developed to implement Title IX. 118 Cong. Rec. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh). We conclude, therefore, that the Department may properly condition federal financial assistance on the recipient’s assurance that it will conduct the aided program or activity in accordance with Title IX and the applicable regulations. V Grove City’s final challenge to the Court of Appeals’ decision — that conditioning federal assistance on compliance with Title IX infringes First Amendment rights of the College and its students — warrants only brief consideration. Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept. E. g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Grove City may terminate its participation in the BEOG program and thus avoid the requirements of § 901(a). Students affected by the Department’s action may either take their BEOG’s elsewhere or attend Grove City without federal financial assistance. Requiring Grove City to comply with Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination as a condition for its continued eligibility to participate in the BEOG program infringes no First Amendment rights of the College or its students. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Section 901(a), 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), provides, in pertinent part: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” Nine statutory exemptions, none of which is relevant to the disposition of this case, follow. See §§ 901(a)(l)-(9), 20 U. S. C. §§ 1681(a)(l)-(9). Section 902, 20 U. S. C. § 1682, provides: “Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [901] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncomplianee has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report” (emphasis in original). See, e. g., 20 U. S. C. § 1071 et seq. (1982 ed.); 34 CFR pt. 674 (1983) (National Direct Student Loans); 42 U. S. C. § 2751 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V); 34 CFR pt. 675 (1983) (College Work Study Program); 20 U. S. C. § 1070b (1982 ed.); 34 CFR pt. 676 (1983) (Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s functions with respect to BEOG’s were transferred to the Department of Education by § 301(a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 678, 20 U. S. C. § 3441(a)(3) (1982 ed.). We will refer to both HEW and DOE as “the Department.” The Secretary, in his discretion, has established two procedures for computing and disbursing BEOG’s. Under the Regular Disbursement System (RDS), the Secretary estimates the amount that an institution will need for grants and advances that sum to the institution, which itself selects eligible students, calculates awards, and distributes the grants by either crediting students’ accounts or issuing checks. 34 CFR §§ 690.71-690.85 (1983). Most institutions whose students receive BEOG’s participate in the RDS, but the ADS is an option made available by the Secretary to schools that wish to minimize their involvement in the administration of the BEOG program. Institutions participating in the program through the ADS must make appropriate certifications to the Secretary, but the Secretary calculates awards and makes disbursements directly to eligible students. 34 CFR §§ 690.91-690.96 (1983). The Title IX regulations were recodified in 1980, without substantive change, at 34 CFR pt. 106 in connection with the establishment of the Department of Education. 45 Fed. Reg. 30802, 30962-30963 (1980). All references herein are to the currently effective regulations. “Federal financial assistance” is defined in 34 CFR § 106.2(g)(1) (1983) to include: “A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made available for: “(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity, or extended directly to such students for payment to that entity.” A “recipient” is defined in 34 CFR § 106.2(h) (1983) to include: “[A]ny public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from such assistance . . . .” See also 34 CFR §§ 106.11, 106.31(a) (1983). The Assurance of Compliance form currently in use differs somewhat from the version quoted in the text. See App. to Brief for Federal Respondents in Hillsdale College v. Department of Education, O. T. 1982, No. 82-1538, pp. 1a-2a. The substance, however, is the same in that it refers to “education programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance.” The Department also sought to terminate Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL’s), 20 U. S. C. § 1071 (1982 ed.), received by Grove City’s students. The District Court held, first, that GSL’s were “contracts] of insurance or guaranty” that could not be terminated under § 902 of Title IX. The Department did not challenge this conclusion on appeal, and we express no view on this aspect of the District Court’s reasoning. The court also concluded that Grove City could not be required to execute an Assurance of Compliance because Subpart E of the Title IX regulations, which prohibits discrimination in employment, was invalid. As the Court of Appeals recognized, we have since upheld the validity of Subpart E. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512 (1982). The District Court held, in the alternative, that § 902 permitted termination only upon an actual finding of sex discrimination and that Grove City’s refusal to execute an Assurance could not justify a termination of assistance. Finally, the court reasoned that affected students were entitled to hearings before their aid could be discontinued. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals accepted the position argued by respondents. As respondents acknowledged in the oral argument before this Court, the Department’s position has not been a model of clarity. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-35. The Department initially took the position that the receipt of student financial aid would trigger institutionwide coverage under Title IX and construed its regulations to that effect. It pressed that position in the lower courts. In their brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondents did not defend this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, but argued instead that the question need not be resolved to decide this case. In their brief on the merits and in the oral argument, however, respondents conceded that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Grove City itself constituted the “program or activity” subject to regulation under Title IX. The Department’s regulations, it was represented, may be construed in a program-specific manner and hence are not inconsistent with the statute. This concession, of course, is not binding on us and does not foreclose our review of the judgment below. See, e. g., Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H. R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 235 (1970) (Rep. May); id., at 483 (Rep. Mink); id., at 739 (Rep. Griffiths); 118 Cong. Rec. 3935-3940, 5803-5809 (1972) (Sen. Bayh). Grove City itself recognizes the problematic nature of the distinction it advances. Although its interpretation of § 901(a) logically would exclude from coverage under Title IX local school districts that receive federal funds through state educational agencies, see, e. g., 20 U. S. C. §3801 et seq. (1982 ed.), Grove City wisely does not attempt to defend this result. In fact, the College concedes that “[b]ecause federal assistance is often passed through state agencies, this type of indirect assistance leads to Title IX jurisdiction over the education program, or activity which ultimately receives the assistance.” Brief for Petitioners 17, n. 17 (emphasis in original). Grove City has proposed no principled basis for treating differently federal assistance received through students and federal aid that is disbursed by a state agency. Grove City’s students receive BEOG’s to pay for the education they receive at the College. Their eligibility for assistance is conditioned upon continued enrollment at Grove City and on satisfactory progress in their studies. 20 U. S. C. §§ 1091(a)(1), (3) (1982 ed.). Their grants are based on the “cost of attendance” at Grove City, 20 U. S. C. § 1070a(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982 ed.), which includes the College’s tuition and fees, room and board, and a limited amount for books, supplies, and miscellaneous expenses. 34 CFR § 690.51 (1983). The amount that students and their families can reasonably be expected to contribute is subtracted from the maximum BEOG to ensure that the assistance is used solely for educational expenses, 20 U. S. C. § 1070a(a)(2)(A)(i) (1982 ed.), and students are required to file affidavits stating that their awards will be “used solely for expenses related to attendance” at Grove City. 20 U. S. C. § 1091(a)(5) (1982 ed.); see 34 CFR §§690.79, 690.94(a)(2) (1983). Grove City’s attempt to analogize BEOG’s to food stamps, Social Security benefits, welfare payments, and other forms of general-purpose governmental assistance to low-income families is unavailing. First, there is no evidence that Congress intended the receipt of federal money in this manner to trigger coverage under Title IX. Second, these general assistance programs, unlike student aid programs, were not designed to assist colleges and universities. Third, educational institutions have no control over, and indeed perhaps no knowledge of, whether they ultimately receive federal funds made available to individuals under general assistance programs, but they remain free to opt out of federal student assistance programs. Fourth, individuals’ eligibility for general assistance is not tied to attendance at an educational institution. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-554, p. 244 (1972) (Supplemental Views); 117 Cong. Rec. 2007 (1971) (Sen. Pell); id., at 37778, 37782 (Rep. Quie); ■id., at 39256 (Rep. Steiger); 118 Cong. Rec. 20295 (1972) (Rep. Reid); id., at 20297 (Rep. Pucinski); id., at 20312 (statement of Isaac K. Beckes); id., at 20310 (letter from Kingman Brewster, Jr.); id., at 20324 (Rep. Mitchell). See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 104-105 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 13388 (1964) (Sen. McClellan). Appendix A to the initial Title VI regulations identified several programs making assistance available through payments to students among those to which the regulations applied, 29 Fed. Reg. 16298, 16304 (1964), as did the version in force when Title IX was enacted. 45 CFR pt. 80, Appendix A (1972). See Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (SC 1974), affirmance order, 529 F. 2d 514 (CA4 1975). The current list of programs covered by Title VI includes BEOG’s and GSL’s, 34 CFR pt. 100, Appendix A (1983), and Grove City’s assumption that Congress would have excluded BEOG’s from coverage under Title VI if the program had been operational in 1964 is baseless. See 117 Cong. Rec. 30158-30159 (1971) (Sen. McGovern); id., at 39260 (Rep. Erlenbom); 118 Cong. Rec. 5814 (1972) (Sen. Bentsen). Grove City relies heavily on a colloquy between Senators Bayh and Dominick: “Mr. DOMINICK. The Senator is talking about every program under HEW? “Mr. BAYH. Let me suggest that I would imagine that any person who was sitting at the head of [HEW], administering this program, would be reasonable and would use only such leverage as was necessary against the institution. “It is unquestionable, in my judgment, that this would not be directed at specific assistance that was being received by individual students, but would be directed at the institution, and the Secretary would be expected to use good judgment as to how much leverage to apply, and where it could best be applied.” 117 Cong. Rec. 30408 (1971). Grove City contends that Senator Bayh’s statement demonstrates an intent to exclude student aid from coverage under Title IX. We believe that his answer is more plausibly interpreted as suggesting that, although the Secretary is empowered to terminate student aid, he probably would not need to do so where leverage could be exerted by terminating other assistance. The students, of course, always remain free to take their assistance elsewhere. The statutory “laying before” procedure and the actions taken by Congress pursuant to it were more completely summarized in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 531-534. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1975) (1975 Hearings). The Secretary added: “Our view was that student assistance, assistance that the Government furnishes, that goes directly or indirectly to an institution is Government aid within the meaning of Title IX. If it is not, there is an easy remedy. Simply tell us that it is not. We believe it is and base our assumption on that.” Id., at 484. Although “Congress has proceeded to amend §901 when it has disagreed with HEW’s interpretation of the statute,” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 534, it has acquiesced in the Department’s longstanding assessment of the types of federal aid that trigger coverage under Title IX. In considering the 1976 Education Amendments, for example, Congress rejected an amendment proposed by Senator McClure that would have defined federal financial assistance as “assistance received by the institution directly from the federal government.” 122 Cong. Rec. 28144 (1976). Senator Pell objected that the amendment would remove from the scope of Title IX funds provided under the BEOG program and pointed out that, “[w]hile these dollars are paid to students they flow through and ultimately go to institutions of higher education . . . .” Id., at 28145. Senator Bayh raised a similar objection, id., at 28145-28146, and the amendment was rejected. Id., at 28147. See also id., at 28013-28016 (treatment of Hatfield amendment). It is also significant that in 1976 Congress enacted legislation clarifying the intent of the Privacy Act to ensure that institutions serving as payment agents for the BEOG program are not considered contractors maintaining a system of records to accomplish a function of the Secretary. Pub. L. 94-328, § 2(f), 90 Stat. 727, 20 U. S. C. §1070a(c). This legislation responded to concerns expressed by educational institutions over “the additional and unnecessary administrative burdens which would be imposed upon them if [they] were deemed ‘contractors.’ ” S. Rep. No. 94-954, p. 3 (1976). In sharp contrast, Congress has failed to respond to repeated requests by colleges in Grove City’s position for legislation exempting them from coverage under Title IX. The statutory authorization for BEOG’s, moreover, has been renewed three times. Pub. L. 94-482, § 121(a), 90 Stat. 2091; Pub. L. 95-566, § 2, 92 Stat. 2402; Pub. L. 96-374, § 402(a), 94 Stat. 1401. Each time, Congress was well aware of the administrative interpretation under which such grants were believed to trigger coverage under Title IX. The history of these reenactments makes clear that Congress regards BEOG’s and other forms of student aid as a critical source of support for educational institutions. See, e. g., Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act and Related Measures: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, p. 400 (1979) (Rep. Ford). In view of Congress’ consistent failure to amend either Title IX or the BEOG statute in a way that would support Grove City’s argument, we feel fully justified in concluding that “the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, supra, at 535. Justice Stevens’ assertion that we need not decide and have no jurisdiction to decide this question is puzzling. Title IX coverage is triggered only when an “education program or activity” is receiving federal aid. Unless such a program can be and is identified, there is no basis for ordering the College to execute an Assurance of Compliance. The Court of Appeals understood as much and ruled that the entire College is the covered educational program. Until and unless that view of the statute is overturned, there will be outstanding an authoritative Court of Appeals’ judgment that the certificate Grove City must execute relates to the entire College and that without such a certificate the Department would be entitled to terminate grants to Grove City students. Grove City asks to be relieved of that judgment on the grounds that none of its educational programs is receiving any federal aid and that if any of its programs is receiving aid, it is only its administration of the BEOG program. Grove City is entitled to have these issues addressed, for otherwise it must deal with the undisturbed judgment of the Court of Appeals that the entire College is subject to federal oversight under Title IX. Even though the Secretary has changed his position and no longer agrees with the expansive construction accorded the statute by the Court of Appeals, it is still at odds with Grove City as to the extent of the covered program; and, in any event, its modified stance can hardly overturn or modify the judgment below or eliminate Grove City’s legitimate and substantial interest in having its submissions adjudicated. There is no merit to Grove City’s argument that the Department may regulate only the administration of the BEOG program. Just as employees who “work in an education program that receive[s] federal assistance,” North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U. S., at 540, are protected under Title IX even if their salaries are “not funded by federal money,” ibid., so also are students who participate in the College’s federally assisted financial aid program but who do not themselves receive federal funds protected against discrimination on the basis of sex. Until 1980, institutions whose students received BEOG’s and other forms of assistance were required to provide assurance that they would “continue to spend on [their] own scholarship and student-aid program[s], from sources other than funds received under [the federal programs], not less than the average expenditure per year made for that purpose during the most recent period of three fiscal years.” 20 U. S. C. § 1088c. This requirement was altered in the Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. 96-374, § 487(a), 94 Stat. 1451, 20 U. S. C. § 1094(a)(2) (1982 ed.), and no longer applies to schools whose students receive only BEOG’s.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO, et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. No. 340. Argued March 1, 1961. Decided April 17, 1961. Gerhard P. Van Arkel argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Henry Kaiser and David 1. Shapiro. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Rankin, Solicitor General Cox, Stuart Rothman and Norton J. Come. Elisha Hanson, Arthur B. Hanson and Emmett E. Tucker, Jr. filed a brief for the Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., Inc., as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a controversy that started in 1956 between petitioner Local 165 and the Worcester Telegram and between petitioner Local 38 and the Haverhill Gazette. The two unions insisted that the collective bargaining agreements that were being negotiated contain clauses or provisions to which each employer objected. The controversy as it reaches here is reduced to two clauses: first, that the hiring for the composing room be in the hands of the foreman; that he must be a member of the union; but that the union “shall not discipline the foreman for carrying out written instructions of the publisher or his representatives authorized by this Agreement” ; and second, that the General Laws of the International Typographical Union shall govern the relations between the parties if they are “not in conflict with state or federal law.” The unions’ demand that these clauses be included in the agreement led to a deadlock in the negotiations which in turn resulted in a strike. The employers filed charges with the Board, complaints were issued, the cases consolidated, and hearings held. The Board concluded that the demands for the two clauses and the strikes supporting them were violations of the Act. It found that a demand for a contract that included those clauses was a refusal to bargain collectively within the meaning of § 8 (b) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136,140-141,29 U. S. C. §158 (b) (3). It found that striking to force acceptance of those clauses was an attempt to make the employers discriminate in favor of union members contrary to the command of § 8 (b) (2) of the Act. It also found that striking for the “foreman clause” was restraining and coercing the employers in the selection of their representatives for the adjustment of grievances in violation of §8 (b)(1)(B) of the Act. 123 N. L. R. B. 806. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s order apart from features not material here. 278 F. 2d 6. The case is here on certiorari, 364 U. S. 878. What we have said in Labor Board v. News Syndicate Co., decided this day, ante, p. 695, is dispositive of the clause which incorporates the General Laws of the parent union “not in conflict with state or federal law.” On that phase of the case the judgment below must be reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COEUR ALASKA, INC. v. SOUTHEAST ALASKA CONSERVATION COUNCIL et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 07-984. Argued January 12, 2009 Decided June 22, 2009 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Scaua, J., joined in part. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 291. Scaua, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 295. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 296. Theodore B. Olson argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc., were Matthew D. McGill, Aaron D. Lindstrom, and Robert A. Maynard. Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General of Alaska, Cameron M. Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, Jonathan S. Franklin, and Tillman J. Breckenridge filed briefs for petitioner State of Alaska. Former Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for the federal respondents urging reversal in both cases. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Pratik A. Shah, Lane McFadden, Earl H. Stockdale, and Marc L. Kesselman. David C. Crosby filed briefs for respondent Goldbelt, Inc., under this Court’s Rule 12.6 urging reversal in both cases. Thomas S. Waldo argued the cause for respondent Southeast Alaska Conservation Council et al. With him on the brief was Scott L. Nelson. Together with No. 07-990, Alaska v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the Council of Alaska Producers by Paul Lawrence and Wilson L. Condon; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by William Perry Pendley; for the National Association of Home Builders by Duane J. Desiderio, Thomas J. Ward, and Amy C Chai; for the National Mining Association et al. by Christopher T. Handman and Harold, P. Quinn, Jr.; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by James S. Burling; and for the Resource Development Council for Alaska, Inc., by Michael Jungreis. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both eases were filed for American Rivers et al. by Deborah A Sivas and Leah J. Russin; for the Nondalton Tribal Council et al. by Seth P. Waxman, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Ethan G. Shenkman, Brian Litmans, and Victoria Clark; for Members of Congress by David C. Vladeck; and for the Honorable G. Tracy Mehan III by Amy J. Wildermuth. Jeffrey C. Parsons and Roger Flynn filed a brief for David M. Chambers et al. as amici curiae in both cases. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases require us to address two questions under the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act). The first is whether the Act gives authority to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, or instead to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency), to issue a permit for the discharge of mining waste, called slurry. The Corps of Engineers (or Corps) has issued a permit to petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc. (Coeur Alaska), for a discharge of slurry into a lake in southeast Alaska. The second question is whether, when the Corps issued that permit, the agency acted in accordance with law. We conclude that the Corps was the appropriate agency to issue the permit and that the permit is lawful. With regard to the first question, § 404(a) of the CWA grants the Corps the power to “issue permits ... for the discharge of . . . fill material.” 86 Stat. 884, 33 U. S. C. § 1344(a). But the EPA also has authority to issue permits for the discharge of pollutants. Section 402 of the Act grants the EPA authority to “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant,” “[e]xcept as provided in” §404. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a). We conclude that because the slurry Coeur Alaska wishes to discharge is defined by regulation as “fill material,” 40 CFR §232.2 (2008), Coeur Alaska properly obtained its permit from the Corps of Engineers, under § 404, rather than from the EPA, under § 402. The second question is whether the Corps permit is lawful. Three environmental groups, respondents here, sued the Corps under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the issuance of the permit by the Corps was “not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). The environmental groups are Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Sierra Club, and Lynn Canal Conservation (collectively, SEACC). The State of Alaska and Coeur Alaska are petitioners here. SEACC argues that the permit from the Corps is unlawful because the discharge of slurry would violate an EPA regulation promulgated under § 306(b) of the CWA, 33 U. S. C. § 1316(b). The EPA regulation, which is called a “new source performance standard,” forbids mines like Coeur Alaska’s from discharging “process wastewater” into the navigable waters. 40 CFR § 440.104(b)(1). Coeur Alaska, the State of Alaska, and the federal agencies maintain that the Corps permit is lawful nonetheless because the EPA’s performance standard does not apply to discharges of fill material. Reversing the judgment of the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that the EPA’s performance standard applies to this discharge so that the permit from the Corps is unlawful. I A Petitioner Coeur Alaska plans to reopen the Kensington Gold Mine, located some 45 miles north of Juneau, Alaska. The mine has been closed since 1928, but Coeur Alaska seeks to make it profitable once more by using a technique known as “froth flotation.” Coeur Alaska will churn the mine’s crushed rock in tanks of frothing water. Chemicals in the water will cause gold-bearing minerals to float to the surface, where they will be skimmed off. At issue is Coeur Alaska’s plan to dispose of the mixture of crushed rock and water left behind in the tanks. This mixture is called slurry. Some 30 percent of the slurry’s volume is crushed rock, resembling wet sand, which is called tailings. The rest is water. The standard way to dispose of slurry is to pump it into a tailings pond. The slurry separates in the pond. Solid tailings sink to the bottom, and water on the surface returns to the mine to be used again. Rather than build a tailings pond, Coeur Alaska proposes to use Lower Slate Lake, located some three miles from the mine in the Tongass National Forest. This lake is small— 800 feet at its widest crossing, 2,000 feet at its longest, and 23 acres in area. See App. 138a, 212a. Though small, the lake is 51 feet deep at its maximum. The parties agree the lake is a navigable water of the United States and so is subject to the CWA. They also agree there can be no discharge into the lake except as the CWA and any lawful permit allow. Over the life of the mine, Coeur Alaska intends to put 4.5 million tons of tailings in the lake. This will raise the lake-bed 50 feet — to what is now the lake’s surface — and will increase the lake’s area from 23 to about 60 acres. Id., at 361a (62 acres), 212a (56 acres). To contain this wider, shallower body of water, Coeur Alaska will dam the lake’s downstream shore. The transformed lake will be isolated from other surface water. Creeks and stormwater runoff will detour around it. Id., at 298a. Ultimately, lakewater will be cleaned by purification systems and will flow from the lake to a stream and thence onward. Id., at 309a-312a. B Numerous state and federal agencies reviewed and approved Coeur Alaska’s plans. At issue here are actions by two of those agencies: the Corps of Engineers and the EPA. 1 The CWA classifies crushed rock as a “pollutant.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(6). On the one hand, the Act forbids Coeur Alaska’s discharge of crushed rock “[e]xcept as in compliance” with the Act. CWA § 301(a), 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a). Section 404(a) of the CWA, on the other hand, empowers the Corps to authorize the discharge of “dredged or fill material.” 33 U. S. C. § 1344(a). The Corps and the EPA have together defined “fill material” to mean any “material [that] has the effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom elevation” of water. 40 CFR § 232.2. The agencies have further defined the “discharge of fill material” to include “placement of . . . slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related materials.” Ibid. In these cases the Corps and the EPA agree that the slurry meets their regulatory definition of “fill material.” On that premise the Corps evaluated the mine’s plan for a §404 permit. After considering the environmental factors required by § 404(b), the Corps issued Coeur Alaska a permit to pump the slurry into Lower Slate Lake. App. 340a-378a. In granting the permit the Corps followed the steps set forth by § 404. Section 404(b) requires the Corps to consider the environmental consequences of every discharge it allows. 33 U. S. C. § 1344(b). The Corps must apply guidelines written by the EPA pursuant to § 404(b). See ibid.; 40 CFR pt. 230 (EPA guidelines). Applying those guidelines here, the Corps determined that Coeur Alaska’s plan to use Lower Slate Lake as a tailings pond was the “least environmentally damaging practicable” way to dispose of the tailings. App. 366a. To conduct that analysis, the Corps compared the plan to the proposed alternatives. The Corps determined that the environmental damage caused by placing slurry in the lake will be temporary. And during that temporary disruption, Coeur Alaska will divert waters around the lake through pipelines built for this purpose. Id., at 298a. Coeur Alaska will also treat water flowing from the lake into downstream waters, pursuant to strict EPA criteria. Ibid.; see Part I-B-2, infra. Though the slurry will at first destroy the lake’s small population of common fish, that population may later be replaced. After mining operations are completed, Coeur Alaska will help “reclaim]” the lake by “Mapping” the tailings with about four inches of “native material.” App. 361a; id., at 309a. The Corps concluded that “[t]he reclamation of the lake will result in more emergent wetlands/vegetated shallows with moderate values for fish habitat, nutrient recycling, carbon/detrital export and sediment/toxicant retention, and high values for wildlife habitat.” Id., at 361a. If the tailings did not go into the lake, they would be placed on nearby wetlands. The resulting pile would rise twice as high as the Pentagon and cover three times as many acres. Reply Brief for Petitioner Coeur Alaska 27. If it were chosen, that alternative would destroy dozens of acres of wetlands — a permanent loss. App. 365a-366a. On the premise that when the mining ends the lake will be at least as environmentally hospitable, if not more so, than now, the Corps concluded that placing the tailings in the lake will cause less damage to the environment than storing them above ground: The reclaimed lake will be “more valuable to the aquatic ecosystem than a permanently filled wetland . . . that has lost all aquatic functions and values.” Id., at 361a; see also id., at 366a. 2 The EPA had the statutory authority to veto the Corps permit, and prohibit the discharge, if it found the plan to have “an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . , wildlife, or recreational areas.” CWA § 404(c), 33 U. S. C. § 1344(c). After considering the Corps’ findings, the EPA did not veto the Corps permit, even though, in its view, placing the tailings in the lake was not the “environmentally preferable” means of disposing of them. App. 300a. By declining to exercise its veto, the EPA in effect deferred to the judgment of the Corps on this point. The EPA’s involvement extended beyond the Agency’s veto consideration. The EPA also issued a permit of its own — not for the discharge from the mine into the lake but for the discharge from the lake into a downstream creek. Id., at 287a-331a. Section 402 grants the EPA authority to “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant,” “[ejxcept as provided in [CWA §404].” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a). The EPA’s §402 permit authorizes Coeur Alaska to discharge water from Lower Slate Lake into the downstream creek, subject to strict water-quality limits that Coeur Alaska must regularly monitor. App. 303a-304a, 309a. The EPA’s authority to regulate this discharge comes from a regulation, termed a “new source performance standard,” that it has promulgated under authority granted to it by § 306(b) of the CWA. Section 306(b) gives the EPA authority to regulate the amount of pollutants that certain categories of new sources may discharge into the navigable waters of the United States. 33 U. S. C. § 1316(b). Pursuant to this authority, the EPA in 1982 promulgated a new source performance standard restricting discharges from new froth-flotation gold mines like Coeur Alaska’s. The standard is stringent: It allows “no discharge of process wastewater” from these mines. 40 CFR § 440.104(b)(1). Applying that standard to the discharge of water from Lower Slate Lake into the downstream creek, the EPA’s § 402 permit sets strict limits on the amount of pollutants the water may contain. The permit requires Coeur Alaska to treat the water using “reverse osmosis” to remove aluminum, suspended solids, and other pollutants. App. 298a; id., at 304a. Coeur Alaska must monitor the water flowing from the lake to be sure that the pollutants are kept to low, specified minimums. Id., at 326a-330a. C SEACC brought suit against the Corps of Engineers and various of its officials in the.United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The Corps permit was not in accordance with law, SEACC argued, for two reasons. First, in SEACC’s view, the permit was issued by the wrong agency — Coeur Alaska ought to have sought a §402 permit from the EPA, just as the company did for the discharge of water from the lake into the downstream creek. See Part I-B-2, supra. Second, SEACC contended that regardless of which agency issued the permit, the discharge itself is unlawful because it will violate the EPA new source performance standard for froth-flotation gold mines. (This is the same performance standard described above, which the EPA has already applied to the discharge of water from the lake into the downstream creek. See ibid.) SEACC argued that this performance standard also applies to the discharge of slurry into the lake. It contended further that the performance standard is a binding implementation of § 306. Section 306(e) of the CWA makes it “unlawful” for Coeur Alaska to “operate” the mine “in violation of” the EPA’s performance standard. 33 U. S. C. § 1316(e). Coeur Alaska and the State of Alaska intervened as defendants. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered the District Court to vacate the Corps of Engineers’ permit. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. United States Army Corps of Engs., 486 F. 3d 638, 654-655 (2007). The court acknowledged that Coeur Alaska’s slurry “facially meets the Corps’ current regulatory definition of ‘fill material,’ ” id., at 644, because it would have the effect of raising the lake’s bottom elevation. But the court also noted that the EPA’s new source performance standard “prohibits discharges from froth-flotation mills.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals concluded that “[b]oth of the regulations appear to apply in this case, yet they are at odds.” Ibid. To resolve the conflict, the court turned to what it viewed as “the plain language of the Clean Water Act.” Ibid. The court held that the EPA’s new source performance standard “applies to discharges from the froth-flotation mill at Coeur Alaska’s Kensington Gold Mine into Lower Slate Lake.” Ibid. In addition to the text of the CWA, the Court of Appeals also relied on the agencies’ statements made when promulgating their current and prior definitions of “fill material.” These statements, in the Court of Appeals’ view, demonstrated the agencies’ intent that the EPA’s new source performance standard govern discharges like Coeur Alaska’s. Id., at 648-654. The Court of Appeals concluded that Coeur Alaska required a § 402 permit for its slurry discharge, that the Corps lacked authority to issue such a permit under § 404, and that the proposed discharge was unlawful because it would violate the EPA new source performance standard and § 306(e). The decision of the Court of Appeals in effect reallocated the division of responsibility that the Corps and the EPA had been following. The Court granted certiorari. 554 U. S. 931 (2008). We now hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals was incorrect. II The question of which agency has authority to consider whether to permit the slurry discharge is our beginning inquiry. We consider first the authority of the EPA and second the authority of the Corps. Our conclusion is that under the CWA the Corps had authority to determine whether Coeur Alaska was entitled to the permit governing this discharge. A Section 402 gives the EPA authority to issue “permit[s] for the discharge of any pollutant,” with one important exception: The EPA may not issue permits for fill material that fall under the Corps’ §404 permitting authority. Section 402(a) states: “Except as provided in . . . [CWA §404, 33 U. S. C. § 1344], the Administrator may ... issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, . . . notwithstanding [CWA § 301(a), 33 U. S. C. § 1311(a)], upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable requirements under [CWA §301, 33 U. S. C. § 1311; CWA §302, 33 U. S. C. § 1312; CWA §306, 33 U. S. C. § 1316; CWA §307, 33 U. S. C. § 1317; CWA §308, 33 U. S. C. § 1318; CWA § 403, 33 U. S. C. § 1343], or (B) prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 402 thus prohibits the EPA from exercising permitting authority that is “provided [to the Corps] in” § 404. This is not to say the EPA has no role with respect to the environmental consequences of fill. The EPA’s function is different, in regulating fill, from its function in regulating other pollutants, but the Agency does exercise some authority. Section 404 assigns the EPA two tasks in regard to fill material. First, the EPA must write guidelines for the Corps to follow in determining whether to permit a discharge of fill material. CWA § 404(b); 33 U. S. C. § 1344(b). Second, the Act gives the EPA authority to “prohibit” any decision by the Corps to issue a permit for a particular disposal site. CWA § 404(c); 33 U. S. C. § 1344(c). We, and the parties, refer to this as the EPA’s power to veto a permit. The Act is best understood to provide that if the Corps has authority to issue a permit for a discharge under §404, then the EPA lacks authority to do so under § 402. Even if there were ambiguity on this point, the EPA’s own regulations would resolve it. Those regulations provide that “discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States which are regulated under section 404 of CWA” “do not require [§402] permits” from the EPA. 40 CFR §122.3. In SEACC’s view, this regulation implies that some “fill material” discharges are not regulated under §404 — else, SEACC asks, why would the regulation lack a comma before the word “which,” and thereby imply that only a subset of “discharges of . . . fill material” are “regulated under section 404.” Ibid. The agencies, however, have interpreted this regulation otherwise. In the agencies’ view the regulation essentially restates the text of § 402, and prohibits the EPA from issuing permits for discharges that “are regulated under section 404.” 40 CFR § 122.3(b); cf. CWA § 402(a) (“[e]xcept as provided in ... [§ 404], the Administrator may . . . issue a permit”). Before us, the EPA confirms this reading of the regulation. Brief for Federal Respondents 27. The Agency’s interpretation is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”; and so we accept it as correct. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question whether the EPA is the proper agency to regulate the slurry discharge thus depends on whether the Corps of Engineers has authority to do so. If the Corps has authority to issue a permit, then the EPA may not do so. We turn to the Corps’ authority under § 404. B Section 404(a) gives the Corps power to “issue permits ... for the discharge of dredged or fill material.” 33 U. S. C. § 1344(a). As all parties concede, the slurry meets the definition of fill material agreed upon by the agencies in a joint regulation promulgated in 2002. That regulation defines “fill material” to mean any “material [that] has the effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom elevation” of water — a definition that includes “slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related materials.” 40 CFR § 232.2. SEACC concedes that the slurry to be discharged meets the regulation’s definition of fill material. Brief for Respondent SEACC et al. 20. Its concession on this point is appropriate because slurry falls well within the central understanding of the term “fill,” as shown by the examples given by the regulation. See 40 CFR § 232.2 (“Examples of such fill material include, but are not limited to: rock, sand, soil, clay . . . ”). The regulation further excludes “trash or garbage” from its definition. Ibid. SEACC expresses a concern that Coeur Alaska’s interpretation of the statute will lead to § 404 permits authorizing the discharges of other solids that are now restricted by EPA standards. Brief for Respondent SEACC et al. 44-45 (listing, for example, “feces and uneaten feed,” “litter,” and waste produced in “battery manufacturing”). But these extreme instances are not presented by the cases now before us. If, in a future case, a discharger of one of these solids were to seek a § 404 permit, the dispositive question for the agencies would be whether the solid at issue — for instance, “feces and uneaten feed”— came within the regulation’s definition of “fill.” SEACC cites no instance in which the agencies have so interpreted their fill regulation. If that instance did arise, and the agencies were to interpret the fill regulation as SEACC fears, then SEACC could challenge that decision as an unlawful interpretation of the fill regulation; or SEACC could claim that the fill regulation as interpreted is an unreasonable interpretation of §404. The difficulties are not presented here, however, because the slurry meets the regulation’s definition of fill. Rather than challenge the agencies’ decision to define the slurry as fill, SEACC instead contends that §404 contains an implicit exception. According to SEACC, § 404 does not authorize the Corps to permit a discharge of fill material if that material is subject to an EPA new source performance standard. But §404’s text does not limit its grant of power in this way. Instead, § 404 refers to all “fill material” without qualification. Nor do the EPA regulations support SEACC’s reading of § 404. The EPA has enacted guidelines, pursuant to § 404(b), to guide the Corps’ permitting decision. 40 CFR pt. 230. Those guidelines do not strip the Corps of power to issue permits for fill in cases where the fill is also subject to an EPA new source performance standard. SEACC’s reading of § 404 would create numerous difficulties for the regulated industry. As the regulatory regime stands now, a discharger must ask a simple question — is the substance to be discharged fill material or not? The fill regulation, 40 CFR §232.2, offers a clear answer to that question; and under the agencies’ view, that answer decides the matter — if the discharge is fill, the discharger must seek a § 404 permit from the Corps; if not, only then must the dis-charger consider whether any EPA performance standard applies, so that the discharger requires a § 402 permit from the EPA. Under SEACC’s interpretation, however, the discharger would face a more difficult problem. The discharger would have to ask — is the fill material also subject to one of the many hundreds of EPA performance standards, so that the permit must come from the EPA, not the Corps? The statute gives no indication that Congress intended to burden industry with that confusing division of permit authority. The regulatory scheme discloses a defined, and workable, line for determining whether the Corps or the EPA has the permit authority. Under this framework, the Corps of Engineers, and not the EPA, has authority to permit Coeur Alaska’s discharge of the slurry. Ill A second question remains: In issuing the permit did the Corps act in violation of a statutory mandate so that the issuance was “not in accordance with law”? 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(A). SEACC contends that the slurry discharge will violate the EPA’s new source performance standard and that the Corps’ permit is made “unlawful” by CWA § 306(e). Petitioners and the agencies argue that the permit is lawful because the EPA performance standard and § 306(e) do not apply to fill material regulated by the Corps. In order to determine whether the Corps’ permit is lawful we must answer the question: Do EPA performance standards, and § 306(e), apply to discharges of fill material? We address in turn the statutory text of the CWA, the agencies’ regulations construing it, and the EPA’s subsequent interpretation of those regulations. Because Congress has not “directly spoken” to the “precise question” of whether an EPA performance standard applies to discharges of fill material, the statute alone does not resolve the case. Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). We look first to the agency regulations, which are entitled to deference if they resolve the ambiguity in a reasonable manner. Ibid.; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 226-227 (2001). But the regulations, too, are ambiguous, so we next turn to the agencies’ subsequent interpretation of those regulations. Id., at 234-238; Auer, 519 U. S., at 461. In an internal memorandum the EPA explained that its performance standards do not apply to discharges of fill material. That interpretation is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s],” and so we accept it as correct. Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). Though SEACC contends that the agencies’ interpretation is not entitled to deference because it contradicts the agencies’ published statements and prior practice, we disagree with SEACC’s reading of those statements and of the regulatory record. A As for the statutory argument, SEACC claims the CWA §404 permit is unlawful because § 306(e) forbids the slurry discharge. Petitioners and the federal agencies, in contrast, contend that § 306(e) does not apply to the slurry discharge. 1 To address SEACC’s statutory argument, it is necessary to review the EPA’s responsibilities under the CWA. As noted, §306 empowers the EPA to regulate the froth-flotation gold mining industry. See 33 U. S. C. § 1316(b). Pursuant to this authority, EPA promulgated the new source performance standard relied upon by SEACC. The standard is stringent. If it were to apply here, it would allow “no discharge of process wastewater” from the mine. 40 CFR § 440.104(b)(1). The term “process wastewater” includes solid waste. So the regulation forbids not only pollutants that dissolve in water but also solid pollutants suspended in water — what the Agency terms “total suspended solids,” or TSS. See § 440.104(a) (limiting the amount of TSS from other kinds of mines); see also EPA Development Document for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Ore Mining and Dressing Point Source Category 157-158 (Nov. 1982) (the amount of TSS in “wastewater” from froth-flotation mines is “generally high”); id., at 175 (Table VI-6) (measuring the amounts of TSS in samples of froth-flotation mines’ discharges); id., at 194 (stating an intent to “regulat[e]” TSS); id., at 402 (evaluating the costs of constructing a “settling pond”); id., at 535 (concluding that even in mountainous regions, a froth-flotation mine will be able to construct a “tailings impoundment” to “provide a disposal area for mill tailings”). Were there any doubt about whether the EPA’s new source performance standard forbade solids as well as soluble pollutants, the Agency’s action in these cases would resolve it. Here, the EPA’s §402 permit authorizes Coeur Alaska to discharge water from Lower Slate Lake into a downstream creek, provided the water meets the quality requirements set by the performance standard. This demonstrates that the performance standard regulates solid waste. The EPA’s permit not only restricts the amount of total suspended solids, App. 327a (Table 3), but also prohibits the mine from allowing any “floating solids” to flow from the lake. Id., at 328a. No party disputes the EPA’s authority to regulate these discharges of solid mining waste; and no party questions the validity of the EPA’s new source performance standard when it is applicable. When the performance standard applies to a point source, § 306(e) makes it “unlawful” for that point source to violate it: “[I]t shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.” CWA § 306(e), 33 U. S. C. § 1316(e). SEACC argues that this provision, § 306(e), prohibits the mine from discharging slurry into Lower Slate Lake. SEACC contends the new source performance standard is, in the words of § 806(e), “applicable to” the mine. Both the text of the performance standard and the EPA’s application of it to the discharge of mining waste from Lower Slate Lake demonstrate that the performance standard is “applicable to” Coeur Alaska’s mine in some circumstances. And so, SEACC reasons, it follows that because the new source performance standard forbids even minute discharges of solid waste, it also forbids the slurry discharge, 30 percent of which is solid waste. 2 For their part, the State of Alaska and the federal agencies claim that the Act is unambiguous in the opposite direction. They rely on § 404 of the Act. As explained above, that section authorizes the Corps of Engineers to determine whether to issue a permit allowing the discharge of the slurry. Petitioners and the agencies argue that §404 grants the Corps authority to do so without regard to the EPA’s new source performance standard or the § 306(e) prohibition discussed above. Petitioners and the agencies make two statutory arguments based on § 404’s silence in regard to § 306. First, they note that nothing in § 404 requires the Corps to consider the EPA’s new source performance standard or the § 306(e) prohibition. That silence advances the argument that §404’s grant of authority to “issue permits” contradicts §306(e)’s declaration that discharges in violation of new source per-. formance standards are “unlawful.” Second, petitioners and the agencies point to §404(p), which protects § 404 permitees from enforcement actions by the EPA or private citizens: “Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section . . . shall be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 [CWA §309] and 1365 [CWA §505] of this title, with sections 1311 [CWA §301], 1317 [CWA §307], and 1343 [CWA §403] of this title.” 33 U. S. C. § 1344(p). Here again, their argument is that silence is significant. Section 404(p) protects the permittee from lawsuits alleging violations of CWA § 301 (which bars the discharge of “any pollutant” “[e]xcept as in compliance” with the Act); §307 (which bars the discharge of “toxic pollutants”); and §403 (which bars discharges into the sea). But § 404(p) does not in express terms protect the permittee from a lawsuit alleging a violation of § 306(e) or of the EPA’s new source performance standards. Section 404(p)’s silence regarding § 306 is made even more significant because a parallel provision in § 402 does protect a § 402 permittee from an enforcement action alleging a violation of §306. CWA §402(k), 33 U. S. C. § 1342(k). In our view, Congress’ omission of §306 from §404, and its inclusion of §306 in §402(k), is evidence that Congress did not intend § 306(e) to apply to Corps § 404 permits or to discharges of fill material. If § 306 did apply, then the Corps would be required to evaluate each permit application for compliance with § 306, and issue a permit only if it found the discharge would comply with § 306. But even if that finding were made, it is not clear that the §404 permittee would be protected from a suit seeking a judicial determination that the discharge violates § 306. 3 The CWA is ambiguous on the question whether § 306 applies to discharges of fill material regulated under § 404. On the one hand, §306 provides that a discharge that violates an EPA new source performance standard is “unlawful”— without any exception for fill material. On the other hand, §404 grants the Corps blanket authority to permit the discharge of fill material — without any mention of § 306. This tension indicates that Congress has not “directly spoken” to the “precise question” whether § 306 applies to discharges of fill material. Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842. B Before turning to how the agencies have resolved that question, we consider the formal regulations that bear on §§306 and 404. See Mead, 533 U. S., at 234-238. The regulations, like the statutes, do not address the question whether § 306, and the EPA new source performance standards promulgated under it, applies to § 404 permits and the discharges they authorize. There is no regulation, for example, interpreting § 306(e)’s text — “standard of performance applicable to such source” — to mean that a performance standard ceases to be “applicable” the moment the discharge qualifies as fill material, which would resolve the cases in petitioners’ favor. Nor is there a regulation providing that the Corps, in deciding whether to grant a permit under § 404, must deny that permit if the discharge would violate § 306(e), which would decide the cases for SEACC. Rather than address the tension between §§ 306 and 404, the regulations instead implement the statutory framework without elaboration on this point. Each of the two principal regulations, which have been mentioned above, seems to stand on its own without reference to the other. The EPA’s new source performance standard contains no exception for fill material; and it forbids any discharge of “process wastewater,” a term that includes solid wastes. 40 CFR §440.104(b)(1); see Part III-A-1, supra. The agencies’ joint regulation defining fill material is also unqualified. It includes “slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related materials” in its definition of a “discharge of fill material,” 40 CFR § 232.2; and it contains no exception for slurry that is regulated by an EPA performance standard. The parties point to additional regulations, but these pro- ■ visions do not offer a clear basis of reconciliation. An EPA regulation, mentioned above, provides that “ [discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States which are regulated under section 404 of CWA” “do not require [§ 402] permits” from the EPA. § 122.3. As we have explained, however, this merely states that a permit for this discharge cannot be issued by the EPA. See Part II, supra. The regulation does not answer the question whether the EPA’s new source performance standard and § 306(e) apply to a discharge regulated by the Corps under § 404. The agencies also direct us to the § 404(b) guidelines written by the EPA to guide the Corps permitting decision. See' 40 CFR pt. 230. The agencies note that these guidelines do not expressly require the Corps, in issuing a permit, to consider whether the discharge would violate EPA’s performance standards. Here we think failure to mention § 306 or the EPA new source performance standards does offer some indication that these are not relevant to the §404 permit, though the argument falls short of being conclusive. The Corps’ own regulations require the agency to evaluate permit applications “for compliance with applicable [EPA] effluent limitations.” 33 CFR § 320.4(d) (2008). The regulations do not answer whether the new source performance standard is “applicable” to a discharge of fill material. C The regulations do not give a definitive answer to the question whether §306 applies to discharges regulated by the Corps under § 404, but we do find that agency interpretation and agency application of the regulations are instructive and to the point. Auer, 519 U. S., at 461. The question is addressed and resolved in a reasonable and coherent way by the practice and policy of the two agencies, all as recited in a memorandum written in May 2004 by Diane Regas, then the Director of the EPA’s Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds, to Randy Smith, the Director of the EPA’s regional Office of Water with responsibility over the mine. App. 141a-149a (Regas Memorandum). The Memorandum, though not subject to sufficiently formal procedures to merit Chevron deference, see Mead, supra, at 234-238, is entitled to a measure of deference because it interprets the agencies’ own regulatory scheme. See Auer, supra, at 461. The Regas Memorandum explains: “As a result [of the fact that the discharge is regulated under §404], the regulatory regime applicable to discharges under section 402, including effluent limitations guidelines and standards, such as those applicable to gold ore mining ... do not apply to the placement of tailings into the proposed impoundment [of Lower Slate Lake]. See 40 CFR § 122.3(b).” App. 144a-145a. The regulation that the Memorandum cites — 40 CFR §122.3 — is one we considered above and found ambiguous. That regulation provides: “Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States which are regulated under section 404 of CWA” “do not require [§402] permits.” The Regas Memorandum takes an instructive interpretive step when it explains that because the discharge “do[es] not require” an EPA permit, ibid., the EPA’s performance standard “do[es] not apply” to the discharge. App. 145a. The Memorandum presents a reasonable interpretation of the regulatory regime. We defer to the interpretation because it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s].” Auer, supra, at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted). Five factors inform that conclusion. First, the Memorandum preserves a role for the EPA’s performance standard. It confines the Memorandum’s scope to closed bodies of water, like the lake here. App. 142a-143a, n. 1. When slurry is discharged into a closed body of water, the Memorandum explains, the EPA’s performance standard retains an important role in regulating the discharge into surrounding waters. The Memorandum does not purport to invalidate the EPA’s performance standard. Second, the Memorandum acknowledges that this is not an instance in which the discharger attempts to evade the requirements of the EPA’s performance standard. The Kensington Mine is not, for example, a project that smuggles a discharge of EPA-regulated pollutants into a separate discharge of Corps-regulated fill material. The instant cases do not present a process or plan designed to manipulate the outer boundaries of the definition of “fill material” by labeling minute quantities of EPA-regulated solids as fill. The Memorandum states that when a discharge has only an “incidental filling effect,” the EPA’s performance standard continues to govern that discharge. Id., at 145a. Third, the Memorandum’s interpretation preserves the Corps’ authority to determine whether a discharge is in the public interest. See 33 CFR § 320.4(a)(1); 40 CFR §230.10. The Corps has significant expertise in making this determination. Applying it, the Corps determined that placing slurry in the lake will improve that body of water by making it wider, shallower, and so more capable of sustaining aquatic life. The Corps determined, furthermore, that the alternative — a heap of tailings larger than the Pentagon placed upon wetlands — would cause more harm to the environment. Because the Memorandum preserves an important role for the Corps’ expertise, its conclusion that the EPA’s performance standard does not apply is a reasonable one. Fourth, the Regas Memorandum’s interpretation does not allow toxic pollutants (as distinguished from other, less dangerous pollutants, such as slurry) to enter the navigable waters. The EPA has regulated toxic pollutants under a separate provision, §307 of the CWA, and the EPA’s § 404(b) guidelines require the Corps to deny a §404 permit for any discharge that would violate the EPA’s §307 toxic-effluent limitations. 40 CFR § 230.10(b)(2). Fifth, as a final reason to defer to the Regas Memorandum, we find it a sensible and rational construction that reconciles §§306, 402, and 404, and the regulations implementing them, which the alternatives put forward by the parties do not. SEACC’s argument, that § 402 applies to this discharge and not § 404, is not consistent with the statute and regulations, as already noted. See Part II, supra. The Court requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether the CWA contemplated that both agencies would issue a permit for a discharge. 556 U. S. 1219 (2009). A two-permit regime would allow the EPA to apply its performance standard, while the Corps could apply its § 404(b) criteria. The parties agree, however, that a two-permit regime is contrary to the statute and the regulations. We conclude that this is correct. A two-permit regime would cause confusion, delay, expense, and uncertainty in the permitting process. In agreement with all of the parties, we conclude that, when a permit is required to discharge fill material, either a § 402 or a § 404 permit is necessary. Here, we now hold, § 404 applies, not § 402. See Part II, supra. The Regas Memorandum’s interpretation of the agencies’ regulations is consistent with the regulatory scheme as a whole. The Memorandum preserves a role for the EPA’s performance standards; it guards against the possibility of evasion of those standards; it employs the Corps’ expertise in evaluating the effects of fill material on the aquatic environment; it does not allow toxic pollutants to be discharged; and we have been offered no better way to harmonize the regulations. We defer to the EPA’s conclusion that its performance standard does not apply to the initial discharge of slurry into the lake but applies only to the later discharge of water from the lake into the downstream creek. D SEACC argues against deference to the Regas Memorandum. In its view the Regas Memorandum is contrary to published agency statements and earlier agency practice. SEACC cites three agency statements: A 1986 “memorandum of understanding” between the EPA and the Corps regarding the definition of fill material; the preamble to the agencies’ current 2002 fill regulation; and comments made by the agencies in promulgating the 2002 fill regulation. These arguments are not convincing. 1 In 1986, to reconcile their then-differing definitions of “fill material,” the EPA and the Corps issued a “memorandum of agreement.” 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (MOA). The memorandum was not made subject to notice-and-comment procedures, but it was published in the Federal Register. It defined the statutory term “fill material” until the current definition took effect in 2002. Brief for Federal Respondents 30-31, n. 8. SEACC points to paragraph B(5) of the MOA, which reads:' “[A] pollutant (other than dredged material) will normally be considered by EPA and the Corps to be subject to section 402 if it is a discharge in liquid, semi-liquid, or suspended form or if it is a discharge of solid material of a homogeneous nature normally associated with single industry wastes .... These materials include placer mining wastes, phosphate mining wastes, titanium mining wastes, sand and gravel wastes, fly ash, and drilling muds. As appropriate, EPA and the Corps will identify additional such materials.” 51 Fed. Reg. 8872. It is true, as SEACC notes, that this passage suggests that §402 will “normally” apply to discharges of “suspended”— i. e., solid — pollutants. But that statement is not contrary to the Regas Memorandum, which acknowledges that the EPA retains authority under § 402 to regulate the discharge of suspended solids from Lower Slate Lake into downstream waters. This passage does not address the question presented by these cases, and answered by the Regas Memorandum, as to whether the EPA’s performance standard applies when the discharge qualifies as fill material. In fact, the MOA’s preamble suggests that when a discharge qualifies as “fill material,” the Corps retains authority to regulate it under §404: “Discharges listed in the Corps definition of ‘discharge of fill material,’ . . . remain subject to section 404 even if they occur in association with discharges of wastes meeting the criteria in the agreement for section 402 discharges.” Id., at 8871. The MOA is quite consistent with the agencies’ determination that the Corps regulates all discharges of fill material and that § 306 does not apply to these discharges. 2 SEACC draws our attention to the preamble of the current fill material regulation. 67 Fed. Reg. 31129 (2002) (final rule). It cites the opening passages of the preamble, which state: “[Tjoday’s rule is generally consistent with current agency practice and so it does not expand the types of discharges that will be covered under section 404.” Id., at 31133. In SEACC’s view, this passage demonstrates that the fill rule was not intended to displace the pre-existing froth-flotation gold mine performance standard, which has been on the books since 1982. The preamble goes on to say, in a section entitled “Effluent Guideline Limitations and 402 Permits”: “[W]e emphasize that today’s rule generally is intended to maintain our existing approach to regulating pollutants under either section 402 or 404 of the CWA. Effluent limitation guidelines and new source performance standards (‘effluent guidelines’) promulgated under section 304 and 306 of the CWA establish limitations and standards for specified wastestreams from industrial categories, and those limitations and standards are incorporated into permits issued under section 402 of the Act. EPA has never sought to regulate fill material under effluent guidelines. Rather, effluent guidelines restrict discharges of pollutants from identified waste-streams based upon the pollutant reduction capabilities of available treatment technologies. Recognizing that some discharges (such as suspended or settleable solids) can have the associated effect, over time, of raising the bottom elevation of a water due to settling of waterborne pollutants, we do not consider such pollutants to be ‘fill material,’ and nothing in today’s rule changes that view. Nor does today’s rule change any determination we have made regarding discharges that are subject to an effluent limitation guideline and standards, which will continue to be regulated under section 402 of the CWA. Similarly, this rule does not alter the manner in which water quality standards currently apply under the section 402 or the section 404 programs.” Id., at 31135. Although the preamble asserts it does not change agency policy with regard to EPA performance standards and § 402 permitting decisions, it is explicit in noting that the EPA has “never sought to regulate fill material under effluent guidelines.” Ibid. The preamble, then, is consistent with the Regas Memorandum. If a discharge does not qualify as fill material, the EPA’s new source performance standard applies. If the discharge qualifies as fill, the performance standard does not apply; and there was no earlier agency practice or policy to the contrary. 3 SEACC also cites remarks made by the agencies in response to public comments on the proposed fill material regulation. App. 22a-127a. These remarks were incorporated by reference into the administrative record. 67 Fed. Reg. 31131. Responding to a question about whether “mine tailings” would be “subject to section 404 regulation as opposed to section 402” under the 2002 fill regulation, the agencies stated: “Today’s final rule clarifies that any material that has the effect of fill is regulated under section 404 and further that the placement of ‘overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related materials’ is considered a discharge of fill material. Nevertheless, if EPA has previously determined that certain materials are subject to an [effluent limitation guideline] under specific circumstances, then that determination remains valid. Moreover,... permits issued pursuant to section 402 are intended to regulate process water and provide effluent limits that are protective of receiving water quality. This distinction provides the framework for today’s rule.” App. 48a. This statement is not conclusive of the issue. SEACC notes that this response, like the regulation’s preamble, pledges that EPA’s “previou[s] determination^]” with regard to the application of performance standards “remai[n] valid.” But, as noted above, the Regas Memorandum has followed this policy by applying the EPA’s performance standard to the discharge of water from the lake into the downstream creek. The response does not state that the EPA will apply its performance standards to discharges of fill material. 4 The agencies’ published statements indicate adherence to the EPA’s previous application and interpretation of its performance standards. SEACC cannot show that the agencies have changed their interpretation or application of their regulations. SEACC cites no instance in which the EPA has applied one of its performance standards to a discharge of fill material. By contrast, Coeur Alaska cites two instances in which the Corps issued a §404 permit authorizing a mine to discharge solid waste (tailings) as fill material. See Brief for Petitioner Coeur Alaska 40-42. SEACC objects that those two §404 permits authorized discharges that used the tailings to construct useful structures — a dam in one ease, a tailings pond in another. Here, by contrast, SEACC contends that the primary purpose of the discharge is to use a navigable water to dispose of waste. Ibid. But that objection misses the point. The two §404 permits cited by Coeur Alaska illustrate that the agencies did not have a prior practice of applying EPA performance standards to discharges of mining wastes that qualify as fill material. SEACC has not demonstrated that the agencies have changed their policy, and it cannot show that the Regas Memorandum is contrary to the agencies’ published statements. * * * - We accord deference to the agencies’ reasonable decision to continue their prior practice. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LASSEN, COMMISSIONER, STATE LAND DEPARTMENT v. ARIZONA ex rel. ARIZONA HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT. No. 84. Argued November 16, 1966. Decided January 10, 1967. John P. Frank argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General of Arizona, by Dale R. Shumway and Dix W. Price. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General of Arizona, by John T. Amey, Assistant Attorney General, and /. A. Riggins, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Weisl, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall and Richard A. Posner. John J. O’Connell, Attorney General, and Harold T. Hartinger, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Washington, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. John J. O’Connell, Attorney General of Washington, and John R. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Washington Parks and Recreation Commission, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was brought as an original proceeding in the Supreme Court of Arizona by the State on the relation of its Highway Department. The Department seeks to prohibit the application by the State Land Commissioner of rules governing the acquisition of rights of way and material sites in federally donated lands held in trust by the State. The Commissioner’s rules provide in pertinent part that “Rights of Way and Material Sites may be granted ... for an indefinite period . . . after full payment of the appraised value . . . has been made to the State Land Department. The appraised value . . . shall be determined in accordance with the principles established in A. R. S. 12-1122.” Rule 12. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that it may be conclusively presumed that highways constructed across trust lands always enhance the value of the remaining trust lands in amounts at least equal to the value of the areas taken. It therefore ordered the Commissioner to grant without actual compensation material sites and rights of way upon trust lands. 99 Ariz. 161, 407 P. 2d 747. The lands at issue here are among some 10,790,000 acres granted by the United States to Arizona in trust for the use and benefit of designated public activities within the State. The Federal Government since the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 has made such grants to States newly admitted to the Union. Although the terms of these grants differ, at least the most recent commonly make clear that the United States has a continuing interest in the administration of both the lands and the funds which derive from them. The grant involved here thus expressly requires the Attorney General of the United States to maintain whatever proceedings may be necessary to enforce its terms. We brought this case here because of the importance of the issues presented both to the United States and to the States which have received such lands. 384 U. S. 926. The issues here stem chiefly from ambiguities in the grant itself. The terms under which the United States provided these lands were included in the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. 36 Stat. 557. The Act describes with particularity the disposition Arizona may make of the lands and of the funds derived from them, but it does not directly refer to the conditions or consequences of the use by the State itself of the trust lands for purposes not designated in the grant. Of the issues which may arise from the Act’s silence, we need now reach only two: first, whether Arizona is permitted to obtain trust lands for such uses without first satisfying the Act’s restrictions on disposition of the land; and second, what standard of compensation Arizona must employ to recompense the trust for the land it uses. Both issues require consideration of the Act’s language and history. I. We turn first to the question of the method by which Arizona may obtain trust lands for purposes not included in the grant. The constraints imposed by the Act upon the methods by which trust lands may be transferred are few and simple. Section 28, which is reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion, requires, with exceptions inapplicable here, that lands be sold or leased only to “the highest and best bidder at a public auction to be held at the county seat of the county wherein the lands . . . shall lie . . . .” The section prescribes the terms, form and frequency of the notice which must be given of the auction. It requires that no lands be sold for a price less than their appraised value. The Act imposes two sanctions upon transactions which fail to satisfy its requirements. First, § 28 provides broadly that trust lands must be “disposed of in whole or in part only in manner as herein provided . . . It adds that “Disposition of any of said lands ... in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust.” Finally, it provides that “Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract of or concerning any of the lands hereby granted or confirmed . . . not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void . . . The parties urge, and the state court assumed, that Arizona need not follow these procedures when it seeks material sites and rights of way upon trust lands. The Commissioner’s rules thus do not require an auction or other public sale. This view has been taken by other state courts construing similar grants. Ross v. Trustees of University of Wyoming, 30 Wyo. 433; 222 P. 3, State v. Walker, 61 N. M. 374, 301 P. 2d 317. We have concluded, for the reasons which follow, that the restrictions of the Act are inapplicable to acquisitions by the State for its highway program. The Act’s silence obliges us to examine its purposes, as evidenced by its terms and its legislative history, to determine whether these restrictions should be imposed here. The grant was plainly expected to produce a fund, accumulated by sale and use of the trust lands, with which the State could support the public institutions designated by the Act. It was not supposed that Arizona would retain all the lands given it for actual use by the beneficiaries; the lands were obviously too extensive and too often inappropriate for the selected purposes. Congress could scarcely have expected, for example, that many of the 8,000,000 acres of its grant “for the support of the common schools,” all chosen without regard to topography or school needs, would be employed as building sites. It intended instead that Arizona would use the general powers of sale and lease given it by the Act to accumulate funds with which it could support its schools. The central problem which confronted the Act’s draftsmen was therefore to devise constraints which would assure that the trust received in full fair compensation for trust lands. The method of transfer and the transferee were material only so far as necessary to assure that the trust sought and obtained appropriate compensation. This is confirmed by the legislative history of the Enabling Act. All the restrictions on the use and disposition of the trust lands, including those on the powers of sale and lease, were first inserted by the Senate Committee on the Territories. Senator Bev-eridge, the committee’s chairman, made clear on the floor of the Senate that the committee’s determination to require the restrictions sprang from its fear that the trust would be exploited for private advantage. He emphasized that the committee was influenced chiefly by the repeated violations of a similar grant made to New Mexico in 1898. The violations had there allegedly consisted of private sales at unreasonably low prices, and the committee evidently hoped to prevent such depredations here by requiring public notice and sale. The restrictions were thus intended to guarantee, by preventing particular abuses through the prohibition of specific practices, that the trust received appropriate compensation for trust lands. We see no need to read the Act to impose these restrictions on transfers in which the abuses they were intended to prevent are not likely to occur, and in which the trust may in another and more effective fashion be assured full compensation. Further, we should not fail to recognize that, were we to require Arizona to follow precisely these procedures, we would sanction an empty formality. There would not often be others to bid for the material sites and rights of way which the State might seek. More important, even if such bidders appeared and proved successful, nothing in the grant would prevent Arizona from thereafter condemning the land which it had failed to purchase; the anticipation of condemnation would leave the auction without any real significance. We cannot see that the trust would materially benefit from this circuity. We conclude that it is consonant with the Act’s essential purposes to exclude from the restrictions in question the transactions at issue here. The trust will be protected, and its purposes entirely satisfied, if the State is required to provide full compensation for the land it uses. We hold, therefore, that Arizona need not offer public notice or conduct a public sale when it seeks trust lands for its highway program. The State may instead employ the procedures established by the Commissioner’s rules, or any other procedures reasonably calculated to assure the integrity of the trust and to prevent misapplication of its lands and funds. II. The second issue here is the standard of compensation which Arizona must employ to recompense the trust for the land it acquires. The Land Commissioner’s rules provide simply that the State must pay the appraised value, as measured by the State’s condemnation statute, of the right of way or material site. The Highway Department urges, and the Arizona Supreme Court held, that nothing need ever be actually paid since it may be conclusively presumed that all highways enhance the value of the remaining trust lands in amounts at least equal to the value of the lands which were taken. The United States, as amicus curiae, suggests that the Highway Department be obliged to pay the land’s appraised value, but that it be permitted to reduce that sum by the amount of any enhancement shown in the value of the remaining trust lands. The rule urged by the United States differs from that adopted by the state court only in that the United States would not permit the Highway Department to presume enhancement, but would instead require that it be established by the Department in each instance with reasonable certainty and precision. Under this rule, enhancement would have to be individually proved and computed for small tracts of land checkered over the entire State. We are urged by the United States to determine only the validity of the rule of law stated by the Arizona Supreme Court, and to defer the broader question of whether enhancement may ever be permitted to diminish the actual compensation payable to the trust. The United States emphasizes that the broader issue does not directly arise under the Commissioner’s rules, since the Arizona condemnation statute incorporated by those rules does not permit benefits to reduce the compensation payable for the condemned land’s fair market value. We are unable to take so narrow a view. The rule adopted by the state court clearly stemmed from, and depended upon, the premise that enhancement may be balanced against the value of the trust lands taken by the State. If we severed the conclusion from its premise, we would halt short of a full adjudication of the validity of the Commissioner’s rules, and unnecessarily prolong the litigation of this important question. We have therefore reached the broader issue, and have concluded that the terms and purposes of the grant do not permit Arizona to diminish the actual compensation, meaning thereby monetary compensation, payable to the trust by the amount of any enhancement in the value of the remaining trust lands. The Enabling Act unequivocally demands both that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred from it and that any funds received be employed only for the purposes for which the land was given. First, it requires that before trust lands or their products are offered for sale they must be “appraised at their true value,” and that “no sale or other disposal . . . shall be made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained . . . The Act originally provided in addition that trust lands should not be sold for a price less than a statutory minimum. Second, it imposes a series of careful restrictions upon the use of trust funds. As this Court has noted, the Act contains “a specific enumeration of the purposes for which the lands were granted and the enumeration is necessarily exclusive of any other purpose.” Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41, 47. The Act thus specifically forbids the use of “money or thing of value directly or indirectly derived” from trust lands for any purposes other than those for which that parcel of land was granted. It requires the creation of separate trust accounts for each of the designated beneficiaries, prohibits the transfer of funds among the accounts, and directs with great precision their administration. “Words more clearly designed ... to create definite and specific trusts and to make them in all respects separate and independent of each other could hardly have been chosen.” United States v. Ervien, 246 P. 277, 279. All these restrictions in combination indicate Congress’ concern both that the grants provide the most substantial support possible to the beneficiaries and that only those beneficiaries profit from the trust. This is confirmed by the background and legislative history of the Enabling Act. The restrictions placed upon land grants to the States became steadily more rigid and specific in the 50 years prior to this Act, as Congress sought to require prudent management and thereby to preserve the usefulness of the grants for their intended purposes. The Senate Committee on the Territories, with the assistance of the Department of Justice, adopted for the New Mexico-Arizona Act the most satisfactory of the restrictions contained in the earlier grants. Its premise was that the grants cannot “be too carefully safeguarded for the purpose for which they are appropriated.” Senator Beveridge described the restrictions as “quite the most important item” in the Enabling Act, and emphasized that his committee believed that “we were giving the lands to the States for specific purposes, and that restrictions should be thrown about it which would assure its being used for those purposes.” Nothing in these restrictions is explicitly addressed to acquisitions by the State for its other public activities; the Enabling Act is, as we have noted, entirely silent on these questions. We must nevertheless conclude that the purposes of Congress require that the Act’s designated beneficiaries “derive the full benefit” of the grant. The conclusive presumption of enhancement which the Arizona Supreme Court found does not in our view adequately assure fulfillment of that purpose, particularly in the context of lands that are as variegated and far-flung as those comprised in this grant. And we think that the more particularized showing of enhancement advocated by the United States, resting as it largely would upon the forecasts of experts which by nature are subject to the imponderables and hazards of the future, also falls short of assuring accomplishment of the basic intendment of Congress. Acceptance of either of these courses for reimbursing the trust in these circumstances might well result in diminishing the benefits conferred by Congress and in effect deflecting a portion of them to the State’s highway program. We hold therefore that Arizona must actually compensate the trust in money for the full appraised value of any material sites or rights of way which it obtains on or over trust lands. This standard most nearly reproduces the results of the auction prescribed by the Act, and most consistently reflects the essential purposes of the grant. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is accordingly reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. Section 28 of New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, as Amended. Sec. 28. That it is hereby declared that all lands hereby granted, including those which, having been heretofore granted to the said Territory, are hereby expressly transferred and confirmed to the said State, shall be by the said State held in trust, to be disposed of in whole or in part only in manner as herein provided and for the several objects specified in the respective granting and confirmatory provisions, and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. Disposition of any of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or indirectly derived therefrom, for any object other than for which such particular lands, or the lands from which such money or thing of value shall have been derived, were granted or confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust. No mortgage or other encumbrance of the said lands, or any part thereof, shall be valid in favor of any person or for any purpose or under any circumstances whatsoever. Said lands shall not be sold or leased, in whole or in part, , except to the highest and best bidder at a public auction to be held at the county seat of the county wherein the lands to be affected, or the major portion thereof, shall lie, notice of which public auction shall first have been duly given by advertisement, which shall set forth the nature, time, and place of the transaction to be had, with a full description of the lands to be offered, and be published once each week for not less than ten successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation published regularly at the State capital, and in that newspaper of like circulation which shall then be regularly published nearest to the location of the lands so offered; nor shall any sale or contract for the sale of any timber or other natural product of such lands be made, save at the place, in the manner, and after the notice by publication provided for sales and leases of the lands themselves. Nothing herein contained shall prevent: (1) the leasing of any of the lands referred to in this section, in such manner as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe, for grazing, agricultural, commercial, and homesite purposes, for a term of ten years or less; (2) the leasing of any of said lands, in such manner as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe, whether or not also leased for grazing and agricultural purposes, for mineral purposes, other than for the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances, for a term of twenty years or less; (3) the leasing of any said lands, whether or not also leased for other purposes, for the exploration, development, and production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances on, in, or under said lands for an initial term of twenty years or less and as long thereafter as oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substance may be procured therefrom in paying quantities, the leases to be made in any manner, with or without advertisement, bidding, or appraisement, and under such terms and provisions as the Legislature of the State of Arizona may prescribe, the terms and provisions to include a reservation of a royalty to said State of not less than 12% per centum of production; or (4) the Legislature of the State of Arizona from providing by proper laws for the protection of lessees of said lands, whereby such lessees shall be protected in their rights to their improvements (including water rights) in such manner that in case of lease or sale of said lands to other parties the former lessee shall be paid by the succeeding lessee or purchaser the value of such improvements and rights placed thereon by such lessee. All lands, leaseholds, timber, and other products of land, before being offered, shall be appraised at their true value, and-no sale or other disposal thereof shall be made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained, nor upon credit unless accompanied by ample security, and the legal title shall not be deemed to have passed until the consideration shall have been paid. No lands shall be sold for less than their appraised value, and no lands which are or shall be susceptible of irrigation under any projects now or hereafter completed or adopted by the United States under legislation for the reclamation of lands, or under any other project for the reclamation of lands, shall be sold at less than twenty-five dollars per acre: Provided, That said State, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, shall from time to time relinquish such of its lands to the United States as at any time are needed for irrigation works in connection with any such government project. And other lands in lieu thereof are hereby granted to said State, to be selected from lands of the character named and in the manner prescribed in section twenty-four of this Act. The State of Arizona is authorized to exchange any lands owned by it for other lands, public or private, under such regulations as the legislature thereof may prescribe: Provided, That such exchanges involving public lands may be made only as authorized by Acts of Congress and regulations thereunder. There is hereby reserved to the United States and excepted from the operation of any and all grants made or confirmed by this Act to said proposed State all land actually or prospectively valuable for the development of water power or power for hydro-electric use or transmission and which shall be ascertained and designated by the Secretary of the Interior within five years after the proclamation of the President declaring the admission of the State; and no lands so reserved and excepted shall be subject to any disposition whatsoever by said State, and any conveyance or transfer of such land by said State or any officer thereof shall be absolutely null and void within the period above named; and in lieu of the land so reserved to the United States and excepted from the operation of any of said grants there be, and is hereby, granted to the proposed State an equal quantity of land to be selected from land of the character named and in the manner prescribed in section twenty-four of this Act. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund corresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. The state treasurer shall keep all such moneys invested in safe, interest-bearing securities, which securities shall be approved by the governor and secretary o.f state of said proposed State, and shall at all times be under a good and sufficient bond or bonds conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties in regard thereto, as defined by this Act and the laws of the State not in conflict herewith. Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract of or concerning any of the lands hereby granted or confirmed, or the use thereof or the natural products thereof, not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of this Act shall be null and void, any provision of the constitution or laws of the said State to the contrary notwithstanding. It shall be the duty of the Attorney-General of the United States to prosecute, in the name of the United States and in its courts, such proceedings at law or in equity as may from time to time be necessary and appropriate to enforce the provisions hereof relative to the application and disposition of the said lands and the products thereof and the funds derived therefrom. Nothing herein contained shall be taken as in limitation of the power of the State or of any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this Act. This action is in form and substance a controversy between two agencies of the State of Arizona, both formally represented by the State’s Attorney General. We have nonetheless concluded that this is a. case with which we may properly deal. The Land Commissioner is apparently a substantially independent state officer, appointed for a term of years and removable only for cause. He is essentially the trustee of the trust at issue here, with custody of the trust lands. In addition, both the Commissioner and the Highway Department are represented by special counsel appointed by the Attorney General to advocate the divergent positions of the parties. The grants consisted of four sections in each township for the support of common schools, plus specified acreages for other designated purposes. The other acreages were granted for the support of agricultural and mechanical colleges, a school of mines, military institutes, the payment of bonds, miners’ hospitals, penitentiaries, and similar purposes. Of the 10,790,000 acres granted to Arizona for all designated uses, some 9,180,000 acres were earmarked for various educational purposes, of which some 8,000,000 acres were given for the support of common schools. Between 1803 and 1962, the United States granted a total of some 330,000,000 acres to the States for all purposes. Of these, some 78,000,000 acres were given in support of common schools. The Public Lands, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 60 (Comm. Print 1963). 36 Stat. 575. Nine States urged as amici curiae that we review the judgment below. One of the nine, New Mexico, received lands in trust under the very grant in issue here. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has held in closely similar circumstances that actual compensation must be paid to the trust. State v. Walker, 61 N. M. 374, 301 P. 2d 317. In addition, the court suggested that the restrictions of the Enabling Act are inapplicable here because the State obtains less than a fee interest. This contention is plainly foreclosed by the language of § 28, by which “Every sale, lease, conveyance, or contract of or concerning any of the lands” is void unless in substantial conformity with the Act. The school lands were granted according to the rigid checkerboard pattern of the federal survey. Four sections per township were granted by number for the support of common schools, instead of the one section per township ordinarily given in the earlier grants, because the unappropriated lands in Arizona and New Mexico were largely of so little value. Orfield, Federal Land Grants to the States 45. S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 18. Remarks of Senator Beveridge, 45 Cong. Rec. 8227. Ibid. These violations culminated in a series of lawsuits brought by the Department of Justice against those privy to them. These, lawsuits were pending when the Enabling Act was under study by Congress. The importance of this episode is also indicated in the committee’s report. S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20. Ariz. Fev. Stat. Ann. §12-1122. The statute permits benefits to reduce any damages caused by severance to the uncondemned portions of a parcel of land, but not to reduce the compensation paid for the land which is condemned. 36 Stat. 574. Ibid. The Act fixed a minimum price of $3 per acre in Arizona. This requirement was removed by the Act of June 5, 1936. 49 Stat. 1477. The Act still requires that land “susceptible of irrigation” under federal or other projects not be sold for less than $25 per acre. 36 Stat. 574. 36 Stat. 574. Orfield, Federal Land Grants to the States 48-52. S. Rep. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 20. Ibid. Remarks of Senator Beveridge, 45 Cong. Rec. 8227. Letter from former Secretary of the Interior Garfield to the House Committee on the Territories. H. R. Rep. No. 152, 61st Cong.-, 2d Sess., 3. Despite widespread use of the value of benefits in computing condemnation awards, the various rules adopted for that purpose have created confusion and difficulties. See Haar & Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 833. These problems would be aggravated in the context of this situation, since the benefits would have to be individually computed for tracts of land scattered over the entire State. We do not mean to suggest that deferred payment arrangements might not be appropriate. Cf. the provisions of §28 (see Appendix): “no sale or other disposal thereof shall be made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained, nor upon credit unless accompanied by ample security, and the legal title shall not be deemed to have passed until the consideration shall have been paid.” Nor do we mean that exchanges, in the situations in which they are permitted by the Act, would not be appropriate. Cf. the provisions of § 28 (see Appendix): “The State of Arizona is authorized to exchange any lands owned by it for other lands, public or private, under such regulations as the legislature thereof may prescribe: Provided, That such exchanges involving public lands may be made only as authorized by Acts of Congress and regulations thereunder.” We are informed by counsel that over a period of years Arizona has obtained the use of large areas of trust lands on bases that may not have accorded with those set forth in this opinion. We wish to make it plain that we do not reach either the validity of any such transfers or the obligations of the State, if any, with respect thereto.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEWSWEEK, INC. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al. No. 97-663. Decided February 23, 1998 Per Curiam. Effective January 1, 1988, Florida exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from its sales tax. See Fla. Stat. §§ 212.08(7)(w), 212.05(1)(i) (Supp. 1988). In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found this classification invalid under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. See Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1304 (1990), vacated and remanded, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 499 U. S. 972 (1991), reaff’d, 604 So. 2d 459 (1992). In the wake of this ruling, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of sales taxes it had paid between 1988 and 1990. See Fla. Stat. § 215.26(1) (Supp. 1998) (“The Comptroller of the state may refund ... any moneys paid into the State Treasury”). When the Department of Revenue denied the refund, Newsweek filed suit, alleging the State’s failure to accord it retroactive relief violated its due process rights under McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18 (1990). The Florida trial court granted summary judgment against Newsweek, and the District Court of Appeal affirmed. Although acknowledging McKesson’s requirement of “meaningful backward-looking relief” when a taxpayer is forced to pay a tax before having an opportunity to establish its uneonstitutionality, the District Court of Appeal held: “McKesson is distinguishable because that holding was expressly predicated upon the fact that the taxpayer had no meaningful predeprivation remedy.” 689 So. 2d 361, 363 (1997). The court interpreted Florida law to permit prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement. See id., at 363-364 (citing Fla. Stat. § 72.011 (1987)). The court concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because it could have pursued this prepayment remedy without suffering onerous penalties. See 689 So. 2d, at 364. The District Court of Appeal’s decision failed to consider our decision in Reich v. Collins, 513 U. S. 106 (1994). There, the Georgia Supreme Court had rejected a taxpayer’s refund claim filed pursuant to a general refund statute, dismissing any due process concerns because a predeprivation remedy was available. See id., at 110. While assuming the constitutional adequacy of Georgia’s predeprivation procedures, we nonetheless reversed because “no reasonable taxpayer would have thought that [the predeprivation procedures] represented, in light of the apparent applicability of the refund statute, the exclusive remedy for unlawful taxes.” Id., at 111 (emphasis deleted). Until the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling, the taxpayer had no way of knowing from either the statutory language of case law that he could not pursue a postpayment refund and was relegated to a predep-rivation remedy. See id., at 111-112. We emphasized a State “has the flexibility to maintain an exclusively predepri-vation remedial scheme, so long as that scheme is ‘clear and certain.’ ” Id., at 110-111. But a State may not “bait and switch” by “holding] out what plainly appears to be a ‘clear and certain’ postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes have been paid, that no such remedy exists.” Id., at 111, 108. Under Florida law, there was a longstanding practice of permitting taxpayers to seek refunds under § 215.26 for taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hardaway Contracting Co. v. Lee, 155 Fla. 724, 21 So. 2d 211 (1945). At Florida’s urging, federal courts have dismissed taxpayer challenges, including constitutional challenges, because §215.26 appeared to provide an adequate postpayment remedy for refunds. See Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (“The district courts shall not enjoin . . . any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State”); see, e. g., Osceola v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 893 F. 2d 1231, 1233 (CA11 1990); Rendon v. State of Fla., 930 F. Supp. 601 (SD Fla. 1996). This Court, too, has interpreted Florida law to provide a postpayment remedy. See McKesson, supra, at 24, n. 4 (“It appears . .. Florida law does not require a taxpayer to pay under protest in order to preserve the right to challenge a remittance in a postpayment refund action”). The State does not dispute this settled understanding. The effect of the District Court of Appeal’s decision below, however, was to cut off Newsweek’s recourse to § 215.26. While Florida may be free to require taxpayers to litigate first and pay later, due process prevents it from applying this requirement to taxpayers, like Newsweek, who reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment refund when paying the tax. Newsweek is entitled to a clear and certain remedy and thus it can use the refund procedures to adjudicate the merits of its claim. We grant the petition for a writ of certio-rari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JAY v. BOYD, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 503. Argued May 3, 1956. Decided June 11, 1956. Will Maslow and John Caughlan argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Mr. Caughlan and Norman Leonard. John V. Lindsay argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Gray Thoron, Beatrice Rosenberg, J. F. Bishop and L. Paul Winings. Mr. Maslow and Shad Polier filed a brief for the American Jewish Congress, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. [Petitioner brought this habeas corpus proceeding to test the validity of the denial of his application under §§244 (a)(5) and 244 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 215, 216, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1254 (a)(5) and 1254 (c), for discretionary suspension of deportation. He contends that the denial of his application was unlawful because based on confidential, undisclosed information. The District Court denied the writ, holding, so far as pertinent here, that, “after complying with all the. essentials of due process of law in the deportation hearing and in the hearing to determine eligibility for suspension of deportation, [the Attorney General may] consider confidential information outside the record in formulating his discretionary decision.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that petitioner was not “denied due process of law in the consideration of his application for suspension of deportation because of the use of this confidential information.” 222 F. 2d 820, 820-821; rehearing denied, 224 F. 2d 957. We granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 931, to consider the validity of 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 244.3, the Attorney General's regulation which provides: “§ 244.3 Use of confidential information. In the case of an alien qualified for . . . suspension of deportation under section . . . 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act the determination as to whether the application for . . . suspension of deportation shall be granted or denied (whether such determination is made initially or on appeal) may be predicated upon confidential information without the disclosure thereof to the applicant, if in the opinion of the officer or the Board making the determination the disclosure of such information would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security.” Following a hearing, the fairness of which is unchallenged, petitioner was ordered deported in 1952 pursuant to 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 137-3. That section provided for the deportation of any alien “who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter,” a member of the Communist Party of the United States. Petitioner, a citizen of Great Britain, last entered the United States in 1921. .-At the deportation hearing he admitted having been a voluntary member of the Communist Party from 1935 through 1940. He attacked the validity of the deportation order in the courts below on the ground that there is “no lawful power . . . under the Constitution or laws of the United States” to deport one who has “at no time violated any condition imposed at the time of his entry.” But that point has been abandoned, and in this Court petitioner in effect concedes that he is deportable. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580. In 1953, upon motion of petitioner, the deportation order was withdrawn for the purpose of allowing petitioner to seek discretionary relief from the Attorney General under § 244 (a) (5) of the Act. The application for suspension of deportation was filed and a hearing thereon was held before a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The special inquiry officer found petitioner to be qualified for suspension of deportation — that is, found that petitioner met the statutory prerequisites to the favorable exercise of the discretionary relief. But the special inquiry officer decided the case for suspension did not “warrant favorable action” in view of certain “confidential information.” The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal, basing its decision “Upon a full consideration of the evidence of record and in light of the confidential information available.” Thus, the Board in considering the appeal reviewed the undisclosed information as well as the evidence on the open record. Petitioner then commenced the present habeas corpus action. As previously noted, § 244 (a)(5) of the Act provides that the Attorney General “may, in his discretion” suspend deportation of any deportable alien who meets certain statutory requirements relating to moral character, hardship and period of residence within the United States. If the Attorney General does suspend deportation under that provision, he must file, pursuant to § 244 (c), “a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case” with Congress, giving “the reasons for such suspension.” So far as pertinent here, deportation finally cancels only if Congress affirmatively approves the suspension by a favorable concurrent resolution within a specified period of time. There is no express statutory grant of any right to a hearing on an application to the Attorney General for discretionary suspension of deportation. For purposes of effectuating these statutory provisions, the Attorney General adopted regulations delegating his authority under § 244 of the Act to special inquiry officers; giving the alien the right to apply for suspension during a deportation hearing; putting the burden on the applicant to establish the statutory requirements for eligibility for suspension; allowing the alien-applicant to submit any evidence in support of his application; requiring the special inquiry officer to present evidence bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for relief; and requiring a “written decision” with “a discussion of the evidence relating to the alien’s eligibility for such relief and the reasons for granting or denying such application.” The Attorney General also promulgated the regulation under attack here, 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 244.3, see pp. 347-348, supra, providing for the use by special inquiry officers and the Board of Immigration Appeals of confidential information in ruling upon suspension applications if disclosure of the information would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety or security. We note that petitioner does not suggest that he did not receive a full and fair hearing on evidence of record with respect to his statutory eligibility for suspension of deportation. In fact, petitioner recognizes that the special inquiry officer found in his favor on all issues relating to eligibility for the discretionary relief and that those findings were adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals. This favorably disposed of petitioner’s eligibility for consideration for suspension of deportation — the first step in the suspension procedure. Thus, we have here the case of an admittedly deportable alien who has been ordered deported following an unchallenged hearing, and who has been accorded another full and fair hearing on the issues respecting his statutory qualifications for discretionary suspension of deportation./! It is urged upon the Court that the confidential information regulation is invalid because inconsistent with § 244 of the Act. In support of this claim, petitioner argues that § 244 implicitly requires the Attorney General to give a hearing on applications for suspension of deportation. It is then said that this statutory right is nullified and rendered illusory by the challenged regulation, and that therefore the regulation is invalid. But there is nothing in the language of § 244 of the Act upon which to base a belief that the Attorney General is required to give a hearing with all the evidence spread upon an open record with respect to the considerations which may bear upon his grant or denial of an application for suspension to an alien eligible for that relief. Assuming that the statute implicitly requires a hearing on an open record as to the specified statutory prerequisites to favorable action, there is no claim here of a denial of such a hearing on those issues. Moreover, though we assume a statutory right to a full hearing on those issues, it does not follow that such a right exists on the ultimate decision — the exercise of discretion to suspend deportation. Eligibility for the relief here involved is governed by specific statutory standards which provide a right to a ruling on an applicant’s eligibility. However, Congress did not provide statutory standards for determining who, among qualified applicants for suspension, should receive the ultimate relief. That determination is left to the sound discretion of the Attorney General. The statute says that, as to qualified deportable aliens, the Attorney General “may, in his discretion” suspend deportation. It does not restrict the considerations which may be relied upon or the procedure by which the discretion should be exercised. Although such aliens have been given a right to a discretionary determination on an application for suspension, cf. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, a grant thereof is manifestly not a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace. Like probation or suspension of criminal sentence, it “comes as an act of grace,” Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492, and “cannot be demanded as a right,” Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 211, 213. And this unfettered discretion of the Attorney General with respect to suspension of deportation is analogous to the Board of Parole’s powers to release federal prisoners on parole. Even if we assume that Congress has given to qualified applicants for suspension of deportation a right to offer evidence to the Attorney General in support of their applications, the similarity between the discretionary powers vested in the Attorney General by § 244 (a) of the Act on the one hand, and judicial probation power and executive parole power on the other hand, leads to a conclusion that § 244 gives no right to the kind of a hearing on a suspension application which contemplates full disclosure of the considerations entering into a decision. Clearly there is no statutory right to that kind of a hearing on a request for a grant of probation after criminal conviction in the federal courts. Nor is there such a right with respect to an application for parole. Since, as we hold, the Attorney General’s discretion is not limited by the suggested hearing requirement, the challenged regulation cannot be said to be inconsistent with § 244 (a) of the Act. Petitioner says that a hearing requirement, with a consequent disclosure of all considerations going into a decision, is made implicit by § 244 (c) if not by § 244 (a). Section 244 (c), it will be recalled, requires the Attorney General to file with Congress “a complete and detailed statement of the facts” as to cases in which suspension is granted, “with reasons for such suspension.” This statutory mandate does not, however, order such a report on cases in which suspension is denied. Section 244 (c) actually emphasizes the fact that suspension is not a matter of right. Congress was interested in limiting grants of this relief to the minimum. It evidenced an interest only in the reasons relied upon by the Attorney General for granting an application so that it could have an opportunity to accept or reject favorable administrative decisions. This in no way suggests that the applicant is to be apprised of the reasons for a denial of his request for suspension. Petitioner also points to § 235 (c) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1225 (c), which specifically authorizes the Attorney General to determine under some circumstances that an alien is excludable “on the basis of information of a confidential nature.” It is argued from this that had Congress intended to permit the use of confidential information in rulings upon applications for suspension of deportation, it would have expressly so provided in language as specific as that used in § 235 (c). The difficulty with this argument is that § 235 (c) is an exception to an express statutory mandate under § 236 (a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (a), that determinations of admissibility be “based only on the evidence produced at the inquiry.” No such express mandate exists with respect to suspension of deportation, and, therefore, no specific provision for the use of confidential information was needed if normally contemplated by the broad grant of discretionary power to the Attorney General. It is next argued that, even if the confidential information regulation is not inconsistent with § 244 (a), it nevertheless should be held invalid. Emphasizing that Congress did not in terms authorize such a procedure, petitioner contends that the Act should be construed to provide a right to a hearing because only such a construction would be consistent with the “tradition and principles of free government.” On its face this is an attractive argument. Petitioner urges that, in view of the severity of the result flowing from a denial of suspension of deportation, we should interpret the statute by resolving all doubts in the applicant’s favor. Cf. United States v. Minker, 350 U. S. 179, 187-188. But we must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences. Cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 528. As we have already stated, suspension of deportation is not given to deportable aliens as a right, but, by congressional direction, it is dispensed according to the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General. In the face of such a combination of factors we are constrained to construe the statute as permitting decisions based upon matters outside the administrative record, at least when such action would be reasonable. It may be that § 244 (a) cannot be interpreted as allowing a decision based on undisclosed information in every case involving a deportable alien qualified for suspension. Thus, it could be argued that, where there is no compelling reason to refuse to disclose the basis of a denial of an application, the statute does not contemplate arbitrary secrecy. However, the regulation under attack here limits the use of confidential information to instances where, in the opinion of the special inquiry officer or the Board of Immigration Appeals, “the disclosure . . . would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security.” If the statute permits any withholding of information from the alien, manifestly this is a reasonable class of cases in which to exercise that power. Our conclusion in this case is strongly supported by prior decisions of this Court. In both Knauff v. Shaugh-nessy, 338 U. S. 537, and Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, we upheld a regulation of the Attorney General calling for the denial of a hearing in exclusion cases where the Attorney General determined that an alien was ex-dudable on the basis of confidential information, and where, as here, the disclosure of that information would be prejudicial to the public interest. And again, as here, the statutes involved in those cases did not expressly authorize the use of such information in making the administrative ruling. It is true that a resident alien in a deportation proceeding has constitutional protections unavailable to a nonresident alien seeking entry into the United States, and that those protections may militate against construing an ambiguous statute as authorizing the use of confidential information in a deportation proceeding. Cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590. But the issue involved here under § 244 (a) is not whether an alien is deportable, but whether, as a deportable alien who is qualified for suspension of deportation, he should be granted such suspension. In view of the gratuitous nature of the relief, the use of confidential information in a suspension proceeding is more clearly within statutory authority than were the regulations involved in the Knauff and Mezei cases. Concluding that the challenged regulation is not inconsistent with the Act, we must look to petitioner’s claim that the use of undiscloséd confidential information is unlawful because inconsistent with related regulations governing suspension of deportation procedures. As previously noted, an application for suspension is considered as part of the “hearing” to determine deporta-bility. 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, §§ 242.53 (c) and 242.54 (d) ; and see 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.5. The alien is entitled to “submit any evidence in support of his application which he believes should be considered by the special inquiry officer.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.54 (d). The hearing to determine deportability, during which the suspension application is considered, is to be a “fair and impartial hearing.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.53 (b). And a decision of the special inquiry officer on the request for suspension must contain “the reasons for granting or denying such application.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.61 (a). We conclude that, although undisclosed information was used as a basis for denying suspension of deportation, none of the above-mentioned regulations was transgressed. While an applicant for suspension is, by regulation, entitled to “submit any evidence in support of his application,” that is merely a provision permitting an evidentiary plea to the discretion of those who are to make the decision. In this respect it is not unlike the “statement” and the opportunity to present “information in mitigation of punishment” to which a convicted defendant is entitled under Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure before criminal sentence is imposed. And the situation is not different because the matter of suspension of deportation is taken up in the “fair and impartial” deportation “hearing.” Assuming that such a “hearing” normally precludes the use of undisclosed information, the “hearing” here involved necessarily contemplates the use of confidential matter in some circumstances. We must read the body of regulations governing suspension procedures so as to give effect, if possible, to all of its provisions. Cf. Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198. This same rationale leads us to conclude that the requirement of a decision containing “reasons” is fully complied with by a statement to the effect that the application has been denied on the basis of confidential information, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety or security. Section 244.3 says that such information may be used “without the disclosure thereof to the applicant.” Reading the provision for a statement of the “reasons” for a decision in the light of § 244.3, it follows that express reliance on confidential information constitutes a statement of the “reasons” for a denial of suspension within the meaning of § 242.61 (a). If “reasons” must be disclosed but confidential information need not be, the former mandate, which certainly comprehends the latter provision, must be satisfied by an express invocation of the latter provision. Congress has provided a general plan dealing with the deportation of those aliens who have not obtained citizenship although admitted to residence. Since it could not readily make exception for cases of unusual hardship or extenuating circumstances, those matters were left to the consideration and discretion of the Attorney General. We hold that in this case the Attorney General has properly exercised his powers under the suspension statute and we affirm the judgment below. It is so ordered. The District Judge wrote no opinion. The quote is taken from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 15, 17-18. A similar provision is now contained in 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(6)(C). “In determining cases submitted for hearing, special inquiry-officers shall exercise . . . the authority contained in section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to suspend deportation.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.6. The finding was: “As the respondent has not been found to have been a Communist Party member later than 1940, it follows that more than ten years has elapsed since the assumption of the status which constitutes the ground for his deportation. Evidence of record, consisting of affidavits of persons well acquainted with the respondent, together with employment records, as well as a report of an investigation by this Service, satisfactorily establishes that he has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years last past. A check of the local and Federal records reveals no criminal record. An independent character investigation, as well as the above related affidavits tend to establish that for the ten years immediately preceding his application for relief, he has been a person of good moral character. "... He has stated that if he were deported he would suffer extreme and unusual hardship in that he would be separated from relatives and friends, and in effect that he would find it almost impossible to maintain himself because of lack of funds. On the record, respondent appears to be qualified for suspension of deportation.” Section 244 (a) (5) of the Act provides in pertinent part that “the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation” in the case of a deportable alien who (1) has been present in the United States for at least ten years since the ground for his deportation arose; (2) “proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character”; and (3) is one “whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus petitioner alleged, “Upon information and belief," that the "confidential information” considered by the special inquiry officer, and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals, was nothing more than the fact that petitioner’s name had appeared on a list circulated by the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, an organization which had been designated subversive by the Attorney General, ex parte. Petitioner claimed that “Solely by reason of [his] name appearing on said list, his case for discretionary relief was prejudged and no fair or impartial consideration of his case was given . . . .” In its Return to the Order to Show Cause, the Government denied that the confidential information relied upon was as alleged by petitioner, and denied that the case had been prejudged. The District Court made no specific finding with respect to the character or substance of the confidential information, but it did determine that the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals “exercised their independent judgment in denying discretionary relief.” See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, 349 U. S. 280; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302. Petitioner apparently abandoned this allegation and argument in the Court of Appeals. In his petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, he indirectly raises the point again by claiming to be “entitled to a judicial hearing upon ... his allegation of fact in habeas corpus proceedings that the undisclosed and so-called confidential matter . . . was of such a character that its consideration was not authorized by applicable regulations established by the Attorney .General.” However, petitioner made no direct assertion in this Court with respect to prejudgment. In this state of the record we conclude that there is no claim of prejudgment before this Court. See n. 22, infra. No further administrative appeal was then available to petitioner. See 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, §§ 242.61 (e), 6.1 (b) (2), 6.1 (h) (1). 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.6 quoted in part at note 3, supra. Petitioner does not suggest, nor can we conclude, that Congress expected the Attorney General to exercise his discretion in suspension cases personally. There is no doubt but that the discretion was conferred upon him as an administrator in his capacity as such, and that under his rulemaking authority, as a matter of administrative convenience, he could delegate his authority to special inquiry officers with review by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 66 Stat. 173, 8 U. S. C. § 1103. 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.54 (d). Ibid. Ibid. CFR, Rev. 1952, §242.53 (c). 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.61 (a). See notes 4 and 5, supra, and accompanying text. Congress first provided for suspension of deportation in 1940 by adding a new provision to the Immigration Act of 1917. 54 Stat. 672, as amended, 62 Stat. 1206, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 155 (c). That new provision provided that “the Attorney General may . . . suspend deportation” under certain circumstances. In enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress added the phrase “in his discretion” after the words “the Attorney General may.” In an analysis of draft legislation leading up to the 1952 Act, prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the assistance of the congressional committees, it was stated that the new words were suggested “in order to indicate clearly that the grant of suspension is entirely discretionary . . . .” That analysis was considered by the congressional committees. See S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28. As stated by Judge Learned Hand, “The power of the Attorney General to suspend deportation is a dispensing power, like a judge’s power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President’s to pardon a convict.” United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489, 491. See also S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 25, for an indication that suspension of deportation is a matter of grace to cover cases of unusual hardship. And see 81 Cong. Rec. 5546, 5553, 5554, 5561, 5569-5570, and 5572, where early proposed legislation for administrative suspension of deportation was variously described as a procedure for “clemency” and “amnesty,” and was compared with presidential discretion. And see S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 600, emphasizing that suspension of deportation is an entirely discretionary action which does not follow automatically from compliance with the formal eligibility requirements. “. . . if in the opinion of the Board [of Parole] such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.” (Emphasis supplied.) 18 IT. S. C. §4203. See United States v. Anderson, 76 F. 2d 375, 376; Losieau v. Hunter, 90 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 193 F. 2d 41. A sentencing court “may suspend . . . sentence and place the defendant on probation” if it is “satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby.” 18 U. S. C. § 3651. “The probation service of the court shall make a presentenee investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation . . . .” Rule 32(c)(1), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. “The report of the presentenee investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the Court.” Rule 32 (c)(2), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. “Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.” Rule 32 (a), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, where this Court held that there is no constitutional bar to setting a state criminal sentence on the basis of “out-of-court information.” “If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for release on parole, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.” 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (a). Note also that only certain prisoners are eligible for this discretionary relief. 18 U. S. C. § 4202. See Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, and Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, upholding a regulation of the Attorney General to a similar effect which had been promulgated prior to the existence of § 235 (c) or any other such specific statutory authority. It is not claimed that a contrary construction would render the statute and regulation unconstitutional, or even that a substantial constitutional question would thereby arise. The thrust of the argument is rather that the statute should be construed liberally in favor of the alien as a matter of statutory interpretation. In any event, in this case we have not violated our normal rule of statutory interpretation that, where possible, constructions giving rise to doubtful constitutional validity should be avoided. That rule does not authorize a departure from clear meaning. E. g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 693; Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315, 334-335. Moreover, the constitutionality of § 244 as herein interpreted gives us no difficulty. Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241. Petitioner presents the claim that the decision of the special inquiry officer was void in that the “so-called confidential matter . . . was of such a character that its consideration was not authorized by applicable regulations established by the Attorney General.” See note 6, supra. To the extent that this is an allegation that the undisclosed information, if revealed, would not have been prejudicial to the public interest, petitioner is arguing that the decision violated 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 244.3. The Board of Immigration Appeals, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals concluded, in effect, that the special inquiry officer found that the disclosure of the information would have been contrary to public interest, safety or security. We accept that finding. Nothing more is required by the regulation. The substance of this regulation is now incorporated in § 235 (c) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1225 (c). See pp. 356-357, supra. See note 18, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO. No. 45. Argued November 20, 1957. Decided December 16, 1957. Alan S. Rosenthal argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub and Melvin Richter. Edmund M. Sweeney argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The General Accounting Office audited transportation bills of the respondent, rendered and paid in 1944, and determined that the Government was overcharged in the amount of $1,025.26. When the respondent did not refund this amount on demand, the Government exercised the right, reserved in § 322 of the Transportation Act of 1940, to deduct the overpayments from a subsequent bill. The Government credited that amount against a bill of the respondent, admittedly owing, of $1,143.03 for 1950 transportation services, and paid the balance of $117.77 by check. The respondent thereupon brought this action under the Tucker Act in the District Court for Massachusetts. The complaint seeks recovery not of the $1,025.26 deducted, but of the full amount of the 1950 bill of $1,143.03. The Government’s answer admits the 1950 bill but pleads its payment by the check of $117.77 and the credit of $1,025.26 in liquidation of the overcharges determined in the 1944 bills. The respondent filed a pleading in response to the government answer admitting “that it did receive the check in the amount of $117.77, all as recited by the defendant, leaving the balance due and to this date unpaid in the amount of $1025.26.” The question presented in both courts below, and in this Court, is whether in this action the carrier has the burden of proving the correctness of the 1944 bills, or the Government the burden of proving that it was overcharged. The District Court held that the respondent carrier was pleading on a contract against which the Government was attempting to “set off” claims under other contracts, and that “whoever attempts to set off the other contractual claims has the burden of showing there are other claims.” In the absence of government evidence proving the claimed overcharges in the 1944 bills, a motion of the respondent for summary judgment was granted. The judgment entered, however, was for $402.84, because the respondent accepted the amount of 1944 overcharges in the difference between that sum and the amount of the bill. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment. 236 F. 2d 101. We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 965. Before enactment of § 322, the Government protected itself against transportation overcharges by not paying transportation bills until the responsible government officers, and, in doubtful cases, the General Accounting Office, first audited the bills and found that the charges were correct. When charges were questioned the carrier was required to justify them. If administrative settlement was not reached and the carrier sued the United States to recover the amount of the bill, no one questions that it was the carrier’s duty to sustain the burden of proving the correctness of the charges. Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 445, 448. Section 322, however, required the payment of such bills “upon presentation . . . prior to audit or settlement by the General Accounting Office . . . .” The audit procedures remained substantially the same as those in effect prior to the statute but the former means of protecting against overcharges — by not paying the bills until their correctness was proved — has, by force of the statute, been replaced by the method of collecting them from subsequent bills, under the right reserved by the section to the Government “to deduct the amount of any overpayment to any such carrier from any amount subsequently found to be due such carrier.” We recently said in United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 74: “. . . This right [to deduct overpayment from subsequent bills of the carrier] was thought to be a necessary measure to protect the Government, since carriers’ bills must be paid on presentation and before audit.” Again at page 75: “The fact that the Government paid the carrier’s bills as rendered is without significance in light of § 322 of the Transportation Act, supra, requiring payment ‘upon presentation’ of such bills and postponing final settlement until audit.” This interpretation of § 322 finds full support in the legislative history of the section. The section was included in the omnibus transportation bill, which became the Transportation Act of 1940, in direct response to a demand of the railroads for legislation relieving them of the inordinate delays in payment of their bills attributable to the preaudit procedure, which tied up substantial amounts of accounts receivable and contributed to the financial difficulties which confronted the railroads during the depression years. The then President of the Association of American Railroads raised the issue in a letter to the Procurement Division of the Department of the Treasury dated October 5, 1937. (See Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 264.) Proposed legislation in almost the identical language which became § 322 was thereupon introduced in 1938. It failed of passage in the Seventy-fifth Congress and a number of similar proposals were therefore introduced in the Seventy-sixth Congress. None of these passed, but in the following year the provision was included as § 322 of the Transportation Act of 1940. It is entirely clear that although the railroads sought, in the words of their spokesman, “corrective action . . . that will render impossible such long delays in payment for services rendered,” to gain that end the railroads recognized that any remedy suggested on their behalf should be “both practical and legal and [one] which can easily be made operative without the assumption of any risk insofar as the Government is concerned.” It was “with this thought in mind” that the railroads proposed the elimination of preaudit procedures and the prompt payment of transportation bills when rendered, with audit “after payment ... [of] these bills referred to the General Accounting Office or such other governmental auditing office as might be desired for audit.” The plan contemplated that “in the event . . . this audit reveals an over-payment” the same “will be promptly paid by the railway, preserving, however, the right of the carrier to make further effort to recollect in the event that it does not believe the proper charges resulted from the Government’s audit.” In hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held June 1, 1938, in connection with one of the bills incorporating the proposal which became § 322, the then General Counsel of the Association of American Railroads, arguing in support of the proposal, urged that “[i]f that section could be put in here, it would require the payment of the bills by the Government as they are rendered by the railroads, with the privilege, however, of course, if it should develop that there has been an overpayment, the Government may deduct that amount from subsequent bills.” The conclusion is inescapable from this history that the Congress was desirous of aiding the railroads to secure prompt payment of their charges, but it is also clear that the Congress, and the railroads, contemplated that the Government’s protection against overcharges available under the preaudit practice should not be diminished. The burden of the carriers to establish the correctness of their charges was to continue unabridged. The carriers were to be paid immediately upon submission of their bills but the carriers were in return promptly to refund overcharges when such charges were administratively determined. The carrier would then have “to recollect” the sum refunded by justifying its bills to the agency or by proving its claim in the courts. The footing upon which each of the parties stood when controversies over charges developed was not to be changed. The right of the United States to deduct overpayments from subsequent bills was the carriers’ own proposal for securing the Government against the burden of having to prove the overpayment in proceedings for reimbursement. In the light of this history, we are unable to agree with the holdings of the Court of Appeals that “[a] 11 that § 322 does is to authorize and direct disbursing officers of the United States to pay transportation bills upon presentation, without waiting for audit or settlement by the General Accounting Office,” and that the reservation of the right of offset against subsequent bills is without significance — “We suppose that this provision was inserted out of an abundance of caution, because the availability of a setoff by the United States need not depend upon specific statutory authorization,” citing Gratiot v. United, States, 15 Pet. 336, 370. 236 F. 2d 101, 105. Nor do we share the view of the Court of Appeals that “the position of the United States as shipper, so far as the present case is concerned, is no different from that of a private shipper.” Id., at 104. Even if we assume that “[i]f a private shipper or consignee should pay the carrier before satisfying himself of the correctness of the charges demanded — as he may be required to do pursuant to § 3 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (2) and regulations of the Commission thereunder — and later sues for a refund of alleged over-payments, or seeks to set off the amount of the overpay-ments against another claim admittedly due, in either case the shipper or consignee would have the burden of alleging and proving the fact and the amount of such overpayment,” the Court of Appeals overlooks the fact that the Government’s statutory right of setoff was designed to be the substantial equivalent of its previous right to withhold payment altogether until the carrier established the correctness of its charges. Thus the issue of overcharges, after the enactment of § 322, arises in a different way, but the differing procedures by which the issue is presented should not control the placement of the burden of proof. In effect the situation is that the railroad is suing to recover amounts which the Government initially paid conditionally, and then recaptured, under the § 322 procedure. We therefore hold that the burden of the carrier to establish the lawfulness of its charges is the same under § 322 as it was under the superseded practice. Similarly, conventional principles of contractual setoff should not govern the determination of the carrier’s burden of proof in this action merely because the complaint frames an action for recovery of the full amount of the 1950 bill rather than the amount deducted therefrom. The respondent’s brief concedes that “[w]henever a railroad brings an action against the Government, directly upon the deduction [as, on the facts of the case, to recover the alleged 1944 overpayments], it has the burden of alleging and proving the facts of the case and establishing the validity of its claim in the light of the contract and the applicable tariffs.” There is also authority that the plaintiff has the same burden, although suing on the subsequent bill, when the claim for damages is for the amount of the deduction. Suncook Mills v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 744; Eastport S. S. Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 210, 130 F. Supp. 333; Buck Express, Inc. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 772, 132 F. Supp. 473. We do not see that a different issue was shaped by the pleadings in this action. Cf. Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. United States, 164 U. S. 190, 212. Although the ad damnum clause of the complaint prays recovery of $1,143.03, respondent’s pleading filed in response to the Government’s answer admits the government payment of $117.77, and that the actual controversy concerns the balance of $1,025.26. The true dispute between the parties, arising from the determination and collection of the overpayments as authorized by § 322, involves the lawfulness of the 1944 bills. It is the substance, not the form, which should be our concern. Cf. Alcoa S. S. Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 421; Reynolds v. United States, 292 U. S. 443. We hold that the respondent is entitled to recover only if it satisfies its burden of proving that its 1944 charges were computed at lawful and authorized rates. We do not here intimate that the administrative determination of overpayment has binding effect in the judicial proceeding, see Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 211; Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 112, 120-121; and we agree with the Court of Appeals that the extrinsic fact, namely the availability of the freight cars in the sizes ordered, remains to be proved in the suit. Our conclusion is that the burden in that respect is upon the carrier. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed with direction to remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissents, on the basis of the opinion of Chief Judge Magruder in the court below, 236 F. 2d 101, and more particularly because the respondent was not the initial carrier. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. The letter, dated October 5, 1937, was addressed by J. J. Pelley, President of the Association of American Railroads, to Captain H. E. Collins, Assistant Director, Procurement Division, Treasury Department, and reads: “Dear Captain Collins: “The railroads members of the Association of American Railroads, which comprise about 98% of all the Class I railroads in the United States, have been very much concerned by the long delay in securing payment for transportation services rendered for the U. S. Government. We know further, from conferences with the officers of the American Short Line Railroad Association, that their lines have been and are experiencing similar difficulty. These delays are not justified and the carriers should not be expected to finance the Government as they are now doing, insofar as transportation is concerned. Furthermore, the railroads are necessarily large borrowers and in that connection are required as a condition to their obtaining the necessary capital to pay substantial interest charges on all such borrowed money, whereas on the other hand the Government is paying no interest on its delayed payments to the railroad companies, which delays in many instances run over a year and invariably are not settled for sixty to ninety days. Although the railroads pay interest for the money they borrow, they cannot under the law collect interest from the Government no matter how long settlements may be delayed. This is obviously unfair. “Under the law applicable to commercial shippers, transactions with railroads are required to be on substantially a cash basis. Shippers are required to pay freight charges within 48 hours, on a majority of the traffic, and in no case are they permitted credit in excess of 96 hours. It appears to us, and particularly under the present unfortunate financial position of the railroads, that the carriers ought to receive settlement from the Government within 96 hours after a bill has been presented and that would be possible providing the proper machinery were set up and the proper instructions issued. “This matter is of very much greater importance today than it has been in years past, for the reason that under present conditions the Government is engaged in shipping to a very much greater extent than ever before. Due to the various bureaus and other agencies, particularly in connection with relief work and in connection with some of the governmental corporations that have been organized, the Government is today handling much tonnage which was previously commercial traffic so that the delay in settlement for the transportation charges is much more serious to the railroads today than would have been the case a decade ago. It should also be borne in mind in connection with Government freight shipped under Government bills of lading the railroads are under the law not assessing their commercial rates but are making such discounts as the law requires because of land-grants and which in many instances today means the handling of this traffic on a basis below the actual cost of performing the service. These facts are mentioned only as indicating the very great importance of providing some sort of a system which will permit the more prompt payment of these charges. “That you may have a picture of the situation, your attention is directed to the fact that as of July 1, 1937, there were 94,182 outstanding unpaid railroad bills against the Government amounting to $11,749,774, all of which bills had been rendered prior to May 1, 1937, and of these bills and this amount there was unpaid $4,683,946, representing 35,761 bills which had been rendered prior to January 1, 1937. “We feel very sure that you and the other officers of the Government will agree that this situation is one that is grossly unfair and that corrective action should be taken that will render impossible such long delays in payment for services rendered. “We are also of the opinion that it is not sufficient for us to simply complain of this situation but that in addition thereto we ought to suggest a remedy which in our judgment is both practical and legal and which can easily be made operative without the assumption of any risk insofar as the Government is concerned, providing you and your associates will put the suggested plan in operation and with such instructions issued as may be needed in connection therewith. With this thought in mind, we very respectfully submit for your consideration the following: “We believe that the delay in the payment of transportation charges by the Government to the railroads would be absolutely avoided if the various departments contracting for transportation were instructed to pay the bills as rendered and after payment have these bills referred to the General Accounting Office or such other governmental auditing office as might be desired for audit. In the event that this audit reveals an over-payment, then claim be presented to the carrier for the amount thereof which will be promptly paid by the railway, preserving, however, the right of the carrier to make further effort to recollect in the event that it does not believe the proper charges resulted from the Government’s audit. Attention is further directed to the fact that the railroads would never have, under such a plan, more money than the Government lawfully owed for the reason that the Government is shipping daily and is currently obligated to the railroad companies for transportation charges. This would place the handling of governmental transportation charges on substantially the same basis as applies in connection with commercial transactions. “I am very sure from our previous negotiations with you and others connected with the Government with regard to the same subject that there exists no differences as between us as to the necessity of more prompt payment than has heretofore prevailed. I hope that you and your associates may consider the suggestions contained herein as reasonable and practical and that we may rely upon your good offices to bring about some such arrangement. It may be that you may desire to discuss this matter and perhaps make some suggestions that differ somewhat from the plan proposed herein. Should this situation develop, I want to assure you that either the officers of this Association or the appropriate officers of this Association with a committee of the lines will gladly discuss the subject with you at such time and place as may be mutually satisfactory. I feel sure that we both desire to obtain, a very substantial improvement in the situation that now exists, and I am of the opinion that if these matters can be handled along lines somewhat similar to those which we have recommended that it will not only create a much better feeling as between the railroads and the Government, but in addition thereto will materially reduce the expenditures of both parties in the handling of these accounts and give to the railroads money which is due and greatly needed. “With very kindest regards, I beg to remain. “Yours most cordially, “(Signed) J. J. Pelley.” Section 322 of the Transportation Act of September 18, 1940, 54 Stat. 955, 49 U. S. C. § 66, provides as follows: “Payment for transportation of the United States mail and of persons or property for or on behalf of the United States by any common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, or the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, shall be made upon presentation of bills therefor, prior to audit or settlement by the General Accounting Office, but the right is hereby reserved to the United States Government to deduct the amount of any overpayment to any such carrier from any amount subsequently found to be due such carrier.” 24 Stat. 505, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (a) (2). The Pleading is captioned “Plaintiff’s Answer to Defendant's Counterclaim.” Government accounts generally are subject to audit prior to payment. 33 Op. Atty. Gen. 383. Prepayment examination of claims has statutory support in several statutes. See 55 Stat. 875, 31 U. S. C. § 82b; R. S. §3620, 31 U. S. C. §492; R. S. §3622, 31 U. S. C. § 496; R. S. § 3623, 31 U. S. C. § 498; R. S. § 3633, 31 U. S. C. §514; R. S. §3648, 31 U. S. C. § 529; 37 Stat. 375, as amended, 31 U. S. C. §82; 55 Stat. 875, 31 U. S. C. § 82c. The claimant must furnish proof satisfactorily establishing his claim. Charles v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 316. Doubtful accounts and claims are transmitted to the General Accounting Office for review. Section 1 of G. A. O. General Regulations No. 50, April 21, 1926, 4 CFR § 4.1. The correctness of the 1944 bills' turned on the determination of fact whether freight cars of the shorter lengths ordered by the United States were available when the initial carrier supplied cars of larger sizes. A wartime measure permitted the charging of the tariffs applicable to the cars furnished if the carrier could not supply cars of the sizes ordered. 236 F. 2d 101, 103. The General Accounting Office determined the overpayment on a finding that the documents showed that longer cars were furnished than were ordered. On the question of whether cars of the sizes ordered were available, the Government stated its position in answer to interrogations: “Such information is peculiarly within the knowledge of plaintiff [respondent] and/or the initial carrier . . . .” The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary. Cf. Sclma, R. & D. R. Co. v. United States, 139 U. S. 560, 566; United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 191 U. S. 84, 91-92. The position of the respondent herein is that the Government had all the information known to the carriers as to the availability of cars of the sizes ordered. S. 3876, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., introduced April 20, 1938 (83 Cong. Rec. 5569). H. R. 10620, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., introduced May 12, 1938 (83 Cong. Rec. 6842). See, e. g., S. 1915, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced March 23, 1939 (84 Cong. Rec. 3143); S. 1990, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced March 30, 1939 (84 Cong. Rec. 3509). Section 1 of both of these bills dealt with the elimination of land-grant rates; § 2 with the payment of transportation bills upon presentation. H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced January 13, 1939 (84 Cong. Rec. 345); H. R. 4862, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced March 8, 1939 (84 Cong. Rec. 2512). Section 501 of Title V of H. R. 2531 and §§ 201 and 202 of Title II of H. R. 4862 concerned government traffic. Their provisions were substantially the same as the provisions in S. 1915 and 1990. H. R. Rep. No. 2016, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. The postpayment audit of transportation bills by the General Accounting Office has been a large-scale operation since enactment of § 322. For example, the Annual Report of the Comptroller General for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, pages 31-32, reports that: “During the fiscal year 1951, there was examined and reviewed in the regular audit of freight transportation payments — exclusive of special cases — a total of 633,706 vouchers covering 2,569,198 bills of lading, paid in the sum of $350,341,941 as to which there were stated for issuance 25,591 notices of overpayment totaling $6,301,799. There was examined and reviewed in the audit of passenger transportation payments a total of 400,639 vouchers covering 2,917,633 transportation requests, paid in the sum of $91,380,604, as to which there were stated for issuance 11,015 notices of overpayment totaling $672,708.” A general practice of making refunds following determination of overpayments has apparently developed under § 322. A footnote to the Government's brief states: “We are advised by the General Accounting Office that, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, carriers refunded a total of $40,941,188.78. The amount deducted from subsequent bills during that same period totaled $11,155,837.72. During the preceding fiscal year, the total amount refunded was approximately two and one-half times the amount deducted.” Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on H. R. 10620, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., June 1, 1938, pp. 34-35. The statute was broadened before final passage to apply to any common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, or the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. See Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives on H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 472. The private shipper must pay freight charges promptly and has no expressed right of offset of any overpayment against charges for other transportation services. 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (2). A limited exception allows carriers to extend credit for a period of 96 hours to private shippers under prescribed conditions and limitations. Ex parte No. 78, 57 I. C. C. 591. Compare the practice followed in the Court of Claims, which has concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court of actions under the Tucker Act. A “Memorandum Order as to Procedure in Common Carrier Cases,” issued March 11, 1953, by the Court of Claims (now, with some amendments, included as Appendix B in the Rules of the Court of Claims, revised December 2, 1957), expressly defines the “dispute” in cases of the instant kind, among others, brought in that court: “The word 'dispute’. . . means the shipment or shipments with respect to which the General Accounting Office or other agency of the Government determined that the' carrier’s charges had been overpaid . . . rather than subsequent shipments which are not in dispute except for the fact that the overpayments determined as to the shipments in dispute have been deducted from the amount of the carrier’s bills covering such subsequent shipments.”- The memorandum prescribes a procedure for the framing of the issues arising from the “dispute” as so defined. The carrier bringing the action must furnish a detailed schedule as to “each of the carrier’s bills for the shipments in dispute” and is required also to file, at the time of its petition or within 30 days thereafter, “a request for admission by the defendant [United States] of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with the request and of the truth of the material matters of fact relied on by the carrier for recovery in the action.” The statements are expressly required to be “sufficiently explicit to show the nature of the dispute and the specific reason or reasons why the plaintiff believes it is entitled to recover higher rates or charges than those allowed by the Government.” Failure to comply with the requirements of the memorandum may be cause for the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal of the carrier’s petition. But see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 1, 140 F. Supp. 569, 572. The Court of Claims there indicated that the burden would be on the United States while holding that the railroad had the duty to provide all the information it had on the issue of availability of cars.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FREEMAN v. UNITED STATES No. 09-10245. Argued February 23, 2011 Decided June 23, 2011 Frank W. Heft, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Scott T. Wendelsdorf. Curtis E. Gannon argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Katyal, Assistant Attorney General Breuer, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and John-Alex Romano. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan join. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. § 3551 et seq., calls for the creation of Sentencing Guidelines to inform judicial discretion in order to reduce unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing. The Act allows retroactive amendments to the Guidelines for cases where the Guidelines become a cause of inequality, not a bulwark against it. When a retroactive Guidelines amendment is adopted, § 3582(c)(2) permits defendants sentenced based on a sentencing range that has been modified to move for a reduced sentence. The question here is whether defendants who enter into plea agreements that recommend a particular sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(1)(C) (authorizing such plea agreements). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, barring a miscarriage of justice or mutual mistake, defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements cannot benefit from retroactive Guidelines amendments. Five Members of the Court agree that this judgment must be reversed. The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the Court of Appeals finds no support in § 3582(c)(2), Rule 11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements. In every case the judge must exercise discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. This discretion, in turn, is framed by the Guidelines. And the Guidelines must be consulted, in the regular course, whether the case is one in which the conviction was after a trial or after a plea, including a plea pursuant to an agreement that recommends a particular sentence. The district judge’s decision to impose a sentence may therefore be based on the Guidelines even if the defendant agrees to plead guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Where the decision to impose a sentence is based on a range later subject to retroactive amendment, § 3582(c)(2) permits a sentence reduction. Section 3582(c)(2) empowers district judges to correct sentences that depend on frameworks that later prove unjustified. There is no reason to deny § 3582(c)(2) relief to defendants who linger in prison pursuant to sentences that would not have been imposed but for a since-rejected, excessive range. Justice Sotomayor would reverse the judgment on a different ground set out in the opinion concurring in the judgment. That opinion, like the dissent, would hold that sentences following 11(c)(1)(C) agreement are based on the agreement rather than the Guidelines, and therefore that § 3582(c)(2) relief is not available in the typical case. But unlike the dissent she would permit the petitioner here to seek a sentence reduction because his plea agreement in express terms ties the recommended sentence to the Guidelines sentencing range. The reasons that lead those Members of the Court who join this plurality opinion may be set forth as follows. I A Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to “modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,” 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c); but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions. Here, the exception is contained in a statutory provision enacted to permit defendants whose Guidelines sentencing range has been lowered by retroactive amendment to move for a sentence reduction if the terms of the statute are met. The statute provides: “[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 994(o)... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(2). This case concerns the application of the statute to cases in which defendants enter into plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). That Rule permits the parties to “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the ease,... [a request which] binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” The question is whether defendants who enter into 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that specify a particular sentence may be said to have been sentenced “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range, making them eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). B Petitioner William Freeman was indicted in 2005 for various crimes, including possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base. 21 U. S. C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). He entered into an agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in which he agreed to plead guilty to all charges. In return the Government “agree[d] that a sentence of 106 months’ incarceration is the appropriate disposition of this case.” App. 26a. The agreement states that “[b]oth parties have independently reviewed the Sentencing Guidelines applicable in this case,” and that “[Freeman] agrees to have his sentence determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id., at 27a-28a. The agreement reflects the parties’ expectation that Freeman would face a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months, ibid. (Offense Level 19, Criminal History Category IV), along with a consecutive mandatory minimum of 60 months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The recommended sentence of 106 months thus corresponded with the minimum sentence suggested by the Guidelines, in addition to the 60-month § 924(e)(1)(A) sentence. The District Court accepted the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, the court “adopt[ed] the findings of the probation officer disclosed in the probation report and application of the guidelines as set out therein.” App. 47a. “[EQaving considered the advisory guidelines and 18 USC 3553(a),” the court imposed the recommended 106-month sentence, which was “within the guideline ranges” — the 46-to 57-month range the parties had anticipated plus the mandatory 60 months under § 924(c)(1)(A) — and “sufficient to meet the objectives of the law.” Id., at 48a-49a. Three years later, the Commission issued a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines to remedy the significant disparity between the penalties for cocaine base and powder cocaine offenses. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Supp. App. C, Arndt. 706 (Nov. 2010) (USSG) (effective Nov. 1, 2007) (adjusting Guidelines); id., Arndt. 713 (effective Mar. 3, 2008) (making Amendment 706 retroactive). Its effect was to reduce Freeman’s applicable sentencing range to 37 to 46 months, again with the consecutive 60-month mandatory minimum. App. 142a-144a (Sealed). Freeman moved for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). The District Court, however, denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Goins, 355 Fed. Appx. 1 (2009). Adhering to its decision in United States v. Peveler, 359 F. 3d 369 (2004), the Court of Appeals held that defendants sentenced following 11(c)(1)(C) agreements that specify a particular sentence are ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief, barring a miscarriage of justice or mutual mistake. This Court granted certiorari. 561 U. S. 1058 (2010). II Federal sentencing law requires the district judge in every case to impose “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the purposes of federal sentencing, in light of the Guidelines and other § 3553(a) factors. 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a). The Guidelines provide a framework or starting point — a basis, in the commonsense meaning of the term — for the judge’s exercise of discretion. E. g., 1 Oxford English Dictionary 977 (2d ed. 1989), Rule 11(c)(1)(C) permits the defendant and the prosecutor to agree that a specific sentence is appropriate, but that agreement does not discharge the district court’s independent obligation to exercise its discretion. In the usual sentencing, whether following trial or plea, the judge’s reliance on the Guidelines will be apparent, for the judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point in the analysis and impose a sentence within the range. Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007). Even where the judge varies from the recommended range, id., at 50, if the judge uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense a basis for the sentence. Rule 11(c)(1)(C) makes the parties’ recommended sentence binding on the court “once the court accepts the plea agreement,” but the governing policy statement confirms that the court’s acceptance is itself based on the Guidelines. See USSG §6B1.2. That policy statement forbids the district judge to accept an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s applicable sentencing range. The commentary to § 6B1.2 advises that a court may accept an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement “only if the court is satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate sentence -within the applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons.” Cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36 (1993) (Guidelines commentary is authoritative). Any bargain between the parties is contingent until the court accepts the agreement. The Guidelines require the district judge to give due consideration to the relevant sentencing range, even if the defendant and prosecutor recommend a specific sentence as a, condition of the guilty plea. This approach finds further support in the policy statement that applies to § 3582(c)(2) motions. See USSG § 1B1.10. It instructs the district court in modifying a sentence to substitute only the retroactive amendment and then leave all original Guidelines determinations in place. § IB 1.10(b)(1). In other words, the policy statement seeks to isolate whatever marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant’s sentence. Working backwards from this purpose, § 3582(c)(2) modification proceedings should be available to permit the district court to revisit a prior sentence to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement. This is the only rule consistent with the governing policy statement, a statement that rests on the premise that a Guideline range may be one of many factors that determine the sentence imposed. Tlius, the text and purpose of the Linee relevant sources— the statute, the Rule, and the governing policy statements— require the conclusion that the district court has authority to entertain § 3582(c)(2) motions when sentences are imposed in light of the Guidelines, even if the defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. Ill The transcript of petitioner’s sentencing hearing reveals that his original sentence was based on the Guidelines. The District Court first calculated the sentencing range, as both § 3553(a)(4) and §6B 1.2(c) require. App. 47a, 49a. It explained that it “considered the advisory guidelines and 18 USC 3553(a),” and that “the sentence imposed . . . fall[s] within the guideline rang[e] and [is] sufficient to meet the objectives of the law.” Id., at 48a-49a. Apart from the defense attorney's initial statement that the ease involved a “(C) plea," id., at 47a, the hearing proceeded as if the agreement did not exist. The court expressed its independent judgment that the sentence was appropriate in light of the applicable Guidelines range, and its decision was therefore “based on” that range. IV The Government asks this Court to hold that sentences like petitioner's, which follow an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, are based only on the agreement and not the Guidelines, and therefore that defendants so sentenced are ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief. The Government's position rests in part on the concern that the conclusion reached here will upset the bargain struck between prosecutor and defendant. See Brief for United States 42-43. That, however, has nothing to do with whether a sentence is “based on” the Guidelines under § 3582(c)(2). And in any event, the concern is overstated. Retroactive reductions to sentencing ranges are infrequent, so the problem will not arise often. Klein & Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 519, 535 (2009). More important, the district court's authority under § 3582(c)(2) is subject to significant constraints, constraints that can be enforced by appellate review. The binding policy statement governing § 3582(c)(2) motions places considerable limits on district court discretion. All Guidelines decisions from the original sentencing remain in place, save the sentencing range that was altered by retroactive amendment. USSG § lB1.10(b)(l). In an initial sentencing hearing, a district court can vary below the Guidelines; but, by contrast, below-Guidelines modifications in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings are forbidden, USSG §1B1.10(b) (2)(A), except where the original sentence was itself a downward departure, § IB 1.10(b)(2)(B). And the court must always “consider the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment.” § IB 1.10, comment., n. l(B)(ii). The district court’s authority is limited; and the courts of appeals, and ultimately this Court, can ensure that district courts do not overhaul plea agreements, thereby abusing their authority under § 3582(c)(2). See Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. 817 (2010) (reviewing and affirming a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction); Gall, 552 U. S., at 49 (all sentences are reviewable for abuse of discretion). The Government would enact a categorical bar on § 3582(c)(2) relief. But such a bar would prevent district courts from making an inquiry that is within their own special knowledge and expertise. What is at stake in this case is a defendant’s eligibility for relief, not the extent of that relief. Indeed, even where a defendant is permitted to seek a reduction, the district judge may conclude that a reduction would be inappropriate. District judges have a continuing professional commitment, based on scholarship and accumulated experience, to a consistent sentencing policy. They can rely on the frameworks they have devised to determine whether and to what extent a sentence reduction is warranted in any particular ease. They may, when considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion, take into account a defendant’s decision to enter into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. If the district court, based on its experience and informed judgment, concludes the agreement led to a more lenient sentence than would otherwise have been imposed, it can deny the motion, for the statute permits but does not require the court to reduce a sentence. This discretion ensures that § 3582(c)(2) does not produce a windfall. As noted, the opinion concurring in the judgment suggests an intermediate position. That opinion argues that in general defendants sentenced following 11(c)(1)(C) agreements are ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief, but relief may be sought where the plea agreement itself contemplates sentence reduction. The statute, however, calls for an inquiry into the reasons for a judge’s sentence, not the reasons that motivated or informed the parties. If, as the Government suggests, the judge’s decision to impose a sentence is based on the agreement, then § 3582(c)(2) .does not apply. The parties cannot by contract upset an otherwise-final sentence. And the consequences of this erroneous rule would be significant. By allowing modification only when the terms of the agreement contemplate it, the proposed rule would permit the very disparities the Sentencing Reform Act seeks to eliminate. The Act aims to create a comprehensive sentencing scheme in which those who commit crimes of similar severity under similar conditions receive similar sentences. See 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(6); K. Stith & J. Cabranes, Fear of Judging 104-105 (1998). Section 3582(c)(2) contributes to that goal by ensuring that district courts may adjust sentences imposed pursuant to a range that the Commission concludes are too severe, out of step with the seriousness of the crime and the sentencing ranges of analogous offenses, and inconsistent with the Act’s purposes. The crack-cocaine range here is a prime example of an unwarranted disparity that § 3582(c)(2) is designed to cure. The Commission amended the crack-cocaine Guidelines to effect a “partial remedy” for the “urgent and compelling” problem of crack-cocaine sentences, which, the Commission concluded, “significantly undermines the various congressional objectives set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act.” United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 8-10 (May 2007); see also USSG Supp. App. C, Arndt. 706; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85, 99-100 (2007), The Commission determined that those Guidelines were flawed, and therefore that sentences that relied on them ought to be reexamined. There is no good reason to extend the benefit of the Commission’s judgment only to an arbitrary subset of defendants whose agreed sentences were accepted in light of a since-rejected Guidelines range based on whether their plea agreements refer to the Guidelines. Congress enacted § 3582(c)(2) to remedy systemic injustice, and the approach outlined in the opinion concurring in the judgment would undercut a systemic solution. Even when a defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, the judge’s decision to accept the plea and impose the recommended sentence is likely to be based on the Guidelines; and when it is, the defendant should be eligible to seek § 3582(c)(2) relief. This straightforward analysis would avoid making arbitrary distinctions between similar defendants based on the terms of their plea agreements. And it would also reduce unwarranted disparities in federal sentencing, consistent with the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Stacy FRY, et vir, as next friends of minor E.F., Petitioners v. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, et al. No. 15-497. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Oct. 31, 2016. Decided Feb. 22, 2017. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Ann Arbor, MI, for Petitioners. Roman Martinez, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting Petitioners. Neal K. Katyal, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Cooperating Attorney, American Civil Liberties Union, Fund of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, Steven R. Shapiro, American Civil Liberties Union, Foundation, New York, NY, Jill M. Wheaton, James F. Hermon, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Ann Arbor, MI, Michael J. Steinberg, American Civil Liberties Union, Fund of Michigan, Detroit, MI, Susan P. Mizner, Claudia Center, American Civil Liberties Union, Foundation, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioners. Thomas P. Schmidt, Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, NY, Timothy J. Mullins, Kenneth B. Chapie, Giarmarco, Mullins & Horton, P.C., Troy, MI, Neal Kumar Katyal, Eugene A. Sokoloff, Mitchell P. Reich, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., ensures that children with disabilities receive needed special education services. One of its provisions, § 1415(l ), addresses the Act's relationship with other laws protecting those children. Section 1415(l ) makes clear that nothing in the IDEA "restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or] remedies" that other federal laws, including antidiscrimination statutes, confer on children with disabilities. At the same time, the section states that if a suit brought under such a law "seek[s] relief that is also available under" the IDEA, the plaintiff must first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. In this case, we consider the scope of that exhaustion requirement. We hold that exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen of the plaintiff's suit is something other than the denial of the IDEA's core guarantee-what the Act calls a "free appropriate public education." § 1412(a)(1)(A). I A The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a "free appropriate public education"-more concisely known as a FAPE-to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. Ibid. ; see § 1401(3)(A)(i) (listing covered disabilities). As defined in the Act, a FAPE comprises "special education and related services"-both "instruction" tailored to meet a child's "unique needs" and sufficient "supportive services" to permit the child to benefit from that instruction. §§ 1401(9), (26), (29) ; see Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). An eligible child, as this Court has explained, acquires a "substantive right" to such an education once a State accepts the IDEA's financial assistance. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). Under the IDEA, an "individualized education program," called an IEP for short, serves as the "primary vehicle" for providing each child with the promised FAPE. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) ; see § 1414(d). (Welcome to-and apologies for-the acronymic world of federal legislation.) Crafted by a child's "IEP Team"-a group of school officials, teachers, and parents-the IEP spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child's "educational needs." §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb), (d)(1)(B). Most notably, the IEP documents the child's current "levels of academic achievement," specifies "measurable annual goals" for how she can "make progress in the general education curriculum," and lists the "special education and related services" to be provided so that she can "advance appropriately toward [those] goals." §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II), (IV)(aa). Because parents and school representatives sometimes cannot agree on such issues, the IDEA establishes formal procedures for resolving disputes. To begin, a dissatisfied parent may file a complaint as to any matter concerning the provision of a FAPE with the local or state educational agency (as state law provides). See § 1415(b)(6). That pleading generally triggers a "[p]reliminary meeting" involving the contending parties, § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i) ; at their option, the parties may instead (or also) pursue a full-fledged mediation process, see § 1415(e). Assuming their impasse continues, the matter proceeds to a "due process hearing" before an impartial hearing officer. § 1415(f)(1)(A) ; see § 1415(f)(3)(A)(i). Any decision of the officer granting substantive relief must be "based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE]." § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). If the hearing is initially conducted at the local level, the ruling is appealable to the state agency. See § 1415(g). Finally, a parent unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court. See § 1415(i)(2)(A). Important as the IDEA is for children with disabilities, it is not the only federal statute protecting their interests. Of particular relevance to this case are two antidiscrimination laws-Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 -which cover both adults and children with disabilities, in both public schools and other settings. Title II forbids any "public entity" from discriminating based on disability; Section 504 applies the same prohibition to any federally funded "program or activity." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 - 12132 ; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). A regulation implementing Title II requires a public entity to make "reasonable modifications" to its "policies, practices, or procedures" when necessary to avoid such discrimination. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016) ; see, e.g., Alboniga v. School Bd. of Broward Cty., 87 F.Supp.3d 1319, 1345 (S.D.Fla.2015) (requiring an accommodation to permit use of a service animal under Title II). In similar vein, courts have interpreted § 504 as demanding certain "reasonable" modifications to existing practices in order to "accommodate" persons with disabilities. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299-300, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) ; see, e.g., Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., 731 F.Supp. 947, 961-962 (E.D.Cal.1990) (requiring an accommodation to permit use of a service animal under § 504 ). And both statutes authorize individuals to seek redress for violations of their substantive guarantees by bringing suits for injunctive relief or money damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) ; 42 U.S.C. § 12133. This Court first considered the interaction between such laws and the IDEA in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746. The plaintiffs there sought "to secure a 'free appropriate public education' for [their] handicapped child." Id., at 994, 104 S.Ct. 3457. But instead of bringing suit under the IDEA alone, they appended "virtually identical" claims (again alleging the denial of a "free appropriate public education") under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 1009, 104 S.Ct. 3457 ; see id., at 1016, 104 S.Ct. 3457. The Court held that the IDEA altogether foreclosed those additional claims: With its "comprehensive" and "carefully tailored" provisions, the Act was "the exclusive avenue" through which a child with a disability (or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his education. Id., at 1009, 104 S.Ct. 3457 ; see id., at 1013, 1016, 1021, 104 S.Ct. 3457. Congress was quick to respond. In the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 796, it overturned Smith 's preclusion of non-IDEA claims while also adding a carefully defined exhaustion requirement. Now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l ), the relevant provision of that statute reads: "Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including § 504 ], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA's administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA]." The first half of § 1415(l ) (up until "except that") "reaffirm[s] the viability" of federal statutes like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act "as separate vehicles," no less integral than the IDEA, "for ensuring the rights of handicapped children." H.R.Rep. No. 99-296, p. 4 (1985); see id., at 6. According to that opening phrase, the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under such laws even if, as in Smith itself, those claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would). But the second half of § 1415(l ) (from "except that" onward) imposes a limit on that "anything goes" regime, in the form of an exhaustion provision. According to that closing phrase, a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws must in certain circumstances-that is, when "seeking relief that is also available under" the IDEA-first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. The reach of that requirement is the issue in this case. B Petitioner E.F. is a child with a severe form of cerebral palsy, which "significantly limits her motor skills and mobility." App. to Brief in Opposition 6, Complaint ¶ 19. When E.F. was five years old, her parents-petitioners Stacy and Brent Fry-obtained a trained service dog for her, as recommended by her pediatrician. The dog, a goldendoodle named Wonder, "help[s E.F.] to live as independently as possible" by assisting her with various life activities. Id., at 2, ¶ 3. In particular, Wonder aids E.F. by "retrieving dropped items, helping her balance when she uses her walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off lights, helping her take off her coat, [and] helping her transfer to and from the toilet." Id., at 7, ¶ 27. But when the Frys sought permission for Wonder to join E.F. in kindergarten, officials at Ezra Eby Elementary School refused the request. Under E.F.'s existing IEP, a human aide provided E.F. with one-on-one support throughout the day; that two-legged assistance, the school officials thought, rendered Wonder superfluous. In the words of one administrator, Wonder should be barred from Ezra Eby because all of E.F.'s "physical and academic needs [were] being met through the services/programs/accommodations" that the school had already agreed to. Id., at 8, ¶ 33. Later that year, the school officials briefly allowed Wonder to accompany E.F. to school on a trial basis; but even then, "the dog was required to remain in the back of the room during classes, and was forbidden from assisting [E.F.] with many tasks he had been specifically trained to do." Ibid., ¶ 35. And when the trial period concluded, the administrators again informed the Frys that Wonder was not welcome. As a result, the Frys removed E.F. from Ezra Eby and began homeschooling her. In addition, the Frys filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), charging that Ezra Eby's exclusion of E.F.'s service animal violated her rights under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Following an investigation, OCR agreed. The office explained in its decision letter that a school's obligations under those statutes go beyond providing educational services: A school could offer a FAPE to a child with a disability but still run afoul of the laws' ban on discrimination. See App. 30-32. And here, OCR found, Ezra Eby had indeed violated that ban, even if its use of a human aide satisfied the FAPE standard. See id., at 35-36. OCR analogized the school's conduct to "requir [ing] a student who uses a wheelchair to be carried" by an aide or "requir[ing] a blind student to be led [around by a] teacher" instead of permitting him to use a guide dog or cane. Id., at 35. Regardless whether those-or Ezra Eby's-policies denied a FAPE, they violated Title II and § 504 by discriminating against children with disabilities. See id., at 35-36. In response to OCR's decision, school officials at last agreed that E.F. could come to school with Wonder. But after meeting with Ezra Eby's principal, the Frys became concerned that the school administration "would resent [E.F.] and make her return to school difficult." App. to Brief in Opposition 10, ¶ 48. Accordingly, the Frys found a different public school, in a different district, where administrators and teachers enthusiastically received both E.F. and Wonder. C The Frys then filed this suit in federal court against the local and regional school districts in which Ezra Eby is located, along with the school's principal (collectively, the school districts). The complaint alleged that the school districts violated Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by "denying [E.F.] equal access" to Ezra Eby and its programs, "refus[ing] to reasonably accommodate" E.F.'s use of a service animal, and otherwise "discriminat[ing] against [E.F.] as a person with disabilities." Id., at 15, ¶ 68, 17-18, ¶¶ 82-83. According to the complaint, E.F. suffered harm as a result of that discrimination, including "emotional distress and pain, embarrassment, [and] mental anguish." Id., at 11-12, ¶ 51. In their prayer for relief, the Frys sought a declaration that the school districts had violated Title II and § 504, along with money damages to compensate for E.F.'s injuries. The District Court granted the school districts' motion to dismiss the suit, holding that § 1415(l ) required the Frys to first exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 50. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same ground. In that court's view, § 1415(l ) applies if "the injuries [alleged in a suit] relate to the specific substantive protections of the IDEA." 788 F.3d 622, 625 (2015). And that means, the court continued, that exhaustion is necessary whenever "the genesis and the manifestations" of the complained-of harms were "educational" in nature. Id., at 627 (quoting Charlie F. v. Board of Ed. of Skokie School Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 993 (C.A.7 1996) ). On that understanding of § 1415(l ), the Sixth Circuit held, the Frys' suit could not proceed: Because the harms to E.F. were generally "educational"-most notably, the court reasoned, because "Wonder's absence hurt her sense of independence and social confidence at school"-the Frys had to exhaust the IDEA's procedures. 788 F.3d, at 627. Judge Daughtrey dissented, emphasizing that in bringing their Title II and § 504 claims, the Frys "did not allege the denial of a FAPE" or "seek to modify [E.F.'s] IEP in any way." Id., at 634. We granted certiorari to address confusion in the courts of appeals as to the scope of § 1415(l )'s exhaustion requirement. 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2540, 195 L.Ed.2d 867 (2016). We now vacate the Sixth Circuit's decision. II Section 1415(l ) requires that a plaintiff exhaust the IDEA's procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws when (but only when) her suit "seek[s] relief that is also available" under the IDEA. We first hold that to meet that statutory standard, a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only "relief" the IDEA makes "available." We next conclude that in determining whether a suit indeed "seeks" relief for such a denial, a court should look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff's complaint. A In this Court, the parties have reached substantial agreement about what "relief" the IDEA makes "available" for children with disabilities-and about how the Sixth Circuit went wrong in addressing that question. The Frys maintain that such a child can obtain remedies under the IDEA for decisions that deprive her of a FAPE, but none for those that do not. So in the Frys' view, § 1415(l )'s exhaustion requirement can come into play only when a suit concerns the denial of a FAPE-and not, as the Sixth Circuit held, when it merely has some articulable connection to the education of a child with a disability. See Reply Brief 13-15. The school districts, for their part, also believe that the Sixth Circuit's exhaustion standard "goes too far" because it could mandate exhaustion when a plaintiff is "seeking relief that is not in substance available" under the IDEA. Brief for Respondents 30. And in particular, the school districts acknowledge that the IDEA makes remedies available only in suits that "directly implicate[ ]" a FAPE-so that only in those suits can § 1415(l ) apply. Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the parties' shared view: The only relief that an IDEA officer can give-hence the thing a plaintiff must seek in order to trigger § 1415(l )'s exhaustion rule-is relief for the denial of a FAPE. We begin, as always, with the statutory language at issue, which (at risk of repetition) compels exhaustion when a plaintiff seeks "relief" that is "available" under the IDEA. The ordinary meaning of "relief" in the context of a lawsuit is the "redress[ ] or benefit" that attends a favorable judgment. Black's Law Dictionary 1161 (5th ed. 1979). And such relief is "available," as we recently explained, when it is "accessible or may be obtained." Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 150 (1993)). So to establish the scope of § 1415(l ), we must identify the circumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress (or, similarly, to access a benefit). That inquiry immediately reveals the primacy of a FAPE in the statutory scheme. In its first section, the IDEA declares as its first purpose "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education." § 1400(d)(1)(A). That principal purpose then becomes the Act's principal command: A State receiving federal funding under the IDEA must make such an education "available to all children with disabilities." § 1412(a)(1)(A). The guarantee of a FAPE to those children gives rise to the bulk of the statute's more specific provisions. For example, the IEP-"the centerpiece of the statute's education delivery system"-serves as the "vehicle" or "means" of providing a FAPE. Honig, 484 U.S., at 311, 108 S.Ct. 592 ; Rowley, 458 U.S., at 181, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ; see supra, at 746 - 747. And finally, as all the above suggests, the FAPE requirement provides the yardstick for measuring the adequacy of the education that a school offers to a child with a disability: Under that standard, this Court has held, a child is entitled to "meaningful" access to education based on her individual needs. Rowley, 458 U.S., at 192, 102 S.Ct. 3034. The IDEA's administrative procedures test whether a school has met that obligation-and so center on the Act's FAPE requirement. As noted earlier, any decision by a hearing officer on a request for substantive relief "shall" be "based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education." § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i) ; see supra, at 747. Or said in Latin: In the IDEA's administrative process, a FAPE denial is the sine qua non . Suppose that a parent's complaint protests a school's failure to provide some accommodation for a child with a disability. If that accommodation is needed to fulfill the IDEA's FAPE requirement, the hearing officer must order relief. But if it is not, he cannot-even though the dispute is between a child with a disability and the school she attends. There might be good reasons, unrelated to a FAPE, for the school to make the requested accommodation. Indeed, another federal law (like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act) might require the accommodation on one of those alternative grounds. See infra, at 754 - 755. But still, the hearing officer cannot provide the requested relief. His role, under the IDEA, is to enforce the child's "substantive right" to a FAPE. Smith, 468 U.S., at 1010, 104 S.Ct. 3457. And that is all. For that reason, § 1415(l )'s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l ) merely by bringing her suit under a statute other than the IDEA-as when, for example, the plaintiffs in Smith claimed that a school's failure to provide a FAPE also violated the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, that plaintiff must first submit her case to an IDEA hearing officer, experienced in addressing exactly the issues she raises. But if, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA's procedures is not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get any relief from those procedures: A hearing officer, as just explained, would have to send her away empty-handed. And that is true even when the suit arises directly from a school's treatment of a child with a disability-and so could be said to relate in some way to her education. A school's conduct toward such a child-say, some refusal to make an accommodation-might injure her in ways unrelated to a FAPE, which are addressed in statutes other than the IDEA. A complaint seeking redress for those other harms, independent of any FAPE denial, is not subject to § 1415(l )'s exhaustion rule because, once again, the only "relief" the IDEA makes "available" is relief for the denial of a FAPE. B Still, an important question remains: How is a court to tell when a plaintiff "seeks" relief for the denial of a FAPE and when she does not? Here, too, the parties have found some common ground: By looking, they both say, to the "substance" of, rather than the labels used in, the plaintiff's complaint. Brief for Respondents 20; Reply Brief 7-8. And here, too, we agree with that view: What matters is the crux-or, in legal-speak, the gravamen-of the plaintiff's complaint, setting aside any attempts at artful pleading. That inquiry makes central the plaintiff's own claims, as § 1415(l ) explicitly requires. The statutory language asks whether a lawsuit in fact "seeks" relief available under the IDEA-not, as a stricter exhaustion statute might, whether the suit "could have sought" relief available under the IDEA (or, what is much the same, whether any remedies "are" available under that law). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (contrasting § 1415(l ) with the exhaustion provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ). In effect, § 1415(l ) treats the plaintiff as "the master of the claim": She identifies its remedial basis-and is subject to exhaustion or not based on that choice. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, and n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). A court deciding whether § 1415(l ) applies must therefore examine whether a plaintiff's complaint-the principal instrument by which she describes her case-seeks relief for the denial of an appropriate education. But that examination should consider substance, not surface. The use (or non-use) of particular labels and terms is not what matters. The inquiry, for example, does not ride on whether a complaint includes (or, alternatively, omits) the precise words(?) "FAPE" or "IEP." After all, § 1415(l )'s premise is that the plaintiff is suing under a statute other than the IDEA, like the Rehabilitation Act; in such a suit, the plaintiff might see no need to use the IDEA's distinctive language-even if she is in essence contesting the adequacy of a special education program. And still more critically, a "magic words" approach would make § 1415(l )'s exhaustion rule too easy to bypass. Just last Term, a similar worry led us to hold that a court's jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act turns on the "gravamen," or "essentials," of the plaintiff's suit. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. ----, ----, ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 390, 395, 396, 397, 193 L.Ed.2d 269 (2015). "[A]ny other approach," we explained, "would allow plaintiffs to evade the Act's restrictions through artful pleading." Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 396. So too here. Section 1415(l ) is not merely a pleading hurdle. It requires exhaustion when the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress for a school's failure to provide a FAPE, even if not phrased or framed in precisely that way. In addressing whether a complaint fits that description, a court should attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities-the IDEA on the one hand, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (most notably) on the other. The IDEA, of course, protects only "children" (well, really, adolescents too) and concerns only their schooling. § 1412(a)(1)(A). And as earlier noted, the statute's goal is to provide each child with meaningful access to education by offering individualized instruction and related services appropriate to her "unique needs." § 1401(29) ; see Rowley, 458 U.S., at 192, 198, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ; supra, at 753 - 754. By contrast, Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act cover people with disabilities of all ages, and do so both inside and outside schools. And those statutes aim to root out disability-based discrimination, enabling each covered person (sometimes by means of reasonable accommodations) to participate equally to all others in public facilities and federally funded programs. See supra, at 749 - 750. In short, the IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions. That is not to deny some overlap in coverage: The same conduct might violate all three statutes-which is why, as in Smith, a plaintiff might seek relief for the denial of a FAPE under Title II and § 504 as well as the IDEA. But still, the statutory differences just discussed mean that a complaint brought under Title II and § 504 might instead seek relief for simple discrimination, irrespective of the IDEA's FAPE obligation. One clue to whether the gravamen of a complaint against a school concerns the denial of a FAPE, or instead addresses disability-based discrimination, can come from asking a pair of hypothetical questions. First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school-say, a public theater or library? And second, could an adult at the school-say, an employee or visitor-have pressed essentially the same grievance? When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject; after all, in those other situations there is no FAPE obligation and yet the same basic suit could go forward. But when the answer is no, then the complaint probably does concern a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all that explains why only a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting or a child in some other) has a viable claim. Take two contrasting examples. Suppose first that a wheelchair-bound child sues his school for discrimination under Title II (again, without mentioning the denial of a FAPE) because the building lacks access ramps. In some sense, that architectural feature has educational consequences, and a different lawsuit might have alleged that it violates the IDEA: After all, if the child cannot get inside the school, he cannot receive instruction there; and if he must be carried inside, he may not achieve the sense of independence conducive to academic (or later to real-world) success. But is the denial of a FAPE really the gravamen of the plaintiff's Title II complaint? Consider that the child could file the same basic complaint if a municipal library or theater had no ramps. And similarly, an employee or visitor could bring a mostly identical complaint against the school. That the claim can stay the same in those alternative scenarios suggests that its essence is equality of access to public facilities, not adequacy of special education. See supra, at 751 - 752 (describing OCR's use of a similar example). And so § 1415(l ) does not require exhaustion. But suppose next that a student with a learning disability sues his school under Title II for failing to provide remedial tutoring in mathematics. That suit, too, might be cast as one for disability-based discrimination, grounded on the school's refusal to make a reasonable accommodation; the complaint might make no reference at all to a FAPE or an IEP. But can anyone imagine the student making the same claim against a public theater or library? Or, similarly, imagine an adult visitor or employee suing the school to obtain a math tutorial? The difficulty of transplanting the complaint to those other contexts suggests that its essence-even though not its wording-is the provision of a FAPE, thus bringing § 1415(l ) into play. A further sign that the gravamen of a suit is the denial of a FAPE can emerge from the history of the proceedings. In particular, a court may consider that a plaintiff has previously invoked the IDEA's formal procedures to handle the dispute-thus starting to exhaust the Act's remedies before switching midstream. Recall that a parent dissatisfied with her child's education initiates those administrative procedures by filing a complaint, which triggers a preliminary meeting (or possibly mediation) and then a due process hearing. See supra, at 748 - 749. A plaintiff's initial choice to pursue that process may suggest that she is indeed seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE-with the shift to judicial proceedings prior to full exhaustion reflecting only strategic calculations about how to maximize the prospects of such a remedy. Whether that is so depends on the facts; a court may conclude, for example, that the move to a courtroom came from a late-acquired awareness that the school had fulfilled its FAPE obligation and that the grievance involves something else entirely. But prior pursuit of the IDEA's administrative remedies will often provide strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff's claim concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term. III The Court of Appeals did not undertake the analysis we have just set forward. As noted above, it asked whether E.F.'s injuries were, broadly speaking, "educational" in nature. See supra, at 752; 788 F.3d, at 627 (reasoning that the "value of allowing Wonder to attend [school] with E.F. was educational" because it would foster "her sense of independence and social confidence," which is "the sort of interest the IDEA protects"). That is not the same as asking whether the gravamen of E.F.'s complaint charges, and seeks relief for, the denial of a FAPE. And that difference in standard may have led to a difference in result in this case. Understood correctly, § 1415(l ) might not require exhaustion of the Frys' claim. We lack some important information on that score, however, and so we remand the issue to the court below. The Frys' complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services E.F.'s school provided. The school districts' "refusal to allow Wonder to act as a service dog," the complaint states, "discriminated against [E.F.] as a person with disabilities ... by denying her equal access" to public facilities. App. to Brief in Opposition 15, Complaint ¶ 68. The complaint contains no allegation about the denial of a FAPE or about any deficiency in E.F.'s IEP. More, it does not accuse the school even in general terms of refusing to provide the educational instruction and services that E.F. needs. See 788 F.3d, at 631 (acknowledging that the Frys do not "state that Wonder enhances E.F.'s educational opportunities"). As the Frys explained in this Court: The school districts "have said all along that because they gave [E.F.] a one-on-one [human] aide, that all of her ... educational needs were satisfied. And we have not challenged that, and it would be difficult for us to challenge that." Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. The Frys instead maintained, just as OCR had earlier found, that the school districts infringed E.F.'s right to equal access-even if their actions complied in full with the IDEA's requirements. See App. to Brief in Opposition 15, 18-19, Complaint ¶¶ 69, 85, 87; App. 34-37; supra, at 751 - 752. And nothing in the nature of the Frys' suit suggests any implicit focus on the adequacy of E.F.'s education. Consider, as suggested above, that the Frys could have filed essentially the same complaint if a public library or theater had refused admittance to Wonder. See supra, at 756. Or similarly, consider that an adult visitor to the school could have leveled much the same charges if prevented from entering with his service dog. See ibid. In each case, the plaintiff would challenge a public facility's policy of precluding service dogs (just as a blind person might challenge a policy of barring guide dogs, see supra, at 751) as violating Title II's and § 504's equal access requirements. The suit would have nothing to do with the provision of educational services. From all that we know now, that is exactly the kind of action the Frys have brought. But we do not foreclose the possibility that the history of these proceedings might suggest something different. As earlier discussed, a plaintiff's initial pursuit of the IDEA's administrative remedies can serve as evidence that the gravamen of her later suit is the denial of a FAPE, even though that does not appear on the face of her complaint. See supra, at 756 - 758. The Frys may or may not have sought those remedies before filing this case: None of the parties here have addressed that issue, and the record is cloudy as to the relevant facts. Accordingly, on remand, the court below should establish whether (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA's dispute resolution process before bringing this suit. And if the Frys started down that road, the court should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion. With these instructions and for the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join all of the opinion of the Court with the exception of its discussion (in the text from the beginning of the first new paragraph on page 756 to the end of the opinion) in which the Court provides several misleading "clue[s]," ante, at 756, for the lower courts. The Court first instructs the lower courts to inquire whether the plaintiff could have brought "essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school-say, a public theater or library." Ibid . Next, the Court says, a court should ask whether "an adult at the school-say, an employee or visitor-[could] have pressed essentially the same grievance." Ibid . These clues make sense only if there is no overlap between the relief available under the following two sets of claims: (1) the relief provided by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and (2) the relief provided by other federal laws (including the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The Court does not show or even claim that there is no such overlap-to the contrary, it observes that "[t]he same conduct might violate" the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA. Ibid. And since these clues work only in the absence of overlap, I would not suggest them. The Court provides another false clue by suggesting that lower courts take into account whether parents, before filing suit under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, began to pursue but then abandoned the IDEA's formal procedures. Ante, at 756 - 758. This clue also seems to me to be ill-advised. It is easy to imagine circumstances under which parents might start down the IDEA road and then change course and file an action under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act that seeks relief that the IDEA cannot provide. The parents might be advised by their attorney that the relief they were seeking under the IDEA is not available under that law but is available under another. Or the parents might change their minds about the relief that they want, give up on the relief that the IDEA can provide, and turn to another statute. Although the Court provides these clues for the purpose of assisting the lower courts, I am afraid that they may have the opposite effect. They are likely to confuse and lead courts astray. At the time (and until 1990), the IDEA was called the Education of the Handicapped Act, or EHA. See § 901(a), 104 Stat. 1141-1142 (renaming the statute). To avoid confusion-and acronym overload-we refer throughout this opinion only to the IDEA. Because this case comes to us on review of a motion to dismiss E.F.'s suit, we accept as true all facts pleaded in her complaint. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). See Payne v. Peninsula School Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 874 (C.A.9 2011) (en banc) (cataloguing different Circuits' understandings of § 1415(l ) ). In particular, the Ninth Circuit has criticized an approach similar to the Sixth Circuit's for "treat[ing] § 1415(l ) as a quasi-preemption provision, requiring administrative exhaustion for any case that falls within the general 'field' of educating disabled students." Id., at 875. In reaching these conclusions, we leave for another day a further question about the meaning of § 1415(l ) : Is exhaustion required when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy she requests-here, money damages for emotional distress-is not one that an IDEA hearing officer may award? The Frys, along with the Solicitor General, say the answer is no. See Reply Brief 2-3; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16. But resolution of that question might not be needed in this case because the Frys also say that their complaint is not about the denial of a FAPE, see Reply Brief 17-and, as later explained, we must remand that distinct issue to the Sixth Circuit, see infra, at 757 - 759. Only if that court rejects the Frys' view of their lawsuit, using the analysis we set out below, will the question about the effect of their request for money damages arise. A case now before this Court, Endrew F. v. Douglas County School Dist. RE-1, No. 15-827, presents unresolved questions about the precise content of the FAPE standard. Without finding the denial of a FAPE, a hearing officer may do nothing more than order a school district to comply with the Act's various procedural requirements, see § 1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) -for example, by allowing parents to "examine all records" relating to their child, § 1415(b)(1). Similarly, a court in IDEA litigation may provide a substantive remedy only when it determines that a school has denied a FAPE. See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). Without such a finding, that kind of relief is (once again) unavailable under the Act. Once again, we do not address here (or anywhere else in this opinion) a case in which a plaintiff, although charging the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy that an IDEA officer cannot give-for example, as in the Frys' complaint, money damages for resulting emotional injury. See n. 4, supra. The school districts offer another example illustrating the point. They suppose that a teacher, acting out of animus or frustration, strikes a student with a disability, who then sues the school under a statute other than the IDEA. See Brief for Respondents 36-37. Here too, the suit could be said to relate, in both genesis and effect, to the child's education. But the school districts opine, we think correctly, that the substance of the plaintiff's claim is unlikely to involve the adequacy of special education-and thus is unlikely to require exhaustion. See ibid. A telling indicator of that conclusion is that a child could file the same kind of suit against an official at another public facility for inflicting such physical abuse-as could an adult subject to similar treatment by a school official. To be sure, the particular circumstances of such a suit (school or theater? student or employee?) might be pertinent in assessing the reasonableness of the challenged conduct. But even if that is so, the plausibility of bringing other variants of the suit indicates that the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint does not concern the appropriateness of an educational program. According to Justice ALITO, the hypothetical inquiries described above are useful only if the IDEA and other federal laws are mutually exclusive in scope. See post, at 759 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). That is incorrect. The point of the questions is not to show that a plaintiff faced with a particular set of circumstances could only have proceeded under Title II or § 504 -or, alternatively, could only have proceeded under the IDEA. (Depending on the circumstances, she might well have been able to proceed under both.) Rather, these questions help determine whether a plaintiff who has chosen to bring a claim under Title II or § 504 instead of the IDEA-and whose complaint makes no mention of a FAPE-nevertheless raises a claim whose substance is the denial of an appropriate education. The point here is limited to commencement of the IDEA's formal administrative procedures; it does not apply to more informal requests to IEP Team members or other school administrators for accommodations or changes to a special education program. After all, parents of a child with a disability are likely to bring all grievances first to those familiar officials, whether or not they involve the denial of a FAPE.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AGUILAR et al. v. FELTON et al. No. 84-237. Argued December 5, 1984 Decided July 1, 1985 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 414. Burger, C. J., post, p. 419, White, J., ante, p. 400, and Rehnquist, J., post, p. 420, filed dissenting opinions. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined as to Parts II and III, post, p. 421. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for appellants in all cases. With him on the briefs for appellant in No. 84-238 were Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Michael Jay Singer. Charles H. Wilson filed a brief for appellant in No. 84-237. Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Leonard Koerner, and Stephen J. McGrath filed briefs for appellant in No. 84-239. Stanley Getter argued the cause and filed briefs for appel-lees in all cases. Together with No. 84-238, Secretary, United States Department of Education v. Felton et al., and No. 84-239, Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New York v. Felton et al., also on appeal from the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Council for American Private Edúcation et al. by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Steven Frederick McDowell; for Citizens for Educational Freedom by Charles E. Rice; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs by Nathan Lewin, Dennis Rapps, and Daniel D. Chazin; for Parents Rights, Inc., by John J. Donnelly; and for the United States Catholic Conference by Wilfred R. Caron and Mark E. Chopko. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Burt Neubome, Charles Sims, and Marc D. Stem; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. by Lee Boothby; and for the Anti-Defamation Leaque of B’nai B’rith by Justin J. Finger, Meyer Eisenberg, and Jeffrey P. Sinensky. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The City of New York uses federal funds to pay the salaries of public employees who teach in parochial schools. In this companion case to School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, ante, p. 373, we determine whether this practice violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. hH <C The program at issue in this case, originally enacted as Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorizes the Secretary of Education to distribute financial assistance to local educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low-income families. The funds are to be appropriated in accordance with programs proposed by local educational agencies and approved by state educational agencies. 20 U. S. C. § 3805(a). “To the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency shall make provisions for including special educational services and arrangements ... in which such children can participate.” § 3806(a). The proposed programs must also meet the following statutory requirements: the children involved in the program must be educationally deprived, § 3804(a), the children must reside in areas comprising a high concentration of low-income families, § 3805(b), and the programs must supplement, not supplant, programs that would exist absent funding under Title I. § 3807(b). Since 1966, the City of New York has provided instructional services funded by Title I to parochial school students on the premises of parochial schools. Of those students eligible to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in private schools. Of that group, 84% were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn and 8% were enrolled in Hebrew day schools. With respect to the religious atmosphere of these schools, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the picture that emerges is of a system in which religious considerations play a key role in the selection of students and teachers, and which has as its substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values.” 739 F. 2d 48, 68 (CA2 1984). The programs conducted at these schools include remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services. These programs are carried out by regular employees of the public schools (teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers) who have volunteered to teach in the parochial schools. The amount of time that each professional spends in the parochial school is determined by the number of students in the particular program and the needs of these students. The City’s Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement makes teacher assignments, and the instructors are supervised by field personnel, who attempt to pay at least one unannounced visit per month. The field supervisors, in turn, report to program coordinators, who also pay occasional unannounced supervisory visits to monitor Title I classes in the parochial schools. The professionals involved in the program are directed to avoid involvement with religious activities that are conducted within the private schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms. All material and equipment used in the programs funded under Title I are supplied by the Government and are used only in those programs. The professional personnel are solely responsible for the selection of the students. Additionally, the professionals are informed that contact with private school personnel should be kept to a minimum. Finally, the administrators of the parochial schools are required to clear the classrooms used by the public school personnel of all religious symbols. B In 1978, six taxpayers commenced this action in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the Title I program administered by the City of New York violates the Establishment Clause. These taxpayers, appellees in today’s case, sought to enjoin the further distribution of funds to programs involving instruction on the premises of parochial schools. Initially the case was held for the outcome of National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (SDNY 1980) (PEARL), which involved an identical challenge to the Title I program. When the District Court in PEARL affirmed the constitutionality of the Title I program, ibid., and this Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 449 U. S. 808 (1980), the challenge of the present appellees was renewed. The District Court granted appellants’ motion for summary judgment based upon the evidentiary record developed in PEARL. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that “[t]he Establishment Clause, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D. N. J. 1973), aff’d mem., 417 U. S. 961 . . . (1974); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 . . . (1975) (particularly Part V, pp. 367-72); and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 . . . (1977), constitutes an insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds to send public school teachers and other professionals into religious schools to carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise, or to provide clinical and guidance services of the sort at issue here.” 739 F. 2d, at 49-50. We postponed probable jurisdiction. 469 U. S. 878 (1984). We conclude that jurisdiction by appeal does not properly lie. Treating the papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, see 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition and now affirm the judgment below. II In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, ante, p. 373, the Court has today held unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause two remedial and enhancement programs operated by the Grand Rapids Public School District, in which classes were provided to private school children at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local private schools. The New York City programs challenged in this case are very similar to the programs we examined in Ball. In both cases, publicly funded instructors teach classes composed exclusively of private school students in private school buildings. In both cases, an overwhelming number of the participating private schools are religiously affiliated. In both cases, the publicly funded programs provide not only professional personnel, but also all materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the programs. Finally, the instructors in both cases are told that they are public school employees under the sole control of the public school system. Appellants attempt to distinguish this case on the ground that the City of New York, unlike the Grand Rapids Public School District, has adopted a system for monitoring the religious content of publicly funded Title I classes in the religious schools. At best, the supervision in this case would assist in preventing the Title I program from being used, intentionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding parochial school. But appellants’ argument fails in any event, because the supervisory system established by the City of New York inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and state, an Establishment Clause concern distinct from that addressed by the effects doctrine. Even where state aid to parochial institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church and state in the administration of that aid. The principle that the state should not become too closely entangled with the church in the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters. “[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.” McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the Court held that the supervision necessary to ensure that teachers in parochial schools were not conveying religious messages to their students would constitute the excessive entanglement of church and state: “A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church. ” Id., at 619. Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), we invalidated a state program that offered, inter alia, guidance, testing, and remedial and therapeutic services performed by public employees on the premises of the parochial schools. Id., at 352-353. As in Lemon, we observed that though a comprehensive system of supervision might conceivably prevent teachers from having the primary effect of advancing religion, such a system would inevitably lead to an unconstitutional administrative entanglement between church and state. “The prophylactic contacts required to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role, the Court held [in Lemon], necessarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state. Id., at 619. The same excessive entanglement would be required for Pennsylvania to be ‘certain,’ as it must be, that . . . personnel do not advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in which they serve. Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, 40-41, aff’d, 417 U. S. 961.” 421 U. S., at 370. In Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736 (1976), the Court sustained state programs of aid to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning. The State allowed the grants to be used for any nonsectarian purpose. The Court upheld the grants on the ground that the institutions were not “‘pervasively sectarian,”’ id., at 758-759, and therefore a system of supervision was unnecessary to ensure that the grants were not being used to effect a religious end. In so holding, the Court identified “what is crucial to a non-entangling aid program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes.” Id., at 765. Similarly, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the Court upheld one-time grants to sectarian institutions because ongoing supervision was not required. See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973). As the Court of Appeals recognized, the elementary and secondary schools here are far different from the colleges at issue in Roemer, Hunt, and Tilton. 739 F. 2d; at 68-70. Unlike the colleges, which were found not to be “pervasively sectarian,” many of the schools involved in this case are the same sectarian schools which had “ ‘as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values’ ” in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 768 (1973), quoting Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 663 (SDNY 1972). Moreover, our holding in Meek invalidating instructional services much like those at issue in this case rested on the ground that the publicly funded teachers were “performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained.” Meek, supra, at 371. The court below found that the schools involved in this case were “well within this characterization.” 739 F. 2d, at 70. Unlike the schools in Roemer, many of the schools here receive funds and report back to their affiliated church, require attendance at church religious exercises, begin the schoolday or class period with prayer, and grant preference in admission to members of the sponsoring denominations. 739 F. 2d, at 70. In addition, the Catholic schools at issue here, which constitute the vast majority of the aided schools, are under the general supervision and control of the local parish. Ibid. The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in Lemon and Meek are thus present in this case. First, as noted above, the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian environment. Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message. Compare Lemon, supra, at 619, with Tilton, supra, at 688, and Roemer, supra, at 765. In short, the scope and duration of New York City’s Title I program would require a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid. This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement. Agents of the city must visit and inspect the religious school regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matter in Title I classes. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 619 (“What would appear to some to be essential to good citizenship might well for others border on or constitute instruction in religion”). In addition, the religious school must obey these same agents when they make determinations as to what is and what is not a “religious symbol” and thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preservation of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought. The administrative cooperation that is required to maintain the educational program at issue here entangles church and state in still another way that infringes interests at the heart of the Establishment Clause. Administrative personnel of the public and parochial school systems must work together in resolving matters related to schedules, classroom assignments, problems that arise in the implementation of the program, requests for additional services, and the dissemination of information regarding the program. Furthermore, the program necessitates “frequent contacts between the regular and the remedial teachers (or other professionals), in which each side reports on individual student needs, problems encountered, and results achieved.” 739 F. 2d, at 65. We have long recognized that underlying the Establishment Clause is “the objective ... to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 614. See also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S., at 212. Although “[separation in this context cannot mean absence of all contact,” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 676 (1970), the detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required to maintain New York City’s Title I program can only produce “a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.” Id., at 674. The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of the city concern matters that may be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to the controlling denominations. As government agents must make these judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines increase. At the same time, “[t]he picture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely raises more than an imagined specter of governmental ‘secularization of a creed.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 650 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Ill Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, the program remains constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate— that neither the State nor Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of those benefits. Affirmed. [For dissenting opinion of Justice White, see ante, p. 400.] Title I, 92 Stat. 2153, was codified at 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. Section 2701 provided: “In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in the following parts of this subchapter) to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means (including preschool programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.” Effective October 1, 1982, Title I was superseded by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 464, 20 U. S. C. § 3801 et seq. See 20 U. S. C. § 3801 (current Chapter I analogue of § 2701). The provisions concerning the participation of children in private schools under Chapter I are virtually identical to those in Title I. Compare 20 U. S. C. §2740 (former Title I provision) with 20 U. S. C. § 3806 (current Chapter I provision). For the sake of convenience, we will adopt the usage of the parties and continue to refer to the program as “Title I.” The statute provides: “A local educational agency may receive a grant under this subchapter for any fiscal year if it has on file with the State educational agency an application which describes the programs and projects to be conducted with such assistance for a period of not more than three years, and such application has been approved by the State educational agency.” See also 20 U. S. C. § 2731 (former Title I analogue). In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U. S. 402 (1974), we addressed the question whether this provision requires the assignment of publicly employed teachers to provide instruction during regular school hours in parochial schools. We held that Title I mandated that private school students receive services comparable to, but not identical to, the Title I services received by public school students. Id., at 420-421. Therefore, the statute would permit, but not require, that on-site services be provided in the parochial schools. In reaching this conclusion as a matter of statutory interpretation, we explicitly noted that “we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program.” Id., at 426. Wheeler thus provides no authority for the constitutionality of the program before us today. The statute provides: “Each State and local educational agency shall use the payments under this subehapter for programs and projects (including the acquisition of equipment and, where necessary, the construction of school facilities) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.” The statute provides: “The application described in subsection (a) of this section shall be approved if . . . the programs and projects described— “(1)(A) are conducted in attendance areas of such agency having the highest concentration of low-income children . . . .” The statute provides: “A local educational agency may use funds received under this subehapter only so as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted under this subehapter, and in no case may such funds be so used as to supplant such funds from such non-Federal sources. In order to demonstrate compliance with this subsection a local education agency shall not be required to provide services under this subehapter outside the regular classroom or school program.” The Court of Appeals held that the plan adopted and administered by the City of New York violates the Establishment Clause. 739 P. 2d 48, 72 (1984). Appeals from this ruling were taken pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. An appeal under § 1252, however, may be taken only from an interlocutory or final judgment that has held an Act of Congress unconstitutional as applied (“i. e., that the section, by its own terms, infringed constitutional freedoms in the circumstances of that particular case”) or as a whole. United States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 U. S. 561, 563-565 (1972). Because the ruling appealed from is not such a judgment, the appeals must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Ibid. As we have in comparable cases, we shall continue in this opinion to refer to the parties as appellants and appellees in order to minimize confusion. See, e. g., Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978). Appellants suggest that the degree of sectarianism differs from school to school. This has little bearing on our analysis. As Judge Friendly, writing for the court below, noted: “It may well be that the degree of sectarianism in Catholic schools in, for example, black neighborhoods, with considerable proportions of non-Catholic pupils and teachers, is relatively low; by the same token, in other schools it may be relatively high. Yet . . . enforcement of the Establishment Clause does not rest on means or medians. If any significant number of the Title I schools create the risks described in Meek, Meek applies. It would be simply incredible, and the affidavits do not aver, that all, or almost all, New York City’s parochial schools receiving Title I aid have . . . abandoned ‘the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools’ existence.’” 739 F. 2d, at 70 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 650 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LINDEN LUMBER DIVISION, SUMMER & CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 73-1231. Argued November 18, 1974— Decided December 23, 1974 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart," J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 310. Norton J. Come argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, respondent in No. 73-1231 and petitioner in No. 73-1234. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, and Patrick Hardin. Lawrence M. Cohen argued the cause for petitioner in No. 73-1231. With him on the briefs were Steven R. Semler and Ronald F. Hart man. Laurence Gold argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent unions in both cases. Together with No. 73-1234, National Labor Relations Board v. Truck Drivers Union Local No. 413 et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Gerard C. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, and Milton Smith filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present a question expressly reserved in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 595, 601 n. 18 (1969). In Linden respondent union obtained authorization cards from a majority of petitioner’s employees and demanded that it be recognized as the collective-bargaining representative of those employees. Linden said it doubted the union’s claimed majority status and suggested the union petition the Board for an election. The union filed such a petition with the Board but later withdrew it when Linden declined to enter a consent election agreement or abide by an election, on the ground that respondent union’s organizational campaign had been improperly assisted by company supervisors. Respondent union thereupon renewed its demand for collective bargaining; and again Linden declined, saying that the union’s claimed membership had been improperly influenced by supervisors. Thereupon respondent union struck for recognition as the bargaining representative and shortly filed a charge of unfair labor practice against Linden based on its refusal to bargain. There is no charge that Linden engaged in an unfair labor practice apart from its refusal to bargain. The Board held that Linden should not be guilty of an unfair labor practice solely on the basis “of its refusal to accept evidence of majority status other than the results of a Board election.” 190 N. L. R. B. 718, 721 (1971). In Wilder there apparently were 30 employees in the plant, and the union with 11 signed and two unsigned authorization cards requested recognition.as the bargaining agent for the company’s production and maintenance employees. Of the 30 employees 18 were in the production and maintenance unit which the Board found to be appropriate for collective bargaining. No answer was given by the employer, Wilder, and recognitional picketing began. The request was renewed when the two unsigned cards were signed, but Wilder denied recognition. Thereupon the union filed unfair labor practice charges against Wilder. A series of Board decisions and judicial decisions, not necessary to recapitulate here, consumed about seven years until the present decision by the Court of Appeals. The Board made the same ruling as respects Wilder as it did in Linden’s case. See 198 N. L. R. B. 998 (1972). On petitions for review the Court of Appeals reversed. 159 U. S. App. D. C. 228, 487 F. 2d 1099 (1973). We reverse the Court of Appeals. In Gissel we held that an employer who engages in “unfair” labor practices “ ‘likely to destroy the union’s majority and seriously impede the election’ ” may not insist that before it bargains the union get a secret ballot election. 395 U. S., at 600. There were no such unfair labor practices here, nor had the employer in either case agreed to a voluntary settlement of the dispute and then reneged. As noted, we reserved in Gissel the questions “whether, absept election interference by an employer’s unfair labor practices, he may obtain an election only if he petitions for one himself; whether, if he does not, he must bargain with a card majority if the Union chooses not to seek an election; and whether, in the latter situation, he is bound by the Board’s ultimate determination of the card results regardless of his earlier good faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a Union-sought election if he makes an affirmative showing of his positive reasons for believing there is a representation dispute.” Id., at 601 n. 18. We recognized in Gissel that while the election process had acknowledged superiority in ascertaining whether a union has majority support, cards may “adequately reflect employee sentiment.” Id., at 603. Generalizations are difficult; and it is urged by the unions that only the precise facts should dispose of concrete cases. As we said, however, in Gissel, the Board had largely abandoned its earlier test that the employer’s refusal to bargain was warranted, if he had a good-faith doubt that the union represented a majority. A different approach was indicated. We said: “[A]n employer is not obligated to accept a card check as proof of majority status, under the Board’s current practice, and he is not required to justify his insistence on an election by making his own investigation of employee sentiment and showing affirmative reasons for doubting the majority status. See Aaron Brothers, 158 N. L. R. B. 1077, 1078. If he does make an investigation, the Board’s recent cases indicate that reasonable polling in this regard will not always be termed violative of § 8 (a)(1) if conducted in accordance with the requirements set out in Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N. L. R. B. [1062], 65 L. R. R. M. 1385 (1967). And even if an employer’s limited interrogation is found violative of the Act, it might not be serious enough to call for a bargaining order. See Aaron Brothers, supra; Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N. L. R. B. 1071 (1965). As noted above, the Board has emphasized that not ‘any employer conduct found violative of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act, regardless of its nature or gravity, will necessarily support a refusal-to-bargain finding,’ Aaron Brothers, supra, at 1079.” 395 U. S., at 609-610. In the present cases the Board found that the employers “should not be found guilty of a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) solely upon the basis of [their] refusal to accept evidence of majority status other than the results of a Board election.” 190 N. L. R. B., at 721; see 198 N. L. R. B., at 998. The question whether the employers had good reasons or poor reasons was not deemed relevant to the inquiry. The Court of Appeals concluded that if the employer had doubts as to a union’s majority status, it could and should test out its doubts by petitioning for an election. It said: “While we have indicated that cards alone, or recognitional strikes and ambiguous utterances of the employer, do not necessarily provide such ‘convincing evidence of majority support’ so as to require a bargaining order, they certainly create a sufficient probability of majority support as to require an employer asserting a doubt of majority status to resolve the possibility through a petition for an election, if he is to avoid both any duty to bargain and any inquiry into the actuality of his doubt.” 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 240, 487 F. 2d, at 1111. To take the Board’s position is not to say that authorization cards are wholly unreliable as an indication of employee support of the union. An employer concededly may have valid objections to recognizing a union on that basis. His objection to cards may, of course, mask his opposition to unions. On the other hand he may have rational, good-faith grounds for distrusting authorization cards in a given situation. He may be convinced that the fact that a majority of the employees strike and picket does not necessarily establish that they desire the particular union as their representative. Fear may indeed prevent some from crossing a picket line; or sympathy for strikers, not the desire to have the particular union in the saddle, may influence others. These factors make difficult an examination of the employer’s motive to ascertain whether it was in good faith. To enter that domain is to reject the approval by Gissel of the retreat which the Board took from its “good faith” inquiries. The union which is faced with an unwilling employer has two alternative remedies under the Board’s decision in the instant cases. It can file for an election; or it can press unfair labor practice charges against the employer under Gissel. The latter alternative promises to consume much time. In Linden the time between filing the charge and the Board’s ruling was about 4y2 years; in Wilder, about 6% years. The Board’s experience indicates that the median time in a contested case is 388;days. Gissel, 395 U. S., at 611 n. 30. On the other hand the median time between the filing of the petition for an election and the decision of the Regional Director is about 45 days. In terms of getting on with the problems of inaugurating regimes of industrial peace, the policy of encouraging secret elections under the Act is favored. The question remains — should the burden be on the union to ask for an election or should it be the responsibility of the employer? The Court of Appeals concluded that since Congress in 1947 authorized employers to file their own representation petitions by enacting §9 (c)(1)(B), the burden was on them. But the history of that provision indicates it was aimed at eliminating the discrimination against employers which had previously existed under the Board’s prior rules, permitting employers to petition for an election only when confronted with claims by two or more unions. There is no suggestion that Congress wanted to place the burden of getting a secret election on the employer. “Today an employer is faced with this situation. A man comes into his office and says, ‘I represent your employees. Sign this agreement, or we strike tomorrow.’ Such instances have occurred all over the United States. The employer has no way in which to determine whether this man really does represent his employees or does not. The bill gives him the right to go to the Board under those circumstances, and say, T want an election. I want to know who is the bargaining agent for my employees.’ ” 93 Cong. Rec. 3838 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). Our problem is not one of picking favorites but of trying to find the congressional purpose by examining the statutory and administrative interpretations that incline one way or another. Large issues ride on who takes the initiative. A common issue is, what should be the representative unit? In Wilder the employer at first took the position that the unit should be one of 30 employees. If it were 18, as the union claimed (or even 25 as the employer later argued), the union with its 13 authorization cards (assuming them to be valid) would have a majority. If the unit were 30, the union would be out of business. Section 9 (c)(1)(B) visualizes an employer faced with a claim by individuals or unions “to be recognized as the representative defined in §9 (a).” That question of representation is raised only by a claim that the applicant represents a majority of employees, “in a unit appropriate for such purposes.” §9 (a). If there is a significant discrepancy between the unit which the employer wants and the unit for which the union asked recognition, the Board will dismiss the employer’s petition. Aerojet-General Corp., 185 N. L. R. B. 794 (1970); Bowman Bldg. Products Div., 170 N. L. R. B. 312 (1968); Amperex Electronic Corp., 109 N. L. R. B. 353 (1954); Wm. Wood Bakery, Inc., 97 N. L. R. B. 122 (1951). In that event the union, if it desired the smaller unit, would have to file its own petition, leaving the employer free to contest the appropriateness of that unit. The Court of Appeals thought that if the employer were required to petition the Board for an election, the litigable issues would be reduced. The recurring conflict over what should be the appropriate bargaining unit, coupled with the fact that if the employer asks for a unit which the union opposes his election petition is dismissed, is answer enough. The Board has at least some expertise in these matters and its judgment is that an employer’s petition for an election, though permissible, is not the required course. It points out in its brief here that an employer wanting to gain delay can draw a petition to elicit protests by the union, and the thought that an employer petition would obviate litigation over the sufficiency of the union’s showing of interest is in its purview apparently not well taken. A union petition to be sure must be backed by a 30% showing of employee interest. But the sufficiency of such a showing is not litigable by the parties. In light of the statutory scheme and the practical administrative procedural questions involved, we cannot say that the Board’s decision that the union should gó forward and ask for an election on the employer’s refusal to recognize the authorization cards was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. In sum, we sustain the Board in holding that, unless an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice that impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization cards purporting to represent a majority of the employees, which is refused recognition, has the burden of taking the next step in invoking the Board’s election procedure. Reversed. At the conclusion of the strike Linden refused to reinstate two employees it alleged to be supervisors and therefore unprotected by the Act. The Board found that to be an unfair labor practice. Thereupon Linden reinstated the two employees and this issue was not tendered to the court below. 159 U. S. App. D. C. 228, 234, 487 F. 2d 1099, 1105 (1973). Section 8 (a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: “(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a).” 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (5). See n. 4, infra. The long series of rulings is described in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 159 U. S. App. D. C., at 229-232, 487 F. 2d, at 1100-1103. Wilder did not petition for certiorari. No. 73-1234, which we granted, is the petition of the Board, but for convenience it is referred to herein as the Wilder case. Thirty-seventh Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 13 (1972). Section 9 (c)(1)(B) provides: “(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board— “ (B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section 9 (a); “the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.” 61 Stat. 144, 29 U. S. C. §159 (c)(1)(B). S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 3838 (1947). Section 9 (a) provides: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . . . 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 61 Stat. 143,29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U. S. 270, 287 n. 6 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). We do not reach the question whether the same result obtains if the employer breaches his agreement to permit majority status to be determined by means other than a Board election. See Snow & Sons, 134 N. L. R. B. 709 (1961), enf’d, 308 F. 2d 687 (CA9 1962). In the instant cases the Board said that the employers and the unions "never voluntarily agreed upon any mutually acceptable and legally permissible means, other than a Board-conducted election, for resolving the issue of union majority status.” 190 N. L. R. B., at 721; see 198 N. L. R. B., at 998.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROEMER et al. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF MARYLAND et al. No. 74-730. Argued February 23, 1976 Decided June 21, 1976 BlacemuN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which RehNQUist, J., joined, post, p. 767. BreNNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 770. Stewart, J., post, p. 773, and SteveNS, J., post, p. 775, filed dissenting opinions. Lawrence S. Oreenwald argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Melvin L. Wulf. George A. Nilson, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland, and Paul R. Connolly argued the cause for appellees. With Mr. Nilson on the brief for appellees Board of Public Works of Maryland et al. were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General. With Mr. Connolly on the brief for appellees Loyola College et al. were Charles H. Wilson and John C. Evelius. George W. Constable filed a brief for appellee College of Notre Dame of Maryland, Inc. George T. Tyler and Robert V. Barton, Jr., filed a brief for appellee St. Joseph College at Emmits-burg, Maryland, Inc. Mr. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Powell joined. We are asked once again to police the constitutional boundary between church and state. Maryland, this time, is the alleged trespasser. It has enacted a statute which, as amended, provides for annual noncategorical grants to private colleges, among them religiously affiliated institutions, subject only to the restrictions that the funds not be used for “sectarian purposes.” A three-judge District Court, by a divided vote, refused to enjoin the operation of the statute, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (Md. 1974), and a direct appeal has been taken to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. I The challenged grant program was instituted by Laws of 1971, c. 626, and is now embodied in Md. Ann. Code, Art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (1975). It provides funding for “any private institution of higher learning within the State of Maryland,” provided the institution is accredited by the State Department of Education, was established in Maryland prior to July 1, 1970, maintains one or more “associate of arts or baccalaureate degree” programs, and refrains from awarding “only seminarian or theological degrees.” §§ 65-66. The aid is in the form of an annual fiscal year subsidy to qualifying colleges and universities. The formula by which each institution’s entitlement is computed has been changed several times and is not independently at issue here. It now provides for a qualifying institution to receive, for each full-time student (excluding students enrolled in seminarian or theological academic programs), an amount equal to 15% of the State’s per-full-time-pupil appropriation for a student in the state college system. § 67. As first enacted, the grants were completely unrestricted. They remain noncategorical in nature, and a recipient institution may put them to whatever use it prefers, with but one exception. In 1972, following this Court’s decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), § 68A was added to the statute by Laws of 1972, c. 534. It provides: “None of the moneys payable under this subtitle shall be utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes.” The administration of the grant program is entrusted to the State’s Board of Public Works “assisted by the Maryland Council for Higher Education.” These bodies are to adopt “criteria and procedures ... for the implementation and administration of the aid program.” They are specifically authorized to adopt “criteria and procedures” governing the method of application for grants and of their disbursement, the verification of degrees conferred, and the “submission of reports or data concerning the utilization of these moneys by [the aided] institutions.” § 68. Primary responsibility for the program rests with the Council for Higher Education, an appointed commission which antedates the aid program, which has numerous other responsibilities in the educational field, and which has derived from these a “considerable expertise as to the character and functions of the various private colleges and universities in the State.” 387 F. Supp., at 1285. The Council performs what the District Court described as a “two-step screening process” to insure compliance with the statutory restrictions on the grants. First, it determines whether an institution applying for aid is eligible at all, or is one “awarding primarily theological or seminary degrees.” Several applicants have been disqualified at this stage of the process. Id., at 1289, 1296. Second, the Council requires that those institutions that are eligible for funds not put them to any sectarian use. An application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the institution's chief executive officer stating that the funds will not be used for sectarian purposes, and by a description of the specific nonsectarian uses that are planned. These may be changed only after written notice to the Council. By the end of the fiscal year the institution must file a “Utilization of Funds Report” describing and itemizing the use of the funds. The chief executive officer must certify the report and also file his own “Post-expenditure Affidavit,” stating that the funds have not been put to sectarian uses. The recipient institution is further required to segregate state funds in a “special revenue account” and to identify aided nonsectarian expenditures separately in its budget. It must retain “sufficient documentation of the State funds expended to permit verification by the Council that funds were not spent for sectarian purposes." Any question of sectarian use that may arise is to be resolved by the Council, if possible, on the basis of information submitted to it by the institution and without actual examination of its books. Failing that, a “verification or audit” may be undertaken. The District Court found that the audit would be “quick and non-judgmental,” taking one day or less. Id., at 1296. In 1971, $1.7 million was disbursed to 17 private institutions in Maryland. The disbursements were under the statute as originally enacted, and were therefore not subject to § 68A’s specific prohibition on sectarian use. Of the 17 institutions, five were church related; and these received $520,000 of the $1.7 million. A total of $1.8 million was to be awarded to 18 institutions in 1972, the second year of the grant program; of this amount, $603,000 was to go to church-related institutions. Before disbursement, however, this suit, challenging the grants as in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, was filed. The $603,-000 was placed in escrow and was so held until after the entry of the District Court’s judgment on October 21, 1974. These and subsequent awards, therefore, are subject to § 68A and to the Council's procedures for insuring compliance therewith. Plaintiffs in this suit, appellants here, are four individual Maryland citizens and taxpayers. Their complaint sought a declaration of the statute's invalidity, an order enjoining payments under it to church-affiliated institutions, and a declaration that the State was entitled to recover from such institutions any amounts already disbursed. App. 10. In addition to the responsible state officials, plaintiff-appellants joined as defendants the five institutions they claimed were constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid: Western Maryland College, College of Notre Dame, Mount Saint Mary’s College, Saint Joseph College, and Loyola College. Of these, the last four are affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church; Western Maryland, was a Methodist affiliate. The District Court ruled with respect to all five. Western Maryland, however, has since been dismissed as a defendant-appellee. We are concerned, therefore, only with the four Roman Catholic affiliates. After carefully assessing the role that the Catholic Church plays in the fives of these institutions, a matter to which we return in greater detail below, and applying the three-part requirement of Lemon I, 403 U. S., at 612-613, that state aid such as this have a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and no tendency to entangle the State excessively in church affairs, the District Court ruled that the amended statute was constitutional and was not to be enjoined. The court considered the original, unamended statute to have been unconstitutional under Lemon I, but it refused to order a refund of amounts theretofore paid out, reasoning that any refund was barred by the decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U. S. 192 (1973) (Lemon II). The District Court therefore denied all relief. This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdiction. 420 U. S. 922 (1975). II A system of government that makes itself felt as pervasively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths with the church. In fact, our State and Federal Governments impose certain burdens upon, and impart certain benefits to, virtually all our activities, and religious activity is not an exception. The Court fyas enforced a scrupulous neutrality by the State, as among religions, and also as between religious and other activities, but a hermetic separation of the two is an impossibility it has never required. It long has been established, for example, that the State may send a cleric, indeed even a clerical order, to perform a wholly secular task. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899), the Court upheld the extension of public aid to a corporation which, although composed entirely of members of a Roman Catholic sisterhood acting “under the auspices of said church,’ id., at 297, was limited by its corporate charter to the secular purpose of operating a charitable hospital. And religious institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all. The Court has permitted the State to supply transportation for children to and from church-related as well as public schools. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). It has done the same with respect to secular textbooks loaned by the State on equal terms to students attending both public and church-related elementary schools. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). Since it had not been shown in Allen that the secular textbooks would be put to other than secular purposes, the Court concluded that, as in Everson, the State was merely “extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens.” Id., at 242. Just as Bradfield dispels any notion that a religious person can never be in the State’s pay for a secular purpose, Everson and Allen put to rest any argument that the State may never act in such a way that has the incidental effect of facilitating religious activity. The Cburt has not been blind to the fact that in aiding a religious institution to perform a secular task, the State frees the institution’s resources to be put to sectarian ends. If this were impermissible, however, a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair. The Court never has held that religious activities must be discriminated against in this way. Neutrality is what is required. The State must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede religious activity. Of course, that principle is more easily stated than applied. The Court has taken the view that a secular purpose and a facial neutrality may not be enough, if in fact the State is lending direct support to a religious activity. The State may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious education, even though it purports to be paying for a secular one, and even though it makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike. The Court also has taken the view that the State’s efforts to perform a secular task, and at the same time avoid aiding in the performance of a religious one, may.not lead it into such an intimate relationship with religious authority that it appears either tb be sponsoring or to be excessively interfering with that authority. In Lemon I as noted above, the Court distilled these concerns into a three-prong test, resting in part on prior case law, for the constitutionality of statutes affording state aid to church-related schools: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” 403 U. S., at 612-613. At issue in Lemon I were two state-aid plans, a Rhode Island program to grant a 15% supplement to the salaries of private, church-related school teachers teaching secular courses, and a Pennsylvania program to reimburse private church-related schools for the entire cost of secular courses also offered in public schools. Both failed the third part of the test, that of “excessive government entanglement.” This part the Court held in turn required a consideration of three factors: (1) the character and purposes of the benefited institutions, (2) the nature of the aid provided, and (3) the resulting relationship between the State and the religious authority. Id., at 615. As to the first of these, in reviewing the Rhode Island program, the Court found that the aided schools, elementary and secondary, were characterized by “substantial religious activity and purpose.” Id., at 616. They were located near parish churches. Religious instruction was considered “part of the total educational process.” Id., at 615. Religious symbols and religious activities abounded. Two-thirds of the teachers were nuns, and their operation of the schools was regarded as an “ 'integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church.' ” Id., at 616. The schooling came at an impressionable age. The form of aid also cut against the programs. Unlike the textbooks in Allen and the bus transportation in Everson, the services of the state-supported teachers could not be counted on to be purely secular. They were bound to mix religious teachings with secular ones, not by conscious design, perhaps, but because the mixture was inevitable when teachers (themselves usually Catholics) were “employed by a religious organization, subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities, and work[ed] in a system dedicated to rearing children in a particular faith.” Id., at 618. The State's efforts to supervise and control the teaching of religion in supposedly secular classes would therefore inevitably entangle it excessively in religious affairs. The Pennsylvania program similarly foundered. The Court also pointed to another kind of church-state entanglement threatened by the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania programs, namely, their “divisive political potential.” Id., at 622. They represented “successive and very likely permanent annual appropriations that benefit relatively few religious groups.” Id., at 623. Political factions, supporting and opposing the programs, were bound to divide along religious lines. This was “one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” Id., at 622. It was stressed that the political divisiveness of the programs was “aggravated ... by the need for continuing annual appropriations.” Id., at 623. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), a companion case to Lemon I, the Court reached the contrary-result. The aid challenged in Tilton was in the form of federal grants for the construction of academic facilities at private colleges, some of them church related, with the restriction that the facilities not be used for any sectarian purpose. Applying Lemon I’s three-part test, the Court found the purpose of the federal aid program there under consideration to be secular. Its primary effect was not the advancement of religion, for sectarian use of the facilities was prohibited. Enforcement of this prohibition was made possible by the fact that religion did not so permeate the defendant colleges that their religious and secular functions were inseparable. On the contrary, there was no evidence that religious activities took place in the funded facilities. Courses at the colleges were “taught according to the academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter,” and “an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination” was maintained. 403 U. S., at 680-682 (plurality opinion). Turning to the problem of excessive entanglement, the Court first stressed the character of the aided institutions. It pointed to several general differences between college and precollege education: College students are less susceptible to religious indoctrination; college courses tend to entail an internal discipline that inherently limits the opportunities for sectarian influence; and a high degree of academic freedom tends to prevail at the college level. It found no evidence that the colleges in Tilton varied from this pattern. Though controlled and largely populated by Roman Catholics, the colleges were hot restricted to adherents of that faith. No religious services were required to be attended. Theology courses were mandatory, but they were taught in an academic fashion, and with treatment of beliefs other than Roman Catholicism. There wére no attempts to proselytize among students, and principles of academic freedom prevailed. With colleges of this character, there was little risk that religion would seep into the teaching of secular subjects, and the state surveillance necessary to separate the two, therefore, was diminished. The Court next looked to the type of aid provided, and found it to be neutral or nonideological in nature. Like the textbooks and bus transportation in Allen and Everson, but unlike the teachers’ services in Lemon I, physical facilities were capable of being restricted to secular purposes. Moreover, the construction grant was a one-shot affair, not involving annual audits and appropriations. As for political divisiveness, no “continuing religious aggravation” over the program had been shown, and the Court reasoned that this might be because of the lack of continuity in the church-state relationship, the character and diversity of the colleges, and the fact that they served a dispersed student constituency rather than a local one. “ [C] umulatively,” all these considerations persuaded the Court that church-state entanglement was not excessive. 403 U. S., at 684-689. In Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973), the challenged aid was also for the construction of secular college facilities, the state plan being one to finance the construction by revenue bonds issued through the medium of a state authority. In effect, the college serviced and repaid the bonds, but at the lower cost resulting from the tax-free status of the interest payments. The Court upheld the program on reasoning analogous to that in Tilton. In applying the second of the Lemon 7’s three-part test, that concerning “primary effect,” the following refinement was added: “Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.” 413 U. S., at 743. Although the college which Hunt concerned was subject to substantial control by its sponsoring Baptist Church, it was found to be similar to the colleges in Tilton and not “pervasively sectarian.” As in Tilton, state aid weht to secular facilities only, and thus not to any “specifically religious activity.” 413 U. S., at 743-745. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), followed in Lemon Vs wake much as Hunt followed in Tilton’s. The aid in Nyquist was to elementary and secondary schools which, the District Court found, generally conformed to a “profile” of a sectarian or substantially religious school. The state aid took three forms: direct subsidies for the maintenance and repair of buildings; reimbursement of parents for a percentage of tuition paid; and certain tax benefits for parents. All three forms of aid were found to have an impermissible primary effect. The maintenance and repair subsidies, being unrestricted, could be used for the upkeep of a chapel or classrooms used for religious instruction. The reimbursements and tax benefits to parents could likewise be used to support wholly religious activities. In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973), the Court also invalidated a program for public aid to church-affiliated schools. The grants, which were to elementary and secondary schools in New York, were in the form of reimbursements for the schools’ testing and recordkeeping expenses. The schools met the same sectarian profile as did those in Nyquist, at least in some cases. There was therefore “substantial risk” that the state-funded tests would be “drafted with an eye, unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church.” 413 U. S., at 480. Last Term, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), the Court ruled yet again on a state-aid program for church-related elementary and secondary schools. On the authority of Allen, it upheld a Pennsylvania program for lending textbooks to private school students. It found, however, that Lemon I required the invalidation of two other forms of aid to the private schools. The first was the loan of instructional materials and equipment. Like the textbooks, these were secular and nonideological in nature. Unlike the textbooks, however, they were loaned directly to the schools. The schools, similar to those in Lemon I, were ones in which “the teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and belief.” 421 U. S., at 366. Aid flowing directly to such “religion-pervasive institutions,” ibid., had the primary effect of advancing religion. See Hunt v. McNair, supra. The other form of aid was the provision of “auxiliary” educational services: remedial instruction, counseling and testing, and speech and hearing therapy. These also were intended to be neutral and nonideological, and in fact were to be provided by public school teachers. Still, there was danger that the teachers, in such a sectarian setting, would allow religion to seep into their instruction. To attempt to prevent this from happening would excessively entangle the State in church affairs. The Court referred again to the danger of political divisiveness, heightened, as it had been in Lemon I and Nyquist, by the necessity of annual legislative reconsideration of the aid appropriation. 421 U. S., at 372. So the slate we write on is anything but clean. Instead, there is little room for further refinement of the principles governing public aid to church-affiliated private schools. Our purpose is not to unsettle those principles, so recently reaffirmed, see Meek v. Pittenger, supra, or to expand upon them substantially, but merely to insure that they are faithfully applied in this case. Ill The first part of Lemon J’s three-part test is not in issue; appellants do not challenge the District Court’s finding that the purpose of Maryland’s aid program is the secular one of supporting private higher education generally, as an economic alternative to a wholly public system. The focus of the debate is on the second and third parts, those concerning the primary effect of advancing religion, and excessive church-state entanglement. We consider them in the same order. A While entanglement is essentially a procedural problem, the primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educational activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds. Hunt requires (1) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so “pervasively sectarian” that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded. (1) The District Court’s finding in this case was that the appellee colleges are not “pervasively sectarian.” 387 F. Supp., at 1293. This conclusion it supported with a number of subsidiary findings concerning the role of religion on these campuses: (a) Despite their formal affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, the colleges are “characterized by a high degree of institutional autonomy.” Id., at 1287 n. 7. None of the four receives funds from, or makes reports to, the Catholic Church. The Church is represented on their governing boards, but, as with Mount Saint Mary’s, “no instance of entry of Church considerations into college decisions was shown.” Id., at 1295. (b) The colleges employ Roman Catholic chaplains and hold Roman Catholic religious exercises on campus. Attendance at such is not required; the encouragement of spiritual development is only “one secondary objective” of each college; and “at none of these institutions does this encouragement go beyond providing the opportunities or occasions for- religious experience.” Ibid. It was the District Court’s general finding that “religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of any of these defendants.” Id., at 1296. (c) Mandatory religion or theology courses are taught at each of the colleges, primarily by Roman Catholic clerics, but these only supplement a curriculum covering “the spectrum of a liberal arts program.” Nontheology courses are taught in an “atmosphere of intellectual freedom” and without “religious pressures.” Each college subscribes to, and abides by, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom of the American Association of University Professors. Id., at 1288, 1293, and n. 3, 1295. (d) Some classes are begun with prayer. The percentage of classes in which this is done varies with the college, from a “minuscule” percentage at Loyola and Mount Saint Mary’s, to a majority at Saint Joseph. Id., at 1293. There is no “actual college policy” of encouraging the practice. “It is treated as a facet of the instructor’s academic freedom.” Ibid. Classroom prayers were therefore regarded by the District Court as “peripheral to the subject of religious permeation,” as were the facts that some instructors wear clerical garb and some classrooms have religious symbols. Ibid. The court concluded: “None of these facts impairs the clear and convincing evidence that courses at each defendant are taught 'according to the academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter and the individual teacher’s concept of professional standards.’ [citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 681].” Id., at 1293-1294. In support of this finding the court relied on the fact that a Maryland education department group had monitored the teacher education program at Saint Joseph College, where classroom prayer is most prevalent, and had seen “no evidence of religion entering into any elements of that program.” Id., at 1293. (e) The District Court found that, apart from the theology departments, see n. 20, supra, faculty hiring decisions are not made on a religious basis. At two of the colleges, Notre Dame and Mount Saint Mary’s, no inquiry at all is made into an applicant’s religion. Religious preference is to be noted on Loyola’s application form, but the purpose is to allow full appreciation of the applicant’s background. Loyola also attempts to employ each year two members of a particular religious order which once staffed a college recently merged into Loyola. Budgetary considerations lead the colleges generally to favor members of religious orders, who often receive less than full salary. Still, the District Court found that “academic quality” was the principal hiring criterion, and that any “hiring bias,” or “effort by any defendant to stack its faculty with members of a particular religious group,” would have been noticed by other faculty members, who had never been heard to complain. Id., at 1294. (f) The great majority of students at each of the colleges are Roman Catholic, but the District Court concluded from a “thorough analysis of the student admission and recruiting criteria” that the student bodies “are chosen without regard to religion.” Id., at 1295. Wé cannot say that the foregoing findings as to the role of religion in particular aspects of the colleges are clearly erroneous. Appellants ask us to set those findings aside in certain respects. Not surprisingly, they have gleaned from this record of thousands of pages, compiled during several weeks of trial, occasional evidence of a more sectarian character than the District Court ascribes to the colleges. It is not our placo, however, to reappraise the evidence, unless it plainly fails to support the findings of the trier of facts. That is certainly not the case here, and it would make no difference even if we were to second-guess the District Court in certain particulars. To answer the question whether an institution is so “pervasively sectarian” that it may receive no direct state aid of any kind, it is necessary to paint a general picture of the institution, composed of many elements. The general picture that the District Court has painted of the appellee institutions is similar in almost all respects to that of the church-affiliated colleges considered in Tilton and Hunt. We find no constitutionally significant distinction between them, at least for purposes of the “pervasiye sectarianism” test. (2) Having found that the appellee institutions are not "so permeated by religion that the secular side cannot be separated from the sectarian,” 387 F. Supp., at 1293, the District Court proceeded to the next question posed by Hunt: whether aid in fact was extended only to “the secular side.” This requirement the court regarded as satisfied by the statutory prohibition against sectarian use, and by the administrative enforcement of that prohibition through the Council for Higher Education. We agree. Hunt requires only that slate funds not be used to support "specifically religious activity.” It is clear that fund uses exist that meet this requirement. See Tilton v. Richardson, supra; Hunt v. McNair, supra. We have no occasion to elaborate further on what is and is not a “specifically religious activity/' for no particular use of the state funds is set out in this statute. Funds are put to the use of the college's choice, provided it is not a sectarian use, of which the college must satisfy the Council. If the question is whether the statute sought to be enjoined authorizes state funds for “specifically religious activity,” that question fairly answers itself. The statute in terms forbids the use of funds for “sectarian purposes,” and this prohibition appears to be at least as broad as Hunt’s prohibition of the public funding of “specifically religious activity.” We must assume that the colleges, and the Council, will exercise their delegated control over use of the funds in compliance with the statutory, and therefore the constitutional, mandate. It is to be expected that they will give a wide berth to “specifically religious activity,” and thus minimize constitutional questions. Should such questions arise, the courts will consider them. It has not been the Court’s practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this kind, to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional use of funds. See, e. g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 744; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 682 (plurality opinion). B If the foregoing answer to the “primary effect” question seems easy, it serves to make the “excessive entanglement” problem more difficult. The statute itself clearly denies the use of public funds for “sectarian purposes.” It seeks to avert such use, however, through a process of annual interchange — proposal and approval, expenditure and review — between the colleges and the Council. In answering the question whether this will be an “excessively entangling” relationship, we must consider the several relevant factors identified in prior decisions: (1) First is the character of the aided institutions. This has been fully described above. As the District Court found, the colleges perform “essentially secular educational functions,” 387 F. Supp., at 1288, that are distinct and separable from religious activity. This finding, which is a prerequisite under the “pervasive sectarianism” test to any state aid at all, is also important for purposes of the entanglement test because it means that secular activities, for the most part, can be taken at face value. There is no danger, or at least only a substantially reduced danger, that an ostensibly secular activity — the study of biology, the learning of a foreign language, an athletic event — will actually be infused with religious content or significance. The need for close surveillance of purportedly secular activities is correspondingly reduced. Thus the District Court found that in this case “there is no necessity for state officials to investigate the conduct of particular classes of educational , programs to determine whether a school is attempting to indoctrinate its students under the guise of secular education.” Id., at 1289. We cannot say the District Court erred in this judgment or gave it undue significance. The Court took precisely the same view with respect to the aid extended to the very similar institutions in Tilton. 403 U. S., at 687 (plurality opinion), See also Hunt v. McNair, supra, at 746. (2) As for the form of aid, we have already noted that no particular use of state funds is before us in this case. The process by which aid is disbursed, and a use for it chosen, is before us. We address this as a matter of the “resulting relationship” of secular and religious authority. (3) As noted, the funding process is an annual one. The subsidies are paid out each year, and they can be put to annually varying uses. The colleges propose particular uses for the Council’s approval, and, following expenditure, they report to the Council on the use to which the funds have been put. The District Court’s view was that in light of the character of the aided institutions, and the resulting absence of any need “to investigate the conduct of particular classes,” 387 F. Supp., at 1289, the annual nature of the subsidy was not fatal. In fact, an annual, ongoing relationship had existed in Tilton, where the Government retained the right to inspect subsidized buildings for sectarian use, and the ongoing church-state involvement had been even greater in Hunt, where the State was actually the lessor of the subsidized facilities, retaining extensive powers to regulate their use. See 387 F. Supp., at 1290. We agree with the District Court that “excessive entanglement” does not necessarily result from the fact that the subsidy is an annual one. It is true that the Court favored the “one-time, single-purpose” construction grants in Tilton because they entailed “no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits, and no government analysis of an institution’s expenditures,” 403 U. S., at 688 (plurality opinion). The present aid program cannot claim these aspects. But if the question is whether this case is more like Lemon I or more like Tilton — and surely that is the fundamental question before us — the answer must be that it is more like Tilton. Tilton is distinguishable only by the form of aid. We cannot discount the distinction entirely, but neither can we regard it as decisive. As the District Court pointed out, ongoing, annual supervision of college facilities was explicitly foreseen in Tilton, 403 U. S., at 675; see also Lemon I, 403 U. S., at 669 (opinion of White, J.), and even more so in Hunt, 413 U. S., at 739-740, 745-749. Tilton and Hunt would be totally indistinguishable, at least in terms of annual supervision, if funds were used under the present statute to build or maintain physical facilities devoted to secular use. The present statute contemplates annual decisions by the Council as to what is a “sectarian purpose/’ but, as we have noted, the secular and sectarian activities of the colleges are easily separated. Occasional audits are possible here, but we must accept the District Court’s finding that they would be “quick and non-judgmental.” 387 P. Supp., at 1296. They and the other contacts between the Council and the colleges are not likely to be any more entangling than the inspections and audits incident to the normal process of the colleges’ accreditations by the State. While the form-of-aid distinctions of Tilton are thus of questionable importance, the character-of-institution distinctions of Lemon I are most impressive., To reiterate a few of the relevant points: The elementary and secondary schooling in Lemon I came at an impressionable age; the aided schools were “under the general supervision” of the Roman Catholic diocese; each school had a local Catholic parish that assumed “ultimate financial responsibility” for it; the principals of the schools were usually appointed by church authorities; religion “pervade[d] the school system”; teachers were specifically instructed by the “Handbook of School Regulations” that “ ' [r] eligious formation is not confined to formal courses; nor is it restricted to a single subject area.’ ” 403 U. S., at 617-618. These things made impossible what is crucial to a nonentangling aid program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes. The District Court gave primary importance to this consideration, and we cannot say it erred. (4) As for political divisiveness, the District Court recognized that the annual nature of the subsidy, along with its promise of an increasing demand for state funds as the colleges’ dependency grew, aggravated the danger of “[pjolitical fragmentation ... on religious lines.” Lemon I, 403 U. S., at 623. Nonetheless, the District Court found that the program “does not create a substantial danger of political entanglement.” 387 F. Supp., at 1291. Several reasons were given. As was stated in Tilton, the danger of political divisiveness is “substantially less” when the aided institution is not an elementary or secondary school, but a college, “whose student constituency is not local but diverse and widely dispersed.” 403 U. S., at 688-689. Furthermore, political divisiveness is diminished by the fact that the aid is extended to private colleges generally, more than two-thirds of which have no religious affiliation; this is in sharp contrast to Nyquist, for example, where 95% of the aided schools were Roman Catholic parochial schools. Finally, the substantial autonomy of the colleges was thought to mitigate political divisiveness, in that controversies surrounding the aid program are not likely to involve the Catholic Church itself, or even the religious character of the schools, but only their “fiscal responsibility and educational requirements.” 387 F. Supp., at 1290-1291. The District Court’s reasoning seems to us entirely sound. Once again, appellants urge that this case is controlled by previous cases in which the form of aid was similar (Lemon I, Nyquist, Levitt), rather than those in which the character of the aided institution was the same (Tilton, Hunt). We disagree. Though indisputably relevant, see Lemon I, 403 U. S., at 623-624, the annual nature of the aid cannot be dispositive. On the one hand, the Court has struck down a “permanent,” nonannua! tax exemption, reasoning that “the pressure for frequent enlargement of the relief is predictable,” as it always is. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 797. On the other hand, in Tilton it has upheld a program for “one-time, single-purpose” construction grants, despite the fact that such grants would, in fact, be “annual,” at least insofar as new grants would be annually applied for. 403 U. S., at 688. See Lemon I, 403 U. S., at 669 (opinion of White, J.). Our holdings are better reconciled in terms of the character of the aided institutions, found to be so dissimilar as between those considered in Tilton and Hunt, on the-one hand, and those considered in Lemon I, Nyquist, and Levitt, on the other. There is no exact science in gauging the entanglement of church and state. The wording of the test, which speaks of “excessive entanglement,” itself makes that clear. The relevant factors we have identified are to be considered “cumulatively” in judging the degree of entanglement. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 688. They may cut different ways, as certainly they do here. In reaching the conclusion that it did, the District Court gave dominant importance to the character of the aided institutions and to its finding that they are capable of separating secular and religious functions. For the reasons stated above, we cannot say that the emphasis was misplaced or the finding erroneous. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, It is so ordered. A 1974 amendment to the statute, Laws of 1974, c. 585, further requires that an aided institution “shall submit all new programs and major alterations of programs to the Maryland Council for Higher Education for its review and recommendation regarding their initiation.” Md. Arm. Code, Art. 77A, § 66(e) (1975). Section 68 provides in full: “The Board of Public Works assisted by the Maryland Council for Higher Education shall adopt criteria and procedures, not inconsistent with this subtitle, for the implementation and administration of the aid program provided for by this subtitle, including but not limited to criteria and procedures for the submission of applications for aid under this subtitle, for the verification of degrees conferred by the applicant private institutions of higher education, for the submission of reports or data concerning the utilization of these moneys by such institutions, and for the method and times during the fiscal year for paying the aid provided for by this subtitle.” The requirement, as found by the District Court, that an aided institution not award “primarily” theological or seminary degrees is apparently an expansion, made by the Council in the exercise of its administrative powers, see n. 2, supra, of the statutory requirement that the institution not award “only” such degrees. The District Court in its opinion described the procedures that the Council to that point had evolved for administering the statute. These have since been set out and expanded upon in formal rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Public Works on January 7, 1976. They are entitled “Criteria and Procedures for Aid to Nonpublic Institutions of Higher Education,” and they appear in full in 2 Maryland Register 1484^-1486 (Oct. 29, 1975). The description of the funding procedure given in the text, as well as the quoted phrasings, are drawn from these regulations. We take judicial notice of them. Regulation 01.03.051. provides in part: “Any verification or audit shall be conducted with the greatest possible speed and the least possible disruption of the institution’s activities and shall be strictly limited to such information and data as is necessary to determine whether or not the sectarian usage prohibition has been violated.” The command of the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” is applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 8 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940). Some of the escrow funds have been paid out since the entry of the District Court’s judgment. Appellants sought an order enjoining these payments pending appeal, but this was denied, first by .the District Court and then by this Court. 419 U. S. 1030 (1974). Two organizations, American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland and Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, were also plaintiffs in this suit at its outset. They were dismissed, however, for lack of standing. 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 n. 1 (1974). The Governor, Comptroller, and Treasurer of the State of Maryland were named as defendants, as well as the Board of Public Works. One of the four institutions, Saint Joseph College, has become defunct since the filing of the suit. It remains a party only insofar as the plaintiff-appellants seek to compel it to repay to the State the funds it received in 1971. Lemon II posed the question of the appropriate relief to be ordered in light of Lemon I’s invalidation of the Pennsylvania private school aid statute. Future payments under that statute were enjoined, and there was no claim that the Constitution required the refunding to the State of amounts already paid out. The statute's challengers, however, dicl seek to enjoin the payment of funds intended to reimburse aided schools for expenses incurred in reliance on the statute prior to its invalidation in Lemon I. This Court affirmed the denial of the injunction, reasoning that the payments would not substantially undermine constitutional interests, and that there had been reasonable reliance by the schools on receipt of the funds, especially since the challengers, although they had filed suit before the expenses were incurred, had dropped an attempt to enjoin payments pending the outcome of the litigation. See, e. g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 209-212 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15-16. It could scarcely be otherwise, or individuals would be discriminated against for their religion, and the Nation would have to abandon its accepted practice of allowing members of religious orders to serve in the Congress and in other public offices. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973) (“the Court has not accepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends”). See also Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 775 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 679 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 664 (1971) (opinion of White, J.); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 244 (1968); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 17. The importance of avoiding persistent and potentially frictional contact between governmental and religious authorities is such that it has been held to justify the extension, rather than the withholding, of certain benefits to religious organizations. The Court upheld the exemption of such organizations from property taxation partly on this ground. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 674-675 (1970). The danger of political divisiveness had been noted by Members of the Court in previous cases. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S., at 695 (opinion of Harlan, J.); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S., at 249 (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). The restriction, as imposed, was to remain in effect for 20 years following construction. Since the Court could not approve the facilities’ sectarian use even after a 20-year period, it excised that time limitation from the statute. 403 U. S., at 682-684 (plurality opinion). The elements of the “profile” were that the schools placed religious restrictions on admission and also faculty appointments; that they enforced obedience to religious dogma; that they required attendance at religious services and the study of particular religious doctrine; that they were an “ 'integral part’ ” of the religious mission of the sponsoring church; that they had religious indoctrination as a “ ‘substantial purpose’ ”; and that they imposed religious restrictions on how and what the faculty could teach. 413 U. S., at 767-768. The program grew out of a study conducted by the Council of the tenuous financial condition of Maryland’s private colleges. All such colleges are eligible for aid, the church-related ones constituting less than one-third of those benefited. As noted above, five church-related colleges were made original defendants in this action, yet a total of 17 institutions were aided in 1971, and 18 were eligible in 1972. The District Court did not make the same finding with respect to theology and religion courses taught at the appellee colleges. It made no contrary finding, but simply was “unable to characterize the course offerings in these subjects.” There was a “possibility” that “these courses could be devoted to deepening religious experiences in the particular faith rather than to teaching theology as an academic discipline.” The court considered this possibility sufficient to require that the Council for Higher Education take steps to insure that no public funds would be used to support religion and theology programs. 387 F. Supp., at 1287-1288, 1295-1296. The Council has complied. See n. 22, infra. There being no cross-appeal from the District Court judgment, this aspect of its ruling is not before us, and we express no opinion as to it. The plurality opinion described the colleges under consideration in Tilton in this manner: “All four schools are governed by Catholic religious organizations, and the faculties and student bodies at each are predominantly Catholic. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that non-Catholics were admitted as students and given faculty appointments. Not one of these four institutions requires its students to attend religious services. Although all four schools require their students to take theology courses, the parties stipulated that these courses are taught according to the academic requirements of the subject matter and the teacher’s concept of professional standards. The parties also stipulated that the courses covered a range of human religious experiences and are not limited to courses about the Roman Catholic religion. The schools introduced evidence that they made no attempt to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. Indeed, some of the required theology courses at Albertus Magnus and Sacred Heart 3-re taught by rabbis. Finally, as we have noted, these four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not in fact followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose predominant higher education mission is to provide their students with a secular education.” 403 U. S., at 686-687. To be sure, ip this case the District Court was unable to find, as was stipulated in Tilton, that mandatory theology or religion courses are taught without taint of religious indoctrination. See n. 20, supra, This is not inconsistent, however, with the Distriot Court’s finding of a lack of pervasive sectarianism. The latter condition would exist only if, because of the institution’s general character, courses other than religion or theology courses could not be funded without fear of religious indoctrination. The role of the affiliated church appears, if anything, to have been stronger in Hunt than in this case. The Baptist College at Charleston, before us in Hunt, was controlled by the South Carolina Baptist Convention to the extent that the Convention elected all members of the Board of Trustees, and retained the power to approve certain financial transactions, as well as any amendment of the College’s charter. 413 U. S., at 743. The Council, at least, thus far has shown every sign of doing so. For example, appellants have pointed during this litigation to three assertedly sectarian uses in which state funds either have been or could be employed under this statute: the salaries of teachers teaching religion or theology courses, scholarships for students in religious studies, and maintenance of buildings used for religious activity. Brief for Appellants 50-55. (The alleged instances of actual use in these ways related to the 1971 funds.) However, the Council has now adopted regulations specifically prohibiting the use of state funds in these and other ways: “A. Art. 77A, § 68A, Annotated Code of Maryland, prohibits recipient institutions from using State funds for 'sectarian purposes.’ That provision generally proscribes the use of State funds to support religious instruction, religious worship, or other activities of a religious nature. Listed below are several potential uses of State funds which would violate the sectarian use prohibition. The list is not intended to be all-inclusive and, if an institution is in doubt whether any other possible use of the funds might violate the sectarian use prohibition, it should consult with and seek the advice of the Council in advance. “(1) Student Aid: State funds may not be used for student aid if the institution imposes religious restrictions or qualifications on eligibility for student aid, nor may they be paid to students then enrolled in a religious, seminarian, or theological academic program. “(2) Salaries: State funds may not be used to pay in whole or in part the salary of any person who is engaged in the teaching of religion or theology, who serves as chaplain or director of the campus ministry, or who administers or supervises any program of religious activities. “(3) Maintenance and Repair: State funds may not be used to pay any portion of the cost of maintenance or repair of any building or facility used for the teaching of religion or theology or for religious worship or for any religious activity. “(4) Utilities: If an institution has any building or facility that is used in whole or in part for the teaching of religion or theology or for religious worship or for any religious activity, State funds may not be used to pay utilities bills unless those buildings or facilities are separately metered. If buildings or facilities used for any religious purpose described in the preceding sentence are separately metered, the cost of providing heat, electricity, and water to those buildings or facilities cannot be paid with State funds. “(5) Capital Construction and Improvements: If State funds are used to construct a new building or facility or to renovate an existing one, the building or facility may not be used for the teaching of religion or theology or for religious worship or for any religious activity at any time in the future.” Regulation 01.03.06A. See n. 4, supra. We have discussed in the text only the constitutionality of the amended statute. Our approval of that statute does not dispose of the claim, made in the District Court, that the colleges must refund amounts paid in 1971 under the unamended statute. As noted, the District Court rejected this claim on the authority of Lemon II. See n. 11, supra. While their position is not entirely clear to us, appellants do not appear to challenge this aspect of the District Court ruling. They assert in this Court that “the appellee institutions should be required to refund all payments not enjoined upon timely filed motions or application.” Brief for Appellants 76 (emphasis added). There were no “motions or applications,” indeed no suit at all, until well after the 1971 payments had been made. Appellants also speak of repayments being necessary in order that there be some remedy “as to public funds paid to the appellee institutions during at least three fiscal years (1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75).” Id., at 79-80. From these statements, and from the fact that appellants premise their argument for repayment upon their “vigorous efforts to enjoin payment and preserve the status quo pending litigation,” id., at 80, we take it that they seek repayment only of funds paid out after the commencement of this suit, and despite their efforts to enjoin such payments. See n. 7, supra. In any event, the District Court’s ruling with respect to the 1971 payments was clearly in keeping with Lemon II. In that case, this Court identified two considerations primarily relevant to the question of retroactive remedy: (1) the reasonableness and degree of reliance by the institutions on the payments, and (2) the necessity of refunds to protect the substantive constitutional rights involved. Reliance was, if anything, less reasonable in Lemon II, where at least a suit had been filed prior to the time the reliance occurred. The degree of reliance was also, if anything, less in Lemon II. There the colleges had not yet received the funds in question, but had simply incurred expenses in expectation of receiving them. The funds in question here long since have been paid out to, and spent by, the colleges. As for the protection of substantive constitutional rights, the separation of church and state may well be better served by not putting the State of Maryland in the position of a judgment creditor of the appellee colleges. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S., at 674. Leo Pfeffer filed a brief for the National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, and Thomas G. Wilson for the United States, and by Charles M. Whelan for the Association of American Colleges et al.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALLEN v. WRIGHT et al. No. 81-757. Argued February 29, 1984 Decided July 3, 1984 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 766. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 783. Marshall, J., took no part in the decision of the cases. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for petitioners in No. 81-970. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Archer, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Ernest J. Brown, and Robert S. Pomerance. William J. Landers II argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-757. With him on the brief was S. Shepherd Tate. Robert H. Kapp argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Joseph M. Hassett, David S. Tatel, William L. Robinson, Norman J. Chachkin, and Frank R. Parker. Together with No. 81-970, Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. Wright et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Wilfred R. Caron and Angelo Aiosa filed a brief for the United States Catholic Conference as amicus curiae urging reversal. Thomas I. Atkins and Harold Flannery filed a brief for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Parents of black public school children allege in this nationwide class action that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them directly and interferes with the ability of their children to receive an education in desegregated public schools. The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. We hold that they do not. I The IRS denies tax-exempt status under §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) — and hence eligibility to receive charitable contributions deductible from income taxes under §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) — to racially discriminatory private schools. Rev. Rui. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230. The IRS policy requires that a school applying for tax-exempt status show that it “admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs. ” Ibid. To carry out this policy, the IRS has established guidelines and procedures for determining whether a particular school is in fact racially nondiscriminatory. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 587. Failure to comply with the guidelines “will ordinarily result in the proposed revocation of” tax-exempt status. Id., §4.08, p. 589. The guidelines provide that “[a] school must show affirmatively both that it has adopted a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made known to the general public and that since the adoption of that policy it has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance therewith.” Id., §2.02. The school must state its nondiscrimination policy in its organizational charter, id., §4.01, pp. 587-588, and in all of its brochures, catalogs, and other advertisements to prospective students, id., §4.02, p. 588. The school must make its nondiscrimination policy known to the entire community served by the school and must publicly disavow any contrary representations made on its behalf once it becomes aware of them. Id., §4.03. The school must have nondiscriminatory policies concerning all programs and facilities, id., §4.04, p. 589, including scholarships and loans, id., §4.05, and the school must annually certify, under penalty of perjury, compliance with these requirements, id., §4.07. The IRS rules require a school applying for tax-exempt status to give a breakdown along racial lines of its student body and its faculty and administrative staff, id., §5.01-1, as well as of scholarships and loans awarded, id., §5.01-2. They also require the applicant school to state the year of its organization, id., §5.01-5, and to list “incorporators, founders, board members, and donors of land or buildings,” id., §5.01-3, and state whether any of the organizations among these have an objective of maintaining segregated public or private school education, id., §5.01-4. The rules further provide that, once given an exemption, a school must keep specified records to document the extent of compliance with the IRS guidelines. Id., §7, p. 590. Finally, the rules announce that any information concerning discrimination at a tax-exempt school is officially welcomed. Id., §6. In 1976 respondents challenged these guidelines and procedures in a suit filed in Federal District Court against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The plaintiffs named in the complaint are parents of black children who, at the time the complaint was filed, were attending public schools in seven States in school districts undergoing desegregation. They brought this nationwide class action “on behalf of themselves and their children, and ... on behalf of all other parents of black children attending public school systems undergoing, or which may in the future undergo, desegregation pursuant to court order [or] HEW regulations and guidelines, under state law, or voluntarily.” App. 22-23. They estimated that the class they seek to represent includes several million persons. Id., at 23. Respondents allege in their complaint that many racially segregated private schools were created or expanded in their communities at the time the public schools were undergoing desegregation. Id., at 23-24. According to the complaint, many such private schools, including 17 schools or school systems identified by name in the complaint (perhaps some 30 schools in all), receive tax exemptions either directly or through the tax-exempt status of “umbrella” organizations that operate or support the schools. Id., at 23-38. Respondents allege that, despite the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools and despite the IRS guidelines and procedures for implementing that policy, some of the tax-exempt racially segregated private schools created or expanded in desegregating districts in fact have racially discriminatory policies. Id., at 17-18 (IRS permits “schools to receive tax exemptions merely on the basis of adopting and certifying — but not implementing — a policy of nondiscrimination”); id., at 25 (same). Respondents allege that the IRS grant of tax exemptions to such racially discriminatory schools is unlawful. Respondents allege that the challenged Government conduct harms them in two ways. The challenged conduct “(a) constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other support for racially segregated educational institutions, and “(b) fosters and encourages the organization, operation and expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts and thereby interferes with the efforts of federal courts, HEW and local school authorities to desegregate public school districts which have been operating racially dual school systems.” Id., at 38-39. Thus, respondents do not allege that their children have been the victims of discriminatory exclusion from the schools whose tax exemptions they challenge as unlawful. Indeed, they have not alleged at any stage of this litigation that their children have ever applied or would ever apply to any private school. See Wright v. Regan, 211 U. S. App. D. C. 281, 238, 656 F. 2d 820, 827 (1981) (“Plaintiffs . . . maintain they have no interest whatever in enrolling their children in a private school”). Rather, respondents claim a direct injury from the mere fact of the challenged Government conduct and, as indicated by the restriction of the plaintiff class to parents of children in desegregating school districts, injury to their children’s opportunity to receive a desegregated education. The latter injury is traceable to the IRS grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools, respondents allege, chiefly because contributions to such schools are deductible from income taxes under §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code and the “deductions facilitate the raising of funds to organize new schools and expand existing schools in order to accommodate white students avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts.” App. 24. Respondents request only prospective relief. Id., at 40-41. They ask for a declaratory judgment that the challenged IRS tax-exemption practices are unlawful. They also ask for an injunction requiring the IRS to deny tax exemptions to a considerably broader class of private schools than the class of racially discriminatory private schools. Under the requested injunction, the IRS would have to deny tax-exempt status to all private schools “which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments, which are located in or serve desegregating public school districts, and which either— “(1) were established or expanded at or about the time the public school districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating; “(2) have been determined in adversary judicial or administrative proceedings to be racially segregated; or “(3) cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school systems . . . Id., at 40. Finally, respondents ask for an order directing the IRS to replace its 1975 guidelines with standards consistent with the requested injunction. In May 1977 the District Court permitted intervention as a defendant by petitioner Allen, the head of one of the private school systems identified in the complaint. Id., at 54-55. Thereafter, progress in the lawsuit was stalled for several years. During this period, the IRS reviewed its challenged policies and proposed new Revenue Procedures to tighten requirements for eligibility for tax-exempt status for private schools. See 43 Fed. Reg. 37296 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 9451 (1979). In 1979, however, Congress blocked any strengthening of the IRS guidelines at least until October 1980. The District Court thereupon considered and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that respondents lack standing, that the judicial task proposed by respondents is inappropriately intrusive for a federal court, and that awarding the requested relief would be contrary to the will of Congress expressed in the 1979 ban on strengthening IRS guidelines. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (DC 1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, concluding that respondents have standing to maintain this lawsuit. The court acknowledged that Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26 (1976), “suggests that litigation concerning tax liability is a matter between taxpayer and IRS, with the door barely ajar for third party challenges.” 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 239, 656 F. 2d, at 828. The court concluded, however, that the Simon case is inapposite because respondents claim no injury dependent on taxpayers’ actions: “[t]hey claim indifference as to the course private schools would take.” Id., at 240, 656 F. 2d, at 829. Instead, the court observed, “[t]he sole injury [respondents] claim is the denigration they suffer as black parents and schoolchildren when their government graces with tax-exempt status educational institutions in their communities that treat members of their race as persons of lesser worth.” Id., at 238, 656 F. 2d, at 827. The court held this denigration injury enough to give respondents standing since it was this injury which supported standing in Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971), summarily aff’g Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 (1973); and Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556 (1974). 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 239-243, 656 F. 2d, at 828-832. The Court of Appeals also held that the 1979 congressional actions were not intended to preclude judicial remedies and that the relief requested by respondents could be fashioned “without large scale judicial intervention in the administrative process,” id., at 248, 656 F. 2d, at 837. The court accordingly remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings, enjoining the defendants meanwhile from granting tax-exempt status to any racially discriminatory school, App. 81-84. The Government defendants and defendant-intervenor Allen filed separate petitions for a writ of certiorari in this Court. They both sought review of the Court of Appeals' holding that respondents have standing to bring this lawsuit. We granted certiorari, 462 U. S. 1130 (1983), and now reverse. II A Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual “cases” and “controversies.” As the Court explained in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471-476 (1982), the “case or controversy” requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded. The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are “founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). “All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III — not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like — relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.” Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 226 U. S. App. D. C. 14, 26-27, 699 F. 2d 1166, 1178-1179 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring). The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government. The Art. Ill doctrine that requires a litigant to have “standing” to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines. “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 498. Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. See Valley Forge, supra, at 474-475. The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. 454 U. S., at 472. Like the prudential component, the constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for example, “‘distinct and palpable,’” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501), and not “abstract” or “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101-102 (1983); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974). The injury must be “fairly” traceable to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be “likely” to follow from a favorable decision. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 38, 41. These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise. The absence of precise definitions, however, as this Court’s extensive body of case law on standing illustrates, see generally Valley Forge, supra, at 471-476, hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the law of standing. Like most legal notions, the standing concepts have gained considerable definition from developing case law. In many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior standing cases. See, e. g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, supra, at 102-105. More important, the law of Art. Ill standing is built on a single basic idea — the idea of separation of powers. It is this fact which makes possible the gradual clarification of the law through judicial application. Of course, both federal and state courts have long experience in applying and elaborating in numerous contexts the pervasive and fundamental notion of separation of powers. Determining standing in a particular case may be facilitated by clarifying principles or even clear rules developed in prior cases. Typically, however, the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted. Is the injury too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate, to be considered judicially cognizable? Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too attenuated? Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling too speculative? These questions and any others relevant to the standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Art. Ill notion that federal courts may exercise power only “in the last resort, and as a necessity,” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892), and only when adjudication is “consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 97 (1968). See Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472-473. B Respondents allege two injuries in their complaint to support their standing to bring this lawsuit. First, they say that they are harmed directly by the mere fact of Government financial aid to discriminatory private schools. Second, they say that the federal tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools in their communities impair their ability to have their public schools desegregated. See supra, at 745. In the Court of Appeals, respondents apparently relied on the first injury. Thus, the court below asserted that “[t]he sole injury [respondents] claim is the denigration they suffer” as a result of the tax exemptions. 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 238, 656 F. 2d, at 827. In this Court, respondents have not focused on this claim of injury. Here they stress the effect of the tax exemptions on their “equal educational opportunities,” see, e. g., Brief for Respondents 12, 14, renewing reliance on the second injury described in their complaint. Because respondents have not clearly disclaimed reliance on either of the injuries described in their complaint, we address both allegations of injury. We conclude that neither suffices to support respondents’ standing. The first fails under clear precedents of this Court because it does not constitute judicially cognizable injury. The second fails because the alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS. 1 Respondents’ first claim of injury can be interpreted in two ways. It might be a claim simply to have the Government avoid the violation of law alleged in respondents’ complaint. Alternatively, it might be a claim of stigmatic injury, or denigration, suffered by all members of a racial group when the Government discriminates on the basis of race. Under neither interpretation is this claim of injury judicially cognizable. This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), for example, the Court rejected a claim of citizen standing to challenge Armed Forces Reserve commissions held by Members of Congress as violating the Incompatibility Clause of Art. I, § 6, of the Constitution. As citizens, the Court held, plaintiffs alleged nothing but “the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution . . . .” Id., at 223, n. 13. More recently, in Valley Forge, supra, we rejected a claim of standing to challenge a Government conveyance of property to a religious institution. Insofar as the plaintiffs relied simply on “‘their shared individuated right’” to a Government that made no law respecting an establishment of religion, id., at 482 (quoting Americans United v. U. S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F. 2d 252, 261 (CA3 1980)), we held that plaintiffs had not alleged a judicially cognizable injury. “[Assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. Ill without draining those requirements of meaning.” 454 U. S., at 483. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972); Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937). Respondents here have no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law. Neither do they have standing to litigate their claims based on the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination. There can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1984). Our cases make clear, however, that such injury accords a basis for standing only to “those persons who are personally denied equal treatment” by the challenged discriminatory conduct, ibid. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), the Court held that the plaintiff had no standing to challenge a club’s racially discriminatory membership policies because he had never applied for membership. Id., at 166-167. In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), the Court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge racial discrimination in the administration of their city’s criminal justice system because they had not alleged that they had been or would likely be subject to the challenged practices. The Court denied standing on similar facts in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976). In each of those cases, the plaintiffs alleged official racial discrimination comparable to that alleged by respondents here. Yet standing was denied in each case because the plaintiffs were not personally subject to the challenged discrimination. Insofar as their first claim of injury is concerned, respondents are in exactly the same position: unlike the appellee in Heckler v. Mathews, supra, at 740-741, n. 9, they do not allege a stigmatie injury suffered as a direct result of having personally been denied equal treatment. The consequences of recognizing respondents’ standing on the basis of their first claim of injury illustrate why our cases plainly hold that such injury is not judicially cognizable. If the abstract stigmatie injury were cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial groups against which the Government was alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school, regardless of the location of that school. All such persons could claim the same sort of abstract stigmatic injury respondents assert in their first claim of injury. A black person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory school in Maine. Recognition of standing in such circumstances would transform the federal courts into “no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Constitutional limits on the role of the federal courts preclude such a transformation. 2 It is in their complaint’s second claim of injury that respondents allege harm to a concrete, personal interest that can support standing in some circumstances. The injury they identify — their children’s diminished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated school — is, beyond any doubt, not only judicially cognizable but, as shown by cases from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), to Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983), one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system. Despite the constitutional importance of curing the injury alleged by respondents, however, the federal judiciary may not redress it unless standing requirements are met. In this case, respondents’ second claim of injury cannot support standing because the injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the Government conduct respondents challenge as unlawful. The illegal conduct challenged by respondents is the IRS’s grant of tax exemptions to some racially discriminatory schools. The line of causation between that conduct and desegregation of respondents’ schools is attenuated at best. From the perspective of the IRS, the injury to respondents is highly indirect and “results from the independent action of some third party not before the court,” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 42. As the Court pointed out in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 505, “the indirectness of the injury . . . may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. Ill... The diminished ability of respondents’ children to receive a desegregated education would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents’ communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in public school integration. Respondents have made no such allegation. It is, first, uncertain how many racially discriminatory private schools are in fact receiving tax exemptions. Moreover, it is entirely speculative, as respondents themselves conceded in the Court of Appeals, see n. 17, supra, whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its policies. See 480 F. Supp., at 796. It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes in educational or financial policy made by the private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt status. It is also pure speculation whether, in a particular community, a large enough number of the numerous relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that collectively would have a significant impact on the racial composition of the public schools. The links in the chain of causation between the challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for the chain as a whole to sustain respondents’ standing. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, the Court held that standing to challenge a Government grant of a tax exemption to hospitals could not be founded on the asserted connection between the grant of tax-exempt status and the hospitals’ policy concerning the provision of medical services to indigents. The causal connection depended on the decisions hospitals would make in response to withdrawal of tax-exempt status, and those decisions were sufficiently uncertain to break the chain of causation between the plaintiffs’ injury and the challenged Government action. Id., at 40-46. See also Warth v. Seldin, supra. The chain of causation is even weaker in this case. It involves numerous third parties (officials of racially discriminatory schools receiving tax exemptions and the parents of children attending such schools) who may not even exist in respondents’ communities and whose independent decisions may not collectively have a significant effect on the ability of public school students to receive a desegregated education. The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents’ alleged injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action” of the IRS. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 41. That conclusion would pave the way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law, are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication. “Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the ‘power of the purse’; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S., at 15. See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 14 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The same concern for the proper role of the federal courts is reflected in cases like O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 (1974), Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976), and Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983). In all three cases plaintiffs sought injunctive relief directed at certain systemwide law enforcement practices. The Court held in each case that, absent an allegation of a specific threat of being subject to the challenged practices, plaintiffs had no standing to ask for an injunction. Animating this Court’s holdings was the principle that “[a] federal court ... is not the proper forum to .press” general complaints about the way in which government goes about its business. Id., at 112. Case-or-controversy considerations, the Court observed in O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 499, “obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief.” The latter set of considerations should therefore inform our judgment about whether respondents have standing. Most relevant to this case is the principle articulated in Rizzo v. Goode, supra, at 378-379: “When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with ‘the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the “dispatch of its own internal affairs,” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961),’ quoted in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 83 (1974).” When transported into the Art. Ill context, that principle, grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U. S. Const., Art. II, §3. We could not recognize respondents’ standing in this case without running afoul of that structural principle. C The Court of Appeals relied for its contrary conclusion on Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556 (1974), on Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 (1973), and on Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971), summarily aff’g Green v. Con- nally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC). Respondents in this Court, though stressing a different injury from the one emphasized by the Court of Appeals, see supra, at 752-753, place principal reliance on those cases as well. None of the cases, however, requires that we find standing in this lawsuit. In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, supra, the plaintiffs asserted a constitutional right, recognized in an outstanding injunction, to use the city’s public parks on a nondiscriminatory basis. They alleged that the city was violating that equal protection right by permitting racially discriminatory private schools and other groups to use the public parks. The Court recognized plaintiffs’ standing to challenge this city policy insofar as the policy permitted the exclusive use of the parks by racially discriminatory private schools: the plaintiffs had alleged direct cognizable injury to their right to nondiscriminatory access to the public parks. Id., at 570-571, n. 10. Standing in Gilmore thus rested on an allegation of direct deprivation of a right to equal use of the parks. Like the plaintiff in Heckler v. Mathews — indeed, like the plaintiffs having standing in virtually any equal protection case — the plaintiffs in Gilmore alleged that they were personally being denied equal treatment. 465 U. S., at 740-741, n. 9. The Gilmore Court did not rest its finding of standing on an abstract denigration injury, and no problem of attenuated causation attended the plaintiffs’ claim of injury. In Norwood v. Harrison, supra, parents of public school children in Tunica County, Miss., filed a statewide class action challenging the State’s provision of textbooks to students attending racially discriminatory private schools in the State. The Court held the State’s practice unconstitutional because it breached “the State’s acknowledged duty to establish a unitary school system,” id., at 460-461. See id., at 463-468. The Court did not expressly address the basis for the plaintiffs’ standing. In Gilmore, however, the Court identified the basis for standing in Norwood: “The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they suffered.” 417 U. S., at 571, n. 10. Through the school-desegregation decree, the plaintiffs had acquired a right to have the State “steer clear” of any perpetuation of the racially dual school system that it had once sponsored. 413 U. S., at 467. The interest acquired was judicially cognizable because it was a personal interest, created by law, in having the State refrain from taking specific actions. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 500 (standing may exist by virtue of legal rights created by statute). The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the State directly injured that interest by aiding racially discriminatory private schools. Respondents in this lawsuit, of course, have no injunctive rights against the IRS that are allegedly being harmed by the challenged IRS action. Unlike Gilmore and Norwood, Coit v. Green, supra, cannot easily be seen to have based standing on an injury different in kind from any asserted by respondents here. The plaintiffs in Coit, parents of black schoolchildren in Mississippi, sued to enjoin the IRS grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools in the State. Nevertheless, Coit in no way mandates the conclusion that respondents have standing. First, the decision has little weight as a precedent on the law of standing. This Court's decision in Coit was merely a summary affirmance; for that reason alone it could hardly establish principles contrary to those set out in opinions issued after full briefing and argument. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring); see also Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 74 (1976). Moreover, when the case reached this Court, the plaintiffs and the IRS were no longer adverse parties; and the ruling that was summarily affirmed, Green v. Connolly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC 1971), did not include a ruling on the issue of standing, which had been briefly considered in a prior ruling of the District Court, Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (DC), appeal dism’d sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U. S. 956 (1970). Thus, “the Court’s affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary controversy.” Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 740, n. 11 (1974). In any event, the facts in the Coit case are sufficiently different from those presented in this lawsuit that the absence of standing here is unaffected by the possible propriety of standing there. In particular, the suit in Coit was limited to the public schools of one State. Moreover, the District Court found, based on extensive evidence before it as well as on the findings in Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (SD Miss.1969), that large numbers of segregated private schools had been established in the State for the purpose of avoiding a unitary public school system, 309 F. Supp., at 1133-1134; that the tax exemptions were critically important to the ability of such schools to succeed, id., at 1134-1136; and that the connection between the grant of tax exemptions to discriminatory schools and desegregation of the public schools in the particular State was close enough to warrant the conclusion that irreparable injury to the interest in desegregated education was threatened if the tax exemptions continued, id., at 1138-1139. What made possible those findings was the fact that, when the Mississippi plaintiffs filed their suit, the IRS had a policy of granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools; thus, the suit was initially brought, not simply to reform Executive Branch enforcement procedures, but to challenge a fundamental IRS policy decision, which affected numerous identifiable schools in the State of Mississippi. See id., at 1130. The limited setting, the history of school desegregation in Mississippi at the time of the Coit litigation, the nature of the IRS conduct challenged at the outset of the litigation, and the District Court’s particular findings, which were never challenged as clearly erroneous, see Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in Coit v. Green, O. T. 1971, No. 71-425, p. 13, amply distinguish the Coit case from respondents’ lawsuit. Thus, we need not consider whether standing was properly found to exist in Coit. Whatever the answer to that question, respondents’ complaint, which aims at nationwide relief and does not challenge particular identified unlawful IRS actions, alleges no connection between the asserted desegregation injury and the challenged IRS conduct direct enough to overcome the substantial separation of powers barriers to a suit seeking an injunction to reform administrative procedures. I-H h-f h-i “The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. Ill requirement.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 39. Respondents have not met this fundamental requirement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the injunction issued by that court is vacated. It is so ordered. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of these cases. As the Court explained last Term in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 579 (1983), the IRS announced this policy in 1970 and formally adopted it in 1971. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. Bull. 230. This change in prior policy was prompted by litigation over tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools in the State of Mississippi, litigation that resulted in the entry of an injunction against the IRS largely if not entirely coextensive with the position the IRS had voluntarily adopted. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (DC) (entering preliminary injunction), appeal dism’d sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U. S. 956 (1970); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC) (entering permanent injunction), summarily aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971). The 1975 guidelines replaced guidelines issued for the same purpose in 1972. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 834. The definition of “racially nondiscriminatory policy” is qualified in one respect: “A policy of a school that favors racial minority groups with respect to admissions, facilities and programs, and financial assistance will not constitute discrimination on the basis of race when the purpose and effect is to promote the establishment and maintenance of that school’s racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students.” Rev. Proc. 75-50, §3.02, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 587. One way a school can satisfy the publication requirement is to disseminate notice of the nondiscrimination policy through the print or broadcast media. Id., §4.03-1, p. 588. Detailed IRS rules govern what print and broadcast media may be selected as well as the content of the notice. Ibid. Although the IRS encourages all schools to follow that route, see id., § 4.03-2, p. 589, there are three alternative ways to satisfy the publication requirement. First, a parochial or church-related school at least 75% of whose students in the preceding three years were members of the church satisfies the requirement if it gives notice of its nondiscrimination policy in church publications, unless it advertises in newspapers of general circulation. Id., §4.03-2(a), p. 588. Second, a school that draws its students from areas larger than the local community satisfies the requirement if it enrolls minority students in meaningful numbers or engages in promotional and recruitment activities reasonably designed to reach all racial segments of the areas from which students are drawn. Id., §4.03-2(b). Third, a school serving only a local community satisfies the publication requirement if it actually enrolls minority students in meaningful numbers. Id., §4.03-2(c), pp. 588-589. A school choosing any of these three options “must be prepared to demonstrate” on audit that this choice was justified. Id., §4.03-2, p. 589. Scholarships and loans must generally be available without regard to race, and this fact must be known in the community served by the school. An exception is made, however, consistent with § 3.02 of Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 587, see n. 3, supra, for financial assistance programs favoring minority students that are designed to promote the school’s nondiscriminatory policy. A second exception is made for financial assistance programs “favoring members of one or more racial groups that do not significantly derogate from the school’s racially nondiscriminatory policy . . . .” Rev. Proc. 75-50, §4.05, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 589. The regulations also declare that discrimination in the employment of faculty and administrative staff (or its absence) is indicative of discrimination with respect to students (or its absence). Id., §4.07. Records must be kept, and preserved for three years, concerning the racial composition of the student body, the faculty and administrative staff, and the group of students receiving financial assistance. Copies of brochures, catalogs, and advertising must also be kept. Id., § 7.01, p. 590. Although the method of figuring racial composition must be described in the records compiled by the school, the school need not require students, applicants, or staff to furnish information not otherwise required, and the school generally need not release personally identifiable records. Id., § 7.02. Cf. id., § 5.02, pp. 589-590 (information furnished by applicant for tax-exempt status subject to similar qualifications). Reports containing the required information, if filed in accordance with law with a Government agency, may satisfy the recordkeeping requirement if the information is current and the school maintains copies of the reports. Id., § 7.03, p. 590. Failure to maintain the required records gives rise to a presumption of noncompliance with the guidelines. Id., § 7.04. The Revenue Procedure expressly notes, id., § 8, that its provisions are superseded by, to the extent they differ from, the injunction concerning Mississippi schools issued in Green v. Connolly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC), summarily aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971). Shortly before respondents filed this action, the plaintiffs in the Green litigation, concerning the tax-exempt status of private schools in Mississippi, ibid., moved to reopen that suit, making allegations comparable to those in respondents’ complaint. See Wright v. Regan, 211 U. S. App. D. C. 231, 236, 656 F. 2d 820, 825 (1981). In 1977, the Mississippi litigation was consolidated with this suit. Ibid. The Green litigation was not consolidated with this lawsuit on appeal, however, and it is not before this Court. Hereafter, references to a private school’s tax exemption embrace both tax-exempt status of the school and tax-exempt status of an “umbrella” organization. We assume, without deciding, that a grant of tax-exempt status to an “umbrella” organization of the sort respondents have in mind is subject to the same legal constraints as a grant of tax-exempt status directly to a school. The complaint generally uses the phrase “racially segregated school” to mean simply that no or few minority students attend the school, irrespective of the school’s maintenance of racially discriminatory policies or practices. Although the complaint, on its face, alleges that granting tax-exempt status to any “racially segregated” school in a desegregating public school district is unlawful, App. 39, it is clear that respondents premise their allegation of illegality on discrimination, not on segregation alone. The nub of respondents’ complaint is that current IRS guidelines and procedures are inadequate to detect false certifications of nondiscrimination policies. See Id., at 17-18, 25. This allegation would be superfluous if respondents were claiming that racial segregation even without racial discrimination made the grant of tax-exempt status unlawful. Moreover, respondents have noticeably refrained from asserting that the IRS violates the law when it grants a tax exemption to a nondiscriminatory private school that happens to have few minority students. Indeed, respondents’ brief in this Court makes a point of noting that their complaint alleges not only segregation but discrimination, see Brief for Respondents 10, n. 8, and it repeatedly states that the challenged Government conduct is the granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools, see, e. g., id., at 9-10 (“Respondents alleged that the federal petitioners are continuing to grant tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools . . .”); id., at 13-14. Since respondents’ entire argument is built on the assertion that their rights are violated by IRS grants of tax-exempt status to some number of unidentified racially discriminatory private schools in desegregating districts, we resolve the ambiguity in respondents’ complaint by reading it as making that assertion. Contrary to Justice Brennan’s statement, post, at 768, the complaint does not allege that each desegregating district in which they reside contains one or more racially discriminatory private schools unlawfully receiving a tax exemption. The complaint alleges that the challenged IRS conduct violates several laws: § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq.; Rev. Stat. §1977, 42 U. S. C. §1981; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Last Term, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983), the Court concluded that racially discriminatory private schools do not qualify for a tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Respondents did not allege in their 1976 complaint that their children were currently attending racially segregated schools. In 1979, during argument before the District Court, counsel for respondents stated that his clients’ children “do go to desegregated schools . . . App. 62. Several additional tax benefits accrue to an organization receiving a tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. Such an organization is exempt not only from income taxes but also from federal social security taxes, 26 U. S. C. § 3121(b)(8)(B), and from federal unemployment taxes, 26 U. S. C. § 3306(c)(8). Moreover, contributions to the organization are deductible not only from income taxes, 26 U. S. C. §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2), but also from federal estate taxes, 26 U. S. C. § 2055(a)(2), and from federal gift taxes, 26 U. S. C. § 2522(a)(2). The first proposal was made on August 22,1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 37296. It placed the burden of proving good faith operation on a nondiscriminatory basis, evaluated according to specified factors, on any private school that had an insignificant number of minority students and that had been formed or substantially expanded at a time the public schools in its community were undergoing desegregation. The second proposal was made on February 18, 1979, after public comment and hearings. 44 Fed. Reg. 9451. It afforded private schools “greater flexibility” in proving nondiscriminatory operation, permitting satisfaction of this proof requirement by a showing that the school has “undertaken actions or programs reasonably designed to attract minority students on a continuing basis.” Id., at 9452, 9454. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, §§ 103 and 615, 93 Stat. 562, 577. Section 615 of the Act, known as the Dornan Amendment, specifically forbade the use of funds to carry out the IRS’s proposed Revenue Procedures. Section 103 of the Act, known as the Ashbrook Amendment, more generally forbade the use of funds to make the requirements for tax-exempt status of private schools more stringent than those in effect prior to the IRS’s proposal of its new Revenue Procedures. These provisions expired on October 1, 1980, but Congress maintained its interest in IRS policies regarding tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools. The Dornan and Ashbrook Amendments were reinstated for the period December 16,1980, through September 30,1981. H. J. Res. 644, Pub. L. 96-536, §§ 101(a)(1) and (4), 94 Stat. 3166, as amended by Supplemental Appropriations and Rescission Act of 1981, § 401, 95 Stat. 95. For fiscal year 1982, Congress specifically denied funding for carrying out not only administrative actions but also court orders entered after the date of the IRS’s proposal of its first revised Revenue Procedure. H. J. Res. 325, Pub. L. 97-51, § 101(a)(3), 95 Stat. 958. No such spending restrictions are currently in force. Indeed, the Court of Appeals observed that respondents “do not dispute that it is ‘speculative,’ within the Eastern Kentucky frame, whether any private school would welcome blacks in order to retain tax exemption or would relinquish exemption to retain current practices.” 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 240, 656 F. 2d, at 829 (footnotes omitted). Judge Tamm dissented from the holding of the Court of Appeals. He concluded that standing in the three eases relied on by the majority was based on injury to rights under a court decree and that respondents in this ease asserted nothing more than the abstract interest in securing enforcement of the law against the Government. Id., at 249-259, 656 F. 2d, at 838-848. The “fairly traceable” and “redressability” components of the constitutional standing inquiry were initially articulated by this Court as “two facets of a single causation requirement.” C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 13, p. 68, n. 43 (4th ed. 1983). To the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested. Cases such as this, in which the relief requested goes well beyond the violation of law alleged, illustrate why it is important to keep the inquiries separate if the “redressability” component is to focus on the requested relief. Even if the relief respondents request might have a substantial effect on the desegregation of public schools, whatever deficiencies exist in the opportunities for desegregated education for respondents’ children might not be traceable to IRS violations of law — grants of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools in respondents’ communities. We assume, arguendo, that the asserted stigmatic injury may be caused by the Government’s grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools even if the Government is granting those exemptions without knowing or believing that the schools in fact discriminate. That is, we assume, without deciding, that the challenged Government tax exemptions are the equivalent of Government discrimination. Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 489-490, n. 26 (1982) (citations omitted): “Were we to recognize standing premised on an ‘injury’ consisting solely of an alleged violation of a ‘ “personal constitutional right” to a government that does not establish religion,’ a principled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents’ standing to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge every affirmative-action program on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose but two among as many possible examples as there are commands in the Constitution.” Respondents’ stigmatic injury, though not sufficient for standing in the abstract form in which their complaint asserts it, is judicially cognizable to the extent that respondents are personally subject to discriminatory treatment. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1984). The stigmatic injury thus requires identification of some concrete interest with respect to which respondents are personally subject to discriminatory treatment. That interest must independently satisfy the causation requirement of standing doctrine. In Heckler v. Mathews, for example, the named plaintiff (appellee) was being denied monetary benefits allegedly on a discriminatory basis. We specifically pointed out that the causation component of standing doctrine was satisfied with respect to the claimed benefits. In distinguishing the case from Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26 (1976), we said: “there can be no doubt about the direct causal relationship between the Government’s alleged deprivation of appellee’s right to equal protection and the personal injury appellee has suffered — denial of Social Security benefits solely on the basis of his gender.” 465 U. S., at 741, n. 9. In this litigation, respondents identify only one interest that they allege is being discriminatorily impaired — their interest in desegregated public school education. Respondents’ asserted stigmatic injury, therefore, is sufficient to support their standing in this litigation only if their school-desegregation injury independently meets the causation requirement of standing doctrine. Indeed, contrary to the suggestion of Justice Brennan’s dissent, post, at 774-775, and n. 5, of the schools identified in respondents’ complaint, none of those alleged to be directly receiving a tax exemption is alleged to be racially discriminatory, and only four schools — Delta Christian Academy and Tallulah Academy in Madison Parish, La.; River Oaks School in Monroe, La.; and Bowman Academy in Orangeburg, S. C. — are alleged to have discriminatory policies that deprive them of direct tax exemptions yet operate under the umbrella of a tax-exempt organization. These allegations constitute an insufficient basis for the only claim made by respondents — a claim for a change in the IRS regulations and practices. Cf. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790, 796 (DC 1979) (“it is purely speculative whether, in the final analysis, any fewer schools would be granted tax exemptions under plaintiffs’ system than under the current IRS system”). Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, framed its standing discussion in terms of the redressability of the alleged injury. The relief requested by the plaintiffs, however, was simply the cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct. In those circumstances, as the opinion for the Court in Simon itself illustrates, see id., at 40-46, the “redressability” analysis is identical to the “fairly traceable” analysis. See n. 19, supra. In O’Shea v. Littleton and Rizzo v. Goode, the plaintiffs sought wide-ranging reform of local law enforcement systems. In Los Angeles v. Lyons, by contrast, the plaintiff sought cessation of a particular police practice. The Court concluded in Lyons, however, that this difference did not distinguish the cases for standing purposes as long as the plaintiff could show no realistic threat of being subject to the challenged practice. We disagree with Justice Stevens’ suggestions that separation of powers principles merely underlie standing requirements, have no role to play in giving meaning to those requirements, and should be considered only under a distinct justiciability analysis. Post, at 789-792. Moreover, our analysis of this case does not rest on the more general proposition that no consequence of the allocation of administrative enforcement resources is judicially cognizable. Post, at 792-793. Rather, we rely on separation of powers principles to interpret the “fairly traceable” component of the standing requirement. On the merits, the Court found that permitting such exclusive use by school groups was unlawful, because it violated the city’s constitutional obligation, spelled out in an outstanding school-desegregation order, to take no action that would impede the integration of the public schools. Exclusive availabililty of the public parks “significantly enhanced the attractiveness of segregated private schools ... by enabling them to offer complete athletic programs.” 417 U. S., at 569. Indeed, the Court stressed the importance of a particularized factual record when it stated that it was “not prepared, at this juncture and on this record, to assume the standing of these plaintiffs to claim relief against certain nonexclusive uses by private school groups.” Id., at 570, n. 10. “Without a properly developed record,” said the Court, it was not clear that such nonexclusive use “would result in cognizable injury to these plaintiffs.” Id., at 571, n. 10. The Court said nothing about the plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the use of the parks, exclusive or nonexclusive, by racially discriminatory groups other than schools. It was unnecessary to do so because the Court declined to consider the merits of that challenge on the record before it. Id., at 570-574. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 467, n. 9 (1973), this Court described the experience of one county in Mississippi: “all white children were withdrawn from public schools and placed in a private academy housed in local church facilities and staffed by the principal and 17 high school teachers of the county system, who resigned in mid-year to accept jobs at the new academy.” The Court observed that similar histories in various other localities in Mississippi were recited by the plaintiffs without challenge. Ibid. The relatively simple either-or nature of the challenged decision affects the extent to which the initial complaint implicated separation of powers concerns. When the IRS altered its policy concerning the grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools, see Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp., at 1156, the plaintiffs were left with an action more closely resembling this lawsuit. We have no occasion to consider here the effect on a plaintiff’s standing of a defendant’s partial cessation of challenged conduct when that partial cessation leaves the plaintiff with a complaint presenting substantially greater uncertainty about standing than the initial complaint did.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. HIGHLAND PARK MANUFACTURING CO. No. 425. Argued April 23, 1951. Decided May 14, 1951. Mozart G. Ratner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, James L. Morrisson, David P. Findling and Alvin Gallen. Whiteford S. Blakeney argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by J. Albert Woll, Herbert S. Thatcher and James A. Glenn for the American Federation of Labor; Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris for the Congress of Industrial Organizations; and Isadore Katz and David Jaffe for the Textile Workers Union of America. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Board entertained a complaint by the Textile Workers Union of America against respondent, Highland Park Manufacturing Company, and ordered respondent to bargain with that Union. At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Textile Workers Union was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations and, while the Textile Workers Union officers had filed the non-Communist affidavits pursuant to statute, the officers of the C. I. O. at that time had not. The statute provides that “No investigation shall be made by the Board . . ., no petition under subsection (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed ... by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party [etc.].” § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 159 (h). (Italics added.) The order was challenged upon the grounds, among others, that the failure of the C. I. O. officers to file non-Communist affidavits disabled its affiliate, the Textile Workers Union, and the Board could not entertain their complaint and enter the order. The general counsel of the Board had ruled that the Board could not entertain a complaint under these circumstances; but the Board, with one member dissenting, overruled him, for reasons stated in Matter of Northern Virginia Broadcasters, 75 N. L. R. B. 11. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Board in West Texas Utilities Co. v. Labor Board, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 179, 184 F. 2d 233. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in this case, 184 F. 2d 98, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Labor Board v. Postex Cotton Mills, 181 F. 2d 919, arrived at a contrary result, holding that the Board could not entertain the complaint. The conflicting results are each so well-considered and so thoroughly documented in opinions already appearing in the books that little could be added to either. We agree with the conclusions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. The definition of “labor union” in the statute con-cededly includes the C. I. O. It is further conceded that the phrase “labor organization national or international in scope” as found in § 10 (c) refers to the A. F. of L. and C. I. O. (Italics added.) But it is claimed that when the adjectives “national” or “international” are alone added, they exclude the C. I. 0., because it is regarded in labor circles as a federation rather than a national or international union. We think, however, that the use of geographic terms to reach nation-wide or more than nation-wide unions does not exclude those of some particular technical structure. The C. I. 0., being admittedly a labor union and one of nation-wide jurisdiction, operation and influence, is certainly in the speech of people a national union, whatever its internal composition. If Congress intended geographic adjectives to have a structural connotation or to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition. The language in its ordinarily accepted sense is consistent with the context and purpose of the Act, which we have defined at length in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382. As the Courts of Appeals for both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have said, the congressional purpose was to “wholly eradicate and bar from leadership in the American labor movement, at each and every level, adherents to the Communist party and believers in the unconstitutional overthrow of our Government.” 181 F. 2d 919, 920; 184 F. 2d 98, 101. It would require much clearer language of exemption to justify holding that the very top levels of influence and actual power in the labor movement in this country were untouched while only the lower levels were affected. The further contention is advanced by the Board that the administrative determination that a petitioning labor organization has complied with the Act is not subject to judicial review at the instance of an employer in an unfair labor practice proceeding. If there were dispute as to whether the C. I. O. had filed the required affidavits or whether documents filed met the statutory requirements and the Board had resolved that question in favor of the labor organizations, a different question would be presented. But here there is no question of fact. While the C. I. O. officers have since filed the affidavits, they were not on file at any time relevant to this proceeding. It would be strange indeed if the courts were compelled to enforce without inquiry an order which could only result from proceedings that, under the admitted facts, the Board was forbidden to conduct. The Board is a statutory agency, and, when it is forbidden to investigate or entertain complaints in certain circumstances, its final order could hardly be valid. We think the contention is without merit and that an issue of law of this kind, which goes to the heart of the validity of the proceedings on which the order is based, is open to inquiry by the courts when they are asked to lend their enforcement powers to an administrative tribunal. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. NRA POLITICAL VICTORY FUND et al. No. 93-1151. Argued October 11, 1994 Decided December 6, 1994 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nok, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 100. Ginsburg, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Lawrence M. Noble argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard B. Bader and Vivien Clair. Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorneys General Dellinger and Hunger, Malcolm L. Stewart, and Douglas N. Letter. Charles J. Cooper argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael A. Carvin and William L. McGrath. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holding that the congressionally mandated composition of petitioner Federal Election Commission (FEC), including as it did representatives of the Senate and House as nonvoting members, violated the separation-of-powers principle embodied in the Constitution. 512 U. S. 1218 (1994). We do not reach the merits of the question, however, because we conclude that the FEC is not authorized to petition for cer-tiorari in this Court on its own, and that the effort of the Solicitor General to authorize the FEC’s petition after the time for filing it had expired did not breathe life into it. The Court of Appeals entered judgment in this case on October 22, 1998. 6 F. 3d 821. The FEC, in its own name, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on January 18, 1994. The FEC neither sought nor obtained the authorization of the Solicitor General before filing its petition. By order dated March 21, 1994, 510 U. S. 1190, we invited the United States to file a brief addressing the question “[wjhether the [FEC] has statutory authority to represent itself in this case in this Court.” The United States filed a brief on May 27, 1994, contending that the FEC lacks such statutory authority. The United States stated, however, that pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) and its implementing regulation, the Solicitor General had authorized the FEC’s petition by letter dated May 26,1994. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. The FEC filed a brief in response on May 31, 1994, asserting that it has independent statutory authority to represent itself before this Court in this case. A petition for certiorari in a civil case must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment below. 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). This “90-day limit is mandatory and jurisdictional.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 45 (1990). Here, the Court of Appeals entered judgment on October 22, 1993, and the FEC filed its petition for certiorari on January 18, 1994, two days before the 90-day time period expired. The FEC’s petition would appear to be timely. However, if the FEC lacks statutory authority to represent itself in this case before this Court, it cannot independently file a petition for certiorari, but must receive the Solicitor General’s authorization. See 28 CFR § 0.20(a) (1994). The question then becomes whether the Solicitor General’s May 26, 1994, letter authorizing the FEC’s petition relates back to the date of the FEC’s unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. We first examine the scope of the FEC’s independent litigating authority. The FEC is an independent agency established by Congress to “administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy” with respect to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. 86 Stat. 3, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 437c(b)(l). The FECA governs various aspects of all federal elections, see 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq., whereas chapters 95 and 96 specifically govern the administration of funds for Presidential election campaigns and the payment of matching funds for Presidential primary campaigns, see 26 U. S. C. § 9001 et seq. (Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act), 26 U. S. C. § 9031 et seq. (Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act). The FEC has “exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions.” 2 U. S. C. §437c(b)(l); see Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 485, 489 (1985). Two separate statutory provisions provide the FEC with independent litigating authority. The first provision, 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6), applies to actions under both the FECA and chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. It gives the FEC power “to initiate . . . , defend ... or appeal any civil action ... to enforce the provisions of [the FECA] and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26, through its general counsel.” The second provision, which is contained in 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d), applies only to actions under chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. It authorizes the FEC “on behalf of the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review, judgments or decrees entered with respect to actions in which it appears pursuant to the authority provided in this section.” The FEC brought this civil enforcement action seeking to establish a violation of 2 U. S. C. § 441b(a), a provision of the FECA. As noted above, 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6) authorizes the FEC to “initiate” and “appeal” an FECA enforcement action such as the present one. Thus, no dispute exists as to the FEC’s authority to litigate this case in the District Court or the Court of Appeals; the question here concerns only the FEC’s independent litigating authority before this Court when it proceeds under § 437d(a)(6). Title 28 U. S. C. § 518(a) provides in pertinent part: “Except when the Attorney General in a particular case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court... in which the United States is interested.” By regulation, the Attorney General has delegated authority to the Solicitor General: “The following-described matters are assigned to, and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Solicitor General, in consultation with each agency or official concerned: “(a) Conducting, or assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases, including appeals, petitions for and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments, and ... settlement thereof.” 28 CFR §0.20 (1994). Thus, if a case is one “in which the United States is interested,” § 518(a), “it must be conducted and argued in this Court by the Solicitor General or his designee.” United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U. S. 693, 700 (1988); cf. United States v. Winston, 170 U. S. 522, 524-525 (1898); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454, 458 (1869). It is undisputed that this is a case “in which the United States is interested.” 28 U. S. C. § 518(a). We have recognized, however, that Congress may “exempt litigation from the otherwise blanket coverage of [§ 518(a)].” Providence Journal, 485 U. S., at 705, n. 9. According to the FEC, one such exemption is found in 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6). Bearing in mind the Solicitor General’s traditional role in conducting and controlling all Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the United States and its agencies — a role that is critical to the proper management of Government litigation brought before this Court, see id., at 702, n. 7, 706; id., at 709, 713-714 (Stevens, J., dissenting) — we “must... scrutinizfe] and subject] [§ 437d(a)(6)] to the ordinary tools of statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to supersede § 518(a).” Id., at 705, n. 9. Title 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6) gives the FEC power “to initiate ... , defend ... or appeal any civil action ... to enforce the provisions of [the FECA] and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26.” The statute clearly authorizes the FEC to “appeal,” but it omits any mention of authority to file a “petition for a writ of certiorari” or otherwise conduct litigation before the Supreme Court. The FEC argues that the term “appeal” is not defined in the FECA, and that in the absence of such a definition in the statute the term is construed “in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). It then refers to the definition of “appeal” found in Black’s Law Dictionary 96 (6th ed. 1990), which includes, inter alia, the following: “There are two stages of appeal in the federal and many state court systems; to wit, appeal from trial court to intermediate appellate court and then to Supreme Court.” This argument might carry considerable weight if it were not for the cognate provision authorizing the FEC to enforce chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. There, Congress has explicitly provided that “[t]he [FEC] is authorized on behalf of the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review,” judgments or decrees. 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d), 9040(d) (emphasis added). It is difficult, if not impossible, to place these sections alongside one another without concluding that Congress intended to restrict the FEC’s independent litigating authority in this Court to actions enforcing the provisions of the Presidential election funds under chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26. Such a differentiation by Congress would be quite understandable, since Presidential influence through the Solicitor General might be thought more likely in cases involving Presidential election fund controversies than in other litigation in which the FEC is involved. The FEC argues that 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d) and 9040(d) shed no light on the issue whether 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6) gives it independent litigating authority before this Court because the provisions are found in different statutes, were drafted by different Congresses in different years, and were originally written to apply to different agencies of the Government. Brief for Petitioner in Response to Solicitor General 21. The FEC is only partially correct. Section 9010(d) was first enacted in 1971, and at that time it applied to the Comptroller General. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 569-570. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 established the FEC, see Pub. L. 93-443,88 Stat. 1263,1280, and enacted §437d(a)(6). See id., at 1282-1283. The 1974 statute transferred to the FEC the functions previously performed by the Comptroller General under 26 U. S. C. § 9010, see id., at 1293, but it also added § 9040 to Title 26. See id., at 1302. Thus, § 9040(d) was originally enacted in 1974 as part of the same legislation that created §437d(a)(6). Each of the two sections, with its contrasting language as to litigating authority, was before the Conference Committee whose report was ultimately adopted by both Houses. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1438, pp. 967, 989 (1974). Section 9040(d) may have been modeled on § 9010(d), but because both §§ 9040(d) and 437d(a)(6) were designed to deal with the FEC’s authority to represent itself in civil enforcement actions, we find the contrasting language to be particularly telling. See United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271, 277 (1975); cf. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 208 (1993) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We recognize sound policy reasons may exist for providing the FEC with independent litigating authority in this Court for actions enforcing the FECA. Congress’ decision to create the FEC as an independent agency and to charge it with the civil enforcement of the FECA was undoubtedly influenced by Congress’ belief that the Justice Department, headed by a Presidential appointee, might choose to ignore infractions committed by members of the President’s own political party. See, e. g., Federal Election Reform, 1973: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priveleges [sic] and Elections and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 17, 177, 186 (1973); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 70-71 (1973). The fact that Congress had these policies in mind when giving the FEC independent enforcement powers, however, does not demonstrate that it intended to alter the Solicitor General’s statutory prerogative to conduct and argue the Federal Government’s litigation in the Supreme Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 518(a). That statutory authority, too, represents a policy choice by Congress to vest the conduct of litigation before this Court in the Attorney General, an authority which has by rule and tradition been delegated to the Solicitor General. See 28 CFR § 0.20(a) (1994). This Court, of course, is well served by such a practice, because the traditional specialization of that office has led it to be keenly attuned to this Court’s practice with respect to the granting or denying of petitions for certiorari. But the practice also serves the Government well; an individual Government agency necessarily has a more parochial view of the interest of the Government in litigation than does the Solicitor General’s office, with its broader view of litigation in which the Government is involved throughout the state and federal court systems. Whether review of a decision adverse to the Government in a court of appeals should be sought depends on a number of factors which do not lend themselves to easy categorization. The Government as a whole is apt to fare better if these decisions are concentrated in a single official. See Providence Journal, 485 U. S., at 706. Congress could obviously choose, if it sought to do so, to sacrifice the policy favoring concentration of litigating authority before this Court in the Solicitor General in favor of allowing the FEC to petition here on its own. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 9010(d), 9040(d). But we do not think that §437d(a)(6) bespeaks such a choice. Nor are we impressed by the FEC’s argument that it has represented itself before this Court on several occasions in the past without any question having been raised regarding its authority to do so under § 437d(a)(6). See, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (finding 2 U. S. C. § 441b unconstitutional as applied); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 (1982) (involving interpretation of 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(4)(C)); Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 455 U. S. 577 (1982) (involving application of 2 U. S. C. § 437h(a)); Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S. 27 (1981) (involving application of 2 U. S. C. §441a(d)(3)); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of certain campaign expenditure limitations imposed by 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq.). The jurisdiction of this Court was challenged in none of these actions, and therefore the question is an open one before us. See, e. g., Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 63, n. 4 (1989) (“[T]his Court has never considered itself bound [by prior sub silentio holdings] when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 38 (1952) (same). And we do not think that the provisions discussed above, authorizing the FEC to litigate in the federal courts, are the sort of provisions that can be said to be within the province of the agency to interpret. Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., supra, at 37, relied upon by the FEC, dealt with the FEC’s interpretation of a substantive provision of the FECA, not with the provisions authorizing independent litigation. Because the FEC lacks statutory authority to litigate this case in this Court, it necessarily follows that the FEC cannot independently file a petition for certiorari, but must receive the Solicitor General’s authorization. See 28 CFR § 0.20(a) (1994). By letter dated May 26, 1994, the Solicitor General authorized the petition filed by the FEC. The Solicitor General’s authorization, however, did not come until more than 120 days after the deadline for filing a petition had passed. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c). We must determine whether this “after-the-fact” authorization relates back to the date of the FEC’s unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. We conclude that it does not. The question is at least presumptively governed by principles of agency law, and in particular the doctrine of ratification. “If an act to be effective in creating a right against another or to deprive him of a right must be performed before a specific time, an affirmance is not effective against the other unless made before such time.” Restatement (Second) of Agency §90 (1958); see also id., Comment a (“The bringing of an action, or of an appeal, by a purported agent can not be ratified after the cause of action or right to appeal has been terminated by lapse of time”). Though in a different context, we have recognized the rationale behind this rule: “The intervening rights of third persons cannot be defeated by the ratification. In other words, it is essential that the party ratifying should be able not merely to do the act ratified at the time the act was done, but also at the time the ratification was made.” Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, 338 (1874) (emphasis added). Here, the Solicitor General attempted to ratify the FEC’s filing on May 26, 1994, but he could not himself have filed a petition for certiorari on that date because the 90-day time period for filing a petition had expired on January 20,1994. His authorization simply came too late in the day to be effective. See, e. g., Nasewaupee v. Sturgeon Bay, 77 Wis. 2d 110, 116-119, 251 N. W. 2d 845, 848-849 (1977) (refusing to uphold town board’s ratification of private attorney’s unauthorized commencement of lawsuit where ratification came after the statute of limitations had run); Wagner v. Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 87, 722 P. 2d 250, 255 (1986) (holding invalid city council’s attempt to ratify police chief’s dismissal of police officer after police officer commenced a wrongful discharge action). But see Trenton v. Fowler-Thorne Co., 57 N. J. Super. 196, 154 A. 2d 369 (1959) (upholding city’s ratification of unauthorized lawsuit filed on its behalf even though ratification occurred after limitations period had expired). The application of these principles of agency law here produces a result entirely consistent with, and perhaps required by, 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c), the statute governing the time for filing petitions for certiorari. “We have no authority to extend the period for filing except as Congress permits.” Jenkins, 495 U. S., at 45. If the Solicitor General were allowed to retroactively authorize otherwise unauthorized agency petitions after the deadline had expired, he would have the unilateral power to extend the 90-day statutory period for filing certiorari petitions by days, weeks, or, as in this case, even months. Such a practice would result in the blurring of the jurisdictional deadline. But “[t]he time of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear.” Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 202 (1988). We hold that the FEC may not independently file a petition for certiorari in this Court under 2 U. S. C. § 437d(a)(6), and that the Solicitor General’s “after-the-fact” authorization does not relate back to the date of the FEC’s unauthorized filing so as to make it timely. We therefore dismiss the petition for certiorari for want of jurisdiction. It is so ordered. Justice Ginsburg took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Under 28 U. S. C. §§ 516 and 519, the conduct of litigation on behalf of the United States and its agencies is subject to control of the Attorney General “[ejxcept as otherwise authorized by law.” The FEC’s “initiation” and “appeal” of this action fall within this “otherwise authorized by law” exception. The dissent says it is incongruous “to assume that Congress wanted the FEC to have independent authority to invoke our mandatory [appellate] jurisdiction when proceeding under § 437h, but not to have the authority to invoke our discretionary jurisdiction when proceeding under other sections of the same statute.” Post, at 100, n. 1. But Congress could have thought the Solicitor General would better represent the FEC’s interests in cases involving our discretionary jurisdiction “because the traditional specialization of that office has led it to be keenly attuned to this Court’s practice with respect to the granting or denying of petitions for certiorari.” Infra, at 96.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 258. Argued January 7, 1953. Decided March 16, 1953. Robert H. Bierma argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Richmond C. Coburn, Frank H. Cole, Jr., Leo P. Day, James B. Cray and Toll R. Ware. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel-lees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, Acting Assistant Attorney General Clapp, Marvin E. Frankel and Edward M. Reidy. Frank A. Leffingwell submitted on brief for the Texas Citrus and Vegetable Growers and Shippers, appellee. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant railroads brought this action in a United States District Court to set aside a rate order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The order prescribed maximum carload rates for carrying certain kinds of fresh vegetables. The rates were charged to be “confiscatory” and therefore in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The sole basis for this charge was an allegation that if put in effect the rates would produce less money than it would cost the railroads to carry the particular vegetables covered by each rate. Denying that a commodity rate violates due process merely because it is noncompensatory, the Commission moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that proof of everything the complaint alleged would not justify invalidation of the order. On this ground, and without reaching another Commission contention on which the District Court relied, we hold that the case was properly dismissed by that court. There is and has been no claim that the challenged rates will make any one of the complaining railroads operate its entire business at a loss, or even carry all fresh vegetables at a loss. The carload rates prescribed are but minor alterations in a vast, complex network of rates that apply to fresh vegetable shipments throughout the Nation. One of the two rates applies only to carload shipments of carrots with tops, the other to carload shipments of a limited group of other fresh vegetables such as string beans, lettuce and parsnips. And both rates relate only to shipments from points in Texas to points in some but not all of the other states. Such adjustments of rates among vegetables as the Commission here made would appear to be but normal, run-of-the-mine regulations and the fixing of a cheaper transportation rate for one vegetable than for another may well serve an important public need. So long as a railroad is not caused by such regulations to lose money on its over-all business, it is hard to think that it could successfully charge that its property was being taken for public use “without just compensation.” And apparently the railroads rely not on the just compensation but on the Due Process provision of the Fifth Amendment. This appears from their complaint and the cases cited to support their contention. Chief reliance is placed on Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, and a companion case decided the same day, Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. West Virginia, 236 U. S. 605. Both cases involved state statutes fixing railroad rates, one on coal and one on passengers. Both were found to be noncompensatory. Both were held violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In both the ground was that the rates were “unreasonable” and “arbitrary.” The Court was careful to point out and emphasize that there was nothing in the records of those cases to show that there were “reasonable” grounds on which to justify imposing noncom-pensatory rates on the railroads. It would not be possible to hold that the vegetable rates here challenged are the result of unreasonable or arbitrary Commission action. The history of regulation of fresh vegetable transportation rates from the south and southwest shows the difficulties the Commission has had in that field. Much of that history can be found in the Commission reports cited below. Not only has the Commission had to consider conflicting rate claims as between shippers and carriers; it has also had to resolve disputes over such questions among the carriers themselves. The present rate order is but one of a long series of Commission orders designed to correct defects and injustices that develop from time to time in the general fresh vegetable rate pattern. Among the factors considered by the Commission in fixing these rates have been these: value of the vegetable; comparison of vegetable values; comparisons with rates on the same vegetables in different sections of the country; comparisons with rates on commodities other than vegetables; special characteristics of some vegetables that add to or subtract from expense of transportation; perish-ability; claim hazards of the carrier as between different vegetables; competing truck rates; and possible harmful effects of rates on vegetable prices and sales. This mere sample of factors that have to be considered in rate cases demonstrates the absolute necessity for considerable flexibility in rate making. For not only are fair decisions as to vegetable rates vital to the welfare of farmers and whole sections of the country; the health and well-being of the Nation are involved. Moreover, Commission power to adjust rates to meet public needs is implicit in the congressional plan for a nationally integrated railroad system. United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225, 230; The New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 583-586. And so long as rates as a whole afford railroads just compensation for their over-all services to the public the Due Process Clause should not be construed as a bar to the fixing of noncompensatory rates for carrying some commodities when the public interest is thereby served. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The District Court dismissed because the railroads had not tendered any issue of confiscation or offered any proof of transportation costs until after the Commission had finished its hearings, made findings and entered its rate order. 105 F. Supp. 631. For this reason the District Court declined the railroads’ request to hear evidence of transportation costs, a procedural course approved in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, or to hold the case for remand to the Commission for it to make a preliminary appraisal of the facts in line with the suggestion in New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 334-336. Relying on the Court’s opinion in the Baltimore & Ohio case, supra, the railroads here contend that dismissal because of their delay in raising the issue before the Commission deprived them of a constitutional right to have a judicial determination of their Fifth Amendment contention. The Commission’s answer to this contention is a request that we re-examine the Baltimore & Ohio case, abandon the constitutional principles announced by the majority there and apply the concurring minority views to the facts of this case. Because there is a more appropriate ground for decision we assume, without deciding, that the confiscation issue here was raised in time. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: “No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 279 I. C. C. 671 and 284 I. C. C. 206 are the original and rehearing reports on the present rate order. Other reports on the system of vegetable rates are Southwestern Vegetable Case, 200 I. C. C. 355, 209 I. C. C. 606, 214 I. C. C. 63; Southeastern Vegetable Case, 200 I. C. C. 273; Transcontinental Rates and Estimated Weights on Vegetables, 270 I. C. C. 665; Estimated Weights on Lettuce from the Southwest, 276 I. C. C. 647.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GARDNER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, et al. v. TOILET GOODS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. No. 438. Argued January 16, 1967. Decided May 22, 1967. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, As sistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Jerome M. Feit and William W. Goodrich. Edward J. Ross argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. In Toilet Goods Ass'n. v. Gardner, ante, p. 158, we affirmed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that judicial review of a regulation concerning inspection of cosmetics factories was improper in a pre-enforcement suit for injunctive and declaratory judgment relief. The present case is brought here by the Government seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ further holding that review of three other regulations in this type of action was proper. 360 F. 2d 677. We likewise affirm. For reasons stated in our opinion in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, ante, p. 136, we find nothing in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1040, as amended), 21 U. S. C. § 301 et seq., that precludes resort to the courts for pre-enforcement relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-704 (1964 ed., Supp. II), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201. And for reasons to follow, we believe the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the District Court did not err when it refused to dismiss the complaint with respect to these regulations. The regulations challenged here were promulgated under the Color Additive Amendments of 1960, 74 Stat. 397, 21 U. S. C. §§ 321-376. These statutory provisions, in brief, allow the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and his delegate, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 22 Fed. Reg. 1051, 25 Fed. Reg. 8625, to prescribe conditions for the use of color additives in foods, drugs, and cosmetics. The Act requires clearance of every color additive in the form of a regulation prescribing conditions for use of that particular additive, and also certification of each “batch” unless exempted by regulation. A color additive is defined as “a dye, pigment, or other substance . . . [which] when added or applied to a food, drug, or cosmetic, or to the human body or any part thereof, is capable (alone or through reaction with other substance) of imparting color thereto . . . ,” 21 U. S. C. § 321(t)(1). Under his general rule-making power, § 701 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 371 (a), the Commissioner amplified the statutory definition to include as color additives all diluents, that is, “any component of a color additive mixture that is not of itself a color additive and has been intentionally mixed therein to facilitate the use of the mixture in coloring foods, drugs, or cosmetics or in coloring the human body.” 21 CFR §8.1(m). By including all diluents as color additives, the Commissioner in respondents’ view unlawfully expanded the number of items that must comply with the premarketing clearance procedure. The Commissioner also included as a color additive within the coverage of the statute any “substance that, when applied to the human body results in coloring . . . unless the function of coloring is purely incidental to its intended use, such as in the case of deodorants. Lipstick, rouge, eye makeup colors, and related cosmetics intended for coloring the human body are ‘color additives.’ ” 21 CFR § 8.1 (f). Respondents alleged that in promulgating this regulation the Commissioner again impermissibly expanded the reach of the statute beyond the clear intention of Congress. A third regulation challenged by these respondents concerns the statutory exemption for hair dyes that conform to a statutory requirement set out in § 601 (e), 21 U. S. C. § 361 (e). That requirement provides that hair dyes are totally exempt from coverage of the statute if they display a certain cautionary notice on their labels prescribing a “patch test” to determine whether the dye will cause skin irritation on the particular user. The Commissioner’s regulation recognizes that the exemption applies to the Color Additive Amendments, but goes on to declare: “If the poisonous or deleterious substance in the ‘hair dye’ is one to which the caution is inapplicable and for which patch-testing provides no safeguard, the exemption does not apply; nor does the exemption extend to the poisonous or deleterious diluents that may be introduced as wetting agents, hair conditioners, emulsifiers, or other components in a color shampoo, rinse, tint, or similar dual-purpose cosmetics that alter the color of the hair.” 21 CFR § 8.1 (u). Respondents contend that this regulation too is irreconcilable with the statute: whereas the statute grants an across-the-board exemption to all hair dyes meeting the patch-test notice requirement, the regulation purports to limit that exemption to cover only those dyes as to which the test is “effective.” Moreover, it is said, the regulation appears to limit the exemption only to the coloring ingredient of the dye, and to require clearance for all other components of a particular hair dye. We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondents’ challenge to these regulations is ripe for judicial review under the standards elaborated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, namely the appropriateness of the issues for judicial determination and the immediate severity of the regulations’ impact upon the plaintiffs. The issue as framed by the parties is a straightforward legal one: what general classifications of ingredients fall within the coverage of the Color Additive Amendments? Both the Government and the respondents agree that for any color additive, distribution is forbidden unless the additive is (1) listed in a Food and Drug Administration regulation as safe for use under prescribed conditions, and (2) comes from a “certified” batch, unless specifically exempted from the certification requirement. The only question raised is what sort of items are “color additives.” The three regulations outlined above purport to elaborate the statutory definition; they include within the statutory term certain classes of items, e. g., diluents, finished cosmetics, and hair dyes, that respondents assert are not within the purview of the statute at all. We agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that this is not a situation in which consideration of the underlying legal issues would necessarily be facilitated if they were raised in the context of a specific attempt to enforce the regulations. Rather, “to the extent that they purport to apply premarketing requirements to broad categories like finished products and non-coloring ingredients and define the hair-dye exemption, they appear, prima facie, to be susceptible of reasoned comparison with the statutory mandate without inquiry into factual issues that ought to be first ventilated before the agency.” 360 F. 2d, at 685. For these reasons we find no bar to consideration by the courts of these issues in their present posture. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192; Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U. S. 40. This result is supported as well by the fact that these regulations are self-executing, and have an immediate and substantial impact upon the respondents. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, ante, pp. 152-153. The Act, as noted earlier, prescribes penalties for the distribution of goods containing color additives unless they have been cleared both by listing in a regulation and by certification of the particular batch. Faced with these regulations the respondents are placed in a quandary. On the one hand they can, as the Government suggests, refuse to comply, continue to distribute products that they believe do not fall within the purview of the Act, and test the regulations by defending against government criminal, seizure, or injunctive suits against them. We agree with the respondents that this proposed avenue of review is beset with penalties and other impediments rendering it inadequate as a satisfactory alternative to the present declaratory judgment action. The penalties to which cosmetics manufacturers might be subject are extensive. A color additive that does not meet the premarketing clearance procedure is declared to be “unsafe,” § 706 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 376 (a), and hence “adulterated,” § 601, 21 U. S. C. § 361 (e). It is a “prohibited act” to introduce such material into commerce, § 301, 21 U. S. C. § 331, subject to injunction, § 302, 21 U. S. C. § 332, criminal penalties, § 303, 21 U. S. C. § 333, and seizure of the goods, § 304 (a), 21 U. S. C. § 334 (a). The price of noncompliance is not limited to these formal penalties. Respondents note the importance of public good will in their industry, and not without reason fear the disastrous impact of an announcement that their cosmetics have been seized as “adulterated.” The alternative to challenging the regulations through noncompliance is, of course, to submit to the regulations and present the various ingredients embraced in them for premarketing clearance. We cannot say on this record that the burden of such a course is other than substantial, accepting, as we must on a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the allegations of the complaint and supporting affidavits as true. The regulations in this area require separate petitions for listing each color additive, 21 CFR §§ 8.1 (f), 8.1 (m), 8.4 (c), at an initial fee, subject to refunds, of $2,600 a listing. 21 CFR § 8.50 (c). One respondent, Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., in affidavits submitted to the District Court, asserted that more than 2,700 different formulae would fall under the Commissioner’s regulations and would cost some $7,000,000 in listing fees alone. According to the allegations the company also uses 264 diluents which under the challenged regulations must be included as color additives as well. Moreover, a listing is not obtained by mere application alone. Physical and chemical tests must be made and their results submitted with each petition, 21 CFR § 8.4 (c), at a cost alleged by Kolmar of up to $42,000,000. Detailed records must be maintained for each listed ingredient, 21 CFR § 8.26, and batches of listed items must ultimately be certified, again at a substantial fee, 21 CFR § 8.51. Whether or not these cost estimates are exaggerated it is quite clear that if respondents, failing judicial review at this stage, elect to comply with the regulations and await ultimate judicial determination of the validity of them in subsequent litigation, the amount of preliminary paper work, scientific testing, and recordkeeping will be substantial. The District Court found in denying the motion to dismiss: “I conclude that in a substantial and practical business sense plaintiffs are threatened with irreparable injury by the obviously intended consequences of the challenged regulations, and that to resort to later piecemeal resolution of the controversy in the context of individual enforcement proceedings would be costly and inefficient, not only for the plaintiffs but as well for the public as represented by the defendants.” 235 F. Supp. 648, 651. Like the Court of Appeals, we think that this record supports those findings and conclusions. And as in Abbott Laboratories, supra, we have been shown no substantial governmental interest that should lead us to reach a conclusion different from the one we have reached in that case. We hold that this action is maintainable. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. We use “necessarily” advisedly, because this case arises on a motion to dismiss. The District Court also denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and called for an evidentiary hearing. If in the course of further proceedings the District Court is persuaded that technical questions are raised that require a more concrete setting for proper adjudication, a different issue will be presented. The Court of Appeals observed that “Very likely these figures are exaggerated-” 360 F. 2d, at 682, n. 5. The District Court stated that “While this amount is immediately suspect, there can be little doubt but that the added recordskeeping and laboratory testing costs in themselves will be extremely burdensome for all of the plaintiffs.” 235 F. Supp. 648, 652. (Footnote omitted.)

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?